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ECONOMIC POLICY BRIEF

#07



THE 2030 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND THE 2021-2024 NEW ECONOMIC PROGRAMME:

ESSENTIAL CAPACITIES AND SKILLS REQUIRED TO MAKE THE UNION (OF INCOMPATIBLE SETS) WORK

In November 2020, Cameroon thus adopted its new ten-year development plan with a name that no longer refers to a document¹. It is entitled the 2030 National Development Strategy (NDS30) and follows the GESP (2010–2019). Much has been said and written about the achievements and the outcome of this first strategy (phase 1 of the 2035 Vision). Our reviews have been widely disseminated and commented thereupon. Notwithstanding!

To this end, we take note of the new directions and the commitments of the government, from the moment that national political authorities have endorsed them. From now on, our role is to support them to the best of our abilities and skills, and that is what we are going to try to do.

Barely launched and without having made tentative steps, the NDS30 is caught up in an unfair competition with a new economic and financial programme. Indeed, according to the latest official reports, after weeks of official negotiations by top representatives of the Cameroonian Government, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is expected to decide in the month of June (precisely on 25 June) to approve an umpteenth economic and financial programme for Cameroon².

¹ – The PRSP and the GESP first referred to a DOCUMENT before the STRATEGY

² – IMF, press release n°21/147 of 27 May 2021 relations with media organs: media@imf.org



It simply means that the country is once again entering into a structural adjustment programme. Our intention is not being for or against, much less is the purpose of this policy note. At this moment, our concern by way of reflexion focuses on the capacities and the skills that are required to reconcile water and fire, arrange the union of incompatible sets and make the two programmes to coexist.

Let us, therefore, try to square the circle, mindful that it is inevitably a high-risk exercise! To do this, we will use the methodology of the Country policy and institutions assessment (WB, AfDB & ACBF) and the approach based on essential capacities and skills as per the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). Indeed, the philosophy that inspired the creation of the ACBF and that continues to underpin its action and operations (today as a specialized body of the African Union in charge of capacity building) is based on the principle and the observation that: it is not resources that are lacking for Africa's take-off but rather capacities and skills. In this regard, these capacities can be grouped into three or four categories. Our risky exercise would, therefore, consist in projecting essential needs based on these four axis.

As for the CPIA, it is a method to evaluate institutions and policies used by the above-mentioned development partners to measure the capacities from the outset and analyze the medium-term achievements (past and future) resulting from these input data.

I. Public Policies

This section will review the main areas of public policies such as [A] Economic Management, [B] Structural Policies, [C] Inclusion/Social Equity Measures, [D] Governance, Management and public sector institutions, and infrastructure and regional integration policy in the context and projections of the NDS30.

A. Macroeconomic management

We will focus on macroeconomic issues as concern only two, but important, aspects out of the four (proposed by the economic theory)³.

A1. Monetary policy

The membership of Cameroon and the other countries of the CEMAC sub-region in the CFA zone holds them to a supranational monetary policy that is «officially» managed by the BEAC. Debates on the monetary sovereignty of states are going on. Although the developments, which admittedly are contrasted, observed in the WAEMU zone that is part of the ECOWAS, are not yet completed, they however show the way. The CFA Franc has reached an impasse and has no future.

³ - It applies to the 04 macroeconomic concepts: the real sector, the foreign trade sector, the monetary sector and public Finances



Let us not stand and watch while others drive the last nail. We have to be proactive and take appropriate measures that will ensure and guarantee the monetary sovereignty of states in the sub-region including Cameroon. This is the right time for Cameroon to make a decision and stand by it. This vision had already been hinted in the GESP but did not thrive over the last decade. The NDS30 must not miss this opportunity again.

The uncertainties and procrastinations on the monetary issue, which includes the management and the immediate future of the CFA Franc, are not compatible with the long-term development objectives of the NDS30.



As an illustration and for the benefit of the ordinary citizen, the current scarcity of coins and small denomination notes in Cameroon is creating and maintaining an artificial inflation that does not encourage consumption

and, by extension, production. This situation has been going on for nearly 10 years and the phenomenon is growing despite BEAC's promises to address it.

