AFRICAN JOURNAL ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Volume 15, Number 3, 2015

Special issue on the theme:
Social cohesion in post-conflict societies

African Journal on Conflict Resolution

Volume 15, Number 3, 2015

ACCORD
THE AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

The *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* is a peer-reviewed journal published by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) for the multidisciplinary subject field of conflict resolution. There are two regular issues per year, and occasionally also a special issue on a particular theme. It appears on the list of journals accredited by the South African Department of Higher Education and Training. ACCORD is a non-governmental, non-aligned conflict resolution organisation based in Durban, South Africa. ACCORD is constituted as an education trust.

The journal seeks to publish articles and book reviews on subjects relating to conflict, its management and resolution, as well as peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa. It aims to be a conduit between theory and practice.

Views expressed in this journal are not necessarily those of ACCORD. While every attempt is made to ensure that the information published here is accurate, no responsibility is accepted for any loss or damage that may arise out of the reliance of any person upon any of the information this journal contains.

 ISSN 1562–6997

Articles and book reviews may be submitted by e-mail, as Microsoft Word attachments, to the Managing Editor of the Journal, Prof Jannie Malan, at both the following e-mail addresses: ajcr@accord.org.za; malanj@accord.org.za.

Articles should be of good academic quality, and should be between 6 000 and 8 000 words in length. An abstract of between 100 and 200 words, a list of six keywords for indexing purposes and a few lines about the author should be included. Book reviews should be between 1 000 and 1 500 words.

All references, according to the Harvard method, should be included. As far as possible, in-text references should include the page numbers of the sections of sources referred to. In the case of a direct quotation, the exact page number is absolutely necessary. For the purpose of adding extra details, comments or references which may distract attention from the argument in the text, footnotes may be used sparingly. For more information about the referencing system, please see the excerpt from ACCORD's Style Guide, which is available at <http://www.accord.org.za>.

Readers may subscribe to receive e-mail alerts or copies of ACCORD's publications by sending an e-mail to publications@accord.org.za.

Lay-out by Keegan Thumberan.

Contents

Advisory Panel

Foreword by the guest editors

Cheryl Potgieter and Paulus Zulu

We welcome you to this special issue which focuses on Social Cohesion in Post-Conflict Societies.

The invitation to have us guest edit an issue which engages with the 'notion' of social cohesion was in part promoted by our membership of a four-person team appointed by the premier of KwaZulu-Natal, Mr Senzo Mchunu, to investigate the obstacles and challenges to social cohesion in the province. The work of the committee has recently been concluded. This special issue does not focus on the report, however, nor are the articles carried herein limited to the region of KwaZulu-Natal or to South Africa.

Social cohesion has been a growing catchphrase in Africa because many countries, as they recover from traumatic and tragic pasts of violence and/or conflict, are grappling with projects of nation-building, reconciliation, social engineering and achieving justice for those who became victims of those traumatic and tragic pasts. Achieving justice in post-conflict societies becomes contested, as the journey to integrate and foster inclusivity between those viewed as having been victims of the past and those regarded as perpetrators of injustice requires more than finding a simple compromise.

In the course of pursuing justice and truth some pockets of society slide back to conflict, spoilers emerge and often political manoeuvring is used to derail progress by those who perceive their power as being threatened.

We thus publish this special issue aware of the competing interests in societies that are recovering from conflict. In this issue post-conflict societies refer to societies that are emerging from recent histories of violence and prejudiced conflict that had certain 'groups' (to put it simply) forcefully and without negotiation dominating 'other' groups within a society.

The term post-conflict should not be understood as an absence of conflict. Where asymmetric power relations exist and conspicuous material deprivation is evident within a society, conflict is bound to emerge. Human relations and the human psyche are set on a collision course when the Gini Coefficient increases. Even without high levels of inequality, lines of solidarity and antagonism are shaped and reshaped by prevailing material conditions. Therefore society is continuously in a state of conflict, albeit not always violent and necessarily undesirable.

As the authors in this journal point out, by way of immersing themselves in varied and different spaces of engagement, social cohesion is not an 'automatic' space or goal in societies deemed to be post-conflict.

The articles indicate, often tacitly, that a policy framework is the first step to the goal of social cohesion but if policies are not supported by interventions and political will, both at the macro and micro level, social cohesion will be nothing more than a theoretical concept. The pursuit of social cohesion can be seen as the transition from negative peace towards positive peace, whereby the absence of conflict alone is not enough. In such a transition, as advanced by Johan Galtung's scholarship, positive peace requires implementing those measures and services that improve the state of life for all people and minimising the potential re-emergence of violence in a society.

We are also particularly aware of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, which were founded on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). While progress has been made on the MDGs we believe they fell short of their objectives. While the new SDGs no doubt go beyond the MDGs, it remains to be seen if countries underpinned by economic models which

are in contradiction to the fundamentals of the SDGs will deliver and contribute to social cohesion and the entrenchment of the goals of post-conflict societies.

The five articles in this journal, written by authors from diverse academic backgrounds, attest to the fact that the challenges to social cohesion go beyond what generally has been identified as obstacles to social cohesion. The articles make important contributions to areas where there has been a paucity of engagement both theoretically and in terms of appropriate interventions. The book review and the book itself are directly related and crucial to the achievement of social cohesion, peace and justice and overall the ending of inequity and poverty.

In preparing to write this foreword we returned to the forewords of previous editions of the journal and noted that they did not tend to provide, as is customary with many journals, a summary or overview of the articles in the journal but rather made some pertinent observations regarding the focus of the journal. The readers are thus encouraged (and dare we say enticed) to embark on the journey of reading the articles without any prior information on each article. We chose to follow the same route.

We are also very clear that the issue of social cohesion in post-conflict societies cannot be neatly tied up and a summary and concluding remarks made.

As members of the KwaZulu-Natal Social Cohesion Committee, after reading the articles in this journal and a number of other spaces where the issue of social cohesion has been on the agenda and debated, we have the distinct feeling that we are 'at the beginning' rather than 'at the end' of an engagement with social cohesion and post-conflict societies.

When we were preparing to write this foreword we were reminded of the relevance of the thinking of Amina Mama of two decades ago. She asked:

> How does one end the beginning of something ... at the very heart of the approach advocated here is a feeling of perpetual change and movement ... This in itself makes the idea of closure somewhat inappropriate.

> This is not a neat story ending with all capillaries cauterized and stitched with surgical precision , but one which makes a small opening through which, it is hoped, many new ideas and arguments may flow (Mama 1995:159).*

We bring to you this special edition, hopeful that the knowledge produced by the authors will lead to fruitful and relevant reflections and interventions on social cohesion and especially commitment by governments and their leaders to honour various protocols. In achieving the latter, the 17 Sustainable Development Goals will be closer to being achieved and the ultimate goal of poverty eradication will become a reality. Only then will social cohesion become an achievement and not an ongoing goal.

We thank all who assisted us with this special edition and we both would like to recognise Lukhona Mnguni for his valuable assistance on a number of levels, including of course the many conversations on this special issue and those directly related to social cohesion. Working with Prof Jannie Malan and Dr Candice Moore has also been an enriching experience.

* Mama, Amina 1995. *Beyond the masks: Race, gender and subjectivity*. London and New York, Routledge.

A comparative analysis of the Post-Arab Spring National Dialogues in Tunisia and Yemen

*Hannah Hamidi**

Abstract

Post-conflict societies are in a fragile state in which social cohesion needs to be gradually rebuilt. One of the tools employed to restore social cohesion in a fragile society is the organisation of a national dialogue which would allow most, if not all, of society's political and civil society actors to air their grievances and make concrete recommendations for the long-lasting resolution of conflict. In the MENA region, both Tunisia and Yemen have organised national dialogues after the Arab Spring with different results. This article uses Jane Jenson's model on social cohesion to determine why Tunisia's national dialogue has been more successful than Yemen's in bringing about social cohesion.

Keywords: Social cohesion, national dialogues, transitions, peacebuilding, Tunisia, Yemen

* Hannah Hamidi is an independent researcher on Middle Eastern and North African politics.

Introduction

In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, two countries, Tunisia and Yemen, have completed national dialogues in the wake of their Arab Spring revolutions. Although Tunisia and Yemen differ in terms of historical experience, socio-economic development and political structure, the two countries have in the past four years shared very similar experiences, having emerged from prolonged dictatorships quasi simultaneously by overthrowing their respective dictators through people-powered revolutions, and subsequently initiated national dialogues to unite their divided societies.

Tunisia and Yemen are the first countries in the region to undertake national dialogues, and this article is interested in comparing these two countries' experiences to draw lessons learned for other countries in the region and further afield. Although both countries spent a great deal of time and resources to ensure the success of their national dialogues, they have had very different outcomes, with Tunisia emerging from the process with a more cohesive society, and Yemen reaping only conflict and instability. Within the same greater region, how did one country's social cohesion efforts succeed while the other's are generally considered to have failed? To answer this question, this article will use the model on social cohesion developed by Jane Jenson (1998), one of the earliest and most widely cited works on social cohesion. In this model, Jenson identifies five key components of social cohesion: Belonging, Inclusion, Participation, Recognition and Legitimacy. Jenson argues that these components must exist in a society for it to be cohesive. This article will employ the theoretical framework of Jenson's model to ask: have Tunisia and Yemen's national dialogues created conducive environments for social cohesion? Framing the question within this theoretical framework will highlight why Tunisia's efforts were more successful than Yemen's, as systematically, the national dialogue in Tunisia fostered a sense of Belonging, Inclusion, Participation, Recognition and Legitimacy, while Yemen's did not. This article will firstly lay out its theoretical framework. It will then provide

background information on Tunisia and Yemen's post-Arab Spring political trajectories, and lastly, it will apply Jenson's model to both countries' social cohesion efforts through national dialogue.

Jenson's model on social cohesion

Within policy and academic spheres, social cohesion is an increasingly recurring concept. Two traditions of study of the concept have emerged, the first within the social sciences, particularly sociology and social psychology. Some of the key texts that have emerged from this tradition have been written by Berger (1998), Gough and Olofsson (1999), Lockwood (1999) and Bollen and Hoyle (2001). The second tradition, from within the policy discourse on social cohesion, has yielded key studies commissioned by various government and non-governmental entities, from the Canadian government, to the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the African Union. However, the literature in English on social cohesion in the MENA region is practically non-existent, despite the fact that several of the region's states already have or will have to undertake social cohesion projects in the wake of the Arab Spring revolutions. This article therefore fills a gap in the literature on the concept of social cohesion.

In order to unpack the concept, Jane Jenson's paper (1998:16-17) on the topic, which followed a Canadian Policy Research Networks Roundtable on Mapping Social Cohesion in December 1997, is used in this article. Having reviewed literature on social cohesion produced by the governments of Canada and France as well as the OECD and the Club of Rome, Jenson extracted five key components which are generally considered to characterise cohesive societies. She also presented these in contrast to components which characterise societies which lack cohesion. Although Jenson's model is based on a limited snapshot of the literature available on social cohesion and includes analyses from countries such as France whose social cohesion efforts are imperfect and ongoing, it remains one of the most comprehensive studies on the subject and provides a useful summary of the conclusions reached by very serious studies.

The five dimensions of Jenson's model on social cohesion are: 1) Belonging v. Isolation, 2) Inclusion v. Exclusion, 3) Participation v. Non-Involvement, 4) Recognition v. Rejection and 5) Legitimacy v. Illegitimacy. The first dimension refers to the existence of shared values and a sense of common identity. According to the Canadian government's Policy Research Sub-Committee, a cohesive society is one in which citizens 'share values' (Jenson 1998:15). As for the OECD, it highlights the importance of a shared sense of identity for citizens to feel 'committed' to their society, and 'part of the same community' (Jenson 1998:15). On the other hand, threats to social cohesion are associated with feelings of isolation from the community. The second dimension refers to the economic inclusion of citizens within a society. This dimension highlights the importance of access to economic markets by all, as those who are economically marginalised might consequently feel excluded from society. The third dimension focuses on people's political participation at both the central and the local levels of government. Literature coming out of France has indeed highlighted the importance of political participation at all levels, including the local. On the other hand, non-involvement is considered a threat to social cohesion. The fourth dimension concerns the respect for difference and tolerance for diversity in a society. Recognition of difference is a core component of a cohesive society. The government of France highlighted the importance of citizens feeling that others within their country accepted them and recognised their contributions to society. By contrast, rejection of difference, or efforts to foster excessive unanimity, are likely to make societies less cohesive. The final dimension refers to the maintenance of legitimacy of major political institutions, the state in particular, as mediators among individuals of different interests. According to the Club of Rome, social cohesion depends on maintaining the legitimacy of those institutions so that they may continue to act as mediators in society.

Tunisia since the Arab Spring

After Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's ousting, elections to determine the composition of the National Constituent Assembly took place in October 2011. The Islamist political party Ennahda won the elections, though only with 37 percent of the vote. This forced it to share power with two secular parties in what became known as 'the Troika' government. This power-sharing arrangement caused unending squabbles over a new Constitution inside the Constituent Assembly. Ennahda's 89 delegates (out of a total of 217) were felt to be pressing their religious agenda, and political wrangling ensued, which postponed the preparation of the Constitution (Ottaway 2013:2).

Soon after the assassination of the opposition figure Mohammed Brahmi on 25 July 2013, the tensions between opposition parties and the ruling Troika turned into a grave political crisis. Popular protests also followed, which strongly destabilised the Troika, and Ennahda in particular. In an attempt to smooth over the conflict, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), together with UTICA (the employers' union), the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH), and the National Bar Association initiated a series of indirect shuttle negotiations between the opposition and the Troika to overcome the political crisis (Salah 2013).

The Tunisian national dialogue then began in earnest. Tunisian politicians were in agreement about what needed to be done in order to complete the stalled transition: approve the Constitution; form a new politically-neutral transitional government to lead the country until the elections; and set up a new independent body to supervise the parliamentary and presidential elections. However, the politicians disagreed profoundly about the sequencing and timing of the steps for reasons of political strategy (Ottaway 2013). Ennahda insisted that the Troika government would not resign until the Constitution was approved, the election commission and the election law were ready, and the election dates firmly set. The opposition parties, on the other hand, wanted to follow the roadmap proposed by the

quartet of mediators. The roadmap called for the formation of the election commission in two weeks and the writing of the election law within two weeks of the beginning of the final negotiations of the national dialogue, the resignation of the government within three weeks, and the completion of the Constitution and establishment of the elections' dates within four weeks. Ennahda feared that once the government had resigned, the opposition would stall on the Constitution and election dates. Indeed, members of the opposition were openly saying that elections should be postponed long enough to give time to the new government to get rid of Ennahda's appointees in bureaucratic positions (Ottaway 2013).

After many delays, and facing a 'final' deadline before mass protests, a bare majority (eleven out of twenty-one) of the dialogue's participating political parties chose Mehdi Jomaa as the new Prime Minister to lead a caretaker government to oversee a transition period until the adoption of a new Constitution and electoral law, and the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections. Ennahda was lauded as being the first Islamist party to willingly and peacefully step down from power. Tunisia also succeeded in adopting a new Constitution. On 26 January 2014, just over 92 percent of members of the National Constituent Assembly voted in favour of the Constitution. On 2 November, parliamentary elections took place peacefully, which Ennahda did not win (the Nidaa Tounes party won a majority of seats), and in December of the same year, Nidaa Tounes's candidate Beji Caid Essebsi was elected president, thereby cementing the country's transition to a non-Islamist-dominated government.

Yemen since the Arab Spring

Following Tunisia and Egypt, Yemen was rocked by the Arab Spring in January 2011 and has not managed to transition to a democratic and peaceful state. Popular protests to topple President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been in power for thirty-three years, began in January 2011. Eventually, Saleh was forced to agree to a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-brokered deal to hand over power in April 2011. However, he refused to sign it until November 2011.

The GCC deal specified that Saleh leave office in thirty days and make way for his Vice-President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi in return for full immunity from prosecution for Saleh. Hadi was to form and preside over a Government of National Unity which would govern the country before presidential elections took place within ninety days. The deal also established a two-year transitional period during which the military and security institutions were to be restructured and a national dialogue would be convened to prepare the ground for new elections to be held by February 2014. According to the GCC agreement, the national dialogue was to provide an opportunity for representatives from all walks of Yemeni society to voice their concerns and stances, including women and youth groups, the Southern and Houthi movements and other political parties and civil society representatives. A Preparation Committee of twenty-five members, including women and youth, was formed in July 2012 and started working in August to prepare the national dialogue (Lackner 2012).

The National Dialogue Conference (NDC) began in March 2013 and after setbacks and delays, approved a draft containing nearly 1800 recommendations in January 2014. In February of the same year, a small presidential panel controversially decided that Yemen should be divided into a federation of six regions, causing concern among the northern Shi'a Houthi movement (Gaston 2014:3-4). President Hadi also controversially announced the passing of a fuel price rise, which led to anti-government protests. The Houthi movement rode this wave of protests to the capital and eventually applied such pressure on Hadi and his cabinet that he resigned (International Crisis Group 2014a). Although he later rescinded his resignation, the Houthi leadership seized power and chased Hadi out of the country. A Saudi-led coalition of states launched air strikes against the Shi'a Houthi movement in support of Hadi, and there is now concern over the internationalisation of the Yemen conflict along sectarian lines, with Saudi Arabia supporting the Sunni transitional government and Iran the Shi'a Houthi movement (BBC 2015).

Applying Jenson's model to Tunisia and Yemen

Jenson' model is a useful tool to assess the level of social cohesion brought about by the national dialogues in Tunisia and Yemen. Although both countries have spent considerable resources and effort to ensure that their national dialogues led to more cohesive societies, Tunisia has seen greater success in bringing about that result. Yet Yemen's national dialogue was one of the most inclusive and democratic processes the country had ever seen. As it was under way, the UN's Special Envoy to Yemen Jamal Benomar reported to the Security Council that Yemen's National Dialogue was making 'extraordinary progress' (Kasinof 2015). The national dialogue was carried out over 10 months to ensure that a wide range of issues was covered to a satisfactory standard. Five hundred and sixty-five delegates took part in the dialogue, including an unprecedented number of youth, women and civil society activists (Gaston 2014:3). It also included representatives who had never been allowed to engage in the country's main political discussions, namely the Houthis and representatives from the southern separatist movement Al Hirak. The fact that these new actors were invited to engage on an equal footing with the main political parties and tribal leaders was very significant. Furthermore, the delegates were required to carry out significant public outreach efforts to seek input from their constituencies in Sana'a and beyond. In the end, the National Dialogue Conference issued nearly 1800 recommendations, ranging from maintaining a 30 per cent quota for women in all government positions to restructuring the military and security apparatus (Gaston 2014:8). These recommendations should have gone a long way towards meeting the popular demands of the Arab Spring revolutionaries; yet within months of the closing of the NDC, the Houthi movement had taken over Sana'a, leading to a Saudi-dominated military operation in the country. Yemen is now in the throes of a raging conflict, a grave humanitarian situation and a plummeting economy. How did its national dialogue fail to foster social cohesion, despite promising signs, and how did Tunisia's fair better?

Box 1

Jenson's Dimensions of Social Cohesion

Belonging ..... Isolation

Inclusion ..... Exclusion

Participation ..... Non-involvement

Recognition ..... Rejection

Legitimacy ..... Illegitimacy

Belonging

Jenson's first component 'Belonging', refers to the existence of a widely shared sense of commitment to a society. Did the national dialogues in Tunisia and Yemen foster this sense of common identity and commitment to the unity of their respective countries? In the case of Tunisia, although prior to the national dialogue the country was embroiled in a political quagmire, the issue of belonging was never a predominant one. The country was indeed split along political lines, where Islamists and Liberals clashed over political predominance in the country's local and national institutions, so that they might influence key moments in Tunisia's modern history, such as the drafting of the Constitution and elections. However, despite their political and ideological differences, particularly with regard to the role of religion in society, none of the opposing parties claimed a sense of isolation. Participants in the national dialogue, whether they represented Ennahda or Nidaa Tounes, shared a sense of belonging to their country and a feeling of commitment to their society. The national dialogue was, in fact, seen by all as an opportunity to peacefully re-establish order in a country which prided itself on being the original and most pacific of the Arab Spring countries.

In contrast, Yemen is a country that faces a secessionist threat from the South. The national dialogue did not stumble on issues pertaining to

the democratisation of the country in the wake of a long dictatorship. Participants involved in the discussions on, among others, State building, Good Governance, Rights and Freedoms and the Role of the Armed and Security Forces, did not face major roadblocks and were able to conclude their work promptly by the September 18th 2013 deadline. The topic which slowed down the dialogue was the southern issue, as the sessions on this issue were delayed by a boycott by southern delegates in August 2013 over the independence of southern Yemen.

The issue of southern Yemen's belonging to Yemen dates back several decades. From 1967 to 1990, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (or South Yemen) existed as an independent state. While South Yemen and its northern neighbour, the Yemen Arab Republic (or North Yemen), united to create the modern-day Republic of Yemen in 1990, tensions between the two regions continued to arise. As part of the new unity government, it was agreed that South Yemen's president, Ali Salim al-Beidh, would become the unified country's vice president, while North Yemen's president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, would become president of the new republic. Within two years of this new arrangement, al-Beidh returned to the former southern capital in protest over the perceived political and economic marginalisation of the south. This bled into a civil war for independence in 1994 which the North won, and in which the North subsequently strengthened its grip over a bitter South. Grievances over the northern elites' access to southern land and natural resources, which contrasted with the rampant unemployment faced by southerners, nourished the rebirth of the southern secessionist movement in 2007 (Reardon 2014).

These tensions arose during the national dialogue and were not dealt with definitively in its sessions, leaving the southern issue unsettled and open to a relapse. It is in fact very likely that the only reason the southern issue has been pushed to the background is because the Houthi issue came to the forefront so explosively. During the national dialogue, the subcommittee investigating the structure of the state became an arena for disputes related to the southern issue. The southerners from the Al Hirak movement participating in the national dialogue insisted that the state be a federal

one composed of two states formed from the territories of the former Yemen Arab Republic in the north and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south, while other southerners and northerners rejected this proposal on the basis that it would allow the former south to reconstitute itself, and instead proposed a five or six state federation.

Demonstrations in the south renouncing the dialogue and calling for secession drew large crowds. The UN tried to build support in the south for the dialogue. For instance, a committee was formed to address the issue of the pensions and employment of those in the southern bureaucracy and military who were dismissed after the 1994 war, and another committee was charged with resolving the issue of land and property in the south (Schmitz 2014a). In addition, Hadi announced the creation of a trust to compensate those hurt in the south during the last two decades of Saleh's rule (Schmitz 2014a). However, in August 2013, southern representatives within the NDC boycotted the remaining sessions unless their demands over the southern issue were met. In September, a sixteen-person subcommittee of representatives from the north and south, known as the North-South Committee, was formed. After months of negotiations, this committee brokered an agreement which avoided southern secession by agreeing that Yemen would become a federal state with greater local autonomy (Gaston 2014:3–4). The number of regions within the federation was not decided, as a proposal for a six-region solution was not accepted at the NDC level. However, a few weeks after the NDC wrapped up its work, a special committee hand-selected and led by President Hadi announced that it had agreed upon six regions, two in the south and four in the north (Gaston 2014:3–4). Hadi's heavy-handed solo approach to this complex issue fostered resentment and rejection among key southern as well as Houthi leaders. In wishing to tackle this pending issue, which could not be resolved without considerably more time and resources being injected into the already delayed National Dialogue Conference, Hadi opened the dialogue to failure, as the Houthis allegedly moved to Sana'a in reaction to the government's handling of the federal issue.

Inclusion

The second dimension of Jenson's model refers to the economic inclusion of citizens within a society. Seeing that the Arab Spring revolutions were in equal parts driven by political and economic grievances, the economic inclusion of the revolutionaries was and remains an extremely important key to social cohesion. In Tunisia, economic factors pushed the dialogue participants to negotiate with each other to resolve the political quagmire. Indeed, the international community was able to apply economic pressures on the participants to ensure their active participation in resolving the country's political woes. The African Development Bank, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank froze their loans to the country, making the flow of funds conditional on economic reforms and on a resolution to the political crisis. Some Gulf countries such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are also believed to have applied economic pressures on the country so that Ennahda would exit the government. The government of Algeria, which Tunisia depends on economically, also made it clear that it would stop its economic and security collaboration with Tunisia if a consensus was not reached among the political parties involved in the dialogue (International Crisis Group 2014b:6). Similarly, tourism is a pillar of the Tunisian economy, and the sector was heavily impacted upon by the revolution in 2011. The number of visitors to the country dropped from 6.9 to 4.8 million visitors between 2010 and 2011 (Tunisian Ministry of Tourism 2015), and the dialogue participants were keenly aware of the potential loss of revenue a prolonged political crisis could cost the country. As a small country with little in terms of natural resources, Tunisia is dependent on foreign investment and tourism. Its reputation as a peaceful and stable country is therefore very important to keeping its economy afloat, and the dialogue participants were aware that prolonging the political crisis was not an option for the country. The national dialogue was therefore undertaken in a fairly short period of time – six months – to avoid, among other things, dragging the economy down any further.

In Yemen, on the other hand, analysts have pointed out that one of the biggest flaws of the national dialogue was to overlook 'bread and butter' issues which regular citizens were facing while the dialogue was taking place. In the words of Charles Schmitz (2014b): 'The National Dialogue Conference produced a document and vision of just government in Yemen, but while the intellectual elites were worried about the semantics of the document, Hadi's government did not govern. The economy worsened (as expected due to the fall in oil production) and security worsened, and the government had no response. The international community urged good governance, which gave little solace to those facing increasingly dire material circumstances'. Rather than face the growing poverty, those who could emigrate, did so, to avoid the near 50% unemployment rate (Naylor 2015). For those who could not emigrate, as the 10-month long dialogue dragged on, resentment grew towards the dialogue participants, who earned a rumoured 125 to 200 dollars in per diems (Gaston 2014:8). This discrepancy between the economic troubles of regular citizens and the position of privilege of dialogue participants created a disconnection with the national dialogue. According to the United States Institute of Peace: 'to its worst critics, the NDC has been a costly political sideshow that has distracted political energy and attention at a critical period in Yemen's transition' (Gaston 2014:8) towards secondary issues which do not put food on the table.

Additionally, in the wake of the national dialogue, the government decided to lift fuel subsidies in July 2014, and this proved too much for the system to bear. Having spent about 3 billion dollars on fuel subsidies, nearly a third of the state's revenues, the previous year, and with bankruptcy looming, the Hadi government attempted to raise fuel prices in an effort to rein in its budget deficit and conclude talks with the IMF for the country to receive a 560 million dollar loan from the organisation (Ghobari 2014; International Crisis Group 2015:3). The Houthis, who had never trusted the transitional government, took advantage of the situation by organising demonstrations demanding a reinstatement of subsidies, a new government, and a swift implementation of NDC agreements. Although the Houthis did not

represent the bulk of Yemeni society, their demands resonated widely and far beyond their core support base because of the country's dire economic straits, thereby opening the door for the Houthi takeover of Sana'a, Hadi's escape to Saudi Arabia, and the current conflict in the country.

Finally, it is worth noting the role of spoilers in bringing about the current breakdown in social cohesion in Yemen. The GCC-brokered deal did not force Saleh into exile or curb his participation in national politics through his party, the General People's Congress (GPC). He therefore remained in the country to undermine the national dialogue as he plotted his own return to politics. It is widely known that Saleh and the Houthis have concluded a marriage of convenience, which has allied their forces long enough to topple Hadi's transitional government and rid them of common enemies.[1] According to the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Jamal Benomar Saleh, who remains well connected and supported in the country, has also been behind the sabotage of electrical grids and oil pipelines by renegade tribesmen in the country, which resulted in Sana'a being without fuel or electricity for days in June 2014. In reaction, mass protests were organised on the 11th June calling for the overthrow of the Hadi government (Schmitz 2014a; International Crisis Group 2014c). The economy is therefore a key component which determines the success or failure of social cohesion efforts, and paying close attention to economic grievances is absolutely crucial to ensure that spoilers do not hijack attempts at peacebuilding.

