# AFRICAN
## LEADERSHIP FORUM

**Follow-up Event**

**Africa In the Global Peace and Security Architecture:**

**Overcoming Gridlocks to Peace**

The United Republic of Tanzania
Former President of the United Republic of Tanzania
**Benjamin William Mkapa**

**UONGOZI Institute**

## Table of Contents

## Acronyms and abbreviations

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| ADF | – | Allied Democratic Forces |
| AGA | – | African Government Architecture |
| ALF | – | African Leadership Forum |
| AMISOM | – | African Union Mission in Somalia |
| APSA | – | African Peace and Security Architecture |
| ASF | – | African Standby Force |
| AU | – | African Union |
| CENCO | – | Conférence Episcopale Nationale du Congo |
| CEWS | – | Continental Early Warning System |
| COMESA | – | Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa |
| DDR | – | Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration |
| DRC | – | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| EAC | – | East African Community |
| ECOMOG | – | Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group |
| ECOSOCC | – | Economic, Social and Cultural Council (of the African Union) |
| ECOWAS | – | Economic Community of West African States |
| EJVM | – | Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism |
| FARDC | – | Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| FDLR | – | Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda |
| FIB | – | Force Intervention Brigade |
| FNL | – | National Forces of Liberation |
| H.E. | – | His Excellency |
| ICGLR | – | International Conference of the Great Lakes Region |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| IGAD | – | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| JIFC | – | Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre |
| LRA | – | Lord's Resistance Army |
| MONUSCO | – | United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| NEPAD | – | New Partnership for Africa's Development |
| OAU | – | Organization of African Unity |
| PSC | – | Peace and Security Council (of the African Union) |
| REC | – | Regional economic community |
| REM | – | Regional mechanism |
| SADC | – | Southern Africa Development Community |
| SRSG | – | Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General |
| TPDF | – | Tanzania People's Defence Force |
| UK | – | United Kingdom |
| UN | – | United Nations |
| US | – | United States |

*Former Presidents, H.E Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, H.E Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and H.E Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia on stage during the opening of the Forum*

## Executive Summary

Peace and security underpin sustainable development. Indeed, the General Assembly of the United Nations has stated that the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development will only be realized in a world of peace, security and respect for human rights. The African Union (AU) has likewise given peace and security due prominence. "A peaceful and secure Africa" is one of the key aspirations of the AU's Agenda 2063 with the goal that "by 2020 all guns will be silent." To achieve this goal, the continent has put in place the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), a set of structures for the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, as well as post-conflict reconstruction.

Despite efforts to date, Africa continues to face serious peace and security challenges; several African Union and United Nations peacekeeping missions are active on the continent, and the numbers of national and sub-national conflicts are increasing. In response, H.E. Thabo Mbeki, former President of South Africa, and H.E. Benjamin Mkapa, former President of the United Republic of Tanzania, convened the fourth African Leadership Forum (ALF) in Johannesburg on 24-25 August 2017 under the theme *"Peace and Security for an Integrated, United and Sustainable Africa".*

The discussions during ALF 2017 were well received. In particular, the dialogue on 'Africa's position in the global security architecture' was highlighted as a topic in need of further discussion. Therefore, the UONGOZI Institute organized a follow-up event with the theme "Africa in the Global Peace and Security Architecture—Overcoming the Gridlocks to Peace."

## Rationale and objectives of the follow-up meeting

Achieving sustainable peace and security in Africa will not only require on-the-ground efforts across the continent, but also a re-balancing/re-positioning of Africa within global peace and security frameworks. Many of these frameworks require reform to keep pace with emerging challenges. Such issues range from the roles and responsibilities of national, regional and continental peace and security frameworks and forces in the African context, to the United Nations Security Council, and the global arms manufacturing and trade structures. Therefore, this follow-up meeting was called to examine how Africa's position in the global peace and security architecture enhances and/or impedes progress in preventing and resolving conflicts with reference to two specific conflict areas in Africa: the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The event featured an opening address by Dr. Admore Kambudzi, the Acting Director for Peace and Security of the African Union, followed by plenary discussion, and two sessions that focused specifically on the conflicts in Somalia and the DRC. Each session commenced with an overview of the conflict/crisis. H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, former President of Somalia, provided the background for the situation in his country, and Amb. Zachary Muburi Muita, Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, provided the context for the Democratic Republic of Congo. The presentations aimed to inform delegates on the most recent developments in those countries, and highlight key challenges and opportunities for resolving the conflicts within the present global security architecture.

Following the focus sessions, the group shifted its focus on how the global context, and in particular the peace and security arrangements, impacts on African conflicts and crisis. This session formed the basis for the meeting's recommendations for African leaders to advance the continent's position in the global security architecture.

### Key messages and recommendations

Throughout the event, the presenters, panellists and delegates candidly contributed their experiences and ideas to overcome the challenges to the sustained peace and security of the continent. This report provides edited summaries from all presentations and discussion sessions. Key messages and recommendations that emerged from meeting are summarized in the sections below.

### Promote multilateral responses to conflicts and crises

Given the number and complexity of the conflicts and crises in Africa, multilateral burden-sharing responses are required to defuse and/or end conflicts on the continent. The African Union needs to promote honest, cohesive and broad alliances, comprising the Peace and Security Council, the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms, civil society, the private sector and Africa's citizenry, as well as the UN and well-meaning international partners. While the need exists to further democratize the UN system, the primacy of the UN as a global forum for legitimate, effective and inclusive multilateralism to address challenges facing the international community remains a foundation of international relations.

Crucially, in the planning and implementation of multilateral peace and security initiatives, the relationships between the UN, PSC and regional institutions need to be clearly defined to promote win-win outcomes, minimize overlapping mandates and avoid mutual destabilization. To develop responses for the long-term advantage of the continent, a more unified voice—a common African position—on peace and security is needed. In the absence of cooperation and consensus among member states, interventions for resolving conflicts are imposed from without rather than negotiated within, and often come with finalized formulas and stifling conditions which are more disabling than empowering.

Of immediate relevance to strategic collaboration at a continental level, the PSC needs to develop a methodology for analyzing the social, economic and political dynamics in at-risk African states as well as the designs of external powers on the resources in those states. Pathways for creating and utilizing knowledge, information and ideas need to fully capitalize on the intellectual and academic capacity on the continent. Spaces and channels need to be opened up so that the right evidence is available to decision makers in real time to identify the interventions required to prevent conflicts erupting and at what level those interventions should be implemented. Improved coordination with respect to decision-making processes—especially between the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and its offices in New York at the UN and in Brussels at the European Union—will be essential to ensure that Africa's voice is taken into account on peace and security decisions made at the international level.

**Reduce Africa's dependence on external funding for peace and security**

Central to building coalitions for peace and security is African funding. Africa's continued dependence on external financial resources for peace efforts has meant that the PSC has not been able to respond fast enough when situations on the ground have deteriorated. Presently, over 90% of the AU's peace and security work is externally funded, mostly by the European Union. In addition, the perpetual uncertainty in funding support saps the confidence and strength of peace-keeping, peace-making and state-building initiatives. To decisively address peace and security challenges, therefore, African member states need to contribute to the work and subsistence of African organizations at both continental and regional levels not just append signatures to charters.

AU efforts to foster greater self-sufficiency are most keenly demonstrated by its efforts to revitalize the AU Peace Fund and to make the African Standby Force (ASF) fully deployable. At present, the financial contributions by member states to the AU Peace Fund total USD 42.5 million, the highest level since the fund was established in 1993 with a target to have the full endowment of USD 400 million in place by 2021. Regarding the ASF, four of the continent's five regions have declared their readiness to deploy regional standby forces. The recent deployments of ECOWAS forces in Guinea Bissau and The Gambia, and Southern African Development Community (SADC) troops in Lesotho are both highly significant steps in Africa's peace efforts under the APSA.

**Prioritize conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building rather than military responses within the African Peace and Security Architecture**

Within its peace and security architecture, the AU needs to raise it profile and capacity for conflict prevention. Finding political solutions to prevent and end conflicts on the continent is especially important as international funding for peace-keeping missions is decreasing. National dialogue is the essential space and foundation for building a culture of managing diversity to constructive ends, especially with regard to religion and ethnicity, and for re-building trust and confidence in the state. Creating a safe space for all stakeholders is extremely complex, especially in light of ongoing developmental challenges such as high youth unemployment and widespread poverty, but inclusive dialogue is the only way to realize sustained peace. All countries throughout Africa must actively promote and engage in national dialogue to find common ground and resolve differences among stakeholders. Of vital importance, opposing political groups need to come together before catastrophe strikes not after conflicts erupt.

The Panel of the Wise and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) provide invaluable tools for conflict prevention For example, the APRM seeks to resolve the causes of a conflict from inside the country rather than impose solutions from outside, through counselling and encouraging leaders to respond to genuine public needs, especially to address grievances, before confrontations escalate. Most importantly, the process works to facilitate inclusive national dialogue involving all stakeholders in the examination of what is wrong and then devise home-grown solutions to address the issues.

However, at present, these processes lie at the margins of the APSA. The Panel of the Wise tends to act more in an advisory capacity and the APRM remains voluntary. The Forum acknowledged the practical limitations of the APRM process; Heads of State are, in some cases, the very people who are breaching the rules of good governance and undermining democratic values. However, delegates urged for universal accession to the APRM by all AU member states as a means to provide early warnings and counsel incumbent leaders to stave-off full-blown conflicts.

In addition, the continent's capacity for post-conflict peace-building will need to be bolstered. By some estimates, in half of all conflicts, countries relapse into war within five years due to inadequate peace building. Hence, strategic investments in strengthening governance and state structures, security sector reform, and programs of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) will need to be prioritized.

**Strengthen governance and the rule of law**

Closing the gap between Africa's present reality and its aspirations for lasting peace and development is the task of good governance and the rule of law. Despite the codification of norms and values in numerous national and continental protocols and agreements on how Africa should be governed, the problem of governance, whether political and/or economic, remains the principal driver of conflicts in Africa. No matter what efforts have been made and what resources have been invested, lasting reconciliation cannot be achieved until the good governance norms are adhered to and the law is enforced. If effective state institutions do not exist, any settlements made to resolve differences, no matter how deep, will not be sustainable. Therefore, strengthening the capacity of state institutions and remedying governance deficits are prerequisites for a conflict-free and prosperous Africa.

**Introduce education for peace and development**

In the spirit of conflict prevention, AU member states are encouraged to introduce peace education in their countries. Peace education does not necessarily need to be introduced through the national curriculum but can be communicated through the media, through communities, through religious institutions or traditional social structures, such as clans. From project experience to date, there is great interest among young people to be engaged in peace education, which is especially important as youth are all too often recruited or forced into terrorist or extremist groups. Instead of investing in young people on the continent to become soldiers, cadets of young people can be enlisted as peace messengers. In this way, the mindset of coming generations can be set in a constructive direction.

**Localize and build infrastructure for peace**

To build confidence and sustain peace, local institutions need to lead the peace process. It is also vitally important to build the infrastructure for peace from the bottom up so as to facilitate peaceful exchange between different groups/communities in conflict areas. The Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Project (GLTFP) currently being implemented by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in eastern DRC, Rwanda and Uganda is one good example. The project aims to rebuild the social fabric and social interrelationships that existed before the war by helping women to cross the border, sell their goods during the day and return home in the evening, thereby enabling communities to peacefully interact and profitably trade with each other.

**Increase the participation of youth and women in peace and security initiatives**

Even with progress to date, the AU has remained state-centred. This absolutely has to change. All parties in society—youth and women in particular—need to be engaged in decision-making and the implementation of interventions by the AU. As part of making space for inclusive participation, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), which is the organ of the AU for engaging civil society, will need to be operationalized and properly resourced.

**Reinvigorate the spirit of Pan Africanism among African leaders**

Africa is struggling to find leaders with the patriotism to consolidate a sense of nationhood within their own countries. And among member states, issues of national sovereignty are taking precedence over beneficial regional and continental integration. As a consequence of these divisions, Africa's states are susceptible to internal and inter-state conflicts and vulnerable to foreign intervention. The proliferation of foreign military bases and bilateral trade agreements is, in part, a reflection of this weakening of continental unity. To counter the dire security challenges facing the continent, a genuine spirit of Pan Africanism needs to be revived among Africa's leadership.

**Act now for peace**

While important issues should not be ignored and national dialogue should be as inclusive and comprehensive as is practicable, appropriate action to defuse and resolve conflicts needs to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity. The events in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and many other conflict zones are testimony that the longer action is delayed, the more vulnerable the country becomes to protracted and recurring violence. It is not possible to have a single architecture that fits every conflict—and resolutions and interventions need to conform to the objective realities of the specific crisis—but for all conflicts it is imperative to shorten the journey to peaceful settlements.

*H.E Benjamin Mkapa welcomes participants to the Forum*

# 1. The Opening Session

## 1.1 Opening remarks by H.E. President Benjamin Mkapa

In his opening remarks, President Mkapa outlined the reasons for hosting a follow-up meeting to the African Leadership Forum in Johannesburg in 2017. He said that the discussions of ALF 2017, which focused on "Peace and Security for an Integrated, United and Sustainable Africa", had not been concluded. The time available at the Forum was too short to deal with specific situations of national insecurity or national instability or examples of progress towards greater integration in a national context that had successfully addressed the issues of human security as well as ethnic diversity. Therefore, the current meeting was intended as a much more intimate discussion; a special encounter between distinguished practitioners, observers, and aspirants for Africa's future.

He said that the meeting would commence with a general discussion followed by focused sessions on peace-making efforts in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). He asked participants "to be frank because we want to tie down what has happened, why it has happened, what could happen, and how it can happen better for the fates of the African people." He hoped that examining these two examples would help to chart the way forward for greater peace and security throughout the continent. To encourage frankness, openness and in-depth analysis, he advised delegates that the meeting would be conducted under Chatham House Rules; any comments made would not be individually attributed. He asked participants to adhere to these rules.

In opening the discussion, he highlighted the address by President Mbeki on Africa's Position in the Global Security Architecture at the Johannesburg gathering, which is immediately relevant to the current meeting. Rather than repeat those remarks, the two former Presidents agreed that the opening address should focus upon the organizations specifically charged with overseeing and following up issues of security and stability on the continent. He welcomed Dr. Admore Kambudzi, the Acting Director for Peace and Security of the African Union (AU), to give the opening address.

## 1.2 Keynote Address: The African Peace and Security Architecture



*Dr. Admore Kambudzi, Acting Director for Peace and Security at the African Union delivering the Keynote Address*

### Dr. Admore Kambudzi, Acting Director for Peace and Security, African Union

To begin, Dr. Kambudzi related that the African Union's Agenda 2063, working in tandem with the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, is premised on realizing a peaceful, integrated and prosperous Africa. He said:

*Africa's abundant human and natural resources, if properly managed to generate benefits within the continent, represent the strongest guarantee for African people to reach the Africa we want—a place free from violence, poverty, misery and hunger, and where ideas flourish in the interests of transformation and progress.*

### Significant events in the development of the peace and security architecture in Africa

To provide the context for discussing peace and security in Africa, Dr. Kambudzi gave a timeline of important events related to peace and security on the continent. Chief among these was the adoption of the Protocol for the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC) as Africa's collective security system at the inaugural session of the AU in Durban, South Africa on 9 July 2002, and the Council's formal launch in Addis Ababa on 25 May 2005. Of equal significance was the adoption by Africa's Heads of State on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the OAU-AU in 2013 of the Solemn Declaration to end all wars on the continent by 2020. To achieve this singularly important goal, the PSC developed the African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020. Adopted by the AU Assembly in early 2018, the Roadmap aims to re-concentrate efforts by the PSC to achieve durable peace and security in Africa.

### The record of the PSC in resolving conflicts

Dr. Kambudzi then reflected on whether the PSC during its first decade of operation had been effective in reducing the incidence of conflicts on the continent. He related that the PSC's early efforts in implementing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) appeared to be bearing fruit with the number of violent conflicts on the continent falling from around 28 conflicts in 2004 to less than 10 conflicts in 2009. This was cause for huge celebration. But, unfortunately, since 2010, these significant gains have been eroded with the outbreak of new conflicts.

Africa currently accounts for 70% of all conflicts globally, which is reflected in the fact that the main business of the UN Security Council derives from the complex conflicts, crises and humanitarian emergencies across the continent. Africa is home to some of the world's largest UN peace-keeping operations yet conflicts and emergencies continue despite these costly operations. Indeed, billions of dollars had been swallowed in peace operations but with limited outcomes. The PSC has also had difficulty in advancing reconciliation, healing and nation building and member states have not shown sufficient political will to equip the AU with the human and financial resources commensurate with the tasks and challenges at hand. He stressed that Africa's ever increasing dependence on external financial resources for peace efforts has meant that the PSC has not been able to respond fast enough when situations on the ground have deteriorated. Moreover, the UN Security Council has not acted with the requisite speed to address crises in Africa despite bilateral annual meetings between the Security Council and the PSC since 2007.

## A comprehensive study on the implementation of the APSA

Acknowledging the trend away from peace and that the causes of conflicts and crises have remained unchecked in many countries, the PSC and the AU Assembly recognized the need to re-think their strategies.[1] In response, the PSC decided in May 2017 to undertake a comprehensive study of the implementation of the APSA since 2002 and that of the African Government Architecture since 2012. The study represents the first concrete step by the PSC to engage in self-assessment and tell Africa the facts of what has happened, and what needs to happen in order to complete the journey to a conflict-free and prosperous continent. The outcomes of the diagnosis will enable the PSC and AU Assembly to forge a new way forward, particularly with a view to generating greater momentum and addressing root causes to quell violent conflicts and prevent new outbreaks of violence.

## The complexity of conflicts requires multilateral responses

Given the growing complexities of conflicts and crises across the globe, Dr. Kambudzi stressed the need for multilateral responses. He said:

*No single actor has adequate capacity to shoulder the burden of addressing such enormous challenges.*

In this context, the AU is leading in efforts to establish broad alliances of international organizations as well as coalitions of countries within African regions to combat threats to peace and security, particularly terrorism, for example, the Multilateral Joint Task Force against the Boko Haram terrorist group in the Lake Chad Basin, and the newly operationalized G5 Sahel Joint Force to combat terrorism and transnational organized crime in the Sahel.

## The African Union Peace Fund

AU efforts to decisively address peace and security challenges are most keenly demonstrated by its efforts to revitalize the AU Peace Fund and to make the African Standby Force (ASF) fully deployable. The January 2018 AU Summit adopted the Peace Fund Instrument based on the governance and the management structure endorsed by the PSC, the AU Executive Council and ultimately the AU Assembly in 2017. Following its adoption, the governance and management structures of the Fund are being established, including the Board of Trustees. At present, the financial contributions by member states to the AU Peace Fund total USD 42.5 million, which represents the highest level since the fund was established in 1993. So far, 28 AU member states have made their contributions for 2017. This is a clear signal of the rising level of political will and commitment to implement AU decisions on the fund. The target is to have the full USD 400 million endowment in place by 2021. Regarding the ASF, four of the continent's five regions have already declared their readiness to deploy regional standby forces. The recent deployments of ECOWAS forces in Guinea Bissau and The Gambia, and Southern African Development Community (SADC) troops in Lesotho are both highly significant steps in Africa's peace efforts under the APSA and the AGA.

*Participants during the Keynote Address*

## The global challenges facing multilateral responses for peace and security in Africa

However, Dr. Kambudzi highlighted that these efforts are taking place against the backdrop of a changing global order; long-standing multilateral systems and structures are increasingly being challenged. Also worrying, is the emerging pattern of unilateral actions by some powerful countries to undermine the very foundations of multilateralism, which are deplorably taking place in the midst of serious conflicts and threats to international peace and security including those posed by terrorism and violent extremism, trafficking of illicit arms and drugs, irregular migration and human trafficking, and climate change.

Without a permanent seat and veto at the UN Security Council, Africa risks becoming more of a spectator to world events as those from outside the continent play their habitual refereeing role. In addition, foreign military bases continue to multiply in parts of Africa and yet little is known of the long-term consequences of this phenomenon on Africa's ambition to be conflict free. Given these pressures, Dr. Kambudzi said:

*Africa's focus should be to safeguard multilateralism as the prime mechanism for promoting its interests and enhancing cooperation to address the global issues of peace and security, and economic and environmental challenges.*

He added:

*While there's the need to further democratize the UN system, the primacy of the UN as a global forum for legitimate, effective and inclusive multilateralism to address the multiple challenges facing the international community remains a cardinal foundation of modern international relations.*

Therefore, he stressed that Africa must continually engage the global peace and security architecture to reshape it as much as is necessary and possible for the long-term benefit of the continent. Through the strategic alliance of the AU and regional economic communities and regional mechanisms, Africa has a central role to play in countering the erosion of multilateralism. Africa is a key player in global multilateral efforts and

it should be remembered that multilateralism contributed to Africa's decolonization and the struggle against apartheid.

Indisputably, Africa's influence in global affairs continues to grow, and home-grown efforts to transform the continent socially and economically are gaining more and more momentum. Moving forward, Africa needs to make full use of all existing means, channels and platforms to more effectively voice the continent's priorities at the international level, including reform of the UN system. To achieve this, Dr. Kambudzi stressed that is vitally important that African countries act in unity and solidarity.

**Innovative and collaborative efforts are needed to secure peace and security in Africa**

More importantly, Dr Kambudzi said that a change is needed in the nature of discourse on peace and security in Africa. In meeting after meeting, the continent tends to repeat the same ideas, theories and approaches yet evidence shows that some of these ideas and approaches have not yielded the expected results. He added:

*There's also a tendency to assume that the PSC can do it alone in the business to cultivate and deliver a durable peace and security order in Africa. Yet, this is not the idea behind the establishment of the PSC.*

Going forward, Africa must promote an honest and cohesive broad alliance comprising the PSC as the vanguard, the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms, African citizens, think tanks, private sectors and philanthropic foundations as well as UN and various well meaning partners. Central to this endeavour is effective African funding and civic mobilization.

**What is needed for peace and security?**

To conclude, Dr. Kambudzi listed some of the key issues and challenges that the PSC and any alliance for peace in Africa will face, which could be fruitfully debated in the current forum. These include:

- Providing education for peace and development to youth and society

- Addressing and remedying governance deficits through transparent management of natural resources and the benefits derived from those resources

- Removing the so-called ungoverned spaces in African countries

- Controlling and eliminating corruption, particularly illicit arms flows and illicit financial flows. On this issue, he recommended that delegates read the report on the Mbeki panel on illicit financial flows.[2] The politicians-bank-state officials nexus which is the conduit for illicit financial flows should be one of the priority elements to be uprooted.

- Promoting political responsibility in a way that encourages or obliges leaders to respond to genuine public needs, especially to address grievances before tensions, anger and confrontation escalate.

- Implanting a taboo-free approach in member states of the PSC to all peace and security situations in Africa. The PSC protocol provides a whole enablement to this effect. This also includes deployment in Addis Ababa and also in New York of high-calibre diplomats, the so-called diplomats of talent and dexterity in the service of the PSC and Africa.

- Building a culture of managing diversity to constructive ends, especially with regard to religion and ethnicity.

- Resolving inter-political parties disputes through dialogue, which includes defining and agreeing on modalities for consultation and decision-making on key national issues

- Harnessing traditional capacities and skills for development and social cohesion

- Promoting free movement of people, ideas and technology in a way that reduces vulnerabilities and insecurities, and promotes peaceful competition to enhance development

- Interacting with foreign partners or entities in a way that avoids mutual destabilization and provides win-win outcomes.

---

[2]  The final report can be downloaded at https://www.uneca.org/publications/illicit-financial-flows

## 1.3   Remarks by H.E. Thabo Mbeki



*H.E Thabo Mbeki*

In his role as plenary chair, President Mbeki thanked Dr. Kambudzi for his presentation. He commended the AU and PSC for their decision to initiate the study on implementation of the APSA for the objective of peace and security has not been achieved despite all of the continent's efforts to put in place the relevant protocols and institutions. He noted that the report from the review is expected in June 2018 and hoped that the day's discussions could valuably contribute to that process. In this context, he shared his insights based on his experience in conflict resolution in the Darfur region of Sudan, and Côte d'Ivoire.

**The conflict in Darfur**

President Mbeki related that he was a member of the panel established by the PSC in 2009 to analyze the situation in Darfur and advise the AU on what was needed to end the conflict. In due course, the panel produced and submitted a report to the PSC in the same year. Principal among its findings was that the conflict in Darfur was a manifestation of the crisis affecting the whole of Sudan. Therefore, to silence the guns in Darfur required that the PSC engage the government of Sudan about processes of democratization, especially to address the problem caused by the centralization of power in one region of the country and the marginalization and exclusion of other areas. To solve the problem of Darfur required processes of national inclusion and national reconciliation.

He then related that the AU PSC meeting at summit level adopted the report and, transformed the panel's mandate from an advisory one to become a panel for implementation of the recommendations. However, he stressed that it was the task of the PSC to engage Sudan not the panel. He considered that if it had done so in 2009, it would also have addressed the issue of the impending referendum to create South Sudan. The report was tabled but that was the end; it was shelved somewhere. He believed that if the PSC had intervened in the manner proposed there would not be two Sudans today, and the present conflict in South Sudan would not be happening. What this experience made clear was that the PSC at that time did not have the capacity to make strategic interventions of the kind proposed. Rather:

*It could meet and pass resolutions and so on and hope that somebody somewhere would read the resolution and implement.*

**Côte d'Ivoire**

Similarly, President Mbeki was asked by the chair of the AU Commission (not the PSC) to go to Abidjan to report on the dispute between Alassane Ouattara and Laurent Gbagbo, the two principal candidates in the 2010 presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire.

The report concluded that it was unclear who had won the elections. Various proposals were advanced for resolving the dispute, including a recount, but above all, the report stressed the need for the AU to directly engage the two opposing candidates in a discussion about the future of Côte d'Ivoire. He strongly considered "if the AU came at this thing in the context of winners and losers you were condemning Côte d'Ivoire to a permanent civil war."

Yet when the report was submitted to the PSC,

*"… they completely ignored everything we said, completely. Well to be fair, they decided to follow a lead that given by ECOWAS, because ECOWAS had decided that rather than deal with this problem in Côte d'Ivoire, they would just recognize a winner… but nevertheless it leaves a problem."*

The problem that remains unresolved is national reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire. And President Mbeki held grave fears that if this process is not addressed that the country will inevitably drift back into civil war.

The structures of the PSC have proved incapable of strategic interventions required to end conflicts and sustain peace

Based upon the events in Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire, President Mbeki said:

*One thing that clearly stands out is that the structures at HQ of the AU PSC have so far proved incapable of making the strategic interventions that are required.*

Resolutions to deploy troops in conflict situations in the short term may well be a necessary step but the PSC also needs the capacity to address the fundamental causes of conflicts on the continent. Therefore, he reiterated his support for the present review of the effectiveness of the peace architecture of the AU.

On this issue, he observed that the PSC is largely staffed by former ambassadors. But, with due respect to qualities and skills of those individuals, he queried whether ambassadors were capable of making the sorts of strategic interventions with respect to the peace and security of the continent. He said:

*Are we not expecting too much of ambassadors?... Is this not a matter that belongs to heads of state? [To] more senior political people? … Are the ambassadors capable of saying to H.E the President of Sudan, "Mr. President, you are not a democrat, you are not presiding over a democratic system. And this is going to destroy Sudan." Are the ambassadors capable of doing that? Or should that responsibility … I am talking about the strategic interventions with regard to peace and security at the continental level, is that not the responsibility of political leaders at the higher level? Rather than delegating this matter to the PSC which in its daily operation is in fact a council of ambassadors.*

## 1.4 Plenary discussion



A plenary discussion followed during which delegates candidly contributed their experiences and ideas to overcome the challenges to the sustained peace and security of the continent. Key messages that emerged from the discussions are summarized in the sections below. As per Chatham House Rules, contributions are not attributed to individual speakers.



*Top: Amb. Ombeni Sefue contributing to the discussion*
*Bottom: Dr. Sahle-Work Zewde and Veronica Modey-Ebi listening to the discussions*

### The situation of conflicts in Africa

One delegate considered that the situation of conflicts in Africa is even worse than that reported by Dr. Kambudzi in the keynote address. Presently, around 85% of UN peace keepers are deployed in Africa, 60% of the deliberations of the Security Council are on Africa, and there are about 7 active conflicts on the continent: including those in the DRC, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Darfur, Mali and Somalia. In addition, around 11 million people are refugees or internally displaced in the Great Lakes region. The speaker concurred with President Mbeki's observation that the root causes of conflicts, especially political issues, are not being addressed. For example, in some states, proposed constitutional changes could allow presidents to be able to rule until 2034.

The African Standby Force, which was scheduled to be in place in 2010, then postponed to 2015, is also nowhere near being seen. And over 90% of the funding of the AU's peace and security work is provided by partners outside of Africa, mostly the European Union. Moreover, the regional powers in Africa—Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, DRC and Ethiopia—have not been able to resolve their own governance issues to be able to provide this kind of leadership at the continental level. On a more positive note, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)—which for a decade made peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone but at a huge cost involving billions of dollars invested—is one example of the type of sacrifice needed to make and sustain peace.

### The need to invest in peace building

By some estimates, in half of the conflicts, countries relapse back to war within 5 years as a result of inadequate peace building. Therefore, the continent's capacity for post-conflict peace building needs to be critically addressed. For example, investments in strengthening state structures, security sectors, and programs of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) need to be prioritized.

### A return to Pax Africana or African-led solutions

The processes of conflict resolution need to be re-framed upon the communal African (Ubuntu) philosophy rather than the ideas on African identity and civilization drawn from Western thought. In particular, this speaker highlighted three fundamental issues which are not working for Africa:

i)   the practice of succession is not working because Africa is a communal society;

ii)  the state's obligation of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)[3] is not working because it comes from top-down rather than bottom-up; and

iii) multilateralism is not working as African voices are not heard most of the time. On this last point, the conditions for resolving conflicts typically come with their own finalized formulas along with stifling conditions which are often more disabling rather than empowering.

### Poor governance drives conflicts in Africa

One delegate highlighted the close relationship between poor governance and conflict. Despite the codification of norms and values in numerous national and continental protocols and agreements on how Africa should be governed, the problem of inclusive governance, whether political and/or economic, remains the primary driver of conflicts in Africa. Given this persistent problem, the APRM, a voluntary instrument for monitoring governance performance among member states, was established in 2003 as part of the implementation of the framework for the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

The APRM provides an invaluable tool for conflict prevention. To start, the mechanism seeks to resolve the causes of the conflict from inside the country rather than impose solutions from outside. But most importantly, the process works to facilitate inclusive national dialogue involving all stakeholders in the examination of what is wrong and then devising home-grown solutions to address the issues. Therefore, the speaker strongly urged for universal accession to the APRM by all member states of the AU, believing that the process would contribute tremendously in preventing conflicts in Africa.

Ideally, the APRM process would facilitate agreement on what the problems are in a given country and what needs to be done. Then, once the outcomes of the review are referred to the heads of state at summit level, the president of the country reviewed could be advised on the best way forward based directly upon the plan of action developed through the national dialogue. The speaker further highlighted that the APRM has been given the expanded mandate to monitor implementation of Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063, which simply cannot happen if some African states are not members.

However, in response to these comments, President Mkapa wondered how the peer review mechanism could be undertaken and reports produced that do not appear to be prosecuting incumbent leaders.

### Strengthening the structure and capacity of the APSA for conflict prevention and peace building

The APSA is too focused on addressing the symptoms rather than the causes of conflict; more needs to be invested in the prevention of conflicts and peace-building initiatives. Currently, the prevention aspect really lies on the margins of APSA, for example, the Panel of the Wise tends to act more in an advisory capacity and it's a very small part of the entire mechanism itself. Similarly, the peer review mechanism is the central component of the prevention aspect of APSA. Yet, it remains voluntary rather than mandatory.

However, the speaker also agreed with President Mkapa about the practical realities of the APRM process. When it comes to issues of governance, the locus of decision-making on those issues resides at the summit level. Yet, in some cases, Heads of State are the very people who are breaching the rules of good governance. Clearly, there is a degree of dissonance in the expectation that leaders who sit within that body can be questioned on governance and then expect them to be at the forefront, at the pointy end of the spear, when it comes to safeguarding democratic values.

---

3   The Responsibility to Protect refers to the obligation of states toward their populations and toward all populations at risk of genocide and other mass atrocity crimes. For further discussion on R2P, see http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html

## On the importance of engaging civil society in building and sustaining peace

The tools of dialogue and mediation to build peace are usually underestimated but they have proven to be the most powerful tools especially in terms of conflict prevention. Crucially, civil society has a role to work alongside the national government to raise awareness of issues at the local level and to assist in developing recommendations and solutions. And, in assessing the national government or in-country context, does the country have a budget for peace? Rather than direct more funds towards military interventions why not make the same investment in basic human social services to address the real issues that the people are crying and dying for? Instead of investing in young people on the continent to become soldiers why not develop a cadet of young peace messengers? In this way, the mindset of coming generations can be set in a positive direction.

> *They should have a passion for peace. We don't want to see peace as just a job. We need to develop a passion for peace on this continent.*





*Participants make contributions to the discussion based on the Keynote Address.*
*Top: Ms. Gwendolyn Myres, Founder and Executive Director, Messengers of Peace*
*Bottom: Mr. Daniel Bukele Mulugeta, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch (African Division)*

## Mutual destabilization is making African states vulnerable to external interventions

Another delegate highlighted the perils of focusing the discussion of Africa's long-term peace and security solely upon responses to the present conflicts afflicting the continent. In particular, he pointed to the worrying proliferation of foreign bases and infrastructure projects. In the Horn of Africa alone—which is right next door to the AU headquarters—seven countries are involved in port projects or military bases, but the AU or responsible continental institutions are quiet about this issue. He said:

> *We are always talking about African-led solutions and yet we are not talking about the interventions of external forces that we created ourselves. If we focus on the Horn of Africa, what is happening now, and no one is talking about it …This particular geographical location has its own geopolitical strategic importance not only for Africa but for Europeans and beyond. And yet it's affecting Africa.*

He believed that due to the poor governance across the continent and the mutual destabilization of countries through conflicts is leading to vulnerability of external interventions and influence.

## On how member states operate within the PSC

One participant agreed with President Mbeki and Dr. Kambudzi that the continent must have the appropriate institutions, personnel and tools in place to strengthen Africa's standing in the global security agenda. Africa also must seek to adopt a common position. This is especially important with respect to the PSC; member states need to work collaboratively within the PSC. Presently, some member states destabilize each other and use national interests to paralyze decisions of the PSC

> *We need to really look at the way member states operate within the PSC and the future of security policy today will depend on that. It will depend not only on the institutions and the people that President Mbeki mentioned but more importantly on the way we interact among ourselves as African member states within the institution we set to deal with peace and security challenges on the continent.*

**On the domestication of peace and security instruments and the importance of traditional local institutions of governance at the grassroots level**

One delegate concurred with the earlier observations on governance but also highlighted the vital importance for member states to ratify and domesticate the instruments and measures put in place by the AU, APSA, RECs and regional mechanisms. Therefore, he recommended

*…we could start by evaluating ourselves as member states, [if we have] ratified, domesticated [the instruments] and have laws and policies in our countries. And how much are we engaging our citizens to ensure that we have an effective functioning national infrastructure for peace to allow early detection, prevention, management and resolution of those conflicts.*

In performing any risk assessment or evaluation of the APSA, there is a need to understand and make room for the unique systems of conflict prevention that exist at the grassroots level in different countries, for example, the 'Gacaca' Court System in Rwanda and the 'Ten-House' Cell System in Tanzania. He said:

*…there is a gap between what we want, the norms that have been set at the AU, APSA level and what the people need to do on the ground and at the grassroots. …If you do your risk assessment then it cannot be uniform everywhere, you have to have the environment at the grassroots and what measures that need to be taken from one place to another.*



*Mr. Said Mwema, Retired Inspector General for the United Republic of Tanzania making his contribution to the discussion*

## Session 2: The Case of the Federal Republic of Somalia

In opening the second session of the Forum, President Mbeki reiterated that the purpose of the meeting is to assess (as practically as possible) the issues affecting the two countries under discussion: Somalia and DRC. He said:

*… in the end we want to make a positive contribution in terms of the actual solution of these problems so that we don't just have a philosophical discussion … We must contribute to the process of silencing the guns.*

To start the discussion, he welcomed H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, former President of Somalia to give an overview of the conflict in his country.

### 2.1 Remarks by H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, former President of Somalia

To begin, President Mohamud expressed his gratitude to the UONGOZI Institute for providing opportunities for present and future generations of African leaders to come together to discuss and understand the true dynamics of the continent. He said that Somalia has a long history but given the limited time available, he would restrict his remarks to how his country's experience relates to the bigger context of African security and African-led solutions for African problems.







*Top: H.E Hassan Sheikh Mohamud delivers a presentation on the Case of Somalia.*
*Bottom: H.E Benjamin Mkapa Contributes to the discussion.*

**Somalia is a test case for regional and continental security**

President Mohamud said that his country was a laboratory for Africa's experiment with regional and continental security. In 2006, the first contingent of troops with the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) landed in the country. These troops were from Uganda. At that time, the extremist militant group Al-Shabaab was in its infancy. Since then, the role of the AU Mission to help the Somali people has been extended and expanded from peace-keeping to state-building and the reconstruction of the country. Unfortunately, due to the extremist elements and their impact, all of these goals have been thwarted by the continuous state of war in the country. He said:

*All the strategic issues of state-building, nation-building, reconstruction of the infrastructure, and building the state institutions; all of this has not happened in Somalia and the role of the AU has been squeezed into the fighting force against these evil forces.*

The main reason that Al-Shabaab became very strong in Somalia was that many areas of the country were simply not governed for a long time. Taking advantage of this absence of authority, Al-Shabaab wedged themselves between the state and the society. Therefore:

*We've been fighting for the last 7 to 8 years to take them out of this space, so that the society and the state can come together and do things together. This is still not complete; in some corners of Somalia it has worked but in other corners it has not worked.*

However, President Mohamud added that for one important reason the AU mission in Somalia is a success story. Because, without them, the Federal Government of Somalia would not be in place now. In 2012, the transitional federal system was completed and the government established in Mogadishu. The AU mission has provided the space to begin the journey towards establishing a modern system of government in Somalia.

## The establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia

President Mohamud said that a federal system had been adopted in Somalia for only one reason: mistrust. After the civil war, people were unable to trust each other. The fabric of society had been so badly torn that, in 2010, the decision was made at a national conference to establish a new state structure on the basis of federalism. Under the provisional constitution, two or more regions were allowed to unite together to form a federal member state. Presently, Somalia has five regional states—Puntland, Galmudug, Jubaland, South West State and Hirshabelle— as the issue of secession of Somaliland in the north has not been solved yet.

These regional administrations are weak; they lack capacity, they lack resources, they lack technical know-how. Local institutions are not strong enough. But, today, at least, there's no ungoverned space in Somalia; there are people who are in charge of every corner of Somalia. This is critically important because the existence of a governing authority presents a more serious challenge to Al-Shabaab. The group can no longer operate in total freedom; the freedom of establishing training centres wherever they want, the freedom of establishing or building a bomb factory wherever they want. They cannot do this today.









*Forum participants discuss the Case of Somalia*
1. *H.E Thabo Mbeki*
2. *Amb. Zachary Muburi-Muita, Executive Secretary of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region*
3. *Prof. Adekeye Adebajo, Director, Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conservation*
4. *Dr. Monde Muyangwa, Director of the African Program, Woodrow Wilson Center*

## The Somali clan system

To offer some historical background to the current situation, President Mohamud related that Somalia is a homogeneous society; almost all Somalis share the same language, the same religion and the same ethnic groups. He said:

*We do not differ in language. We do not differ in culture. We do not differ in religion. We have almost everything similar.*

*You cannot distinguish a Somali living in one corner of Somalia to another 2,000 or 3,000 km apart. [It is] very difficult to distinguish them.*

However, Somalia has a strong clan system, a social structure with long historical roots based upon a socialist structure that existed before colonialists came to the country. Historically:

*We were living in social groups, nomads mainly, existing in environments with their own traditional laws and traditional systems but no state or state structure.*

This allegiance to and dependence on their clans has created a more complex political situation. Reflecting upon the experience of an ordinary Somali, he said:

*I belong to my clan so I go back to it. And, if I wanted to do something towards state-building, I always have the fear that I may lose my clan and then I don't have any other place to go, so the priority is keeping or satisfying my clan.*

Typically, within the framework of the state or nation, President Mohamud said that some citizens belong to political parties, others to professional association or trade unions or numerous other civil society institutions or interest groups. However, Somalia lost all these things; the only thing that an individual Somali belongs to is his/her clan. As a result:

*Governance is not possible, state-building is not possible, security, consequently, is not possible, if there's no sense of nationhood, if there's no sense of belonging to the nation. If everybody claims I am more of my clan or my tribe than my state or my nation then I would always focus on the issues related to my clan or my tribe.*

Moreover, despite the homogenous nature of Somalia's people, he said that there are communities "who believe they have been marginalized for a long, long time, not because they are different ethnic groups but because they have … a different way of life than the majority of the country."

## National dialogue is the essential space and foundation for re-building trust and confidence in the state

President Mohamud said that the only way out of this impasse is dialogue. Dialogue is the natural space for building trust and confidence. Importantly:

*…when you open space for dialogue, that space must give everybody the sense of feeling that he's safe enough, he has the power to speak, and he has the influence that others will listen.*

He recognized that creating such a space for all stakeholders is extremely complex, especially when added to the ongoing developmental challenges faced by the country, such as the lack of education, very high levels of youth unemployment and widespread poverty. He said that when poverty reaches a certain level that it is very easy to manipulate people. Indeed, with a small amount of resources you can manipulate whole geographical areas, which may or may not be in the interests of the people.

Understandably, some people are also very mistrustful of efforts to re-establish a centralized government. They fear that the leaders of this new government will seek to increase their powers and become just like the dictators of the 1970s and 1980s. So they oppose that. On the other side, people who are supportive of central government as the best option for Somalia, view their opponents as wanting to divide the country. He said:

*So, these are the challenges that exist in Somalia. But, it's improving. Maybe it is taking too much time, but it is improving.*

## The economic reasons underlying the ongoing conflict

As he had at the ALF meeting in Johannesburg last year, President Mohamud highlighted the particular vulnerability of the millions of young people in Somalia, where almost 60% of the population is under 30 years of age. He said that it is now 28 years since the collapse of the state in Somalia. In 1990, everything collapsed—education, health, governance, security, policy—and the population who lived in metropolitan areas like Mogadishu fled their homes and businesses and returned to their clan areas. The capital became a ghost city.

Continuing, he imagined how the events in his country might have affected an individual who was a young child living in a small, rural village when the state collapsed. He said:

*In the life span of a nation, 28 years is very short period of time, but in the life span of a human being, 28 years is a long, long time…A boy or a girl who was 6 years old in 1990, today is 34-35 years old. [He/she] never went to school, never went to any system of training [and]… is living in a remote village, where there are no opportunities. Maybe, by that age, he's a father or she's a mother. They cannot support their family. They are there, frustrated… Now, you just imagine when an extremist group goes there and says, "Ahh, you don't have anything at all. We'll give you 100 dollars by the end of the month. Come and join us."*

Though hypothetical, such a story is a realistic scenario confronting many youth in Somalia. As a consequence, President Mohamud stated that the bulk of Al-Shabaab's fighting force did not join for ideological reasons. They are there for economic reasons. They don't have other options.

## The success and challenges of the AU mission in Somalia

Turning his attention to the experience of the AU mission in Somalia, President Mohamud commended the role that the mission has played in Somalia. He said that during his presidency a force of 20,000 troops were stationed in the country and he opposed the proposal for the AU troops to be rehatted as UN peace-keeping forces. However, he did highlight the ongoing issue of coordination between forces from different countries that have been mandated to manage security in different sectors of the country. Even after 12 years in Somalia, he said that AU mission forces are still more attached to the sector commanders from their own countries than the headquarters of the mission and the force commander who's entitled to command all forces. Consequently, the force commander can't do much even when he wants to.

Funding was another significant challenge. He said:

*Imagine a force that is not [just] peace-keeping but [also] peace-making. They are trying to make the peace, train local police, train local military, train elders and make everybody conscious about security. But then they are told, "Oh! You guys, after 3 months, you don't have salary. We cannot afford to pay this money" [or] when the EU says, "we will deduct 20% of the funding within the next 6 months", and then others say … "we cannot keep these forces in Somalia more than 10 years because there's Mali, there's Chad, there's DRC, because there are a lot of hotspots here and there in Africa."*

President Mohamud said that this continual uncertainty in funding support had sapped the confidence and strength of the mission generally, and the local Somali forces particularly. He added that promises had been made but not delivered. For example, given the very large size of the country, requests have been made to the UN Security Council through the AU for the mission and local forces to receive some sort of force enablers, for example, helicopters. But these requests have not been fulfilled. He again highlighted the issue of coordination.

*The UN [troops] have the helicopters. They are the ones who are supplying and they do things the way they feel fit, not the way the AU mission sees fit or the forces on the ground, let alone the Somali forces.*



*AMISOM troops patrol the streets in Somalia. Photo. courtesy*

## Piracy, illegal fishing and dumping in Somali maritime zones

President Mohamud also described the enormous challenges facing Somalia in policing its maritime territory. According a 2013 World Bank report, Somali piracy off the Horn of Africa as an increased cost of trade translates into an estimated US$18 billion yearly loss to the world economy.[4] But he said that none of this 18 billion has come to Somalia or come to Africa to safeguard the shipping lanes in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean or to save the marine resources of the country. Illegal fishing and the dumping of waste and other toxic materials is still common in Somalia's territorial waters despite the presence of international forces.



*A Somali pirate in front of a hijacked Taiwanese vessel. Photo: Farah Abdi Warsameh/AP*

At one point, when told that the country's maritime zones were not known, the government duly registered all of its zones with the United Nations in 2013 but nothing has changed.

*We did it. We registered in 2013. We registered all the zones—the contiguous, the economic, the continental shelves. We registered it in the UN registry, but nothing has changed. Somalia has got more territorial waters than land. We have 637,000 sq km of land but we have 1.8 million sq km of territorial waters, three times our land mass. So there's no way that Somalia can claim that it can control this.*

In addition, the long-standing UN Security Council arms embargo on Somalia means that the country cannot seek support from other countries—weapons, equipment or training— to protect its territories unless authorized by the Security Council. He said:

*We cannot even hire an international company or agree with another country to protect our territories, our maritime territory. We cannot do that because that is a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 720 that was put in place in 1990 when the civil war started in Somalia. Until today, it's there.*

## Optimism for change but the threat of delayed action

President Mohamud was hopeful that the situation in Somalia will continue to improve but that appropriate action to address these challenges and end the conflict need to be taken as soon as possible. The longer action is delayed, the more vulnerable the country becomes. For example, the Qatar-Gulf Crisis which started in mid-2017 is seriously impacting on Somalia today with the central government supporting one side and some federal member states supporting the other side of the dispute.

*When solving problems takes longer, all unexpected and unplanned things come in … and interfere here and there. So what's most important is to shorten the journey to a peaceful settlement.*

Citing the experience of both South Sudan and Somalia, he stressed the need to resolve the conflict at the earliest possible moment while not ignoring important issues.

*In 2015, I think there was only President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, his Vice President. The conflict was two parts only. I don't know today how many parts are there in the conflict of Sudan and that's true for every conflict. In Somalia, in 1990 we started with 6 factions and we ended up into 55 factions in 2010. Within 20 years instead of 6 we became 55. So that is the nature. So, always solving the problem at the earliest possible … without ignoring the important issues that are the major attributes of resolving the conflict.*

### Somalia in 2018

In closing his remarks, the President summed up the situation in Somalia in 2018. The civil war had ended a long time ago but in some areas a level of anarchy remains where no or weak state institutions are in place that are not able to handle the security situation. Terrorism remains the greatest ongoing threat to peace. He said:

*The most serious element—a thorn in the neck—is the issue of the terrorism. They [terrorist groups] squeeze between the people and the state and they are very serious obstacles to the state-building issue.*

Therefore, how to effectively fight terrorism and extremism is the most pressing problem that needs solving. On a positive note, he said, since 2010, when the first transitional government was established in neighbouring Djibouti, Somalia has held more than 2,000 elections at national, state and local levels. Despite all of their problems— there are strong arguments that not all elections have been fully free or fair—they are one of the indicators that the situation is improving.

---

[4]  World Bank. 2013. The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding the Nation, pp. xxiii. Report can be downloaded at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/182671468307148284/The-pirates-of-Somalia-ending-the-threat-rebuilding-a-nation

## 2.2 Questions and contributions from the floor with responses from President Mohamud

As the moderator of the session, President Mbeki opened up the discussion to questions and contributions from the floor. He tasked all delegates to focus their comments on addressing the issue of Somalia, and as President Mohamud had stressed, on shortening the journey to a peaceful settlement of the Somali conflict. Key issues raised by delegates are summarized in the following sections, but as per Chatham House Rules, contributions are not attributed to individual speakers.

### The conflict situation in Somalia is more dire

The latest UN Security Council country report paints a much less positive picture of the security situation in Somalia. For example, the Speaker of Parliament was just removed in the most brutal way and there have been inter-clan clashes, almost militarized inter-clan clashes, between Somali security forces and Al-Shabaab, with hundreds of casualties.

Also, this delegate expressed surprise that President Mohamud has insisted on the continuation of the AU forces rather than rehatting the troops as United Nations, given that in other conflict situations, such as Burundi and Darfur, and also with respect to ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, peace-keeping forces have been put under UN command due to a lack of logistics and finance. Furthermore, the AU has recently reported that they will be reducing AMISOM troop numbers by 1,000 by later this year, but troop-contributing countries are trying to resist that cut saying that conditions in the country are not yet there to do that. Finally, the current Tanzanian Foreign Minister Augustine Mahiga was

the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG) of Somalia yet some sources reported that you as the President at that time insisted on a British special representative. Is that accurate or not?

In response to the final question, President Mohamud said that reports that Somalia had either refused the extension of Ambassador Mahiga as SRSG or the appointment of another African to the role are not true. Somalia has never been given the chance to select the representative. The Somali government has a minimal role in the selection of the SRSG; it can provide criteria and recommendations on the representative it wants but the final decision rests with the UN. He said that the Somali government has never opted for a non-African SRSG. Currently, the SRSG is British, whose term has been extended several times. The expectation is that the next SRSG for Somalia will be from South Africa but this is not yet confirmed.



*Mr. Joel Netshitenzhe, Executive Director, Mapungubwe Institute contributes his views to the discussion*

### Human rights abuses by AU peace-keeping forces

One delegate acknowledged the critical role that the AU mission in Somalia has played in improving the conflict and security situation in the country, but raised the serious issue that AU forces have been implicated in human rights abuses, including indiscriminate attacks against civilians and the sexual exploitation and abuse of women and girls. These are not mere speculations but have been credibly established, including through the AU's own investigation. Such abuses by peace-keeping forces are not unique to AU peace-keeping forces; similar problems have arisen with UN peace-keeping forces. However, when considered from a victim's perspective, it is the most tragic disaster when the troops who came with guns to protect innocent civilians then turn out to be the abusers. Indeed, it is

probably the worst thing that can happen to you next to the abuse you have already endured. Therefore, as more peace-keeping forces are deployed across the region, whether in Somalia or elsewhere, ways to prevent abuses by troop-contributing countries need to be put in place as well as procedures to ensure accountability and justice in situations where the protectors become abusers.

On the subject of human rights abuses by AU forces, President Mohamud acknowledged that incidences of sexual and other exploitation had occurred in some parts of Somalia. In response, the AU mission had put in place different mechanisms to ensure that troops understand what they are supposed to do. In particular, all members of the forces are required to

complete Human Rights Due Diligence Training. Even domestic Somali forces, both local and national (army and police) must be qualified as a pre-condition for receiving international support. Still, even after all of these efforts and training, a level of exploitation remains. It is an extremely complex issue to resolve, one that is closely linked to the problem of poverty which is increasing by the day. He said:

*Wherever there are AU forces in place, there are a lot of people coming to seek support, coming to do business with the forces, and the like. So, the issue of exploitation, as asked by my friend, I do not deny it is there.*

But, the President counselled on the importance of ascertaining the facts in each case. For example, during his tenure in office, there were reports that child soldiers were being used in Somalia. In response to these claims, the President invited five key stakeholders, including UNICEF and Save the Children to join the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of National Security to investigate whether children were being recruited and extent of the problem. Subsequently, a specific area was visited where it was held that a large number of children were with the forces in that area. He continued:

*And when they went there were no children among them. But what was there exactly? The same number, close to the number they mentioned, who were young boys, many of them orphans, who lived with the soldiers there. They eat with the soldiers because they don't have something to eat at their homes. They stay there. They clean homes. They sometimes do some other works but … they never get guns, they're never used as soldiers.*



Participants in discussion.
Left: Brigadier General Irvine Aryeteey, Deputy Commandant, Koffi Annan International Peace Keeping Training Centre
Right: Dr. Anicia Lala, Security Sector Reform Adviser, Democratic Control of Armed Forces

However, the President acknowledged that where the enforcement of laws is weak, there is always abuse, especially in circumstances when someone who suffers abuse has no place to go to report the abuse or seek protection. Beyond the mechanisms that the AU has put in place to prevent human rights violations, the President stressed that the very best way to prevent abuses is to shorten the journey to peace and state-building.

*The only way to eliminate abuses or to minimize the abuses is to shorten the journey of state-building and peace-building, to put responsible state institutions in place.*

However, the President shared his reservations that all reports on human rights abuses reflected reality on the ground. He observed that given security concerns, human rights organizations often commission local people to conduct research

studies and prepare these reports, and he related a hypothetical situation of a young unemployed Somali who has been hired for such a task. He said:

*A young boy who's been unemployed for a long time, who fluently speaks English language, is being given some sort of funding. We need a report on this matter, how the refugees or the IDPs are abused or how the children are abused or how the AU forces are, whatever, on some specific subject, and is given, for example, 10,000 dollars for preparing that report. So, the boy, psychologically [thinks], if he sends back [a report saying that] there's no problem at all, there are no abuses, there are no human rights abuse, there's nothing there, what are the consequences? No more funding for him. So, he has to say good things sometimes but he has to say there's a potential element which needs further investigation.*

In support of his concerns, President Mohamud gave the example of a report produced by the Mogadishu office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that said that 1,700 IDPs had been forcefully evicted from their places in Mogadishu. Upon reading the report, the President contacted the Mayor of Mogadishu to investigate these claims of eviction. In turn, the Mayor contacted the district commissioners and elders in the areas identified in the report. But, upon checking, it was found that no such evictions had taken place. Subsequently, when the Mayor queried the officer in charge of the UN in Mogadishu as to the origins of the report, he was told that a local partner organization had produced the report. Therefore, the President stressed the importance of checking the facts in each situation.

*H.E Benjamin Mkapa contributes his views*

### The existence of a parallel economy as a conflict driver

A question was posed as to whether the existence of a parallel economy as a driver that perpetuates the conflict is manifested in the context of Somalia, i.e., is the conflict providing material benefits, especially to those who are fighting against the state that provides the motivation from them to keep fighting. This issue has arisen in other conflicts. For example, some analysts have concluded that in Angola and Mozambique, the generals on both sides were perversely benefitting from the war continuing. This question is important not just from an analytical perspective. If this is

the case in Somalia, it might be critical for peace-making efforts to identify and provide alternative modes of accumulation to combatants rather than the war itself.

Given that Al-Shabaab is more economic than ideological, another delegate wondered what the state is doing to economically empower its citizens of Somalia, especially young people, so that in the event that Al-Shabaab groups approach them and offer economic gains that they can easily reject them.

In response to the question of whether a parallel economy exists in Somalia, President Mohamud said that many reports have been written that say that Somalia is a failed state.

*But there's no failed society in Somalia. Somalis, by nature, are very active people—dynamic, entrepreneurial, business-oriented people. So, there has always been a very informal economy, which is very, very active in Somalia.*

He described that the operation of the informal economy has positive benefits in some areas and a much darker side in others. For example, the telecommunications industry in Somalia is very advanced compared with many African countries, cheaper in terms of rates and better in terms of coverage in remote villages. Yet, the National Telecommunication Commission was only established about two years ago. So this is an example where the informal economy is working. Until recently, no regulatory framework was in place but a number of companies compete with each other to provide the best service possible. Al-Shabaab is an obstacle—for example, they have prohibited the use of 4G signals and smart phones in some areas—but the provision of telecommunications is one bright side of the informal economy.

Despite increasing restrictions on financial services to combat the funding of terrorist activities, Somalia also has one of the fastest remittance systems in the world. These remittances are a lifeline for many Somalis. He said:

*A boy in Minnesota puts 100 dollars there and within one hour his mother in a remote village gets that 100 dollars. Very fast and efficient.*

However, the bad side of the informal economy in Somalia, particularly in southern part of Somalia bordering with Kenya, is the wholesale destruction of the country's equatorial forest to produce charcoal. Estimates vary but reports indicate that 60 to 70% of the forests have now been destroyed. He said:

*It's not there anymore, for one reason, charcoal. It's been cut and burned to make charcoal, and that charcoal has then been exported. Some business people are doing that, some local administrations are involved, some AU forces are also involved, and above all, Al-Shabaab is benefitting from it. Because, in that remote area, in the jungle, where the charcoal is prepared there's no AU mission and there's no Somali government forces, there is Al-Shabaab only. And, if you don't pay them, you cannot do this. So, they are paid. So again, indirectly it's auto-funding for the terrorists.*

The President said that the UN Security Council has adopted a resolution banning the production of charcoal in Somalia but as of now, sitting here in Dar es Salaam, it's still going on, it's never been stopped. Other goods are also smuggled across Somalia's long and very porous borders with Kenya and Ethiopia. No customs duties or other taxes are paid. For example, Somali sugar, which is much cheaper to produce, is imported illegally into Kenya, which has had significant impacts on the Kenyan sugar industry.

**Exploring the clan system as an African model for conflict resolution**

One delegate wanted to know whether the attempts to put in place a Somali state is clashing with the clan system. Is the state trying to push or replace the clan system? And why do we want to box Somalia into a western model of statehood? Rather, given its resilience, perhaps the clan system should be explored and possibly developed to become the template for the African-led solution to conflict that we are seeking. All attempts at installing a state, a western type state in Somalia, have failed. And across Africa a lot of our states are fragile; most of them have failed and are unable to deliver to expectations. So, perhaps, Somalia's present system and how it has evolved could become a template to shape the desired statehood architecture for Africa.



*Mr. Cosmas Nkhara Bahali, Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in Africa lends his voice to the discussion*



However, as observed by another delegate, the question needs to be answered as to why Somali society or the clans as they are currently constituted, find a mutuality of interests with Al-Shabaab and other extremist groups as opposed to the state, i.e. as described by President Mohamud, why is the gap between state and the society being filled by groups like Al-Shabaab?

**Instilling confidence, localizing the peace process, and initiating political dialogue**

The peace process will be delayed-or worse, unable to be sustained-if the crisis of confidence that pervades the country is not addressed. Importantly, to build confidence and sustain peace, the process needs to be localized; local institutions need to lead the peace process.

> … *If we have no local institutions that can really take the lead it is very difficult to achieve confidence and without confidence we cannot move forward with the peace process in Somalia.*

On a closely related note, another participant emphasized that what is needed is a process of dialogue not a military solution. He said:

> *If you look at the AU Mission of Somalia, I have not read anywhere if there's any political dialogue process going on. Because in any peace-keeping mission … if there's no political process going on, that mission will never end.*

Initiating dialogue and finding political solutions to end conflicts on the continent is especially important as international funding for peace-keeping missions is decreasing. The AU is fortunate that, at the 2017 summit of the African Union and European Union, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to the Joint Strategy adopted ten years ago at the Lisbon Summit that is the framework for its partnership with the AU. As part of that framework, the EU is committed to cooperate on peace and security issues including the funding of African missions by the AU. Nonetheless, the EU is tired. They are trying to reduce the money and they asking African presidents to come up with ideas on how to raise funds for these missions.

## Achieving sustainable reconciliation in Somalia

AU mission in Somalia has been described as one of the most successful African peace support operations and has been at the forefront of the entire discussion about having an African peace support operation model and doctrine. However, what happens when areas are liberated? Once liberated, areas face the challenge of replacing AU troops to maintain law and order and avoiding recapture by groups like Al-Shabaab. This is very important with respect to AMISOM's long-term strategy for securing peace. Therefore, this delegate asked President Mohamud whether domestic security forces in Somalia had the capacity to take over and continue the fight against Al-Shabaab.

In response, President Mohamud said that, in theory, once an area is liberated by the AU or via a joint operation by the AU and the Somali National Army, then a program of stabilization starts. During this period, local administrations are re-built, reconciliations are made, and economic recovery is commenced. But, in practice, this stabilization program has never succeeded due to logistical problems, for example, the difficulty in linking one place to another via the country's main supply routes. But, most importantly, local institution-led peace processes are needed.

Prior to entering politics, President Mohamud explained that he was the director of the Centre for Research and Dialogue in Mogadishu, which was the prime mover for local reconciliations in Somalia. In that role, he travelled to all corners of Somalia to facilitate reconciliations. But that experience showed that if there are no state institutions, the

reconciliations and settlements made, no matter how deep, will not be sustainable. He said:

*Reconciliations, in most conflict environments, will be sustainable only when someone kills someone, and [the person] who killed the other fellow is called a murderer … that he's a criminal who has violated the rules.*

To make his point clear, President Mohamud said:

*But when you make reconciliation and everything is settled, including the compensation of those who have been killed or looted or destroyed, after few months people get together, they come back, they stay together, villages are rebuilt, but one person who lost a father or who lost a brother comes to do a revenge killing. Once he kills that person, [if] he does not become a murderer or someone who killed someone he becomes clan X killed clan Y. Or group X killed group Y. And then the other group comes and they kill someone who has nothing to do with what has been happening and then the conflict starts again, the local conflict starts again.*

Therefore, no matter what efforts have been made and what resources have been invested, lasting reconciliation cannot be achieved until the law is enforced. It cannot happen if someone kills another person and is not seen as a murderer and taken before a court of law.

*So, state institutions, however weak, are very important and a prerequisite for a sustainable peace to be embraced.*

## Introducing peace education for Somali youth

Based upon President Mohamud's assessment that the civil war in Somalia had ended but the perennial disease of terrorism has remained, one delegate asked if the space existed to introduce peace education for youth in the country. Peace education does not necessarily need to be introduced through the classroom but can be communicated through the media, through communities and through clans. From project experience in Somalia and Ethiopia, there is huge interest from young people to be engaged in peace education. This is especially important as youth are frequently the prime movers of terrorism or violent extremism. Another delegate recommended that the AU could facilitate youth dialogue first within the clan and then extend it beyond the clan as an effective way to contribute to stability of Somalia.

On a related issue, another participant cited the complexity of identifying and combating terrorists.

*There is an agenda which needs to be re-thought by the African people … When you are in D.C. in U.S., for example, a terrorist definition can be a person who is coming from the Arab world or coming from Somalia coming to the US. But when you are in African countries, a terrorist becomes a member of your clan, a member of your family, a member of another group. Now, in this peace enforcement we are talking about, we are killing the children, who are part of a clan, who are part of a tribe.*

## Somaliland: Republic or secessionist state?

One participant described how the authorities in the city of Hargeisa have declared that Somaliland is a Republic. They consider that Somaliland has always been a republic and by declaring themselves as a separate state, they have simply reverted to the political situation that existed prior to independence. In contrast, the Somali Government views this declaration of independence as secession from Somalia. However, unlike the situation in other parts of the country, the political situation of Somaliland has not degenerated into clans. Rather, the area is very peaceful and authorities are running free and fair elections. It's completely the opposite of other areas of Somalia. How can this be explained?

In response, President Mohamud concurred that, in terms of peace and security, some regions of the country are far better than others. In particular, Somaliland is a very, very stable place. In identifying reasons for its stability, President Mohamud said that the processes of dialogue and reconciliation were more advanced in Somaliland. Similarly, Puntland, the region bordering Somaliland is also much more stable than the central and southern regions. Importantly, too, Al-Shabaab has never been effective in those areas, and he posited that the presence of traditional religious institutions in those two regions was a significant factor. He said:

*Where there are traditional religious institutions, Al-Shabaab [finds it] very difficult to infiltrate. But where there are no traditional religious institutions, they succeeded to infiltrate.*

**The role of the League of Arab States**

Media reports have highlighted the interference of members of the Arab League, that they have undermined attempts to consolidate national authority and defend Somalia's territorial integrity. As an organization, the League of Arab States is traversing a very difficult time and dealing with very contentious issues, not only the recent move of the US embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and the fallout from the Iran nuclear deal, but also the general political events in the Middle East, especially the Sunni and Shi'a alignment. Therefore, the delegate wished to know how relations with different members of the Arab League have affected the conflict in Somalia. It's one thing to have individual member states advancing their national interests in the way they deem fit but, as an organization, how much has the Arab League been supportive of national efforts to bring peace to Somalia?

In response, President Mohamud said that Somalia is a member of the Arab League as well as member of the AU, and that the League has a very clear position on Somalia, i.e., the unity and the territorial integrity of Somalia is indivisible and inviolable. Various resolutions have been made to this effect at summits of the Arab League, but he said there are a lot of other countries that have vested interests in this issue.

**Popular participation in conflict resolution and peace building**

One delegate highlighted how the OAU, the predecessor to the African Union, mobilized the masses of African countries.

> *I am talking about people. It mobilized people. I remember when I was in primary school, we used to sing about the problems in Mozambique, in Angola. We used to contribute chickens, goats, even maize to people who were going to try to liberate other people in Southern Africa.*

But when the AU was established, it effectively de-linked itself from the people. The AU established a Secretariat and a very good APSA—including the African Standby Force, Military Staff Committee, Panel of the Wise and the PSC—but that structure is now completely divorced from the people. Therefore, popular contribution and participation in the framework needs to be fostered anew.

> *We are seeing the problem of Somalia is not the problem of the Somali people, it's our problem. So the problem must be solved by the people of Africa not by the AU itself in Addis Ababa … That structure is a very big structure but it delinks itself from the population of the African continent.*

## Session 3: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The third session of the Forum focused on the complex situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. President Mohamud chaired the session, which was opened with a presentation on the status of the conflict by Ambassador Zachary Muburi Muita, Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), an intergovernmental organization of 12 African states[5] working to address the root causes of conflicts so as to attain peace, security, political stability and development in the Great Lakes Region.



*Map of Democratic Republic of Congo*

---

[5]  The twelve member states of the ICGLR are: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Republic of South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia.

## 3.1 Presentation by Ambassador Zachary Muburi Muita, Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region



*Amb. Zachary Muburi-Muita Executive Secretary, ICGLR making a presentaion on the Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo*

### The 2004 Dar es Salaam Declaration and 2006 Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region

To begin his remarks, Ambassador Muita briefly described the development and role of the ICGLR. In 2004, he said that the then eleven member countries of the ICGLR[6] unanimously adopted the Declaration on Peace, Security and Development in the Great Lakes Region in Dar es Salaam, which is popularly known as the Dar es Salaam Declaration. Subsequently, in 2006, the ICGLR was formally established when the Heads of State and Government of the ICGLR re-convened in Nairobi to sign the Pact on Security, Stability and

Development in the Great Lakes Region.[7] The ICGLR's responsibility is to coordinate, facilitate and monitor the implementation of the Pact.

Amb. Muita related that this period was a particularly difficult time for the region with several inter-state wars in progress. Therefore, these documents were signed with the key intention to transform the Great Lakes Region into a place of durable peace and security and of economic growth and shared development. Under the Pact, the Heads of State committed to promote the greater peace and security in the region through the respect of democracy and good governance, the respect of the territorial integrity, national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states, and the principles of non-aggression. In particular, they would prohibit any member state from allowing the use of its territory as a base for subversion against other member states. They also pledged for sustained political will so as to jointly seek peaceful solutions to the disputes and to honour their commitments. They reaffirmed the need to base their mutual relations on international legal instruments, universal fundamental principles, and the observance of the standards and principles of humanitarian international law, especially in regard to the protection of women, children and displaced persons. To advance these ideals, the Pact contained 10 protocols.

### The central importance of the DRC in resolving the conflict in the Great Lakes Region

Turning to the topic of the current discussion, Amb. Muita said that the stability of the DRC continues to be the key reason for the existence of the ICGLR. He added:

*And the reason for that is not too difficult to discern. Principally, if only for the self-interests of the neighbouring countries, the DRC has some 10-11 neighbours, and, therefore, when it is not at peace with itself, the conflict therein is contagious to the neighbouring countries as well. So, the converse would also be true. If the DRC were doing well, it would mean that it would be the big engine that would pull the entire region into prosperity.*

Continuing, Amb. Muita said that the main achievement of the ICGLR as far as the DRC is concerned is the elimination of interstate conflicts in the Great Lakes Region. In the decade prior to the establishment of the ICGLR, many states of the region were at war, especially inside the DRC. Several countries had armies in the DRC either fighting for or against the government. This is no longer the case, which is a big achievement of the organization and its member states and international partners.

### Current challenges to peace and security in DRC

### Armed militias

Amb. Muita then described some of the current challenges to peace and security in the DRC. The first is the existence of a large number of armed groups and militias in the country, known collectively as negative forces, which challenge the authority and territorial integrity of the state in different areas of the country. Some of these negative forces are of foreign origin, for example, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and remnants of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), both of which originated in Uganda, and the National Forces of Liberation (FNL), which originated from Burundi. These groups are mainly active in eastern DRC, particularly in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu.

In addition, various local rebel groups/militias operate in different parts of the country, such as the Mai-Mai[8], some of which are growing stronger and occasionally engaging the national army, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), and the Kamwina Nsapu militia which has been active in the Kasai region (including Kasai-Central province and neighbouring Kasai, Kasai-Oriental, Lomami and Sankuru provinces) in the south-western part of DRC. Since 2016, violence in the Kasai region has led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people within DRC while around 30,000 people fled as refugees into Angola and Zambia, resulting in a huge humanitarian catastrophe. Military operations against these local and foreign negative forces have been spearheaded by the FARDC working with United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

---

6  South Sudan attained independence in 2011.
7  The Pact included the Dar es Salaam Declaration, Programmes of Action and Protocols.

8  Mai-Mai refers to any kind of community-based militia group active in the DRC, most of which were formed to defend their local territory against other armed groups.

*Dr. Boubacar Ndiaiye, security sector governance specialist, College of Wooster comments on the situation in the DRC.*

### Demobilization and repatriation of combatants

Another significant challenge is the demobilization and repatriation of ex-combatants. In particular, demobilized ex-combatants of the FDLR have been in camps—principally Kisangani, Walungu and Kanyamba Yonga—for the last 3 years awaiting repatriation to Rwanda but that has not happened. Rwanda has been ready to receive them but the ex-combatants have not been willing to move back. The ICGLR summit in October 2017 pledged to give them an ultimatum to return to Rwanda by October 2018. In addition, since their military defeat in 2013 and the signing of the Nairobi Declarations, ex-combatants of the March 23 (M23) rebellion in North Kivu province have been in cantonments in Rwanda and Uganda. Occasionally they break out and spread into the DRC, as happened late last year causing tensions between the two countries.

Amb. Muita said that the continued stay of these ex-combatants is a source of mistrust and tension, hence, a significant obstacle to peace not only

in the DRC, but also in the region as a whole. Therefore, at the instruction of the ICGLR summit in October last year, a joint group comprising representatives from the ICGLR, the United Nations, African Union, Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as officials from the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda completed a field mission to these camps, conveying the final warning that the camps would be forcefully closed in October 2018 unless the ex-combatants move out voluntarily.

Perhaps an even bigger challenge are intelligence reports that the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has been transforming into a terrorist organization and is recruiting across the whole region. In December last year, combatants of the ADF ambushed troops with the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), a military unit which is a part of MONUSCO, and about a dozen soldiers of the Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF) were killed.

### Recent initiatives of the ICGLR

### Political dialogue

As an organization, ICGLR was established to increase political engagement and a unique mechanism was created to foster inter-state dialogue. Under the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM), each of the 12 member states of ICGLR as well as SADC and MONUSCO contribute two high-ranking soldiers (a total of 28 personnel) to this security body. Based in Goma, the capital of North Kivu province in eastern DRC, the EJVM is responsible for verifying accusations and counter-accusations of cross-border infringements between the DRC and neighbouring countries. Whenever there is an incident, the EJVM is deployed on the ground to establish the facts and present their findings. The work of EJVM is further assisted by the Joint Intelligence Fusion Centre (JIFC), a team of intelligence officers also headquartered in Goma, which provides information on cross-border infringements. The ICGLR also works very closely with the SADC for purposes of fostering peace and security in the DRC.

ICGLR also has an important role with respect to the MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), which, in 2013, successfully drove the troops of the M23 Movement from Goma, and helped end that rebellion. In part, the FIB was established because of dissatisfaction with traditional peace-keeping operations of the UN. Amb. Muita considered that the FIB does a fantastic job but is often constrained in what they are allowed to do. Therefore, the ICGLR and SADC along with troop-contributing countries

(TCCs) continue to lobby the UN Secretariat to streamline and strengthen the mandate of the FIB so that the brigade is given room to do their work.

### Elections

With respect to the overall political situation in the DRC, Amb. Muita considered that good progress was being made and that the atmosphere for national elections is very conducive. Assurances have been provided that everything is in place to hold the elections in December 2018.[9] However, he acknowledged a number of contentious issues that still need to be addressed before the polls are conducted. In particular, there is ongoing controversy over the use of electronic voting. From a number of recent experiences on the continent—for example, the historic nullification of the presidential vote by the Supreme Court of Kenya due to the irregularities in the electronic transmission of vote tallies—electronic voting is not the panacea for a successful, free and just election.

Amb. Muita was also optimistic about the opening up of democratic space, for instance, opposition figures, such as Tshisekedi, have been getting much more room than has usually the case. However, from a technical point, he urged nations in the region to exert more pressure on the Government so as to live true to its promise of a peaceful election. He also pointed to the need for a joint long-term observation mission to monitor elections in the DRC.

---

[9] Following the Forum, elections were held on 30th December 2018 with Felix Tshisekedi, party leader for the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) announced as the next President of the Democratic Republic of Congo on 10th January 2019

*Opposition suporters during a rally in Kinshasa.*
*Photo: Eduardo Soteras/AFP/Getty Images*

### The way forward

In closing, Amb. Muita reiterated the importance of designing effective modes of cooperation between the UN, AU, regional economic communities and the regional mechanisms in the DRC and elsewhere on the continent to ensure that the implementation of interventions are coherent, harmonized and produce sustainable results in fragile and post-conflict situations.

Again, he highlighted the issue of disarmed combatants being allowed to go home because unless the issue of mistrust is tackled then it poisons the whole idea of regional relations to help the DRC get to a peaceful state. There is also the aspect of security sector reform (SSR), which not only requires the support of member states of the region but also the international community. And he stressed the need for Africa to act with urgency. He said:

> *When we talk of African solutions to African challenges, it would mean that we take first priority to help tackle our own problems, but that window of opportunity can only last for so long. Because, if we don't, then fellow Africans continue to suffer—human displacements, refugees, IDPs—and the rest*

> *of the world community will say, "Hey, Africans are also a member of the human species so we'll give you a window of opportunity for you to help your neighbours, your brothers, your sisters." But if you don't, then you should not cry non-interference or African solutions when you are not doing anything.*

Vitally, as in other cases in the Great Lakes Region, Amb. Muita observed that member states and regional organizations have an onerous responsibility to intervene quickly in DRC to design a common strategy to encourage the government, opposition parties and other stakeholders to conduct a peaceful general election. He said:

> *The events in Eastern DRC, in the Kasai Region, they are all related to what is going on in Kinshasa. If there is a firm timetable for elections, the regions can see they have a chance of picking their leaders in the capital. There is usually a direct correlation; when there is greater predictability or events in the capital, there is less conflict in the margins. But when there is an upheaval and uncertainty in the capital about the direction of the nation's political affairs then we see an upsurge of violence by the negative forces in the other areas.*

## 3.2 Questions and contributions from the floor

As the moderator of the session, President Mohamud opened up the discussion to questions and contributions from the floor. Key issues raised by delegates are summarized in the following sections. Again, as per Chatham House Rules, contributions are not attributed to individual speakers.

**The confidence-building measures under the New Year's Eve Agreement of 2016 have not been implemented. How then can the atmosphere in the country be conducive for elections?**

On 31 December 2016, a Catholic Church-mediated power-sharing agreement known as the "New Year's Eve agreement" was signed in Kinshasa. The agreement, also known as the CENCO[10] Accord, called for elections to be held by the end of 2017, but the election date was subsequently postponed until 23 December 2018. The agreement also called for the implementation of "confidence-building measures" to reduce tensions and re-open civic and political space so as to increase the chances that free, fair and representative elections would take place in accordance with the democratic principles of the country's constitution. These measures included lifting the ban on peaceful political protests and meetings, re-opening of media houses close to the opposition, releasing political prisoners, and allowing political leaders living in exile to return to contest the elections.



*Ms. Kigwene Germaine from the Congo Peace Network lends her perspective on peace and security in the DRC*

However, these confidence building measures have never been fully implemented; the ban on freedom of association and assembly and demonstration is still in effect. Indeed, demonstrations in late 2017 and early 2018, particularly the peaceful protests organized by the Catholic Lay Coordination Committee, were terribly repressed. In several marches following Sunday Mass, demonstrators—many of whom were holding Bibles, crosses and branches of trees as

symbols of peace—were violently attacked by Congolese government security forces. These are not mere allegations but have been confirmed by the Joint Commission of Enquiries established by the government itself. In addition, opposition politicians and activists from the citizens' movements, including LUCHA and Filimbi, have been arrested and remain in prison. How then can the atmosphere in the country be described as conducive for elections? And will the ICGLR be pushing for/insisting on the full implementation of the confidence-building measures?

---

[10] The mediators for the agreement were from the Conférence Episcopale Nationale du Congo (CENCO); in English, the DRC's Conference of Catholic Bishops.

**President Kabila is unwilling to relinquish power**

One delegate observed that the present context in the country is very difficult, with political disagreements among the government and the opposition leading to violations of human rights, especially freedom of speech. But there is no point in concealing the source of the problem; it is not the fault of the ICGLR or the AU. The real problem lies with the current President. It is the President who is refusing to respect the rules, who wants to extend his mandate, who is trying to stop the elections so that he can remain in power.

Whether in Kasai or the east, every time the country seeks to go to elections or build peace, a crisis arises and everything collapses. The government is not acting to achieve peace and security in the country so that democratic elections can be held. The president and opposition leaders and all stakeholders signed the CENCO Accord but they are not willing to respect even what they have signed.

Another delegate described that over the last 15 years, the situation in DRC has continued to deteriorate. In 2004, approximately 20 armed groups were involved. Now, in 2018, according to the Joint Mission Analysis Centre, 150 armed groups are active in the conflict. And some statements by the AU or SADC have actually fuelled the conflict.

**The absence of leadership in governance across Africa: Who has the credentials to advise President Kabila?**

Another delegate said that, back in 2009, not one of the countries surrounding Sudan had the democratic credentials, the good governance credentials to tell President Omar al-Bashir what he needed to hear to change the course of his country and the history of the continent. Similarly, with respect to the DRC, aside from Tanzania, and arguably, Zambia, none of the leaders in the countries neighbouring the Congo have the democratic credentials to tell President Kabila to stop endangering his people and imperilling the stability of his own country and countries throughout the region. More broadly, aside from Botswana's recently retired President Ian Khama, sitting African leaders don't seem to have the courage to tell their peers what they need to hear to change course in their countries.

However, another delegate highlighted that a double standard persists in Africa; the leaders of some countries on the continent have been allowed or have managed to change their constitutions to remain in power forever, while others are not allowed to do so.



*Dr. Sahle-Work Zewde, Director General, United Nations Office in Nairobi making a contribution to the discussion*

**Too many cooks in the kitchen: Who has the mandate and capacity to intervene in the DRC?**

With respect to the situation in the DRC, i.e., when the leaders have failed to abide by the principles laid out by the New Year's Agreement, who precisely has the mandate to hold the leaders and the government accountable for the agreements they have signed? In resolving crises on the continent, multiple institutions with overlapping mandates are often involved.

Another serious problem in dealing with the crises on our continents is that only military/security-related solutions are considered, which does not help at all. The peace-keeping operation in the DRC is the UN's biggest in Africa, costing over 1 billion USD per year. Surely, such huge sums of money could be used productively to develop the country rather than be spent solely on security measures. Therefore, it is imperative not to remain in a strait jacket and propound one narrative in dealing with these issues.

**Peace-keeping is turning into a business. Who is deployed matters.**

One delegate described that early deployments of UN peace-keeping troops in the DRC were specialist units, but very soon, they began sending troops who were not deployable. Additionally, the forces deployed were predominantly from Asian countries, such as Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, and no African brigades were deployed. He lamented that peace-keeping in the Congo is now a business. Military personnel are typically deployed for one year—they go in, want to make a mark and come out—but UN staff there have permanent jobs so they don't have any reason why they want the mission to end. He said:

*I don't see where Congo is going if the AU does not truthfully take over the mission. That is why I support what the Ambassador said when he said that they refuse the UN in Somalia because in my view the UN is just doing business as usual and nothing is happening in Congo.*

In closing his remarks, he considered that everyone knows that the elections scheduled for December 2018 won't take place. If they were, all of the presidential candidates should be known by now. Moreover, Congolese authorities have blocked Moise Katumbi from returning to the country to file his candidacy, and Felix Tshisekedi cannot even bury his own father.[11]

**Security sector reform in the DRC**

The DRC needs security sector reform not only to enhance the effectiveness of the security forces but also their governance. However, efforts to date to improve governance have been met with resistance from the Congolese Government. Moreover, the AU has limited capacity to support such reform and the capacity of the UN has also been cut. Therefore, who in the continent is creating that repository of capacity to provide support in these areas? Are member states really making their capacity available for doing this and on what terms?

On a closely related issue, just as peace-keeping troops must abide by the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy for the protection of civilians, Congolese national security forces must also fulfil their mission to protect the citizens of the country. This is a core element of security sector reform. Therefore, how are national security forces implementing their own mission? How are these aspects being passed on to Congolese forces? And how is the issue of military justice being tackled at the moment? For example, how are captured leaders and soldiers of negative forces processed? Is there a working justice system which enables people to be rehabilitated into society Are their human rights respected? Or do they go into containers and die? If not, radicalization will be fuelled.

**Elections are not a panacea for a country's problems**

Elections are not a panacea to the problems in Kenya, which is a very advanced democracy, let alone DRC. Frequently, the holding of elections is considered to be the most important issue as if it would be the solution to all the problems in the country, which is simply not the case. Indeed, normally, the conduct of an election should be a technical process that brings somebody to power or continues or changes the government but it can never be a solution to a crisis.

But, even though elections may not be panacea to the country's problems, it is what the people want. And, if indeed the AU intervene or an agreement is reached to secure what the people of the Congo want, how can the interests of one individual will be allowed to supersede the interest of the entire continent?

President Mohamud also had reservations on whether elections or a change in the country's leadership will help to solve the problems in the DRC, especially when no robust state institutions are in place. Reflecting on the experience in his home country, he related that after the civil war, Somalia's first transitional president was elected in 2000, and, since 2007, the country has elected five presidents. Fortunately, these elections were conducted without conflict, but the country still does not have a functioning bureaucracy. Each time a new president is elected, the task of building state institutions is set back a couple of years or starts from scratch again until the next president is sworn in and this process is repeated. Therefore, he counselled that a delicate balance needs to be struck between leadership change and continuity so as not to impede the development of the country. He said:

*I don't advocate for people to stay longer because I didn't stay longer but it's the issue of balance. Is a four-year term enough for building institutions from scratch or what? ... It [continuity of leadership] has worked to a certain extent in some African countries. It worked for Ethiopia, it worked for Uganda, it worked for Rwanda, but the issue is, where is the cut-off? Where do we stop the continuity and how much continuity do we need? That is the delicate balance that we must think about.*

**The African Union makes resolutions but cannot enforce them**

Another delegate considered that the AU is like a talk tank, where our leaders go, they meet, have good deliberations yet how to implement those agreements and enforce those agreements is increasingly a problem. Increasingly, the AU has no mandate, because resolutions are not enforced. Therefore, stronger African institutions need to be established that can actually help in enforcing resolutions so that the citizens of individual states do not suffer. For instance, if the problem in DRC is coming from just one person, what should the AU do to ensure that that one person leaves the way for the majority of the citizens to have freedom?

---

11 Long-time opposition leader, Etienne Tshisekedi, died in Belgium in February 2017, but a protracted dispute between his family and the government over the repatriation of his body and funeral arrangements have delayed his burial for well over a year.

**An historical perspective on the conflict in the DRC**



*Laurent-Desire Kabila was the third President of the DRC and served from May 1997 until his assassination in January 2001*

President Mkapa related that President Mbeki was a central figure in developing the political dispensation that has kept the DRC together for the last 15 years. Therefore, he asked President Mbeki to share his experience and knowledge on the different elements of the agreement reached at that time, including who was involved, how he was able to get stakeholders to agree, and where did it start falling apart? He also asked to what extent the UN was involved and whether they have been trouble-shooters or trouble-makers. By looking back at the original dispensation, President Mkapa felt that the forum would better understand how and why factionalism emerged and the agreement was abandoned, who had been abandoned it, and why did the guarantors/neighbours watch this happen.

President Mbeki gave a detailed historical perspective on the conflict in the DRC. Important points from his recollection of events were as follows:

• When Laurent Kabila took over in Congo, he advised the new President that, to rebuild the Congo, would require a return to the country's Lumumbist beginnings, because the country's path to independence had been interrupted by the assassination of the Pan-Africanist and Congolese nationalist leader, Patrice Lumumba in 1961. So he recommended that the President should gather together all of the other Lumumbists. But President Kabila said that Mbeki was wrong. He agreed with the need to go back to the country's Lumumbist origins but said that he was wrong in seeking to bring back the Lumumbists, because Kabila considered that he was the only true Lumumbist remaining. There were no others. President Mbeki said that there was no way to debate the matter with him.

• Subsequently, during the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in South Africa with President Joseph Kabila and the leaders of the two main rebel groups, President Mbeki raised the same issue, i.e., regardless of the political parties that the participants represented, it was now their common obligation to rebuild the Congo and restart the process of independence and transformation that was interrupted when Patrice Lumumba was killed. At that time, a power-sharing agreement was reached, even the constitution was negotiated with a common vision to build this new Congo.

• However, the process got interrupted. On the night before the agreement was due to be signed[12]—which included the formation of a government of national unity—Joseph Kabila and Pierre Bemba, who led one of the armed groups, refused to sign. As a result, implementation of the agreement was postponed for over a year. It wasn't signed because Kabila and Bemba thought that they could form a government just between the two of them and forget the rest. He added:

*And we said, "You can't do that." The reason we've met in this format with all of the Congolese representatives as they are is to ensure that you act together as Congolese to build this new Congo. Now you want to form a government out of the two of you to exclude the rest. It's not going to work.*

• A year later, President Mbeki received a call from President Kabila asking him to come to Kinshasa. Reluctantly, he agreed to travel to the DRC to meet Kabila. At that meeting, President Kabila apologized for his actions the year before. He said that what had been proposed about forming a government of national unity was correct and asked President Mbeki to act as mediator to achieve that goal. Again, reluctantly, President Mbeki agreed to take on the role of mediator and the government was formed.

President Mbeki went on to illustrate how an important part of the story in the DRC is that there are too many countries around the world that are very interested in what happens to the DRC because of the centrality of this country in terms of the future of the continent. The host of competing foreign interests in the country is a significant obstacle to the resolution of the conflict of the Congo.

---

[12] World Peace Foundation. African Politics, African Peace: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) / United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) Short Missions Brief, page 2.

*"Although the warring parties signed a ceasefire in 1999, widespread fighting persisted until the 2002 peace arrangement known as the Pretoria Agreement, signed by Laurent Kabila's son, Joseph, who assumed power upon his father's assassination in 2001. The Pretoria Agreement created a transitional government to rule until democratic elections could be held in 2006. President Joseph Kabila led this transitional government alongside four vice-presidents who represented two rebel groups, the president's supporters, and civil society at large."*

### Endemic corruption and historical border disputes

President Mbeki highlighted that corruption, long-standing cross-border disputes in the Eastern Congo which date back to the Mobutu years, and the historical involvement of Rwanda and Uganda, remain integral parts of the conflict today. On the issue of corruption, he recalled a meeting he had with former President of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, to discuss transitional arrangements if and when Mobutu leaves. He asked Mwalimu who he would recommend as a transitional leader, someone who's not corrupt. In reply, Mwalimu said:

*You know, you people, you don't know the Congo. Don't say you are looking for a person that's not corrupt, say you are looking for the least corrupt among them.*

As it was then, corruption remains a big part of the problem in the Congo. We now have a situation in which Joseph Kabila doesn't want to leave office, and one of the reasons he does not want to leave is because he does not know what's going to happen to him once he ceases to be president. This is for two reasons. First, he was one of the commanders during the rebellion against Mobutu, and it is alleged that his troops committed war crimes, including massacres of civilians at his command. Kabila is afraid of the consequences for those actions once he leaves office. Second, he is afraid of the consequences for the corruption that has taken place during his time in power. Therefore, some Congolese leaders are saying that the only way to get Kabila to leave is to guarantee amnesty that he won't be arrested and charged.

Another historical aspect to the conflict is the issue of the Banyamulenge, a population of ethnic Tutsi in North and South Kivu in the Eastern Congo. The problem started when Mobutu said that the Banyamulenge were foreigners, Rwandese, who ought not to be there. One of the consequences was the emergence of the Mai-Mai in the Eastern Congo, whose target was the removal of these so-called foreigners. But the fact is that the Banyamulenge are Congolese, who have lived in the area for generations. It's the same phenomenon that exists everywhere on the continent, that people of the same ethnic group are living across borders. Kabila Senior inherited that issue. Indeed, that's why the rebellion led by Laurent Kabila started in the Kivus and marched all the way to Kinshasa. Kabila Senior took advantage of the base of people in the Kivus, who were interested in the removal of Mobutu.

In addition, President Mbeki explained that the removal of Mobutu was a decision of the Governments of Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia who had decided that Mobutu had to go. They were the godfathers of Kabila Senior. From then until today, the involvement of Rwanda and Uganda is an integral regional component of the problems in the Congo and one that must be factored in when seeking a resolution to the conflict.

In closing his remarks on the Congo, President Mbeki lamented that a Lumumbist leadership in the Congo, with a nationalist mentality and commitment does not exist. He said:

*It's a problem [and] I don't know how we are going to solve it. In the end, to find a resolution to these problems of peace and security in the Congo, you have got to address this issue. What is it that we need to do, what do the Congolese need to do to go back to the Lumumbist tradition. If we don't have that, I don't think we are going to find peace and security for Congo. That's my fear.*

## The DRC in 2018

Ambassador Muita concurred with President Mbeki's historical summary of events and their ongoing influence on the conflict today. He said that those who do not know their history will not know where they are going, that the continent's past has to be the mirror of the future. In particular, he highlighted that African states have borders dating back to the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 when European colonial powers arbitrarily partitioned the continent. Consequently, people of the same ethnic group were separated across borders so it is not right to denounce those on one side or the other side as foreigners. In their wisdom, Africa's founding fathers and the continent's organizations kept the borders as they were lest there be total chaos at independence between neighbouring countries making opposing territorial claims. And just as those the borders were kept, so too countries must keep the people who are within those historical boundaries.

He then sought to provide responses to specific comments and questions from the floor. To begin, he said that the leadership of all of the countries in the region, with the support of the ICGLR and SADC, need to appeal with a unified voice to President Kabila to commit to the full implementation of the confidence-building measures of the New Year's Agreement as the pre-conditions for peaceful, free and fair, credible and transparent elections that can bring peace not only to the DRC but to the whole region. He considered that good progress had been made but by working together we can move faster. He related that Congo's electoral commission (CENI) had reported that it had finished voter registration, and the cost of running the elections—which was originally estimated at over a billion dollars, hence, was used as one of the excuses for postponing the elections—had been scaled downwards to



*Top: H.E Thabo Mbeki and Amb. Ami Mpungwe, former Ambassador of Tanzania to South Africa enjoy a light moment.*

*Bottom: Amb. Zachary Muburi-Muita responding to comments and the question from the floor*

just below half a billion dollars. In addition, since 2016, the Catholic Church and all the other main stakeholders in the Congo have put pressure on President Kabila not to seek a third presidential term. It is now for all leaders of the region to remain seized on this matter.

On the challenge of leadership, Amb. Muita felt that the DRC and that Africa generally is still struggling to find leaders with the patriotism to consolidate a sense of nationhood within their countries. And he felt that this is a challenge that dates back to the days of the slave trade when some chiefs collaborated with foreigners to sell and/or colonize our own people.

On the question of whether elections per se were a panacea for problems in any country, he highlighted the importance of inclusivity, which was discussed at the ALF in Johannesburg. He said:

*You can have the elections alright, but many times you find that we have a winner take it all [mentality] where groupings come together, ethnic or religious,*

*and they then run away with the leadership and sharing of government positions and resources to the exclusion of big chunks of the population just because you have won an election. I think [what is] more necessary, [is] inclusivity, fairness and justice in society; that's what leadership should be all about.*

On the proliferation of regional organizations in Africa—with overlapping memberships and mandates—he said it was unfortunately the reality of the continent. Addressing this challenge requires that each organization maintain close and active working relationships with the others so as to achieve greater synergy in desired outcomes. On the question of double standards with respect to term limits in different countries, he considered that a lot of good would be done by harmonizing the work of the different regional organizations. For example, member states of each region could be given the first priority to respond to regional crises and not have parallel processes started on the sidelines.

He said that the ICGLR also works to prevent the illegal exploitation of natural resources, given

that the proceeds from these resources are one of the principal source of funds for negative forces. Hence, the ICGLR has created a regional certification mechanism, which brings in upstream and downstream dealers in resources to cut out the illegal traders in these resources. ICGLR brings merchants from Europe, America and Asia as well as those in the mines so that you can track the minerals as they leave the DRC.

On the question of security sector reform, Amb. Muita recalled words of the commander of the National Defence College in Nairobi that "politics is the master science of society". Therefore, he felt that security sector reform cannot be fully realized unless the political challenges are resolved first. He said

*We have been working on the sidelines about security sector reform—for the criminal justice system, for customs, police and certainly the military—but we'll not get as much results as we would if there was a greater political accommodation in the capital. The protection of civilians certainly is a very key point for us.*

**Thinking outside the box: Tailoring elections to specific post-conflict environments in Africa**

In closing the session, President Mohamud said that elections is always a topical issue but it's not elections in themselves that are being questioned. He said:

*In the 21st century, no one is going to advocate that we establish monarchies and kings and princes and emirs and so on. The question is: Can we Africanize the elections?*

In particular, how can elections be adapted to specific post-conflict environments which are characterized by mistrust, weak institutions, corruption, and so many spoilers who are benefiting from the problems? How can elections be framed within the political market of Africa?

To better illustrate his point, he related that in 2000 in Somalia when the first transitional government was established, it was very difficult to identify or decide which tools were appropriate to share power among all the contending groups. Everyone wanted to grab power for their own benefit or to address their own fears. He described:

*So, a formula was put in place called the 4.5 formula—4.5 means 4 major clans and 1 minority clan, which is half … It's not written in the constitution and it's not written in any other legal document or legal platform. But up to today, it's working still.*

He said that some people argue that the country is now unable to move forward because of this clan formula. In particular, intellectuals, oftentimes westerners, claim that the clan model is not appropriate for state-building because it's old and traditional, because it's a social tool not a political tool, and because it does not end anywhere, i.e., in every clan there are sub-clans and in every sub-clan, there are further sub-clans, so where is the cut-off point.

But at this point in time, there are no other tools in Somalia's political market so it will continue to be used until we reach a day where we build trust and we accept that other instruments are available. Hence, the leadership of the continent needs to think outside the box to solve or address the issue of governance in Africa generally, and, in particular, in post-conflict Africa.

## Session 4: A reflection on the role and place of the AU with respect to peace and stability on the continent



In the final session, the group shifted its focus to how the global context, in particular international peace and security arrangements, impacts on African conflicts and crises. In introducing the session, President Mbeki said the need exists to review what the African Union has been doing to secure peace and security on the continent, where and why has it succeeded, where and why it has failed, and what needs to be done afresh and how necessary changes can be made to the APSA. In setting the direction of the session, he reiterated a few key issues from the earlier sessions. For example, with respect to the DRC, he said

*…who in the neighborhood of the DRC has got the moral standing to intervene with Kabila; to say you are doing right, you are doing wrong, step down and so on… Maybe nobody does have that kind of moral authority. But if it's a task that needs to be discharged … it must be the responsibility of the AU to discharge the task.*



*Top and Bottom: H.E Thabo Mbeki chairs a session reflecting on role of the AU with respect to peace and security in Africa*

Therefore, the pertinent question becomes, how can the AU strategically intervene to prevent and/or end conflicts on the continent? In particular, within its peace and security architecture, the AU needs to raise its profile for conflict prevention. Here, raising the profile, capacity and influence of the Panel of the Wise and the African Peer Review Mechanism will be vitally important to provide early warnings and counsel to incumbent leaders.

## 4.1  Reflections and recommendations from the floor

Throughout the final session, delegates offered their reflections and recommendations on what was needed to resolve conflicts and secure lasting peace and security on the continent. Their contributions are summarized in the sections below.

### Enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the PSC

Compared to the PSC, the UN Security Council—its structure and working methods—is much more effective. Like the PSC, it doesn't involve Heads of State in its missions. However, the members of the UN Security Council, especially the permanent ones, have a direct hotline to their capitals and before they go in into the room to discuss particular issues they are comprehensively briefed on what line to take and how to react. If need be, there's also somebody at the end of that hotline if advice is required during negotiations. Such a minute-by-minute engagement between AU PSC and the capitals of the member states is not in place but it is a good practice that could be emulated to enhance the effectiveness of interventions on the continent.

The PSC also needs to develop a methodology for analyzing the social, economic and political dynamics and problems in African states, and for identifying the interventions required to prevent conflicts erupting and at what level those interventions should be implemented. Lastly, if interventions are made, mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation are needed to continually assess whether progress is being made.

### Utilize the full capacity of the continent

One delegate queried whether the AU should delegate responsibility for interventions in conflicts to regional economic communities, for instance, should the AU delegate responsibility for the DRC to SADC? Importantly, the full capacity of the continent needs to be harnessed to deal with the continent's challenges. In addition to the AU and the regional communities, Africa's academics, intellectuals, religious institutions, unions and businesses need to be involved both to ensure that appropriate interventions are made and to monitor events as they unfold. For example, the University of Dar es Salaam might have people researching developments in the Congo but this knowledge may not be being accessed by decision makers in Kinshasa or Addis.

### Introduce a peace education curriculum in Africa

Africa is the Cradle of Mankind yet, at the same time, Africa is known as a source of violent conflicts. Echoing comments from an earlier speaker, one delegate recommended the introduction of a peace curriculum across the continent from kindergarten up to university. It could be given different meanings depending upon the context. For instance, in Japan, peace education focuses on never repeating the country's horrific experience at the end of World War II when atomic bombs were dropped on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In South Korea, they call it unification education, which is geared towards uniting North and South Korea. Here in Africa, peace education could be used to instil the values of the African Union. Starting from family, Africa's youth can learn that Africa has its own philosophy, its own culture, its own wisdom and way of generating knowledge, and how that indigenous knowledge, that embedded knowledge can be applied into peaceful culture or non-violent communication. Intellectuals, churches, mosques and elders can all be engaged in developing the core curriculum so that the continent has a culture of peace—a Pax Africana or African peace—and share that wisdom with the world.

### Improve the coordination between AU delegations as well as cooperation between the AU and UN Security Council

Presently, there is little to no coordination with respect to decision-making processes between the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and its offices in New York at the UN and in Brussels at the European Union. Improved coordination will be critical in ensuring that Africa's voice is taken into account on peace and security decisions made at the international level. Second, and directly related to the issue of coordination, is achieving a more unified voice, a common African position on peace and security. Today, this is very difficult as national interests and issues of sovereignty are taking over the desire for regional integration.

Another delegate stressed the importance of continued cooperation between AU and UN Security Council. At the global level, the responsibility for maintaining peace and security is the responsibility of the UN Security Council, but chapter 8 of the UN Charter provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and institutions to support the work of the Security Council in emergency situations. The AU has already shown its ability to contribute to peace and security operations on the continent, for example, the UN Mission in Darfur. Hence, this speaker recommended that AU-UN collaboration should be increased; by strengthening the MoU between the two bodies' agencies, the AU could benefit more from the strength of the UN so that it can strengthen its own muscle.

### Return to a people-centred vision of the AU

One delegate considered that the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor to the African Union, worked more closely with the people. Now, the AU concentrates upon its relationship with donors, particularly the EU, and, as a consequence, has increasingly detached itself from the African people. Hence, this delegate stressed the need to return the ownership of the AU back to the African masses to increase the potential for the AU to realize its mission.

In response, President Mbeki countered that it is not the AU that has distanced itself from the people, but the political parties in countries right across the continent that have distanced themselves from the Pan African principles of the AU. He said:

*Pan Africanist political formations brought the OAU close to the people and that has receded because of the weakening of that Pan Africanist spirit among the political leadership on our continent.*

### Prepare countries for the transition to democracy

One delegate highlighted that many African countries entered the multi-party system with no preparation for democratization. For example, Tanzania enacted the Political Parties Act in 1992 to establish a multi-party system of government and only three years later the country conducted its first multi-party election with no preparation of the masses.

*We've changed our laws but we have not really prepared ourselves to go into parties. As a result, there's big mistrust among the elites within political systems in the continent. They fear each other. They don't speak. They don't talk. They don't even meet. So that distance has continued to increase because of lack of trust and lack of preparedness.*

Hence, the African Union (perhaps through its Department of Political Affairs) needs to insist on the importance of education for democratization. And, instead of focusing on the number of elections this year, the AU needs to concentrate on monitoring them.



*Participants give their views during the reflection session. Left: Veronica Modey-Ebi, Deputy Regional Represantative, UNHCR. Right: Dr. Kidane Kirosa, Director, Institute of Peace and Security Studies.*

### Define the relationships between the regional organizations, the PSC and the UN

President Mkapa stressed the need to define relationship between the PSC and the regional organizations, which have assumed political responsibility for the stability in their regions. To give a living example, the President has been asked by the summit of the East African Heads of State, i.e. the East African Community (EAC) to facilitate the stability process in Burundi. That resolution also states that the EAC should be the primary institution for this task, which raises a series of problems. He said:

*We [the EAC] are a regional organization in the context of Pan Africanism in the context of the AU. What relationship do I establish with the PSC? What interest and how far should their interests go into our operations? But, in addition, we are also subject to the United Nations because they have an interest in Burundi. They have resolutions … So how is the*

*working relationship … how is the collective action going to be fashioned? It's a big question.*

But above all, President Mkapa highlighted the issue of who is going to finance the EAC's work in Burundi.

*Who is going to finance this process? If you say it is exclusively ours for the time being [then] finance it, [but] they [the EAC] are not financing it. Who is financing it? The EU, China, one or two others. But whoever pays the piper decides on the tune. That's the reality; let's face facts. I may be as strong as I want but if they tell me that there's no money to call your consultation process, what do I do? And if the sponsors of the initiative are not prepared to pay, what do I do? Then, if the others are prepared to take it away from us where do you complain and why do you complain? You can't. And if the AU was ready to take from us this facilitation process, how do I get the consent of the Heads of State to such a procedure? But would they be able to fund it and manage it and so on? No. And always there's the UN lurking around you. Come, we have a Security Council discussion, come and enrich it. You know that is the kind of atmosphere that absolutely binds you in your initiatives as well as your enterprise.*

Hence, President Mkapa stressed the need to determine the relationship between regional organizations and PSC for implementation of any and all peace and security initiatives.

On a related point, one contributor stressed that an appropriate peace and security architecture needs to be formulated that is relevant to each conflict. It is not possible to have a single architecture that fits every conflict. For example, in the case of Rwanda, the bureaucratic procedures of the UN were not in sync with what was being agreed in Arusha. Therefore, it is critical that UN resolutions in African conflicts need to conform to the objective realities that characterize these crises.

## Reform the African Union

One delegate highlighted five areas for reforming/strengthening the African Union as follows:

- Align the APSA with Africa's peace and security aspirations, which will include an assessment of prevention, conflict management and post-conflict peace building as well as the critical investments that are needed to move the continent closer to those aspirations.

- Strengthen governance norms and accountability, including what sort of sanctions would apply to those who violate those norms. The norms right now are 'squishy' at best.

- Move closer to youth. A generational transition of the AU is needed towards the issues that matter to youth and the issues that youth are going to be responsible for in terms of moving this continent forward.

- Unify and amplify Africa's voice in international fora. The continent cannot afford to keep missing out on important opportunities. In reality, Africa may not be able speak out with one voice on all issues but it would do well to identify 3 or 4 issues that are critical to the continent's development on which to collaborate and try to speak as one.

- Inform the future direction of peace-keeping globally. No other continent has done more, given more, and been the source of more peace-keeping missions than this continent. Over the last 30 years, the continent has faced many challenges in peace-keeping and learned a lot of lessons. Africa can share those best practices and really inform peace-keeping in a way that works not just for Africa but for the rest of the planet.

On the issue of strategic collaboration at a continental level, another speaker stressed the importance on deciphering and understanding the designs of external powers on the continent and its resources. For this analysis, the AU should tap into its Diaspora in the US and Europe. A third participant stressed that the African Union should analyze the conflicts and the peace and security challenges for what they are and not what we would like them to be. Critically, as part of that analysis, the pathways for using knowledge, data, ideas and information need to be interrogated. To fully capitalize on the intellectual and academic capacity on the continent demands an honest conversation about the spaces and channels through which evidence reaches or is blocked from policy makers. Therefore, as part of the proposed review of the APSA and the PSC, he suggested that recommendations be developed to establish genuine pathways for information and evidence to get to policy makers.

## Ensure the participation of youth and women

Another delegate was more forthright with respect to increasing youth participation. Up to now, the continent's youth have been marginalized from the decision-making and implementation of interventions by the AU. Even with progress to date, the AU has remained state-centred. This absolutely has to change. All parties in society, youth in particular, must be made part of decision-making and implementation.

A third delegate weighed in on the issue of inclusion, of making space not only for young people but for unheard voices more generally.

*If we look at the situation of young people on the continent, the fact is that young people are no longer asking for inclusion, no longer asking for a seat at the table. They are demanding the table and that the table be moved to another room, in fact, they have taken it away to another room. So, I think we need to be aware of that reality and how it links to the point about envisioning a future, a different future. So I think a point here again [is] for the AU to invest in those spaces where those conversations are happening.*

President Mbeki concurred on the need for greater youth involvement but also expressed surprise that in talking about peace and security, no one had spoken about women's involvement because women are the first victims of violence on the continent. He pointed out that the African Union is basically an inter-governmental organization, and, as such, it will not engage in mass mobilization. The Economic, Cultural and Social Council (ECOSOCC) is the organ of the AU, which is supposed to engage civil society—youth, women, business, academia and others—but he doubted whether the unit was currently operational. If, as proposed, increased youth involvement in the deliberations of the AU is desired then it is the responsibility of the people in this Forum—who are all activists in one sector or another—to advocate that ECOSOCC is operationalized and properly financed. He said:

*I think it also becomes our responsibility to ensure that there is that popular participation in the remaking of the continent not just to say we delegate this matter to Dr. Kambudzi, there you go and do it. Because we are also activists in the making of Africa.*

## Complete the process of nation building and strengthen regional integration

One participant identified three inter-related dimensions/types of conflict situations in Africa. The first type of conflict is between communities within one country, in other words, intra-state conflicts. The second type is between two or more states (inter-state), and the third type is proxy war.

With respect to the first type of conflict, whether it is in Somalia or Congo, the cause is poor governance. In most of our states, different groups of people are marginalized and our governments typically prefer to use force to resolve disputes. In some cases, there's also an insurgency which has arisen as a direct consequence of marginalization and/or the use of coercive force. On the second type, if you look at all African states, communities straddle boundaries, so if there is a problem in one country, automatically there will be a problem on the other side of the border, which leads to mutual destabilization of a region or the continent. And, third, as a continent we are weak, we are vulnerable to external intervention.

This participant suggested two ways to address the challenges faced by the continent. The first solution is to finish the unfinished business of nation building, and the second one is to strengthen regional integration, especially through building regional economic markets. In turn, to secure regional interests, it will be essential to develop negotiating power as a region (or as a continent) instead of selling one's interests to the first buyer coming from outside of the continent. The AU alone cannot be expected to achieve these outcomes. Rather, it will require the engagement of all stakeholders, including the states and governments themselves as well as partners outside of Africa.

## Acknowledge that ending conflicts may depend on negotiating control of resources

Reiterating, but more directly, a point made earlier, about the existence of parallel economies that perpetuate conflicts, one participant said that groups opposed to the state, especially military insurgencies, frequently make money out of their activities. For example, an armed group will capture an area and sell blood diamonds, or impose tolls on ships by hijacking them. Indeed, the ebbs and flows in tensions in many African countries are centred upon whether and to what extent resources are controlled or not.

*You can talk politics but there are issues to do with resources. And therefore, shouldn't we develop creative ways of addressing that issue over and above just talking politics and federalism and so on and so forth. To say, some of you, in inverted commas, 'rebels', we can give you an oil block. You'll be properly registered, you must pay tax and you must operate according to the law. Find ways of that kind to try and resolve some of these problems because just trying to resolve the political level might not in fact deal with them adequately. This might be a bit provocative but I thought it's something to reflect on.*

President Mbeki concurred that access to resources is an important factor for the AU in analyzing what is driving a conflict and planning what needs to be done to end it. For example, the conflict in the Central African Republic is partly driven by minerals, including diamonds, and logging. He added:

*… in a negative sense … at some point during the civil war in Angola, the government gave the generals commanding the government forces … diamond mining licenses. So, this commander of this division who's got a license to mine diamonds in this area, instead of fighting with UNITA, they used the division to protect the mining concession.*

## Build infrastructure for peace

One participant spoke on the importance of building infrastructure for peace from the bottom up so as to facilitate trade between different communities in conflict areas. The Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Project (GLTFP) currently being implemented by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) with communities in eastern DRC, Rwanda and Uganda is one good example. The project aims to rebuild the social fabric and social interrelationships that existed before the war by helping women to cross the border, sell their goods during the day and return home in the evening, thereby enabling communities to liaise and interact with each other.

## Prioritize peace-building in Africa's security architecture

Another delegate reiterated a point from the plenary session that Africa's security architecture needs to prioritize peace building through investment in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs, security sector reform and strengthening state institutions. The African Standby Force needs to be urgently established to fill the logistical and financial deficiencies of African countries.

## Persuade African member states and leaders to contribute to the work and subsistence of Pan African organizations

President Mkapa wondered how African member states can be persuaded to contribute to the work and subsistence of African organizations at both continental and regional levels not just append signatures to charters. To do otherwise, he considered was dishonourable.

Echoing this sentiment, President Mbeki added:

*What is it that we need to do to revive a genuine spirit of Pan Africanism among the African leadership? So that we as Africans say, in a very meaningful way, the future is in our hands as Africans, and therefore we want peace and we'll pay for it as Africans. But I am saying what underlines that must be a much stronger spirit of Pan Africanism, which I am afraid [is] dying.*

He considered that many of the dire security challenges facing the continent were a reflection of this weakening of the Pan African spirit. For example, the proliferation of foreign bases— particularly the US military footprint— on the continent, along with arrangements that allow permanent military access to airports and other facilities in individual countries is truly frightening. He felt that such a situation arises in part because of the continent's divisions. Perhaps the most outstanding and negative example was when three African countries—South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon—authorized the use of force to remove Gaddafi. In direct opposition to the resolution adopted by the AU PSC, the UN Security Council authorized the invasion of Libya, and our ambassadors in New York, who knew that, voted contrary to what the continent had decided. He concluded:

*I am saying it's a reflection of the weakening of that Pan African spirit, as a result of which people will ratify documents … but not pay for the consequences of the implementation of what they have decided.*

## 4.2   Closing remarks by Dr. Admore Kambudzi



*Dr. Admore Kambudzi shares his closing remarks*

To conclude the session, President Mbeki invited Dr. Kambudzi to share his closing remarks. From listening intently to the day's discussions, he was "even more convinced that the patient, our common patient is the PSC." He offered his reflections on challenges faced by the PSC and recommendations for fixing these issues.

PSC ambassadors are not utilizing the full range of provisions in the PSC protocol. Africa has the best protocol in peace and security in the region but only 50% of its provisions are being used. At the same time, the PSC is often failed by conflicting analyses. For example, in Burundi, the analysis of the AU Commission was conditioned for genocide, while the East African Community considered it to be a constitutional crisis. The ICGLR had another

explanation. And those conflicting analyses were shared when the PSC and the UN Security Council were sitting together in Addis Ababa to discuss Burundi. As a result, the heads of state of the AU reversed the decision taken by the ambassadors because due process in terms of the PSC protocol had not been complied with by the PSC. Moreover, there is no provision for the PSC and the UN Security Council to make decisions together. Hence, joint meetings of the two bodies are effectively ceremonies to compare notes.

A huge gap exists between the PSC and the regional economic communities at the decision-making level. In reality, representatives of the RECs are invited to PSC meetings, they make brief diplomatic statements and then they leave.

Then the PSC remains alone to take a decision over things that it does not understand properly. Therefore, a mechanism is urgently needed whereby the PSC creates a space in real time to receive and discuss substantive inputs/advice/evidence for its decisions.

The PSC does not have the sanctions machinery to back up implementation of peace agreements or deal with obstructions to peace or peace spoilers, such as those in Somalia, South Sudan or the Lake Chad basin areas. In addition, there is confusion between the capacity of the AU to impose sanctions in cases when a member state fails to honour its financial obligations, and when a state fails to comply with the policies and resolutions of the AU.

Since its inception, the membership of the PSC has not conformed to Article 5.2 of the PSC protocol. Based on an objective assessment of the criteria for countries to sit on the PSC, only 4 out of the 55 countries in Africa would qualify to sit on the Council, namely, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and Algeria.

Important mechanisms are also missing from the protocol. For example, a mechanism is needed for removing a country from their seat on the PSC when it falls into a civil war. On the issue of conflict prevention, the PSC has an early warning system but does not have trigger for intervening. A mechanism for the transmission of authority and responsibility for a given conflict is also missing. For example, IGAD has failed in South Sudan but there is no mechanism for IGAD to pass that file to the AU PSC.

Finally, a key issue is the problem of responsibility of elected officials at the AU Commission. For example, if a report is produced by the APRM that identifies a problem that needs action to prevent a conflict, then the chairperson of the AU Commission needs to refer the matter to the PSC or to the Assembly. But presently, this is not happening; when a report is made, the information often dies in the offices in Addis Ababa.

**Appendix A: List of Delegates**

**ALF Follow Up Event**
**17th May, 2018**
**Serena Hotel, Dar Es Salaam**

| 1. | H.E. Benjamin Mkapa | Former President of Tanzania (Host) |
|---|---|---|
| 2. | H.E. Thabo Mbeki | Former President of South Africa |
| 3. | H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud | Former President of Somalia |
| 4. | Amb. Zachary Muburi-Muita | Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region |
| 5. | Ms. Shuvai Nyoni | Director, African Leadership Center |
| 6. | Dr. Kidane Kiros | Director, Institute of Peace and Security Studies |
| 7. | Ms. Michelle Ndiaye | Director (African Peace and Security Program), Institute of Peace and Security Studies |
| 8. | Dr. Monde Muyangwa | Director of the African Program, Woodrow Wilson Center |
| 9. | Ms. Kigwene Germaine | Congo Peace Network |
| 10. | Amb. Ombeni Sefue | Former Chief Secretary, Government of Tanzania |
| 11. | Mr. Cosmas Nkhara Bahali | Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in Africa |
| 12. | Mr. Korsi Kumedzina | Executive Director, African Centre for Peacebuilding |
| 13. | Ms. Candice Moore | Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal |
| 14. | Brigadier General Irvine Aryeteey | Deputy Commandant, Koffi Annan International Peace Keeping Training Centre |
| 15. | Ms. Gwendolyn Myres | Founder and Executive Director, Messengers of Peace |
| 16. | Amb. Ami Mpungwe | Former Ambassador of Tanzania to South Africa |
| 17. | Prof. Adekeye Adebajo | Director, Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conservation |

| 18. | Mr. Ahmed Muckson Sesay | Director, Organisation for Peace, Reconciliation and Development |
|---|---|---|
| 19. | Dr. Kudrat Virk | Ag. Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution |
| 20. | Dr. Boubacar N'Diaye | Security Sector Governance Specialist, College of Wooster |
| 21. | Mr. Joel Netshitenzhe | Executive Director, Mapungubwe Institute |
| 22. | Dr. Yonas Adaye Adeto | Associate Academic Director, Institute of Peace and Security Studies |
| 23. | Dr. Sahle-Work Zewde | Director General, United Nations Office in Nairobi |
| 24. | Dr. Admore Kambudzi | Ag. Director for Peace and Security, African Union |
| 25. | Mr. Kagni S. Dieudonne | Secretary General, Universal Peace Federation |
| 26. | Veronica Modey-Ebi | Deputy Regional Representative, UNCHR |
| 27. | Ms. Anicia Lala | Security Sector Reform Advisor, Democratic Control of Armed Forces |
| 28. | Prof. Adolf Mkenda | Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| 29. | Amb. Peter Kallaghe | Senior Directing Staff, National Defence College |
| 30. | Mr. Daniel Bekele Mulugeta | Executive Director, Human Rights Watch (Africa Division) |
| 31. | Mr. Ernest Ansah Lartey | Head of Conflict and Security Program, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Institute. |
| 32. | Mr. Said Mwema | Retired Inspector General of Police, Tanzania Police Force |
| 33. | Dr. Benard Achiula | Ag. Director, Center for Foreign Relations |
| 34. | Prof. Emmanuel Nnadozie | Executive Secretary, African Capacity Building Foundation |
| 35. | Prof. Joseph Semboja | Executive Director, UONGOZI Institute |

## Appendix B: Agenda of the Forum

| TIME | ACTIVITY | REMARKS |
|---|---|---|
| **8:30 – 9:00** | **Arrival and Registration** | |
| 9:00 – 10:30 | Opening Plenary | Chair: H.E. Benjamin Mkapa |
| | Keynote Address | Dr. Admore Kambudzi |
| | General Discussion | |
| **10:30 – 11:00** | **Health Break** | |
| 11:00 – 12:30 | Session I: The Case of the Federal Republic of Somalia | Chair: H.E. Thabo Mbeki |
| | Presentation | H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud |
| | General Discussion | |
| 12:30 – 13:30 | Lunch Break | |
| 13:30 – 15:00 | Session II: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo | Chair: H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud |
| | Presentation | Amb. Zachary Muburi-Muita |
| | General Discussion | |
| **15:30 – 16:00** | **Health Break** | |
| 16:00 – 16:50 | Reflection | Chair: H.E. Thabo Mbeki |
| 16:50 – 17:00 | Arrival of the Press | Press |
| 17:00 – 17:20 | Summary and Key Messages | Mr. Gerase Kamugisha |
| 17:20 – 17:30 | Official Closing | H.E. Benjamin Mkapa |
| 18:00 – 21:00 | Iftar | |