Yes, Chinese have been observed to be exporting coins from the CFA franc zone/CEMAC. Why are these Chinese not fond of the American Cents or the Euro Cents? The Central Bank of Burundi has issued notes in amounts that are equivalent to less than 5CFA francs [...]⁴ Similarly, the Central Bank of Ethiopia has issued a bank note of 5ETB (Ethiopian Birr) that is equivalent to less than 100CFA francs. Why would this solution be so difficult for the CEMAC zone and Cameroon? Let's think about it [...].

⁴ - As of 14/06/2021, 1,000Fbu (Burundian Franc) = 0.42 Euros or 275CFA francs. A 10Fbu bank note is therefore equivalent to approximately 3CFA francs. A 5 ETB (Ethiopian Birr) bank note is equivalent to approximately 63CFA francs



Denominations of 10 and 5E TB brought into circulation by the Central Bank of Ethiopia



Denominations of 10 and 20F bu (Burundian Franc) brought into circulation by the Central Bank of Burundi

A2. About budgetary and debt policy

The implications and the challenges of the NDS30 are highly crucial from a budgetary point of view. The unachieved results of the GESP did not give any leeway to the government. Completing the major projects of the 2010-2020 decade and making them operational in order to resume the path to emergence require the mobilization of huge budgetary resources (1). Furthermore, the projects or the new commitments of the NDS30 for the structural transformation of the economy, notably through the implementation of the IMP (updated Industrialization Master Plan), also require huge budgetary resources (2).

Therefore, on a straight-line basis, the combination of the two guidelines above (1) + (2) suggests a budgetary policy that is more ambitious and innovative, associated to a debt strategy that is flexible and adaptable almost in real time.

However, the country is embarking again (June 2021) in an economic programme with the IMF (and certainly other Technical and Financial Partners). This inevitably imposes the obligation of budgetary consolidation⁵, and close surveillance coupled with extreme caution at the budgetary level. Both options are clearly incompatible. Although it is stated that the new programme will rely on the NDS30, one must not be an expert in IMF programmes to understand that it is a diplomatic casing. Technically, it simply means that priorities will henceforth be chosen among the NDS30 priorities that are compatible with the programme.

⁵ - The communiqué clearly specifies that "the programme will limit non-concessional loans to projects that are essential [...]" >>.

The entry into a programme with the IMF contradicts and jeopardizes the development objectives of the NDS30 that forecasts, for its first two years, major reforms to set into motion the planned structural transformation and industrialization.

It is barely one year that the NDS30 was launched, yet it has not effectively started its first three-year action plan. It is comparable to an athlete who, before a 100-metre-long race (which requires running fast and well), has his right leg laden with a 10-kg time watch under the pretext of measuring his performance. Is this an advantage or a disadvantage? Let's think about it. In our humble opinion, the debate triggered and fuelled in the media and the public opinion on Cameroon's indebtedness is irrelevant as concern the volume and the rhythm of indebtedness. The real issue worth addressing is the quality and the management of debt: how it is being used and the results achieved. If every time that the country borrows 1,000CFA francs and the proper use of this additional resource makes it possible to obtain 1,300CFA francs that is used to repay 1,100CFA francs and create a wealth of +200, its credibility would be intact despite the volume of the debt. This is the case of other countries like the United States, Japan, etc.

Once again, like the GESP, the NDS30 will be short-lived just as it was the case with the 5th five-year plan (1986-1990). Its goals should, therefore, be revised with clear-sightedness and realism by incorporating this constraint of the Economic Programme for the next three years. To this end, as concern revenues, perhaps a glimmer of hope would come from (1) finally realizing the tax potential that corresponds to our economy, and (2) efficiently addressing the challenge of controlling non-tax revenues⁶ that still offer significant margins.

