

BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

**RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECS),
NEPAD AND CIVIL SOCIETY**



CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

POLICY SEMINAR REPORT
THE VINEYARD HOTEL, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA
20 – 22 AUGUST 2005



CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

**RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ECONOMIC
COMMUNITIES (RECS), NEPAD
AND CIVIL SOCIETY**

POLICY SEMINAR REPORT

THE VINEYARD HOTEL, CAPE TOWN, 20 - 22 AUGUST 2005
RAPPORTEURS: TIM MURITHI AND ANGELA NDIINGA-MUVUMBA



CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments, the CCR and the Rapporteurs	7
Executive Summary	8
Introduction	16
1. From The OAU to The AU: The New Pan-Africanism	17
2. Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding	22
3. NEPAD: Myth or Reality?	33
4. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): Progress and Prospects	36
5. The Pan-African Parliament, Africa's Courts and ECOSOCC	39
6. Human Security Challenges	43
7. The AU, Regional Integration and External Actors	47
8. Africa's Stake in UN Reform	50
9. Conclusion – The Way Forward	51

Annexures

I. Agenda	52
II. List of Participants	56
III. Other Publications in this Series	62

Design: Shearwater Design, Cape Town
Editor: Yazeed Fakier, Centre for Conflict Resolution
Photographs: Fanie Jason

Acknowledgements

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), Cape Town, South Africa, would like to thank the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland, as well as the United Kingdom's (UK) Department for International Development (DFID) for their generous support which made possible the holding of the policy seminar in Cape Town from 20 to 22 August 2005.

About the CCR

The Centre for Conflict Resolution is affiliated to the University of Cape Town (UCT) in South Africa. Established in 1968, the organisation has wide-ranging experience of conflict interventions in the Western Cape and southern Africa and is working increasingly on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa's regional organisations, as well as on policy research on South Africa's role in Africa; the United Nations' (UN) role in Africa; African Union (AU)/New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) relations; and HIV/AIDS and Human Security.

The Rapporteurs

Dr Tim Murithi and Ms Angela Ndinga-Muvumba are Senior Researchers at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There is a need to examine the significance and progress of the African Union (AU), which was officially launched in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. The AU and its programme for economic recovery - the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) - as well as Africa's sub-regional organisations and civil society actors, have outlined strategies and committed themselves to addressing Africa's governance, socio-political, economic and developmental challenges in the 21st century. However, as these actors embark on this necessary and urgent mission, they continue to face major challenges, including limited capacity in terms of requisite financial and human resources to implement socio-economic programmes to address poverty, conflict, health, education and other challenges.

It was in this context that the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) at the University of Cape Town (UCT), South Africa, held a three-day policy seminar in Cape Town, from 20 to 22 August 2005, on the theme, *"Building an African Union for the 21st Century: Relations with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), NEPAD and Civil Society"*. The Cape Town seminar brought together about 60 participants from the AU, sub-regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); government officials and other policymakers; members of civil society; and academics. Participants discussed the extent to which the AU's institutions, including NEPAD, can achieve their aims and objectives. They also shared their insights on the individual and collective initiatives being undertaken by the regional economic communities and civil society actors. The meeting interrogated the objectives and programmes of these organisations in order to generate concrete policy proposals on how to ensure an appropriate division of labour to achieve the common objectives of strengthening Africa's evolving security and governance architecture. The seminar also identified the capacity needs of the AU, NEPAD, RECs and civil society, and put forward strategic recommendations for strengthening these institutions and actors.

From the OAU to the AU: The New Pan-Africanism


The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the AU demonstrates the revival of the spirit of pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism should manifest itself as the willingness of African governments and societies to work together collectively to improve the wellbeing of people on the continent and in the Diaspora. Pan-Africanism is an ideal that will only be achieved when African countries build and sustain their collective security through democratic governance and economic development. The OAU, which had a promising start in 1963 and was in the forefront of the decolonisation and anti-apartheid struggles, eventually became an organisation that was devoted to protecting its leaders and was accused of developing a culture of indifference to the suffering of African people. Post-Cold War inter-African relations must be based on the notion of "sovereignty as responsibility" and the "responsibility to protect" people from human rights abuses. The continental organisation has adopted a much more interventionist stance and has embraced a spirit of non-indifference towards war crimes and crimes against humanity in Africa. The AU has categorically stated that its Assembly of heads of state will be the principal source of authority with respect to its interventions in Africa. In this regard, the organisation has embraced a new conflict prevention doctrine. Its norms and principles must be upheld in order for this doctrine to succeed.

The AU has also recognised that conflict prevention and peacebuilding cannot be achieved without gender equality and the empowerment of women. It is thus critical to integrate gender perspectives into strategies for economic development and conflict management. Discussions during the Cape Town meeting focused on three policy considerations for achieving meaningful gender equality in Africa:

- Civil society organisations, political parties, civil servants, policymakers in sub-regional organisations and the AU, as well as other national actors, must foster a genuine demand for gender equality in public institutions;
- The AU and its organs must generate ownership of gender equality at decision-making levels; and
- Gender mainstreaming must be articulated and institutionalised as a development concept and strategy.

Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The OAU existed for almost 40 years and during this time, it was faced with major peacemaking and mediation challenges. The principle of non-intervention in the affairs of member states became the common practice and the OAU could only intervene in a conflict if it was invited to do so by the parties to a dispute. As a result, the OAU often became a silent observer to the atrocities being committed by its member states. The AU is learning from the lessons of the OAU and has adopted a more interventionist stance through its legal frameworks and institutions. The AU's 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) is mandated to oversee conflict management efforts on the continent. An African Standby Force (ASF) is to be established, comprising five brigades from each of Africa's sub-regions: southern, East, Central, West and North. A Continental Early Warning System will also be established. To confront its peacekeeping challenges, the AU will need to address the financial and logistical weaknesses of regional organisations; the lack of political consensus among African leaders on collective security norms and practices; the controversial peacekeeping role of regional hegemons like South Africa and Nigeria; the centrality of



PARTICIPANTS OF THE POLICY SEMINAR, BUILDING AN AFRICAN UNION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, AT THE VINEYARD HOTEL, CAPE TOWN, 20 - 22 AUGUST 2005

the UN's peacekeeping role in Africa; and the need to establish a clear division of labour among Africa's security actors and sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS, IGAD, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECASS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Closer collaboration between Africa's regional economic communities will also accelerate the socio-economic development of the continent. The NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework argues for the need to ensure the mobilisation of resources for an AU Peace Fund to assist countries emerging from conflict and to consolidate peace through the promotion of reconciliation and democratic governance. Post-conflict reconstruction strategies must address the needs of vulnerable groups such as women and children who are increasingly the targets of violence in conflict situations. To ensure ownership of the reconciliation process by communities affected by conflict, indigenous approaches to forgiveness should be used to sustain peace. The proposed UN Peacebuilding Commission should support such processes and draw more attention and resources to post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa. There is scope for greater collaboration and co-ordination of activities between the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the AU and NEPAD.



FROM LEFT: **DR ADEKEYE ADEBAJO**, CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CAPE TOWN; **MS VICTORIA MALOKA**, CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CAPE TOWN; **PROFESSOR ADEBAYO ADEDEJI**, AFRICAN CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, IJEBU-ODE, NIGERIA

NEPAD: Myth or Reality?

NEPAD is due to be integrated into the AU as a specialised agency by 2006 and the Cape Town seminar focused on its potential to promote Africa's development objectives. NEPAD's framework, programmes and processes make explicit links between democratic governance, peace, security and economic development. In order for the AU and NEPAD to integrate successfully by 2006, both institutions must address three critical challenges. First, the commitment to democratic governance enshrined in the NEPAD document must be reinforced. Second, African leaders must promote and institutionalise deeper co-ordination and collaboration among themselves, Africa's sub-regional organisations and civil society actors. Third, Africa must address the financial and infrastructural weaknesses of its social, political and security institutions. Critics argued that NEPAD still operates as a "top-down" organisation in which leaders drive the process without much involvement from civil society or citizens. In addition, some of the leaders who are seen as the architects of NEPAD have been accused of infringing on the human rights of their own citizens. According to critics, NEPAD needs to place people at the centre of its processes and initiatives and become more accountable to African people. NEPAD's critics have also argued against its adoption of a neo-liberal economic framework which has historically exposed African industries to economic exploitation. NEPAD's neo-liberal economic focus on foreign direct investment and the concessions granted to multinational corporations was also criticised. Several participants questioned whether this was the best strategy for promoting poverty eradication and argued that NEPAD is failing to promote people-centred development.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): Progress and Prospects

The NEPAD process has launched an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which 23 African countries have joined. The APRM will monitor and assess the compliance of African governments with norms of governance and human rights as articulated in the AU's Constitutive Act of 2000. The success of the APRM, however, rests on the willingness of governments to respect the process and to ensure the appropriate co-ordination and transparent nomination of representatives to meet the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons. The voluntary nature of the APRM means that it cannot sanction countries, but the mechanism is still one of the most innovative and useful institutions to emerge from the NEPAD framework. If it is effectively supported, the APRM can lay the foundations for a paradigm shift on the continent in efforts to consolidate Africa's fragile democracies and improve democratic governance. The mechanism should also be used to encourage the revitalisation of Africa's indigenous institutions. It was, however, noted that if all 53 member states of the AU joined the APRM, it would take about 10 years, at the current pace of activities, to conduct a continent-wide review. It is, therefore, important to increase the institutional capacity of the Eminent Panel of the APRM and its support staff.

The Pan-African Parliament, Africa's Courts and ECOSOCC

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was created in March 2004 to provide a vehicle through which African citizens can contribute towards deliberating and providing advice on how to deepen democratic governance and promote development. The parliament is mandated to exercise oversight on issues of governance and development on the continent. According to the protocol establishing the parliament, it can discuss or express an opinion on any matter,

either on its own initiative or at the request of the AU Assembly of heads of state. The PAP can also make recommendations on how to achieve the objectives of the AU, and will strive to contribute to the co-ordination and harmonisation of policies, programmes and activities of the RECs and Africa's national parliaments. Among its current functions, the PAP debates the AU's budget and the reports of the AU's Peace and Security Council, while its president attends the twice-yearly meetings of the Assembly of heads of state. The parliament is expected to become more effective after five years when it becomes an elected body and assumes full legislative powers. Another key institution, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights will complement other AU institutions and has a mandate to protect human and minority rights. The court has a judiciary and advisory function and can assess cases submitted to it by member states or African citizens who have been victims of human rights violations. African citizens will also be able to interface with the work of the AU through its Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). Through ECOSOCC, civil society will be able to influence the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of AU policies and programmes.

Human Security Challenges

Policies, programmes and institutions put in place by the AU demonstrate an increasing commitment to bridge the gap left by the OAU between the sovereign rights of states and the human rights of African citizens. The notion of human security is implicit in the AU's adoption of a people-centred vision of peace and development. Despite this focus on people, the concept of human security has not been fully incorporated into the policy-making processes of Africa's regional and national institutions. Human security encompasses economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. This definition does not exclude traditional notions of state security and is more comprehensive. Human security emphasises that threats to the wellbeing of people originate from many sources which have to be acknowledged and addressed. In order for the AU to promote human security effectively, it needs to co-ordinate its activities more closely with those of sub-regional organisations, implement national security sector reform, and advocate for debt-cancellation as a means of ensuring access to education and improving service delivery in health-care systems. One major challenge facing Africa's healthcare systems is the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which is one of the most serious threats to human security on the continent. In 2001, African leaders declared AIDS to be a "state of emergency" on the continent and committed themselves to allocating at least 15% of their annual budgets to improving the health sector. So far, only Botswana has met this target. Human security is also lacking for internally displaced persons on the continent because governments are often themselves responsible for displacing people and denying them protection. The AU is currently developing a normative Framework of Response on this issue.

The AU, Regional Integration and External Actors

The AU needs to accelerate continental integration by consolidating and rationalising the various regional economic communities which are often duplicating functions. Social and political security are vital ingredients for a successful process of regional integration. Restrictions on trade and the flow of labour, goods and services have had a negative effect on regional integration in Africa's four post-independence decades. Governments must, therefore, strive to include their citizens in promoting regional integration. The founders of the AU were, in part, motivated by a desire to strengthen Africa's leverage to engage with the rest of the world on its own terms and to manage the process of globalisation to the continent's advantage. The African Diaspora can play a part in enhancing Africa's role in the world by promoting the development of the continent. A genuine engagement by the AU with the Diaspora could enhance Africa's negotiating and resource mobilisation capacity with the international community. The European Union (EU) has demonstrated a willingness to engage with the AU. The EU is naturally focused on "organisation-to-organisation" interactions, and welcomes continental AU-EU opportunities to devise common policies. The EU's African Peace Support Facility (APSF) contributes about \$250 million annually to continental peacekeeping efforts and currently supports the AU's peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Brussels is also assisting with building capacity in the AU's Peace and Security Department. The negotiation of regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and various African sub-regional groupings is currently facing obstacles due to the possibility of adverse implications that may result from liberalising trade relations with the EU.



MS WINNIE BYANYIMA, DIRECTORATE OF WOMEN, GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT, AFRICAN UNION, ADDIS ABABA

Africa's Stake in UN Reform


Participants agreed that the UN reform process needs to be focused on delivering and making progress on development issues. The UN reform process must enable the AU and Africa's sub-regional organisations to address the issues of poverty, development and security more effectively. The AU was the only continental organisation to have adopted a common position on the reform of the UN. Some participants argued strongly that Africa should maintain its position of insisting on two veto-wielding permanent members on an expanded UN Security Council as this was the only way to ensure that global power imbalances can be rectified. The majority of African countries were not involved in creating the post-Second World War international political and financial system and the AU therefore has to ensure that it influences the current UN reform process to its advantage. The UN is, however, an institution which has developed a pre-occupation with its own institutional survival. In this regard, it was noted that UN reform may not necessarily prioritise the pressing problems of humanity. In terms of Africa's stake in UN reform, it was noted that Africa should seek to address its own problems rather than relying too heavily on the prospects of a "reformed" UN.

