




THE AFRICAN CAPACITY BUILDING FOUNDATION | FONDATION POUR LE RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITES EN AFRIQUE

Securing Africa's future through capacity development

AFRICA CAPACITY REPORT 2014

Capacity Imperatives for Regional Integration in Africa

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Foreword

This year's Africa Capacity Report takes a fresh look at an old issue: regional integration, which attracted the attention and interest of leaders and development specialists and partners even before the independence of African countries. For at least three reasons, this is a good time for the African Capacity Building Foundation to be thinking about the capacity imperatives for regional integration.

First, regional integration has been extensively debated in the literature. But relatively few works have paid attention to the capacity dimension. The Africa Capacity Report 2014 is therefore meant to serve as a guide to African governments, development partners, regional economic communities (RECs) and continental bodies, nonstate actors, and civil society organizations on strengthening their capacities for successful regional integration. It also contributes to the ongoing timely debate, and the broader literature on regional integration, filling gaps related to the capacity imperatives for regional integration in Africa.

Second, regional integration is a relentless reality of modern times, and it is even more important for Africa, as featured in the continental Agenda 2063. Besides being a priority and subject of discussions among the continent's development partners and elites, regional integration is considered as a key driver and the way forward for the structural transformation of African economies. The strong commitment to regional integration and the increasing recognition that collaborative actions and regional approaches are critical to achieving Africa's development goals suggest a different angle for attending to the imperatives for capacity development.

Third is the necessity to have empirically based evidence underlying the policy recommendations and way forward for Africa's

regional integration. For regional integration to provide the expected benefits in trade, peace, security, investment, and above all economic transformation and sustainable development, African countries, the RECs and continental bodies need to understand the key issues and constraints, formulate and coordinate appropriate strategies and policies, and implement successfully the different regional development projects and plans.

The 2014 report identifies the many challenges of regional integration: overlapping memberships, limited financing, uneven commitments, and slow implementation. Experience from the European Union (EU) shows that although African RECs have treaties that let the countries dominate the relationship with RECs, member states lack the minimum enforcement capacity that the EU has. Further, the RECs that we surveyed have expressed their capacity needs as related to the required number of staff, the mobilization of resources, the coordination of activities, the conduct of research, the sharing of knowledge, and the monitoring and evaluation of projects, programs, and plans.

The report's results provide a compelling case to support the efforts of capacity building throughout the continent. The surveyed RECs have indicated that they need institutional capacity building in fiscal policy, energy, and statistics. They also need organizational

capacity building in fiscal policy, financial market development, infrastructure, and free movement of people. And they need individual capacity building in trade, agriculture, food security, industry, and the free movement of people.

Clearly, capacity is needed to drive the integration process in Africa and to support the creation of the African Economic Community. More pressing is building the capacity to implement regional projects and programs, to coordinate and harmonize country and REC strategies and programs, and to conduct research and share knowledge.

The encouraging message is that our efforts to focus on regional integration are well placed. We need to continue working along the same lines by providing financial and technical support to the RECs and other bodies working

on regional integration—and by redoubling our efforts to achieve results. The Report also calls attention to giving more prominence to increasing financing, improving intraregional trade, sharing knowledge and practices, and implementing the various regional cross-border projects and programs.

Regional integration is a priority focus area of the Foundation. Our hope is that the stakeholders and development partners interested in Africa's development agenda will join us to tackle the remaining challenges with renewed vigor.



*Professor Emmanuel Nnadozie
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The African Capacity Building Foundation
December 2014*

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Acronyms

ACBF	The African Capacity Building Foundation
ACI	Africa Capacity Index
ACR	Africa Capacity Report
AEC	African Economic Community
APTA	Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEPGL	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EU	European Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Agency for Development
IOC	Indian Ocean Community
MRU	Mano River Union
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
REC	Regional economic community
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UEMOA/WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
UMA/AMU	Arab Maghreb Union

All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated.

Overview

The Africa Capacity Report (ACR) and its supporting indicators offer inputs for decisions on what to finance to develop capacity. Most countries are doing well on their policy environments and having processes in place to implement policies. Countries are doing less well on achieving development results and least on capacity development outcomes.

The Report and its indicators also point to the regulatory and institutional reforms needed to better support public–private partnerships in capacity investment and building—and to the investments needed to further strengthen public administration. And they spotlight the importance of political will to enhance social inclusion and development.

Each Report showcases an annual theme of key importance to Africa's development agenda. This year the focus is on the capacity imperatives for regional integration, a core mandate of the ACBF, and on the capacities of the regional economic communities (RECs). The Report outlines what is needed to strengthen the RECs. Integrate capacity building in wider efforts to achieve sustainable development. Assure adequate administrative and financial resources. Emphasize the retention and use of skills, not just their acquisition. And monitor and evaluate all efforts to develop capacity.

The capacity dimensions and imperatives for regional integration are crucial today as countries, RECs, specialized regional institutions, and regional development organizations, are developing strategic regional frameworks and building capacity to pursue regional integration across the continent. The ACBF's many regionally oriented interventions help move the regional integration agenda forward by strengthening the RECs as platforms for harmonizing policy and enhancing trade among member countries.

Highlights of the Africa Capacity Indicators 2014

Results are generally satisfactory. The Africa Capacity Index ranges from 22.4 (Central African Republic) to 73.1 (Morocco) (table 1).

Table 1: The 2014 Africa Capacity Index

Country	2014 ACI values	Country	2014 ACI values
Benin	55.2	Côte d'Ivoire	45.8
Burkina Faso	56.8	Djibouti	49.9
Burundi	50.9	Egypt	53.8
Cabo Verde	64.9	Ethiopia	49.0
Cameroon	49.2	Gabon	40.1
Central African Republic	22.4	Gambia (the)	63.5
Chad	44.8	Ghana	54.8
Comoros	31.6	Guinea	45.3
Democratic Republic of Congo	50.3	Guinea Bissau	37.4
Congo (Republic of)	40.4	Kenya	55.3


Country	2014 ACI values	Country	2014 ACI values
Lesotho	57.9	Rwanda	68.3
Liberia	51.3	São Tomé and Príncipe	32.3
Madagascar	43.1	Senegal	51.3
Malawi	60.1	Sierra Leone	50.8
Mali	60.8	South Sudan	41.6
Mauritania	39.8	Swaziland	32.0
Mauritius	64.0	Tanzania	64.4
Morocco	73.1	Togo	45.5
Mozambique	50.8	Tunisia	58.6
Namibia	44.8	Uganda	53.4
Niger	46.6	Zambia	54.7
Nigeria	40.0	Zimbabwe	50.9

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

No countries are at the extremes of capacity (Very Low or Very High). It is encouraging that eight countries are in the High category, and that no countries are Very Low (figure 1). However, countries still have to make more effort to break into the coveted Very High bracket.

The bulk of countries have Medium capacity. Of the 44 countries surveyed, 30 fall in the Medium bracket, 8 in High, and 6 in Low. It is encouraging that more countries are in the High bracket and that none are in the Very Low. Countries in the Medium and Low brackets now have to strive to break into the High and Very High brackets.

Figure 1: Africa Capacity Indicators 2014



Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

Analysis by cluster presents a pattern that has not greatly changed from year to year (table 2). The policy environment is the strongest, and the capacity development outcomes the weakest (ACBF 2011; 2012; 2013).

Table 2 : Countries by 2014 ACI bracket and by cluster (percent)

Level	Policy environment	Process for implementation	Develop results at country level	Capacity development outcomes
Very High	90.9	40.9	6.8	-
High	9.1	40.9	36.4	-
Medium	-	18.2	36.4	15.9
Low	-	-	15.9	70.5
Very Low	-	-	4.5	13.6
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

On the policy environment, all countries are ranked High or Very High (91 percent Very High). Impressive implementation processes are also evident, with around 81 percent of countries High or Very High. The environment is therefore conducive for capacity development.

Yet countries do not appear about to achieve development results: 20.4 percent ranked Low or Very Low on development results at the country level, and a paltry 6.8 percent are ranked Very High. But the real challenge remains capacity development outcomes: 84.1 percent of countries are in the Very Low and Low brackets.

Overall scores have been improving. In 2013, 11 percent of countries were in the Very Low capacity bracket, but none this year. And 18.2 percent of countries are in the High category, up from 4.5 percent last year. More encouraging is that the majority of countries were classified as Low capacity in 2013, but the majority this year have Medium capacity.

Achievements on the thematic indices are generally encouraging. More than 50 percent of countries are High or Very High on four main thematic indices. They have done well on gender equality and social inclusion, where no country has Low or Very Low scores, and with Medium scores for only 2.3 percent of countries. But more effort is needed on policy

choices for capacity development, where no country has a Very High score.

Countries thus need to focus more on capacity development outcomes in their strategies and policies, particularly on carrying out regular capacity profiling and capacity needs assessments (which require greater resources for capacity development initiatives). The technical assistance and interventions of the ACBF is highly relevant here. Improving capacity development outcomes can also be linked to the capacity needs of the RECs, which expressed as top priorities their individual, institutional, and organizational capacities.

Challenges of regional integration

Regional integration has an enduring appeal for Africa as the right strategy for overcoming the constraints of high fragmentation, small domestic markets, and growing transnational threats. But Africa's portfolio of regional economic communities has a bewildering array of sizes and types. Many of them have overlapping membership. Of Africa's 54 countries, only five belong to just one REC, while three belong to four, and the numbers of members vary widely. The knock-on effects hurt Africa's ability to negotiate as an equal with, say, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), or the European

Union (EU) over its economic partnership agreements (EPAs).

These arrangements have not been very effective, and they have so far failed to propel the continent's economic transformation. Why? The multiplicity of constraints including inadequate political will and commitment to the process. The high incidence of conflicts and political instability. The poor design and sequencing, along with slow implementation, inadequate funding, and the exclusion of key stakeholders.

In contrast, the EU, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North American Free Trade Agreement countries, and some frontier RECs have demonstrated how geographic regions can create conditions for shared growth and prosperity by removing barriers to commerce, harmonizing regulatory norms, opening labor markets, and developing common infrastructure. But for the most part, African integration has focused on import tariffs. Tackling services and such behind-the-border issues as investment, competition policy, and government procurement has proven contentious.

Deeper integration could improve Africa's regional cooperation because border measures are likely to represent only a minor constraint to regional trade in Africa, compared with structural economic shortcomings such as the lack of infrastructure, institutional framework, skills, and economic diversification. These supply-side constraints could be addressed in part by a regional integration agenda that includes services, investment, competition policy, and other behind-the-border issues. In short, a deep integration agenda could address supply-side constraints more effectively than an agenda almost exclusively on border measures.

Despite fundamental problems in the design of the type of integration, there is widespread support for integration in Africa. The reality is that regional integration is not a choice for Africa—it is a must. Building bigger, more integrated subregional markets deeply embedded in the global economy is one of the most urgent tasks for Africa to sustain its recent economic performance.

At the moment, the capacity to implement regional cooperation and integration is grossly inadequate. Previous capacity building approaches have not produced the requisite capacities to develop the RECs. This dearth threatens the RECs' ability to achieve their goals. Many protocols have been signed but remain unimplemented, due to ineffective and inadequate implementation capacity. In some RECs where capacity exists, it is neither optimally used nor sufficiently nurtured.

Global reordering: the BRICS

Africa presents a new frontier of economic opportunities and hosts some of the fastest-growing economies in the world, attracting global partners such as the BRICS and other emerging economies such as Turkey, India, Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesia (TIMBI), all of which see Africa as helping resolve global challenges. The BRICS countries particularly offer huge opportunities for financing development in Africa on an equal and win-win basis. Such a partnership also presents an opportunity to foster regional integration in Africa, either through AU leadership or exchanges with the RECs.

To benefit from the partnership, the AU and the RECs need to maximize the backward–forward processing linkages of their commodity sectors. Doing so will enhance trade and foreign direct investment, and ease the transfer of capacity and technology to

Africa. The BRICS are heavy African investors and their potential, at least in the short term, appears huge. The BRICS' share in Africa's foreign direct investment stock and flows topped 14 and 25 percent respectively in 2010. This trend is likely to continue.

The role of South Africa in the SADC region illustrates the type of partnership African RECs could build with the BRICS. It is playing a key role in consolidating the free trade area of SADC members. It is also encouraging negotiations on the Tripartite Agreement between members of SADC, COMESA, and EAC, creating an integrated market of 26 member states and a combined population of nearly 600 million people and a GDP of some \$1 trillion.

The partnership with emerging entities such as the BRICS and TIMBI countries can enhance regional integration and benefit the continent if African regional bodies, including RECs, can rectify the capacity deficits that hinder the continent's ability to manage relations with its partners—whether new—or traditional.

Capacity to negotiate global partnerships

The EU has traditionally been Africa's most important trade, investment, and development partner. Trade with the EU was governed by a series of Lomé Conventions, which granted African countries (excluding South Africa) unilateral preferential access to EU markets. The EU and African countries subsequently concluded the Cotonou Agreement, paving the way for the WTO-compatible EPAs in 2000.

Yet EPAs are controversial, and their impacts uncertain. They may bring benefits to Africa, such as cheaper imports and greater exports and competitiveness. But they also risk diverting trade, complicating further the spaghetti bowl of trade arrangements, narrowing policy space, creating fiscal losses in countries that rely heavily on trade taxes,

and eroding the fragile industrial base. They may also work against continental integration. All these factors do not seem to have tarnished their allure, however, given RECs' attempts to negotiate them.

Although EPAs were negotiated with seven different ACP regions (four in Africa), only two—EAC and ECOWAS—covered the full membership of the RECs and so could negotiate as a bloc. The rest, because of overlapping membership of countries in different RECs or a lack of interest from some of their members, could at best represent subsets of their configurations, with onerous implications for how the EPAs affect the RECs' agendas.

Negotiating the EPAs posed a serious challenge for the ACP countries due to their limited capacity in almost all relevant fields. Most of these states, particularly the poorest, had little capacity in trade policy formulation, evaluation, or implementation, or in research and analysis or consultation. They also had to deal with a shortage of skilled trade negotiators, nationally and regionally. Their financial means were usually scant. And even then the scarce resources had to be divided between the EPA talks and parallel regional integration talks, WTO negotiations, and bilateral negotiations.

Weak institutions were also often a problem, hindering much needed intragovernmental coordination, a clear division of roles, and political independence and stability. This slowed or stalled negotiations. And Africa's inability to identify and defend its interests underlined the need to strengthen the continent's regional economic institutions and capacities. There is nothing to suggest that this fundamental flaw has been corrected or receiving adequate attention since the negotiations began.

Still, for some RECs perseverance has paid off. The ECOWAS's negotiations were based on its own regional integration initiative, and on July 10, 2014, the West Africa EPA negotiating group became the first African region to officially conclude and endorse a regional EPA with the EU. Following suit was the SADC–EPA of the Southern African region, signed on July 22, 2014.

Clearly, Africa needs to pursue a deeper integration agenda that includes services, investment, competition policy, and other behind-the-border issues. The RECs need to rationalize themselves, such that each state can concentrate on the one grouping that matters most to it. They also need to sharply boost their capacity—to manage complex agreements with vastly greater resources.

Major areas of capacity and other needs for the RECs

The RECs are at different stages of integration (table 3). As they move from one stage of integration to another, they need to strengthen

staff capacity to adapt to that higher stage. EAC, for instance, is now moving to its third pillar, monetary union. Indeed, EAC Heads of States and Government signed the Monetary Union Protocol on November 30, 2013. This calls for a paradigm shift in the institution's organization and operation, and that of partner states. Consequently, there is great demand for additional resources (capital, human) at regional and partner-state levels.

Among the surveyed RECs, EAC has shown the best performance over the stages of regional integration. It has fully achieved a free trade agreement and customs union, made good progress on a common market and monetary union, and is preparing for economic and political union. ECOWAS, too, has made relatively good progress, especially on its free trade agreement, customs union, and monetary union. RECs such as UMA and the ECCAS, though active on the ground, are only just preparing for a free trade agreement and have yet to start any of the other stages.

Table 3: Status of surveyed African RECs through the stages of regional integration

	Free trade agreement	Customs union	Common market	Economic union	Monetary union	Political union
UMA	In preparation	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started
CEPGL	In preparation	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started
COMESA	Fully achieved	Good progress	In preparation	Not yet started	In preparation	Not yet started
EAC	Fully achieved	Fully achieved	Good progress	In preparation	Good progress	In preparation
ECCAS	In preparation	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started
ECOWAS	Fully achieved	Good progress	Not yet started	In preparation	Good progress	Not yet started
IOC	In preparation	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started
MRU	Good progress	Good progress	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started
SADC	Fully achieved	In preparation	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

The RECs surveyed show many similarities:

- *Staff complement.* The organogram of each REC indicates the required number of personnel needed to execute its mandate. But RECs expressed concern about a lack of funds to recruit the staff needed, and about staff skills development and training.
- *Sources of funding.* Most of the member/partner states fall short of making the necessary contribution to REC operations, compelling development partners to consistently contribute 40–60 percent of the budget. UMA stands apart, fully funded by member States.
- *Activities.* The activities of RECs are developed by the secretariat or commission and implemented by the member/partner states. The RECs indicated a need to strengthen links between the secretariats and member/partner states and to boost the skills of those entities. Indeed, one deputy secretary general commented during discussions with the ACBF survey team: “If you strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat without strengthening that of the member States, then it is of no use.”
- *Conflict management.* Most of the RECs have been immersed in conflict resolution. UMA and ECCAS have practically suspended trade negotiations. SADC has been heavily involved in Madagascar. And ECOWAS recently resolved a number of conflicts, assisted by bilateral partners in Mali. These pressing matters could not be planned for.
- *Knowledge sharing.* RECs are making


efforts to share knowledge and experience. For example, EAC is collaborating with UEMOA on monetary integration, and there have been high-level meetings and technical cooperation. UMA and ECOWAS are interacting on environmental issues. And SADC, EAC, and COMESA have technical teams for human resource management. They need to be strengthened.

- *Research.* The RECs need to establish or strengthen research to inform the integration process. ECOWAS has set up the Economic Policy Research Unit with ACBF support, and SADC recruited senior personnel to start the process. UMA and EAC do not have a research unit.
- *M&E.* All RECs recognize that M&E is important for consolidating gain and guiding future plans and programs. M&E departments have developed elaborate user-friendly web-based monitoring systems, especially for secretariat activities—though the “E” remains weak.
- *Innovative ideas.* There are efforts under way to set up a well-trained team of experts to peer-review data and information provided by member/partner states.

Capacity priorities for RECs

The surveyed RECs were asked to assess their capacity needs: Very Low; Low; Medium; High; Very High; No need for capacity. Here we look at the priorities assessed as High or Very High by at least 75 percent of the RECs.


Figure 2: Institutional capacity needs



Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

Fiscal policy and development of capacity building programs are top priorities for institutional capacity. Of the surveyed RECs, eight affirmed that fiscal policy and development of capacity building programs are essential. And seven stated that energy and statistics are areas where they need institutional capacity building (figure 2).


Figure 3: Organizational capacity needs



Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

On organizational capacity needs, 88 percent of the RECs stated that fiscal policy and financial market development are their first priorities. Development of capacity building programs, infrastructure, and free movement of people are the second set of priorities expressed by 75 percent of the RECs (figure 3).

Figure 4: Individual capacity needs



Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

On the need for individual capacity building, trade is considered the most important area by 88 percent of the RECs. In addition, 75 percent affirmed that they need it in agriculture and food security, industry, and free movement of people (figure 4).

So, what is needed? Assessing the capacity of RECs should be a continuing exercise conducted at regular intervals, and not a one-off event, to ensure that the RECs are working in concert with other stakeholders. And because regional integration and cooperation are knowledge intensive, requiring careful policy analysis, Africa's think tanks and universities should be structured to conduct research and offer advice—they have the capability to focus on issues in depth and over time.

Institutional and legal frameworks

The RECs, with their ultimate goal of economic and fiscal harmonization, can draw inspiration from the EU, at least in their visions for the longer term.

The EU has a de facto constitution that defines how member states and institutions interrelate and how power is shared among supranational, national, and local parties. For example, the EU operates to ensure separation of powers among its institutions, and it has a system of legislation and adjudication for EU bodies and citizens, including parliamentarians elected by citizens. This pattern makes the EU operate like a very large confederal country that has some capacity to enforce its will through national governments. But because the EU does not enjoy the power to coerce, administer, or tax, its member states tend to dominate the relationship between citizens and the EU, and substantial areas of governance are in the hands of those governments.

In contrast, although African RECs have treaties that let the countries dominate the relationship with the RECs, member states lack the minimum enforcement capacity that the EU has. For example, the European Commission's proposals must receive approval from the Council of Ministers, assented to by EU parliamentarians, after

which they are reflected in national laws by national parliaments, and then implemented by national bureaucracies. Domestic and European courts are involved in adjudication. This process (at times cumbersome) not only creates awareness of the integration process but also ensures profound participation by all stakeholders, in ways analogous to national policymaking.

The African RECs do not, however, have this supranational–national integration policy structure. The organs of integration are rarely formed and functional, or citizens are unaware of their relationship, including rights and obligations vis-à-vis the region.

The differences in country readiness to join particular initiatives in African RECs are associated with the way their decisions are reached. Most African REC treaties stipulate that decisions should be by consensus rather than by simple or qualified majority vote (which the EU generally follows). The latter mechanism enables wide political participation through national and local discussions, leading to national positions on issues. While this consensus method does not preclude discussions at various political levels, decisions are mostly anchored on the procedures of national bureaucracies, which sometimes do not allow for optimal disclosure, often grounded in the natural secrecy of government decision making.

While EU supranational–national decision making is naturally longer and more tedious, and so tends to be rigid and resistant to basic reform, the EU tolerates internal diversity and compromises (a “multispeed Europe”). Some internal flexibility is permitted to countries ready to embark on initiatives such as the single currency or Schengen visa arrangements, while others can join later. Such flexibility is also found in ECOWAS, where eight francophone countries ready to embark

on a single currency adopted the CFA franc for trade internally and among themselves under UEMOA, which accounts for most of the recorded intra-ECOWAS trade.

A function of the huge discrepancy in funding between the EU and African RECs, the inadequacies of these RECs' human resource capacity are major factors in the low achievement of their integration projects, resulting in overly long deadlines, missed dates, costs overruns, and even missing objectives and ideas. The EU, it must be remembered, has about 30,000 staff, about two-fifths of whom are involved in policy design, implementation, and M&E. These three elements are discouraged in African RECs by their underdeveloped ICT infrastructure and databases, inadequate staff-needs analysis and strategic planning, staff mismatches and workloads, and limited autonomy of their secretariats.

These obstacles are partly attributable to poor financing systems among the RECs that lead to unpaid arrears among member States. Their financing (apart from COMESA and ECOWAS) comes largely from membership contributions, which may be curtailed after a national economic catastrophe. They are fashioned after the EU model where EU funds represent transfers from national governments rather than from direct or indirect taxes. This funding method limits fiscal expansion and undermines human resource development. A funding mechanism that combines national contributions with independent revenues, such as import levies, would go a long way to helping African RECs become financially independent.

Progress in African regional integration projects

Myriad regional integration projects established in the African RECs aim to ensure that each region achieves economic and

sociopolitical cooperation arrangements on time. These projects cover such areas as trade in goods and services, free movement of persons, tourism, industry, investment promotion, agriculture and food security, and peace and security. Key programs have associated projects either planned or at different stages of implementation.

An important aspect of economic integration among all RECs is to guarantee the free movement of capital, people, and goods and services, through a number of projects in the elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers, trade facilitation (such as one-stop border posts), competition and investment promotion policies, and infrastructure development in energy and transport. Some of these projects appear to be yielding positive results, given the increased intraregional trade, though this is only a start, especially in the lagging RECs—UMA, CEN-SAD, IGAD, and ECCAS.

EAC is the most advanced, launching its common market in 2010. COMESA, SADC, and ECOWAS are mid-level performers: the first two launched customs unions in 2009 and 2013, and ECOWAS plans to launch its own on January 1, 2015. While common markets and customs unions address tariff reductions mainly, nontariff barriers face traders of African RECs, and many of them have thus subscribed to eliminating them. For example, ECOWAS has set up a complaints desk to monitor nontariff barriers, and COMESA-EAC-SADC has instituted an internet-based monitoring mechanism.

To facilitate trade, one-stop border posts (OSBPs) have been built by five RECs—COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, and SADC—to reduce delays due to border procedures by clearing traders' merchandise at only one point. OSBPs can be built on the border, on each territory, or on the

territory of one country. The Chirundu (Zambia–Zimbabwe) and Noepe–Elubo (Ghana–Côte d'Ivoire) OSBPs are built on each territory, while the Sème–Krake (Benin–Nigeria) OSBP is being built on the territory of the country (Benin).

Though detailed engineering designs were prepared for five OSBPs—Noepe (Ghana–Togo); Seme–Krake (Nigeria–Benin); Malanville (Benin–Niger); Paga (Ghana–Burkina Faso); and Kouramalé (Mali–Guinea)—only the first three received funding. ECOWAS–UEMOA is securing more funds for OSBPs, while the European Development Fund is financing OSBPs in East Africa. Clearance based on simultaneous or single-window inspection requires modalities for cooperation and coordination, as well as for procedural harmonization, equipment standardization, and common operating methods, which are usually contained in bilateral agreements that provide the institutional and organizational entities for the clearance system. So, joint border operations committees, comprising the two countries' public agents and chaired by a customs agent, are responsible for day-to-day operations of OSBPs.

Progress on movement of people is mixed among RECs: UMA, EAC, and ECOWAS are doing quite well, but CEN-SAD, COMESA, ECCAS, IGAD, and SADC less so. All RECs suffer from poor road transport infrastructure, often related to numerous security road blocks.

All of the RECs are, however, haunted by inadequate road transport infrastructure related to numerous security road blocks. Excessive roadblocks or checkpoints create delays, facilitate opportunities for bribes, and increase the cost of goods to consumers. And the ill treatment of those transiting can lead to violence.

Along three major corridors in West Africa, bribes are declining, but the number of checkpoints has remained almost constant. Delays have lessened along the Tema–Ouagadougou Corridor but have worsened along the Lomé–Ouagadougou Corridor.

Lessons for RECs

Based on the differences in REC capacities, the following imperatives stand out for capacity building.

Take a long-term perspective. Capacity development is a long-term process. It can be promoted through a combination of shorter term results driven from the outside and more sustainable, longer-term ones driven from the inside. It requires sticking with the process even under difficult circumstances.

Adopt an integrated and holistic approach to capacity building. All dimensions of capacity need attention—the individual, the institution, and the overall policy framework. Inadequate emphasis at system level may diminish the impact of efforts at institutional and individual levels. A proper balance, therefore, needs to be established between all three, closely inter-linked, levels. This is also an admonition not to undertake one-time, ad hoc activities.

Integrate capacity building in wider efforts to achieve sustainable development. Capacity is very fluid and has multiple uses. Any strategy to address capacity building must therefore recognize that developing capacities for regional integration is closely related to, and must be integrated with, initiatives to enhance capacities for broader sustainable development and structural transformation of Africa in general.

Capacity building must be demand-driven. The design of interventions to nurture capacity must be results-oriented and focus on

“capacity for what and whom.” The underlying principle should be clear about who will benefit from the capacity building, and the design of the activities must reflect the needs of the beneficiaries. Donor practices can, at best, facilitate and, at worst, hamper the emergence of national capacity.

Assure adequate resources (both administrative and financial). There must be enough resources (human and material) for all capacity building, which ideally should be incorporated in the budget. It is also essential to monitor expenditures against budgets. Many capacity building initiatives have stalled or failed to meet their objectives due to a lack of resources.

Emphasize skill retention and use, not simply acquisition. African countries face serious impediments to long-term capacity building with growing emigration of scarce skilled nationals. Long-term efforts must consider incentive structures for skill retention and their impact; otherwise, further efforts may have little or no sustainable impact.

Accommodate the dynamic nature of capacity development. Capacity building is a dynamic process with many facets. Existing potential may not be used because it does not reside in the institution that is charged with the respective responsibility, or individual expertise may not be used because of organizational deficiencies. Capacity has to be used to avoid obsolescence through continuous use and short-term courses, workshops, seminars, and other training services. Existing capacity has to be adjusted or converted to deal with new problems. New capacity has to be created through formal training programs. And capacity has to be accepted and improved by subsequent generations.

Monitor and evaluate capacity development efforts. Given that capacity building is not static but a dynamic and iterative process, M&E with appropriate benchmarks and indicators are essential for learning-by-doing and adaptive management. Players should from time to time revisit operational principles, strategic elements, tools, and methodologies.

Adopt a learning-by-doing approach. Capacity development efforts should be supported by a variety of tools and methodologies anchored on a learning-by-doing approach. These could range from the more traditional (workshops, in-service technical training) to those offering greater scope methodologically and institutionally (networking, horizontal exchanges and cooperation, multi-stakeholder project steering committees, sharing of project management responsibilities, internships, South–South cooperation, issue-based scientific networks).

Focus on institution building. There are two main problems with focusing on individuals or training. First, individuals move on, so normal career progression can dilute impact. Second, individual knowledge, skills, and attitudes, while obviously important, may not result in permanent change if there are systematic organizational bottlenecks. That is why good capacity building practice typically includes multiple activities that complement and reinforce each other with opportunities to address problems as they arise.

Ensure coordination. Successful capacity building depends on good coordination with the flexibility to fine-tune plans and priorities as conditions change.

In sum: African RECs are falling behind on their development goals, raising doubts about their approaches to encouraging regional trade and regional integration. Worse, as most regional integration agreements have done little to promote intraregional trade, questions about the relevance of their linear integration models (goods integration initially, fiscal integration ultimately) also arise.

The obstacles facing Africa call for a more inclusive approach to economic integration, ameliorating the supply-side constraints so far inhibiting efficient production. What is therefore needed is a deep regional integration agenda that can confront behind-the-border issues and open markets in services.

But a major constraint on African RECs is the paucity of human capital, caused by and manifest in a host of issues: low numerical skills paucity; lack of regular on-the-job training; inadequate staff incentives; underdeveloped ICT; too little staff-needs analysis and strategic planning; staff mismatches and workloads; and limited secretariat autonomy.

And so Africa's RECs need to strengthen their capacities to exploit the new opportunities offered by the post-2015 development agenda, by economic partnership agreements, by stronger relations with the BRICS, and by Agenda 2063.





Africa's capacity development landscape

1

Chapter



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CAI

NYK LOGISTICS
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1

Africa's capacity development landscape

Africa is feeling new waves of global confidence generated by the continent's continuing economic growth, the rising influence of China and other emerging powers, and the importance of new South–South partnerships. These have shifted its capacity development landscape, underlining the need to document its capacity development efforts—and more important, to measure and assess its capacity for efficient and well-informed interventions.

It is in this vein that the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) annually produces the Africa Capacity Report (ACR). The Report measures and empirically assesses capacity as it relates to the development agenda in African countries. It also highlights key determinants and components of capacity for development. The ACR maps Africa's capacity development landscape with the goal of sharpening the focus on capacity deficits as a major development policy issue.

The Report and its key index—the Africa Capacity Index (ACI)—offer inputs for decisions on what to finance to develop capacity; for the regulatory and institutional reforms needed to better support public–private partnerships in capacity investment and building; and for investment to further strengthen public administration. Together, they also spotlight the importance of political will to enhance social inclusion and development beneficitation.

Besides presenting the ACI, the Report showcases an annual theme of key importance to Africa's development agenda. This year it focuses on the capacity imperatives of regional integration, which remains a core mandate of the ACBF as reflected in its Third Strategic Medium Term Plan (SMTP III) 2012–2016. That aside, the ACBF has developed many regionally oriented interventions, through which it has helped move forward the regional integration agenda by strengthening capacities of regional economic communities (RECs), which provide a

platform for harmonizing policy and enhancing trade among member countries.

This platform includes support at continental level to the African Union (AU) and at regional level to the RECs, such as the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA).

A focus on the capacity dimensions and imperatives of regional integration is crucial at this time when countries, RECs, and specialized regional institutions, as well as regional development organizations, are developing strategic regional frameworks and building capacity to pursue regional integration across the continent.

This first chapter, after describing the Africa Capacity Indicators, provides some key results from the 2014 ACI, mainly countries' performance on the ACI and on its key components. Chapter 2 looks at the new opportunities and challenges of regional integration stemming from new global forces, as well as a look at some more traditional aspects. Chapter 3 maps the capacity development landscape of Africa, highlighting the key capacity needs for the RECs. Chapter 4 investigates links between trade, capacity, and regional integration in Africa, Europe, and Asia. Chapter 5 summarizes and offers some conclusions.

1.1 Elements of the Africa Capacity Indicators

Giving decision makers information on the state of capacity in Africa forms part of the ACBF's interventions, including the ACI—the ACR's primary index and its signature trademark.

The ACI is a composite index computed from four subindices, or clusters (figure 1.1), each of which is an aggregated measure calculated from a quantitative and qualitative assessment of components.

The *policy environment* cluster examines the conditions that must be in place to make possible transformational change and development, notably effective and development-oriented organizations and institutional frameworks. It focuses on four components: whether countries have put in place national strategies for development (including a strategy for agricultural development, given the importance of transforming agriculture and achieving food security), and their level of legitimacy; countries' commitment to meeting

development and poverty reduction goals set under the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); country-level awareness and focus on better use of limited resources for capacity development, as measured by the presence of policies for aid effectiveness; and the degree of inclusiveness that supports the country's long-term stability as measured by the existence of gender-equality and other socially inclusive policies. Broad participation and good governance underpin this cluster.

Processes for implementation assess how far countries are prepared to deliver results and outcomes. This cluster focuses on the creation of an environment that motivates and supports individuals; the capacity to manage relations with key stakeholders inclusively and constructively; and the capacity to establish appropriate frameworks for managing strategies, programs, and projects. Equally important are processes for designing, implementing, and managing national development strategies to produce socially inclusive development outcomes.


Development results at country level are tangible outputs that encourage development. The cluster's main components are: coordination of aid support to capacity development; creativity and innovation; success in implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness; gender equality; and social inclusion and partnering for capacity development.

Capacity development outcomes largely measure change in the human condition. Indicators are captured mainly through the financial commitment to capacity development; actual achievement of specific MDGs; measures of gender and broader social equity; and gains in agriculture and food security (ACBF 2012:30).

Five thematic indices are also computed (see figure 1.1), based on the same dataset as the primary ACI index but grouped in different combinations according to the thematic area. Annual theme indices too, are computed,

linked to the ACR's theme for the year. Each of these independent composite indices is calculated in the same way as the ACI, though with different variables.

Figure 1.1 : Elements of the Africa Capacity Indicators



The data that serve to compute the various indicators are obtained through the surveys ACBF conducts every year in the countries covered. The methodology of the survey is presented in the technical note. Given the particular theme of this 2014 Report, in addition to the countries, the Regional Economic Communities were also surveyed, namely:

- i Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL)
- ii Common Market for Eastern and


- iii Southern Africa (COMESA)
- iv East African Community (EAC)
- v Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
- vi Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
- vii Indian Ocean Community (IOC)
- viii Mano River Union (MRU)
- ix Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)
- x Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)

1.2 Highlights of the Africa Capacity Indicators 2014

Country coverage in 2014

The ACR aims ultimately to target all African countries. The inaugural ACR (2011) covered 34 countries, 2012's ACR 42 and 2013 and 2014's ACR 44 (map 1.1, which also shows their capacity). (The figure of 44 in 2013's and 2014 masks a change in composition: Angola, Botswana, and South Africa were surveyed in 2013 but not in 2014, and vice versa for Comoros, Egypt, and South Sudan).

Map 1.1: Geographical representation of capacity levels



Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

Results of the Africa Capacity Indicators 2014

Results are generally satisfactory. The Africa Capacity Index ranges from 22.4 (Central African Republic) to 73.1 (Morocco) (table 1.1).


Table 1.1: The 2014 ACI

Country	2014 ACI values	Country	2014 ACI values
Benin	55.2	Madagascar	43.1
Burkina Faso	56.8	Malawi	60.1
Burundi	50.9	Mali	60.8
Cabo Verde	64.9	Mauritania	39.8
Cameroon	49.2	Mauritius	64.0
Central African Republic	22.4	Morocco	73.1
Chad	44.8	Mozambique	50.8
Comoros	31.6	Namibia	44.8
Democratic Republic of Congo	50.3	Niger	46.6
Congo (Republic of)	40.4	Nigeria	40.0
Côte d'Ivoire	45.8	Rwanda	68.3
Djibouti	49.9	São Tomé and Príncipe	32.3
Egypt	53.8	Senegal	51.3
Ethiopia	49.0	Sierra Leone	50.8
Gabon	40.1	South Sudan	41.6
Gambia (the)	63.5	Swaziland	32.0
Ghana	54.8	Tanzania	64.4
Guinea	45.3	Togo	45.5
Guinea Bissau	37.4	Tunisia	58.6
Kenya	55.3	Uganda	53.4
Lesotho	57.9	Zambia	54.7
Liberia	51.3	Zimbabwe	50.9

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

No countries are at the extremes of capacity (Very Low or Very High). It is encouraging that eight countries are in the High category, and that no countries are Very Low (figure 1.2). However, countries still have to make more effort to break into the coveted Very High bracket.

The bulk of countries have Medium capacity. Most countries (68.2 percent) fall within the Medium (yellow) bracket, 18.2 percent in High, and 13.6 percent in Low.

Figure 1.2: Africa Capacity Index 2014

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

Analysis by cluster presents a pattern that has not greatly changed from year to year (table 1.2). The policy environment is the strongest and capacity development outcomes the weakest (ACBF 2011; 2012; 2013).

Table 1.2: Percentage of countries by 2014 ACI bracket and by cluster

Level	Policy environment	Process for implementation	Develop results at country level	Capacity development outcomes
Very High	90.9	40.9	6.8	-
High	9.1	40.9	36.4	-
Medium	-	18.2	36.4	15.9
Low	-	-	15.9	70.5
Very Low	-	-	4.5	13.6
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

Results show an excellent policy environment. As one moves from left to right in table 1.2, the majority of countries see a decline in capacity. On the policy environment, all countries are ranked High or Very High (91 percent Very High). Impressive implementation processes are also seen, with around 81 percent of countries High or Very High. The environment is therefore conducive for capacity development.

Translating policies into results remains a challenge. Yet countries do not appear about to achieve development results (20.4 percent ranked Low or Very Low on development results at country level and a paltry 6.8 percent are ranked Very High). But the real challenge remains capacity development outcomes (box 1.1): 84.1 percent of countries are in the Very Low and Low brackets.

Box 1.1: Why is it so hard to achieve satisfactory capacity development outcomes?

Countries need to make a financial commitment to capacity development. The proportion of government budgets allocated to it is low (and unknown for some countries). More than half the surveyed countries (51 percent) allocated less than 1 percent of their budget to capacity development.


As important is achieving the MDG targets—yet 75 percent of countries have met fewer than six of the 21 targets.

And too little capacity profiling and assessment of needs is conducted: 27 percent of countries report not having conducted an analysis since 2008.

Scores overall improved from the previous year. In 2013, 11 percent of countries were in the Very Low capacity bracket, versus none this year. This year sees 18.2 percent of countries in the High category, against only 4.5

percent last year. More encouraging is that the majority of countries (56.8 percent) were classified as Low capacity in 2013, but the majority this year (68.2 percent) have Medium capacity (figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3: Africa Capacity Index levels, 2013 and 2014



Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

Achievements on the thematic indices are generally encouraging. More than 50 percent of countries are High or Very High on four main thematic indices (table 1.3). In particular, they have done well on gender equality and

social inclusion where no country has Low or Very Low scores, with Medium accounting for only 2.3 percent of countries. But more effort is needed on policy choices for capacity development where no country has Very High.

Table 1.3: Percentage of countries by level of thematic indices in 2014


	Policy choices for capacity development	Aid effectiveness to capacity development	Gender equality and social inclusion	Partnering for capacity development
Very High	-	34.1	47.7	22.7
High	52.3	43.2	50.0	38.6
Medium	34.1	15.9	2.3	34.1
Low	11.4	4.5	-	4.5
Very Low	2.3	2.3	-	-
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

Africa Capacity Index 2014 top performers

Eight countries have high capacity. These are the best performers on ACI 2014 (see figure 1.4). A closer look at clusters (figure 1.4) reveals a common pattern similar to the overall one (see table 1.2). The gap among the clusters for policy environment, processes for imple-

mentation, and development results at country level is relatively small. Capacity development outcomes, however, seem not yet fully integrated with development objectives and strategies. Malawi and Mauritius in particular could improve their overall score by focusing more on development results—perhaps by looking at Tanzania (box 1.2).