Participation

The third dimension of Jenson's model on social cohesion focuses on people's political participation at both the central and the local levels of government. In the case of Tunisia, political participation was at the heart of the tensions between Ennahda and the opposition parties. In the October 2011 Parliamentary elections, Ennahda won with 37 per cent of

1 These common foes include General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who combated the Houthis during Saleh's reign, and turned against Saleh during the revolution, as well as members of the opposition Islamist Islah party and the powerful Hashid tribal federation, which are led by brothers and have clashed with the Houthis and opposed Saleh's plans to have his son succeed him in power.

the vote. This meant that although it was the clear winner, a large portion of the electorate did not feel represented by the party. Fear of an Islamist political takeover was shared by many liberals, particularly in light of what was perceived as Ennahda's strategy to place its men and women at all levels of the political echelons. According to the opposition, during the two years that it was leading the Troika, Ennahda placed close to 2000 Islamists in positions of power in local, regional and central administrations (International Crisis Group 2014b:9). It was feared that Ennahda intended to use these well-placed loyalists to secure successes in the country's future elections. These political appointees could allegedly do this by offering jobs, promotions within the civil service, a helping hand to get to the top of waiting lists for cheap state housing and free healthcare to those who voted for Ennahda (International Crisis Group 2014b:9).

For a large portion of the Tunisian people, the national dialogue was intended to bring more political balance to the country. As for Ennahda, the level of wariness it faced within the National Constituent Assembly and beyond led it to decide that its best option was to compromise during the national dialogue and agree to hand over power to a technocratic interim government which would oversee the country's 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections. Analysts generally concur that Ennahda agreed to this out of self-preservation (International Crisis Group 2014d:7). Indeed, since the 2013 ouster of President Mohammed Morsi in Egypt, Ennahda became aware of the risks it ran if it alienated large segments of the political spectrum and was seen to govern single-handedly. The Ennahda leadership therefore instructed its base to strengthen the party's reputation within the political, business and media spheres through conciliation and compromise. In light of the regional climate of tension towards Islamist parties, Ennahda leaders feared a repeat of the persecution the party faced in the early 1990s after it obtained 20 to 25 per cent of the vote in the country's April 1989 legislative elections. Ennahda's leader Rached Ghannouchi is quoted as saying that: 'We must accept to negotiate with forces that are hostile to us, otherwise we risk returning to jail or being exiled again' (International Crisis Group 2014d:7). Regardless of its

motives, Ennahda's willingness to step down from power at the outcome of the national dialogue preserved social cohesion in the country. Although the party did not win the parliamentary and presidential elections which followed the national dialogue, Ennahda may very well have prepared the terrain for future wins by proving that it respected the values of democracy and was willing and able to compromise.

In Yemen, political participation proved to be a sticking point for the national dialogue. Southern participation in the dialogue was a point of contention during the planning stage. Despite the mandate that half of the dialogue delegates come from the South, most of the Al Hirak leadership refused to participate in the NDC from the beginning, particularly those with secessionist views. Those southerners who did participate had personal ties with Hadi and were therefore not representative of the full range of positions in the South. They also did not possess sufficient political clout to enforce the NDC's decisions in the South. This made it difficult for the NDC to be the platform where the southern issue could be resolved definitively. Indeed, Al Hirak members who were not represented in the NDC were reportedly expecting the dialogue to fail and waiting for their chance to escalate their independence campaign through protests, regardless of NDC decisions. It was estimated that this chance would occur during the referendum over the country's new Constitution, at which time they planned to launch a boycott and possibly turn to violence (Gaston 2014:5).

Unlike the southern delegation, the Houthi movement's participation in the dialogue seemed unproblematic. After rejecting the GCC Initiative and Hadi's replacement of Saleh during the transitional period, by 2013, the movement actively participated in the national dialogue, seemingly belatedly endorsing the GCC Initiative. The national dialogue's sub-committee on the Sa'ada conflict, in which the Houthi movement controlled the governorate of Sa'ada and parts of the surrounding governorates of al-Jawf, Amran and Hajjah, easily produced a report endorsed by the Houthis which called for: freedom of thought and worship for all sects, good governance and economic development, a prohibition against receiving foreign support, the prevention of the military from being used in internal

political struggles, and the disarming of militias (Schmitz 2014a). The fact that the Houthis agreed to the prohibition against receiving foreign support and the disarming of militias when they are an Iran-backed militia was taken as a positive step during the dialogue. However, the Houthis' strategy seemed to be to undermine the dialogue while actively participating in it. While the Houthis had 35 delegates in the NDC, they continued to wage battles in the North, in Sa'ada and different provinces around it, fighting with tribes allied to the Islah party, Yemen's most influential Islamist party, and with Salafi groups (Al-Muslimi 2014). The Houthi leadership argued that its target was not the Yemeni state, but rather Salafi groups which it has fought for decades, leaders of the Islah party and General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who headed the wars waged by President Saleh against the Houthis. However, the movement's efforts to undermine the national dialogue in the north were warning signs that the Houthis were determined to shape the country's political map through armed conflict. Although the Houthi takeover of Sana'a surprised many, the writing was on the wall from the early days of the national dialogue.

Recognition

The fourth dimension of Jenson's model on social cohesion concerns the respect for difference and tolerance of diversity in a society. In the case of Tunisia, the country's Constitution illustrates how the national dialogue fostered a respect for difference and tolerance for diversity in the country. Approving the Constitution was one of the three processes that the dialogue participants had to work on, along with choosing a new consensual interim Prime Minister to prepare the country's 2014 elections and establishing a new independent body to supervise the elections. The Constitution is therefore a direct product of the national dialogue and was one of the markers of its success.

Indeed, the text of the Constitution was lauded by analysts and international policymakers alike as one of the most democratic and liberal in the Arab world. The Constitution quieted the fears that Tunisians, and in particular Tunisian women, might lose their gains under the watch of

an Islamist-dominated National Constituent Assembly. The Constitution stipulates that Islam is the state religion, but that Tunisia is a civil state based on citizenship and the rule of law, meaning that Sharia law is not the main source of legislation in the country. An article ratified in the new Constitution establishes freedom of conscience in the country. This allows individuals to freely practice any religion, or no religion at all. Additionally, although Ennahda MPs had proposed declaring that women are 'complementary' to men, this formulation was not approved in the final draft. Instead, the Constitution introduces a number of elements that will be crucial for women's rights in the future. Article 46 specifically provides that the state must work to achieve 'parity between men and women in elected assemblies' (Al-Ali and Ben Romdhane 2014; Al-Sheikh 2014). Gender sensitive wording also peppered the entire Constitution. Article 40 states that the right to work is 'a right for every citizen, male and female' (Al-Ali and Ben Romdhane 2014; Al-Sheikh 2014). Gender sensitive wording is also used regarding the right to decent working conditions, to a fair wage and to stand for election. Indeed, Article 73 provides that 'every male and female voter' has the right to stand for election for the position of President of the Republic (Al-Ali and Ben Romdhane 2014; Al-Sheikh 2014). The Constitution therefore turns the page on any divisiveness within Tunisian society and promotes social cohesion through the respect of diversity.

In the case of Yemen, this article has covered the secessionist movement in the south in the section on Belonging. This movement represents segments of the southern population who do not feel committed to a united Yemen state. On the other hand, the Houthi problem in Yemen is based on sectarian/religious grievances, whereby the Houthis do not necessarily want to secede, but do not feel that their religious beliefs are accepted and respected by Sana'a. Tolerance for the Houthis' differences has not existed throughout the country's history. Indeed, Zaydism, the Shi'a sect of Islam which the Houthis follow, was severely repressed prior to the 1990 unification of both Yemens by the authorities of the Yemen Arab Republic, who followed the Sunni branch of Islam. Saudi Arabia also saw the Houthis

as a threat at its border, and by the 1970s, it began to fund a Salafi Wahhabi group in northern Yemen to convert Shi'a Zaydi locals to Wahhabism (Sunni Islam). By the 1990s, the Salafis had become powerful in the area, which made then President Saleh fearful of their increasing influence. Saleh decided to temper this influence by supporting the Houthis, letting the group's leader, Hussein al-Houthi, run for parliament in Saleh's ruling party (Al-Muslimi 2014). Hussein al-Houthi served in Parliament but soon abandoned politics to focus on the promotion of Zaydism in the North. In the late 1990s and early 2000s he launched Zaydi religious education and summer camp programmes for the young, largely in reaction to the continued use of these same measures by Salafi and Wahhabi organisations in the North. As repression against Zaydism also continued, he militarised the movement, urging members to purchase weapons to defend themselves (Schmitz 2012).

When the Saleh regime endorsed the Bush administration's War on Terror and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Hussein al-Houthi saw an opportunity to broaden the appeal of his movement by attacking Saleh's alliance with the United States. Saleh responded to this provocation by ordering Hussein's arrest. Hussein's supporters clashed with government forces to resist Hussein's arrest, and this quickly metamorphosed into an armed conflict in Sa'ada in the summer of 2004. Hussein was killed at the end of this first war in the fall of 2004, but Hussein's father, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and his brother, Abd Malik al-Houthi, assumed leadership and refused to compromise with Saleh. Five more wars ensued before Saleh was toppled by the Arab Spring revolution in the country (Schmitz 2012, 2014c; Al-Muslimi 2014). By the time the national dialogue came, the Houthis were distrustful of the central government because of their history with it. As will be seen in the following section, the Hadi government was also perceived as an extension of the Saleh regime which persecuted the Houthis, making the national dialogue a near impossible feat.

Legitimacy

The final dimension of Jenson's model on social cohesion refers to the importance of legitimacy for major political institutions serving as mediators among individuals of different interests. In the case of Tunisia, the mediators of the national dialogue played a key role in its success. The fact that the mediators, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), UTICA (the employers' union), the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH) and the National Bar Association, were not state institutions but fairly independent, respected and powerful civil society organisations certainly aided the process. The UGTT for instance, is the largest conglomeration of affiliated trade unions, which boasts 400 000 members across the country (International Crisis Group 2014b:3). It has often played an important role in key political events in Tunisia's history, including in the country's fight for independence from France in the 1950s and more recently during the Jasmine Revolution.[2] This has given it moral authority in the country, as it is perceived as having been a force for good in the country's recent history. Due to the presence within its ranks of individuals from all walks of the political spectrum, it was also perceived as a fairly unbiased mediator, as opposing political allegiances within the organisation cancelled each other out. Indeed, while the more anti-Islamist and leftist members of the union were inclined to endorse and push the secular opposition's agenda, the union's more centrist members resisted this. One example of this dynamic was the union's refusal to endorse the opposition's call for the dissolution of the National Constituent Assembly, which was dominated by Ennahda (International Crisis Group 2014b:4). The combined influence over Tunisian society of these civil society organisations made this mediating team difficult to ignore during the national dialogue. It was therefore able to exert considerable influence over the proceedings, and the UGTT's Secretary-General was able to direct and shape the debates, allegedly forcing the participants to remain in the room until satisfactory decisions were reached (International Crisis Group 2014b:4). It is therefore

2 The name given to Tunisia's 2010–2011 revolution to topple President Ben Ali.

possible to state that the success of Tunisia's national dialogue was in large part due to the mediating team's considerable leverage over the dialogue's participants and its legitimacy in their eyes.

In the case of Yemen, no independent mediator was appointed to oversee the national dialogue, and it was organised and run by the transitional government. Problematically, the transitional government was not endorsed by all factions of Yemeni society, particularly the Houthis. Indeed, the Houthis publicly rejected the GCC initiative that removed Saleh from power, even though it achieved their goal of ousting the president. They believed the GCC initiative to be a conspiracy by Saudi Arabia and the United States to hijack Yemen's revolution. Because many of Yemen's elite, particularly Saleh's party, the GPC, were unaffected under the initiative, the Houthis felt that more change was needed and that all should step down in order for Yemen to forge a new path. After Saleh's vice-president, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, was brought to power, the Houthis continued to protest, although other political groups had stopped (Al-Muslimi 2014). There was therefore distrust between the Houthis and Hadi from the beginning of the transition process, as Hadi was seen as an extension of the Saleh regime which had persecuted the Houthis.[3] More generally, the transitional government was made up of a cabinet split evenly between members of Saleh's party and the opposition party the Mustarak, and a parliament which was dominated by Saleh's party. The Houthis argued that with such leadership, as temporary as it was, the revolution was incomplete, and these remnants of the old regime would eventually turn on the Houthis as had happened in the past.

As the dialogue came to an end and Hadi proposed a 6-state federation for the country, the Houthis descended upon Sana'a and proceeded to undermine Hadi and his government. In January 2015, they kidnapped

3 As mentioned above, the Houthis were however not unwilling to conclude a marriage of convenience with Saleh himself, despite having participated in his downfall. It is generally held that this alliance was meant to be short-lived and that both sides would end up resuming their traditional stances towards each other upon defeating their common foes (Salisbury 2015).

Hadi's chief of staff, sacked the presidential palace and placed the president and government ministers under house arrest. After Hadi escaped from his house arrest and fled to the south, the Houthis pursued him, which pushed him to flee the country altogether.

Following Hadi's escape from house arrest, the Houthi Supreme Revolutionary Committee, the group's 15-member governing body, issued a statement via the state-run Saba News Agency declaring Hadi a fugitive who: 'lost any legitimacy as president after his reckless actions undermined the security, stability and economy of the country' (Al-Moshki 2015). Although the Houthis participated in the national dialogue, the legitimacy of the Hadi government seems to always have been an underlying issue for them, and they seized the first opportunity to topple him. This unravelled the fragile social cohesion achieved by the national dialogue, as Hadi loyalists, an international coalition headed by Saudi Arabia and other Houthi enemies have resisted the Houthi takeover.

Conclusion

This article has sought to compare the post-Arab Spring social cohesion efforts of Tunisia and Yemen through their respective national dialogues. It has employed Jane Jenson's model on social cohesion to break down the comparative analysis into five components which characterise social cohesion. In doing so, it has explained why Tunisia's social cohesion efforts have seen greater success than Yemen's. It has found that while Yemen struggled with the demands of a secessionist movement during the national dialogue, Tunisian dialogue participants were more committed to their country's unity, making the dialogue much more feasible in the latter case. Realising the risks of a prolonged political crisis on the country's economy, Tunisian politicians decided to negotiate with each other to avoid an economic meltdown. In Yemen, however, the transitional government's lack of interest in the economy hijacked the achievements of the national dialogue, as the state of the economy was manipulated by spoilers to weaken social cohesion. At the height of the political crisis in Tunisia, the Ennahda party was willing to step down from power to restore

an acclaimed balance in political participation, while in Yemen, both the Southern and Houthi participation in the national dialogue masked hidden agendas which undermined the country's social cohesion. While Tunisia's national dialogue allowed it to usher in the future by passing a Constitution which guaranteed tolerance for diversity in the country, Yemen's history of rejection of the Houthis came back to haunt the national dialogue, as the movement was unwilling to trust the government's initiative and reverted to its traditional aggressive stance towards Sana'a. And finally, whereas Tunisia's dialogue was organised by respected independent mediators, Yemen's was not overseen by mediators and was instead organised by the very authorities which the Houthis mistrusted and viewed as illegitimate.

Key lessons learned emerge from Tunisia and Yemen's national dialogues which are worth considering by countries in similar transitional phases: the grievances of secessionist movements should in some cases be addressed separately prior to engaging in a national dialogue, as their demands can hijack national dialogues which are meant to cover all of a society's woes; the economy should be revitalised at the same time as the dialogue is taking place; spoilers, whose participation in national dialogues can hide ulterior motives, should be minded; national dialogues should assuage the fears of all participants and their constituencies by fostering tolerance for diversity within a society; and national dialogues should be overseen by an authority which is deemed legitimate by all participants. Although this is by no means an exhaustive list of the requirements for a successful national dialogue, recent history shows us that these are core elements which should not be overlooked when carrying out social cohesion efforts.

Sources

Al-Ali, Zaid and Donia Ben Romdhane 2014. Tunisia's new constitution: progress and challenges to come. Open Democracy, 16 February. Available from: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/zaid-al-ali-donia-ben-romdhane/tunisia%E2%80%99s-new-constitution-progress-and-challenges-to-> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Al-Moshki, Ali Ibrahim 2015. President or fugitive? Houthis reject Hadi's letter to Parliament. *Yemen Times*, 25 February. Available from: <http://www.yementimes.com/en/1863/news/4928/President-or-fugitive-Houthis-reject-Hadi%E2%80%99s-letter-to-Parliament.htm> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Al-Muslimi, Farea 2014. The Houthi paradox. Middle East Institute, 16 January. Available from: < http://www.mei.edu/content/houthi-paradox > [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Al-Sheikh, Bissan 2014. New Tunisian constitution 'turning point' for Islamist movements. *Al Monitor,* 14 January. Available from: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/01/tunisia-new-constitution-ennahda-turning-point-islamists.html#> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

BBC 2015. President Hadi leaves Yemen as Saudi-led raids continue. *BBC News*, 27 March. Available from: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32078817> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Berger, Peter 1998. *The limits of social cohesion: Conflict and mediation in pluralist societies.* Boulder, Westview.

Bollen, Kenneth A. and Rick H. Hoyle 2001. Perceived cohesion: a conceptual and empirical examination. *Social Forces,* 69 (2), pp. 479–504.

Gaston, Erica 2014. Process lessons learned in Yemen's National Dialogue. Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace.

Ghobari, Mohammed 2014. Talks on new Yemeni government collapse over Shi'ite Houthi subsidy demands. Reuters, 24 August. Available from: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/24/us-yemen-protests-idUSKBN0GN06820140824?irpc=932> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Gough, Ian and Gunnar Olofsson eds. 1999. Capitalism and social cohesion: Essays on exclusion and integration. Basingstoke, Macmillan.

International Crisis Group 2014a. *Conflict Alert: Unrest in Sanaa.* Sanaa/Brussels, International Crisis Group.

International Crisis Group 2014b. *L'exception tunisienne : succès et limites du consensus.* Tunis, Brussels, International Crisis Group.

International Crisis Group 2014c. *CrisisWatch Database.* Available from: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-database.aspx?CountryIDs=%7b9D2149C0-C350-40FC-BE12-7693FB454AEE%7d#results> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

International Crisis Group 2014d. *Elections en Tunisie : vieilles blessures, nouvelles craintes.* Tunis, Brussels, International Crisis Group.

International Crisis Group 2015. *Yemen at war.* Sanaa, Brussels, International Crisis Group.

Jenson, Jane 1998. Mapping social cohesion: The state of Canadian research. *Canadian Policy Research Networks,* CPRN Study No. F(03).

Kasinof, Laura 2015. Yemen: From the Arab Spring to a leaderless nation. *Defense One*, 26 January. Available from: <http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/01/yemen-arab-spring-leaderless-nation/103692/> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Lackner, Helen 2012. Yemen's National Dialogue: Will it succeed? *Open Democracy*, 18 October. Available from: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-lackner/yemen%E2%80%99s-national-dialogue-will-it-succeed> [Accessed 15 July 2015].

Lockwood, David 1999. Civic integration and social cohesion. In: Gough, Ian and Gunnar Olofsson eds. *Capitalism and social cohesion*: *Essays on exclusion and integration.* Basingstoke, Macmillan. ch.4.

Naylor, Hugh 2015. For Yemen's Arab Spring activists, hope plummets as chaos deepens. *The Washington Post*, 26 February. Available from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/for-yemens-arab-spring-activists-hope-plummets-as-chaos-deepens/2015/02/26/ef5c87fe-b78a-11e4-bc30-a4e75503948a_story.html> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Ottaway, David 2013. Tunisia's Islamist-led democracy founders. *Woodrow Wilson Center*, 18 October. Available from: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/tunisias_islamist_led_democracy_founders.pdf> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Ottaway, Marina 2013. Tunisia's struggle for a constitution. *The National Interest*, 24 October. Available from: <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/tunisias-struggle-constitution-9299> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Reardon, Martin 2014. South Yemen and the question of secession. *Al Jazeera*, 3 December. Available from: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/12/south-yemen-question-secession-201412351732176656.html> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Salah, Omar Belhaj 2013. Tunisia's political impasse. *Open Democracy*, 7 October. Available from: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/omar-belhaj-salah/tunisia%e2%80%99s-political-impasse> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Salisbury, Peter 2015. The surprising alliance that explains Yemen's political collapse. *The Washington Post*, 28 January. Available from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/01/28/the-surprising-alliance-that-explains-yemens-political-collapse/> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Schmitz, Charles 2012. Yemen's Spring: Whose agenda? *Middle East Institute*, 29 March. Available from: <http://www.mei.edu/content/yemens-spring-whose-agenda> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Schmitz, Charles 2014a. Yemen's National Dialogue. *Middle East Institute*, 10 March. Available from: <http://www.mei.edu/content/yemens-national-dialogue#_ftnref5> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Schmitz, Charles 2014b. The Houthis' rise and Obama's legacy in Yemen. *Middle East Institute*, 4 November. Available from: <http://www.mei.edu/content/article/houthis%E2%80%99-rise-and-obama%E2%80%99s-legacy-yemen> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Schmitz, Charles 2014c. The Houthi ascent to power. *Middle East Institute*, 15 September. Available from: <http://www.mei.edu/content/at/huthi-ascent-power> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Tunisian Ministry of Tourism 2015. *Réalisations du Secteur Touristique*. Available from: <http://www.tourisme.gov.tn/realisations-et-perspectives/tourisme-en-chiffres/statistiques-2014.html> [Accessed 19 August 2015].

Social cohesion, sexuality, homophobia and women's sport in South Africa

*Mari H. Engh and Cheryl Potgieter**

Abstract

In the post-Apartheid era sport has been consistently celebrated as an avenue for fostering social change, curing various social ills, and uniting South Africans across the divides of race, class, gender and geography. The argument for using sport to foster social cohesion in South Africa rests on two main assumptions: firstly, that direct participation in sport and physical activity promotes sustained communication, collaboration and understanding across social divides; and secondly, that the success of national teams and athletes promotes national pride and unity. In this article we raise the question of whether sport can indeed foster social cohesion in a context where women's sports participation and symbolic embodiment of the nation give rise to regulatory schemas that enforce compulsory heterosexuality and mainstream constructs of 'feminisation'. We explore these issues by drawing on media reports of cases in which South African elite women athletes have had their gender or sexual identities questioned, challenged or regulated according to heteronormative gender regimes. By so doing we argue that efforts to increase women's sports participation or the promotion of women athletes as embodiments of the nation can contribute to facilitating social cohesion. To realise the potential of sport as

* Dr Mari H. Engh is a Post-doctoral scholar at the School of Applied Human Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal. Prof Cheryl Potgieter is Deputy Vice-Chancellor at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, and Professor in Psychology.

a tool for building social cohesion, a conscious and dedicated effort must be made, we argue, to deal more directly with narrow heteronormative gender regimes and the homophobic attitudes and prejudices that these foster.

Keywords: Gender, sexuality, homophobia, sport, social cohesion, race, South Africa

Introduction

In the post-Apartheid era sport has been consistently celebrated as an avenue for fostering social change, curing various social ills, and uniting South Africans across the divides of race, class, gender and geography. A recent example of this was when Sports Minister Fikile Mbalula on Wednesday 20th May 2015 – following former Banyana Banyana captain Portia Modise's announcement of her retirement from international football – proclaimed that 'it is a widely accepted fact that sport is a powerful tool to healing past wounds and creating a cohesive society'. The South African White Paper on Sports and Recreation (Sports and Recreation South Africa, henceforth SRSA, 2012:7) institutionalises this social role of sport, and defines social cohesion as:

> the degree of social integration and inclusion in communities and society at large, and the extent to which mutual solidarity finds expression itself among individuals and communities… Within a sporting context social cohesion is the process by which efforts are made to ensure equal opportunities that everyone, regardless of their background, can achieve their full potential in life.

In the conceptual background for the South African Sports and Recreation White Paper, it is argued that 'sport works primarily by bridging relationships across social, economic and cultural divides within society… by sharing sports experiences, sports participants from conflicting groups increasingly grow to feel that they are alike, rather than different' (SRSA 2009:7). As such, sport is posited as an important vehicle for promoting peaceful reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa. In addition to defining sports participation as a crucial element, the same document

(*A case for sport and recreation*) posits that pride in national teams is a key indicator of social cohesion across society (SRSA 2009:32). Hence, the argument for using sport to foster social cohesion in South Africa rests on two main assumptions: firstly, that direct participation in sport and physical activity promotes sustained communication, collaboration and understanding across social divides; and secondly, that the success of national teams and athletes promotes national pride and unity. In this sense, sport is believed to promote social cohesion on both a material (direct mass participation) and symbolic level (national pride and patriotism).

The claim that sport can function to foster social change and cohesion has wide international support, and is repeated in the sport policy documents of various nation-states, inter-governmental organisations such as the United Nations, as well as numerous non-governmental organisations (cf. Saavedra 2005). An argument which has also been made internationally is that peacebuilding could be facilitated through sport or put differently sport is a driver for both development and peace and could assist in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (see Cardenas 2013; Burnett 2010).

International and grassroots organisations have made use of sport to reduce and resolve conflict, and build inter-community bridges in societies shaped by ethnical, cultural and racial divides (Schulenkorf and Sugden 2011; Lawson 2005). Schulenkorf and Sugden (2011), in their analysis of a sport and reconciliation project in Israel, argue that it was not sport *per se* but the active involvement of community leaders and change agents that contributed to cooperation and inclusive change.

Commenting on the history and future potential of sport in post-apartheid South Africa, Sugden (2010:263) has argued that while much work remains to be done, sport 'if imbued with socially progressive values and organized and managed correctly, can play a role in promoting peace and reconciliation in even the most fractured and deeply divided societies'. In South Africa, sport played an important role in the struggle against apartheid, as well as in subsequent, and ongoing, efforts to bring about reconciliation and unity (Sugden 2010). Nauright (1997:2) has argued that 'sport has served

both to unify and divide groups, it has been closely interwoven with the broader fabric of South African society and has been at the forefront of social and political change'. Yet, mass sports participation and the pride invested in national teams and athletes do not automatically contribute to building stronger, more equal and cohesive societies; to realise the potentials of sport a conscious and dedicated effort must be made. Sport does not have an intrinsic value, or effect; rather it 'is a social construction that is malleable according to the social forces that surround it' (Sugden 2010:262). Hence, we argue, policy and programmatic efforts to use sport in fostering social cohesion in South Africa, need to engage more directly with the disciplinary power of narrow heteronormative gender regimes and the homophobic attitudes and prejudices that these foster.[1]

A good example of the challenges associated with the facilitation of social cohesion through sport is related to issues of gender equity and women's empowerment. In South African policies on sport, it is made clear that in order to build cohesive societies and communities inequities, disparities and exclusions 'based on ethnicity, gender, class, nationality, age, disability' must be reduced and eliminated (SRSA 2012:7). In these sport policy frameworks, 'women' are identified as a key priority group – alongside 'youth', 'the aged' and 'people with disabilities'. In the 2009 document, *A case for sport and recreation*, it is noted that women and girls are less likely to participate in sports in South Africa, not because they do not wish to, but because of material and ideational barriers to inclusion. Moreover, it is noted that women are underrepresented in sports leadership and administration. Nevertheless, the document reasserts the opportunities for using sport to achieve women's empowerment and gender equity:

> Sport helps improve female physical and mental health and offers opportunities for social interaction and friendship… sport can cause positive shifts in gender norms that afford girls and women greater safety and control over their lives (SRSA 2009:4).

1 In this article we refer to heteronormative gender regimes and heteronormativity as the normalisation and institutionalisation of compulsory heterosexuality (Steyn and Van Zyl 2009:3).

According to these South African policy statements, it is evident that working towards gender equity and women's empowerment falls within the purview of 'social cohesion'.

What is seldom included in policy and writing on sport, social cohesion and transformation, however, are issues related to heterosexual normativity and homophobia. Yet, in relation to sport, questions of gender performances and sexual orientation are particularly pertinent. While sport normalises and epitomises masculinity, it serves to raise questions and concerns about the 'femininity' (and sexual orientation) of women athletes (Messner 1996; Mean and Kassing 2008). Helen Lenskyj (2003) argues that for women, sports participation disrupts hegemonic expectations regarding gender and (hetero)sexuality, and frequently leads to questions being raised about their gender identities and sexual behaviours. This is also precisely the reason why scholars argue that sport may play an important role in changing restrictive gender roles and regimes (Meier and Saavedra 2009). In the South African context, research indicates that women playing football are commonly met with what is 'negative' stereotypes, which include 'masculinising' women and or putting women 'at risk' of being/becoming lesbians (Ogunniyi 2014:263–269; Ogunniyi 2015; Engh 2010c; Meier and Saavedra 2009).

While scholarship has drawn attention to the various ways that sport can facilitate social cohesion within post-conflict societies, this all too often fails to incorporate examinations of heteronormativity and sexual diversity (Carney and Chawansky 2014). In such post conflict contexts, the struggle for gender equity remains of key importance.