Policy Recommendations

The discussions at the Cape Town seminar raised seven key policy issues which need to be brought to the attention of key decision-makers within the AU, NEPAD and the RECs, as well as key external actors. These include:

- First, there are major constraints to achieving some of the objectives and commitments made by African leaders for the continent's peace, security, governance and development. African leaders need to start living up to their own expectations and respecting the norms and principles that they themselves have established.
- Second, the AU Constitutive Act of 2000 has outlined principles and objectives and created institutions which, if respected, could build and sustain collective security, democratic governance and economically viable societies.
- Third, a closer partnership between NEPAD, the RECs and civil society is essential if the AU is to consolidate past gains. In addition, the APRM should be viewed as a positive step towards achieving justice, equity, transparency and accountability. The peer review mechanism should be used to encourage the revitalisation of Africa's indigenous institutions. It should also be used to hold leaders accountable to their citizens and as a tool for achieving socio-economic goals.
- Fourth, it is necessary to rationalise existing African institutions, particularly at the level of the RECs. Where there is an overlap, structures must be consolidated. Furthermore, common objectives and goals will benefit from an acceleration of efforts at collaboration and harmonisation.
- Fifth, the peace and security structures that the AU has created, such as the Peace and Security Council and the African Standby Force, are vital for promoting stability on the continent. However, in the absence of the political will and financial and logistical support to operationalise these institutions, they will remain empty shells; they will be impressive in theory but disappointing in practice.

- Sixth, the AU needs to implement and give substance to its clearly-stated desire to work more closely with civil society organisations and the African Diaspora. ECOSOCC, the Pan-African Parliament and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights are institutions which are well placed to promote this goal. African leaders must respect these institutions if they are to succeed in promoting engagement and dialogue between governments and civil society.
- Finally, the AU must continue to engage effectively and constructively with the international community, particularly through building on efforts to reform the UN and to promote development, peace and governance in Africa in a holistic manner.



PROFESSOR ADEBAYO ADEDEJI, AFRICAN CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, IJEBU-ODE, NIGERIA, LEFT;
COMMISSIONER LEON LEVY, CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION (CHAIR OF THE BOARD), CAPE TOWN

Introduction

The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in July 2002 at the heads of state summit in Durban, South Africa, generated a great sense of optimism. This optimism was further reinforced by the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as the AU's framework for development. NEPAD is set to be integrated into the AU as a specialised agency by 2006. In parallel, Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), are continuing to strengthen their own governance and security mechanisms. Civil society actors are also actively working across the continent to address the challenges faced by Africa's 800 million people.

At the dawn of a new century, these broad transformations in Africa's peace, governance and economic development architecture will have a significant impact on the continent's future. The prospects and challenges of the new AU and other actors and institutions deserve careful examination and analysis. It was in this context that the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, held a three-day policy seminar in Cape Town from 20 to 22 August 2005 on the theme, *"Building an African Union for the 21st Century: Relations with Regional Economic Communities, NEPAD and Civil Society"*. The seminar was a follow-up to a successful policy advisory group meeting in Johannesburg in December 2004 on the theme, *"The AU/NEPAD and Africa's Evolving Governance and Security Architecture"*, organised by CCR, in partnership with the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in Johannesburg.¹

The Cape Town seminar brought together about 60 participants from the AU, sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development; government officials and other policymakers; members of civil society; and academics. Key participants included Professor Adebayo Adedeji, former Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and a member of the Eminent Panel of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM); Professor Francis Deng, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons; Ms Winnie Byanyima, Director of the Department of Gender, Women and Development at the AU Commission in Addis Ababa; Mr Jean Mfasoni, AU Director for Collaboration with Regional Economic Communities (RECs); and Mr Cunningham Ngcukana, Deputy Director-General of the NEPAD Secretariat.

The following eight themes and issues were addressed during the policy seminar:

- From the OAU to the AU: The New Pan-Africanism
- Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding
- NEPAD: Myth or Reality?
- The African Peer Review Mechanism: Progress and Prospects
- The Pan-African Parliament, Africa's Courts and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council
- Human Security Challenges
- The AU, Regional Integration and External Actors
- Africa's Stake in UN Reform

¹ Centre for Conflict Resolution and the Centre for Policy Studies, *The AU/NEPAD and Africa's Evolving Governance and Security Architecture*, Seminar Report, Johannesburg, South Africa, 11 and 12 December 2004. (Available at: <http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za>).

This report is a summary of the discussions and recommendations from the Cape Town seminar, as well as additional research based largely on the papers presented at the meeting.

1. From the OAU to the AU: The New Pan-Africanism

1.1 The Renaissance of Pan-Africanism: The AU and The New Pan-Africanists

The transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002 demonstrated the persistence of the spirit of pan-Africanism, which historically animated the struggle for freedom, human security and self-determination in Africa and the Diaspora.¹ The establishment of the AU is a recognition that greater solidarity and collaboration are critical to addressing the domestic and global challenges confronting the continent in the 21st century. This solidarity is currently being challenged by issues related to human security, enduring conflicts and the complex humanitarian situations currently afflicting the African continent. The true expression of pan-Africanism will be achieved only when African governments build and sustain collective security by promoting democratic governance and economically viable societies. The “new pan-Africanism” has heightened the obligations of states to protect civilians from autocratic and undemocratic governments, with a particular emphasis on preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. This new paradigm is a departure from the practices of the OAU between 1963 and 2002. The OAU operated within a rigid state-centric paradigm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of its members. In contrast, the AU’s recent deployment of peacekeepers in conflict situations in Burundi and Sudan’s Darfur region reflect an increasing concern for human security principles. Nevertheless, strong and consistent political will is required to maintain the momentum to address present and future crises effectively. The notions of “sovereignty as responsibility” and “the responsibility to protect”³ must therefore become firmly entrenched in post-Cold War Africa’s international relations.⁴

The African Union is the sum total of its 53 members and 800 million citizens, as well as the institutions which have been created to achieve its objectives. The AU Commission, under the leadership of Mali’s Alpha Oumar Konaré, is the implementing branch of the organisation.⁵ The commission implements the programmes and decisions of the African Assembly of heads of state and the Council of ministers. The body comprises 10 commissioners responsible for a range of social, economic and political issues. The Cape Town seminar discussed the progress made by the commission and other AU organs and institutions in advancing the ambitious goals of the continental organisation. The meeting also assessed some of the major challenges of implementing the AU’s programmes and initiatives.

2 K M Mathews, “Renaissance of Pan-Africanism: The African Union and the New Pan-Africanists”, paper presented at the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) policy seminar, *Building an African Union (AU) for the 21st Century: Relations with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and Civil Society*, Cape Town, South Africa, 2022 August 2005. See also Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, (London: Panaf, 1963); and Ali Mazrui, *Towards A Pax Africana*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967).

3 See *The Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (Ottawa: International Development Research Council, 2001). See also, Francis Deng *et al.*, *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996).

4 Centre for Conflict Resolution, *A More Secure Continent: African Perspectives on the UN High-Level Panel Report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Seminar Report, Cape Town, South Africa, 23 and 24 April 2005. (Available at: <http://ccrweb.ccruct.ac.za>)

5 Analytical Report of the Brainstorming Meeting of the Commission of the African Union and Eminent Personalities on *Building an African Union for the 21st Century*, held from 25-28 October 2003, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The AU is an embodiment of a renewed pan-Africanism and is a potential catalyst for economic integration in Africa. The 53 states constituting the AU would therefore benefit enormously from regional economic integration, but there are still significant constraints that continue to undermine progress towards economic integration and prosperity. The Cape Town seminar identified a range of pressing challenges, including the continuing legacy of colonialism and the balkanisation that resulted in a multiplication of weak and small states in Africa. These states have small internal markets and weak infrastructure and economies that produce a small range of primary products that are vulnerable to unequal global trade relations with the rich world. Globalisation therefore remains a significant challenge for Africa. African states are also confronted with the threat of external interventions in their internal affairs; poverty, underdevelopment, illiteracy and weak education systems; a lack of political will and effective leadership; unresolved and latent conflicts; the prevalence of unreformed militaries and defence structures; the non-compatibility of largely mono-crop African economies that is a major obstacle to economic integration; the uncertain role of Arab Africa in the new pan-Africanism; and the continuing manipulation of ethnic, linguistic and religious forces which remains a major cause of conflicts in Africa.⁶

A core debate during the Cape Town meeting was the issue of “pan-Africanism in the 21st century”. Nearly 50 years have passed since most African states gained their independence. While the preamble of the OAU’s 1963 Charter highlighted the need for an organisation that would transcend ethnic and national boundaries, the organisation was, in practice, devoted to protecting its leaders and the political independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of its member states. The OAU must, however, be credited for its leading role in Africa’s decolonisation and anti-apartheid struggles. With the end of the Cold War and the major transformations in the international system, new ideologies that promote economic and political integration in Africa are now more attainable. Several pan-African legal instruments have been signed by African governments during the last two decades, including the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), the Arusha Declaration (1990), the Abuja Treaty (1991), and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) (1991). Calls for the establishment of an African Economic Community (AEC) were made by the Abuja Treaty in June 1991.

1.2 From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: Humanitarian Intervention and Africa’s Responsibility to Protect

A major aspect of the AU is a new spirit of “non-indifference” towards massive crimes against humanity and genocide in Africa. This was a major subject of debate and discussion during the Cape Town seminar. The AU, in stark contrast to the OAU, has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of member states in order to protect human rights and constitutional order. Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act of 2000 clearly states that the African Union has the right to intervene in the affairs of a member state – pursuant to a decision of the Assembly of heads of state in respect of “grave circumstances” - namely, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as a serious threat to legitimate order - to restore peace and stability in a member state.⁷ A year before the adoption of the Constitutive Act, the 1999 Algiers decision on unconstitutional changes of government was a “normative revolution” for the emerging AU.⁸ Algiers affirmed that international human rights instruments such as the Universal

6 See K M Mathews, “Renaissance of Pan-Africanism: The AU and the New Pan-Africanists”, paper presented at the CCR policy seminar, 2022 August 2005.

7 Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, article 4(h). ([Available at: www.africa-union.org](http://www.africa-union.org))

8 See Musifiky Mwanasali, “The AU and the Responsibility to Protect”, paper presented at the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) policy seminar, *Building an African Union (AU) for the 21st Century: Relations with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and Civil Society*, Cape Town, South Africa, 2022 August 2005.

Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) all helped to establish this new norm. Global democracy movements and political participation at the grassroots level in Africa have also driven this new norm, resulting in the transformation of the absolute right of state sovereignty that dominated the era of the OAU, to an emerging recognition of the “responsibility to protect”.

The Cape Town meeting also focused on the prospects for achieving the commitment of all African governments to the “responsibility to protect”. While there is consensus that African governments are obligated to protect the human rights of their citizens and to intervene in the internal affairs of other states in order to prevent genocide and massive crimes against humanity, it is unclear who interprets this responsibility with reference to existing humanitarian and human rights crises.

The founders of the AU recognised that the risk of massive human rights abuses was still prevalent on the continent. It is therefore necessary to have a doctrine of intervention which goes beyond the culture of “indifference” that often informed the OAU. The “responsibility to protect” which the AU is seeking to enshrine as a norm, implies an obligation to be proactive in preventing situations of gross violations of human rights. This also implies a responsibility to *react* to potential conflict situations and to *rebuild* in the aftermath of conflicts. By adopting a “responsibility to protect”, the AU has, in effect, embraced a new conflict-prevention doctrine.⁹ This doctrine of prevention, however, will only be effective if the AU’s norms and principles are systematically enforced. This process of implementation will involve harmonising the mandates of national, sub-regional and regional bodies. Sustained funding is also required to ensure the effectiveness of this doctrine, as well as active participation by Africa’s civil society.

The UN Charter of 1945 established the UN Security Council as the world’s pre-eminent mechanism for promoting international peace and security. The charter also encourages regional organisations to undertake peacemaking initiatives in their respective regions. Under Article 53 of the UN Charter, regional organisations are, however, required to obtain authorisation from the UN Security Council before any enforcement actions are taken and to keep the council fully informed of their actions. Although 70% of peace and security situations addressed by the UN Security Council are in Africa, there is a seeming indifference and lack of political support by powerful members of the UN to respond to conflicts on the continent. This has frustrated many African governments and actors, and explains the AU’s position that its Assembly of heads of state will be the principal source of authority with respect to its interventions in Africa, with or without prior authorisation from the UN.


The Ezulwini Consensus of February 2005, involving 15 African foreign ministers who gathered in Swaziland to forge a common position on UN reform, emphasised the UN’s role in maintaining international peace and security, and encouraged the AU and sub-regional organisations to seek the approval of the Security Council before undertaking military interventions.¹⁰ This acknowledgement of the UN’s pre-eminence is, however, conditional: the Ezulwini Consensus noted that in certain conflict situations in Africa requiring an urgent response, the UN Security Council’s authorisation may be sought and granted *after* the fact, as occurred with the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervention in Liberia in 1990. AU member states often feel that the UN Security Council is located too far from conflict situations in Africa to appreciate the urgency of the situation on the ground. This question of the legal interpretation of the “responsibility to protect” poses a major challenge for the implementation of this new norm.

9 Mwanasali, “The AU and the Responsibility to Protect”.

10 African Union, *The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus*, Seventh Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council, Ext/EC.CL/2 (VII), Addis Ababa: African Union, 7 and 8 March 2005, p.7.

