SA Reconciliation Barometer 2012

TICKING TIME BOMB OR DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND?

Youth and Reconciliation in South Africa

Cover photo – Text books destroyed: These textbooks are waiting
to be destroyed and burnt at Mass Tech College, formerly known
as Kwena Moloto College, in Seshego, Limpopo. 24 June 2012.

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Ticking Time Bomb or Demographic Dividend? Youth and Reconciliation in South Africa

SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey: 2012 Report

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THE INSTITUTE
FOR JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION

Open Society Foundation for South Africa

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ACRONYMS

AMPS	All Media Products Survey
ANA	Annual National Assessments
ANC	African National Congress
ANOVA	analysis of variance
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CEE	Commission on Employment Equity
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DA	Democratic Alliance
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
EA	enumerator area
EE	Employment Equity
GCRO	Gauteng City-Region Observatory
GDP	gross domestic product
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IES	Income and Expenditure Survey
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
KAS	Konrad Adenauer Foundation
LSM	living standards measure
MTBPS	Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement
NDP	National Development Plan
NMMU	Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University
NPC	National Planning Commission
NYDA	National Youth Development Agency
SAPS	South African Police Service
SOE	state-owned enterprise
StatsSA	Statistics South Africa
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
VAP	voting-age population

IN MEMORY OF
HECTOR
PETERSON
AND ALL OTHER
YOUNG HEROES
AND HEROINES
OF OUR STRUGGLE
WHO LAID DOWN
THEIR LIVES FOR
FREEDOM, PEACE
AND DEMOCRACY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For decades in apartheid South Africa, youth and young people were looked to as the champions of a fair, equitable and democratic future. Within the liberation struggle, young activists in diverse corners of the country defied the writ of apartheid law, challenged complacent elders, fled their homes into exile and were shot down in the streets – and inspired, in the words we hear so often, hope for the future and the promise of better leadership.

Perhaps in our commemoration we sometimes run the risk of being overly nostalgic. But certainly the way we think – and talk – about youth in South Africa seems to have taken a dramatic turn. When COSATU general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi referred to the country's current volatile mix of 'unemployment, grinding poverty and deepening inequalities' as a ticking time bomb after acrimonious clashes between organised unionists and opposition political party members in May, this image quickly became emblematic of our youth – the unemployed and disenfranchised, provocateurs of violent service delivery protests, and guileless pawns in political plays between business, government, politicians and organised labour. Increasingly, young people are being portrayed as personifications of their circumstances rather than purveyors of dynamism and change. In a country split by deep economic inequality and extreme poverty, crippled by a faltering education system, and unable to create and sustain new jobs, the young – together with the social context they represent – have in the words of the National Planning Commission (NPC) become our 'single greatest risk to social stability', 'likely to rebel if left with no alternative but unemployment and poverty' and a potential 'hazard and a lost resource to society'.

This, however, is not how young South Africans see themselves, and it raises questions about how much we really understand about a critical demographic that is treated with both enormous expectations and deep trepidation. Young South Africans regard themselves as confident, active and creative. They are optimistic about the future, but also sceptical on many fronts – they question the motives and work of political parties and the extent that leadership cares about their views, are eager about their economic prospects, are confident that the country will unite and move forward, and in some ways, have begun to challenge and change the ways in which they relate to their peers across historical dividing lines.

This year's Reconciliation Barometer report focuses on youth attitudes emerging from round 12 of this nationally representative public opinion survey, conducted annually by the IJR since 2003.

Until recently, it has been a challenge to measure and analyse the attitudes of the 'born-free' generation, but this is becoming increasingly possible as those born during and after the democratic transition begin to reach the age of majority. On some issues, there is very little difference between the attitudes of youth and older generations. However, other indicators show fractures in opinion, emerging shifts and signals of change that may be yet to come.

While many public institutions continue to earn high levels of public support and confidence, this endorsement is lower among racial minority groups. Youth appear less likely than adults to trust that national leaders will act in the best interests of the country, yet also believe more firmly that they have the ability to influence public officials and decision-makers, although the ways they intend to do so are not always clear.

Young people are also extremely optimistic about their future economic prospects – perhaps overly so, given the country's relatively lacklustre performance in creating and sustaining job growth. Some youth appear cynical about workplace transformation programmes, which they believe to be significant obstacles to labour force entry.

Consensus remains among many South Africans about the historical truths of the country's apartheid past, but divides are evident among both youth and adults and across race lines about whether social change is possible given current inequality, the lasting economic impact of apartheid's legacy and obligations of restitution to victims.

And while many young people still associate strongly with the same identity groups as their parents' generation – constructed around language, ethnicity and gender – they also demonstrate growing approval for racial integration and an interest in meeting and learning more about others. Critically, youth are also more likely to build stronger relationships across these divides.

Reconciliation Barometer results also, however, show reason for caution. Broadly speaking, young people seem even more reticent than older generations to engage in multi-racial party politics. Other pockets of opinion appear to signal growing cynicism and conservatism – about the capacity and integrity of government and leadership, black economic empowerment and other transformation initiatives, and the extent and profound impact of apartheid. These deserve careful scrutiny, a watchful eye and careful tracking going forward. As potential social faultlines of the future, they also require dedicated attention alongside current imperatives for urgent economic change.

South Africa's youth are much more than the ticking time bombs or demographic dividend than they have been reduced to in our recent public discourse. It is important that we address the nuanced and complex challenges young people face with the same energy, creativity and innovation that they see in themselves.

I.
INTRODUCTION

In a keynote address at an international policy conference in May, Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) general secretary Zwelinzima Vavi described South Africa's current 'political reality' as a 'ticking time bomb of unemployment, grinding poverty and deepening inequalities'.

While leadership and elites celebrate the 'political medals for the 18th year' as well as the 'economic jewellery over the past 300 years of colonialism, including now more painfully, the 18 years of our democracy', young South Africans – Vavi warned – make up 72% of the unemployed. Some are at the forefront of violent service delivery protests. Others have been the targets of a politically motivated 'race to the bottom' with organised workers (Vavi, 2012a). These comments were a response in part to a clash between COSATU members and young Democratic Alliance (DA) supporters at a rally organised by the political party in Johannesburg the previous day in support of the proposed youth wage subsidy, which would see short-term government grants paid to businesses employing wage-disadvantaged 18–29-year-olds in a bid to encourage increased labour market participation (National Treasury, 2011). After the tragic killing of 34 striking workers and local community members at a Lonmin mine in Marikana on 16 August, Vavi qualified this earlier statement: 'we now must talk of *exploding* bombs' (Vavi, 2012b).

Vavi's characterisation of South Africa's ticking time bomb has very quickly become an emblem attached to the young people of this country, a reason for fear and trepidation, and a harbinger of things to come. Ebrahim-Khalil Hassen reminds us that 'ticking time bombs' overthrew governments in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, and cites recent forecasts by Moeletsi Mbeki that current levels of youth unemployment have increased the likelihood of a major social upheaval to come (Hassen, 2012).

This discourse is also evident, for example, in the policy orientation of government: diagnostic reports produced by the National Planning Commission (NPC) in 2011, in preparation for the subsequent release of a National Development Plan (NDP), variously refer to high levels of youth unemployment as the 'greatest threat to social cohesion' and the 'single greatest risk to social stability in South Africa' (NPC, 2011b: 31; 2011a: 4). The NDP, tabled in Parliament just days before Marikana, similarly warns of the need to 'find ways to urgently reduce alarming levels of youth employment and provide young people with broader opportunities' or risk that this cohort is 'likely to rebel if left with no alternative but unemployment and poverty'. Disenchanted youth, the Commission finds, are 'both a hazard and a lost resource to society' (NPC, 2012: 26, 98, 106, 266). The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) cautions that without adequate education and skills development policy in place, 'unemployment and instability may result, and health, education and social welfare systems may undergo unbearable strain' (Mayer *et al*, 2011: 7). And the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA), while noting that the youth cohort can 'create new economic growth opportunities if exploited efficiently', also warns that 'if not properly managed and supported, it could result in social and developmental catastrophes' (NYDA, 2011: 2).

Amidst this dark discourse, however, the NPC does allude to the possibility that if unemployment levels are turned around, young South Africans may in fact become a 'demographic dividend' rather than a risk, threat or hazard. Yet the country does not seem to be on this path so far: a crippled education system has meant, according to the department's own Annual National Assessments (ANAs), that many primary school learners demonstrate limited reading comprehension and are 'unable to perform basic numeracy operations, such as subtraction, multiplication and division' (Chisholm, 2011: 50–51). Equal Education reports, also based on government data, that only 8% of schools have stocked libraries and 3 600 operate without electricity (Isaacs, 2012: 11). Recent policy debate over the youth wage subsidy appears to have reached an impasse, with the African National Congress (ANC), COSATU, the DA and government each holding corners (see Janzen, 2012): the administration that once proposed the subsidy now appears to reject it, the official opposition is unexpectedly quoting Amartya Sen, and the streets are full of calls for 'Economic Freedom in our Lifetime' (DA, 2012; Munusamy, 2012).

Within the ruling party itself, and at the policy conference held in July of this year, some discussion focused on the challenge of the current 'youth bulge' and prospects for reaping so-called demographic dividends. But the proposals that emerged appear relatively benign, and include for example: improving educational outcomes through better retention rates at schools; positioning state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government departments to better absorb graduates; and a job-seekers' grant linked to skills development programmes, as an alternative proposal to the youth wage subsidy (ANC, 2012a: 11; 2012b: 20). These general recommendations unfortunately inspire little despite the fact that the party's top job – and therefore likely the state presidency – is open for competition at the national elective conference that will be held in Mangaung in December. Speaking at a panel discussion convened by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town in February, national chairperson Baleka Mbete herself described the party in the following way:

> ... a word that always comes to my mind about the ANC is the word 'edifice', something solid, something huge, something that has been there for some time … sometimes you feel sorry for people who come in and rush in and they want to make a difference, they want to get on to lead –

doesn't work that way, especially with a hundred-year old organisation. It's been there, you can't push it in a hurry, you know … (CCR, 2012)

Here, several concerns come to mind. First, it feels as though, in our planning, proposals, policy and implementation, we may have missed out on the boldness required to address these very urgent challenges, and to capture what the ANC itself describes as the 'creativity, daring and energy of the youth', who have fewer 'of the hang-ups of the older generations, are more confident with a definite global sense, and are technology savvy' (ANC, 2012c: 13, 20). This characterisation, as well as the need for innovation and dynamism, was well captured in a comment made by a young student attending a presentation on the results of the 2011 Reconciliation Barometer survey at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) in Port Elizabeth in March:

> Most of us never really grew up in the deep 70s where there was wide struggle and everything else – we grew up in a digital age. Our socialisation and media, especially media, is the part that actually informs us mostly, rather than telling stories in the fireplace, because there's no more fireplaces anymore, there's TV ... Now, as it relates to political affiliations and everything else, you watch a nice advert on TV about another organisation, which I won't mention, you say no man – what's this trend about voting and regurgitating my vote with the same vote for the same party, whereas there's a new trend now. Is it organic that I have to vote for this organisation or should I vote for this one, because it's the 'cool' thing to do? … as young people we are not fully informed, we don't read a lot, we Google and we Facebook a lot and watch TV ...

Further, in our broad depictions – among these, as ticking time bombs and demographic dividends – we risk oversights and assumptions. Who are South Africa's youth, and what are their views – are they political pawns, or actors in their own rights? Volatile? Lawless? A liability? Our rands in the bank for the future? We also miss out on important nuances below the surface of these high-profile and politicised debates.

This year's report on the results of round 12 of the Reconciliation Barometer survey offers some deeper insights into the views, opinions and beliefs of young South Africans, particularly around the issues of political participation, the economy, understanding of the country's past and the apartheid legacy, and relationships between people of different historically defined race groups. Youth views on reconciliation are the subject of significant interest and debate, both within the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) and in South Africa broadly, but have been a challenge to report on as the so-called 'born free' generation has only begun reaching the age of majority required to participate in the Reconciliation Barometer and other surveys.

Much of the data analysed in subsequent sections of this report is examined through different lenses, including according to age groups, socioeconomic status and living conditions, and race. Some indicators have yet to show any significant difference between the views of older and younger generations. However, some emerging and critical trends are evident, as are signals of political and social change that may be yet to come. Certainly, we do want our youth to become a demographic dividend that contributes to both the economic and social future of the country. However, a critical conclusion emerging out of this year's round of the Reconciliation Barometer is that if in focusing on current economic challenges we underestimate the simultaneous imperative of actively growing inclusivity, unity, national values and better social relationships, we in fact risk a more divided and fragmented country in the future. And that, as predicted, may prove a ticking time bomb.

II.
METHODOLOGY

The Reconciliation Barometer is a nationally representative public opinion poll that has been conducted by the IJR since 2003.[1] It is the only survey in South Africa at present that provides a longitudinal measure of progress in reconciliation since the transition to democracy in 1994.

In addition to tracking and reporting trends and year-on-year change, it is among the project's founding goals to collect reliable and accurate data that can meaningfully inform public and policy debates, particularly where these risk over-reliance on assumptions, rhetoric and stereotypes as is sometimes the case in discourse around reconciliation, social relations and nation-building. Two qualitative studies on reconciliation have also been conducted by the IJR alongside the survey, in 2001 and again ten years later in 2011.[2]

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The Reconciliation Barometer survey recognises that, like many other facets of social change, reconciliation is difficult to define and inherently challenging to measure. IJR founding director Professor Charles Villa-Vicencio has described reconciliation as involving different processes and parameters, but always disrupting a pattern of events. It entails understanding, social dialogue, grieving and healing, acknowledgement of the truth, the pursuit of justice, reparations, and sometimes forgiveness (Villa-Vicencio, 2004: 6–8). Daniel Philpott (2009) refers to the importance of restoring 'right relationships within a community' through processes that 'address the wide range of harms that crimes cause, and enlist the wide range of persons affected by these crimes', (2009: 392). Louis Kriesberg also usefully defines reconciliation as

> the process of developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between enemies or formerly antagonistic groups. It often refers to the process of moving toward a relatively cooperative and amicable relationship, typically established after a rupture in relations involving extreme injury to one or more sides in the relationship. (Kriesberg, 2007: 2)

IJR executive director Fanie du Toit has also proposed that reconciliation should be 'framed as a call of recognition of the basic and radical interdependence of comprehensive (moral, political, social and environmental) wellbeing across conflict lines', and as a process should allow for both participation and creativity but also 'concrete agendas, fostering shared memories and more effective institutions (Du Toit, 2012: 10, 15, 25–57).