Sport as a driver to promote social cohesion, unity and national pride, raises a number of challenges that have not been sufficiently explored and responded to by academic work and public policy on social cohesion, sport and gender equity. What, for instance, is the impact of myths about 'lesbian sportswomen' on the experiences of women who participate in sport? What happens when the bodies of athletic women, the women we look to as symbols of our progress and achievement as a nation, disrupt our understandings of what a woman is, how she behaves, and whom she loves? What then of our desire to use sport to build cohesive communities?

Gender, sport, normative whiteness and (hetero)sexuality

Historically, hegemonic discourses of femininity (and masculinity) have functioned to create an image of the ideal woman that has excluded the possibility of her being active, athletic and 'feminine' at the same time. Popular beliefs about the 'nature of woman' have served to justify inequality and have limited women's participation in sport and physical activity through the assertion that women's physical bodies were 'too weak' to withstand participating in sport (Hargreaves 1994). The development of modern competitive sport was closely linked to Victorian ideas about the frailty of women, ideals of muscular (male) Christianity and normative heterosexuality (Carrington 2010; Hargreaves 1994; Mangan and Park 2013). Sport has social and cultural significance because it has 'power to represent and reproduce beliefs about gender, physicality, race and sexuality' (Douglas and Jamieson 2006:134). As a social institution, sport perpetuates and provides justification for ideologies of gender binaries in which men are naturally masculine and athletic, and women are, and should continue to be, naturally feminine and weaker than men. Normative whiteness is an integral part of these gendered and heteronormative discourses.

Institutionalised and naturalised heterosexuality 'requires and regulates gender as a binary relation in which the masculine term is differentiated from a feminine term, and this differentiation is accomplished through the practices of heterosexual desire' (Butler 1990:31). Within sports, heteronormativity is policed, and thus also made evident in two key ways: first through the historical and ongoing practice of sex/gender testing, and secondly through homophobia and the myth of the 'lesbian bogeywoman' (Griffin 1998). Sex tests (or 'gender verification' and 'femininity tests' as they are also sometimes referred to) were imposed upon female elite athletes between the 1960s and 2000 (Ritchie 2003). Ritchie, among others, has argued that although never explicitly stated in policy documents of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), sex/gender tests were instituted to ensure that women do not have to compete with individuals who are physically superior to 'average women' (Ritchie 2003; Sullivan 2011;

Wackwitz 2003). Wackwitz (2003) refutes these claims about the necessity of sex testing female athletes for concerns of 'fair play' and argues instead that the practice functions to uphold sex/gender binaries and to enforce the incompatibility of athleticism and femininity. The labelling of women who transgress the compulsory heterosexual sex/gender/sexuality order (Butler 1990) as not being 'real women' forms part of the widespread homophobia within sports. Homophobia not only serves to keep many women away from sport, it also puts women who are labelled as 'deviant' (read: not heterosexual) at risk of homophobic prejudice and violence. As such, heteronormativity and homophobia create a situation in which many sporting women are policing their own bodies and appearances to fit with conventional femininity. The need for women in sport to 'prove' their femininity (and thus their heterosexuality) has been referred to by many as the 'feminine apologetic' (Theberge 2000). The feminine apologetic refers to the practices of adorning the body or posing for a beauty makeover (Lenskyj 2014), whereby female athletes appear acceptable and appropriate when presenting themselves as (hetero)sexually appealing.

Griffin (1998:53) has argued that myths about lesbian women in sport erase varieties in lesbian experience and contribute to the construction of a persistent 'monolithic image, a lesbian bogeywoman, [that] haunts all women, scaring young athletes and their parents, discouraging solidarity among women in sport, and keeping women's sports advocates on the defensive'. While homophobia affects most women in sport, it has a particular implication for those women who identify as homosexual/lesbian. Many sporting lesbians remain 'in the closet' for fears of discrimination, alienation or even violence (Griffin 1998).

Due to this, homosexuality within sport remains an almost invisible issue, and very little research and writing has given this issue the attention it deserves. In the South African context there is a paucity of scholarship which debunks myths regarding women's sport and lesbianism. Burnett (2001:73), in one of the few South African contributions that explores questions of sexuality, argues that 'female athletes are often stereotyped as sex symbols, while a more muscular body is perceived to be unnatural. This

also explains the negative association of female athletes with lesbianism, expressed in a particular lifestyle which is not accepted in the wider society'.[2]

Within the marginal field of South African sport scholarship, questions of gender and sexuality have been markedly overlooked. While research challenging the dominance of heterosexuality as an identity or lived experience has increased over the past two decades (see Naidoo and Muholi 2010; Engh 2010a and 2011; Ogunniyi 2015), there is a paucity of scholars who have cast the gendered lens challenging women's experiences in sport and even fewer challenging heteronormativity. Those who have include Jennifer Hargreaves (1994, 1997), Hargreaves and Jones (2001), Denise Jones (2001, 2003) and Cheryl Roberts (2012, 2913a, 2913b)[3] who has written academic articles and an ongoing blog who have all offered valuable insights into the development and state of women's sports during apartheid as well as how the legacies of segregation continue to manifest today.

Martha Saavedra (2004); Meier and Saavedra 2009), Cynthia Pelak (2005, 2006, 2009, 2010), Cassandra Clark (2011; Clark and Burnett 2010; Ogunniyi 2014, 2015) and Mari Engh (2010a, 2010b, 2011) have focussed on women's football in particular, and examined the development of the game in South Africa, the effects that lacking public and corporate support had on this development, and the question of how South African women footballers have persisted in the face of marginalisation and under-development. Cora Burnett (2001, 2002) has argued for increased attention to realities of gendered and racial inequity in South African sports today. In so doing, Burnett has highlighted the need for further critical and feminist research on sport in South Africa, as this can inform and strengthen the battle for gender equity within and beyond South African sports.

2 See also Ogunniyi 2014, 2015; Naidoo and Muholi 2010; Engh 2011.

3 See Roberts 2012, 2013a, 2013b.

While these accounts offer useful insights into the realities facing women in sport in South Africa, the focus has mostly overlooked and thus not deconstructed the myth of the lesbian bogeywoman. The latter is a shortcoming and unless scholarship and public policy begin to engage more meaningfully with questions of heteronormativity and homophobia, key aspects of women's experiences in sport will continue to be ignored. To date, scholarly and popular writing on women and sport in South African contexts seem so concerned with 'speaking back' to the lesbian stereotype that critical engagements with sexuality and subjectivity are almost completely absent. In an attempt to sanitise and make women's sports (and perhaps football in particular) palatable and respectable, a silence about the experiences of lesbian sportswomen is constructed. Potgieter (2006:5) argues that 'lesbians in South Africa live in a hostile world of hyper-visibility where their lives are sensationalised or made invisible'. Hence, by engaging more critically with questions of gender, sexuality and race in relation to the lives and experiences of sportswomen we may find it possible to also deal more meaningfully with homophobic attitudes, acts and violence, as well as the ways in which these attitudes affect the use of sport in building stronger and more cohesive societies. Discourses which re-inscribe and re-mystify the 'lesbian bogeywoman' of women's sport have to be 'discounted' to ensure more sophisticated and critical engagements recognising the intersectionality of heteronormativity, homophobia and racism in South African women's sports.

Social cohesion through sport: Athletes as symbols of the nation

Across the world competitive and elite sports, particularly in relation to international competitions, are upheld as important avenues for building social unity and pride. However, the teams and athletes imbued with such national symbolism are mostly drawn from the 'malestream' mainstream of modern competitive sports. The continued and dominant celebration of male athletes and teams from traditionally masculine sports such as football, cricket and rugby, functions to marginalise women's sports and

female athletes (Burnett 2002). In a study conducted by Gender Links and the Media Institute of South Africa from 2003, it is noted that less than 10% of news coverage on economics, politics and sport focused on women (Mwamba 2009). Considering the relative absence of celebrations of black, female sporting role models in South African sports (Burnett 2002), it is no surprise that modern competitive sports continue to uphold white and male dominance in ideological, structural, political and economic terms (Adjepong and Carrington 2014; Travers 2008).

When athletes represent South Africa internationally, whether individually or in teams, they are not only expected to be successful, but also to appear as respectable representatives and role models for the nation. These expectations, however, affect male and female athletes quite differently. South African media outlets tend to mostly cover men's sport and tend to portray women athletes not in their professional or sporting terms, but as 'sexy', 'mothers' or 'having a feminine side' (Burnett 2001:76). This contributes to the practice of overlooking sporting achievements in favour of feminising women athletes. Moreover, women athletes are, particularly when competing outside of the country, also tasked with performing and embodying femininity – they must show that they are, in fact, women. In nationalist ideology and discourse, women tend to be represented as the symbolic reproducers of the nation (McClintock 1995; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989), meaning that the morals and values of a nation are often seen as represented on and through women's bodies.

For sportswomen these regulatory schemes combine expectations of appearing appropriately feminine (to make women's sports more popular), with a 'heterosexy' athletic look (not lesbian or 'pseudo-manly'). In the South African context, an example of this was in 2005 when Ria Ledwaba, then chairperson of the South African Football Association's (SAFA) Women's Committee, argued that the senior women's national football team, Banyana Banyana, start playing their games in tighter shirts and shorter shorts, and that they attend 'etiquette classes' to learn how to behave and appear as proper and feminine representatives of the nation. Ledwaba was quoted in national newspapers as stating:

> We don't want our girls to look, act and dress like men just because they play soccer… They need to learn how to be ladies… At the moment you sometimes can't tell if they're men or women (Molobi 2005).

While Ledwaba's statements reveal the constructed nature of gender, that is, that gender is learned and performed, they also speak to the widespread belief that (some) sports, like football, have 'masculinising effects' on women, and that this is problematic. Ledwaba's statements reassert football as a masculine game, suggesting women footballers must remain mindful of the masculinising effects of participation. Moreover, Ledwaba's comments speak to the persistent requirement that women athletes be visibly marked as women/feminine when they participate in sports, perhaps particularly when representing the nation on the international stage. By invoking the notion of 'ladies', Ledwaba also hints at an expectation of femininity that includes ideas about morality and respectability. As the national women's football team, Banyana Banyana must not merely appear as unquestionably feminine, but also as respectable and well-behaved South African 'ladies'. Women athletes must not merely present athletic and strong bodies, they must also distinguish themselves from men, and the lesbian 'bogeywoman', by displaying visible feminine markers. This signifies the burdens, beyond actual sporting performance, that elite-level women athletes are tasked with performing and displaying.

Moreover, due to the association of athletic ability and achievement with manhood and masculinity, women athletes who do not display visible feminine and heterosexual markers face suspicion as to their gender and sexuality. Women athletes continue to be confronted with claims that they are not 'real women', and subsequently have to submit to gender verification testing to 'prove' that they really are women (Wackwitz 2003). Shortly after Caster Semenya qualified for the 800 metres final in the 2009 World Championships, the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) 'conducted physical tests and genital screening to try to determine the legitimacy of Semenya's sex' (Moyo 2009). The concerns that Semenya might not be a 'real' woman were primarily based on her physical appearance; 'a muscular physique for a girl her age, facial hair

and a deep-toned voice have all raised suspicions' (Moyo 2009). Despite the controversy, Semenya proceeded to win the women's 800 metres final, beating her closest competitor by over two seconds.

Despite the international debate regarding Caster Semenya's 'real' sex/gender, in South Africa Semenya was 'celebrated by the national collective' (Magubane 2014:766) and framed by the media and sporting fraternity as 'Our First Lady of Sport'. For a brief moment South Africa appeared to be expressing 'encouraging disregard for a woman's non-conforming gender performance' (Schuhmann 2010:96). Yet, this seemingly liberal attitude towards gender non-conformity was short-lived, and quickly replaced by concerted efforts to feminise Caster so as to illustrate her legitimate (heterosexual) womanhood. This was illustrated, for example, by the constant repetition of claims that Caster was South Africa's 'girl', 'child', 'lady'. Schuhmann (2010:96) argues that the 'real message' of the public endorsement and celebration of Semenya was that 'we support you for the price of reinforcing your sex as female, and as long as you play along we are willing to overlook your masculine gender performance'. In this view, the support for Caster was less an indication of a progressive attitude towards gender performance, than it was part of an effort to silence suspicions by constant reinforcement and repetition of her womanhood. A visually powerful example of this was the *YOU-Magazine* spread of 10th September 2009 wherein Caster was turned from a 'Power Girl' to a 'Glamour Girl' by wearing makeup, high heels, typically feminine clothes and long carefully styled hair. The implication of this was the transformation of 'the athlete' into 'a woman', as if the twain would not otherwise meet.

The re-invention of Caster as an indisputably feminine woman illustrates the power of the feminine apologetic: the need for athletic women to 'prove' their femininity (and thus their heterosexuality) through making themselves appear heterosexually attractive. Nyong'o (2010:96) argues that the 'feminising' treatment Caster received upon her return to South Africa was 'a transparent bid to render her a more suitable standard bearer for national femininity'. This illustrates clearly the 'double burden' of women athletes when made to symbolise the nation; they must work at being good

at their sport while also proving that they are 'real women'. Schuhmann (2010:96) suggests that this treatment of Semenya was inspired by what the public needed her to be: 'a woman; a South African woman; a black South African woman; a black, South African, heterosexual, woman; a 'normal' woman. In this, Schuhmann alludes also to the intersections and mutual imbrications of race and gender in the lives of sportswomen. Because heterosexual, white, middle-class femininity remains the norm and symbol of respectability and attractiveness (Douglas 2005, 2012; Sanger 2008), 'black sportswomen take up space as simultaneously belonging and not belonging' (Adjepong 2015:2). Meaning that while white and heterosexual women athletes are more likely to be celebrated as national cultural icons (Adjepong 2015), black women athletes are faced with racist stereotypes regarding their irresponsible and pathological gender and sexualities (Adjepong and Carrington 2010; Douglas 2012). As such, Adjepong and Carrington (2014:175) argue, black female athletes are framed as 'space invaders' in elite sports, they are celebrated and deemed acceptable only in so far as they appear and behave in ways that are in line with expectations of middle-class white femininity. Through making Caster appear as a traditionally feminine woman, by normalising her and de-emphasising her athleticism, an effort was made to 'turn her into a proper symbol of national honour and pride' (Gender DynamiX, cited in Dworkin, Swarr and Cooky 2013). Like Ria Ledwaba's attempts to regulate and emphasise the (presumed deficient) femininity of Banyana Banyana players, the public media in South Africa regulated Caster Semenya's appearance according to expectations of emphasised, heterosexual femininity.

Both of the above-mentioned cases speak to the tenuous inclusion of women into the world of sport, particularly at the highest level of sporting performance. Both Banyana Banyana and Caster Semenya were publicly reminded that regardless of their sporting exploits, they must also take care to present themselves as 'feminine', both on and off the sports field. Women who are elite-level athletes face a more intimate regulation of their appearance and behaviour than those who participate in amateur or grassroots sports. They are, in particular, faced with the challenge of

disproving crude stereotypes about the masculinising effects of sports and lesbian 'bogeywoman' within sports (Engh 2010a). The effects of this are that only certain sportswomen, who appear and behave in particular and appropriately feminine ways, are made to seem acceptable national symbols for building pride and social cohesion. Those sportswomen who do not 'fit' with being national symbols of honour and pride are excluded, made invisible, or re-presented in overly feminised terms. This does not contribute to solidarity and diversity in the name of social cohesion, but rather reinforces the strength of a narrow range of options for women's public performances of gender and sexuality.

Social cohesion in sport: Homophobia and exclusion

In South African policies on sport, as in much international activism and scholarship, it is noted that sports participation offers particular advantages for girls and women. The South African White Paper on Sport and Recreation, for instance, argues that among other things participating in sports 'can also empower and promote the inclusion of marginalised groups' (SRSA 2012:22) such as women and girls. The Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group (SDP-IWG) has specified the advantages of sports participation and argued that 'sport programmes can enhance the empowerment process by challenging gender norms, reducing restrictions and offering girls and women greater mobility, access to public spaces, and more opportunities for their physical, intellectual and social development' (SDP-IWG 2008:132). These assertions, and others like them, have provided useful and important rationales for increasing funding and investment aimed at sports activities for women and girls across the world. While women's participation in sport is considered an important vehicle for promoting social inclusion and cohesion, stereotypes linking women's participation in sport to masculinisation and lesbianism prejudice women's access to and experience of participation. While this affects all women athletes, it is particularly challenging for those sportswomen who identify as lesbian. Fears of the 'lesbian bogeywoman' impact on how women athletes are seen and presented on national levels, and they

affect the relationships between and among women in sport. In this sense, homophobia can be the source of divisive and exclusionary practices. In South African women's football, for instance, homophobic attitudes have been the cause of the exclusion of self-identified lesbian women on several occasions.

Commenting on the persistent nature of homophobia in South African women's football, Phumla Masuku, a former Banyana Banyana player, has argued that the problem is that the organising body of football itself, SAFA, does not 'believe in homosexuality' (Naidoo and Muholi 2010:134). Illustrating that despite policies of 'non-discrimination' in South African sports, self-identified lesbian women, such as Phumla Masuku, Gloria Hlalele and Portia Modise, have experienced numerous incidents of homophobic prejudice and exclusion while playing at the highest level of South African football. Naidoo and Muholi (2010:132), quoting an interview with Gloria Hlalele, argue that her 'sexual orientation [was]… a reason for her exclusion from professional playing and coaching of the sport'. Further, Naidoo and Muholi (2010:133) argue that Hlalele, like many other women footballers across the country, effectively face a gendered double-bind when it comes to playing football; first for not being 'man enough' to play football as a child, and later for not being 'woman enough' to be a positive role model for women's football.

In the world of football, the pressure put on women to mark their femininity – through the feminine apologetic – appears particularly strong. Women footballers must prove their womanhood and 'do' femininity in specific ways to be accepted and acknowledged. This means that women footballers while 'playing like men', must nevertheless 'look like women'. Looking like a woman entails marking the body as heterosexually feminine and involves ways of dressing, moving, training and speaking. Being too masculine is seen to signal deviant sexuality and a lack of femininity and thus posits the woman concerned as pseudo-woman/lesbian (Cox and Thompson 2001). In African contexts, it has been noted that fears of the lesbian stereotype and accompanying threats of violence dissuade many women from participating in sport (Meier and Saavedra 2009).

Shortly after the conclusion of the African Women's Championship in October 2010, several South African newspapers published reports that the male head coach of the senior women's national football team – Augustine Makalakalane – had been accused of sexually harassing several of the national squad players. Makalakalane was also alleged to have expressed homophobic attitudes, and refused to let lesbian players be a part of his team (Baloyi 2010). Nthabiseng Matshaba, a former member of the team, was quoted as saying that Makalakalane had made sexual advances on several occasions, and that she was eventually fired from the team because she refused to sleep with him (Baloyi 2010). Another player, Lena Masebo, stated that the coach had expressed clearly homophobic attitudes and that he would only allow 'young and straight' girls to play in his team. Portia Modise, former Banyana Banyana captain, confirmed this, and said:

> It is true. He treated lesbians in an abusive manner, verbally insulting us in front of our teammates. He said he didn't want us in the team (Baloyi 2010).

In response, Makalakalane denied the reports and threatened to sue the players involved. Although SAFA made no official statement regarding this case, or the allegations posed by former national team players, Makalakalane was suspended and subsequently replaced as the head coach of the South African women's senior national team in December 2010. Initial reports stated that a full investigation into the allegations would be conducted, but the findings of this were not made public by SAFA, nor has the organisation made any other official statements regarding homophobia. The failure of the organising body of football to make any official statement following this incident is indicative of a silence regarding homophobia in South African women's sport.

Moreover, this illustrates how engagements with gender and sexuality, both from coaches and sports administration in general, significantly shape women's participation in sport, as well as the ways in which women imagine their participation. Naidoo and Muholi (2010:137) argue that with regard to South African women's football, it 'has been those women who have chosen to remain silent about their sexual orientation, and to render

issues of sexuality secondary to the game and to issues of development of talent, that have maintained their positions in the game'. Hence, for women aiming to achieve their fullest potential in sport, homophobia remains a major stumbling block. On the one hand, homophobia and crude stereotyping motivate straight sportswomen to actively distance themselves from lesbians in sport, through disapproval and/or marking themselves as heterosexy-feminine. On the other hand, homophobic attitudes and prejudices cause lesbian athletes to remain in the closet and work to 'pass' as straight. Unless homophobia is directly addressed and discussed by policy makers, sport federations, media and participants, it will continue to support exclusionary and divisive practices within women's sport.

Conclusions and recommendations: Combating homophobia and building social cohesion

In the South African imagination, sport is positioned as a key facilitator of social cohesion; and pride in national teams and athletes is taken as proof that a level of cohesion and unity has been achieved. In the introduction to an edited volume on social cohesion entitled *What holds us together*, Chidester, Dexter and James (2003:vii) state that 'in the glow of the South African "miracle", national identity seemed as easy as one, two, three: South Africa had one flag, two national anthems and three national sporting teams'. While theirs is a critique of simplistic notions of, and roads to, social cohesion, this assertion nevertheless reveals something about the primary role assigned to sport in the national project for cohesion. While it may be true, as Nelson Mandela suggested, that sport has the power to break down all barriers, it is no less true that sport both shapes and is shaped by inequitable gender relations and exclusionary practices. Though sport offers opportunities for a sense of belonging to an imagined community, embodied by the personas and exploits of national athletes and teams, the ways in which sportswomen are represented and consumed as 'symbols of the nation' leaves a lot to be desired.

The SDP-IWG (2008) argues that the achievements of elite sportswomen can dispel prejudices against women's sport and foster national pride and

unity. They argue that 'when the athlete is female, she provides a visible demonstration of what is possible for women to achieve' (SDP-IWG 2008:153). While the power of sport to disprove and dispel myths about 'the frailty of women' is undoubtedly a fact, our discussion above has illustrated that a simple 'add women and stir' approach to sport cannot alone shift gendered expectations and regimes. Rather, we have argued, the achievements of elite women athletes are not only measured on the sports-field, but also in terms of whether and how they perform femininity. Rather than challenging the assumed incompatibility between femininity and athleticism, 'professional sports participation can further subjugate women through an intensification of feminine expectations' (Engh 2010a:75). An indication of this is the level of discomfort and regulation that appears when our sporting heroines are 'not quite' in line with imaginaries of sex, gender and 'the nation'. The response to such transgressions may involve, as was the case with the rape and murder of Eudy Simelane, extreme incidents of violence. This indicates that, despite legal protection against discrimination and violence on the basis of gender and sexual orientation, violence against women and lesbians remains rife in post-apartheid South Africa (Mkhize et al. 2010). High levels of homophobic and gender based violence, such as is the case in South Africa, 'render notions of being "at peace" very vulnerable' (Bennett 2010:38).

In this article, we have aimed to illustrate some of the ways in which women's sports participation, both on elite and amateur levels, brings about heteronormative regulatory schemas that affect the ways in which women athletes are able to present and perform their gendered and sexual identities. By so doing, we have raised questions as to the potentials of using sport as a tool for building social cohesion in a context where women (1) are largely excluded from acting as sporting 'symbols of the nation', (2) experience (hetero)feminisation and sexualisation as elite athletes, (3) police their appearances and behaviours so as to appear 'straight' and distance themselves from the 'lesbian bogeywoman' of sport, or in the most extreme cases, (4) are excluded from sports participation on the basis of their sexual orientation.

Nevertheless, we agree that as an embodied and symbolic practice, sport does hold the potential to facilitate social transformation and cohesion. In order to effectively do so, however, an effort must be made to foster more inclusive participation for women, at both the material and discursive levels. The divisions and exclusions sustained by heteronormative expectations of femininity and homophobic attitudes cannot be addressed merely through bringing more women into sport. Rather, policies and strategies must be attentive also to the type and quality of participation. This requires a more sustained engagement with the nature and extent of homophobia toward and within women's sport, as well as with more general debates about femininity and athleticism in South Africa. Homophobia and heteronormative expectations of femininity affect (1) whether women decide to participate in sport, and in which sports they decide to participate, (2) the nature of relationships between and among women in different sport codes and teams, as well as (3) the experience of athletic women outside of sport, for instance, when travelling to or from training sessions or competitions. What is needed is a further de- and re-construction of feminine expectations and performances to encompass sexual and gender diversity. Disentangling suspicions of lesbianism from women's sporting prowess will make possible a qualitatively different kind of participation for women; a participation that does not enforce heteronormative femininity but one that encompasses the diversity of South African women's sexualities, self-representations and identifications. It will realise not mere mass participation in sport, but a quality of sports participation that has the potential to foster social cohesion. By expanding the forms of gender expression and performance available to women in sport, advances will also be made towards enabling women to fully be seen as symbols of the nation, and not merely as symbols of the (heterosexual) femininity of the nation. If sportswomen are to function as embodiments of the nation, cognisance must be taken of all the constituent parts of the nation, including those women, and athletes who do not seem to 'fit' with the narrow ideals of gender performances and (hetero)sexuality.

Sources

Adjepong, Anima 2015. 'We're like a cute rugby team': how whiteness and heterosexuality shapes women's sense of belonging in rugby. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*. DOI: 10.1177/1012690215584092

Adjepong, Anima and Ben Carrington 2014. Black female athletes as space invaders. In: Hargreaves, Jennifer and Eric Anderson eds. *Routledge handbook of sport, gender and sexuality*. New York, Routledge. pp. 169–178.

Baloyi, Patrick 2010. 'Rude predator! 'Randy coach' too hands-on. *Sunday World*, 21November. Available from: <http://www.sundayworld.co.za/article.aspx?id=1179761> [Last accessed 22 January 2011]. The article is no longer available on this URL, but is referred to on the following existing site: Doyle, Jennifer 2010. Disturbing allegations against South African team coach Makalakalane. From a Left Wing: Soccer, Sport Polemics, 2 December. Available from: <http://fromaleftwing.blogspot.com/2010/12/disturbing-allegations-against-south.html>[Accessed 10 June 2015].

Bennett, Jane 2010. 'Circles and circles': Notes on African feminist debates around gender and violence in the c21. *Agenda: Empowering women for gender equity,* 14 (67), pp. 21–28.

Burnett, Cora 2001. Whose game is it anyway? Power, play and sport. *Agenda*, 49, pp. 71–78.

Burnett, Cora 2002. Women, poverty and sport: A South African scenario. *Women in Sport and Physical Activity Journal,* 11 (1), pp. 23–47.

Burnett, Cora 2010. Sport for Development approaches in the South African context: a case study analysis. *South African Journal for Research in Sport, Physical Education and Recreation,* (1), pp. 12–23.

Butler, Judith 1990. *Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity.* New York, Routledge.

Carney, Alison and Megan Chawansky 2014. Taking sex off the sidelines: challenging heteronormativity within 'sport for development'. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport,* DOI: 10.1177/1012690214521616, pp. 1–15.

Cardenas, Alexander 2013. Peace Building through Sport? An Introduction to Sport for Development and Peace. *Journal of Conflictology,* 4 (1), pp. 24–33.

Carrington, Ben 2010. *Race, sport and politics: The sporting black diaspora.* London, Sage.

Chidester, David, Philip Dexter and Wilmot James 2003. *What holds us together: Social cohesion in South Africa.* Cape Town, HSRC Press.

Clark, Cassandra 2011. Leading or losing? Women challenging male hegemony in South African football and the FIFA World Cup. *Soccer and Society*, 12(6), pp. 834–849.

Clark, Cassandra and Cora Burnett 2010. Upward social mobility through women's soccer: Psycho-social perspectives of sports. *African Journal for Physical Health Education, Recreation and Dance*, 1 (16) (Special issue), pp. 141–154.

Cox, Barbara and Shona Thompson 2000. Multiple bodies: Sportswomen, soccer and sexuality. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport,* 35 (1), pp. 5–20.

Douglas, Delia D. 2005. Venus, Serena, and the Women's Tennis Association: When and where 'race' enters. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 22 (3), pp. 256–282.

Douglas, Delia D. 2012. Venus, Serena and the inconspicuous consumption of blackness: A commentary on surveillance, race talk and new racism(s). *Journal of Black Studies*, 43 (2), pp. 127–145.

Douglas, Delia D. and Katherine M. Jamieson 2006. A farewell to remember: Interrogating the Nancy Lopez farewell tour. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 23, pp. 117–141.

Dworkin, Shari L., Amanda Lock Swarr and Cheryl Cooky 2013. The (mis)treatment of South African track star Caster Semenya. In: Nyeck, S.N. and Mark Epprecht eds. *Sexual diversity in Africa: Politics, theory, citizenship*. Quebec, McGill-Queen's University Press. pp. 129–149.