The “responsibility to protect” was accepted by the UN General Assembly in its reform outcome document of September 2005.¹¹ This development reinforces the AU’s doctrine of conflict prevention and lends legal and political support and legitimacy to interventions in situations of grave crises. The AU’s 15-member Peace and Security Council (PSC) has been legally empowered by its member states to implement the “responsibility to protect” in Africa. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union¹² confers this body with “the authority to use its discretion to intervene” or “effect entry into” and “take appropriate action to address potential or actual conflict situations”.¹³ The protocol also empowers the chairperson of the commission to bring to the attention of the PSC any situation which is likely to threaten peace and stability in Africa. This is an unambiguous legal framework with which to operationalise the “responsibility to protect” in Africa. One interpretation of this framework is that the AU now has the legal authority to act as a check-and-balance mechanism against the excesses of state power. This represents a “normative revolution” in African diplomacy.

Military interventions often require sustained and durable funding. Without the European Union’s (EU) African Peace Support Facility (APSF) that provides \$250 million annually to African security institutions, and other donor support, the AU would not be able to undertake peacekeeping missions. In July 2005, the AU acknowledged that there was a \$200 million shortfall for its operation in Darfur.¹⁴ Despite funding pledges from the donor community, support did not materialise as expected. The December 2004 UN High-Level Panel report on UN reform recommended the establishment of a 10-year capacity-building fund for the AU. If these funds are made available, Africa’s regional bodies would be strengthened in their promotion of peace and security on the continent.



FROM LEFT: PROFESSOR KM MATHEWS, UNIVERSITY OF ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA; DR MUSIFIKY MWANASALI, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK; MR JOB SITHOLE, MP, SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT, CAPE TOWN

11 United Nations General Assembly, *Outcome Document*, 14 September 2005.

12 AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State, Durban, South Africa, 9 July 2002.

13 Cited in Mwanasali, “The AU and the Responsibility to Protect”.

14 Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on Conflict Situations in Africa, Executive Council, Seventh Ordinary Session, 28 June – 2 July 2005; Sirte, Libya. EX.CL/191 (VII).

1.3 Africa and Gender Equality: Priorities for the AU

Africa's women's movement has worked for over three decades to build consensus around the idea that development and democracy in African societies cannot be achieved without gender equality and the empowerment of women. The AU Constitutive Act's emphasis on the promotion of gender equality is a clear sign that the importance of this issue is increasingly being recognised at the highest political level. Moreover, during the AU's inaugural summit in Durban in 2002, a decision was taken that the allocation of posts in the commission should be based on the principle of gender parity among men and women in decision-making positions. A concrete example of gender parity is that five of the 10 AU commissioners are women. The promotion of gender equality also corresponds with the AU's new vision of building partnerships between governments and all segments of civil society. Various organs of the AU have been mandated to support processes that enhance the role of women in peace processes; accelerate economic empowerment; implement gender equality legislation and the political participation of women; and increase access of women and girls to education, health and social services.

Furthermore, Article 12(3) of the AU's Constitutive Act of 2000 provides for the establishment of a special unit in the Office of the Chairperson of the AU Commission to co-ordinate gender issues across all departments of the organisation. The unit - now called the Women, Gender and Development Directorate - is strategically positioned to liaise with various AU organs and the commission's departments; RECs; civil society; the private sector; and external partners to accelerate gender mainstreaming and support the harmonisation of legislative processes across the continent. The directorate, together with a number of civil society actors, organised a special heads of state debate on gender equality during the AU summit in Addis Ababa in July 2004. This special debate resulted in the adoption of a Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality, whereby African leaders promised to hold each other accountable through a reporting mechanism on gender mainstreaming at national and regional levels.¹⁵

Discussions during the Cape Town meeting focused on three policy considerations for achieving meaningful gender equality in Africa:

- Civil society organisations, political parties, civil servants, policymakers in sub-regional organisations and the AU, as well as other national actors, must foster a genuine demand for gender equality in public institutions;
- The AU and its organs must generate ownership of gender equality at decision-making levels; and
- Gender mainstreaming must be articulated and institutionalised as a development concept and strategy.

These three considerations emanated from the observation that gender equality and gender parity continue to be viewed and articulated by many as a politically-correct, donor-driven imposition.

Despite the AU's progressive gender policies, parity between women and men is far from being achieved, even within the organisation. This is also a reality in many of Africa's public institutions and reflects a divide between the various declarations and assertions for gender equality and the reality of the situation on the ground. Achieving gender equality will involve a lengthy process of cultural transformation. The relegation of gender equality to a technical level of gender experts may undermine the implementation of progressive policies to mainstream gender into Africa's public institutions. This could also weaken efforts to integrate gender perspectives into strategies for economic development and conflict management. Future activities in this area should aim to ensure that the AU works closely with RECs in implementing and integrating gender equality effectively into their activities.

¹⁵ AU, *Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality*, Assembly of Heads of State, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 6-8 July 2004, AU/Decl.12 (III); and AU Permanent Representatives' Committee Report of the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Permanent Representatives' Committee, 28 and 29 June 2005, Sirte, Libya, PRC/Rpt (X).

2. Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

2.1 The OAU and Peacemaking: A Retrospective

The OAU existed for almost 40 years, during which it was faced with major peacemaking and mediation challenges. The preamble of the OAU Charter of 1963 outlined a commitment by member states to establish, maintain and sustain the “human conditions for peace and security”.¹⁶ However, in parallel, the same OAU Charter contained the provision to “defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the member states”.¹⁷ This was later translated into the norm of non-intervention. The key organs of the OAU - the Council of ministers and the Assembly of heads of state and government - could only intervene in a conflict situation if they were invited to do so by the parties to a dispute. At the time, many intra-state disputes were viewed as internal matters and the exclusive preserve of the governments concerned. Regrettably, due to the doctrine of non-intervention, the OAU became a silent observer to the atrocities being committed by some of its member states. Eventually, a culture of impunity and indifference became entrenched in the international relations of African countries during the era of the “proxy” wars of the Cold War.

The OAU did, however, make an effort to resolve border and territorial disputes as well as political conflicts whenever it was permitted to do so. The OAU Charter established a mechanism to conduct peacemaking initiatives known as the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. The first real test for the OAU came during the border dispute between Algeria and Morocco in August 1963. In order to address this issue, the organisation established an *ad hoc* commission on the Algeria-Morocco border dispute. Several African countries played a critical peacemaking role in this dispute, including Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast (present-day Côte d'Ivoire), Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Tanganyika (present-day Tanzania). Working collectively, these countries were able to convince Algiers and Rabat to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement to this dispute.¹⁸

The commission for the Algeria-Morocco border dispute was, in effect, an *ad hoc* commission. The OAU did not go a step further and institutionalise a legal framework for resolving disputes in Africa. The effect of this was that the OAU continued to rely on *ad hoc* political approaches to the settlement of disputes. In effect, the organisation's approach to peacemaking and mediation was conducted on a case-by-case basis. A mechanism to address conflict situations in Africa was not established by the OAU until 1993 - exactly 30 years after the organisation's creation.

At its annual summit of heads of state and government in Cairo in 1993, the OAU decided to establish a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The primary objective of the mechanism was to anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances in which conflicts had occurred, the mechanism was tasked with undertaking peacemaking initiatives. The OAU also established the principle of civilian and military missions to observe and monitor peace operations. In the 1990s, military observer missions of less than 100 personnel were deployed to Rwanda, Burundi and Comoros, with decidedly mixed results. At the time of the creation of the OAU mechanism, conflicts raged in Angola, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia. From the outset, the OAU focused on conflict prevention rather than peacekeeping, and worked with the UN and Africa's sub-regional organisations. The OAU also deployed special envoys, as well as monitoring and verification missions to assist with peacemaking, where required.

¹⁶ Solomon Gomes, “The Peacemaking and Mediation Role of the OAU and AU: What Prospects?”, Paper submitted to the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) policy seminar, *Building an African Union (AU) for the 21st Century*, Cape Town, South Africa, 20-22 August 2005.

¹⁷ Organisation of African Unity, *Charter of the Organisation of African Unity*, (Addis Ababa: OAU, 1963).

¹⁸ Gomes, “The Peacemaking and Mediation Role of the OAU and AU: What Prospects?”, p. 5

The OAU's peacemaking efforts also included mediating between Somalia and Kenya in 1964 over the disputed district on the border between both countries. The organisation mediated between Somalia and Ethiopia over the disputed Ogaden region in the 1970s; between Libya and Chad on the issue of the disputed Aouzou Strip in 1977; and supported Togo's mediation efforts in the Bakassi Peninsula between Cameroon and Nigeria. The OAU further supported the mediation efforts of Tanzania's Julius Nyerere in the Burundi peace process. In 1997, the UN and the OAU jointly appointed a Special Representative for the Great Lakes to co-ordinate peacemaking efforts in the volatile region.

Overall, the OAU's experience with peacemaking and mediation produced limited results. Its reliance on *ad hoc* commissions in the first three decades of its existence meant that there was no institutionalised framework for resolving disputes. The OAU relied heavily on its moral authority to compel disputing parties to seek a negotiated solution, but this was often ineffective. The organisation lacked a robust institutional capacity to conduct peacemaking, which meant that many conflict situations across the continent were left unresolved. The AU must learn from the lessons of the OAU and build more effective mechanisms for its conflict management efforts on the continent.



MR PAUL BOATENG, HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, TSHWANE (PRETORIA), LEFT;
DR ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CAPE TOWN

2.2 The Peacekeeping Challenges of the AU and the RECs

In his landmark *An Agenda for Peace* published in 1992, the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, argued for humanitarian intervention and advocated the use of regional security arrangements like the AU and the RECs to achieve this objective. Since the Rwandan genocide of 1994, it has become clear that Africa has to develop its own conflict management and peacekeeping capacity. In this regard, the AU needs to rethink its intervention strategies and train its civilian and military personnel to respond effectively to conflict and post-conflict situations. The AU, NEPAD and Africa's RECs have increasingly recognised that peace, security and democratic governance are the preconditions for sustainable development.¹⁹ The AU's protocol relating to its Peace and Security Council, NEPAD's peace and security proposals, and the security mechanisms of the RECs all advocate the creation of a more robust, Africa-wide system of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The AU Peace and Security Council was established in 2004 through the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council of 2002.²⁰ The Cape Town seminar discussed Africa's peacekeeping challenges with a specific focus on five key themes: the financial and logistical weaknesses of regional organisations; the lack of political consensus among African leaders on collective security norms and practices; the controversial peacekeeping role of regional hegemony like South Africa and Nigeria; the centrality of the UN's peacekeeping role in Africa; and the need to establish a clear division of labour among Africa's security actors.



MS BALEKA MBETE, MP, SPEAKER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT, CAPE TOWN, LEFT; **MR RAYMOND KITEVU**, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT, ADDIS ABABA

¹⁹ AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State, Durban, South Africa, 9 July 2002.

²⁰ AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, (Addis Ababa: African Union, 2002).

The AU has authorised the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010. A Military Staff Committee will provide advice on deployment and security requirements. Through the creation of this force, the AU has also been mandated to co-ordinate the activities of Africa's sub-regional mechanisms. The force will comprise five brigades from each of Africa's sub-regions: southern, East, Central, West and North. The AU's Peace and Security Protocol also plans to establish a continental early-warning system. The ASF will eventually be linked to the UN's stand-by arrangements. At the operational level, the force needs further development to enhance its capacity to conduct mission planning, budgeting and mission management. The ASF can only be effective if there is much closer co-ordination and co-operation between the African defence and foreign ministries, and if a stable source of funding is found for the force. The AU has drawn up an annual budget of \$62 million for its peace and security activities (of a total budget of \$158 million). However, unless AU member states pay their dues regularly, plans for the ASF can not be implemented. In addition, the AU will have to secure durable and predictable contributions from external donors.

On the question of sub-regional conflict management efforts, the peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s relied heavily on the Nigerian-led ECOMOG. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development is currently planning to deploy peacekeepers to Somalia. The South African-led AU mission to Burundi and the current AU mission in Sudan's Darfur region are further examples of Africa's new political commitment to conducting peace support operations.

The AU deployment of a protection force to Darfur in June 2004, also known as the African Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), was discussed. An expanded AU mission was authorised in October 2004 and includes civilian police units to protect refugee camps. The overall mission of 6,170 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police was mandated to monitor and observe compliance with the ceasefire, provide security for humanitarian relief and facilitate the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, the mission has struggled to maintain security and remains a test case for the AU. The continental body must identify and internalise important conflict management lessons from RECs like ECOWAS and SADC as it undertakes its new peace and security mandate. The conflict management experiences of ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD should also influence the AU's ongoing and future peace operations. The RECs have been mandated to serve as the building blocks and pillars of the African Standby Force in its efforts to implement regional peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

The conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau in the 1990s claimed over 250,000 lives and generated 1.2 million refugees. ECOWAS²¹ conducted five peacekeeping missions in Liberia (1990 and 2003), Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1998) and Côte d'Ivoire (2003). The organisation has three key organs: a Mediation and Security Council (MSC); a Defence and Security Commission (DSC); and a Council of Elders. Civil society actors actively participate in ECOWAS' early-warning system and have established an office in its secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria. One lesson learned from the experiences of ECOWAS is the critical need to obtain the support of member states before deploying peacekeepers. The five ECOMOG interventions exposed the logistical weaknesses of West Africa's armies. ECOMOG's dominance by Nigeria – which constituted over 70% of ECOMOG troops and provided 90% of its funding in the Liberia and Sierra Leone missions – resulted in a lack of sub-regional unity and legitimacy. Therefore, the command of future missions must be based at the ECOWAS secretariat, and its management capacity needs to be urgently enhanced.