A wide range of thought and theory on conflict, social and political transition and reconciliation was taken into account in the development of the Reconciliation Barometer survey. Initial and important contributions were made by Professor James Gibson, who worked closely with the IJR in the early stages of the survey's development. Gibson proposed that the measurement of reconciliation in South Africa required testing of the following concepts:

- 'Inter-racial reconciliation – defined as the willingness of people of different races to trust each other, to reject stereotypes about those of other races, and generally to get along with each other;
- Political tolerance – the commitment of people to put up with each other, even those whose ideas they thoroughly detest;
- Support for the principles (abstract and applied) of human rights – including the strict application of the rule of law and commitment to legal universalism; [and]
- Legitimacy – in particular, the predisposition to recognise and accept the authority of the major political institutions of the New South Africa.' (Gibson, 2004: 4)

From these concepts, as well as the results of an initial exploratory study conducted in 2002 that aimed to identify the 'meanings and associations South Africans attribute to the concept of reconciliation' (Lombard, 2003: 3), seven initial indicators and hypotheses were used to develop the measures included in the Reconciliation Barometer research instrument. These were later reduced to six hypotheses, as shown in Table 1.

SAMPLING AND FIELDWORK

The Reconciliation Barometer survey is conducted through face-to-face interviews with South Africans in all nine provinces of the country, using a quantitative questionnaire developed by the IJR that includes approximately one hundred survey items. All questions are close-ended, and the majority are in the form of five-point Likert scales. Sampling, piloting and interviews are conducted by Ipsos, and form part of the bi-annual KhayaBus omnibus survey, which focuses on measuring social and political trends. A national sample is drawn that is representative of the South African adult population aged 15 and above, and in 2012 includes approximately 2 004 metro and 1 561 non-metro inhabitants, with an equal gender split. The sample frame is based on the 2001 census enumerator areas (EAs). Following random selection of EAs, secondary sampling is conducted at the household level, before a final stage of selecting respondents aged 15 and above. Random sampling 'ensures that each person in the South African adult population has an equal probability of being chosen to do the interview'. As a representative sample, the 'results of the survey

Table 1: SA Reconciliation Barometer hypotheses and indicators, 2004–2012	
Hypotheses	**Indicators**
Human security: If citizens do not feel threatened, they are more likely to be reconciled with each other and the larger system.	Physical security; economic security; cultural security
Political culture: If citizens view the institutions, leadership and culture of the new system as legitimate and accountable, reconciliation is more likely to progress.	Justifiability of extra-legal action; legitimacy of leadership; legitimacy of Parliament; respect for the rule of law
Cross-cutting political relationships: If citizens are able to form working political relationships that cross divisions, reconciliation is more likely to advance.	Commitment to national unity; commitment to multi-racial political parties
Historical confrontation: If citizens are able to confront and address issues from the past, they are more likely to be able to move forward and be reconciled.	Acknowledgement of the injustice of apartheid; forgiveness; reduced levels of vengeance
Race relations: If citizens of different races hold fewer negative perceptions of each other, they are more likely to form workable relationships that will advance reconciliation.	Inter-racial contact; inter-racial preconceptions; inter-racial tolerance
Dialogue: If citizens are committed to deep dialogue, reconciliation is more likely to be advanced.	Commitment to more dialogue

Table 2: SA Reconciliation Barometer sample, 2012				
	Achieved sample	% split	Weighted sample	% split
Female	1 778	50	17 726	48.5
Male	1 787	50	18 783	51.4
Black	2 716	76.1	28 252	77.3
Coloured	395	11.0	3 418	9.3
Indian	145	4.0	1 031	2.8
White	309	8.6	3 808	10.4
15–24 years	805	22.5	9 925	27.1
25–34 years	930	26.0	7 983	21.8
35–49 years	1 022	28.6	9 888	27.0
50+ years	808	22.6	8 712	23.8

Source: Ipsos, 2012

can be projected onto the South African population as a mirror image of trends in attitudes and perceptions amongst adult South Africans in general'. In 2012, a sampling error of 1.7% on a sample of 3 565 respondents was achieved, with a confidence interval of 95% (Ipsos, 2012). Participation is voluntary, and no incentives were offered to respondents.

Prior to the commencement of fieldwork in 2012, pilot interviews were conducted to test several new and revised questions. Ipsos subsequently reported that the pilot was successful, and no problems were encountered with these questions.

Fieldwork was carried out between April and May of 2012. Interviews were conducted in six languages, according to the preferences of respondents: English, Afrikaans, Zulu, Sotho, Xhosa and Tswana. Ipsos ensures a minimum back-check of 20% of interviews conducted by each fieldworker, to ensure accuracy and consistency. The metro sample is then weighted according to race, metro, gender and age, while the non-metro sample is weighted by community size, age, gender and province, based on 2011B All Media Products Survey (AMPS) data (Ipsos, 2012).

ADDITIONAL REPORTING CONSIDERATIONS

The results of the Reconciliation Barometer survey are released annually by the IJR to coincide with the commemoration of the Day of Reconciliation on 16 December. This report provides a snapshot overview of national public opinion in relation to the social, economic and political indicators shown in Table 1. All reported data is weighted unless otherwise stated, to allow for conclusions to be drawn about the entire South African population.

This report focuses primarily on comparisons between the attitudes of young and older South Africans, and data is generally analysed and presented using several key demographic variables that include age, living standards measure (LSM) and historically defined race categories. For the purposes of this report, a variable has been created that distinguishes between 'youth' respondents, ages 15–34, and 'adult' respondents aged 35 years and older. This age range differs from that captured in policy, which also includes 35-year-olds in the national definition of 'youth'. However, this analytical distinction was used for purposes of consistency and comparability with other national surveys that frequently report on age bands of five to ten years, usually either 30–34 or 25–34. The LSM is a composite that includes a range of survey items that assess dwelling type, telecommunications, domestic workers employed in the household, water and sanitation services on site, ownership of household consumer items (refrigerator, microwave oven, television, etc.), and residence in a rural or metropolitan area. Further, it is not the intent of the IJR to endorse the continued use of apartheid racial categories in South Africa, but survey responses are presented according to race where this is analytically meaningful and deemed relevant to the tracking of public opinion.

The data presented in this report is largely descriptive. Examining the survey results according to age group and race makes further inferential analysis challenging, particularly given the small overall

numbers of white (n = 309), coloured (n = 395) and Indian/Asian (n = 145) respondents in the sample (see Table 3). Where inferential results are reported, for example through analysis of variance (ANOVA) or linear regression testing, this is conducted on the full unweighted sample (n = 3 565) as well as on two randomly selected subsamples (n = 500). Inferential results are only reported where statistical significance ($p \leq .01$) is determined in the full sample as well as in both subsamples.

It is important to note at the outset of this report that across many survey items, there are no statistically significant differences between the views of youth and adult South Africans. However, it is the position of the IJR that given demand, interest and the context outlined in the introduction to this report, an analytical focus on youth opinion is nonetheless warranted. The findings of this analysis suggest both points of social coherence and possible faultlines, and may highlight possible future opinion trends as numbers of South African born-frees increase and enter adulthood.

Finally, the IJR grants external access to the Reconciliation Barometer survey datasets for purposes of secondary analysis on an application basis. Interested researchers, academics, students, civil society organisations and others are encouraged to contact the Institute with access requests (see www.ijr.org.za).

Table 3: Youth and adult sample by race, 2012 (n)					
	Black	Coloured	Indian	White	Total
Youth (15–34)	1 459	150	44	82	1 735
Adults (35+)	1 257	245	101	227	1 830
Total	2 716	395	145	309	3 565

NOTES

1. During 2003 and 2004, the survey was conducted twice per year, and reduced to annually in 2005. For purposes of longitudinal comparison, this report only includes data from rounds 1 and 3 from 2003 and 2004, conducted in March/April during the first term Khayabus, and excludes rounds 2 and 4, which were conducted mid-year in 2003 and 2004.

2. A full report on the results of the 2011 qualitative study will be released in 2013.

SA Reconciliation Barometer | Newsletter

'I would rather socialise with my own guy'

KATE LEFKO-EVERETT asks whether South Africa has made progress towards our constitutional vision of a non-racial society

In recent years, and while I have managed the IJR's Reconciliation Barometer survey, an interesting trend has begun to emerge in our data. As time goes by, South Africans become increasingly less likely to identify 'race' as the biggest division in the country. Instead, the gap between rich and poor is named most frequently as the faultline that keeps us apart: one in four South Africans – 25% – answer in this way in 2012, while only 13% believe race is still our biggest division.

Social scientists have considered this possibility for a number of years. As time passes, generations change and the lived memory of apartheid fades, will historically defined racial identities be overtaken by stronger associations built around income and class? Some seem to think this is happening already, including a number of participants in a qualitative study conducted by the IJR in 2011. One explained, 'before we had social classes that were based on race. Today we have classes based on your social status. How much money you have.'

This is an important finding, and one that both provokes interesting debate and guarantees us real estate on newspaper front pages.

It also inspires some criticism. Get your head out of spreadsheets and survey stats, we are sometimes challenged, and look around you: race remains the most powerful force shaping our experiences, opportunities and interactions in this country.

It is a strange and uneasy admission to say that some among us need this reminder, and more often than the occasional racist diatribe on Twitter, defacing of naked artwork or glimpses of camo-clad AWB members. For the huge majority of South Africans, change since 1994 likely seems meagre.

The vision of a 'non-racial' South Africa is one that was fought for by many liberation movements, championed in the Constitutional Principles for a Democratic South Africa, debated as 'the national question' within the ANC, and ultimately enshrined in the founding provisions of the constitution.

Last year I was part of a group of researchers, academics and analysts who worked to interpret the findings of a series of dedicated focus groups on non-racialism, conducted by the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation and the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO). The purpose of the study was to explore how participating South Africans understood the idea of non-racialism, whether or not they felt tangible change had occurred since 1994, and how – if at all – they felt improvements could be made in relationships across historically defined race lines.

Interview texts were funny at times, inspired and unpredictable, and also deeply saddening and strange.

One of the first clear findings to emerge from the study was that many participating South Africans of all different demographics are not yet ready to give up on race. It is still often one of many practised and embedded identities even though, as some participants said, today you 'cannot become actively racist against people', you should not 'look at the colour of the next person' and it is important to start 'doing things together despite your race'. When asked how individuals identified themselves, many responded with descriptions such as 'I'm a black South African lady' or 'I am a white person, I speak English and I stay in South Africa'.

On the surface, research findings suggested that South Africans felt interaction and socialising across race lines had improved in some facets of public life – in sports, at religious gatherings, in schools and universities, and at restaurants and nightclubs. 'You meet most races at stadiums', one participant commented, and another, 'in soccer stadiums, taverns, clubs and things like that'.

> Young children who learn that 'race doesn't matter' in public life, and continue to find each other at 'soccer stadiums, taverns and clubs' may indeed be the ones who provoke real change towards the non-racial society our constitution envisions.

Discussion of relationships in more private spaces, however, took on an entirely different tone, and alluded to underlying unspoken conversations, apprehension and social distance. Many South Africans confined relationships with people of other races to the preserve of the public sphere – 'we would phone one another and have lunches at Greenacres ... but they would never invite me to come to their place'. Participants confessed anxiety over a lack of commonality, or the prospect of having nothing to say to each other: '[my neighbour], she says come over, come over – there is nothing to talk about. I sat there, the kids, the weather – there is nothing to talk about, you are so afraid to talk about things.' A man interviewed in Paarl explained that it is possible to 'be friends with all the other races, but I just don't feel at ease mixing with them'. Another from Durban said 'mingling' made him 'feel funny, weird – you know, strange'. A young participant in Gugulethu was concerned about socialising with 'coloured people' because 'maybe I am not a party animal', but also worried that 'white people do not have the same kind of fun that we do'.

Underlying this social distance, the pervasive extent of stereotyping, misperceptions and generalisations – as well as racism – was all too evident. Importantly though, in my readings of interview texts I found this to be a practice of participants of all different race groups, and seemingly, about all other groups. 'Whites are still racist – especially the Boers'. 'Black people get along very well with white people', but 'you know that a black hates an Indian'. 'Coloureds are racists', and they 'can't be recognised because they are fence-sitters'. 'Indians are still racist', and 'I won't accept Indians because they don't know where they stand in life'. Disturbingly, suspicion, fear and intolerance featured in many of the focus groups: 'there are races you can accept and there are those that you can't', some participants explained. 'We do not, and cannot communicate with them', said others.

It was also clear that focus group participants across almost every age group, from young students to those approaching retirement, felt non-racialism and greater integration were an unlikely prospect for 'their generation'. Much hope, however, was placed on prospects for change in relationships among young children: they 'don't see

colour', 'don't have an issue with race', 'socialise so freely with each other' and don't understand what 'racism means'. Being at school or university together, explained men in Johannesburg, 'makes it a hell of a lot easier, being put in the pot together'.

Perhaps this could inspire some cautious optimism. Young children who learn that 'race doesn't matter' in public life, and continue to find each other at 'soccer stadiums, taverns and clubs' may indeed be the ones who provoke real change towards the non-racial society our constitution envisions. But what happens when they return home to closed private spaces, around kitchen tables, on the stoep or at the braai? How likely is it that they will effectively withstand and reject the stereotyping that seems to persist, particularly when parents have resolved that their generations are past changing?

In my view, just 'leaving it to the children' is not a strategy, nor is it sufficiently aggressive or anti-racist enough to overcome our shared fears and prejudices. Writing in 2001, Xolela Mangcu usefully proposed that 'getting people to respect each other's group identities' would constitute a meaningful start, and the social progress that might follow should be a 'transition from segregation to integration, [and] from race consciousness to race neutrality'. But we need to be far more active, and work much harder, if we indeed want to realise this vision for the future.

Kate Lefko-Everett is senior project leader for the Reconciliation Barometer at the IJR. A full version of this article appeared in Politikon 39:1, April 2012.

III.
MEET OUR YOUNG RESPONDENTS

The recently released results of the 2011 Census confirm that South Africa is indeed experiencing a 'youth bulge'. Just under one-third of all South Africans (29.6%) are under the age of 14 years old, and a further 28.9% are aged 15–34, making up 58.5% of the national population overall (StatsSA, 2012b: 28). However, for many young South Africans, age may be one of the few shared characteristics that binds this demographic together.

The 2010/2011 Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) shows profound differences in household incomes and expenditure across different racial groups: the average income for black households was R69 632, compared with R139 190 for coloured households and R252 724 among Indian/Asians. White households earned an average of R387 011: 'more than 5.5 times the income of the average black African headed-household' (StatsSA, 2012c). StatsSA reported in 2010 that 57% of youth aged 15–24 and 43% aged 25–34 lived in households with a per capita income of less than R570 per month. Extreme differences are also evident when race and gender are taken into account: 66% of black females between the ages of 15 and 24 lived in poor households with this low per capita income, compared to only 3% of their white peers (StatsSA, 2011: 38, 43).

Clear differences in educational access and achievement are also evident in census 2011. While the greatest percentages of black (35.3%) and coloured (41.8%) South Africans report their highest level of educational achievement to be 'some secondary' schooling, Indian/Asian (40.4%) and white (40.8%) South Africans were more likely to report completion of grade 12. As shown in Table 4, 36.5% of whites age 20 and older indicated participation in higher education after completing school, compared with only 8.3% of black and 7.4% of coloured South Africans. The NPC also reports on high levels of inequality in the physical assets and infrastructure of schools around the country. In 2009, 706 schools were without adequate sanitation facilities, and 412 were entirely mud structures (NPC online).