Figure 1.4: Africa Capacity Index 2014, top performers by cluster

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

Box 1.2: Lessons can be learned from Tanzania, a top performer

Tanzania has posted improvements in capacity across the board, with a policy environment score of 87.5 in 2014. Capacity for implementation has grown from 50.0 in 2011 to 60.2 in 2013 and 78.7 in 2014, and capacity to generate development results has also picked up, from 32.7 in 2011 to 42.0 in 2013 and 74 in 2014.

Tanzania has work to do on the effectiveness of dialogue mechanisms established by government, especially in light of the discovery of oil and natural gas reserves. Nor has it made that much progress in investing in dynamic capabilities. Part of the reason is poor integration of capacity development priorities in the national development strategy.


The ACBF has contributed to some of these results by supporting skills-building in its work with the Nelson Mandela African Institute for Science and Technology in Arusha, which aims to build scientific and entrepreneurial skills in life sciences at a pan-African level. It has also supported the Economic and Social Research Foundation, an autonomous think tank providing benchmarking and advice to government.

Africa Capacity Index 2014 low performers

Six countries are low performers. These countries (see figure 1.2) are characterized by a relatively good policy environment and then a huge gap to the other clusters, which are generally below 50 (figure 1.5). In particular, their scores on capacity development outcomes are very low. Low performers present a syndrome of having policies driven

by external partners, efforts put in in designing policies, but no great care in implementation.

The Central African Republic (box 1.3), Comoros, and Swaziland show very low scores on development results at country level, below 25. Results for this cluster also greatly affect overall ACI scores, and need more support and reinforced capacity development interventions.

Figure 1.5: Africa Capacity Index 2014, low performers by cluster

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

Box 1.3: Why are the low performers in that bracket? The Central African Republic

The country has seen deterioration in overall capacity from 40.8 in 2011 to 27.5 in 2013 and 22.5 in 2014. Despite a noticeable push to implement development programs with implementation capacity going from 67.4 in 2011 to 72.2 in 2013 and to 67.6 in 2014, the reversal in policy on 2012 and the instability in 2014 could have affected attainment of development results, where the cluster deteriorated from 32.7 in 2011 to 24.0 in 2012, recovered to 29.0 in 2013 but dropped off to 9 in 2014.

The presidential and parliamentary elections of January 2011 and the establishment of a National Transitional Council in January 2014 did not seem to provide the country with a mandate to achieve solid results in capacity development.

Critical areas that could help the country improve its scores center on effectiveness of the public sector, including flexibility in adapting its development strategy to emerging shocks, how much the country has done to embed incentives in implementation processes (such that public servants can deliver critical development priorities), and weak tracking and monitoring mechanisms.

Above all, the country needs to regain political and social stability—a basic requirement for development anywhere.

1.3 Conclusions

At the point when African countries and their leaders are forming a common continental vision—Agenda 2063—to develop Africa's growth trajectory for the next 50 years, it is vital to map the state of capacity development in the continent and pinpoint the main opportunities and challenges for regional integration.


This chapter demonstrates that Africa has made strides on capacity development. Not one of the 44 countries surveyed has been classified in the Very Low or Very High brackets, and 68.2 percent are economies with Medium capacity. Eight countries show High capacity. All the countries have a good policy environment.

Strong and weak performers need to make more effort on capacity development outcomes, where on average 84.1 percent of the countries show Low and Very Low scores.

Countries need to focus more on capacity development outcomes in their strategies and policies, particularly on carrying out regular capacity profiling and capacity needs assessments (which require greater resources for capacity development initiatives). The technical assistance and interventions of the ACBF would be highly relevant here.

Efforts to improve capacity development outcomes can also be linked to the capacity needs of the RECs, which expressed their top priorities as individual, institutional, and organizational capacities.

The next chapter goes into the dynamics of regional integration and describes in detail these opportunities and challenges with a focus on the capacity dimension. Nearly all RECs urgently need capacity strengthening to move from one stage to the next in regional integration, and may well require interventions from the ACBF.



New opportunities and challenges
for regional integration

2

Chapter



2

New opportunities and challenges for regional integration

The rapid increase in regional integration agreements has been a prominent feature of international trade policy in recent times. All World Trade Organization (WTO) members countries¹ are party to at least one regional integration arrangement. Interest in forming these groups continued through the global economic crisis.

Africa's interest in regional cooperation and integration predates independence (UNECA 2005). But from 1960 to 1980 Africa witnessed a surge in the number of these initiatives, giving it the highest density of economic integration arrangements in the world.

Regional integration has an enduring appeal for Africa as the right strategy for overcoming the constraints of high fragmentation, small domestic markets and growing transnational threats. In a continent of 54 countries,² its small populations and low incomes combine to limit the size of domestic markets. While Africa is the world's second-largest and second-most populous continent, with an estimated population of 1.03 billion people in 2013, it still has fewer people than either China (1.39 billion) or India (1.27 billion). In 2010, 31 (58 percent) of the 53 African countries had populations of fewer than 15 million and 19 (36 percent) had fewer than 5 million. Despite the much acclaimed narrative of "Africa rising," about 75 percent of its countries had per capita incomes below \$745 (one of the yardsticks of a least developed country). Officially, 33 of the world's 49 least developed countries are in Africa, and 12 of them have no access to the sea (Jerome 2013).

2.1 History, issues, motives

History

Pursuing regional integration and rapid socioeconomic development in Africa, the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980. The main strategy involved collective self-reliance, regional cooperation, and integration. Africa's drive toward regional integration was given a further boost in 1991

by the Abuja Treaty, signed in 1991 but coming into force in 1994, which established the African Economic Community (AEC).

Article 4 of the Abuja Treaty enumerates four basic objectives of the AEC. These are:

- (a) To promote economic, social and cultural development and the integration of African economies in order to increase economic self-reliance and promote an endogenous and self-sustained development;

¹ The WTO has a membership of 160 countries. Mongolia—until 2013 the only WTO member country not in any regional arrangement—joined the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) that year.

² On 9 July 2011, South Sudan broke away from Sudan to become the newest country in the world, and Africa's 54th country. Independence followed a referendum in January 2011, in which nearly 99 per cent of South Sudanese voted to secede.

- (b) To establish, on a continental scale, a framework for the development, mobilization and utilization of the human and material resources of Africa in order to achieve a self-reliant development;
- (c) To promote cooperation in all fields of human endeavour in order to raise the standard of living of African peoples, and maintain and enhance economic stability, foster close and peaceful relations among member States and contribute to the progress, development and the economic integration of the Continent; and
- (d) To coordinate and harmonize policies among existing and future economic communities in order to foster the gradual establishment of the Community.

The Treaty provides for the creation of a full Pan-African Economic Community through six stages extending 34 years, using the RECs as building blocks.

Among the more than 20 schemes in the continent, only eight regional integration arrangements were considered adequate to form the backbone of the AEC (table 2.1). The eight cover Africa's five subregional structures. Although the AU recognizes only eight RECs, six other intergovernmental organizations are working on regional integration, with numerous treaties and protocols governing relations among them as well as between them and the member States (table 2.3 below).

Table 2.1 Regional integration arrangements in Africa

Acronym	Full form	Date of establishment	Member states (and headquarters)	Goal
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel - Saharan States	Since 1998	Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, and Tunisia (Tripoli, Libya)	Free trade association
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; followed PTA	Since 1993	Burundi, Comoros, Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Lusaka, Zambia)	Full economic union
EAC	East African Community	Since 2000	Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda (Arusha, Tanzania)	Political federation
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	1983	Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe (Libreville, Gabon)	Full economic union
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	Since 1975	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo (Abuja, Nigeria)	Full economic union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Agency for Development	Since 1996	Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda (Djibouti); Eritrea joined in 1993 but suspended membership in 2007	Full economic union
SADC	Southern African Development Community	Since 1992	Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Gaborone, Botswana)	Full economic union
UMA	Arab Maghreb Union	Since 1989	Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia (Rabat, Morocco)	Full economic union

With the ultimate goal of eradicating deep-seated problems of poverty and underdevelopment, the Abuja Treaty seeks to create an AEC by 2028, with time-bound objectives (table 2.2).

Table 2.2: Stages for achieving the AEC

Phase	Objective	Time frame
1. Creation of regional blocks	Strengthen existing RECs and establish new ones in regions where they do not exist	1994–1999
2. Strengthening of intra-REC integration and harmonization	Stabilize tariff and other barriers to regional trade; strengthen sectorial integration, particularly in trade, agriculture, finance, transport and communication, industry and energy; and coordinate and harmonize the activities of the RECs	1999–2007
3. Establishment of regional FTAs and Customs Unions	Establish a free trade area and a customs union at the level of each REC	2007–2017
4. Establishment of continent-wide FTA and Customs Union	Coordinate and harmonize tariff and nontariff systems among RECs, with a view to establishing a continental customs union	2017–2019
5. Establishment of continent-wide African Common Market	Establish a continent-wide African common market	2019–2023
6. Establishment of continent-wide economic and monetary union and parliament	Establish a continent-wide economic and monetary union (and thus also a currency union) and pan-African parliament	2023–2028
7. Full integration	End all transition periods	Latest by 2034

The Treaty also reflected the fact that it had become necessary to restructure the OAU to deal better with the issues of integration in Africa. At this point, it had achieved the two main objectives that had led to its establishment: decolonization of the continent and collapse of apartheid in South Africa. On September 9, 1999, the Heads of State and Government of the OAU issued the Sirte Declaration, calling for the establishment of an African Union, with a view toward accelerating the process of unity among countries of the continent, enabling it to better participate in the global economy and to better address social, economic, and political problems.

Consequently, the OAU was officially transformed into the AU in Durban, South Africa on July 9, 2002. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) was initiated in 2001 as Africa's blueprint for economic development—a milestone in the collective response to the realities of contemporary Africa and a new resolve to fight poverty and underdevelopment.

Issues

Africa's portfolio of regional integration contains a bewildering array of sizes and types, described by Yang and Gupta (2005) as “a dense web and classical example of variable


geometry in integration.” Many of them have overlapping membership (table 2.3). Of Africa's 54 countries, only five are members of just one REC, while three belong to four RECs (figure 2.1). Numbers of members vary widely (figure 2.2). The knock-on effects hurting

Africa's ability to negotiate as an equal with, say, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), or the European Union (EU) over its economic partnership agreements (EPAs) are discussed later in this chapter.


Table 2.3: Membership of RECs and other regional groupings

No.	Country	AUC-recognized RECs								Other RECs						Total
		CEN-SAD	EAC	ECCAS	ECOWAS	COMESA	IGAD	SADC	UMA	CEMAC	CEPGL	IOC	MRU	UEMOA	SACU	
1	Algeria							YES								1
2	Angola			YES				YES								2
3	Benin	YES			YES								YES			3
4	Botswana							YES						YES		2
5	Burkina Faso	YES			YES								YES			3
6	Burundi		YES	YES		YES					YES					4
7	Cabo Verde				YES											1
8	Cameroon			YES						YES						2
9	Central African Republic	YES		YES						YES						3
10	Chad	YES		YES						YES						3
11	Comoros	YES				YES					YES					3
12	Congo			YES						YES						2
13	Congo, Dem. Rep.			YES		YES		YES			YES					4
14	Côte d'Ivoire	YES			YES							YES	YES			4
15	Djibouti	YES				YES	YES									3
16	Egypt	YES				YES										2
17	Equatorial Guinea			YES						YES						2
18	Eritrea	YES				YES	YES									3
19	Ethiopia					YES	YES									2
20	Gabon			YES						YES						2
21	Gambia	YES			YES											2
22	Ghana	YES			YES											2
23	Guinea	YES			YES							YES				3
24	Guinea-Bissau	YES			YES								YES			3
25	Kenya		YES			YES	YES									3
26	Lesotho							YES							YES	2
27	Liberia				YES							YES				2
28	Libya	YES				YES			YES							3
29	Madagascar					YES		YES			YES					3
30	Malawi					YES		YES								2
31	Mali	YES			YES									YES		3
32	Mauritania	YES							YES							2
33	Mauritius					YES		YES			YES					3
34	Morocco	YES							YES							2
35	Mozambique							YES								1
36	Namibia							YES							YES	2
37	Niger	YES			YES									YES		3
38	Nigeria	YES			YES											2
39	Rwanda		YES			YES					YES					3
40	São Tomé & Príncipe			YES												1
41	Senegal	YES			YES									YES		3
42	Seychelles					YES		YES			YES					3
43	Sierra Leone	YES			YES							YES				3
44	Somalia	YES					YES									2
45	South Africa							YES							YES	2
46	South Sudan						YES									1
47	Sudan	YES				YES	YES									3
48	Swaziland					YES		YES							YES	3
49	Tanzania		YES					YES								2
50	Togo	YES			YES									YES		3
51	Tunisia	YES							YES							2
52	Uganda		YES			YES	YES									3
53	Zambia					YES		YES								2
54	Zimbabwe					YES		YES								2
	Total membership	25	5	10	15	19	8	15	5	6	3	4	4	8	5	

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

Figure 2.1: Distribution of countries by REC memberships

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

Figure 2.2 Main REC memberships

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

As ARIA reports³ have shown, these arrangements have not been very effective and they have so far failed to propel the continent's economic transformation due to a multiplicity of constraints including inadequate political will and commitment to the process; high


incidence of conflicts and political instability; poor design and sequencing; multiplicity of initiatives; slow implementation; inadequacy of funding; and exclusion of key stakeholders (AU 2013).

³ Since 2004, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), AU and African Development Bank (AfDB) have produced the report Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA) to monitor the pace of integration in Africa. ARIA I in 2004 provided a comprehensive assessment of the status, with subsequent editions focusing on thematic areas. Thus ARIA II examined rationalization of regional economic communities and their overlapping memberships. ARIA III addressed macroeconomic policy convergence, as well as monetary and financial integration in the regional economic communities. ARIA IV focused on enhancing intra-African trade. ARIA V provided analytical research and empirical evidence to support establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area and the benefits that African countries stand to gain from it. ARIA VI is on harmonizing policies to transform the trading environment.

In contrast, the experiences of the EU, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), North American Free Trade Agreement and other frontier RECs have demonstrated how geographic regions can create conditions for shared growth and prosperity by removing barriers to commerce, harmonizing regulatory norms, opening labor markets, and developing common infrastructure.

A recurring challenge has been overlapping mandates leading to what Bhagwati (1995) famously described as the “spaghetti bowl” (figure 2.3). Overlapping membership is often assumed to be a reason for weak implementation (Fergin 2011; Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2014) and the agreements' limited trade impact, as conflicting rules impede potential trade creation and generate confusion over integration goals (UNCTAD 2009).

Figure 2.3: The spaghetti bowl of RECs



A major criticism is the adherence to a “linear” integration model in Africa (Hartzenberg 2011), marked by the stepwise integration of goods, labor, and capital markets, and eventually monetary and fiscal integration. For the most part African integration has focused on

import tariffs. Including services and other behind-the-border issues, such as investment, competition policy, and government procurement, has proved contentious.

Deep integration⁴ could improve Africa's regional cooperation because border measures

⁴ Trade agreements that deal mainly with border measures are often defined as “shallow” agreements. Trade agreements that include rules on other domestic policies are referred to as “deep” agreements.

are likely to represent only a minor constraint to regional trade in Africa, compared with structural economic shortcomings such as the lack of infrastructure, institutional framework, skills, and economic diversification. These supply-side constraints could be addressed in part by a regional integration agenda that includes services, investment, competition policy, and other behind-the-border issues. In short, a deep integration agenda could address supply-side constraints more effectively than

an agenda almost exclusively on border measures (WTO 2011).

Country motives for joining RECs

The Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) aside, countries joined RECs mainly for economic reasons, which calls for interventions focusing on that dimension (figure 2.4). (In the 2014 ACBF survey, countries could give more than one reason.)

Figure 2.4 Country motives for joining a REC (%)



Table 2.4 highlights the RECs' achievements at each stage (and see table 3.3). In a nutshell, progress has been slow. The main integration apparatus—intraregional trade—is too small

to provide any integrating incentive. Sad to say, but these shortcomings make fully attaining the AEC in 2028 a mirage.

Table 2.4: Status of implementing the Abuja Treaty by REC

Stage	Stage one: 1994–1999	Stage two: 2000–2007		Stage three: 2008–2017		Stage four: 2018–2019	Stage five: 2020–2023	Stage six: 2024–2028 Latest 2034
	RECs	Strengthening existing RECs and creating new RECs where they do not exist	Coordinating and harmonizing activities	Gradually eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers	Free trade area	Customs union	Continental customs union	Establishing an African common market
UMA	☑	☑	In progress	Not yet	Not yet	This stage will be achieved when all RECs have achieved Customs Union and harmonized their respective Common External tariff (CET), with a view of creating one single continental CET.	This stage will be achieved when all RECs have achieved continental customs union as well as free movement of labor and capital.	This stage will be achieved when all RECs have achieved African Common Market at which time there will be a common currency, issued by the African Central Bank.
IGAD	☑	☑	In progress	Not yet	Not yet			
SADC	☑	☑	☑	☑	2013			
CEN-SAD	☑	☑	Not yet	Not yet	Not yet			
ECOWAS	☑	☑	☑	☑	2015			
COMESA	☑	☑	☑	☑	☑			
ECCAS	☑	☑	☑	☑	No date fixed			
EAC	☑	☑	☑	☑	☑			

Source: AUC 2012.

Despite fundamental problems in the design of the type of integration, there is widespread support for integration in Africa. The reality is that regional integration is not a choice but a must for Africa. Building bigger, more integrated subregional markets that are deeply embedded in the global economy is one of the most urgent tasks if Africa is to sustain its recent economic performance.

At the moment, the capacity to implement regional cooperation and integration is grossly inadequate. Previous capacity building approaches have not produced the requisite capacities to develop the RECs. This dearth threatens the RECs' ability to achieve their goals. Many protocols have been signed but remain unimplemented, due to ineffective and inadequate implementation capacity. In some RECs where capacity exists, it is neither optimally used nor sufficiently nurtured.

Capacity building for the RECs should be regarded in its interrelated human, institutional, legal, and infrastructural dimensions. Action must be taken in each of these areas.

Critical capacities are needed for ensuring good governance, human rights, political stability, peace, and security; generating effective socioeconomic policy analysis and management; building and fully using human capacities; developing entrepreneurial capacities for public and private sector management; building and using physical infrastructural capacities; maximizing natural resources and diversifying African economies into processing and manufacturing; strengthening capacities in support of food security and self-sufficiency; and mobilizing and allocating domestic and external financial resources.

2.2 Speaking with one voice: new agendas and forces

As further background to the discussion on capacity building in later chapters, we look at fundamental global changes—institutional and economic—spotlighting the importance of Africans working together to exploit the new opportunities and overcome the new challenges.

Post-2015 development agenda

The eight globally agreed MDGs have been at the center of economic development since 2000. They offered a millennial opportunity for

directing global policies and economic endowment across the globe. Yardsticks for progress, they show that Africa has done well on some goals but lags behind on others (table 2.5).

Table 2.5 Africa's MDG performance at a glance, 2013

Goal	Status	Best performing countries, selected targets and indicators
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	Off track	Target 1A: Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia Target 1B: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Togo, and Zimbabwe Target 1C: Algeria, Benin, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, South Africa, and Tunisia
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education	On track	Target 2A: Indicator 2.1: Algeria, Egypt, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe Indicator 2.2: Ghana, Morocco, Tanzania, and Zambia
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women	On track	Target 3A: Indicator 3.1: Gambia, Ghana, Mauritius, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe Indicator 3.2: Botswana, Ethiopia, and South Africa Indicator 3.3: Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, and South Africa
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality	Off track	Target 4A: Indicators 4.1 and 4.2: Egypt, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Rwanda, Seychelles, and Tunisia
Goal 5: Improve maternal health	Off track	Target 5A: Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, Mauritius, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Tunisia Target 5B: Egypt, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, South Africa, and Swaziland
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria and other diseases	On track	Target 6A: Côte d' Ivoire, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe Target 6B: Botswana, Comoros, Namibia, and Rwanda Target 6C: Algeria, Cape Verde, Egypt, Libya, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sudan, and Tunisia
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability	Off track	Target 7A: Egypt, Gabon, Morocco, and Nigeria Target 7C: Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Comoros, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, and Swaziland
Goal 8: Global partnership for development	Off track	Target 8F: Kenya, Libya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia

Source: UNECA et al. 2013.

The post-2015 development agenda gives Africa an opportunity to reach consensus on common challenges, priorities, and aspirations, and to take part in the global debate on how to provide a fresh impetus to the MDGs and to devise strategies to address key emerging development issues.

The AU Summit held in July 2012 mandated the AUC, in consultation with member States and RECs, to identify Africa's priorities for the post-2015 development agenda. A High-Level Committee comprising 10 Heads of State and Government was constituted in May 2013 to coordinate the activities of African leaders and

build regional and inter-continental alliances on a “common African position” for that agenda. Adopted at the 22nd Summit of AU Heads of State and Government, in Addis

Ababa, Ethiopia, on January 21–31, 2014, the Common African Position document is the outcome, which groups Africa's development priorities into “six pillars” (box 2.1).

Box 2.1 The six pillars of the Common African Position

Pillar one: Structural economic transformation and inclusive growth

- Inclusive growth that reduces inequality
- Sustainable agriculture, food self-sufficiency and nutrition
- Diversification, industrialization and value addition
- Developing the services sector
- Infrastructure development

Pillar two: Science, technology and innovation

- Enhancing technological capacities for Africa's transformative agenda
- Building enabling environment for innovation
- Increasing support for research and development
- Optimal utilization of space and geospatial technologies

Pillar three: People-centered development

- The eradication of poverty
- Education and human capital development
- Universal and equitable access to quality healthcare
- Gender equality and women's empowerment
- Leveraging population dynamics for development
- Harnessing Africa's youthful population
- Improving access to sustainable human settlements

Pillar four: Environmental sustainability, natural resources management and disaster risk management

- Improving natural resource and biodiversity management
- Enhancing access to safe water for all
- Responding effectively to climate change
- Addressing desertification, land degradation, soil erosion, flooding, and drought
- Natural disaster risk reduction and management

Pillar five: Peace and security

- Addressing the root causes of conflict
- Preventing the outbreak of armed conflicts

Pillar six: Finance and partnerships

Finance

- Improving domestic resource mobilization
- Maximizing innovative financing
- Implementing existing commitments and promoting quality and predictability of external financing

Partnerships

- Promoting mutually beneficial partnerships
- Strengthening partnerships for trade
- Establish partnerships for managing global commons

A key part of the common position is that the post-2015 agenda will be driven largely by domestic resources and through private sector partnerships, unlike past development agendas. This choice should enhance ownership and accountability. The common position also offers Africa an opportunity to speak with one voice in negotiations, strengthening its bargaining power and increasing the likelihood of fully integrating its position with the global development agenda.

At the global level, one of the main outcomes of the Rio+20 Conference was the agreement by member States to launch a process to develop a set of Sustainable Development Goals, which will build upon the MDGs and converge with the post-2015 agenda. The UN General Assembly agreed on September 10, 2014 that the proposal of the Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals would be the main basis for a concise set of sustainable development goals that will encapsulate a transformative post-2015 agenda. The group has proposed 17 goals with 169 targets covering a broad array of issues. The final goals are due to be presented at a special session of the General Assembly in September 2015.

The post-2015 agenda, with the Sustainable Development Goals at its core, will pick up the problems left unresolved by the MDGs, by addressing a more inclusive conception of human development than its predecessor. The new goals include a focus on inclusive economic growth and decent work for all, reduction of inequalities within and between countries, sustainable production and consumption patterns, peaceful and inclusive societies, safe and sustainable human settlements, and protection of natural resources. As well as broadening the development narrative, the new framework goes beyond goals for developing countries alone, becoming a

universal agenda, one not imposed by any one bloc but owned by North and South and translated according to local needs and specificities (Cavaleri 2014).

The new agenda must not be restricted to a national level. Indeed, the High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 Agenda has suggested that regions participate through mutual and voluntary accountability peer reviews (UN 2013: 22). Regional integration has also been identified as one of the key enablers for attaining structural economic transformation (Mwanza 2014).

Countries in groups are implementing regional integration initiatives. Integrating them with post-2015 national strategies will help mesh the two processes. At regional and continental levels, it could also mean integrating the post-2015 agenda with current and new initiatives. Again, some of the desired outcomes are already part of the process in different global regions. Aspects such as designing regional strategies and institutional measures for closely harmonizing the two agendas become clearer as the Common African Position is taken forward and the post-2015 global agenda further consolidated (Mwanza 2014).

Hence strong regional dimensions are required to keep pace with the shifting landscape. Agenda 2063 is one of them.

Agenda 2063—the Africa that Africans want

The Golden Jubilee celebration of the OAU/AU led to a consensus for a new continent-wide development agenda—Agenda 2063. Africa's political leadership has rededicated itself to the continent's development in tightly focused areas of identity and renaissance. More widely, Agenda 2063 is a blueprint for inclusive growth and sustainable development over the next 50 years (AU 2013).

Agenda 2063 seeks to harness the continent's comparative advantages—its people, history, and cultures; its natural resources; and its position in the world (table 2.6). It is justified by the changing global context of globalization and information technology; by the need

to build on the NEPAD⁵ experience of a more united and stronger Africa, and strong and well-functioning regional institutions; and by the need to seize new development and investment opportunities. These factors present a unique opportunity for Africa.

Table 2.6: Agenda 2063—aspirations and goals

Aspiration	Goal
A prosperous Africa, based on inclusive growth and sustainable development	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high standard of living, quality of life, and well-being for all citizens 2. Well-educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by science technology and innovation 3. Healthy and well-nourished citizens 4. Modern and livable habitats 5. Transformed economies and jobs 6. Modern agriculture for increased production, productivity, and value addition 7. Environmentally sustainable and climate resilient economies and communities
An integrated continent politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. United States of Africa (federal or confederate) 9. World-class infrastructure crisscrossing Africa
An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice, and the rule of law	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 10. Democratic values, practices, and universal principles of human rights, justice, and the rule of law are entrenched 11. Capable institutions and transformative leadership in place at all levels
A peaceful and secured Africa	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 12. Peace, security and stability preserved
Africa with a strong cultural identity values and ethic	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 13. Pan-Africanism fully entrenched 14. African cultural renaissance preeminent
An Africa whose development is people driven, especially relying on the potential by its youth and women	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 15. Full gender equality in all spheres of life 16. Engaged and empowered youth
An Africa as a strong and influential global player and partner	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 17. Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful coexistence 18. An Africa no longer aid dependent, and taking full responsibility for financing her development

Source: Berhane 2014.

⁵ As the Agenda 2063 concept paper shows, national, regional, and continental efforts to implement NEPAD (not evident in earlier endeavors), have enabled AU to build institutions such as the African Peer Review Mechanism. These represent a commitment to implement agreed-on agendas, generating lessons for building a strong foundation for Agenda 2063.

According to AU (2013) and Natama (2014), Agenda 2063 will pursue a multitrack approach:

- *Sustained political support at all levels*—national, regional, and continental. A start has been made with the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration made by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in May 2013. This will be cascaded to lower levels—regional bodies, national assemblies, municipalities, and other local governments.
- *A participatory process centered on conversations with broad strata of African society*, including the diaspora, to solicit and analyze their views on their aspirations for Africa and defining the Africa they want to see in 50 years. Emphasis must be on youth (the implementers) and women, whose untapped potential represents an enormous reservoir of energy in development.
- *Assessments and studies, priority- and goal-setting, and implementation mechanisms* covering the following:
 - o Definition of baseline conditions to inform the situational and trends analyses; and baseline assessments to provide elements of the Agenda and inputs into the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework. Given that the rest of the world will also change, one needs to understand global megatrends and their key drivers.
 - o Scenario planning to distill the opportunities, threats, weaknesses, and strengths facing African societies and economies.

- o A review of past and present strategies and plans at national, regional, and continental levels to identify lessons and best practices, and select those to become building blocks in Vision 2063.
- o A review of long-term strategies and programs of the AUC and NEPAD.

Agenda 2063 details threats such as conflict, instability, corruption, social and economic inequalities, organized crime and illicit financial flows, mismanagement of diversities, ascendancy of religious fundamentalism, failure to harness the demographic dividend, escalation of Africa's disease burden, climate risks and natural disasters, and external shocks—and offers recommendations to counter them (Berhane 2014). It tries to discern and weave in long-term trends that will influence or present challenges to global socioeconomic well-being. It also proposes ideas to tackle Africa's remaining challenges, placing achievement milestones along the way (El Fassi 2013).

Fulfilling the agenda will be challenging as there is no clear pattern of funding given how poorly African countries mobilize domestic resources. The agenda merely provides a list of funding sources—including the Africa infrastructural development fund, Agenda 2063 implementation tax, home-linked solidarity fund, the diaspora, adaptation of public-private financing models, and funds from African capital markets and financial institutions—without going into detail about how they will be generated, the challenges in getting them, or the likely amount from each source. These are key issues given the continent's enormous socioeconomic problems (box 2.2).

Box 2.2: Distributing the fruits of economic growth—equitably

Although Africa's economies are growing, the gains are rarely inclusive and shared—notably, growth often fails to reduce poverty—low growth elasticity of poverty. And so inequality stays high.

The future may be brighter though—in parts: over the next 20 years African poverty is expected to drop 24 percent but its share of global poverty may rise to 82 percent. In its short-term forecast the International Labour Organization (ILO) expects the number of unemployed people in Sub-Saharan Africa to rise 5.4 percent and in North Africa 4.3 percent, by 2015. The outlook for youth unemployment looks no more promising.

In its global employment trend for 2014, the ILO indicated that unemployment remains a major challenge for Sub-Saharan Africa at 7.6 percent (South Africa 25.3 percent), with North Africa having the highest unemployment rate (12.2 percent).

Source: Mgidlana and Maziya 2013; ILO 2014.

Agenda 2063 should thus be forged on the anvil of stronger regional integration, which requires greater competitiveness from Africa's economies. There is tremendous power and potential in intensified regional and inter-regional cooperation, particularly for landlocked developing countries. Hence the RECs must include the elements of Agenda 2063. They can also help mobilize domestic resources for implementing the agenda, and will want to explore new vehicles for this.

In sum, projections for the next half century suggest that Africa can realize a vision of a united, prosperous continent at peace with itself and boast well-diversified, competitive economies from which extreme poverty and inequality may well have been removed. Africa has many opportunities: huge land and mineral wealth, a youthful and growing population, and urbanization that favors emerging regions.

Global reordering: the BRICS

Africa represents a new frontier of economic opportunities and hosts some of the fastest-growing economies in the world, attracting global partners such as the BRICS and other emerging economies such as Turkey, India, Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesia (TIMBI), all of which see Africa as helping resolve global challenges. The BRICS countries particularly

offer huge opportunities for financing development in Africa on an equal and win-win basis. Such a partnership also represents an opportunity to foster regional integration in Africa, either through AU leadership or exchanges with the RECs.

To benefit from the partnership, the AU and the RECs need to maximize the backward-forward processing linkages of their commodity sectors. Doing so will enhance trade and foreign direct investment, and ease the transfer of capacity and technology to Africa. The BRICS are heavy African investors and their potential, at least in the short term, appears huge. The BRICS' share in Africa's foreign direct investment stock and flows topped 14 and 25 percent respectively in 2010 (UNCTAD 2013a). This general trend, even if not at these high rates, looks likely to continue.

The role of South Africa in the SADC region illustrates the type of partnership African RECs could build with the BRICS. It is playing a key role in consolidating the free trade area of SADC members. It is also encouraging negotiations on the Tripartite Agreement between members of SADC, COMESA, and EAC, creating an integrated market of 26 member States and a combined population of nearly 600 million people and a

GDP of some \$1.0 trillion (UNECA 2013).

As stated by Nnadozie (2014), the partnership with emerging entities such as the BRICS and TIMBI countries can enhance regional integration and benefit the continent if African

regional bodies, including RECs, can rectify the capacity deficits that hinder the continent's ability to manage relations with its partners—whether new (box 2.3)—or traditional (following section).

Box 2.3 Capacity to partner with the BRICS

Africa and its countries individually must deploy high-quality resources to manage their relationship with the BRICS. The continent must have a clear picture of its needs as part of the overall policy and planning framework of each country, and a clear setting of objectives and priorities is essential as a basis for dialogue of equals. Maximizing the benefits of the partnership requires the African side to rectify the capacity deficits that hinder its relationship management with its partners.

The main deficits are the capacities to:

- **Understand the issues.** This requires investing in research, stronger think tanks and conducting extensive background analysis of impact of BRICS and other major partners as well as putting in place mechanisms and processes for robust internal dialogue on relations with BRICS.
- **Coordinate.** African countries must have effective mechanisms for coordinating among themselves and must encourage and support participation of new actors and processes in cooperation arrangements.
- **Negotiate.** African countries need to build negotiation capacity to be effective in bilateral forums, handle large and complex deals with BRICS, and consider adopting a similar strategy of integrating trade, financing, and development considerations in their approach to BRICS partners.
- **Monitor.** Africa must boost its analytical capacity to monitor trade and financial flows and implementation of projects. Several countries are already formulating strategies for more effective engagement with BRICS and other Southern partners.
- **Compete.** Enhancing Africa's capacity to compete in the global market is critical for African–BRICS cooperation, but it requires promoting technology transfer and capturing the positive spillovers from foreign investment and learning from the BRICS.

Africa's relations with BRICS partners should be based on an articulated African interest. The continent should then install the critical capacities required to participate as equals in dialogue.

Source: Nnadozie 2014.

EPAs

The EU has traditionally been Africa's most important trade, investment, and development partner. Trade with the EU was governed by a series of Lomé Conventions, which granted African countries (excluding South Africa) unilateral preferential access to EU markets. The EU and African countries subsequently

concluded the Cotonou Agreement, paving the way for the WTO-compatible EPAs in 2000.

Yet EPAs are controversial and their impacts still uncertain. While they may bring benefits to Africa, such as cheaper imports and greater exports and enhanced competitiveness, they also risk diverting trade, complicating further the spaghetti bowl of trade arrangements,

narrowing policy space, creating fiscal losses in countries that rely heavily on trade taxes, and eroding the existing fragile industrial base. They may also work against continental integration. All these factors do not seem to have tarnished their allure, however, given RECs' attempts to negotiate them.

Although EPAs were negotiated with seven different ACP regions—four in Africa—only


two—EAC and ECOWAS—covered the full membership of the RECs and so could negotiate as a block. The rest, because of overlapping membership of countries in different RECs (box 2.4), or lack of interest of some of their members, could at best represent subsets of their configurations (figure 2.5). This has onerous implications for how the EPAs affect the RECs' agenda.

Box 2.4: Subregions need to align their EPA negotiating groups more tightly

Overlapping and multiple memberships are particularly pervasive in Eastern and Southern Africa, making it hard to meet the requirement that the EPA process should build on regional integration initiatives. There are two regional EPA negotiating groups: for Eastern and Southern Africa and for SADC—a solution that has left some parties disgruntled.

Elsewhere, the regional EPA negotiating group for Central Africa is configured around CEMAC, even though CEMAC is not as inclusive for Central Africa as ECCAS, and so neither can the Central Africa–EU EPA fully meet the above requirement. The EPAs were also confined to Sub-Saharan African countries, excluding the North African members of UMA, which may potentially create a split there.

Figure 2.5: Regional integration initiatives and EPA configurations in Africa



Source: South Centre 2007

Negotiating the EPAs posed a serious challenge for the ACP countries due to their limited capacity in almost all relevant fields (Laporte 2005). Most of these states, particularly the poorest, had little capacity in trade policy formulation, evaluation, or implementation, or in research and analysis or consultation (Szambelan 2012). They also had to deal with a shortage of skilled trade negotiators, nationally and regionally. Their financial means were usually tight. And even then the scarce resources had to be divided between the EPA talks and parallel regional integration talks, WTO negotiations, and bilateral negotiations.

Weak institutions were also often a problem, hindering much needed intragovernmental coordination, a clear division of roles, stability, and political independence (Laporte 2005). This caused a general slowdown or stalling of negotiations, or Africa's inability to identify and defend its interests—underlining the need to strengthen the continent's regional economic institutions and capacities. There is nothing to suggest that this fundamental flaw has been corrected or receiving adequate attention since the negotiations began.

Still, for some RECs perseverance has paid off. The ECOWAS's negotiations were based on its own regional integration initiative, and on July 10, 2014, the West Africa EPA negotiating group became the first African region to officially conclude and endorse a regional EPA with the EU. Following suit was the SADC–EPA of the Southern African region, signed on July 22, 2014 (Jerome 2014).

2.3 Conclusions—key messages and recommendations

Key messages

- Regional integration continues to hold a central place in the continent's quest for economic transformation and sustainable socioeconomic progress, especially in the face of new developments such as the Post -2015 Development Agenda, Africa Agenda 2063, and the rising economic might of the BRICS—as well as more traditional aspects such as EPA negotiations. These are placing heavy demands on RECs.
- The experiences of the EU, ASEAN, the North American Free Trade Agreement and other frontier RECs have demonstrated how geographic regions can create conditions for shared growth and prosperity.
- Yet progress in Africa has been slow. Achieving regional integration arrangements is highly problematic as the main integration apparatus (intraregional trade) is too weak to provide an integrating incentive.
- Capacity building is a central challenge for African RECs. Capacity for regional cooperation and integration is grossly inadequate, and where it exists, it is not optimally used.
- Getting the capacity right in regional groupings is at least as important as getting the institutions right.

- The AEC will only be accomplished in 2028 with urgent remedial action, including capacity building.

Recommendations

- African RECs need to rationalize themselves, such that each state can concentrate on one grouping that matters most to it.
- Africa needs to pursue a deeper integration agenda that includes services, investment, competition policy, and other behind-the-border issues.
- RECs need to sharply boost their capacity, so as to manage complex agreements with vastly better resourced entities.



Capacity for RECs—
meaning, evolution, and issues

3

Chapter





3

Capacity for RECs— meaning, evolution, and issues

Many capacity issues still litter the path to the benefits of regional integration—summarized later in this chapter after an elucidation of the meanings of “capacity” and a quick tour d’horizon of the evolution of capacity building.

3.1 Meaning of capacity, capacity development, and capacity building

Concepts of capacity

Despite broad consensus—which seems to coalesce around the ability of individuals, institutions, and societies to solve problems, make informed choices, define their priorities, and plan their futures—“capacity” has multiple and imprecise definitions:⁶

- An organization with capacity has the ability to function as a resilient, strategic, and autonomous entity (Kaplan 1999: 20).
- Capacity represents the potential for using resources effectively and maintaining gains in performance with gradually reduced levels of external support (LaFond and Brown 2003: 7).
- Capacity is [the] potential to perform (Horton et al. 2003: 18).
- Capacity is that emerging contribution of attributes that enables a human system to create development value (Morgan 2006: 8).
- Capacity is the ability of people, organizations, and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully (OECD 2006: 12).
- Capacity is the ability of individuals, organizations, and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve goals (UNDP 2009).

The ACBF uses a definition of capacity conceptualized at the individual, organizational, and societal levels, focusing on the ability to set goals for development and achieve them; to budget resources and use them for agreed purposes; and to manage the complex purposes and interactions that typify a working political and economic system (box 3.1). The definition is broad yet specific enough to encompass African contexts, recognizing that many countries are starting from a low base of individual competencies.

⁶ For more definitions, see Ubels, Acquaye-Baddoo, and Fowler (2010), perhaps the largest study undertaken on the subject.

Box 3.1: The ACBF's definition

For the ACBF, capacity comprises the ability of people, organizations, and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully; and capacity development is the process by which people, organizations, and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt, and maintain capacity over time. Capacity is also better conceptualized when answering the question: capacity for what? Capacity for individuals, organizations, and societies to set goals and achieve them; to budget resources and use them for agreed purposes; and to manage the complex processes and interactions that typify a working political and economic system. Capacity is most tangibly and effectively developed in the context of specific development objectives such as delivering services to poor people; instituting education, public service, and healthcare reform; improving the investment climate for small and medium enterprises; empowering local communities to better participate in public decision-making processes; and promoting peace and resolving conflict. Capacity building is synonymously used with capacity development in the literature, although the former term is fast getting out of vogue because of its connotation of a process starting from scratch and involving a step-by-step erection of a new structure, based on preconceived design.

