

SANIA

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## **SOUTH AFRICA'S PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTELLATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES**

### **Introductory Note**

The creation of a constellation of Southern African states has become a major objective of the South African Government. Although the concept of a constellation of states had already been used by Prime Minister B J Vorster in 1975, it has become firmly identified with Prime Minister P W Botha. Not only has Mr Botha consistently used the term, but he has given it a substance previously lacking. Moreover, the groundwork has already been laid for a formal constellation comprising South Africa and its three former "homelands" — Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda — recognised as independent by the South African Government.

The Government's proposed constellation is part and parcel of its *total national strategy*. This strategy is spelled out in Prime Minister Botha's "twelve policy principles", the eighth of which provides for the creation of a constellation of states in Southern Africa. The origins of the notion of a total national strategy go back some years, when it was used primarily in a military/security context.

In view of the importance the South African Government attaches to the need for a total national strategy, in particular the creation of a constellation of states as part thereof, it has been decided to reproduce below extracts from some of the major official documents and statements which deal with (A) the concept of a total national strategy, (B) the twelve-point plan, and (C) the nature and objectives of a constellation.

### **A. The Concept of a Total National Strategy<sup>1</sup>**

#### **(i) Recommendations of the Potgieter Report:<sup>2</sup>**

Among the recommendations of this report which led to the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act, 1972, were:

That a Council, to be known as the State Security Council, under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister, be established by law (p. 90). Among the recommended duties and functions of a State Security Council are: . . .

1. For origins of this concept and of the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act, 1972, see the following note.
2. The official title of the Potgieter Report is, Republic of South Africa. *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating to the Security of the State* (Abridged). Pretoria: Government Printer, 1970.

(b) to give consideration to and make recommendations on national policy and strategy for the protection of the State; (p. 91).

**(ii) Summarized extract from the Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act, 1972 (64/72):**

Section 4: Provides for the establishment of a State Security Council consisting of:

Prime Minister (Chairman), Ministers of: Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Police, and the Senior Cabinet Ministers, if not already included under the above mentioned portfolios, and other co-opted Ministers and certain Heads of Departments.

Section 5: Functions include "to advise the government with regard to (i) the formulation of national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the Republic, and the manner in which such policy or strategy shall be implemented and be executed".

**(iii) Extracts from: Republic of South Africa. Department of Defence. *White Papers on Defence and Armament Production, 1975 and 1977 respectively***

*1975: Preface*

A credible military capability still remains a requirement for survival. This does not mean that, in the prevailing circumstances, any country can rely on military power alone. All countries must, more than ever, muster all their activities — political, economic, diplomatic and military — for their defence. This, in fact, is the meaning of "total strategy".

*1977: Section I. General Review*

*National Security*

1. The process of ensuring and maintaining the sovereignty of a state's authority in a conflict situation has, through the evolution of warfare, shifted from a purely military to an integrated national action.

.....  
The resolution of a conflict in the times in which we now live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields — military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural, etc. Germany had already realised this before World War II, and Russia has maintained a multi-dimensional campaign against the West since this war. Consequently we are today involved in a war, whether we wish to accept it or not.

2. It is therefore essential that a total national strategy be formulated at the highest level. The defence of the RSA is not

solely the responsibility of the Department of Defence. On the contrary, the maintenance of the sovereignty of the RSA is the combined responsibility of all government departments. This can be taken further — it is the responsibility of the entire population, the nation and every population group. The Department of Defence is merely an executive body responsible for the achievement of certain national security goals, as directed by the Government.

.....  
6. ...Total strategy is, however, a complex subject. It can perhaps be described as the comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies. A total national strategy is, therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all levels and to all functions of the state structure.

7. The main elements which influence this, namely, the political, economic, psychological, technological and military means are, in the strategic sense, dynamic and interacting. Strategy, therefore, is not something constant, since a change in one of the factors must have an effect on all the others. It must be constantly adapted to changing situations in respect of, for example, the threat, manpower potential, the financial climate, domestic or foreign politics, etc. Constant interaction, and revision of planning and implementation at all levels of the various government departments are essential.

.....  
10. The aspects of national security which require attention on an inter-departmental basis are the following:

- Political action
- Military/para military action
- Economic action
- Psychological action
- Scientific and technological action
- Religious-cultural action
- Manpower services
- Intelligence services
- Security services
- National supplies, resources and production services
- Transport and distribution services
- Financial services
- Community services
- Telecommunication services

Together the above fields cover the whole spectrum of national security.

.....  
Factors which Influence the Total National Strategy

21. *The National Objectives.* In order to realise these aims the state has as its goal the *continued existence of the RSA and all its people* by:

- a. the orderly development and maintenance of the body politic;
- b. the preservation of the identity, dignity, the right to self-determination and the integrity of all population groups;
- c. the identification, prevention and countering of revolution, subversion and any other form of unconstitutional action;
- d. the maintenance of a sound balance of military power in relation to neighbouring states and other states in Southern Africa;
- e. aiming for the greatest possible measure of economic and social development, and the maximum self-sufficiency;
- f. the creation of friendly relationships and political and economic co-operation with the states of Southern Africa;
- g. planning total national strategy at government level for co-ordinated action between all government departments, government institutions and other authorities to counter the multi-dimensional onslaught against the RSA in the ideological, military, economic, social, psychological, cultural, political and diplomatic fields.

## B. The 12-Point Plan

Extract from an address by the South African Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and of National Security, the Hon. P.W. Botha, to a National Party Congress in Durban on 15 August 1979.

And that brings me — and I want to conclude with this — to what I regard as the only alternative to serve as a framework for the policy of the Republic of South Africa. *Within this framework a total national strategy must be developed and executed.*

In the words of the Israeli General: "We have only one alternative".

What is this alternative? What is its basis? It is to strive for the recognition of the following policy within the framework of multinational Southern Africa. And we must convince all reasonable people in Southern Africa that this is the only solution to our problems.

*First*, the recognition and acceptance of the existence of multinationalism and of minorities in the Republic of South Africa. You cannot wish them away.

*Secondly*, the acceptance of vertical differentiation with a built-in principle of self-determination at as many levels as possible.

*Thirdly*, the establishment of constitutional structures by the Black peoples to make the highest degree of self-government possible for them in states that are consolidated as far as practicable. I do not want to discuss consolidation tonight, I shall do so on the next occasion when I am addressing a congress. But we believe that part of the right to self-determination of these Black states is to allow them to grow towards independence according to their own judgement. And to help them to build up the best possible economic future in co-operation with us.

*Fourthly*, the division of powers between South African Whites, South African Coloureds and South African Indians with a system of consultation and co-responsibility so far as common interests are concerned. For this purpose, there is at present a joint select committee of Parliament now a commission of inquiry, consisting of members of all parties engaged in collecting evidence and drawing up a report if possible. And I am not going to prejudice the report of that commission; we have as a Government submitted our plans as we see things for the future. I hope the approach of others will be practical and positive and take into account the highest interests of South Africa.

*Fifthly*, the acceptance of the principle that where at all possible each population group should have its own schools and live in its own community as being fundamental to social contentment. In my view this is not discrimination, it is the recognition of each others' rights. The preparedness to consult as equals on matters of common interest with a sound balance between the rights of the individual and those of the community.

*In the sixth place*, I am in favour of removing hurtful and unnecessary discriminatory measures. I have said this in Parliament, I have said that those discriminatory measures that are unnecessary and create bad feeling should be removed. And I have said that this Government has already removed many of them. But I am not in favour of a system of compulsory integration in South Africa, and I am not in favour of endangering my own people's right to self-determination.

*In the seventh place*, the recognition of economic interdependence and the properly planned utilisation of manpower.

*In the eighth place*, striving for a peaceful constellation of South-



ern African states with respect for each other's cultures, traditions and ideals. To talk of a federation or a confederation at this stage would, in my view, be premature. A pact between states becomes possible only when the will is there. One first has to make all those states equal through independence, and then leave it to them to decide what they want to belong to.

*In the ninth place*, South Africa's firm determination to defend itself against interference from outside in every possible way. And allow me to say here tonight, not boastfully, but we are better able tonight to defend South Africa militarily than ever before in the country's history. And I want to warn those who think that we practise our politics from a position of weakness: we are not speaking from a position of weakness, we are speaking from a position of decency. If they want to test us — our strength — we will hit back for the sake of South Africa's self-respect.

*In the tenth place*, as far as possible, a policy of neutrality in the conflict between super-powers, with priority given to Southern African interests.

*In the eleventh place*, the maintenance of effective decision-making by the State, which rests on a strong Defence Force and Police Force to guarantee orderly government as well as efficient, clean administration. Clean administration is essential at all levels. And strong security forces with contented members are of the utmost importance in today's dangerous world, and that is why I am pleased to be able to state that the Public Service Commission has undertaken a thorough investigation into the operational allowances and service allowances of the South African Defence Force, the South African Police and the South African Prisons Service, and that the Public Service Commission has made recommendations in this connection and that, within the limits of our financial abilities, a new improved form of service and operational allowance is being introduced for all these three services.

*In the twelfth place*, the maintenance of free enterprise as the basis of our economic and financial policy. This also presupposes the most effective training and utilisation of manpower, as set forth in the White Papers arising out of the Riekert and Wiehahn reports on manpower.

### C. A constellation of Southern African states

- (i) Extracts from an address by the South African Foreign Minister, the Hon. R.F. Botha, to the Swiss South African Association in Zürich on 7 March 1979

I think we ought to look more at a strategy of a constellation of Southern African States, seven, eight, nine, ten, with forty million people south of the line Kunene/Zambezi, which contains *inter alia* 87% (this is South Africa) of the world's platinum and 73% of its gold, 53% of its vanadium, 51% of its growth. I am not even talking of antimony, uranium, nickel, silver, gold and a host of others. Rhodesia properly worked — I don't know whether you know it — Rhodesia alone can provide sufficient food for the whole of Africa due to its climate and particular soil. And the others, south of that line which I sketched to you, have got immense natural resources, much of it of a strategic nature and you've got people, human beings. It would be awful — it would have been an unrewarding day — if we in South Africa could think that just because we have the minerals and resources, and the other blessings, that we could rely on that alone to save us. No, we don't. Please accept it from me tonight, we don't! We must rely in the last resort on our human resources, on human development, on human understanding, on the bringing together of peoples.

