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THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS: PROGRESS, CHALLENGES AND PROGNOSIS.



Augustine Ikelegbe
Nathaniel Umukoro

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PREFACE

This monograph is one of the final outputs of the research project of the *Centre for Population and Environmental Development (CPED)* titled “*Amnesties for Peace in the Niger Delta: a critical assessment of whether forgiving crimes of the past contributes to lasting peace*” the *International Development and Research Centre (IDRC)* under its *Governance, Security and Justice* program and the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

The overall objective of the study is to critically interrogate the amnesty and the political settlement leading to it, in terms of perceptions, discourses and conversations that undergird it; the nature of bargains, understanding and consensus constructed around it; the content and methods of the Amnesty; the nature of inclusiveness, equity, justness and gender sensitivity; the levels of legitimacy and sustainability of the settlement; the challenges of compliance, implementation and accountability, and the impacts on violence mitigation, conflict resolution, peace building and state building.

This monograph presents some of the interim findings of a comprehensive study of the Amnesty for Peace programme. The general objective of the research is to assess the impacts, challenges and sustainability of the amnesty programme and the *political settlements* leading to it, as a strategy of conflict resolution and peace building at the sub-national level. The study attempts to critically interrogate the content and methods of the Amnesty on the basis of issues of inclusiveness, equity, justice, gender sensitivity; legitimacy, management, challenges, sustainability and impacts on violence mitigation, conflict resolution and peace-building, and nation-building and national stability. Beyond a critical investigation of the Amnesty and its DDDR

programme against standards, objectives, best practices and comparative experiences, the study investigates the comprehensiveness, participatory and action basis of the Amnesty; the poor focus on the dynamic capture of the socio-political processes which shape the Amnesty; the specific linkages between political settlements, state and peace building; the linkages between amnesty, justice and peace-building and the basis and prospects for sustainable peace and security.

We are particularly grateful to the Governance, Security and Justice Program of IDRC and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for the support to CPED which has enabled the Centre to carry out the study and the publication of this policy document.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Niger Delta region of Nigeria, quite synonymous with the South-south geopolitical zone, occupies the mid-southern and south-eastern flank of Nigeria's coastal region and is geographically Africa's largest wetland. As the delta of the River Niger, draining into the Atlantic, its terrain comprises lowland rain forests and mangrove swamps, and estuaries, creeks, canals, lakes, rivers and swamps. Its population is approximately about 40 million people comprising of several minority ethnic groups. It is home to Nigeria's crude oil and gas reserves and the vast and extensive oil and gas infrastructure.

The rich natural resource endowments that contributes over 70% of Nigeria's revenues, foreign earnings and exports notwithstanding, the region has suffered from marginality in developmental attention, benefits from the oil and gas revenues, as well as participation in the oil economy. Grievances framed around these issues began to drive a regional agitation for developmental attention, benefits from the oil economy and regional autonomy from the mid 1950s. The admixture of poor corporate responsibilities of the oil companies, extensive environmental devastation contingent to oil pollution, and deep declines in derivation based oil revenues, as well as the construction of a highly centralized federal structure that disadvantaged the states particularly in the minority Niger Delta region, generated a new wave of agitation from the late 1970s. The new agitation which rested on popular and civil groups' mobilization began at the communities, and culminated in the Ogoni ethnic wide environmental protests. The Ogoni protests internationalized the agitation and catalyzed further protests

which by the late 1990s, turned into a region wide youth driven militant agitation for resource control and state reforms.

The new agitation driven by thousands of youth militias that violently engaged the oil companies and the Nigerian security agencies turned the region into a melting pot of violent conflicts and insurgency between 1998 and 2009. The insurgency was accompanied by extensive devastation of oil infrastructure, abduction and kidnapping of oil companies' staff, disruption of oil and gas production and attacks on oil tankers on the maritime waters. The violence had extensive effects on the oil infrastructure, production and revenues. There was decline of oil production from 2.3 bpd to 900,000bpd by mid 2009. There was extensive insecurity indicated by kidnapping, bank robberies, criminality, violent conflicts, electoral violence, inter and intra community conflicts, inter and intra youth and militia conflicts, vandalism of oil facilities, oil bunkering and illegal crude oil refineries. These were alongside extensive youth restiveness, aggression and youth lawlessness.