Source: ACBF 2011: 30–31.

Capacity development versus capacity building

Over the last decade the development literature has often used the terms capacity development and capacity building interchangeably. For example, the United Nations Development Programme prefers to use capacity development, which is more comprehensive, as this best reflects its approach, premised on the fact that some capacities exist in every context. It uses this base of capacities as its starting point and then supports national efforts to enhance them, in a process of transformation from the inside, based on nationally determined priorities, policies, and desired results. It encompasses areas where new capacities have to be introduced and so supports the building of new capacity.

According to Simister and Smith (2010), capacity development can be seen as a more deliberate process in which people, organizations, or the enabling environment as a whole create, maintain, and strengthen capacity over time.⁷ It is more of an internal process that involves the main actor or actors taking primary responsibility for change processes.

Capacity development thus entails sustainable creation, use, and retention of that capacity to reduce poverty, enhance self-reliance, and improve people's lives. It requires acquiring individual skills, institutional capacities, and social capital as well as developing opportunities to put these skills and networks to productive use in transforming society.

There is often a time lag between capacity development support, the emergence of new or stronger capacities, and performance improvements. Building individual skills may take many years, while transforming society may take generations. Capacity development should thus be seen as a long-term process, whose outcomes may not evolve in a controlled and linear way.

Capacity building, in contrast, commonly refers to a process that supports only the initial stages of building or creating capacities and implicitly assumes that there are no preexisting capacities. It is thus less comprehensive than capacity development. It is more often understood as a purposeful, external intervention to strengthen capacity over time.

⁷ In the literature on capacity development, these three levels are sometimes referred to differently. For example, the organizational level is occasionally called the institutional level and the enabling environment the institutional or societal level. The three levels are mutually interactive and each influences the others through complex codependency relationships.

The government of Australia outlines various attributes of capacity building (Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005):

- Capacity building is a process—a means to an end—by which individuals, groups, and communities further develop their understanding, ability, and motivation.
- Capacity building should not be considered in isolation. It should specifically support effective implementation.
- Capacity building provides important intermediate outcomes related to attitude, behavior, and practice change, and to increased engagement.
- Activities can be considered under the broad headings of awareness raising, information and knowledge sharing, skills and training, and facilitation and support.
- Together these activity areas aim to build people's ability to act, as well as their motivation to act.

Comprehended in this manner, capacity building occurs at many levels and involves much more than, for example, short-term training. It covers legal and regulatory frameworks, policies, and laws; human resources development, including individual knowledge and skills; access to information through formal and informal education and training; institutional development, including

management structures and procedures within organizations and relationships among different organizations and stakeholders; and the information system to disseminate and share knowledge and good practices.

In sum, capacity building is an integrated program of activities embedded in the overall development process that systematically transfer the ability of developing economies to plan and implement their own futures.

Hard- and soft-core capacities

A wide range of characteristics, both hard and soft, together make up capacity (box 3.2). While some capacities are “hard” or “technical” (such as engineering or financial management), others are “soft” (such as the ability to internalize values and principles, build and sustain relationships, or garner commitment and loyalty) (Farrell 2007). Increasingly, the literature suggests that soft capacities may be as important as, or even more important than, hard capacities in influencing change. They may also be more enduring than their hard equivalents, which tend to come and go from an organization, while a strong sense of identity, for example, lives on.

Ultimately of course capacity is shaped by the development of both types, and the ability of an organization or system to balance them. External interveners, though, need be attuned to the existence and importance of soft capacities when identifying opportunities for support and when designing interventions (Farrell 2007).

Box 3.2: Hard and soft capacities

Both types of capacity are important for performance. Although the soft capacities are less obvious, neglecting them can have grave consequences for any capacity development project.

Hard capacity elements

Capacities generally considered to be technical, functional, tangible, and visible:

- Technical skills, explicit knowledge, and methodologies (which for individuals can be considered as competencies).
- Organizational capacity to function: appropriate structures; systems and procedures for management, planning, finance, human resources, M&E, and project cycle management; the ability to mobilize resources.
- Laws, policies, systems, and strategies (enabling conditions).

Tangible resources like infrastructure, money, buildings, equipment, and documents can be considered the material expression or product of capacity, but they are not capacity in and of themselves.

Soft capacity elements

Capacities generally considered to be social, relational, intangible, and invisible. They include operational capacities such as:

- Organizational culture and values.
- Leadership, political relationships, and functioning.
- Implicit knowledge and experience.
- Relational skills: negotiation, teamwork, conflict resolution, facilitation, and so on.

They also entail adaptive capacities such as:

- Ability and willingness to self-reflect and learn from experience.
- Ability to analyze and adapt.
- Change readiness and change management.
- Confidence, empowerment, and participation for legitimacy to act.
- Problem-solving skills.

3.2 Contexts for capacity development in Africa

Economic

Since the 2000s, Africa has been the second-fastest growing region on the planet, after developing Asia (figure 3.1). Though the

continent's regions and countries grow at different rates—with West and East Africa the fastest—Africa generally offers encouraging growth prospects. Trade picked up in 2013 and is expected to rise further in 2014 and 2015 as world trade strengthens (AfDB, OECD, and UNDP 2014).

Barring unforeseen calamity, the macroeconomic situation of Africa is set to remain favorable. In fact, growth is projected to accelerate or at least keep its current pace, reflecting improved macroeconomic, political, and social prospects in many countries, including most oil exporters and several low-income countries and fragile states (IMF 2014). Although agriculture is still important in African economies, services have recently supported growth and offer great opportunities, as witnessed by the expansion of transport, trade, real estate, public and financial services, and information and communications technology (ICT) in many nations.


Yet despite this high economic growth, structural transformation (the reallocation of economic activity across the different sectors that accompanies the process of modern economic growth) remains a challenge. Still, Africa continues to be a magnet for considerable financial flows, and has improved its social and political environment. For instance, foreign direct investment inflows increased by 4 percent in 2013, reaching about \$57 billion (UNCTAD 2014).

Political

The political landscape of Africa in the 2000s looks quite different from that in previous decades. There has been a remarkable increase in the number of African states that have formal democratic systems. Since 2010, Africa has witnessed an increasing number of free, peaceful, and fair elections, with a good participation of women in political activities. The trend is expected to continue, with about 600 million Africans ready to elect leaders in 2014–2015.

Still, politicians cannot afford to be complacent: preserving Africa's social and political stability has recently become of greater

Figure 3.1: Economic growth in Africa and other regions of the world



Source: Constructed using data from ACFB, AfDB, OECD, and UNDP 2014; and Economy Watch 2014.

concern given the activities of terrorist groups like Boko Haram, Al Shaabab, and Al-Qaeda. These conflicts are mainly internal to countries but are increasingly spilling across borders. In fact, half the armed conflicts in 2012 involved more than one African country and international allies fighting insurgents (AfDB, OECD, and UNDP 2014).

Governance

Governance has improved over recent years. African countries have made slight progress on good governance, mainly because of progress in participation, human rights, and human development (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2014).

Two agendas: post-Ebola reconstruction and post-2015 development

The Ebola outbreak in West Africa is threatening stability and economic activities. The spread of the virus in primarily Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone—the epicenter—has caused thousands of deaths and hurt the growth and development potential of these countries, as well as that of the wider region.

Equally important economically is that the outbreak is compromising the capacity building efforts of the ACBF and other institutions.

There is room for hope, however, as some countries seem to have contained the disease. No new cases have been reported in Nigeria and Senegal, now declared Ebola free. The same applies to the Democratic Republic of Congo, a country first affected in 1976, and for the second time in 2014. Lessons can be learned from these cases of potential best practices: besides containing the disease, some countries have cured an encouraging proportion of individuals.

The year 2015 will mark the end of the worldwide commitment toward the MDGs and the start of a renewed pledge to international development through the post-2015 development agenda. However, for the countries affected by the Ebola virus, the post-

2015 development agenda will shift to the “post-Ebola reconstruction agenda,” which will call for focused reconstruction and capacity development. The ACBF stands ready to take a lead with other stakeholders, in order to assess the impact and capacity dimension of the crisis and to propose capacity building interventions for the short and medium term.

Evolution of approaches, actors and interventions

Approaches to capacity development (and the terminology to describe it or its predecessors) have been evolving since the 1950s (table 3.1). While in the early years they focused on transposing models copied from developed countries, the appeal during the current decade is more toward partnership, networking, results-based management, and long-term sustainability.

Table 3.1: Changes in style and substance since the 1950s

Decade	Terminology	Approaches
1950s–1960s	Institution building	Provision of public-sector institutions Design of functioning organizations Focus on individual organizations Models transplanted from the North Training in Northern universities
1960s–1970s	Institutional strengthening	Shift to strengthening from establishing Focus still on individual organizations Tools to improve performance Training in the North
1970s	Development management	Redesign of administrative systems Reaching neglected target groups Improved delivery systems and public programs to reach target groups
1980s	Institutional development	People-focused development Education, health, population—key sectors Sustainability Organization and management

Table 3.1: Changes in style and substance since the 1950s (continued)

Decade	Terminology	Approaches
1980s–1990s	New Institutionalism	Structural adjustment, policy reform, governance paradigm Capacity building broadened to sector level (government, private, NGOs) New focus on networks More attention to external environment and national economic behavior Shift from project to program focus
1990s	Capacity development	Concern with sustainability of capacity building Reassessment of technical cooperation Donor discussions on capacity building Coalescing of different ideas around capacity building
2000s	Capacity development/knowledge networks	Emergence of importance of local ownership Participatory approaches seen as key MDGs the key driver Increased participation in capacity building Spread of ICT-based knowledge networks Emphasis on ongoing learning and adaptation Systems approaches and emerging talk of complex systems Balancing results-based management and long-term sustainability More emphasis on needs assessment/analysis Increased donor coordination Concern with securing long-term donor investments

Source: Adapted from Lusthaus, Adrien, and Perstinger 1999; Farrell 2007.

Many actors with varying interventional focus are involved in Africa (table 3.2). The ACBF, for instance, strengthens human and institutional capacity in six core competences: economic policy and management; financial management and accountability; public administration and management; national parliaments and parliamentary institutions; national statistics and statistical institutions; and professionalization of the voices of the private sector and the civil society.

Among other actors, the World Bank covers virtually all countries while the IMF focuses on strengthening countries' public finances and macroeconomic capacity. The African Development Bank (AfDB) supports all development sectors in its member countries. Continent-wide institutions like the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and NEPAD also develop capacity, focusing on structural transformation and policy implementation.


Table 3.2 Actors and interventions in Africa

Institutions	Focus/Interventions
The African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support to capacity development institutions • Grants to national, regional and continental institutions • Technical assistance and advisory services • Production and dissemination of knowledge products • Partnerships networks
African Development Bank (AfDB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All development sectors • Support to capacity development institutions • Grants to national and regional institutions
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agriculture development and food security • Policies and strategies in rural development
International Labour Organization (ILO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migration, youth and employment • Enterprise development and microfinance • Vocational training and skills development • HIV/AIDS in the workplace
International Monetary Fund (IMF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public finance management • Macroeconomic capacity and balance-of-payments support • Staff training
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leadership and citizenship transformation • Developing capacity of capacity developers • Integrated planning and implementation for results
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy advisory services to national, subregional and regional institutions • Formulation of strategies, programs, and projects
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advocacy, policy advisory and implementation services • National human development goals
World Bank	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All development sectors • Support to capacity development institutions
World Trade Organization (WTO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training on WTO rules • Accession to WTO • Trade negotiations skills and trade regimes

Source: Adapted from AfDB 2010 and other sources.

The ACBF also provides support to training and research institutions as well as to regional organizations to promote economic growth, good governance, regional integration, and greater participation by Africa in the global economy (box 3.3).

Box 3.3 ACBF support to countries in 2013



3.3 Major areas of capacity and other needs for the RECs

The capacity needs of the surveyed RECs show some similarities:

- *Staff complement.* The organogram of each REC indicates the required number of personnel needed to execute its mandate. However, RECs expressed concern over lack of funds to recruit the staff needed, and over staff skills development and training.
- *Sources of funding.* Most of the member/partner states fall short of making the necessary contribution to RECs' operations, compelling development partners consistently to contribute 40–60 percent of the budget. UMA stands apart, as it is fully funded by member States.
- *Activities of RECs* are developed by the secretariat or commission and implemented by the member/partner states. The RECs indicated a need to strengthen links between the secretariats and member/partner states, and to boost the skills of those entities. Indeed, one deputy secretary general commented during discussions with the ACBF survey team: “If you strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat without strengthening that of the member States, then it is of no use.”
- *Conflict management.* Most of the RECs have been immersed in conflict resolution. UMA and ECCAS have practically suspended trade negotiations; SADC has been heavily involved in Madagascar; and ECOWAS has recently resolved a number of conflicts, assisted by bilateral partners in Mali. These pressing matters could not be planned for.
- *Knowledge sharing.* RECs are making efforts to share knowledge and experience. For example, EAC is collaborating with WAEMU on monetary integration and there have been high-level meetings and technical cooperation. UMA and ECOWAS are interacting on environmental issues. And SADC, EAC, and COMESA have technical teams on human resource management. These need to be strengthened.
- *The statistical* units of most RECs are understaffed. UMA does not even have one, and wants one urgently.
- *Research to inform* the integration process needs to be strengthened or established by the RECs. While ECOWAS has set one up (the Economic Policy Research Unit) with ACBF support, SADC recruited senior personnel to start the process. UMA and EAC do not currently have a research unit.
- *M&E* is important for consolidating gains made and guiding future plans and programs, as recognized by all RECs. M&E departments have developed elaborate user-friendly web-based monitoring systems especially for secretariat activities—though the “E” remains weak.
- *Innovative ideas* abound among RECs. The secretariats are thrusting with energetic and creative personnel. For example, there are efforts to set up a well-trained team of experts to peer-review data and information provided by member/partner states. RECs are at different stages of integration (table 3.3). As they move from one stage of integration to another, they need to strengthen staff capacity to adapt to that higher stage. EAC, for instance, is now moving to its third pillar, monetary union. Indeed EAC Heads of States and Government of partner states signed the Monetary Union Protocol on November 30, 2013. This calls for a paradigm shift in the

institution's organization and operation, and that of partner states. Consequently, there is great demand for additional resources (capital, human, etc.) at regional and partner-state levels.

Among the surveyed RECs, EAC has shown the best performance over the stages of regional integration. It has fully achieved a free trade agreement and customs union, made good progress on a

common market and monetary union, and is preparing for economic and political union. ECOWAS, too, has made relatively good progress, especially on its free trade agreement, customs union, and monetary union. RECs such as UMA and the ECCAS, though active on the ground, are only just preparing for a free trade agreement and have yet to start any of the other stages.

Table 3.3 Status of surveyed African RECs through the stages of regional integration as of 2014


	Free trade agreement	Customs union	Common market	Economic union	Monetary union	Political union
UMA	In preparation	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started
CEPGL	In preparation	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started
COMESA	Fully achieved	Good progress	In preparation	Not yet started	In preparation	Not yet started
EAC	Fully achieved	Fully achieved	Good progress	In preparation	Good progress	In preparation
ECCAS	In preparation	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started
ECOWAS	Fully achieved	Good progress	Not yet started	In preparation	Good progress	Not yet started
IOC	In preparation	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started
MRU	Good progress	Good progress	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started
SADC	Fully achieved	In preparation	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started	Not yet started

Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

3.4 Prioritizing REC interventions in capacity development

The nine surveyed RECs were requested to assess their capacity needs: Very Low; Low; Medium; High; Very High; No need for capacity. Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 present the priorities assessed as High or Very High by at least by 7 RECs.


Figure 3.2: Institutional capacity needs



Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

Fiscal policy and development of capacity building programs are top priorities for institutional capacity. Of the surveyed RECs, eight affirmed that fiscal policy and development of capacity building programs are essential. And seven stated that energy and statistics are areas where they need institutional capacity building (figure 3.2).


Figure 3.3: Organizational capacity needs



Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

On organizational capacity needs, 88 percent of the RECs stated that fiscal policy and financial market development are their first priorities. Development of capacity building programs, infrastructure, and free movement of people are the second set of priorities expressed by 75 percent of the RECs (figure 3.3).

Figure 3.4: Individual capacity needs



Source: Africa Capacity Indicators database 2014.

On the need for individual capacity building, trade is considered the most important area by 88 percent of the RECs. In addition, 75 percent affirmed that they need it in agriculture and food security, industry, and free movement of people (figure 3.4).

3.5 Conclusions—key messages and recommendations

Key messages

- The evolution of Africa's institutions for regional integration has been mainly ad hoc and reactive, with most having emerged in response to specific objectives, pressing needs, and donor pressure.
- There is no standard template or one-cap-fit-all approach for building the capacity of RECs.
- Most African RECs recognize the importance of capacity building, but face crippling capacity constraints in at least four areas—financial, human, institutional, and knowledge—all central to their effectiveness.
- Inadequacy of capacity for designing and implementing regional integration strategies and programs threatens continental and regional initiatives.


Recommendations

- Assessment of the capacity of RECs should be a continuing exercise conducted

at regular intervals and not a one-off event, to ensure that the RECs are working in concert with other stakeholders.

- Capacity building needs to become a major activity of the eight recognized RECs if they are to play meaningful role in Africa's development.
- RECs' secretariats and commissions need to be strengthened urgently. African RECs would benefit from funding and capacity building, especially in designing, operating, and monitoring regional programs and projects. Building strong institutions would help lay the basis for faster and better economic—and potentially monetary—integration.
- Regional integration and cooperation are knowledge intensive, requiring careful policy analysis and innovative ideas. For this reason, Africa's think tanks and universities, capable of focusing on issues in depth and over time, should be structured to conduct research and offer advice to RECs and institutional dealing with regional integration.





Intraregional trade, capacity, and frameworks as markers of regional integration in Africa, Europe, and Asia

4

Chapter



4

Intraregional trade, capacity, and frameworks as markers of regional integration in Africa, Europe, and Asia

This chapter surveys trade performance in three regions over the last decade and, to the degree possible, the impact that capacity and institutions (notably RECs) can have on that performance.⁸ It also looks at regional integration projects, closing with some tips for effective capacity building among RECs.

RECs' integration can be measured in several ways. One is to review the growth of intraregional trade (as it is a marker of integration projects, such as a free trade area, customs union, or new road links within the region). Another is to compare global RECs' human resource capacities. Finally, an overview of the RECs' institutional and legal frameworks—because they help set the design, implementation, and M&E of their operations—is useful (discussed in more detail in the annex).

(Other indicators include reduction of transport costs, telecommunications network development, type of institutions created and equipped to carry out integration activities, and performance of regional financial institutions in investment and trade financing. Still others include whether a unit of account has been developed and deployed for the payments systems among the integrating countries for clearing claims and liabilities, and whether and the extent to which there has been policy and regulatory reform and harmonization of the transport and telecommunications sectors in the REC, as well as in other key sectors. These aspects are not, however, examined in this chapter.)

4.1 Intraregional trade

Intraregional trade shows a marked difference between that in Europe and Asia and that in Africa (figure 4.1). For the most part the share of intraregional trade over 2000–2012 averaged 33 percent in Europe and 25 percent

in Asia against 13 percent in Africa. This stems partly from the differences between the EU and the African RECs in how the institutions of integration are structured to design and implement integration policies, as well as their capacity (discussed below).

⁸ It conducts its analysis through the prism of RECs: eight in Africa—UMA, COMESA, CEN-SAD, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC; five RECs in Europe—the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), European Economic Area (EEA), EU, Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), and Union for the Mediterranean (UfM); and five in Asia—ASEAN, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Figure 4.1: Intraregional exports and imports, 2000–2012



Source: Computation using UNCTADstat 2014.

The wave of globalization and the failure of multilateral trade negotiations have spawned many regional preferential trading arrangements around the world. From that stage the trend has been to deepen regional integration through common markets and economic unions—an uphill climb for many developing

countries. And only the EU has managed a single currency—the ultimate stage of economic integration—yet the future even of the euro is not necessarily assured. Box 4.1 looks at what may be holding back Africa and South Asia, and what East Asia “did right.”

Box 4.1: What's holding Africa back

Non-complementarities of production and export structures form a frequent obstacle. These structures are disproportionately focused on primary commodities (minerals, timber, coffee, cocoa, and other raw materials) for which demand is external. Most African countries lack the industrial capacity for diversified manufactured goods, inducing relatively few trade goods for supporting intraregional commerce. Such non-complementarities cannot be resolved quickly (UNECA 2010).

Shared borders, such as African countries have, do not necessarily facilitate trade, however: Armstrong, Drysdale, and Kalirajan (2008) found that intraregional trade in South Asia performed worse than South Asian trade overall, stemming not just from political barriers but also from a host of institutional barriers to intraregional trade.

East Asia stands in stark contrast: regionalized trade and production networks led to strong trade and output growth (they are underdeveloped in South Asia). East Asia has benefited greatly from being able to host international production bases for many manufacturing products and to develop the sophisticated production networks prevalent in the electronics and automobile industries.

This fairly new phenomenon is no accident or natural endowment. It stems from deliberate trade and investment policies, based on complementarities in production, cooperation, and spillovers that attracted international investors to exploit differences in comparative advantage within the region. Under the U.S. security umbrella, East Asian policymakers have made strong commitments to regional and global policies that promote trade, investment, and other cross-border links, as well as domestic reforms and deregulation.

Intraregional exports*Africa*


Intraregional exports have been growing in Africa, as the total value of intra-African exports surged from \$6.8 billion 2000 to \$48.5 billion in 2012 (table 4.1). COMESA had the largest share in 2000, followed by CEN-SAD; in 2003 and 2004, CEN-SAD took the largest share, with ECOWAS taking second-largest share from COMESA in 2009 (figure 4.2). EAC, UMA, and IGAD were the smallest contributors.

Table 4.1: Intraregional exports in Africa, 2000–2012

Year	CEN-SAD		COMESA		EAC		ECCAS		ECOWAS		IGAD		SADC		UMA		Total \$ billion
	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	
2000	1.5	22.4	1.7	26.4	0.3	5.0	0.2	2.8	1.0	14.4	0.4	6.4	1.1	16.0	0.4	6.5	6.6
2001	1.6	22.3	1.6	22.2	0.4	5.5	0.3	4.3	1.0	13.2	0.5	7.2	1.4	19.0	0.5	6.4	7.4
2002	2.0	22.3	2.0	23.0	0.5	6.0	0.3	3.7	1.1	12.5	0.6	7.0	1.7	19.1	0.6	6.5	8.8
2003	2.5	24.3	2.3	22.8	0.6	5.7	0.3	3.2	1.4	13.6	0.7	6.8	1.7	16.7	0.7	6.9	10.1
2004	3.4	24.5	3.1	22.3	0.7	4.9	0.6	4.6	2.2	15.7	0.8	5.7	2.1	15.6	0.9	6.7	13.7
2005	3.8	24.5	3.0	19.3	0.9	5.8	1.0	6.5	2.3	14.5	0.9	5.9	2.4	15.4	1.3	8.0	15.7
2006	5.3	26.7	3.8	18.9	1.0	5.2	1.1	5.7	3.6	17.8	1.0	5.0	2.7	13.5	1.4	7.1	20.0
2007	6.4	23.8	4.7	17.5	1.3	4.8	2.7	10.0	4.4	16.3	1.4	5.0	3.8	14.2	2.2	8.4	26.8
2008	7.8	23.4	5.6	16.8	2.0	5.8	4.0	12.0	5.1	15.2	1.9	5.7	4.5	13.5	2.6	7.6	33.4
2009	8.8	27.1	4.8	14.8	1.6	5.0	2.8	8.7	5.9	18.2	1.8	5.5	4.7	14.4	2.0	6.2	32.6
2010	11.0	26.9	5.9	14.4	2.1	5.0	4.1	10.1	7.5	18.3	2.1	5.1	5.5	13.5	2.6	6.5	40.8
2011	12.7	28.5	6.5	14.7	2.5	5.6	4.0	9.0	8.5	19.2	2.5	5.6	5.1	11.5	2.7	6.0	44.4
2012	13.8	28.5	6.9	14.1	2.9	6.0	4.0	8.2	9.7	20.0	2.8	5.7	5.0	10.3	3.5	7.2	48.5

Source: UNCTADstat 2014.

Note: Current prices and current exchange rates.

Figure 4.2 Intraregional exports in Africa, 2000–2012 (\$ billion)

Source: Computation using UNCTADstat 2014.

Asia


Dwarfing Africa, Asia saw a huge increase in trade values, surging from \$397.9 billion in 2000 to more than \$2 trillion in 2012 (table 4.2). The Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) consistently had the largest share, followed by ASEAN, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (figure 4.3).

Table 4.2: Intraregional exports in Asia, 2000–2012

Year	APTA		ASEAN		ECO		SAARC		Total
	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	
2000	201.8	50.7	153.2	38.5	24.3	6.1	18.6	4.7	397.9
2001	196.8	51.6	142.2	37.3	23.4	6.1	19.0	5.0	381.5
2002	228.7	53.1	151.4	35.2	27.5	6.4	22.9	5.3	430.5
2003	289.0	54.5	178.8	33.7	34.5	6.5	28.2	5.3	530.5
2004	375.5	55.7	217.7	32.3	44.3	6.6	36.7	5.5	674.3
2005	449.1	55.6	253.9	31.4	56.7	7.0	48.5	6.0	808.2
2006	547.5	56.0	299.1	30.6	72.3	7.4	59.2	6.1	978.1
2007	662.7	56.8	340.9	29.2	90.1	7.7	73.0	6.3	1,166.6
2008	766.5	55.5	397.4	28.8	126.1	9.1	91.9	6.7	1,381.9
2009	671.4	56.2	338.2	28.3	93.1	7.8	92.1	7.7	1,194.8
2010	860.1	55.4	450.8	29.0	124.0	8.0	119.0	7.7	1,553.9
2011	1,081.3	55.7	546.6	28.2	163.1	8.4	150.5	7.8	1,941.5
2012	1,194.9	58.1	540.9	26.3	168.7	8.2	150.9	7.3	2,055.3

Source: UNCTADstat 2014.

Note: Current prices and current exchange rates.

Figure 4.3 Intra-regional exports in Asia, 2000–2012 (\$ billion)

Source: Computation using UNCTADstat 2014.

Europe


Higher than Asia initially but slightly less at the end of the period (but far greater than Africa throughout), intra-regional exports in Europe also climbed sharply, from \$645.8 billion in 2000 to \$1,835 billion in 2012 (table 4.3). The euro area had the largest share, followed by EU-27 and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (figure 4.4).

Table 4.3: Intra-regional exports in Europe, 2000–2012

Year	EFTA		EU-27		Euro area		Total
	\$ billion	% of intra-regional exports	\$ billion	% of intra-regional exports	\$ billion	% of intra-regional exports	
2000	99.1	15.3	132.9	20.6	413.8	64.1	645.8
2001	100.6	14.8	144.8	21.3	433.0	63.8	678.4
2002	105.9	14.4	157.2	21.4	470.1	64.1	733.2
2003	122.7	14.0	192.1	21.9	562.1	64.1	876.9
2004	144.7	13.6	236.7	22.3	680.4	64.1	1,061.8
2005	169.0	14.4	270.6	23.0	735.3	62.6	1,174.9
2006	198.2	14.5	321.5	23.5	851.2	62.1	1,370.8
2007	225.8	13.6	398.1	24.0	1,032.2	62.3	1,656.0
2008	277.7	14.7	469.3	24.8	1,147.0	60.6	1,894.0
2009	201.6	14.6	337.1	24.5	839.3	60.9	1,378.0
2010	229.5	14.8	386.6	25.0	932.9	60.2	1,549.0
2011	274.4	14.6	484.8	25.8	1,118.7	59.6	1,877.9
2012	267.5	14.6	491.6	26.8	1,076.0	58.6	1,835.0

Source: UNCTADstat 2014.

Note: Current prices and current exchange rates.

Figure 4.4: Intra-regional exports in Europe, 2000–2012 (\$ billion)

Source: Computation using UNCTADstat 2014.

Intra-regional imports

Africa


Africa saw its intra-regional imports jump from \$10.5 billion in 2000 to \$53.6 billion in 2012, both higher than the corresponding figures for exports (table 4.4). As with exports, COMESA had the largest share of intra-regional imports in 2000—a position that, unlike with exports, it managed to keep (figure 4.5). CEN-SAD and ECCAS switched second place a couple of times, generally followed by SADC, while UMA, EAC, ECOWAS, and IGAD had the smallest shares.

Table 4.4: Intra-regional imports in Africa, 2000–2012

Year	CEN-SAD		COMESA		EAC		ECCAS		ECOWAS		IGAD		SADC		UMA		Total
	\$ billion	% of intra-regional exports	\$ billion	% of intra-regional exports	\$ billion	% of intra-regional exports	\$ billion	% of intra-regional exports	\$ billion	% of intra-regional exports	\$ billion	% of intra-regional exports	\$ billion	% of intra-regional exports	\$ billion	% of intra-regional exports	
2000	1.4	13.8	4.3	40.6	0.7	6.5	1.6	15.1	0.7	6.8	0.6	5.3	0.7	6.4	0.6	5.5	10.5
2001	1.8	15.6	4.3	38.3	0.7	6.3	1.5	13.1	0.9	8.1	0.6	5.3	0.9	7.7	0.6	5.7	11.2
2002	2.0	16.3	4.3	36.1	0.7	5.7	1.8	15.3	0.9	7.2	0.6	5.3	1.0	8.5	0.7	5.7	12.0
2003	2.4	15.9	5.4	35.9	0.9	6.0	2.5	16.7	1.0	6.8	0.8	5.1	1.2	7.8	0.9	5.8	15.1
2004	2.8	14.9	7.0	37.5	1.2	6.6	2.6	13.6	1.2	6.6	1.1	6.1	1.8	9.5	1.0	5.2	18.7
2005	4.0	17.4	7.6	33.5	1.4	6.1	3.3	14.4	1.8	8.0	1.5	6.4	2.0	8.9	1.2	5.2	22.7
2006	4.4	16.6	7.8	29.5	1.7	6.4	4.0	15.2	2.1	8.0	1.6	5.9	3.5	13.4	1.3	5.0	26.3
2007	6.0	18.4	9.3	28.5	1.9	5.7	5.3	16.3	2.7	8.4	2.0	6.0	3.5	10.8	1.9	5.9	32.6
2008	8.2	19.4	11.8	27.9	2.4	5.7	6.5	15.3	4.2	9.9	2.5	6.0	4.3	10.2	2.4	5.7	42.2
2009	6.5	16.3	10.5	26.2	2.3	5.7	8.0	20.0	3.1	7.7	2.8	7.0	4.4	10.8	2.5	6.3	40.2
2010	7.5	16.0	12.3	26.1	2.7	5.7	8.8	18.6	3.8	8.0	3.2	6.9	5.8	12.2	3.1	6.6	47.2
2011	8.3	17.2	12.7	26.2	3.2	6.7	8.8	18.1	3.8	7.7	3.5	7.1	5.3	10.8	3.0	6.1	48.4
2012	8.9	16.7	14.9	27.8	3.4	6.4	8.0	14.9	3.9	7.3	3.9	7.3	6.4	12.0	4.1	7.6	53.6

Source: UNCTADstat 2014.

Note: Current prices and current exchange rates.

Figure 4.5: Intraregional imports in Africa, 2000–2012 (\$ billion)

Source: Computation using UNCTADstat 2014.

Asia


Total intraregional imports soared from \$262 billion in 2000 to \$387.1 billion in 2012 (table 4.5). ECO had the least share initially but took top spot from SAARC in 2007, a position it kept (figure 4.6). APTA and ASEAN had generally similar, but smaller shares.

Table 4.5: Intraregional imports in Asia, 2000–2012

Year	ECO		APTA		ASEAN		SAARC		Total \$ billion
	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	
2000	22.6	8.6	80.5	30.7	67.7	25.8	91.2	34.8	262.0
2001	21.5	8.4	78.7	30.8	67.1	26.2	88.7	34.6	256.0
2002	25.6	9.9	76.7	29.7	67.1	26.0	88.7	34.4	258.2
2003	33.9	13.0	74.6	28.6	63.6	24.4	88.3	33.9	260.5
2004	47.2	17.2	72.2	26.4	64.6	23.6	90.0	32.9	274.0
2005	61.3	21.4	70.0	24.4	64.6	22.5	91.2	31.8	287.1
2006	75.3	25.0	69.6	23.1	64.4	21.3	92.5	30.7	301.8
2007	92.7	29.1	68.6	21.6	64.6	20.3	92.4	29.0	318.3
2008	119.9	34.3	69.9	20.0	65.8	18.8	93.9	26.9	349.5
2009	93.7	29.1	68.5	21.3	65.2	20.3	94.2	29.3	321.6
2010	126.4	35.5	69.5	19.5	66.0	18.6	94.0	26.4	355.9
2011	55.1	40.1	70.5	18.2	67.3	17.4	94.2	24.3	387.1
2012	153.7	39.7	70.5	18.2	68.2	17.6	94.7	24.5	387.1

Source: UNCTADstat 2014.

Note: Current prices and current exchange rates.

Figure 4.6: Intraregional imports in Asia, 2000–2012 (\$ billion)

Source: Computation using UNCTADstat 2014.

Europe


Imports were not that distant from exports over the whole period, climbing strongly from \$641.1 billion in 2000 to \$1,830.3 billion in 2012 (table 4.6). The euro area consistently had the largest share, followed by EU-27 and EFTA (figure 4.7).

Table 4.6: Intraregional imports in Europe, 2000–2012 (\$ billion)

Year	EFTA		EU-27		Euro area		Total \$ billion
	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	\$ billion	% of intraregional exports	
2000	90.2	14.1	167.1	26.1	383.8	59.9	641.1
2001	93.4	14.8	159.1	25.2	377.8	59.9	630.4
2002	97.3	14.7	166.8	25.2	398.4	60.1	662.4
2003	113.5	13.7	219.1	26.5	494.7	59.8	827.3
2004	132.9	13.3	277.5	27.8	589.3	59.0	999.7
2005	145.7	12.7	340.9	29.7	662.4	57.7	1,149.0
2006	162.7	12.1	412.7	30.6	774.4	57.4	1,349.7
2007	191.3	12.4	463.9	30.0	893.5	57.7	1,548.7
2008	212.5	11.6	584.6	32.0	1031.4	56.4	1,828.4
2009	171.5	12.6	410.5	30.2	778.7	57.2	1,360.6
2010	191.3	12.3	489.1	31.3	881.4	56.4	1,561.8
2011	225.4	11.9	613.7	32.3	1063.9	55.9	1,903.0
2012	209.2	11.4	620.9	33.9	1000.1	54.6	1,830.3

Source: UNCTADstat 2014.

Note: Current prices and current exchange rates.

Figure 4.7 Intra-regional imports in Europe, 2000–2012 (\$ billion)

Source: Computation using UNCTADstat 2014.

4.2 Human resource structure and capacity

There are no consistent publicly available data on the staff capacity of African and Asian RECs, while the EU provides some data about staffing on its website. Thus we rely on a handful of documents.⁹ (The annex to this chapter discusses institutional and legal frameworks in the three regions.)

EU

The EU is by far the most human-resourced of the three regions. The European Commission—its executive wing—is divided into departments known as Directorates General, which have a semblance and equivalence to government ministries. Each is mandated to work in a well-defined policy or service area such as trade, or peace and security. Each is headed by a Director-General who reports to a Commissioner. About 33,000 people divided between the Directorates General are

employed by the European Commission. Of these are 1,750 linguists and 600 staff interpreters and 850 support staff. About 6,000 people work in the general secretariat and in the political groups of the European Parliament, not counting Members of Parliament and their personal staff. About 3,500 people work in the general secretariat of the Council of the EU. The EU spends around 6 percent of its annual budget on staff, administration, and building maintenance.¹⁰

ASEAN

The ASEAN Secretariat, headed by a Secretary General, has 260 staff members, including 79 recruited openly from member countries. The staff is responsible for project management and implementation. Established in 1976—a decade after ASEAN—the Secretariat was designed as a coordinating office and information channel to loosely serve ASEAN and so was deprived of capacity to take control of ASEAN's activities and set agendas as a

⁹ Primarily the capacity report on RECs by the ACBF (2008).

¹⁰ See EU administration—staff, languages and location, accessed at http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/administration/index_en.htm on October 23, 2014.

supranational entity (unlike the European Commission).

After reforms in 1992, the Secretariat is now empowered to implement and monitor the ASEAN Free Trade Area. The transformation initiated the need for merit-based recruitment of international staffers rather than the continuing practice of deployment of staff appointed or seconded by member countries. The ASEAN Charter of 2008, which also strengthened the Secretariat's administrative mandate, raised the profile of the Secretary General to operate on behalf of ASEAN, including adequate financial support, personnel, and infrastructure. By 2012 this had translated into a budget of \$15.78 million for the Secretariat—which, certainly when set against the European Commission's, is tiny. Still, the Secretariat levers what it calls the “networked secretariat”—a vast pool of intellectuals and those with local wisdom in member countries, to bridge the capacity gap.

African RECs

In CEN-SAD the number of general service staff reached 70, including two elected members of the organs and 10 senior officials seconded by member States. The staff comprises 10 senior managers and 9 consultants; no regional experts, middle managers, or support staff are available. Personnel gaps therefore remain high relative to the optimal number of staff, estimated at 160, including 30 high-level officials.

Put succinctly, the CEN-SAD Secretariat suffers from too few highly skilled staffers, absence of research services, weak recourse to external experts and consultants, and lack of women at managerial level. Some male staff hold PhDs, but all staff members are proficient in at least one of the three working languages of the AU—Arabic, English, or French.

Sector-based engineers, administrators, lawyers, and economists are the most numerous personnel. All managers have proven experience in project management. Yet there is a sizable staff shortage, and the staff devotes more than 80 percent of its time to economic objectives.

UMA has 6 directors, 5 divisional heads, and 5 experts in charge of directorates of infrastructure; human resources; food security; political, information, cabinet affairs; economic affairs; and administrative and financial affairs.¹¹ These directorates are charged with developing programs and projects to advance the overall integration objectives of the Maghreb, and the success or failure of such designed initiatives substantially rests on these directorates and divisions and the expertise embedded in the staff. With only one expert per division, UMA lacks the expertise it needs to undertake a critical mass of policy design, implementation, and M&E to pick up the speed of regional integration.

COMESA has designed and implemented a wide range of programs using Secretariat staff and consultants. Similar to other RECs, it has weak human and institutional capacity. Critical gaps are in project planning and implementation, coordination, resource mobilization, and M&E. Required are additional staff, continuous professional training, skills upgrading, ICT equipment, and regular networking with other African RECs. Many of the administrative weaknesses of COMESA from its weak resource mobilization and use are reflected in persistence of member States' arrears, overdependence on donor support, and poor coordination of resources.

EAC has neither the staff to carry out its Secretariat functions nor the skills needed in other EAC institutions. For instance, accord-

¹¹ Diplomatic List, Arab Maghreb Union, accessed at http://www.maghrebarabe.org/en/list_dip.cfm

ing to ACBF (2008), the proposed total headcount of the EAC Court was 46, but seven judge posts and 22 general service staff posts were waiting to be filled. Nor did EAC seem to possess organizational systems promoting a learning culture that can help it institutionalize knowledge matters. Because of these weaknesses in capacity, integration in East Africa is insufficiently participatory among key stakeholders, particularly at the grassroots. Another shortcoming is EAC's lack of capacity to set up comprehensive management information and financial management systems. As with COMESA, member States' chronic arrears, overdependence on donor resources, and poorly harmonized donor-support systems are issues.

ACBF (2008) found that ECCAS had a staff complement of 36 employees: 17 professionals, 4 long-term consultants, and 15 support personnel. The professional staff are recruited through a competitive national quota system, and support staff on a competitive basis nationally. Although all professional staff had modern equipment to work with and were trained, they had little time to undertake research, upgrade their skills, or network with other RECs and other stakeholders due to the staff shortage. Hence policy design, implementation, and M&E are left to consultants. The staff shortage stems partly from assignments to defuse explosive security situations: 8 of the 17 professionals spent most of their time in conflict management, leaving little time for economic integration. Unsurprisingly, ECCAS lacked a comprehensive strategic plan, financial programming, and coherence in its annual regional plans.