⁶ - A recent research carried out by Cameraparc on behalf of MINFI on the statistical information system of the said revenues provides benchmarks for this optimization in addition to the one on the tax potential in 2019

■ B. - Structural policies

The country has made the theoretical and «intellectual» choice of the structural transformation of its economic model; and the main driver at the operational level is the Industrialization Master Plan that has been updated to align with the NDS30 (and the other commitments of the AU 2030 SDG Agenda and the 2063 Agenda). For the ordinary citizen, this structural transformation should be visible and perceptible through an abundant supply of everyday consumer products «made in Cameroon» like building material, pharmaceutical and cosmetic products, textile and clothing products, and especially food supplies. It is the surplus that would be used in supplying the markets of the sub-region and the continent. That is how the country can promote regional integration because it has products to offer and to sell on the markets of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The inevitable consequence is the recovery of the trade balance and the restoration of external balances, with a substantial inflow of foreign currencies. Infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, electricity, and telecommunications) is not an end to itself but a means that supports structural transformation.

As of June 2021, the starting signal for this option does not yet seem to be given. However, the IMP needs an ambitious model of governance in its institutional entrenchment and its organizational structure that will identify the essential and required skills, and above all an autonomous monitoring and evaluation mechanism with real sanctioning powers.

To do this, the political authority would have to accept to cede its power (ego) to a technocratic and scientific authority. It is essential to resolve the equation of an optimal combination of competent human resources. We think that **for this end, there is need for each actor to have an individual mission letter**. It is a commitment that specifies the results to be achieved within the deadline accompanied by sanctions after a rigorous, objective, and shared evaluation.

The choice made in the NDS30 to opt for import-substitution should be accompanied, at the legal and regulatory levels, by visible incentives for national preference. To this end, relevant skills are necessary in order to take actions that materialize this strong willingness.

■ C. Inclusion and social equity policies

The damage caused by the first structural adjustment programmes (1986-1990) at the social level brought in a new paradigm namely the Social Dimension of the Adjustment. In the year 2000 it imposed the inclusion of the poverty reduction notion by placing emphasis on social sectors: Education, Health, and Justice. This new approach is reflected in acronyms like PRGF, PRSP/SFPR, and then the employment aspect (GESP). This brief background aims to highlight that over the past two decades, there has always been a strong political

will to reduce inequalities among the social classes in Cameroon. However, in practical terms, the results seem to diverge and widen⁷ over time, sometimes despite the significant efforts that are obviously made. Perhaps there is the need to question the approaches and methods of implementing pro-poor policies.

In the current context of the NDS30, although the effectiveness of decentralization that is now in place is not a panacea, it could however represent real hope. The benefit of transferring skills to CTDs as concern most of the actions in this field is that it should enable beneficiaries to be closer to decision-making centres. The plea is that CTDs should build their essential capacities and skills on the PPBS chain, management, and leadership in order to create and propose endogenous and proximity solutions to the populations. It is faster and less costly to conceive, develop, and implement endogenous solutions with the participation of beneficiaries for the needs that have been identified. To do this, an adaptation of the contextualization of the SDGs seems an excellent driver at the local level. The language of the targets and SDGs indicator (which are reflected in terms of impact) is more acceptable and accessible by CTDs given that the alignment of the NDS30 with the 2030 Agenda contributes to ensure non-confrontational bottom-up coherence. The development of a socioeconomic monograph for each CTD is a prerequisite.

In this sense, while implementing the NDS30 goals, it is more than necessary to develop skills and no longer knowledge to address the key issues imposed by the immediate environment of the populations..

■ D. Governance, peace and security

SDG16⁷ of Agenda 2030 summarizes the content of this triad according to the United Nations. It aims to *promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels*.

Indeed, this SDG is based on the understanding that conflicts, insecurity, weak institutions, and limited access to justice are threats to sustainable development. In Cameroon, for almost five years, the crisis in the NOSO, threats posed by Boko Haram in the northern regions, and conflicts in the CAR and the DRC have been creating and posing obstacles to peace and internal security. This situation greatly weighs on state budget and funding that can be allocated to development projects. The HCR estimates about 1 million internally displaced persons (IDP) in 2020 and an inflow of about 500,000 refugees fleeing war, persecutions, and conflicts from neighbouring countries.

⁷ - Refer to the last Cameroon Household Survey (ECAM 2014) which revealed that inequality gaps have widened between the poor people and the non-poor people

On another level, the COVID-19 pandemic is threatening to widen vulnerabilities across the world and in a singular way in Cameroon. Because, beyond the health aspect, resource management issues emerged with what is now referred to as Covidgate.

Indeed, a leaked report published by the Audit Bench of the Supreme Court has revealed embezzlements and serious faults in the management of funds allocated for Covid-19 response in Cameroon. Moreover, all the evaluations (internal or external) carried out by independent rating agencies or competent bodies show that the governance sector has always appeared as the weakest link in the governance system in Cameroon. Much has been said and various actions proposed, initiated, and some implemented, but in vain...

Indeed, a leaked report published by the Audit Bench of the Supreme Court has revealed embezzlements and serious faults in the management of funds allocated for Covid-19 response in Cameroon.

We don't want to dwell on the findings. Our commitment to lasting solutions prompts us to try a different approach. It is the one that has finally established itself as a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG16), retained as the condition for achieving the other goals related to the Prosperity (1) of Peoples (2), preserving the Planet (3) in Peace (4) by Partners (5): the five «P» of the 2030 Agenda. Our review shows that conditions to achieve the

NDS30 can be met if the country's authorities and the Cameroonian people actively commit to work with faith and zeal toward achieving the 10 targets of SDG16. The Governance axis of the NDS30 can thus be contextually developed around these more tangible targets (Annex1). For this purpose, the required national capacities and skills should, therefore, be mobilized. They are available. They have even been identified. They should be organized and invited to perform the job. To do this, leaders must show humility and recognize merit instead of co-opting through secret networks.

Lastly, at the institutional and political level, it is advisable to adapt/adjust the government architecture and the organizational framework of sectoral ministries to the prevailing context of decentralization.

This is an imperative in order to avoid overlap and duplication of skills, which is a waste of resources.

Indeed, the introduction of regional executives should inevitably lead to an adjustment of missions due to the transfer of some positions and skills from the central level to the outlying level. As an illustration, it seems indispensable to create ramps in order to clarify the roles between regional, divisional, and district delegations in the sense of relieving ministries on the one hand, and on the other hand regional and municipal services of the CTDs that are in charge of these skills. Thus, by these actions, ministerial charts and government architecture should be adjusted accordingly. The success of the NDS30 depends on it.

In this context, skills in leadership and management of decision-making process can be convoked: knowing how to make the right decisions in a timely fashion.

■ E. Infrastructures and Regional Integration


Good quality infrastructures are indispensable to meeting the objective of structural transformation which is one of the major criteria to feature among countries classified or viewed as emergent. These infrastructures are also seen as a key driver for sub-regional and regional integration. Cameroon understood it and laid the foundations during the GESP (2010-2019). The end date results are known. Several projects that were launched are uncompleted (as of this date) and those that have been completed are more or less operational.

At the centre of all these dysfunctions, there is the issue of project maturation and the choice of managers of the said projects. The latter's mandate is not indexed or linked to result (in terms of effectiveness and efficiency) but to political connection and manoeuvres. This issue should be addressed with courage and audacity during the NDS30 period.

As main recommendations regarding skills on the ground, it would be advisable to be more rational in choosing projects and managers. It would also be appropriate to conduct a rigorous and systematic monitoring and evaluation to complete phase 1 projects and make them operational; incorporate infrastructure asset management (IAM) into the design of the projects from the genesis.

But, as a matter of urgency and priority, public authorities must hurry and finally launch the Industrialization Master Plan (IMP), with innovative and modern mechanisms as per the international standards in this area, in its implementation phase, and a monitoring and evaluation mechanism based on quality assurance. This could, for instance, make it necessary to guarantee the consistency of government's interventions in the management of infrastructure projects (too many actors and little efficiency).

Lastly, concerning inclusive projects that have a cross-border dimension, it is urgent to adopt a law based on Public Private Partnership (PPP) to explore this funding option. It is not presently the case.



II. The Mission letter or the Mandate

As a common practice within institutions (national/international public and private institutions or civil society organizations), the mission letter is a document that outlines the mandate entrusted to a staff to perform a specific task. It specifies: (i) the purpose of the mission; (ii) the duration and the venue of the mission; (iii) the results expected to which are attached the necessary and adequate resources to achieve the results agreed upon with management; (iv) in some cases, the risks, alternatives, or even the consequences (positive or negative sanctions) may be included

What about the NDS30? How is the mission letter reflected?

If it is agreed and admitted that the NDS30 is a project with a set objective to achieve within a specific deadline, which is already the case, our focus is to target and determine who is doing what? Who has been entrusted with the mandate and who is accountable to whom? It is less so in the document that has been published.

(i) **The purpose of the mission** (answers the WHAT question) The document was prepared, finalized, adopted, and published by the government. It exists. For the sake of loyalty and faithfulness, all actors and stakeholders must adhere to it. It is now the official reference document used by authoritative voices in the area of public policies with regard to the economic and social development of Cameroon over the next 10 years (unless otherwise stated).

It is clearly stated in it that (...) the Government will rely on four (04) main pillars namely: the structural transformation of national economy, the development of human capital and well-being, the promotion of employment and economic integration, governance, decentralization, and the strategic management of the State.

Expected results have been outlined. Notwithstanding!

(ii) **The trustee** ? It provides answer to the question, who is accountable for results? Who has to do what to avoid the NDS30 from meeting the same fate as the PRSP and the GESP? To whom should the mission letter be addressed? ?

a) One would naturally and logically reply that it is the government. And that is where the problem of the mandate begins.

The Government certainly has a Chief, the Prime Minister and Head of Government. However, the Government is a legal person, a political entity that is not necessarily operational to carry out missions with measurable results. According to the constitution and the model of the political regime that prevails in

Cameroon, the Prime Minister and Head of Government is not accountable to the people (represented by the Parliament). Therefore, he is not liable. Thus, the Prime Minister is just a «facilitator». He supervises actors of the team of operational departments which are sectoral ministries and other public institutions. This is the second level of problems concerning the mandate. Indeed, ensuring the optimal coordination of these departments whose number is close to a hundred (ministries, public companies, and public institutions) is not an easy task, much less a game of golf or lawn bowl.

To be achieved, the goals of the NDS30 require various and multifaceted essential capacities and skills. The roles and actions to be carried out could sometimes be conflicting or create inconsistencies in the system. It is, therefore, necessary or even a prerequisite to conduct an analysis of consistency and optimization according to an approach that is well-known in computer programming⁸. It is thus preferred to adopt a holistic approach (top-down) that focuses on team performance and not on the individual or basic achievement of each member.

In the case of the 2030 NDS, the mandate would, therefore, correspond to an optimized basic procedure that would contribute without any conflict in achieving the overall expected result, as stipulated in the document.

b) Another plausible and politically connected or correct response would be to say: the people or ALL OF US.

The inference of this response will be to find out if the people are aware of it. Are the people aware of the NDS30? What is it all about? Do the people have a shared perception of the results expected? If not, what needs to be done? It ends up with the basic solution of the individual mission letter. That is what each citizen needs to do to achieve the NDS in 2030 and emergence in 2035.

Communication skills are required. Here, we should even be able to talk about dissemination, meaning an open and permanent communication that is even aggressive via various channels and media outlets, in all languages (vehicular) spoken in the country. This is not yet the case.

(iii) **The common understanding of the mission to achieve and consensus on the expected results.**

⁸ - As a matter of fact, a computer programme is a set of procedures described as basic according to a specific architecture. As it turns out, each procedure is written separately, tested and then approved. But quite often, when two or several procedures approved individually are conflicting, the set crashes. It is, therefore, necessary to first of all review the overall functional logic and modify the basic procedures

Since the PRSP and the GESP, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms have been adopted and appear to have taken shape. It is advisable to reactivate them and pay greater attention to them, and moreover make a good use of the results obtained. Clearly, for the country to successfully implement the NDS30, we must be able to apply the basic management principle which stipulates that «a result that is not achieved within the deadline is a failure». Therefore, we need to draw lessons to remedy the situation in order to get back on track and make up for the lost course. Failures are not justified, they are corrected!

Based on facts and figures, the institutional mechanism should be able to immediately initiate the decision-making process for corrective action. Time will be extremely short during this decade, especially from the first years that must give the impetus and give the signal that things are no longer the same as usual (no more as usual!). This is all the more as the NDS30 is starting with the handicap of being replaced by the ECF-II/EFF⁹.

Of course, CSOs would have to keep watching and sound the alarm bell when necessary, not as opponents of the government but rather as partners for a collective well-being.

In these conditions, is the impetus needed to create the breakaway still possible?

The culture of continuous and permanent evaluation, coupled with the principle of sanction, must be the uncompromising drivers in the quest for performance. There is the need to reward merit, encourage efforts, and celebrate successes. Not that it is forbidden to fail. But we should not dwell in it. Failure should make it possible to better prepare for success and not to get bogged down.

For statistical monitoring, for example, the institutional framework in force in Cameroon empowers the National Statistical System (NSS) under the coordination of the INS to play this role¹⁰. This seems to have been established from the PRSP period to date with some satisfaction, although there is always room for improvement. Urgent improvements include the realization of the major basic operations namely the RGPH-4 and the RGAE. We can also include the signing and publication of texts relating to the geographical code of administrative units and CTDs, in order to refine the digital mapping of territories for an optimal Geographic Information System (GIS), a tool that is essential for decentralization.

The works that are being carried out by MINEPAT, MINEFI, and the INS to provide programme performance indicators is part of this logic. The next step is to move them from the design phase to achievement through the secure financing of the 2030 National Strategy for the Development of Statistics aligned with the NDS30.

FORTHCOMING
.... July 2021



Prime Minister's Office

⁹ - Extended Credit Facility (ECF)/Extended Fund Facility (EFF): it is the name of the financial instrument provided by the IMF for the new economic programme

¹⁰ - Refer to the law recently enacted by the PRC, Law n° 2020/010 of 20 July 2020 governing statistics activities in Cameroon; and decree 2001/0100 of 1 April regarding the creation and functioning of the National Institute of Statistics. Other texts implementing the law are underway and in the publication process

CONCLUSION

After 30 years of economic adjustment, how far should we go?

As a historical background, Cameroon fell into crisis in 1986 and launched the unending structural adjustment programmes, shelving the sixth five-year plan (covering the period from 1986 to 1990). After reaching the decision point in the year 2000 and the completion point of the HIPC in 2006, the country launched the PRSP until 2009. The GESP (2010–2019) is expected to lay the foundations of a long term development toward emergence as the first phase of the 2035 Vision. The implementation of this ten-year plan is unfortunately hamstrung by other priorities: PLANUT, the Special Youth Programme, the special CHAN/AFCON Programme and, from late 2016, by the ECF (2018–2020). And here comes the NDS30 that is conceived and brought into being under this hat. Its first steps are henceforth narrowed in their ambitions, not to say stifled or even prohibited (technically until 2024).

Has the time not come to change model? Even by mere pride? Eeekiééé, Ya! !

On a purely political and strategic level, the will of a strategizing Government announced in the NDS30 seems incompatible with the assistance by the IMF in the management of a national economy.

We can go into debt as long as the State is credible, and this can be possible without structural adjustment programme. As a proof, after 30 years we are yet to find the way forward.

Our previous publications advocated DEPARTURE from the current model that is based on a different three-stage approach :

- The structural transformation of the production sector (horizontal and vertical diversification underpinned by economic patriotism): the NDS30 has adopted it pending implementation and tangible results ;
- The conceptual transformation of the Education/Training sector based on Science-Technology-Innovation (STI)/Science-Technology-Engineering (STEM) to instil the spirit of creativity and innovation in the child so that he can transform his environment and provide solutions to the daily problems faced by the populations: beyond speechmaking, this issue is not yet effectively addressed in practice.
- The governance aspect that must be addressed with courage and determination.

For this reason, it is necessary to DREAM that it is possible, DARE the right actions to get there, and INNOVATE to make tomorrow better

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Barnabé Okouda


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AN OPTION TO CONSTITUTE A MIDDLE CLASS IN RURAL AREAS,
CHARACTERISTIC OF EMERGING COUNTRIES.

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**BUDGET INDISCIPLINE, A PRIME RISK FOR
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**PROFILS ET PREFERENCES DES JEUNES
EN MATIERE D'EMPLOI AU CAMEROON**
ELEMENTS DETERMINANTS POUR UNE POLITIQUE DE L'EMPLOI BASEE
SUR UNE APPROCHE SELON LA PREFERENCE

Série : Etudes # 02
Decembre 2016

REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
MINISTRE DE L'ECONOMIE,
DE LA PLANIFICATION ET
DE L'AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE

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**SHUTDOWN OF PRIVATE PORTFOLIO ACTIVITIES:
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Some Initiatives for Enterprise Rescue in Cameroon
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Some Avenues for Balancing Private Enterprises in the Context of Cameroon
Conclusion and Monitoring Mechanism

August 2016

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DE L'AMENAGEMENT DU TERRITOIRE

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**OPTIMISATION DU POTENTIEL
FISCAL DU CAMEROON**
PREMIER LEVIER POUR REUSSIR LE
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Série Etudes #11
DECEMBRE 2019

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**COVID-19
ET LES AGENDAS DE DEVELOPPEMENT AU
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Nov 2020

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**FACILITE ELARGIE DE CREDIT (FEC) : LE CAMEROON DE NOUVEAU
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OCTOBRE 2017

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**ETUDE SUR LES SCIENCES,
LA TECHNOLOGIE ET L'INNOVATION
CAS DU CAMEROON**
UNE CONTRIBUTION AU RAPPORT SUR LES CAPACITES EN AFRIQUE 2017 DE L'ACBF

Série : Etudes # 03
Decembre 2016

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**COMMENT AMELIORER LA MATURATION DES
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SUR LE
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**EVALUATION DES BESOINS EN RENFORCEMENT
DES CAPACITES EN VUE DE LA
TRANSFORMATION ECONOMIQUE DU CAMEROON**

● INNOVER
INNOVATE
● PROPOSER
SUGGEST
● EVALUER
ASSESS

Série : Etudes # 08
Dec. 2018

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**(IN)EFFICACITE DE LA PROGRAMMATION
BUDGETAIRE AU CAMEROON**
VOLUME 1 : LE CAS DU BUDGET D'INVESTISSEMENT PUBLIC (BIP)
OU LA QUESTION QUE L'ON NE VEUT PAS SE POSER :
TOUS LES SERVICES PUBLICS ONT-ILS VOCATION
A INVESTIR DANS LES INFRASTRUCTURES ?

Série Etudes #10
SEPTEMBRE 2019

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**COMMENT AMELIORER LA MATURATION
DES PROJETS AU CAMEROON ?**
**MANUEL DE REFERENCE DES NORMES DE
MATURATION DES PROJETS
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Volume 1 : Rapport Analytique

Les objectifs que s'était
fixé le gouvernement
camerounais
24% PIB Execution Rate
in West Region
Pris de 1396,7
milliards de FCFA non
rentabilisés
Physical Execution
Needs Improvement

Avril 2017 - Série Etudes #05



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EVALUER - PROPOSER - INNOVER
ASSESS - SUGGEST - INNOVATE

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SUR LES POLITIQUES ECONOMIQUES ET
SOCIALES DU CAMEROUN**

**CAMEROON POLICY ANALYSIS
AND RESEARCH CENTER**

● **INNOVER
INNOVATE**

● **PROPOSER
SUGGEST**

● **EVALUER
ASSESS**



B.P. 6175 Yaoundé



Avenue FOCH - Immeuble CNR (4^{ème} étage)



(237) 222 22 58 58



(237) 222 22 34 82



(237) 222 22 34 21



contact@camercap-parc.cm



www.camercap-parc.cm



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