21 ECOWAS members include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.



FROM LEFT: **MR RAYMOND KITEVU**, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT, ADDIS ABABA; **MR JEAN MFASONI**, AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION, ADDIS ABABA; **MR TSEPE MOTUMI**, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, TSHWANE (PRETORIA); **MS FLORENCE IHEME**, ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, ABUJA; **GENERAL PAULINO MACARINGUE**, UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG

There is also a pressing need to establish a proper division of labour between the UN and Africa's sub-regional security organisations. In Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Burundi, the UN took over peacekeeping duties from African regional institutions. The willingness of western peacekeepers - who have both equipment and resources - to continue to contribute to UN missions in Africa remains important. The missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi and the DRC could also signify an innovative approach to UN peacekeeping in Africa, based on regional pillars supported by local hegemony like Nigeria and South Africa whose political dominance is diluted by multinational peacekeepers from outside their sub-regions. By placing regional forces under the UN flag, peacekeepers may be viewed as more legitimate and impartial. Moreover, some of the financial and logistical shortcomings of regional peacekeepers can be alleviated through greater burden sharing. There is also a need for ECOWAS to establish the logistical and financial arrangements to train peacekeepers. The Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana, is now providing operational-level training; the War College in Abuja, Nigeria, is providing training in strategy; and a centre in Mali will provide tactical training.

SADC's Organ for Politics, Defence and Security co-ordinates security policy through a troika of members under a one-year rotating chair. An Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and an Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) comprising regional ministers drive SADC's security activities.

In 2004, SADC²² unveiled a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), a five-year project to implement its security protocol and involving political, defence, state and public security.²³ SADC will also be contributing a brigade to the ASF and will need greater financial resources and better logistical preparedness. The SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare, Zimbabwe, has trained over 3,000 military officers. The centre is now under the umbrella of the SADC secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana. A network of actors in the security field is co-ordinated by the Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) network involving security institutions in South Africa, Namibia, Tanzania, the DRC, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia. SADSEM has trained over 1000 senior officials, military officers and civil society leaders since January 2000.

In January 2002, IGAD developed a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) based in Ethiopia, with co-operation from civil society groups. CEWARN focuses on cattle-rustling, small arms trafficking and refugee flows, and has national focal points in each of the seven IGAD member states working closely with civil society. CEWARN, however, has so far been unable to address the root causes of conflicts, as well as governance and inter-state disputes such as the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000. IGAD remains understaffed and inadequately funded, but is co-ordinating the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) as part of the ASF. This will involve IGAD members²⁴ as well as Mauritius, the Seychelles and Rwanda. Eastern African states established their own security mechanism in 2005, and called for a brigade and logistical headquarters in Addis Ababa, as well as a planning cell in Nairobi. Like SADC, but unlike ECOWAS, the EASBRIG force is to come under an AU or UN umbrella. Centres of excellence for training sub-regional peacekeepers have been identified in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. However, given the political division between its members, IGAD has failed to co-ordinate its peacemaking efforts effectively. Significantly, under the chairmanship of Algerian leader Abdelaziz Bouteflika, it was the OAU, and not IGAD, which devised the peace plan for ending the Ethiopia/Eritrea war in 2000. In November 2005, as a result of mounting political tension between the two countries, Ethiopia and Eritrea deployed troops in their previously disputed border regions.

IGAD has asked the AU to lead the deployment of peacekeepers into Somalia. It is also the UN, and not IGAD, that is deploying 10,000 troops to oversee the peace process in southern Sudan. However, despite its deficiencies, IGAD has devoted much time and resources to peacemaking initiatives in Sudan and Somalia, with the financial support of the United States and the European Union.

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) have made less progress than ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD in developing security mechanisms. However, both organisations are critical to the establishment of Africa's continental peacekeeping capacity. ECCAS was established in 1983.²⁵ National interests and technical problems have frustrated the effective operationalisation of ECCAS structures. In 1997, Central African leaders established the *Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l'Afrique Centrale* (COPAX) to promote peace and security in Central Africa. COPAX was established under the auspices of the UN Standing Committee for Security Questions in Central Africa. Leaders in the region have, however, been unable to agree on the relationship between ECCAS and the COPAX early-warning system. Central African states have, moreover, responded to the failure to create an institutional framework for managing conflicts by seeking membership in

22 SADC members include Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

23 Centre for Conflict Resolution, *Whither SADC? An Agenda for Southern Africa's Post-Apartheid Security*, Seminar Report, Cape Town, South Africa, 18 and 19 June 2005. (Available at: <http://ccrweb.ccruct.ac.za>)

24 IGAD members include Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

25 ECCAS members include Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Congo-Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial-Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe.

alternative sub-regional organisations: the DRC joined SADC in 1997, while Burundi and Rwanda have applied to join the East African Community (EAC) consisting of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. More positively, senior ECCAS officials met six times between July 2003 and December 2004 and are planning to establish a 2,177-strong regional brigade as their contribution to the ASF.

The AMU²⁶ created in 1989 has become largely dormant due to the breakdown in bilateral relations between Algeria and Morocco. With the conflicts in Western Sahara and Algeria, and devastating terrorist attacks in the Moroccan city of Casablanca in May 2003, the Maghreb region could erupt into further violence. No regional peacekeeping has occurred in north-west Africa, and a sub-regional brigade for an African stand-by force appears to be a long way off. Though the AMU has made the least progress of Africa's five sub-regions in establishing a brigade for the ASF, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) offered rapid-reaction training to sub-regional states in 2004. AMU members, however, remain deeply divided.



MS FLORENCE IHEME, ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, ABUJA

26 AMU members include Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.

2.2 Collaboration between the AU and the RECs

Close collaboration between Africa's regional economic communities such as ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, the AMU, ECCAS, the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community on the one hand, and the AU on the other, will accelerate the socio-economic development of the continent. While policymakers generally talk of the RECs as the building blocks of the AU - as enshrined in the Abuja Treaty of 1991 - co-ordination and harmonisation of policies between them has barely begun. The UN's Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the OAU and the African Development Bank (ADB) issued a statement in January 1998 encouraging the gradual rationalisation of functions and institutions in Africa based on communities that share common values and objectives through a division of labour and harmonisation of policies and instruments. The AU is in the process of establishing additional legal instruments and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) which will formally link the AU to Africa's RECs. Still, a more concerted effort to improve co-ordination and harmonisation between the AU and the RECs is critical to accelerating Africa's integration process.

As a first step towards effective collaboration in West Africa, the AU will establish an office in Abuja, Nigeria, at the headquarters of ECOWAS. IGAD's rapid progress in establishing the East African Standby Brigade, with its headquarters in Addis Ababa and its logistics and operational training base in Nairobi, is also a sign of new possibilities for collaboration. IGAD's early-warning mechanism, CEWARN, has made substantial progress towards becoming operationalised. The AU can draw lessons from CEWARN as it begins to operationalise the continental early-warning system. Several participants noted that SADC is still afflicted by a low level of trust and unhealthy competition among its leaders. There remains a lack of common values in the sub-region, and there are still serious structural inequalities in southern Africa.

A core debate at the Cape Town seminar focused on the need to strengthen political leadership at the sub-regional level. More specifically, member states have been slow - and even reluctant - to pool their sovereignty. Further mechanisms for increased inter-state collaboration need to be established urgently. The appointment of an AU delegate to interface with the RECs was seen as a positive step. The issue of the lack of adequate staff and infrastructure in the RECs was also discussed. Due to these constraints, sub-regional organisations are often unable to implement key decisions emanating from the AU in a timely manner. RECs also need to be given sufficient time to digest some of the AU's new initiatives. Finally, the proliferation of sub-regional organisations and the multiple membership of many African states in different RECs have complicated efforts to ensure harmonisation and co-ordination. African governments must rationalise Africa's proliferation of RECs. In this regard, the AU has recognised seven RECs with which to collaborate: ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, the AMU, ECCAS, COMESA and the EAC.

2.3 The Role of the AU and NEPAD in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The Cape Town seminar concluded that Africa's security actors must urgently tackle the challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction in war-affected countries. The AU has the primary responsibility for peace and security on the continent. NEPAD is developing a role in supporting post-conflict reconstruction and the mobilisation of resources for the AU Peace Fund.²⁷ Specifically, these institutions will support processes of

²⁷ Wiseman Nkhulu, *The New Partnership for Africa's Development: The Journey So Far*, (Midrand: NEPAD Secretariat, June 2005), p.9.

demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants into local communities, as well as implementing security sector reform. This includes addressing and promoting social and economic justice, as well as putting in place political structures of governance which will consolidate peacebuilding, reconciliation and the rule of law. The deleterious effects of post-conflict situations are being felt across the continent. In particular, refugee flows and the increase in internally displaced persons continue to have a major impact on Africa's stability.

According to its *Indicative Work Programme of the Peace and Security Council*, the AU will endeavour - whether as a stand-alone AU operation, or in partnership with the UN, the RECs and other partners - to be active in post-conflict reconstruction. As a first step towards ensuring a successful transition from peacemaking to post-conflict peacebuilding, the AU Peace and Security Council could deploy special envoys. For example, an AU envoy was deployed to assist with peacebuilding efforts in the Central African Republic (CAR) in April 2003.²⁸ Some participants, however, felt that the AU is not communicating effectively with the RECs on issues of post-conflict reconstruction, and suggested that the notion of "integrated missions" be explored. The UN mission in Sierra Leone has adopted this integrated mission concept, with the UN Special Representative responsible for the UN system in Sierra Leone as a whole, and the Deputy Special Representative focusing more on development issues. Consequently, when the Special Representative leaves the mission at the end of his or her service, the deputy will be mandated to continue with the development process, thus reinforcing the view that peacebuilding and development are intimately linked.

NEPAD has developed an African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework through a consultative process with some civil society actors and key stakeholders.²⁹ This framework stresses the link between the peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. The NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework aims to co-ordinate and guide the efforts of the AU Commission, the NEPAD secretariat, the RECs, civil society, the private sector and other internal and external partners in the process of rebuilding war-affected communities. This plan is based on the premise that each country should adopt a post-conflict reconstruction strategy that responds to its own particular needs.³⁰ In most countries, there is a need to develop a post-conflict reconstruction process that addresses the needs of vulnerable groups such as women and children who are increasingly the targets of violence in conflict situations. NEPAD's peacebuilding policy stresses the importance of factoring the needs of these groups into planning and programming in order to have an effective overall post-conflict strategy. The disabled, ex-combatants, child soldiers and victims of sexual violence also need to be provided with appropriate care and attention since an inadequate post-conflict programme can increase the vulnerability of these groups.

NEPAD's peacebuilding policy also stresses the importance of synchronising the delivery and absorption of post-conflict reconstruction assistance. Violent conflict often erodes the capacity of local actors to absorb assistance due to the destruction of infrastructure and the loss of the human resource capability to manage the aftermath of conflicts. Greater collaboration is therefore required between the recipient country or region and external actors such as international organisations, the donor community, international non-governmental organisations and the private sector. All of these actors have an important role to play in post-conflict peacebuilding efforts, but their participation must be managed in a co-ordinated manner. The AU and NEPAD Peacebuilding framework, working closely with the RECs, can help to co-ordinate the engagement of these actors.

28 Timothy Muriithi, *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp.91-95.

29 New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, (Midrand: NEPAD Secretariat, 29 April 2005).

30 Patrick Bond, *Fanon's Warning: A Civil Society Reader on the New Partnership for Africa's Development*, (Trenton, NJ: AIDC, 2002).

The NEPAD policy framework further proposes the establishment of an AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit to play an advocacy role. This unit would develop the necessary protocols and policy guidelines for regional post-conflict activities, as well as assist stakeholders in participating in this process. The unit would also undertake research on how to improve post-conflict recovery and develop a monitoring and evaluation process.

The AU, in partnership with the South African NGO, SaferAfrica, held a brainstorming retreat for members of its Peace and Security Council and several members of the AU Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Durban, South Africa, in September 2005.³¹ The retreat discussed the experiences and lessons learned by various organisations working in the field of post-conflict reconstruction and development. The meeting also identified the key actors and the institutional set-up and co-ordination that will be required to generate broad agreement on the creation of an AU framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development.



PROFESSOR EBOE HUTCHFUL, AFRICAN SECURITY DIALOGUE AND RESEARCH, ACCRA, LEFT; **MS SELMA WALTERS**, CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CAPE TOWN

³¹ AU, *Report of Proceedings: The 4th Brainstorming Retreat of the Peace and Security Council and other AU Member States' Permanent Representatives to the African Union (AU) on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in Africa*, 4 and 5 September 2005, Durban, South Africa.

The Durban meeting further reiterated that the AU has an important role to play in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. It noted that African ownership of the post-conflict reconstruction process must be ensured through the AU and NEPAD, and that the external leadership of past processes has often led to the failure of a number of post-conflict reconstruction processes. In order to ensure the availability of the necessary resources to ensure effective post-conflict recovery, an AU-managed African Development Fund could be established to act as a catalyst for accessing and targeting resources for the continent's peacebuilding needs.

An effective AU post-conflict strategy must also focus on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants with a view to ensuring that demobilised fighters have access to rehabilitation programmes that enable them to acquire new skills and facilitate their reintegration into society. Security sector reform is also vital for ensuring that national defence and police forces re-orient their activities to building sustainable peace in their respective countries. National institutions need to be rebuilt to ensure the consolidation of democratic governance, the rule of law and the protection of the human rights of citizens in transitional societies. In order to guarantee the sustainability of these institutions, education and training must be provided to establish professionalism and integrity.

The Durban meeting also further emphasised the importance of promoting reconciliation in order to achieve sustainable peace. Participants at the Cape Town seminar discussed the lack of emphasis in NEPAD's policy on the role that a culture of forgiveness can play in assisting post-conflict reconstruction. As with indigenous structures of governance, there is a key role for indigenous approaches to forgiveness in sustaining peace in post-conflict societies. Indigenous institutions of governance can enhance and improve the quality of political participation and the responsiveness of existing governmental structures to the needs of citizens.³² It is, however, unclear whether the AU and NEPAD will be able to mobilise the resources and build the capacity to undertake peacebuilding initiatives effectively. External actors like the UN and the World Bank have far more resources and experience in this critical area than Africa's resource-poor actors.

