

# AN EVALUATION OF THE POST-SAVIMBI PEACE PROCESS IN ANGOLA SINCE FEBRUARY 2002: THE VICTOR'S PEACE TREATY

Martin Rupiya & Jemima Njeri

## Introduction

The abrupt end of the war in Angola, following the death of the *Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola* (UNITA) leader Jonas Savimbi near the small town of Luena in Moxico Province on 22 February 2002, ushered in a peace process that has evolved with break-neck speed over the past two years. Significantly, although the process appears to be strictly managed by the Government of the Republic of Angola (GRA), it has, however, sought to observe the guidelines as provided for by the November 1994 Lusaka Accords, now reinforced by the Luena Military Agreement, in the rapprochement with a severely weakened UNITA hierarchy. UNITA General and Chief of Staff Abreu Kamorteiro and his equivalent from the *Forces Armadas de Angola* (FAA), General Armando da Cruz e Neto, signed the agreement.<sup>1</sup>

Where there is an impression that a peace process is being managed by one victorious side, the challenge is how to avoid taking advantage of the situation and securing pre-conflict objectives at the expense of the 'defeated opponent.' Meanwhile, the conclusion of conflicts through peace treaties has been noted to have a tendency that leads to the re-imposition of the status quo, and by default perpetuating the causes of conflict. The challenge, therefore, is to adopt fair, pragmatic and just policies that are designed to benefit both sides as well as the country's future in the long term. Owing to the ever-changing landscape of the unfolding drama, almost inevitably, most existing research has focused on the contemporary events at the expense of a proper evaluation and reassessment of the implications. Yet for genuine and lasting peace-building, aspects of how the peace process is panning out need to be carefully weighed with a view to determining their usefulness or otherwise, both now and in the future.

The contradictions emerging from a peace process that is managed by the victors, studied over 200 years, have shown a preponderance towards adopting policies that have themselves become the root cause(s) of subsequent conflict.<sup>2</sup> For example, Schwank and Rohloff single out the 1919 Treaty of Versailles as having laid the foundations for the Second World War. This treaty, according to the two researchers, was "constructed by victors with little relevance to the

vanquished". In the process this significantly strengthened the Nationalist Socialist (NAZI) movement in Germany that had sprung up during the early 1920s and catapulted it to national prominence by 1929. Consequently, part of the root causes of the Second World War lie in the manner in which the Versailles Treaty was constructed during the volatile period of 1919 to 1923. Another significant case cited includes Booker T Washington's call for caution and an avoidance of retribution by the victorious North towards the Confederacy from the South at the end of the American Civil War in 1865. Finally, the conclusion of the Nigerian Civil War in 1966 also witnessed victorious General Ayub Gowon calling for a peace treaty in which "there would be no victors, no vanquished, no malice and charity to all". In support of this thesis, a survey undertaken between 1945 and 1995 of 104 peace agreements found that 79 of the agreements subsequently ended up in conflict, with as many as 65 cases resulting in all-out war.<sup>3</sup> The lessons to take away from this are, among others, that:

- a mismanaged peace processes by victors can easily lead to the resumption of conflict;
- a balance has to be struck between refraining from humiliating the 'defeated party' and allowing a modicum of central authority to remain, which is engaged in working out the modalities of a lasting peace settlement;
- appreciating that the benefits of military capacity dismantling with the aid and assistance of the 'defeated' is a cheaper option to continuing the task by the victors; and
- in order to make a meaningful impact, the foundations of permanent peace and reconciliation must be laid early in the ceasefire process.

Moving away from the universal and historical examples, key actors in the Angolan conflict demonstrated an awareness of the cautions outlined above. For instance, the UNITA representative in Washington argued that "for over four decades, war has continued to stalk Angola", despite the celebration of three peace agreements – the Alvor Accord, the Bicesse Accord and the Lusaka Protocols. He continued:

"Angolans were not able to transcend the psychology of suspicion and the mentality of exclusion so embedded in the country's political culture. Peace processes, including elections, became the 'continuation of war by other means'."<sup>4</sup>

The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan was also acutely aware of the ramifications of a peace process under the control of the 'victor', as it related to Angola. Annan called for "a dignified end to the Angolan hostilities in which there would be no winners or losers"<sup>5</sup>. His special representative to

Angola, Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari, followed this up by calling for reconciliation that was not designed to “punish UNITA but to persuade [it] to abandon violence and enter the political process”.

