African Journal on Conflict Resolution

Volume 8, Number 1, 2008

ACCORD
THE AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

Contents

Foreword

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Following our special issue on identity and cultural diversity in conflict resolution in Africa (Volume 7, Number 2, 2007), this issue of the *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* addresses various problems from diverse conflict resolution perspectives. Despite the broad range of issues covered, however, the articles and the book review in this issue reveal a striking common focus on diversity and the restoration of relationships.

Jonah Leff discusses the fact that one of the most urgent tasks in a post-war situation is the rehumanising one. Ex-combatants are not just military puppets that have to be disarmed and demobilised; they are members of families and communities. After, but also during, the formal work of disentangling them from military units and belligerent networks, there is the crucially important task of reintegrating former combatants into their fellow-human networks. They should restore and rebuild relationships with partners, parents, children, relatives, neighbours and communities. There are also the more general relationships that usually have to be repaired or improved after a war – those, for instance, that cross the lines between ethnic, religious, income and gender groups. Human relationships are of such value that they are aptly regarded as a key component of social capital. The Sierra Leonean case study provides recommendations for an internationally supported but local community-focused approach to the reintegration of ex-combatants and the transformative rebuilding of war-torn communities.

Claude-Hélène Mayer, Christian Boness and Lynette Louw have focused their research on encounters between individuals from different cultures (Tanzanian and European) during which orientations to different values caused conflict. The authors analyse feedback from respondents and discuss the value domains and dimensions represented. Particular attention is paid to the value-orientations that seem to be most prone to lead to conflict, and to approaches that individuals, groups and mediators may adopt to resolve such conflict and avoid repetitions of similar incidents. The authors provide recommendations, that are particularly relevant for education institutions, cross-cultural trainers, consultants and researchers, and which are about cross-cultural awareness, knowledge, sensitivity, empathy and understanding.

Mark Davidheiser and Aniuska Luna have studied the history of intergroup relations between sedentary, agricultural farmers and more nomadic pastoralists in West Africa (using case studies from Senegal, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Cameroon). In the more remote past these two groups apparently managed – generally speaking – to coexist in a complementary and cooperative relationship. In the more recent past, however, this relationship has been disrupted by demographic changes and environmental degradation, and especially by international development projects. However well-intentioned, the top-down importation of Western models of 'development' and 'production' systems proved to be incompatible with the time-proven custom of mutually beneficial symbiosis. Recommendations are therefore given for restoring the traditional relationship between farmers and herders as far as possible although current circumstances and population figures are very different. Instead of formal and retributive approaches, bottom-up methods of land management and conflict resolution can be promoted.

In the last article, David McCoy emphasises the prevalence of inequalities between groups as a root cause of conflict, not only in Africa but also in the rest of the world. He stresses the crucial importance of this insight when, after a protracted intra-state war, efforts are undertaken to rebuild a peaceful and stable society. In such a process, superficial restorative measures cannot be of real and lasting effect. Nothing less is necessary than effectively

addressing the root cause behind the conflict in a way that satisfies all the parties concerned, but particularly, of course, the group that has suffered most under inequalities. Obviously, the particular types and levels of inequality differ from situation to situation, and accordingly different key concepts may be most appropriate in each case. Very often the focus of a conflict is on ethnicity or poverty, or on greed as a major cause of poverty or discrimination. In so many cases, however, the basic problem proves to be nothing other than inequality between groups who are convinced that they can justifiably claim equality. In this article, case studies of Mali and Rwanda are used and lessons are recommended for resolving conflicts by eliminating inequalities or reducing them as far as possible. Wrongdoing can be admitted – even by a government. Groups discriminated against can be included and granted access to citizenship rights or property rights, or they may be granted decentralised self-determination. Priority may be given to poverty reduction and national reconciliation.

The reviewed book, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace* by Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala, highlights the complexity of ethnic, religious and political identities, of cultural and economic diversities, and of the spate of violent conflicts that has seriously marred the first fifty years of independence in Sudan. The authors show how peace agreements came to nothing due to the breaking of promises and trust. The book emphasises that a future of reconciliation is possible, but would require the political will to acknowledge the injustices of the past, accept the equality and dignity of all Sudanese, and become committed to mutual respect and accommodation.

We are glad that in this issue we can share more perspectives on identity and cultural diversity with our readers. As usual, we do not expect readers to agree with everything in the articles we publish, but we are sure that there will be enough agreement about the relevance of exploring human interactions and relations across the divides in human society. There should also be sufficient agreement about the need to come up with courageous recommendations on putting appropriate theories into practice, and propagating locally proven solutions for wider use.

Something else we wish to share with our readers, is a semantically-based relational experience we had when editing these articles. We were struck by all the important words beginning with one of two key prefixes we have inherited from Latin. The first one is 're-', which adds the notion of 'again' to what follows. 'Reintegration' means *again* making a separated person or thing part of an integrated whole that used to exist. 'Reconciliation' means to make friends *again*. So as we read about restoring and rebuilding relationships, we can form a mental picture of an interrelatedness that used to be there and that might be put into place again as far as possible – if the erstwhile bonds cannot even become stronger after having been disrupted. The other prefix is 'co-', which communicates 'together', 'jointly' or 'equally'. When we read about cooperating and coexisting, we can feel the thrill of our *ubuntu*-togetherness and be inspired to contribute to greater social cohesion. At the same time, however, we may remember that 'con-' also means 'together' and that 'conflict' is a matter of 'hitting together'. But, as stated in the concluding article, 'conflict should not be viewed as something intrinsically negative'. Conflict may indeed serve the legitimate purpose of exposing and removing inequalities and working towards the best attainable level of coexistence.

We therefore see this issue of the Journal as articulating the idea that peacemakers should identify socio-politico-economic injustices, acknowledge cross-cultural and other diversities, and promote approaches, mindsets and methods that restore relationships and build coexistence.

The Nexus between Social Capital and Reintegration of Ex-combatants: A Case for Sierra Leone

Jonah Leff *

Abstract

Following the end of the cold war, the international community shifted its attention from duelling ideological warfare to the many intra-state, or internal armed conflicts occurring globally. In response, the United Nations, along with a wide array of aid agencies, have invested greater and greater time and resources in post-conflict environments. When peace is reached after conflict, economic and social conditions are not conducive for ex-combatants to reintegrate on their own. Programmes that address ex-combatants as well as broader post-conflict recovery are essential. Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) is one such programme that has received widespread attention. Policy analysts have debated the factors that contribute to a successful DDR programme.

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This study examines reintegration, the final phase of DDR, arguing that in order to achieve successful reintegration of ex-combatants, a community-focused approach that generates social capital must be implemented. Using a comprehensive literature review of social capital and community-based reintegration and a thorough case study from Sierra Leone, this paper will demonstrate the relationship between social capital and reintegration.

Introduction

Since the end of the cold war, the international community has shifted its focus from what for decades was characterised by duelling ideological warfare to the many masked internal armed conflicts taking place throughout the world. In doing so, international organisations and States have placed post-conflict peacekeeping and reconstruction at the top of their humanitarian and development agendas. The development community has recognised that the insecurity that persists in the aftermath of armed conflict can impede development efforts and progress toward meeting the Millennium Development Goals and sustainable peace. There is also evidence that insecurity, intensified by the prevalence of small arms and the ex-combatants that possess them, can have a negative impact on the economic and social conditions of countries emerging from conflict (Muggah 2005). At the end of conflict there is often a surge of ex-combatants entering the highly competitive labour market. Many times ex-combatants lack skills, assets, and social networks that enable them to create sustainable livelihoods. As a result, ex-combatants may return to war or a life of criminality and banditry that could adversely affect the peace process. Providing support for ex-combatants is therefore central to any post-conflict reconstruction process. This study will examine how international organisations can best support the reintegration of ex-combatants into society.

In response to the challenge of building human security in post-conflict settings, the international community has instituted a programme most commonly referred to as Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) – three distinct yet overlapping components. Under varying

nomenclature, DDR programmes are implemented by the United Nations, the World Bank, international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations. In his report to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Kofi Annan reaffirms, 'the matter of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in a peacekeeping environment as part of its continuing effort to contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building activities… has repeatedly proved to be vital to stability in a post-conflict situation; to reducing the likelihood of renewed violence, either because of a relapse into war or outbreaks of banditry; and to facilitating a society's transition from conflict to normalcy and development' (UNSC 2000a:1).

Through processes such as the United Nations' Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), the Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) and the Multi-donor Reintegration Programme (MDRP), there has been a growing acceptance that DDR, as opposed to simply a military activity, must be treated as a political, social, and economic process that intersects with sustainable long-term development (Bell & Watson 2006). Whereas disarmament and demobilisation primarily focus on the individual, reintegration shifts from the individual to the community that the ex-combatant is relocating to. In order for DDR programmes to succeed, sufficient resources and planning must be invested in the reintegration phase. It has been shown that in cases where donors have reduced or eliminated funding prematurely during reintegration, ex-combatants have been likely to resort back to lives of violence and crime. If left untreated, ex-combatants may form criminal gangs and militia groups, partaking in crime based on trade in drugs, stolen goods, and illicit weapons (Muggah 2005), as was the case in Angola, in the late 1990s, where reports linked high levels of crime and banditry to the failure of the DDR programme (UNIDIR[1] 1999).While all three elements of the DDR process are equally important in restoring peace and security, this paper will primarily focus on reintegration, the longest and most often neglected phase of DDR. The successful

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1   United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

reintegration of ex-combatants presupposes that there is a community that is socially and economically ready and able to receive them. However, this is often not the case. Having reviewed a wide range of literature explaining the reasons for successful reintegration of ex-combatants (dependent variable), this study will focus on social capital (independent variable) as a causal determinant of successful reintegration. Utilising a thorough literature review of social capital and community-focused reintegration and an in-depth case study of community-based reintegration in Sierra Leone, this study will link social capital with reintegration success. In order to measure success in Sierra Leone, three dependable reintegration evaluations will be used to operationalise the indicators for successful reintegration.

Social capital

Background

Social capital is a multidimensional term that has been defined by several social scientists, all pointing to human relationships as a resource or form of capital just as valuable as human and monetary capital. Robert Putnam describes social capital as networks of trust, which are based on agreed upon norms that can enhance efficiency through collaborative action (Putnam 1993). In Francis Fukuyama's seminal work, *Trust*, he highlights the importance of association and formation of civil society, claiming that it can only take shape in communities with shared norms and values. Out of such shared values, he argues, comes trust, which when mobilised becomes an economic value (Fukuyama 1995).

Social capital is the fabric that creates the bonds necessary for civil and civic society to effectively put policies in place. Strong social capital forms connections that cross ethnic, religious, income, and gender lines, providing a basis for post-conflict mediation, management, and mechanisms for sustaining peace and development. Before liberalising economic and political institutions, it is vital to build horizontal and vertical social capital, so that newly established frameworks will have a dependable base from which to operate. This includes developing an efficient, non-corrupt bureaucracy and

judiciary, a free press, and a participatory civil society. Social networks are integral features of peacekeeping and fulfil an important role in instituting reconstruction and reconciliation measures in post-conflict states. Countries emerging from conflict with vibrant civil society organisations and networks among its citizens can often regenerate social capital that may have deteriorated during the conflict.

Social capital and armed conflict

During armed conflict, social capital is often hijacked and used to form allegiances in the warring parties. In other words, combatants join a new social unit that rewards them with social status and a means to earn a living. In some cases, social capital is generated in the formation of demanding the right to economic equality or simply identifying a common enemy. Such was the case in Rwanda, where Hutus used ethnic-based common values to rationalise the massacre of almost 1 million Tutsis (Colletta & Cullen 2000). It is often difficult for combatants to stop fighting, because the 'war family' (Hazen 2007:1) defines their identity and is a source of security. Moreover, violence contributes to social fragmentation by polarising communities and forcing individuals to take sides during the conflict. Citizens are likely to withdraw from institutions with crosscutting ties, retreating to formal groups based on greater alliances, such as race and religion. This breakdown is important for survival, but has damaging impacts on the economy. For instance, when trust is destroyed, transaction costs rise due to the extra measures that must be taken to ensure proper delivery of goods and services. In addition, tolerance levels decrease and discrimination grows as groups lose the ability to interact outside of their own.[2]

Post-conflict societies that have been involved in human rights abuses and mass killings are often left with low levels of trust and damaged social capital. As for ex-combatants, the DDR process strips them of their social status, their sense of importance, their income, and their support network (Hazen 2007). This is exacerbated by the reluctance of communities to accept the return of ex-combatants, who in many cases had committed atrocities in the very

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2   Phone interview with Nat Colletta on December 8, 2006

communities that they wish to return to. In Uganda, for example, distrust and resentment were widespread during the initial stages of demobilisation and reintegration. Communities were unwilling to accept the return of ex-combatants that had terrorised their lives for so many years. In some cases, this led to hostilities and alienation in the early phase of reintegration (Colletta et al 1996).

In order for ex-combatants to reintegrate, they must relinquish ties with wartime social networks, and reacclimatise themselves with a new social structure, which includes unfamiliar norms, beliefs, and laws within the community. Making this transition can be confusing and psychologically traumatic for ex-combatants and the communities that they return to. Therefore, successful long-term reintegration, as part of the DDR process, can positively impact conflict resolution processes and the rebuilding of social capital (Colletta et al 1996). On the other hand, failure to conduct well planned and funded reintegration programmes can lead to further deterioration in social capital, poor economic conditions, and possibly violence. Reintegration programmes that use existing community organisations enable communities to take ownership of development, while facilitating the reintegration of ex-combatants. Informal networks among ex-combatants, such as discussion groups, veterans' associations, and business ventures are key elements for successful economic and social reintegration. These networks are especially powerful in societies where social capital is scarce (Colletta 1997).

Social capital must be transformed and catalysed so that both ex-combatants and the community can benefit from the many networks of trust that result. It is essential that ex-combatants be fully engaged in the formation of civil society, which is both a by-product and a generator of social capital (Levinger 2005). To achieve this, economic and social reintegration must be embedded in a larger process that addresses ex-combatants within the development framework of their communities. This paper will examine reintegration, claiming that without a community-focused approach that fosters new, and nurtures pre-existing, forms of social capital, ex-combatants will be less likely to secure sustainable livelihoods in post-conflict environments.

Community-focused reintegration

As opposed to targeting ex-combatants on an individual level, community-focused reintegration demands more flexible timetables and funding from donors, and views the reintegration process as a means of equally benefiting ex-combatants and community members. The World Bank estimates that it costs approximately US$1,200 to turn an ex-combatant into a civilian, with a job and a role in his or her community (World Bank 2005). This figure does not take into account the need to deliver funds for varying costs based on the needs of ex-combatants vis-à-vis their communities. Reintegration programmes that solely focus funds on the ex-combatant may be neglecting those in the community most affected by conflict. Hence, in the past few years, there has been a pendulum swing from individual to community reintegration. Nat Colletta, formerly of the World Bank, argues that there must be a balance between targeting individual ex-combatants in the short-term to bring about security and stabilisation and targeting communities in the long-term to encourage identity change, acceptance in the community, and economic integration.[3] This approach aims to provide a wide range of services for which there is demand to both ex-combatants and community members (USAID[4] 2005). DDR programmes that only target ex-combatants have received criticism, claiming that those that have been perpetrators of violence unjustifiably benefit from skills training, and are rewarded with cash packages, while community members are neglected. Although it has been shown that transitional cash payments ultimately benefit the community (Willibald 2006), it is only natural for community members to develop animosity toward ex-combatants when such support is issued. Services to ex-combatants must be offset by programmes that directly benefit communities.

A community approach to reintegration ensures that ex-combatants are given training in skills that suit the demand of the job market. In Mozambique, ex-combatants were unable to find employment in the areas in which they

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3   Phone interview with Nat Colletta on December 8, 2006
4   United States Agency for International Development

were trained. This highlights the need for training programmes to be designed around the needs of the local community and to job opportunities that are realistic. This can be achieved through labour market surveys, demographic assessments of ex-combatants, or by using key informants at the community level (UN 2006). Linking the needs of the community with relevant skills training enables ex-combatants to take steps toward sustainable livelihoods.

BOX 1 – Reintegration Impact Indicators

- Percentage of ex-combatants the programme has returned to full time education or sustainable productive economic activities.
- Percentage of child ex-combatants the programme has placed into full time education, training, apprenticeship, or income generating activities.
- Level of participation of ex-combatants in community groups, associations, and unions.
- Level of crime among ex-combatants.
- Level of social conflict reported between ex-combatants and civilians.
- Prevalence of the use of the term 'ex-combatant' in the community.

Source: Arthy 2003

DDR programmes can be structured to help communities as well as ex-combatants. For instance, establishing health centres for ex-combatants usually demands that existing health facilities and services be upgraded. With proper coordination and consultation with community leaders, such improvements can benefit community members (UN 2006). Additional reintegration methods that can be employed to nurture social capital are:

- Stopgap programmes
- Media and public awareness campaigns

- Community development projects
- Programmes for special target groups
- Reconciliation programmes

Stopgap programmes

Between the demobilisation and reintegration phase, it is sometimes beneficial to undertake stopgap programmes for ex-combatants. These are 2-3 month programmes that pay ex-combatants for demining and for the construction of community infrastructure, such as schools, water systems, hospitals, roads that may have been damaged or destroyed during the war (Caramés 2006). This is a crucial period for ex-combatants, when they often rearm and resort to banditry if their basic needs are not being met. Stopgap programmes can fill this gap, providing short-term employment for ex-combatants, while benefiting the community in the process. These programmes frequently are an entry to reconciliation between ex-combatants and their communities. In some cases, ex-combatants and community members have worked together forging relationships between the two groups. While stopgap programmes can be highly beneficial, they should not replace the main reintegration mechanism. Stopgap programmes certainly contribute to social reintegration and community building, but such programmes rarely build long-term skills and seldom lead to sustainable livelihoods. Therefore, stopgap programmes should not take the place of broader employment initiatives (UN 2006).

Media and public awareness campaigns

The establishment of social cohesion between ex-combatants and communities is essential to lasting peace. Particularly at the onset of reintegration, relations between ex-combatants and community members are far from normal. Ex-combatants are often perceived as bringing violence or being a burden to the community. Public education and awareness about the war and the return of ex-combatants is a central component of the reintegration process. The dissemination of information in schools, the media, and in communities not only prepares communities for the arrival of ex-combatants, but aids in the reconciliation process as a tool for crisis

prevention (Douglas et al 2004). Furthermore, campaigns can develop an understanding among stakeholders that DDR's purpose is not to reward ex-combatants, but rather to equip them with skills and provide them with counselling so that they become valuable assets in rebuilding the society toward greater security and peace (UN 2006).

Community development projects

Community development projects that employ ex-combatants and community members can be very beneficial toward rebuilding trust and starting reconciliation. During these programmes, implementing agencies develop a decision-making body with representatives from community members and ex-combatants. With a focus on future development, project groups can achieve conflict resolution through planning projects as opposed to dwelling on the conflict itself.[5]

The World Bank-assisted Community Reintegration and Development Project in Rwanda best illustrates this approach. The project focuses on reassigning decision-making authority from the organisation to the community level, strengthening partnerships between the local administration and the local population, and building trust and cooperation within and between the local government and the population. The majority of the projects strive to improve food security, strengthen the capacity of farms and businesses, and repair infrastructure. Under the plan, each group is allocated $240,000 to fund three to five year Community Development Plans (CDP) (World Bank 1999). This participatory approach to development empowers local communities to take ownership of progress toward a peaceful future.

Programmes for special target groups

Special groups include female, child, disabled, and sick and/or elderly ex-combatants (Specht and the TRESA Team 2006). Until fairly recently, DDR programmes have not taken into consideration the needs of female ex-combatants. In Security Council resolution 1325 of 2000, however, the UN declared the need for all aspects of reintegration to take into consideration

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5   Phone interview with Nat Colletta on December 8, 2006

the gender dimensions of armed conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. Point 13 of the resolution clearly '*encourages* all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants', and in point 15 the resolution, '*expresses* its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women's groups' (UNSC 2000b).

Women experience conflict differently from men. Time and again women are victims of sexual as well as armed violence. This requires that women receive psychological counselling and support from women's associations within the community. In addition to fighters, women are often used as messengers, cooks and war wives, which are roles that don't always require being armed. Consequently, women are excluded from the DDR programme when they are without a weapon to turn in during the disarmament phase (Harsch 2005). While they may not need to be involved in the early phases of disarmament, it is essential that women are encouraged to participate and are supported through demobilisation and reintegration. Trust and understanding can be accomplished through awareness campaigns in the community that focus on sensitising families and potential employers of the hardships that female ex-combatants experienced during the conflict (UNIFEM[6] 2004).

In Nicaragua and El Salvador, where females comprised approximately 30 percent of the total combatants, women were excluded from demobilisation and reintegration by their male counterparts. In response, women formed ex-combatant associations to support one another in their reintegration (Watteville 2002). This also gave rise to decision-making power that women so often lose during the DDR process. In Uganda, the Uganda Community Based Association for Child Welfare (UCOBAC)/UNICEF[7] project funded groups in the interest of promoting income-generating projects to improve gender relations within the community (Colletta et al 1996). These

6   United Nations Development Fund for Women
7   United Nations Children's Fund

associations are particularly effective in countries with poor women's rights records.

Special support is also required for former child soldiers. During war, children experience a psychological trauma that differs from that of adult combatants. Their exposure to violence and insecurity has a deep impact on their social and emotional development. Separate protection and rehabilitation programmes are required, especially for girl soldiers who are often denied assistance during demobilisation and reintegration. For child ex-combatants, reintegration should be family- and community-focused, and should aim to reunite children with their families, provide psychosocial care, and afford them with access to education and vocational training (Kingma 1997b).