RECONCILIATION BAROMETER YOUTH SAMPLE

The Reconciliation Barometer survey sample draws from the national population. The households that young survey respondents come from reflect the context and lived experiences captured in the 2011 Census. As shown in Table 5, close to half of the entire sample (48.7%) was composed of respondents aged 15–34. As in the national population, black respondents were younger on average (*mean* = 36.1 years) than coloured (*m* = 41.1 years), Indian/Asian (*m* = 44.6 years) or white (*m* = 45.5 years) respondents.

Interviews were conducted in all provinces of the country, and in both urban and rural areas. The highest percentage of youth respondents in the 2012 sample lived in metropolitan areas (56.2%), while 17.8% lived in smaller cities, towns and villages and 25.9% in rural areas. Younger survey respondents, aged 15–19, were more likely than others to live in rural areas.

Table 4: Participation in higher (post-school) education, age 20 and older by race and sex, 2011				
	Black	**Coloured**	**Indian/Asian**	**White**
Male	7.9%	7.3%	22.1%	38.1%
Female	8.7%	7.5%	21.2%	35.0%
Total	8.3%	7.4%	21.6%	36.5%

Source: Statistics South Africa, Census 2011 (StatsSA, 2012a: 32)

Table 5: Survey respondents by age group and race, 2012					
	Black	**Coloured**	**Indian/ Asian**	**White**	**Total**
15–19 years	8.7%	7.3%	7.6%	5.2%	8.2%
20–24 years	16.1%	11.4%	6.9%	6.8%	14.4%
25–29 years	16.1%	9.9%	9.0%	7.1%	14.4%
30–34 years	12.8%	9.4%	6.9%	7.4%	11.7%
35 years+	46.2%	61.9%	69.7%	73.4%	51.4%

The youngest survey respondents (15–19 years), as is perhaps to be expected, also reported lower levels of post-school education than others, although 93.5% indicated that they had either completed some secondary school or matriculated. Greater percentages of older youth respondents reported higher educational experiences: among 25–29-year-olds, for example, 2.7% had completed a university degree, 8.2% a degree or diploma from a technical university and 8.4% another non-university post-school certificate or qualification.[1] As found in Census 2011, the Reconciliation Barometer sample shows clear differences in educational achievement between South Africans of different race groups. Among older youth aged 30–34, only 14.4% of black respondents had completed a university degree, technical university diploma or degree or another post-school qualification, compared to 39.1% of their white peers.

Most of the youngest survey respondents (15–19) indicated that they were not working because they were still in school (79.5%), but employment patterns distinctly changed among those 20 years old

and above, who were beginning to enter the labour market. Almost half of all respondents aged 20–24 (49.0%) were unemployed and looking for work, while 22.1% were students and 22.8% were working full- or part-time. It was in this age category where demand for work seemed to be highest. Comparatively, 39.8% of 25–29-year-olds, 33.3% of 30–34-year-olds and 20.7% of respondents 35 and older were unemployed and actively looking for work.

Reporting on the household income of young respondents is challenging: 22.0% of those under 35 indicated that they did not know the total monthly income of their households, and a further 16.8% refused to answer this question. However, here the composite LSM variable offers some further insight into household living conditions. Some LSM items suggest that youth survey respondents reside in less affluent households than adults on average: 21.6% of under-35s report having no tap water in their house or on the plot where they live, 38.2% do not have a flush toilet and 69.7% do not have hot running water from a geyser. Figure 1 shows that higher percentages of youth than adults are concentrated in the lower LSM groups.

Access to communications technology, information and social media are also considered to be important priorities for young people in South Africa and elsewhere. On average within the Khayabus sample, according to Ipsos, young South Africans are somewhat more likely to own or use a cellphone and have access to the internet, and less likely to have one or more radios in their home than their older counterparts. Overall, 87.5% of under-35s sampled had access to a cellphone, and 27.1% were able to use the internet. The highest percentage of young people accessing the internet are able to do so through their cellphones (22.5%), while 7.3% reported access at work and 5.5% at home.

The 2012 Khayabus also included a number of self-evaluation questions, which revealed that young South Africans were most likely to describe themselves as confident, active and creative: this despite the challenges many face, as residents of rural areas, in low-income households with poor services, and in accessing education and finding work. Young respondents were least likely to describe themselves as trendy, methodical or steady/set in their ways. Older South Africans, in comparison, self-described as decision-makers, confident and leaders most frequently, and trendy, shy and hesitant least often.

Figure 1: Youth and adult respondents by LSM category, 2012 (%)

Youth (15–34) Adults (35 and above)

NOTES

1. This includes professional, technical, secretarial and other certificates and qualifications.

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Volume 10 • Issue 1 • April 2012

Are they proud?

Award-winning novelist KOPANO MATLWA MABASO reflects on progress and changes in South Africa after eighteen years of democracy – some of them unexpected

I sometimes wonder how the parents of the new South Africa feel about her now, now that she is fully grown and not that fetus in the womb of time they used to dream about. I wonder sometimes how it might have been for them as they anxiously anticipated the day of her arrival. What questions did they ask themselves? What thoughts passed through their minds? Perhaps they too wondered as I now wonder: Would they be ready? Would she come early in the morning after the sun was up? Or would she arrive before midnight? Who would be there and what would they wear? Would there be cameras or would it be their own private miracle?

What she might be like?

I bet they had so many dreams and plans for her. What else could they look forward to, if not her: their hope for a different tomorrow.

There had been so much pain.

But it would be different once she arrived.

It had been so difficult.

But with her birth, she'd bring them together.

Things would be better.

They'd have to be.

How could they not be, when she would have everything they had never had.

I bet they were sure that she'd be born healthy. Who could blame them, all parents are optimistic. Not just healthy, but healthy and strong. 'She'll thrive,' is what I bet they told each other. 'Grow bigger and bigger with each passing year. Fair, kind and honest, she'll be an example to her peers.'

This is the year she turns eighteen. And as her parents' sun sets, as their curtains close, I wonder if they are proud.

She is a strange child, with her piercings and her odd taste in music; she's not quite what they expected. Her hobby is acquiring things, all things. She does not read, well, not much anyway. She does not want to go to school, says she will start her own company. Sell T-shirts, or something like that. She gets upset when talk about colour comes up – says racism is a thing of the past. That we need to let it go and move on.

She is headstrong and asks difficult questions. Like why did her parents let it happen anyway? How was it possible and why did they let it go on for so long? She wants to know why they still stay up fighting all night, and why they do it so violently. She doesn't understand why they are still so angry. But pretend not to be. She asks why they lie to each other about how they really feel. Why they don't make eye contact when they speak to each other. And why, when they claim that they want things to be different, they don't act differently. She asks if it's perhaps because they don't really want things to change.

And just as her parents, worn out and tired, are about to put their heads down to rest at this late hour, she asks these questions they do not know how to answer. She shouts that she is not yet finished:

And what about the inequalities? She points to the taxis, and the cars and the planes in the sky and uses big words like Gini coefficients and insists that she wants answers. Why things haven't improved and why in many ways they are only getting worse?

Her parents try to explain that it was easier then. They knew who the enemy was. His name was Apartheid and they knew where he lived. They had his address and could go to his home and throw rocks at his house. But things are blurry now, not as clear, no one really knows any more what is what and who is who.

Of course there have been achievements. 'Look at you,'

> She is a strange child, with her piercings and her odd taste in music; she's not quite what they expected. She gets upset when talk about colour comes up – says racism is a thing of the past.

they say, 'look at all you have.' All the things we have built for you. Look at the clinics and roads and schools. And money, there is a lot of it now, and it's all for you.

But she is unimpressed. She insists that although the clinics stand, their cupboards are empty. Although the schools are rich, the results are poor. Although the roads are tarred, they remain unfinished. And the money, she says she doesn't want any of it. It is not good money, she says, she doesn't like how it moves, or where it has come from. She says if that is what they intend to leave her, she rejects it and wants nothing to do with it.

When she starts to talk like this it makes them angry. How ungrateful this child is, how impetuous, how rude. What does she know of what was and what is now?

But what to do with her, because she is theirs? A creature of their own creation. And now that she is fully grown, no longer a child, ready to put on a suit and step out into the world of adult democracies. What do they do with her? Now that she can drive herself and purchase alcohol and make decisions that have far-reaching consequences. What do they do with her? What now do they do with this child, their new South Africa, the one they gave birth to, the one who was supposed to save us all?

Kopano Matlwa Mabaso is author of Coconut and Spilt Milk, and the recipient of the European Literary Award as well as the Wole Soyinka Prize for Literature in Africa.

IV.
YOUTH AND POLITICAL CULTURE

Just as in many other societies around the world, there is a great deal of debate in South Africa about issues of youth participation in civic and political life. Government departments, independent institutions, political parties and civil society organisations have all worked to get youth 'involved' and encourage active citizenship. What impact has this had within the 'Facebook generation'?

This section of the Reconciliation Barometer survey report focuses on confidence in government institutions, trust in leadership, protest and the rule of law, and youth opinion on partisanship and political parties.

CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS

The Reconciliation Barometer survey hypothesises that reconciliation is more likely to occur in South Africa if citizens view public institutions, political leaders and the work of government as legitimate, accountable and responsive (see Table 1). Since 2006, the survey has tested public confidence in a range of government and independent institutions, which include the executive, legislative and judicial spheres. In 2006, the survey recorded high levels of confidence among South Africans: 77.0% indicated a 'great deal' or 'quite a lot' of confidence in the presidency, 73.1% in national government and 69.4% in Parliament, as shown in Figure 2. Confidence levels in all institutions, however, dropped consistently thereafter, reaching their lowest recorded levels in 2009 – the year in which national and provincial elections were held, and South Africa entered an economic recession after 17 successive years of growth. Levels of confidence – alongside general optimism about the future of the country – increased again in 2010 with the FIFA Soccer World Cup on South Africa's horizon. Yet across most institutions, these have remained relatively consistent since 2010, and have not returned to the heights recorded in 2006.

In 2012, the Constitutional Court (69.4%) and the legal system overall (67.3%) continue to earn the confidence of more than two-thirds of the national population. National government follows closely behind at 65.4%, and 63.7% agree that they have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the presidency: the president's office has received this relatively high rating consistently over the last three rounds of the Reconciliation Barometer survey. However, it is difficult to predict whether this level of public approval will protect President Zuma's position as the head of the party when ANC members elect new leadership in Mangaung in December. Both Parliament (62.9%) and provincial government (61.2%) also enjoy the confidence of more than 60% of South Africans; confidence, however, is marginally lower in the South African Police Service (SAPS)(60.2%), and as consistent with previous survey rounds, considerably lower in local government at 49.8% (see Figure 2 and Table 6).

This year's survey data shows virtually no difference in confidence ratings between youth and adult South Africans overall. However, clear differences are evident between black South Africans and those

Figure 2: Confidence in institutions, 2006–2012 (%)

of racial minority groups: for example, 70.5% of black South Africans report a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the presidency, compared to only 36–43% of white, Indian/Asian and coloured South Africans. Similar differences are evident in evaluations of institutions across the different spheres of government, as shown in Table 6. Notable, although with due cognisance of the small numbers of white, Indian/Asian and coloured survey respondents, are also the differences between generations but within racial groups. Only 35.2% of white youth reported confidence in national government, compared with 46.6% of adults, and this pronounced gap between generations is also evident in assessments of provincial and local government, the legal system and the courts. This lack of confidence in institutions among young people is also evident among South Africans of other race groups: only 39.2% of coloured youth report confidence in local government, compared to 50.2% of adults, and only 37.9% positively evaluate the legal system. Black youth and adults are more likely to indicate higher levels of confidence across all of the institutions than other groups (see Table 6).

Table 6: Youth and adult confidence in institutions by race, 2012						
Confidence in institutions		White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Black	Total
Presidency	Youth	40.0%	18.0%	31.4%	70.5%	64.4%
	Adults	43.8%	54.6%	40.7%	70.7%	63.0%
	TOTAL	42.7%	42.6%	36.7%	70.6%	63.7%
National government	Youth	35.2%	23.3%	36.8%	72.3%	66.2%
	Adults	46.6%	50.4%	41.8%	72.3%	64.6%
	TOTAL	43.3%	41.5%	39.7%	72.3%	65.4%
Parliament	Youth	45.2%	25.7%	36.9%	68.9%	64.0%
	Adults	46.2%	53.9%	43.3%	68.3%	61.9%
	TOTAL	45.9%	44.7%	40.6%	68.6%	62.9%
Provincial government	Youth	36.5%	20.3%	41.3%	65.6%	61.0%
	Adults	51.5%	53.6%	46.9%	65.8%	61.3%
	TOTAL	47.2%	42.6%	44.5%	65.7%	61.2%
Local government	Youth	36.7%	25.7%	39.2%	51.3%	49.0%
	Adults	45.6%	45.9%	50.2%	51.9%	50.6%
	TOTAL	43.0%	39.2%	45.4%	51.6%	49.8%
Legal system	Youth	57.1%	46.2%	37.9%	71.0%	66.9%
	Adults	64.3%	67.8%	52.2%	70.7%	67.7%
	TOTAL	62.2%	60.7%	46.1%	70.8%	67.3%
Constitutional Court	Youth	63.6%	56.3%	44.1%	71.9%	68.8%
	Adults	74.6%	65.4%	54.8%	71.5%	70.0%
	TOTAL	71.4%	62.4%	50.2%	71.7%	69.4%
SAPS	Youth	52.5%	55.6%	44.3%	64.6%	62.0%
	Adults	52.4%	42.0%	49.6%	62.0%	58.6%
	TOTAL	52.4%	46.5%	47.3%	63.4%	60.2%

Poor service delivery is often cited as an indicator of inadequate government performance, a contributor to eroding confidence in institutions, and among the root causes behind the high numbers of protests that have occurred around the country since 2007. Research conducted in 2011 into explanations of the causes of protests found that participants' complaints have largely focused on access to affordable or adequate housing (21.2%), electricity (19.8%), water (10.6%) and sanitation (8.8%) (Karamoko, 2011: 32). In 2007, the Reconciliation Barometer survey asked South Africans about the extent that they trust local government to deliver the services that citizens require, with moderate results: 43.1% agreed that local government could be trusted, 27.1% disagreed and 24.5% were neutral. This survey item was re-introduced in 2012, with virtually no change in results five years later: this year, 43.3% agreed that local government can be trusted to deliver services, 27.7% disagreed and 26.7% are neutral. In 2012, however, average agreement that local government can be trusted – as measured on a five-point Likert scale – appears to have increased among more affluent households in higher LSM groups, who likely have access to more basic services. Average agreement has declined among less affluent households in lower LSM groups, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Average trust in local government to deliver services by LSM, 2007 and 2012 (*mean*)

TRUST IN LEADERSHIP

Previous rounds of the Reconciliation Barometer survey have revealed the interesting finding that a majority of South Africans are both confident in government institutions and trust leaders to act in the best interests of the country, but at the same time believe that leaders and public officials are not interested or responsive to citizens' concerns. This may be an indication that people still believe in the legitimacy and 'rightness' of leaders to govern and act in the best interests of the country despite a lack of consultation and public participation: a tenuous balance. Nonetheless, trust in leadership remains relatively high in 2012 at 50.3%, and with little change from 2011. About half of all South Africans (49.3%), however, agree that national leaders are not concerned with the views of people like themselves, and 49.1% agree that if public officials are not interested in hearing what people think there is no way to make them listen (see Figure 4).