Engh, Mari 2010a. Football, empowerment and gender equality: An exploration of elite-level women's football in South Africa. In: Shehu, Jimoh ed. *Gender, sport and development in Africa: Cross-cultural perspectives on patterns of representation and marginalization.* Dakar, CODESRIA. pp. 63–78.

Engh, Mari 2010b. The battle for centre stage: Women's football in South Africa. *Agenda*, 85, pp. 97–104.

Engh, Mari 2010c. Football, femininity and muscle: An exploration of heteronormative and athletic discourses in the lives of elite-level women footballers in South Africa. Master's Dissertation, University of Cape Town, Cape Town.

Engh, Mari H. 2011. Tackling femininity: The heterosexual paradigm and women's football in South Africa. *International Journal for the History of Sport*, 28 (1), pp. 137–152.

Griffin, Pat 1998. *Strong women, deep closets: Lesbians and homophobia in sport*. New York, Human Kinetics.

Hargreaves, Jennifer 1994. Sporting females: Critical issues in the history and sociology of women's sports. London and New York, Routledge.

Hargreaves, Jennifer 1997. Women's sport, development and cultural diversity: The South African experience. *Women's Studies International Forum,* 20 (2), pp. 191–209.

Hargreaves, Jennifer and Denise E.M. Jones 2001. South Africa. In: Christensen, Karen, Allen Guttman and Gertrud Pfister eds. *International Encyclopedia of women and sports,* Volume 3. New York, MacMillan. pp. 1084–1089.

Jones, Denise E.M. 2001. In pursuit of empowerment: Sensei Nellie Kleinsmidt, race and gender challenges in South Africa. In: Hong, Fan and Mangan eds. *Freeing the female body: Inspirational icons*. London, Frank Cass. pp. 219–238.

Jones, Denise E.M. 2003. Women and sport in South Africa: Shaped by history and shaping sporting history. In: Hartman Tews, Ilse and Gertrud Pfister eds. *Sport and women: Social issues in international perspective.* London, Routledge. pp. 130–144.

Lawson, Hal A. 2005. Empowering people, facilitating community development and contributing to sustainable development: The social work of sport, exercise and physical education programs. *Sport, Education and Society*, 10 (1), pp. 135–160.

Lenskyj, Helen 2003. *Out on the field: Gender, sport and sexualities*. Toronto, Women's Press.

Lenskyj, Helen 2014. Reflections on communication and sport: On heteronormativity and gender identities. *Communication and Sport*, 1 (1–2), pp. 138–150.

Magubane, Zine 2014. Spectacles and scholarship: Caster Semenya, intersex studies and the problem of race in feminist theory. *Signs*, 39 (3), pp. 761–785.

Mangan, James Anthony and Roberta Park 2013. *From fair sex to feminism: Sport and the socialization of women in the industrial and post-industrial eras.* New York, Routledge.

McClintock, Anne 1995. *Imperial leather: Race, gender and sexuality in the colonial contest.* New York, Routledge.

Mean, Lindsey, J. and Jeffrey W. Kassing 2008. 'I would just like to be known as an athlete': Managing hegemony, femininity and heterosexuality in sport. *Western Journal of Communication*, 72 (2), pp. 126–144.

Meier, Marianne and Martha Saavedra 2009. Esther Phiri and the Moutawakel effect in Zambia: An analysis of the use of female role models in sport for development. *Sport in Society*, 12 (9), pp. 1158–1176.

Messner, Michael 1996. Studying up on sex. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 13, pp. 221–237.

Mkhize, Nonhlanhla, Jane Bennett, Vasu Reddy and Relebohile Moletsane 2010. *The country we want to live in: Hate crimes and homophobia in the lives of black lesbian South Africans.* Cape Town, HSRC Press.

Molobi, Timothy 2005. Banyana captain hits out at Ledwaba. *City Press* 12 March. Available from: <http://152.111.1.87/argief/berigte/citypress/2005/03/13/C1/9/01.html> [Accessed 10 June 2009].

Moyo, Phathisani 2009. *Under-fire Semenya set to run, says Athletics Body. Mail and Guardian*, 19 August. Available from: <http://mg.co.za/article/2009-08-19-underfire-semenya-set-to-run-says-athletics-body> [Accessed 10 June 2015].

Mwamba, Lombe 2009. Media can promote women in sport. *Gender Links*. Available from: <http://www.genderlinks.org.za/article/media-can-promote-women-in-sport-2009-06-29> [Accessed 10 June 2015].

Naidoo, Prishani and Zanele Muholi 2010. Women's bodies and the world of football in South Africa. In: Desai, Ashwin ed. *The race to transform: Sport in post-apartheid South Africa.* Cape Town, HSRC Press. pp. 105–145.

Nauright, John 1997. Sport, cultures and identities in South Africa. London, Leicester University Press.

Nyong'o, Tavia 2010. The unforgivable transgression of being Caster Semenya. *Women and Performance*, 20 (1), pp. 95–100.

Ogunniyi, Cassandra C. 2014. Perceptions of the African Women's Championships: Female footballers as anomalies. *Sport in Society*, 17 (4), pp. 537–549.

Ogunniyi, Cassandra C. 2015. The effects of sport participation on gender relations: Case studies of female footballers in Johannesburg and Cape Town, South Africa. *South African Review of Sociology*, 46 (1), pp. 25–46.

Pelak, Cynthia Fabrizio 2005. Negotiating gender/race/class constraints in the new South Africa: A case study of women's soccer. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 10 (1), pp. 53–70.

Pelak, Cynthia Fabrizio 2006. Local-global processes: Linking globalization, democratization, and the development of women's football in South Africa. *Africa Spectrum*, 41 (3), pp. 71–392.

Pelak, Cynthia Fabrizio 2009. Women's sport as a site for challenging racial and gender inequalities in post-apartheid South Africa. In: Britton, Hannah, Jennifer Fish and Sheila Meintjies eds. *Women's activism in South Africa: Working across divides.* Scottsville, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press. pp. 96–123

Pelak, Cynthia Fabrizio 2010. Women and gender in South African soccer: A brief history. *Soccer and Society*, 11 (1–2), pp. 63–78.

Potgieter, Cheryl 2006. The imagined future for gays and lesbians in South Africa: Is this it? *Agenda: Empowering women for gender equity,* 20 (67), pp. 4–8.

Ritchie, Ian 2003. Sex tested, gender verified: Controlling female sexuality in the age of containment. *Sport History Review,* 34, pp. 80–98.

Roberts, Cheryl 1992. *Against the grain: Women and sport in South Africa.* Cape Town, Township Publishing Cooperative.

Roberts, Cheryl 1993. Black women, recreation and organized sport. *Agenda*, 17, pp. 8–17.

Roberts, Cheryl 2012. Against abuse of sportsgirls: Sport can no longer remain silent. In: Africanwomanwarrior.wordpress.com, 13 November 2012. Available from: http://africanwomanwarrior.wordpress.com/2012/11/13/against-abuse-of-sportsgirls-sport-can-no-longer-remain-silent-by cheryl-roberts/> [Accessed 20 July 2015].

Roberts, Cheryl 2013a. Raising fists against prejudice in sport. Available from: <http://africanwomanwarrior.wordpress.com/2013/05/08/raising-fists-against-prejudice-in-sport-by-cheryl-roberts/>[Accessed 15 September 2015].

Roberts, Cheryl 2013b. Discrimination of abused black sportswomen. Available from: <http://africanwomanwarrior.wordpress.com/2013/02/19/discrimination-ofabused-black-sportswomen-by-cheryl-roberts/> [Accessed 15 September 2015].

Saavedra, Martha 2005. Women, sport and development. International Platform on Sport and Development. Available from: <http://www.sportanddev.org/en/learnmore/sport_and_gender/the_role_of_sport_in_addressing_gender_issues/index.cfm?uNewsID=63> [Accessed 28 May 2015].

Sanger, Nadia 2008. 'There's got to be a man in there': Reading intersections between gender, race and sexuality in South African magazines. *African Identities,* 6 (3), pp. 275–291.

Schuhmann, Antje 2010. Taming transgressions: South African nation building and body politics. *Agenda,* 24 (83), pp. 95–106.

Schulenkorf, Nico and John Sugden 2011. Sport for development and peace in divided societies: Cooperating for inter-community empowerment in Israel. *European Journal for Sport and Society,* 8 (4), pp. 235–256.

Sport for Development and Peace, International Working Group (SDP-IWG) 2008. Harnessing the power of sport for development and peace: Recommendations to governments. Toronto, Right To Play.

SRSA (Sports and Recreation South Africa) 2009. A case for sport and recreation: The social and economic value of sport. Pretoria, Sports and Recreation South Africa.

Sports and Recreation South Africa 2012. The white paper on sports and recreation for the Republic of South Africa. Pretoria, Sports and Recreation South Africa.

Sugden, John 2010. Critical left realism and sport interventions in divided societies. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport,* 45 (3), pp. 258– 272.

Steyn, Melissa and Mikki van Zyl 2009. Introduction. In: Steyn, Melissa and Mikki van Zyl eds. *The price and the prize: shaping sexualities in South Africa.* Cape Town, HSRC Press. pp. 3–17.

Sullivan, Claire F. 2011. Gender verification and gender policies in elite sport eligibility and 'fair flay'. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 35 (4), pp. 400–419.

Theberge, Nancy 2000. Gender and sport. In: Coakley, Jay and Eric Dunning eds. *Handbook of Sports Studies.* London, Sage Publications. pp. 322–333.

Travers, Ann 2008. The sport nexus and gender injustice. *Studies in Social Justice*, 2 (1), pp. 79–101.

Wackwitz, Laura A. 2003. Verifying the myth: Olympic sex testing and the category 'Woman'. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 26 (6), pp. 553–560.

Yuval-Davis, Nira and Floya Anthias eds. 1989. *Woman-Nation-State.* Macmillan, London.

Student leadership and advocacy for social cohesion: A South African perspective

*McGlory Speckman**

Abstract

This article utilises the insights of sociology and social psychology in defining social cohesion, outlining the ideal state and making a case for the role of student leadership in social cohesion. It draws from personal experience as former Dean of Students while it relies mostly, not entirely, on secondary sources in the disciplines of sociology and social psychology. The conclusion is that given the numbers behind them and the position of influence derived from student structures, student leadership is ideal for advocacy and activism.

Keywords: Social cohesion, student leadership, liminality, advocacy, common assumptions, fluctuating vision

* McGlory Speckman is currently a professor in the Department of New Testament Studies at the University of Pretoria. He is a former Dean of Students at the same university. Between 2012 and 2014 he was seconded to the University of Zululand as Advisor to the Vice-Chancellor on student affairs.

Introduction

This article is a personal reflection on the potential of student leadership in higher education in South Africa to act as advocates for social cohesion, thereby addressing the questions of advocacy[1] and mobilisation which are currently lacking around the issue. Making use of sociological and psychological insights, it first establishes the grounds for a social cohesion campaign[2] before it makes a case for the involvement of young people in general and student leadership in particular,[3] as advocates for social cohesion. The latter have access to critical tools as well as the student body which provides the necessary critical mass.[4] However, the success of the proposed approach is predicated on two crucial conditions: that students intellectually and emotionally transcend the baggage of the past and that they commit themselves to a cause: in this case, a social cohesion vision.[5]

Following this introduction is a discussion of the concept 'social cohesion'. This is followed by a comment on assumptions implicit in talks about social cohesion in South Africa. A diagnosis of the root cause of the failure to take advantage of the auspicious moment created by the post-conflict conditions and the enabling legal framework follows under the sub-heading 'the youth

1 The term advocacy is preferred to 'agency' owing to its use of campaigns towards achieving the goal(s). Students seem to be good at employing this technique.

2 While not intending to make use of Erikson's work in this article, cognisance is taken of his view that the ideological outlook of society speaks most clearly to the adolescent mind (Erikson 1963:263) which, in any case, is in search of an identity.

3 A distinction is consciously drawn between 'youth' and 'students' since not all the youth are students. There are times that the youth in general act in solidarity with students who are biologically their peers but are, by association, different from them. Most of the time, students and their leaders tend to pursue different interests and campaigns. Even in cases where joint campaigns are undertaken, students are expected by society to approach issues differently from the manner in which they are approached by non-student youth.

4 Taken from Nuclear Physics, this term is used here to refer to the minimum number of people required to start and sustain a project of this nature.

5 It should be borne in mind that South Africa only recently (2002) started to discuss social cohesion (see also *What holds us together? Social cohesion in South Africa* (HSRC 2003). This follows a national conflict of many decades which only ended after the release of Mandela from prison (Bernstein 1998:173).

and the liminal space'. Van Gennep's (1908) model of *liminality* as applied, inter alia, by Turner (1967, 1974) is used heuristically in this reflection. An outline of a possible South African model precedes a case made for the role of student leadership as potential advocates. This is followed by a conclusion.

What is social cohesion?

There are as many attempts at definitions as there are concerns about the state of the social fibre of a number of societies. Each society/context responds in a manner it deems appropriate to address its concerns. Some definitions are based on social experiences and are aimed at healing communities and nations (Canada) while others seem to have purely academic origins, resulting from analyses. As Gough and Olofson (1999) observe, the content of the term varies from author to author, ranging from 'solidarity and trust' to 'inclusion, social capital and poverty alleviation'.

Durkheim used the term to refer to the 'mechanical and organic solidarity' of a society (Osler and Starkey 1991:564). Within this framework, the concept is associated with social integration in simple societies, where there is a limited division of labour and where individuals are relatively interchangeable (Osler and Starkey 1991:564). In such societies, everybody was understood to be dependent on each other, sharing a collective consciousness that guarantees social cohesion and survival (Osler and Starkey 1991:564). Thus, social cohesion defines the degree of consensus of the members of a social group or the perception of belonging to a common project or situation (Osler and Starkey 1991:564). Further, as Elster in Osler and Starkey (1991:565) observes, social solidarity becomes the 'cement' of society.

The Canadian Government defined social cohesion as the 'on-going process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity within Canada, based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity among all Canadians' (Policy paper cited in Jenson 1998:4). This definition confirms two issues, namely, group solidarity and the on-going nature of

social cohesion which, according to Chan et al. (2006:281), refers to the state of affairs rather than an event or end-state (see also Jenson 1998:5). It is critical for nurturing future citizens. Jenson and Saint-Martin (2003:85) divide philosophies of social cohesion into those that related to the post-war social rights regime and those that relate to ideas of an emerging social investment (2003: 85).[6]

The European Union, which had established a commission (2003) to look at how social cohesion could benefit economic development, hoped thereby to achieve the most viable economy in the world with fewer inequalities and diversity-driven conflicts (Chan et al. 2006). This necessitated a review and integration of systems to ensure inclusivity through the creation of equal opportunities, the integration of minorities and the democratisation of structures. Thus it would be reflecting the current position of most societies, namely, a shift away from community (*Gemeinschaft*) to contract (*Gesellschaft*) (see Green et al. 2008:7). Theories that deal with structural imbalances are associated with this approach to social cohesion. These include concepts such as social inclusion, social equality and social capital, by which is meant the 'features of social life-networks, norms and trust that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives' (Putnam 1995:664, cf. Putnam 1993:167). Discrepancies in these areas are a hindrance to social networks.

In light of the above, it may be said that social cohesion is about regaining lost community values and repairing faulty social systems, thus clearing the way for 'mechanical' albeit not necessarily organic solidarities. However, in South Africa, the situation is complicated by racial, ethnic, ideological and, in recent years, class divisions. The youth are caught up in the midst of it all. Yet post-conflict South Africa has no alternative but to invest in its youth in order for it to make progress. This notwithstanding, it cannot be assumed that everyone is on board, as the discussion below will show.

6 See Myles and Street (1994:7) who link it to the citizen's rights and responsibilities, as well as Jenson and Saint-Martin (2003:81) who see it as an investment in the future rather than present benefits.

Common assumptions

The assumptions foregrounded below are based on public statements made through the media and from interaction with both public figures and students. In other words, it is raw material which, unless specifically acknowledged as such, has not been scientifically processed. However, it cannot be ignored. The assumptions pertain to: 1) assumed commitment of today's youth to social transformation; 2) assumed interest of South Africans and the youth in particular, in social cohesion; 3) the assumption that South Africans have a clear view on how they want to advance the Constitution in respect of reconciliation and nation-building and 4) the assumption that the youth of South Africa is a homogenous group.

First, those who think of the youth and students as vehicles for change often do so with the calibre of the youth of the 1970s and 1980s at the back of their minds. That generation was born and bred in a conflict situation and was therefore forced by circumstances to take a stand against social injustices. The developmental stage through which those two or three generations went also assisted in the choice of a cause for them. The generation of 1976, for example, seems to have had a commitment to alter the course of history. No one, including the brutal armed forces of the apartheid regime, could stop them. Student leadership across ethnic and racial lines took the lead in exposing the evil nature of apartheid and the damage it caused to society and individuals.

It would appear that current socio-economic circumstances are steering the youth in a different direction. This is supported by a preoccupation with success which is measured in terms of materialism which emerged about a decade ago. There is little visible commitment to a cause in order to change history in the same way as it would have been found in the youth of the 20th century. Instead, some Deans of Students have had to intervene in instances where students of the same organisation in their institutions would be fighting over tender allocations outside the institution rather than concern themselves with student issues or analyses and interpretation of various ideologies.

The predictable student protests at the beginning and middle of each year have recently been focusing on the insufficient funds for student financial aid in so far as this affects individuals. However, during the second half of 2015, this took a different turn as higher education students formed barricades to resist fee increases for 2016, using a vehicle known as the #FeesMustFall campaign. This is the first time that students of a democratic South Africa have united across political and racial lines, around an issue that is of national concern to students. Although a concession was made at government level,[7] in respect of fee increments for 2016 and some institutions pledged to reverse 'outsourcing' to 'insourcing' of cleaning services, there is no record of a policy change in respect of student funding. A scientific determination also has to be made on the impact of the campaign on student social outlook and behaviour. The point made here however, is not so much about such details as it is about the potential of students to take South Africa over the threshold which is characterised by instability and procrastination.

Secondly, it is assumed that South Africans have an interest in social cohesion. The Presidency, Department of Higher Education and Training and the Department of Arts and Culture, all talk about it and there is an expectation that everyone will jump onto the bandwagon. In the first place, South Africans do not know what it entails. Even those who attempt to espouse it from a political platform seem to lack an in-depth knowledge of it. This alone becomes a hindrance in terms of advancing or promoting social cohesion. In the second, they view social cohesion as part of the political rhetoric, not something that does happen in reality.

The above notwithstanding, there is little optimism about whether it would be different if the South African public knew, in any case, owing to numerous divergent views about how the historical baggage should be dealt with. Some harbour resentment while others are already imagining themselves to be living in a post-conflict society. A re-enactment of the past

7 A meeting between the State President, higher education leaders and student leadership on 21 October 2015 at the Union Buildings in Pretoria resolved that fee increments in 2016 would not be implemented.

seems to hinder the forward-moving process. While rehearsing the past is intended to educate subsequent generations, it also polarises and assists in keeping the past alive. Unfinished business manifests, for example, in the resentment of parole for prisoners convicted of apartheid-related crimes; land claims and threats to take the land forcefully if it is not reallocated by the government; as well as the resentment between black and white which becomes apparent at certain times in the history of the young democracy of South Africa. Most of these are regularly reported in the media.

Thirdly, related to the second point above, is the assumption that South Africans have decided on how to advance reconciliation and nation-building as required by the Constitution. This is not supported by the reality of relationships across race, class, religion, ethnicity and ideology. What is clear at this point is the perception that the moment of a radical change was halted by what some now label as cosmetic attempts at national reconciliation during the early stages of democracy. Several public commentators and political analysts, for example, Xolela Mangcu from the University of Cape Town and Eusebius MacKaizer, a newspaper columnist, seem to have joined the analysts who are critical of the compromises made during the era of the Government of National Unity which are repeatedly ascribed to the Mandela administration. Apparently, the leadership of the Economic Freedom Fighters recently questioned the conciliatory approach of the 'founding fathers' of the South African democracy, as espoused by Nelson Mandela, during their visit to London.[8] They are of the view that there has been considerable compromise, even in areas where there should not have been. The strong movement in favour of land repossession, ridding the country of various colonial symbols and nationalising the natural resources of the country should be understood in the light of this.

8 The *Sunday Times* of 29 November 2015 for example carried a report on the visit of Julius Malema, leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters, with Dali Mpofu, the national chairperson of the same organisation, to the United Kingdom where Malema is alleged to have accused Mr Mandela of having 'sold out' through his concessions to the capitalist forces. There were also reports, in the same paper, on reactions from the African National Congress and its allies to the statements made by Malema.

These actions stand out because South Africa had, at the outset committed itself to national reconciliation and reconstruction, not only as a constitutional imperative but as a realistic approach to the creation of a reconciled and prosperous nation. The establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1995), the Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994), the demilitarisation of the former liberation formations (1994) and the creation of a single system of education under one department (1994) engendered hope for a new beginning. Even the desegregation of sport and sporting amenities played a major role in defusing the social tensions that had their roots in the apartheid past.

However, the shortcomings of this approach in creating the ideal future society began to push through the cracks shortly after Nelson Mandela vacated office after the (1999) general elections. The old issues of social differentiation and resultant social inequality, that is, structural imbalances, were soon going to create a Frankenstein's Monster manifesting in crime, radical political groupings and a daily culture of service delivery protests.[9] It is not so much the scale of these ills as it is the perceived failure of the state to address them decisively that is a source of concern, for it conjures up a view that there is social dissolution in the country.[10]

Fourthly, there is an assumption that the youth of South Africa is homogenous. This includes the perception of the student body both by outsiders and, strangely, the students themselves. Hence some groups expect students to act in unison once they have made pronouncements on campus and tend to victimise those who have a different view on how to respond to issues. The mere fact that student solidarity is not being based

9 According to the State President, there were 12 575 service delivery protest actions in 2014 (Mbeki 2015).

10 Social cohesion is, almost invariably, thought to be triggered by a situation that threatens the well-being of a community or society in a given geographical area (Riley 2013). That, according to Chan et al. (2006:275), is what social dissolution does, whereas for Harvey (2010), social conflict is normal in a living society.

on kinship ties,[11] that is, not on ethnicity but on ideological grounds, is indicative of the extent to which social contracts (*Gesellschaft*) can play a role in the present situation. This may be both good and bad news. It is good news when social contracts provide the critical mass for a good cause and it becomes bad news when 'others' are excluded as a result of their non-affiliation.

Naturally, the issue of social cohesion will be a thorn in the side of those who prefer to live in comfort zones as it draws individuals and groups out of these zones and into a solidarity with others, regardless of how uncomfortable this may be. As has become clear in the discussion of the term above, social cohesion exposes the obstacles to the 'mechanical' solidarities Durkheim (1965) and others alluded to – be they structural or individual creations. In one way or another, one has to give up something in order to be reconciled to others or to cohere with others.

The youth and the liminal space

Anyone who knows the background to the present democratic constitution of South Africa would expect cohesion to come as second nature to the leadership and citizens. South Africans voluntarily chose the path of an open democratic society which is founded on the principles that are enshrined in the Freedom Charter (1955) and couched in Roman Law. The aim was to project a society that is the opposite of apartheid as well as to ensure a bright future for all. However, what is reflected on paper finds little expression in daily life. If it was only a question of lethargy, it would be understandable. However, the examples provided below indicate that in some cases, individuals unwittingly act contrary to the Constitution, driven by their experience of the past.

In seeking to understand the current situation better, two questions have been posed. First, why is it that the South African society, otherwise known

11 In terms of Erikson's developmental theory, this already, could be seen as a positive step since adolescents tend to identify with their own kinship groups (Erikson 1959). A definition of solidarity based on ideology or political strategy demonstrates a high level of social maturity.

as the 'Rainbow Nation', finds it difficult to foster cohesion? Secondly, why has the youth, which is known for its zeal to change the course of history, not made social cohesion a programme that is driven by young people in this country? A brief and straightforward analysis in light of Arnold Van Gennep's model of rites of passage and *liminality,* summarised below, seems to provide an answer.

The model has three distinct stages: 1) the separation or detachment from the stabilised environment; 2) the margin which is equal to an ambiguous state of the subject and 3) aggregation, which is the final stage or state of completeness. At this stage, the subject has crossed the threshold into a new fixed and stabilised state. Transitions from one group to another play an important role in this theory. Groups may be classified according to age, gender or social relationships (Willet and Deegan 2001:137). The common processes these groups go through are known as the rites of passage, the origin of the title of Van Gennep's book. Van Gennep (1908:189) wrote of the 'passage' process:

> For groups, as well as for individuals, life itself means to separate and to be reunited, to change form and condition, to die and to be reborn. It is to act and to cease, to wait and rest, and then to begin again, but in a different way.

The important stage is the *liminal* or waiting phase during which the displaced individual can be made or broken. This makes it imperative that reintegration takes place at the end of the process, failing which the individual remains in a permanent *liminal* state (Willet and Deegan 2001:138). Victor Turner was later to modify this with a view to making it simpler. He argued that society is a structure of positions where the *liminal* stage marks the transition between two socially viable positions (Turner 1967:73). In other words, *liminality* is, according to his subsequent publication, a 'movement between fixed points and is essentially ambiguous, unsettled, and unsettling' (Turner 1974:274). During this stage, the *liminar*[12]is characterised by a series of contradictions (Turner

12 This term is used interchangeably with 'subject'. It refers to the initiate.

1967:95). For example, he is 'no longer classified, and not yet classifiable'. Turner refers to this state as 'betwixt and between' (1967:97).

Viewed from the perspective of Van Gennep's model, the current socio-political situation that appears to be exploding, two decades into the democracy of South Africa, might be a reflection of the consequences of attempting to jump to the 'ideal state' in terms of the model, before removing the underlying obstacles to cohesion. For example, it was good to talk of the South African miracle on the macro-level at some point however, at a micro-level, there are aggrieved people whose problems arise from both systemic and filial fronts. These remain hurdles in the way of national reconciliation, let alone, social cohesion. Yet, South Africa cannot go back to that stage because it has already told the world that it had moved on.[13] What needs to be done is move on ideologically and practically, so that the chaotic space South Africa is currently in does not become a permanent feature of society.

In terms of the above model, the prevalent situation in South Africa is characteristic of the 'chaos' that accompanies the *liminal* or 'in-between' state. Many individuals and groups are being drawn out of their comfort zones, some have lost their original identities or are going through the process of losing their identities, if civic groups such as the Afriforum[14] are anything to go by. Despite their fears and resistance, they can never be the same again. Yet, efforts to get them to cross the threshold and embrace a new identity have been fruitless for they constantly return to the past where they think that there is comfort and security deriving from a familiar world, familiar group and 'rootedness'. The procrastination of the Democratic Alliance and Agang-SA in merging before the May 2014 general elections is another example, reflecting the problem of historical roots more than power dynamics. One leader represents a black history of the struggle while the other is perceived to have represented white

13 See Mbeki 1995:51.

14 This is a splinter group of the Freedom Front Plus. It claims to be concerned with civic matters rather than politics although membership is drawn from those who adhere to the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism.

privilege. Statements uttered by the African National Congress to the effect of 'rent-a-black', a denigrating reference to black politicians who are affiliated with previously white dominated political parties, in the context of a constitutional democracy, also reflect this dilemma. It all makes the situation look chaotic: the Constitution directs one way but the citizens, by allowing the past to rule their minds, behave contrary to it.

Student leadership is in no better situation as it is part of the same society. However, it is trapped between the past which the young leaders have never experienced and the future they have not started investing in. They know that the country ought to be in a different place but the majority of them are of the view, *albeit* shallow, that this place is the high level of racial harmony. A deeper analysis which exposes structural imbalances as the root-cause of chasms between 'races' seems to be favoured by the political leadership who, nevertheless, prefer the racial view when it suits them. Anyone whose goal is to move the youth to the final stage, the 'new being', on the other side of the threshold, has to start by addressing structural imbalances, the basis of the problems of our society. Once the students embrace the social analysis and buy into the future vision, they willingly act as advocates for change.