At the end of 2004, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change submitted a report to the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, entitled *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*.³³ The report recommended the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, a Peacebuilding Support Office, and a Peacebuilding Fund. The UN General Assembly established a Peacebuilding Commission in September 2005, to become operational by 31 December 2005. The UN outcome document issued by the General Assembly in September 2005 further noted that it was important to emphasise "the need for a co-ordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation".³⁴ The Peacebuilding Commission was established with a view to achieving sustainable peace and in recognition of the need for a dedicated mechanism within the UN to address the special need of countries emerging from conflict. The commission will co-ordinate the efforts of the different United Nations agencies and departments working on post-conflict reconstruction. The creation of the commission was a clear recognition by the General Assembly that deploying peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces may be essential for ending conflicts, but such missions are insufficient for long-term recovery. Given the common mandates of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the NEPAD and evolving AU post-conflict recovery framework, there is scope for greater collaboration and co-ordination of their activities. A formal institutional body should be established between the AU and NEPAD and the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

32 Timothy Kiogora, "Good Governance for Development: Perspectives from the African Traditional Cultural Heritage", in Hizkias Assefa and George Wachira (eds.), *Peacemaking and Democratization in Africa: Theoretical Perspectives and Church Initiatives*, (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1996), pp. 23-33.

33 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, (New York: United Nations, 2004).

34 United Nations General Assembly, *Outcome Document*, 14 September 2005, paragraph 97.

3. NEPAD: Myth or Reality?

3.1 The Birth and Evolution of NEPAD

NEPAD, which has been designated by African leaders as a vital tool for achieving Africa's development objectives, is to be integrated into the AU as a specialised agency by 2006. The birth and evolution of NEPAD was revisited during the Cape Town seminar and participants enthusiastically debated NEPAD's problems and prospects and its aim of promoting economic development and democratic governance in Africa.

South Africa's president, Thabo Mbeki - the foremost proponent of an *African Renaissance* - and Nigeria's president, Olusegun Obasanjo, first went to the OAU summit in Algiers in 1999 to address the "digital divide" between Africa and the industrialised North. At this meeting, both leaders requested a mandate from their African colleagues to discuss development issues with the leaders of the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialised countries in Okinawa, Japan, in 2000. This led to a broader mandate to negotiate on behalf of the continent. Mbeki has championed the idea that Africa needs a "new deal" in the current international economic order. Obasanjo, before becoming Nigeria's president in 1999, was instrumental in establishing the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa, which promotes norms of human rights and governance. Furthermore, Senegal's Abdoulaye Wade put much effort into the OMEGA plan - essentially a blueprint for infrastructural development. Some participants in the Cape Town seminar argued that NEPAD is the operationalisation of three prophetic visions for Africa: a new partnership with the industrialised world; a focus on "good governance" and human rights in Africa; and renewed attention on large-scale infrastructure for the continent's development. Indeed, NEPAD's framework, programmes and processes make explicit links between democratic governance; peace and security; and economic growth and development.

In contrast, several participants noted that Africa relies too heavily on external resources, and should consider "indigenising" NEPAD and transforming it into a grassroots development process. In order for the AU and NEPAD to integrate successfully by 2006, both institutions must address three critical challenges. First, the commitment to democratic governance enshrined in the NEPAD document must be reinforced. Second, African leaders must promote and institutionalise deeper co-ordination and collaboration among themselves, Africa's sub-regional organisations, and civil society actors. Third, Africa must address the financial and infrastructural weaknesses of its social, political and security institutions. Several participants also agreed that even though NEPAD has political, economic and social limitations, it is nevertheless a bold effort to devise an African-owned strategy for socio-economic development and democratic governance. NEPAD's programmes appear, however, to focus heavily on the privatisation and deregulation of industries, including agrarian and commodity industries, which the majority of Africans depend on for their livelihoods.



FROM LEFT: **MS SUE MBAYA**, SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGIONAL POVERTY NETWORK, TSHWANE (PRETORIA); **DR SHEILA BUNWAREE**, UNIVERSITY OF MAURITIUS, REDUIT; **MS BALEKA MBETE**, MP, SPEAKER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT, CAPE TOWN;

3.2 NEPAD and its Discontents

NEPAD's critics have argued against its focus on debt relief as opposed to debt cancellation, neo-classical economics and foreign direct investment. They have acknowledged that NEPAD has sought new development resources and placed a strong emphasis on debt relief, with Africa's external debt standing at \$290 billion. After nearly seven years of engagement, however, NEPAD's leaders secured only minimal debt relief at the Gleneagles summit in the United Kingdom (UK) in July 2005. Only 14 states will benefit from debt relief - and then only those that have been part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) process and have met certain conditions. In this regard, several participants argued that the only success that the NEPAD/G-8 process has achieved is to lock African countries into a more subordinate relationship with the West.



A SEMINAR SESSION

Several participants also expressed concern that NEPAD represents old wine in a new bottle. The NEPAD framework borrows heavily from failed modernisation strategies as well as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), HIPC and Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs) which have not yielded development or addressed poverty effectively. Additional research is needed on the broad historiography of NEPAD and its ideological underpinnings to demonstrate whether it is indeed a departure from old doctrines and, if so, how it can contribute towards implementing a new developmental paradigm on the continent. Africa needs growth for development, and the continent must engage with the global North in order to generate economic growth. African governments and civil society should, however, explore alternative sources of co-operation, as well as undertake South-South co-operation and engage more effectively with the African Diaspora to mobilise additional resources for development.

A major criticism of NEPAD is that it has not effectively placed people at the centre of its processes and initiatives, nor are there clear mechanisms of accountability to African citizens. NEPAD was said to be a “top-down” initiative. Furthermore, some of the architects of NEPAD have been accused of infringing on the human rights of their own people. Some participants felt that it might be useful to revisit the African Charter for Popular Participation of 1990 to use some of the declarations contained in this document to promote the empowerment of African people as well as gender equality.

4. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): Progress and Prospects

The NEPAD framework in July 2003 launched an African Peer Review Mechanism, which 23 countries³⁵ have so far joined.³⁶ The APRM will monitor and assess the compliance of African governments with norms of governance and human rights articulated in the AU's Constitutive Act. This innovative mechanism of voluntary, self-imposed assessment seeks to raise the standards of governance and economic management in Africa to improve the livelihood of African people by promoting a climate that will encourage investment and development. There are five stages to the APRM process: i) Stage One involves the study of the political, economic and corporate governance and development environment in the country to be reviewed; ii) Stage Two involves a visit by the review team to the country concerned to conduct consultations with government officials, political parties, parliamentarians, the organised private sector and representatives of civil society organisations; iii) Stage Three involves the preparation of the review team's report, based on briefing material prepared by the APRM secretariat and information obtained from in-country consultations; iv) Stage Four – involves the submission of the review team's report to the peer review participating heads of state through the APRM secretariat for adoption; and v) Stage Five takes place six months after the report has been considered by the heads of state and includes the forwarding and tabling of the report to key regional and sub-regional structures such as the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Peace and Security Council and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council. After this stage, the country concerned is expected to implement the recommendations of the report.³⁷

Participants at the Cape Town seminar noted that the APRM is one of the positive innovations of the NEPAD programme. The mechanism represents a commitment to African self-monitoring and accountability by relying on a system of peer pressure whereby African governments can "self-monitor" political and economic performance among themselves.³⁸ The APRM's review process is essentially a performance assessment of key governance indicators (political, economic and corporate), thereby promoting the values and outcomes of democratic governance and constitutional government. The structures for implementing the APRM were established in May 2004 and the six-member Panel of Eminent Persons (the review team) has made progress in popularising the integrity of the process.³⁹ Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and Mauritius agreed to be the first countries to be reviewed in 2004 and the reports from these reviews are currently being finalised.⁴⁰ Reviews have also been launched in South Africa, Nigeria and Uganda. The APRM panel does not only consult with governments, but also with all stakeholders in a given country. Each country has a focal point and a co-ordinating mechanism. For example, individuals from the private sector must be nominated by the private sector. As an illustration, Rwanda had a co-ordinating group of 50 participants drawn from government, civil society and the business sector. The success of the APRM therefore rests on governments genuinely respecting the process and co-ordinating the open and transparent nomination of representatives to meet with the APRM panel.

35 Countries that have joined the APRM include Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.


36 See the New Partnership for Africa's Development website. (Available at: <http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/aprmcountries.php>)

37 Adebayo Adedeji, "NEPAD's Africa Peer Review Mechanism: Progress and Prospects", paper presented at the Centre for Conflict Resolution policy seminar, *Building an African Union (AU) for the 21st Century*, Cape Town, South Africa, 20-22 August 2005, pp. 12-13.

38 The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), *The African Peer Review Mechanism*, March 2003.

39 The members of the APRM Eminent Persons Panel are Professor Adebayo Adedeji, of Nigeria; Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, of Kenya; Dr Graça Machel, of Mozambique; Dr Dorothy Njeuma, of Cameroon; Ms Marie-Angelique Savané, of Senegal; and Dr Chris Stals, of South Africa.

40 Ayesha Kajee, "NEPAD's APRM: A Progress Report, Practical Limitations and Challenges", in *South African Yearbook of International Affairs*, (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004).



PROFESSOR MWESIGA BAREGU, UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA

Due to the voluntary nature of participation in the APRM, some participants felt that the mechanism lacked legitimacy to sanction countries that failed to meet agreed standards of democratic governance and the rule of law. However, it was noted that the mechanism was not created to punish governments, but to build mutual trust and to engender a new culture through which clear rules for democratic governance are respected and sound political and economic policies are promoted in Africa. In this regard, the APRM strives to enhance African "ownership" of its development and governance agenda; to identify, evaluate and disseminate "best practices"; and to monitor progress towards previously-agreed governance goals. Moreover, it was noted that the APRM process was not established to achieve debt forgiveness. However, external donors could, of course, more favourably consider a country's eligibility for debt forgiveness if it has successfully undertaken an APRM review.

Many external powers view the APRM as the centrepiece of the NEPAD project. Participants at the Cape Town seminar, however, agreed that it is premature to judge the significance and progress of the mechanism. It may be more appropriate to conduct a mid-term review in 2008 when the APRM will be five years old. Ultimately, the mechanism is a positive step towards achieving justice, equity, transparency and accountability. The APRM also has the potential to revitalise Africa's indigenous institutions and to hold African leaders accountable through local values and closer co-operation on governance issues.

The APRM can also serve as a tool for promoting intra-African technical co-operation. Historically, Africa has relied on the West's technical competence to develop political and socio-economic policies and strategies.⁴¹ In this context, it was mainly policies and programmes crafted by donors and the international financial institutions that were implemented. Policies such as the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, crafted by Africans and deemed by many to be more appropriate to the African context, were often not implemented. This has resulted in a lack of confidence in Africa's self-generated policy solutions and fostered a culture of dependence. The APRM, therefore, has the potential to serve as a strategic indigenous instrument for entrenching Africa's technical independence.

Ultimately, the APRM is expected to usher in a paradigm shift in the governance area that will consolidate and sustain Africa's fragile democracies and promote human development on the continent. This paradigm shift stresses that economic development is linked with freedom of association, human rights and peoples' participation in running their own affairs.⁴² Several criticisms of the APRM have emerged on its financial capacity and political commitment to ensure that the process works. The mechanism is currently being supported in its work by the UN's Economic Commission for Africa. In addition, the process will not work effectively unless governments align their institutional frameworks to the APRM, so that national programmes reflect some of the priorities outlined in the mechanism. Since every review must be technically competent, credible and free of political manipulation, it may take up to a decade to complete the process if all the AU's 53 member states sign up - unless the process is accelerated and additional human and financial resources are provided.⁴³



FROM LEFT: **MS ANGELA NDIINGA-MUVUMBA**, CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CAPE TOWN; **PROFESSOR EBOE HUTCHFUL**, AFRICAN SECURITY DIALOGUE AND RESEARCH, ACCRA; **MS NOMCEBO MANZINI**, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR WOMEN, JOHANNESBURG; **MS VICTORIA MALOKA**, CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CAPE TOWN

41 Adebayo Adedeji, 'NEPAD's Africa Peer Review Mechanism: Progress and Prospects'.

42 Adebayo Adedeji, 'NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism: Progress and Prospects', p.16.

43 Adebayo Adedeji, 'NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism: Progress and Prospects', p.16.

5. The Pan-African Parliament, Africa's Courts and ECOSOCC

5.1 The AU's Pan-African Parliament: Progress and Prospects

A key institution created by the AU to enable the effective participation of civil society in Africa's evolving governance and security architecture is the Pan-African Parliament.⁴⁴ The PAP was inaugurated in South Africa in March 2004. The notion of the PAP was, however, first outlined in 1991 in the *Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament*. The objective behind the PAP's creation is to provide a vehicle through which African citizens can contribute towards deliberating and providing advice on how to deepen democratic governance on the continent. Among its current functions, the PAP debates the AU's budget and the reports of its Peace and Security Council, while the parliament's president, Getrude Mongella, attends the twice-yearly meetings of the Assembly of the AU heads of state. The PAP is expected to become more effective after five years, when it will be an elected body and assumes full legislative powers. This body will serve as another platform through which civil society can influence policy formulation and monitor implementation within the AU and NEPAD frameworks.