As a result of the characteristic flaw in peace processes managed by victors, a typology has emerged designed to guide and inform those who find themselves facing such a challenge. It argues that:

- there must be no willful deception while concluding a treaty;
- one must minimise attempts to secure at the negotiating table what parties have failed to achieve on the battlefield through military means;
- there must be no deliberate interference in the organisational structures of the adversary(ies);
- territorial annexure or advantages must not be gained through the auspices of the peace treaty;
- a lasting peace treaty must include all parties to the conflict;
- during the negotiations, each party must be allowed to tell its story and is expected to enter into the agreement freely and with mutual understanding;<sup>6</sup>
- the peace treaty must try to address all relevant conflict issues;
- there must be no secret appendices to the agreement; and
- the peace treaty must be relevant to the ‘prevailing historical circumstances’ of the conflict.<sup>7</sup>

In the light of the above, the purpose of this paper is to evaluate policy pronouncements and measures related to the Angolan peace process and to weigh these against actual implementation, with a view to commenting on whether or not these will result in long-lasting peace for Angola.

### **The war in Angola**

The end of the war found the GRA confronted with at least four formidable challenges which had guided both sides during the intense period of fighting from late 1997 until 2002. In each of the areas controlled by UNITA and the MPLA:

- political life and dialogue had been suspended;
- humanitarian concerns had been subordinated to the war aims;
- a decision had been taken to focus economic resources exclusively on the war effort, with UNITA relying on diamonds and the GRA on oil; and
- the aim was the complete military defeat of the opponent.

Before evaluating the policies enunciated by the GRA following the killing of Savimbi, it is useful to revisit the impact of ferocious war during the protracted

period from late 1997, as this provides one with a better understanding of the terrain upon which subsequent policies after peace had ‘broken out’ were predicted. The same understanding should also guide one’s expectations regarding the impact of the latter policies, given the extensive destruction, demographic depopulation and economic haemorrhaging that ensued.

### **Background to February/April 2002**

By 1997 UNITA had dislodged the GRA from an estimated 75% of the rural areas. It did this by relying on a military strategy that was generously funded by the illegal diamond trade, the proceeds of which were cleverly invested in international markets. UNITA also received donations from the West that included material and military support from both Western countries and apartheid South Africa. The GRA was effectively confined to the isolated and vulnerable urban centres.

However, while UNITA enjoyed unparalleled military success on the battlefield, its political cohesion was fragmenting. This process had begun after the disputed elections in 1992 and the resumption of war after a sizeable number of UNITA members of parliament had taken up posts in Luanda. When war resumed, some of the parliamentarians remained behind and constituted the New UNITA or *Renovada* UNITA. This faction came under Eugenio ‘Ngolo’ Manuvakola. At about the same time, when sanctions and restrictions on international travel were imposed on the movement, colleagues abroad came under an external faction led by Paris/Washington-based Isias Henrique Samakuva. Savimbi continued to head the rest of the organisation that returned to the bush mainly in the south in Ovambo to continue waging war. In the intervening period, it was evident that each of the factions commanded some measure of support as they continued to function politically, while appearing to fight over the heart and soul of UNITA, which was dominated by the personality and physical presence in military fatigues of Jonas Savimbi.

UNITA’s military capacity was formidable, totalling about 80,000 armed combatants at its height. With the support of the United States (US), apartheid South Africa and some African countries including Togo and Mobutu’s Zaire, UNITA had put together a four-layered military structure that spearheaded the late 1997 military thrust.

At the bottom of the structure were village militia units each averaging anything between 30 to 60 men, whose primary task was to hold ground and harass any FAA units spending overnight periods in the area. These units were also responsible for keeping local populations in check, particularly since the villagers doubled as logistical supporters given the foodstuffs they produced in the fields. In defending these areas, the locally based militia units employed perimeter defence tactics, laying thousands of anti-personal landmines. The next layer was made up of guerrilla units, exposed to rudimentary military

training of about three months, again each unit numbering anything between 20 to 60 combatants. Their primary role was to show an ever present but dispersed military threat to designated areas. A secondary role was to seek out and engage FAA units, temporarily established in the different areas of strategic significance. In each of these areas, the guerrilla units would destroy communicating roads and bridges and would plant mines to stem mobile vehicular movement as well as to enhance their chances of making maximum impact on a disabled enemy advance. The third layer comprised an estimated three brigades/formations made up of conventional forces, each under the command of a senior colonel or brigadier. The formations were well trained, for periods averaging six months or more, and were well equipped with even NATO-type rifles and missile systems, not to mention artillery and anti-air support. Each was responsible for an operational area covering several provinces. Furthermore, each formation was equipped to fight against organised conventional FAA units deployed, and to hold ground and repulse any FAA incursion(s). Finally, UNITA had special elite forces operating as minor combined arms units. These were created to seek out, engage and disrupt the orderly deployment of elite vanguard forces of the FAA and were also structured to regain lost territories.