Survey findings in 2012 point to relative consensus on unresponsive leadership across race and age groups: a majority of black, coloured, Indian/Asian and white South Africans agree that leaders are not concerned with the views of people like themselves, with little variation between different generations (see Table 7). White (31.2%), coloured (33.5%) and Indian/Asian (40.8%) South Africans were less likely to agree that leaders can be trusted to do what is right most of the time than black South Africans (55.3%). As shown in Table 7, within racial minority groups youth are less trusting of leadership than adults, but they are also less likely to agree that there is no way to make officials listen to citizens' concerns. This is an important finding with regard to youth participation in public and political life, provided that young people are encouraged to make contributions and inputs in constructive ways.

PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION

For the first time in 2012, the Reconciliation Barometer asked South Africans about the extent that they believe they have witnessed corruption happening in their communities, with results that may signal declines in trust in leadership in coming survey rounds. Corruption seems to be a growing concern for many South Africans, and the results of the Afrobarometer survey released earlier this year show a jump in the percentage of respondents who view it as prevalent in a range of different government departments and institutions. While 17% of Afrobarometer respondents believed that most or all officials working in the presidency were corrupt in 2007, this had increased to 35% by 2011 (Afrobarometer, 2012).

According to the results of the Reconciliation Barometer, about two-fifths of all South Africans (43.9%) believe they have seen incidences of corruption in their communities. Just over one-third (38.5%) believe government is doing enough to combat crime of this kind. Youth aged 25–29 and 30–34 were the most likely to indicate that they had seen corruption at work (48–49%). Overall, black (46.3%) and Indian/Asian (52.7%) South Africans were more likely to report witnessing corruption than white (34.3%) or coloured (32.6%) South Africans, yet black South Africans (43.2%) were also more likely than others to agree that government is doing enough to combat corruption at present (see Table 8).

Table 7: Trust in leadership by age and race, 2012 (%)

Agree		White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	Black	Total
Leaders are not concerned with people like me	Youth	57.3%	55.9%	47.3%	49.4%	49.8%
	Adults	55.1%	55.7%	49.7%	47.1%	48.8%
	Total	55.7%	55.8%	48.7%	48.3%	49.3%
No way to make disinterested public officials listen	Youth	33.4%	48.2%	38.7%	51.5%	49.3%
	Adults	50.4%	61.0%	46.9%	48.3%	48.9%
	Total	45.5%	56.8%	43.3%	50.0%	49.1%
Trust leaders to do what is right	Youth	26.9%	26.6%	31.7%	55.2%	51.0%
	Adults	32.9%	47.7%	34.9%	55.5%	49.7%
	Total	31.2%	40.8%	33.5%	55.3%	50.3%

Table 8: Perceptions of corruption by age and race, 2012 (%)

Agree		White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	Black	Total
Seen instances of corruption in my community	Youth	33.9%	63.0%	36.7%	47.4%	46.0%
	Adults	34.4%	47.7%	29.4%	44.9%	41.9%
	Total	34.3%	52.7%	32.6%	46.3%	43.9%
Government is doing enough to combat corruption	Youth	17.5%	30.7%	20.1%	42.6%	38.9%
	Adults	22.8%	33.3%	20.9%	43.8%	38.0%
	Total	21.3%	32.5%	20.6%	43.2%	38.5%

Figure 4: Trust in leadership, 2003–2012 (%)

Legend:
- Leaders not concerned about people like me
- No way to make disinterested public officials listen
- Trust leaders to do what is right

RULE OF LAW

Current policy and political discourse has painted young South Africans as a potential threat and a source of future social instability, and the data presented in this section has shown that some youth don't trust national leadership, believe corruption occurs in their communities and lack confidence in the legal system. Considering these findings, do South African youth have disregard for the law, to the extent that we fear they might?

Statistical results since 2003 show that overall, respect for the rule of law appears to have increased. While in 2003 over half of all South Africans (54.1%) agreed that it was alright to 'get around the law as long as you don't actually break it', this figure – while still relatively high – has dropped to 42.6% by 2012. Over the same period, South Africans who agreed that it is sometimes better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately rather than waiting for a legal solution has dropped from 35.0% to 32.6%. The percentage of South Africans who agreed that it is not necessary to obey the laws of a government they did not vote for dropped from 27.6% in 2003 to 23.6% in 2011, and remains similar at 22.8% in 2012 (see Figure 5): a worrying number given that according to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), about 13.8 million South Africans of voting age did not cast a ballot in the 2009 national and provincial elections (IDEA online). Further, there was little difference in agreement that it is acceptable to 'get around' or break the law between youth and older South Africans: young people do not seem markedly less compliant with the rule of law than their parents' generation. They also do not seem more law-abiding despite spending a greater portion of their lives in a democratic country and under a legitimate Constitution and legal framework. However, white, coloured and black youth were slightly more likely than adults to agree that it is sometimes better to solve problems immediately than wait for a legal solution, and across all race groups, were also marginally in greater agreement than adults that it is not necessary to obey the laws of a government they did not vote for (see Table 9).

APPROVAL AND PARTICIPATION IN PROTEST

In 2012, 35.1% of young South Africans felt it was sometimes better to ignore the law and legal solutions in order to solve problems immediately, and a further 24.3% that they do not need to follow the laws of a government that they did not vote for. Using SAPS data, Peter Alexander (2012) reports an increase in recorded 'crowd management incidents' – including protests – from an average of 2.1 daily from 2004–2009 to 2.9 daily between 2009 and 2012. The tragic and fatal clash between SAPS officers and striking mine workers at Marikana has dominated local and international media headlines since it occurred in August.

This data aside, the results of the Reconciliation Barometer show that the percentage of South Africans who believed peaceful demonstrations (39.1%) and strikes (39.6%) are justifiable when an individual's rights are being violated have continued to decline in 2012. The percentage who believed violence is justifiable under these circumstances is almost unchanged from 2011, at 13.5% (see Figure 6). There has, however, been an increase in the numbers of South Africans who

Agree		White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	Black	Total
Alright to get around the law	Youth	26.9%	30.7%	35.9%	45.8%	43.6%
	Adults	23.9%	53.1%	37.1%	45.5%	41.7%
	Total	24.8%	45.7%	36.6%	45.7%	42.6%
Better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately	Youth	28.2%	43.4%	35.7%	35.4%	35.1%
	Adults	23.5%	45.7%	31.0%	30.6%	30.2%
	Total	24.8%	45.0%	33.0%	33.1%	32.6%
Not necessary to obey the laws of a government I did not vote for	Youth	15.9%	30.9%	20.8%	25.1%	24.3%
	Adults	11.5%	29.3%	17.2%	23.6%	21.4%
	Total	12.7%	29.8%	18.8%	24.4%	22.8%

Table 9: Agreement with getting around or breaking the law by age and race, 2012 (%)

Figure 5: Agreement with getting around or breaking the law, 2003–2012 (%)

Legend:
- Alright to get around the law
- Not necessary to obey laws of a government I did not vote for
- Better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately

Table 10: Participation in protest by age and race, 2012 (%)

Always + Often + Sometimes		White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	Black	Total
Demon-strations	Youth	6.1%	20.0%	13.9%	26.0%	23.6%
	Adults	12.0%	13.4%	12.4%	28.3%	23.7%
	Total	10.3%	15.6%	13.1%	27.0%	23.7%
Strikes	Youth	6.5%	10.6%	11.6%	27.2%	24.4%
	Adults	13.6%	12.4%	11.4%	29.1%	24.4%
	Total	11.5%	11.8%	11.5%	28.1%	24.4%
Violent protests	Youth	1.6%	21.5%	13.8%	21.2%	19.4%
	Adults	5.8%	11.8%	11.0%	18.9%	15.9%
	Total	4.6%	15.0%	12.2%	20.1%	17.6%

**Figure 6:** Justification of protest, 2003–2012 (%)

Figure 7: Participation in protest, 2011–2012 (always, often or sometimes) (%)

report that they actually participated in demonstrations, strikes or violent protests (always, often or sometimes) in the year prior to being interviewed for the Reconciliation Barometer survey: this is consistent with Alexander's (2012) conclusion that incidents of this kind have, and will continue to increase. Just under one quarter of South Africans indicated that they had been part of a peaceful demonstration (23.7%) or strike (24.4%) in the past year, and 17.6% that they had participated in a more violent or destructive event: up from 11.6% in 2011 (see Figure 7).

Young people are often seen to be involved in, if not instigators of, protest activity. However, survey findings show that the average (*m*) age of South Africans who indicate that they always or often participate in peaceful demonstrations and strikes was 35–36 years old: at the upper bounds of the already broad age range that constitutes youth in South Africa. The average age of those who often or always participate in violent protest was only slightly lower (*m*), at 34–35 years. Overall, participation in all three types of protest was lowest among the youngest (15–19) and oldest (65 and above) South Africans interviewed. White adults were more likely than youth to have taken part in demonstrations, strikes or violent protests, as shown in Table 10. Black, coloured and Indian/Asian youth were, however, more likely to indicate that they had taken part in violent protests over the past year than adults in these race groups.

COMING TO THE PARTY?

What happens when political leaders are 'popular', but are thought to be unresponsive and untrustworthy by some? When concern is growing over perceived corruption? And political parties are out courting youth votes?

Political parties' internal cogs are already turning in preparation for the national and provincial elections that will take place in 2014. Internal elections at the ANC national conference in Mangaung will see either the re-election of Jacob Zuma or a new party president: the victor will be a likely nominee for the state presidency. Meanwhile in Parliament in November, the DA and a host of smaller opposition parties tabled a motion of no confidence in President Zuma.

It is often assumed in South Africa that party loyalty is static and consistent and that voters are unwilling to change their partisan allegiance for a variety of reasons – many un-interrogated and often untrue. Collette Schulz-Herzenberg (2009) finds, for example, that strong party identification has declined since 1994, and the number of 'floating voters' has increased accordingly. It is also becoming apparent that South Africans may in fact be staying away from the polls altogether in greater numbers than ever before. While the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) reported a high voter turnout of 77.3% at the 2009 national and provincial polls, the actual percentage of South Africans eligible to vote who went and cast ballots has in fact declined. While 85.5% of the voting-age population (VAP) participated in the 1994 national polls, this declined to 63.9% in 1999, 56.8% in 2004 and 56.6% in 2009. Data compiled by IDEA suggests that in the last national election, about 13.8 million South Africans who were eligible to vote did not do so, up from 12.1 million in 2004 (see IDEA online).

Reconciliation Barometer data shows that many South Africans are already sceptical about political parties. More than forty percent (44.3%) of black youth have little or no confidence in political parties, and this percentage rises substantially among coloured (68.9%), Indian/Asian (78.1%) and white (77.2%) under-35s.

In 2012, more than one-third (36.2%) of all South Africans also agreed that it was actually better not to vote at all than to cast a ballot for a different party: this belief is consistent with evidence of dropping electoral participation among the VAP overall. A further 34.0% disagree, however, and 25.8% are neutral. Little difference is evident between South Africans of different races or generations, although white adults are slightly more likely to agree that it is better not to vote than change parties (33.6%) than youth (21.1%) (see Table 11). At the same time, more than half of all South Africans (56.7%) agree that they would consider joining a political party that they felt best represented their interests, even if it was different to the party supported by their closest friends. This may indicate, at least in principle, that a majority of South Africans are not overly concerned about social stigma or sanctions as a result of changing party affiliation. Only coloured (40.9%) South Africans seemed somewhat less likely to do so than others.

The prospect of joining a political party in which you would be a racial minority, however, still seems a difficult one for many South Africans: 32.5% could not imagine doing so, and this percentage is higher among black South Africans (35.6%) than other groups. Notably, as shown in Table 11, young South Africans appear even more resistant to joining a political party under these circumstances than those of older generations. About one quarter of white (24.2%) and coloured (26.1%) youth agree that they could not imagine joining a political party in which they would be part of a racial minority, and the same was true of 31.3% of Indian/Asian and 36.6% of black youth. While it is too early to describe this as a trend within the born-free VAP, it is an early indication of poor progress with regard to deepening national commitment to multi-racial parties and political relationships that cross historical divisions.

Table 11: Party membership and identification by age and race, 2012						
Agree		White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	Black	Total
Would consider joining a different political party	Youth	53.1%	62.1%	43.2%	59.7%	58.0%
	Adults	55.3%	59.5%	39.2%	57.5%	55.4%
	Total	54.7%	60.3%	40.9%	58.7%	56.7%
Better not to vote than to change parties	Youth	21.1%	46.2%	31.3%	38.4%	36.9%
	Adults	33.6%	25.5%	30.3%	37.1%	35.5%
	Total	30.0%	32.3%	30.7%	37.8%	36.2%
Could not imagine being a racial minority in a party	Youth	24.2%	31.3%	26.1%	36.6%	34.8%
	Adults	17.0%	21.5%	22.9%	34.6%	30.3%
	Total	19.1%	24.7%	24.3%	35.6%	32.5%

Op Ed

SONA 2012

Big plans from THE BIG MAN

KATE LEFKO-EVERETT

I have to confess that this year, I felt very little of my usual excitement around the State of the Nation Address (SONA). The outrageous outfits parading through Plein Street held little purchase or appeal. Same for the skinner about who scored invites to the gallery. And most of all, my patience for a SONA of the visionary, ascendant and full-of-new-promises variety turned out to be quite thin.

For many South Africans, 2012 has started with a vague sense of trepidation – we know there is a difficult year ahead. Finance minister Pravin Gordhan warned us in his October Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) that the robust recovery we had hoped for in the wake of the 2008/2009 recession is 'not to be'. Further economic contraction, big bailouts and accompanying civil unrest seem likely to continue in Europe. At home, recently-released 2011 unemployment numbers and matric results are testimony to the fact that on two issues of foremost concern for many South Africans – job creation and education – our achievements have fallen far short of our soaring expectations. Remember those five million new jobs we celebrated (prematurely) after last year's SONA?

Hearing reports of a flood of comments to President Zuma through social media networks, I thought I would have a look at some of the issues that ordinary South Africans – albeit those with access to the internet – thought should be prioritised in the SONA.

A flood was perhaps an exaggeration. But a few hours before the blue-light brigade sped down Nelson Mandela Boulevard towards parliament, there were indeed hundreds of comments of The Presidency's Facebook page. When I copied them into a Word document they came to just over ninety pages, although annoyingly aligned in a skinny left-hand column. And all those eager, lovely profile pics – everyone looking how they would most like

others to see them, holding up a new baby, posing with a celebrity, showing off a treasured cat. Even though by midday there was little chance that any newly-posted comments would make the SONA, as President Zuma was already practicing the speech on his iPad while a dutiful publicist stood by tweeting pictures.