The PAP is currently made up of 230 Members of Parliament (MPs) who are elected by each of the 46 national parliaments that have ratified the Protocol on the Pan-African Parliament.⁴⁵ When all 53 AU member states have elected their quota to the body, the PAP will eventually have 265 members. The parliament is mandated to exercise oversight on issues of governance and development on the continent. According to the protocol establishing the parliament, it can "discuss or express an opinion on any matter, either on its own initiative or at the request of the Assembly".⁴⁶ The PAP can also make recommendations on how to achieve the objectives of the AU, and will strive to contribute towards the co-ordination and harmonisation of policies, measures, programmes and activities of the RECs and African national parliaments.

Since the inauguration of the PAP more than 19 months ago, it has established ten committees: the Committee on Rural Economy, Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment; the Committee on Monetary and Financial Affairs; the Committee on Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters; the Committee on Co-operation, International Relations and Conflict Resolution; the Committee on Transport, Industry, Communications, Energy, Science and Technology; the Committee on Health, Labour and Social Affairs; the Committee on Education, Culture, Tourism and Human Resources; the Committee on Gender, Family, Youth and People with Disability; the Committee on Justice and Human Rights; and the Committee on Rules, Privileges and Discipline. These committees meet between parliamentary sessions and make recommendations to the PAP.

The Rules Committee is critical to operationalising the PAP, which now has more than 90 procedural rules. The South African government provided significant human and financial support during these critical early stages of the parliament, and the PAP is based in Midrand, near Johannesburg. As the operationalisation of the continental parliament commences, the committees have made significant efforts to become actively engaged with the AU's other organs and institutions.

44 Jakkie Cilliers and Prince Mashele, "The Pan-African Parliament: A Plenary of Parliamentarians", *African Security Review*, 13(4), 2004.

45 Baleka Mbete, "The AU's Pan-African Parliament: Progress and Prospects", paper presented at the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) policy seminar, *Building an African Union (AU) for the 21st Century: Relations with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and Civil Society*, Cape Town, South Africa, 2022 August 2005.

46 Baleka Mbete, "The AU's Pan-African Parliament: Progress and Prospects", p.2.

The PAP sent a mission to Darfur and held a session in the troubled Sudanese region from 19 November to 3 December 2004 in order to engage with all the key actors in the conflict and to obtain first-hand insights into the causes of the conflict. The PAP mission held a second session on Darfur from 14 to 18 February 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya. The parliamentarians recommended that the mandate of the AU Mission in Sudan be strengthened to protect vulnerable citizens.

The PAP's committees have also debated issues including gender and women's issues; strategies for improving inter-African co-operation; South-South relations; and North-South relations. The parliamentary committees have further discussed the issue of land dispossession in Africa and recommended the establishment of an African Land Title System. Parliamentarians also recommended the establishment of a Pan-African Investment and Financing Institution to enhance the continent's rural economy. The PAP has addressed the challenges of improving the continent's telecommunications infrastructure and ensuring that African citizens have access to this technology. In terms of its relationship with Africa's national parliaments, the PAP will hold an annual consultative forum involving regional and national parliaments. This should contribute towards harmonising the work programmes of the continent's legislatures.

Concerns raised during the Cape Town seminar focused on how to build an accountable and responsive Pan-African Parliament. Participants considered a number of issues such as the range of experience and political culture of parliamentarians; the role of civil society in the PAP; the need to develop an oversight modality for the parliament; the importance of avoiding duplication with national parliaments; and opportunities for the PAP to contribute to Africa's peace and security efforts. Ultimately, when the parliament becomes endowed with full legislative powers and is provided with the necessary political support, "it will act as a common platform for all the peoples of Africa to get more involved in discussions and decision-making on the problems and challenges which beset it".⁴⁷



FROM LEFT: **PROFESSOR SHADRACK GUTTO**, CENTRE FOR AFRICAN RENAISSANCE STUDIES, TSHWANE (PRETORIA);
MR CUNNINGHAM NGCUKANA, NEPAD SECRETARIAT, MIDRAND; **MS WINNIE BYANYIMA**, AFRICAN UNION, ADDIS ABABA;
MS BALEKA MBETE, MP, SPEAKER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT, CAPE TOWN

⁴⁷ Mbete, "The AU's Pan-African Parliament: Progress and Prospects", p.1.

5.2 The African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights

In order to ensure and promote the rule of law in Africa, the AU decided to establish an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights in January 2004. The court will complement other AU institutions by ensuring the protection of human and minority rights. The body is empowered to act both in a judiciary and advisory capacity. Article 2 of its protocol states that "the Court shall, bearing in mind the provisions of this Protocol, complement the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights conferred upon it by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights".⁴⁸ In terms of its judicatory power, the court can assess cases submitted to it by member states or citizens who have been victims of human rights violations. It will be important to ensure that the court is not undermined by political interference so that it can serve as a genuine arbitrator and mechanism to check excesses of state power.

At the fourth ordinary session of the AU Assembly of heads of state held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 2004, a decision was taken to merge the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights with the proposed African Court of Justice (ACJ). Several African civil society groups criticised the merging of both courts, arguing that each was established independently to perform separate functions. Moreover, the protocols for establishing each court were at different stages of ratification. Several participants at the Cape Town seminar applauded the decision of the assembly in Sirte, Libya, in July 2005 to establish the Court on Human and Peoples' Rights immediately and not wait for the merger instrument of the two courts to be fully ratified. African leaders also authorised the drafting of a legal instrument relating to the establishment of the merged court and decided that the seat of the court should be in East Africa.⁴⁹ Participants highlighted the importance of holding governments accountable to the rule of law and questioned the assembly's decision to merge the courts in the first place. It was noted that there could be various rationales for the decision, ranging from the political interests of certain governments such as Nigeria (the chair of the AU at the time), to more benign explanations such as the erroneous application of the legal frameworks of the protocols establishing the courts. Several participants emphasised that there are human and financial resource implications of seemingly uninformed decisions of African leaders and AU officials, and experts should make these costs clear to African leaders early in the policy process in order to avoid similar experiences in future.

5.3 The AU's ECOSOCC: Progress and Prospects

The AU Constitutive Act of 2000 created various organs to co-ordinate and implement its objectives. The CSSDCA was initiated in 1991 and subsequently incorporated into the structures of the AU. The initiative recognises that there must be a unified strategy for development that addresses security, stability, development and co-operation in a comprehensive and integrated manner. This is based on the recognition that none of these issues can be addressed separately. Rather, they must be approached in an interdependent manner. The CSSDCA has identified the key performance indicators which would demonstrate whether each AU member state is fulfilling its commitment to the CSSDCA process.

⁴⁸ AU, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2004.

⁴⁹ AU, Decisions, Declarations and Resolutions, Assembly of the African Union, Fifth Ordinary Session, 4-5 July 2005, Sirte, Libya, AU/Dec.73-90 (V).

In part, the establishment of a civil society organ within the AU stems from the conceptual vision of the CSSDCA. Article 22 of the AU Constitutive Act notes that “the Economic, Social and Cultural Council shall be an advisory organ composed of different social and professional groups of the member states of the Union”.⁵⁰ ECOSOCC was launched in March 2005 in Addis Ababa and provides a vehicle for civil society – non-governmental organisations, professional groups, trades unions and other stakeholders – to establish formal relations with the AU and to participate in its initiatives and work. Its overall aim is to provide a forum for civil society to influence the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of AU policies and programmes. Dr Wangari Maathai, Kenya’s Nobel laureate and environmental campaigner, was chosen as its first interim president.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) currently involved in the ECOSOCC process tend to be NGOs and not necessarily organisations representing grassroots movements or the interests of ordinary people through religious, community-based, student, professional or trade associations. Debate about the definition of civil society was further reflected in the confusion about the civil society affiliation of the interim president who is also deputy minister of environment in Kenya’s government. Several participants noted that the decisions taken during this interim period reflected the need to mobilise funding and to build human resource capacity. The challenges facing ECOSOCC include popularising the AU and ECOSOCC; promoting the exchange of ideas and dialogue at grassroots level; ensuring the integration of the Diaspora into ECOSOCC’s activities and decision-making processes; and integrating ECOSOCC into all AU programmes, structures and organs. National and sub-regional efforts by CSOs will be critical to meeting these challenges. Moreover, the AU’s other institutions and organs should benefit from interfacing with ECOSOCC’s interim sectoral cluster committees which are its key operational mechanisms and provide input into AU policies and programmes.



FROM LEFT: **DR JOHN AKOKPARI**, UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA; **PROFESSOR DANIEL BACH**, UNIVERSITY OF BORDEAUX, FRANCE; **PROFESSOR BEN TUROK**, MP, SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT, CAPE TOWN; **MR FRANCIS KORNEGAY**, CENTRE FOR POLICY STUDIES, JOHANNESBURG

⁵⁰ AU, Constitutive Act, (Addis Ababa: African Union, 2000).

6. Human Security Challenges

6.1 From Military Security to Human Security

The relevance of a human security framework for the new AU was discussed. The AU's ambitious agenda transcends state-centric security and aims to bridge the gap between the sovereign rights of states and the human rights of citizens. In this context, the AU has adopted a people-centred vision, articulated most clearly through some of its newest organs such as ECOSOCC, the Pan-African Parliament, and the Peace and Security Council.⁵¹ Despite this implicit focus on people, the concept of human security has not been fully incorporated into policy-making processes in Africa. Human security emphasises freedom from fear and want. Modern concepts of security were originally tied to the pre-eminence of the Westphalian nation-state and articulated threats to be military in nature, external in origin and emanating from other states. Human security, on the other hand, redefines these notions.

The term "human security" was first used in a 1994 UN Human Development Report and encompasses economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. The African consensus on "human security" is embedded in the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa, and the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) outlined on 28 February 2004.⁵² In turn, the CSSDCA established two foundations for African security: human security and collective security. This new definition does not exclude traditional state security, but is more comprehensive and multifaceted. Human security defines threats as emanating from many sources and, in addition, argues that there are guarantors of security beyond the state's military structures. Human security can thus lead to a more holistic approach to security, but tends to place an emphasis on the state's economic development structures, which at times undermine the strengthening of military and defence structures. Measurements for human security are yet to be properly defined. However, useful avenues for building and strengthening human security lie in efforts that ensure sustainable development; alleviate absolute poverty; provide basic social services; establish the rule of law; protect and promote human rights; nurture democratic governance and institutions; and promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts in societies.⁵³

Strategies for delivering human security in Africa will include enhancing co-ordination between the continental and sub-regional security architectures. At the national level, security sector reform will need to proceed with a view towards sustaining peace. The privatisation of military activities during conflicts, particularly in the form of private military companies, has distorted the capacity of war-affected countries to ensure their own state security. The democratic oversight of militaries in Africa is thus a vital ingredient for the delivery of human security on the continent.

51 See Articles 2 and 3 of the AU Statutes of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union, (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2005). (Available at: http://www.africa-union.org/organs/orgEconomic_Social_%20and_%20Cultural_%20Council.htm) and Articles 9 and 10 of the AU Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. (Available at: http://www.africaunion.org/organs/orgThe_Peace_%20and_Security_Council.htm)

52 AU, Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, Addis Ababa: African Union, 28 February 2004.

53 See the Principles of the Human Security Network, First Ministerial Meeting, Lysøen, Norway, 20 May 1999. (Available at: <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org>)

It will take time to mainstream the notion of human security, given the historical dominance of military security. The understanding that “military security is the indispensable condition for human security” can facilitate this process.⁵⁴ However, democratic consolidation and the implementation of policies that improve the wellbeing of people remain the best strategy for ensuring stability and order, and to reduce the reliance of governments on traditional approaches to security. Since the AU has chosen to emphasise the wellbeing of African people, the development of policies that promote human security should be viewed as essential to the consolidation and building of a more secure continent.

6.2 The AU’s Evolving HIV/AIDS Policy

As the leading killer of adults in Africa, HIV/AIDS represents a considerable threat to human security: an estimated 25 million adults and children are currently living with the virus which has killed nearly 20 million Africans in the last two decades. HIV/AIDS has orphaned over 12 million children under the age of 15.⁵⁵ The AU Commission notes that “the life expectancy of African populations has been slashed down by 20 years, and the GDP of the continent is losing billions of dollars annually.”⁵⁶ Africa’s own response to the pandemic has been mixed. However, in 2001, African leaders declared AIDS to be a state of emergency on the continent and in the Abuja Declaration of the same year committed to allocating at least 15% of their annual national budgets to the improvement of the health sector. Only Botswana has so far met this target. Eight leaders, headed by Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, established AIDS Watch Africa (AWA) and subsequently instituted it within the AU Commission during its summit in 2004. As a further follow-up, President Obasanjo announced that the AU would convene a summit on HIV/AIDS, Malaria, Tuberculosis and related Infectious Diseases in 2006 to review progress made in the last five years. African governments, during the AU summit in Sirte, Libya, in July 2005, also supported the integration of HIV/AIDS into the APRM and NEPAD.

The AU’s Commissioner for Social Affairs, Ms Bience Gawanas, has been mandated to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic within the AU Commission. The Department of Social Affairs, together with civil society, national AIDS commissions and the UN, have prepared a continental strategy to enhance Africa’s response to the pandemic.⁵⁷ In this strategic document, the commission emphasises that HIV/AIDS should be addressed as a multi-dimensional security and governance challenge. Because the commission is burdened with a number of other urgent priorities such as institutional transformation, integration, and peace and governance issues, its role on the AIDS pandemic has had to be developed carefully. The AU’s current strategy focuses on advocacy, including ensuring that African governments adhere to the Abuja Declaration’s commitments to increase health spending.

54 Eboe Hutchful, “From Military Security to Human Security”, paper presented at the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) policy seminar, *Building an African Union (AU) for the 21st Century: Relations with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and Civil Society*, Cape Town, South Africa, 20-22 August 2005.

55 See Centre for Conflict Resolution, *HIV/AIDS and Human Security: An Agenda for Africa*, Seminar Report, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 9 and 10 September 2005. (Available at: <http://ccrweb.ccruct.ac.za>).