Relying on the combined efforts of the four-layered military capacity from 1997,<sup>8</sup> UNITA registered spectacular gains on the battlefield. The FAA was for a while effectively shut out from operating in rural and outlying urban areas.

The impact of the war on ordinary people was to result in an increase of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from barely a million before 1998 to 4.5 million by 2000. A second category of human suffering was witnessed in the increased number (just less than a million) of refugees in neighbouring states, with Zambia taking the largest number followed by Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Namibia. South Africa and other countries in the region also gave succour to thousands of refugees. Given the extent of human suffering, both sides in the Angolan war were accused of "having little regard or sensitivity to the hardships visiting the ordinary peoples in the areas that fighting was taking place".<sup>9</sup> Finally, the war also made an impact on the political economy of the country, which exhibited an almost exclusive focus on fuelling the war by both sides.

Placed under the threatening sword by UNITA, the GRA responded with a military strategy launched in 1998. This was bankrolled by the GRA, which mortgaged the country's oil potential for the next two decades in order to re-equip its forces.<sup>10</sup> The government offensive was complemented by its harnessing of the international community through the UN Security Council. This measure succeeded in imposing travel, trade, fuel and military sanctions against UNITA. A diplomatic effort at the Southern African Development Community (SADC) regional level secured similar public policy commitments. UNITA was branded by SADC as a pariah organisation serving the interests of

imperialists. This position, adopted at SADC Summit level, closed off the ‘neighbouring state for rear bases’ dimension so crucial for successful guerrilla operations and confined the Angolan conflict to a truly civil war. The decision also reigned in all the countries, at least publicly, to adhere to the imposition of sanctions on UNITA, effectively limiting its ability to function regionally. The final nail in UNITA’s coffin at this level came from the US – a previous covert and overt backer – which, because of the increasing importance of Angolan oil, decided at this time to change horse and back the GRA. At the time, an estimated 900,000 barrels of oil a day (and increasing) were being produced and almost exclusively exported to the US where it accounted for between 11 to 12% of that country’s oil needs. It may be recalled that apartheid had come to an end in South Africa in 1994, closing yet another earlier and traditional avenue. This fact had a significant influence in changing relations between Washington and Luanda.

The ensuing war was to witness initial ferocious fighting over the cities before fanning out to the rural areas. In this the FAA also employed mines to safeguard and defend areas wrested from local UNITA units. The landmine curse eventually manifested significantly, with seven of the 18 provinces emerging as the most heavily mined; namely, the Benguela, Bie, Huambo, Huila, Kuando Kubango, Malanje and Moxcio provinces.

The effects of the FAA military offensive began to tell in late 1999 when UNITA’s ability to hold ground was dislodged, leaving many of its combatants and their families exposed and on the move from harassing fire and regular patrols. In the subsequent periods, this dislocation affected the logistical chain as foodstuffs coming from the fields were disrupted, leaving locals hiding in the hills and their numbers swelling the IDP figures, which under these circumstances could not be accurately assessed.

Clearly reeling from the military reverses and its debilitating effects, Savimbi issued a call for dialogue and negotiations during late 1999. This was, however, rejected by the GRA as yet another ploy in which UNITA wished to secure the time and space to remuster and reorganise itself. The ferocity of the war did not abate, now characterised by an increasing presence of the FAA in both the destroyed towns and rural areas of Angola. Military pressure on UNITA was set to increase in 1999–2000 following an agreement reached in the south by the GRA with the Government of Namibia.

Initially, the FAA was allowed to enter Namibia in hot pursuit of fleeing UNITA combatants. Later, because of problems between the FAA and local Namibians, this role was taken over by the Namibian Defence Forces (NDF), which deployed well into the southern parts of Angola in a reversal of the apartheid era when UNITA was responsible for routing many of the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) military incursions from Ovambo into the then South West Africa.