On the one hand those that can be brought together in one political structure, we will do. On the other hand, some cannot, due to inherent internal wishes of their own: we cannot force people against their will to join each other. It has nothing to do with racism. I do not believe in the superiority of the white man. I do not believe that we are cleverer or better. I do not believe that the white man is entitled to a better quality of life because he has a white skin.

.....  
In my country, we are a minority but so are the Venda, a black people, and the Sotho, and the Zulu and the Tswana and the Xhosa. They are also minorities in a certain way. . . . And even if you could remove every white man from South Africa tomorrow, what would you have achieved? You would just have started the most severe strife and conflict and turbulence ever noticed in Southern Africa. And this is what we are trying to get through to the minds also of people in other parts of the world.

.....  
If we find the answer in a Southern African constellation of

states, with forty million people, allies of one another, that same solidarity could grow and the white people would more and more see in the black man an ally instead of fearing him and fearing his numbers and thinking that he would overrun us or throw us into the sea. We need trust! We will generate it. We have the will to play our role to the full in that subcontinent.

.....  
I want to conclude this address by saying to you that we are more hopeful than ever before as far as Southern Africa is concerned. All the potential is there. The goodwill is there. There are problems, yes, but they are there as a challenge, and a challenge that will be converted into an opportunity for black and white to understand each other and then by agreement to work together. Against that background I have spoken, as you have heard this, without notes, now I have to count my words. I want to conclude by reading the statement which we drafted earlier in South Africa, a statement that concerns a very important direction which we believe we should now follow in Southern Africa in international life, and that is something which you know very well. We believe that we should follow a road of greater neutrality. Greater neutrality in the world outside, not antagonistic against the West or the East, but just for ourselves, for a change, and I wish to put it in these words:

South Africa's strategic position in the world cannot be denied. Occupying the southernmost part of the African continent, its strategic location is immediately evident. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to state that the closing of this gateway midway between the two oceans would have a devastating effect on the side against whom the closing is directed. We find ourselves midway between the East and the West, geographically speaking. This geographical fact might in future assume greater significance. Our shores are washed by both the Indian and Atlantic oceans. It is as if we are destined either to brave the stormy seas of both oceans or to enjoy the tranquility of our shores divorced from both.

Thus far we have been a target for many and diverse forces. We have attracted stormy weather. However, we have no intention of remaining a target. We have the will and the desire and the technical skills and the resources to set up targets of our own, new objectives to be achieved. These targets would include the achievement of peace and stability in the whole of Southern Africa, reinforcement of mutual trust among the leaders and nations of our region and the establishment of a subcontinental solidarity which could form the basis for close

co-operation in all the important spheres of life. We will have to give serious consideration to the desirability of adopting a neutral position in international affairs, a neutral position in the struggle between East and West. Our sole commitment ought to be towards the security and advancement of our own Southern African region. Southern Africa could steer a new course of its own midway between East and West. I believe that such a course could initiate a new era for the subcontinent; a new era of prosperity and greater understanding among our various peoples.

Text supplied by the press section, South African Embassy, Berne. *Bulletin no. 5/1979*, 16.3.1979

**(ii) Extract from a statement in Parliament by the South African Prime Minister, the Hon. P.W. Botha on 19 April 1979\***

As I take stock today of South Africa's economic and political situation I find it impossible to disregard the present international currents. It has quite correctly been stated that the increasing strains on the world order are no less ominous obvious. The world is engaged in two simultaneous struggles that exercise, and will continue to exercise, a vast influence on the affairs of the entire globe, embracing nations both large and small. The one struggle is between the values of Western civilization and the doctrines of Marxist-Soviet imperialism. The other struggle is a conflict of aims and aspirations between the developed and the under-developed world. There is an interaction between them, an economic dimension, *viz.* the choice between free enterprise systems and the concept of centrally controlled economies. There is also the issue of poverty versus plenty. It has quite correctly been pointed out that there is disillusionment with the results of aid programmes and that development aid is distributed more out of habit and opportunism than from a sense of conviction. The overall attitudes of the world's major powers, their self-interest, are shaped by their specific attitudes to these issues. In the Republic of South Africa our attitude is complicated because our multi-national complexities are being exploited by our opponents to their own opportunistic advantage, and nobody denies that. During January of 1979 the Canadian Minister of Defence made an important statement, from which I want to quote a paragraph or two because I am in full agreement with him. He said:

In Africa the Russians used Guinea as a staging base to supply arms for the MPLA-Cuban takeover in Angola. They in-

\*During the committee stage of the Prime Minister's budget vote

tervened in Ethiopia with a massive projection of power. The Horn of Africa is strategically an extension of the Middle East which supplies two-thirds of Western Europe's oil. The objectives become increasingly clear: greater command of strategic sea-routes, lessening the influence of Western democracies.

He then goes on to say:

The West saw détente as a basis for co-operation and trade. The Russians saw it as a means of gaining badly needed technology. Soviet military build-up, and the use of that power in Africa, has stripped us of our illusions. We can see now that weakness invites conflict.

A further example of what he spells out here is proved by the visit of a prominent East German leader to Angola, Mozambique and Zambia recently. I agree that the Soviet Union seeks imperial domination by force, whatever its own problems might be. No better illustration is required than the presence, in the South Atlantic in recent weeks, of a Soviet Black Sea task-force led by an aircraft carrier. The Soviet Union now has a blue water fleet capable of intervening throughout the world. In part this is the result of Nato's unwillingness to accept responsibility for the security of the South Atlantic. In these circumstances many countries feel compelled to review their position. There is growing doubt about how far the United States is still willing to honour its commitments of support. South Africa, too, has been forced to the conclusion that a review of her position has become imperative. We shall have to endeavour to remove ourselves, politically, as far as possible from the East-West disputes and avoid involvement in their future conflicts while we trade with whomever it is in our interests to trade. Secondly, we shall be guided solely by our own interests and the interest of our region. We have been taught the hard way that in international relations there is no friendship, especially from great powers, but only self-interest. Consequently we must most determinedly and unequivocally follow the signposts of co-operation in Africa and especially Southern Africa.

I have referred to this earlier this year. During the no-confidence debate I accentuated the necessity of co-operation in various fields, e.g. health services, housing, power supply, agriculture, technology and many others.

I mentioned the possibility of non-aggression pacts between us and the different Southern African states. Let me add that I am in favour of discussions between governments of independent states in Southern Africa. We shall certainly take the opportunity as soon as possible to bring this about. I sincerely believe that

Southern Africa could have a secure future, and I know for a fact that there are reasonable, well-balanced and moderate leaders in Africa with whom it will be possible to co-operate and we shall do everything in our power to make that possible. Southern Africa, with its abundant natural resources, has a vast potential and we in the Republic of South Africa have gained considerable experience in improving standards of living and can be of service not only to some countries in Africa as a whole, but also and more specifically to Southern Africa. In an objective second report on South Africa in December 1978, the Dallas Securities Investment Corporation stated the following about South Africa:

An objective analysis of the social situation reveals that the quality of life for the Black peoples in South Africa is better than that of Blacks living elsewhere on the continent. They live in better homes, earn higher wages and receive better medical care.

In the light of this report, and in the light of the facts we are all aware of, there is, to my mind, no reason why a constellation of states in the Southern African region should not proceed on its own to create a better future for itself. In our policy of dialogue with Africa, we naturally experienced setbacks in the past. This does not, however, derogate from the validity and sincerity of our commitment.

*South Africa. (Republic) House of Assembly Debates, no. 10, April 1979, Cols. 4456 — 4459*

**(iii) Extracts from a statement in Parliament by the South African Foreign Minister, the Hon. R.F. Botha, on 5 June 1979\***

At the end of the Second World War the UN came into existence. In the preamble to the UN Charter we read, *inter alia*, that the UN was founded:

To save succeeding generations from war, to uphold human rights and dignity, to promote social progress and better living standards, to practise tolerance and live together with one another in peace as good neighbours, and to promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples.

Today, 1979, nothing much has come of these constructive, positive ideals which were set for this world organization. Today, 1979, the picture presented by this planet is a sombre one, extremely sombre. If we consider the world situation, we find that countries and peoples and nations are threatening one another. Poverty prevails on an unprecedented scale. We find disease. We find strife and discord. We find that the struggle for the balance of power between the West and the East, between the free world

\* During the committee stage of the Minister's budget vote

and the communistic world, has increased in intensity, but that the free world is losing its will to offer resistance, if it has not already done so.

The active bridging of the gap between the poor world, the hungry world, the sick world, the ignorant world on the one hand, and the more affluent world, the industrialized world, the world in which Russia may to a certain extent be included, on the other, is becoming all the more unbridgeable.

We find that specifically on our continent, in Africa, little — very little — has been done to raise the living standards of the peoples of Africa. We find that large quantities of arms and murder weapons for the destruction of people have been imported to our continent. However, we find few successful attempts to ensure the people of a better life.

.....  
In this sombre world South Africa must not only find its way internationally, it must also continue to exist on this continent. For the purposes of my argument it makes no difference what democratic party is in power here, but seen objectively it is true that if there is a government in power here that wishes to maintain order in the country, that wishes to preserve peace in the country and wishes to establish the basic conditions and norms for development and for the happiness of the people of this country, such a government naturally, in the sombre world which I have sketched and in the specific circumstances in Africa, has an almost super-human task. I do not think that anyone doubts that. Without faith the task is impossible.

.....  
We at the southern point of this continent are also dealing with internal problems of a magnitude and range which, to my knowledge, no other nation in modern human history has ever had to cope with.

On the one hand we must try to remain true to the principles and ideals which gave birth to our nation, the aspirations with which we came to this part of the world 300 years ago. We must remain true to our norms of fairness and justice and to our Christian creed of love for one's neighbour.