The IGAD Secretariat, per ACBF (2008), had 44 staff: 1 Executive Secretary appointed by the Council, 22 professionals, 9 general service staff, and 12 local staff. Of the 22 professional staff, 20 possess masters or

higher degree qualifications. Unlike ECCAS, which does not have separate conflict-related staff, IGAD under its Conflict Early-Warning and Response Mechanism has 8 staffers, 5 professionals, and 3 local staff, though severe capacity constraints still need to be addressed, especially in programs and projects in the REC's three "pillars" and in the administration and finance division, such that each key section had only one professional staff dealing with many programs simultaneously. A training and human development policy was required, as were links between the library and other regional documentation centers.

The ECOWAS Secretariat faced capacity challenges such as no critical mass of staff (the minimum to run its programs or implement its growing mandate); no planned training programs to update staff skills; conditions of service not good enough to increase productivity and efficiency; underdeveloped ICT infrastructure and databases; and inadequate equipment and funding to run regional integration activities. It needed to establish a strong staff analysis and strategic planning mechanism as well as a multidisciplinary division to prepare proposals on regional infrastructure (ACBF 2008).

Finally, SADC has institutional and staff constraints: a mismatch among staffing, resources, and workloads in the technical functions; lack of investment in staff development; limited autonomy for the Secretariat to operate efficiently, as most decisions are tied to SADC's political structure; and lack of a coordination structure between the Secretariat and member country departments. SADC should focus on investing heavily in technical human resources, including recruitment and skills development in areas such as project planning development and management, M&E, and reporting.

4.3 Institutional and legal frameworks

The frameworks in the EU and Africa's RECs are here compared, as arguably it is the EU from which the RECs, with their ultimate goal of economic and fiscal harmonization, can draw inspiration, rather than ASEAN, at least in their longer-term vision.

The EU has a de facto constitution that defines how member States and institutions interrelate and how power is shared among supranational, national, and local parties. For example, the EU operates to ensure separation of powers among its institutions, and has a system of legislation and adjudication for EU bodies and citizens, including parliamentarians elected by citizens. This pattern makes the EU operate like a very large confederal country that has some capacity to enforce its will through national governments. But because the EU does not enjoy the power to coerce, administer, or tax, its member States tend to dominate the relationship between citizens and the EU, and substantial areas of governance are in the hands of those governments.

In contrast, although African RECs have treaties that let the countries dominate the relationship with the RECs, member States lack the minimum enforcement capacity that the EU has. For example, the European Commission's proposals must receive approval from the Council of Ministers, assented to by EU parliamentarians, after which they are reflected in national laws by national parliaments, and then implemented by national bureaucracies. Domestic and European courts are involved in adjudication. This (at times cumbersome) process not only creates awareness of the integration process but also ensures profound participation of all stakeholders, analogously to national policymaking.

The African RECs do not, however, have this supranational–national integration policy structure. The organs of integration are rarely formed and functional, or citizens are unaware of their relationship, including rights and obligations vis-à-vis the region.

The differences in countries' readiness to join particular initiatives in African RECs are associated with the way their decisions are reached. Most African RECs' treaties stipulate that decisions should be by consensus rather than by simple or qualified majority vote (which the EU generally follows). The latter mechanism enables wide political participation through national and local discussions, leading to national positions on issues. While this consensus method does not preclude discussions at various political levels, decisions are mostly anchored on procedures of national bureaucracies, which sometimes do not allow for optimal disclosure, often grounded in the natural secrecy of government decision making.

While EU supranational–national decision making is naturally longer and tedious, and so tends to be rigid and resistant to basic reform, the EU tolerates internal diversity and compromises (a “multispeed Europe”): some internal flexibility is permitted to countries ready to embark on initiatives such as the single currency or Schengen visa arrangements, while others can join later. This type of flexibility is also found in ECOWAS, where eight francophone countries ready to embark on a single currency adopted the CFA franc for trade internally and among themselves under WAEMU, which accounts for most of the recorded intra-ECOWAS trade.

A function of the huge discrepancy in funding between the EU and African RECs, the inadequacies of these RECs' human resource capacity are major factors in the low achieve-

ment of their integration projects, resulting in overly long deadlines, missed dates, costs overruns, and even missing objectives and ideas. The EU, it must be remembered, has about 30,000 staff, about two-fifths of whom are involved in policy design, implementation, and M&E. These three elements are discouraged in African RECs by their underdeveloped ICT infrastructure and databases, inadequate staff-needs analysis and strategic planning, staff mismatches and workloads, and limited autonomy of their secretariats.

These obstacles are partly attributable to poor financing systems among the RECs that lead to unpaid arrears among member States. Their financing (apart from COMESA and ECOWAS) comes largely from membership contributions, which may be curtailed after a national economic catastrophe. They are fashioned after the EU model where EU funds represent transfers from national governments rather than from direct or indirect taxes. This funding method limits fiscal expansion and undermines human resource development. A funding mechanism that combines national contributions with independent revenues, such as import levies, will go a long way to helping African RECs become financially independent.

Regional integration projects

EU

The EU's two main pillars of integration are economic (a free trade area, customs union, single market, euro area, fiscal union, aviation, energy, and standardization) and sociopolitical (education, research, health, charter of fundamental rights, right to vote, Schengen, common visa policy, and common foreign policy).

The free trade area was defined when the European Economic Community was created

in 1957, an institutional action that eliminated tariffs, quotas, and preferences on goods traded among the six original member States. (More detailed history of the EU, ASEAN, and African RECs is in the annex.) The EU customs union canceled customs duties on movement of goods within the EU in 1968. The single market project created by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 further entrenched the free movement of capital, goods, and services.

The Economic and Monetary Union of the EU—the euro area—was another milestone in economic integration. It defines interactions among the EU member States that adopted the euro as the national and international medium of exchange, on January 1, 1999, with 11 members, joined by other members later. As of 2014, 18 EU states and six non-EU members use the euro as their national currency. A fiscal union is the next project, but it appears to face challenges due to the recent European sovereign debt crisis as national governments remain skeptical of its technical feasibility and potential merits.

ASEAN

The ASEAN Declaration seeks to accelerate economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the region and to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region.

In a bid to accelerate regional economic growth, projects launched include:

- Roadmap for Financial and Monetary Integration of ASEAN in four areas: capital market development, capital account liberalization, liberalization of financial services, and currency cooperation

- Trans-ASEAN transport network of major interstate highways and railway networks, including the Singapore–Kunming Rail Link, principal ports, and sea lanes for maritime traffic, inland waterway transport, and major civil aviation links.
- Roadmap for Integration of the Air Travel Sector.
- Interoperability and interconnectivity of national telecommunications equipment and services, including the ASEAN Telecommunications Regulators Council Sectoral Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Conformity Assessment for Telecommunications Equipment.
- Trans-ASEAN energy networks—the ASEAN Power Grid and the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Projects.
- Initiative for ASEAN Integration focusing on infrastructure, human resource development, ICT, and regional economic integration, primarily in Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, and Viet Nam.

A key ASEAN strategy is to develop and enhance human resources for generating employment, alleviating poverty, narrowing socioeconomic disparities, and ensuring economic growth with equity. Current activities include the ASEAN Work Program for Social Welfare, Family, and Population; HIV/AIDS; Preparing ASEAN Youth for Sustainable Employment and Other Challenges of Globalization; and a University Network promoting collaboration among 17 member universities.

Leaders of ASEAN have agreed to establish an ASEAN Security Community to strengthen security in the REC, and to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world. The members of the Community pledge to rely exclusively on

peaceful processes in settling intraregional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision, and shared objectives. The components of this project are political development; shaping and sharing of norms; conflict prevention; conflict resolution; postconflict peace building; and implementing mechanisms.

In moving toward the ASEAN Economic Community—the goal of economic integration outlined in ASEAN Vision 2020—ASEAN has agreed to institute new measures to strengthen the implementation of its existing economic initiatives, including the ASEAN Free Trade Area, ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, and ASEAN Investment Area. It has also agreed to accelerate regional integration in air travel, agro-based products, automotive, e-commerce, electronics, fisheries, healthcare, rubber-based products, textiles and apparel, tourism, and wood-based products; facilitate movement of business persons, skilled labor and talent; and strengthen the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN, including the ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism to ensure expeditious and legally binding resolution of economic disputes.

Africa

Myriad regional integration projects established in the African RECs aim to ensure that each region achieves economic and sociopolitical cooperation arrangements on time. These projects cover such areas as trade in goods and services, free movement of persons, tourism, industry, investment promotion, agriculture and food security, and peace and security. Key programs have associated projects either planned or at different stages of implementation. An important aspect of economic integration

among all the RECs is to guarantee the free movement of capital, people, and goods and services, through a number of projects in the elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers, trade facilitation (e.g. one-stop border posts), competition and investment promotion policies, and infrastructure development in energy and transport. Some of these projects appear to be yielding positive results given increased intraregional trade (seen above), though only a start has been made, especially in the lagging RECs—UMA, CEN-SAD, IGAD, and ECCAS.

EAC is the most advanced, launching its common market in 2010. COMESA, SADC, and ECOWAS are mid-level performers: the first two launched customs unions in 2009 and 2013, and ECOWAS plans to launch its own on January 1, 2015. While common markets and customs unions address tariff reductions mainly, nontariff barriers face traders of African RECs, and many of them have thus subscribed to eliminating them. For example, ECOWAS has set up a complaints desk to monitor nontariff barriers, and COMESA-EAC-SADC has instituted an internet-based monitoring mechanism.

To facilitate trade, one-stop border posts (OSBPs) have been built by five RECs—COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, and SADC—to reduce delays due to border procedures by clearing traders' merchandise at only one point. OSBPs can be built on the border, on each territory or on the territory of one country. The Chirundu (Zambia–Zimbabwe) and Noepe–Elubo (Ghana–Côte d'Ivoire) OSBPs are built on each territory, while the Seme–Krake (Nigeria–Benin) OSBP is being built on the territory of the country (Benin). The European Development Fund (€44.5 million) to ECOWAS–WAEMU

assisted OSBPs to gather speed (UNECA, AUC and AfDB 2013).

Though detailed engineering designs were prepared for five OSBPs—Noepe (Ghana–Togo); Seme–Krake (Nigeria–Benin); Malanville (Benin–Niger); Paga (Ghana–Burkina Faso); and Kouramali (Mali–Guinea)—only the first three OSBPs received funding. ECOWAS–WAEMU is securing more funds for OSBPs, while the European Development Fund is financing OSBPs in East Africa (UNECA, AUC and AfDB 2013). Clearance based on simultaneous or single-window inspection requires modalities for cooperation and coordination, as well as for procedural harmonization, equipment standardization, and common operating methods, which are usually contained in bilateral agreements that provide the institutional and organizational entities for the clearance system. Hence, joint border operations committees, composed of the two countries' public agents and chaired by a customs agent, are responsible for day-to-day operations of OSBPs.

Progress on movement of people is mixed among RECs: UMA, EAC, and ECOWAS are doing quite well, CEN-SAD, COMESA, ECCAS, IGAD, and SADC less so. But all RECs suffer from poor road transport infrastructure, often related to numerous security road blocks (UNECA and AU 2013).

All of the RECs are, however, haunted by inadequate road transport infrastructure related to numerous security road blocks.¹² Excessive roadblocks or checkpoints create delays, facilitate opportunities for bribes, and increase the cost of goods to consumers. The ill-treatment of those transiting can lead to violence.

¹² UNECA/AU Document E/ECA/COE/32/3 and AU/CAMEF/EXP/3(VIII) of March 2013

Along three major corridors in West Africa, bribes are declining, but the number of checkpoints has remained almost constant (table 4.7). Delays have lessened along the

Tema–Ouagadougou Corridor but have worsened along the Lomé–Ouagadougou Corridor. Africa's main corridors are listed in table 4.8.

Table 4.7: Checkpoints, delays and bribes along three ECOWAS corridors

Corridor	Distance	Checkpoints (controls per 100 km)		Delays (minutes per 100 km)		Bribes per 100 km (CFA)	
		2007	2011	2007	2011	2007	2011
Bamako–Ouagadougou via Heremakono	934	2.6	2.6	25	21	7,184	5,365
Lomé–Ouagadougou	1,020	1.7	1.6	12	18	2,695	1,532
Tema–Ouagadougou	1,057	2.2	2.2	48	27	2,412	1,480

Source: USAID–WAEMU Reports on Road Governance.

Note: Nominal Exchange rate (CFA/USD, period average): 479 (in 2007) and 471 (in 2011)

Table 4.8: Main corridors in Africa

Corridor	Distance	Remarks
Dakar–Mali	1,250 km	Rail
Abidjan–Burkina Faso–Mali	1,200 km	Multimodal options to Ouagadougou, then road
Tema/Takoradi–Burkina Faso–Mali	1,100 km to Ouagadougou	Road
Lomé–Burkina Faso–Niger/Mali	2,000 km	Road
Cotonou–Niger–Burkina Mali	1,000 km up to Niger	Multimodal options
Lagos–Niger	1,500 km	Road
Port Harcourt–Chad		
Doualas–Central African Republic–Chad	1,800 km	Multimodal
Pointe Noire–Central African Republic–Chad	1,800 km	Rail/river
Lobito–DRC–Zambia	1,300 km	Not currently used
Luanda–DRC–Ruanda–Burundi		Not currently used
Walvis Bay–Zambia–DRC (Trans Caprivi)	2,100 km to Lusaka	Road
Walvis Bay–Botswana–South Africa (Trans Kalahari)	1,800 km	Road
Durban–Zimbabwe–Zambia–DRC (North–South Corridor)	2,500 km to DRC	Multimodal options
Maputo–South Africa	600 km	Multimodal options
Beira–Zimbabwe–Zambia (DRC)	1,500 km	Multimodal options
Naccala–Malawi–Zambia–DRC	1,800 km to Lusaka	Multimodal options
Mtwara–Malawi–Zambia–DRC		Not yet used for transit
Dar es Salaam–Zambia–DRC (TAZARA Corridor)	2,000 km to Lusaka	Multimodal options
Dar es Salaam–Rwanda–Burundi–Uganda–DRC (Central Corridor)	1,400 km to Kigali, 1,600 km to Kampala	Multimodal options
Tanga–Uganda	1,500 km	Not yet developed
Mombasa–Uganda–Rwanda–Burundi–DRC (Northern Corridor)	1,200 km to Kampala, 2,000 km to Bujumbura	Multimodal options
Berbera–Ethiopia	840 km	Road
Djibouti–Ethiopia	900 km	Multimodal options
Assab–Ethiopia	900 km	Not currently used
Massawa–Ethiopia		Not currently used
Port Sudan–Ethiopia		Not currently used
Lagos–Niger–Mali–Lagos–Chad as part of Central Corridor Light Rail Transit	8,000 km	Multimodal options

Source: UNECA 2010.

Road transport infrastructure is inextricably linked to corridors and transport corridor infrastructure because of their roles in resolving logistical problems between countries, especially when landlocked. Africa has an estimated 16 landlocked countries with a population of over 200 million, facing distances to ports of 1,000–1,500 km.

African RECs have launched initiatives to resolve physical and non-physical barriers along the continent's corridors by creating permanent secretariats to deal with port

congestion. Other initiatives include the Dar es Salaam (TAZARA) and Beira corridors designed to free Zambia and Zimbabwe from dependence on South African ports and corridors. The priority infrastructure projects for 2012–2017 are estimated at \$50 billion (UNECA 2010).

A raft of transport infrastructure projects to ease cross-border flows in the RECs are at various stages, from concept through (near) completion (table 4.9).

Table 4.9: Selected cross-border road, rail, and air transport infrastructure projects

REC	Project
UMA	
Libya	Development of railway infrastructure, particularly linking to Egypt and to Tunisia Development of sea ports capacity and capabilities Development of railways network capacity and modernization
Tunisia	Enfidha Deep Sea Port (PPP concession) Remaining links of the Highway linking Libya to Algeria through Tunis Development of missing rail links toward Libyan border
Morocco	Upgrading of logistics zones infrastructure through PPP concessions Development and upgrading of railway links capacities Development of sea ports capacities Development of the air transport facilities
Mauritania	Development of missing road links with Algeria, Mali, and Senegal Development of air transport facilities Development of Nouakchott sea port capacity
ECOWAS	Rehabilitation projects of road sections in Benin, Ghana, and Togo Multinational highway and transport facilitation program between Cameroon and Nigeria (Bamenda–Enugu road corridor) Lagos–Abidjan road corridor, and the building of three bridges in Sierra Leone at Moa, Sewa, and Waanje
IGAD	Nairobi–Addis Ababa corridor (Isiolo–Moyale–Addis Ababa road) where sections are being constructed or rehabilitated Kampala–Juba corridor: Nimule–Juba sector under construction in South Sudan; Gulu–Nimule (Uganda) under procurement Berbera corridor (Somaliland–Ethiopia): feasibility study and detailed engineering design services under procurement Djibouti–Addis Ababa corridor: remaining section of Arta–Guelile road section in Djibouti under procurement

REC	Project
EAC	<p>Feasibility studies and detailed design of the Arusha–Holili–Taveta road and the Malindi–Lunga Lunga and Tanga–Bagamoyo roads</p> <p>Scoping study on civil engineering contracting capacity in East Africa</p> <p>Audit of consulting services for the Arusha–Namanga–Athi River road development project</p> <p>Study on the East African Transport Strategy, the Regional Road Sector Development Programme, and the East African Transport Facilitation Project</p> <p>Development of standard-gauge rail networks to replace the existing narrow-gauge networks in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the five EAC countries</p>
ECCAS	<p>The ECCAS Blueprint on transport in Central Africa in priority areas. Projects include:</p> <p>Implementation of the Fougamou–Doussala–Dolisie (Gabon–Congo) highway project</p> <p>Development of the Ouesso–Sangmelima road project</p> <p>Transport facilitation project on the Brazzaville–Yaoundé road corridor</p> <p>Extension of the Leketi–Franceville railway between Congo and Gabon</p>
COMESA	<p>Setting up road funds, using fuel levy, and involving road development agencies to maintain regional and national road networks in member States</p> <p>Constructing and rehabilitating roads using government budget allocations, borrowing from development banks, and getting funding from partners</p>

Source: UNECA and AU 2013.

On air transport, Africa needs to pay particular attention to projects for several reasons (AfDB 2012).

One, air transport plays a vital role in the continent's growth through accelerating conveyance of goods and persons as the contribution of air transport exceeds that of road transport sevenfold. Two, growth in air transport feeds into economic growth via spillover effects by creating direct and indirect jobs in the industry and other auxiliary sectors such as tourism and other services. In 2010, the aviation industry in Africa supported about 7 million jobs (including 257,000 direct jobs)

through the impact on travel and tourism; this translated into \$67.8 billion of GDP. In 2012, the industry generated \$428 billion in Africa and provided an additional 12, 894 jobs (Gittens 2012). Three, the expansion in air transport creates market opportunities for local entrepreneurs by creating regional and global economic centers.

Yet despite robust growth, air services face challenges of poor safety, lack of resources and infrastructure, long distances, limited connectivity, lack of regulation and government action, stiff competition, and high operating costs (box 4.2).

Box 4.2: Air transport projects

Africa's air transport environment is split: aviation markets in Africa are largely closed and controlled because markets operate under restrictive bilateral air services agreements, but aviation markets with countries outside Africa are liberalized. Intra-African aviation thus remains underdeveloped, stifling the opportunities that aviation could offer as an engine of growth and development.

The Yamoussoukro Decision of 1999—signed by 44 countries and coming into force on August 12, 2000—sought to deregulate air services and to promote opening of regional air markets to transnational competition (IATA 2014). The objective of the Decision is defined under Article 2, Scope of Application, as the gradual liberalization of scheduled and nonscheduled intra-African air transport services whose chief elements are the granting, to all state parties to the decision, the free exercise of first, second, third, fourth, and fifth freedom rights on both scheduled and nonscheduled passenger and freight (cargo and mail) air services performed by an eligible airline (Schlumberger 2010).

Since the Decision came into force, ECOWAS has focused on implementation through setting up a common legal framework for air transport in ECOWAS member States. Projects in the Cooperative Development of Operational Safety and Continuing Airworthiness Programme, run by the International Civil Aviation Organization, have been the preoccupation of ECCAS member countries.

4.4 Lessons for African RECs**Capacity building**

Based on the differences in the RECs' capacities, the following imperatives for capacity building in African RECs stand out.

Take a long-term perspective. Capacity development is a long-term process. It can be promoted through a combination of shorter-term results driven from the outside and more sustainable, longer-term ones driven from the inside. It requires sticking with the process even under difficult circumstances.

Adopt an integrated and holistic approach to capacity building. All dimensions of capacity need attention—the individual, the institution, and the overall policy framework. Inadequate emphasis at system level may diminish the impact of efforts at institutional and individual levels. A proper balance, therefore, needs to be established between all three, closely interlinked, levels. This is also an admonition not to undertake one-time, ad hoc activities.

Integrate capacity building in wider efforts to achieve sustainable development. Capacity is very fluid and has multiple utility. Any strategy to address capacity building must

therefore recognize that developing capacities for regional integration is closely related to and must be integrated with initiatives to enhance capacities for broader sustainable development and structural transformation of Africa in general.

Capacity building must be demand driven. Design of interventions to nurture capacity must be results oriented and focus on “capacity for what and whom.” The underlying principle should be clear on who will benefit from the capacity building, and the design of the activities must reflect the needs of the beneficiaries. Donor practices can, at best, facilitate and, at worst, hamper the emergence of national capacity.

Assure adequate resources (both administrative and financial). There must be enough resources (human and material) for all capacity building, which ideally should be incorporated in the budget. It is also essential to monitor expenditure against budget. Many capacity building initiatives have stalled or failed to meet their objectives due to lack of resources.

Emphasize skill retention and use, not simply acquisition. African countries face serious impediments to long-term capacity building

with growing emigration of scarce skilled nationals. Long-term efforts must consider incentive structures for skill retention and their impact; otherwise, further efforts may have little or no sustainable impact.

Accommodate the dynamic nature of capacity development. Capacity building is a dynamic process with many facets: *mobilization* of existing potential may not be used because it does not reside in the institution that is charged with the respective responsibility, or individual expertise may not be used because of organizational deficiencies; *enhancement* of capacity to avoid obsolescence through continuous use and short-term courses, workshops, seminars, and other training services; *conversion* or *adjustment* of existing capacity to deal with new problems; *creation* of capacity through formal training programs; and *succession* or *improvement* of capacities by subsequent generations.

Monitor and evaluate capacity development efforts. Given that capacity building is not static but a dynamic and iterative process (as opposed to linear), M&E with appropriate benchmarks and indicators are essential for learning-by-doing and adaptive management. Players should revisit operational principles, strategic elements, tools, and methodologies from time to time.

Adopt a learning-by-doing approach. Capacity development efforts should be supported by a variety of tools and methodologies. These could range from the more traditional (workshops, in-service technical training) to those offering greater scope methodologically and institutionally (networking, horizontal exchanges and cooperation, creation of multi-stakeholder project steering committees, sharing of project management responsibilities, internships, South–South cooperation, issue-based scientific networks).

Focus on institution building. There are two main problems with focusing on individuals or

training. First, individuals move on and so normal career progression can dilute impact. Second, individual knowledge, skills, and attitudes, while obviously important, may not result in permanent change if there are systematic bottlenecks at organizational level. Hence, good capacity building practice typically includes multiple activities that complement and reinforce each other with opportunities to address problems as they arise.

Ensure coordination. Successful capacity building depends on good coordination with the flexibility to fine-tune plans and priorities as conditions change.

Institutional

How the EU institutions of integration are arranged for designing and implementing EU integration process provides lessons for emerging RECs such as those in Africa to shape up for optimal integration.

The EU's institutions are structured to involve supranational, national, and local governance organizations that are required to participate in the EU integration process and each of these institutions has an enforcement function to perform that renders the EU countries to behave as a confederation: national interests are often subordinated to the “confederal” interest—a willingness that is often absent in African RECs, perhaps due to the enduring fear of domination of one country in a REC and frequent instability in some of them.

This last point constitutes a real threat to any agglomerating initiative in Africa—orderly coexistence is a prerequisite. Further, a better structured institutional setup that allows for citizens' maximum participation and propagation of awareness of the gains of regional groupings will contribute to more thriving RECs. The organs of integration should therefore be well formed, well prepared, and functional for integration objectives, while citizens' education on these

initiatives should start early to ensure maximum cooperation and buy-in, to make them aware of economic gains, as well as other rights—and obligations.

According to UNECA (2006), while African countries must take a cue from the EU on how institutions shape integration outcomes, they should allow for institutional design experimentation that admits the special sociopolitical and economic circumstances in African subregions and so prepare for some institutional failures, while learning from those which succeed—an experience, too, of EU integration.

Legal

The EU's legal framework seems to provide the best lessons for the African RECs, for several reasons. First, it makes political actions relevant to citizens locally. Second, national governments are willing to “domesticate” EU laws passed by the EU primarily because national legislatures are involved in passing EU laws (enabling these laws to be easily implemented by national bureaucracy).¹³ Third, national and European courts participate in adjudication if EU laws are subject to dispute. Finally, decisions in the EU are reached by simple or qualified majority vote, which ensures political engineering and discussions among participating countries, allowing for some transparency through to citizens.

4.5 Conclusions—key messages and recommendations

Key messages

- Progress in regional integration is uneven across subregions. UMA, CEN-SAD, IGAD, and ECCAS are the lagging

performers on integration, EAC the most advanced. COMESA, SADC, and ECOWAS are mid-level performers. Trade facilitation efforts focus on OSBPS by COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS and SADC. All of the RECs are however haunted by inadequate road transport infrastructure related to numerous security road blocks.

- Progress of regionalism as measured by intraregional trade varies hugely among global regions. The share of intraregional trade in Europe and Asia over 2000–2012 averaged 33 percent and 25 percent against Africa's 13 percent, differences largely explained by how the institutions of integration are structured to design and implement integration policies.
- Africa appears a global outlier on all dimensions of regional institution building. Inadequacies of human resource capacity among African RECs are fundamental reasons for low integration.
- There is no single model of regional development that Africa must emulate.

Recommendations

- Capacity building offers many best global practices (just discussed under *Lessons for African RECs*), and they are increasing. Member States and RECs need to have a platform to share and emulate them.
- African RECs need to intensify action on all fronts in building capacity. Initiatives should be aligned with member countries' priorities and needs, requiring internal, country-led processes.

¹³ UNECA (2006) also documented the stalling of EU integration by British reluctance, repeated Danish rejections of European treaties, Irish rejection of the crucial Treaty of Nice, and less enthusiasm of European citizens than their leaders about further coordination and uniformities of policy as examples of growing reluctance toward embracing the EU.





Summary and recommendations

5

Chapter



5

Summary and recommendations

Regional integration has played a key role in Africa's post-colonial history. Since the 1960s, the Continent has sought to build continent-wide institutions for boosting integration, alongside a panoply of subregional experiments in economic integration as a means of overcoming political fragmentation, promoting development, and increasing Africa's global competitiveness.

The Abuja Treaty establishing the AEC in 1994 laid the foundation and established the framework for Africa's integration, with RECs as the building blocks. These eight RECs are moving toward implementing the Abuja Treaty at different speeds. Four RECs are making tangible progress at regional integration and four are falling behind. EAC appears to have made the most progress.

As RECs are a potent force for Africa's development but that they must boost their capacity, this year's Report—comparing African RECs with frontier RECs in Europe and Asia—indicates that African RECs are falling behind their development goals, raising doubts about their approaches to encouraging regional trade and regional integration. Worse, as most regional integration agreements have done little to promote intraregional trade, questions about the relevance of their linear integration models (goods integration initially, fiscal integration ultimately) also arise.

The obstacles facing Africa call for a more inclusive approach to economic integration, ameliorating the supply-side constraints so far inhibiting efficient production. What is therefore needed is a deep regional integration agenda that can confront behind-the-border issues and open markets in services.

Greater trade is crucial, but not easy to stimulate, as the huge difference between intraregional trade in Europe and Asia versus that in Africa partly arises from how the institutions of integration are structured. RECs lack, for example, the enforcement capacity that the EU has, which is exacerbated by consensus decisions rather than simple or qualified majority voting. The EU's supranational–local decision making—though more tedious—at least has the virtue of tolerating internal diversity and compromises, rather than forcing the common, across-the-board solutions seen in many African RECs.

But a major constraint on African RECs is the paucity of human capital, caused by and manifest in a host of issues: acute numerical and skills paucity; lack of regular on-the-job training; inadequate staff incentives; underdeveloped ICT; too little staff-needs analysis and strategic planning; staff mismatches and workloads; and limited Secretariat autonomy.

And so Africa's RECs need to strengthen their capacities to exploit the new opportunities offered by the post-2015 development agenda, by EPAs, and by Agenda 2063.

It is therefore recommended that:

- Integration institutions in African RECs be restructured to allow for maximum local to national political participation in activities of the RECs.
- A funding mechanism combine national contributions with independent revenues (such as import levies adopted by COMESA and ECOWAS).
- Greater funding addresses the chronic staff shortages in the RECs. Continuous training should be adopted to upgrade skills, and adequate ICT infrastructure and equipment should be provided.
- Regular networking be held with other African RECs.
- Member States and RECs build a platform to share and emulate global best practices.
- Capacity building initiatives be aligned with member States' priorities, needs, and conditions. This will require internal country-led processes, connected capacity building measures, and strengthened staff incentives.
- Traditional tools be transformed, such as technical assistance and training, to support the broadened capacity building.
- M&E be systematically adopted, including appropriate mechanisms.
- Considerable data collection, analysis, networking, planning, and other resource-intensive activities be funded.
- Staff exchanges among African RECs be encouraged to facilitate experience sharing and eventual standardization of processes and procedures.
- The secretariats or commissions of African RECs be restructured and empowered to take binding decisions on behalf of members states in order to speed up implementation of regional integration projects, programs, and policies.
- Like their ASEAN counterparts, the Authorities of Heads of State and Government of African RECs be committed to domesticating and implementing regional integration treaties and initiatives. Strong political will at the highest level is a necessity.
- African countries invest heavily in institutional capacity in order to negotiate EPAs with the EU, so as to fully benefit from free trade opportunities.

Capacity building is a complex, long-term process, requiring RECs' close involvement with their member States to ensure that macroeconomic changes are on track. Africa needs to unleash a fundamental change in capacity building of RECs, one that looks to the long term, and that is locally owned, demand driven, and context specific.

Annex to Chapter 4. Institutional and legal frameworks

This annex looks at the institutional and legal frameworks of regional economic communities (RECs) in Europe and Asia that are integrating well—the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—and the same frameworks in Africa's RECs.

Institutional framework—EU

The EU started as the European Economic Community in 1957 as an international organization created by the Treaty of Rome that year. It aimed to bring about economic integration, including a common market, among its members, which have grown from the original six to 28 by 2014. The European Economic Community was renamed the European Community in 1993 and the EU in 2009 to reflect the wider coverage of different policies and the merging of other associations such as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The initial group of six countries was first enlarged in 1973 to nine and in 1980 to 12.

The EU has a unique supranational configuration with stakeholders at every level from local and national to supranational—the European Commission. This configuration combines both sovereignty and intergovernmentalism, an economic and political construction that binds the 28 EU members in a cooperative arrangement to decide on matters of common interest. Thus the configuration results in a complex structure that requires enormous capacities for policy design, implementation, and evaluation as well as financing. Some of these capacities are embedded in the five main institutions—the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Council, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament. The European Court of Auditors, the Economic and Social Com-

mittees, and the Committee of Regions are three other key institutions.

European institutions charged with decision making at the EU level hold executive and legislative (and judicial) powers: the European Parliament, which represents the EU's citizens who directly elect its members; the European Council, which consists of the Heads of State or Government of the EU member States; the Council of the European Union, which represents the governments of the EU member States; and the European Commission, which represents the interests of the EU as a whole.

The European Council charts the general policy thrusts of the EU, which the European Commission proposes as new laws that the European Parliament, which exercises legislative functions, acts on. Both the European Parliament and European Council adopt these laws while the member States and the European Commission implement them. The European Commission also ensures that legislation is implemented by dealing with the day-to-day running of the EU, including ensuring compliance with legislation among members, through litigation at the European Court of Justice if necessary. Parliament expanded its legislative powers and the security of the European Commission after the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The European Court of Justice is the highest authority for EU law, while the associations such as auditors have an investigative function.

The most important institution of the EU in the economic space is the European Central Bank, which maintains monetary stability in the euro area. It works independently of national governments and other EU institutions. It aims to ensure low and stable consumer price inflation, to sustain economic growth.

Institutional framework—ASEAN

ASEAN was formed on August 8, 1967, by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand and has since been joined by Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, and Viet Nam. ASEAN aims to accelerate economic growth, social progress, and sociocultural evolution, protect regional peace and stability, and create opportunities for member States to discuss differences peacefully.

The ASEAN charter signed in 2007 and entering into force on December 15, 2008, turned ASEAN into a legal entity to create a single free trade area encompassing 500 million people and to move closer to “an EU-style community in an era of climate change and economic upheaval, and seemingly uniting Southeast Asia.”¹⁴

The ASEAN charter serves as the foundation to build the ASEAN Community, provides the legal status and institutional framework for ASEAN, sets objectives for ASEAN, and enshrines accountability and compliance. The charter has 14 fundamental principles woven around respect for sovereignty and equality of all ASEAN member States; shared commitment and collective responsibility in enhancing regional peace, security, and prosperity;

democracy and constitutional government; promotion and protection of human rights; social justice; and adherence to multilateral trade rules and ASEAN's rules-based regimes for implementing economic commitments and eliminating all barriers to regional economic integration, within a market-driven economic framework.

After the ASEAN charter came into force, organs were set up to boost progress toward the ASEAN Community: the ASEAN Summit, ASEAN Coordinating Council, ASEAN Community Councils, ASEAN Political-Security Community Council, ASEAN Economic Council, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Council. The charter also established institutions such as the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights, and the ASEAN national secretariats.

The ASEAN Summit is the highest policymaking body, meeting twice a year, under which are the ASEAN Coordinating Council made up of foreign ministers called the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and the other three councils just listed. The ASEAN Secretariat led by the Secretary-General and four deputy secretaries-general is the fulcrum for all ASEAN activities, such as facilitating and monitoring compliance with member countries' commitments and agreements.

¹⁴ Former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia.

ASEAN's structure and mandate suggest that it maintains its status as an intergovernmental institution to emphasize cooperation as a modality for collaboration among members. Cooperation is largely determined by the political will of member States rather than through enforcement by a supranational body (like the European Commission). The lack of a compliance system suggests that ASEAN's agreements and commitments remain highly informal, and so it seems highly unlikely that the current institutional and legal framework will hasten ASEAN's integration objectives because they depend on member States preoccupied with domestic priorities over regional commitments (rather than the Secretariat, to which the charter granted little or no power and a miniscule budget). Thus the ASEAN goal of regional integration may be only slowly realized, if at all.

Institutional framework—Africa

UMA

The Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)—also officially known as the Union du Maghreb Arabe—was established on February 17, 1989, by a treaty in Marrakech by Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia to foster cooperation and economic and future political unity among the countries. UMA has a Presidential Council comprising Heads of member States as the supreme organ of the Union with its rotating presidency lasting for one year. It is the only decision-making organ, with decisions made unanimously, and holds ordinary sessions once a year (and extraordinary sessions when necessary).

UMA also has a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and specialized Ministerial Commissions established by the Presidential Council. Preparation for the sessions of the Presidential Council is done by the Ministerial Council, which also evaluates issues emanat-

ing from the Follow-Up Committee and the specialized Ministerial Commissions. A General Popular Committee whose members are designated by every member State is in charge of UMA affairs and is responsible for following up UMA affairs and for submitting outcomes to the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The Presidential Council also established the Permanent General Secretariat and determines its mandate and composition, as well as with the Secretary General.

UMA also created a Consultative Council of 30 representatives from each country chosen by the legislative organs of the member States. This body, which devises its internal regulation, and expresses its opinion and recommendation on any draft decision submitted to it by the Presidential Council, holds an ordinary session every year and an extraordinary session at the request of the Presidential Council.

Another important body of UMA is the Judicial Authority, with two judges from each member State and designated for six years renewable every three years. The main mandate of the Authority is to pronounce judgments, which are enforceable and final, on conflicts regarding interpretation and application of UMA treaties and agreements. The Presidential Council approves the statute of the Judicial Authority.

CEN-SAD

The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), established in February 1998 by six countries and with current membership of 25, aims to achieve economic unity through the implementation of a free trade area for people and goods. CEN-SAD's institutional structure comprises the Conference of Heads of State, made up of the Leader and Heads of State of the Community; the Executive Council, made up of Ministers or Secretaries

of General People's Committees responsible for special departments; specialized ministerial committees set up by the Executive Council, made up of Secretaries and Ministers of sectors; the Sahel-Saharan Bank for Investment and Trade; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and the General Secretariat whose responsibility is to supervise the activities and monitor achievements of CEN-SAD.

The Conference constitutes the supreme authority over all the various institutions while the Executive Council is in charge of departments of external relations and cooperation; economy, finance, and planning; and interior and public security. The Sahel-Saharan Bank exercises all banking, financial, and commercial functions including financing of economic development projects and external trade. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council helps the organs of CEN-SAD design and prepare development policies, plans, and programs of an economic, social, and cultural nature.

COMESA

The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is a free trade area with 19 member States formed in December 1994 to replace the preferential trade area. The Authority of the Heads of States or Government is the institution's supreme policymaking organ. The Authority, headed by a Chairman, is in charge of the general policy direction and controls the overall performance of COMESA's executive functions. Its annual summits chaired by host governments rotate among member States, and are organized jointly by host government and the COMESA Secretariat. The decisions and directives of the Authority on matters within its jurisdiction are by consensus and remain binding on all subordinate institutions and on member States, other than the Court of Justice. Along with the

Authority are three other organs that make decisions jointly for COMESA: the Council of Ministers; the Court of Justice; and the Committee of Governors of Central Banks. Other bodies such as the intergovernmental committee, the technical committees, the Secretariat, and the consultative committee only make recommendations to the Council of Ministers, which in turn makes recommendations to the Authority.

The COMESA Council of Ministers (the Council), the second-highest policy organ of COMESA, is charged with responsibility for ensuring proper functioning of COMESA in accord with the provisions of the COMESA Treaty. It makes policy decisions by consensus on COMESA programs and activities, and includes monitoring and reviewing its financial and administrative management.

The judicial arm of the COMESA is the Court of Justice whose jurisdiction covers all matters referred to it pursuant to the COMESA Treaty and whose decisions are binding and final. (For more detail see the COMESA subsection in Legal framework—Africa, below in this annex.) Specifically, appropriately and accurately interpreting and applying the provisions of the Treaty, and adjudicating any disputes among the member States regarding interpretation and application of the provisions of the Treaty, are its main mandates. The Court's decisions on these mandates have precedence over those of national courts, and it is independent of the Authority and the Council when acting within its jurisdiction. A President heads the Court, which comprises six additional judges appointed by the Authority.

The Committee of Governors of Central Banks is empowered under the Treaty to decide the credit limits and maximum debt to the COMESA Clearing House, and to determine

the daily interest rate for outstanding debt balances and the Staff Rules for Clearing House staff. It also monitors and ensures the proper implementation of the Monetary and Financial Cooperation programs.

The other COMESA institutions are the Intergovernmental Committee, the Technical Committees, the Consultative Committee, and the Secretariat. The Intergovernmental Committee is a multidisciplinary body of permanent secretaries from the member States in the fields of trade and customs, agriculture, industry, transport and communications, administrative and budgetary matters, and legal affairs. It develops programs and action plans in all the sectors of cooperation, except in the finance and monetary sector, monitors and reviews the functioning and development of COMESA, and oversees implementation of Treaty provisions. There are 12 Technical Committees, in such areas as administrative and budgetary matters; agriculture; comprehensive information systems; energy; finance and monetary affairs; and trade and customs. They prepare comprehensive implementation programs and monitor them to make recommendations to the Council. The Consultative Committee of the Business Community and Other Interest Groups facilitates dialogue between these groups and other organs of COMESA.