56 Principles of the Human Security Framework, p.2.

57 See the AU Commission, *HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2005-2007*; and AIDS Watch Africa (AWA) *Strategic Plan*, 28 June - 2 July 2005, Sirte, Libya, Executive Council Document EX.CL/194 (VII).

58 UNAIDS, Office of AIDS, Security and Humanitarian Response: Progress Report, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 2005.

59 Ibid.

60 A Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on HIV/AIDS was held in Maseru, Lesotho, on 4 July 2003. The Declaration issued from the summit noted the adoption of the SADC HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework and Plan of Action: 2003-2007 at Ministerial level. SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) provides further clarity on the organisation’s strategy for combating HIV/AIDS.

Africa's sub-regional organisations are in the process of developing AIDS policies. There is still a policy gap, however, on the incorporation of HIV/AIDS mitigation strategies into the establishment of sub-regional stand-by brigades. In July 2005, IGAD began exploring the possibility of integrating HIV/AIDS into the EASBRIG.⁵⁸ ECOWAS has an HIV/AIDS Action Plan and has sought to establish a peer education programme for young recruits in Liberia's armed forces. However, ECOWAS is yet to incorporate HIV/AIDS into training or doctrine for the West African brigade.⁵⁹ SADC has moved most rapidly to declare HIV/AIDS to be an emergency,⁶⁰ but the organisation has yet to integrate meaningful HIV/AIDS strategies into its strategic plan for its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. In January 2005, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) started collaborating with SADC's Inter-State Defence and Security Committee in order to harmonise southern Africa's HIV/AIDS policies.⁶¹

Participants also discussed the relevance of harmonising HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programmes both at the sub-regional and continental levels. The RECs and the AU have yet to develop a comprehensive approach for mitigating the impact of the pandemic on Africa's security architecture. The successful operationalisation of the African Standby Force by 2010 will depend heavily on the political will and deployment capability of troop-contributing countries. However, the highly sensitive nature of the HIV/AIDS issue presents a unique challenge to this process. Moreover, if conflicts are characterised by gender-based violence such as the systematic rape of women in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, then HIV transmission will increase significantly. In Darfur, where *Janjaweed* militia are systematically raping women, AU troops and observers may also be infected with HIV/AIDS.

6.3 Africa's Internally Displaced Persons

Another human security issue discussed during the Cape Town seminar was the subject of internally displaced persons. The issue of IDPs is one that significantly affects the African continent. There are 25-30 million IDPs worldwide, and Africa has more than half of them. The OAU - and now the AU - has been positive in its response to the issue of IDPs. However, there continues to be a "vacuum of responsibility" for IDPs, given the crisis of legitimacy facing several African countries. Since governments are often responsible for displacing people and then denying them protection, the issue has to be addressed at an international level. The safety and security of IDPs is a humanitarian issue that has a human rights dimension. In order to address it effectively, the sources of displacement must simultaneously be addressed. It is vital to establish national frameworks for peace, equality, justice and respect for fundamental human rights.

According to the UN Special Representative for Internally Displaced Persons' assessment of the key issues relating to IDPs, the guarantee of support and protection for this vulnerable group was problematic during the Cold War. During this post-Cold War era of "sovereignty as responsibility", government support and attention to IDPs has to be framed as a positive concept of state responsibility. While serving as the UN Special Representative for Internally Displaced Persons between 1992 and 2004, Francis Deng - who presented on this topic at the Cape Town seminar - used his mandate to raise awareness and mobilise civil society engagement on IDPs. Additionally, he established several pillars to achieve his mandate, including the development of a normative legal framework for IDPs, which led to the drafting of the "Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons" in 1998. It was also important to develop an institutional framework, and several organisations were involved in establishing a co-ordinating mechanism and an inter-agency standing committee within the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

61 UNAIDS, Office of AIDS, Security and Humanitarian Response, op.cit.

Participants discussed how the AU is developing a normative Framework of Response to the IDP issue. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and the AU Constitutive Act need to be assessed to see whether there are gaps in the protection of IDPs and how they can be filled by new continental legislation. Today, the "responsibility to protect" implies accountability by African leaders to their citizens. Guidelines for addressing the threats faced by IDPs would further strengthen this normative framework of responsibility.



FROM LEFT: **PROFESSOR FRANCIS DENG**, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES WASHINGTON, DC; **DR TANDEKA NKIWANE** (WHO CELEBRATED A BIRTHDAY), UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG; **PROFESSOR ADEBAYO ADEDEJI**, AFRICAN CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, IJEBU-ODE, NIGERIA

7. The AU, Regional Integration and External Actors

7.1 Dilemmas of Regional Integration and Development in Africa

Discussions on the question of development in Africa focused on the new dilemmas faced by the continent as it continues to promote regional integration. It was noted that NEPAD, which is the economic engine for Africa's development, reflects the continent's swing toward market-led development. The assumptions on which NEPAD is based are dramatically different from those of the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, which was inward-looking and oriented towards self-sufficiency and regional co-operation. NEPAD represents a "new regionalism" that adopts neo-liberal development strategies, largely in order to attract foreign direct investment. Thirty-three of the 41 most heavily indebted countries in the world are in Africa; roughly half of sub-Saharan Africa's 700 million people earn less than \$2 a day; and unemployment is as high as 40% in many African countries, including Liberia, Lesotho and Mozambique.

Five important obstacles to Africa's economic integration were identified. First, there is a "cacophony" of regional groupings which has led to confusion, duplication and a dissipation of energies and resources. These groupings include the official RECs recognised by the AU, such as ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, COMESA, the AMU and the EAC, as well as many others. It was noted that Tanzania has membership of SADC, COMESA and the EAC; Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland are all members of both the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and SADC; and Arab North Africa simultaneously holds membership of the Arab League and the AMU. Second, regional economic and political insecurity detracts attention from more positive and concrete measures of integration. Governments tend to devote their time and resources to internal crises, thus short-changing regionalist initiatives that would benefit their countries in the long-term. The third related point is that regionalism in Africa is driven largely by governments, and is often held hostage to the political will of African leaders. Fourth, the prevalence of nascent and weak regional institutions, and rigorous and cumbersome regulatory procedures such as import controls and tariffs, have had an adverse effect on regional integration. Finally, Africa must urgently tackle its infrastructural problems of poor and inefficient communication, and road and transport systems.⁶²

The challenges posed by globalisation should not be underestimated. Indeed, the architects of the AU and continental integration were in part motivated by a desire to strengthen Africa's ability to engage with the rest of the world on its own terms. Globalisation has led to Africa's vulnerability and exposure to global market forces and externally driven developmental paradigms. Market-based structural adjustment programmes were touted as necessary for Africa to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA). Historically, Africa was incorporated into the global economy as a weaker and unequal partner. African countries still engage the global economy individually and therefore remain more susceptible to manipulation and exploitation. A more pronounced process of continental economic and political integration is therefore vital for Africa to establish itself as an equal partner in the global economy.

⁶² See John Akokpari, "The Dilemmas of Regional Integration and Development in Africa", paper presented at the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) policy seminar, *Building an African Union (AU) for the 21st Century: Relations with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and Civil Society*, Cape Town, South Africa, 20-22 August 2005.

7.2 The AU and Africa's Three Diasporas

The AU has designated the African Diaspora as its sixth sub-region. The African Diaspora is a generic term referring to people of African descent who live outside the African continent. Historically, Diaspora communities came about as a result of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. This gave rise to new, African-descended nationalities in the western hemisphere: Afro-Cubans, Afro-Brazilians, African-Americans and Afro-West Indians. The African Diaspora also contributed towards the establishment of several nation-states, including Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The Diaspora further comprises African expatriate communities of nationals from existing AU member states who are either citizens of, or otherwise residing in, countries outside Africa. Indeed, Africa and its far-flung Diaspora has come to be known as "Global Africa", which has taken on a particular significance in the era of globalisation. "Global" Africans in the Diaspora can contribute significantly towards building human resource capacity in Africa.

The AU defines the African Diaspora as "peoples of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality, and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union".⁶³ The Diaspora will largely engage with ECOSOCC, but it is unclear how this engagement will take place, or what measures of transparency and accountability exists in terms of navigating relationships with West Indian countries, as well as South American countries such as Brazil. Participants noted that it is important not to over-romanticise and resuscitate previous narratives and debates on the Diaspora.

A genuine engagement with the Diaspora could enhance Africa's negotiating and resource mobilisation capacity with the international community. However, this engagement will be difficult to foster. First, the global Diaspora is broad and scattered, and the institutional links between various Diaspora communities and nation-states and the AU are not clearly defined, popularised or even formed. Second, factionalism between various Diaspora communities (for example, African-American political elites and African immigrant populations) has created a vacuum in Africa's engagement with the United States, particularly since Washington has had a dominant impact on African societies and governments. The absence of a united and coherent lobbying group comprising the Diaspora in the US means that African issues are not always placed high on the political agenda – in stark contrast to the Jewish lobby. The one notable success of the African-American lobby in terms of US policy towards Africa, was the imposition of American sanctions on apartheid South Africa in 1986.


Third, the capacity of the AU Commission and other institutions to pursue and build relations with the Diaspora is still in its infancy. Participants proposed exploring emerging opportunities through other AU organs to address some of these challenges. For example, the AU Commission, the South African government and the Jamaican government jointly organised a conference on pan-Africanism in Jamaica in May 2005, which brought together a number of intellectuals and civil society activists from the continent and the Diaspora. Such initiatives should be built upon, and existing institutions and organisations in the Diaspora should be integrated with the AU. A pan-African parliamentary union between the PAP and the US Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) would be one such innovation.

⁶³ AU, *Decision on the Definition of the African Diaspora*, Decisions, Declarations and Resolutions, Assembly of the African Union, Fifth Ordinary Session, Sirte, Libya, EX.CL/Dec.221 (VII).

7.3 The AU and the EU

The Cape Town seminar also examined the AU's relationship with the European Union. These relations have been partly inspired by the AU's affinity for the institutional architecture of the EU. Moreover, the EU is naturally focused on "organisation-to-organisation" interactions, and welcomes continental AU-EU opportunities to devise common policies. Focal points of the strategic partnership are peacekeeping, institution-building and policy dialogue. The EU Peace Facility for Africa, an annual grant of 250 million euros, has supported AU peacekeeping in Darfur, the Central African Multinational Force (CEMAC) and capacity-building for the commission's Peace and Security department. This partnership reflects the AU's need for new collaborative models beyond traditional aid and development, and also adds substance to the strategic ambitions of member states of the European Common Security and Defence Policy which was established in Maastricht, Netherlands, in 1993.

Participants also debated issues of rationalisation both within Africa's regional groupings and in relation to Africa's negotiating power with the EU. In 2000, the Cotonou Convention was signed by the EU and African countries for a period of 20 years. But, although the convention is the over-arching framework for Europe's engagement with Africa, the EU has other agreements which have affected Africa's power to negotiate as one bloc. There is the EU-South Africa Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement of 1999, and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreements with North Africa of December 2003. The negotiation of the regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and various African sub-regional groupings are currently facing obstacles due to the possible adverse implications that may result from liberalising trade relations with the EU. Finally, Brussels is monitoring ongoing developments such as the APRM, which many European politicians and parliamentarians view as the litmus test for the AU's credibility and sustainability.



FROM LEFT: DR MUSIFIKY MWANASALI, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK; PROFESSOR ADEBAYO ADEDEJI, AFRICAN CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, IJEBU-ODE; MR GERARD CORR, AMBASSADOR OF IRELAND, TSHWANE (PRETORIA); PROFESSOR MWESIGA BAREGU, UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA; PROFESSOR FRANCIS DENG, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

8. Africa's Stake in UN Reform

The Cape Town meeting took place on the eve of the summit of world leaders in New York in September 2005.⁶⁴ Several participants noted that the AU's common position - the Ezulwini Consensus - demanded greater representation on the UN Security Council and "the allocation of two permanent seats to Africa with all the privileges, including the right of veto, and five non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council".⁶⁵ Ezulwini, based on a meeting of 15 African foreign ministers in Swaziland in February 2005, also defined a common African position on sustainable development, collective security, conflict prevention and the use of force.⁶⁶ The AU further called for the strengthening of the UN General Assembly as the UN system's most democratic organ and advocated increased representation for Africa in the UN secretariat.



DR ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, CENTRE FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, CAPE TOWN

⁶⁴ CCR, *A More Secure Continent: African Perspectives on the UN High-Level Panel Report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, and In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, report of the UN Secretary-General, follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, 21 March 2005, A/59/2005.

⁶⁵ AU, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus, Seventh Extraordinary Session, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 7 and 8 March 2005, Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII).

⁶⁶ AU, Decisions, Declarations and Resolutions, Assembly of the African Union, Fifth Ordinary Session, Sirte, Libya, 4 and 5 July 2005, AU/Dec.73-90 (V).

Participants agreed that UN reform would be vital to establish a proper division of labour among the UN, the AU, the RECs and civil society in order to build an effective continental security architecture for a new century. However, the reform of the UN has been underway for the last four decades. Every UN Secretary-General has found it necessary to undertake some level of reform, often as a result of pressure from member states. African leaders were urged to focus on poverty and the link between development and security. The UN's peacekeeping and peacebuilding costs in Africa can be reduced if efforts to alleviate poverty are accelerated. Obtaining African seats on a reformed UN Security Council will therefore not necessarily impact on the lives of ordinary Africans.

Africa should first address its many problems, rather than relying too heavily on the UN. Participants also cautioned that Africa should ensure that the current issues around global terrorism are not used to undermine its peace and development agenda. It is important to acknowledge that the UN has developed an institutional interest in its own survival, so reform may not necessarily be in the interest of those who currently benefit from the status quo. The Cold War era created a bipolar global power structure and led to more power being concentrated in the UN Security Council as a result of the superpowers' use of the veto. Some participants, therefore, argued that the UN General Assembly has become increasingly subordinate to the Security Council. However, since 70% of issues on the Council's agenda relate to Africa, it is important that the continent's interests be effectively defended in the UN's most powerful chamber.