.....  
We find ourselves at the southermost point of a continent on which we are to a large extent being rejected. We find ourselves far from our countries of origin. We have been weaned. I am grateful that we have ultimately been weaned from any expectations of those countries of origin helping us in our hour of crisis. We must therefore be strengthened by and convinced in the

knowledge that if we wish to survive, we have to depend on our own ability, skill judgement, way of thinking and will to resist. We must also strengthen our faith.

Our position in Africa is made more difficult — as far as this is concerned, I wish to speak quite frankly — by the fact that there are leaders in Africa who refuse to admit that this nation has become and is a nation of Africa. This tree can no longer be transplanted. It will have to stand here, and die where it stands or live and bear fruit. The roots of this tree have penetrated deeply, through the rocks, and must live on pure water. The branches of this tree can be ripped off, but the tree itself cannot flee. It will have to provide a shade and weather the stormy blasts where it stands. It can never again be transplanted.

There are leaders in Africa who do not want to realize that this government and also, I should like to accept, the leaders of all white political parties in this country wish to establish, to the utmost of their ability, a situation of peace and development for all people, regardless of the colour of their skin. However, we cannot do it alone. As far as the requirements for peace and progress in Southern Africa are concerned, there is one absolute requirement, and that is reciprocity. It cannot come from one side only. But reciprocity and sufficient mutual trust have so far been lacking.

.....  
The sombre picture of the world causes the picture presented by South Africa's foreign relations to be even more sombre. That is so. But after analysis, if one looks below the surface, it is ironic that those very factors which contribute in great measure to the sombre picture of our international relations, are also the factors which in my opinion could contribute to solutions to the problems of Southern Africa. The impending isolation creates opportunities. It is not only the Whites who stand alone at the southern point of Africa; every black leader who desires order, freedom, peace and development for his people — and not only wants to work for himself and for his own enrichment — also stands alone, just as Bishop Muzorewa and the black leaders of SWA/Namibia are standing alone today. In exactly the same way Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi will find — in fact, he experienced this recently as a result of a rebuff which he received from a South American country — that in the end his only true and lasting allies are the Whites of South Africa. This is what I think the black leaders of Southern Africa will discover in time and they will, in my opinion, develop greater moderation and perceive that their survival goes hand in hand with the survival of the Whites.



.....

I should like to say that there are approximately 40 million of us, Blacks, White people, Coloureds and Asians, living here in Southern Africa south of the Kunene, Kavango and Zambesi Rivers in various states. South of these rivers we have enough gold, diamonds, chrome, platinum, iron-ore, coal and technical skill, expertise and knowledge in the various spheres of life, from medicine to food production to manufacturing. We also have the people. It may justifiably be asked what then, is lacking. I really do not think that anything material, insurmountable is lacking. However, I just want to say that our spiritual resources as well, for example mutual trust, respect, understanding, tolerance and the ability to appreciate the other man's argument and see his side of the matter have been unexplored. There are issues which require probing attention such as the fair division of land and political power and there are the measures and practices which are based on colour and which discriminate, harmful forms of unjust discrimination against people merely on the ground of colour. We ask our black friends in Southern Africa to display the same courage as the Whites, the courage of the Whites not only to fight unwaveringly against the onslaughts from abroad, but also to make internal adjustments in accordance with our moral norms by means of which alliances can be forged. Just as the black majority government of Bishop Muzorewa was unable to gain recognition through its removal of discrimination, so, it seems to me, South West Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana or Venda will not gain recognition either. These black states remain the target of radical onslaughts. Therefore, the same fate must ultimately befall Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana as well. We must be able to think in subcontinental terms, be able to get along with one another and cultivate trust and tolerance on subcontinental terms. The black leaders and we must develop a reciprocal feeling of understanding and trust.

.....

I repeat that we can tell our black neighbours that we are not inviting them to a Maundy Thursday, that we do not see them as beggars by means of whom we can elevate ourselves temporarily in order to escape from our problems in that way. We stand together, confronted by the same, problems, and we are prepared, with our skills which at this stage of our history are further developed than theirs, to support them as well and to uplift them and to ensure everyone in Southern Africa of a new era of prosperity. If the ideals which gave life to this nation still continue to draw us on, and if our desire for identity, our desire to be

ourselves and to have the right to govern ourselves, will be a right which we also grant to others, this will lead us to a fair solution to our problems. The Whites of this country are not what the world makes them out to be. If our religious doctrines and our faith are the stars which guide us, I predict today that we will be led through the sombre night of isolation which now threatens us to a new dawn of development and prosperity for all the peoples of Southern Africa.

South Africa. (Republic) *House of Assembly Debates*, no. 17, 5 June, 1979. Cols. 7794-5, 7798 — 7800, 7801-2, 7803-4, 7805

**(iv) Extract from a statement in Parliament by the South African Foreign Minister, the Hon. R.F. Botha, on 6 June 1979\***

We are endeavouring to mould together our interests and the interests of all the other states of Southern Africa into some form, into structures to give expression to that moulding together of common interests. It should embrace the desire of a common approach in the security field, the socio-economic field and even the political field. Within joint structures we could discuss political dispensations, on condition that the self-determination of each nation of the region is respected. The leaders of Southern Africa in a spirit of mutual trust and friendship ought to have the opportunity to talk, air their views and say to each other what they do not like about each other's policies. Such discussions among friends can do no harm. But if we, the states of Southern Africa, wish individually each to steer our own course, it would naturally inhibit the practical implementation of this whole project, this constellation of states that we have in mind and that we wish to bring into being. It will inhibit our joint efforts if individual States of our region support opposing multilateral entities. In any event, South Africa cannot undertake this venture alone. We must do it together.

If our interests and the interests of all the states of the region require that we should steer a course midway between East and West, then that will be the course which we should adopt. If I understood the hon. member for Constantia correctly, he said that we should at all times follow a course which was in our interest. I therefore do not see any basic divergence in our views. If that is what hon. members have in mind, I fully agree with them namely we will follow a course which best serves our interests.

\*During discussion of the Minister's budget vote

South Africa. (Republic) *House of Assembly Debates*, no. 17, June 1979. Cols. 7884-5

(v) Extract from an address by the South African Prime Minister, the Hon. P.W. Botha, at the Carlton Centre, Johannesburg, on 22 November 1979

*The Concept "Constellation of States in Southern Africa"*

In a constellation the constituent bodies have fixed positions *vis-a-vis* each other unlike in a solar system in which planets revolve around a central point. In a constellation of states the countries concerned therefore derive from their fixed proximity to each other a common interest whilst maintaining their individual sovereign status. This concept thus specifically excludes a satellite relationship among any of the constituents. The concept "constellation of states" does not primarily denote a formal organisation, but rather a grouping of states with common interests and developing mutual relationships, and between which a clear desire to extend areas of co-operation exists.

In Southern Africa a rich diversity of cultures, ideologies and value systems which derives from the history and needs of each nation, exists. Given these factors and the existing links between countries in the region, it will not always be possible or desirable to attempt to establish uniform umbrella organisations. Co-operation will have to be voluntary and will have to grow naturally and organically from within.

The membership of a constellation of Southern African states can include any country in the sub-continent which identifies the need to expand relationships and to co-operate in a regional context. Firstly, the national states within South Africa's boundaries come to mind, but also those countries with which a measure of co-operation and economic exchange already exists. This naturally also includes members of the Rand Monetary Area and the Customs Union. We must also bear in mind that in due course this area may grow and extend to other countries in the region.

Comprehensive reciprocal relationships already exist on both bilateral and multilateral levels and offer considerable potential for extension and rationalisation. Much has already been achieved on a multilateral level by way of organisations such as the Customs Union and the Rand Monetary Area. We can also refer to a successful specialised institution such as SARCCUS (Southern African Regional Council for the Conservation and Utilisation of the Soil).

In taking into account political realities it will not be possible, for the present, to establish common consultative structures and secretariats where it would otherwise have been desirable as in the case of the Customs Union and the Rand Monetary Area. The political will to co-operate is ultimately decisive in allowing co-

operation to thrive fully. This political will can often be significantly strengthened by expanding relations in non-political technical and economic fields.

The extension of personal communication, mutual understanding, trust and an awareness of each other's problems is necessary. Assistance such as selective technical aid and the rendering of professional advice to overcome specific problems can lead to the creation of a climate conducive to development and regional solidarity.

Text supplied by the Prime Minister's office

**(vi) Extracts from a statement in Parliament by the South African Prime Minister, the Hon. P.W. Botha, on 29 April 1980\***

The idea of the constellation of states, however, is based on voluntary co-operation. That is why I went to the Carlton Hotel last year and asked the private sector, on behalf of the government, to give us their assistance, because the state, if it wishes to survive as a state with a free economy, cannot take on all the development tasks. Then it has to persuade the private sector to bear a large part of the responsibility.

This pre-supposes voluntary co-operation, not only between the various states, but also between the state and the private sector, and the private sectors of these various states as well. It also pre-supposes the co-operation of the various population groups. If one cannot achieve this, it is a lost cause in any case. How do we want to achieve this in practice? We want to achieve it in the first place through the black national states — and this I conveyed to the black leaders in personal talks after the Carlton conference — encouraging the private sector to development and giving them guarantees against nationalization. The private sector will not venture into independent states or independent-states-in-embryo on a large scale if there is no assurance against nationalization.

Secondly, the government must give serious attention to the effort to create a multilateral development bank for Southern Africa, and we are working on this. Such a development bank must give representation on its board of governors to the various co-operating states so that they can have a share in it. Moreover, it must be placed under the very sound management of a proper board of directors. Once one has established this and has brought about nationalization in the development corporations, one can, as it is necessary, serve both kinds of economies by making the

\*During discussion of the Prime Minister's budget vote

necessary adaptations in order to promote the particular needs of each one.

The government cannot do it on its own with its state administration. We have already launched studies to make such a development bank possible. We shall discuss it further, and I wish to state here at once that I think that the preference which South Africa should give is that to its own independent states and not to those far from its borders. We must begin to concentrate our priorities on our own independent states, in other words they must receive the most attention from us.

What should the objects of such a development bank be? I wish to mention only a few items. I am not an expert in this field. For example there is the granting of development aid, the mobilization of financial and technical assistance, the recruiting of private investment, channelization of financial resources in lesser developed countries and the provision of loans, and, when necessary, soft loans as well. We have already made a great deal of progress with the preparatory work. A special division of experts has been established in the Department of Foreign Affairs. We mentioned this at the Carlton conference, and we have been doing follow-up work. The assistance of operational departments and others has been called in, and each of the proposals made at the Carlton conference is being considered and we are seeing what can be done to launch such an institution. We are not merely paying lip-service to this idea. A report has just been sent to me in which the progress made was set out.

What should our approach be? Our approach should in my opinion be not to be disparaging but to encourage these things and to say collectively, as opposition and government, that it is in the interests of all the people in South Africa. As I said yesterday evening when I began speaking, there is no alternative. This is all there is. We must go further and be prepared, at the given moment, to consider the establishment of a secretariat, to promote the co-operation between these states. It must be a permanent secretariat. That is what I envisage for the future.

We have already made progress in many respects. We already have a Customs Union and the Rand Monetary Area. In addition we have already held talks with various governments, outside the Republic as well, on health services, the combating of stock diseases, the making available of technology, and on tourism and water conservation. There is activity in virtually each of these fields. In spite of all the uproar at world meetings and in spite of all the vituperation hurled at South Africa, hardly a week passes without our receiving some delegation or other here that wishes

to discuss these matters with us. We shall not let them down. We do not wish to create the impression that they cannot trust us. We shall continue to promote co-operation, because we think it is in the interests of all of us, not only in the interests of black South Africa, but also in the interests of white South Africa.

### *The 12-Point Plan*

I do not wish to speak for much longer this afternoon. There will be a further opportunity to discuss other matters. However, I have a deep-felt desire to refer briefly to two other matters. One is specifically the 12-point plan. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition asked what the 12-point plan was, whether it was a new thing or whether it was simply a re-affirmation of party-policy. What does the hon. the Leader of the Opposition expect from me? Surely he does not expect that I, as the chief leader of the National Party, should jettison the principles of the party. He will not do so as far as his party is concerned. . . . The fact remains that the NP is founded on certain basic principles. Only the congresses of the four provinces can do that when they collectively agree to do so. I made it clear to the congresses that I consider myself to be bound by the decisions of the congresses, and to the principles of the party, as long as I am their leader, but in respect of the daily implementation of policy I cannot subject myself to the congresses. I shall do so when they are in session, but otherwise I must consult representatives, the cabinet and other bodies from the private sector, and then I must pursue a policy as it becomes necessary from day to day.

The 12-point plan is therefore in the first place a framework within which strategies in the various spheres can be developed and expanded. In the second place it is a reaffirmation of the basic principles of the NP. This is friendly nationalism, and if the opposition wishes to debate this matter with me, they are at liberty to do so. The hon. the Leader of the Opposition said that some aspects of the plan were obscure. I have already dealt with one of them, with the question of differentiation. I do not believe in a unitary state or in a unitary society. I do not think it will work. Nor do I think it can work, unless the population is homogeneous. This is why there must be differentiation. The 12-point plan provides that we must recognize and accept our multinationalism. Is there any person here in this House who does not do so? Is there any person in this House who closes his eyes to it and says that it does not exist? Let me give an example of what I mean. About 700 or 800 km from here, there are two independent states, Lesotho and the Transkei. Does the hon. the Leader of the

Opposition now, even in his wildest dreams, think that he can unite those two states? Let us be practical. I am not reproaching them. The fact of the matter is simply that we must take into account the multi-nationalism within Southern Africa, not because people are inferior, but because people are different. Surely it is not a disgrace to be different. Surely it is not a disgrace to be a Coloured, a Zulu or a Sotho in South Africa, just as it is not a disgrace to be an Afrikaner, a Jew or an English-speaking person. In other words, we must accept multi-nationalism and build on it for the future.

South Africa. (Republic) *House of Assembly Debates*, no. 11, April/May 1980. Cols. 5084—5087

**(vii) Joint press statements issued on 16 and 17 February 1980, respectively, by the Governments of South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, after the multilateral meeting between their Foreign Ministers at Port St. Johns on 15 and 16 February 1980**

A. The Foreign Ministers of Transkei, South Africa, Bophuthatswana and Venda met in Port St. Johns on 15 and 16 February to review and discuss the situation in Southern Africa with particular reference to the threat of instability in Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

Matters of common political concern and the concept of a constellation of states or a form of a confederation were also discussed as well as ways and means of furthering the economic development of the independent states.

It was decided that meetings of this nature will be held at regular intervals

B. The Governments of the Republic of Transkei, South Africa, Bophuthatswana and Venda, fully aware of the forces threatening peace and stability in Southern Africa, are determined, as a group, to resist and stop all attempts from the outside to interfere in their affairs and impose solutions on Southern Africa by force.

Together they will bend all their efforts to further socio-economic progress in their countries and Southern Africa as a whole.

Bearing in mind the overriding importance of current events in Zimbabwe Rhodesia on the future of Southern Africa, the four governments will keep in close contact with one another on developments.

Transcript text supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information

**(viii) Extracts from a statement in Parliament by the South African Foreign Minister, the Hon. R.F. Botha, on 19 May 1980\***

South Africa and the countries of Southern Africa have been co-operating with one another for a long time now in various spheres of life. No one can deny that. I think that if a survey were to be made, we would be astonished to see in how many spheres there is co-operation between the states in Southern Africa in the private sector and public sector, of which we are not even generally aware.

In the first place there are the three so-called BLS countries, i.e. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Then there are the three countries which have already become independent in our midst, and in addition there is Zimbabwe and South West Africa which fall south of the horizontal line of the Zambezi river. If one adds together the population of these countries, and possibly includes Malawi as well, which is situated not far from Zimbabwe, it gives one a total of approximately 40 million people. If one takes these 40 million people who are living in these nine independent states and adds the people living in the states which still ought to become independent, and which we hope will still do so, it is virtually a natural idea which then emerges as to how one can institutionalize forms of co-operation in order to save labour and costs and to promote our mutual security and mutual interests. But the confederation concept is not based on a circumscribed geographical entity. It is based on the voluntary exercise of will by the countries of the region.

The idea of confederation, constellation or co-operation consequently emerges naturally, as it were, from an already existing natural situation. Who is better aware of this than my department and I, that have to undertake the co-ordination of the foreign aid and the technical co-operation which we extend and of a great many other aspects of the assistance which we render to independent countries around us and further to the north in Africa?

I shall refer again to the sphere of health. I cannot think of a sphere which lends itself more to practical, successful, positive and constructive co-operation than health services both as regards curative services after a person has fallen ill and preventative services before a person falls ill. In this way one can expand the field to telecommunication services for example. It is a fact — and it is not merely I who am saying so — that many of the African countries do not as yet have the technical know-how and ability — and frequently do not have the capital — to afford the more modern telecommunication systems, or if they are in fact able to afford it, to operate them, or if they are in fact able to afford and

\* During the discussion of the Minister's budget vote



operate them, to install and maintain them on an effective cost basis. These are facts; it has nothing to do with black or white.

The same applies to agriculture and to food production. This too, is a sphere of life in which fruitful co-operation can take place through proper and joint planning of food and agricultural production in South Africa, and everything which goes with it.

Just consider the supply of water for a moment. If one looks at Southern Africa and listens to what the hon. the Minister of Water Affairs has to say about many of his schemes and projects, what does one discover? Quietly inserted between the lines and figures of the Water Affairs Vote one will see projects and dams for which provision is being made and which are being or are to be built in other countries or along commonly-shared rivers so that the whole of Southern Africa may benefit from them. This is a fact. Large parts of our country are arid. Parts of the country inhabited by the white people are arid and parts of the country inhabited by the black people are arid, and together we must plan to get the water from the water-rich areas to the arid areas so that we can establish factories, create work opportunities and create prosperity for us all.

The same applies to forestry. This country has developed a silvicultural technology. Today we are able to plant trees from sea level to 8 000 feet above sea level. For every level we have the right variety of tree. We are proud of this, and can share this knowledge with our neighbours and others if they are interested.

Let us consider transportation. What is a more important element of any infrastructure than transportation: railway, road and air transportation? There must be harbours which function properly, not harbours in which things lie rusting and accumulating for months. These must not be harbours where goods are never loaded or off-loaded and where fruit and meat lie rotting. A country needs harbours which function properly. These must be harbours with proper modern containerized systems. A country needs harbours and railways which are reliable and are properly maintained. A factory in Europe is not happy if the chrome which it has ordered will arrive there somewhere between 1 June and Christmas. It has workers whom it has to pay and it has a production programme to which it must adhere. And then many people probably wonder why countries well endowed with minerals do not make progress. Here is the simple answer. Their transport systems leave too much to be desired. Their infrastructures are inadequate. I do not wish to refer specifically to Africa, but Africa must really begin to hold its own now and remove the chips of inferiority from its shoulder. If it wants to play in the top league

of development, it must begin to realize that it has an inability to maintain its harbours and railways properly, to repair its roads and to take good care of the sluices of its dams. We understand the reasons for the economic problems of our continent. We have all been exploited by colonial powers. But we must guard against exploiting the past to conceal our own shortcomings and failings. We must face up to reality and the truth. It is high time grown men told one another candidly where the faults lie, and why Africa attracts so few investments from the private sectors of the industrial countries. I think it is time that was done. Africa finds itself in a critical position, *inter alia*, because some of its leaders themselves contribute to the being-cosseted syndrome which accords an inferior position to the black man. We do not begrudge the black man the opportunity of proving that he can achieve whatever the people of the industrialized countries are able to achieve but then their leaders must also do something about this from their side. From their side prejudices must also be overcome, and then the African leaders who rant and rave at South Africa with so much vehemence, must put a stop to this. Then they must not buy all the food for their Lusaka conferences in this country. They must buy it in other countries. I am saying this candidly this afternoon. One is slowly becoming tired of leaders who think they can feed their people by stirring up hatred and fomenting revolution against South Africa.