The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary General appointed by the Authority for a renewable term of five years. The Secretariat provides technical support and advisory services to the member States on how to implement the Treaty. It undertakes research as a basis for implementing the decisions of COMESA organs in activities such as agriculture; transport and communications; industry and energy; trade and customs; monetary cooperation; and administration.

COMESA has a number of other institutions to promote development, including the PTA Bank (Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank) in Nairobi, Kenya; the COMESA Clearing House in Harare, Zimbabwe; the COMESA Association of Commercial Banks in Harare; the COMESA Leather Institute in Ethiopia; the COMESA Re-Insurance Company (ZEP-RE) in Nairobi, Kenya; the Regional Investment Agency in Cairo, Egypt; and the COMTEL Project, aimed at upgrading regional telecommunications infrastructure.

EAC

The East African Community (EAC)—Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda—was revived in 2000 after its initial collapse in 1977, 10 years after it was first established. It aimed to become a common market for capital, goods, and labor, with an ultimate goal of establishing a common currency within 10 years in accord with a 2013 protocol signed to lay out the Community's plan. On the institutional framework, the EAC comprises the Summit, Council of Ministers, Coordination Committee, Sectoral Committees, East African Court of Justice, East African Legislative Assembly, and the Secretariat.

The Summit consists of the Heads of State or Government of the member States. Its annual meetings, and the office of the Chairperson that is held for one year, are rotated among member States and its decisions are made by consensus. The Summit discusses issues submitted to it by the Council and any other matter affecting the Community but determines its own procedures to perform its functions that include providing general directions and motivation for achieving EAC objectives; considering annual progress reports and other reports submitted to it by the

Council; and reviewing the status in EAC with respect to peace, security, good governance, and progress toward achieving the objective of becoming a Political Federation. The Summit may delegate certain functions to the Council or the Secretary General, and it causes all its rules and orders to be published in the Gazette.

The Council comprises the Ministers/Cabinet Secretary responsible for regional cooperation of each member State and such other people in that category that the member State may determine. Apart from extraordinary meetings held when necessary, the Council regularly meets twice a year, one of which must immediately precede a meeting of the Summit. It determines its own procedures for carrying out its functions and takes decisions by consensus, without which the matter is referred to the Summit for decision. Council decisions are binding on partner States, on all Community organs and institutions except the Summit, the Court, and the Assembly.

The EAC has a Coordination Committee as an implementation arm of Council decisions. This Committee meets at least twice a year to precede Council meetings and may hold extraordinary meetings if its Chairperson requests. It is formed from Permanent/Principal Secretaries responsible for regional cooperation in each member State. It also determines its own procedures of business. The office of the Chairperson rotates among its members. Its functions include submitting reports and recommendations to Council; implementing the decisions of the Council; and receiving and considering reports of the Sectoral Committees and coordinating their activities. The Sectoral Committees are responsible for preparing comprehensive implementation programs, setting out priorities on sector issues, monitoring implementation of programs, and making

recommendations to the Coordination Committee on issues that affect sectors.

The East African Court of Justice is the EAC's judicial arm. (For more detail see the EAC subsection in Legal framework—Africa, below in this annex.) The Summit appoints its judges, including its President and Vice Presidents, from among sitting judges of any national court or from jurists of recognized competence, while the Council of Ministers appoints the Registrar. There are 10 judges, two from each member State, and shared equally between the Court of First Instance and the Appellate Division (following amendments to the Treaty in 2006 and 2007 which split the Court into two divisions). The foremost responsibility of the Court is to ensure adherence to law of EAC Treaty interpretation, application, and compliance.

The East African Legislative Assembly (the Assembly) is EAC's lawmaking organ, comprising 52 members: 45 elected equally by each partner State and seven *ex officio* members consisting of the Minister or Assistant Minister responsible for EAC affairs from each partner State; the Secretary General; and Counsel to EAC. The Assembly's functions span legislative, representative, and oversight mandates, and include legislation, as well as liaising with the national assemblies of the partner States on EAC matters; budget appropriation; consideration of EAC annual reports; and establishment of committees for necessary tasks. The Assembly has established about seven Committees—in house business, accounts, agriculture, tourism, natural resources, regional affairs, and conflict resolution—which oversee the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and the EAC Development Strategy in the special areas of cooperation. The Committees execute the Assembly's work and are its technical arm.

ECCAS

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was established on October 18, 1983, by members of the Customs and Economic Union of Central African States, São Tomé and Príncipe, and members of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda). ECCAS's primary objective is to promote and strengthen cordial cooperation and balanced development in all areas of economic and social activity to achieve collective self-reliance and to raise standards of living. ECCAS institutions include the Conference of Heads of State and Government (the supreme body of ECCAS); the Council of Ministers; the Court of Justice; the General Secretariat (the executive organ of the Community); the Advisory Commission; and Specialized Technical Committees.

The Conference determines the general policy and major guidelines of the Community, as well as directing and harmonizing the socio-economic policies of member States. It meets once a year in ordinary session and may be convened in extraordinary session on the initiative of the President of the Conference, or on two-thirds of its members States' approval of a member's request. Its Presidency is held every year by one of the heads of state in alphabetical order of appointment of member States.

The Council of Ministers consists of ministers responsible for economic development issues or any other Minister designated for that purpose by each member State. It is charged with making recommendations to the Conference on any action aimed at achieving the objectives of the Community, meets twice a year in ordinary session, one session preceding that of the Conference.

The Court of Justice is to ensure compliance with the law in interpreting and applying the Treaty establishing ECCAS and to adjudicate disputes, under the provisions of the Treaty. The Conference determines the composition, process, status, and other matters relating to the Court (which is, however, not yet operating).

The General Secretariat of ECCAS—its executive arm—establishes the annual program, prepares and implements the decisions and directives of the Conference and Council, and promotes development programs and community projects. The General Secretariat comprises a secretary-general, deputy general-secretary, financial controller, accountant, and other personnel.

There is a Consultative Committee under the responsibility of the Council of Ministers, which studies issues and projects submitted by other ECCAS institutions.

ECOWAS

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional group of 15 West African countries established on May 28, 1975, with the signing of the Treaty of Lagos. Its mission is to promote economic integration across the region. Following the Revised Treaty of 1993, its main organs of governance institutions are the Authority of Heads of States or Government, the Council of Ministers, the ECOWAS Parliament, the Community Court of Justice, and the ECOWAS Secretariat (Commission since 2006).

The Authority defines general ECOWAS policy guidelines. The ordinary session meeting of the Authority is once a year but it may convene in extraordinary session on the initiative of the President and on the approval of a member's request.

The Council of Ministers consists of ministers responsible for economic integration and trade or any other Minister designated for that purpose by each member State. It makes recommendations to the Authority on any action deemed necessary to advance ECOWAS objectives, and it meets twice a year in ordinary session, with one session preceding that of the Authority.

The ECOWAS Parliament is the Assembly of the peoples of the Community with three political wings (Plenary, Bureau of the Parliament, and Conference of Bureau) and administrative wings. The Parliament has 115 seats with each member State having a guaranteed minimum of five seats while the remaining 40 seats are shared on the basis of population. Nigeria has 35 seats, Ghana 8, Côte d'Ivoire 7, and the remaining member States between 5 and 6. The Parliament deals with any matter concerning ECOWAS, such as human rights and fundamental freedoms, interconnection of communications, energy networks, public health, common educational policy, Treaty review, and community citizenship. It meets at least twice a year in ordinary session and may meet in extraordinary session when necessary. The Speaker directs the business of its organs and presides over meetings and debates.

The Community Court of Justice (the Court) has seven independent judges, appointed by the Authority, from nationals of member States, for a four-year term based on the advice of the Community Judicial Council. (For more detail see the ECOWAS subsection in Legal framework—Africa, below in this annex.) The Court ensures the observance of law and the principles of equity in the interpretation and application of the provisions of the revised Treaty. It also examines cases of failure by member States to honor their obligations under

ECOWAS law; adjudicates on disputes involving interpretation and application of Community acts between institutions and officials; and adjudges and makes declarations on the legality of regulations, directives, decisions, and other subsidiary legal instruments adopted by ECOWAS. The decisions of the Court are binding and each member State must indicate the national authority responsible for enforcing Court decisions. They are not subject to appeal, except in cases of application for revision by the Court.

The ECOWAS Commission has been provided with greater powers and its seven Commissioners are now responsible in well-defined operational areas. The Commission is led at top management level by a President, Vice President, and seven Commissioners. The redesignation of this institution was to strengthen its supranational characteristics and provide it with more effective power to lead the integration that comes with a new legal regime where decisions are directly applicable in member States and with institutions (rather than protocols and conventions, which are subject to lengthy national parliamentary ratification, delaying entry into force of legal texts). The Commission adopts rules for implementing Acts passed by the Council. These rules have the same legal force as the Council's Acts. The Commission also makes recommendations and gives advice (they are not enforceable).

IGAD

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a trade bloc in Eastern Africa comprising Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda—countries from the Horn of Africa, Nile Valley, and African Great Lakes region. It is the successor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), which functioned in

1986–1996. IGAD's mission is to assist and complement the efforts of member States to achieve, through increased cooperation, food security and environmental protection; promotion and maintenance of peace and security and humanitarian affairs; and economic cooperation and integration. It seeks to harmonize policies on trade, customs, transport, communications, agriculture, and natural resources; to promote the free movement of goods, services, and people within the region; and to create an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border, and domestic trade and investment. Promoting and realizing the aims of COMESA and the African Economic Community are among its other objectives.

Its institutional framework comprises the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Secretariat, the Council of Ministers, and the Committee of Ambassadors. The Assembly, IGAD's supreme policymaking organ, determines its objectives, guidelines, and programs. It meets once a year and has its Chairperson elected from among the member States in rotation.

The Council of Ministers comprises the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and one other Minister designated by each member State. Its main functions are to formulate policy and to approve the work program and annual budget of the Secretariat during its biannual sessions.

The Committee of Ambassadors is made up of the Ambassadors of IGAD member States or Plenipotentiaries accredited to the country of IGAD headquarters. This Committee convenes as often as needed to achieve its mandate of advising and guiding the Executive Secretary.

The Secretariat provides assistance to member States in formulating regional projects in

priority areas, and facilitates coordination and harmonization of development policies. It mobilizes resources to implement regional projects and programs approved by the Council and reinforces national infrastructure necessary for regional projects and policies. It is headed by an Executive Secretary appointed by the Assembly for four years, renewable once. Four Directors assist the Executive Secretary, who themselves lead Divisions of Economic Cooperation and Social Development, Agriculture and Environment, Peace and Security, and Administration and Finance, as well as 22 regional professional staff and various short-term project and technical assistance staff.

SADC

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) originated from the Southern African Development Coordination Conference on August 17, 1992, through the Windhoek declaration and treaty with the member States. The Treaty provides for both socioeconomic cooperation and political and security cooperation. An amendment to the 1992 SADC treaty in August 2001 overhauled structures, policies, and procedures. It is divided into eight principal bodies: the Summit, comprising heads of state or heads of government; Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security; Council of Ministers; SADC Tribunal; SADC National Committees; and Secretariat. Except for the Tribunal (based in Windhoek, Namibia), National Committees, and Secretariat, decision making is by consensus.

Legal framework—EU

EU laws are mainly in form of regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions. A regulation is a directly applicable and binding law in all member States that need

not be passed into national law by the member States but may conflict with it and thus require changes to national law to avoid conflict. A directive is a law that also binds the member States, or a group of them, to achieve an objective. Directives state the results expected from them and are usually transposed into national law. While a decision is binding and can be addressed not only to member States but also to groups of people or even individuals, recommendations and opinions do not bind member States, groups, or individuals.

Every European law has a basis in a treaty article, called the “legal basis.” The treaty specifies the decision-making process, from European Commission proposals through successive readings by the Council and Parliament, as well as the opinions of the advisory bodies such as the national parliaments, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions when required. It also specifies when the Council should adopt legislation, whether through unanimity or qualified majority. The Ordinary Legislative Procedure under which Parliament and the Council share legislative powers forms the main channel for adopting EU legislation.

The Commission's proposals presented to the Council and Parliament receive views and comments from governments, businesses, civil society, and individuals (figure A4.3). The proposals emanate either from the Council, European Council, Parliament, or European citizens, or the Commission itself.

The Council and Parliament each read and discuss the proposal and it is when no agreement is reached at the second reading that the proposal is put before a “conciliation committee” comprising equal numbers of Council and Parliamentary representatives as well as Commission representatives. Otherwise, the agreed text is presented to Parliament and the Council for a third reading, after which it is adopted into law by simple majority in Parliament and by qualified majority voting or sometimes unanimous voting at the Council.¹⁵

Two special legislative procedures make laws in the EU: the Consultation Procedure and the Consent Procedure. In the Consultation Procedure the Council must consult Parliament, but may not accept advice offered, on a proposal from the Commission especially in a few areas such as internal market exemptions and competition law. In the Consent Procedure, Parliament may accept or reject a proposal, but may not propose amendments. The Consent procedure is used in approving a negotiated international treaty. These modalities demonstrate that the Council and Commission, or the Commission alone, can pass legislation in only a few cases. Underlining the democratic component of the legislative process is the requirement to consult certain advisory bodies when proposed legislation involves their area of interest, even if advice from such consultation will not be taken. This opens the possibility of scrutinizing proposed legislation by a wider representative audience in the EU as well as stakeholder support at an early stage.

¹⁵ In qualified majority voting, each member State has a certain number of votes in line with its size and population.

Legal framework—ASEAN

The fundamental principles that govern ASEAN member States are in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, signed on February 24, 1976, during the first ASEAN Summit. Originally conceived as a legally binding code of friendly inter-state conduct among Southeast Asian countries, the Treaty was amended in 1987 to open it for accession by states outside Southeast Asia.

There are great historical, cultural, and political diversities among ASEAN member States, as reflected in their legal systems, making it necessary to adopt a constitution called the ASEAN Charter, which the member States signed in November 2007.

Satisfied with its achievements and expansion of ASEAN through the ASEAN Declaration, ASEAN member States established an ASEAN Charter in the Vientiane Action Program, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter, and the Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter. Also established, through this Charter, was the legal and institutional framework for ASEAN. Member States have equal rights and obligations under this Charter. They have to take all necessary measures, including enacting domestic legislation, to implement the provisions of the Charter and to comply with all membership obligations.

Before the Charter, ASEAN member States had to conduct their own national reviews, analysis, and monitoring to ascertain compliance with the rules, with no legally binding authority to resolve disputes among them. The Charter affirms the fundamental principles in the Bangkok Declaration and subsequent agreements, but introduces a novel clause by making “respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights,

and the promotion of social justice” and “adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government” key principles.

With the Charter, member States have assumed the obligation of not attempting to defeat its purposes, one of which is adherence to multilateral rules. Member States have to affirm adherence to rules of the international legal order, such as “the United Nations Charter and international law, including international humanitarian law,” the principle of nonintervention and all multilateral trade rules, emphasizing “respect for the different cultures, languages, and religions of peoples of the ASEAN,” given their “common values in the spirit of unity in diversity.”

Thus member States are expressly obligated to “take all necessary measures to effectively comply with all obligations, including the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively implement the provisions of this Charter and to comply with all obligations of membership” in relation to these broader purposes and principles of conduct.

Most important, the ASEAN Charter appears to dilute the consensus requirement in decision making. While the Charter states that as a “basic principle, decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation and consensus,” the failure to achieve a consensus will vest the ASEAN Summit with the authority to “decide how a specific decision can be made,” a mechanism by which the ASEAN Summit can opt out of the consensus requirement case by case.

Legal framework—Africa

Among the African RECs, four do not appear to have clear legal frameworks—UMA, CEN-SAD, ECCAS, and IGAD. The discussion focuses on the other RECs.

COMESA

The COMESA Court of Justice is the judicial organ of COMESA, established to oversee the implementation and interpretation of the COMESA agreement, as well as to settle disputes arising under the COMESA Treaty between COMESA's member States, Secretary General, individuals and corporations, it was modeled on the EU Court of Justice. Unlike the EU Court of Justice, the COMESA Court of Justice does not have general competence to hear individual complaints of alleged human rights violations. The Treaty, unlike the Statute of the International Court, does not state the sources of law to be applied by the Court. The Treaty and any COMESA issued legal instruments will of course make the initial law to be applied, but municipal law and international law (including humanitarian law) may also be determined applicable by the Court.

Under Article 6(e) of the COMESA Treaty, COMESA also recognizes, promotes, and protects human and people's rights as set out in the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. Therefore, Article 7(c) of the COMESA Treaty establishes the Court of Justice, which now has its seat in Khartoum, Sudan.

As laid out in Chapter Five of the Treaty, the Court's principal function is to “ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of [the] Treaty” with Article 2 of the Treaty granting jurisdiction to hear all matters arising under the COMESA Treaty. The Treaty's provisions generally deal with the details of trade, economic integration, and development; however, specific chapters deal with health, the environment, access to food, water, education, sanitation, and infrastructure, promoting the role of women, and free movement of persons. The decisions of the

COMESA Court are binding and supersede national courts' decisions.

Article 24 of the Treaty dictates that member States may refer cases to the Court when they consider “that another member State or the Council has failed to fulfil an obligation under [the] Treaty” or in order for the Court to rule on “the legality of any act, regulation, directive or decision of the Council” alleged to be in violation of the Treaty “or any rule or law relating to its application or [which] amounts to a misuse or abuse of power.” Likewise under Article 25, the COMESA Secretary General may refer disputes involving member States to the Court for the same reasons, but only after allowing the member State an opportunity to respond.

Moreover, Article 26 grants that individuals and corporations resident in any COMESA member State “may refer for determination by the Court the legality of any act, regulation, directive, or decision of the Council or of a member State on the grounds that [it] is unlawful or an infringement of the provisions of [the] Treaty...” In complaints against member States, the individual or corporation must first exhaust domestic remedies in the national courts

EAC

The East African Court of Justice is EAC's judicial arm. The court has original jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of the 1999 Treaty that reestablished the EAC and in the future may have other original, appellate, human rights, or other jurisdiction on conclusion of a protocol to realize such extended jurisdiction. It is temporarily based in Arusha, Tanzania.

The East African Legislative Assembly, EAC's legislative arm, has 27 members who are all elected by the National Assemblies or

Parliaments of the member States of the Community. The Assembly has oversight functions on all matters that fall within EAC's work and its functions include debating and approving EAC's budget, discussing all EAC matters and making recommendations to the Council as it may deem necessary for the implementation of the Treaty, liaising with National Assemblies or Parliaments on EAC matters and establishing committees for such purposes as it deems necessary. Since being inaugurated in 2001, the Assembly has had several sittings as a plenum in Arusha, Kampala, and Nairobi.

ECOWAS

The ECOWAS Court of Justice, ECOWAS's judicial organ, is charged with resolving disputes related to ECOWAS's treaty, protocols, and conventions. The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice has competence to hear individual complaints of alleged human rights violations.

The ECOWAS Court of Justice was created pursuant to the Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States of 1993, and is headquartered in Abuja, Nigeria. In addition to providing advisory opinions on the meaning of Community law, the Court has jurisdiction to examine cases involving: an alleged failure by a member State to comply with ECOWAS law; a dispute relating to the interpretation and application of ECOWAS acts; dispute between ECOWAS institutions and their officials; ECOWAS liability human rights violations, and the legality of ECOWAS laws and policies.

The Court gained “jurisdiction to determine case(s) of violation(s) of human rights that occur in any member State” in 2005 with the implementation of Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05, which followed the adoption of Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and

Good Governance, requiring that the Court be given “the power to hear, inter alia, cases relating to violations of human rights...” The Court's decisions on human rights matters interpret the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, considered by Article 1(h) of Protocol A/SP1/12/01 to contain “constitutional principles shared by all member States” as legally binding on ECOWAS member States. Corporations and individuals can submit complaints alleging human rights violations by ECOWAS or member State actors.

There is no domestic exhaustion of remedies requirement limiting the Court's jurisdiction, meaning individuals do not need to pursue national judicial remedies before bringing a claim to the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Rather, the principal requirements are that the application not be anonymous and that the matter is not pending before another international court. The ECOWAS Court operates according to its Rules of Procedure.

SADC

The overall aim of SADC is to achieve regional integration and eradicate poverty. To achieve these goals, legal and institutional instruments have been put in place, including the SADC Protocols, which enshrine SADC's aims by providing codes of procedure and practice on various issues, as agreed by member States.

A Protocol is a legally binding document committing member States to the objectives and specific procedures stated within it. For a Protocol to enter in to force, two-thirds of the member States need to ratify or sign the agreement, giving formal consent and making the document officially valid. Any member State that had not initially become party to a Protocol can accede to it at a later stage.

For an amendment to be made to a Protocol

any member State may propose the amendment to the Executive Secretary of SADC for preliminary consideration by Council after all member States have been notified. The amendment to this Protocol can then be adopted by a decision of three-quarters of the member States of SADC.

A provision for any disputes arising from the application or interpretation of a Protocol is made by referring grievances to the SADC Tribunal if they cannot be resolved amicably through regular diplomatic channels. SADC has 26 Protocols, including those yet to enter into force.

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
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Technical Notes

A - ACIR TEAM ORGANIZATION

The ACR Team comprises a dedicated ACBF group supported by various stakeholders and partners at different level as presented in the chart below.



ACBF ACR Team

A dedicated group of individuals (ACR Team) within the ACBF Secretariat is constituted to spearhead the process from conceptualization through to the publication of the ACI Flagship Report. Team members come from the various units and departments within the Secretariat.

External Reference Group (ERG)

The ERG is created to provide motivation and intellectual guidance, as well as to challenge the ACBF ACR team to develop its thinking behind the assessment and ensure that the team achieves its objective of delivering a quality publication. To this end, the External Reference Group acts as the ACR team's strategic partner to ensure that:

- The approach and methodologies employed in preparing the Flagship are theoretically sound,

conceptually appropriate, rigorous, balanced, and draws in divergence as appropriate;

- The data capturing instruments are adequately reviewed and appropriate;
- Comments on the ACR survey template, selected indicators, case studies and stories are provided in a timely manner;
- Presentation of findings balances views from across the broad spectrum of opinion and reflect current and innovative practice;
- The review and report balance public, legal and operational perspectives appropriately;
- There is feedback on implementation support and costing tools for specific topics examined in the ACR, and on the appropriateness of, for example, the costing assumptions and the approach adopted within the tools as well as peer review of the background papers;

- Where needed, ACBF is supported in the identification of appropriate networks and/or experts with whom to engage to assist in the development of the tools; and
- All conclusions drawn and policy recommendations provided are sound and evidence-based.

Focal regional points

On the basis of their geographic and linguistic affinity, the targeted countries were grouped into five broad regions – Anglophone West Africa; Francophone West North Africa; Central Africa and other French speaking countries; East Africa and the Horn; Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. A Policy Unit was tasked with coordinating and supervising the country data collection process within each of the above-mentioned regions.

Data collectors

At the country level, a national familiar with the country context, was identified and selected through an open and competitive process, invited to a 3-day training session on the ACR survey instrument; following which he/she conducted the administration of the questionnaire. However Section G of the survey instrument on the CPIA and section on RECs was administered by fifteen (15) nationally and internationally recognized Policy Institutes in surveyed countries.

B - DATA COLLECTION

Coverage

In line with the target of covering all African countries, the number of countries covered during this fourth edition increased from 34 (in 2010) to 44 (see list below).

TABLE X


List of countries covered by the study

Group 1 West Africa English-speaking countries	Group 2 North and West Africa French-speaking countries	Group 3 Central Africa and other French-speaking countries	Group 4 Eastern Africa	Group 5 Southern Africa
Cabo Verde	Benin	Burundi	Ethiopia	Lesotho
Gambia (The)	Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Kenya	Mauritius
Ghana	Côte d'Ivoire	CAR	Malawi	Mozambique
Liberia	Egypt	Chad	Rwanda	Namibia
Nigeria	Guinea	Comoros	South Sudan	Swaziland
Sierra Leone	Guinea Bissau	Congo (Rep. of)	Tanzania	Zambia
	Mali	Congo (Dem. Rep. of)	Uganda	Zimbabwe
	Mauritania	Djibouti		
	Morocco	Gabon		
	Niger	Madagascar		
	Senegal	São Tomé and Príncipe		
	Togo			
	Tunisia			

Data collection instrument

The data collection instrument is designed along the three dimensions of capacity: (i) Enabling environment; (ii) Organizational level; and (iii) Individual level. These dimensions constitute the three primary components of the data collection instrument. However, four specific sections are dedicated to explicit issues: the Section G on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), the Section I on Agricultural Transformation and Food Security, the Section J on Natural Resources Management, and the section K on Regional Integration the thematic focus of this year's Report. The structure of the questionnaire is presented in Chart 2 below. One single questionnaire was administered in each of the countries covered by the study. The RECs were also surveyed in this year's Report.

CHART 2
Structure of the data collection instrument



Training workshop

As alluded to above, a training workshop was organized from 12-15 February 2014 for all the selected in-country data collectors who were to administer the main questionnaire (excluding Section G on CPIA which was done by the Policy Institutes). During the workshop, the data collection instrument was reviewed, revised and the final version adopted. Also during the workshop, the potential sources of information per country were discussed and agreed upon. However, it was acknowledged and agreed that the list could be adjusted during the field data collection to suit country-specific needs (e.g. Ministry of Women Affairs in country A, could be Ministry of Gender in

country B, etc.). A separate workshop was organized for the fifteen (15) Policy Institutes that were to lead the CPIA country self-assessment in their respective countries.

Period of field data collection

The field data collection was conducted from February through March 2014. Reporting was done on a weekly basis. At the end of the field data collection, the data collectors submitted their completed questionnaires along with their final field report.

C - COMPUTING THE INDICES

C.1. Scoring the answers to questions

Each question is assigned an associated variable indicator whose nature depends on the type of question asked. The scoring of the variable indicators is in relation with their respective natures. The scores are standardized on a scale ranging from 0-100.

Qualitative variables

A value is attributed to each expected answer. Questions with a YES or NO answer are scored 0 or 100. Questions with three possible answers are scored 0; 50; and 100. Questions with 4 answers are scored 0, 33.3, 66.7 and 100. Questions with 5 answers are scored 0; 25; 50; 75 and 100.

Some few examples:

Question No.	Question	Expected answers	Score
B1	Does the country have a National Development Strategy (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, National Development Plan, Vision Strategy, etc)?	YES	100
		NO	0
B4	Is Capacity Development (CD) integrated in the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy/National Development Plan?	<i>CD is not mainstreamed in the current PRSP/National Development Plan</i>	0
		<i>CD is mainstreamed, but with no clear objectives and targets</i>	50
		<i>Clear objectives and targets set in the PRSP/National Development Plan</i>	100
B13b	How effective is the dialog mechanism with development partners?	<i>Very High</i>	100
		<i>High</i>	75
		<i>Average</i>	50
		<i>Low</i>	25
		<i>Very Low</i>	0

Numerical variables

a- The answer is a proportion

The score is the answer (assuming that moving from 0 to 100% is improving, otherwise, one may just read backwards).

b- Numerical variable in the form of ordinal scales

The values on the predetermined scale is brought to a scale ranging from 0 – 100.

Example:

C4: On the scale1 (Very weak) to 6 (Very strong), assess how support to capacity is being coordinated in the country Very weak = 1 2 3 4 5 6 = Very strong						
Answer	1	2	3	4	5	6
Score	0	20	40	60	80	100

c- Numerical variable in the form of absolute value

Three different options were considered.

Option 1 (Best achievement)

From the minimum and maximum values observed (among the 44 countries), define a range 0 - 100 where 0 is associated with the minimum value, and 100 with the maximum value. One disadvantage for this option is that it may not capture sufficiently the progress made by a country, as its efforts are assessed with respect to those of other countries.

Option 2 (Best progress)

A country may be assessed with respect to efforts it made the previous years with regard to the concerned variable. The indicator would measure the variation in the efforts it is making on its own. This is another way to measure investment in capacity development.

$$\frac{Y_t - Y_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} \text{ (in \%)}$$

$Y_t = \text{Value at current date } t$
 $Y_{t-1} = \text{Value at previous year (t-1)}$

One disadvantage of the above option is that positive variations may range from 0 to infinity. Two countries shifting respectively for example from 0 to 1 and from 0 to 1000 would have the same infinite rate of increase.

Option 3 (Best relative change)

This option is the same as option 2, but with a formula that mitigates the disadvantage with the formula in option 2.

$$\frac{Y_t - Y_{t-1}}{Y_t} \text{ (in \%)}$$

$Y_t = \text{Value at current date } t$
 $Y_{t-1} = \text{Value at previous year (t-1)}$

A minor disadvantage presented by this formula is that if a country experiences a drastic decrease (more than 50%), then the indicator will be less than -100%. This situation, though rare, may apply to a country facing some turmoil.

The option 1 is used so far. The other options will be tested in further years, when a time series of ACI variables is constituted.

C.2 Computation of the Indices**C.2.1 The ACI Composite Index**

During the first edition of the ACI Report, the exploratory approach was used to define the components of the ACI composite index. To this end, the hierarchical cluster analysis was carried out, using the Ward's method applying squared Euclidian distance as the distance or similarity measure. From the findings of the analysis, 4 groups of factors appeared to be the most relevant. They are the following:

- i. Cluster 1: Policy environment
- ii. Cluster 2: Processes for implementation
- iii. Cluster 3: Development results
- iv. Cluster 4: Capacity development outcomes.

Four cluster indices are then calculated, each one being the arithmetic mean of its cluster variable indicators.

Cluster Index j ($j = 1, 2, 3, 4$) is the arithmetic mean of variable indicators within cluster j .

$$CL_j = \frac{1}{n_j} \sum_{i=1}^{i=n_j} VI_{ji}$$

$V_{ji} = \text{Score assigned to variable } i \text{ within Cluster } j$
 $n_j = \text{Number of variable indicators within Cluster } j$

The ACI Composite Index is the harmonic mean of the four cluster indices. The rationale for choosing the harmonic mean formula is that capacity development is an indivisible whole of its dimensions. As such, none of the capacity development factors as given by the four clusters should be neglected. Weakness in one of the four components should be easily captured by the harmonic mean formula, which is sensitive to small values.

$$ACI = \frac{1}{\frac{1}{4} \sum_{j=1}^4 \frac{1}{CL_j}}$$

C.2.2 Sub-indices

In addition to the clusters indices, a number of sub-indicators are also calculated. They are built around the component and the sections of the questionnaire (see structure of the questionnaire, Chart 2)

Component Indicators

Ten component indices are calculated as follows:

Component Index j ($j = 1, 2, \dots, 10$) is the arithmetic mean of the variable indicators within that component.

$$CI_j = \frac{1}{n_j} \sum_{i=1}^{i=n_j} VI_{ji}$$

VI_{ij} = Score assigned to question i within Component j

n_j = Number of Variable Indicators associated with Component j

The list of the component indices is presented below.

No.	Name of the Component
1	Strategic choices for capacity development
2	Policy environment/Efficiency of instrument
3	Dialogue mechanisms for capacity development
4	Strategic policy choices for improving the capacity of statistical system
5	Financial commitment for capacity development
6	Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities
7	Gender Equality
8	Social inclusion
9	Partnering for capacity development
10	Capacity profiling and capacity needs assessment

Section Indicators

Five thematic Indices are calculated with the same formula as for the component indices.

Thematic index k ($k = 1, 2, \dots, 5$) is the arithmetic mean of Component Indexes within that thematic section.

$$SI_k = \frac{1}{m_k} \sum_{i=1}^{i=m_k} CL_{ki}$$

m_k = Number of Component indices associated with Section k .

$m_1 = 5, m_3 = 2$.

The list of the thematic indices is presented below.

No.	Name
1	Policy choices for capacity development
2	Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities
3	Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion
4	Partnering for capacity development
5	Capacity profiling and capacity needs assessment

C.2.3 Agricultural transformation and Food Security Index

Specific sub-indices are computed for the agricultural transformation and food security. They cover the following four themes:

- Agricultural strategy formulation and implementation
- Training, research and development/innovations in agriculture
- Role of private sector in the value chain
- Information system

C.3 Ranking the countries

According to the index values, the countries are ranked into five categories as follows:

	Index value	Category	Color
1	0 to less than 20	Very Low	Red
2	20 to less than 40	Low	Orange
3	40 to less than 60	Medium	Yellow
4	60 to less than 80	High	Light Green
5	80 and above	Very High	Dark Green

Africa Capacity Index 2014: reconsidering the ACBF-supported projects

For the present report, the number of variables associated with Cluster 4 (capacity development outcomes) has been reviewed downward. The previous variables included the inputs and outputs from ACBF-supported countries. Accordingly, for this cluster, the inputs and outputs of the capacity building activities of countries without ACBF-supported projects were not properly captured because rated as non-existing.

This Report has corrected such anomaly that had advantaged countries with ACBF-financed projects and programs. Such a revision on calculations has implications on the ACI scores of the different countries. For example, in the previous Reports, countries such as Ghana, and Ethiopia with a relatively good number of ACBF-supported projects were better ranked on Cluster 4 than some best performing countries on the same cluster. This is the case for Mauritius and Morocco, which are now better ranked.

Africa Capacity Indicators

Table A1. ACI Composite Index by countries (in alphabetical order)

No.	Country	ACI 2014 composite value	Level of capacity development	Rank
1	BENIN	55.2	Medium	13
2	BURKINA FASO	56.8	Medium	11
3	BURUNDI	50.9	Medium	20
4	CABO VERDE	64.9	High	3
5	CAMEROON	49.2	Medium	26
6	CENTRAL AFRICA REPUBLIC	22.4	Low	44
7	CHAD	44.8	Medium	32
8	COMOROS	31.6	Low	43
9	CONGO (DRC)	50.3	Medium	24
10	CONGO (REPUBLIC)	40.4	Medium	36
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	45.8	Medium	29
12	DJIBOUTI	49.9	Medium	25
13	EGYPT	53.8	Medium	16
14	ETHIOPIA	49.0	Medium	27
15	GABON	40.1	Medium	37
16	GAMBIA (THE)	63.5	High	6
17	GHANA	54.8	Medium	14
18	GUINEA	45.3	Medium	31
19	GUINEA BISSAU	37.4	Low	40
20	KENYA	55.3	Medium	12
21	LESOTHO	57.9	Medium	10
22	LIBERIA	51.3	Medium	18
23	MADAGASCAR	43.1	Medium	34
24	MALAWI	60.1	High	8
25	MALI	60.8	High	7
26	MAURITANIA	39.8	Low	39
27	MAURITIUS	64.0	High	5
28	MOROCCO	73.1	High	1
29	MOZAMBIQUE	50.8	Medium	22
30	NAMIBIA	44.8	Medium	33
31	NIGER	46.6	Medium	28
32	NIGERIA	40.0	Medium	38
33	RWANDA	68.3	High	2
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	32.3	Low	41
35	SENEGAL	51.3	Medium	19
36	SIERRA LEONE	50.8	Medium	23
37	SOUTH SUDAN	41.6	Medium	35
38	SWAZILAND	32.0	Low	42
39	TANZANIA	64.4	High	4
40	TOGO	45.5	Medium	30
41	TUNISIA	58.6	Medium	9
42	UGANDA	53.4	Medium	17
43	ZAMBIA	54.7	Medium	15
44	ZIMBABWE	50.9	Medium	21




Table A2. Percentage of countries by levels of capacity development

Level	% of countries
Very Low	0.0
Low	13.6
Medium	68.2
High	18.26
Very High	0.0
TOTAL	100





Table A3. Cluster indices values

No.	Country	ACI 2014	Cluster 1 Policy Environment	Cluster 2 Process for Implementation	Cluster 3 Development result at country level	Cluster 4 Capacity development outcome
1	BENIN	55.2	100.0	83.3	59.0	29.8
2	BURKINA FASO	56.8	95.8	83.3	76.0	28.7
3	BURUNDI	50.9	100.0	77.8	62.0	25.2
4	CABO VERDE	64.9	95.8	80.6	71.0	40.5
5	CAMEROON	49.2	83.3	83.3	54.0	25.8
6	CAR	22.4	87.5	67.6	9.0	24.4
7	CHAD	44.8	91.7	66.7	34.0	29.5
8	COMOROS	31.6	70.8	59.3	14.0	41.5
9	CONGO, REP	40.4	83.3	63.0	32.0	25.0
10	COTE D'IVOIRE	45.8	83.3	66.7	62.0	22.7
11	DJIBOUTI	49.9	95.8	81.5	69.0	23.3
12	DRC	50.3	83.3	75.0	71.0	24.9
13	EGYPT	53.8	91.7	63.9	66.0	30.6
14	ETHIOPIA	49.0	91.7	82.4	36.0	32.4
15	GABON	40.1	62.5	67.6	54.0	19.9
16	GAMBIA (THE)	63.5	100.0	81.5	68.0	38.5
17	GHANA	54.8	100.0	87.0	64.0	27.9
18	GUINEA	45.3	83.3	77.8	39.0	26.5
19	GUINEA BISSAU	37.4	91.7	50.0	52.0	17.6
20	KENYA	55.3	83.3	70.4	47.0	40.3
21	LESOTHO	57.9	95.8	87.0	73.0	29.9
22	LIBERIA	51.3	83.3	87.0	53.0	28.1
23	MADAGASCAR	43.1	83.3	59.3	28.0	35.3
24	MALAWI	60.1	100.0	93.5	54.0	36.6
25	MALI	60.8	87.5	70.4	66.0	40.1
26	MAURITANIA	39.8	95.8	55.6	34.0	23.5
27	MAURITIUS	64.0	87.5	98.1	73.0	36.7
28	MOROCCO	73.1	87.5	77.8	84.0	53.9
29	MOZAMBIQUE	50.8	100.0	88.0	78.0	22.5
30	NAMIBIA	44.8	100.0	89.8	59.0	19.5
31	NIGER	46.6	87.5	80.6	82.0	20.1
32	NIGERIA	40.0	83.3	70.4	58.0	17.7
33	RWANDA	68.3	95.8	88.9	86.0	39.6
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	32.3	75.0	40.7	51.0	15.1
35	SENEGAL	51.3	100.0	80.6	55.0	26.8
36	SIERRA LEONE	50.8	100.0	84.3	46.0	28.4
37	SOUTH SUDAN	41.6	79.2	73.1	62.0	18.6
38	SWAZILAND	32.0	91.7	40.7	24.0	20.8
39	TANZANIA	64.4	87.5	78.7	74.0	40.8
40	TOGO	45.5	95.8	55.6	59.0	23.5
41	TUNISIA	58.6	87.5	72.2	53.0	41.5
42	UGANDA	53.4	87.5	73.1	44.0	37.0
43	ZAMBIA	54.7	95.8	53.7	69.0	33.8
44	ZIMBABWE	50.9	95.8	74.1	46.0	30.3