From love to cybercrime and the Ten Commandments, it's all in there. There are comments on the role of China in the South African economy, the difficulties of getting a driver's license, challenges faced by graduating social workers and the need for more maritime development. There is extensive feedback, including on the eTolling system, the proposed Media Tribunal, the Jobs Fund and South Africa's BRICS membership. Recommendations on how to enforce compliance with executive ethics standards, both increase and reduce social spending and grants, encourage small business development and foreign investment, and how South Africa should go about securing the leadership of the African Union Commission. Pleas to regulate unregistered practitioners carrying out unsafe abortions, for better urban rodent and pest control.

Not to mention specific oratorical tips to the President on the importance of pace in public speaking, and of making eye contact with the audience. That South Africans take the time to consider and respond to government calls for engagement remains a good endorsement of a culture of democratic practice. Like.

However, as it turns out, my short - and I should say upfront, anecdotal – analysis shows that others also have limited appetite for Big New Plans and programmes. A perusal of several hundred public Facebook comments shows a thick and fast concentration of online commentary and consensus around a few key priority issues.

Foremost among these – and I think probably even intense techno-cynics would agree – is the issue of

job creation. Likely reflective of the demographic that uses this channel for democratic participation, there were also numerous specific comments on the need for jobs, training, skills development and tertiary education funding for young people. As captured in comments made by Mojalefa Moeletsi, 'Mr presdent i am 27 and i completed my matric in 2004 and I'm still unemployed, all what i'm saying Bab'Zuma Msholozi is please create more job opportunities for us the youth. THANK YOU'. Nthabiseng Grace Mphelo writes, 'Mr p I psd matric in 2009 ma parent dnt hv money 2 take m 2 skul ive tryd bursary but no luck plz hlp m am stuck my future is messed am stll young 2 sit at kai dng nothng, plz I nid education'[sic].

The issue of corruption was also a major concern for Facebook commentators, with many expressing frustration and disapproval over perceived fraudulent tender processes and nepotism. Hamilton Daluxolo Ntsinde feels dodgy tenders are 'killing the spirit of the country, while Mahlasela Mokgolobotho suggests that they benefit only people who work 4 goverment &their brothers & sisters' and Fumanekile Wisani that they 'fuel corruption and fraud'. Sizwe Humphrey Shiba adds, 'as a South African citizens I m sick and tired about the fertilized corruption farm where gorvernment officials reap for themselves, as it's sorrounded by tender fence, what I would like to hear from the State of the nation address, is the new strategy of eradication of corruption, as last years strategies failed to deliver proper solutions against the corruption which is our democracy's worst enemy.'

Finally, and perhaps most striking are the numerous comments that recall just how little service delivery has taken place in some rural areas in particular. Munangiwa Raivhogo asked the President to visit Masia in Limpopo, where he says, 'since I was born (now I'm 29), I have to tell you that the conditions of our roads are the same, no water at all... Everything seems hopeless from that place.' He continues, 'as the government, you promised service delivery. I mean, I am not crying by anything fancy, only water supply and decent tar roads will do, so that we can also proudly say we have enjoyed the benefits of our democratic government.' Edward Thunioswa asks the President about the lack of electricity at schools in Mount Frere: 'U said education is the children's right, but, to these kids it is a priviledge.' Ayanda Caluza writes, 'We are still using bucket toilets @ Majaldin.'

Unlike.

To say that these concerns did not feature in this year's SONA, or more importantly in the overall work plan of government, would be unfair. In fact it would be patently incorrect. However, just this small screen grab reveals something of a disconnect between the lofty articulations ultimately contained within the SONA, and the very fundamental concerns and priorities expressed by some South Africans.

When President Zuma took to the podium later that day, he revealed Big Plans for industrialisation and infrastructure development, albeit that many of these have their roots in the New Growth Path and other existing documents and programmes. These will see the expansion of rail lines between inland mines and sea ports, as well as new and upgraded roads and further electrification.

Basic service delivery, rather than an urgent goal in itself, is largely presented as a guaranteed outcome of

> Mr p I psd matric in 2009 ma parent dnt hv money 2 take m 2 skul ive tryd bursary but no luck plz hlp m am stuck my future is messed am stll young 2 sit at kai dng nothng, plz I nid education.
>
> — *Nthabiseng Grace Mphelo*

infrastructure upgrades. Specific commitments have been made to improve access to water, described by the President as 'still a challenge in some areas', but issues of sanitation and human settlement development only receive passing mentions of 'steady progress' at 'an advanced stage'.

Infrastructure development is also presented as a major solution for job creation, for example, through the 'expansion of the iron-ore rail line between Sishen in the Northern Cape and Saldanha Bay in the Western Cape. This may bode well for new employment opportunities in some areas. At least, if you live close to a major industrial development or extraction site.

And the potential for corruption that may come with an inevitable increase in government tenders to carry out this development? The President has reassured us of a commitment to cooperate with Corruption Watch and that a review of the state procurement system remains ongoing, but the SONA promises little in the way of innovative and proactive solutions in the vein of those proposed by interested Facebookers.

We cannot fault the president on the tradition of a SONA, nor the popular expectation of Big New Plans that comes with the opening of Parliament in February. But with tough times ahead, it also seems that some South Africans are ready for a back-to-basics approach. This needs to start with a very frank assessment of progress in job creation and service delivery since last year's SONA. South Africans also want a transparent and responsive government: confidence in this deliverable may be jeopardised by, in the very frank words of Unathi Puti, the perception of 'a long boring boring day full of empty promises'.

Perhaps the time is right for a new rhetorical tradition, and one with a better balance between where we are now, and where we would like to be.

A version of this article appeared in The Big Issue, *Volume 16, Issue 193, March 2012.*

V.
OUR YOUNG ECONOMY

Since the outset of the project, the Reconciliation Barometer survey has hypothesised that a greater sense of security among South Africans will contribute to reconciliation. A longitudinal assessment of the survey results over time also reveals, broadly speaking, that dips in public optimism and confidence often coincide with economic downturn – particularly during the 2008 recession.

Unfortunately, as Europe undergoes economic meltdown, finance minister Pravin Gordhan has warned that 'economic uncertainty will be with us for some time', 'significant financial risks cloud the global economic outlook' and employment has not returned to the peak levels recorded in 2008 (National Treasury, 2012a). By the time of the release of the Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS) in October, predicted growth rates for 2012 were downwardly revised to only 2.5%, revenue collection was at R5 billion less than anticipated, a higher-than-expected deficit was expected to reach 4.8%, and the minister projected that national debt will rise to 39% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015/16 (National Treasury, 2012b). Presenters at a conference co-hosted by the IJR and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) in Johannesburg in August on 'Economic Justice for the Next Generation' spoke of the challenges of substandard education for young South Africans, a mismatch between emerging skills and the demands of the economy and significant structural challenges to labour market entry and participation. This section of the report focuses on opinion and prospects for economic security among South African youth.

ECONOMIC OPTIMISM PREVAILS

Amid a year of economic instability and contraction and low employment figures, South Africans appear to nonetheless be evaluating their own financial and job prospects more positively than in previous survey rounds. Nationally, 34.9% believed when interviewed in April/May that their chances of finding a job had improved over the past year. Just over two-fifths (44.9%) believe that the situation of people like themselves is set to improve over the next two years. However, and in what appears to be some contradiction with this optimism, 45.9% also believe that they are likely to be unemployed within the coming year: the highest percentage response to this survey item since it was introduced in 2004 (see Figure 8).

Despite the challenges they face, young South Africans – like adults – are optimistic about their future prospects in the coming years. Thirty-seven percent (37.0%) of black youth, for example, feel their chances of finding a job were better in 2012 than 2011, although close to half (46.3%) expect to be unemployed in the months ahead (see Table 12). As is perhaps to be expected, closer analysis shows that optimism among under-35s with regard to the economic situation of people like themselves in the next two years is highest among those who are already working full-time (52.9%) or part-time (56.4%), in comparison with those who are unemployed and looking for work (41.4%).

**Figure 8:** Economic security, 2004–2012 (%)

Legend:
- Better chance of finding a job than one year ago
- Better financial situation than one year ago
- Likely to be unemployed in the next year
- Economic situation likely to improve in the next two years

Table 12: Economic security by age and race, 2012 (%)

Economic security		White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Black	Total
Better financial situation than one year ago	Youth	27.7%	31.9%	28.4%	31.7%	31.2%
	Adults	29.2%	26.1%	19.6%	30.0%	28.6%
	Total	28.8%	28.0%	23.4%	30.9%	29.9%
Better chances of finding a job compared to one year ago	Youth	29.0%	34.0%	28.7%	37.0%	35.8%
	Adults	37.4%	30.9%	26.2%	34.6%	34.0%
	Total	35.0%	31.9%	27.3%	35.9%	34.9%
Likely to be unemployed in the next year	Youth	54.4%	56.5%	35.6%	46.3%	46.1%
	Adults	48.3%	51.2%	39.4%	45.8%	45.7%
	Total	50.1%	53.0%	37.7%	46.1%	45.9%
Economic situation likely to get better in next two years	Youth	39.0%	39.5%	34.6%	49.9%	47.7%
	Adults	41.2%	42.4%	27.7%	44.4%	42.1%
	Total	40.5%	41.5%	30.7%	47.3%	44.9%
Government is doing well getting young people into jobs	Youth	18.1%	23.1%	25.0%	37.4%	34.9%
	Adults	28.9%	32.4%	20.2%	34.1%	31.8%
	Total	25.8%	29.3%	22.2%	35.8%	33.3%

Job creation for young people remains a concern for many South Africans, however, and 41.9% overall feel government is not doing enough on this front. Criticism was most robust from those living in the least affluent households in the country – more than half (53.1%) of all South Africans in LSM 1 felt government has not delivered enough jobs for young people. Confidence was also lower among young white (18.1%) and Indian/Asian (23.1%) South Africans than adults within these groups. Conversely, black youth (37.4%) were marginally more confident in government's ability to get young people into work than adults (34.1%) (see Table 12).

These are difficult findings. While youth optimism and energy are encouraging – and we know that young South Africans see themselves as confident, active and creative – both the international and domestic economic forecasts are grim, and there are simply not enough economic opportunities available to absorb the millions in this eager demographic. This is indeed reason for concern.

EMPLOYMENT EQUITY AND WORKFORCE TRANSFORMATION

Employment Equity (EE) policy constitutes the main thrust of government's programme to increase the participation of under-represented groups in the economy and labour market. According to the EE Act (Act 55 of 1998), designated groups eligible for preference in hiring and appointments include black people (referring to those classified as African, coloured or Indian under apartheid), women and people with disabilities. Progress has arguably been slow, and the Commission for Employment Equity (CEE) reports that in 2011, 80.9% of top managers in the country were male and 65.4% were white (CEE, 2012: 11).

EE policy and implementation has always been contentious. Participants in a qualitative study conducted by the IJR in 2011,

particularly from racial minority groups, voiced some concerns about perceived barriers and obstacles to labour market entry as a result of EE, despite the fact that some were in fact eligible for preference in appointment as members of 'designated groups':[1]

> I see EE positions, I see BEE positions. There are so many people without work. Now already I am negative, you know, that step has been made. (Group 1, Cape Town)

> ... from my point of view, in the past it was mainly about whites right, but now in the present, we are living in a democratic country – fair enough – but in a democratic country where blacks are given opportunities, like they suffered apartheid by themselves and not looking at the other race groups that suffered too. (Group 14, Durban)

> With affirmative action all the black people are being advanced. Coloured people don't get prioritised at all. We who are in the middle don't benefit and that is why we are not on the same level. (Group 3, Worcester)

> I have been unemployed and the fact that am a white female, it makes it exceptionally difficult ... (Group 5, Johannesburg)

Public opinion is divided on issues of EE and workplace transformation, and some of these differences are along racial lines. Overall, about half of all South Africans (49.2%) believe that government should still make use of apartheid racial categories, specifically to measure the impact of policy and programming and track progress for disadvantaged communities, and this has increased from 40.1% five years ago. Support is highest among black South Africans (54.0%) in 2012, and lowest among coloured (33.5%) and white South Africans (27.5%). More than half of the national population agrees that the workforce should be representative on the basis of race (57.7%), gender (62.9%)

and disabilities (63.1%) although as shown in Figure 9, agreement has declined across all of these measures in recent years.

Both coloured (36.1%) and black (55.0%) youth were slightly more likely than adults to agree that government should continue to use apartheid race categories for purposes of tracking progress, but agreement with this practice was markedly lower among white youth (18.6%). White youth also voiced some of the most adamant agreement that the South African workforce should be representative on the basis of race (67.6%), gender (72.1%) and physical ability (81.0%). It is difficult to tell from these figures if white youth are simply vociferous supporters of these interventions, or possibly, see them-selves and others like them as under-represented in the labour force at present as a result of EE (see Table 13). A comment made by a white focus group participant in Heilbron (Group 9) illustrated the possibility that the concept of 'representivity' could be contested or misunderstood: 'at our work we must be 70/30 – 70% black and 30% white. Why 70/30? Why 90% black and 10% white? Why can't it be 50/50? There's inequality.'

Two other Reconciliation Barometer survey items also speak to this issue: South Africans were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) as a policy for ensuring greater participation of black people in the economy. Agreement about BEE effectiveness was highest among black youth (53.9%) and adults (49.1%) and lowest among white youth (35.4%) and adults (34.8%). White youth (23.6%) were also the demographic least likely to agree that EE policies have succeeded in creating a representative workforce (see Table 13).

Figure 9: Support for Employment Equity, 2007–2012 (%)

- Government should use race categories to measure progress
- Workforce should be representative of race
- Workforce should be representative of disability
- Workforce should be representative of gender

NOTES

1. See Appendix A for details of the location and composition of focus groups conducted in 2011.

Table 13: Support for Employment Equity by age and race, 2012 (%)						
Agree		White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Black	Total
Government should use race categories to measure progress	Youth	18.6%	44.8%	36.1%	55.0%	51.0%
	Adults	31.2%	50.9%	31.4%	52.9%	47.4%
	Total	27.5%	48.9%	33.5%	54.0%	49.2%
Workforce should be representative of race	Youth	67.6%	61.5%	52.8%	57.9%	58.1%
	Adults	61.0%	61.4%	48.8%	57.6%	57.3%
	Total	62.9%	61.5%	50.5%	57.8%	57.7%
Workforce should be representative of gender	Youth	72.1%	64.3%	53.8%	63.9%	63.6%
	Adults	67.5%	67.2%	53.4%	62.3%	62.3%
	Total	68.8%	66.2%	53.6%	63.1%	62.9%
Workforce should be representative of disability	Youth	81.0%	54.1%	57.5%	64.5%	64.8%
	Adults	73.1%	63.7%	55.0%	60.1%	61.6%
	Total	75.4%	60.6%	56.1%	62.4%	63.1%
BEE is an effective policy for ensuring black participation in the economy	Youth	35.4%	40.9%	39.2%	53.9%	51.3%
	Adults	34.8%	39.4%	42.5%	49.1%	46.0%
	Total	35.0%	39.9%	41.1%	51.6%	48.6%
EE policies have succeeded in creating a representative workforce	Youth	23.6%	32.6%	29.3%	49.1%	45.6%
	Adults	38.7%	37.7%	36.9%	45.6%	43.4%
	Total	34.3%	36.0%	33.7%	47.5%	44.5%

SA Reconciliation Barometer | Newsletter

Income-based education?