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But what is important here? What is important for us in Southern Africa in the spheres of agriculture, water provision, power and energy provision, telecommunications, transportation in its various facets, mineral production and the stabilization of mineral production prices etc.? In all these spheres we see that it is in the interests of Whites, Blacks, Coloureds and Asiatics that we should establish structures which can be agreed upon multilaterally, by way of treaties between states, and with which we can co-ordinate and implement development factors on the sub-continent, to the benefit of everyone. As regards these disciplines to which I have just referred, there are already several forms of co-operation in practice which actually need only to be properly structured and institutionalized by way of treaties between those countries which are interested in doing so. There is great interest in this connection. It is for this reason that we conferred recently in Port St. Johns with the Republics of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. The declaration which we issued there, read, *inter alia*, as follows:

The Governments of the Republics of Transkei, South Africa,

Bophuthatswana and Venda, fully aware of the forces threatening peace and stability in Southern Africa, are determined as a group to resist and stop all attempts from the outside to interfere in their affairs and impose solutions on Southern Africa by force. Together they will bend all their efforts to further socio-economic progress in their countries in Southern Africa as a whole.

Here we already have a declaration in intent in general terms by these four governments. Consequently the framework has already been created for the idea of a confederation or constellation of states in which the independent states of Southern Africa can co-operate with one another in respect of practical disciplines and by way of multilateral treaties. One can imagine, for example, that the following organizations can be established in Southern Africa, i.e. a transport commission, a telecommunications union, a food and agricultural organization, a water supply organization and a forestry organization. One could conceive of all these constructive structures coming into existence. Moreover, if we wish to make progress, we shall of course need a development bank and a development corporation.

These are important matters which were also broached and initiated at the Prime Minister's conference on 22 November 1979, to which there was a wonderful, positive and constructive reaction from our private sector, from Mr Oppenheimer through to Anton Rupert. There were people from all population groups present at that conference.

A new spirit of taking one another by the hand without wishing to oust one another, and in this way creating a future for Southern Africa. That is what confederation means to us. It is the natural growing together of countries towards co-operation in respect of practical disciplines, and of ultimately ascertaining whether they can also reach multilateral agreements in the political sphere to arrange matters such as citizenship and passport facilities.

I do not know what form this is going to take, when it is going to be done and how it is going to be done. All I am convinced of is that if everyone would cultivate a little more mutual trust, tolerance and understanding and maintain an equilibrium between the interests of Whites, Blacks, Coloureds and Asiatics in this country, there is nothing standing in the way of the creation of a Southern African confederation of states. Such a confederation would be able to regulate its external interests in respect of foreign relations, trade, defence and security mutually by way of treaty and so, too, ultimately the rights of individuals internally, can be

properly regulated by way of international treaties, so that Blacks, Coloureds, Asiatics and Whites can continue to exist safely and peacefully in this wonderful country. We have the raw materials, chrome, platinum, manganese, diamonds, copper, gold and water, and we have the technology. We are blessed with a great deal. What is lacking is a slightly greater measure of faith and a slightly greater measure of self assurance.

South Africa. (Republic) *House of Assembly Debates*, no 14 May 1980. Cols. 6654—6657, 6660—6662

**(ix) Extracts from a statement in Parliament by the South African Foreign Minister, the Hon. R.F. Botha, on 20 May 1980\***

The hon. member for Benoni supported the idea of close co-operation between South Africa and the black states. He readily foresaw the advantages of such co-operation if African states could overcome their political prejudices and liaise with South Africa in a pragmatic way. The hon. member pointed out the economic desperation of most African governments, and ascribed this to deficiencies in the administrations of those countries. He advocated a review of South Africa's foreign aid programme to African states. I wish to tell him that this should much rather be applied close to our own borders. I think the hon. member will agree with me, because the practical benefits for us then materialize so much closer to our borders. This country does not have the means to launch large programmes everywhere in the underdeveloped world, and moreover, "charity begins at home".

In future therefore, we shall, in my opinion, look first to those countries which became independent in our midst. We shall have to ensure that Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, although they differ drastically from us on many points of colour discrimination, can nevertheless in essence help us to develop the basic commonwealth of nations idea. We may not allow them to begin to feel that they are in a weaker position owing to their decision to become independent. We may not allow them to feel that they are being penalised because they became independent. Consequently I shall, as far as it is within my means, advocate that preference should be given to these countries over the black communities which are not yet independent, so that a feeling of frustration among the independent states does not arise. I am not saying that those who are not independent should be rebuffed, but if preference has to be given, it has to be given to Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda.

\* During discussion of the Minister's budget vote

The hon. member for Winburg pointed out the advantages which South Africa offers its neighbouring states. The miscellaneous economic aid which is, through co-operation, being made available to the benefit of the inhabitants of these countries, brings stability which would otherwise have been absent. Good neighbourliness, however, also entails obligations which have to be discharged by all individual States.

The vision of the hon. member for Geduld of a bastion of peace and progress in Southern Africa is an ideal which ought to be supported by all interest groups in South Africa. It offers security to all the inhabitants of the respective countries. It can be developed into an effective counter to the onslaught of ideological enemies. In this way we could possibly, in a constellation of states, get through to black Africa. A successful policy of co-operation with the rest of Africa will undoubtedly promote our own position in the Western community. I am grateful for the hon. member's sturdy contribution.

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The hon. member for Umlazi saw special merit in ample development aid to the TBV (Transkei, Bothuthatswana, Venda) countries in particular. The political existence of these countries stems from their earlier constitutional ties with South Africa. Up to now they have received no international recognition. This is a great dilemma for all of us, and it places additional restrictions on their means. The hon. member asked the valid question whether these circumstances did not perhaps place an additional responsibility upon South Africa to prevent, through the rendering of economic assistance, these states from becoming economic casualties. I want to assure the hon. member, as I have just done now, that the Government will consider the special circumstances with these countries with compassion and understanding. We should like to help these countries, within our means, to develop to the greatest advantage of their citizens, and also of all the inhabitants of the Southern African complex.

- (x) **Extract from a statement by the South African Prime Minister, the Hon. P.W. Botha, at the opening of the summit meeting between the Governments of South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, in Pretoria on 23 July 1980**

*A New Programme of Action to Promote a Constellation of States*

I now turn to a subject which will come up for discussion under various items on the agenda of this summit meeting. This is the proposed constellation of states in Southern Africa — an issue discussed in depth during the meeting my Cabinet colleagues and I held with leading South African businessmen in the Carlton Hotel in Johannesburg in November 1979.

As I pointed out on that occasion, the concept “constellation” does not primarily denote a formal organisation, but rather a loose grouping of states with common interests, developing mutual relationships and a willingness to extend areas of co-operation. The voluntary nature of this co-operation must be stressed, since the concept of a “constellation” specifically excludes any kind of satellite relationship among the constituents. The membership of such a constellation of Southern African states need not be confined to the four countries participating in this summit meeting, but can include any state in the sub-continent which recognises the existing economic and other interrelationship between itself and other states in Southern Africa, and wishes to co-operate in a regional context. Indeed, apart from the special relationship between the countries represented here today, there already exists a substantial measure of economic and other co-operation between the Republic of South Africa and various other Southern African countries. Examples of such co-operation can be found in the Rand Monetary Area and the Customs Union. In addition, comprehensive bilateral and multilateral relationships already exist between the Republic of South Africa and a number of other Southern African states in fields such as agriculture, finance, health, posts and telecommunications and transport.

In my view the time has now arrived to take the next major step towards a constellation of states in Southern Africa. I therefore wish to propose the launching of a new co-ordinated programme of action to this end by all states in Southern Africa which are prepared, in their own interests, to participate in one form or another in the development of such a constellation.

Ideally, this programme of action should entail a simultaneous advance on the four broad fronts of interstate political relations, economics, social affairs and security. As far as the four indepen-

dent states represented at this meeting are concerned, I am confident that significant progress will, in fact, be made in all four of these areas today and in the months ahead. However, in the development of a broader constellation also involving other Southern African states, I believe that the most logical and constructive way to proceed would be to build upon the existing economic interdependence between these states and to place the main emphasis at this stage on *economic* co-operation, leaving participating states free to reserve their position on certain political or other non-economic issues if they so desire.

It is in accordance with this approach that I wish to propose that a number of economic and financial issues relevant to the development of a Southern African constellation be discussed not only at this meeting but also with other possible participating states, and that early action be taken to implement specific proposals in this field which prove acceptable to the states concerned. This will clearly have to be a *multilateral* exercise and not merely unilateral action by the Republic of South Africa. In addition to the existing interstate arrangements, I would therefore envisage the formation of new multilateral committees to work out the details of the various further steps which will be required.

As far as the contribution of the Republic of South Africa to this process is concerned, the Cabinet has decided, with immediate effect, to appoint Dr Gerhard de Kock, Senior Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank and Special Economic Adviser to the Minister of Finance, as Co-ordinator of Constellation Affairs. Dr De Kock will continue to hold his present office in the Reserve Bank and in the Ministry of Finance, and will also remain Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry into the Monetary System and Monetary Policy in South Africa.

On constellation matters Dr De Kock will be responsible directly to me and to the Cabinet, and will work in close co-operation with the Ministers concerned and with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information. I have authorised him to enlist the aid of all government departments and other public sector entities to the full extent necessary to enable him to carry out his task. With a view to achieving the desired co-ordination, he will serve as Chairman of a Special Constellation Committee consisting of the chairmen and secretaries of a number of working parties which are now being formed to deal with specific economic aspects of constellation development. The working party chairmen already appointed are Dr S.S. Brand, Dr J.H. de Loor, Dr S.J. Kleu and Prof. J.A. Lombard. Further details of these new arrangements will be made available separately.

In launching this further programme of action; I propose that particular attention be paid to the following:

- Monetary arrangements, such as those involved in the Rand Monetary Area Agreement.
- The establishment of a multilateral Development Bank for Southern Africa; the rationalisation of the existing development corporations in the Republic of South Africa; and special arrangements to encourage small business enterprises.
- The fiscal and other financial relations between the central government of the Republic of South Africa and the various categories of other states in Southern Africa.
- Regional development, industrial decentralisation and Customs Union matters.
- Agricultural development and food production.

At the same time, increased emphasis will be placed on co-operation in the fields of transport, posts and telecommunications, energy, manpower utilisation, tourism, forestry and the utilisation of mineral and other natural resources.