This pincer movement by well-armed government forces against UNITA

further reduced its operational space and accelerated its demise. The result was an increase of peoples' suffering both within the country and outside, congregated in the refugee camps.

Owing to the increased suffering of people and the continued determination of the fighting groups to bleed each other dry, civil society and church groups began holding vigils in the occupied areas calling for both sides to consider the deteriorating plight of ordinary people. At the height of the war in 1999, an inter-denominational church organisation (COEIPA) emerged, arguing for both sides to respond to the increasing plight of ordinary citizens who were suffering from the effects of the war and to enter into dialogue and negotiations while abandoning the military strategy.<sup>11</sup> This was the point at which, on 22 February 2002, Jonas Savimbi was shot dead in the small town of Luena in Moxico Province. Three days later, his deputy Antonio Dembo also died, but of natural causes (cited as high blood pressure), leaving the organisation without a political leader in the bush.

It is our view that this event, significantly, took the wind from the sails of the initiative that had been started by the COEIPA. The role of civil society in the subsequent unfolding peace process became relegated to that of invited guests as the GRA took effective control of the process.

### **The aftermath**

While the GRA moved with speed in implementing key foundations of the peace treaty, in retrospect, this was clearly one of several pre-selected scenarios as it appeared not have been taken aback by the singular success of permanently removing Savimbi. Within days of the killing of Savimbi, the FAA declared a unilateral ceasefire. It then invited UNITA to the negotiating table. This not only acknowledged the importance of the surviving military capacity within UNITA; it also sought to engage a modicum of central and organised authority that would still be able to exercise some control. In retrospect, this was a commendable move as it resulted in confidence building between the two suspicious sides and reduced the possibility of a drawn-out guerrilla war with remnants of the movement. Furthermore, the route followed by the GRA recognised the deep ethnic and regional divisions as represented by UNITA. It is evident that in the future, political stability in the country will come from an acceptance of the ethnic and regional diversity between the north and south. This chasm is unbridgeable except through political integration that acknowledges diversity.

The political olive branch extended to UNITA appeared to strike the right chord amongst the exhausted, disoriented and scattered leaderless UNITA combatants. Within six weeks, with the third leader in line, General Paulo 'Gato' Lukamba, the organisation agreed to the Luena Agreement. Soon afterwards a large delegation made up exclusively of UNITA military generals was flown to

Luanda for the formal signing ceremony and commencement of the demobilisation process. It must be admitted that even when the emphasis appeared to be military disarmament, political recognition of UNITA was already apparent at the signing ceremony when President Dos Santos stood side by side with General Lukamba, while the appointed senior officers carried out their allotted tasks. With military characters in charge, however, the fear of repeating the error of combining a military and political leader as Savimbi – not unlike Napoleon – would again haunt the country. UNITA's military capacity had been employed to destabilise the country, and keeping its resurgence to a minimum appeared to be the preferred option. Against this background it was evident that Angola's political leaders in government wanted a 'purely political' leader with little influence in matters military.

The fragmented political factions representing UNITA also appeared to need time in which to absorb the fact that Savimbi was no more and to consider the way forward as a movement. The advantages for the various factions to now unite appeared greater than the previous attempts at emphasising differences, although still claiming to operate under the UNITA umbrella. Only after fully absorbing this fact would they become useful partners to the GRA in taking the process forward. Put differently, Savimbi's ghost needed to be put to rest, even within UNITA itself.

The ceremony was before a crowd of over 4,000, which included local and international organisations, UN representatives, the church and other interested persons. In the aftermath of the agreement, the GRA announced some key elements that would guide the way forward, against official comments that it did not wish to take advantage of the political disarray facing UNITA. These elements were to:

- prioritise a consolidation of the peace process;
- promote national reconciliation and the social reintegration of demobilised soldiers and their families;
- address the plight of IDPs and refugees in neighbouring states;
- rehabilitate infrastructure, health, education and economic sectors;
- consolidate and stabilise the macroeconomic environment; and
- re-establish constitutional normalcy.

### **Political rehabilitation: UNITA and the DDR of former UNITA combatants**

In its interactions with UNITA since the death of Savimbi, two distinct processes appear to dominate. On the one hand, there is an initiative that seeks to create space for the political transformation and revival of UNITA, while on the other hand there is a determination to emasculate its military capacity as an organised entity in the future. Viewed in the long term, this strategy might



actually backfire if UNITA is left with 'no representative military capacity' within the national army and security sector, leaving these dominated by the MPLA. What would be useful then is for the GRA to attempt to strike some semblance of a balance that reflects the 'national integration of forces' without allowing for an element which has the capacity to operate independently in a manner threatening to national interests.