School is not a talent competition and learners need critical resources and infrastructure to succeed, writes DORON ISAACS.

In his autobiography *Long Walk to Freedom*, former president Nelson Mandela places enormous value and hope on education: 'Education is the great engine of personal development. It is through education that the daughter of a peasant can become a doctor, that the son of a mineworker can become the head of the mine, that a child of farmworkers can become the president.'

Many people know this famous quote, and when Mandela wrote it he knew that he was living proof of its truth. The statement that followed, however, is less well-known: 'It is what we make out of what we have, not what we are given, that separates one person from another.'

This is certainly sound advice from a father to a son or daughter, especially during the difficult months before matric exams. Young people should work as hard as they can. With the 2012 matric exams about to begin, all across South Africa, grade 12 learners are challenged and even pleaded with in terms that resemble Mandela's. Yet whether from Madiba or a concerned parent, this advice deserves close attention – because it is categorically ill-fitted to the reality that faces young people in South Africa.

Despite the impressive increase in the overall matric pass rate in 2011, many learners in poor schools still leave the national education system after twelve years without the tools or the grades to improve their own lives, or those of their families. In fact, most learners do not manage to complete these full twelve years. Of the 1 035 192 who started school in 2000, just 104 033 – only 10% – were able to pass mathematics in 2011. A fact often obscured by commendations over supposed improvements in national pass rates is that there was a sharp drop in the numbers of learners even writing maths exams, with a decline of 20 716 (17%) from 2010.

Academic achievement correlates closely with financial resources at schools. Government schools are classified by the education department into five quintiles, which are an indicator of relative wealth or poverty. Quintile 1 is comprised of the poorest schools, and quintile 5 the most affluent. Nearly half of all quintile 5 schools achieved matric pass rates of over 80%, while less than one-fifth of quintile 5 schools managed to do so.

Mandela's vision of education is clearly that of a great leveller, a lever of equality and the levee against a tide of poverty and joblessness. But more often than not, education in South Africa today functions as a great engine of social division. As a system, it ensures that the daughter of a peasant becomes a call centre temp, the son of a mineworker becomes a street sweeper, and the child of farmworkers a domestic servant. In South Africa today, education is perpetuating inequality – not ending it.

In 2009, all grade 6 learners in the Western Cape took standard numeracy tests. The pass rate in integrated, former Model C schools was 60.2%. In African township schools it was 2.1%.

For most young people, what they have – brains, dreams and determination – cannot make up for what they were not given: text books, libraries, calculators, and well-prepared and well-paid teachers. The work done by Section 27 in exposing the lack of textbooks in Limpopo schools is a stark illustration of this. The education department's own figures show that only 8% of South African schools have stocked libraries, and that 3 600 function without electricity. Without books in their homes or quiet, well-lit places to study, many learners depend on these vital institutional resources. As documents in papers that Equal Education – a movement of learners, parents, teachers and community members campaigning for quality and equality in the South African education system – has prepared for an upcoming court case against Minister Angie Motshekga, over 2 400 schools do not have running water.

School is not a talent competition in which learners are judged on self-taught brilliance and aptitude. It is a marathon in which everyone runs the same course and, ultimately, a gifted athlete who is denied running shoes, coaching, a route map and hydration is often beaten by an average runner in soft Nikes, with a GPS and sipping Powerade.

The members of Equal Education know this well. Campaigning for libraries, textbooks and minimum norms and standards for school infrastructure are among the organisation's priorities this year, alongside the concurrent values of arriving at school on time and working hard.

On 20 November Equal Education's two-year campaign for school infrastructure standards will reach the Bhisho High Court. In exhaustive papers we have demonstrated the crushing weight of poor facilities, the pervasive extent of such problems, and the persistent and unforgivable failure by Minister Motshekga to take corrective action. It is within the Minister's power to prescribe binding targets for provinces – a move that is not opposed by provinces themselves – yet she defers, dithers and dissimulates.

It is often easy and convenient to see the present as unchanged from the past, but this is wrong – South Africa has a constitution that protects our rights to organise, and to change the material conditions under which we study and live. We also have a government committed to non-discrimination, even if those with wealth or governmental power need to be reminded of the extent of disadvantage still experienced by many.

While inequality remains a critical challenge, middle-class black learners are excelling academically in private and former Model C schools. Those who can afford high fees at school and university buy a real chance at making a success of life. As for the rest – they must be sublimely talented and lucky to escape unemployment, or grindingly

For most young people, what they have – brains, dreams and determination – cannot make up for what they were not given: text books, libraries, calculators, and well-prepared and well-paid teachers.

monotonous work. After all, Mandela himself was raised by the Thembu Paramount Chief, who could afford to educate him.

Many of South Africa's educational problems of the past decade have been rightly linked to outcomes-based education (OBE), but as we move beyond OBE we are faced with an even bigger problem: incomes-based education.

Conservatives argue that resources have little to do with outcomes, but ample evidence from national and multi-country studies over the past decade demonstrates that a wide range of resources, particularly textbooks and libraries, are indispensible for academic success. Most vital of all are skilled teachers – a diminishing resource that requires large investments by the state to revive and replenish.

The work of Equal Education has only just begun to address some of these enormous challenges.

Doron Isaacs is deputy general secretary of Equal Education, and recently spoke at an IJR conference on 'Economic Justice for the Next Generation'. You can follow him on Twitter on @doronisaacs, or donate to Equal Education at www.equaleducation.org.za/donate.

VI.
COMING TO TERMS WITH HISTORY

South Africa is approaching nearly two decades of democracy. Close to 20 million South Africans have no lived experience of decades of apartheid segregation and oppression, and neither did they experience the struggle to end it.

As described by the NMMU student quoted at the beginning of this report, 'most of us never really grew up in the deep 70s where there was wide struggle and everything else – we grew up in a digital age'. Capturing youth views on the history of this country has always been a challenge for the Reconciliation Barometer survey: born-frees are only beginning to be represented in our national sample, and quite often when asked about their understanding of the past, many have simply answered, 'I don't know'. This section of the report focuses on how youth view South African history, what they understand to be the impacts of apartheid's legacy, and how they assess progress in reconciliation to date.

CONFRONTING HISTORICAL TRUTHS

Previous rounds of the Reconciliation Barometer survey have found that many South Africans – for better or worse – believe it is time for the country to 'forget about the past' and move forward towards a better shared future. This sentiment also emerged clearly from the qualitative focus groups conducted by the IJR in 2011. Comments from some youth participants (ages 16–24), particularly from minority racial groups, included the following:

> It's almost like being Afrikaans it's like your family is more against change. It's the truth but the thing it's like the change happened so long ago I mean it's been how many years now… it's the older generation, but more and more people are starting to realise that they don't need to be negative. (Group 1, Cape Town)

> I say let's leave the past in the past and move forward. (Group 3, Worcester)

> I think that we young people are being blamed for what our parents and grandparents might have done. I mean, I was four when apartheid ended ... (Group 7, Pretoria)

> The people that did the wrong and the people who were wronged those people are already dead. So why are we nagging about this… say for example my great grandfather and stuff. If he did something wrong he's already dead and the people he did it to is probably dead as well. (Group 1, Cape Town)

Despite this readiness to move on, there remains a relative consensus across the country on a number of critical truths about South Africa's past that has changed little over successive rounds of the Reconciliation Barometer survey. A large majority of South Africans (83.8%) continue to agree that apartheid was a crime against humanity, and this is an important finding. Similarly high numbers (82.5%) agree that before the transition to democracy, the state was responsible for committing atrocities against anti-apartheid activists. A further 81.1% agree that the apartheid government wrongly oppressed the majority of South Africans.

Across all of these survey items, however, differences in public opinion are again evident along racial lines, with recorded agreement lower (68–74%) among white South Africans than other groups. A particularly pronounced split is evident in response to a question that assesses apartheid's economic legacy: whether or not black South Africans are still poor today as a result of the lasting effects of apartheid. Eighty-two percent (82.0%) of black South Africans agree that this is the case, as do 73.3% of Indian/Asian and 61.4% of coloured South Africans. Only about half (50.6%) of whites agree. Here, further inferential analysis found statistically significant difference in agreement about apartheid's economic legacy according to race groups (p ≤ .01). Linear regression analysis also confirms that race is a significant predictor of agreement that black poverty today is the result of apartheid, although it explains only a small amount of variability.[1]

Some generational differences in understanding the past have also begun to emerge clearly. White, coloured and black youth are all more likely than adults to question whether apartheid was a crime against humanity and that the state committed atrocities against activists: 27.7% and 24.6% of white youth agree that these statements are certainly or probably not true, as shown in Table 14. Higher percentages of white (38.0%), Indian/Asian (28.4%) and coloured (32.2%) youth than adults feel it is untrue that black South Africans are poor today as a result of apartheid's legacy. These findings pose difficult questions about how young people understand South African history, their sources of information, and whether a struggling school system has missed an important opportunity for education on the past, civic identity and citizenship, and national and constitutional values.

ARE WE RECONCILED?

All of the indicators and items included in the Reconciliation Barometer survey are used to test progress in various areas of social and economic change in South Africa. As shown in this and other sections of the report, there is strength of opinion on many issues – for example,

Table 14: Disagreement with historical truths by age and race, 2012 (% not true)

Not true		White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Black	Total
Apartheid was a crime against humanity	Youth	27.7%	1.2%	14.8%	13.0%	13.9%
	Adults	14.8%	7.1%	12.8%	9.9%	10.8%
	Total	18.6%	5.1%	13.6%	11.6%	12.3%
Apartheid government committed atrocities against activists	Youth	24.6%	6.5%	16.2%	13.6%	14.3%
	Adults	19.9%	11.6%	15.8%	9.8%	12.0%
	Total	21.3%	9.9%	15.9%	11.8%	13.1%
Apartheid government oppressed the majority of South Africans	Youth	19.5%	11.5%	16.8%	15.5%	15.7%
	Adults	20.7%	19.2%	18.4%	11.0%	13.5%
	Total	20.4%	16.7%	17.7%	13.4%	14.6%
Many black SAs are poor today as a result of apartheid's legacy	Youth	38.0%	28.4%	32.2%	16.0%	18.9%
	Adults	36.3%	14.4%	25.9%	13.8%	18.4%
	Total	36.8%	19.0%	28.6%	15.0%	18.7%

Table 15: Disagreement with progress in reconciliation by age and race, 2012

Disagree		White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Black	Total
SA has made progress in reconciliation since 1994	Youth	3.8%	7.1%	5.2%	12.5%	11.3%
	Adults	13.2%	9.2%	12.0%	14.2%	13.6%
	Total	10.5%	8.5%	9.1%	13.3%	12.5%
My friends and family have experienced reconciliation	Youth	16.5%	16.0%	9.1%	20.3%	19.1%
	Adults	26.2%	16.7%	13.4%	21.6%	21.2%
	Total	23.4%	16.5%	11.5%	20.9%	20.2%
Reconciliation is impossible as long as disadvantaged remain poor	Youth	31.1%	34.2%	13.4%	21.9%	22.0%
	Adults	21.2%	16.3%	18.1%	19.4%	19.5%
	Total	24.1%	22.2%	16.1%	20.7%	20.7%
SA should forget about apartheid and move forward	Youth	0.5%	6.5%	4.9%	10.0%	8.9%
	Adults	4.9%	3.9%	4.8%	10.3%	8.7%
	Total	3.7%	4.7%	4.8%	10.2%	8.8%
Time to forgive those who hurt others during apartheid	Youth	10.3%	5.3%	5.8%	9.9%	9.5%
	Adults	6.7%	6.5%	5.7%	9.8%	8.8%
	Total	7.7%	6.1%	5.8%	9.8%	9.1%
Government should continue to support apartheid victims	Youth	29.5%	18.0%	9.4%	10.3%	11.6%
	Adults	14.5%	11.5%	8.6%	9.7%	10.3%
	Total	18.9%	13.7%	9.0%	10.0%	10.9%
TRC succeeded in bringing about reconciliation	Youth	1.3%	18.9%	8.6%	10.1%	9.6%
	Adults	10.0%	10.4%	12.3%	11.1%	11.1%
	Total	7.5%	13.1%	10.7%	10.6%	10.3%

as evidenced by relatively robust confidence in government, doubt that national leadership is interested in the views of ordinary citizens, poor evaluations of efforts to get young people into jobs, and significant consensus around how the past is understood.

Testing South Africans' direct experiences of reconciliation, however, has proved difficult. Responses are moderate, and many people either indicate that their feelings are neutral or that they just don't know. When looking at the national picture in 2012, a moderate 55.5% agree that progress has been made in reconciliation since 1994. Just under half (47.5%) agree that the people they know around them – their friends and family – have experienced reconciliation, whether or not the individual respondent himself or herself was born before or after the transition to democracy. A slightly higher percentage (60.4%) believe that based on what they know firsthand and have heard from others, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) succeeded in bringing about reconciliation.

In 2012, the Reconciliation Barometer survey again found that most South Africans are willing to 'forget about apartheid' and move forward together as a country (66.7%), and that is time to forgive those people who hurt others in the past (66.9%). Yet, at the same time issues of material justice seem to stand in the way, low levels of economic inclusion and slow transformation remain important concerns: 43.1% believe that reconciliation and improved social relationships between South Africans are impossible while those who were disadvantaged under apartheid are still poor.

Strength of disagreement can be a useful gauge for interpreting these results, as shown in Table 15. Levels of disagreement that progress has been made in reconciliation, and that friends and family have experienced reconciliation, are lower among youth than adults across all racial groups. Irrespective of race or age, less than ten percent of South Africans disagree outright with the statements that it is time to move forward, forget the past and forgive perpetrators. With the exception of Indian/Asian South Africans, youth were less likely overall to doubt the TRC's success.

Differences between groups were, however, particularly evident in relation to two survey items related to restitution, and once again, the economic legacy of apartheid. About one-third of white (31.1%) and Indian/Asian (34.2%) youth feel that economic justice and greater equality is not a necessary pre-condition for reconciliation to take place. White youth (29.5%) also demonstrated particular opposition to the idea that government should still support apartheid victims, far more so than white adults (14.5%).

NOTES

1. For ANOVA, $p \leq .01$; for linear regression, $p \leq .01$, $R^2 = .051$.

SA Reconciliation Barometer | Newsletter

Volume 10 • Issue 3 • October 2012

It's time to set politics aside

Political finger-pointing is getting us nowhere in the critical fight for effective and sustainable unemployment policies, writes DIANE JANZEN

Recent debate over proposals for a youth wage subsidy, coupled with speculation over prospects for a job seekers' grant, are just a few among a host of indicators of just how fragmented South Africa's unemployment policy land-scape has become. Unless these discrepancies are urgently tackled, there will be little change ahead for the 33% of the economically active population (EAP) that is currently unemployed.