Table A4. Levels of capacity by cluster

No.	Country	Level	Cluster 1 Policy environment	Cluster 2 Process for implementation	Cluster 3 Development results at country level	Cluster 4 Capacity development outcome
1	BENIN	Medium	Very High	Very High	Medium	Low
2	BURKINA FASO	Medium	Very High	Very High	High	Low
3	BURUNDI	Medium	Very High	High	High	Low
4	CABO VERDE	High	Very High	Very High	High	Medium
5	CAMEROON	Medium	Very High	Very High	Medium	Low
6	CAR	Low	Very High	High	Very Low	Low
7	CHAD	Medium	Very High	High	Low	Low
8	COMOROS	Low	High	Medium	Very Low	Medium
9	CONGO (DRC)	Medium	Very High	High	High	Low
10	CONGO, REP	Medium	Very High	High	Low	Low
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	Medium	Very High	High	High	Low
12	DJIBOUTI	Medium	Very High	Very High	High	Low
13	EGYPT	Medium	Very High	High	High	Low
14	ETHIOPIA	Medium	Very High	Very High	Low	Low
15	GABON	Medium	High	High	Medium	Very Low
16	GAMBIA (THE)	High	Very High	Very High	High	Low
17	GHANA	Medium	Very High	Very High	High	Low
18	GUINEA	Medium	Very High	High	Low	Low
19	GUINEA BISSAU	Low	Very High	Medium	Medium	Very Low
20	KENYA	Medium	Very High	High	Medium	Medium
21	LESOTHO	Medium	Very High	Very High	High	Low
22	LIBERIA	Medium	Very High	Very High	Medium	Low
23	MADAGASCAR	Medium	Very High	Medium	Low	Low
24	MALAWI	High	Very High	Very High	Medium	Low
25	MALI	High	Very High	High	High	Medium
26	MAURITANIA	Low	Very High	Medium	Low	Low
27	MAURITIUS	High	Very High	Very High	High	Low
28	MOROCCO	High	Very High	High	Very High	Medium
29	MOZAMBIQUE	Medium	Very High	Very High	High	Low
30	NAMIBIA	Medium	Very High	Very High	Medium	Very Low
31	NIGER	Medium	Very High	Very High	Very High	Low
32	NIGERIA	Low	Very High	High	Medium	Very Low
33	RWANDA	High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Low
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	Low	High	Medium	Medium	Very Low
35	SENEGAL	Medium	Very High	Very High	Medium	Low
36	SIERRA LEONE	Medium	Very High	Very High	Medium	Low
37	SOUTH SUDAN	Medium	High	High	High	Very Low
38	SWAZILAND	Low	Very High	Medium	Low	Low
39	TANZANIA	High	Very High	High	High	Medium
40	TOGO	Medium	Very High	Medium	Medium	Low
41	TUNISIA	Medium	Very High	High	Medium	Medium
42	UGANDA	Medium	Very High	High	Medium	Low
43	ZAMBIA	Medium	Very High	Medium	High	Low
44	ZIMBABWE	Medium	Very High	High	Medium	Low

Table A5. Thematic indices by countries

No.	Country	Policy choices for CD	Aid effectiveness related to CD	Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	Partnering for CD	Capacity profiling and capacity needs assessment
1	BENIN	68.3	84.3	75.8	75.0	100.0
2	BURKINA FASO	65.3	87.1	80.8	75.0	100.0
3	BURUNDI	62.7	81.4	79.2	50.0	100.0
4	CABO VERDE	60.1	87.1	83.3	75.0	100.0
5	CAMEROON	66.0	41.4	92.5	75.0	100.0
6	CAR	38.5	77.1	68.3	75.0	100.0
7	CHAD	59.4	70.0	60.8	50.0	0.0
8	COMOROS	45.1	48.6	62.5	75.0	50.0
9	CONGO (DRC)	70.2	51.4	62.5	75.0	100.0
10	CONGO, REP	56.1	17.1	75.8	25.0	50.0
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	56.9	45.7	73.3	75.0	50.0
12	DJIBOUTI	55.9	84.3	90.0	75.0	100.0
13	EGYPT	50.2	72.9	81.7	50.0	50.0
14	ETHIOPIA	57.8	58.6	78.3	75.0	100.0
15	GABON	48.2	41.4	68.3	75.0	50.0
16	GAMBIA (THE)	62.8	82.9	84.2	100.0	100.0
17	GHANA	72.3	70.0	75.8	100.0	100.0
18	GUINEA	66.8	27.1	70.8	75.0	100.0
19	GUINEA BISSAU	28.9	67.1	87.5	100.0	100.0
20	KENYA	64.1	31.4	75.8	50.0	50.0
21	LESOTHO	69.3	75.7	86.7	100.0	100.0
22	LIBERIA	66.6	82.9	54.2	100.0	100.0
23	MADAGASCAR	32.9	68.6	68.3	75.0	0.0
24	MALAWI	72.8	77.1	81.7	100.0	100.0
25	MALI	64.1	72.9	68.3	50.0	100.0
26	MAURITANIA	42.3	70.0	70.8	25.0	50.0
27	MAURITIUS	76.7	75.7	80.8	100.0	100.0
28	MOROCCO	67.2	70.0	92.5	50.0	100.0
29	MOZAMBIQUE	68.0	82.9	91.7	50.0	100.0
30	NAMIBIA	67.4	84.3	91.7	50.0	100.0
31	NIGER	65.3	74.3	81.7	100.0	100.0
32	NIGERIA	55.6	68.6	70.8	50.0	50.0
33	RWANDA	72.4	94.3	86.7	75.0	100.0
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	19.4	80.0	81.7	100.0	0.0
35	SENEGAL	64.4	71.4	75.8	50.0	100.0
36	SIERRA LEONE	64.2	80.0	78.3	75.0	100.0
37	SOUTH SUDAN	49.2	67.1	80.0	50.0	100.0
38	SWAZILAND	24.9	77.1	74.2	50.0	0.0
39	TANZANIA	64.1	70.0	87.5	50.0	100.0
40	TOGO	47.7	84.3	80.0	75.0	0.0
41	TUNISIA	47.7	90.0	74.2	100.0	100.0
42	UGANDA	54.7	55.7	80.8	75.0	50.0
43	ZAMBIA	36.5	70.0	84.2	50.0	100.0
44	ZIMBABWE	53.7	80.0	79.2	50.0	100.0

CD = Capacity Development

Table A6. Agricultural transformation and food security index

No.	Country	ACIAgric	Level
1.	BENIN	60.5	High
2.	BURKINA FASO	64.6	High
3.	BURUNDI	59.0	Medium
4.	CABO VERDE	58.1	Medium
5.	CAMEROON	65.2	High
6.	CAR	38.0	Low
7.	CHAD	61.0	High
8.	COMOROS	34.7	Low
9.	CONGO, REP	55.6	Medium
10.	COTE D'IVOIRE	58.4	Medium
11.	DJIBOUTI	47.6	Medium
12.	DRC	47.5	Medium
13.	EGYPT	62.7	High
14.	ETHIOPIA	72.9	High
15.	GABON	50.7	Medium
16.	GAMBIA (THE)	69.4	High
17.	GHANA	71.2	High
18.	GUINEA	60.7	High
19.	GUINEA BISSAU	44.1	Medium
20.	KENYA	67.8	High
21.	LESOTHO	60.9	High
22.	LIBERIA	64.0	High
23.	MADAGASCAR	71.9	High
24.	MALAWI	65.7	High
25.	MALI	67.1	High
26.	MAURITANIA	55.3	Medium
27.	MAURITIUS	67.1	High
28.	MOROCCO	67.8	High
29.	MOZAMBIQUE	58.8	Medium
30.	NAMIBIA	50.8	Medium
31.	NIGER	55.8	Medium
32.	NIGERIA	80.5	Very High
33.	RWANDA	57.4	Medium
34.	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	31.7	Low
35.	SENEGAL	67.1	High
36.	SIERRA LEONE	57.3	Medium
37.	SOUTH SUDAN	41.6	Medium
38.	SWAZILAND	42.3	Medium
39.	TANZANIA	67.9	High
40.	TOGO	60.9	High
41.	TUNISIA	72.4	High
42.	UGANDA	69.2	High
43.	ZAMBIA	66.2	High
44.	ZIMBABWE	63.5	High

Table A7. Agricultural transformation and food security component indices

No.	Country	Agricultural strategy formulation and implementation	Training, research and development/innovations in agriculture	Role of private sector in the value chain	Information system
1	BENIN	64.5	45.1	75.0	66.3
2	BURKINA FASO	73.6	41.0	76.9	91.7
3	BURUNDI	58.4	43.2	84.6	63.5
4	CABO VERDE	70.5	43.8	48.1	91.3
5	CAMEROON	62.1	47.0	75.0	93.8
6	CAR	57.5	23.3	32.7	69.8
7	CHAD	59.9	42.0	69.2	94.8
8	COMOROS	35.2	21.7	48.1	50.0
9	CONGO, DRC	36.4	41.9	44.2	96.9
10	CONGO, REP	58.3	40.4	63.5	69.8
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	67.4	38.8	75.0	68.8
12	DJIBOUTI	66.0	36.8	36.5	69.8
13	EGYPT	53.4	45.6	88.5	84.4
14	ETHIOPIA	70.0	56.8	86.5	87.5
15	GABON	49.3	33.3	67.3	72.9
16	GAMBIA (THE)	96.0	40.2	88.5	90.6
17	GHANA	81.3	46.1	88.5	91.7
18	GUINEA	63.0	40.1	71.2	90.6
19	GUINEA BISSAU	59.1	21.5	75.0	71.9
20	KENYA	70.8	53.3	88.5	67.7
21	LESOTHO	55.9	40.9	78.8	93.8
22	LIBERIA	66.8	41.1	84.6	87.5
23	MADAGASCAR	63.2	58.3	82.7	94.8
24	MALAWI	73.7	40.8	82.7	93.8
25	MALI	66.1	44.5	88.5	93.8
26	MAURITANIA	77.8	36.8	46.2	93.8
27	MAURITIUS	70.7	42.0	92.3	92.5
28	MOROCCO	76.9	48.5	73.1	85.4
29	MOZAMBIQUE	55.2	39.7	71.2	93.8
30	NAMIBIA	42.7	33.2	94.2	68.8
31	NIGER	70.9	37.2	51.9	87.5
32	NIGERIA	63.2	89.0	84.6	92.7
33	RWANDA	77.6	36.8	73.1	62.5
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	38.1	22.4	65.4	25.0
35	SENEGAL	70.8	41.5	94.2	92.7
36	SIERRA LEONE	75.1	41.0	48.1	88.5
37	SOUTH SUDAN	40.6	36.4	46.2	44.8
38	SWAZILAND	32.7	25.8	84.6	74.0
39	TANZANIA	64.9	50.9	75.0	94.8
40	TOGO	57.9	41.4	75.0	91.7
41	TUNISIA	57.6	62.4	92.3	90.6
42	UGANDA	71.1	45.8	86.5	96.9
43	ZAMBIA	67.5	44.8	84.6	87.5
44	ZIMBABWE	51.8	47.9	92.3	83.3



Country Profiles

Benin

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	55.2
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank.....	13

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	68.3
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	84.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	75.8
Development agencies.....	75.0
Assessment of needs.....	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	60.5

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012).....3.5
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....Non-Fragile
- Self-country assessment.....4.0

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012.....	2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	233,198

Burkina Faso

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	56.8
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank.....	11

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	68.3
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	84.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	75.8
Development agencies.....	75.0
Assessment of needs.....	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	64.6

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012).....3.8
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....Non-Fragile
- Self-country assessment.....NA

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012.....	3
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	2,232,569

Burundi

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	50.9
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank.....	20

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	62.7
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	81.4
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	79.2
Development agencies.....	50.0
Assessment of needs.....	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	59.0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012).....3.2
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....Fragile
- Self-country assessment.....3.2

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012.....	2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	820,227

Cabo Verde

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	64.9
Level of Capacity Development	High
Rank	3

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	60.1
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	87.1
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	83.3
Development agencies	75.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	58.1

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)..... 3.9
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)Non-Fragile
- Self-country assessment

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	420,948

Cameroon

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value.....	49.2
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank.....	26

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	66.0
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities.....	41.4
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion.....	92.5
Development agencies.....	75.0
Assessment of needs.....	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	65.2

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012).....3.2
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....Non-Fragile
- Self-country assessment.....3.7

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012.....	3
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	1,581,500

Central African Republic

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	22.4
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank	44

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development	38.5
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	77.1
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	68.3
Development agencies	75.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security	38.0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)
 - Self-country assessment
- | | |
|--|---------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 2.7 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13) | Fragile |
| Self-country assessment | NA |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$)	422,240

Chad

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	44.8
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	32

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	59.4
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	70.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	60.8
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	00.0
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	61.0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
 - Self-country assessment
- | | |
|---|---------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 2.5 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... | Fragile |
| Self-country assessment | NA |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	3,802

Comoros

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	31.6
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank	43

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development	45.1
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	48.6
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	62.5
Development agencies	75.0
Assessment of needs	50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security	34.7

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)
 - Self-country assessment
- | | |
|--|---------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 2.8 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13) | Fragile |
| Self-country assessment | NA |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$)	0

Congo (Dem. Rep. of)

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	50.3
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	24

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	70.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	51.4
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	62.5
Development agencies	75.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	47.6

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
 - Self-country assessment
- | | |
|---|---------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 2.7 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... | Fragile |
| Self-country assessment | NA |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	671,391

Congo, Rep.

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	40.4
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	36

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	56.1
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	17.1
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	75.8
Development agencies	25.0
Assessment of needs	50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	55.6

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
 - Self-country assessment
- | | |
|---|---------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.0 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... | Fragile |
| Self-country assessment | NA |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	197,716

Côte d'Ivoire

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	45.8
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	29

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	56.9
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	45.7
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	73.3
Development agencies	75.0
Assessment of needs	50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	58.4

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
 - Self-country assessment.....
- | | |
|---|---------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.1 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... | Fragile |
| Self-country assessment..... | 3.8 |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	601,156

Djibouti

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	49.9
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	25

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	55.9
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	84.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	90.0
Development agencies	75.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	47.6

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
- Self-country assessment

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	2,810

Egypt

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	53.8
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	16

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	50.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	72.9
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	81.7
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	62.7

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
- Self-country assessment

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	0

Ethiopia

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	49.0
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	27

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	57.8
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	58.6
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	78.3
Development agencies	75.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	72.9

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
 - Self-country assessment
- | | |
|---|-------------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.4 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... | Non-Fragile |
| Self-country assessment | NA |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	3
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	1,414,947

Gabon

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	40.1
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	37

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	48.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	41.4
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	68.3
Development agencies	75.0
Assessment of needs	50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	50.7

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012).....NA
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....Non-Fragile
- Self-country assessment

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	291,248

Gambia (The)

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	63.5
Level of Capacity Development	High
Rank	6

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	62.8
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	82.9
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	84.2
Development agencies	100
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	69.4

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
- Self-country assessment

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	339,961

Ghana

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	54.8
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	14

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	72.3
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	70.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	75.8
Development agencies	100
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	71.2

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)
 - Self-country assessment
- | | |
|--|-------------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.8 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13) | Non-Fragile |
| Self-country assessment | NA |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	5
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	1,920,100

Guinea

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	45.3
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	31

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	66.8
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	27.1
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	70.8
Development agencies	75.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	60.7

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
 - Self-country assessment
- | | |
|---|---------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.0 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... | Fragile |
| Self-country assessment | NA |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	2,628

Guinea-Bissau

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	37.4
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank	40

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development	28.9
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	67.1
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	87.5
Development agencies	100
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security	44.1

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)
 - Self-country assessment
- | | |
|--|---------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 2.6 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13) | Fragile |
| Self-country assessment | NA |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$)	25,000

Kenya

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	55.3
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	12

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	64.1
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	31.4
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	75.8
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	67.8

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
 - Self-country assessment.....
- | | |
|-------|-------------|
| | 3.9 |
| | Non-Fragile |
| | 4.6 |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	4
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	2,029,316

Lesotho

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	57.9
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	10

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	69.3
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	75.7
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	86.7
Development agencies	00
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	60.9

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
- Self-country assessment

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	237,586

Liberia

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	51.3
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	18

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	66.6
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	82.9
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	54.2
Development agencies	100
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	64.0

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
 - Self-country assessment.....
- | | |
|---|---------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.1 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... | Fragile |
| Self-country assessment..... | 4.1 |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	213,596

Madagascar

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	43.1
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	34

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	32.9
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities... ..	68.6
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	68.3
Development agencies	75.0
Assessment of needs	00.0
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	71.9

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
 - Self-country assessment
- | | |
|---|-------------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.0 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... | Non-Fragile |
| Self-country assessment | NA |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	404,138

Malawi

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	60.1
Level of Capacity Development	High
Rank	8

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	72.8
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	77.1
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	81.7
Development agencies	100
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	65.7

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)
 - Self-country assessment
- | | |
|--|-------------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.2 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13) | Non-Fragile |
| Self-country assessment | NA |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	99,712

Mali

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	60.8
Level of Capacity Development	High
Rank	7

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	64.1
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	72.9
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	68.3
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	67.1

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) 3.4
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... Non-Fragile
- Self-country assessment

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	3
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	1,026,046

Mauritania

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	39.8
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank	39

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development	42.3
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	70.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	70.8
Development agencies	25.0
Assessment of needs	50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security	55.3

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
 - Self-country assessment.....
- | | |
|---|-------------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.2 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... | Non-Fragile |
| Self-country assessment..... | 3.6 |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	366,838

Mauritius

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	64.0
Level of Capacity Development	High
Rank	5

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	76.7
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	75.7
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	80.8
Development agencies	100
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	67.1

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
- Self-country assessment

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	0

Morocco

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	73.1
Level of Capacity Development	High
Rank	1

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	67.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	70.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	92.5
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	67.8

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012).....NA
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....Non-Fragile
- Self-country assessment

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	4,052

Mozambique

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	50.8
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	22

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	68.0
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	82.9
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	91.7
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	58.8

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)
- Self-country assessment

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	3
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	471,694

Namibia

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	44.8
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	33

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	67.4
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	84.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	91.7
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	50.8

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)NA
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)Non-Fragile
- Self-country assessment

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	85,208

Niger

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	46.6
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	28

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	65.3
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	74.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	81.7
Development agencies	100
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	55.8

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)
 - Self-country assessment
- | | |
|--|-------------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.5 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13) | Non-Fragile |
| Self-country assessment | NA |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	182,910

Nigeria

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	40.0
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	38

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	55.6
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	68.6
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	70.8
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	80.5

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
- Self-country assessment

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	3
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	1,846,265

Rwanda

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	68.3
Level of Capacity Development	High
Rank	2

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	72.4
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	94.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	86.7
Development agencies	75.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	57.4

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
 - Self-country assessment.....
- | | |
|---|-------------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.8 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... | Non-Fragile |
| Self-country assessment..... | 5.0 |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	1,008,988

São Tomé and Príncipe

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	32.3
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank	41

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development	19.4
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	80.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	81.7
Development agencies	100
Assessment of needs	00.0
Agricultural transformation and food security	31.7

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)3.1
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....Non-Fragile
- Self-country assessmentNA

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	36,661

Senegal

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	51.1
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	19

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	64.4
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	71.4
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	75.8
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	67.1

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)
 - Self-country assessment
- | | |
|--|-------------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.8 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13) | Non-Fragile |
| Self-country assessment | NA |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	1,026,871

Sierra Leone

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	50.8
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	23

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	64.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	80.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	78.3
Development agencies	75.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	57.3

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
 - Self-country assessment
- | | |
|---|---------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.3 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... | Fragile |
| Self-country assessment | NA |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	131,765

South Sudan

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	41.6
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	35

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	49.2
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	67.1
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	80.0
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	41.6

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... Non-Fragile
- Self-country assessment

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	1
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	5,600

Swaziland

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	32.0
Level of Capacity Development	Low
Rank	42

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development	24.9
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	7.1
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	74.2
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	00.0
Agricultural transformation and food security	42.3

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012).....NA
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)Non-Fragile
- Self-country assessment.....3.7

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	206,098

Tanzania

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	64.4
Level of Capacity Development	High
Rank	4

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	64.1
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	70.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	87.5
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	67.9

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... Non-Fragile
 - Self-country assessment.....
- | | |
|------------------------------------|-----|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.8 |
| Self-country assessment..... | 3.4 |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	4
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	1,036,859

Togo

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	45.5
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	30

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	47.7
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	84.3
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	80.0
Development agencies	75.0
Assessment of needs	00.0
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	60.9

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)
 - Self-country assessment.....
- | | |
|--|---------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.0 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13) | Fragile |
| Self-country assessment..... | 3.4 |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	237,460

Tunisia

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	58.6
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	9

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	47.7
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	90.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	74.2
Development agencies	100
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	72.4

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012).....NA
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....Non-Fragile
- Self-country assessment

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	0
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	0

Uganda

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	53.4
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	17

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	54.7
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	55.7
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	80.8
Development agencies	75.0
Assessment of needs	50.0
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	69.2

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)..... 3.7
- State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... Non-Fragile
- Self-country assessment..... 3.6

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	2
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	691,927

Zambia

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	54.7
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	15

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	36.5
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	70.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	84.2
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	66.2

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
 - Self-country assessment.....
- | | |
|---|-------------|
| IRAI Value (World Bank 2012) | 3.5 |
| State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13)..... | Non-Fragile |
| Self-country assessment..... | 3.7 |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	3
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	1,663,250

Zimbabwe

ACI Composite Index

ACI Composite Index value	50.9
Level of Capacity Development.....	Medium
Rank	21

Assessment of capacity development areas: Component Indexes values

Policy choices for capacity development.....	53.7
Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities	80.0
Gender equality mainstreaming and social inclusion	79.2
Development agencies	50.0
Assessment of needs	100
Agricultural transformation and food security.....	63.5

Assessment of the quality of the country's policy and institutional framework

- IRAI Value (World Bank 2012)
 - State of Fragility (World Bank Harmonized list FY13).....
 - Self-country assessment.....
- | | |
|-------|---------|
| | 2.2 |
| | Fragile |
| | 3.2 |

ACBF-related activities

No. of active ACBF-supported projects in 2012	5
Total cumulative grant disbursed in 2012 (US\$).....	2,291,132



Compendium of Statistics

Strategic policy choices for capacity development

No.	Country	Existence of a National Development Strategy	Number of NDS since 2000	Year of adoption of latest version	Integration of Capacity Development in National Development Strategy/ National Development Plan (NDS)	Specific National Program for CD	Level of Government Commitment to MDGs	Number of targets of MDGs achieved
1	BENIN	YES	3	2011	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	2
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	2	2010	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	Average	3
3	BURUNDI	YES	1	2012	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	2
4	CABO VERDE	YES	3	2013	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	6
5	CAMEROON	YES	2	2009	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	1
6	CAR	YES	2	2011	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	NO	Low	0
7	CHAD	YES	3	2013	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	NO	High	0
8	COMOROS	YES	2	2009	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	NO	Low	2
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	2	2011	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	2
10	CONGO, REP	YES	2	2012	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	NO	High	
11	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	YES	2	2012	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	YES	Average	
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	3	2010	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	5
13	EGYPT	YES	4	2013	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	Average	8
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	3	2011	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	YES	High	4
15	GABON	YES	2	2011	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	Average	2
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	3	2012	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	5
17	GHANA	YES	3	2010	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	3
18	GUINEA	YES	3	2013	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	3
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	2	2011	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	NO	High	0
20	KENYA	YES	3	2013	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	9
21	LESOTHO	YES	3	2012	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	0
22	LIBERIA	YES	8	2012	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	0
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	2	2006	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	NO	High	5
24	MALAWI	YES	5	2012	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	8
25	MALI	YES	4	2011	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	10
26	MAURITANIA	YES	3	2011	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	NO	High	0
27	MAURITIUS	YES	6	2013	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	11
28	MOROCCO	YES	4	2011	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	YES	Average	5
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	3	2010	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	YES	High	1
30	NAMIBIA	YES	3	2012	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	
31	NIGER	YES	3	2012	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	0
32	NIGERIA	YES	4	2010	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	1
33	RWANDA	YES	3	3	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	17
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	2	2012	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	NO	Average	
35	SENEGAL	YES	4	2013	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	YES	High	1
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	3	2008	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	High	0
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	2	2011	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	Average	2
38	SWAZILAND	YES	1	2006	CD not mainstreamed	NO	High	0
39	TANZANIA	YES	4	2010	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	YES	Average	10
40	TOGO	YES	4	2012	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	NO	Average	1
41	TUNISIA	YES	3	2010	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	NO	High	15
42	UGANDA	YES	2	2013	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	NO	Average	10
43	ZAMBIA	YES	4	2011	CD not mainstreamed	YES	High	4
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	6	2011	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	YES	Average	4

(...) Data not available

NDS = National Development Strategy/National Development Plan

CD = Capacity Development

MDGs = Millennium Development Goals

Policy environment/Efficiency of instrument

No.	Country	Level of legitimacy of the National Development Strategy	Levels of incentives for compliance provided by the National Development Strategy	Level of flexibility of the National Development Strategy
1	BENIN	High	High	High
2	BURKINA FASO	High	High	High
3	BURUNDI	High	High	High
4	CABO VERDE	Average	Average	High
5	CAMEROON	High	High	High
6	CAR	Average	High	High
7	CHAD	High	High	High
8	COMOROS	Average	Low	Average
9	CONGO (DRC)	High	High	High
10	CONGO, REP	High	High	High
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	High	High	High
12	DJIBOUTI	Average	Average	Average
13	EGYPT	Average	Average	Average
14	ETHIOPIA	High	Average	Average
15	GABON	Average	Average	Average
16	GAMBIA (THE)	High	High	High
17	GHANA	High	High	High
18	GUINEA	High	Average	High
19	GUINEA BISSAU	High	Low	Average
20	KENYA	High	High	High
21	LESOTHO	High	High	Average
22	LIBERIA	High	High	High
23	MADAGASCAR	Low	Low	Low
24	MALAWI	High	High	High
25	MALI	High	High	High
26	MAURITANIA	High	High	Average
27	MAURITIUS	High	High	High
28	MOROCCO	Average	Average	Average
29	MOZAMBIQUE	High	Average	High
30	NAMIBIA	High	High	Average
31	NIGER	High	High	High
32	NIGERIA	Average	Average	High
33	RWANDA	High	High	High
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	Low	Low	Average
35	SENEGAL	High	High	Average
36	SIERRA LEONE	High	High	High
37	SOUTH SUDAN	Average	Average	Low
38	SWAZILAND	High	Low	Average
39	TANZANIA	Average	Average	High
40	TOGO	High	High	High
41	TUNISIA	Average	Average	Average
42	UGANDA	High	High	Average
43	ZAMBIA	Average	Average	Average
44	ZIMBABWE	High	Average	Average

Dialog mechanisms for capacity development

No.	Country	Effective dialog mechanism (and other links as appropriate) among domestic institutions (civil society, private sector) engaged in CD	Level of effectiveness	Effective dialog mechanism established by Government with development partners relating specifically to CD	Level of effectiveness
1	BENIN	Institutionalized dialog	Low	CD discussed within broader dialog	Low
2	BURKINA FASO	Institutionalized dialog	High	Institutionalized dialog	High
3	BURUNDI	Institutionalized dialog	Average	Institutionalized dialog	Average
4	CABO VERDE	Informal dialog	Average	Institutionalized dialog	High
5	CAMEROON	Institutionalized dialog	Average	CD discussed within broader dialog	Average
6	CAR	Institutionalized dialog	Very Low	CD discussed within broader dialog	High
7	CHAD	Institutionalized dialog	High	CD discussed within broader dialog	High
8	COMOROS	No institutionalized mechanism		No institutionalized mechanism	
9	CONGO (DRC)	Institutionalized dialog	Average	Institutionalized dialog	High
10	CONGO, REP	Institutionalized dialog	Average	Institutionalized dialog	Average
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	Institutionalized dialog	Average	No institutionalized mechanism	
12	DJIBOUTI	Institutionalized dialog	Average	CD discussed within broader dialog	Average
13	EGYPT	Institutionalized dialog	Average	Institutionalized dialog	High
14	ETHIOPIA	Institutionalized dialog	Average	CD discussed within broader dialog	High
15	GABON	Institutionalized dialog	Average	CD discussed within broader dialog	Low
16	GAMBIA (THE)	Institutionalized dialog	High	CD discussed within broader dialog	High
17	GHANA	Institutionalized dialog	Average	Institutionalized dialog	Average
18	GUINEA	Institutionalized dialog	High	Institutionalized dialog	High
19	GUINEA BISSAU	No institutionalized mechanism		No institutionalized mechanism	
20	KENYA	Institutionalized dialog	Average	Institutionalized dialog	Average
21	LESOTHO	Institutionalized dialog	Average	Institutionalized dialog	Very High
22	LIBERIA	Institutionalized dialog	High	Institutionalized dialog	High
23	MADAGASCAR	No institutionalized mechanism		No institutionalized mechanism	
24	MALAWI	Institutionalized dialog	Average	Institutionalized dialog	High
25	MALI	Institutionalized dialog	Average	CD discussed within broader dialog	Very Low
26	MAURITANIA	No institutionalized mechanism		No institutionalized mechanism	
27	MAURITIUS	Institutionalized dialog	Very High	Institutionalized dialog	Very High
28	MOROCCO	Institutionalized dialog	Average	Institutionalized dialog	Average
29	MOZAMBIQUE	Institutionalized dialog	Very High	CD discussed within broader dialog	High
30	NAMIBIA	Institutionalized dialog	Average	Institutionalized dialog	High
31	NIGER	Informal dialog	Average	CD discussed within broader dialog	High
32	NIGERIA	Informal dialog	Average	Institutionalized dialog	Average
33	RWANDA	Institutionalized dialog	Very High	Institutionalized dialog	Very High
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	No institutionalized mechanism		No institutionalized mechanism	
35	SENEGAL	Informal dialog	Average	Institutionalized dialog	High
36	SIERRA LEONE	Informal dialog	High	Institutionalized dialog	Very High
37	SOUTH SUDAN	Institutionalized dialog	Very High	Institutionalized dialog	High
38	SWAZILAND	No institutionalized mechanism		CD discussed within broader dialog	Average
39	TANZANIA	Informal dialog	Average	Institutionalized dialog	High
40	TOGO	No institutionalized mechanism		No institutionalized mechanism	
41	TUNISIA	Institutionalized dialog	High	CD discussed within broader dialog	High
42	UGANDA	Informal dialog	High	Institutionalized dialog	Average
43	ZAMBIA	No institutionalized mechanism		CD discussed within broader dialog	
44	ZIMBABWE	Institutionalized dialog	Low	Institutionalized dialog	High

(...) Data not available

Dialog mechanisms for capacity development (Cont'd)

No.	Country	During 2011 calendar year, how frequently did the Head of State, the Head of government and/or other high officials speak publicly and favorably about capacity development efforts?	Level of civil society participation in priority setting related to capacity development agenda	Level of transparency of information to civil society about the capacity development agenda
1	BENIN	3	2	1
2	BURKINA FASO	3	2	1
3	BURUNDI	3	2	2
4	CABO VERDE	3	1	1
5	CAMEROON	3	1	2
6	CAR	3	1	1
7	CHAD	3	3	3
8	COMOROS	3	2	2
9	CONGO (DRC)	2	2	2
10	CONGO, REP	3	1	1
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	3	3	3
12	DJIBOUTI	3	2	2
13	EGYPT	3	2	3
14	ETHIOPIA	3	2	2
15	GABON	3	2	1
16	GAMBIA (THE)	3	1	2
17	GHANA	3	3	2
18	GUINEA	3	2	2
19	GUINEA BISSAU	3	1	1
20	KENYA	3	2	2
21	LESOTHO	3	3	3
22	LIBERIA	3	3	3
23	MADAGASCAR	3	1	3
24	MALAWI	3	2	2
25	MALI	3	2	2
26	MAURITANIA	2	1	1
27	MAURITIUS	3	2	3
28	MOROCCO	3	2	2
29	MOZAMBIQUE	2	6	6
30	NAMIBIA	3	2	3
31	NIGER	3	1	1
32	NIGERIA	3	1	1
33	RWANDA	3	2	2
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE			
35	SENEGAL	3	1	3
36	SIERRA LEONE	3	1	1
37	SOUTH SUDAN	2	1	1
38	SWAZILAND	1	1	1
39	TANZANIA	3	2	1
40	TOGO	2	1	1
41	TUNISIA	3	3	2
42	UGANDA	2	2	2
43	ZAMBIA	2	2	2
44	ZIMBABWE	3	1	1

(...) Data not available

Strategic policy choices for improving the statistical system

No.	Country	Existence of a National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS)	Year of adoption of NSDS	NSDS is fully operational	Statistics taught at any of the higher training institutions	National Statistics Office operate an in-service training center	Signing of the African Charter on Statistics (adopted on 3rd February 2009)
1	BENIN	YES	2008	YES	YES	YES	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	2003	YES	NO	YES	YES
3	BURUNDI	YES	2011	YES	NO	NO	YES
4	CABO VERDE	YES	2006	YES	YES	NO	YES
5	CAMEROON	YES	2009	YES	YES	YES	NO
6	CAR	NO		NO	YES	NO	NO
7	CHAD	YES	2011	YES	NO	NO	NO
8	COMOROS	YES	2009	YES	YES	NO	YES
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	2012	YES	YES	YES	YES
10	CONGO, REP	YES		NO	YES	NO	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES		YES	NO	NO	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	2010	YES	YES	YES	NO
13	EGYPT	NO			YES	YES	NO
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	2009	YES	YES	YES	NO
15	GABON	YES	2010	NO	YES	NO	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	2007	YES	NO	NO	YES
17	GHANA	YES	2008	YES	YES	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	YES	2008	YES	YES	NO	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	NO			NO	NO	YES
20	KENYA	NO		YES	NO	YES	YES
21	LESOTHO	YES	2011	YES	YES	NO	YES
22	LIBERIA	YES	2008	YES	NO	YES	NO
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	2008	YES	YES	YES	NO
24	MALAWI	YES	2013	YES	YES	YES	YES
25	MALI	YES	2006	YES	NO	NO	YES
26	MAURITANIA	YES	2011	YES	YES	NO	NO
27	MAURITIUS	YES	2007	YES	YES	YES	YES
28	MOROCCO	YES	2004	YES	YES	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	2012	YES	YES	YES	YES
30	NAMIBIA	YES	2011	YES	YES	YES	NO
31	NIGER	YES	2008	YES	YES	YES	YES
32	NIGERIA	YES	2010	YES	YES	YES	NO
33	RWANDA	YES	2010	YES	YES	NO	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	2009	NO	NO	NO	YES
35	SENEGAL	YES	2007	YES	YES	YES	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	2008	YES	YES	NO	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	2012	YES	YES	YES	NO
38	SWAZILAND	NO			YES	NO	NO
39	TANZANIA	YES	2012	YES	YES	YES	YES
40	TOGO	YES	2008	YES	YES	NO	YES
41	TUNISIA	NO			YES	NO	YES
42	UGANDA	YES	2006	YES	YES	NO	YES
43	ZAMBIA	NO			YES	NO	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	2011	YES	YES	YES	NO

(...) Data not available

Financial commitment for capacity development

No.	Country	Proportion of Government budget allocated to CD (%)	Official Development Assistance in % of Government budget
1	BENIN	5.9	13.7
2	BURKINA FASO	2.4	1.9
3	BURUNDI	-	-
4	CABO VERDE	23.8	5.2
5	CAMEROON	0.6	23.6
6	CAR	1.6	3.8
7	CHAD	20.4	2.1
8	COMOROS	23.1	80.0
9	CONGO (DRC)	0.0	2.4
10	CONGO, REP	6.2	0.1
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	0.8	-
12	DJIBOUTI	0.0	0.9
13	EGYPT	0.1	2.4
14	ETHIOPIA	0.8	0.6
15	GABON	10.5	0.1
16	GAMBIA (THE)	10.3	0.0
17	GHANA	-	-
18	GUINEA	3.5	14.6
19	GUINEA BISSAU	0.5	0.0
20	KENYA	0.5	0.1
21	LESOTHO	-	20.4
22	LIBERIA	0.3	0.3
23	MADAGASCAR	0.1	2.7
24	MALAWI	0.2	3.0
25	MALI	27.8	0.0
26	MAURITANIA	1.7	0.6
27	MAURITIUS	-	-
28	MOROCCO	55.6	44.4
29	MOZAMBIQUE	-	7.6
30	NAMIBIA	22.6	-
31	NIGER	0.0	0.3
32	NIGERIA	0.3	-
33	RWANDA	0.4	-
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	0.4	-
35	SENEGAL	0.0	-
36	SIERRA LEONE	0.3	0.2
37	SOUTH SUDAN	-	0.1
38	SWAZILAND	-	-
39	TANZANIA	6.3	21.0
40	TOGO	0.4	-
41	TUNISIA	4.4	6.9
42	UGANDA	-	-
43	ZAMBIA	-	-
44	ZIMBABWE	1.4	0.0

(...) Data not available

Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities

No.	Country	Endorsement of the Busan Global Partnership	The country has an aid policy	Existence of an aid coordination mechanism	Mutual accountability framework in place	Assessment of coordination of support to capacity in the country Scale 1 = Very weak to 6 = Very strong
1	BENIN	YES	YES	YES	YES	3
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	YES	YES	4
3	BURUNDI	YES	YES	YES	YES	2
4	CABO VERDE	YES	YES	YES	YES	4
5	CAMEROON	YES	NO	NO	NO	3
6	CAR	YES	YES	YES	NO	3
7	CHAD	YES	NO	YES	YES	3
8	COMOROS	YES	NO	YES	NO	3
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	NO	NO	YES	4
10	CONGO, REP	YES	NO	NO	NO	2
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	NO	YES	YES	2
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	YES	YES	YES	3
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	YES	YES	4
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	NO	YES	NO	4
15	GABON	NO	NO	NO	YES	3
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	YES	YES	YES	5
17	GHANA	YES	YES	YES	YES	3
18	GUINEA	YES	NO	NO	NO	3
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	YES	NO	NO	2
20	KENYA	YES	NO	NO	NO	2
21	LESOTHO	YES	YES	YES	NO	5
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	5
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	NO	YES	YES	5
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	YES	YES	3
25	MALI	YES	NO	YES	YES	4
26	MAURITANIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	3
27	MAURITIUS	NO	YES	YES	YES	5
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	YES	YES	3
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	YES	YES	YES	5
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	YES	NO	3
31	NIGER	YES	NO	YES	YES	2
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	5
33	RWANDA	YES	YES	YES	YES	4
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	YES	YES	NO	4
35	SENEGAL	YES	YES	YES	YES	1
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	YES	YES	NO	4
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	YES	YES	YES	2
38	SWAZILAND	YES	YES	YES	YES	3
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	3
40	TOGO	YES	YES	YES	YES	3
41	TUNISIA	YES	YES	YES	NO	5
42	UGANDA	YES	NO	YES	NO	3
43	ZAMBIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	3
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	YES	NO	4



Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities (Cont'd)

No.	Country	Proportion of ODA for CD scheduled and disbursed within 2011 (%)	Percent of bilateral aid for capacity that was untied in calendar year 2011 (%)	Trend of proportion of bilateral aid for CD, with respect to 2011	M&E framework to assess progress against NDS developed
1	BENIN	90	90	Stable	Adequate M&E
2	BURKINA FASO	85	90	Decreased	M&E tools, but not adequate
3	BURUNDI	69	9	Decreased	M&E tools, but not adequate
4	CABO VERDE	209	31.2	Stable	Adequate M&E
5	CAMEROON	67			M&E tools, but not adequate
6	CAR	76		Stable	M&E tools, but not adequate
7	CHAD	70	80	Decreased	M&E tools, but not adequate
8	COMOROS	40	70	Increased	Adequate M&E
9	CONGO (DRC)	10	5	Stable	M&E tools, but not adequate
10	CONGO, REP	0	0	Increased	No M&E mechanism in place
11	COTE D'IVOIRE				Adequate M&E
12	DJIBOUTI	48.6	17	Stable	Adequate M&E
13	EGYPT			Decreased	M&E tools, but not adequate
14	ETHIOPIA			Increased	M&E tools, but not adequate
15	GABON	80.1	100	Decreased	M&E tools, but not adequate
16	GAMBIA (THE)			Increased	Adequate M&E
17	GHANA			Decreased	M&E tools, but not adequate
18	GUINEA	38.4	60	Stable	No M&E mechanism in place
19	GUINEA BISSAU			Decreased	M&E tools, but not adequate
20	KENYA	58	78	Stable	M&E tools, but not adequate
21	LESOTHO	177	7	Stable	Adequate M&E
22	LIBERIA	85	89	Stable	M&E tools, but not adequate
23	MADAGASCAR			Increased	Adequate M&E
24	MALAWI	66	88	Increased	Adequate M&E
25	MALI	0	0	Decreased	M&E tools, but not adequate
26	MAURITANIA			Decreased	M&E tools, but not adequate
27	MAURITIUS		0	Stable	Adequate M&E
28	MOROCCO	35	30	Increased	M&E tools, but not adequate
29	MOZAMBIQUE	18	36.5	Increased	Adequate M&E
30	NAMIBIA	30		Stable	Adequate M&E
31	NIGER	51	0.5	Decreased	Adequate M&E
32	NIGERIA			Increased	Adequate M&E
33	RWANDA	56	60	Decreased	Adequate M&E
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE		60	Stable	M&E tools, but not adequate
35	SENEGAL			Stable	M&E tools, but not adequate
36	SIERRA LEONE	5	70	Increased	Adequate M&E
37	SOUTH SUDAN	50	91	Increased	M&E tools, but not adequate
38	SWAZILAND	70	90		Adequate M&E
39	TANZANIA	98		Increased	M&E tools, but not adequate
40	TOGO			Stable	Adequate M&E
41	TUNISIA	100		Stable	Adequate M&E
42	UGANDA			Increased	M&E tools, but not adequate
43	ZAMBIA			Stable	Adequate M&E
44	ZIMBABWE			Decreased	Adequate M&E

(...) Data not available

Aid effectiveness related to capacity development activities (Cont'd)

No.	Country	Mutual assessment of progress in implementing agreed commitments between the government and the community of donors conducted	Tracking system on CD allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment	Transparency of information on bilateral cooperation on capacity development
1	BENIN	YES	NO	NO
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	YES
3	BURUNDI	YES	NO	NO
4	CABO VERDE	YES	YES	YES
5	CAMEROON	YES	NO	NO
6	CAR	YES	NO	NO
7	CHAD	YES	NO	YES
8	COMOROS		NO	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	YES	YES
10	CONGO, REP	NO	NO	YES
10	COTE D'IVOIRE	NO	NO	NO
11	DJIBOUTI	YES	YES	YES
13	EGYPT	NO	YES	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	YES	YES
15	GABON	YES	NO	NO
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	NO	YES
17	GHANA	NO	NO	YES
18	GUINEA	NO	YES	NO
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	NO	NO
20	KENYA	NO	NO	NO
21	LESOTHO	NO	NO	YES
22	LIBERIA	YES	NO	NO
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	NO	YES
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	YES
25	MALI	YES	NO	YES
26	MAURITANIA		NO	YES
27	MAURITIUS	YES	YES	YES
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	YES	YES
30	NAMIBIA	YES	NO	YES
31	NIGER	YES	NO	NO
32	NIGERIA	NO	NO	YES
33	RWANDA	YES	YES	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	NO	NO
35	SENEGAL	YES	NO	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	NO	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	YES	YES
38	SWAZILAND	YES		
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES	YES
40	TOGO	YES	NO	NO
41	TUNISIA	YES	NO	YES
42	UGANDA	YES	YES	YES
43	ZAMBIA	NO	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	NO	YES	YES

(...) Data not available

Gender equality mainstreaming

No.	Country	Ratification of CEDAW	Year of ratification	Report to the Committee	Institutional mechanisms to implement the CEDAW
1	BENIN	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1992	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
2	BURKINA FASO	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1984	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
3	BURUNDI	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1991	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
4	CABO VERDE	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1979	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
5	CAMEROON	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1994	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
6	CAR	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1991	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
7	CHAD	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1995	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special man
8	COMOROS	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1994	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
9	CONGO (DRC)	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1986	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special man
10	CONGO, REP	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1982	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1995	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
12	DJIBOUTI	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1998	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
13	EGYPT	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1996	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
14	ETHIOPIA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1981	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
15	GABON	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1983	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
16	GAMBIA (THE)	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1992	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special man
17	GHANA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1986	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
18	GUINEA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1982	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
19	GUINEA BISSAU	CEDAW ratified without reservation	2008	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
20	KENYA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1984	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
21	LESOTHO	CEDAW ratified with reservations	1995	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special man
22	LIBERIA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	2009	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special man
23	MADAGASCAR	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1998	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
24	MALAWI	CEDAW ratified without reservation	2000	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
25	MALI	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1985	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special man
26	MAURITANIA	CEDAW ratified with reservations	2000	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
27	MAURITIUS	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1984	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
28	MOROCCO	CEDAW ratified without reservation	2012	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
29	MOZAMBIQUE	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1993	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
30	NAMIBIA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1995	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
31	NIGER	CEDAW ratified with reservations	1999	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
32	NIGERIA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1985	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
33	RWANDA	CEDAW ratified with reservations	1981	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special man
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	CEDAW ratified without reservation	2003	No reporting	Focal point at appropriate level
35	SENEGAL	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1985	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
36	SIERRA LEONE	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1988	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
37	SOUTH SUDAN	CEDAW not ratified		No reporting	Focal point at appropriate level
38	SWAZILAND	CEDAW ratified without reservation	2004	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special man
39	TANZANIA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	2004	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special man
40	TOGO	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1983	Some reporting done	Focal point at appropriate level
41	TUNISIA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1985	Reporting is up to date	Focal person without special man
42	UGANDA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1985	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
43	ZAMBIA	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1985	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level
44	ZIMBABWE	CEDAW ratified without reservation	1991	Reporting is up to date	Focal point at appropriate level

(...) Data not available

Gender equality mainstreaming (Cont'd)

No.	Country	Ratification of the Optional Protocol	Embodiment of the principle of equality of men and women in national constitution or other appropriate legislation	Consistency of family laws with the principles of equality between the sexes as under provision of Article 16 of the CEDAW	The country has put in place (enacted) a gender policy
1	BENIN	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
3	BURUNDI	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
4	CABO VERDE	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
5	CAMEROON	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES
6	CAR	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES
7	CHAD	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	NO
8	COMOROS	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
9	CONGO (DRC)	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES
10	CONGO, REP	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
13	EGYPT	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
15	GABON	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
17	GHANA	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
18	GUINEA	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
20	KENYA	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
21	LESOTHO	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
22	LIBERIA	NO	No law or legal measure	Law approved by Parliament	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
24	MALAWI	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
25	MALI	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES
26	MAURITANIA	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
27	MAURITIUS	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
28	MOROCCO	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
30	NAMIBIA	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
31	NIGER	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES
32	NIGERIA	YES	No law or legal measure	Draft law in place	YES
33	RWANDA	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
35	SENEGAL	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	NO	Draft law in place	Draft law in place	YES
38	SWAZILAND	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES
39	TANZANIA	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES
40	TOGO	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	NO
41	TUNISIA	YES	Draft law in place	Draft law in place	YES
42	UGANDA	YES	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES
43	ZAMBIA	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Draft law in place	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	NO	Law approved by Parliament	Law approved by Parliament	YES

Gender equality mainstreaming (Cont'd)

No.	Country	Gender equality policy is integrated in the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy	Government allocated financial resources to gender related activities	Mainstreaming gender in statistics
1	BENIN	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
2	BURKINA FASO	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	Clear guide
3	BURUNDI	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
4	CABO VERDE	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
5	CAMEROON	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	No clear guide
6	CAR	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	No clear guide
7	CHAD	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
8	COMOROS	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
9	CONGO (DRC)	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	Clear guide
10	CONGO, REP	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	No clear guide
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
12	DJIBOUTI	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	
13	EGYPT	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	Clear guide
14	ETHIOPIA	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
15	GABON	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
16	GAMBIA (THE)	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
17	GHANA	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
18	GUINEA	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
19	GUINEA BISSAU	Clear objectives and targets set	No budget line allocated	No clear guide
20	KENYA	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	Clear guide
21	LESOTHO	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
22	LIBERIA	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
23	MADAGASCAR	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
24	MALAWI	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	No clear guide
25	MALI	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
26	MAURITANIA	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	No clear guide
27	MAURITIUS	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
28	MOROCCO	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
29	MOZAMBIQUE	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
30	NAMIBIA	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
31	NIGER	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	Clear guide
32	NIGERIA	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	Unclear kind of budget allocated	Clear guide
33	RWANDA	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	Unclear kind of budget allocated	Clear guide
35	SENEGAL	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	No clear guide
36	SIERRA LEONE	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
37	SOUTH SUDAN	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
38	SWAZILAND	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
39	TANZANIA	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
40	TOGO	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
41	TUNISIA	Gender mainstreamed, no clear objectives and targets	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide
42	UGANDA	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
43	ZAMBIA	Clear objectives and targets set	Sufficient budget allocated	Clear guide
44	ZIMBABWE	Clear objectives and targets set	Unclear kind of budget allocated	No clear guide

(...) Data not available

Social Inclusion

No.	Country	Provisions in the country's Constitution allowing the President / Head of State to appoint some representatives to Parliament in addition to the elected representatives	Instances where some nationals in the country require special permission / qualification to enjoy certain privileges	Social services accessible to nationals in the country on equal terms	Equal employment opportunities for all nationals	Policy or law that provides equal opportunity for all	Policy or law that protects the vulnerable in the society
1	BENIN	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
3	BURUNDI	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
4	CABO VERDE	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
5	CAMEROON	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
6	CAR	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
7	CHAD	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
8	COMOROS	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
10	CONGO, REP	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
15	GABON	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
17	GHANA	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
20	KENYA	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
21	LESOTHO	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
22	LIBERIA	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
23	MADAGASCAR	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
24	MALAWI	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
25	MALI	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
26	MAURITANIA	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
27	MAURITIUS	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
30	NAMIBIA	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
31	NIGER	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
32	NIGERIA	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
35	SENEGAL	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
38	SWAZILAND	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
40	TOGO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
41	TUNISIA	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
42	UGANDA	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
43	ZAMBIA	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES

Partnering for capacity development

No.	Country	Establishment of a National Assistance Coordinating Unit for CD by the Government	Main partners from multi-lateral cooperation have developed a country assistance strategy/program relating to the country
1	BENIN	Clear Unit established	Not all
2	BURKINA FASO	Clear Unit established	Not all
3	BURUNDI	Coordination, not formal	Not all
4	CABO VERDE	Clear Unit established	Not all
5	CAMEROON	Coordination, not formal	All
6	CAR	Clear Unit established	Not all
7	CHAD	No institutional Unit	All
8	COMOROS	Clear Unit established	Not all
9	CONGO (DRC)	Clear Unit established	Not all
10	CONGO, REP	No institutional Unit	Not all
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	Clear Unit established	Not all
12	DJIBOUTI	Clear Unit established	Not all
13	EGYPT	Coordination, not formal	Not all
14	ETHIOPIA	Clear Unit established	Not all
15	GABON	Clear Unit established	Not all
16	GAMBIA (THE)	Clear Unit established	All
17	GHANA	Clear Unit established	All
18	GUINEA	Clear Unit established	Not all
19	GUINEA BISSAU	Clear Unit established	All
20	KENYA	Coordination, not formal	Not all
21	LESOTHO	Clear Unit established	All
22	LIBERIA	Clear Unit established	All
23	MADAGASCAR	Clear Unit established	Not all
24	MALAWI	Clear Unit established	All
25	MALI	Coordination, not formal	Not all
26	MAURITANIA	No institutional Unit	Not all
27	MAURITIUS	Clear Unit established	All
28	MOROCCO	Coordination, not formal	Not all
29	MOZAMBIQUE	Coordination, not formal	Not all
30	NAMIBIA	Coordination, not formal	Not all
31	NIGER	Clear Unit established	All
32	NIGERIA	Coordination, not formal	Not all
33	RWANDA	Coordination, not formal	All
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	Clear Unit established	All
35	SENEGAL	Coordination, not formal	Not all
36	SIERRA LEONE	Clear Unit established	Not all
37	SOUTH SUDAN	Coordination, not formal	Not all
38	SWAZILAND	Coordination, not formal	Not all
39	TANZANIA	Coordination, not formal	Not all
40	TOGO	Clear Unit established	Not all
41	TUNISIA	Clear Unit established	All
42	UGANDA	Coordination, not formal	All
43	ZAMBIA	Coordination, not formal	Not all
44	ZIMBABWE	No institutional Unit	All

(...) Data not available

Capacity profiling and assessments of needs

No.	Country	Capacity profile conducted in the country since 2007	Date last capacity profile conducted	Who commissioned the capacity profiling	Capacity needs assessment conducted in the country since 2007	Who commissioned the capacity needs assessment
1	BENIN	YES	2011	Government Body	YES	Government Body
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	2008	Government Body	YES	Government Body
3	BURUNDI	YES	2012	Development partner	YES	Gvnt & Dev. Partner
4	CABO VERDE	YES	2009	Development partner	YES	Development partner
5	CAMEROON	YES	2008	Government Body	YES	Government Body
6	CAR	YES	2008	Government Body	YES	Development partner
7	CHAD	NO			NO	
8	COMOROS	NO			YES	Development partner
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	2010	Government Body	YES	Government Body
10	CONGO, REP	NO			YES	Government Body
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	NO			YES	Development partner
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	2012	Government Body	YES	Government Body
13	EGYPT	Don't know			YES	Other
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	2012	Government Body	YES	Gvnt & Dev. Partner
15	GABON	Don't know			YES	Government Body
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	2009	Government Body	YES	Government Body
17	GHANA	YES	2011	Development partner	YES	Development partner
18	GUINEA	YES	2010	Gvnt & Dev. Partner	YES	Government Body
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	2007	Government Body	YES	Gvnt & Dev. Partner
20	KENYA	YES	2011	Government Body	NO	
21	LESOTHO	YES	2012	Gvnt & Dev. Partner	YES	Development partner
22	LIBERIA	YES	2008	Gvnt & Dev. Partner	YES	Gvnt & Dev. Partner
23	MADAGASCAR	NO			NO	
24	MALAWI	YES	2013	Gvnt & Dev. Partner	YES	Gvnt & Dev. Partner
25	MALI	YES	2011	Development partner	YES	Government Body
26	MAURITANIA	YES	2009	Development partner		
27	MAURITIUS	YES	2010	Government Body	YES	Government Body
28	MOROCCO	YES		Development partner	YES	Development partner
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	2009	Development partner	YES	Development partner
30	NAMIBIA	YES	2012	Government Body	YES	Government Body
31	NIGER	YES	2010	Gvnt & Dev. Partner	YES	Government Body
32	NIGERIA	NO			YES	Gvnt & Dev. Partner
33	RWANDA	YES	2009	Government Body	YES	Government Body
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	Don't know			Don't know	
35	SENEGAL	YES	2012	Government Body	YES	Government Body
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	2012	Gvnt & Dev. Partner	YES	Government Body
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	2012	Gvnt & Dev. Partner	YES	Gvnt & Dev. Partner
38	SWAZILAND	NO			NO	
39	TANZANIA	YES	2010	Government Body	YES	Government Body
40	TOGO	NO			NO	
41	TUNISIA	YES	2010	Gvnt & Dev. Partner	YES	Gvnt & Dev. Partner
42	UGANDA	NO			YES	Gvnt & Dev. Partner
43	ZAMBIA	YES	2009	Government Body	YES	Government Body
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	2012	Gvnt & Dev. Partner	YES	Gvnt & Dev. Partner

(...) Data not available

Agricultural strategy formulation and implementation

No.	Country	Existence of strategy in use for the agricultural sector	CD integrated in that Strategy	Level of integration
1	BENIN	YES	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	National & Regional
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	National & Regional
3	BURUNDI	YES	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	National/Federal
5	CABO VERDE	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	Regional & Local
4	CAMEROON	YES	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	Region/Province/State
6	CAR	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National/Federal
7	CHAD	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National/Regional
8	COMOROS	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National/Federal
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National/Federal
10	CONGO, REP	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National/Federal
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National/Federal
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National, Regional & Local
13	EGYPT	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National, Regional & Local
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	National, Regional & Local
15	GABON	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National & Regional
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	Region/Province/State
17	GHANA	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National/Federal
18	GUINEA	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National & Regional
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National & Regional
20	KENYA	YES	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	National, Regional & Local
21	LESOTHO	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National/Federal
22	LIBERIA	YES	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	National/Federal
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	National/Federal
24	MALAWI	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National/Federal
25	MALI	YES	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	National/Federal
26	MAURITANIA	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National/Federal
27	MAURITIUS	YES	CD not mainstreamed	National/Federal
28	MOROCCO	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National, Regional & Local
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National/Federal
30	NAMIBIA	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National/Federal
31	NIGER	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National, Regional & Local
32	NIGERIA	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National & Regional
33	RWANDA	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National, Regional & Local
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	NO		
35	SENEGAL	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National/Federal
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National, Regional & Local
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National & Local
38	SWAZILAND	NO		
39	TANZANIA	YES	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	National, Regional & Local
40	TOGO	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National, Regional & Local
41	TUNISIA	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National/Federal
42	UGANDA	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	National & Local
43	ZAMBIA	YES	CD mainstreamed, no clear object	National, Regional & Local
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	CD mainstreamed, clear objective	Local

(...) Data not available

Agricultural strategy formulation and implementation (Cont'd)

No.	Country	Country has completed the CAADP Investment Plan	Country performance in the CAADP four pillars				Completion of CAADP donors roundtable
			Pillar 1	Pillar 2	Pillar 3	Pillar 4	
1	BENIN	YES	Average	High	High	Average	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	High	High	Very High	Average	YES
3	BURUNDI	YES	Average	Average	Average	Average	YES
5	CABO VERDE	YES	High	High	Very High	High	NO
4	CAMEROON	YES	Average	Low	High	Average	YES
6	CAR	YES	Low	Low	Low	Low	YES
7	CHAD	YES	High	Average	High	Low	NO
8	COMOROS	NO					NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	NO	Very Low	Very Low	Very Low	Low	NO
10	CONGO, REP	YES	Average	High	High	Average	NO
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	Low	High	Average	Average	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	Average	Average	Average	Average	YES
13	EGYPT	NO	Average	Average	Average	Average	NO
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	High	Average	High	Average	YES
15	GABON	YES	Low	Average	Average	Low	NO
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	YES
17	GHANA	YES	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	YES
18	GUINEA	YES	High	Average	Average	Average	NO
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	Average	Average	High	Average	YES
20	KENYA	YES	Average	High	High	High	YES
21	LESOTHO	YES	Average	Average	Average	Average	NO
22	LIBERIA	YES	High	High	Average	Average	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	Average	Average	Low	Low	YES
24	MALAWI	YES	Average	Average	High	Average	YES
25	MALI	YES	High	Average	High	High	YES
26	MAURITANIA	YES	Very High	Very High	Very High	Average	YES
27	MAURITIUS	NO	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	NO
28	MOROCCO	YES	Average	Average	Average	Average	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	NO	Average	Average	Low	Average	YES
30	NAMIBIA	NO					
31	NIGER	YES	Average	High	High	Average	YES
32	NIGERIA	YES	Average	Average	Low	Low	YES
33	RWANDA	YES	High	Average	High	Average	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	NO	High	Average	Average	Low	YES
35	SENEGAL	YES	High	Average	High	Average	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	Low	High	High	Average	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	NO	Average	Low	Average	Very Low	NO
38	SWAZILAND	NO	Low	Low	Low	Low	NO
39	TANZANIA	YES	Average	Average	Average	Average	YES
40	TOGO	YES	Average	Average	Average	Low	YES
41	TUNISIA	NO	Average	Average	High	High	NO
42	UGANDA	YES	Average	Average	High	High	YES
43	ZAMBIA	YES	Average	Average	Average	Average	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	NO	Average	Average	Average	Average	

(...) Data not available

Assessment of the level of the implementation of the strategy for agriculture

No.	Country	In agricultural productivity	In training	In R&D	In rural infrastructure & marketing	In water management	In land management	Level of organization for implementation of CAADP	Overall quality of current agricultural Strategy
1	BENIN	High	High	Medium	Medium	High	Medium	High	Medium
2	BURKINA FASO	High	Medium	Very High	High	High	Low		High
3	BURUNDI	Medium	High	Low	Medium	Low	Low	High	Medium
5	CABO VERDE	High	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium
4	CAMEROON	High	High	High	Medium	High	High	High	Medium
6	CAR	High	Medium	Medium	High	High	Very High	High	Medium
7	CHAD	Medium	Low	Low	High	High	High	High	Medium
8	COMOROS	High	High	High	High	Medium	Medium	Very High	Medium
9	CONGO (DRC)	High	High	Medium	High	Medium	High	High	High
10	CONGO, REP	Very High	Very High	Medium	High	Very High	High	High	High
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	High	High	High	High	Medium	High	Medium	Medium
12	DJIBOUTI	Medium	Medium	Medium	High	Medium	Medium	High	Medium
13	EGYPT	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
14	ETHIOPIA	Medium	High	Low	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Medium
15	GABON	Medium	Medium	High	High	Low	Medium	Very High	High
16	GAMBIA (THE)	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Medium
17	GHANA	High	Very High	High	Low	High	Medium	Medium	Medium
18	GUINEA	Medium	Medium	High	High	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium
19	GUINEA BISSAU	High	Very High	Medium	High	High	High		Medium
20	KENYA	High	High	Medium	High	Very High	Medium	High	Medium
21	LESOTHO	High	High	High	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	High
22	LIBERIA	Very High	High	High	Medium	High	Very High	High	High
23	MADAGASCAR	High	High	High	Medium	Medium	Medium	High	Medium
24	MALAWI	Medium	High	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	High	Medium
25	MALI	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium	Low	Low	Low
26	MAURITANIA	Low	High	Medium	Low	Low	High	High	Medium
27	MAURITIUS	Very High	Very High	High	Very High	High	Low	High	High
28	MOROCCO	High	Medium	High	Medium	Medium	Medium	High	Medium
29	MOZAMBIQUE	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	High	High	Low	Low
30	NAMIBIA	High	High	Medium	High	Medium	Medium	Very High	High
31	NIGER	Very High	High	Very High	High	High	High	Medium	High
32	NIGERIA	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	High	High	High	Medium
33	RWANDA	Very High	Low	High	Low	Low	Low	High	High
34	S. T. & PRINCIPE	High	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium
35	SENEGAL	Very High	Very High	Very High	High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High
36	SIERRA LEONE	Medium	Medium	High	High	Medium	Medium	High	High
37	SOUTH SUDAN	Very High	High	High	High	High	High		Medium
38	SWAZILAND	High	Very High	Medium	Very High	Very High		Very High	Medium
39	TANZANIA	High	Medium	Medium	Very High	High	Low	High	High
40	TOGO	High	Medium	High	Medium	High	Medium	High	Medium
41	TUNISIA	High	High	High	High	Medium	High	High	High
42	UGANDA	High	Low	Low	High	Medium	Low	Medium	Low
43	ZAMBIA	Medium	Medium	Low	Medium	Medium	Low	Low	Low
44	ZIMBABWE	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low

(...) Data not available

Agriculture and job creation

No.	Country	Incentives for youth jobs creation	Domain concerned
1	BENIN	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
2	BURKINA FASO		
3	BURUNDI	YES	Production
5	CABO VERDE	YES	Production
4	CAMEROON	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
6	CAR	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
7	CHAD	YES	Production
8	COMOROS	NO	
9	CONGO (DRC)	NO	
10	CONGO, REP	YES	Production & Marketing
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	Production & Transformation
12	DJIBOUTI		
13	EGYPT	NO	
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
15	GABON	YES	Production & Marketing
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
17	GHANA	YES	Production
18	GUINEA	NO	
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
20	KENYA	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
21	LESOTHO	YES	Production & Marketing
22	LIBERIA	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
23	MADAGASCAR	NO	
24	MALAWI	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
25	MALI	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
26	MAURITANIA	YES	Production & Transformation
27	MAURITIUS	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
28	MOROCCO	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
30	NAMIBIA	YES	Production
31	NIGER	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
32	NIGERIA	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
33	RWANDA	YES	Production & Transformation
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE		
35	SENEGAL	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	Production & Marketing
38	SWAZILAND	NO	
39	TANZANIA	YES	Production
40	TOGO	YES	Production & Marketing
41	TUNISIA	YES	Production & Transformation
42	UGANDA	YES	Production, Transformation & Marketing
43	ZAMBIA	YES	Production & Marketing
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	Production

(...) Data not available

Training, Research and Development / Innovations in agriculture

No.	Country	No. of tertiary academic institutions delivering training in agriculture	No. of tertiary academic institutions delivering training in agricultural economics	No. of professional institutions delivering training in agriculture	Level of involvement of NGOs in agricultural sector	Existence of institution/research center dedicated to agriculture	Notable innovations in agric. over the last five years
1	BENIN	6	4	12	High	YES	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	2	3	1	High	YES	YES
3	BURUNDI	3	2	9	High	YES	YES
5	CABO VERDE	1	1	1	Very High	YES	YES
4	CAMEROON	2	1	35	Average	YES	YES
6	CAR	2	2	3	Average	YES	NO
7	CHAD	5	2	2	High	YES	YES
8	COMOROS	0	0	1	Average	YES	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	4	4	2	High	YES	YES
10	CONGO, REP	1	1	2	High	YES	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	2	3	6	Average	YES	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	0	1	2	Average	YES	YES
13	EGYPT	15	15	8	Average	YES	NO
14	ETHIOPIA	28	13	25	High	YES	YES
15	GABON	1	1	2	Low	YES	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	2	1	1	High	YES	YES
17	GHANA	7	5	14	High	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	2	1	3	Average	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	0	0	0	Average	YES	NO
20	KENYA	19	10	4	Very High	YES	YES
21	LESOTHO	2	2	2	High	YES	YES
22	LIBERIA	4	0	4	High	YES	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	3	2	50	Very High	YES	YES
24	MALAWI	3	1	2	High	YES	YES
25	MALI	2	2	9	High	YES	YES
26	MAURITANIA	1	1	2	Average	YES	YES
27	MAURITIUS	1	1	6	High	YES	YES
28	MOROCCO	3	2	12	High	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	5	1	10	Average	YES	YES
30	NAMIBIA	3	1	1	Low	YES	YES
31	NIGER	6	1	1	Average	YES	YES
32	NIGERIA	97	40	50	Low	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	3	1	1	Average	YES	YES
34	S.TOME AND PRINCIPE	1	1	1	Average	YES	NO
35	SENEGAL	2	1	3	High	YES	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	2	3	1	High	YES	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	0	1	1	Average	YES	YES
38	SWAZILAND	1	1	1	High	YES	NO
39	TANZANIA	18	3	10	High	YES	YES
40	TOGO	1	2	4	High	YES	YES
41	TUNISIA	11	8	39	High	YES	YES
42	UGANDA	5	5	5	High	YES	YES
43	ZAMBIA	13	2	2	High	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	10	10	8	High	YES	YES

Role of private sector in the value chain

No.	Country	Intervention of the private sector in the value chain			
		Production and marketing of agricultural inputs	Production of agricultural commodities for local consumption	Production of agricultural commodities for export	Production and processing of agricultural commodities for local consumption
1	BENIN	YES	YES	YES	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	YES	YES
3	BURUNDI	YES	YES	YES	YES
5	CABO VERDE	YES	YES	NO	YES
4	CAMEROON	YES	YES	YES	YES
6	CAR	NO	YES	NO	YES
7	CHAD	NO	YES	YES	YES
8	COMOROS	NO	YES	YES	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	YES	NO	YES
10	CONGO, REP	YES	YES	YES	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	YES	YES	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	NO	YES	NO	YES
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	YES	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	YES	YES	YES
15	GABON	YES	YES	YES	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	YES	YES	YES
17	GHANA	YES	YES	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	YES	YES	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	YES	YES	YES
20	KENYA	YES	YES	YES	YES
21	LESOTHO	YES	YES	YES	YES
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	YES	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	YES	YES	YES
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	YES	YES
25	MALI	YES	YES	YES	YES
26	MAURITANIA	NO	YES	NO	YES
27	MAURITIUS	YES	YES	YES	YES
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	YES	NO
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	YES	YES	YES
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	YES	YES
31	NIGER	NO	YES	YES	YES
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	NO	YES	YES	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	NO	YES	YES	YES
35	SENEGAL	YES	YES	YES	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	NO	YES	YES	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	NO	YES	NO	YES
38	SWAZILAND	YES	YES	YES	YES
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES	YES	YES
40	TOGO	YES	YES	YES	YES
41	TUNISIA	YES	YES	YES	YES
42	UGANDA	YES	YES	YES	YES
43	ZAMBIA	YES	YES	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	YES	YES

Role of private sector in the value chain (Cont'd)

No.	Country	Intervention of the private sector in the value chain				
		Production and processing of agricultural commodities for export	Processing of agricultural products intended for local consumption	Processing of agricultural commodities for export	Marketing of agricultural commodities intended for local consumption	Marketing of agricultural commodities intended for export
1	BENIN	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
3	BURUNDI	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
5	CABO VERDE	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
4	CAMEROON	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
6	CAR	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
7	CHAD	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
8	COMOROS	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES
9	CONGO (DRC)	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
10	CONGO, REP	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
15	GABON	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
17	GHANA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
20	KENYA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
21	LESOTHO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
25	MALI	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
26	MAURITANIA	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
27	MAURITIUS	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
28	MOROCCO	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
31	NIGER	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
35	SENEGAL	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
37	SOUTH SUDAN	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
38	SWAZILAND	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
40	TOGO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
41	TUNISIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
42	UGANDA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
43	ZAMBIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

(...) Data not available

Role of private sector in the value chain (Cont'd)

No.	Country	State involvement in purchase and distribution of inputs	State involvement in procurement and distribution of major agricultural commodities	Level of processing of key agricultural products		Existence of a financial institution dedicated to agriculture	Level of access to market by small farmers
				Major staple agricultural commodity	Major livestock commodity		
1	BENIN	YES	YES	Medium	Low	NO	
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	Low	Low	NO	Medium
3	BURUNDI	YES	YES	Low	Low	YES	Medium
5	CABO VERDE	NO	NO	Very Low	Very Low	YES	Low
4	CAMEROON	YES	YES	Low	Very Low	NO	Medium
6	CAR	NO	NO	Very Low	Very Low	NO	Low
7	CHAD	YES	YES	Low	Low	YES	Medium
8	COMOROS	NO	NO	Very Low	Very Low	YES	Low
9	CONGO (DRC)	NO	NO	Very Low	Low	NO	Medium
10	CONGO, REP	YES	NO	Medium	Very Low	YES	High
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	YES	Low	Very Low	NO	Medium
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	YES	Very Low	Low	YES	Medium
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	Medium	Medium	YES	Medium
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	YES	Low	Medium	YES	Medium
15	GABON	NO	NO	Low	Low	NO	Low
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	YES	Medium	Medium	YES	Medium
17	GHANA	YES	YES	Medium	High	YES	Low
18	GUINEA	YES	YES	Medium	Medium	YES	Low
19	GUINEA BISSAU	NO	NO	Medium	Low	NO	Very Low
20	KENYA	YES	YES	Medium	Medium	YES	Medium
21	LESOTHO	YES	YES	High	Low	NO	Low
22	LIBERIA	NO	NO	High	Medium	YES	High
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	NO	Low	Low	YES	Low
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	Low	Low	YES	Low
25	MALI	NO	NO	Medium	Low	YES	High
26	MAURITANIA	YES	YES	Medium	Medium	YES	
27	MAURITIUS	YES	YES	Medium	Medium	YES	Very High
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	Medium	Medium	YES	Medium
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	NO	Medium	Medium	YES	Low
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	High	Very High	YES	Medium
31	NIGER	YES	YES	Low	Low	YES	Low
32	NIGERIA	YES	NO	Medium	Low	YES	Low
33	RWANDA	NO	YES	Low	High	YES	Medium
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	YES	Low	Low		
35	SENEGAL	YES	YES	High	Medium	YES	Very High
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	YES	Medium	Low	YES	Medium
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	YES	Low	Low	YES	Medium
38	SWAZILAND	YES	YES	Very High	Medium	NO	Medium
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES	Low	Very Low	NO	Medium
40	TOGO	YES	YES	Low	Low	NO	Low
41	TUNISIA	YES	YES	High	High	YES	Medium
42	UGANDA	YES	YES	Low	Low	YES	High
43	ZAMBIA	YES	YES	Very High	Medium	NO	Medium
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	High	High	YES	Medium

(...) Data not available

Food security

No.	Country	Country received food aid over the last 5 years	Existence of a food security & Early warning system	Operated by	The country has put in place a security policy	The country has put in place a security program
1	BENIN	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	Government & NGO	YES	YES
3	BURUNDI	YES	YES	Government & Development partner	YES	YES
5	CABO VERDE	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
4	CAMEROON	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
6	CAR	YES	YES	Government & Development partner	YES	YES
7	CHAD	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
8	COMOROS	NO	YES	Government	YES	YES
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	YES	Government & Development partner	YES	YES
10	CONGO, REP	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	YES	Government & Development partner	YES	YES
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
15	GABON	NO	NO		YES	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
17	GHANA	YES	YES	Other	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	NO	YES	Government & Development partner	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
20	KENYA	YES	YES	Government & NGO	YES	YES
21	LESOTHO	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	Government & Development partner	YES	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	YES	Government & Development partner	NO	YES
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	Government & Development partner	YES	YES
25	MALI	YES	YES	Government	NO	YES
26	MAURITANIA	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
27	MAURITIUS	NO	NO		YES	YES
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	Government & NGO	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	YES	Government	NO	YES
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
31	NIGER	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
32	NIGERIA	NO	YES	Other	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	NO	YES	Government	NO	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
35	SENEGAL	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	YES	Development partner & NGO	NO	YES
38	SWAZILAND	YES	YES	Government	YES	YES
39	TANZANIA	NO	YES	Government	YES	YES
40	TOGO	NO	YES	Government	NO	YES
41	TUNISIA	NO	YES	Government	YES	YES
42	UGANDA	YES	YES	Government & Development partner	YES	YES
43	ZAMBIA	NO	YES	Government	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	Government & Development partner	YES	YES

(...) Data not available

Information system: Agricultural statistics

No.	Country	Agricultural census conducted	Agricultural survey conducted during the last 5 years	Frequency of agricultural surveys	Rating of the current agricultural statistics
1	BENIN	NO	YES	1-2 Years	High
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	3-5 Years	High
3	BURUNDI	NO	YES	3-5 Years	Medium
5	CABO VERDE	YES	YES	6 Years & above	High
4	CAMEROON	YES	YES	1-2 Years	High
6	CAR	YES	YES	1-2 Years	High
7	CHAD	YES	YES	1-2 Years	High
8	COMOROS	YES	NO		Very High
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	YES	3-5 Years	High
10	CONGO, REP	YES	NO		High
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	NO	6 Years & above	High
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	NO	6 Years & above	Very High
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	1-2 Years	Low
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	YES	1-2 Years	Medium
15	GABON	YES	YES	1-2 Years	Very High
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	YES	1-2 Years	High
17	GHANA	YES	YES	1-2 Years	High
18	GUINEA	YES	YES	3-5 Years	High
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	YES	6 Years & above	Very High
20	KENYA	NO	YES	6 Years & above	High
21	LESOTHO	YES	YES	1-2 Years	High
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	1-2 Years	Medium
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	YES	3-5 Years	High
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	6 Years & above	High
25	MALI	YES	YES	1-2 Years	High
26	MAURITANIA	YES	YES	1-2 Years	High
27	MAURITIUS	YES	YES	3-5 Years	High
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	6 Years & above	Medium
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	YES	1-2 Years	High
30	NAMIBIA	YES	NO	6 Years & above	High
31	NIGER	YES	YES	1-2 Years	Medium
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES	1-2 Years	High
33	RWANDA	NO	YES	1-2 Years	Medium
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	NO		
35	SENEGAL	YES	YES	1-2 Years	High
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	YES	3-5 Years	Medium
37	SOUTH SUDAN	NO	NO		High
38	SWAZILAND	YES	YES	1-2 Years	Very High
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES	3-5 Years	High
40	TOGO	YES	YES	1-2 Years	High
41	TUNISIA	YES	YES	1-2 Years	High
42	UGANDA	YES	YES	3-5 Years	Very High
43	ZAMBIA	YES	YES	1-2 Years	Medium
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	1-2 Years	Low

(...) Data not available

Information system: Market information

No.	Country	Existence of an agricultural market information system	Coverage		
			National	Local	Regional
1	BENIN	YES	YES	YES	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	YES	YES
3	BURUNDI	YES	YES	NO	YES
5	CABO VERDE	YES	YES	YES	YES
4	CAMEROON	YES	YES	YES	YES
6	CAR	NO			
7	CHAD	YES	YES	YES	YES
8	COMOROS	NO			
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	YES	YES	YES
10	CONGO, REP	YES	YES	NO	NO
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	YES	YES	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	YES	YES	NO
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	YES	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	YES	NO	YES
15	GABON	YES	NO	YES	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	YES	NO	NO
17	GHANA	YES	YES	NO	YES
18	GUINEA	YES	YES	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	NO			
20	KENYA	YES	YES	YES	YES
21	LESOTHO	YES	YES	YES	YES
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	YES	NO
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	YES	YES	YES
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	YES	YES
25	MALI	YES	YES	YES	YES
26	MAURITANIA	YES	YES	NO	YES
27	MAURITIUS	YES	YES	YES	YES
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	YES	YES	YES
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	YES	YES
31	NIGER	YES	YES	YES	YES
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	YES	YES	YES	NO
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	NO			
35	SENEGAL	YES	YES	YES	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	YES	NO	NO
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	YES	YES	NO
38	SWAZILAND	NO			
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES	YES	YES
40	TOGO	YES	YES	NO	YES
41	TUNISIA	YES	YES	NO	YES
42	UGANDA	YES	YES	NO	NO
43	ZAMBIA	YES	YES	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	NO	NO

(...) Data not available

POLICY ENVIRONMENT

No.	Country	Country's current natural resources status	The country has developed a strategy for the mining sector	The country has developed a Local Environment Plan	In line with AMV, Govt. has created domestic & regional policy environment for mining	Level of transparency of transactions in mining sector
1	BENIN	Mineral producer only	Not at all	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
2	BURKINA FASO	Mineral producer only	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
3	BURUNDI	Mineral producer only	Not at all	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
5	CABO VERDE	None	NA	YES	Not applicable	Fairly transparent
4	CAMEROON	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	Not at all	YES	Creation underway	Very transparent
6	CAR	Mineral producer only	Not at all	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
7	CHAD	Hydrocarbon producer only	YES	YES	No action so far	Fairly transparent
8	COMOROS	Prospective	YES	YES	Creation underway	Not transparent
9	CONGO (DRC)	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	Not at all	YES	Creation underway	Not transparent
10	CONGO, REP	Hydrocarbon producer only	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	Part of NDS	YES	No action so far	Fairly transparent
12	DJIBOUTI	Prospective	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
13	EGYPT	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	YES	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
14	ETHIOPIA	Mineral producer only	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
15	GABON	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	Not at all	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
16	GAMBIA (THE)	None	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Very transparent
17	GHANA	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
18	GUINEA	Mineral producer only	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
19	GUINEA BISSAU	Prospective	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
20	KENYA	Mineral producer only	Not at all	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
21	LESOTHO	Mineral producer only	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
22	LIBERIA	Mineral producer only	YES	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
23	MADAGASCAR	Mineral producer only	Not at all	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
24	MALAWI	Mineral producer only	YES	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
25	MALI	Mineral producer only	YES	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
26	MAURITANIA	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	Not at all	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
27	MAURITIUS	None	NA	YES	NA	NA
28	MOROCCO	Mineral producer only	Not at all	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
29	MOZAMBIQUE	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	YES	NO	No action so far	Not transparent
30	NAMIBIA	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Very transparent
31	NIGER	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
32	NIGERIA	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	YES	YES	Creation underway	Very transparent
33	RWANDA	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	YES	YES	Creation underway	Very transparent
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	Prospective	NA			
35	SENEGAL	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	Not at all	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
36	SIERRA LEONE	Mineral producer only	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Not transparent
37	SOUTH SUDAN	Hydrocarbon producer only	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
38	SWAZILAND	Mineral producer only	YES		Creation underway	Fairly transparent
39	TANZANIA	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	YES	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
40	TOGO	Mineral producer only	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
41	TUNISIA	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	Part of NDS	YES	No action so far	Not transparent
42	UGANDA	Mineral producer only	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
43	ZAMBIA	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent
44	ZIMBABWE	Hydrocarbon & Mineral	Part of NDS	YES	Creation underway	Fairly transparent

NA: Not applicable
 (...): Data not available
 AMV: Africa Mining Vision

POLICY ENVIRONMENT (Cont'd)

No.	Country	Extent to which the environment is enabling for transparency	National consensus for equitable, accountable and sustainable mgmt of NR	Level of participation of CSOs in extractive industries mngt	Level of participation of media in extractive industries mngt	The Constitution provides for CSO involvement in economic policy-making for NRM
1	BENIN	Fair	YES	Fair	Fair	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	Fair	YES	Poor	Fair	NO
3	BURUNDI	Good	YES	Very Good	Very Good	NO
5	CABO VERDE	Good	YES	NA	Good	YES
4	CAMEROON	Good	YES	Poor	Good	YES
6	CAR	Good	YES	Very Good	Very Good	YES
7	CHAD	Good	YES	Very Good	Very Good	YES
8	COMOROS	Poor	YES	NA	NA	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	Poor	NO	Very Good		NO
10	CONGO, REP	Fair	YES	Very Good	Good	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	Fair	NO	Fair	Poor	NO
12	DJIBOUTI	Fair	YES	Good	NA	YES
13	EGYPT	Good	YES	Very Good	Very Good	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	Good	YES	Fair	Good	YES
15	GABON	Fair	YES	Fair	Fair	NO
16	GAMBIA (THE)	Good	YES	NA	Good	YES
17	GHANA	Good	YES	Very Good	Very Good	YES
18	GUINEA	Good	YES	Good	Fair	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	Fair	NO	Fair	Fair	YES
20	KENYA	Fair	YES	Good	Good	NO
21	LESOTHO	Fair	YES	Fair	Fair	NO
22	LIBERIA	Good	YES	Good	Good	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	Fair	NO	Poor	Fair	NO
24	MALAWI	Good	YES	Poor	Fair	YES
25	MALI	Fair	YES	Fair	Good	YES
26	MAURITANIA	Fair	NO	Fair	Fair	NO
27	MAURITIUS	Very Good	YES	NA	NA	YES
28	MOROCCO	Fair	YES	Fair	Fair	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	Good	NO	Good	Poor	NO
30	NAMIBIA	Good	YES	Fair	Very Good	NO
31	NIGER	Very Good	YES	Very Good	Good	YES
32	NIGERIA	Fair	YES	Good	Good	YES
33	RWANDA	Very Good	YES	Very Good	Very Good	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	Fair	YES	Fair	Fair	
35	SENEGAL	Fair	YES	Fair	Fair	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	Fair	NO	Fair	Fair	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	Good	YES	Fair	Fair	YES
38	SWAZILAND	Good		Fair	Very Good	YES
39	TANZANIA	Poor	NO	Poor	Fair	NO
40	TOGO	Fair	YES	Good		YES
41	TUNISIA	Fair	YES	Poor	Fair	YES
42	UGANDA	Good	YES	Very Good	Fair	YES
43	ZAMBIA	Fair	YES	Fair	Fair	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	Fair	YES	Fair	Poor	NO

NA: Not applicable

(...): Information not available

PROCESSES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

No.	Country	The country has joined EITI	The country has not joined EITI and is working towards EITI candidacy	Existence of CSO network to give citizens ability to influence decisions on NR e.g. TAI (Access Initiative)	A multi-stakeholder national dialog platform is established	Local development councils are set up
1	BENIN	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
2	BURKINA FASO	YES		YES	YES	YES
3	BURUNDI	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO
5	CABO VERDE	NO			YES	NO
4	CAMEROON	YES		YES	NO	NO
6	CAR	YES		YES	YES	YES
7	CHAD	YES		YES	YES	YES
8	COMOROS	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES		YES	NO	NO
10	CONGO, REP	YES		YES	YES	NO
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES		YES	NO	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
13	EGYPT	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
15	GABON	YES		YES	NO	NO
16	GAMBIA (THE)	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
17	GHANA	YES		YES	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	YES		NO	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU				YES	NO
20	KENYA	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
21	LESOTHO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	YES		NO	NO	YES
24	MALAWI	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
25	MALI	YES		YES	YES	YES
26	MAURITANIA	YES		NO	YES	NO
27	MAURITIUS					
28	MOROCCO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
30	NAMIBIA	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
31	NIGER	YES		YES	YES	YES
32	NIGERIA	YES		YES	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE					
35	SENEGAL	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES		YES	YES	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO
38	SWAZILAND	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES
39	TANZANIA	YES		YES	YES	YES
40	TOGO	YES		YES	YES	NO
41	TUNISIA	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES
42	UGANDA	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
43	ZAMBIA	YES		YES	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES

(...): Information not available

Global environmental governance

No.	Country	The country has signed up to CASM	The country has signed up to REDD	The country has signed up to Ottawa Process	Knowledge of the quantity & quality of proven & probable NR	Knowledge of where NRs are located	Comprehensive computerized records of resources, in form of maps
1	BENIN	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
3	BURUNDI	YES	YES		NO	YES	YES
5	CABO VERDE		NO		NO	NO	NO
4	CAMEROON	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
6	CAR	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
7	CHAD	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
8	COMOROS	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	YES		NO	YES	YES
10	CONGO, REP	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
13	EGYPT		NO		YES	YES	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
15	GABON	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)		YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
17	GHANA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
20	KENYA		YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
21	LESOTHO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
24	MALAWI	NO	YES		YES	YES	YES
25	MALI	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO
26	MAURITANIA	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
27	MAURITIUS		NO		YES	YES	YES
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
31	NIGER	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
32	NIGERIA	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE				NO	YES	YES
35	SENEGAL	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO
37	SOUTH SUDAN	NO	NO		NO	NO	NO
38	SWAZILAND	NO	NO		YES	YES	YES
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
40	TOGO	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
41	TUNISIA	NO	YES		NO	NO	YES
42	UGANDA	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
43	ZAMBIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES

(...): Information not available

CASM: Communities, Artisanal and Small-scale Mining Initiative

REDD: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation

Global environmental governance (Cont'd)

No.	Country	How much space multilateral & bilateral institutions allow for governments and their citizen to dialogue on NRM	CSO have space/freedom to execute their mandate	The legislature has the mechanism to execute its mandate in environmental governance
1	BENIN	NO	NO	NO
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	NO
3	BURUNDI	NO	NO	NO
5	CABO VERDE	YES	YES	YES
4	CAMEROON	NO	YES	NO
6	CAR	YES	YES	YES
7	CHAD	YES	YES	NO
8	COMOROS	NO	NO	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	NO	YES	NO
10	CONGO, REP	YES	YES	NO
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	NO		NO
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	NO	NO
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	NO	NO
15	GABON	NO	NO	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	NO	YES	YES
17	GHANA	YES	YES	NO
18	GUINEA	YES	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	NO	YES	NO
20	KENYA	NO	NO	NO
21	LESOTHO	NO	YES	NO
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	NO	YES	NO
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	NO
25	MALI	NO	NO	NO
26	MAURITANIA	NO	NO	YES
27	MAURITIUS	YES	YES	YES
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	NO	NO	NO
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	YES
31	NIGER	YES	YES	NO
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	YES	YES	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	NO	YES
35	SENEGAL	NO	NO	NO
36	SIERRA LEONE	NO	YES	NO
37	SOUTH SUDAN		NO	NO
38	SWAZILAND	NO	NO	NO
39	TANZANIA	NO	NO	NO
40	TOGO	NO	YES	NO
41	TUNISIA	NO	NO	NO
42	UGANDA	YES	NO	YES
43	ZAMBIA	YES		NO
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	NO

(...) Information not available

Global environmental governance (Cont'd)

No.	Country	National consensus on the management of natural resources	Cross-sectorial forum mechanism for decisions on natural resources	Alternative asset-holding to ensure continuous generation of stream of income when NR un dry
1	BENIN	NO	NO	NO
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	NO
3	BURUNDI	NO	NO	NO
5	CABO VERDE	YES	YES	YES
4	CAMEROON	NO	YES	NO
6	CAR	YES	YES	YES
7	CHAD	YES	YES	NO
8	COMOROS	NO	NO	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	NO	YES	NO
10	CONGO, REP	YES	YES	NO
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	NO		NO
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	NO	NO
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	NO	NO
15	GABON	NO	NO	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	NO	YES	YES
17	GHANA	YES	YES	NO
18	GUINEA	YES	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	NO	YES	NO
20	KENYA	NO	NO	NO
21	LESOTHO	NO	YES	NO
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	NO	YES	NO
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	NO
25	MALI	NO	NO	NO
26	MAURITANIA	NO	NO	YES
27	MAURITIUS	YES	YES	YES
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	NO	NO	NO
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	YES
31	NIGER	YES	YES	NO
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	YES	YES	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	NO	YES
35	SENEGAL	NO	NO	NO
36	SIERRA LEONE	NO	YES	NO
37	SOUTH SUDAN		NO	NO
38	SWAZILAND	NO	NO	NO
39	TANZANIA	NO	NO	NO
40	TOGO	NO	YES	NO
41	TUNISIA	NO	NO	NO
42	UGANDA	YES	NO	YES
43	ZAMBIA	YES		NO
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	NO

(...) Information not available

Global environmental governance (Cont'd)

No.	Country	How much space multilateral & bilateral institutions allow for governments and their citizen to dialogue on NRM	CSO have space/freedom to execute their mandate	The legislature has the mechanism to execute its mandate in environmental governance
1	BENIN	No space	YES	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	Enough space	YES	YES
3	BURUNDI	No space	YES	YES
5	CABO VERDE	Moderate space	YES	YES
4	CAMEROON	Moderate space	YES	YES
6	CAR	Moderate space	YES	YES
7	CHAD	Moderate space	YES	YES
8	COMOROS	Moderate space	NO	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	Enough space	YES	YES
10	CONGO, REP	Moderate space	YES	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	Moderate space	YES	
12	DJIBOUTI	No space	YES	YES
13	EGYPT	Moderate space	YES	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	Moderate space	NO	YES
15	GABON	Moderate space	YES	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	No space	YES	YES
17	GHANA	Enough space	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	Moderate space	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	Moderate space	YES	YES
20	KENYA	Moderate space	YES	YES
21	LESOTHO	Moderate space	YES	YES
22	LIBERIA	Enough space	YES	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	Moderate space	YES	YES
24	MALAWI	Enough space	YES	YES
25	MALI	Moderate space	YES	YES
26	MAURITANIA	Moderate space	YES	YES
27	MAURITIUS	Enough space	YES	YES
28	MOROCCO	Enough space	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	No space	YES	YES
30	NAMIBIA	Enough space	YES	YES
31	NIGER	Moderate space	YES	YES
32	NIGERIA	Moderate space	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	Enough space	YES	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	No space		
35	SENEGAL	Moderate space	YES	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	Enough space	YES	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	Moderate space	YES	YES
38	SWAZILAND	Moderate space		
39	TANZANIA	Enough space	YES	YES
40	TOGO	Moderate space	YES	YES
41	TUNISIA		YES	YES
42	UGANDA	No space	YES	YES
43	ZAMBIA	Moderate space	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	Enough space	YES	YES

(...) Information not available

Government commitment to environmental sustainability

No.	Country	Extent to which environmental policies foster the protection and sustainable use of NR	The government funds educational and training institutions, R&D organizations & public sector institutions that regulate the mineral sector	Extent to which the government provide infrastructure support for mining investment & infrastructure financing
1	BENIN	Fair	Not enough	Very Low
2	BURKINA FASO	Fair	Not enough	Medium
3	BURUNDI	Fair	Not enough	Very Low
5	CABO VERDE	Good	NA	NA
4	CAMEROON	Fair	Enough	High
6	CAR	Good	Not enough	Low
7	CHAD	Good	Not enough	Medium
8	COMOROS	Fair	Not enough	Very Low
9	CONGO (DRC)	Good	Not enough	Low
10	CONGO, REP	Good	Enough	Medium
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	Fair	Not enough	Medium
12	DJIBOUTI	Fair	Not enough	Medium
13	EGYPT	Very Good	Enough	High
14	ETHIOPIA	Good	Enough	Medium
15	GABON	Good	Enough	High
16	GAMBIA (THE)	Very Good	Not enough	Low
17	GHANA	Good	Enough	Medium
18	GUINEA	Good	Not enough	High
19	GUINEA BISSAU	Good	Not enough	Very Low
20	KENYA	Good	Enough	Low
21	LESOTHO	Fair	Enough	Medium
22	LIBERIA	Fair	Not enough	Medium
23	MADAGASCAR	Fair	Not enough	Low
24	MALAWI	Poor	Enough	Medium
25	MALI	Fair	Not enough	Low
26	MAURITANIA	Good	Enough	Medium
27	MAURITIUS	Very Good	NA	NA
28	MOROCCO	Good	Enough	Medium
29	MOZAMBIQUE	Poor	More than enough	High
30	NAMIBIA	Very Good	More than enough	High
31	NIGER	Very Good	Not enough	Medium
32	NIGERIA	Good	Not enough	Medium
33	RWANDA	Very Good	Enough	Low
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE		NA	NA
35	SENEGAL	Good	Enough	Low
36	SIERRA LEONE	Good	Not enough	Low
37	SOUTH SUDAN	Good	Enough	Medium
38	SWAZILAND	Good	Enough	Medium
39	TANZANIA	Fair	Not enough	Medium
40	TOGO	Fair	Not enough	Medium
41	TUNISIA	Fair	Enough	Very High
42	UGANDA	Good	Not enough	Medium
43	ZAMBIA	Fair	Not enough	Medium
44	ZIMBABWE	Good	Not enough	Medium

NA: Not applicable
(...) Information not available

Early and comprehensive dispute management

No.	Country	The country has experienced a conflict related to NRM	The government has set up effective dispute resolution mechanism in partnership with stakeholders
1	BENIN	NO	NO
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES, in partnership
3	BURUNDI	YES	YES, in partnership
5	CABO VERDE	NO	YES, in partnership
4	CAMEROON	YES	YES, in partnership
6	CAR	YES	YES, in partnership
7	CHAD	NO	YES, in partnership
8	COMOROS	NO	YES, not in partnership
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	YES, in partnership
10	CONGO, REP	YES	YES, in partnership
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	YES, not in partnership
12	DJIBOUTI	NO	YES, in partnership
13	EGYPT	NO	YES, in partnership
14	ETHIOPIA	NO	YES, in partnership
15	GABON	YES	YES, not in partnership
16	GAMBIA (THE)	NO	YES, in partnership
17	GHANA	YES	YES, in partnership
18	GUINEA	YES	YES, in partnership
19	GUINEA BISSAU	NO	NO
20	KENYA	YES	YES, in partnership
21	LESOTHO	YES	NO
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES, in partnership
23	MADAGASCAR	NO	NO
24	MALAWI	YES	NO
25	MALI	NO	YES, in partnership
26	MAURITANIA	YES	NO
27	MAURITIUS	YES	YES, in partnership
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES, not in partnership
29	MOZAMBIQUE	NO	YES, in partnership
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES, in partnership
31	NIGER	NO	YES, in partnership
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES, in partnership
33	RWANDA	YES	YES, in partnership
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	NO	
35	SENEGAL	NO	NO
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	YES, in partnership
37	SOUTH SUDAN	NO	YES, not in partnership
38	SWAZILAND	NO	NO
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES, in partnership
40	TOGO	NO	YES, not in partnership
41	TUNISIA	NO	NO
42	UGANDA	YES	YES, in partnership
43	ZAMBIA	YES	YES, in partnership
44	ZIMBABWE	NO	YES, in partnership

(...) Information not available

Thorough compliance, monitoring and enforcement of commitments

No.	Country	The country has developed a commonly agreed compliance monitoring and enforcement mechanisms with stakeholders	The country is a member of the Kimberley Process
1	BENIN	NO	NA
2	BURKINA FASO	NO	YES
3	BURUNDI	YES	NA
5	CABO VERDE	YES	NA
4	CAMEROON	YES	YES
6	CAR	YES	YES
7	CHAD	YES	NA
8	COMOROS	NO	NA
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	YES
10	CONGO, REP	YES	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE		YES
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	NA
13	EGYPT	YES	NO, though diamond producer
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	NA
15	GABON	NO	NO, though diamond producer
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	NA
17	GHANA	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	NO	NA
20	KENYA	YES	NA
21	LESOTHO	YES	YES
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	NA
24	MALAWI	NO	NA
25	MALI	YES	YES
26	MAURITANIA	YES	NA
27	MAURITIUS	YES	NA
28	MOROCCO	YES	NA
29	MOZAMBIQUE	NO	NA
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES
31	NIGER	YES	NA
32	NIGERIA	YES	NA
33	RWANDA	YES	NA
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE		
35	SENEGAL	NO	NA
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	NA
38	SWAZILAND	NO	YES
39	TANZANIA	NO	YES
40	TOGO	NO	YES
41	TUNISIA	NO	NA
42	UGANDA	YES	NA
43	ZAMBIA	NO	NA
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES

NA: Not applicable

(...) Information not available

Statistics for managing natural resources

No.	Country	The country has joined the JODI	During 2011-2012, a public official has participated in training workshops on JODI	Existence of a statistical legislation to facilitate specific data on NR	National Accounts produce disaggregated data on NR by main type of resources	Data on NR are published in any other means
1	BENIN	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
2	BURKINA FASO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
3	BURUNDI	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
5	CABO VERDE	NO	NO	NO	NO	
4	CAMEROON	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
6	CAR	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
7	CHAD	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
8	COMOROS	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	NO	NO	NO	NO	
10	CONGO, REP	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	NO	NO	NO	YES	
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	YES	YES	
14	ETHIOPIA	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
15	GABON	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
17	GHANA	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
20	KENYA	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
21	LESOTHO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
24	MALAWI	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
25	MALI	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
26	MAURITANIA	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
27	MAURITIUS	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
30	NAMIBIA	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
31	NIGER	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
32	NIGERIA	YES		NO	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE					
35	SENEGAL	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO
36	SIERRA LEONE	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
38	SWAZILAND	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
40	TOGO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
41	TUNISIA	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
42	UGANDA	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
43	ZAMBIA	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES

(...): Information not available

Statistics for managing natural resources (Cont'd)

No.	Country	Within the bodies listed below, there is a Unit dedicated to the collection of data on environment			
		National Statistical Office	Ministry of Environment	Ministry of Forest	Ministry of mining
1	BENIN	NO	YES	YES	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	NO	NO	NO	NO
3	BURUNDI	YES	YES	YES	YES
5	CABO VERDE	YES	YES	YES	NO
4	CAMEROON	YES	YES	YES	YES
6	CAR	NO	YES	YES	YES
7	CHAD	YES	YES	YES	YES
8	COMOROS	NO	YES	YES	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	YES	YES	YES
10	CONGO, REP	YES	YES	YES	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	NO	YES	YES	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	YES	YES	YES
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	NO	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	NO	NO	YES
15	GABON	NO	YES	YES	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	YES	YES	YES
17	GHANA	YES	YES	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	NO	YES	YES	NO
19	GUINEA BISSAU	NO	NO	NO	NO
20	KENYA	YES	YES	YES	YES
21	LESOTHO	YES	YES	YES	YES
22	LIBERIA	NO	NO	NO	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	YES	YES	YES
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	YES	YES
25	MALI	YES	YES	YES	YES
26	MAURITANIA	NO	YES	YES	YES
27	MAURITIUS	YES	YES	YES	
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	NO	YES	NO	NO
30	NAMIBIA	NO	YES	YES	YES
31	NIGER	NO	YES	YES	NO
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES		YES
33	RWANDA	YES	NO	NO	NO
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE				
35	SENEGAL	YES	YES	YES	NO
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	YES	YES	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	YES	YES	NO
38	SWAZILAND	NO	NO	NO	NO
39	TANZANIA	NO	YES	YES	NO
40	TOGO	NO	YES	YES	NO
41	TUNISIA	YES	YES	YES	YES
42	UGANDA	YES	YES	YES	NO
43	ZAMBIA	YES	YES	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	YES	YES

(...): Information not available

DEVELOPMENT RESULTS AT COUNTRY LEVEL

Governance of natural resources

No.	Country	Existence of a national institution with the mandate to, and oversight for, identifying, inventorying and holding NRM GIS information	Extent to which national institutions are active in the management of the extraction and sale of NR	Assessment of management of the macroeconomic challenges of NR revenues	The country ensures social stability by expenditure-smoothing in case of NR prices fluctuation
1	BENIN	YES	Not at all	Poorly	NO
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	Fairly active	Good	NO
3	BURUNDI	YES	Fairly active	Poorly	NO
5	CABO VERDE	YES	Fairly active	Poorly	NO
4	CAMEROON	YES	Fairly active	Good	NO
6	CAR	YES	Very active	Poorly	YES
7	CHAD	NO	Fairly active	Satisfactorily	YES
8	COMOROS	YES	Not at all	Poorly	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	Fairly active	Satisfactorily	NO
10	CONGO, REP	YES	Fairly active	Satisfactorily	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	NO	Fairly active	Poorly	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	Fairly active	Satisfactorily	
13	EGYPT	YES	Very active	Very Good	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	Fairly active	Good	NO
15	GABON	YES	Fairly active	Satisfactorily	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	Very active	Very Good	YES
17	GHANA	YES	Very active	Good	YES
18	GUINEA	NO	Not at all	Poorly	NO
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	Fairly active	Satisfactorily	NO
20	KENYA	YES	Fairly active	Satisfactorily	NO
21	LESOTHO	YES	Fairly active	Poorly	NO
22	LIBERIA	YES	Very active	Good	NO
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	Fairly active	Poorly	NO
24	MALAWI	YES	Fairly active	Poorly	NO
25	MALI	YES	Very active	Satisfactorily	YES
26	MAURITANIA	YES	Fairly active	Satisfactorily	YES
27	MAURITIUS	NO	Very active	Good	YES
28	MOROCCO	YES	Very active	Satisfactorily	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	Fairly active	Satisfactorily	NO
30	NAMIBIA	YES	Not at all	Very Good	YES
31	NIGER	YES	Very active	Poorly	NO
32	NIGERIA	YES	Fairly active	Good	YES
33	RWANDA	YES	Very active	Very Good	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	NO			
35	SENEGAL	YES	Not at all	Good	NO
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	Very active	Satisfactorily	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	NO	Fairly active	Poorly	NO
38	SWAZILAND	YES	Fairly active		
39	TANZANIA	YES	Not at all	Poorly	YES
40	TOGO	NO	Not at all	Poorly	NO
41	TUNISIA	YES	Very active	Good	YES
42	UGANDA	YES	Fairly active	Satisfactorily	NO
43	ZAMBIA	NO	Very active	Good	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	Very active	Good	NO

(...): Information not available

Governance of natural resources (Cont'd)

No.	Country	Attitude of govt. towards the equitable distribution of revenues & saving for the future	External players operating in the country have information disclosure policies	How do external players fare on human rights, CSR and environmental standards	The country has a mechanism to facilitate transparent and legal trade in NR
1	BENIN	Not favorable	YES	Fair	Fair
2	BURKINA FASO	Favorable	YES	Good	Poor
3	BURUNDI	Favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
5	CABO VERDE	Very favorable	YES	Good	Poor
4	CAMEROON	Favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
6	CAR	Not favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
7	CHAD	Favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
8	COMOROS	Not favorable	YES	Poor	Fair
9	CONGO (DRC)	Not favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
10	CONGO, REP	Favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	Not favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
12	DJIBOUTI	Favorable	YES		Poor
13	EGYPT	Favorable	YES	Good	Poor
14	ETHIOPIA	Favorable	NO	Poor	Poor
15	GABON	Favorable	YES	Fair	Fair
16	GAMBIA (THE)	Favorable	YES	Good	Poor
17	GHANA	Favorable	YES	Good	Poor
18	GUINEA	Favorable	YES	Good	Poor
19	GUINEA BISSAU	Not favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
20	KENYA	Not favorable	NO	Fair	Fair
21	LESOTHO	Favorable	YES	Good	Poor
22	LIBERIA	Not favorable	YES	Good	Poor
23	MADAGASCAR	Favorable	YES	Good	Poor
24	MALAWI	Not favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
25	MALI	Favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
26	MAURITANIA	Favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
27	MAURITIUS	Very favorable	YES	Very Good	Poor
28	MOROCCO	Not favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
29	MOZAMBIQUE	Not favorable	NO	Poor	Poor
30	NAMIBIA	Very favorable	YES	Good	Poor
31	NIGER	Favorable	YES	Good	Poor
32	NIGERIA	Favorable	NO	Good	Poor
33	RWANDA	Very favorable	YES	Very Good	Poor
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	Favorable	YES		
35	SENEGAL	Not favorable	NO	Poor	Fair
36	SIERRA LEONE	Favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
37	SOUTH SUDAN	Not favorable	NO	Fair	Poor
38	SWAZILAND			Good	
39	TANZANIA	Not favorable	YES	Fair	Fair
40	TOGO	Favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
41	TUNISIA	Favorable	YES	Fair	Fair
42	UGANDA	Favorable	YES	Good	Poor
43	ZAMBIA	Favorable	YES	Fair	Poor
44	ZIMBABWE	Not favorable	YES	Good	Poor

(...) Information not available

CSR: Corporate social responsibility

Necessary infrastructure to exploit natural resources

No.	Country	The country has the necessary infrastructure to exploit its NR				
		Roads	Rail	Sea ports	Air ports	Refinery
1	BENIN	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
3	BURUNDI	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO
5	CABO VERDE	YES	NA	YES	YES	NA
4	CAMEROON	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
6	CAR	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
7	CHAD	YES	NO		YES	YES
8	COMOROS	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
10	CONGO, REP	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
15	GABON	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO
17	GHANA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO
20	KENYA	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
21	LESOTHO	YES	NO	NA	YES	NA
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	NA	YES	NA
25	MALI	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO
26	MAURITANIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
27	MAURITIUS	YES	NA	YES	YES	YES
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
31	NIGER	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	YES	NA	NA	YES	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	NA			NO
35	SENEGAL	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	NO	NA	YES	NO
38	SWAZILAND	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO
39	TANZANIA	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
40	TOGO	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
41	TUNISIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
42	UGANDA	YES	NO	NA	NO	NO
43	ZAMBIA	YES	YES	NA	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	NO	NA	YES	NO

(...): Information not available

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES

Progressive capacity building and knowledge sharing among stakeholders in natural resources

No.	Country	Existence of a rolling program of advisory groups, workshops and stakeholder consultation	Existence of tailored training & development programs	Degree of alignment of education & training towards AMV	Trend of the number of students graduating in mineral related qualifications for the last 5 years
1	BENIN	NO	NO	Poor	NA
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	fair	Increased
3	BURUNDI	YES	YES	fair	Increased
5	CABO VERDE	YES	NO	NA	NA
4	CAMEROON	YES	NO	Good	Increased
6	CAR	YES	YES	fair	Increased
7	CHAD	YES	YES	Poor	Increased
8	COMOROS	YES	YES	Poor	Decreased
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	NO	Poor	Stable
10	CONGO, REP	YES	NO	Poor	Increased
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	NO	Poor	Increased
12	DJIBOUTI	NO	NO	Poor	Increased
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	Good	Increased
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	YES	Good	Increased
15	GABON	NO	YES	Good	Increased
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	YES	NA	NA
17	GHANA	YES	YES	Good	Increased
18	GUINEA	YES	NO	fair	Increased
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	NO	NA	Stable
20	KENYA	NO	YES	fair	Increased
21	LESOTHO	NO	NO	fair	Increased
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	Good	Increased
23	MADAGASCAR	NO	NO	Poor	Stable
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	fair	Stable
25	MALI	NO	NO	fair	Increased
26	MAURITANIA	YES	YES	fair	Increased
27	MAURITIUS	YES	YES	NA	NA
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	Good	Stable
29	MOZAMBIQUE	NO	YES	Good	Increased
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	NA	Increased
31	NIGER	YES	NO	Good	Increased
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES	fair	Increased
33	RWANDA	YES	YES	Good	Increased
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE				
35	SENEGAL	YES	YES	Very Good	Increased
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	YES	fair	Increased
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	YES	Poor	Stable
38	SWAZILAND	YES	YES	Poor	Decreased
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES	Poor	Increased
40	TOGO	YES	YES	Poor	Stable
41	TUNISIA	NO	NO	Good	Increased
42	UGANDA	YES	YES	Poor	Increased
43	ZAMBIA	YES	YES	fair	Stable
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	Good	Increased

NA: Not applicable

(...) Information not available

Shared understanding of the costs and benefits, risks and responsibilities related to mineral development

No.	Country	The ICMM's Mining partnerships for Development Toolkit is being implemented in the country	If not, a company has conducted a rigorous and collaborative socio-economic study to share understanding of the costs and benefits, risks and responsibilities related to mineral development	Assessment of the media's capacity to fulfill their mission in the oversight of NR	The country have capacity to manage resource a boom including the sterilization of inflows
1	BENIN	NO	NO	Weak	NO
2	BURKINA FASO	YES		Weak	YES
3	BURUNDI	NO	NO	Good	YES
5	CABO VERDE	NA	NA	Good	NO
4	CAMEROON	NA	YES	Fair	NO
6	CAR	YES		Weak	NO
7	CHAD	NO	NO	Fair	NO
8	COMOROS	NO	NO	Weak	YES
9	CONGO (DRC)	NO	NO	Fair	YES
10	CONGO, REP	NO	NO	Weak	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE			Fair	NO
12	DJIBOUTI	NA	NA	Weak	YES
13	EGYPT	NA	NA	Good	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	NA	YES	Fair	NO
15	GABON	NO	NO	Weak	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	NO	YES	Good	NO
17	GHANA	YES	NA	Fair	YES
18	GUINEA	NO	NO	Good	NO
19	GUINEA BISSAU	NA	NO	Weak	NO
20	KENYA	NO	NO	Fair	YES
21	LESOTHO	NO	NO	Weak	NO
22	LIBERIA	NO	YES	Good	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	YES	Good	NO
24	MALAWI	NO	YES	Weak	NO
25	MALI	NA	YES	Weak	YES
26	MAURITANIA	NO	NO	Fair	YES
27	MAURITIUS	NA	NA	Very Good	YES
28	MOROCCO	NA	NA	Fair	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	NO	NO	Weak	NO
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	Fair	YES
31	NIGER	NO	NO	Good	NO
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES	Good	YES
33	RWANDA	YES		Good	YES
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE				
35	SENEGAL	NO	NO	Weak	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	NO	YES	Good	NO
37	SOUTH SUDAN	NO	NA	Weak	NO
38	SWAZILAND	NO	NO	Weak	NO
39	TANZANIA	YES		Weak	YES
40	TOGO	NA	NO	Fair	NO
41	TUNISIA	NA	YES	Fair	YES
42	UGANDA	NO	NO	Fair	YES
43	ZAMBIA	YES	NO	Fair	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	NO	NA	Fair	YES

NA: Not applicable

(...) Information not available

ICMM: International Council on Mining and Metals

REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Geography and memberships

No.	Country	Number of border countries	Country landlocked	Country membership to:				
				APPA	OPEC	Commonwealth	OIF	ICO
1.	BENIN	4	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
2.	BURKINA FASO	6	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
3.	BURUNDI	3	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
4.	CABO VERDE	0	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
5.	CAMEROON	6	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
6.	CAR	6	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
7.	CHAD	6	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
8.	COMOROS	0	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
9.	CONGO (DRC)	9	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
10.	CONGO, REP	5	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
11.	COTE D'IVOIRE	5	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
12.	DJIBOUTI	3	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
13.	EGYPT	4	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
14.	ETHIOPIA	6	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
15.	GABON	3	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
16.	GAMBIA (THE)	1	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
17.	GHANA	3	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO
18.	GUINEA	6	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
19.	GUINEA BISSAU	2	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
20.	KENYA	5	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
21.	LESOTHO	1	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
22.	LIBERIA	3	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
23.	MADAGASCAR	0	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
24.	MALAWI	3	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
25.	MALI	7	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
26.	MAURITANIA	4	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
27.	MAURITIUS	0	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
28.	MOROCCO	2	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
29.	MOZAMBIQUE	6	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES
30.	NAMIBIA	5	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
31.	NIGER	7	YES	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
32.	NIGERIA	4	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
33.	RWANDA	4	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
34.	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	0	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
35.	SENEGAL	4	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
36.	SIERRA LEONE	2	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
37.	SOUTH SUDAN	6	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
38.	SWAZILAND	2	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
39.	TANZANIA	8	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
40.	TOGO	3	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
41.	TUNISIA	2	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
42.	UGANDA	5	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES
43.	ZAMBIA	8	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
44.	ZIMBABWE	2	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO

OIF: Francophonie

ICO: Islamic Conference Organization

APPA: African Petroleum Products Association

OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

Membership AU-recognized RECs

No.	Country	CEN-SAD	EAC	ECCAS	ECOWAS	COMESA	IGAD	SADC	UMA
1	BENIN	YES			YES				
2	BURKINA FASO	YES			YES				
3	BURUNDI		YES	YES		YES			
5	CABO VERDE				YES				
4	CAMEROON			YES					
6	CAR	YES		YES					
7	CHAD	YES		YES					
8	COMOROS	YES				YES			
9	CONGO (DRC)			YES		YES		YES	
10	CONGO, REP			YES					
11	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	YES			YES				
12	DJIBOUTI	YES				YES	YES		
13	EGYPT	YES				YES			
14	ETHIOPIA					YES	YES		
15	GABON			YES					
16	GAMBIA	YES			YES				
17	GHANA	YES			YES				
18	GUINEA	YES			YES				
19	GUINEA-BISSAU	YES			YES				
20	KENYA		YES			YES	YES		
21	LESOTHO							YES	
22	LIBERIA				YES				
23	MADAGASCAR					YES		YES	
24	MALAWI					YES		YES	
25	MALI	YES			YES				
26	MAURITANIA	YES							YES
27	MAURITIUS					YES		YES	
28	MOROCCO	YES							YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE							YES	
30	NAMIBIA							YES	
31	NIGER	YES			YES				
32	NIGERIA	YES			YES				
33	RWANDA		YES			YES			
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE			YES					
35	SENEGAL	YES			YES				
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES			YES				
37	SOUTH SUDAN						YES		
38	SWAZILAND					YES		YES	
39	TANZANIA		YES					YES	
40	TOGO	YES			YES				
41	TUNISIA	YES							YES
42	UGANDA		YES			YES	YES		
43	ZAMBIA					YES		YES	
44	ZIMBABWE					YES		YES	
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP (including other countries not surveyed)		25	5	10	15	19	8	15	5

Membership other RECs

No.	Country	CEMAC	CEPGL	IOC	MRU	UEMOA	SACU
1	BENIN					YES	
2	BURKINA FASO					YES	
3	BURUNDI		YES				
5	CABO VERDE						
4	CAMEROON	YES					
6	CAR	YES					
7	CHAD	YES					
8	COMOROS			YES			
9	CONGO (DRC)		YES				
10	CONGO, REP	YES					
11	CÔTE D'IVOIRE				YES	YES	
12	DJIBOUTI						
13	EGYPT						
14	ETHIOPIA						
15	GABON	YES					
16	GAMBIA						
17	GHANA						
18	GUINEA				YES		
19	GUINEA-BISSAU					YES	
20	KENYA						
21	LESOTHO						YES
22	LIBERIA				YES		
23	MADAGASCAR			YES			
24	MALAWI						
25	MALI					YES	
26	MAURITANIA						
27	MAURITIUS			YES			
28	MOROCCO						
29	MOZAMBIQUE						
30	NAMIBIA						YES
31	NIGER					YES	
32	NIGERIA						
33	RWANDA		YES				
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE						
35	SENEGAL					YES	
36	SIERRA LEONE				YES		
37	SOUTH SUDAN						
38	SWAZILAND						YES
39	TANZANIA						
40	TOGO					YES	
41	TUNISIA						
42	UGANDA						
43	ZAMBIA						
44	ZIMBABWE						
TOTAL MEMBERSHIP (including other countries not surveyed)		6	3	4	4	8	5

Treaties/Protocols signed/ratified

No.	Country	Abuja Treaty		Constitutive Act of the African Union		Constitution of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations	
		Signed	Ratified	Signed	Ratified	Signed	Ratified
1	BENIN	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
3	BURUNDI	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
5	CABO VERDE	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO
4	CAMEROON	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
6	CAR	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
7	CHAD	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
8	COMOROS	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
10	CONGO, REP	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	YES	YES	YES		
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
15	GABON	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
17	GHANA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
20	KENYA	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO
21	LESOTHO	YES	YES	YES	YES		
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
25	MALI	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
26	MAURITANIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
27	MAURITIUS	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
28	MOROCCO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
31	NIGER	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
35	SENEGAL	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
38	SWAZILAND	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
40	TOGO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
41	TUNISIA	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO
42	UGANDA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
43	ZAMBIA	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO

(...) Data not available

Treaties/Protocols signed/ratified (cont'd)

No.	Country	Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament		Protocol on the African Investment Bank	
		Signed	Ratified	Signed	Ratified
1	BENIN	YES	YES	YES	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	YES	NO
3	BURUNDI	YES	YES	NO	NO
5	CABO VERDE	NO	NO	NO	NO
4	CAMEROON	YES	YES	NO	NO
6	CAR	YES	NO	YES	NO
7	CHAD	YES	YES	NO	NO
8	COMOROS	YES	YES	YES	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	NO	YES	YES
10	CONGO, REP	YES	YES	YES	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES		YES	NO
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	YES	YES	NO
13	EGYPT	YES	YES	NO	NO
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	YES	NO	NO
15	GABON	YES	YES	NO	NO
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	YES	YES	YES
17	GHANA	YES	YES	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	YES	YES	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	YES	YES	YES
20	KENYA	YES	YES	NO	NO
21	LESOTHO	YES	YES	NO	NO
22	LIBERIA	YES	YES	NO	NO
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	YES	YES	YES
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	NO	NO
25	MALI	YES	YES	NO	NO
26	MAURITANIA	YES	NO	YES	YES
27	MAURITIUS	YES	YES	NO	NO
28	MOROCCO	NO	NO	NO	NO
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	YES	NO	NO
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	NO	NO
31	NIGER	YES	YES	YES	YES
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES	YES	NO
33	RWANDA	YES	YES	NO	NO
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	YES	YES	NO	NO
35	SENEGAL	YES	YES	YES	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	YES	YES	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	YES	NO	NO	NO
38	SWAZILAND	NO	NO	YES	NO
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES	YES	YES
40	TOGO	YES	YES	YES	NO
41	TUNISIA	YES	YES	NO	NO
42	UGANDA	YES	YES	NO	NO
43	ZAMBIA	YES	YES	YES	NO
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	NO	NO

(...) Data not available

Treaties/Protocols signed/ratified (cont'd)

No.	Country	Country has ratified the Treaties of all RECs it belongs to	Country is member of the sub-Saharan Africa Transport Programme (SSATP)	Country is a signatory of an Open Skies Agreement
1	BENIN	YES	YES	YES
2	BURKINA FASO	YES	YES	YES
3	BURUNDI	YES	YES	YES
5	CABO VERDE	NO	NO	NO
4	CAMEROON	YES	YES	YES
6	CAR	NO	YES	NO
7	CHAD	YES	YES	NO
8	COMOROS	YES	YES	NO
9	CONGO (DRC)	YES	YES	NO
10	CONGO, REP	NO	YES	YES
11	COTE D'IVOIRE	YES	YES	
12	DJIBOUTI	YES	NO	YES
13	EGYPT	YES	NO	YES
14	ETHIOPIA	YES	YES	YES
15	GABON	YES	YES	YES
16	GAMBIA (THE)	YES	YES	YES
17	GHANA	YES	YES	YES
18	GUINEA	YES	YES	YES
19	GUINEA BISSAU	YES	YES	NO
20	KENYA	YES	YES	YES
21	LESOTHO	YES	YES	NO
22	LIBERIA	NO	YES	YES
23	MADAGASCAR	YES	YES	YES
24	MALAWI	YES	YES	NO
25	MALI	YES	YES	YES
26	MAURITANIA	YES	YES	NO
27	MAURITIUS	NO	NO	NO
28	MOROCCO	YES	YES	YES
29	MOZAMBIQUE	YES	YES	NO
30	NAMIBIA	YES	YES	YES
31	NIGER	YES	YES	YES
32	NIGERIA	YES	YES	YES
33	RWANDA	NO	YES	NO
34	SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE	NO	NO	NO
35	SENEGAL	NO	YES	YES
36	SIERRA LEONE	YES	YES	YES
37	SOUTH SUDAN	NO	NO	NO
38	SWAZILAND	NO	NO	NO
39	TANZANIA	YES	YES	YES
40	TOGO	YES	YES	YES
41	TUNISIA	NO	YES	NO
42	UGANDA	YES	YES	YES
43	ZAMBIA	YES	YES	YES
44	ZIMBABWE	YES	YES	YES

(...) Data not available



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