The youth and the fluctuating vision

What is the youth in South Africa expected to champion? In its understanding, the Moral Regeneration Movement would respond by referring to the shared values in the South African Constitution (1996) which are intended to promote the 'common good'(MRM Report I and II 2002; Charter of Positive Values 2012). Looked at carefully, the values contained in the second chapter of the Constitution, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, support the vision of a South Africa that belongs to all. These values are intended to create an environment where all equally enjoy their rights. In other words, the Moral Regeneration Movement's analysis looks below the surface which presents as race relations, to the pillars that keep people apart. Talk of social cohesion therefore, ought

to be synonymous with, and give effect to, the values enshrined in the Constitution.

However, there is a disconnect between theory and practice, largely because of what I have identified above as *liminality*. It would appear that older generations across the political and social spectra sit with their unfinished businesses of the past, the reason for their clinging on to false securities which manifest in different ways such as an exclusive group identity and a refusal to accept change– in particular, regarding identification with a democratic South Africa. This is in contrast to both the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and the definition of social cohesion as provided in the report of the study that was commissioned by the Presidency. The study defines social cohesion as the 'extent to which a society is coherent, united and functional, providing an environment within which its citizens can flourish'.[15]

The above-mentioned behaviour of older generations confirms the background provided under sub-sections 'common assumptions' and 'the youth and the *liminal space*' which cannot be ignored by those who are seeking to create a society which is 'coherent, united and functional'. The first sub-section confirms that South African citizens have yet to come on board in respect of social cohesion twenty-one years into democracy, despite conducive conditions and an enabling legal framework. The second provides a possible explanation for that which, in terms of Van Gennep's model, may be ascribed more to the reluctance to give up something rather than the ignorance about what to do. One only needs to observe rallies on national days and listen to race-based finger-pointing in order to get a glimpse of where South Africans are. This leaves the vision fluctuating between the past and the ideal future, the whims of individual leaders and the constitutional framework. This fluidity should however, not be exaggerated as it is part of the chaotic stage in Van Gennep's model. The

15 Government attempts include a study commissioned by the Presidency (2005), an investigation into cohesion and transformation in higher education (2008), the National Summit on Social Cohesion (2012) and the Arts and Culture Pledge (2012).

only challenge is that two decades have now elapsed and no one seems to have been able to cross the threshold to the ideal state.

The impact of structural imbalances cannot be underestimated and cohesion demands a commitment that transcends all comfort zones, including a renunciation of the privilege accorded by an unjust system. South Africans have an inclination towards failure to make a connection between their inability to go all the way in ridding themselves of the past, on the one hand, and the chasm that exists between them and others, on the other. In its April 2015 report, the Institute of Race Relations predicts that violent protests and service delivery demands are going to continue as the youth who are 'born free' still find themselves in chains (IRR 2015). This confirms the view expressed in this paper, that there is a connection between structural imbalance and social cohesion. As the above model from social anthropology shows, structural imbalances are a hindrance to social capital. In South Africa, these are driven and maintained by economic elitism and cultural bigotry.

In a different context, Laurence (2009:2; cf. Letki 2008) suggests that social cohesion must be treated as a multi-faceted concept which requires *bridging ties*[16] *between layers or groups* (my emphasis). Without the latter, the chasm between groups remains or grows wider. The problem as he understands it, is the existence not of diverse groups but of *disadvantage* (my emphasis) (Laurence 2009:2). Bridging ties addresses natural discrepancies as well as those caused by the system while disadvantage undermines social capital (solidarity) and group relations (Laurence 2009:2).

Problems of ethnicity, racism, social inequality and the exclusion of groups and individuals from opportunities, as well as the marginalisation of immigrants, are well-known and documented. These exist at all levels of society and its institutions. Invariably, they are linked in one way or another to the apartheid system and stand, as monuments to this doomed system, between the people of South Africa. It is clear from this list that

16 The ideas of bonding and bridging were first used by Putnam to distinguish between dimensions of social capital that affect social life differently.

material compensation alone cannot provide a sustainable solution, even if it had been possible to provide it as recommended by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC 1998). A case study by Fearon et al. (2009:287), which focuses on post-conflict Liberia, provides evidence of the limitations of 'development aid' in similar situations. It would seem that material-driven programmes tend to lead to further fragmentation as people struggle over the control of resources. This, it should be noted, is not the same as the transformation of the socio-economic structures.

An emerging vision should therefore first focus on national identity, which must consciously transcend, not ignore, ethnic, racial, economic and ideological barriers. Its emphasis should be on the proactive, that is, the end-result, as opposed to the reactive, that is, with the view to reversing the wrongs of the past. In other words, the question should always be: 'what kind of society do we want to have?' The Constitution is forward-looking, thus providing a beckoning vision to the youth and students who can make a difference. It creates an opportunity for a new beginning rather than a mechanism for the reversal of the past. In fact, this, according to Mandela (1994), is a mechanism for ensuring that the past will never visit the South African society again, that is, if the Constitution is allowed to provide guidance. Given this, the success of cohesion should therefore not be measured in terms of how close to each other the races have moved but whether at a national level, their detachment from the structures of privilege facilitates their contribution to the 'common good'. In Van Gennep's terms, this would be an indication that they had attained the level of a new, reintegrated person. This is what is meant by South Africans belonging to one country (not necessarily belonging to each other) – living for one country and being in pursuit of a common destination. Put sociologically, social cohesion should define the 'degree of consensus of the *members* (my emphasis) of a social group or the perception of *belonging* (my emphasis) to a common project or situation' (Casas 2012: 564).

The second focus of the fluctuating vision needs to be on fostering social inclusion. This is one of the recipes for national unity and identity. The opposite, exclusion, becomes an obstacle precisely because of the reaction

of the majority of South Africans to their systematic exclusion from the mainstream of social, economic and political life for almost five decades (see Bernstein 1998:172–173). In terms of the 1996 Constitution, inclusion now goes beyond race and ethnicity and covers gender, sexuality, physical challenges and nationality. It is therefore not surprising that the draft policy on inclusivity which is being mooted by the Department of Higher Education and Training is not just inclusive but 'all inclusive', covering every category one could think of (see DHET 2014).

Education has been singled out by some as both a problem and a solution in respect of inclusion and exclusion. According to Osler and Starkey (2011) it is responsible for exclusion in so far as it gives opportunity to some and excludes others. However, it is also inclusive because it can contribute towards the development of citizens who are fully integrated into society. In South Africa, it has played both roles and will continue to do so until an effective strategy that will bring an end to the current status quo has been developed.

In a more abnormal situation like that of South Africa, the situation is compounded by the deep-seated damage caused by the education systems which were designed to keep some at the bottom of the ladder and provide a ladder for others to ascend (See the Bantu Education Act of 1953, which was intended for this). This has implications for employment opportunities and income distribution. The great concern about skills development in South Africa is a legitimate one. However, the skills should not only be aimed at the labour market (cf. Green et al. 2003:455) but at building communities so as to change their socio-economic profiles.

The third focus of the vision should be on social development. By this I mean strategies to put people at the centre of development. If the vision for social cohesion is aimed at inculcating good citizenship, then an investment in people, that is, social investment, rather than social security is imperative. The latter is less sustainable than the former.

The foregoing discussion under different sub-headings provides enough items for a social development agenda in South Africa. However, this needs

a driver and there have not, thus far, been any successful vehicles for it. One of the possible vehicles is the student leadership, which with its support base provides the necessary critical mass. Advocacy campaigns are usually employed as a mobilising strategy.

Advocacy and student leadership

Student activists and student leadership in particular, enjoy a slightly different position from that of the youth in general. As individuals, student leaders are members of the society. However, as a group, student leadership constitutes one of the stakeholder groups of higher education which enjoy legal recognition (Higher Education Act 1997). Contrary to popular views (see Tabane et al. 2003;Khan 2011), student governance is broader than the Student Representative Council (SRC) but includes all the leadership in the sub-structures of the SRC, that is, the recreational structures, residence leadership, academic structures, and so forth. In other words, those whose leadership qualities and skills are recognised by the students are voted into leadership positions in various areas of university life.[17]

If the youth in general cannot make their voice heard in respect of social cohesion owing to the ways in which senior generations cling to comfort zones, student leadership will become advocates, taking advantage of the support provided by the student body. The two advantages of this group are their energy which comes with the zeal to change the world and their support base which provides a critical mass. They possess analytical skills to deconstruct and expose the pillars that support the comfort zones which prevent progress to the final stage in Van Gennep's model. Their primary role is to organise students around the issues of student life and governance. However, they are also expected to take the lead in matters of student social involvement by identifying issues and mobilising students around such issues (Bodibe 2012:10).Thus, they are expected to act as catalysts although this can only succeed if they themselves have attained the third level status, that is, the status beyond the chaotic stage. In other

17 I do not concur with the narrow interpretation of the Education Act of 1997 which confines student governance to just the Student Representative Council (see Khan 2011:14).

words, they ought to break ranks with the generations that are stuck in a *liminal* state and lead the country to a reintegrated state that is based on the values that are enshrined in the Constitution. The second advantage is that once the student leadership buys into the vision and is in turn able to sell it to the student body, embarking on advocacy campaigns often finds easy support.

However, it would be folly to think that student leadership is neutral despite a recent claim by the Student Representative Council of Rhodes University to the effect that it is neutral (SAFM 2015).They are usually long-haul vehicles of the interests or unfinished business of their principals. My earlier reference to a decentralised model of student leadership was intended to make the point that when different structures such as residences, societies, academic structures, etc. in a broad-base campus democracy produce their own strong leadership, it becomes difficult for the SRC, regardless of its political alignment, to further sectarian interests. Instead, it is forced to seek consensus. This is one step towards cohesion.

The South African vision which has yet to be implemented has three focal points, namely, the creation of a national identity, the reversal of structural imbalances and social investment. My experience in working with huge and divergent student populations is that starting with identity takes the process nowhere, whereas starting with social investment increases the chances of them finding each other around a common objective. It is in the process of pursuing a less threatening common objective that students begin to cohere and appreciate each other more. In most cases, something new results from such newly found solidarities. This has the potential to address the obstacles to cohesion and open the way to the final stage in the rites of passage model (also referred to as liminality in this article).

I have already referred to the work of sociologists and social psychologists in respect of definitions of social cohesion. I have also outlined an 'anthropological' model of the rites of passage which shed light on why an extra effort has to be made in order to get South Africans to move towards a point of cohesion. It has become clear that the South African situation is

compounded by a combination of privilege and race, a legacy of colonialism and apartheid with its structural imbalances, and that failure to address this effectively poses a threat to social cohesion. Our limited psychological knowledge tells us that students (mostly in adolescence) with their zeal to 'change the world' can play an important advocacy and agency role. It is not my intention to go into the details of the works of Erickson's which focus on a young person's development. My aim is only to highlight the need for a redirection of the students' energy as they seek to forge their own identities, away from the dilemma of the South African society which is not their creation, while they are still pliable. If a positive vision is inculcated in them, there will be hope for subsequent generations.

The history of the struggle against apartheid reveals what students are capable of and the impact that student campaigns that start small have on the nation and legislative processes. This goes back to the 1940s, in the days of Anton Lembede, to the times of the young Robert Sobukwe and Nelson Mandela, in the 1950s[18] and later, the much younger Abraham Tiro and Steve Biko, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, culminating in Tsietsie Gordon Mashinini[19] and the 1976 Soweto uprisings which precipitated the sustained rolling mass actions that ended with the release of Mandela from prison in 1990. It took a thinking, planning and visionary leadership to achieve this. The leadership diligently interrogated various theories and ideologies in order to decipher them for the 'masses' and they mobilized students around well-argued, substantiated and worthwhile issues. They would not, for example, have left talk about social cohesion to political leadership only but would have raised questions about whether the term means the same in both developed and developing countries (Mercado 2012:592), a question that has not been raised in the discourse on social cohesion in South Africa.

18 The three later went on to establish the Youth League within the African National Congress before Sobukwe proceeded to form the Pan Africanist Congress in 1959.

19 This generation was associated with the Black Consciousness Movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s before Tiro and Biko died at the hands of the apartheid security officials while Mashinini disappeared without a trace after the 1976 Soweto uprisings. However, this inspired rather than discouraged the students to pursue the cause of liberation.

The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which is undergirded by a dream of a non-racial, non-sexist and democratic country (Mbeki 1995:87–95), has opened up the formerly closed society. All it needs is a student body that is united around campaigns to make it a reality. Political education around issues of democracy, economic justice, etc. is crucial in this process. However, those who move along these lines are instead frowned upon and ostracized by their fellow students who do not realize that they are trapped in a 'betwixt and between' space but could make a breakthrough in the current impasse if they allowed themselves to do so. There is an urgent need to raise leaders of a new South Africa who will think out of the box of the present 'chaotic' state.

There are campaigns such as the anti-marginalization of international students and citizens, non-discrimination along gender lines or sexual preferences, anti-racism, institutional transformation, democratisation of the campus, anti-materialism, political tolerance, economic justice and issues of morality.[20] While these campaigns are not prescribed in the Higher Education Act of 1997, students are usually keen to embark on them. Fine-tuned leaders find such campaigns worth pursuing as their contribution to matters of justice or fairness. Hence the importance of training them, empowering them with positive skills and content at the outset. The rest of the student body serves as the critical mass behind the leadership. Successful campaigns depend on this.

As Berger (1998) observes in the context of the broader society, a 'more cohesive society has a greater capacity to solve conflicts, as social cohesion facilitates putting together a greater number of normative, cultural and social resources into practice'. Who has said that students cannot be role-models of such a society?

20 Incidentally, the Moral Regeneration Movement (MRM) of South Africa has a Charter of Positive Values under whose banner all the mentioned concerns could be organised. There is a student chapter of the MRM which operates at some universities as well as in Soweto schools.

Conclusion

It is clear from the above discussion that social cohesion is not a straightforward term and that it is vague enough to allow various attempts to bring together sections, factions and fragments of communities under one umbrella. However, 'mechanical solidarity' seems to be a basic and common factor, despite the different approaches and permutations of the concept. Whether this observation would have been the same or not if the discussion was being conducted along the lines of 'developed', 'non-developed' or 'developing' countries is a concern for a different article. The focus of this article has fallen on highlighting some aspects of it and what role the students in South Africa could play in promoting it.

While young people are no longer the same in terms of their level of commitment to a cause to change the world or to better their society, other than themselves individually, a vision is already reflected in the pages of the Constitution. They only need to focus on an aspect or two at a time; alternatively, the national students' structure could ask each campus to appropriate an aspect for its context. This is working well with the Moral Regeneration Movement in the Soweto schools. It should work better with university students. The role of student leadership is to serve as catalysts on campus so as to ensure that such campaigns are taken up. More importantly, they are to monitor progress and conduct on-going evaluation so as to ensure gains rather than to digress from the focal point. There is no better way of describing advocacy at work. While the British have chosen, in their context, to make cohesion part of the school curriculum, South Africa will be the first country to use a popular medium, the students, to do this.

Sources

Bender, Katja, Markus Kaltenborn and Christian Pfleiderer eds. 2013. *Social protection in developing countries reforming systems,* London, Routledge.

Berger, Peter 1998. General observation on normative conflicts and mediation. In: Berger ed., pp. 172–206.

Berger, Peter ed. 1998. *The limits of social cohesion: Conflict and mediation in pluralist societies.* Colorado, Westview Press.

Bernstein, Anne 1998. Normative conflicts, social cohesion, and mediating Institutions. In: Berger ed.

Bodibe, R. Cecil 2012. *The importance of student leadership in higher education.* Presented at the Leadership Summit for Student Leaders. KwaDlangezwa, UNIZULU. 25–27 June 2012 (unpublished).

Casas, Rosalba 2012. Social cohesion in distributive policies and the role of knowledge. *Science and Public Policy*, 39, pp. 562–569.

Chan, Joseph, HoPong To and Elaine Chan eds. 2006. Reconsidering social cohesion: Developing a definition and analytical framework for empirical research. *Social Indicators Research*, 2006 (75), pp. 273–302.

DHET (Department of Higher Education and Training) 2014. Draft social inclusion policy framework for public higher education institutions. *Government Gazette.* 2014/08/22.

Donzelot, J. 2013. City, insecurity and citizenship: The emergence of social cohesion policies. In: Lianos ed., pp. 23–38.

Durkheim, Emil 1965. *The division of labour in society.* New York, Free Press.

Erikson, Erik H. 1959. *Identity and the life cycle.* New York, International University Press. Cited in: Hammack, L. 2011. *Narrative and the politics of identity: The cultural psychology of Israeli and Palestinian youth.* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Erikson, E.H. 1963. *Childhood and society.* New York, Norton.

Fearon, James D., M. Humphreys and J.M. Weinstein eds. 2009. Can development aid contribute to social cohesion after civil war? Evidence from a field experiment in post-conflict Liberia. *American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings,* 99 (2), pp. 287–291.

Gough, Ian and Gunnar Olofson eds. 1999. *Capitalism and social cohesion: Essays on exclusion and integration.* London, MacMillan.

Green, Andy, John Preston and Ricardo Sabates eds. 2003. Education, equality and social cohesion: A distributional approach. *Compare*, 33(4), pp. 453–470.

Harvey, David 2010. *The enigma of capital and the crisis of capitalism.* London, Profile Books.

HSRC (Human Sciences Research Council) 2003. *Annual Report.* Pretoria, HSRC.

IRR (Institute of Race Relations) 2015. Radio Broadcast, 29 April. *Born free but still in chains: South Africa's first post-apartheid generation report.* Johannesburg.

Jenson, Jane 1998. *Mapping social cohesion: The state of Canadian research.* CPRN (Canadian Policy Research Networks) Study No. *F/03.*

Jenson, Jane and Denis Saint-Martin eds. 2003. New routes to social cohesion? Citizenship and the social investment state, *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 28(1), pp. 79–99.

Khan, Moonira B.M. 2011. *Governance in higher education institutions in the Western Cape, South Africa: A case study.* Ph.D. Thesis. University of KwaZulu-Natal.

Laurence, James 2009. The effect of ethnic diversity and community disadvantage on social cohesion: A multi-level analysis of social capital and interethnic relations in UK communities. Available from: <http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/content/27/1/70.abstract> [Accessed February 2015].

Letki, Natalia 2008. Does diversity erode social cohesion? Social capital and race in British neighbourhoods, *Political Studies*, 56, pp. 99–126.

Lianos, Michalis 2013. *Dangerous others, insecure societies, fear and social division.* Farnham, Surrey, Ashgate.

Mandela, Nelson R. 1994. Inaugural Address, 10 May, Union Buildings. Pretoria.

Mbeki, Thabo 1995. South Africa: A workable dream. In: Mbeki, Thabo 1998. *Africa –The time has come: Selected speeches – Thabo Mbeki.* Cape Town, Tafelberg. pp. 46–59.

Mercado, Alexis 2012. Social inclusion or social illusion: The challenges of social inclusion in Venezuelan social transformation policy. *Science and Public Policy*, (39), pp. 592–601.

MRM (Moral Regeneration Movement) 2002. *Freedom and obligation. MRM conference reports I & II. MRM.* Pretoria.

MRM 2012. *A charter of positive values.* MRM leaflet, Johannesburg.

Myles, John and Debra Street 1994. Should the economic life course be redesigned? Working paper series, Pipper Institute on ageing and public policy, Florida State University.

Osler, Audrey 2010. Education policy, social cohesion and citizenship. In: Ratcliffe, P and I. Newman eds. 2011. *Promoting social cohesion: Implications for policy and frameworks for evaluation.* Bristol, Polity Press.

Osler, Audrey and Hugh Starkey eds. 1991. Education, democracy and inclusion in education. *British Citizenship and Cultural Difference.*

Putnam, Robert D. 1995. Tuning in, tuning out: The strange disappearance of social capital in America. *Political Science and Politics*, 28 (4), pp. 664–683.

Putnam, Robert D. Robert Leonardi and Raffaela Nometti. 1993. *Making democracy: Civic tradition in modern Italy*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Riley, Kathryn A. 2013. Walking the leadership tightrope: Building community cohesiveness and social capital in schools in highly disadvantaged urban communities. *British Educational Research Journal*, 39 (2), pp. 266–286.

SAFM May 2015. Live transmission from Rhodes University for the programme 'Morning Live', May 2015. A discussion on the #RhodesMustFall campaign and a possible name change for Rhodes University.

Tabane, J.J. Ongkopotse, T. Mxenge and S. Thabakgale 2003. SRCs: A guide to developing a constitution. Cape Town, CHET.

TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa) 1998. *Report.* Volumes One and Two (of Six). Kenwyn, Cape Town, Juta.

Turner, Victor 1967. *The forest of symbols: Aspects of Ndembu ritual.* Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

University of Cape Town 2000. Student governance review. Available from: <www.uct.ac.za> [Accessed February 2015].

Van Gennep, Arnold1908. *Rites of passage.* Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Willet, Jeffrey and M. Deegan 2001. *Liminality* and disability: Rites of passage and community in hypermodern society. *Disability Studies Quarterly,* (21) 3, pp. 137–152.

South Sudan's December 2013 conflict: Bolting state-building fault lines with social capital

Robert Gerenge[*]

Abstract

The December 2013 violent conflict in South Sudan, the world's newest and most fragile state, has shown that a state-building trajectory that only emphasises formal institutional development is not viable. Like any state at its formative stage, formal institutions in South Sudan have demonstrated limited capacity to meet the high demands by citizens for 'peace or post-secession' dividends. The state's limited capacity has further been eroded by political constructs claiming ethnic supremacy by both the Dinka and Nuer, the main parties to the December 2013 conflict. This article argues that the entitlement tied to post-secession dividends claims by the Dinka and Nuer has (re)produced a generally volatile social space for South Sudan by defining the mode of political settlement of the state, and undermining the generation of social capital for conflict management in the society. By constructing a nexus between state-building and social capital, this article shows that the state-building process in South Sudan requires the hybridity of formal and informal institutions. This helps in transforming the volatile social space created through the supremacy constructs of the Dinka and Nuer and high citizen demands placed on the fragile state.

Keywords: State-building, social capital, ethnic supremacy, Dinka, Nuer, South Sudan

---

* Robert Gerenge is the Head of Special Programmes at the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA).

Introduction

South Sudan is officially the most fragile state in the world according to the Fragile States Index 2014. The newest state in the world was indeed poised for significant political problems right from the onset. The deadly conflict that began on 15 December 2013 in the country has killed thousands of people and displaced more than 1 500 000, with significant humanitarian consequences. The violence that has threatened the very existence of the barely three year-old independent state is only the height of the political difficulties that South Sudan has experienced, even before its inception as a formal state. Under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Compromise Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan was signed on 26 August 2015 between the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), the main parties to the conflict. As of 12 November 2015, both parties had violated the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (IGAD 2015), signifying a difficult pathway to political order in South Sudan.

Whilst current literature on the conflict has mostly focused on elite politics and the ethnic dimensions (De Waal 2014; International Crisis Group 2014; Pinaud 2014), it is important to transcend these analyses by examining the mode of political settlement that the state-building process has produced. This enables us to understand the levels of vulnerability of the communities in South Sudan, which, as we shall later see in this article, have made it easier to mobilise people for violence rather than for the adoption of peaceful 'coping' mechanisms for survival. Luka Biong Deng (2010), Ann Laudati (2011) and Clémence Pinaud (2014) offer useful insight on how large elements of social capital in South Sudan were dismantled while other forms of social capital were created during the civil war. However, their analyses fail to show how social capital can constitute an important element of state-building, and how the process of state-building itself, can in fact become detrimental to social capital development.

The state-building trajectory embraced by South Sudan has emphasised the development of the formal institutional capacity of the state, which takes a long time to respond to the basic needs of the citizens. In this article, the concept of state-building is drawn from Richard Caplan (2004:53) who defines it as 'a set of actions undertaken by actors, whether national or international, to establish, reform and strengthen state institutions where these have been eroded or are missing'. South Sudan had a semblance of these institutions during the six-year transition period stipulated by the Compressive Peace Agreement (CPA), spearheaded by IGAD, that was reached on 9 January 2005. This ended the 1983–2005 civil war that had pitted the Government of Sudan (GoS) against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)[1]. At independence in July 2011 the institutions inherited were embryonic and understandably weak in light of the long civil war.

Paradoxically, the very process of strengthening the weak institutions in South Sudan has in itself become a vehicle for the depletion of social capital, which is a key ingredient for state-building and sustainable peace. Social capital is the instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation in a society based on embedded trust (Fukuyama 2001:7). It forms an important element in promoting cohesion in society by mobilising people towards the achievement of collective ends, hence complementing the formal institutional goals of the state (Colletta and Cullen 2000; Sawyer 2005; World Bank 2011).

This article contends that the ideological constructs of ethnic supremacy by the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups have defined the mode of political settlement in South Sudan through state capture. These constructs of supremacy have been mobilised to sustain claims for post-secession dividends, thereby undermining the generation of social capital for conflict management in the society. By constructing a nexus between state-building and social capital, the article shows that the state-building process

1 SPLM was the political wing of the rebel movement while SPLA was the military wing. Upon signing of the CPA, SPLM transformed to a political party while the SPLA became the official army of South Sudan.

in South Sudan requires the hybridity of formal and informal institutions. This helps in transforming the volatile social space created through the supremacy constructs of the Dinka and Nuer and the high demands placed by citizens on the fragile state.

After this introduction, the next section of this article builds a theoretical link between state-building and social capital within the prism of conflict management in society. The article then reviews the emergence of the state of South Sudan and the December 2013 conflict and demonstrates the weakness of the state-building strategy. From the foregoing, the article proceeds with a discussion of how political constructs by both Dinka and Nuer that justify ethnic supremacy have cultivated a form of socio-political dominance. This has contributed to the depletion of social capital and the creation of volatile social spaces within society. This discussion is followed by a section that suggests revisiting the current state-building strategy by integrating social capital, and then a conclusion.

The nexus between state-building and social capital

State-building has increasingly become a focus of international development discourse in a diametric departure from the past where an anti-statist stance occupied the development paradigm as embodied by the Washington Consensus. The proliferation of intra-state conflicts in developing countries with the attendant regionalised externalities, particularly during the first decade of the post-cold war era (Marshall and Gurr 2005), led to the perceived need to shift the focus to building states which are resilient to the deadly conflicts that had engulfed a considerable number of countries in the past. This is particularly the case for Africa, which has experienced numerous intra-state conflicts, more than any other continent (Straus 2012:180).

The conception of the state in this article is drawn from Max Weber who defines the state as a human community that (successfully) claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber 1946:77). The overarching priority of state-building must therefore

be to craft a form of political governance and the articulation of a set of political processes or mechanisms through which the state and society reconcile their expectations of one another (OECD 2008). Challenging as this may be, attaining this objective is important for the endurance of the legitimacy of the state. There is a shared understanding that state-building is about controlling violence, establishing legitimacy and building capable and responsive institutions so as to create or foster a shared sense of the public realm (Menocal and Fritz 2007). To make these ends achievable, the state must *a priori* act in relative autonomy in deploying its infrastructural power by organising society in the interest of citizens in their generality (Mann 1984). The inherent challenge, however, is that most citizens as principal recipients of the dividends (mostly social and economic) of state-building tend to have high expectations of the state especially during the aftermath of independence or in the post-conflict period (Menocal 2011). Yet experience has shown that state-building can only realise tangible dividends over the long-term, as the process is inevitably conflict-ridden (Menocal 2011).

The process of reconciling societal expectations and the state's [lack of] capacity to meet these expectations, a process that establishes the nature of the political settlement, remains one of the most daunting endeavours of any state-building enterprise. Political settlement is the balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes, on which any state is based (Di John and Putzel 2009; Khan 1995). Even though the vision of how the state should be constructed or function is often an elitist bargaining process (Di John and Putzel 2009), the necessary legitimacy that undergirds state-building can be sustained only if a shared understanding on political settlement is not limited to the political class but extended to the masses. This presupposes a democratic as opposed to a Marxist trajectory of state-building. The Marxist approach to state-building is defined by its focus on class struggles in which the dominant class seeks to sustain its ascendency through state capture (Hellman et al. 2000). On the other hand, the democratic track to state-building is essentially inclusive, with various constitutive elements of the society

taken into account. Failure to forge a shared understanding of how the state should function may result in some groups or individuals mobilising their own vision of the state-society relationship and being driven to pursue it through alternative means, including violence (Zartman 1989).

While there is agreement that institutions matter because they can mediate societal differences and manage conflicts, the existing literature on state-building offers no consensus on the most suitable institutions to achieve this, including in post-conflict settings (Horowitz 2008; Wolff 2011). Understandably, the contextual complexities vary considerably and it would be naïve to proffer a one-size-fits-all institutional trajectory for building states. State-building (or state formation as the embryonic stage) is indeed complex, non-linear and replete with unintended outcomes.

That said, a major weakness in most policy trajectories on state-building is that they tend to emphasise formal institutional development to the detriment of informal institutions (Boege et al. 2008). The prominence accorded to these formal institutions is due to their presumed substantial ability to mediate delicate state-society relationships. Yet the political settlement which is at the core of state-building includes not only 'formal institutions adapted or created to manage politics - such as electoral processes, parliaments, constitutions and truth commissions, many of which may be the direct result of peacebuilding efforts – but also, crucially, the often informal and unarticulated political arrangements and understandings that underpin a political system' (Menocal 2011:1721). This underscores the importance of social capital in managing conflicts in society and the need for it to be taken into account in the creation of a sustainable political order.

Where state capacity is under extreme stress, with a weak grip over the monopoly of legitimate use of force within its territory, experience in other post-conflict settings such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Rwanda has shown that social capital can be an important resource for conflict management in society (Colletta and Cullen 2000; Sawyer 2005; Sanginga et al. 2007; World Bank 2011). All these empirical

cases demonstrate how social capital has been critical in developing coping mechanisms for the survival of local people to confront security as well as social and economic challenges where state capacity was either diminished or absent. Local communities have relied on informal norms of cooperation that served useful in building trust across communities by encouraging collective action to resolve the exigencies of public life, including those that fall within the remit of the state, such as security and education.

Social capital, as defined by Robert Putnam, James Coleman and Francis Fukuyama, offers useful insights in understanding the link between state-building and social capital. A commonality in these authors' conception of social capital is that trust is epiphenomenal, as it facilitates informal norms of cooperation and reciprocity rather than constituting social capital by itself. Another main similarity in their definition of social capital is that it is situated in social structures in which cooperation between individuals or groups takes place. However, whilst Coleman (1998:105) conceives of social capital as a public good that therefore would be under-produced by private agents, Fukuyama (2001:10) refutes this claim by contending that cooperation is necessary to virtually all individuals as a means of achieving their selfish ends. As we shall see later in the South Sudan case study, these contrasting ideas are both useful as they enable us to understand that although social capital can produce positive externalities, it can also be mobilised for the narrow goals of a group. For instance, during periods of armed conflict, social capital is often hijacked and mobilised to form allegiances within the belligerent parties (Leff 2008).

Putnam (1993:36) focuses on horizontal relationships in society by conceiving of social capital as consisting of 'features of social organisation, such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit'. Drawing from his study on Italy's governmental reforms, Putnam noted that communities with positive economic development and effective governments are those supported by networks of civil engagement, which foster norms of reciprocity that reinforce sentiments of trust within a society.

Putnam (2000) further elaborates his conception of social capital by stating that social networks can be between homogenous groups, that is *bonding*, or between heterogeneous groups, hence conceived as *bridging* social capital. Both bonding and bridging social capital are important for social and economic development and for group survival, due to their potency in developing coping mechanisms in times of socio-economic difficulties.

Fukuyama cautions that *bonding* social capital is amenable to supporting vertical patronage systems where social capital can be used to cultivate patron-client relationships (Fukuyama 2002) that are inimical to state-building. In his conception of social capital, Fukuyama contends for a 'wider radius of trust' embedded in networks that transcend a particular group (such as one based on kinship ties) in order to have a vibrant civil society which is an important ingredient for democracy (Fukuyama 2000). Trust, in his view, is a key measure of social capital and is reproduced through norms of reciprocity and successful cooperation in networks of civic engagement (Fukuyama 2001). Coleman's definition of social capital focuses on vertical relationships that are characterised by hierarchy and an unequal distribution of power among members (Coleman 1988), echoing Fukuyama's conception that social capital can be beneficial to some and/or harmful to others, depending on its characteristics and application.

Both formal vertical relationships and informal horizontal forms of social capital which generate trust embedded in structural relationships are critical in political settlement, which is at the heart of state-building. However, it is important to note that most of the time there is a paucity of generalised trust in formal [vertical] institutions due to the state's failure to meet the demands of its people. Consequently, the tendency to develop coping mechanisms for the realisation of social and economic needs tends to be more undergirded by informal horizontal relationships between people, which over time derive a sense of legitimacy. Boege et al (2008:7) note that, '... on many occasions, therefore, the only way to make state institutions work is through utilising informal and other traditional networks. This way, the state's 'outposts' are mediated by 'informal' indigenous societal institutions which follow their own logic and rules within the (incomplete)

state structures'. This results in the coexistence of various sources and forms of legitimacy, and these may not necessarily reinforce each other, but rather compete with or undermine one another (Menocal and Fritz 2007).

The foregoing shows that laying emphasis on formal institutional choices alone is bound to produce unintended outcomes to state-building. This may include a decay of the monopoly of the state's legitimate use of coercive force, leading to the unregulated use of force by other actors within the state. One of the challenges in South Sudan is the pursuit of formal institutional development to the detriment of informal institutions in a bid to build a state that satisfies the needs of the society while remaining resilient to conflicts. The December 2013 conflict was therefore a corollary of this state-building approach in South Sudan.

Emergence of the State of South Sudan

South Sudan is the product of a painful history of struggles for self-determination characterised by protracted wars while it was still territorially an integral part of Sudan. The first civil war in Sudan that started at independence from Britain in 1956 pitted Anya-Anya rebels in southern Sudan, who were mostly African Christian and animist, against the Islamic and Arab-dominated, Khartoum-based GoS. The civil war ended in 1972 with the Addis Ababa Agreement which granted the south of Sudan political autonomy with a regional executive and legislature. The Agreement only lasted until 1983 when President Ja'afar Nimeiri abrogated on the agreement and continued the policies of Arabisation and Islamisation of the South (Lesch 2001:14). The discovery of oil, which is mostly located in the south of Sudan, was a key factor in making the civil war intractable as it became the economic mainstay of the country and a source of self-aggrandisement of the Northern political elite. The CPA which ended the second civil war created a semi-autonomous territory of Southern Sudan with its own government, although the GoS maintained overall jurisdiction over the national territory. The CPA also stipulated a six-year transitional period after which the people of Southern Sudan would be given an opportunity to choose through a referendum whether to

unite with or secede from the Sudan. The overwhelming vote for secession in January 2011 led to the independence and creation of the Republic of South Sudan on 9 July 2011, six months later.

The people of South Sudan were subjected to a long history of imposed racialised and religious identity constructs that predates the colonial era. These were sustained during colonialism and mobilised by successive post-independence Northern governments of the Sudan and consequently underpinned the political, economic and social marginalisation of southerners (Deng 1995). Although the leader of SPLM/A, the late John Garang, originally had a vision of a united 'democratic' Sudan, it was more than obvious that the currents would flow undeterred towards a total political disengagement from the North. The 98.83% vote for self-determination (Southern Sudan Referendum Commission 2011) was a polemical expression of the aspirations of southerners.

That said, it is important to note that the very racialised identities of the North-South axis in Sudan that were politically constructed to produce historical forms of power (Idris 2001) have now transmuted and reproduced themselves in the independent South Sudan as constructs of ethnic supremacy tied to post-independence entitlements. Whilst the Dinka and Nuer-dominated SPLA led the struggle against the North, the two ethnic groups split in 1991 into rival factions under John Garang (Dinka) and Riek Machar (Nuer) respectively during the civil war. The internal conflict between the Dinka and Nuer elites was mainly influenced by the quest for political-military leadership of the southern course (Madut and Hutchinson 1999:127–128). This was also underpinned by competition for economic resources which resulted in the violence being directed against each other's civilian population (Madut and Hutchinson 1999:128).

Hitherto, the Dinka-Nuer dominance had carried a different ideological construction from the kind of dominance sought during the CPA transitional period and after secession. During the civil war, the two ethnic groups, which are the most populous in South Sudan, had not attained the objective of transforming their relationship with the North in order to lay

claims for legitimating their dominance over southerners. Therefore, it was difficult to mobilise and sustain an ideology of ethnic supremacy and seek entitlements through use of state power. As Schomerus and Allen (2010: 20–21) state, 'political power is an extremely scarce and highly valuable resource, available only periodically under specific conditions. In Southern Sudan, the CPA Interim Period[2] provided those conditions'.

The logic of indigenous, inferior southern identity which was formed by the North undergirded entitlements that excluded most southerners from governance. As we shall see below, this logic has now been reproduced by the southerners themselves through the agency of state-building. The CPA Interim Period as well as the secession offered beneficial conditions for the Dinka and Nuer to define a form of political settlement which justified their grip on political power and determined the accompanying socio-economic entitlements. The state-building process that favoured formal institutional development sustained this mode of settlement.

The December 2013 conflict: A reminder of the hard road to state-building

The conflict which started on the evening of Sunday 15 December 2013 in South Sudan claimed thousands of lives and left over 1 500 000 people displaced. The violence began when the SPLM National Liberation Council was holding its meeting in Juba, the capital of South Sudan. Riek Machar, the leader of SPLM/A-IO, was sacked as Vice-President by President Salva Kiir in July 2013 in a cabinet purge. This purge was aimed at political rivals within the Government, thereby reviving the past violent factionalism that was evident during the North-South civil war (Fletcher 2013).

According to a report by the International Crisis Group (ICG 2014), the dispute within the SPLM that led to the conflict was primarily political. President Kiir declared an attempted coup d'état, a claim refuted by Machar, the SPLM-IO leader. However, communal mobilisation along ethnic lines led to appalling levels of brutality against civilians, including

2 This refers to the CPA six-year transitional period.

deliberate killings inside churches and hospitals. Whilst violence initially targeted Dinka and Nuer civilians, armed youth from different ethnic groups mobilised and responded to attacks in a widening circle of reprisal and revenge (ICG 2014:9). It is important to understand how the conflict found the intensity to spread rapidly in a matter of days to civilian spheres. The violence found a fertile seedbed of volatile space of weak social capital ready to be exploited by the political elite.

At independence on 9 July 2011 the new citizenry was plunged into a difficult road of state-building where everything was either a 'need or necessity' (Gerenge 2014:24). Basic infrastructure to deliver essential public services in South Sudan was minimal at best, compared to most African states at independence in the past century. This condition is well captured by the South Sudan Fragility Assessment Report (GoSS 2012:1) which states that:

> Due to the legacy of conflict and neglect, socio-economic development in South Sudan starts from a very low base, despite a nominally high income derived from oil. In the absence of basic infrastructure and limited delivery capacity, most people remain cut off from access to social services. Many health, education and food security indicators remain close to crisis levels. Government capacity to deliver services only begins to form, and is limited by fiscal austerity following a temporary shutdown of oil production.

Thus, the December conflict unfolded on the back of persistent social and economic demands and war fatigue. The post-secession euphoria in South Sudan dissipated fast in the face of persisting social and economic challenges accentuated by growing insecurity that ran deep within South Sudan (Stevenson 2011). Indeed, war-like tendencies had already begun to re-emerge in the face of challenging social and economic conditions in the transitional period. Laudati (2011:20–23) gives a nuanced and empirically-informed insight on the extent to which in Jonglei, the largest and most populous of South Sudan's ten states, the Dinkas have obscured the ethnic supremacy construct through the formation of a victim narrative over the more widely cited liberator narrative, which legitimises greater Dinka control over non-Dinka regions. It is alleged that Dinka portray themselves

as peace-loving and the victims of aggression from other communities whom they label as aggressive. This construct is sustained by the Dinka diaspora with greater access to the media and as well as the government machinery. It is alleged that the Dinka diaspora have tended to gloss over evidence of Dinka-perpetrated atrocities against other communities. Yet, as of October 2012, Jonglei accounted for 74 per cent of 1 326 conflict-related deaths during the year (GoSS 2012:3).

It is worth noting that a similarly disguised victim-liberator narrative has also been crafted by the Nuer and played a significant role of mobilisation of Nuer civilians in internally displaced camps as a result of the December conflict. The displacement of Nuer populations led to mobilisation of the Nuer White Army as a response to the perception that President Kiir is consolidating a 'Dinka dominated' Government (South Sudan Protection Cluster 2014).

That said, the reality is that the current state-building approach which builds on institutions that existed during the CPA transitional period, in fact, propagates the liberator narratives of both Dinka and Nuer. On one hand, this approach nominally emphasises a democratic track focused on seeking to build strong decentralised state institutions that seek to redress the legacy of marginalisation by the North (Schomerus and Allen 2010). However, on the other hand, this approach has produced counter-productive results. The decentralised institutions lack accountability at the local level and have served to create tribal fiefdoms, which become incubators of violence themselves (Schomerus and Allen 2010). On the back of high levels of poverty, merit-based recruitment in the public administration in South Sudan has been superseded by nepotism based on the grounds of those who fought for peace most (African Development Bank 2011) – a claim that is palatable to the Dinka and Nuer but inimical to the democratic track of state-building that promotes inclusive governance. This system uses government salaries for little or no work performed, which further drains government resources that otherwise might be used for public service delivery (African Development Bank 2011:22).

The formal institutions of the state meant to distribute public goods and services to the people have been captured and have become detrimental to the informal norms of cooperation by sowing discord among communities. The result of state capture in South Sudan is that 'the underlying ethnic and regional cleavages continue to provide a motive for violence. The actors who mobilise these grievances and have the organisational, financial and other capacities to organise and direct violence (the means); and trigger points that provide the opportunity for conflict actors to set violence into motion' (African Development Bank 2011:21).

The Dinka-Nuer ethnicised liberator narrative has therefore served to strengthen *bonding* social capital[3] but depleted the *bridging* social capital among communities. This has resulted in creating weak structural relationships in society which impede the generation of cooperative norms by cultivating a wider radius of trust beyond a particular ethnic group. The December 2013 violent conflict was, thus, poised to rapidly escalate through mobilisation along the existing structural fault-lines despite the fall-out between President Kiir and former Vice-President Machar a few months earlier.

Quest for 'peace' or post-secession dividends

The politics of patronage has to be understood within the extant tensions in South Sudanese society which are a result of the clamour for peace or post-secession dividends. The quest for dividends has reproduced conflicting visions of the kind of political settlement that should be forged in South Sudan. The local Dinka and Nuer people are perceived to have relatively easier access to public goods through their patrons in the government or within the SPLA, whilst the rest of society have simpler expectations of a fair share from the state. For instance, Pinaud (2014:208) provides an example of how patronage has been built on kinship networks in state institutions in South Sudan. She notes that the military elite dominated by Dinka and Nuer, for

3 This does not mean that there are no intra-Dinka and Nuer divisions. In fact, there are members of these communities who disagree with the constructed supremacy of these tribes (see ICG 2014).

instance, used the affirmative action criteria of the post-CPA constitution, which states that at least 25 percent of the organisation must be female, to appoint the wives of commanders and of lower-stratum intermediaries to important army, police, and government positions. De Waal (2014) argues that the GoSS allowed this kind of patronage to exist in order to maintain cohesion within the SPLM/A. As in other post-conflict settings, ensuring cohesion in the army through maintaining loyalty is crucial, particularly, because the national army is often composed of former armed rebel groups who undergo a process of transformation through disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. However, the process of deconstructing previous loyalties to former rebel leaders is complex and often replete with unintended consequences. Indeed, the effort to maintain loyalty of the army through patronage in South Sudan has proven counter-productive, as clearly shown by the eruption of the December conflict within the ranks of the SPLM/A and also within a volatile civilian space.

It is known that the Dinka and Nuer played a prominent role during the civil war against the North, but ordinary citizens in South Sudan also lay rightful claims that they participated in and were affected by the liberation war and have an inalienable entitlement to the post-civil war dividends (South Sudan News Agency 2014). In a country with over sixty ethnic groups, many non-Dinka and non-Nuer civilians lament that they also lost their property and members of their families during the civil war with the North, and therefore are rightfully entitled to a fair share of government jobs and security (South Sudan News Agency 2014).

Whilst the above shared historical experience should guide the population towards common aspirations, post-CPA realities show how ethnic supremacy has redefined social order in local communities. An illustrative example of the detrimental quest for entitlement is vividly illuminated by a leader of a local non-governmental organisation in Western Bahr eh Ghazal, South Sudan who commented in 2010 that:

> You know, our Dinka, during the war, there was nothing. After CPA, they start fighting. I went to Mundri, there was a big farm. And Dinka of Bor

> took their cattle there. They ate everything. But the payam[4] administrator said we have no choice. Dinka says it belongs to them and they have a gun. I went to Torit and I heard that there is now a payam in Nimule called Bor [Dinka town and Garang's home] payam… For me I am thinking that they are thinking this Southern Sudan belongs to them. So they want to cover all the small tribes (Schomerus and Allen 2010:20).

The above predicament is a manifestation of communities at odds with each other, where informal norms of cooperation are either minimal or non-existent and public institutions are incapable of regulating relationships among citizens. It has constrained the generation of *bridging* social capital across ethnic groups and communities in South Sudan, which is a consequence of the state-building process in South Sudan.

The depletion of social capital can be understood by looking at how cooperative informal norms among communities prevailed before periods of violent inter-communal conflicts. According to Deng (2010:242), farming was a collective endeavour in communities in South Sudan. This traditional practice involves a regular system, whereby each household within the community invites members of the community to perform a certain activity on its farm; in return, the inviting household will provide food and local beer.

Despite intermittent conflicts that existed during the CPA six-year transitional period, the massive rallying for secession (with a 98.83% vote) indicates that there was still a dense stock of social capital that could be explored and nurtured by defining a common vision of political settlement. Whilst there is no accepted method of measuring social capital, the level of internal group cohesiveness and action in relation to outsiders can be a critical qualitative measurement of social capital (Fukuyama 2001:13). The overwhelming vote by the southerners to secede from the North therefore indicated the level of spontaneous cohesion where the people acted in collective resolve towards a common goal. It is this instantiated informal

4 *Payam* is the nomenclature of the local administrative unit in South Sudan.

norm that promoted the cooperation towards secession that was further depleted rather than nurtured by the state-building process in South Sudan.

Social capital: A recourse for peace in South Sudan

As noted earlier, alongside the main conflict pitting the GoS against the SPLM-IO, other localised violent conflicts also persisted in communities. The grievances tend to be related to resource competition as well as perceptions of economic and political marginalisation. It has also been noted that current state-building challenges facing South Sudan have led to the further breakdown of state capacity to respond to citizens' needs while citizens' expectations of the state remain high. Under these circumstances, the quest for a state that is responsive to the needs of the people as an entitlement for the hard-won independence of South Sudan is likely to continue to strain the already weak institutions.

Whilst the peace accord to end the December 2013 conflict has been signed, sustainable peace through the current state-building trajectory cannot be realised through formal institutional engineering alone. Indeed, there is already a realisation in the state-building and conflict management literature that there are 'limits of constitutional engineering alone' in achieving sustainable peace after conflict (Wolff 2011). As stipulated in the peace accord, institutional arrangements that promote consociational governance have importance in promoting inclusive governance in divided countries (Wolff 2011), and would therefore, arguably, be instrumental in contributing to minimising the Dinka and Nuer hegemony in governance in South Sudan. However, more is needed in the state-building process than inclusive governance, whether through power-sharing or another form of institutional arrangement that ensures the different segments of society are genuinely represented in political institutions. That said, one of the main challenges encountered in fragile states is that this type of legitimacy can be particularly difficult to achieve, given these states' weak governance structures, which makes it difficult for them to build their legitimacy solely on the basis of their performance (Menocal and Fritz 2007).

That is, the re-negotiation of the relationship between the state and society in South Sudan must take cognisance of the logic that defines the current existing mode of political settlement – which is tied to the claims for dividends of peace or post-secession. For the state to grow its capacity in order to penetrate social life (Mann 1984), the people's expectations of the state must be transformed in South Sudan. Put differently, there is need for a gradual scaling down of expectations that the state of South Sudan is capable of meeting all demands, particularly social and economic. This does not imply the state 'exiting' society, but the state transforming its ideological technique by reshaping its relationship with the society.

Generally, in the face of the significant social, economic and political problems in the country the effects of state-building in South Sudan will not be easily palpable in the short or medium-term. This is in spite of the massive exogenous political, military and humanitarian support mobilised mainly through the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and other international initiatives. Indeed, experience has shown that external intervention alone cannot provide lasting solutions to security and governance dilemmas within a society (Sawyer 2005).

On the back of persistent social and economic needs in South Sudan, little investment has been directed at generating informal norms of cooperation among communities. The generation of such norms of cooperation can be achieved through developing public policies that encourage the formation of informal voluntary associational groups that specifically target collective actions for social and economic gains. Given that most of the conflicts are tied to the competition for post-secession dividends, understanding the potential sources of social capital in the South Sudanese society offers insights for building the self-governing capabilities of communities in South Sudan. Understanding how people craft or adapt institutions of collective action can serve as a critical lens for developing their capacities for self-governance, which can be extended to embrace situations of governance failure and violent conflict where survival is at stake (Sawyer 2005).

If the conflict in South Sudan is all about the politics of marginalisation, as viewed by some, then a critique of this view would be that conflict resulting from exclusion, inequality, and indignity does not in itself necessarily lead to the eruption of widespread hostilities (Colletta and Cullen 2000). Indeed, the tolerance and coping capacities of the poor and marginalised are legend and manifold (Colletta and Cullen 2000). Social capital has been instrumental in mobilising communities to cope with their own social, security and economic dilemmas in many contexts. In effect, social capital has contributed to the reformation of state-society relationships and management of conflicts.

Generally, it is important to note that states do not have many obvious levers for generating social capital (Fukuyama 2000). Social capital is frequently a by-product of religion, tradition, shared historical experience, and other factors that lie outside the control of government (Fukuyama 2001). Indeed, experience from countries such as Uganda suggests that a better understanding of how the synergy between social capital and public policy can be strengthened is crucial to minimise conflicts over scarce natural resources (Sanginga et al. 2007). In the South-western highlands of Uganda, a combination of voluntary associations ranging from credit and savings groups, farming groups, to church-based groups, and the development of by-laws, collectively contributed to managing conflicts (Sanginga et al. 2007). Since a considerable proportion of members of a particular social group belonged to several other self-help groups, the cost of making transactions was reduced as trust was built among the people and it became easier for parties to a conflict to resolve it through a win-win outcome (Sanginga et al. 2007). From this experience it can be deduced that multiple memberships which transcended 'tribal' borders created a dense network of shared interests among individuals, which in effect generated informal norms of cooperation based on embedded trust.

Stemming from the above, it can be noted that social capital has the capacity to restructure relationships to transcend specific groups (ethnic, religious or otherwise), trigger cooperative predispositions of individuals and engender peaceful resolution of conflicts when they

arise. All these cooperative engagements in Uganda were made possible through local policies that encouraged the formation of informal groups. For example, Sanginga et al. (2007) state that in order to buttress the structured resolution of conflicts through informal group networks, the local government developed by-laws that facilitated recourse to Local Councils by individuals in cases where there were overlapping conflicts that therefore perceivably required external adjudication. They also state that the success of this synergy between social capital and public policy is premised on complementarity and embeddedness: mutually supportive relations between local government and local communities, and the nature and extent of the ties connecting people, communities and public institutions. The Ugandan case above does not demonstrate state failure but rather limited state capacity to regulate conflicts, a situation remedied through recourse to social capital.

However, a different experience, in Liberia during the civil war, demonstrates social capital as being useful for the survival of individuals in situations of total governance failure, and demonstrates how it further forms an important building block in the reconstruction of post-conflict governance arrangements. According to Sawyer (2005), communities forged cooperative engagements with each other as a 'coping' mechanism against state-sponsored violence. Consequently, in the ensuing post-conflict reconstruction period, these already forged informal structural relationships among communities became critical in the mobilisation of joint efforts for local development such as building schools.

The resilience to conflicts in society undergirded by social capital is therefore structurally situated in a dense network of overlapping memberships that create broad trust that transcends specific 'group borders'. These dense informal norms of cooperation and reciprocity reproduced through pursuit of collective goals may be important in transforming the volatility of the public space that is easily exploited to mobilise the society through violence. In South Sudan, this volatility of the public space can be diffused by diminishing the over-reliance on the already strained state as the 'only'

means of realising social and economic ends and in effect helping to meet high expectations for 'peace' or post-secession dividends.

Thus, it is necessary to revisit the existing strategy for state-building in South Sudan. Whilst the current process of 'institutional engineering' needs to be sustained to ensure stronger accountability mechanisms that reduce patronage in governance, the ideological deconstruction of an approach that is hinged on ethnic supremacy tied to independence dividends is crucial to redefine the mode of political settlement for the state. Arguably, these efforts are only sustainable if other 'informal institutional arrangements' are nurtured to offer complementarity rather than supplant the legitimacy of the state to monopolise the use of force within its territory. Thus, conscious efforts to generate stocks of social capital as a self-regulatory governance system of conflict management among and across communities are suggested to buttress broader state-building mechanisms and secure sustainable peace in South Sudan.

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that the December 2013 conflict is not only about the elitist struggle for power between President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, the former Vice-President, both representing the Dinka-Nuer ethnic axis of the conflict respectively. It is important to transcend this ethnic conundrum by seeking to understand how the conflict found so volatile a seedbed in the public space, propelling it to rapidly escalate to unimaginable scale in the civilian community. The triggers of the December 2013 conflict in South Sudan were indeed bound to benefit from such a volatile space. The conflict found a ground defined by weak *bridging* social capital that was depleted through a state-building process that favoured formal institutional engineering to the detriment of informal norms of cooperation based on horizontal relationships. The logic of racial and religious superiority which undergirded the civil war against the North has been reproduced within the new state of South Sudan. Whilst the southerners were conceived as inferior, those who were at the forefront in the liberation struggle have developed the same kind of supremacy

narrative that they resented while at war with the North. The post-CPA era offered beneficial conditions for the Dinka and Nuer to define a form of political dominance and accompanying socio-economic entitlements. Yet, on the other hand, ordinary South Sudanese citizens lay rightful claims to peace or post-secession dividends, which collectively has placed a high demand on the weak state. The divergent conception of expectations of the state has generated a conflicting vision of the state-society relationship in South Sudan.

By attempting to construct a nexus between state-building and social capital, this article has demonstrated that the success of state-building does not depend on formal institutional engineering alone but requires the buttressing of informal institutions as well. It is suggested that in order to renegotiate the relationship between the state and society, social capital should be incorporated for the peaceful management of conflicts by the state, which is under stress to deliver dividends for independence. In order to enhance the sustainability of the state, it is suggested that the current state-building strategy be revisited to integrate the fostering of social capital in order to contribute to the 'development of self-governing capabilities' of communities in South Sudan. This serves to buttress rather than supplant the state's capacity to regulate conflicts.

Sources

African Development Bank 2011. A report on the political economy of South Sudan: A coping analytical study. Available from: <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/2011%20Political_Economy_South_Sudan_-_24_October_20111.pdf> [Accessed 12 December 2015].

Boege, Volker, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan 2008. On hybrid political orders and emerging states: State formation in the context of 'fragility'. Berghof Handbook Dialogue No.8, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Available from: <http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2595/pdf/boege_etal_handbook.pdf> [Accessed 12 December 2015].

Caplan, Richard 2004. International authority and state building: The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Global Governance*, 10 (1), pp. 53–65.

Coleman, S. James 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94, pp. 95–120.

Colletta, J. Nat and L. Michelle Cullen 2000. The nexus between violent conflict, social capital and social cohesion: Case studies from Cambodia and Rwanda. Social Capital Initiative, Working Paper No. 23. Washington, D.C., The World Bank.

Deng, B. Luka 2010. Social capital and civil war: The Dinka communities in Sudan's civil war. *Journal of African Affairs*, 109 (435), pp. 231–250.

Deng, Francis 1995. *War of visions: Conflict of identities in the Sudan*. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution Press.

De Waal, Alex 2014. When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: Brute causes of the civil war in South Sudan. *Journal of African Affairs*, 113 (452): pp. 347–369.

Di John, Jonathan and James Putzel 2009. Political settlements. *Issues Paper*, Governance and Social Development Research Centre. Birmingham, University of Birmingham.

Fletcher, Pascal 2013. Riek Machar: South Sudan's divisive pretender for power. Available from: <http://www.reuters.com> [Accessed 10 January 2014].

Fragile States Index 2014. Report by Funds for Peace. Available from: <http://ffp.statesindex.org/> [Accessed 24 July 2014].

Fukuyama, Francis 2000. Social capital and civil society, IMF Working Paper. Available from: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp0074.pdf> [Accessed 12 December 2015].

Fukuyama, Francis 2001. Social capital, civil society, and development. *Third World Quarterly*, 22 (1), pp. 7–20.

Fukuyama, Francis 2002. Social capital and development: The coming agenda. *School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Review*, 22 (1), pp. 23–37.