In practice, the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, resettlement and rehabilitation (DDRRR) of former UNITA combatants took precedence over political matters, although it must be admitted that in some cases this process ran very close to or parallel with the political rehabilitation of UNITA. Soon after the ceasefire and the signing of the Luena Agreement, parliament passed amnesty for all combatants who had been engaged in the conflict ending at the end of June. Thereafter, DDRRR was expected to commence, to be completed by the beginning of August under the stewardship of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) that was established. The JMC was later transformed into a National Commission for Social and Productive Reintegration of Demobilised Military Personnel and IDPs (CNRSPDD).

Within weeks of the April ceasefire, 76,654<sup>12</sup> former UNITA combatants accompanied by over 340,000 dependants – or approximately six dependants per person – assembled in 42 family reception areas (FRAs), seven of which were essentially temporary shelters located in the southern part of the country, for the disarmament phase to commence.<sup>13</sup> This included pointing out known local arms caches.

The results at the end of the disarmament exercise in October 2002 were disappointing, with only 26,000 light weapons and few ammunition being surrendered to the FAA. This was equivalent to one weapon for every three UNITA soldiers who had been known to be operational. Furthermore, most of these weapons were fairly old and largely non-working.

During this early stage a further point of unease emerged related to the conditions in the FRAs. Many camps were little more than rudimentary and without infrastructural support, and this, according to the Roman Catholic Church-affiliated *Radio Ecclesia*, had resulted in some deaths.<sup>14</sup> Despite the harsh conditions, many combatants and their families quickly established food plots around the localities from which to feed themselves. However, the FAA then moved on the 'demobilised soldiers and families', quickly driving out the inhabitants from the camps using lorries and relocating them to areas claimed to be even worse. On this score, Isias Samakuva, who has since been elected as the UNITA political leader after Savimbi, pointed out that:

"The closure of the FRAs, around April/May, has been premature ... many people were forcibly removed from the quartering areas. Despite government denials, this is fact ... many were simply put on trucks and dropped off in unknown locations ...

we do not need camps to reorganise. Every UNITA combatant sows a seed for the UNITA cause.”<sup>15</sup>

As for demobilisation and reintegration, only 5,500 former UNITA combatants were selected and integrated within the Angolan National Police. At least 18 senior generals have been publicly retired and provided with certificates to enable them to draw pensions and other benefits for the rest of their lives. This represents a minuscule 7.5% of the estimated over 80,000 UNITA combatants. Given the thrust of April to August 2002, we can safely say that UNITA as an organised military machine has been dispersed. However, lingering doubts remain as to whether those demobilised into a non-functioning economy with little or no infrastructure in terms of roads, bridges and urban towns that were themselves battlefields, will reintegrate easily. As argued earlier, ‘the more national’ the new army under the multiparty political environment appears, the better for internal stability in the future.

The final phase of rehabilitation appears to have taken place *vis-à-vis* the broader initiatives taken within society, including rehabilitation of the economy and a return to normalcy. Furthermore, the DDRRR of UNITA former combatants occurred against a background of continuing conflict in the north – in Cabinda. While peace has come to the rest of the country it allows the FAA to concentrate its efforts in the geographically tiny Cabinda.<sup>16</sup>

A further challenge on this aspect that has not been addressed so far is the need for the GRA to DDRRR the FAA ‘victorious army’ at some point if the peace process is to hold. As already mentioned, re-equipping the FAA had taken precedence over other national demands from 1997, and a return to normalcy requires the fundamental reallocation of resources to other social and productive sectors. In terms of the demobilisation process, the GRA did provide significant resources, later supported by the World Bank. However, all these efforts operating in a non-viable economic environment have not made a sufficient impact to deflect charges of neglect. Removed from the war-fighting structures, former UNITA combatants have not been able to generate incomes to support reasonable lifestyles. This has created the possibility of increased banditry and local insecurity stemming from individuals with martial skills but without recourse to sustainable livelihoods. Finally, the speed of rapprochement with UNITA caught the Angolan society by surprise. Propaganda from each side during the war had demonised the other, and time was required after the killing of Savimbi for this to<sup>17</sup> be addressed before former combatants from UNITA showed up at various remote villages. When, suddenly, many of their number were simply ‘dropped off’ in the numerous sites, they came under hostile reception from the traumatised population, amongst whom were now some ‘victors’ from the ruling political party.

The severely damaged infrastructure in Angola’s countryside may also be serving to deny the media access to record and document cases of stress, the

existence of which may only be revealed much later in the process. The Angolan experience – set against other examples of flawed DDRRR initiatives in Southern Africa – provides a precedence for predicting what is likely to happen in the future. In countries such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, former combatants found themselves marching on the streets, demanding welfare support, jobs and vocational training opportunities.

The second initiative, as we saw, focused on allowing UNITA to reconstitute itself into a political party. Based on recommendations from the GRA, travel sanctions imposed on UNITA officials were temporarily lifted between May and November 2002 in order to allow travel intended for participation in the country's peace process. The three factions of UNITA Renovada, the external faction and surviving elements from Ovambo in the bush began serious negotiations for integration. Delegates from each were scheduled to meet in Luanda and to engage in the succession debate and political horse-trading. At the end of 2003 the three factions came together and elected Isias Samakuva as the political leader of UNITA. Thereafter, UNITA elements were allowed to move around the country and to re-open offices in towns and rural areas. However, these met the same fate as the former UNITA combatants, when a hostile community that had not been psychologically prepared to reconcile with the old enemy confronted them. This phenomenon slowed down the process of political rehabilitation, although in the capital this phase has been overcome. Consequently, the party may need more time in order to reorganise and restructure itself before the scheduled elections in 2006.

Policies fashioned to address the UNITA post-conflict crisis have implications for Cabinda. Current events are under keen observation by colleagues from Cabinda who, it must be assumed, must travel a similar route in order for Angola to enjoy complete and permanent peace.

### **Humanitarian resettlement of IDPs, refugees and the social reintegration of Angolan society**

The next important area of the peace process has been returning the country to normalcy, focusing on the returning of subordinated civilian life. The first thrust has been the rehabilitation of IDPs and refugees who were uprooted by the ferocity of the conflict. At the close of the war, nearly 30% of the population was displaced, with approximately 200,000 of their number hampered from accessing particular areas as a result of the indiscriminately planted landmines. A further 660,000 were in refugee camps in the neighbouring states.

The GRA established a humanitarian resettlement unit, working with international agencies but specifically with a mandate to include former UNITA combatants and their families. The strategy to resettle people was also carried out in close liaison with the reintegration of UNITA former combatants and their dependants. This phase faced almost insurmountable odds, having to

contend with a destroyed infrastructure and minimal government support, essentially limited to seeds, tools and transportation to designated areas. Elaborate plans to resettle the IDPs, refugees and former combatants were made but the reality soon turned out to be different. With the first signs of the peace process holding from May 2002, spontaneous returns of refugees and IDPs reached proportions that went beyond the carefully planned numbers. Refugees flowed from the DRC, Zambia and Namibia, and needed to be provided with seeds, tools and transport. Given the good rains that followed, by the end of the year, food production increased an appreciable 14% in the rural areas, demonstrating the value of increased human safety and security in rural Angola. However, yet another feature entered the equation a year later. This was the, again spontaneous, re-return of refugees to camps in the neighbouring states – especially back to Zambia, the DRC and Namibia – as they could not cope with the lack of infrastructure in Angola. The provision of running water, schools and clinics that was commonplace in refugee camps was not repeated in rural Angola, forcing families to elect to leave and then integrate themselves within the long-winded and gradual United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) rehabilitation phases, while they exploited the much needed facilities. This to-ing and fro-ing of the refugees has confused the picture of human resettlement in Angola, although it must be admitted that this is not unique to Angola. As Patrick Clawson pointed out: “Typically, the conditions of civilians deteriorate at the end of the war.”<sup>18</sup>

More recently, the FAA has worsened the situation by mounting strong-arm tactics in order to dislodge mostly West African and Congolese nationals from working the diamond mines in former UNITA held areas. An estimated 60,000 refugees were summarily dismissed and forced to leave the country’s borders within days. Given the hardships experienced, by May 2004 the UN humanitarian agencies intervened and succeeded to prevail on the GRA to suspend, for 45 days, its military operation against ‘economic refugees’ to allow them to regularise themselves.