The complicated matter of economic policy-making is one that is shared across a range of different government departments, and at various levels. Coordination, consensus and implementation become even more difficult when politics enters the mix.

South Africa is currently experiencing burgeoning growth in the national youth population (ages 15–34): this group constitutes 58% of the EAP. According to Statistics

> Debates reflect the extreme positions of strong stakeholders and their constituencies, but are often divorced from the bigger imperative of pushing back poverty levels.

South Africa, 66% of the EAP is employed, while 22% are unemployed and 11% are discouraged job seekers. Youth make up 70% of the unemployed overall.

In a 2011 discussion paper entitled 'Confronting Youth Unemployment: Policy Options for South Africa', the National Treasury proposed that with R5 billion in tax expenditure, 'up to 423 000 new subsidised formal sector decent jobs for young people could be created over three years for unemployed 18 to 29-year-olds'. The 'youth wage subsidy', which Treasury suggested could be launched in 2012, would be available for a period of up to two years and with a maximum value of R12 000.

The African National Congress (ANC), which initially backed this initiative, has since given the appearance of qualified and diminished support – possibly due to growing pressure from the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). In the interim, the Democratic Alliance's (DA) quick uptake of the issue – and its march to COSATU headquarters earlier this year – seem to have had the effect of producing even more uncertainty and ambiguity from within the ruling party, which has reacted by touting a 'national youth service' instead.

Unfortunately, this underscores the reality of the extent to which politics can get in the way of solving critical social issues. Policy suggestions – in this case those related to unemployment – are debated on the merits of their champions and opponents, rather than on the policy's content. In a 2011 working paper on 'The South African Unemployment Debate: Three Worlds, Three Discourses', published by the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU), Frederick Fourie also points out that research on unemployment generally is fragmented into separate discourses on labour, poverty/development and the macro-economy, which rarely interact with each other. The isolation of these discourses is also evident in non-academic sectors.

Although labour market actors must be a part of unemployment policy discussions, their main allegiance is to their own members and interests. Arguably, the business community supports the youth wage subsidy for its own goals of lowering salary bills and increasing output; COSATU leadership, on the other hand, has lobbied hard to protect the employment position of older, higher-wage workers. Both have the ability to hold the debate hostage. The role of private business in job creation is critical, and therefore its concerns cannot be summarily brushed aside. And while recognising the importance of protecting labour, COSATU's strategic importance for the ANC's electoral fortunes gives it leverage that is disproportionate to the 10% of the EAP that the organisation represents.

Notably absent from current discourses on unemployment are the views of non-unionised formal-sector workers, as well as those employed in the informal economy and the unemployed themselves. Debates reflect the extreme positions of strong stakeholders and their constituencies, but are often divorced from the bigger imperative of pushing back poverty levels.

At the ANC's centenary celebrations in January, President Zuma listed unemployment, poverty and inequality as the top issues facing South Africans. At the party's subsequent policy conference in June a job seekers' grant was mooted, which will be elaborated upon further at the national conference in December. Meanwhile, the DA continues to promote the youth wage subsidy, and to call for policy interventions on both the supply and demand sides of labour. This debate needs to go much broader and deeper.

The World Bank's recent economic update on South Africa focused on 'inequality of opportunity', reporting that the options and choices available to youth are shaped by circumstances that are largely beyond their control – such as gender, ethnicity and geography. A young black female in a rural area who is able to complete her education, and in doing so overcome significant inequalities in service delivery and quality, faces more difficulty in finding work than a white male living in an urban area. Among other obstacles, she will likely have less work experience, a smaller network of contacts and fewer resources to search for a job. Without addressing entrenched inequality and poverty, alongside supply and demand interventions in the labour market, unemployment policies alone will not create sustainable change.

Against this backdrop, it should come as no surprise that disillusioned youth are undoubtedly driving numbers of the economy-related protests across the country. Without the options of withholding taxes or labour, protests and elections remain among only a few options for destitute citizens enduring terrible living conditions and deep poverty.

As political parties gear up for elections in 2014, South Africans are in desperate need of credible unemployment policy proposals, and for arenas of insightful and productive debate on them. To citizens who have not yet lost faith in the ballot to effect social change, promises of a better life alone will no longer suffice. It is time policymakers stop skimming the surface of these issues and using them as ammunition in political finger-pointing, and begin to respond with real change.

Diane Janzen is currently an MA candidate in peace studies at the University of Notre Dame. She is completing her field placement semester at the IJR. A version of this article appeared in the Cape Times.

VII.
GROWING NEW RELATIONSHIPS

Amid complex questions of understanding and accepting the past, forgiveness, and restitution, it is not uncommon to hear a plea for South Africans to just start 'getting along' – alongside the assumption that this will be a natural eventual outcome as generations change and lived memories of apartheid fade.

The results of a qualitative study on non-racialism conducted by the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation and the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO) showed that many South Africans, irrespective of age, believe that relationships between people of different historically defined racial groups are only likely to improve with the 'next generation', particularly when greater social contact happens at schools and in other public spaces (Lefko-Everett, 2012a, 2012b). This section of the report looks at questions of youth identity, interaction and socialisation and perceived sources of division in the country.

YOUTH IDENTITY IN 2012

Since 2007, the Reconciliation Barometer survey has asked South Africans about the groups they identify and associate with most strongly: have these changed in the 'new South Africa', and have exclusive identities been replaced by a more inclusive, shared identity?

In past survey rounds, South Africans have indicated that they associate most strongly with others who speak the same language, share their ethnic background, or who they believe to be of the same race group. This trend has remained largely the same in 2012, as shown in Table 16. Although language identification has fluctuated (21.6% associate most strongly on the basis of language) over time, those who associate on the basis of race and ethnicity have increased to 18.4% and 15.8% respectively. Identification with others of the same economic class has also increased slowly, from 6.9% in 2007 to 10.6% in 2012. The percentage overall who identify themselves as South Africans first is low at 8.3%.

Overall, differences in the groups that young and older South Africans identity most strongly with were minimal, although as shown in Table 17, youth were more likely to associate strongly with those of the same ethnicity than adults, and less likely on the basis of language. White adults (26.5%) in particular were more likely than white youth (18.9%) to associate most strongly with others who speak the same language. White and Indian/Asian youth were more likely to indicate a strong association with others of the same race or economic class than adults within these groups.

A majority of South Africans (78.8%) view association with, or belonging to this primary identity group as important. For most, these associations are thought to be a positive source of self-worth (66.6%), feelings of importance (64.9%) and a sense of security (63.4%).

Table 16: Primary association, 2007–2012 (%)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Language	20.4%	24.1%	19.3%	20.7%	18.3%	21.6%
Ethnicity	15.1%	18.4%	19.3%	18.5%	18.6%	15.8%
Race	11.8%	12.0%	10.9%	14.5%	19.0%	18.4%
Economic class	6.9%	6.3%	5.2%	5.4%	6.1%	10.6%
Neighbourhood	8.9%	7.1%	8.4%	8.7%	7.2%	8.9%
Religion	6.9%	5.2%	7.1%	6.4%	6.3%	4.8%
South African first	11.2%	11.9%	14.2%	13.7%	12.6%	8.3%

Table 17: Primary association by age and race, 2012 (%)

Identity		White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	Black	Total
Language	Youth	18.9%	13.0%	34.8%	18.7%	19.9%
	Adults	26.5%	17.7%	35.7%	21.1%	23.3%
	Total	24.3%	16.0%	35.3%	19.8%	21.6%
Ethnicity	Youth	5.6%	6.8%	9.6%	18.8%	17.0%
	Adults	7.6%	8.8%	9.4%	17.2%	14.7%
	Total	7.1%	8.2%	9.5%	18.0%	15.8%
Race	Youth	18.1%	13.9%	16.4%	18.6%	18.3%
	Adults	12.7%	8.5%	14.3%	20.8%	18.5%
	Total	14.3%	10.3%	15.2%	19.6%	18.4%
Economic class	Youth	17.4%	14.5%	4.2%	10.1%	10.2%
	Adults	13.6%	4.5%	8.1%	11.4%	11.1%
	Total	14.7%	7.8%	6.4%	10.7%	10.6%
Neighbour- hood	Youth	6.9%	7.7%	9.6%	9.8%	9.6%
	Adults	7.4%	17.9%	10.8%	7.5%	8.2%
	Total	7.3%	14.6%	10.3%	8.8%	8.9%
Religion	Youth	3.8%	13.0%	8.9%	4.4%	4.9%
	Adults	4.7%	14.3%	7.2%	3.9%	4.7%
	Total	4.4%	13.9%	7.9%	4.2%	4.8%
South African first	Youth	8.1%	14.2%	3.8%	7.3%	7.2%
	Adults	9.3%	13.3%	6.8%	9.6%	9.4%
	Total	9.0%	13.7%	5.5%	8.4%	8.3%

BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS ACROSS HISTORICAL DIVIDES

In addition to assessing how South Africans identify themselves, the Reconciliation Barometer measures the extent to which interaction and social relationships with others occur – specifically across historical race lines. In 2012, just under one-third (27.4%) of South Africans interact with a person they believe to be of another race always or often, on ordinary weekdays. A quarter (25.9%) do so sometimes, and 43.5% rarely or never speak to someone of another race. Levels of socialisation, and the development of stronger relationships across race lines, are consistently lower in successive survey rounds. In 2012, 17.8% of South Africans always or often socialise with people of other races, for example, in their homes or in the homes of friends. A further 21.6% do so sometimes, and more than half (56.6%) rarely or never socialise across race lines. Figure 10 shows that both contact and socialisation levels increased during the early rounds of the Reconciliation Barometer survey, between 2004 and 2008 in particular, but have changed little since 2010.

Certainly, latent and overt stereotypes, fear or trepidation about others, and even naked racism may have contributed to static levels of interaction and the slow pace at which social bonds are being forged between South Africans of different race groups. Indeed, in 2012 41.4% agree that they find the 'ways and customs' of people of other race groups difficult to understand (see Table 18). However, each year the Reconciliation Barometer survey also finds an almost entirely linear relationship between contact, socialisation and living standards: South Africans who live in affluent households in urban areas interact and socialise the most across racial lines, and those in the least affluent households – often in rural areas, homogenous former townships and informal settlements, and where formal sector employment is low – interact and socialise the least (see Figure 11). A closer look at generational differences in both contact and socialisation, though, yields interesting results: within LSM 1, both contact and socialisation across race lines is much higher among youth than adults. Differences in levels of contact are minimal, but in every LSM group youth are more likely to socialise across race lines than adults, and this is a positive finding.

It is also clear from the 2012 survey results that many South Africans say that they want to learn more about the 'ways and customs' of others people (38.8%) and would like to interact more across race lines (23.2%), although the extent that they may actually initiate these actions is difficult to gauge. A further 61.8% of South Africans believe that national unity across historical divides is desirable – although agreement is lower among white (49.4%) and coloured (50.5%) youth, who display higher levels of ambivalence – and 59.0% believe that this is possible (see Table 18).

Another positive trend emerging from the Reconciliation Barometer is that disapproval of racial integration in a range of different contexts and setting – schools, residential neighbourhoods, workplaces and in marriage – has continued to decline overall, as shown in Figure 12. Within the national population in 2012, 18.1% of South Africans indicate that they would not approve of living in a residential area in which half of their neighbours were people of other races, and 20.3% would disapprove of working for and taking instructions from someone

**Figure 10:** Contact and socialisation across race lines, 2003–2012 (% always, often + sometimes)

Figure 11: Generational comparison of contact and socialisation across race lines by LSM, 2012 (%)

Table 18: Interest in greater interaction and unity by age and race, 2012 (%)						
Agree		White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Black	Total
Difficult to understand the ways and customs of others	Youth	34.2%	21.8%	20.1%	44.7%	41.6%
	Adults	29.2%	35.9%	26.0%	46.1%	41.2%
	Total	30.6%	31.3%	23.5%	45.4%	41.4%
Want to learn more about the ways and customs of others	Youth	25.9%	49.1%	40.5%	42.2%	41.2%
	Adults	38.8%	42.6%	46.7%	34.1%	36.4%
	Total	35.1%	44.8%	44.1%	38.4%	38.8%
Want to talk to people of other races more often	Youth	19.4%	24.9%	33.0%	26.2%	26.3%
	Adults	16.4%	33.1%	27.9%	19.2%	20.2%
	Total	17.3%	30.4%	30.1%	22.9%	23.2%
National unity is desirable	Youth	49.4%	81.4%	50.5%	62.4%	61.0%
	Adults	61.8%	73.9%	51.7%	63.7%	62.5%
	Total	58.2%	76.4%	51.2%	63.0%	61.8%
National unity is possible	Youth	48.3%	78.2%	49.1%	61.2%	59.7%
	Adults	53.4%	59.5%	47.3%	60.8%	58.3%
	Total	52.0%	65.6%	48.1%	61.0%	59.0%

Figure 12: Disapproval of racial integration, 2006–2012 (%)

Inter-racial marriages
Integrated neighbourhoods
Integrated schools

Table 19: Disapproval of racial integration by age and race, 2012 (%)						
Disapproval		White	Indian/Asian	Coloured	Black	Total
Living in an integrated neighbour-hood	Youth	21.9%	15.4%	15.7%	18.6%	18.5%
	Adults	21.3%	6.4%	11.2%	18.3%	17.6%
	Total	21.5%	9.6%	13.1%	18.5%	18.1%
Working for someone of another race	Youth	9.6%	8.0%	29.9%	20.2%	20.2%
	Adults	26.4%	15.0%	27.6%	19.0%	20.4%
	Total	21.4%	12.5%	28.6%	19.6%	20.3%
Close relative marries someone of another race	Youth	42.7%	34.7%	17.3%	23.5%	24.1%
	Adults	30.2%	21.4%	21.6%	25.5%	25.5%
	Total	34.0%	26.2%	19.8%	24.5%	24.8%
Integrated schools	Youth	7.7%	0.0%	7.6%	16.0%	14.9%
	Adults	12.9%	7.5%	8.3%	14.9%	13.9%
	Total	11.4%	4.8%	8.0%	15.5%	14.4%

of another race. Among these items, disapproval for racially integrated schools is lowest (14.4%), and highest (24.8%) for inter-racial marriage by a close family member. While generational differences in disapproval were relatively minimal overall, white adults (26.4%) were more disapproving of the prospect of answering to an employer of another race than youth (9.6%) (see Table 19).

WHAT KEEPS SOUTH AFRICANS APART?

Reconciliation Barometer results show that socioeconomic status (as measured by LSM) is a key determinant of the extent that interaction and socialisation occurs across racial lines, but apart from inferring from responses, the survey also asks South Africans directly about their views on the biggest source of division in the country today.

Table 20: Biggest division in the country, 2003–2012 (%)

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Political parties	22.0%	27.9%	17.7%	19.1%	11.9%	21.7%	23.2%	25.3%	21.5%	17.4%
Income	29.8%	23.8%	30.8%	30.0%	31.0%	29.3%	26.8%	25.0%	31.6%	25.4%
Disease	14.3%	15.9%	21.1%	17.7%	21.4%	17.2%	18.6%	15.8%	14.4%	19.3%
Religion	6.9%	6.9%	5.8%	7.4%	6.6%	6.6%	6.7%	7.2%	6.5%	12.5%
Race	20.1%	20.4%	17.3%	19.7%	21.4%	18.6%	18.5%	20.6%	19.8%	13.2%
Language	6.3%	4.8%	6.2%	5.8%	7.4%	6.3%	6.2%	5.9%	5.6%	4.0%

Since 2003, the most frequent response has consistently been that the gap between rich and poor is what keeps us apart from one another in this country, and 25.4% answered in this way in 2012. Divisions caused by HIV/AIDS and other diseases were the second most frequent response (19.3%), followed by political party membership at 17.4%. Only 13.2% of South Africans view race as the foremost source of social division in the country today (see Table 20). Although young South Africans, like adults, tend to associate strongly with identity groups constructed around race, language and ethnicity, for many these are not the foremost social faultlines in the country. This finding should not, however, be interpreted as class replacing race as a social schism – there is too much overlap between the two to draw such a conclusion. Yet, it is significant that when prompted, most citizens refer to inequality as being the root of the country's most pressing social challenges.

Table 21: Biggest division by age and race, 2012 (%)

Division		White	Indian/ Asian	Coloured	Black	Total
Political parties	Youth	13.2%	20.1%	21.5%	15.5%	15.9%
	Adults	26.0%	35.3%	27.8%	15.1%	18.8%
	Total	22.3%	30.3%	25.1%	15.3%	17.4%
Economic inequality	Youth	27.8%	8.0%	20.0%	26.8%	26.0%
	Adults	26.6%	11.9%	18.7%	26.2%	24.9%
	Total	27.0%	10.6%	19.3%	26.5%	25.4%
HIV/AIDS and disease	Youth	12.7%	19.8%	13.5%	21.8%	20.5%
	Adults	8.8%	14.3%	12.0%	21.2%	18.2%
	Total	9.9%	16.1%	12.6%	21.5%	19.3%
Religion	Youth	4.5%	19.2%	13.2%	12.5%	12.2%
	Adults	8.7%	11.9%	13.8%	13.6%	12.9%
	Total	7.5%	14.3%	13.6%	13.0%	12.5%
Race	Youth	26.4%	19.5%	18.8%	12.8%	14.3%
	Adults	11.8%	14.5%	15.3%	11.8%	12.2%
	Total	16.0%	16.1%	16.8%	12.3%	13.2%
Language	Youth	5.2%	0.0%	2.7%	4.1%	3.9%
	Adults	6.0%	0.4%	1.8%	4.2%	4.1%
	Total	5.8%	0.3%	2.2%	4.1%	4.0%

SA Reconciliation Barometer | Newsletter

Volume 10 • Issue 1 • April 2012

The Cape race debate
IN DENIAL?

Racism may be alive and unwell in Cape Town, but agreeing to a dialogue across historic dividing lines may be a starting point for real progress, writes KENNETH LUKUKO.

In the early 1980s, as South Africa lived through the last full decade of apartheid, a group of multi-national corporations made a serious attempt to contribute to the building of a democratic future. They entered into a partnership with one of the first schools to become multi-racial and provided scholarships to youngsters from Cape Town's black townships.

This was a very bold step for South Africa at that time, and neither government nor society was prepared for the reality of having black learners in a white school in the suburbs.

There has been significant recent debate in the media about whether or not Cape Town is a racist city. I reflected on the lives of those boys, of whom I am one, and the society that has had to adjust to accommodate our new democratic reality. This is my account of the story, and the difficulty of finding a future without 'racism', and ultimately without 'race'.

This group of boys ate, washed and played together, prayed together and sung in chapel, were punished together, and studied and travelled to school together as children of different races, but with virtually no understanding or memory of race. They learned English and isiXhosa together and at times outperformed each other in the other's mother tongue. Sometimes when travelling through the suburbs they would all climb into the same train carriage, oblivious as to which race it was reserved for.

Of course, when this happened a shocked and outraged ticket conductor would quickly escort the black learners out of the 'Whites Only' carriage. Whatever conversations were going on between friends would come to an abrupt end. The protective bubble of life on school grounds would be quickly shattered by the reality of life outside. Some, but not all, of the white learners would accompany their schoolmates into the non-white carriage.

One of the most humiliating moments in the life of any victim of apartheid, the boys would sadly learn, would be the experience of walking past whole groups of disapproving onlookers in both carriages. Would their faces be remembered, and how would they be treated afterwards? This was a sudden reminder of the reality that all other black South Africans faced under apartheid laws. The equality of the classroom, boarding house, and the sports field was suddenly overturned for a hierarchy in which black Africans were legally and socially obliged to take up their position at the bottom.

This was only the beginning. These boys had to learn a plethora of accompanying laws in order to avoid breaking the law again. The next humiliation would be to consider in which one out of the two worlds one would ask for further explanation of the laws made for his race.

It is now almost three decades later. As a young black professional, I have never left Cape Town to work elsewhere. Yet in my own experience, the resilient status dynamics between white, coloured and black African people in the Western Cape and Cape Town seems to reflect apartheid's legacy more than anywhere else in South Africa.

Is Cape Town an inherently racist city? And why are we asking this question now – is it only to improve our image and marketing to the outside world, or are we truly committed to honest debate and a shared, long-term solution?

It is a historic reality that the apartheid exclusion of black Africans from Cape Town was particularly emphatic, in the economy but also in social and family life.

Recent rounds of the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) survey conducted by the IJR have found repeatedly that social contact between people of different

races in South Africa remains limited. The SARB also finds that the lower a household's income, the less likely they are to be in contact with people of other races. For the majority of South Africans, life in this country is still experienced through a racially segregated reality. Even progressive attempts to change this situation are proving a challenge.

Capetonians of different races still engage socially in limited ways, particularly those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder – who, by apartheid design, are mostly black and speak languages other than Afrikaans and English.

The pervasive political rhetoric in this province, which escalates during election times, is premised on a subtext that this part of South Africa needs to be kept away from the apparently dangerous, impending clutches of control of the ruling party. Those of us who are still waiting for transformation struggle to understand what seems, at times, to be a schizophrenic embrace of both a rainbow-nation dream and what seems to be a fear of black control.

During Nelson Mandela's presidency, it was the only city in which he was met with a placard that referred to him with the K-word. And it has taken Cape Town longer than anywhere else in the country to name a major public space or amenity after Mandela, although it is the city associated most closely with his incarceration, as well as being the backdrop for scenes of his release, which were broadcast all over the world.

Our racism is also illusive. It has many proxies and guises and ways of camouflaging itself, in the economy, in our inferences about corruption. Media coverage and reporting seems to suggest that we need to celebrate this city as more civilised or more competent than the rest of South Africa. For this reason, 'disturbing the peace' on suburban Rondebosch Common was condemned and then the demonstration was closed down in the harshest manner.

For those of us who feel targeted by these claims and exclusions, the lack of willingness to attempt to understand, respect and appropriately address our experiences is sometimes understood as an arrogance that is itself racially inspired.

Addressing racism means that we need to interrogate its mostly hidden foundations. We need to look at the historic origins of our stereotyping and prejudice which have been used to justify violence, unequal treatment, political disempowerment and exclusion. We need to work to deconstruct the legacy of apartheid's power relations, and reject uncritical and unfounded insinuations about black competence.

We need to take seriously the research on racism recently published in the media, particularly as it occurs in the workplace, and particularly in Cape Town.

Can we deny that Cape Town is still the most racist city in South Africa? Perhaps we can't. But what may be more important is simply agreeing that racism exists and agreeing to talk about it, and that we can work together to stop it, and that solutions to bring it to an end must cut across racial as well as class, language and political lines.

Kenneth Lukuko is project leader for community healing in the IJR's Building an Inclusive Society programme.

It is a historic reality that the apartheid exclusion of black Africans from Cape Town was particularly emphatic.

VIII.
CONCLUSION

Recent binary characterisations of young South Africans in our public discourse may mean that, in either preparing for ticking time bombs to detonate or counting the cash we hope to earn from our demographic dividends, we risk missing out on the complexity and nuance of youth opinion, attitudes, values and concerns.

The results of the 2012 round of the Reconciliation Barometer survey begin to shed more light on these issues, and survey rounds to come will allow us to begin to talk of trends and patterns that emerge from these findings.

With the Mangaung conference ahead and with national and provincial elections on the horizon in 2014, youth participation in politics and voting – and likewise the choice of abstention – will be a critical determinant of the country's future governance landscape. After 18 years of democracy, confidence in public institutions such as Parliament, national government and the courts is moderate to high, but tends to be lower among racial minority groups – youth and adults alike. Taken together with the high percentage of South Africans of all different groups who believe that national leaders and public officials are unresponsive, this finding signals the need for more considered, consultative and inclusive governance processes. For citizens to view government as legitimate and accountable, it must be responsive to people's concerns.

Confidence levels in local government have increased in recent years of the Reconciliation Barometer but still leave room for improvement. For low-income households with limited access to the most basic services, greater trust in this sphere – located at the coal face between citizens and the state – may only come with real and qualitative improvements in delivery.

Likening youth to ticking time bombs cannot but inspire fears of volatility, impatience and lawlessness. The Reconciliation Barometer shows that many young South Africans lack trust in the integrity of national leaders. With or without evidence in hand, many also believe corruption is taking place in their communities. While the impact of these negative perceptions is difficult to assess definitely, some young people – in greater numbers than adults – believe the law is open to interpretation and bending. This may yet contribute to the further erosion of confidence in government and leadership. Further, there is evidence that some youth may be opting for immediate and extralegal 'solutions' to the challenges they face: almost one in five South Africans under 35 report being involved in a violent protest in the past year. After the killing of Andries Tatane in 2011, after Marikana, this is a trend that cannot continue.

It is a difficult conclusion to find that young South Africans – and adults as well – seem overly optimistic about their economic prospects, given forecasts nationally and abroad. Without more effective and sustained job creation, and soon, a mismatch between these expectations and the capacity of the economy to absorb young people is inevitable, and will have consequences as the NPC predicts.

Reconciliation Barometer findings also point to a disconnect and a rising cynicism between younger South Africans, the born-free generation, and this country's past. Among some youth, while strong support for the idea of a representative workforce prevails, there is doubt about the success of BEE, questioning of the impact of apartheid's legacy, and disapproval of economic measures aimed at restitution and redress. Commitment to moving forward together as a united country is high, but opinion is divided on whether a new social fabric can be created while deep inequality still exists.

Young South Africans, for the most part, have not given up on the identities espoused by their parents' generations in favour of one unifying national identity. It may be that, together with this disconnect from the past, we have missed an important opportunity in the education system to develop a serious and inclusive history curriculum and instil shared values around civic identity and citizenship among young people. At the same time, preservation of group identities does not seem to have diminished a growing acceptance of racial integration – in schools, neighbourhoods, workplaces and homes. It is also an important finding that levels of youth contact across race lines are similar to those of adults but reported socialisation is greater – it seems young people may be developing deeper relationships across historic dividing lines, beyond just interaction.

It is important that as a country, we move away from this binary approach, and begin to address the nuanced and complex challenges that youth face with the same energy, creativity and innovation that the young people see within themselves – and deserve to find in our collective solutions. Certainly economic solutions must not be at the expense of simultaneously working to close social faultlines and fissures, or a ticking time bomb may indeed be on our hands.

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Appendix A

Location and composition of SA Reconciliation Barometer focus groups, 2011

Table A1: SA Reconciliation Barometer Focus Groups, 2011					
#	Province	Area	Age	Race	Language
1	Western Cape	Cape Town – Southern Suburbs	16–24	White	English
2	Western Cape	Cape Town – Southern Suburbs	25–49	Coloured	English
3	Western Cape	Worcester	16–24	Coloured	Afrikaans
4	Western Cape	Worcester	25–49	Coloured	Afrikaans
5	Gauteng	Johannesburg	25–49	White	English
6	Gauteng	Johannesburg	50 and above	Black	Sotho/Zulu
7	Gauteng	Pretoria	16–24	White	Afrikaans
8	Gauteng	Pretoria	25–49	African	Sotho/Zulu
9	Free State	Heilbron	25–49	White	Afrikaans
10	Free State	Warden	16–24	Black	Sotho
11	Free State	Warden	25–49	Black	Sotho
12	KwaZulu-Natal	Ladysmith	16–24	Black	Zulu
13	KwaZulu-Natal	Ladysmith	25–49	Black	Zulu
14	KwaZulu-Natal	Phoenix DBN	25–49	Indian	English
15	KwaZulu-Natal	Chatsworth DBN	16–24	Indian	English
16	Eastern Cape	Mount Frere	50 and above	Black	Xhosa
17	Eastern Cape	Mount Frere	25–49	Black	Xhosa
18	Eastern Cape	Umtata	16–24	Black	Xhosa

The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) is an independent, non-governmental organisation, which was established in 2000 in the wake of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with the aim of ensuring that the lessons of South Africa's successful transition to democracy remain fundamental principles central to government and society as the country moves forward. Today, the IJR works to build fair, democratic and inclusive societies across Africa after conflict.

Since 2003, the IJR's Policy and Analysis programme has conducted the South African Reconciliation Barometer survey: an annual national public opinion poll that measures citizen attitudes towards reconciliation, transformation and national unity in post-apartheid South Africa. Change in these complex social trends is measured through six key indicators: human security, political culture, cross-cutting political relations, race relations, historical confrontation and dialogue. As one of the few dedicated social surveys on reconciliation in Africa and worldwide, the Barometer has become an important resource for encouraging national debate, informing decision-makers, developing policy and provoking new analysis and theory on reconciliation in post-conflict societies.

South African's views on reconciliation:

Since 1994, there is no more violence. People came together and voted and forgave each other. We now live in a democracy. We have freedom of speech. Unlike before.

The word reconciliation is going to take a long time because nobody is telling us what it is. Because if you tell a person to reconcile, they don't know what they should do.

I think past governments must reconcile with the people of South Africa. Because they are the ones that brought on apartheid that split our nation. So I think it's them, they have to ask us for forgiveness.

I think like it's hard for you to go forward if you keep looking back, like people always looking back at apartheid. So how are you going to move forward if you have one eye looking back over your shoulder.

Then there's poverty and your social class. People still categorise each other according to class. There's your top, then you get your middle class, then you get your lower class. No-one has moved beyond those categories. That is why you cannot have true reconciliation if people in the same communities still have that outlook.

For more information, visit the IJR website at **www.ijr.org.za**, the Reconciliation Barometer blog at **www.reconciliationbarometer.org**, or follow us on Twitter at **@SABarometer**.

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