Gerenge, Robert 2014. South Sudan's 2013 resurgent political crisis: Through the lens of social capital. *Conflict Trends*, 1, pp. 20–27.

Hellman, S. Joel, Daniel Kaufmann and Geraint Jones 2000. Seize the state, seize the day: State capture, corruption and influence in transition. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2444. Washington, D.C., The World Bank.

Horowitz L. Donald 2008. Conciliatory institutions and constitutional processes in post-conflict states, *William and Mary Law Review*, 4 (1), Article 7. Available from: <http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol49/iss4/7> [Accessed 23 November 2015].

ICG (International Crisis Group) 2014. South Sudan: A civil war by any other name. *Africa Report* No.27, 10 April.

Idris, H. Amir 2001. *Sudan's civil war: Slavery, race, and formational identities*. New York, The Edwin Mellen Press.

IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) 2015. Summary of latest reports of violations of the Permanent Ceasefire. Investigated and verified by the IGAD Monitoring and Verification Mechanism in South Sudan as at 12 November 2015. Available from: <http://southsudan.igad.int/attachments/article/305/Summary%20of%20Latest%20Reports%20of%20Violations%20of%20the%20Permanent%20Ceasefire%20V052%20ENG-1FINAL.pdf> [Accessed 12 December 2015].

Khan, Mushtaq 1995. State failure in weak states: A critique of New Institutionalist explanations. In: Harris, John, Janet Hunter and M. Colin Lewis eds. *The New Institutional Economics and Third World development*. London, Routledge.

Laudati, Ann 2011. Victims of discourse: Mobilizing narratives of fear and insecurity in post-conflict South Sudan – The case of Jonglei State. *African Geographical Review*, 30 (1), pp. 15–32.

Leff, Jonah 2008. The nexus between social capital and reintegration of ex-combatants: A case for Sierra Leone. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 8 (1), pp. 9–38.

Lesch, Ann M. 2001. The impasse in the civil war. *Arab Studies Quarterly* (Pluto Journals), 23 (2), pp. 11–29.

Madut, Jok J. and Sharon E. Hutchinson 1999. Sudan's prolonged second civil war and the militarization of Nuer and Dinka ethnic identities. *African Studies Review*, 42 (2), pp. 125–145.

Mann, Michael 1984. The autonomous power of the State: Its origins, mechanisms, and results. *Archives européennes de sociologie,* 25 (1), pp. 185–213.

Marshall, Monty G. and Ted Robert Gurr 2005. *Peace and conflict 2005: A global survey of armed conflicts, self-determination movements, and democracy.* Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). College Park, MD, University of Maryland.

Menocal, Alina Rocha and Verena Fritz 2007. Understanding state-building from a political economy perspective: An analytical and conceptual paper on processes, embedded tensions and lessons for international engagement. Report for DFID's Effective and Fragile States Teams.

Menocal, Alina Rocha 2011. State building for peace: A new paradigm for international engagement in post-conflict fragile states? *Third World Quarterly*, 32 (10), pp. 1715–1736.

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 2008. Concepts and dilemmas of State building in fragile situations: From fragility to resilience. OECD/DAC Discussion Paper. Off-print of the *Journal on Development*, 9 (3). Available from: <http://www.oxfam.org/en/emergencies/southsudan> [Accessed 24 July 2014].

Pinaud, Clemence 2014. South Sudan: Civil war, predation and the making of a military aristocracy. *African Affairs*, 113 (451), pp. 192–211.

Putnam, D. Robert 1993. The prosperous community: Social capital and public life. *American Prospect*, 4, pp. 35–42.

Putnam, D. Robert 2000. *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York, Simon and Schuster.

Sanginga, Pascal, Rick Kamugisha and Andrienne Martin 2007. The dynamics of social capital and conflict management in multiple resource regimes: A case of the South-Western Highlands of Uganda. *Ecology and Society*, 12 (1), article 6. Available from: <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org> [Accessed 5 January 2014].

Sawyer, Amos 2005. Social capital, survival strategies, and their potential for post-conflict governance in Liberia. Research paper No. 15. World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University, Helsinki.

Schomerus, Mareike and Tim Allen 2010. *Southern Sudan at odds with itself: Dynamics of conflict and predicament for peace*. London, London School of Economics.

South Sudan News Agency 2014. There's no tribe called Equatoria in South Sudan. Available from: <http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/editorials/theres-no-tribe-called-equatoria-in-south-sudan> [Accessed 31 July 2014].

South Sudan Protection Cluster 2014. Report on Macro Analysis of Conflict in South Sudan, August. Available from: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Macro%20Analysis%20of%20Conflict%20in%20South%20Sudan%20SSPC%20August%202014.pdf> [Accessed 12 December 2015].

Southern Sudan Referendum Commission 2011. Southern Sudan referendum final results report. 2 February. Available from: <http://southernsudan2011.com/sites/default/files/Final_Results_Report_20110206_1512.pdf> [Accessed 12 December 2015].

Stevenson, Hannah-May 2011. Beyond the euphoria – the implications of independence in Southern Sudan. Available from: <http://www.consultancyafrica.com> [Accessed 10 January 2014].

Straus, Scott 2012. Wars do end! Changing patterns of political violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of African Affairs*, 111 (443), pp. 179–201.

Weber, Max 1946. *Essays of Sociology*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Wolff, Stefan 2011. Post-conflict State building: The debate on institutional choice. *Third World Quarterly*, 32 (10), pp. 1777–1802.

World Bank 2011. *Conflict, security and development*. World Development Report. Washington, D.C., The World Bank.

Zartman, William 1989. *Ripe for resolution: Conflict and intervention in Africa*. New York, Oxford University Press.

Towards Pentecopolitanism: New African Pentecostalism and social cohesion in South Africa

*Chammah Kaunda**

Abstract

This article evaluates the challenges that militate against the full engagement of New African Pentecostalism (NAP) in the process of social cohesion in South Africa. It argues that this new religious phenomenon in South Africa has been preoccupied with the promotion of internal social cohesion within its ecclesiastical boundaries to the neglect of national social cohesion. Employing the notion of 'religious cosmopolitanism' (Cahill 2003) as theoretical underpinning, the article proposes a new concept termed Pentecopolitanism, as an ethical frame for New African Pentecostal engagement in democratisation and social cohesion in South Africa. The notion of Pentecopolitanism is envisaged to function as an antidote against sectarianism and fundamentalism within NAP and a framework for its constructive engagement with pluralism in the current South African search for national social cohesion. Pentecopolitanism is a philosophy which arises out of the need for recognition of the social function of religion, so as to enable human beings to discover their humanity through the humanity of others.

Keywords: Social cohesion, Pentecopolitanism, South Africa, Black Africans, New African Pentecostalism

* Chammah J. Kaunda (Ph.D.) is currently a Post-doctoral Research Fellow in the College of Humanities, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Kaunda's professional interests cover a wide range of topics within the African Theology with a focus on the intersection of African Religious Traditions and Christianity, Politics, Theological Education, African Pentecostal Theology, African Ethics, Missiology and Ecumenical Theology.

Introduction

The ideological machines of today are religious, and they assume in many cases the functions of the guardian of the public (moral) order, the platform of political conscience and the refuse of a bruised and disarticulated sociability. We must strenuously reject political reductionism or symbolic expansionism, yet if there is an organised community which at the moment is part of the foundations of the democratic field of tomorrow, it is the church, in the generic rather than institutional sense (Jean Copans, cited in Ruth Marshall (1995:237).

The use of the article 'the' in Copans' argument makes religion sound as if it is 'the' ideological machine; the truth is that religion is indeed a machine which has gained renewed popular currency in the last two decades in Africa. Copans sagaciously refers to the fact that the generic or performative church cannot be easily dismissed as it remains a key player in the process of democratisation and social cohesion in Africa. This means that the community of believers who actively re-enact their identity and faith in public social spaces such as churches, work, schools, and homes also have something to contribute to democratisation and social cohesion (Marshall 1995:243). The New African Pentecostalism (hereafter, NAP) as socio-religious movement has become a dynamic and popular brand of Christianity in post-apartheid South Africa precisely because of its engagement with the socio-historical struggles of the masses in black communities (Anderson 2005). In his article, 'New African Initiated Pentecostalism and Charismatics in South Africa', Allan Anderson (2005:67) observes that NAP among black South Africans has only taken centre stage after 1994 and has become so popular that at 'the beginning of the twenty-first century between 10 to 40 per cent of SA's population could be termed 'Pentecostal', depending on how this is defined'. This new phenomenon and its potential to be the religious machinery for democratisation and social cohesion is the main focus of the article.[1]

1 For discussions of the different strands of Pentecostalism within South Africa see Balcomb (2001) and Anderson (1997, 2005, and 2013). For a lucid comparison between Neo-Pentecostalism and Classical see Stephen Hunt's (2002) article, 'Deprivation and Western Pentecostalism Revisited: NeoPentecostalism'. The new wave of Pentecostalism is classified variously as New Pentecostalism, NeoPentecostalism, Modern Pentecostalism, or Charismatics.

NAP is to be distinguished from two other forms of Pentecostalism: the classical Pentecostalism, the first 'wave' of Pentecostalism which began early in the twentieth century as a revival/renewal movement with emphasis on the manifestations and working of the Holy Spirit through spiritual gifts; and the African Initiated Churches (AICs). a Pentecostal type of church started independently by Africans without the help of missionaries from outside the continent. New African Pentecostalism is essentially an urban phenomenon and relates to a westernised urban black culture which attracts young generation, middle class Africans, the elite and fairly educated populations (Gifford 1998; Anderson 2005, 2013). The bulk of its members come from high-density townships such as Soweto, which is host to Grace Bible Church led by Bishop Mosa Sono. This is the largest single-congregation church in Soweto, with members numbering between 8 000 and 10 000 in 2010 (Anderson 2013; Frahm-Arp 2010). Members also emanate from nearby squatter camps (Molobi 2014).[2] This New Pentecostal phenomenon is characterised by an ideology of spiritual superiority and a prosperity gospel with strong emphasis on the ethics of 'separation from the world', which has shaped its political discourses (Anderson 2013:166). This process of 'separation from the world' is understood as 'breaking' with cultural pasts, social relations and the nation-state as constraints to the attainment of progress and prosperity (Van Dijk 2009, Meyer 1998, 2004).

David Maxwell (1998) and David Martin (1990) demonstrate how Pentecostal social cohesion is engendered by the radical 'revision of consciousness' of its adherents as the means for their inclusion in the *oikos* (household) of the Spirit which Ruth Marshall (1993:216) classifies as 'the community of the saved'. Once incorporated in the household of the Spirit, the believer is expected to strive to maintain the bond of the Spirit in two ways: 'first, through continuous involvement in religious, social and welfare activities centred upon the church; secondly through abstinence from what are popularly described as 'traditional' rituals and practices and by means of participation in Christian alternatives' (Maxwell 1998:353).

2 A similar trend has been observed by Damaris Parsitau and Philomena Mwaura (2010) in their research on NeoPentecostalism in Kenya.

In studying the Pentecostal notion of ecclesiastical social cohesion, some literature has focused on how this process of re-socialisation or re-tuning members' religio-social consciousness makes Pentecostal believers more industrious and socially mobile in a variety of ways, compared to those who are not Pentecostals (Van Dijk 2009; Maxwell 1998; Martin 1990). On one level this perspective demonstrates the ideological positioning of these scholars. This means that this perspective might not be accurate at another level of observation as Anthony Balcomb (2001) and Ogbu Kalu (2008) argue. Writing from within the South African context, Balcomb feels that Pentecostal 'revision of consciousness' in its adherents could have been politically beneficial for general democratisation and social cohesion in South Africa if it had raised a consciousness in members that could function beyond denominational-chauvinism and sectarianism. But the weakness of the movement is its preoccupation with personal salvation which some South African scholars feel worked against the movement in the days of structural and systemic evil wrought by apartheid (Balcomb 2001; Anderson and Pillay 1997; De Wet 1989).

While such parochial characteristics might have militated against any positive engagement against apartheid, despite the subsequent democratisation process among some Pentecostals, the article aims to demonstrate that within the tradition there are resources which can be harnessed for the purpose of developing what is termed here Pentecopolitanism – an ethical frame for Pentecostal engagement in social cohesion. This ethical frame can enable the movement to transcend ecclesiastical chauvinism and to embrace wider society; such an approach can also benefit the other church traditions in South Africa. The question is: how can Pentecopolitanism as a new ethical frame help NAP to broaden its notion of social cohesion in order to contribute more adequately to national social cohesion in South Africa? Or more precisely, how should contemporary African Pentecostalism in South Africa define itself in the context of religious pluralism for the sake of social cohesion? I will respond to these questions in three steps, corresponding to the three sections of this article. I begin by showing the challenges that militate against NAP's

viable engagement in the process of promoting social cohesion. Secondly, I will engage the potential of the movement for promoting social cohesion. Finally, I propose a new concept I term Pentecopolitanism, as an ethical frame for NAP's engagement in social cohesion in South Africa.

The NAP and the Challenge of Promoting Social Cohesion

The notion of social cohesion in this study refers to the search for a socially healed and reconciled, just and equitable, inclusive, participatory society in which restitution and land redistribution have taken place. According to Stephanus de Beer (2014:2), this is a kind of society:

> That does not minimise the reality of diversity and complexity but that displays high degrees of collectivity, interconnectivity, interdependence, acceptance, inclusivity, equity, justice, fairness, mutuality and integration. It speaks of a society that unifies people despite their difference; that builds on local, community and regional assets; that journeys towards a common vision or visions that have been negotiated and constructed despite (initially) competing visions.

It is a kind of society that promotes 'social solidarity and reduction in wealth disparities; social networks and social capital; place attachment and identity' (Vasta 2013: 198). The question is how to enable new African Pentecostal Christianity to engage in the 'process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunities within [South Africa], based on trust, hope, and reciprocity among all [South Africans]' (Jenson 1998:4).

Current research that has explored the possible role NAP can play in the promotion of political and economic development in South Africa has not specified ways in which this can be done, especially in reference to the promotion of social cohesion (Centre for Development and Enterprise - CDE 2008).[3] NAP promotes social networks, social capital, mobility, belonging and identity, and simultaneously emphasises 'rupturing and

3 The CDE research on Pentecostalism in South Africa concluded that the movement remains underutilised as a social capital resource for socio-political and economic development in South Africa (CDE, 2008).

"breaking" [as] part of the overall ideology, they are in practice translated in day-to-day situations in patterns of social distancing' (Van Dijk 2009:284).

NAP in South Africa cannot be understood except in the socio-historical context in which it has developed. The movement emerged in the context of entrenched marginalisation and the struggles of the underprivileged for their humanity, dignity and identity (Anderson and Pillay 1997; Balcomb 2001; Horn 2006; Frahm-Arp 2010). Black South Africans were denied their basic human rights even in many white Pentecostal churches, which for the most part supported apartheid (Anderson and Pillay 1997; Horn 2006). As a result, many black South African Pentecostals continue to function with an 'otherworldly' theology (Anderson and Pillay 1997). This means that while they talk about material success, their theological focus is much more on heavenly participation than on national experiences. Some scholars think that 'Pentecostal and charismatic churches create new social, economic and moral structures and act to transform both the subjectivities and lifestyles of their followers' (Freeman 2012:15). African Pentecostal scholars are not sure about this argument as they argue that the Pentecostal role in economic development in Africa is more ambiguous than some scholars acknowledge (Wariboko 2012; Zalanga 2010). This seems to be the position Ogbu Kalu (2008:191–192) takes when he argues that 'the ordinary Pentecostal in Africa is less concerned with modernity and globalization and more focused on a renewed relationship with God, intimacy with the transcendental, empowerment by the Holy Spirit and protection in the blood of Jesus as the person struggles to eke out a viable life in a hostile environment'. It is important to highlight that an essentialist approach to Pentecostalism may fail to recognise that the movement functions differently in different contexts and this also contributes to diversity within it. This raises a question: how did Pentecostalism in South Africa construct its identity in relation to wider society?

The influence of beliefs on political engagement

In the initial stages, Pentecostalism in South Africa, like global Pentecostalism – was framed in the discourses of becoming 'born again',

which was equated with being a 'new creation' (Van Wyk 2002:41). This demanded the adoption of a new moral code and spiritual life which put members in a process of constantly struggling to uphold a newfound religious identity, and simultaneously opposing mainstream Christianity, and subverting non-Christian religious traditions, African cultural heritage and national identities. Those born again were constantly challenged to adopt 'a new morality that condemns abortion, adultery, and homosexuality, all in the context of a symbolic break from the "world"' (Sorj and Martuccelli no date:30). Peter Berger (2010:3–9) has described Pentecostalism as a form of 'this-worldly asceticism' with a strong affinity with the Protestant ethic that promotes personal piety, discipline and honesty, and discourages excessive spending of money, while encouraging entrepreneurship. In the minds of many Pentecostals, all other identities are an inadequate reference for pleasing God and hence they engage in self-construction of identities that are antagonistic or in opposition to other religious and secular identities (Esterberg 1997). Such a self-construction is objective as well as subjective (Berger 1973). The way Pentecostals acquire knowledge is conditioned by the Pentecostal worldview enshrined in their belief systems. The significance of Pentecostal beliefs in identity construction lies in the emphasis on experience as a critical resource for doing pastoral ministry. Thus, it is not easy to identify Pentecostals on the basis of their beliefs or even theology. Pentecostalism has deliberately created the identities of its adherents as a mechanism for sorting through existential experiences, relationships and politics. This shared worldview shapes the members' empirical attitudes to and expectations of political activity (Wessels 1997). Nico Horn (2006:2), researcher for the Pentecostal Project for University of South Africa, notes that for many Pentecostals in South Africa 'politics was initially part of the taboo. Light and darkness had nothing in common. Empowerment of the Holy Spirit had nothing to do with society'.

NAP in South Africa seems to be positioned between opposing realities – political engagement or disengagement. The movement's thought system exists in tension with its engagement with issues of politics, development and

modern science. For instance, some scholars argue that many Pentecostals emphasise a 'this-worldly ascetic' orientation since their members are involved in all aspects of national life as a critical site for propagating their beliefs and practices (Anderson 1992a). Yet others see ambiguity in the theological orientation of the movement (Wariboko 2012; Zalanga 2010). The apparent contradictions in the observations could result from the methodological approaches, biases, and ideological orientation of field researchers but could equally result from 'inherent contradictions, diversity, and tensions within the movement' (Kalu 2008:194). Anderson (1992a) and other scholars who argue that the movement is this-worldly oriented, however, refer to the personal involvement of individual Pentecostal members which is not often done in the name of any denomination.

Pentecostalism in South Africa perceives itself in terms of a missionary and evangelistic vocation to take the gospel to the ends of the earth. This process also involves a spiritual struggle against 'principalities and powers', and the state and public spheres are often expressed in these terms. Horn (2006:2) argues that in the worldview of many South African Pentecostals 'power and empowerment of the Spirit are the diametric opposite of the power and power structures of the world'. There has been a belief that the Holy Spirit has had nothing to do with the present world order. During apartheid many Pentecostals such as Reverend Nicholas Bengu 'saw political involvement in political struggle as "sinful"' (Anderson and Pillay 1997:239) or 'even contrary to God's plans and thus counter-productive' (Horn 2006:3). To be fair, some Africans in Pentecostal circles engaged in political struggle against apartheid, such as the Reverend Frank Chikane. However, this was done at an individual level (Anderson and Pillay 1997).

Despite this occasional involvement, CDE (2008:61) finds that many adherents of NAP in post-apartheid South African are 'notoriously averse to talking about or occupying their minds with politics'. This does not mean that Pentecostals have no 'firm views about the political situation in South Africa,' rather, 'most preferred to emphasise spiritual rather than social and political convictions' (CDE 2008:19). Many Pentecostals are sceptical about involving themselves in social activities due to a belief that the world

can absorb them into its social system and snuff out their spiritual vitality. They argue that one cannot influence the world by becoming 'like it or more tolerant' (Hughes 2011:54). The worldview that informs this kind of religious consciousness is ambiguous, perceiving political engagement as seduction by evil forces. It is therefore important to examine this worldview, as this article now does.

Pentecostal ontology as a locus for exclusive identity construction

Defining Pentecostal ontology is fraught with insurmountable challenges. A reasonable way to approach this task, however, is to examine some of the notable features that embody Pentecostal thinking. In his article, 'Charismatic Christian Congregations and Social Justice: A South African perspective,' Gabriel Wessels (1997) identifies three most salient features of the New African Pentecostal worldview in South Africa as follows.

First, the ontology is essentially dualistic. It makes a sharp dichotomy between the present reality in which we live and the spiritual reality. The present reality is constructed as a site of struggle between spiritual forces of good and evil. Satan is understood as the ultimate source of human suffering and all evil, even those that have physical causality (Wessel 1997; Marshal 1995; Asamoah-Gyadu 2005). The born again thus perceive their Christian vocation as God's calling to separate themselves from the world and its evil desires by living a holy life (Anderson and Pillay 1997:230). They see themselves as the temple of God which should have no agreement with idols; 'believers will not be unequally yoked together with unbelievers, righteousness will have no fellowship with unrighteousness, and light will have no communion with darkness' (Hughes 2011:54). If there is any form of involvement in social activities, this is often motivated by an underlying desire to convert 'the sinners' to Pentecostalism. Social involvement is often unconsciously or consciously utilised as bait within a gospel marketing strategy. Such a dualistic worldview seems to have prevented Pentecostals from contributing adequately to democratisation and the social cohesion process in post-apartheid South Africa. There is a corresponding

ambivalence in most Pentecostals' understanding of citizenship. Most of them see a dichotomy between their national citizenship and heavenly citizenship. In fact some do not even see themselves as citizens of their particular nations but describe themselves as aliens or foreigners whose citizenship is in heaven. Writing from the Brazilian context Rudolf von Sinner (2012:116) argues that even in the 'increasingly publicly-present Pentecostal churches have widely abided by the principle that "the faithful don't mingle with politics"'. This appears to be the case even for NAP in South Africa. The question that arises is whether such an understanding of Pentecostalism makes it susceptible to being described as divisive and as an alienating religious movement.

The second flows from the first. It is that Pentecostal ontology is apocalyptic in nature. Whereas different Pentecostal churches subscribe to various beliefs about eschatology (the doctrine about the 'end times'), they nevertheless share a fundamental conviction of the imminent damnation or destruction of the present reality (Wessels 1997). They believe in the coming of the new world, which is qualitatively different from the present world and which will be inaugurated with the advent of Christ. This conceptualisation of the present reality as transient shows the important role played by the movement's eschatological beliefs in shaping and reinforcing conceptions of political engagement, particularly the church's sense of mission in promoting programs of social cohesion (Dempster 1993). The majority of these beliefs are based on the understanding that Christians live for the future, while sinners live for the present evil world (Hughes 2011:54). The consequences are that if people become convinced that the present reality is destined for imminent destruction, they become apathetic to socio-political activities because they no longer see themselves as part of that reality, nor do they see its activities as valuable and beneficial.

Despite that, in her recent study of New Pentecostalism in South Africa, Maria Frahm-Arp (2010:68) notes that the movement in its most recent manifestation is no longer a world-rejecting movement but rather one that calls for embracing the world and seeking ways to change it by encouraging members to express their faith in the public sphere, engage in

evangelism and take up leadership in all aspects of civic and economic life. Frahm-Arp (2010:68) adds that there is a notable emphasis 'on building communities as secure places that shield members from the forces of evil'. What Frahm-Arp does not acknowledge is that there are no consistent theological admonishments given to members to be involved in political activities. Much of the members' involvement takes the form of personal initiatives which are motivated by Pentecostal values and too often do not impact significantly on all levels of society. This does not mean that Pentecostalism is politically neutral. These seemingly apolitical and socially unconcerned beliefs and practices have serious political implications and 'are not confined to the sphere of subjectivity' (Sorj and Martuccelli no date:31). They have serious 'repercussions for daily life, building solidarity and becoming a purveyor of meaning and collective identification'. However, these repercussions are only for the members of that particular Pentecostal denomination (Sorj and Martuccelli no date:31). This means that while Pentecostalism provides social cohesion to its members, it also threatens the national vision for social cohesion by negating political and other public spheres.

This leads to the third aspect of this ontology. It is seen as pessimistic because it rejects the present world in favour of the coming world. This perspective is especially true for classical Pentecostals who are essentially premillennialists[4] (Balcomb 2001). But many New African Pentecostal churches are world-affirming postmillennialists.[5] However, the weakness of these churches is that while 'they represent coherent ideological alternatives' (Ranger 1986:3) to premillennialism, they do not engage in rational socio-political analysis and develop deliberate strategies for promoting social cohesion beyond their ecclesiastical corners. They are also involved in vicious competition for members and accusations of 'sheep-stealing' (Kalu 2008).

4 Premillennialism is a classical theology based on the argument that there would a millennium of blessedness which will begin with the imminent Second Coming of Christ.

5 Postmillennialism is a theological view that the Second Coming of Christ will culminate in a millennium of blessedness.

Further, many of these NAP churches can be regarded as this-worldly in focusing on the immediate existential needs of any individual member and preoccupied with progress and prosperity, while simultaneously promoting sectarian approaches to other religious traditions and secular institutions. The ideology of 'breaking' has also promoted individualism, as some have preferred to break with extended family and social relational obligations (Van Dijk 2009; Meyer 1998). In addition, many NAP churches are preoccupied with how to remoralise political and public spheres completely through the power of the Holy Spirit (Marshall 1995; Gifford 1998). The effect of this self-construction is that the political spheres and their agendas are perceived negatively, as controlled by evil forces (Marshall 1995). Such a contradictory postmillennial view of this world seems to militate against positive engagement in social and political action, except narrowly to advance self-preservation and security. This means that for the NAP to become proactive in championing social cohesion there is a need for it to develop coherence within its worldview.

The potential of NAP to contribute to social cohesion

Despite the weaknesses observed above, I argue that NAP has enormous potential for the mobilisation of its adherents for nation building and social cohesion in South Africa. In many Pentecostal churches the believers are encouraged to 'develop new personal and commercial skills through the programmes offered by their churches that support them in managing the various demands of modernising neo-liberal [South] African economies' (Frahm-Arp 2010:68). As observed above, the theology of some of the New African Pentecostal churches in South Africa can be classified as this-worldly because of its emphasis on context realities. For instance, Bishop Musa Sono of Grace Bible Church in Soweto or Pastor Vusi Dube, who is a politician and senior pastor of eThekwini Community Church in Durban, seek in their proclamations to overcome the current pessimistic attitude that nothing has changed in the new South Africa 'and that black people were destined to spend their lives on the economic and political fringe of the world' (Frahm-Arp 2010:115). They therefore encourage

their members to participate actively in socio-political, economic and cultural transformation in the country. In addition, they emphasise the building of strong family ties. The nuclear family is understood as a sign of God's blessing and expression of holiness in the world. Therefore men are admonished to play an active role in the upbringing and care of their children, and to have a strict moral code of purity. They are urged to desist from premarital sex, extramarital sex, alcohol, gambling, pornography, tobacco, drugs and a range of activities which Pentecostals perceive as sinful (Frahm-Arp 2010). In terms of the protection of family institutions, preservation of home life and defending the personal spheres of many South Africans, the CDE survey established that Pentecostalism has done far better than any public institution (CDE 2008:30). There are also certain social therapeutic benefits for becoming born again in South Africa today such as recovery and abstinence from alcohol and drug abuse, promotion of family ties and the work ethic associated with saving, valuing success, and obtaining material wealth by the grace of God.

Some sociologists of religion have observed that metaphysically NAP is a movement that is not just more hospitable to gender equality but promotes the emancipation of women (Berger 2010). On the contrary, some recent studies on these movements demonstrate that while the earliest Pentecostals promoted emancipation of women, in NAP women remain marginalised from positions of authority and remain under the leadership of men (Masenya 2004; Nadar 2009). This shows that NAP is far from any form of utopia for women. In fact, the irony about the Pentecostal empowerment of women is that it disempowers women through its vehement propagation of the theology of unquestionable submission of women to male authority which strategically relegates women to subaltern positions. Yet there is a level at which the New Pentecostalism has provided a safe space and 'avenue for the recognition and integration of marginalised people' (CDE 2008:26). The CDE concluded that of all public institutions, and 'all the denominations, the Pentecostal churches are probably best able to reach out to South Africa's marginalised communities' (CDE 2008:26).

NAP also claims to have divine secrets and the power to solve every human problem, and has contributed to perceiving itself as a legitimate religious *locus* for constructing and shaping new social identities (Anderson 2013; Frahm-Arp 2010; Horn 2006). Pentecostal churches in South Africa are no longer mere contexts of spiritual renewal but have become critical sites of identity construction and moral formation – spaces where people who are politically and economically excluded find inspiration as they join together to apprehend religiously what it means to be and live in post-apartheid South Africa with its socio-political and economic struggles (Chipkin and Leatt 2011; Frahm-Arp 2010; CDE 2008). Pentecostalism is a socially therapeutic space for purging of the old self fashioned in the image of apartheid. It is a socially introspective site for evaluating and re-evaluating identities and evolving new identities fashioned in the image of the Pentecostal imagination. These churches act as spaces for experiencing 'deliverance' and engaging in activities that overflow beyond formal church services into other social spaces such as family and work. The recent survey on the impact of Pentecostalism in South Africa revealed that 'religious commitment in general imparts a buoyant mood and spiritual "capital" seems to be correlated with social capital, confidence, patience and fortitude. Religion seems to insulate people from political and economic stress even without "other worldly" seclusion or fatalism' (CDE 2008:61).

The following five key aspects render NAP a desirable force needed in South Africa, a country searching for strategies for nation-building and social cohesion: First, the recent study by Ivor Chipkin and Annie Leatt (2011) demonstrates that new Pentecostalism is the fastest growing religio-social movement in South Africa. This means that the movement is contributing enormously to reshaping the cultural identity of post-apartheid South Africans. This has major implications for nation building and social cohesion. There will no doubt be radical worldview alterations in future South African religious and socio-political landscapes. Second, Pentecostalism has faithful members who regularly attend church, not only on Sundays, but during the week. Anderson (2013:3) notes that the adherents of new Pentecostalism 'are often on the cutting edge of the

encounter with other religions and ideology, sometimes confrontationally so'. Third, Pentecostal membership comprises mostly the younger generation, which is believed to be more volatile and an age group that contributes significantly to social unrest and upheaval in South Africa (Thomas 2003). This means that in many ways the future of South Africa lies in the hands of these churches. Fourth, Pentecostal churches have successfully maintained a strong public presence in the media, more than any other religious groups or social institutions. This means that Pentecostalism appeals to wider audiences beyond their local churches. Consequently 'they shape new forms of public religiosity that spill over into various forms of popular culture and resonate with broad audiences' (De Witte 2012:144). Fifth, these churches also promote 'internationalism through global travel and networking' (Anderson 2005:87). These patterns of Pentecostal pilgrimages also contribute to shaping the transcultural nature of present-day Pentecostalism. This means that through such visits to other Pentecostals in different countries, new cultures are developing among South African churches and consequently the cultural life of the nation will soon become transformed either for good or bad. To revert then to the main question: how can Pentecopolitanism as an ethical frame of thinking assist NAP to engage efficaciously in the process of social cohesion in South Africa?

The Pentecopolitanism: An ethical framework for engaging in social cohesion

In the present South African context, one that is radically religiously pluralistic and secular, it has become increasingly necessary for any religion to search for theological premises that can guide it in relating to other religions and in finding life-giving ways of engagement in the process of social cohesion. Hans Kung (cited in Cahill 2003:23), a Roman Catholic theologian, rightly argues that what is needed today is 'religiosity with a foundation but without fundamentalism; religiosity with religious identity, but without exclusivity; religiosity with certainty of truth, but without fanaticism'. This kind of religion is what Desmond Cahill

(2003:23) classifies as 'a new religious cosmopolitanism'. This is a similar point that Jean-Daniel Plüss (2014), a Pentecostal scholar, makes when he calls for rethinking Pentecostal ecclesiology in the context of ecumenical engagement. These scholars appear to be pointing to the need for a new cosmopolitan theological discourse that demonstrates an equal love for other religious traditions as much as one loves his or her religious tradition. This is because God's Spirit is presented in the Bible as a cosmopolitan Spirit of unconditional love and solidarity with the whole universe. The Spirit of God is present and active in the lowest of all creation as much as it is present in the greatest and most intelligent of all creation. Thus, I suggest a Pentecostal ethical frame of engaging in the process of social cohesion based on Pentecostal cosmopolitanism or a newly-coined term, 'Pentecopolitanism'.

The idea of Pentecopolitanism is based on theological and ecclesiastical openness toward divergent religious and nonreligious experiences and a life-giving way of managing 'meaning in an interconnected and pluralistic' South African society (Hannerz 2006). The term Pentecopolitanism suggests an application of the notion of cosmopolitanism to NAP in South Africa. It is a way of connecting denominational knowledge to the immediate national context and global realities by embracing and celebrating a state of identity and religious hybridity – both to be Pentecostal and to embrace the religious other and seek to engage their religious values. The argument is that Pentecostalism may need to embrace ecclesia-ethics of openness towards diversity as the movement itself reflects some degree of religious contamination. The term contamination is used in the sense of being affected by other religious systems and not claiming religious purity. Harvey Cox (1995:16) in his empirical research on Pentecostalism discovered that the movement is 'a kind of ecumenical [hybrid/contaminated] movement, an original – and highly successful – synthesis of elements from a number of other sources, and not all of them Christian'. He (1995:16) further notes that Pentecostal 'worship constitutes a kind of compendium of patterns and practices from virtually every Christian tradition' including African traditional religions, as has been demonstrated by various scholars working

on the movement on the continent (Gifford 2009; Meyer 2004; Asamoah-Gyadu 2005).

In his seminal book, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers,* Kwame Appiah (2006) offers a particularly compelling vision that has implications for the way Pentecopolitanism is to be articulated. He (2006:144) argues, 'One distinctively cosmopolitan commitment is to pluralism. Cosmopolitans think that there are many values worth living by and that you cannot live by all of them. So we hope and expect that different people and different societies will embody different values'. Appiah (2006:163) further argues that valorising pluralism extends to embracing 'a variety of political engagements' and multiple approaches to social cohesion. In a similar trend of thought, Achille Mbembe's (2007:28) argument captures the religio-cultural, socio-historical and aesthetic sensitivity that should underlie the notion of Pentecopolitanism. He thus writes,

> Awareness of the interweaving of the here and there, the presence of the elsewhere in the here and vice versa, the relativisation of primary roots and memberships and the way of embracing, with full knowledge of the facts, strangeness, foreignness and remoteness, the ability to recognise one's face in that of a foreigner and make the most of the traces of remoteness in closeness, to domesticate the unfamiliar, to work with what seem to be opposites.

That should be at the core of how NAP frames itself in the context of searching for social cohesion. To return to Appiah, he believes that religions that maintain a critical distance and solidarity from the state are significant in broadening the definition of social cohesion; similarly Pentecostalism can contribute to national consciousness precisely because African life is deeply entrenched in the religious dimension. In his analysis of Appiah, Justin Neuman (2011:150) observes that 'strong religions run afoul of the second tenet of Appiah's cosmopolitanism, fallibility: 'Another aspect of cosmopolitanism is what philosophers call fallibilism – the sense that our knowledge is imperfect, provisional, subject to revision in the face of new evidence'. This is precisely so because despite the observation

that cosmopolitanism is entrenched in pluralism and fallibility, Appiah (2006:143) believes that, 'the neofundamentalist conception of a global *ummah* (community of believers), by contrast, admits of local variations – but only in matters that don't matter. These counter-cosmopolitans, once more like many Christian fundamentalists, do think that there is one right way for all human beings to live'. This is the situation that the Pentecopolitan perception of reality aims to overcome, by enabling its adherents to come to terms with the fact that in contemporary South Africa no single religion can have a divine monopoly on universal truth and claim universal validity (Neuman 2011:150). The question is: what practical steps can NAP take to realise the vision of Pentecopolitanism for promoting social cohesion? Drawing from Cahill's (2003:20–21) suggestions on the role religious institutions can play in promoting social cohesion, two multi-faceted contours are proposed as follows:

First, there is an urgent need to reconceptualise Pentecostal theology of prosperity as a framework for creating social capital for the social and economic well-being of South Africa. The theology of prosperity should become part of the Pentecostal commitment to the future of South Africa's 'social capital which is built around bonds, bridges, links and acceptance of the other indicat(ing) the processes that facilitate individual and social well-being and positive communal and societal outcomes within a nation or a group' (Cahill 2003:20). A theology of prosperity as a frame for conceptualising social capital will be grounded in the following aspects: a) accurate socio-historical analysis of the South African context ; b) means for critical resistance to corruption and greediness within the church and government institutions; c) nurturing 'positive psychosocial characteristics such as openness to new challenges and ambiguities, the tendency to modernity and long-sightedness, the propensity for care, nurturance and honesty' (Cahill 2003:20); and d) critically reclaiming and appropriating life-giving African cultural values in dialogue with contemporary theories of political economy and modern science to broaden Pentecostal prosperity theology. This is significant in broadening Pentecostal methodology for

creating social capital for social cohesion, within the family, economic, political, recreational and other endeavours (Cahill 2003:20).

Secondly, there is a need to reconceptualise Pentecostalism as a counter-cultural prophetic voice in South Africa. This is not to suggest that Pentecostals abandon their traditional understanding of prophesy as predicting of future events or foretelling, but calling them to broaden the notion to include social analysis and critique of the prevailing socio-political and economic order. The church is still in the world because both the church and the world need each other. Pentecostalism is well positioned in South Africa to point to and show up 'the wrong, misguided actions and false values of government, its institutions and of individuals misguided in their lust for power, sex or whatever god' (Cahill 2003:21). The church was created by God as an agent of God's prophetic mission in the world to call to account human institutions by 'challenging corruption, hypocrisy and mistaken directions' (Cahill 2003:21) in the following two ways:

First, this means that for Pentecostals to consolidate their prophetic voice in South Africa, participation in policy discourses should be regarded as a sacred task similar to homily proclamation on a Sunday. It should become a crucial aspect of the public prophetic ministry of NAP.[6] If the Pentecostals become involved in policy making discourse they will have a more significant impact on public life and affect the course of national events. This also entails that the church must learn the language that is used by policy makers so that it can effectively and intellectually participate in the process. This may require organising workshops on the policy making process which may include, but should not be limited to, the significance of public policies for national life and how they affect the lives of individuals in different ways. This should also include how to identify policy problems, formulate proposals, and legitimise, implement and evaluate public policies. Without such preparation, some Pentecostals may be uncomfortable with

6 In the article, 'Churches and public policy discourses in South Africa', Nico Koopman (2010) discusses at length the why and the how the church's involvement in the process of policy making in South Africa.

engaging in public policy processes mainly because they have little or no understanding of what is involved in the process of making public policy.

Secondly, Pentecostals must also be concerned about the struggles of the working class in South Africa as this class contributes significantly to the financial stability and wellbeing of mushrooming churches. There is a need for a prophetic Pentecostal strategy that can advocate for the dignity and rights of the working class in South Africa. The concerns of the workers in their work places are sacred concerns because human beings are sacred. Therefore, their concerns must be taken as ecclesiastical concerns. For instance, Pentecostalism must have a prophetic response to concerns such as the Marikana massacre in which 44 lives were lost during a prolonged wage strike. The Pentecostals must seek to engage in advocacy against exploitation in the field of wages, working conditions and social security for the working class. It should be calling for fair wages and safe work places for these are issues of social justice and human rights. Pope John Paul II (1981:33) in the encyclical of 1981, *Laborem Exercens (On Human Work)* notes that 'the principle of the priority of labor over capital is a postulate of the order of social morality'. This means that the church cannot leave the concerns of the workers in the hands of government and unions alone. There is a need to achieve social justice within the work places of South Africa and the Church has a role to play in this.

Conclusion

This article responded to the research question of how Pentecopolitanism as a new ethical frame can help NAP broaden its understanding of social cohesion in order to contribute more adequately to national social cohesion in South Africa. It has demonstrated that NAP lacks the theology that is effective in enabling the movement to engage in the process of promoting social cohesion in South Africa. Despite its theological weaknesses, NAP in South Africa has 'cultural advantages' in terms of social mobility and the promotion of social cohesion. Thus, this article has proposed Pentecopolitanism as a new ethical frame for NAP's engagement in social cohesion. The notion is intended to help New African Pentecostalism to

broaden its religious identity by reconceptualising itself as a cosmopolitan religious movement within South Africa in which pluralism is perceived no longer as a threat but as an opportunity for religious growth.

The article has also demonstrated the need to develop a theological methodology through which NAP can adequately engage in the political spheres in South Africa without fear of losing its religious distinctiveness and flavour. This will help the movement to become more proactive in engaging with issues of democratisation and social cohesion in South Africa.

Sources

Anderson, Allan H. 1992. *Bazalwane: African Pentecostals in South Africa.* Pretoria, University of South Africa.

Anderson, Allan 2005. New African initiated Pentecostalism and Charismatics in South Africa. *Journal of Religion in Africa,* 35 (1), pp. 66–92.

Anderson, Allan H. 2013. *To the ends of the earth: Pentecostalism and the transformation of world Christianity.* Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Anderson, Allan H. and Gerald J. Pillay 1997. The segregated Spirit: The Pentecostals. In: Elphick, Richard and T.R.H. Davenport eds. *Christianity in South Africa: A political, social, and cultural history.* Berkeley, University of California Press. pp. 227–241.

Appiah, Kwame A. 2006. *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a world of strangers.* New York, W.W. Norton.

Asamoah-Gyadu, Kwabena J. 2005. Mission to 'set the captives free': Healing, deliverance, and generational curses in Ghanaian Pentecostalism. *International Review of Mission,* 93, pp. 389–406.

Balcomb, Anthony O. 2001. Evangelicals and democracy in South Africa - helpers or hinderers, another look, another method. *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa,* 109, pp. 3–15.

Berger, Peter L. 1973. *The social reality of religion.* Middlesex, Penguin.

Berger, Peter L. 2010. Max Weber is alive and well, and living in Guatemala: The Protestant ethic today. *The Review of Faith & International Affairs,* 8 (4), pp. 3–9.

Cahill, Desmond 2003. Paradise lost: Religion, cultural diversity and social cohesion in Australia and across the World. National Europe Centre Paper No. 79. 18–20 February 2003. Available from: <http://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/41762> [Accessed 24 June 2015].

CDE, 2008a. *Dormant capital: The Pentecostal movement in South Africa and its potential social and economic role.* Johannesburg, CDE. Available from: <http://www.cde.org.za/> [Accessed 12 September 14].

CDE, 2008b. *Under the radar: Pentecostalism in South Africa and its potential social and economic role.* Johannesburg, CDE. Available from: <http://www.cde.org.za/> [Accessed 12 September 14].

Chipkin, Ivor and Annie Leatt 2011. Religion and revival in post-apartheid South Africa. *Focus,* pp. 39–46.

Cox, Harvey 1995. *Fire from heaven: The rise of Pentecostal spirituality and the reshaping of religion in the twenty-first century*. Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

De Beer, Stephanus S. 2014. Demythologising social cohesion: Towards a practical theological vision. *Verbum et Ecclesia,* 35 (2), pp. 1–12. Available from: <http://dx.doi. org/10.4102/ve.v35i2.1344> [Accessed 21 June 2015].

De Wet, Christian R. 1989. The Apostolic Faith Mission in Africa: 1908–1980. A case study in church growth in a segregated society. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cape Town, Cape Town.

De Witte, Marleen 2012. Television and the gospel of entertainment in Ghana. *Exchange,* 41, pp. 144–164.

Dempster, Murray W. 1993. Christian social concern in Pentecostal perspective: Reformulating Pentecostal eschatology. *Journal of Pentecostal Theology,* 2, pp. 51–64.

Esterberg, Kristin 1997. *Lesbian and bisexual identities: Constructing communities, constructing selves.* Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

Frahm-Arp, Maria 2010. *Professional women in South African Pentecostal charismatic churches.* Leiden, Brill.

Freeman, Dena 2012. The Pentecostal Ethic and the Spirit of Development. In: Freeman, Dena, ed. *Pentecostalism and development: Churches, NGOs, and social change in Africa.* Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 1–40.

Gifford, Paul 1998. *African Christianity: Its public role.* London, Hurst and Company.

Gifford, Paul 2009. The primal Pentecostal imagination: Variants, origins and importance. *Suomen Antropologi,* 34 (2), pp. 44–52.

Hannerz, Ulf 2006. Two faces of Cosmopolitanism: Culture and politics. Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB), Barcelona, Spain. Available from: <www.cidob.org> [Accessed 21 June 2015].

Horn, Nico 2006. Power and empowerment in the political context of some Afrikaans-speaking Pentecostals in South Africa. *Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae,* XXXII (3), pp. 225–253.

Hughes, Ray H. 2011. *Classic Pentecostal sermon library, Vol. 1.* Cleveland, Pathway Press.

Hunt, Stephen J. 2002. Deprivation and Western Pentecostalism revisited: Neo-Pentecostalism. *PentecoStudies*, 1 (2), pp. 1–29.

Jenson, Jane 1998. Mapping social cohesion: The state of Canadian research. Canadian Policy Research Networks, CPRN Study No. F/03, Ottawa. Available from: <http://cprn.org/documents/15723_en.pdf> [Accessed 26 June 2015].

Koopman, Nico N. 2010. Churches and public policy discourses in South Africa. *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa,* 136, pp. 41–56.

Marshall, Ruth 1995. 'God is not a democrat': Pentecostalism and democratisation in Nigeria. In: Gifford, Paul ed. *The Christian Churches and the democratisation of Africa.* Leiden, E. Brill, pp. 239–260.

Martin, David 1990. *Tongues of fire: The explosion of Protestantism in Latin America.* Oxford, Blackwell.

Masenya, Madipoane 2004. *How worthy is the woman of worth: Rereading Proverbs 31:10–31 in African South Africa.* Peter Lang, New York.

Maxwell, David 1998. 'Delivered from the Spirit of Poverty?': Pentecostalism, prosperity and modernity in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 28 (3), pp. 350–373.

Mbembe, Achille 2007. Afropolitanism. In: Simon, Njami and Lucy Durán eds. *Africa remix: Contemporary art of a continent.* Johannesburg, Johannesburg Art Gallery. pp. 26–30.

Meyer, Birgit 1998. 'Make a complete break with the past.' Memory and post-colonial modernity in Ghanaian Pentecostalist discourse. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 28 (3), pp. 316–349.

Meyer, Birgit 2004. Christianity in Africa: From African Independent to Pentecostal-charismatic Churches. *Annual Review of Anthropology,* 33, pp. 447–474.

Molobi, Victor 2014. Living in the townships: An appraisal of Pentecostal social ministry in Tshwane. *HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies*, 70 (3), pp. 1–9. Available from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/hts.v70i3.2791> [Accessed 21 June 2015].

Nadar, Sarojini 2009. 'The Bible Says!' Feminism, hermeneutics and Neo-Pentecostal challenges. *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa*, 134, pp. 131–146.

Neuman, Justin 2011. Religious cosmopolitanism? Orhan Pamuk, the headscarf debate, and the problem with pluralism. *Minnesota Review,* 77, pp. 143–161.

Paul, John (Pope) 1981. Encyclical Letter: *Laborem Exercens.* The Catholic Document Archive. Available from: <http://www.catholic-pages.com/documents/> [Accessed 26 June 2015].

Parsitau, Damaris S. and Philomena N. Mwaura 2010. God in the city: Pentecostalism as an urban phenomenon in Kenya. *Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae*, 36 (2), pp. 95–112.

Plüss, Jean-Daniel 2014. Pentecostalism and ecumenism of the Spirit. 48th International Ecumenical Seminar, Strasbourg, France, July 2–9, 2014. Available from: <http://www.strasbourginstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Pentecostalism-and-Ecumenism-of-the-Spirit.pdf> [Accessed 24 June 2015].

Ranger, Terence 1986. Religious movements and politics in Sub-Sahara Africa. *African Studies Review*, 29 (2), pp. 1–69.

Sorj, Bernardo and Danilo Martuccelli no date. *The Latin American challenge: Social cohesion and democracy.* São Paulo, the Edelstein Center. Available from: <http://www.centroedelstein.org> [Accessed 11 September 2014].

Thomas, Paul 2003. Young people, community cohesion and the role of youth work in building social capital. *Youth and Policy*, 81, pp. 21–43.

Van Dijk, Rijk 2009. Gloves in times of AIDS: Pentecostalism, hair and social distancing in Botswana. In: Becker, F. and W. Geissler eds. *Aids and religious practice in Africa.* Leiden and Boston, Brill. pp. 283–306.

Van Wyk, Jan A. 2002. Discrepancies in textual interpretation within Pentecostal theology - Hermeneutic considerations. Masters Thesis, University of South Africa, Pretoria.

Vasta, Ellie 2013. Do we need social cohesion in the 21st Century? Multiple languages of belonging in the metropolis. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 34 (2), pp. 196–213.

Von Sinner, Rudolf 2012. Pentecostalism and citizenship in Brazil: Between escapism and dominance. *International Journal of Public Theology*, 6, pp. 99–117.

Wariboko, Nimi 2012. Pentecostal paradigms of national economic prosperity in Africa. In: Yong, Amos and Katherine Attanasi eds. *Pentecostalism and prosperity: The socioeconomics of the Global Charismatic Movement.* New York, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 35–59.

Wessels, Gabriel 1997. Charismatic Christian congregations and socialjJustice: A South African perspective. *Missionalia*, 25 (3). Available from: <http://www.reocities.com/Athens/parthenon/8409/wessels.htm> [Accessed 11 September 2014].

Zalanga, Samuel 2010. Religion, economic development, and cultural change: The contradictory role of Pentecostal Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Third World Studies*, 27 (1), pp. 43–62.

Book review

A Nation in crisis: An appeal for morality

Zulu, Paulus 2013

Cape Town, Tafelberg, 224 pages.
ISBN: 978-0-624-06536-4

Reviewed by Lukhona Mnguni (M.Sc. in Africa and International Development), Ph.D. intern Researcher in the Maurice Webb Race Relations Unit, University of KwaZulu-Natal

Professor Paulus Zulu's 2013 book is authoritative. It stands as a compelling indictment of the lack of public morality in the governance of South Africa by governing bodies, parliament and the ruling political party – the African National Congress (ANC). The book undertakes a critical discussion of morality in South Africa, tracing its roots and its manifestation in the public sphere. The book is heavily laden with academic jargon but is not overbearing and remains palatable to the general reader who is not a student of morality as an academic discipline and its informing philosophies.

Zulu's model of analysis is borrowed from the works of Joseph Schumpeter who coined the 'thesis of political entrepreneurship' and is complemented by the concept of 'political instrumentalisation of disorder' as asserted by

Chabal and Daloz. However, there may be other conceptual sources and one should not downplay the influence of a concept borrowed from an essay written in 2008 by South African struggle poet, Breyten Breytenbach. He had coined the phrase 'public office as an exercise in scavenging'. Supplementary to these three analytical frameworks is the perspective taken from political science that 'one party dominance' in a democratic state brings into question the very bona fides of that country's democracy.

Broadly speaking, it is tempting to locate the book within those that analyse the patrimonial state. However, this is for the reader to infer as the book is subject to interpretation. I choose to view the book as an explorative indictment of the lack of public morality in those that govern, and to regard its setting largely as that of the interplay between the state and the ruling party. Zulu explores a vast number of examples: from the Travelgate scandal to the challenges facing the judiciary through the case between Judge John Hlope and Justices of the Constitutional Court. A number of public protests are cited, to indicate that citizens are revolting because of a dream deferred – the dream that was promised to them in 1955 through the declaration of the Freedom Charter and 39 years later in 1994 through the ushering in of democracy.

The book has seven chapters that deal (respectively) with the roots of public morality in South Africa, the question of a dream deferred, parliamentary oversight, democracy under siege, the widening wealth gap, the question on whether a universal standard for right or wrong exists and, lastly, issues of owning up and taking responsibility for one's actions. Zulu offers this explorative indictment knowing fully well that not everyone will agree with his interpretation of events and certain actions; let alone his book. This Zulu attributes to the concept of 'contested registers', wherein there is no agreement on what is right or wrong and how the wrong should be rectified or maintained – thus leading to contested concepts of justice.

To illuminate this point, he gives an interesting account on how the discourse on Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) as a tool for redressing the past injustices suffered by black people under colonialism and apartheid

is contested. However, Zulu is not interested in the concept or rationale of BEE per se (not to say this does not matter; it simply does not fit into his adopted analytical framework). He is occupied with looking at the conduct and practice of politicians and senior bureaucrats in implementing BEE. Here he details many cases that bring to fore the ubiquity of corruption in the dealings of those who govern.

Zulu finds contesting registers even within the ruling party itself, citing the desire by the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs to ban the holding of top municipality positions by political office bearers. The 2010 National General Council of the ANC called for a revision of the Bill that the Minister had submitted in Parliament to effect this desire to separate the party from the state. Herein we can note that the party was deliberately attempting to maintain its influence on the running of municipalities.

Zulu emphatically states that 'public morality in governance is approaching a state of moral abyss' (p. 160). For this to be turned around, he does make a number of proposals. These include electoral system reform, the election of men and women of integrity into political office and the improvement of governance systems. In the latter proposal, the author considers the idea of doing away with the second sphere of government – provinces. This is an idea hardly discussed, however. The discussion is mainly about re-demarcating provinces and about increasing or decreasing their number.

However, thinking of doing away entirely with provinces could revolutionise how we think about district municipalities and about devolving more powers to them. Ultimately, this could lead to the decentralisation of governance to bring it closer to people, create better space for accountability and transparency, and increase professionalisation by redeploying some provincial public servants at municipal level. I am simply expanding and thinking on this idea by Zulu. In the book he does not elaborate much on it.

Whilst the book traces and exposes the presence of malfeasance in the governing of present day South Africa, there is little tracing done of its roots and foundations within the apartheid government days. This would expand our understanding of whether the entire genesis of corruption is attributable

to the ruling party or whether certain aspects of it were systematically embedded in the structure of governance that the ANC inherited from apartheid. Of course, Zulu does not disagree that corruption existed under apartheid. At issue here is the lack of exposition on this aspect and how corruption has sustained itself in the era of democratic dispensation.

The BEE deals that are cited by Zulu as vehicles of this malfeasance are themselves owned and managed by people who either founded them or inherited them from apartheid era participants. These owners do not guard against the corruption, and in many cases wilfully assist to ensure these BEE deals benefit politicians, state officials or their friends and families. It will be important in future for a study to be conducted towards understanding this collusion in the making of corruption between the current ruling elite and the former ruling elite under apartheid. More so, because Zulu himself emphasises that South Africa is dealing with politics of transition and ethical dilemmas attendant to such a phase of development.

The final chapter is one of the most important in the book. Here, Zulu deals with how politicians and senior public officials react when they are confronted with wrongdoing. Finding a glimpse of hope in the actions of the Gauteng Provincial Minister of Health, Qedani Mahlangu, who apologised to affected mothers due to shortage of a baby formula in a public hospital, Zulu calls this a rare occurrence in South Africa. When a politician practises such a form of taking responsibility, he/she can be said to be within the 'confessional modality'. Here, the politician or senior official in the wrong exercises contrition (realising his/her wrongful act), then confesses to it and ultimately experiences atonement. Other forms of reaction include *legalism*, wherein the accused person responds with 'I will meet you in court', certainly a growing phenomenon these days with ever increasing numbers of court cases now involving Ministers and/or senior public servants across the government and in parliament.

The third response is *moral relativism*, wherein the accused points a finger at the pervasiveness of what they are being accused of, claiming that 'others are also doing it'. The fourth response is *restitutive morality*, wherein the

accused invoke historic successes and heroism to obfuscate the current accusation against them. This would fit in well with a perspective by Franz Fanon in his seminal *Pitfalls of National Consciousness* wherein he warned that liberation movements will tend to invoke struggle credentials to remain relevant in the face of people's despondency. The last response is *conferred innocence*, wherein the accused retorts by the Animal Farm dictum that some pigs are more equal than others.

Zulu's book can be summed up as a contribution to meet the need to build a South African democracy, anchored on sound and solid institutions, and led by men and women who function within the Kantian concept of deontological morality – wherein the actions of governance must in themselves be morally sound and ethical in pursuit of a noble end. Democracy for Zulu is built on three pillars: fraternity, equality and liberty. He counsels the reader soundly that 'a country's human rights record is not judged by the GDP per capita that it generates nor by conspicuous consumption, but rather by the absence of beggars in the streets' (p. 17). Therefore, consolidating the South African democracy is in the interest of building a more just and prosperous society – reversing the malaise that is leading millions of people to the perception of a dream deferred.