Reintegration programmes that address the needs of disabled and chronically ill ex-combatants, and those with HIV/AIDS, lower the chance that these groups will be neglected by the community or the health care system (UN 2006). Assistance to these groups demands that resources be channelled to health and counselling services. This not only benefits the community's medical infrastructure, but also creates social bonds between health care providers and ex-combatants.

Reconciliation programmes

Reconciliation is both a process and a goal that intersects with DDR and the broader post-conflict reconstruction process. Furthermore, it is a process that includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness and healing, and is rooted in the idea that societies are capable of moving from a 'divided past to a shared future' (IDEA[8] 2003:12). Reconciliation involves acknowledging past wrongs and grievances in the hope of moving toward attitudinal changes that will eventually pave the way for developing a shared vision of the future, in which people can live harmoniously without returning to conflict (Hamber & Grainne 2004). Unfortunately, in more cases than not, countries return to conflict. An example of this can be seen in Guatemala's

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8   International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

return to conflict twice over a 40 year period of civil war (1954-1994). These events resulted in 180,000 deaths, 40,000 disappearances, the devastation of 400 villages, and displacement of over 1 million people (Colletta & Cullen 2000).

Typically, reconciliation is generated through three institutional practices: war crime tribunals, truth commissions, and peace commissions (Douglas et al 2004). While these methods have proved successful, local processes, such as traditional ceremonies and cleansing rituals, have sometimes proved more effective than formal ones. Community-based processes are more accessible and many times more efficient than state-run methods. By involving communities in utilising local structures, customs and values, differences can be reconciled through a participatory approach that leads to authentic trust between parties (Duthie 2005).

Cleansing rituals played a critical role in reintegrating Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) fighters into communities in Mozambique. The healing process consisted of symbolical rituals designed to purify the identity of the individual and reintegrate him or her back into the community (Honwana 1998). In some cases, ex-combatants spent their demobilisation money on gifts to be given to village elders (Kingma 1997b). The capacity for Mozambicans to utilise local instruments for healing and forgiveness is testimony to the importance of home-grown reintegration. With a community-focused approach, formal reintegration programmes can assist in the facilitation of traditional practices.

Following the brutal rule of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, institutional reconciliation processes did not take shape. There have been, however, some notable community initiatives. The UNDP-sponsored[9] Cambodia Resettlement and Rehabilitation Programme (CARERE) is one such case. From 1993 to 2000, CARERE contributed to reconciliation by setting up elected village development councils (VDC), which were responsible for overseeing development projects along with strategies to foster community cohesiveness. VDCs offered support to families, religious and local

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9   United Nations Development Programme

organisations by facilitating activities that emphasised ritual and communal understanding. CARERE's area-based approach brought opposing parts of the community together to build on the fragile peace process (UNDP 2001).

Sierra Leone

Background

Sierra Leone received independence from Britain in 1961. Beginning with the Margai brothers of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), the country was ruled by one corrupt leader after another. In 1967, the SLPP lost power to the All People's Congress, which was led by Siaka Stevens, who gained support through his mobilisation of rural communities against wealthy urbanites. During Stevens' seventeen-year rule, power was consolidated into a one-party state, stripping civil society of its role in political life. An economic crisis brought about by political corruption and international economic factors spawned widespread discontent throughout the country. By 1982, Sierra Leone's flourishing diamond and iron industry had been taken over by a group of corrupt firms that funnelled the majority of profits to government leaders and foreign investors (Adebajo 2002).

In 1985, Stevens relinquished power and handed leadership to Joseph Momoh. Under Momoh, the economy continued to decline as well as the diamond business, which had been appropriated by smugglers and corrupt companies.

Amid growing dissatisfaction, a civil war erupted in March 1991, when Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels, backed by Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor, entered southeastern Sierra Leone. Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, met Charles Taylor in the late 1980s while undergoing military training in Libya. The two rebel leaders agreed to support one another in overthrowing their respective governments using the diamond mines in Sierra Leone to finance their incursions (International Crisis Group 2007). Charles Taylor was committed to toppling Sierra Leone's government, so

that they would withdraw troops from the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peace operation in Liberia (Ginifer 2005).

In 1997, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) took control, and later joined forces with the RUF. Their rule was characterised by extensive human rights abuses and dissolution of the rule of law. In 1998 the AFRC/RUF were driven out by ECOMOG, who reinstated President Kabbah. In 1998, it was estimated that between 60,000 and 80,000 combatants were engaged in fighting – out of a population of about 4.5 million. The total number of deaths from the conflict is unknown, but is most commonly cited at around 50,000 (Ginifer 2005).

On July 7, 1999, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of Sierra Leone, and Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, sat down in Lomé, Togo, to sign a peace agreement ending eight years of fighting (Dobbins et al 2005). On October 22, 1999, the Security Council launched the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to oversee the peacekeeping mission. With the support of UNAMSIL, the World Bank and the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), a governmental organisation lead by President Kabbah, was established to spearhead the DDR process in 1998 (Ball et al 2004).

The first few years of the DDR process saw little progress due to outbursts of violence and lack of political will. However by 2002, the DDR programme had succeeded in disarming 72,490 combatants, far exceeding the expected 45,000. Of the disarmed, 71,043 were demobilised and 56,751 registered with NCDDR (see box 2). Of the 56,751 ex-combatants that applied for demobilisation, 56,127, nearly 100 percent, filed for reintegration assistance (Comninos et al 2002).

BOX 2 - Sierra Leone DDR Figures

DDRP's Beneficiaries NCCDR September 2003	No. Ex-combatants
Combatants Disarmed (phases I, II and interim)	72,490
Ex-combatants demobilised (children included)	71,043
Ex-combatants discharged (by receiving identification cards)	69,463
Child ex-combatants demobilised	6,845
Ex-combatants registered to receive reintegration assistance	56,751
Ex-combatants having received or receiving reintegration assistance	48,233
Discrepancy between the numbers disarmed, demobilised and discharged reflects combatants lost during the January 1999 attack on Freetown and those rearmed and remobilised during the Fall 2000 security breakdown at the end of Phase Interim.	

Source: Ball et al 2004

Community-focused reintegration

Social capital eroded during the conflict, damaging support networks and institutional ties. The use and threat of small arms deeply undermined systems of trust and organisational cooperation. In both urban and rural settings, social cohesion was destroyed, which led to divisions and at times robbery among neighbours (Ginifer 2005). With this in mind, NCDDR took a community-centred approach to reintegration. The National Recovery Strategy states that a community approach should be adopted, and that long-term reintegration will only be accomplished by engaging host communities with an equal share of resources afforded to ex-combatants and non-combatants (Sierra Leone National Recovery Strategy 2002).

The NCDDR Training and Employment Programme (TEP) was established to offer ex-combatants options for social and economic reintegration. The main areas of training were in carpentry, car mechanics, tailoring, and agriculture. In addition to training, the programme offered psycho-social

support and counselling (Comninos et al 2002). NCDDR also encouraged ex-combatants to find work that benefited the community, such as public works, street cleaning, and construction. In addition, education programmes, peace education, music and sports groups have been established to restore social capital (Ginifer 2003).

Stopgap or temporary work programmes proved to be successful for reintegrating ex-combatants. In addition to giving them access to money at a critical time, ex-combatants were able to prove themselves to community members by working side by side with them on community projects. These often broke down social barriers, built confidence, and formed new social ties. This was especially advantageous for ex-combatants who were displaced, unable to rely on families for financial and moral support (Arthy 2003). The UK-backed Community Reintegration Programme (CRP) and the German aid organisation, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), played a leading role in community-focused reintegration throughout Sierra Leone. Their projects targeted badly affected communities by setting up employment opportunities and social reintegration programmes for ex-combatants (Ginifer & Oliver 2004).

In order to sensitise and build trust within the community, NCDDR conducted information dissemination exercises. These were complemented by campaigns in the media and on radio stations countrywide (Ginifer 2003). Religious leaders found it helpful to use radio as a means of reaching out to affected communities. Through a mix of prayer, information, and song, reconciliatory processes were broadcasted throughout the country (Comninos et al 2002). Radio UNAMSIL also played a leading role in addressing issues such as crime, justice, tolerance, forgiveness, and peace (Ginifer 2003).

Many ex-combatants returned to their place of origin to reunite with families. In other cases, ex-combatants were given access to land, which can sometimes lead to disputes over land and past grievances. However, ex-combatants have reported acceptance from neighbours. This is due in part to the establishment of Joint Farms that placed ex-combatants and

civilians together, working collectively. Once settled, ex-combatants were encouraged to join organised groups centring on themes, such as agriculture, trade, sports, culture (Arthy 2003).

Reintegration was especially difficult for women, who suffered psychological trauma during the conflict. Many women were sexually abused and separated from their families. This was compounded at the onset of reintegration by a myriad of false perceptions by other ex-combatants and community members. Suspicions arose that stigmatised women as being overly violent and having diseases, such as HIV and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). This soon faded when women had the opportunity to work with others during training. Women that received training often ended up acting as mentors for other war-affected women (Comninos et al 2002). GTZ set up Women's Welfare Committees in all its supported communities to assist women with microcredit and other business opportunities. CRP also established centres in Magboraka and Tonkolili Districts for women to seek counselling (Arthy 2003). Despite these achievements, women were generally neglected by the NCDDR due to their gender-neutral approach, which set DDR registration standards equally for men and women (Ball et al 2004).

Unlike female combatants, child soldiers were placed into a separate programme from the beginning. It is estimated that roughly 7,000 child soldiers were involved in the conflict in Sierra Leone (Ball et al 2004). By 2002, 6,845 child soldiers were demobilised, and the strategy after demobilisation was to reunite child ex-combatants with their families. During reintegration, NCDDR, UNAMSIL, UNICEF as well as other organisations conducted campaigns to sensitise communities to the return of child ex-combatants. Community meetings, posters, and radio were the most common means of informing citizens (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2006). Former youth combatants have also been well received by youth groups. At times organised by partnering NGOs, youth groups were formed around sports clubs, religious institutions or dance halls. These groups play a vital role in socialising ex-combatants that in many cases lost out on their childhood. Youth groups have also been hired to help

with minor infrastructure projects such as road maintenance and sanitation (Comninos et al 2002).

The people of Sierra Leone showed a high propensity for reconciliation, based on deep religious faith and fatigue from the war. Local and international NGOs assisted in developing a grassroots movement that ignited reconciliation among differing groups (Ball et al 2004). As in the case of Mozambique, traditional reconciliation techniques, such as cleansing rituals, had a positive impact on communities in Sierra Leone. In addition to male and female ex-combatants, traditional practices were often extended to child ex-combatants. In some cases, ex-combatants received forgiveness from entire communities after admitting wrongdoing (Ginifer 2003). Particularly among the RUF, digging up of 'charms' was a popular ceremony. It is believed that progress in the community cannot be made until charms are dug up and destroyed (Arthy 2003). In tandem with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, local reconciliation programmes have helped citizens to absolve those that committed horrifying acts, while bridging ties for a shared future.

Measuring success of reintegration

Experts often cite the case of Sierra Leone as a DDR success story. In addition to the achievement of peace between the warring parties, it is due in large part to the accomplishment of its disarmament and demobilisation process. The large number of weapons collected along with the high percentage of demobilised combatants is indicative of a well-implemented DDR programme. In terms of measuring the success of reintegration, however, many more factors come into play. As opposed to a quantitative assessment of the number of ex-combatants registered for reintegration, analysts must look at qualitative as well as quantitative indicators to measure success. In other words, employment rates can be a reliable indicator pertaining to economic reintegration, whereas social reintegration demands perception indicators to measure levels of cooperation, acceptance, and trust. With additional time and resources, a more thorough analysis and study of reintegration success could be conducted. Nonetheless, given the parameters

of this study, three reputable analytical studies will be used for measurement purposes.

The NCDDR assessment team, with the support of implementing partners, conducted an evaluation of Sierra Leone's reintegration programme. Findings were obtained through interviews with and surveys to NCDDR staff as well as a sample population of ex-combatants (Comninos et al 2002). An analysis of the following survey results from 2002, when DDR was completed, reflects an interesting dichotomy (See box 3). The first two questions are based on behaviour – quarrels and acceptance. Both findings suggest that ex-combatants reached a level of comfort in their communities in a short amount of time. This suggests that ex-combatants and communities benefited from reintegration programmes that aimed at sensitisation and normalisation. The third question, regarding trust, reveals that by 2002, ex-combatants had not gained a high level of trust in relation to neighbours, friends, and particularly family. Further analysis may explore the reasons behind the majority of ex-combatants distrusting family over friends and neighbours. It would also be useful to know whether high levels of trust existed prior to the conflict. In all, this survey illustrates that reconciliation and the establishment of social capital is a process that takes time and must not be ignored during DDR, and principally when these programmes end.

BOX 3 – Assimilation in Communities

Do you quarrel with…	Family	Friends	Neighbours	Colleagues at Work	Strangers	People in Authority
Yes, all the time	1.8%	0.8%	1.0%	0.5%	0.5%	1.3%
Yes, but only sometimes	22.0%	30.8%	17.5%	15.0%	3.5%	4.5%
No, never	76.3%	68.5%	81.5%	84.5%	96.0%	94.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
n=	400					

Problems being accepted by...	Family	Friends	Neighbours
Yes regular problems	0.8%	0.3%	0.8%
Yes occasional problems	3.0%	3.3%	3.3%
No problems	96.3%	96.5%	96.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
n=	400		
Do you trust your....	**Family**	**Friends**	**Neighbours**
Yes I trust them all the time	14.0%	7.5%	6.5%
Yes I trust them, but only occasionally	7.8%	30.0%	27.8%
No I do not trust them	78.3%	62.5%	65.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
n=	400		

Source: Comninos et al 2002

In 2003, DFID conducted an impact evaluation of their reintegration programmes, which were implemented by GTZ and CRP. Through interviews (total 27), focus group discussions (total of 30 with 10 representatives at each), and participatory workshops with programme staff, DFID found that community perceptions had shifted from one of suspicion and distrust to one of cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Indicative of this was the absence of the term 'ex-combatant' in everyday conversation. Community members expressed the desire to move on from

past grievances, recociling differences to form cohesive communities. The majority of commnity members reported that relations with ex-combatants improved significantly from their first contact during demobilisation to the end of reintegration. Consistent with community respondents, ex-combatants expressed an absence of problems between the two parties (Arthy 2003). This evaluation reveals that relations between ex-combatants and their communities are such that an enabling environment has been established for economic and social development. Whether these conditions can be fully attributed to reintegration is nebulous and difficult to measure. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that reintegration programmes contributed to other community processes that may have been taking place.

Between June and August 2003, just more than a year after the conflict subsided, Humphreys and Weinstein conducted a study targeting a sample of 1,043 ex-combatants. Information was gathered through closed-ended questionnaires and interviews at training sites and in community centres. In order to obtain a representative sample it was disaggregated by region, gender, faction, and age. 89% of their sample joined the DDR programme, while 11% chose to reintegrate on their own. This ratio is consistent with the figure that states 7,000 out of the total 79,000 combatants did not join the DDR programme countrywide. According to their measure of successful reintegration, 93% of the respondents experienced high levels of reintegration success, 2% cluster at the very bottom, and 5% are dispersed around the middle (Humphreys & Weinstein 2004). While 7% seems to be an insignificant number, it represents 5,000 ex-combatants that expressed mild to extreme levels of dissatisfaction with reintegration. Examining the experience of these 5,000 ex-combatants may reveal some interesting insights and lessons for future DDR programmes.

BOX 4 – Ex-combatants' Perspective on Training

	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)	Neither (%)	# of Respondents
The training I received has prepared me well for my work.	75.8	19.2	5.0	318
The skills I learned are needed by employees in this region.	91.5	4.7	3.8	339
I am better socially because of the training I received	87.1	7.1	5.9	340
The training I received was responsible for the job I have.	42.9	51.6	5.5	219

Source: Humphreys & Weinstein 2004

The results (in percentages) from box 4 above demonstrate that training was mostly perceived to be helpful. With regard to preparation for work, demand of skills, and social benefits, ex-combatants responded positively. Interestingly, responses were mixed when asked about post-training employment. There are a number of economic factors that may have contributed to this result.

Ex-combatants' perspective on employment opportunities was not as favourable (See box 5). More than 50% of the respondents thought opportunities were the same or worse than before the war. These results

were especially poor for the SLA[10] and the AFRC, who compared with the militias, lost more in terms of job security and social status. This result raises a good question regarding programme expectations. Does arriving at these employment results one year after the programme constitute failure? There are a number of externalities beyond the control of the reintegration programme that can affect this indicator. By isolating perceptions of employment opportunities, factors related to economic degradation from war and possible post-conflict reconstruction failures might be disregarded. Further studies may want to consider proposing benchmarks for employment opportunities following reintegration. This would be extremely challenging due to the complexities and variables that each post-conflict context contains.

BOX 5 – Employment Opportunities

Source: Humphreys & Weinstein 2004

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10   Sierra Leone Army

Conclusion

Along with the increase of involvement of the international community in post-conflict assistance, has come a greater focus on DDR. It has been well established that DDR is an essential component of post-conflict recovery. While development and humanitarian organisations focus on improving political and economic institutions and upholding the peace, particular attention must be paid to ex-combatants, who are most prone to become spoilers of the peace process. Given their access to weaponry, their experience with armed violence, and left-over animosity, ex-combatants are most likely to return to violence if conditions do not allow them to make the transition from war to peace. In post-conflict settings, economies and institutions are too damaged and fragile to absorb tens to hundreds of thousands of ex-combatants at once. Therefore, it is imperative that well-planned and dynamically funded DDR programmes are implemented.

While disarmament and demobilisation are important, it is the reintegration phase that requires the greatest amounts of time and funding for successfully assisting ex-combatants and their return to sustainable livelihoods in their former or sometimes new communities. Typically, reintegration targets the individual ex-combatant with cash packages and job training. More recently, there has been a shift in conventional wisdom, calling for a community-focused approach to reintegration. Consequently, this study argues that both individual and community-based reintegration approaches are important when conducting DDR programmes.

In addition to human and financial capital, social capital must be cherished and nurtured in post-conflict settings. As a measure of trust and reciprocity, social capital is the driving force behind reconciliation and normalisation processes. This study attempts to show that community-focused reintegration programmes that generate social capital will build networks of trust and cooperation through the community for which ex-combatants can rely on for a safe and sustainable return. Likewise, community members are able to relinquish past grievances, while focusing on progress and a shared vision of peace. Reintegration programmes that

provide its beneficiaries with an atmosphere conducive to cooperative organisation building, leads to an empowered civil society with the capacity to recycle social capital for its own benefit indefinitely.

In order to illustrate the relationship between community-based reintegration programmes that promote social capital and the extent to which ex-combatants successfully reintegrate, this study examined the experience of Sierra Leone. As a current model, Sierra Leone reveals the advantages that a community-focused reintegration approach bequeaths to its recipients. While reintegration results are mixed for some indicators, there are, however measurable lessons that can be taken from the reintegration methodologies that were instituted there. Programmatic interventions that proved successful in Sierra Leone can be duplicated in future DDR scenarios, and will most likely have positive impacts if tailored to the post-conflict context in which they are applied. To build on the lessons learned from Sierra Leone, the following policy recommendations should be considered by current and future DDR implementing actors: A global fund should be established for long-term reintegration of ex-combatants. This would comprise a group of experts that could assess post-conflict reconstruction in relation to the needs of ex-combatants and their communities, reducing reliance on voluntary contributions of UN member states.

1. Donors should incorporate longer-term reintegration packages that support community-based organisations engaged in assisting ex-combatants and their communities. Reintegration shall be outlined during the peace process with a designation of implementing organisations and funding bodies. Once disarmament and demobilisation are complete, funding should not be curtailed, but rather enhanced to ensure long-term recovery.

2. Instead of viewing reintegration as the third stage of DDR, reintegration should be perceived as a much broader process that begins at the onset of DDR.

3. Coordination among the government, NGOs, community organisations, and donors should take place as early as possible to avoid duplication of efforts, regional favouritism, and loss of confidence within communities.

4. Social capital should not only be nurtured during all stages of DDR, but should also be an objective of the entire programme. Social capital should be strengthened by utilising existing community organisations, which enables communities to take ownership of their own development and reintegration of ex-combatants. Community programmes should be participatory, equitable, and sustainable, so that recipients can benefit from the programme long after completion.

5. DDR programme managers should encourage the establishment of informal networks of ex-combatants, which serve as a platform for discussion between them and their communities.

6. Implementing actors must conduct participatory monitoring and evaluation of programmes that take into account the need of all stakeholders. This gives ex-combatants and community members a sense of ownership that leads to cooperation and acceptance.

The findings of this study suggest that reintegration programmes that address both the needs of the individual ex-combatant and communities with proper funding in a timely manner will reduce the risk that ex-combatants will turn to lives of criminality once released from their role as combatants. In a world where armed conflict persists, international organisations should not underestimate or take for granted the transformative effects that social capital has on rebuilding communities. By placing programmes that enhance social capital at the top of the post-conflict agenda, citizens will become empowered to take control of their future aspirations for economic development, political stability, and peace.

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The Impact of Value-Orientations on Cross-cultural Encounters and Mediation: A Survey in Tanzania's Educational System

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Abstract

This article focuses on the impact of value-orientations on cross-cultural encounters and mediation in the Tanzanian educational system. The purpose of the article is to give an emic perspective on value-orientations in cross-cultural encounters and mediation situations in the educational system, to improve understanding of the conflictive aspects of these encounters. To achieve this purpose, the aim of the article is to identify which value-orientations lead to conflicts and how these conflicts are managed.