FROM LEFT: **PROFESSOR ADEBAYO ADEDEJI**, AFRICAN CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, IJEBU-ODE, NIGERIA; **PROFESSOR MWESIGA BAREGU**, UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA; **DR CHRIS LANDSBERG**, CENTRE FOR POLICY STUDIES, JOHANNESBURG; **MS BALEKA MBETE**, MP, SPEAKER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT, CAPE TOWN

9. Conclusion — The Way Forward

The birth of the African Union marks a milestone in the evolution of continental politics. Participants at the Cape Town policy seminar debated several themes relating to building an African Union for the 21st century. The presentations and discussions raised seven key policy issues which need to be brought to the attention of key decision-makers within the AU, NEPAD and the RECs, as well as key external actors. Many of these issues will also require further research. They include:

- First, there are major constraints to achieving some of the objectives and commitments made by African leaders for the continent's peace, security, governance and development. African leaders need to start living up to their own expectations and respecting the norms and principles that they themselves have established.
- Second, the AU Constitutive Act of 2000 has outlined principles and objectives and created institutions which, if respected, could build and sustain collective security, democratic governance and economically viable societies.
- Third, a closer partnership between NEPAD, the RECs and civil society is essential for enabling the AU to consolidate past gains. In addition, the APRM should be viewed as a positive step towards achieving justice, equity, transparency and accountability. The peer review mechanism should be used to encourage the revitalisation of Africa's indigenous institutions. It should also be used to hold leaders accountable to their citizens and as a tool for achieving socio-economic goals.
- Fourth, it is necessary to rationalise existing African institutions, particularly at the level of the RECs. Where there is an overlap, structures must be consolidated. Furthermore, common objectives and goals will benefit from an acceleration of efforts at collaboration and harmonisation.
- Fifth, the peace and security structures that the AU has created, such as the Peace and Security Council and the African Standby Force, are vital for promoting stability on the continent. However, in the absence of the political will and financial and logistical support to operationalise these institutions, they will remain empty shells; they will be impressive in theory but disappointing in practice.
- Sixth, the AU needs to implement its clearly stated desire to work more closely with civil society organisations and the African Diaspora. ECOSOCC, the Pan-African Parliament, and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights are institutions which are well placed to promote this goal. African leaders must respect these institutions if they are to succeed in promoting engagement and dialogue between governments and civil society.
- Finally, the AU must continue to engage effectively and constructively with the international community, particularly by building on efforts to reform the UN and to promote development, peace and governance in Africa in a holistic manner.

This report hopes to make an important contribution to policy debates around these issues relating to Africa's evolving security and governance challenges in a new millennium. Much remains to be done to refine and bring clarity to evolving policies that will build and sustain the response of Africa's key institutions and actors to the urgent needs of its 800 million people.

ANNEX I

AGENDA

Day One: Saturday 20 August 2005

9h00 – 9h15

Welcome and Introductions

Speaker: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

9h15 – 10h45

Session I

Chair: Commissioner Leon Levy, Chairperson of the Board of Governors, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

Keynote Address: Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Member of the Eminent Panel of the APRM: "The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): Progress and Prospects"

Coffee Break:
10h45 – 11h00

11h00 – 12h45

Session II

From the OAU to the AU: Human Security and the New Pan-Africanism

Chair: Mr Job Sithole, Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee, South African Parliament, Cape Town

Speakers: Ms Winnie Byanyima, African Union (AU) Commission, Addis Ababa: "Africa and Gender Equality: Priorities for the AU"
Professor KM Mathews, University of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: "Renaissance of Pan-Africanism: The AU and the New Pan-Africanists"
Dr Musifiky Mwanasali, United Nations, New York: "The AU and the Responsibility to Protect"

Lunch Break: 12h45 – 13h45

13h45 – 15h30

Session III

Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Chair: Mr Paul Boateng, High Commissioner of the United Kingdom to South Africa

Speakers: Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town: "The Curse of Berlin: The Peacekeeping Travails of the AU and the RECs"

Dr Tim Murithi, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town: "The Role of the AU and NEPAD in Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa"

Coffee Break: 15h30 – 15h45

15h45 – 17h30

Session IV

The Pan-African Parliament, NEPAD and Africa's Courts

Chair: Ms Winnie Byanyima, African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Speakers: Madam Baleka Mbete, Speaker of the South African Parliament: "The AU's Pan-African Parliament: Progress and Prospects"

Mr Cunningham Ngcukana, Deputy Director-General of the NEPAD Secretariat, South Africa: "NEPAD: Progress and Prospects"

Professor Shadrack Cutto, African Renaissance Institute, Tshwane: "The Battle over the African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights"

Day Two: Sunday 21 August 2005

9h00 – 10h30

Session V

NEPAD: Myth or Reality?

Chair: Professor Mwesiga Baregu, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Speakers: Dr Chris Landsberg, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg: "The Birth and Evolution of NEPAD"

Dr Sheila Bunwaree, University of Mauritius: "NEPAD and its Discontents"

Coffee Break: 10h30 – 10h45

10h45 – 12h30

Session VI

Human Security Challenges and ECOSOCC

Chair: Ms Nomcebo Manzini, United Nations Development Fund for Women, Johannesburg

Speakers: Professor Eboe Hutchful, African Security Dialogue and Research, Accra, Ghana: "From Military Security to Human Security"
Ms Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town: "The AU's Evolving HIV/AIDS Policy"
Ms Victoria Maloka, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town: "The AU's ECOSOCC: Progress and Prospects"

Lunch Break: 12h30 – 13h30

13h30 – 14h45

Session VII

Chair: Ambassador Lulu Mnguni, South African Foreign Ministry, Tshwane

Special Address: Professor Francis Deng, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC: "A Special Envoy's Reflections on Africa's Internally Displaced Persons"

Coffee Break: 14h45 – 15h00

15h00 – 16h45

Session VIII

The AU, Regional Integration and External Actors

Chair: Professor Ben Turok, Member of the South African Parliament, Cape Town

Speakers: Dr John Akokpari, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town: "The Dilemmas of Regional Integration and Development in Africa"
Mr Francis Kornegay, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg: "The AU and Africa's Three Diasporas"
Professor Daniel Bach, University of Bordeaux, France: "The AU and the EU"

Day Three: Monday 22 August 2005

9h00 – 10h30

Session IX

Roundtable Discussion: Collaboration between the AU and the RECs

Chair: Mr Tsepe Motumi, South African Defence Ministry, Tshwane

Speakers: Mr Jean Mfasoni, AU Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Ms Florence Iheme, Economic Community of West African States, Abuja, Nigeria
Mr Raymond Kitevu, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
General Paulino Macaringue, Centre for Defence and Security Management, Johannesburg

Coffee Break: 10h30 – 10h45

Session X: 10h45 – 12h30

Roundtable Discussion: Africa's Stake in the Reform of the UN

Chair: Ambassador Gerard Corr, Embassy of Ireland, Tshwane

Speakers: Dr Musifiky Mwanasali, United Nations, New York
Professor Francis Deng, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC
Professor Adebayo Adedeji, African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies, Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria
Professor Mwesiga Baregu, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

12h30 – 13h30

Session XI

Rapporteurs' Report and the Way Forward

Chair: Dr Musifiky Mwanasali, United Nations, New York

Rapporteurs: Dr Tim Murithi, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, and
Ms Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town

ANNEX II

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

1. Dr Adekeye Adebajo
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
South Africa
2. Professor Adebayo Adedeji
African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies
Ijebu-Ode
Nigeria
3. Dr John Akokpari
Department of Political Studies
University of Cape Town
South Africa
4. Minister Counsellor Pertti Anttinen
Ambassador of Finland
Tshwane
South Africa
5. Ms Sara Basha
University of Cape Town
South Africa
6. Professor Daniel Bach
Institut d' Etudes Politiques
University of Bordeaux
France
7. Professor Mwesiga Baregu
University of Dar es Salaam
Dar es Salaam
Tanzania
8. Mr Paul Boateng
High Commissioner of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Tshwane
South Africa
9. Dr Sheila Bunwaree
Faculty of Social Studies and Humanities
University of Mauritius
Reduit
Mauritius
10. Ms Winnie Byanyima
Directorate of Women, Gender and Development
African Union
Addis Ababa
Ethiopia
11. Mr Gerard Corr
Ambassador of Ireland
Tshwane
South Africa
12. Mr Cavan Davids
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
South Africa

13. Professor Francis Deng
School of Advanced International Studies
Washington, DC
US
14. Ms Bridget Dillon
United Kingdom Department for International
Development
Addis Ababa
Ethiopia
15. Mr Nazeem Dramat
Mail and Guardian
Johannesburg
South Africa
16. Dr André du Pisani
Department of Political Studies
University of Namibia
Windhoek
Namibia
17. Mr Omano Edigheji
Centre for Policy Studies
Johannesburg
South Africa
18. Ms Thelma Ekiyor
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
South Africa
19. Mr Yazeed Fakier
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
South Africa
20. Professor Shadrack Gutto
Centre for African Renaissance Studies
Tshwane
South Africa
21. Mr Pereric Högberg
Ambassador of Sweden
Tshwane
South Africa
22. Professor Eboe Hutchful
African Security Dialogue and Research
Accra
Ghana
23. Ms Florence Iheme
Economic Community of West African States
Abuja
Nigeria
24. Dr Iqbal Jhazbhay
University of South Africa
Tshwane
South Africa
25. Mr Siviwe Kakaza
South African Foreign Ministry
Tshwane
South Africa
26. Mr Raymond Kitevu
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
Addis Ababa
Ethiopia.

27. Mr Francis Kornegay
Centre for Policy Studies
Johannesburg
South Africa
28. Dr Abdul Lamin
Department of International Relations
University of the Witwatersrand
Johannesburg
South Africa
29. Dr Chris Landsberg
Centre for Policy Studies
Johannesburg
South Africa
30. Dr Garth le Pere
Institute for Global Dialogue
Midrand
South Africa
31. Commissioner Leon Levy
Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town
South Africa
32. Ms Lorna Levy
Current Affairs Researcher
Cape Town
South Africa
33. General Paulino Macaringue
Graduate School of Public and Development
Management
University of the Witwatersrand
Johannesburg
South Africa
34. Ms Victoria Maloka
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
South Africa
35. Professor Amina Mama
Africa Gender Institute
University of Cape Town
South Africa
36. Ms Nomcebo Manzini
United Nations Development Fund for Women
Johannesburg
South Africa
37. Mr Pal Martins
Safer Africa
Tshwane
South Africa
38. Ms Noria Mashumba
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
South Africa
39. Professor KM Mathews
University of Addis Ababa
Ethiopia
40. Ms Sue Mbaya
Southern African Regional Poverty Network
Tshwane
South Africa

41. Ms Baleka Mbete, MP
Speaker of the South African Parliament
Cape Town
South Africa

42. Mr Jean Mfasoni
African Union Commission Ambassador
Addis Ababa
Ethiopia

43. Ms Lulu Mnguni
South African Foreign Ministry
Tshwane
South Africa

44. Mr David Monyae
Department of International Relations
University of the Witwatersrand
Johannesburg
South Africa

45. Mr Tsepe Motumi
Department Of Defence
Tshwane
South Africa

46. Dr Tim Murithi
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
South Africa

47. Dr Musifiky Mwanasali
Department of Political Affairs
United Nations
New York
US

48. Mr Neeran Naidoo
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
South Africa

49. Ms Angela Ndinga-Muvumba
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
South Africa

50. Mr Cunningham Ngcukana
NEPAD Secretariat
Midrand
South Africa

51. Dr Naison Ngoma
Institute for Security Studies
Tshwane
South Africa

52. Dr Tandeka Nkiwane
University of the Witwatersrand
Johannesburg
South Africa

53. Ms Susan Nkomo
Office of the Status of Women
The Presidency
Tshwane
South Africa

54. Dr Helen Scanlon
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
South Africa

55. Mr Job Sithole, MP
South African Parliament
Cape Town
South Africa

56. Professor Ben Turok, MP
South African Parliament
Cape Town
South Africa

57. Ms Christi van der Westhuizen
Institute for Global Dialogue
Johannesburg
South Africa


Conference Team

58. Ms Dawn Alley
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
South Africa


59. Ms Selma Walters
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town
South Africa

60. Mr Fanie Jason
Independent Photographer
Cape Town
South Africa


OTHER PUBLICATIONS IN THIS SERIES




The inter-related and vexing issues of political instability in Africa and international security were specifically focused on at this policy seminar, held from 21 – 23 May 2004 in Claremont, Cape Town.




The role that South Africa has played on the African continent and the challenges that persist in South Africa's domestic transformation 10 years into democracy were assessed at this meeting in Stellenbosch, Cape Town, from 29 July - 1 August 2004.




African perspectives on the United Nations' (UN) High-Level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change were considered at this policy advisory group meeting in Somerset West, Cape Town, on 23 and 24 April 2005.



The state of governance and security in Africa under the AU and NEPAD were analysed and assessed at this policy advisory group meeting in Misty Hills, Johannesburg, on 11 and 12 December 2004.



The role and capacity of South Africa as Chair of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) were focused on at this meeting in Oudekraal, Cape Town, on 18 and 19 June 2005.



The links between human security and the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, and the potential role of African leadership in addressing this crisis were analysed at this policy advisory group meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 9 and 10 September 2005.

NOTES

NOTES



CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN ■ C/O RHODES GIFT POST OFFICE ■ 7707 ■ CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

TEL: (27) 21 422 2512 ■ FAX: (27) 21 422 2622 ■ e-mail: mailbox@ccr.uct.ac.za

<http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/>



UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN