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## ANGOLA/NAMIBIA : PROSPECTS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

### Agreement on Principles

It was announced on 20 July 1988 that the Angolan, Cuban and South African governments had agreed on 'a set of essential principles to establish the basis for peace in the southwestern region of Africa'. (The text of the 14 principles is given below.) The agreement followed a series of three meetings (London, Cairo and New York) between the parties, with US Assistant Secretary of State Chet Crocker as mediator and chairman, as well as a bilateral Angolan/South African meeting (Brazzaville). These meetings - the first and last between senior officials and the other two at ministerial level (see annexure to previous Brief Report) - took place over 2½ months from early May to mid-July and were mainly devoted to hammering out an acceptable framework (in the form of the principles) for a settlement of the conflicts in Angola/Namibia. In effect, the principles also set an agenda for further substantive and detailed negotiations, which will begin at a meeting in Geneva at the beginning of August.

### Significance

This is the first agreement involving Cuba. The previous agreement mediated by Crocker (Lusaka, in February 1984), which could not be sustained, was between South Africa and Angola. Given the South African concern about the Cuban presence, a commitment by the Castro government to total withdrawal provides an important additional element.

The main focus of the principles is on Namibian independence by means of resolution 435, including SA military withdrawal from Namibia, and on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. Although it is not explicitly stated, this implies that Cuba and Angola accept the link between the two issues, as SA and the US have maintained since 1981. However, while the SA government can claim that its condition of Cuban agreement to withdraw is being met before Namibian independence, the Cubans can equally claim that they will only be going once Namibian independence is guaranteed (having thus achieved the aim of their mission in Angola).

The four principles relating to security (D - G), which were included at South African insistence, are identical to four clauses in the preamble to the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique (March 1984). Principle H is also very similar to another clause in the Nkomati preamble. While the statement of principles is not a formal binding agreement like Nkomati, the inclusion of these particular principles is in line with the South African aim for many years to conclude security or non-aggression pacts with neighbours. If formal agreement is to be reached on the basis of these principles, it will have considerable implications for the link between South Africa and UNITA and between the Angolan government and the ANC and SWAPO. There is no commitment on either side yet, but, if it is the intention to reach an agreement and break the respective links, this will mark a significant change in policy on both sides.

The acceptance of the principles of verification and monitoring of compliance with possible agreements, and of the role of the five permanent members of the Security Council (which include China and the Soviet Union, in addition to the three Western powers) as guarantors for the implementation of such agreements, underlines the significance of the security principles. If all these principles are embodied in formal agreements, the five big powers will be expected to verify that no support of any kind is going from South Africa to UNITA and similarly that the ANC is given no bases or other support for military purposes by Angola. (No such independent verification provision was included in the Nkomati Accord.)

The acceptance of all five powers is related to an important factor which has facilitated the reaching of this agreement, viz the co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union, with the shift in Soviet policy towards the political settlement of regional disputes. This has strengthened the hand of the US in its negotiating initiatives, and it has removed the element of East/West competition which has bedevilled issues in Southern Africa. For South Africa this Soviet support for the negotiations has undercut one of the government's previous main arguments, viz that it was defending the region for the West against Soviet expansionism. The SADF presence in Southern Angola is thus becoming more and more difficult to justify.

By accepting this statement of principles, the SA government has demonstrated a significant degree of political will to make progress towards agreements in this region, even to the extent of facing up to outright Conservative Party opposition to the principles and the probable exploitation of this issue in the October municipal elections.

### Prospects

Given the various previous occasions, since the adoption of 435 in 1978, when there was apparent progress towards a settlement, followed always by disappointment, considerable caution must be applied to any assessment of the prospects for peace now. Pik Botha has spoken of reaching only the foot of the mountain, with a long difficult road ahead up to the summit. Chet Crocker has

said that the acceptance of the principles clears the way for the 'hard bargaining' to begin. So, although there is always hope while negotiations continue, there are no grounds for talk of a breakthrough at this stage. The following difficult issues are among those that still have to be resolved :

- The position of forces currently on the ground - South African and Cuban - in southern Angola. Further clashes have to be avoided and tension reduced.
- Timetables for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and SA forces from Namibia have to be synchronised so as to be acceptable to all parties. The Cubans originally proposed withdrawal over four years, while the SADF would be required to withdraw within seven months under resolution 435. This gap is still very wide between the Cuban proposals and the South African aim to have more or less "simultaneous" withdrawals.
- The issue of "reconciliation" between UNITA and the MPLA within Angola has not been on the agenda of the negotiations, and the MPLA government remains adamantly opposed to any idea of a "deal". For the SA government, however, this remains a very important issue, and efforts are being made separately to promote "reconciliation". For instance, President Mobuto of Zaire has been involved (possibly with the President of Congo Brazzaville), but President Dos Santos of Angola is recently reported to have warned Mobuto not to interfere in Angola's domestic affairs. If no way is found of accommodating UNITA politically, it is difficult to see South African military support being completely cut off, after all the years of commitment to Savimibi's movement.
- Treaties have to be drafted to reflect the principles, before their implementation can begin, and there are many aspects, particularly in respect of the security and verification principles, which could give rise to disputes and abort the negotiating process.
- The ultimate question is South African acceptance of the implementation of the 435 plan for Namibia, which includes military withdrawal, the presence of a UN monitoring group (UNTAG) and elections (with the possibility of a SWAPO victory). Crocker maintains there can be no more pre-conditions after Cuban withdrawal is agreed, but there are not yet any clear indications of South African intentions.
- There is little chance of finality (ie a start to 435 implementation) before the end of 1988, even if all goes smoothly on the above issues. January 1989 will see the inauguration of a new American President, adding another imponderable to the many in the outlook for Namibia and Angola.

JOHN BARRATT  
DIRECTOR GENERAL

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Principles For a Peaceful Settlement  
In Southwestern Africa

The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa have reached agreement on a set of essential principles to establish the basis for peace in the southwestern region of Africa. They recognize that each of these principles is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement.

- A. Implementation of Resolution 435/78 of the Security Council of the United Nations. The parties shall agree upon and recommend to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a date for the commencement of implementation of UNSCR 435/78.
- B. The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and of the Republic of South Africa shall, in conformity with the dispositions of Resolution 435/78 of the Security Council of the United Nations, co-operate with the Secretary-General with a view towards ensuring the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections, abstaining from any action that could prevent the execution of said Resolution.
- C. Redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola on the basis of an agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba and the decision of both states to solicit the on-site verification of that withdrawal by the Security Council of the United Nations.
- D. Respect for the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence of states and for territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.
- E. Non-interference in the internal affairs of states.
- F. Abstention from the threat and utilization of force against the territorial integrity and independence of states.
- G. The acceptance of the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence against other states.
- H. Reaffirmation of the right of the peoples of the southwestern region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights.
- I. Verification and monitoring of compliance with the obligations resulting from the agreements that may be established.

- J. Commitment to comply in good faith with the obligations undertaken in the agreements that may be established and to resolve the differences via negotiations.
- K. Recognition of the role of the Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations as guarantors for the implementation of agreements that may be established.
- L. The right of each state to peace, development, and social progress.
- M. African and international cooperation for the settlement of the problems of the development of the southwestern region of Africa.
- N. Recognition of the mediating role of the Government of the United States of America.