In this whole process of economic development in Southern Africa, the role of the private sector will be vital. My own government's commitment to the encouragement of the free enterprise system and the utilisation of the market mechanism is well-known and has in recent years been demonstrated not only in our budgetary policy but also in many other ways. As far as the other states participating in this meeting are concerned, they will have an opportunity today to restate their policies in this regard, and possibly we shall be able to present a common front on this important issue.

I fully realise that in order to obtain the active co-operation of the private sector in the development of a constellation of states, much more is required from my own Government and from other participating Governments than mere declarations and regular consultations with business leaders. We shall have to make more rapid progress in removing unnecessary restrictions on economic freedom and in replacing direct economic controls of a socialistic nature by more market-oriented policies. These are essential conditions for providing a framework within which the system of free enterprise can make the maximum contribution to economic development and a rising standard of living for all the residents of Southern Africa. It remains my Government's firm intention to contribute to such a framework, and a large part of the new programme of action I have announced today will be directed to this end.



There should be no question mark behind the dedication of the four Governments present here today to establish a system of goodwill and co-operation between our peoples. This is the only possible road to ensure freedom and welfare, not only for ourselves, but for the generations that will follow in our footsteps. I have no doubt that today's discussions will represent an important step in this direction.

**(xi) Joint press statement issued by the Governments of South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, following the summit meeting in Pretoria on 20 October 1980**

Representatives of the Governments of South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, as well as observers from South West Africa/Namibia, held discussions in Pretoria today as a follow-up to the Summit Meeting of Heads of Government on 23 July 1980, to discuss various aspects of economic co-operation.

Special attention was given to formulating economic guidelines on development co-operation on a sub-regional basis within the Southern African region and ways and means of promoting small business enterprises within the region.

Agreement in principle on important policy matters and implementation procedures was reached and announcements in this regard will be made shortly.

Texts for Items (x) and (xi) supplied by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information

**(xii) Extracts from the opening address by the South African Prime Minister, the Hon. P.W. Botha, to the Annual Congress of the Associated Chambers of Commerce in Johannesburg on 21 October 1980**

*Progress in the Development of a Constellation of States in Southern Africa*

It is against this background of stability and development that I propose to address the major part of my remarks tonight to the progress being made in the development of a constellation of states in Southern Africa. That this progress is both rapid and far-reaching will be evident from certain announcements I shall make in the course of my address.

Following on the Carlton conference with top businessmen in November last year, a summit meeting of the Heads of Government of South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda was held in July this year, at which agreement was reached on various aspects of a constellation action programme.

To expedite matters from the South African side, the Cabinet at that time also appointed a Co-ordinator of Constellation Affairs who, with the assistance of four working parties of top officials, has since been actively engaged in the further development of the constellation initiative. The chairman and secretaries of these four working parties form what is known as the Special Constellation Committee under the Chairmanship of the Co-ordinator, who, in turn, reports directly to me and the Cabinet.

In accordance with my instructions, priority was given to three related subjects:

- The first was the new proposed approach of regional economic development co-operation transcending political borders.
- The second was the establishment of a multilateral or multiregional Development Bank for Southern Africa.
- And the third was the promotion of small business enterprises.

Such was the progress made, that I was already able on 1 September to announce the principles on which my Government's approach to these three issues would be based.<sup>1</sup> In the ensuing weeks more specific and detailed proposals regarding the new regional development strategy and the promotion of small business enterprises were put forward by the Special Constellation Committee and approved by the Cabinet on 16

1. Included in the Prime Minister's address to the Transvaal National Party Congress in Pretoria on 1 September, 1980

September as a basis for discussion with the various independent and self-governing national states.

Intensive discussions on these and related matters were held by the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr Koornhof, and members of the Special Constellation Committee with the Chief Ministers and/or other representatives of all the self-governing national states last Friday, 17 October. And similar discussions were held yesterday, 20 October, under the chairmanship of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, Mr Pik Botha, with Cabinet Ministers and other senior representatives of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda, as well as with observers from South West Africa/Namibia. The delegation of the Republic of South Africa at yesterday's discussions included the Deputy Minister of Finance, the Minister of Industries, Commerce and Tourism, the Co-ordinator of Constellation Affairs and other members of the Special Constellation Committee.

It is customary all over the world, after discussions of this kind, to issue public statements to the effect that the talks were "frank" and "useful", and that they were conducted "in a friendly spirit", and so on. I can go much further on this occasion and state that these discussions resulted not only in agreement on the general desirability of extended economic co-operation among all the states involved, but also in agreement *in principle* on proceeding with all due speed on the three fronts I have mentioned, namely

- regional economic development co-operation transcending political boundaries;
- the establishment of a Development Bank for Southern Africa as a joint multilateral or multiregional institution; and
- the promotion of small business enterprises.

This represents progress indeed. As I have indicated before, I believe that the most logical and constructive way to proceed in developing a constellation of Southern African states is to build upon the existing economic interdependence between these states and to place the main emphasis at this stage on economic co-operation, leaving participating states free to reserve their position on political, constitutional or other non-economic issues if they so desire. This is precisely what we are doing now, and I believe the favourable impact on the economies of all the regions involved will be enormous.

Naturally, apart from the constitutional-political differences

which may continue to exist, there are still many matters of detail on the economic issues which have to be thrashed out and on which there will inevitably be conflicting opinions or, at least, differing shades of emphasis. It would be naive therefore, to minimise the difficulties and pitfalls which lie ahead. Nevertheless, we have now reached agreement in principle on our broad economic strategy and we have jointly set in motion certain processes which are bound to gain considerable momentum in the weeks and months ahead.

#### *Co-operation with the private sector*

Now that these decisions on the inter-governmental level have been taken, the way has been cleared for us to resume discussions and negotiations with private sector institutions and bodies on the role they might wish to play in the development of a constellation of states in Southern Africa. If there is one point on which there is complete unanimity among the various states involved, it is that the private sector has a crucial part to play in the economic development of this sub-continent and that it must be encouraged to do so in every possible way. It was in this spirit that the Carlton Conference was held last year, and it is in this spirit that all the states concerned have now resolved to proceed.

#### *Regional development co-operation transcending political borders*

Let me deal first with the new agreed policy of regional economic development co-operation across the political borders of the states involved. I believe that the adoption of this totally new approach will prove to have been an historic event with far-reaching beneficial effects on Southern Africa and all its inhabitants.

A major structural characteristic of economic development in Southern Africa in the past has been the unbalanced distribution of such development among the different areas of the region. To make matters worse, these long-standing growth disparities have in recent years been aggravated by the structural escalation of energy costs. For the mineral-rich areas in the region, this burden has been more than offset by the gains derived from the sharp increases in the price of gold and other minerals. Indeed, on an overall assessment, the South African economy has been strengthened rather than weakened by these structural changes. But for the less developed areas of the region the adverse effects of these changes have been serious.

This situation in Southern Africa is almost a microcosm of the international economic situation at present. In the world as a whole, the rise in energy costs has brought about a significant redistribution of income and wealth between countries. The oil-producing countries have benefited from this process and the so-called "non-oil-producing developing countries" — including most of the Third World — have been dealt a severe blow. A major economic challenge now facing the world is how to "recycle" funds for development from the enriched oil-producing nations to the stricken developing countries.

For us in Southern Africa it has also become vitally important to redress the existing area growth disparities, and to "recycle" the savings generated in the rapidly growing areas to investment in the less rapidly growing regions.

It is, of course, well known that we have for years been actively promoting economic growth inside the various national states as such. But we have learned from hard experience that the scope for such economic decentralisation is limited, and that the geographical location of material growth is determined in the final analysis by economic laws and requirements, few of which happen to coincide in their effect with political borders as such. The harsh reality in South Africa is that economic activity is still concentrated mainly in four large metropolitan "growth poles" — the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area, Durban-Pinetown, the Cape Peninsula and Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage. New decentralisation strategies are therefore urgently required.

The problem cannot be solved merely by an extension of the programme of land consolidation beyond the 1975 proposals in terms of the 1936 Land and Trust Act. The reality which must be faced, is that it is impossible to consolidate the geographical area of each national group in such a way that it will become economically viable on its own, or that it will satisfy the material aspirations of its people within its geographical boundaries. Less than 20 per cent of the income of the people of most national states is currently generated inside the geographical areas of the states themselves. In carrying out its consolidation programme and in meeting its commitments in this respect, the Government will therefore do so within the context of the new regional economic development policy. This places the whole land consolidation issue in a new perspective.

In essence, the new regional economic strategy consists of economic development co-operation across the political borders of states in regions functionally defined to meet the requirements for economic development, and in which so-called "balancing

growth poles” can be developed to counter the magnetic attraction of the existing four large metropolitan areas.

.....

#### *The Development Bank for Southern Africa*

In the implementation of this new approach to regional economic development, a key role is envisaged for the proposed new Development Bank of Southern Africa. The Bank will be able to give concrete expression to the desire of the various states to co-operate in a sober and confidence-inspiring programme of growth in the less developed areas of the entire Southern African region. It will also give expression to the desire of the private sector to contribute positively to the success of such an economic approach. The Bank will furthermore provide continuous opportunities for the identification of the different kinds of problems which are to be found in any multinational programme of development, and it should be possible to consider and treat these problems on a largely non-political basis.

Although, as I have already indicated, the principle of the establishment of the Development Bank has been agreed to by the various national states, its precise organisational structure and functions are still being investigated, and on all these matters of detail further negotiations will have to be conducted with all interested parties.

#### *The promotion of small business enterprises*

This brings me to the third matter on which agreement has been reached, namely the promotion of small business enterprises.

Underlying the importance of this aspect of constellation development is the failure of past economic growth in Southern Africa to absorb adequately the rapid rate of growth in the economically active population. Economists are agreed that methods of production in South Africa have over the past three decades become increasingly capital intensive rather than labour intensive. This means that any given rate of growth in output requires increasing proportions of capital and decreasing proportions of manpower. In an area with a rapidly growing population such as South Africa, this is a formula for trouble. It means a worsening of economic dualism in the region — rising per capita incomes among some of the people together with growing unemployment among masses of other people. It is the kind of trend which provides grateful material for Marxist slogans of “capitalist

exploitation". But the most important point is that it is all really unnecessary and uneconomic.

'n Sleutelprobleem in hierdie verband is dat die vinnig toenemende bevolking van Suid-Afrika gemiddeld nog nie geskoold genoeg is om ten volle opgeneem te word in die tegnologies ingewikkelde produksieprosesse wat in Suid-Afrika ingestel is nie. Die Regering het hierdie struktuurvraagstuk deur verskeie deskundige groepe laat ondersoek, onder andere deur die Wiehahn- en Riekert-kommissies, die Brand/De Waal-paneel en die Kleu-komitee. Hierdie deskundiges is dit eens dat ons strukturele indiensnemingsprobleem 'n hele reeks oorsake het, waaronder die volgende:

- Die relatief lae peil van rentekoerse, wat kapitaalintensiewe produksiemetodes bevoordeel;
- Die feit dat dit goedkoper en makliker vir groot as vir klein ondernemings is om finansiële kapitaal te bekom;
- Die hoë koste verbonde aan die verkryging en behoud van geskoolde mannekrag;
- Die groot aantal statute en ander regulasies wat dit moeilik maak om toegang tot die geskoolde arbeidsmark te verkry en om sake-ondernemings op te rig;
- Die gevolglike gebrekkige aansporing vir jong mense om nywerheids- en handelsopleiding te bekom en vir werkgewers om sodanige opleiding op die gewenste skaal te voorsien.

.....  
*(The Prime Minister stressed the importance of the development of small business enterprises to provide employment opportunities. Aptly summed up by Dr Anton Rupert at the Carlton conference; "in thinking of creating new jobs we must think small".)*

Against this background it is understandable that one of the first initiatives of the Special Constellation Committee was to put before me and the Cabinet a comprehensive proposal for the promotion of small business enterprises. Following the acceptance by the Cabinet of this proposal and the agreement reached in principle on this issue at the recent meetings held with the independent and self-governing national states, I can now announce that the following two related actions will be taken in this regard:

- The first is the introduction of an expanded programme budget for the financial support of approved initiatives among both public and private bodies concerned with the provision of training and guidance to small enterprises and with related research. This budget programme will be administered by a Programme Advisory Board of experts drawn

from both the private and the public sector and led by an Executive Chairman, who will be assisted by a small secretariat of two or three qualified persons provided by the private sector. The funds will be appropriated through the budget vote of the Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism. The Advisory Board will be asked to make recommendations not only in regard to the appropriation of the available funds, but also with respect to policy formulation, programme budgeting, co-ordination of actions, and any other problem affecting the growth of small business.

- The second action is to accept the proposal made by Dr Anton Rupert at the Carlton Meeting last November that a Small Business Development Corporation be established as a joint undertaking by the private sector and the state. The initial share capital of the Corporation is expected to be put at R100 million, of which the private sector is expected to take up at least R50 million. Negotiations in this regard are in process.

The Government will combine its participation in the new Corporation with the rationalisation of a number of existing state corporations concerned with development. These are the Coloured Development Corporation, the Indian Development Corporation, and those small business activities of the Economic Development Corporation (for Blacks) which cannot be decentralised to the various Development Corporations in the national states concerned. The intention is to transfer the relevant assets of these corporations to the newly established Small Business Development Corporation, retaining the existing organisational structures as regional offices. Appropriate arrangements are also being made regarding the position of the existing Boards and staff of these State Corporations.

The transfer of assets will be effected at values which should render the current income on these assets reasonably remunerative. To reduce further the fixed cost burden on the new Corporation and to allow it to keep down its own lending and underwriting rates, the Government will take up part of its holding in the Corporation on special terms and/or make interest free loans to it. The Government will also appoint a small number of Directors on the Board of the new Corporation.

The functions of this new non-racial and privately managed but publicly supported corporation will, on the whole, be complementary to and not competitive with the existing services rendered to small businesses by commercial banks and other financial institutions. Among the various services envisaged are the



guaranteeing of loans from banks required for working capital, the provision of risk capital on a temporary or minority share holder basis and the provision of end-use supervision and managerial guidance on projects financed or guaranteed by the Corporation.

One of the main purposes of the Government representation on the Board of the new Corporation is to ensure that the development services to the Coloured and Indian population groups are improved by the new arrangement. It is firmly expected that, although the new Corporation will be non-racial, the expansion in both its financial resources and the range of its services will in practice result in large net benefits to all population groups. As far as black residents of the national states are concerned, the various National Development Corporations will in the first instance be enabled to assume more of the development responsibilities in their respective states, but residents of these states will be perfectly free to benefit from the services of both the new Budget Programme and the new Small Business Development Corporation if they find it useful. This applies equally to other states in Southern Africa. The new programme is directed towards the economic interests, rather than the political status, of the people of Southern Africa.

*Emphasis on economic aspects of constellation*

I am naturally gratified at the progress being made with constellation development. Ideally, the longer-term programme of developing a constellation of states in Southern Africa should entail a simultaneous advance on the four broad fronts of interstate political relations, economics, social affairs and security. I remain confident that significant progress will be made in all four of these areas in the months and years ahead. But in the meantime, while the evolutionary constitutional and political changes are being worked out and negotiated in the proper way and through the proper channels — a process which must inevitably take time — there is no need to postpone or retard economic co-operation.

It is not putting the cart before the horse to proceed as rapidly as possible now in developing the economic dimension of a constellation of states in Southern Africa. Certainly, in the final analysis the constitutional-political, social, security and other dimensions are also crucial to the success of the constellation programme and require our full and urgent attention. There is no need to remind me of that! But all of us living in this sub-

continent have everything to gain and little to lose by joining forces now in developing the economy of Southern Africa, including particularly the less-developed regions.

It would be extremely short-sighted of us as political and business leaders to refrain from proceeding now with economic development co-operation on the grounds that we do not yet see eye to eye on certain important constitutional-political or other non-economic issues. Let us differ on some of these issues if we must. Let the constitutional-political debate continue. But let us cooperate now in combating poverty, unemployment, malnutrition and deprivation. And let us make full use of the rich natural and other resources Providence has granted us, in raising the standard of living and the quality of life of all sections of our diverse population.

Text supplied by the Associated Chambers of Commerce, Johannesburg

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## NEGOTIATIONS ON SWA/NAMIBIA

### Further report of the UN Secretary-General, dated 24 November 1980, concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978)

1. On 31 March 1980 I reported to the Security Council (S/13862)<sup>1</sup> concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978)<sup>2</sup> on the question of Namibia. In that report I described discussions undertaken by a mission led by Mr Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, in Southern Africa during February and March. Following detailed technical discussions on the proposed demilitarized zone, I concluded that, in the light of the mission's findings, UNTAG could, with the co-operation and support of all concerned, function and fulfil its obligations satisfactorily on the basis of the arrangements discussed. I also stated that we had come to a point where the necessary political decisions had to be taken to move the matter from the stage of discussion to the stage of implementation.

2. On 12 May 1980 I received a letter from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, Mr R.F. Botha (S/13935).<sup>3</sup> Mr Botha reiterated that South Africa sought an international settlement of the Namibian question. He stated that South Africa had tested and evaluated the feasibility of the demilitarized zone and, in the context of its effort to make the zone a feasible proposition, wished to receive information on four matters. Having also mentioned certain additional subjects, he concluded by stating that as soon as the issues raised in his letter had been resolved the South African Government would co-operate in implementing Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

1. See *Southern Africa Record* no. 20, August 1980, pp. 15-23

2. *Op. Cit.* no. 14, December 1978, pp. 43 and 54, respectively

3. *Op. Cit.* no. 20, August 1980, pp. 24-26

3. After consultations, I replied to Mr Botha's letter on 20 June 1980 (S/14011).<sup>4</sup> In my letter, I dealt fully with the four points which he had raised relating to the demilitarized zone. I stated that in view of the information which I had thus provided upon these questions, which were those remaining to be dealt with after the recent United Nations Mission to Southern Africa, I hoped that South Africa would now be in a position to co-operate in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). I also dealt with the additional matters to which he had referred. I reiterated that the principle of impartiality had been, and would be, consistently followed in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and recalled in this connection my report of 29 August 1978 (S/12827)<sup>5</sup> which stated that, "in performing its functions, UNTAG will act with complete impartiality. In order that the proposal may be effectively implemented, it is expected that the Administrator-General and all other officials will exhibit the same impartiality". Finally, I reiterated my belief in the urgency of arriving at a peaceful solution to a question which had preoccupied the international community for many years, and whose unresolved condition had led to tragic loss of life and destruction in Namibia and throughout the whole region.

4. On 29 August I received a further letter (S/14139)<sup>6</sup> from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, Mr R.F. Botha. This letter, *inter alia*, contained a number of "assumptions" made by South Africa in regard to the matters described in my letter of 20 June. The assumptions related to certain of the military and technical subjects which I had clarified, including the functioning of selected locations in the demilitarized zone, the return of SWAPO personnel after the elections, the commitments of Angola and Zambia, and the deployment of UNTAG's military component. Mr Botha then dealt at length with the question of impartiality. In conclusion he stated that, on the basis of his assumptions, and my confirmation, the South African Government stood ready to discuss with me the composition of UNTAG, the status of forces agreement and the setting in motion of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

5. Following extensive consultations, I replied to this letter on 19 September 1980 (S/14184).<sup>7</sup> I stated that, taking all factors of the situation into account, as well as the need to move forward

4. *Op. Cit.* no. 21, October 1980, pp. 1-4

5. *Op. Cit.* no. 14, December 1978, pp. 9, 19

6. *Op. Cit.* no. 21, October 1980, pp. 5-12

7. *Ibid.* p. 23

without further delay, it was my belief that we should now proceed with the implementation of the United Nations plan. I proposed to Mr Botha that I send a team of senior officials to South Africa to discuss with the Government the setting of a time-frame and other modalities for such implementation. I recalled that I had, on many occasions, expressed my deep concern at the cycle of violence resulting from the unresolved nature of the Namibian question. I reiterated that the best way to stop such violence was to establish, as soon as possible, the cease-fire which is the first step in the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

6. Mr Botha replied on 22 September (S/14185)<sup>8</sup> suggesting that the United Nations Mission visit South Africa during the period 20 to 27 October 1980. He assumed that at the outset the matters raised in his letter of 29 August would be discussed. I replied on 25 September (S/14202) stating that, while I would have preferred an earlier date, I had noted the reasons for the suggestion of 20 October, and would be arranging for the United Nations team to be in Pretoria on that date.

7. After I had held consultations with the Security Council on 15 October 1980, the United Nations Mission departed for South Africa. The Mission, led by the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr Brian Urquhart, consisted also of Mr Abdulrahim Farah, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Questions, Mr Martti Ahtisaari, my Special Representative for Namibia, Lieutenant-General D. Prem Chand, Commander-Designate of UNTAG's military component, and a group of senior political and military experts from the Secretariat. The Mission had discussions with the South African Government from 20 to 25 October in Pretoria.

8. At the opening meeting, Mr Urquhart first summarized the course of events since the visit of the previous Mission to South Africa in March 1980. He emphasized that the outstanding matters remaining for discussion, as confirmed in the published records, occupied a very narrow spectrum and that consensus had been reached in regard to virtually all the technical aspects of resolution 435 (1978) and the demilitarized zone. He explained that the Mission was precluded from re-opening any matters which had previously been agreed. While the Mission was willing to discuss the various matters alluded to in Mr Botha's letter of 29

8. *Op. Cit.* no. 21, October 1980, p. 23

August, Mr Urquhart wished from the outset to emphasize the grave concern felt by the United Nations membership as a whole, and by the Secretary-General, in regard to the delays which had affected the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). These delays could additionally complicate the search for a peaceful settlement of the issue, as well as lead to a further escalation of the violence resulting from its unresolved nature. Many of the questions that had been raised by the South African Government relating to implementation could be definitively dealt with only in the context of a firm time-frame for a cease-fire and the emplacement of UNTAG in Namibia. In this connection, the matters raised by South Africa in its comments upon the impartiality of the United Nations were inextricably linked to the need for an implementation time-frame. Mr Urquhart, moreover, recalled that South Africa also had duties which required strict impartiality under the Settlement Proposal. In the light of all these considerations Mr Urquhart emphasized the primary importance of establishing a time-frame.

9. In his opening statement, Dr Brand Fourie, Director-General for Foreign Affairs, said that South Africa, too, was concerned over the delays in implementing resolution 435 (1978). He did not feel that it would be constructive during the forthcoming discussions, however, to seek to allocate responsibility for such delays. South Africa also saw the need for a time-frame for implementation but believed that this could not be achieved without resolving the remaining issues to which reference had been made in the letter of 29 August. He referred in particular to the question of impartiality and equal treatment of the parties and said that a deep suspicion existed among the Namibian people that the United Nations was not impartial and could not therefore enjoy their confidence in supervising and controlling the free and fair elections to which all parties were committed. In this connection, the South African Government hoped that the United Nations Mission would make time available to see representatives of those political parties who travelled to Pretoria from Windhoek for this purpose. Mr Urquhart explained that the Mission would, as was the practice of the United Nations, do its best to make time available, if requested by any Namibians, to see them during its stay in Pretoria. He then set out the position of the United Nations in regard to the technical aspects of implementation which were the subjects of "assumptions" in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of the South African letter of 29 August.

10. On these points, Mr Fourie stated that South Africa had taken note of the Missions's comments and was grateful for the clarifications which had been given. On the question of deployment, he emphasized the importance South Africa attributed to the deployment of UNTAG's military component in the entire demilitarized zone. He said that this issue was closely linked to the question of the creation of trust and confidence, which was, in his view, associated with the question of partiality. It was of paramount importance to overcome this problem if implementation were to be agreed upon.

11. The United Nations Mission pointed out that the establishment of trust and confidence was a subjective and imprecise criterion. If any party sought to use it as a pretext for delay, the implementation of resolution 435 would be seriously undermined. The Mission strongly expressed the opinion that the South African viewpoint should not imply the introduction of a general reservation to prior agreements. The Mission was assured that no such reservation was contemplated and it reiterated, once again, the need for a time-frame for implementation.

12. Mr Urquhart then dealt with the question of impartiality in regard to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). He said that impartiality had two aspects: undertakings which the United Nations may reasonably require of the South African Administration so as to ensure the impartial discharge of its responsibilities under the Settlement Proposal (S/12636),<sup>9</sup> and those which the United Nations would wish to adopt in order that its impartiality as the supervisor of free and fair elections would be manifest. Mr Urquhart recalled that UNTAG had been established by the Security Council. The Settlement Proposal and resolution 435 (1978) contained full provisions for the holding of free and fair elections under United Nations supervision and control. Resolution 435 (1978) would be the governing resolution for the conduct of the elections and was therefore solidly based on provisions for the fair and equal treatment of all parties. The Secretary-General had given repeated assurances of United Nations impartiality in the conduct of the elections. All participants in the political process would, at the commencement of the transition period and thereafter, be placed on an equal footing by UNTAG, which would be directly responsible for implementation. Upon agreement on implementation, including an early

9. See *Southern Africa Record*, no. 12, May 1978, pp. 25-30



date for cease-fire and emplacement of UNTAG, appropriate measures would need to be taken to support and ensure such an approach by both the United Nations and South Africa.

13. Mr Fourie stated that the discussions had made it clear that lack of trust was the main obstacle in the way of implementation of resolution 435 (1978). He said that he believed that the internal parties had emphasized that obstacle when they had called on the Mission. He repeated that if South Africa were to proceed to implementation a solution to this problem must be found.

14. The Mission explained to the South African Government the situation regarding the composition of the UNTAG military component. Mr Urquhart described the normal processes of consultation and emphasized that final decisions on composition were taken by the Security Council on the basis of proposals by the Secretary-General. The Mission also held discussions with the South African Government regarding the draft status of forces agreement and identified the remaining minor matters on which agreement would be sought upon a decision being taken to implement resolution 435 (1978).

15. In his final statement on 24 October Mr Urquhart reiterated, once again, the pressing need for a South African response to the Mission's repeated request for an agreement on the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) including, in particular, an early date for the cease-fire and the emplacement of UNTAG. He referred to the deep concern of the United Nations membership as a whole and of the African states in particular over the protracted delays. On the residual questions, as well as on the matter of creating confidence, Mr Urquhart said that he believed that progress had been achieved during the talks with the South African Government and that no insurmountable obstacles should remain, if the political will to proceed were present.

16. During the concluding phase of meetings with the South African Government, discussion focused upon the question of means to facilitate the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) within a specified time-frame and in a context which would deal with any remaining concerns. In this connection, views were exchanged on the subject of a possible pre-implementation meeting.

17. At the end of the Mission, Mr Farah and Mr Ahtisaari travelled to inform the current Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity, and the Presidents or Prime Ministers of the Front-Line States and Nigeria, concerning the discussions in Pretoria, and to brief the President of SWAPO. Consultations also continued with the Government of South Africa which, on 21 November, stated that it gave its assent to the conclusions which are set out in paragraphs 18 to 24 below. While assent was also given by the other parties consulted to the course of action there proposed, concern was expressed that if the time-frame for starting implementation were linked even indirectly to the issue of trust and confidence, there could be the risk of a further and unacceptable delay. In this connection, I have set out the position taken by my Representatives in Pretoria in paragraph 11 above. I am deeply aware of the concern of the international community over the all-to-long postponement of a solution to the question of Namibia. I believe, however, that we may have reached a decisive phase in the long and difficult effort to resolve this question. I hope, therefore, that all concerned will now be prepared to move forward boldly and in good faith along the lines now suggested in order to ensure a sequence of events leading to the start of implementation of resolution 435 (1978) in March 1981, and independence by the end of 1981. In the consultations which I have undertaken since the return of the Mission with the Governments of the five Western members of the contact group, they have pledged their support for the course of action proposed and in particular for the time-frame set out below. They have also emphasized that they will continue to use their good offices to this end.

#### **Conclusions**

18. It is of vital importance that the independence of Namibia should be achieved in 1981, in accordance with Security Council resolution 435 (1978). In order to achieve this aim a date for the cease-fire and a start of implementation should be set in the early part of 1981.

19. One of the main obstacles to progress in the negotiations hitherto has been acute mutual distrust and lack of confidence. The Mission was informed by the South African Government that this problem in itself affects the setting of a date for implementation. It was also informed that, if this obstacle can be overcome, the end of 1981 would be a realistic target date for the independence of Namibia.

20. A means of facilitating agreement and of creating the necessary climate of confidence and understanding would be a pre-implementation multiparty meeting in which the parties concerned in the envisaged election would be included. There is general agreement that this meeting should be held under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

21. There have recently been a number of initiatives and approaches from various quarters for such a meeting based on the United Nations plan, in conformity with Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and other practical proposals. Such a meeting could facilitate the implementation of that resolution by discussing relevant aspects of implementation with the purpose of securing the co-operation of all concerned. In this connection it will be recalled that, under the Settlement Proposal, the task of drawing up and adopting a constitution is the function of the Constituent Assembly.

22. It would be understood that the proposed meeting would be held in the context of an agreed time-frame, with a view to the parties themselves assisting in resolving difficulties created by distrust and lack of confidence, South Africa having reaffirmed its continuing role as the interlocutor under resolution 435 (1978).

23. In the expectation that the problem of confidence can be overcome by the holding of such a meeting, and subject to a satisfactory arrangement concerning the composition of UNTAG, I would, on the basis of the discussions recently held in Pretoria and after the necessary consultations, propose March 1981 for the commencement of implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

24. Accordingly, the intention would be to hold a pre-implementation meeting from 7 to 14 January 1981 under the auspices and Chairmanship of the United Nations. The basis of the meeting would conform to the formula agreed upon during bilateral discussions held earlier this year on the question of "direct talks". Accordingly, South Africa and SWAPO have been contacted concerning the composition of the respective delegations that would participate in the meeting. I have also contacted the Front-Line States and Nigeria, the OAU and the contact group of five Western States and about the sending of observers.

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