Owing to this policy of enforced repatriation, a further interesting dimension has emerged: Congolese and West African refugees forced to leave Angola have, in retaliation, burned down Angolan refugee camps located in the DRC.

The underlying struggle appears to be the GRA’s attempt to take control of the internal diamond trade industry that was the monopoly of UNITA before 2002. Clearly, the initiative on human resettlement bears revisiting if Angola is to lessen the civil reintegration hardships and restore normalcy in the shortest possible time.

## **Recommendations and conclusions**

The war in Angola had culminated in the suspension of political life, the exclusive focus of the economy towards the war effort, and the subordination

of the human rights and security of ordinary people. After Savimbi's untimely death in February, the country has moved with zeal towards establishing a multiparty political dispensation, with UNITA dominant in the ethnic and geographic south. Militarily, UNITA has been stripped of its central organisational capacity and is unlikely to pose a threat in the future. The remaining threat, however, is that of UNITA former combatants who appear to have been left to their own devices and are dispersed. The next challenge after winning peace in Cabinda is for the GRA to provide a security guarantee while shedding some of its military weight, thereby releasing funds and resources for other purposes; least of which will be developing and investing in all the regions in order to address the root causes of conflict located in the equitable sharing of national resources. The hope is to continue to encourage this process until elections are held in 2006.

Of all the related policies – including the dismantling of UNITA military capacity, allowing the party to transform itself politically, resettling IDPs and refugees, and returning the country to normalcy *vis-à-vis* the economy and constitutional democracy – only the disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants continue to cause concern. Management and implementation of the policies appear to have reinforced the notion that Angola is serious about bringing about permanent peace, although this is emerging from a 'victor's' peace. The extensive deconstruction of UNITA's military capacity and its lack of representation in the 'new national army' may create a perception that the state institutions are not representative, which may in future result in the same being regarded as a source of grievance. This view was expressed by the ruling party MPLA Secretary General Norberto dos Santos when he pointed out that: "For those used to surviving by the gun, government has to be careful and solicit support from the international community to create employment as the state alone is unable to address this problem."<sup>19</sup>

## Notes

- 1 The Luena Memorandum of Understanding replaced annexures 3 and 4 of the Lusaka Accords which addressed the cessation of hostilities and the implementation of outstanding military issues.
- 2 N Schwank & C Rohloff, *War is over – conflict continues? Conditions for stable conflict outcomes*, Uppsala Conflict Data Conference, 2001, p 2.
- 3 *Ibid*, pp 2-3.
- 4 Address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RUSI), London, UK, Domingos J Muekalia, UNITA representative in Washington DC, 24 June 2002.
- 5 *Angola, UN Mission Report*, 6(2), Mar/Apr 2002.
- 6 Put differently, the peace treaty must emerge from a process of consensual and non-dictatorial terms and must seek not to reflect the victor's pre-war terms.
- 7 Schwank & Rohloff, *op cit*, p 5.

- 8 And even before, but for purposes of this discussion from this date.
- 9 UN Information Agency and Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA-IRIN, *Angola – demobilisation and reintegration obstacles*, 13 February 2003, p 5.
- 10 Radio Netherlands, 4 November 2002.
- 11 The Baptist, Reverend Dr Daniel Ntonga, headed this.
- 12 This figure was against the 54,583 combatants declared by UNITA as on their books, raising suspicion among GRA officials that the rest, 22,071, were frauds.
- 13 A Lari, *Returning home to a normal life? The plight of Angola's internally displaced*, ISS Occasional Paper, forthcoming, 5 February 2004.
- 14 Human Rights Watch, *Africa – Angola*, 2003, pp 3-4. On 31 May 2002, a local correspondent, Manuel Viera, reported deaths averaging 45 people in two days in the Lubango Province; a fact denied by the GRA.
- 15 *Samakuva criticises treatment of UNITA ex-soldiers*, IRIN, 6 March 2003. See also International Crisis Group (ICG), *Dealing with Savimbi's ghost – peace process at a crossroads*, 27 February 2003.
- 16 See J G Porto, *Cabinda – Notes on a soon-to-be-forgotten war*, ISS Paper 77, August 2003; IRIN, *Angola: President denies ongoing unrest in Cabinda*, 17 May 2004.
- 17 Later, each faction dispatched a delegation of about 25 people to the meetings.
- 18 Of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Institute.
- 19 Cited by N Hano, *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 April 2002.