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The article will, firstly, provide an overview on current value discourses and, secondly, prove the bilingual validity of value domains based on the Schwartz value model. Thirdly, methodology and empirical findings will be presented. The conclusion leads to recommendations for cross-cultural interactions between Europeans and Tanzanians.

1. Introduction

The research on values and value-orientation is following a well-established tradition in social psychology (Bond 1988, 1998; Oishi, Schimmack, Diener & Suh 1998; Rokeach 1973, 1979, 1985; Schwartz 1994; Schwartz & Sagiv 1995; Schwartz & Bardi 2001; Spini 2003), sociology (Inglehart & Abramson 1994; Inglehart & Flanagan 1987; Klages & Gensicke 2006), political sciences (Huntington & Harrison 2004), development psychology (Colby & Kohlberg 1978; Kohlberg 1976; Piaget 1979, 1984), cultural psychology (Hofstede 1985, 1993, 1997; Triandis 1972, 1980, 1994, 1995) and organisational psychology (Von Rosenstiel 2003).

Over recent decades, however, scientific debate on value-orientation has gained much prominence in educational sciences and educational practice (Bennack 2006). This discourse on value education in schools and educational contexts has recently become important with regard to multicultural educational settings in schools in Europe (Koppen, Lunt & Wulf 2003), as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa (Boness 2002; Mayer 2001). Even though discourses on value-orientations in European and African countries may have different historical backgrounds, contexts and motivations, they are equally important and justified. At the same time, African and Western[1] value-orientations have experienced value shifts through globalisation which disintegrate a clear distinction between Western and Tanzanian values. Moreover, these concepts melt into each other due to historical factors and globalisation (Boness 2002; Mayer 2001).

Value discourses are particularly relevant to cross-cultural educational encounters in 'cultural transition situations' (Dadder 1987:21), which often

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1   African refers in this article to Tanzanian and Western to European concepts.

arise through the differences in value-orientations of individuals or groups involved. Values – as a key player in cultural and educational settings – are seen as having a major underlying impact on cross-cultural conflict, cross-cultural conflict management and mediation (Mayer 2008a) in educational systems.

Values are essentially dialectic and contradictory (Stewart, Danielian & Foster 1998). Differences in values and value concepts often play an important role in conflict (Druckmann & Broom 1991; Moore 1996), because differences in value-orientations, and competing or incompatible values can lead to conflict (Berkel 2005). Clashing value concepts are common, particularly in diverse settings (Miller, Glen, Jaspersen & Karmokolias 1997), and are additionally interlinked with the cultural background of a person (Kitayama & Markus 1991). It has been established (Druckmann, Broom & Korper 1988) that parties are generally more willing to move further from their initial position and became more cooperative when they have talked about value-orientations before negotiations.

Conflict in the organisational context, as in schools, is often related to the negotiation of values (Berkel 2005; Bond 1998; Kluckhohn & Stroedbeck 1961; Wallace, Hunt & Richards 1999) and to value management (Agle & Caldwell, 1999; Gandal, Roccas, Sagiv & Wrzesniewski 2005; Smith, Peterson & Schwartz 2002).

Conflicts and value concepts are often managed through cross-cultural mediation. During the last decade, the interdisciplinary interest in theoretical approaches to cross-cultural mediation has increased (Busch 2006; Liebe & Gilbert 1996; Mayer 2005, 2006) without reaching a common definition or concept (Augsburger 1992; Myers & Filner 1994). It is common sense, however, that particularly in cross-cultural mediations, culture-specific Nicvalue-orientations are discussed. It is the creative act of re-constructing conflict realities and values through third party intervention (Mayer 2008b). Cross-cultural mediation is defined as 'a situation where one or two individuals or a group would take a third party in to mediate between the parties' (see Mayer 2005; Mayer & Boness 2004).

Especially in the last years, research on cross-cultural values has intensified, with an increasing focus on the African region (Burgess, Schwartz & Roger 1995; Schwartz & Bardi 2001; Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, Harris & Owens 2001). However, Sub-Saharan Africa is still underrepresented in cross-cultural value research, and research methodologies generally suffer from a Western bias (Noorderhaven & Tidjani 2001).

With reference to the importance of values, value-orientations and conflicts, this article will focus on value-orientations of Europeans and Tanzanians in cross-cultural school encounters.

As a result of these insights and the emergence of globalisation impacts in educational systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, the demand for intercultural value research with regard to conflict management has escalated. Therefore, there is a large need for collecting, analysing and evaluating values and their impact on cross-cultural conflict and mediation – interdisciplinary and interculturally. Focusing on this need, the purpose of this article is to contribute to the academic cross-cultural discourse on the occurrence and effects of value-orientations and their constellations which impact on cross-cultural encounters between Tanzanians and Europeans.

This interdisciplinary empirical survey accumulates new insights into the impact of value-orientations in cross-cultural encounters and their constructive management. By evaluating relevant value-orientations in interpersonal encounters between individuals of 'distant cultural contexts' (Hall 1976, 1981), and by surveying and working in education settings, empirical studies aim to develop cross-cultural awareness and conflict management techniques that may lead to a higher level of cross-cultural sensitivity, empathy, understanding and meta-communication on culture-specific values and conflict management, culture-synergetic models of conflict management and mediation (Mayer 2008b).

This article is linked to the aims of research of Boness (2002) and focuses on Tanzania as one important survey example in the African context, in which cross-cultural conflict management between Europeans and Africans takes place. In doing so, cognisance is taken of both Western and African

approaches to conflict, and the value-orientations that influence cross-cultural situations described in the findings of the conducted survey.

This article provides insight into specific value-orientations underlying cross-cultural conflicts and mediation from an African perspective, which should contribute to an in-depth understanding of the values involved in conflict management processes in Tanzania.

The main aim of the article is

- ◆ to identify value-orientations and correlations in cross-cultural encounters and mediations in Tanzania's educational system.

Sub-aims are

- ◆ to introduce how Schwartz's value domains and dimensions can be linked to the research findings of the survey,
- ◆ to determine in which culture categories cross-cultural interaction takes place, and
- ◆ to establish which value-orientations are involved in cross-cultural conflict and mediation between Europeans and Tanzanians.

In the following, the article presents an overview of value discourses and proves the bilingual validity of value domains (Schwartz 1994). Subsequently, the article highlights the research methodology and discusses the empirical research findings. Finally, selected culture-specific value-orientations in cross-cultural conflict and mediation situations in the educational system in Tanzania will be presented.

2. Discourses on value-orientations

In the decade after the Second World War, value research gained much prominence. Interdisciplinary projects were implemented which contributed to value researches across different disciplines (Allport 1954; Inglehart 1971, 1977; Kluckhohn 1951; Kluckhohn & Stroedbeck 1961; McClelland, 1961; Parsons & Shils 1951). Since the 1970s, research on values has gained momentum, mainly driven by social and cultural sciences and the humanities.

Rokeach (1973, 1979) developed a theory of human values and the Rokeach Value Survey, and built the base of Schwartz's and Bilsky's (1987, 1990, 1994) and Schwartz's (1994) value model which posed the question of a 'universal theory of human values', which will be introduced in the following section.

2.1 Value domains and dimensions

The broad interdisciplinary research interest in values and value-orientation led to a broad variety of definitions of the term and concept 'value' (Mayton, Ball-Rokeach & Lodges 1994). This survey uses the definition of values and their presentation according to the statements of Schwartz presented in this article.

Schwartz and Bilsky (1987:551ff) have defined ten value domains on account of their intercultural and empirical studies, and based on the concept of Rokeach's (1973) seven universal value domains. The motivational domains of power, benevolence, universalism, achievement, as well as hedonism, self-direction, tradition and universalism present definitions with values of Allport and Vernon (1931) and Spranger (1921). These domains are regarded as universal value concepts and are expected to carry cultural implications and variations (Schwartz 1994:19ff).

Schwartz and Bilsky (1987:551) divide values into five main categories: 'According to the literature, values are concepts or beliefs about desirable end states or behaviors (terminal and instrumental values), which transcend specific situations; guide the selection or evaluation of behavior; or order events according to relative importance.' Values are cognitive representations, as defined by Kluckhohn and Stroedbeck (1961), which basically comprise three forms of universal human sources of values: the needs of individuals as biological organisms, the requisites of coordinated, social and interpersonal interaction, and the security of functions concerning the well-being and the survival of groups.

The natural cognitive and verbal requirements of values are transformed into cultural values and goals, constructed and defined by the members of a

group. Through socialisation, values then become a socio-cultural concept of individuals, groups or societies, defined by Schwartz (1994:24) as follows:

> Values are desirable trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity. Implicit in this definition of values as goals is that (1) they serve the interests as of some social entity; (2) they can motivate action – giving it direction and emotional intensity; (3) they function as standards for judging and justifying action, and (4) they are acquired both through socialization to dominant group values and through the unique learning experience of individuals.

The following table shows the motivational value domains as formulated by Schwartz (1994:22) in regard to definition and aim, as well as exemplifying values.

Table 1: Motivational value domains

| Definition and aim of values	Exemplary values
Power: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources	Social power, authority and wealth
Achievement: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards	Success, capability, ambition
Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself	Pleasure, enjoying life
Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life	Daring, varied life, exciting life
Self-direction: Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring	Creativity, curiosity, freedom

Definition and aim of values	Exemplary values
Universalism: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature	Broad-mindedness, social justice, equality
Benevolence: Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact	Helpfulness, honesty, forgiveness
Tradition: Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide	Humbleness, devoutness, acceptance of my 'portion in life'
Conformity: Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms	Politeness, obedience, Honour of parents and elders
Security: Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and of self.	National security Social order, cleanliness

Source: Schwartz 1994: 22

These value domains have been validated by different research teams: Oishi, Schimmack, Diener and Suh (1998), Schwartz and Bardi (2001), Schwartz and Sagiv (1995), and Spini (2003). Oishi and others (1998) provide support for the findings of Schwartz's conception of values as higher order goals. These values serve individualistic (achievement, enjoyment, self-direction) or collectivistic goals (prosocial, conformity), which can be entangled. The value of security, for example, may be defined as a collectivistic value, but also contains, through the value of inner harmony, individualistic value-orientations. Using data from 88 samples from 40 countries, Schwartz and Sagiv (1995) have re-evaluated the propositions of the values theory and provided criteria for identifying what is culture-specific in value meanings and structure. They confirm the widespread presence of ten value types, arrayed on a motivational continuum, and organised on the following virtually universal, orthogonal dimensions:

- openness to change versus conservation; and
- self-transcendence versus self-enhancement.

Figure 1: Model of motivational value domains and dimensions

Source: Mayer (2001: 29), Boness (2002:180) adapted from Schwartz (1994: 24-25)

Values define themselves in dynamic interactions and dependencies on each other. Every action strives to fulfil the value requirements. Bordering value domains are more transparent than value domains that are in opposition. The relationship patterns of conflict and compatibilities between values and value priorities Schwartz (1994: 24-25) presented as follows:

- openness to change: independent thoughts and actions, as well as change, self-direction, stimulation, hedonism;
- conservation: self-restrictions, maintenance of traditional practices, protection of stability, security, conformity, tradition;

- ◆ self-enhancement: sense and purpose of success and dominance over others: power and achievement, hedonism; and
- ◆ self-transcendence: acceptance of others as equals and caring for the well-being of others: universalism and benevolence.

Schwartz and Bardi (2001) have found out that there is a widespread consensus regarding the hierarchical order of values, in spite of striking value differences in the value priorities of various groups. Average value hierarchies of representative and near representative samples from 13 nations exhibit a similar pattern that replicates itself with school teachers in 56 nations and college students in 54 nations. The authors have analysed that the values of benevolence, self-direction, and universalism are consistently most important to school teachers in 56 nations and college students in 54 nations; while the values of power, tradition, and stimulation are least important; and the values of security, conformity, achievement and hedonism lie in between.

Subsequently, with regard to the African context, Schwartz's survey was carried out in 1989 in Zimbabwe among a target group of teachers and students. But Schwartz and Sagiv (1995: 101) experienced difficulties in having the value questionnaire completed: the data base evidently was not reliable to evaluation (Schwartz & Sagiv 1995:101).

2.2 Evidence of Schwartz's value dimensions and domains in Swahili

With regard to this survey, it is relevant to assess if the value dimensions and domains in Schwartz' value model are reflected in Swahili linguistic terms which refer to existing value-orientations in the Tanzanian cultural context.[2] Most of the value domains can be translated into Swahili as shown in table 2, like the example of a value in a domain 'mature love' to 'upendo'. However, some value domains are 'untranslatable' as indicated. Other value concepts can be translated only by using circumscriptions of the concept such as 'ukosefu wa ubaguzi'

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2   In Tanzania, 95% of the population are Swahili speakers.

Table 2: Schwartz's value domains and examples of values in Swahili

Value domains and examples of values in domains in the Schwartz Value Model	Swahili translation
Self-direction	**muamuzi mwaelekeo**
Creativity	*untranslatable*
Freedom	usalaama
Choosing own goals	malengo
Curious	mjuaji
Independent	kujitegemea
Stimulation	*untranslatable*
A varied life	*untranslatable*
An exciting life	*untranslatable*
Daring	ushujaa
Hedonism	*untranslatable*
Pleasure	kuona raha
Enjoying life	maisha yenye furaha
Achievement	**kufikia**
Ambitious	mwenye nia
Successful	Faulu
Capable	Mbinu
Influential	mwenye uwezo
Power	**Nguvu**
Authority	Cheo
Wealth	Utajiri
Social power	mwenye mamlaka
Preserving my public image	*untranslatable*
Social recognition	utambuzi
Security	**usalaama**
Social order	kutegemeana
Family security	kutegemeana kifamilia

National security	usalaama wa taifa
Reciprocation of favours	kupeana
Clean	safi
Sense of belonging	kuwa na
Health	Afya
Conformity	**Kuungana na/ pamoja na..**
Obedient	mtiifu
Self-disciplined	*untranslatable*
Politeness	tabia nzuri
Honouring parents and elders	heshimu
Tradition	**mila na desturi**
Respect for tradition	heshima
Humble	mnyenyekevu
Devout	mnyenyekevu
Accepting my position in life	*untranslatable*
Moderate	mtaratibu
Benevolence	**ukarimu**
Helpful	Kujitoa, ushirikiano
Loyal	Mfuasi
Forgiving	sameheana
Honest	mkweli
Responsible	mwenye madaraka
True friendship	undugu, urafiki
Mature love	upendo
Universalism	*untranslatable*
Broad-minded	*untranslatable*
Social justice	*untranslatable*
Equality	usawa wa watu (ukosefu wa ubaguzi)
World of peace	dunia yenye usalaama na amani
World of beauty	dunia yenye uzuri

Unity with nature	umoja wa asili
Wisdom	ujuzi
Protecting the environment	utunzaji wa mazingira
Spiritual life	**mwenendo wa kiroho**

Source: Boness 2002: 122-124

Particularly 'individualistic concepts' such as 'self-direction' often do not have equivalent terms and concepts in Swahili (Boness 2002) and are 'untranslatable'.[3] However, values linked to basic needs can directly and easily be translated such as 'security' and 'benevolence' (Burton 1990).

These linguistic insights influence the interpretation of findings. Surely, the underlying meanings and motivations of value concepts mentioned in the critical incidents (CIs) need culture-specific interpretations, although they are assumed as being 'human universal concepts' (Schwartz 1994).

In the following, the research methodology and the empirical findings will be discussed.

3. Research methodology

The survey follows a positivistic research paradigm (Collis & Hussey 2003:47) in the tradition of critical hermeneutic approaches (Habermas 1999; Gadamer 1990; Adorno 1972) and was conducted as an explorative survey.

Using the critical hermeneutic approach, a permanently changing perspective of the researcher in approaching and interpreting the subject of survey is implied. Habermas (1973:261) calls this permanent self-reflexion on a meta-level, monitoring the process of analysis, a 'movement of emancipation'. Precise and critical reflections of research are combined with hermeneutic

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3   Other value concepts that could not be directly translated into Swahili include: self-direction, creativity, choosing own goals, independent, stimulation, a varied life, an exciting life, hedonism, achievement, ambitious, successful, capable, influential, preserving my public image, self-discipline, accepting my position in life, moderate, universalism, and broad-minded.

statements on structures. They realise interpretations of realities regarding a hermeneutic initial position of inter-subjectivity and action-orientated understanding (Habermas 1973:241). In this regard, triangulation of methods, by using qualitative and quantitative methods, was used. Data were gathered by means of the Critical Incident Technique (Flanagan 1954) and focused interviews, which will be introduced in the following section.

3.1 Data collection

The main research instrument was a Critical Incident Research Questionnaire (see annexure), which used the Critical Incident Technique (CIT) developed by Flanagan (1954). Through this technique, deep insight in value-orientations of individuals is gained (Flechsig 1996, 2001). 'The CIT is a set of procedures for collecting direct observations of human behaviour in such a way as to facilitate their potential usefulness in solving practical problems and developing broad psychological principles. The CIT outlines procedures for collecting observed incidents having special significance and meeting systematically defined criteria' (Flanagan 1954:327).

The reliability of the questionnaire has been tested and validity controls have been undertaken in social systems such as the US Air Force, General Motors and other organisations (Flanagan 1954:336). The questionnaire was translated into Swahili, the official language of Tanzania, in order to obtain valid results within the social system of secondary education (Boness 2002). During the survey, the questionnaire was explained to the respondents in both English and Swahili, as well as through verbal explanations and role-plays.

In addition to the questionnaire survey, ten focused interviews were conducted with teachers and academics from the University of Dar es Salaam, as well as governmental employees from the Ministry of Education and Culture in Dar es Salaam, to gain information on the Swahili culture and the Tanzanian Secondary System. To collect background information on culture and politics, focused interviews were conducted with representatives from different organisations and educational institutions in Tanzania, Kenya, France and the United Nations on the topic of values in the Tanzanian school

system. This information has influenced the interpretation of data in this article.

3.2 Sample

The survey was embedded in a three-year research project conducted under the umbrella of the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) in Dar es Salaam and the University of Göttingen (UG) in Germany. The field research was conducted by a bi-cultural team of four researchers (two Germans and two Tanzanians)with academic background in education and cross-cultural didactics (Social Sciences). The team consisted of two male and two female researchers in the age group 25 to 50 years. All four were familiar with Swahili, as mother tongue or as foreign language speakers.

Nation-wide, 781 governmental and private secondary schools (Boness 2002:66) were invited to participate in the survey. The criteria on which schools were selected were accessibility, governmental schools,[4] and willingness to participate. The number of participating schools varied in terms of region and district, based on the mentioned criteria, selected by the MEC. Altogether 19 schools finally participated, including a subtotal of 8 UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) schools. Out of the 19 selected schools, 16 were secondary schools, two technical colleges, and one a Benedictine seminary. Gender-specific schools were indicated by the MEC (Boness 2002:229-230) to comprise 13 co-educative, four boys' and two girls' schools. The schools were located in nine regions in Tanzania as shown in Table 3.

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4   The selection criteria were defined by the MEC together with the research group

Table 3: Schools and zones in Tanzania

Zones	Regions	Districts
Eastern zone	Dar es Salaam Coast	Ilala Kisarawe
Northern zone	Arusha Tanga Kilimandjaro	Monduli, Arusha Tanga, Lushoto Moshi
Central zone	Dodoma	Dodoma
Southern Highlands	Mtwara Lindi	Mtwara Lindi-Kilwa
Zanzibar-Visiwani	Zanzibar	Zanzibar

Source: Boness 2002

The research route was defined as shown in Figure 2:[5]

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5   Number abbreviations indicate the number of surveyed secondary institutions, letters represent the regions as follows: Do: Dodoma, D: Dar es Salaam, Z: Zanzibar, L: Lindi, M: Mtwara, P: Pwani/Coast, A: Arusha, Kili: Kilimandjaro, T: Tanga

Figure 2: Research itinerary

Source: Boness 2002

A total of 408 questionnaires were completed by students and teachers during school hours to secure a response of usable questionnaires from 179 teachers and 211 students in the 19 Tanzanian schools that participated in the survey.

3.3 Data analysis

After data collection and transcription, data were cross-analysed by the research team. Different procedures were aligned to the main analysis. One procedure was to identify three or more culture elements in every description of CIs. Excluded were questionnaires containing no information, doublets,

and non-personal conflicts (such as descriptions of terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania). These procedures which had been carried out and validated by two European and one Tanzanian academic, led to the subtotal of 358 analysable CIs (Boness 2002:264).

Culture elements were defined as comprising all basic manifest statements that explain a cross-cultural encounter. Through culture elements, culture categories were developed and provided a link to value domains. From the total of more than 250 culture elements identified in the 408 questionnaires, culture categories were inductively construed. Culture categories were defined as comprising areas of culture in which the European culture and the Tanzanian culture expose specific rules, norms, values and behaviours when they meet (see Table 5). An example of how this generating procedure took place is the following. In one CI a Tanzanian called a European a 'thief', because the European had taken a photograph of the Tanzanian without asking prior permission. The concept 'thief' is tightly linked to property or possession. So, this incident could be linked to the culture category 'property and possession'. In total, 19 culture categories were analysed. A ranking of frequency distribution was carried out. All CIs were linked to culture categories, containing culture elements. Through inter-judge validation, culture elements were linked to Schwartz's value dimensions and domains.

4. Research findings

Research findings refer to biographical data and empirical findings. The questionnaires were completed by a majority of respondents between 15 and 24 years; male persons represented more than two-thirds of the respondents; and 70 respondents originated from the Kilimandjaro region. The following table shows the age strata of the sample. More than 50% of the sample constitute the first decade age group, as Table 4 shows.

It is assumed that the first age decade of the sample is representing the mindset of the future generation with high educational standards in the society. Thus, the identified value-orientations and cross-cultural mediations

narrated in this survey are indicators of future directions in a globalising world of cross-cultural encounters.

Table 4: Age groups

Age decade	Age group in years	Number of persons
1	15-24	217
2	25-34	61
3	35-44	65
4	45-55	43
1-4	No indication of age	22

Source: Boness 2002

Figure 3 gives a graphic representation of the gender proportions in the sample of 285 male and 119 female respondents. Gender equilibrium in governmental secondary school enrolments has nearly been achieved, but the sample included a number of single-gender schools. The high number of 285 male respondents reflects the fact that four boys' schools and only two girls' schools were surveyed.

Figure 3 Gender distribution

Source: Boness 2002

According to current national school policy, managing cultural and ethnic diversity is desired and stimulated in governmental schools, to avoid ethnic

and language dominance and therefore power imbalance. The sample represents the ethnic diversity in governmental schools as shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Ethnic origin of respondents

Rank	Ethnic origin	Percentage	number
1	Chagga	>= 5%	70
2	Shambala		24
3	Tanzanians		23
4	Pare	>= 3%	18
5	Mwera/Makua		14
6	Matengo		13
7	Ngoni		12
8	Nyamwezi/Sukuma		12
9	Maassai/Meru/Arusa		12
10	Haya	>= 2%	10
11	Hehe		9
12	Nyakusa		8
13	Suaheli/Sansibar/Pemba		8
14	Makonde		7
15	Bena		5
16	Gogo		4
17	Yao		4

Source: Boness 2000

After the biographical data have been presented, the empirical findings will be outlined.

4.1 Cross-cultural critical incidents and value-orientations

The analysed CIs are clustered in 19 culture categories. The highest frequency of narrated CIs can be found in the culture categories of 'foreignness and contact', 'possession and property', 'education' as well as 'outer appearance of a person', as indicated in Table 6. This means that cross-cultural expectations in these categories are highly conflictive. 'Possession and property' is often a conflictive category due to the high awareness of material imbalances between 'rich Europeans' and 'poor Africans'.

'Education' in Tanzania is highly valued, particularly if education is embedded in culturally accepted norms and morals and implied with culturally defined methods. Therefore, education and educational methods which are based on different value-orientations are met with scepticism and often lead to conflict.

In addition, the 'outer appearance of a person', the way of dressing and hairstyles are of concern: Tanzanians prefer decent dressing for both genders. If individuals are dressed extraordinarily, conflict arises easily.

Table 6: Critical incidents and culture categories

Rank	Culture category	Number of CIs
1	Foreignness and contact	89
2	Possession and property	52
3	Education	44
4	Outer appearance of a person	35
5	Sexuality	21
6	Language and communication	21
7	Consumption	21
8	Time and space	16
9	Health and illness	13

10	Environment and nature	11
11	Work and cooperation	11
12	Power and hegemony	10
13	Trade and economy	8
14	Religion	8
15	History	5
16	State	4
17	Community and neighbourhood	4
18	Family	3
19	Celebrations and feasts	3

Source: Boness 2002

After the culture categories are defined and ranked in importance, in the following, culture elements will be linked to the Schwartz's value model to evaluate value-orientations in CIs.

4.2 Findings of Schwartz's value domains and dimensions

Culture elements could be linked to value domains and value dimensions of the Schwartz's value model. In the following, the article only refers to selected value domains, such as power and spiritual life. As shown in table 7, 442 of the culture elements mentioned can be linked to the value domain 'power' incorporated in the value dimension of self-enhancement. The culture element 'photo, film, camera, picture' scores highest comprising 116 culture elements. This might be caused by the fact that the use of cameras is handled and interpreted culture-specifically. Europeans take photos without building social relationships and personal contact. From the Tanzanian perspective photos can only be taken after a personal relationship has been created.

Table 7: Value domain 'power' in value dimension 'self-enhancement'

Value dimension	Value domain	Culture element	Number of culture elements
Self-enhancement	Power	Power and hegemony	7
		Power	4
		Possession and property	38
		Money	104
		Riches	6
		Poverty	38
		Theft	74
		Acceptance and respect	2
		Asking for something.	25
		Begging	22
		Photo, film, camera, picture	116
		Exploit, suppress	6

Source: Boness 2002

With regard to the four value dimensions and the ten value domains, culture elements could be attributed to all Schwartz's value dimensions and domains. In addition to these value domains and dimensions of Schwartz, the value domain 'spiritual life' could be gained inductively from the data. This newly developed value domain contains the culture elements of God, prayer, spirituality and religion (see Table 8). Referring to the 71 culture elements, 31 indicated a relationship to God, 23 were related to prayers and 17 to spirituality and religion. The relationship to God was emphasised as highly important with regard to church services, prayers and spirituality which led to conflict in cross-cultural encounters, as indicated in Table 8. Spirituality does not seem to be of importance for Europeans in the described CIs. However, spiritual values are guiding principles for the Tanzanians in cross-cultural interactions.

Table 8: Value domain 'spiritual life' in value dimension 'self-transcendence'

Value dimension	Value domain	Culture element	Number of culture elements
Self-transcendence	Spiritual life	God	31
		Prayer	23
		Spirituality and religion	17

Source: Construction by Mayer and Boness

After these selected examples referring to the value dimension of self-enhancement and value domain of power as well as of spiritual life, Figure 4 shows the distribution of CIs across the Schwartz value dimensions and domains (with 'spiritual life' added as a domain).[6] Figure 4 gives an overview of Tanzanian versus European value-orientation frequencies in each value domain.

Figure 4: Critical incidents and value domains

Source: Construction by Mayer and Boness

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6   Tanzanian respondents differentiate between Tanzanian value-orientations (indicated in Figure 4 as T) and European value-orientations (indicated in Figure 4 as E).

In the value domain of 'power', the respondents ascribe 10 value-orientations in their CIs as being Tanzanian and 18 as being European value-orientations. Furthermore, the respondents ascribe the value domain of 'spiritual life' as being exorbitant in four Tanzanians, whilst value-orientations referring to the value domain of 'spiritual life' are not ascribed to Europeans. That means that the respondents either can not decode spirituality in Europeans, or that Europeans do not show their spiritual or religious values in the CIs.

Focusing on value dimensions in CIs significant differences could be found.[7] Respondents ascribe 'openness to change' statistically significantly higher to Europeans than to Tanzanians (χ^2 16,86). At the same time, they ascribe 'conservation' as being significantly higher in Tanzanians than in Europeans (χ^2 55,54), as the following Table 9 shows. This means that the respondents view the basic image of the 'Self' in the dimension of 'conservation' whereas the basic image of the 'Other' European is depicted in the dimension of 'openness to change'.

Table 9: Value dimensions: Openness and conservation

Value dimensions	Europeans	Tanzanians	χ^2	Significance
OC (Openness)	149	37	16,86	***
CO (Conservation)	28	180	55,54	***

Source: Construction by Mayer and Boness

In the dimension of 'self-enhancement', there is a low statistical significance; in the dimension of 'self-transcendence', there is no statistically significant characteristic, as Table 10 shows.

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7   Significance indication: *** Highest significance, ** middle significance, * low significance, - no significance

Table 10: Value dimensions: Self-enhancement and self-transcendence

Value dimensions	Europeans	Tanzanians	χ²	Significance
SE (Self-enhancement)	126	87	3,37	*
ST (Self-transcendence)	65	60	0,06	-

Source: Construction by Mayer and Boness

Table 11 shows the statistical significance of value domains. The significances vary between different levels and across cultures. The European behaviour in the value domain of 'self-direction' is interpreted as threatening Tanzanian tradition and conformity, and is therefore experienced as conflictive.

Table 11: Statistical significance of value domains

Value domain	Frequency Europeans	Frequency Tanzanians	χ²	Significance
OCself-direction	116	23	30,22	***
OChedonism	19	7	2,76	*
OCstimulation	14	7	0,82	-
COtradition	17	125	41,07	***
COconformity	4	37	13,76	***
COsecurity	7	18	2,77	*
SEachievement	42	41	0,01	-
SEpower	84	46	5,55	**
STbenevolence	44	15	6,53	**
STuniversalism	15	28	2,32	-
STspiritual life	6	17	3,00	*

Source: Construction by Mayer and Boness

The value domains 'tradition', 'self-direction' and 'conformity' were statistically highly significant. The respondents interpreted the behaviour of Europeans with regard to these value domains as being 'selfish' and 'arrogant'. At the same time, they interpreted the behaviour of Tanzanians with regard to these value domains, as 'conforming' and 'traditional'.

The value domains of 'benevolence' and 'power' were also statistically significant. Regarding 'benevolence', respondents defined Europeans as 'generous'. With regard to 'power', respondents viewed European as being 'interested in power and dominant behaviour'.

'Spiritual life', 'security' and 'hedonism' are low in statistical significance. Respondents view Tanzanians as very 'religious' and 'led by religion' (Boness & Mayer 2003), but perceived Europeans as 'not spiritual'.[8]

Respondents see different value-orientation priorities in Tanzanian and European values and behaviour. These perceived differences are seen as multiple causes of cross-cultural conflicts. Simultaneously, respondents describe in their CIs how cross-cultural conflicts and value differences are managed in the Tanzanian context according to the culture-specific ways of conflict management and mediation.

4.3 Cross-cultural mediation in Critical Incidents

A total of 87 respondents out of 408 explicitly referred to mediation as a tool of conflict management. Considering the success of mediation processes, 77 mediations led to a positive outcome and were defined as being successful and ten led to negative outcomes.

With regard to culture categories (see Table 6) successful mediation was achieved in:

- possession and property (20 cases were mediated: 14 successfully, 7 unsuccessfully),

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8   There were no statistically significant data in the value domains 'universalism', 'stimulation' and 'achievement'.

- outer appearance (14 cases were mediated: 13 successfully, 31 unsuccessfully),
- foreign culture (11 cases were mediated: 11 successfully),
- language (9 cases were mediated: 9 successfully),
- education (8 cases were mediated: 7 successfully, 1 unsuccessfully).

In contrast to successful mediations, there are 10 CIs that show – in the eyes of the respondents – 'unsuccessful' cross-cultural mediations. These relate mostly to the value domains 'possession and property' as well as 'power'. This may be related to the Tanzanian perception as being the 'losers of possession' with regard to land use and ownership as well as to 'power' – referring to administration and globalisation. Therefore Tanzanian mediators in cross-cultural mediations may tend to be not impartial, but rather promote their own ways of redistributing possession and power.

In the following, an unsuccessful mediation example of the value domain 'possession and property' will be given to provide an insight of conflictive value-orientations in cross-cultural conflicts and their management.

A Tanzanian teacher narrates a CI he has observed (Boness 2002:326):

> A European tourist was taking photos of Swahili people walking on the street in Arusha city. They got upset about the photo-shooting, and called the tourist 'a thief'. During that situation the European got slightly injured and was brought to hospital. His camera was taken away. A Tanzanian friend of the European tried to mediate, but without success. The situation is very emotional. The Tanzanian mediator came too late with his intervention. So he was not able to convince the people on the street that the European does not want to steal their personality by taking photographs.

The values underlying the CI in this example are linked to the dimension of 'self-enhancement' particularly regarding 'power'. The domains 'tradition'

and 'conformity' also do play a role in this CI to preserve a person's public image. The respondents define values in the value dimension 'conservation' as very important for Tanzanians and the dimension 'openness to change', including the domains 'stimulation' and 'self-direction' as very important for Europeans. The European takes pictures and therefore – from the Tanzanian perspective – steals parts from a person's personality and implies power. The European is seen as acting 'self-directed' without re-confirming this social interaction. The Tanzanians react by using physical power to fight the implied psychological power imposed on their personalities in public. In the following section, selected aspects of cross-cultural mediation will be presented to broaden the understanding of how conflict is managed in cross-cultural encounters in Tanzania in the educational context.

4.4 Aspects in cross-cultural mediation in Tanzania

According to the survey, the term cross-cultural mediation is used in the broad sense of 'third party intervention' in Tanzanian contexts. In these interventions, parties of different ethnic, cultural, language or national backgrounds attempt to resolve a conflict situation.

In all CIs, cross-cultural mediation situations aim at 'win-win solutions'. Win-win solutions refer to mutual understanding, tolerance, peace and harmony. The mediation setting is seen as social interaction to exchange ideas and to promote comfort and harmony between the parties. The role of the mediator is to explain cultural concepts, values and norms of African cultures. The mediator does not necessarily consider culture-specific norms and values foreign to African concepts: foreigners are expected to adapt to the social and cultural situation by accepting local values and behaviours. Therefore, the mediator explains socio-cultural aspects, communicating analogies, idioms and metaphors. The mediator is defined as a culturally competent person who follows the aim of integrating all parties into the social order and the morals of African cultures. He/she is also a consultant advising the parties what to do and how to behave. Usually, key persons of the community are chosen as mediators, in light of their occupation, charisma, age or spirituality. Mediators are bishops, pastors, teachers, old and highly

respected community leaders as well as spiritual leaders. Mediations take place spontaneously in private or public spaces, at the locus of conflict, in the context of family and friends (Mayer, Boness & Thomas 2003).

The mediator is expected to be fair and in harmony with the social norms and values. In most of the CIs, the mediator was accepted by the Tanzanian conflict party, but not necessarily by the European. After the parties have agreed on the mediation, the mediator tries to create a common basis referring to humanness, God, *Ubuntu* as a concept of humanity, family and relationship values, and respect for others and the ancestors. After the common basis is established, the parties give their perspectives on the conflict. The mediator advises the conflict parties how to manage conflicts. At the end, all conflict parties apologise and forgive each other. Social control mechanisms are set up to ensure sustaining peace.

5. Conclusion

The overall purpose of the article was to give insight into specific value-orientations underlying cross-cultural interactions and mediation from a Tanzanian perspective, and contribute towards an in-depth understanding of the values involved in cross-cultural encounters in Tanzania.

More specifically, the objective was to identify value-orientations in encounters and mediations in Tanzania's educational system. The sub-aims were to introduce the Schwartz's value model and interrelate it with the research findings, to analyse in which culture categories cross-cultural interaction takes place and to establish value-orientations which are involved in cross-cultural conflict between Europeans and Tanzanians.

In conclusion, the value-orientations of the Schwartz model could be elaborated through the applied research methodology. The Schwartz values could be identified and their culture-specific meanings could partly be revealed with regard to cross-cultural encounters and mediations in the Tanzanian educational context. The linguistic analysis showed compatibilities between the English and Swahili value terms referring to basic needs values. On the

contrary, however, value terms could be assessed which were untranslatable and therefore showed the cultural bias of the Westernised value-orientations of the Schwartz value model.

The findings emphasise high conflictive potential in certain culture categories, such as 'foreignness and contact', 'possession and property', 'education' and 'outer appearance of a person'. In addition, the value dimension 'self-enhancement', including the value domain 'power', indicated a high number of culture elements which can be highly conflictive in cross-cultural encounters between Europeans and Tanzanians. Moreover, it could be established that the value dimensions 'openness to change' and 'conservation' are highly significant. Respondents view Europeans as emphasising value domains in the value dimension 'openness to change' and Tanzanians in the value dimension 'conservation'. These differences lead to cross-cultural conflicts which are often managed through culture-specific mediation procedures. Nearly 90% of cross-cultural mediations succeed. The success of cross-cultural mediation in the Tanzanian context seems to be bound to the parties' acceptance of Tanzanian mediators and the culture category which is negotiated in the mediation session. Particularly, strong differences in culture categories and value-orientations lead to unsuccessful mediations, as assessed in the culture category 'possession and property'.

6. Recommendations

With regard to the findings and the conclusion of this article, the following recommendations can be given to education institutions, cross-cultural trainers, consultants and researchers:

- Individuals and groups meeting in cross-cultural encounters in the Tanzanian education contexts should be trained in cross-cultural and culture-specific competencies. These trainings should form an integral part of the school curriculum, to ensure proper preparations for cross-cultural exchange and globalisation processes.

 ◆ Cross-cultural trainings should include the improvement of knowledge, sensitivity and awareness for culture-specific value-orientations and behaviour with regard to self-reflection and reflection of the others.

 ◆ Cross-cultural learning and education referring to conflict management and mediation should be taught through theoretical and practical approaches. Teachers and students should be introduced to basic skills in cross-cultural communication and mediation.

 ◆ Cross-cultural trainers and consultants need to focus on value-orientations in cross-cultural trainings and develop training tools and materials to prepare their clients for culturally adjusted and satisfying interaction on both sides.

 ◆ Follow-up research, both quantitative and qualitative, should be done on value-orientations prevailing in East-Africa. Since a rapid globalising impact on the development in East Africa can be expected, the relevance of such research should be evident, especially if focused on other fields of societal interaction like economy, politics and leisure.

The implementation of these recommendations will contribute to the empowerment of individuals in cross-cultural encounters and to global peace building across the nations.

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Annexure

Questionnaire on
Critical Incidents in Tanzania

Institute of Ethnology, University of Goettingen, Germany

We would kindly like you to describe a "Critical Incident", i.e. a conflict situation, which you experienced with Europeans.

Please don't fill in any personal names due to data protection!

Personal Data

Age:				
Sex:	Male		Female	
Level of Education:	A-Level		O-Level		University	
Occupation:				
Nationality:				

Please specify the **ethnic origin/ cultural group (tribe)** you belong to:
We would like you to remember a **"critical incident"** which you experienced with a **person from another ethnic/cultural group (tribe)**. Could you please specify to which **ethnic/cultural group** your **"incident partner"** probably belongs?

The Critical Incident

Please **define a main event** which you experienced with a person from Europe. Please describe a conflict situation by answering the following questions:

1. Please find a **headline** for this situation.

2. **Please describe the critical incident situation:** what happened? Where and when did it happen? who was present (age, sex, cultural group, role)?

3. Please write down the **reason for the opening** of the sitation: who did talk or act first? Remember please the **way of opening:** atmosphere, words, gestures, observation, communication style etc

4. What was the **conflicting point** of the situation?

5. How did the incident **end**? Did somebody help in finding a solution? Please outline the ending: mediating, crying, agreeing, hurting, laughing, talking etc.

6. Did somebody else tell you about a **similar incident** he/she experienced?
__Yes   __No

7. What was the **cause of conflict**?

8. What do you think which **cultural values** influenced your behavior in the situation?

9. What do you think which **cultural values** influenced the behavior of your conflict partner in the situation?

10. What did you learn out of the incident? Please outline your **intercultural experience**!

11. How did you **feel in** the situation? Please describe your emotions exactly.

12. How would you try to **solve the conflict**?

Thank you very much for your support!

Note: In the version printed above, the spaces for entering responses have been left out.

From Complementarity to Conflict: A Historical Analysis of Farmer-Fulbe Relations in West Africa

*Mark Davidheiser and Aniuska M. Luna**

Abstract

This paper provides a socio-historical analysis of conflict between Fulbe pastoralists and farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa. The discussion examines various structural factors that have fostered conditions conducive to conflict generation and intensification, including international development projects, demographic changes, and environmental degradation. Our analysis highlights changes in production systems and land tenure regimes as central to the aggravation of farmer-herder goal incompatibility and intercommunal strife. Many of these changes are the deliberate results

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of interventions and legislation that were based on Western models and intended to increase production outputs and market integration. Effective conflict mitigation will require the abandonment of top-down, directive policymaking in favour of a more supportive engagement that strives to draw on and build up local resources and capacities.

1. Introduction

The Fulbe are an ethno-linguistic group spread across fifteen countries in Africa.[1] By the year 2000, there were 13 million Fulbe speakers inhabiting an area of over 3000 square miles, from Mauritania in the north to Cameroon in the south, Sudan in the east and Senegal in the west (Miller 2007). Due to their widespread regional distribution, the Fulbe have an extensive history of interaction with a large array of groups, including many whose subsistence is primarily based on horticulture. Fulbe have historically been known as herders. Many do not engage solely in pastoralism and the marketing and exchange of animal products, however. In some areas, Fulbe are known as traders and shopkeepers and for numerous others cultivation has become increasingly significant. Growing numbers of Fulbe have added some horticultural activity to their production strategies; others have adopted farming as their primary mode of subsistence. Nevertheless, the association between Fulbe and herding remains strong in the minds of many Africans, and many contemporary Fulbe are pastoralists.

Although there has always been a mix of conflict and cooperation between pastoralists and horticulturalists, conflict has become increasingly likely due to several historical, social and environmental factors. During the pre-colonial era, the subsistence and small-surplus peasant modes of production of Fulbe herders and West African farmers were often intertwined in a mutually beneficial fashion. The changes in land tenure laws during the colonial period increased commodity production and the environmental degradation that often results from it. The adoption of new irrigation

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1 There are a number of alternate labels for the ethnolinguistic or collective identity category of 'Fulbe', including 'Fula', 'Fulbe', 'Peuhl' and 'Pulaar'.

techniques, and the sedentarisation schemes for transhumant pastoralists that accompanied the introduction of capitalism to West Africa, disrupted the production symbiosis of Fulbe and farmers in addition to increasing the likelihood of conflict between them.

Integrating capitalist and indigenous modes of production undermined the previous symbiosis of the agriculturist and pastoralist production systems. The associated outcomes, (for instance, population growth, environmental degradation, and a gradual shift from exchange-based relations to marketisation and commodification), intensified the pressure on natural resources and made them both more scarce and more desirable. As the production patterns were altered and the scarcity of natural resources and the competition for them increased, there was a corresponding growth in the potential for opposition between the interests of graziers and cultivators.

The international market economy began impacting Africa well before the colonial era, but colonialism heralded an era of unprecedented European expansion into the continent, complete with policymaking and social engineering. Many of the trends begun then continued after independence under the direction of indigenous elites, and assisted by multinational corporations and the development industry. Widespread changes in production systems and socio-political landscapes created conditions that enabled the likelihood of goal incompatibility, and heightened the potential severity of strife between Fulbe herders and their farmer neighbours in West Africa. This assessment implies that conflict mitigation between Fulbe herders and West African farmers requires systemic, institutional, and/or structural changes to address the root causes. The current analysis explores the historical, structural, and various cultural factors that led to the emergence of conflict between these two groups. The paper ends with brief recommendations on what must be done in order to ameliorate it or work towards its resolution.

2. Historical overview

Pre-colonial era

The pre-colonial West African domestic mode of production was based on subsistence and small surplus production. Fulbe herders generally engaged in transhumance, which was a sustainable or 'ecologically stable' production strategy (Sinclair & Fryxell 1985:992). Fulbe herders also exchanged some of the animal products they produced with farmers for grain, thus supplementing the diets of each respective group (Wilson 1984).

In 'Desert-Side Economy of the Central Sahel', Lovejoy and Baier (1976) describe how in pre-colonial Niger the connections between pastoralist and agriculturalist groups and production systems meant that farmers and herders each had a stake in the well-being of the opposite group. The interconnectedness of these two modes of production was a common occurrence in pre-colonial West Africa.[2] Their interdependence, thus, created 'symbiotic relationships' between 'pastoral and settled agricultural systems' based on a certain commonality of interests (World Bank Overseas Evaluation Department 1994:4).

Two intergroup interactional patterns and modalities of exchange historically practised in the Sahel that characterise the complementarity of farming and herding are cattle entrustment and dung and stubble exchanges (Bassett 1988; Galaty & Johnson 1990; Harshbarger 1995; Picardi & Seifert 1976). These are mutually beneficial cooperative schemes that increase productivity and reduce famine risk, or risk of loss by local epidemics for both types of producers. Cattle entrustment usually involves some variation on the following theme: A farmer lends cattle that he or she owns to a herder, who will then take care of them in return for being able to keep some or all of the milk and offspring that the cattle produce. The dung and stubble exchanges take place as the Fulbe move from their wet season pastures to the wetter grasslands in which subsistence and small-surplus producing peasant

2   See Baier 1976; Frantz 1975; Fratkin, Roth & Galvin 1994; Guéye 1994; Mortimore 1989 and Forde 1960 as cited in Van den Brink, Bromley & Chavas 1995 for further information on this issue.

farmers have long worked. In dung and stubble exchanges, known as the *contrat de furnure* in the Francophone Sahel, Fulbe graze their cattle on fields that have already been harvested, and the manure of the cattle provides fertilisation for the farmer (Van den Brink, Bromley & Chavas 1995).[3]

The regions to the south of the Fulbe's arid zone wet season grazing lands were essential to the pre-colonial Fulbe production system. These farmer-populated indigenous areas provided dry season foods and also functioned as drought reserves. The pastoralist production system relied on mobility that was typically transhumant rather than nomadic in nature. Seasonal migration depended on careful timing as Fulbe travelling southwards needed an understanding of agricultural cycles in order to avoid disputes with farmers (Picardi & Seifert 1976:46).

Some Fulbe groups have created social structures geared towards minimising conflicts with farmers and preserving the overall harmony between these groups that was necessary for their production symbiosis. An example is the role of the Ruga in Niger and Nigeria. The Ruga is an elected official who regulates the grazing and pasture use of his group. He is in charge of selecting migration routes and deciding where specific animals will graze. The Ruga is also considered responsible for internal and external dispute management and settling conflicts between farmers and his group (Ellwood 1995).

Another manifestation of the linkages between Fulbe and farmer societies is the history of elasticity of the ethnic identities of Fulbe and Manya farmers: 'distinctions between Fulbe cattle herders and Manya agriculturalists have been continuously manipulated to permit people to cross the ethnic boundary' (Lovejoy & Baier 1976:158). Practices like these made it possible for Fulbe to coexist and travel through regions settled by farmers, while

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3   Picardi and Seifert (1976) highlight the importance of this delicately timed mobility to the Fulbe production system. Accordingly: A symbiotic relationship is thus established and the herdsmen have customary 'clients' among the agriculturalists to whom they regularly return with their cattle. However, the herdsmen delay the southern portion of their trek until after harvesting to avoid having the cattle wander into unharvested fields, thus incurring the farmers' wrath (Picardi & Seifert 1976:46).

maintaining relatively cooperative relations with them and preserving the symbiotic production system that evolved as an adaptive response to the ecology of West Africa.

Colonial period

Contact and interaction with Europeans were associated with a variety of transforming processes impacting African social and physical landscapes. The level of influence was greatly magnified in colonial settings. The early industrial states of Europe were becoming increasingly modernised, legal-rational, and bureaucratic. Their greatest interest in and capacity for administration encouraged policymaking geared toward the intentional manipulation of African environments for a variety of purposes. For example, by drafting new laws regarding land ownership and using European style court systems, colonial regimes gained control of large amounts of land in West Africa.

Europeans imposed formal laws on societies that had developed generally informal – but often quite sophisticated and complex – systems of land use and tenure that were appropriate for local production styles and tended to incorporate farmer-herder interaction in the production process (Jacobsen 1988). The resulting changes undermined this cooperative system, reduced farmer-Fulbe goal compatibility, and weakened customary or informal land tenure and resource use. This is significant because such systems contain culturally specific and relevant procedures and mechanisms for dispute management (Lane 1996; Shepherd 1996). One of the many unintended outcomes of the resultant state policies, ergo, was an array of structural conditions conducive to intergroup conflict between sowers and graziers.

Key aspects of the subsumption of land by capitalism were the policies and projects that aimed for the privatisation and nationalisation of land and sedentarisation of Fulbe nomads. Flexible property rights had been an important historic adaptive strategy in the Sahel, especially for Fulbe (Waller & Sobania 1994). They played a significant role in the sustainable use of natural resources and in preventing farmer-herder goal incompatibility and conflict. As part of the subsumption of the forces of production, the

colonial regimes pursued policies of privatisation. These policies not only reduced indigenous peoples' control of and access to land and natural resources, (thus making them more scarce and increasing competition and conflict over the resources that were still available), but privatisation was also associated with environmental degradation. As noted by Van den Brink, Bromley and Chavas (1995:392), 'exclusive property regimes' have repeatedly resulted in the 'overuse of the resource base, amplification of negative effects of drought periods, and increased conflicts between nomads and farmers, among nomadic groups, and within nomadic groups'.

Nationalisation of land, on the other hand, not only occurred during the colonial era but it has continued under post-colonial governments. Such policies have often thrown traditional land tenure systems and relations of production into disarray, and caused herders to seek new land for grazing and increase the size of their herds. The nationalisation of land was especially hard on pastoralists as colonial regimes tended to lay claims to territories that were not permanently settled, and that were an important part of the transhumant Fulbe production system.

Transient populations are anathema to the legal, rational, and bureaucratic state. Attempts to sedentarise nomadic and transhumant herders are another policy pursued by colonial regimes in West African that continues to this day. Ethnocentrism and the belief that sedentarised herders are easier to tax and regulate can account for part of this phenomenon, but the desire of capitalist forces to gain control of land also played a role. In addition, sedentarisation enables the surveillance and control of nomads.

Settled, stationary groups typically mistrust nomads, who are often viewed as threatening. They can be stigmatised as thieves (as exemplified in the case of the Turkana, the Roma 'Gypsies', and the Lapps of Finland) or as warlike.[4] Once herders were permanently settled in a certain area it became much easier for colonial regimes to claim the former grazing lands that they utilised. Unfortunately, just as sedentarisation, 'semisedentarization

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4   In a North American case of farmer-herder conflict, for instance, there is a long history of juxtaposing stereotypes of aggressive Navajo against peaceful Hopi.

[of nomads] has serious long-term management and environmental implications which have in turn created another stereotype: the "destructive pastoralist" responsible for the tragedy of the commons' (Waller & Sobania 1994:50). Such environmental damage further augments the possibility of goal incompatibility and conflict with farmers. As noted by Unruh (1990:224), 'land use conflicts in river basin and floodplain areas increase as degradation of rangelands, growing populations, and greater pressures on these areas to produce food, cause increased competition for land and water resources'.

The sedentarisation of some Fulbe, combined with the other changes in land tenure that colonial regimes undertook, weakened their transhumant production system and the symbiosis with farmers. Sedentarisation, therefore, not only contributed to conflict between these groups but hindered mobility which, in many ecological zones, is greatly beneficial for pastoralist production strategies (Gilles & Gefu 1990).

Another effect of the capitalist system on production was an increase in commodity production, especially in the agricultural sector. Colonial regimes encouraged – and in various instances imposed – production of cash crops such as cotton. These cash crops were grown for export to the industries of Western Europe. But according to Waller and Sobania (1994:45), 'by 1950 … pastoralists had been relegated to the periphery of an economic and political system that was now dominated by the needs of export agriculture and in which stock had been bypassed for new avenues of accumulation'. The unsustainable ways in which cash crop farming is conducted caused significant environmental damage and increased desertification. The enormous demand in the world market for the raw materials that were and are grown in West Africa generated an expansion and intensification of farming, frequently resulting in deforestation and the destruction of grazing reserves used by Fulbe in times of drought. For example, in Senegal, Mali and Niger the introduction of new varieties of groundnuts made it possible for farmers to expand to the northern arid regions traditionally used as grazing lands (Sinclair & Fryxell 1985).

The switch in production meant major changes in the way that land in West Africa is utilised, and played a major role in the increased land and natural resource competition between the Fulbe and agriculturalists of recent years. Colonialism began a process of increased incorporation into the international markets and exchange network. In this context, production for subsistence came to be seen as inadequate, and customary or traditional forms of land tenure and resource management were considered primitive and outdated (Galaty 1994). Conflict and goal incompatibility between Fulbe and farmers were further exacerbated directly and indirectly by changes in power dynamics, medical advances introduced by Europeans, and demographics.

The colonial governments obliterated the existing political systems, which maintained Fulbe-farmer production symbiosis. These regimes tended to favour certain ethnic groups at the expense of others, and there was a general preference for farming groups, with pastoralists often being stigmatised as unruly and warlike. Consequently, such favouritism caused significant changes in the balance of power between them. This dynamic was an important part in the gradual decrease of available land for Fulbe pastoralist production:

> The more rapid incorporation of farming peoples into the developing larger political systems resulted in decreasing control of land and cattle among the pastoralists – this, at a time when rapid growth in the agricultural, commercial, and industrial sectors had generated a larger volume of competition and conflict over basic natural resources (Frantz 1975:14).

Since each collectivity attempts to secure the most resources and benefits for itself, rather than sharing them with others, the existing power structures of cooperation and goal compatibility (such as those in 'peasant-nomad interaction') are challenged (Bates 1971:116). In other words, the processes and changes in power balances between these groups brought about by the colonial administrations altered the cooperative system and generated farmer-herder goal incompatibility and conflict.

The colonial era further undermined the basis of farmer-Fulbe goal compatibility and the customary land tenure systems, which contained conflict management mechanisms, by introducing systems of conflict management based on formal European-style laws and courts which were ineffective. The Fulbe usually did not use the formal judicial arenas and procedures for handling resource conflicts established by colonial regimes (Frantz 1975:12). This group felt that they would probably not be satisfied with the outcome of judiciary procedures and preferred to migrate, or simply avoided the situation or dispute (Frantz 1975:12).

Prior to the colonial period, 'competition and conflict between these groups [Fulbe-farmers] were often limited because of small human population pressures, periodic droughts, and epidemics of cattle disease' (Frantz 1975:9). Colonialism brought new medical knowledge and practices to West Africa and both the human and the cattle (especially as rinderpest was brought under control) populations rose greatly, resulting in an increase in competition for resources (Ellis & Swift 1988; Jacobsen 1988). Therefore, 'both the tenure systems imported from Europe to Africa and the reduced mortality rates which have resulted from various pre- and post-colonial health initiatives have impacted heavily on the relationship of Africans to land. Although the former was a deliberate and the latter an accidental factor in changing this relationship, both have increased the potential for conflict' (Shepherd 1996:2). In addition, 'modern' medical services have been used as an additional rationale for the sedentarisation of nomadic Fulbe (and other nomads). The argument is that nomads need to be sedentarised in order to receive proper health care and other 'modern' government services (Ellwood 1995).

Post-colonial period

After independence, the articulation of the modes of production continued and many of the other processes such as urbanisation, demographic pressure, and increased influence of a global market economy continued, decreasing available pasture land and increasing competition for natural resources in West Africa (Wilson 1984). The models of the colonial era were generally

followed by post-colonial governments. For example, some of the features of the land tenure systems and land laws (including the bias against pastoralists and nomads) instituted during the colonial period generally remained unchanged (Elbow & Rochegude 1989). The independent governments and development agencies continued several of the policies instituted by previous regimes such as nationalisation and privatisation of land, sedentarisation of nomads (the desire of the new independent governments to prevent herders from travelling over national borders also played a role in this), the establishment of plantations and encouragement of cash crop production.

Development agencies play a major role in the continuation of a number of the policies and processes begun in the colonial era. After colonialism, development groups, in conjunction with independent governments, have continued the articulation of the two modes of production and the impacts on farming and pastoral systems that increased the likelihood of conflict between farmers and herders. Development in the Sahel has been driven to a large extent by Western agencies that ascribe to the paradigm of formalist economics. The paradigm for development projects in this region has long been influenced by theories of the type that Garret Hardin (1968) presented in the famous article 'The Tragedy of the Commons'. According to Garrett Hardin's (1968) model of land use, common land meant open access land which individual pastoralists could use, unfettered by the constraints of substantive rationality. Privatisation was therefore a way in which the land could be used in a more sustainable manner. This conclusion turned out to be erroneous, but it does fit nicely with the land tenure and free-market capitalist economic system of most Western countries. Since the dominant paradigm for African development linked common property regimes and nomadism to resource degradation, sedentarisation of pastoralists, and the privatisation of land have been dominant features of West African development programs (Galaty 1994; Gilles & Gefu 1990). The mixture of formalist economics, rational choice models, and equilibrium-based rangeland management theory that has guided the paradigms for development in this region has also meant a continuation of policies that undermine farmer-herder goal complementarity and cause environmental degradation.

Development agencies have been instrumental in the introduction of new irrigation technology and the drilling of boreholes in West Africa. In much of the Sahel and the neighbouring lands, the arid climate has historically been a key limiting factor in the availability of land for farming. The aridity of such areas has meant that farming, as it was traditionally conducted before colonialism, was not a viable strategy on many areas. In the past, such land was used by the Fulbe for their wet season herding and they would migrate to the wetter zones in the dry season after the farmers there had harvested their crops.

The introduction of new irrigation technology and techniques into Africa through development projects allows the expansion of agriculture into relatively arid regions. In the 1950s and 1960s many farmers in the Sahel expanded north into semi-arid regions traditionally used by Fulbe as grazing lands, and this process has continued since then (Sinclair & Fryxell 1985). The European bias against nomadism and common property land tenure systems is one reason that farmers have been encouraged by colonial regimes, post-colonial governments, and development agencies to expand into areas used by pastoralists (Frantz 1975). The influence of the tragedy of the commons paradigm and its precursors allowed colonial regimes to justify encouraging farmers to move into former grazing lands and reserves, and produce cash crops by arguing that these were unproductive or unoccupied areas that farmers could settle and plant. The expansion of farmers onto grazing lands remains one major contributor to a frequently noted phenomenon of the late nineteenth and twentieth century: 'a declining resource base for pastoralism' (Bassett 1988:453). This has been one important push factor encouraging Fulbe expansion into southern areas that lack a history of farmer-herder production integration. In addition, irrigation technology played a role in the sedentarisation of pastoralists. As development agencies helped drill new boreholes in the Sahel, pastoralists were encouraged to settle around them (Sinclair & Fryxell 1985).

Contemporary climatic conditions and patterns have also interacted with rapid population increases, changes in modes of production and increased goal incompatibility and incidences of farmer-herder conflict, especially in

Africa. Since the 1970s 'there has been a significant decline in the average rainfall received across the African arid and semiarid zone' (Galaty 1994:187, cf Bonfiglioli 1992). These weather patterns are definitely linked to the changes in land tenure and the domestic modes of production in West Africa, and the effects that this has had on the environment. Many theorists have noted the environmental degradation, rangeland defoliation, and deforestation that occurred in West Africa as a result of cash crop production, agricultural strategies emphasising short-term gains and extraction from the land, the drilling of boreholes and sedentarisation of nomads, the move away from customary land tenure systems, and privatisation and nationalisation of land. The end result of these processes is a continent-wide trend towards aridity in which the environment is moving towards 'a new stable state of self-perpetuating drought' (Sinclair & Fryxell 1985:992). Furthermore, environmental degradation has been explicitly linked by many theorists to development intervention due to the effects of this intervention on population growth, overgrazing, desertification, and unsustainable agricultural projects (Sinclair & Fryxell 1995). As noted by Ellis and Swift (1988:451), 'in many cases development has exacerbated degradation in pastoral ecosystems... while curtailment of nomadism, losses of grazing lands to agriculture, security problems, and the settlement of some pastoralists have combined to reduce the area of rangeland'.

It is important to note the effects that this weather pattern is having on Fulbe migration. The increasing aridity in the Sahel and decrease in rangeland vegetation mean that natural resources are increasingly scarce and access to them is more likely to be contested. The unusually dry weather pattern of the past few decades (especially the severe drought in the Sahel during the early 1970s) contributed to the southward migration of the Fulbe into more humid zones (Bassett 1988). Fulbe 'out-migration' from the Sahel helped 'crowd already overextended agricultural land in the Sudan zone' (Picardi & Seifert 1976:51). Their southward migration created new frictions with farmers as the Fulbe moved into more humid areas long dominated by horticultural production. The entry of Fulbe herds in these regions led to crop and soil damage, intergroup competition for natural resources, and

numerous disputes in localities lacking a history of farmer and herder production symbiosis and interaction and corresponding social institutions for managing conflicts (Basset 1988; Behnke & Scones 1992; Harshbarger 1995).

A number of other factors are also involved in the massive population flow to the south. There has long been stiff competition for land and water between farmers and Fulbe in the transition zones between pastureland and farmland. The recent northwards movement of farmers combined with additional elements such as demographic pressures and desertification to act as push factors causing Fulbe herders to seek new areas to pasture their herds (Wilson 1984). The combination of the 'declining resource base for pastoralism' in areas long inhabited by Fulbe, and the dry weather patterns in the Sahel weakened the checks on traditional Fulbe southward migration patterns (Gallais 1979; Hjort 1982 cited in Bassett 1988:453). As previously mentioned, these checks promote synergistic and harmonious relations with farmers and avoid conflict over crop damages. For example, poor pasture conditions in Niger and Mali have caused herders there to bring their animals to Burkina Faso, straining Burkina's pasture resources. Areas where water is available are particularly subject to overgrazing. The increasing use of traditional pasturelands for crop production – particularly along the border with Mali – has aggravated the situation and has led to increasing conflict between agriculturalists and pastoralists (USAID 1996).

In other cases, governments of countries like the Ivory Cost and the Central African Republic that want to lessen beef imports and strengthen local food production have supplied and are supplying pull factors for this new southward surge of Fulbe herders. The southerly movement of herders has important implications for the environmental future of the more humid zones. The sandy soil of the arid zones is more resistant to negative impacts from grazing than the heavily textured and clay type soils in the more humid areas (Behnke & Scones 1992). The southwards migration of Fulbe herders may therefore pose major risks for the long-term health of the southern environments that they are moving to. By examining specific localised cases of farmer-Fulbe interaction, such as those in the next section, one can

achieve a greater and more concrete understanding of the types of processes described in this paper.

3. Specific cases

The Zamfara Reserve district of Nigeria

This district is located in northwestern Nigeria and was designated as a forest reserve by the British in 1916. Although subsequent legislation prohibited both grazing and farming within the district, arable crop production slowly began to occur there. In 1960 (the year that Nigeria became independent), the district was designated as a grazing reserve. The area is now inhabited by Hausa farmers, settled agro-pastoral Fulbe, and transhumant pastoral Fulbe.

The Zamfara Reserve has become an important rainy season pasture for the herds of Fulbe and pastoralists who have been pushed out from other rangelands. The 'cattle corridors' that Fulbe used to move their herds around according to environmental conditions have either been swallowed up by the expansion of cultivation or have become too narrow for Fulbe herds (Hoffman 1996:5). Government-constructed dams have also reduced the amount of land available to the herders.

The fact that the Zamfara district is an official grazing reserve further contributes to its use by Fulbe. The land tenure laws of Nigeria are very unfavourable to traditional pastoralists and they hold no legal rights over land. They can merely be granted temporary use permits of certain land (Gefu 1992 cited in Hoffman 1996). In addition, ecological pressure on other areas has increased the use of the reserve and, consequently, generated significant overgrazing and environmental degradation. Much of the degradation has been caused by 'government interventions in the indigenous livestock sector... based on certain assumptions that date back to the colonial era' (Hoffman 1996:6).

Land use conflicts between Hausa farmers and Fulbe herders have become common there due to the end of the past pattern of production symbiosis

between the groups: 'the different ethnic groups and lifestyles are a source for conflicts, particularly since the complementarity between cropping and herding is breaking down: Fulbe become increasingly settled and require crop land without giving up their herds, while Hausa agriculturalists depend increasingly on their own livestock for utilising crop residues and manuring their fields' (Hoffman 1996:1-2). Other factors that have changed the local Fulbe mode of production are the practice of waged herding and the increase in absentee herd ownership. This region in Nigeria provides an example of the environmental degradation, reduction of farmer-herder symbiosis, and increased conflict between Fulbe and farmers that have become common in West Africa.

Senegal

Groundnuts (peanuts) are an example of a crop grown for export, introduced by the French and promoted by post-independence governments (Freudenberger 1995; Lovejoy & Baier 1976). Peanut farming in Senegal is often done in an unsustainable way that uses up the fertility of land and contributes to the scarcity of arable land. The groundnut plants are uprooted at harvest time, leaving the ground bare and without any leftover plant material to break down and enrich the soil or groundcover to protect from erosion throughout the dry season. During the latter, the harmattan winds from the Sahara easily blow away the topsoil (Freudenberger 1995). The resulting resource scarcity exacerbates competition between farmers and pastoralists (Traore & Lo 1996).

The change from subsistence production to commodity production, and the new technology and methods for irrigation, have further encouraged farmer expansion into areas previously used as pastures for the production of other commodities for the international market (Freudenberger 1995; Guéye 1994). In addition, development projects play a role in farmers being 'tempted into lands previously considered too dry for agriculture. Each year new fields are cleared around the boreholes, blocking access routes used by cattle as they move from one grazing area to another and creating bitter conflicts between herders and farmers' (Freudenberger 1995:16). For

instance, two dams were built along the Senegal River in the 1980s and this caused the displacement of the Fulbe who lived along the banks of the river as well as from other nearby land which previously could not be irrigated. Such land was quickly claimed by wealthy farmers (Freudenberger 1995).

Environmental degradation and pressure placed upon Fulbe herders in Senegal encouraged Fulbe migration patterns into new areas such as the Ivory Coast and Cameroon. Deviating from their historical routes and caution not to damage crops and avoid conflict with farmers, the herdsmen of the Sahel (Fulbe and Tuareg) have thus been forced into territories and humid zones to the South. This migration has generated other cases of farmer-herder conflict as discussed further below.

Freundenberger's (1995) case study of the Ferlo region of northern Senegal, reveals how the post-colonial trend towards sedentarisation, export-oriented cash crop production and the resulting environmental degradation, the expansion of farmers into grazing land and forest reserves, and population increases are leading to JeerinkooBe Fulbe-farmer conflict. The Ferlo region described by Freudenberger (1995) is an area of sparse and extremely variable rainfall where 'one hamlet may receive a drenching downpour while another five kilometers away remains bone dry' (Freudenberger 1995, 15). The key to the success of the Fulbe in exploiting this environment has been their transhumance (Freudenberger 1995). When the whole Ferlo region is stricken with drought, the Fulbe move south into densely populated areas inhabited by Wolof and Serere farmers. The Fulbe avoid conflicts and find grazing land for their herds by seeking out the forest reserves of this region where farming is not allowed.

The Fulbe's room to manoeuvre in the Ferlo is being restricted on several sides. As population pressure in the south builds and land there becomes more degraded, farmers are increasingly moving into this arid land and are utilising new irrigation technology and boreholes for farming. To the north of the Ferlo are the dams built in the 1980s on the Senegal which have brought farmers into that region. To the west the land has been walled to serve as gardens for absentee owners: 'lush gardens are owned by powerful

religious leaders, Lebanese businessmen, and other members of an elite based in the capital, Dakar. They serve both wealthy city dwellers and Europe's insatiable desire for fresh fruit and vegetables in winter' (Freudenberger 1995:16). To the south of the Ferlo lie the important forest reserves. The last major reserve, the Mbegué forest, has largely been planted with peanuts by the Mouride Islamic Brotherhood which received a government grant for this. Only three of the thirty-five watering holes are still available for use by the Fulbe. One consequence of the pressure on Fulbe herders in the Ferlo is that some herders have left this region in a phenomenon referred to as 'escape mobility' (Hoffman 1996:10).

Another analysis of the gradual increase in intercommunal conflict is supplied by Guéye's (1994) 'Conflicts and alliances between farmers and herders: A Case Study of the 'Goll' of Fandéne village, Senegal'. The author debunks the notion that farmer-herder coexistence inevitably leads to conflict. In pre-colonial central Senegal farmer-herder complementarity was 'the rule rather than the exception'. 'Herder and field are natural allies' is a popular saying in this region (Guéye 1994:1). In fact, the Fulbe came to settle in the arid Goll area of the village territories following an invitation from local Serere farmers wishing to maintain their claim to that fallow land by preventing other farmers or agri-business investors from occupying or purchasing it.

A boom in Borassus palm cultivation lessened the availability of rangelands, yet conflict between farmers and the Fulbe remained fairly well managed for a while (Guéye 1994). There was a smattering of disputes over crop damages when cattle strayed into Wolof fields, but the Fulbe adjusted their transhumance patterns to avoid this problem. Another source of contention was the cutting of the *kinkeliba* bush by Wolof and Serere women who wished to make a pleasant, non-caffeinated tea. However, cattle also find that plant pleasant, leading to a classic case of resource scarcity. As in the case of the Nigerian *Ruga,* local mechanisms and traditions of conflict management successfully contained the potential for widespread intergroup strife.

The potential for serious conflict was greatly heightened when the national government undertook a canal project to supply Dakar with drinking water.

It became known that the Cayor canal would allow certain villages, including Fandéne, to receive water for irrigation, enabling cultivation to spread to arid zones like the Goll. Disputes arose when the Serere, who claimed the Goll, began to try and remove the Fulbe so that they could farm there. In addition, several agri-business representatives attempted to gain access to the Goll through the local Rural Council. Senegal's Rural Councils can allocate land in this way, and the Fandéne area Rural Council has allowed some outsiders to use the Goll land. The response of the local communities was to band together in opposition to the outsiders who were attempting to gain access to land in this area. The Fulbe, Serere, and Wolof of Fandéne thus were united in cooperation towards a common goal: preventing outsiders from gaining access to local land.

In the Fandéne village, the Fulbe and farmers prefer informal channels of settling disputes. In rural areas people tend to prefer customary law over modern law (Guéye 1994). Guéye (1994) further affirms the need for more enlightened legislation concerning pastoralist land rights in Senegal. He specifically notes that regulations concerning natural resource management need to be more amenable to the pastoralist production system and land use patterns. Senegal is similar to Nigeria in that the Senegalese land tenure laws consider traditional pastoral grazing lands as national land, and specify that cultivation of land is a necessary part of land ownership (Hoffman 1996).

The case of the Fandéne village reinforces the argument of theorists such as Wilson and Ellwood that Fulbe and farmer communities need to be able to control the land which they use, and regulate its use without external interference. External pressures and interference create pressure on the scarce natural resources and aggravate latent conflict.

Ivory Coast and Cameroon

Since its independence in 1960 the government of the Ivory Coast has pursued a capitalist and international market economy oriented strategy of economic development. The government has encouraged cash crop production for export and has invested in large sugar and palm oil complexes. In order to bolster its economic situation, the government has attempted

to restrict imports of all kinds (specifically beef imports) from other West African countries whose prices were extremely variable, and from South America and West Europe whose prices were always high. To this end, it has adopted an official policy of encouraging Fulbe to migrate to this country and settle there. In keeping with the development models that sprung from the colonial era, the government also included a plan to sedentarise the Fulbe in this scheme. The migration of Fulbe into the region bolstered the national economy of the Ivory Coast by reducing their need for beef imports, but it has also resulted in serious conflict between Fulbe and local farmers (Bassett 1988; Harshbarger 1995).

Fulbe responded to the government's initiative, and to other pull factors such as high cattle prices in the Ivory Coast markets and the lack of taxes on cattle, by moving into this area. As Fulbe migrated to the Ivory Coast, disputes between the Fulbeherders and Senufo farmers began to occur. In the 1970s 'an unprecedented number of herds entered the northern savannah' (Bassett 1988:453). Due to the absence of historical ties between herding and farming in this area there is no tradition of farmers and Fulbe sharing compatible goals because of synergistic arrangements in their production styles. This makes the incidences of crop damage more important, as they do not constitute a necessary risk contained within the overall production framework.

Changes in the Senufo production style have made crop damage an especially significant phenomenon. In the past, Senufo farmers employed a lineage-based system of production that provided buffers against crop losses. Now, however, the conjugal household is the primary unit of production and major crop losses can inflict severe debts and the resulting personal mortification on Senufo farmers. In addition, the increases in monetisation and commodity production that resulted from the articulation with capitalism further increased the significance of crop damage to the Senufo. 'The expansion of cotton cultivation and the increasing monetisation of the local economy have also heightened farmers' awareness of the monetary value of their crops' (Bassett 1988:466).

The conflict between these two groups became manifest and violent in the early 1980s as some Senufo began attacking and killing Fulbe. Ivory Coast politicians made inflammatory statements about the Fulbe presence in their country. Consequently, it gave the impression that these politicians and the government supported violence and thus encouraged the Senufo assaults (Bassett 1988; Harshbarger 1995). Many Fulbe migrated to the northern border of the Ivory Coast in order to flee from the violence.

On the other hand, Fulbe also began migrating south and west into the grasslands of Cameroon during the colonial period. This migration was encouraged by the British colonial government, who did not demand that farmers were compensated when crops were damaged by pastoralists. The presence of Fulbe herds, population growth, and the switch of many Cameroonian farmers from subsistence to commodity farming over the years led to major resource competition and conflict between farmers and herders. In the past five years there has been major conflict between Aghem and Meta farmers and Fulbe herders because of crop damages.

Current attempts at farmer-herder conflict management in the Ivory Coast and Cameroon

There are currently ongoing attempts to address the issue of crop damages caused by herd animals in both the Ivory Coast and Cameroon. In the Ivory Coast, crop damage committees have attempted to resolve disputes of this nature since the 1970s. The Farmer-Grazier Commission attempts to mediate between disputants in Cameroon. These institutions have generally failed to satisfy their mandate and enable farmers to be compensated, and have been ineffective as a means of managing farmer-Fulbe conflict (Bassett 1988; Harshbarger 1995).

There are several major problems that have been noted about these reactive approaches to farmer-herder conflict. One is that bribery and corruption are commonplace to both attempts; another is the time factor (Bassett 1988; Kum 1983 as cited in Harshbarger 1995). Time is a key element in dispute resolution, and 'slow access [to 'forums for dispute resolution'] is no access' (Nader & Todd 1978:22-23). In the Ivory Coast, owners of damaged

fields must travel to an administrative centre in order to begin the process of attempting to gain compensation. Unfortunately, the Farmer-Grazier Commission tends to delay cases, presumably often because of corruption (Kum 1983 as cited in Harshbarger 1995).

Nader and Todd (1978) further identify costs as an important element of the characteristics of forums for dispute resolution. The crop damage committees do not only require that field owners travel to administrative centres, which undoubtedly entails some expenses and loss of potential productivity, but they also stipulate that such plaintiffs must pay for the committee members' travel expenses (Bassett 1988)! These systems are simply not effective, and fail to diminish tensions between farmers and herders.

It is revealing that both of these systems are based on the model of adjudication (Harshbarger 1995). Adjudication refers to adversarial ways for dealing with conflict. These models tend to be non-participatory, and rely on third parties to unilaterally decide the outcome of the dispute. Adjudication occurs after a conflict has been manifested; it is generally not used to prevent them. Because these systems are adjudicative in nature, they are not set up to address the causes of crop damage – they merely exist in theory to rectify the effects of crop damage through compensation, and in practice they fail even in that.

4. Conclusion: From analysis to mitigation

Our analysis suggests that conflict between Fulbe and farmers has been heightened due to techno-environmental factors, particularly changes in production systems and land tenure regimes. These undermined the basis for cultivator-grazier complementarity and increased the potential for goal incompatibility and strife. Western interventions have exacerbated the root causes underlying the conflict situation, even when those efforts were purportedly aimed at improving living conditions for inhabitants of the subregion. Indeed, development and assistance projects have likely exacerbated farmer-Fulbe conflict in many cases.

Before concluding, the policy implications of the points made here that underline the significance of analysis for conflict management practice or interventions must be considered as follows:

1. Western style land tenure policies have increased environmental degradation and have contributed to farmer-Fulbe goal incompatibility. Legislation that potentially aggravates intercommunal tensions, therefore, should be revised. Future legislation should consider the relationship between farming groups and Fulbe and avoid benefiting one group at the expense of the other.

2. Fulbe and farming groups are capable of effectively managing resources and cooperating for mutual benefit. Local control of natural resources and land is an important factor in making such cooperation possible.

3. Top-down, formalist, retributive and adjudicative approaches to managing conflict have been ineffective in Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal. Such approaches were generally derived from Western models and have frequently failed to effectively address farmer-Fulbe disputes.

4. Communities in areas with a history of farmer-herder interaction developed strategies for conflict mitigation. These could provide context-appropriate conflict management institutions and should be investigated and reinvigorated or supported when feasible and desirable.

Taken together the above points suggest that in terms of policymaking, paternalistic, directive interventions should be abandoned in favour of a more supportive engagement that strives to draw on and build up local resources and capacities. A first step toward preventing and mitigating farmer-herder conflict may, ergo, be to agitate for more local control of resources. In addition, another significant task is the revision of laws that are biased against pastoralists and promote their marginalisation. Although

less common, legislation and conditions that disadvantage horticulturalists are equally problematic.

Recent innovations in the fields of rangeland management, development, and pastoralist studies should be incorporated into policymaking. These theories are generally more appreciative of autochthonous or local methods of production, rangeland management and land tenure than previous paradigms. While they have garnered much attention, particularly among scholars, and despite some laudable efforts such as the Campfire project, there has been more discussion than action and the standard top-down approach remains influential. Governments, international organisations, and other actors in the Sahel have continued promoting ecologically questionable production styles, cash-crop plantations and settled agriculture on rangelands (Jacobsen 1988). Grazier mobility should be recognised as a viable production strategy and coercive sedentarisation should be abandoned. Policies should aim to increase the options and decision-making capacity of producers.

There have been many recent calls to develop new bottom-up methods of conflict resolution. Farmer-herder conflict mitigation would certainly be enhanced by the availability of effective methods of dispute settlement. There should be more exploration of local practices that could be utilised to help develop (and in some cases restore) local and grassroots type of mechanisms based on a 'win-win' approach to conflict. The populations in southern areas that have experienced relatively recent influxes of Fulbe could be introduced to the types of dispute management processes long used in the north and be trained in them, for instance. The lessons learned from such projects could be useful to the wider field of development and assistance, which has struggled with the need to effectively engage local practices and conflict management approaches.

In summation, farmer-herder conflicts are sometimes portrayed as one of the many plagues afflicting the 'poor, unfortunate' African continent. Such perspectives overlook the historical and structural processes that have heightened the potential of intercommunal strife. As is generally true, a state

of positive peace or sustainable coexistence between these disparate groups is by no means impossible. Diagnosis or recognition of the factors influencing the current situation is the first step towards correcting misinformed views and enabling conflict prevention and mitigation. Hopefully the analysis of Fulbe-farmer disputes in this paper will make a modest contribution in that direction.

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Rectifying Horizontal Inequalities: Lessons from African Conflict

David McCoy *

Abstract

In Africa, the decade of the nineteen nineties was characterised by civil war and interstate conflict, but as the decade came to a close and a new millennium emerged many of the protracted conflicts in Africa had officially come to an end. The official resolution of conflict in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire has helped stem the rampant instability that has plagued the continent for most of its post-colonial history. With the newly established peace agreements comes an even more critical and difficult challenge of creating peaceful societies in these war-ravaged nations. In order to rebuild a nation, one must examine and acknowledge the root causes of the conflict. One of the most prevalent and underrepresented root causes of conflict in Africa and worldwide is that of horizontal inequalities. In that light, the goal of this paper is to provide

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practical solutions for the long-term resolution of conflict by addressing one of its root causes, that of horizontal inequalities. Reference will be made to solutions proven successful in past cases where conflict emerged as a result of group inequalities, namely Rwanda and Mali. The paper will take the following form: Section one will look at the current literature on conflict and demonstrate the link between horizontal inequalities and conflict. Section two will focus on the two case studies providing background to the conflict, and the action taken after violent conflict ceased. Section three will be dedicated to the lessons learned from the Malian and the Rwandan experience, including policy recommendations that should be instituted for any nation where horizontal inequalities are a major catalyst of conflict.

Introduction

As a new century dawned there was a renewed sense that the international community would be able to quell the many conflicts and threats to peace that exist around the world; however, by the autumn of 2001 that hope was drastically altered. With the events of September 11th, the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq, the much heralded Millennium Development Goals and the commitment to assisting those in the most dire of circumstances fell to the wayside in the name of national security. This new national security and terrorist agenda, which has been championed by the United States (US), remains the focus of the international community almost seven years after the terrorist attacks occurred. The international attention paid to both Iraq and transnational terrorist organisations has resulted in a departure from the humanitarian and individual focused security agenda that was beginning to emerge. However, while the US and most of the rest of the world is fixated on Al-Qaeda and the Global War on Terror (GWOT), progress towards peace and stability has developed in one of the more unstable regions of the world – Sub-Saharan Africa. There are now peace agreements in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and if successful, these developments will bring much needed stability and hope to millions throughout Africa.

The problems the US is encountering in Iraq and Afghanistan and the long road ahead for the many African nations emerging from conflict illustrate the multitude of challenges that accompany nation building. In this light, one of the most pressing questions the international community must answer is: How can nations emerging from conflict create sustainable peace and stability? The answers to this question have global relevance, but the solutions are especially necessary in Africa where, since the independence movement of the 1960s, conflict has ensued with regard to every imaginable nature. The formal peace agreements emerging in many nations are the starting point of a long process, but that process's validity and success lies in solving the root causes of violent conflict. Even though the cultures, regions and people involved in these conflicts are exceedingly complex the conflicts, in and of themselves, have one similarity: they are a result of domestic horizontal inequalities. Horizontal inequalities are inequalities between groups and can be attributed to conflicts in all parts of the world – from the US race riots in the 1960's and the 2005 Paris riots to the genocides that unfolded in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Consequently, if countries and regions in Africa and the rest of the world want to develop stable peaceful societies they must rectify the horizontal inequalities that are at the root of many violent conflicts.

The ability of a nation to resolve inequalities between groups is of the utmost importance in any peace process. Thankfully, the international community and nations that are embarking on this process have a history and past experience to guide future action. In order to answer the question of how African nations and regions emerging from conflict can create sustainable peace and stability, this paper will analyse the steps African nations have taken to rectify horizontal inequalities in post-conflict environments. This analysis is constructed upon two case studies, Mali and Rwanda, and will provide lessons for future peace initiatives in Africa and beyond. Furthermore, this paper will provide an in-depth analysis with a focus on successful initiatives, something often ignored in circulating literature. The goal of this paper is to provide practical solutions for the long-term resolution of conflict by addressing one of its root causes, that of horizontal inequalities. Moreover,

it will provide solutions proven successful in past cases regarding conflicts caused by group inequalities.

Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict

In order to understand the mechanisms needed to create peace, the reasons for the development of conflict must be understood. There exists in the international community the idea that conflict resolution is necessary and possible, however, it should also be understood that conflict should not be viewed as something intrinsically negative. Victor Azarya argues that conflict is natural and cannot be prevented. Because conflict cannot be eliminated, he further argues that conflict can only be contained and moderated (Azarya 2003:3). What the international community must aim to achieve is the elimination of violent conflict, not conflict in and of itself. Once this is understood the question then revolves around conflict management and violence prevention. The most effective way to preventing violent conflict is to address the root causes of conflict. Azarya argues that a democracy is the preferred mechanism to contain conflict because it is the 'art of conflict accommodation' (Azarya 2003:4). Democracy provides room for disagreement without having to resort to violence. Mark Malloch Brown, Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), is also a proponent of democracy promotion stating, 'It is my strong belief that democratic governance is vital not just for ensuring sustainable development, but is vital for sustaining peace within societies' (Brown 2003:142). The greatest impediment to democracy, however, is that democratic governance will only work if all parties deem it legitimate. The goal of democracy as a tool for stability must be predicated on the full involvement of all parties and groups. It must also be recognised that while the theory of democratic reconstruction is appealing, instituting it is proving to be very difficult in practice (Ottaway 2003:315).

Other authors including Vamik Volkan argue that the root causes of many protracted conflicts are the result of ethnicity. He states, that at the 'root of many conflicts are bloodlines' (Volkan 1997:20). The argument of

ethnicity causing conflict is normally divided into two different theories: constructivism and primordialism. The former views ethnicity as a fluid social construct and the latter views ethnicity as something that one is born into and that cannot be easily altered. Violence often develops between ethnic groups when one group feels threatened or harmed by the other, usually as a result of some inequality or perception of inequality.

Still others, including Riwanto Tirtosudarmo (2006), Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999) and Robert Kaplan (1994) view population pressures as the root of many conflicts. Said Adejumobi takes the conflict argument in a different direction, citing the denial of citizenship rights as major cause of conflict. Adejumobi (2001:156) states:

> It is the consciousness of the denial of citizenship rights by a people, which usually facilitates the transformation of sectarian groups, like racial and ethnic groups, from being 'groups in themselves' into 'groups for themselves.' The idea of elite mobilization of ethnic or racial ideology, which most analysts emphasize in explaining politics and conflicts in Africa, is only possible in the context of a fertile ground of citizenship exclusion.

The exclusion of people, often groups, from aspects of citizenship creates systemic exclusion, inequalities and animosities that foster group mobilisation and violent conflict.

The control and exploitation of resources, it is argued, is a major contributor to violent group mobilisation. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler assert that civil conflict can be articulated as a greed versus grievance dynamic where rebellions start because of the greed of leaders or because of genuine grievance of the people. However, because rebels must finance their rebellion, the control of resources becomes an impediment for peace (Collier & Hoeffler 2001). This dichotomy of either greed or grievance is troublesome to Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke of the International Peace Academy. They state, 'conflict analysis models should avoid "resource reductionist models" in favor of comprehensive approaches' (Ballentine & Nitzschke 2003:1).

James Busumtwi-Sam also advocates a more comprehensive approach for explaining conflict. He states that there are three interrelated factors that contribute to protracted conflict: 'contests over the state and the distribution of political power, the distribution of membership in the political community and the distribution of values and resources' (Busumtwi-Sam 2002:94). Considering a multitude of inequalities when explaining conflict creates a more complete understanding of conflict and leaves us better equipped to rebuild a state.

One of the most cited sources of inequality is poverty and, as a result, an increased level of violence is attributed to high levels of poverty. Ted Robert Gurr argued that rebellions occur when a large discrepancy exists between people's legitimate and actual levels of material reward (Gurr 1970). Nicholas Sambanis (2004:202) demonstrates that a robustly inverted relationship exists between the per capita income and political violence. It should be noted that because of the need for group mobilisation, the disparity in income must occur between groups if there is to be any occurrence of violent conflict. The argument that income disparity between people and groups creates violent conflict can be included in the larger idea of the dissolution of the social contract. Tony Addison and S. Mansoob Murshed argue that conflict can be viewed as a partial or complete breakdown of the social contract (Addison & Murshed 2001:2).[1]

Many scholars have theorised and articulated what they view as causes of conflict; notably, they all directly or indirectly point to the inequalities between individuals and groups. This realisation will help guide further discussion on how to reduce the impact of both vertical (between individuals) and horizontal (between groups) inequalities. A number of scholars have addressed the question of inequalities. Frances Stewart, for example, deals with the problem of horizontal inequalities in a number of papers.[2] Stewart (2002:3) argues that 'unequal access to political/economic/social resources

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1   The social contract can be seen as the implicit rules that govern the distribution of resources and duties in an organised society.

2   See Stewart 2000, 2002 and 2006 for a comprehensive explanation of horizontal inequalities.

by different cultural groups can reduce individual welfare…[and] where there are such inequalities in resource access and outcomes, coinciding with cultural differences, culture can become a powerful mobilizing agent'. Stewart recognises that it is not only the underprivileged that can become violent; groups benefiting from the current system may also resort to violence if they feel their access to resources is threatened (as happened in Rwanda). The focus on group inequalities is important because in order to have a large-scale violent outbreak groups of individuals must mobilise. Moreover, the relative position of groups within society is a determinate factor in stability, not the absolute position of the individual. As Cohen (1974:94) articulates, 'when men do fight…they fight over some fundamental issues concerning the distribution and exercise of power, whether economic, political, or social'. One's cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious differences will not create conflict unless there are extreme political or economic issues within a society. Consequently, the greater the horizontal inequalities, be they political, social, or economic, the greater the chance for violent conflict to emerge. Gudrum Østby (2005:23) adds to the idea of horizontal inequalities as a determinant of conflict by showing that 'recent studies of the inequality-conflict nexus may be wrong when concluding that inequality is unrelated'. Furthermore, Østby (2006) establishes a relationship between conflict and severe socio-economic horizontal inequalities. The prevalence of systemic and pervasive horizontal inequalities within societies has led to the destruction and underdevelopment of numerous societies; however, the issue of group inequalities continues to lack substantial attention within academia and, more importantly, within the international development agenda.

In order to foster stability and development, societies that have experienced conflict as a result of horizontal inequalities must find a way to resolve these disparities. Much of the literature on conflict revolves around theoretical approaches without advancing applicable solutions. As a way of gaining insight into how to bridge the gap between theory and application, an analysis of how post-conflict states have addressed the problem of horizontal inequalities follows.

Case Studies: Mali and Rwanda

Mali

With a landmass of 1.24 million square kilometres (Central Intelligence Agency 2006) and a human development index of 175 (United Nations Development Programme 2006), the country of Mali is one the largest and most underdeveloped countries in Africa. From 1990 to 1996 the government of Mali was confronted with a secessionist movement instigated by a northern nomadic population called the Tuareg. Trained by Libya, the Tuareg formed the *Mouvement Populaire de l'Azawad* (MPLA) with the goal of gaining independence for the Azawad region in Northern Mali. The conflict 'took place in the vast desert and mountains regions of the far north of the country a region – referred to as the "Azawad" by the rebel movements – constituting two thirds of the national territory but relatively poor in natural resources' (Humphreys & Mohamed 2007:6). The country is bisected by the Niger River with the north of the country lying in the Sahara Desert and the south lying in a more arable and temperate climate. This climatic disparity is responsible for the smaller population in the north as well as for its economic irrelevance. The roots of the Malian conflict can be seen as a combination of ethnic fighting between the black population of the south and the paler northern population coupled with northern economic grievances (*Economist* 1990). Moreover, the systematic neglect, discrimination and exploitation of the northern provinces added to the Tuareg grievances against the government (Lode 1997). Almost immediately after the beginning of the conflict in 1991, the government of Moussa Traoré agreed to negotiate with the northern rebels. The talks, which took place in Algeria, resulted in the Tamanrasset Accords. These Accords as well as the Traoré government, however, proved fragile. On 26 March 1991 Moussa Traoré was overthrown. The new transitional government worked quickly to foster acceptance of the Tamanrasset Accords, but did not achieve any substantial success. Because the Accords were unpopular with the army, the rebels and the citizenry, and suffered from imprecise construction, they were increasingly becoming irrelevant (Humphreys & Mohamed 2007:23-24). The

installation of a new government instilled the population and the belligerents with a renewed sense that peace could be legitimately achieved. 'The [failed] Tamanrasset Accords of 6 January 1991 provided a starting point for the dialogue that would eventually lead to a settlement' (Storholt 2001:334). On 11 April 1992 the National Pact was signed by three of the four rebel factions, but 'the Tuaregs continued to resist central authority until 1996 when Konaré (democratically elected in 1992) brought the rebellion to a close through negotiations and promises of administrative reform' (Smith 2001:75). On 27 March 1996 the peace process was celebrated by the burning of 3,000 firearms which was attended by both government officials and rebel leaders and marked the end of the six-year conflict (University of Maryland 2007). Horizontal inequalities between the Northern and Southern populations were the root cause of the Malian conflict. As a result of a concerted effort to resolve the horizontal inequalities, governmental stability has increased and violence has ceased between the two groups.

The Tamanrasset Accords, while imprecise and unpopular, were the basis for the National Pact, which eventually led to peace. The National Pact had many similarities with the Tamanrasset Accords. However, its construction was more holistic, reasonable and confronted the roots of the Malian conflict. The National Pact, signed in April 1992, included 'integration of Tuareg combatants into the Malian armed forces, demilitarization of the north, economic integration of northern populations and a more detailed administrative structure for the three northern regions' (Seely 2001:507). The National Pact, unlike other agreements, went to great lengths to explicitly recognise the economic marginalisation of the northern populations. Moreover, in a speech on 9 November 1991 Col. Toumani Touré recognised that 'all Malians, including people in the North, should have the same rights and should be treated equally' (Storholt 2001:341). Furthermore, 'He admitted that the Malian government had done wrong in the past and officially apologized to the people of the north' (Storholt 2001:342). The recognition of economic and political neglect helped foster an environment of cooperation, while demonstrating governmental willingness to first admit to and then rectify past actions. The peace process was aided in part because

the new government was willing to engage all sectors of society in order to create a more democratic and progressive society. The willingness of the government to admit wrongdoing and the inclusion of the northerners in the military, governmental, and economic sectors of society along with a proactive reform agenda of decentralisation paved the way for the northerners and the government to reach a mutually beneficial agreement.

The Tuareg's secessionist-centred goal was rectified by the transitional and the permanent government's policy of decentralisation. The policy of decentralisation was originally confined to the north; but 'shortly after taking office in the newly democratic Malian Republic…President Alpha Oumar Konaré decided to implement a nation-wide policy of decentralization' (Seely 2001:495). This policy allocated administrative and fiscal control over health, education and some infrastructure to the local communes (Seely 2001). The decentralisation of the country, especially the north, had a three-part effect. The government was able to consolidate power, gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public and the dissidents, and mitigate the threat from the north. The promises of economic and political inclusion, as well as decentralised rule was strengthened by the government's political will to follow through with the agreed framework.

The last major incident which helped to create a workable and ultimately successful peace plan was the development by both sides of what I. William Zartman (1995:18) called 'hurting stalemate'. He writes, 'Negotiations take place when both parties lose faith in their chances of winning and see an opportunity for cutting losses and achieving satisfaction through accommodation.' In Mali, both parties to the conflict recognised they had more to gain through dialogue than through violence. In fact, 'what characterized the peace process in Mali was first the *will* to find a peaceful solution, and second, a *strategy* for managing the conflict' (Storholt 2001:334). The conflict in Mali came to a resolution while the new government was attempting to regain control and legitimacy throughout the country. As a result, they managed to end the six-year conflict while developing a democracy that has 'found firm support in recent economic growth, social structures conducive to equality, a unique political culture, a favorable international environment

and effective political leadership' (Smith 2001:73). Mali's successful peace process can be attributed to a responsive government admitting past neglect, a peace accord that addressed the root causes of conflict i.e. economic and political horizontal inequalities between the north and the south, and the advent of a 'decentralized administration that gave real authority to previously voiceless local governments' (Pringle 2006:33).

Rwanda

In the summer of 1994, Rwanda, a 'quite scenic country in Central Africa, whose very nature exudes serenity became the venue of the cruellest butchery ranking among the biggest tragedies of the 20th century' (Dulian 2004:40). The Rwandan genocide of over 800,000 Tutsis came as the result of historic and modern inequalities between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority. The deep animosities that have plagued Rwandan politics are rooted in the historical management of colonialism. Relations between Hutu and Tutsi have always been one of status. However, historically, the lines between the two distinctions were fluid and changeable and the two groups had much in common. The Hutu and Tutsi 'developed a single and highly sophisticated language, Kinyarwanda, crafted a common set of religious and philosophical beliefs, and created a culture which valued song, dance, poetry, and rhetoric' (Human Rights Watch 1999:1). In pre-colonial Rwanda, power was attained by the acquisition of cattle and because the Tutsi were primarily pastoralists, they became the elite class within Rwandan society. This was an informal process resulting in a system by which both groups could attain power, and where class mobility and intermarriage existed (Shah 2003:2). Even though the 'minority Tutsi dominated over the Hutu… it was Belgium, which after taking control from Germany following World War I, institutionalized Tutsi dominance and solidified these divisions through the issuance of ethnic identity cards' (Kuperman 1996:223). The institutionalisation of Hutu and Tutsi as distinct people introduced for the first time the idea of race. Moreover, the colonialists developed the so-called Hamitic hypothesis which held that the Tutsi and everything humanly superior in Central Africa came from ancient Egypt or Abyssinia. Because of the solidification of identity as

the main determinant of access and power and because the Tutsis were seen as more *European*, they became the privileged minority in a nation that was becoming more stratified. What evolved in Rwanda was the development of two distinct identities. The Hutu was an identity of subjugation and the Tutsi was an identity of power. While membership as a Tutsi did not necessarily result in power, it did grant them exemption from the most cruel and degrading treatment reserved for the Hutu population. By the end of the colonial era, Rwanda was a nation defined by identity. The Hutu saw the Tutsis as oppressors and foreigners, a distinction that would play a huge role in post-colonial Rwanda.

Between independence and the 1994 genocide, Rwanda had two successive Hutu republics. The opportunity to eradicate the system of rigid identity instituted under colonialism was at hand, however, 'the 1959 revolution turned the world colonialism created upside down; but it did not change… instead of challenging the identities [the new government]…embraced them' (Mamdani 2002:500). The sixty years of colonialism and Tutsi rule 'inflated Tutsi egos inordinately and crushed Hutu feelings, which coalesced into an aggressively resentful inferiority complex' (Magnarella 2003:25). During the first republic under Kayibanda, many Tutsi fled to surrounding nations, including Uganda. Those that remained in Rwanda faced widespread oppression and a violence that was not only accepted, but rewarded. This violence was realised during the first republic, where intermittent massacres of Rwandan Tutsi occurred in 1963, 1967 and 1973 (Kuperman 1996:223). The development of the second republic was the result of a 1973 coup orchestrated by General Juvenal Habyarimana. Under the second republic 'Habyarimana officially redefined Tutsi from a race into an ethnic group… with political rights and with proportional representation in parliament, in embassies, in the cabinet, even in the army' (Mamdani 2002:500). The second republic's attempt to rectify and put the past to rest was tempered by opposition Hutus residing outside of northern Rwanda. The new regime 'went to great lengths to integrate Tutsi elements into society and publicly stressed the need for national reconciliation' (Fujii 2004:101). However, the Hutu were divided into two groups: the Parmehutu, who wielded power

during the first republic, and the minority Hutu, who occupied the north. With General Habyarimana's successful coup the economic, political, and military power in Rwanda shifted to northern Hutus, which engendered aversion from the Hutu as well as Tutsi (Kuperman 2000:95). The most contentious issue, which brought about the 1990 civil war, was the issue of the Tutsi refugees residing in Uganda. 'Habyarimana adamantly refused to allow their (Tutsi refugees) return, insisting that Rwanda was already too crowded and had too little land, jobs and food for them' (Magnarella 2003:26). As a result of the problems with the Ugandan and the Rwandan governments' handling of refugees, 'an expatriate rebel force composed mainly of Uganda-based Tutsi refugees, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), invaded northern Rwanda' (Kuperman 2000:95). The civil war between the government and rebels lasted until 1993 when the Arusha Accords, a power-sharing agreement between the Hutu government and the Tutsi refugees/rebels, was signed in 1993.

The Arusha Accords were under-funded and operated on an unrealistic timetable that was unable to appease the more extremist factions within the Hutu power structure. The northern Hutu under Habyarimana controlled political patronage, and dominated the civil service, both key sources of power (Kuperman 1996:223-224). The entrenched political elite of the north 'viewed the accords as abject surrender to the Tutsi, who they feared would seize the spoils of rule and seek retribution' (Kuperman 2000:96). As President Habyarimana was taking steps to ensure the implementation of Arusha, his plane was shot down on 6 April 1994. This acted as the trigger for Hutu extremists focused on retaining control of Rwanda to enact a campaign of genocide against the Tutsi population (Human Rights Watch 1995). The sudden and mysterious death of the Rwandan president set in motion one hundred days of horror that decimated the Tutsi population and led to the overthrow of the second republic when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)[3] took Kigali and instituted a unilateral ceasefire and a return to Tutsi rule.

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3   Within the organisation of the rebel movement the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) was the military arm of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). For an in-depth analysis of the history and evolution of the RPF refer to Reed 1996:479-501 and Kuperman 2004:61-84.

The genocide in Rwanda was the result of deep and systemic horizontal inequalities within the political, economic and military sectors of society. The inequalities were suffered by both 'identities' and resulted in widespread violence against both Hutu and Tutsi. These inequalities and the thirst for power, coupled with systemic social and economic insecurity, bred extremism which resulted in one of the most efficient and most deadly violent outbreaks of the modern era. In post-genocide Rwanda, the transitional government and the elected Tutsi leadership took many steps to rectify the deep divide brought upon by the events that took place in the spring and summer of 1994.

With the end of the genocide and the 'victory' of the RPF, Rwanda was in the hands of the minority Tutsi who were the majority of the genocide victims and the traditional oppressors within Rwandan society. With the inception of a new government the opportunity to change the system of domination and inequality was again at hand. The new RPF government came to power with two core priorities, the fostering of national reconciliation and the reduction of poverty (Zorbas 2004:37). The ability of the new government to accomplish these two goals will be instrumental in developing a peaceful and stable Rwanda. In a relatively short period, the national unity government accomplished a great deal, including the fostering of stability, developing the foundations for rule-of-law, aiding in the emergence of democratic and civil society and overseeing the normalisation of the financial sector (Dulian 2004). While democratic structures must be developed and rule-of-law must reign supreme, the government must resolve the issues that created the outburst of violence in the first place, namely economic and political exclusion. The president's call for 'prioritization of poverty reduction in all government programs' (Zorbas 2004:37) is a step in the right direction. The reduction of poverty will not only create stability, it will aid in the reconciliation process by giving those affected by the genocide the means to begin life anew. The government has also abolished the identity cards that did so much to stratify the society, stressing the idea of being a Rwandan not a Hutu or a Tutsi. Taken at face value this is a positive development, but what is

beginning to emerge is a victim/perpetrator mentality which is making the deconstruction of the Hutu/Tutsi identity extremely difficult. Additionally, 'despite the government's insistence that ethnic divisions are a thing of the past, there is nothing to indicate that local communities accept this policy as anything more than naïve political rhetoric' (Tiemessen 2004:65). It must be recognised that obtaining local support for this policy will only be gained in time and should be seen as a very important step to creating equality. The abolition of official identity and the government's recognition that poverty must be a priority are steps in the right direction. There are three issues, however, that must be addressed if Rwanda is to have a stable and peaceful future: reconciliation, property and governance.

Reconciliation is the cornerstone of the Rwandan government's strategy to heal from the genocide. Currently there are about 120,000 people in custody for genocide charges. The severity of the charges range from being a chief architect of the genocide to people charged with looting and vandalising (International Crisis Group 1999:6). The main perpetrators of the genocide are being tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), but the government retains responsibility for trying the majority of the ordinary killers. Given the poor condition of the Rwandan legal system, its ability to perform these duties is highly questionable. The government lacks a functioning court system, it is suffering from huge delays in setting up trial mechanisms, and it lacks adequate detention facilities to house the 120,000 prisoners.

The process of reconciliation is structured on three parts: the ICTR, domestic trials, and Gacaca. The first two divisions of reconciliation focus on retributive justice (that of punishment), while the third operates under restorative justice (that of healing and trust building). The ability of the government to accommodate the large number of perpetrators and the ability of the Gacaca trials to succeed has been called into question mainly because of a lack of resources and of the length of time needed to perform these trials. The process of reconciliation is not having the effects that the post-genocide government would have liked. This is, in part, the result of the massive trauma inflicted upon the entire country; but there are also

issues of victor's justice and the lack of equal punishment that continue to hinder national reconciliation.

The hard-handed control maintained by the RPF since its military victory in 1994 has led many to view the reconciliation process as victor's justice, creating greater animosities as the process of reconciliation is enacted. The perceived inequality of justice will destroy any legitimacy that the RPF would have attained and will contribute to the disunity of the country, making renewed conflict more likely.

The basis of the genocide hearings are in the Organic Law, which 'stipulates a jurisdiction over crimes committed between October 1990 and December 1994, including both the civil war and the genocide' (Tiemessen 2004:70). In that light, all illegal acts and perpetrators could be charged and punished; however, this has not happened. The new, primarily Tutsi government, has only been arresting and trying Hutus that committed crimes, without holding Tutsis accountable. During the years of Organic Law jurisdiction, the Tutsi were allegedly guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The crimes included the forcible displacement of Hutu populations, moreover, according to Human Rights Watch, the RPF 'destroyed property, recruited child soldiers against their will, and displaced thousands in order to create free fire zones' (Human Rights Watch 1994:13). In order for any type of reconciliation to occur, whether based on retribution or restoration, both sides of a conflict must atone for their actions. Until the government of Rwanda holds soldiers and civilians guilty of crimes against the Hutu accountable, reconciliation will be impossible. Unless all proceedings are viewed as neutral and impartial, the reconciliation that is so sorely needed will never develop and Rwanda will be a country in the 'pursuit of justice without reconciliation' (Lemarchand 1998:13).

Property continues to be a contentious issue. Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Africa, and as a result issues of property are continuously creating issues of insecurity. In Rwanda, according to Human Rights Watch (1995), the 'atmosphere of insecurity was…heightened by frequent and bitter disputes over property'. With property in the post-

genocide era such a contentious issue and because property issues were a major cause of animosity and insecurity (Fisiy 1998:24), the government must address this property issue. The main 'policy documents [regarding land] in circulation…aim to ensure food security and to increase off-farm income' (Van Hoyweghen 1999:367). The two-part focus will help to ensure that basic food needs are met while providing income-earning opportunities separate from agriculture. The need for land reform is evident to not only deal with the large population, but to help reintegrate refugees back into Rwandan society. The government continues to take strides to deal with land because it is 'widely believed that the problem [of development for peace and stability] can only be settled by major agrarian…reform' (Van Hoyweghen 1999:365).

Governance in Rwanda has for its entire modern history been that of inequality and repression, which led in large part to the events of 1994. In the post-genocide era the new government must develop an inclusive and representative government; but this has yet to take hold. The mainly Tutsi government is once again failing to address the structural inequalities that have led to so much bloodshed over the decades. Instead of taking a holistic approach to development; the current government 'is prioritizing economic and social rights while ignoring civil and political rights' (International Crisis Group 2002:2). In fact, 'police control over all forms of opposition, both within and outside the regime, has steadily increased [and] the press, associations and opposition parties have been silenced, destroyed, or co-opted' (International Crisis Group 2002:1). The lack of progress in governance is making violence an 'increasingly attractive option, which in turn fuels security pressures on the regime' (International Crisis Group 2002:2). However all is not lost; President Kagame has declared that all presidential and legislative elections will be carried out by direct universal suffrage and through secret ballot. Moreover, 'the Rwandan government has made efforts towards reconciliation including the reintegration of ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises Hutu soldiers into the army' (International Crisis Group 2002:7). It still remains to be seen whether the government will distance itself from the authoritarian tendencies that have defined

RPF rule since the end of the genocide.[4] Without a more equalised and representative governing structure, massive land reform, and a reconciliation process based on restorative justice, Rwanda will never be able to achieve stability and will once again fall victim to outbursts of violence as a way to rectify grievances that have come as a result of horizontal inequalities.

Moving Forward: Lessons from Malian and Rwandan Experience

The Rwandan and Malian experience can inform the way scholars and practitioners address post-conflict societies. These conflicts are very different and their levels of success are as dispersed as the trauma each society has faced, but while Mali can be viewed as a successful post-conflict society, Rwanda has a long road to travel. What makes these two conflicts alike is that they occurred as a result of horizontal inequalities and provide valuable insights as to the best approach in addressing the inequalities that have served as a catalyst for conflict.

Peace Agreements

The development of peace agreements is a necessary and inevitable part of the peace process. Accordingly, the Rwandan and the Malian peace process can offer some guidance when building a peace accord. First, the construction and enforcement of peace agreements are oftentimes not fluid or flexible enough when they create specific deadlines and obligations that are unattainable. Peace processes must have leeway built into them to ensure that they are as dynamic and flexible as the parties involved. Furthermore, the timetable that peace processes operate under must be realistic. Unfortunately, the international community too often places unrealistic time constraints on peace. Rebuilding a nation after war

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4   As a way to demonstrate the authoritarian drift the International Crisis Group shows that 11 out of 12 prefects are affiliated with the RPF, 13 out of 15 ambassadors are RPF, 7 out of 9 security services are headed up by the RPF, the chief prosecutor of the Court of Cessation and head of the Constitutional Court are all members of the RPF, 8 out of 9 Rwandan banks are managed by RPF members, all institutes of higher education are run by RPF members, and 25 out of 29 leaders of the top state-run companies in Rwanda are RPF members.

is a time-consuming endeavour and should not be rushed for financial or public relations concerns. The international community must allow for more lenient timetables when instituting peace in war-torn nations.

Secondly, peace accords must include as many actors as possible. In the case of Mali, the first attempt at peace was not sustainable, in part because some of the major parties were excluded from the negotiations. As a way of getting as many of these issues resolved as possible, the international community and domestic interests should ensure that all belligerents and interested parties have a voice.

Third, the effectiveness of a peace accord is dependent on it addressing the root causes of conflict. The Arusha Accords and the Tamanrasset Accords did not do an adequate job in dealing with the root causes of each conflict; as a result, their irrelevance became evident when more violence broke out. The National Pact in Mali did an outstanding job addressing the real grievances of the north and consequently was successful. The United Nations, African Union, United States, European Union, and other nations and groups that negotiate peace accords must strive to address the *root causes of conflict* or face inevitable failure.

Fourth, oftentimes in the peace process and the subsequent development agenda put forth, the focus is on the individual when it should be on the group. When measuring success the international community looks at the number of individuals helped or affected. Instead, the international community and national policy must focus on how groups of people are being affected. This refocusing in the peace and development agenda is necessary because paying attention only to individuals does not paint a complete picture. People and groups are motivated to conflict when they are deprived relatively, not absolutely. What is often lost in looking at development and post-conflict progress is which groups are making progress. Therefore, when nations have experienced conflict, those involved in reconstruction must focus their efforts on rectifying the root cause of the conflict as it relates to *groups*.

Fifth, the international community must show a sustained commitment to post-conflict societies. Oftentimes, nations emerging from conflict are

so economically and politically disadvantaged that they lack the ability to enforce the stipulations of a peace agreement. This was the case in Rwanda where the Arusha Accords were unable to be adhered to because of the lack of resources and assistance from the international community. According to the United Nations Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 'the Rwandan people needed to be told that they had to rely on themselves during the interim period' (United Nations 1999:7). Too often the international community creates complicated and expensive peace structures and then leaves the war-torn country to administer them. Creating peace and development is very costly and takes a commitment by the international community to underwrite the financial burden of post-conflict reconstruction. The international community should develop an international peace fund that will help defer the cost of implementing peace agreements. The current mechanism is too ad hoc and inconsistent to be effective. Hence, advocating for the development of a more sustainable and consistent source of funding is necessary. The fund should be administered under the auspices of the UN, be controlled by the General Assembly and funded though national contributions. Given the reluctance of nations to increase their incurred cost to the UN, the fund would most likely be financed though voluntary donations. The necessity of consistent funding and assistance is evident, and in order for peace to develop in conflict zones there must be a reliable source of funding for peace endeavours worldwide.

Sixth, while developing the structures for peace, domestic and international actors must explicitly address issues of economic, social, political and refugee injustices. Actors must also build a framework for rectifying these issues in order for a nation to rebuild itself and not repeat the mistakes of the past. This is best exemplified in the Malian National Pact. The National Pact not only addressed the many issues that caused the conflict in the peace agreement, but the government and the northern rebels came to an agreement as to how to ensure that each group's grievances and concerns were addressed. This type of explicit recognition and plan of action should be utilised in all peace agreements and strategies for post-conflict states.

While peace and stability are the ultimate goal, the international community and those interested in conflict resolution must understand that not all conflicts can be negotiated when they prefer to do it. When determining which conflicts the international community should spend its time and expertise on, they must look for what is commonly known as 'hurting stalemate'. A hurting stalemate occurs when all belligerents recognise that the continuation of violence will not be advantageous and that negotiating with the enemy is the best option available. This exact situation happened in Mali and as a result a viable and mutually beneficial peace was struck. If there is not a hurting stalemate, the possibility of the international community or any interested party ending a conflict will be very small. In order for peace to take hold, all parties must see it as beneficial. In the absence of a hurting stalemate the international community and those in the domestic realm must work towards creating a hurting stalemate through either diplomatic or coercive means. Instead of the UN or anyone intervening in conflicts and failing to establish peace, the UN must choose those conflicts that are ripe for resolution. With regard to belligerents that see conflict as beneficial, the role of the UN, neutral nations, and other interested parties to facilitate the development of a hurting stalemate is tremendously important.

Immediately after conflict and during the reconstruction phase, there must be a sustained effort to change the way people define themselves. This is being applied in Rwanda with abolition of ethnic identity cards. In nations where identity has played a crucial role in stability, as in Rwanda and Mali, nations must work to shift the focus away from sub-groups within the state. Instead, identity should be built around a national or regional consciousness, as is being tried in Rwanda. Moreover, nations should encourage the deconstruction of group identities by placing an emphasis on individual accountability through the development of viable economic and rule-of-law structures. In the case of Mali, the government was able to take a different approach to the problem of identity. Instead of working to integrate the northern populations into the larger Malian construct, they offered them a high amount of autonomy. This approach is possible and oftentimes easier to institute but can only work for groups that are already economically

and geographically isolated. In the case of Rwanda, group autonomy is impossible given geographic constraints and the level of integration before violence occurred. In cases of a large degree of integration, the need to create a new national 'identity' is imperative, while in nations where there is a high level of isolation offering varying levels of autonomy may prove easier and more acceptable to the populations involved.

Truth and reconciliation

The need for a war-torn nation to develop formal mechanisms for truth, reconciliation and justice is widely touted as a necessary step to creating stability and peace. The development of truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) has been worked into peace accords, and instituted in the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Japan, Germany, Rwanda and others. One of the main goals of these formal proceedings is to find the truth about what happened. Obviously, however, 'truth is constituted by multiple facts, each of which is vulnerable to distortion, denial, rationalization and refutation' (Fletcher & Weinstein 2002:588) and this makes the development of a common history extremely difficult. The National Pact in Mali had TRC mechanisms written into it so as to provide a forum for recovery; however, formal processes were never undertaken because the Malian people deemed them unnecessary. The case of Rwanda offers a good example of both a well and a poorly constructed TRC. One action that the international community should make compulsory in developing TRCs is that they should focus on principles of restorative justice and not on retribution. Rwanda has set up Gacaca courts that focus on truth telling and forgiveness as a way for the country to heal. Processes like Gacaca should be the cornerstones of any healing process utilising forgiveness and informal processes instead of retribution and punishment. It should be noted that the Gacaca trial is primarily for those who have admitted wrongdoing and who are not charged with the most severe crimes. In cases of genocide and massive atrocities the ability of individuals to forgive the perpetrators should be promoted as far as possible.

The UN in conjunction with the Rwandan government has established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for those who played a more integral part in the planning and implementation of the genocide.[5] This is problematic for two reasons. First, the tribunal takes place in Arusha, Tanzania, where the proceedings and decisions are carried out hundreds of miles away. Secondly, because the system of punishment established under the ICTR does not allow for the death penalty, many of the most responsible parties are subject to more lenient sentences than their compatriots.[6] While it can be argued that those who carried out the actual murders are just as culpable if not more, the perceived leniency afforded the organisers of the genocide as well as the location of the trials are creating resentment and disillusionment by both the Tutsi and the Hutu. In fact, one prisoner replied, 'Why is it that the tribunal gives them more lenient sentences than us, they are the ones who told us to kill on radio…how come we are paying the higher price?' (Tiemessen 2004:62) The international community should 'in the case of international trials…support the efficient and impartial administration of justice on home soil' (Fletcher & Weinstein 2002:596). Instituting justice at home will provide the victims access to the proceedings and create a visible environment of justice throughout the country.

In cases where there are large numbers of people held captive, the international community and the domestic leadership must work to ensure that the proceedings and accommodations are consistent with international human rights standards. Otherwise, those instituting justice risk becoming the perpetrators of injustice. This has become the case in Rwanda where more than a hundred thousand people are being held in substandard conditions,

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5   Please see Article 1-9 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for a full articulation of the ICTR jurisdiction, located at <http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/ basicdocs/statute/2007.pdf> (Accessed 25 May 2008)

6   Article 23.1 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda states, the penalty imposed by the trial chamber shall be limited to imprisonment. Located at <http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute/2007.pdf> (Accessed 25 May 2008). It should be noted that those indicted and prosecuted nationally under the 1996 Organic Law are, depending on their level of involvement, subject to the death penalty.

lack adequate nutritional support and are dying before they receive a fair hearing.

With large scale atrocities and tribunals come large numbers of prisoners. As a result, when developing and carrying out punishments, the international community and domestic parties should, like those of Rwanda, use restorative practices as a way to defer the costs of building large numbers of correctional facilities. Those convicted of crimes relating to the genocide are, by and large, being sent to 'work camps' to rebuild the nation that they helped destroy. The idea behind this approach is that those guilty of harming people can atone for their actions by helping to rebuild the communities they have harmed. This will, in turn, aid in the nation's recovery and demonstrate to the victims that the guilty are trying to make amends. International and domestic processes of restorative justice in punishment should be advocated for.

Lastly, in carrying out truth and reconciliation and criminal trials, there must be accountability of all sides in order to facilitate healing. In Rwanda the criminal proceedings are one-sided with the Hutu génocidaires receiving punishment for their crimes while the RPF, who were perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity during the 1990-1993 civil war and in the wake of the genocide, have eluded punishment. If the truth that is established or the criminal proceedings are seen as victor's justice there will be no peace. Furthermore, this can quite possibly lead to more animosity, mistrust and conflict. Those involved in any TRC must approach the process of truth seeking and reconciliation on the side of impartiality and hold all people and groups accountable for their actions. Otherwise, they must risk facing the continuation of conflict.

As part of the reconciliation which is necessary for a society to heal after a traumatic event, one of the most important actions groups can perform is admitting wrongdoing. In the Malian case, the government explicitly admitted that the northern populations were harmed by government policy and that they were entitled to the same rights and privileges as any other Malian. This action constitutes a necessary starting point in any recovery,

helping to build trust between oppressed and oppressor. In Rwanda, neither the Hutu nor the Tutsi have offered an apology for the harm they have suffered upon each other throughout the years. The Hutu must publicly show remorse for the genocide they orchestrated, and the Tutsi must admit to the atrocities that unfolded during the civil war of the 1990s as well as to the pain and alienation they caused during their years of domination. Moreover, there must be a rhetorical and actual commitment devoted to the prevention of such harm in the future. Without this necessary step, trust will not develop, and without trust there cannot be cooperation. Admission and atonement are vital when healing from conflict. It demonstrates that the wrongdoer is aware of his/her actions and is willing to make amends while altering these actions. Within the context of conflict, those who have instigated and carried out violent acts should in all cases publicly address their actions. Oftentimes this must be done by all parties involved because in many conflicts, especially in Africa, there is blood on everyone's hands.

Access: citizenship, property and identity

The issue of society membership and identity is a problem that must be addressed in order for stability to materialise. Citizenship in Rwanda and Mali was a major issue in post-conflict reconstruction. Citizenship was at the heart of both civil wars and as a result must be addressed. The issue of who is (as well as who is not) a citizen was also seen in South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, the former Yugoslavia, and many other conflict zones around the world. The denial of full citizenship and the inability of all citizens to obtain equal access results in 'the central state becom[ing] an arena…with the more powerful…groups excluding and submerging the lesser ones and denying their people the benefits of citizenship' (Adejumobi 2001:162). Consequently, all nations must construct citizenship identities in a fair and equitable manner, without discrimination against race, ethnicity, religion, socioeconomic status, geographic location, and/or historical myth. Moreover, nations must abide by and enforce the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in

Africa and allow refugees to repatriate regardless of the economic, social, or political hardships that the nation may incur. In Rwanda for instance, if the Hutu government had created space for Tutsis to repatriate, then the civil war of the early 1990's may not have materialised and the genocide could have been avoided. The international community should also play a role in ensuring that citizenship is a right by enforcing the refugee conventions and providing support to nations with highly factionalised populations.

Along with citizenship rights, property rights remain a very contentious issue within post-conflict societies. This is demonstrated in both the Malian and the Rwandan cases. Nations must therefore strive to ensure that every group has an equal opportunity to access land. It is not necessary for every person to be granted land, but each person and group must have the ability to obtain property. There should be no arbitrary restrictions on land access. Moreover, every group within a nation must have access to the products of land, namely for food and economic security. Governments experiencing land grievances must, like that of Rwanda, reform the agrarian and land use policies and practices. If a nation experiences conflict as a result of land grievances, redistribution and equitable access to land must be explicitly written into the ensuing peace accord.

Conclusion

Within the international community there has been a marked improvement in the number of conflicts resolved worldwide. In no other place have the effects of the international community and third parties been felt as much as in Africa. During the last decade, a number of conflicts have come to a close in Africa and worldwide. In fact, in the last five years conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire have come to a close. A new chapter in African history is upon us – one of reconstruction, not war. The many conflicts that have ravished the African continent can help inform domestic and international parties as to how best to rebuild shattered societies. Examining the past also helps those who are studying conflict management understand conflict and prevent

future conflict. One of the most destructive and under-appreciated causes of violent conflict is that of horizontal inequalities. These inequalities have been among the causes of all of the aforementioned conflicts along with the two conflicts addressed in this paper. The Rwandan and the Malian conflicts can help practitioners develop a comprehensive strategy for nations ravished by horizontal inequalities. While this paper is far from comprehensive, it has offered policymakers and practitioners strategies to enable nations to rise from the ashes of conflict. The international community and those within the field of conflict management have the knowledge to mitigate the root causes of conflict. Theoretically, we as a community are well equipped; what is needed now is to translate the volumes of theory into an operational strategy. We must fill the gap between theory and practice. This gap must be bridged though a sustained long-term commitment of resources, both human and financial, in order to rectify the horizontal inequalities that are often at the root of so many conflicts. If action fails to materialise, the African continent will inevitably backtrack into the violence the international community has worked so hard to terminate.

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Book Review

Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace

Iyob, Ruth & Khadiagala, Gilbert M. 2006

Reviewed by Jannie Malan
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Writing a book – one book – on the elusive quest for peace in Sudan is a daunting and difficult task. Each of the many social groups who happen to live in this large and variegated country may of course prefer to write or read their own books and focus only on the versions of history, culture, religion, human rights and social justice that they are used to and that support their views. If individuals from one group were to read a book written from another group's perspective or from a perspective that claims to be objective, they may be inclined to write

critical comments and corrections in the margins, or reach a point where they throw down the book in disgust.

The authors of this book do not claim objectivity or neutrality, but one can surely agree with Terje Rod-Larsen's foreword which states that: '…the authors help us to move well beyond the oversimplified and misleading dichotomies that are usually offered to explain Sudan and its wars…. [They] provide us with a deeper understanding of the complex interplays of political, historical, cultural, and geographical factors and what they imply for current peace initiatives'.

In the introductory chapter the authors begin to outline the complexities which have repeatedly obstructed the way to peace. Sudan's peace agreements have been 'as numerous as the wars fought', but the promises written into agreements or accompanying them never became the realities that could have ushered in peace. Such abrogated promises have been one of the clearest signs of 'the gap between the official discourse of peace and the unofficial pursuit of war'. What has also been very clear, was that the hidden agendas were part of the wielding of power. A major obstacle, or as the authors venture to say, 'the one obstacle to a just and lasting peace', has therefore been the unwillingness of powerful leaders and their followers 'to acknowledge the plurality of Sudan's peoples and their rights of empowerment as equals in the land'.

A determined resistance by powerful political leaders (and their constituencies) against undertaking the paradigm shift from unwillingness to willingness is of course not peculiar to Sudan. It is found among politically minded people – and others – in every country of the world. What is exceptional in Sudan, however, is its degree of plurality. It is a country in which many lines have been drawn by history and geography.

In early times, the area became labelled as 'land of *black* peoples', but after four tides of Arab immigration, a colonial period under two powers (European and African), and the inroads made by two

expansionist religions, Sudan ended up with an inevitable 'maze of identities'. The authors emphasise that the cleavage between Arab and African is still wide, but that through the centuries it has been criss-crossed by 'fusions of cultures, ethnicities and identities'. Sweeping terms are often used: Arabised Africans and Africanised Arabs. But more precise descriptions are usually more appropriate. There are, for instance, Sudanese identities that were fabricated by colonialists, but were later adopted and owned by the ethnic groups themselves. Sudan also has various kinds of 'hyphenated identities'. Finally, cultural and religious choices had to be made between original matrilineal kinship systems and imported patriarchal institutions, and between traditional African religions, Islam and Christianity.

The lines drawn by geography include those related to topography (rivers, plains and mountains), vegetation/climate (desert, savannah, forest) and weather (droughts, outside the desert proper), but also those of 'an ideological geography' according to which the domain of believers/masters was distinguished from that of unbelievers/slaves.

After the chapters on Sudan's plurality and polarisation, the authors provide a very apt identification of the main divides underlying the hostilities: 'racial, religious, and resource cleavages'.

In the chapters on the decades of intra-Sudan conflict and failed attempts to make peace, the authors give a clear overview of the fighting between different sides, as well as the in-fighting between factions of the same side. They give enough particulars but do not overburden the already complicated account with unnecessary detail. In addition to the actions and reactions of the various parties in the centre and at the southern, western and eastern peripheries of Sudan, the initiatives, involvements and interventions from neighbouring or other regional countries and from actors on the international scene are duly described and discussed.

The authors show how two issues remained contentious and conflict-generating over more than half a century: *self-determination* and

secularisation. It was a southern 'mutiny' against domination by the north that precipitated a hastily implemented independence for Africa's largest country and set in motion a protracted and violent tug-of-war. Time and again it was a matter of using brute political and/or military *power*. Ruling elites and rebel forces, with more blatancy than tact, fervently pursued social (or socio-religious) engineering in order to advance their own ideology. For the policies of manipulating or pressuring people into ethno-political and/or religio-social camps, *-ise* verbs and *-isation* nouns had already been coined, and the authors could conveniently make use of them in this book. Typical sets of opposing terms are Arabising and Africanising, ethnicising and Sudanising, Islamising, Christianising and secularising, centralising and marginalising (plus pauperising).

Although the greatest part of the book inevitably deals with the depressing past of wars and failed peace agreements, there are also the sections that point to a scenario of reconciliation in a possible future. On the last page of the concluding chapter this possibility is succinctly outlined as follows: 'Willingness to recognize the past without remaining its prisoner may be a first step toward correcting the injustices of the past and constructing a shared future built on mutual respect and accommodation'.

It is to be hoped that enough of such willingness will be revealed in the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. If the parties and their allies do remain committed to what was agreed, without reverting to 'hidden transcripts', then 'pragmatic policymaking and a spirit of reconciliation' may become realities in a future-oriented Sudan. The daily interaction of southerners and northerners 'as equal members of Sudanese society' may contribute to the tolerance and compromise that will be needed to peacefully resolve issues of self-determination and secularisation.

In my opinion, the authors have produced a really reader-friendly publication. As already said above, they have effectively included

enough information but not unnecessary detail. They have made the complex material easier to follow by arranging it under helpful chapter headings and sub-headings. At the end, the book has forty pages of very useful annexures: chronology, acronyms, glossary, bibliography and index.

Readers from particular Sudanese, regional or international perspectives may have their critical comments or additional emphases, but most of them may agree that the approach of the authors is fair and balanced. *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace* can be strongly recommended as meaningful reading for leaders and followers in all contexts where religious convictions, cultural traditions, equality aspirations and poverty alleviation are burning issues. Ruth Iyob and Gilbert Khadiagala have produced a book that should be of great value to many readers, including academics, researchers and practitioners in the field of conflict and peace.