The usual public policy response to the violent agitation since the 1970s was extensive deployment of the military and security agencies and the use of excessive force to repress and suppress the region. However, this failed to suppress the agitation and establish peace and security as well as a clement environment for continued exploration of oil and gas resources. In 2009, the federal government charted a new course for tackling the insurgency in the region. After a major military offensive in parts of the region that seemingly failed because of the extensive damages to the oil and gas infrastructure that followed the militia counter attacks in 2009, the government took the path of peaceful settlement,

through an amnesty for all militants with a view to disarming and rehabilitating them.

On June 25 2009, the amnesty for militants operating in the Niger Delta was announced by Nigeria's former president Umaru Musa Yar' Adua with the condition that the militants will renounce militancy within 60 days. He granted the amnesty in accordance with section 175 of the 1999 Constitution which provides that 'the President may grant any person concerned with or convicted of any offence created by an Act of the National Assembly a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions'. A Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament of militants in the Niger Delta was then set up to manage the process of disarmament. The militants were expected to demobilize and surrender their arms at designated centres to pave way for rehabilitation and reintegration. The amnesty initiative started on August 6, 2009 and ended on October 4, 2009.

The Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) was set up to manage the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of the ex-militants. PAP is also the federal government major structure for the management of the post conflict transition to peace. Initially, the federal government promised a post amnesty programme for the region, but this fizzled out particularly after the death of president Yar' Adua, and the restoration of oil and gas production and revenues. PAP has been implementing the PCTP and the DDR since late 2009.

This study presents some of the interim findings of a comprehensive study of the Amnesty for Peace programme. The general objective of the research is to assess the impacts, challenges and sustainability of the amnesty programme and the *political settlements* leading to it, as a strategy of conflict resolution and peace building at the sub-national level. The study attempts to critically interrogate the content and methods of the Amnesty on the basis of issues of inclusiveness, equity,

justice, gender sensitivity; legitimacy, management, challenges, sustainability and impacts on violence mitigation, conflict resolution and peace-building, and nation-building and national stability. Beyond a critical investigation of the Amnesty and its DDRR programme against standards, objectives, best practices and comparative experiences, the study investigates the comprehensiveness, participatory and action basis of the Amnesty; the poor focus on the dynamic capture of the socio-political processes which shape the Amnesty; the specific linkages between political settlements, state and peace building; the linkages between amnesty, justice and peace-building and the basis and prospects for sustainable peace and security.

The research questions for the overall project are:

- i) What are the essential goals, components and methods of the Amnesty programme? What/whose voices, narratives, discourses and visions undergird the framing and content of the political settlement and what were the processes leading to and the terms, agreements, arrangements and understanding around which the legitimacy and implementation of the settlement were based? What tensions or strains exist in the Amnesty's political settlement?
- ii) How broad based and inclusive is the Amnesty and political settlement in terms of participation of all key stakeholders and how accommodative, equitable, fair and just is the settlement in relation to victims, marginal groups, vulnerable communities, women, minority ethnic groups, and diverse segments of militias and non-militant youth? Particularly, how gender inclusive, equitable and sensitive, are the processes, content and benefits of the Amnesty?
- iii) What strategic and policy instruments, methods of implementation and mechanisms for oversight, review and accountability are put in place to

ensure implementation success? More specifically, what challenges of compliance, implementation and accountability exist, how have different actors and stakeholders responded to them and how do these affect the sustainability and commitments to the political settlement and peace?

- iv) How have different actors (government officials, militant leaders, political society, civil society, ethnic, cultural and business elite, youth, women, private sector and international organizations) managed and implemented or related to the Amnesty and associated political settlement and with what effects on public confidence, legitimacy, sustainability and the potential for non-conflict reoccurrence? Particularly, how have government efforts and commitment to addressing the grievances and development challenges of the region reinforced the legitimacy and sustainability of the Amnesty?
- v) What lessons can be learnt about political settlement and peace building at sub-national levels, and what models can be developed and replicated in the management of other conflict situations in Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa?

In this study, a segment of the study relating to research objectives and research questions pertaining to the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDR) programme of the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) are presented. This study is interested in the inclusion, management, legitimacy, performance, impact, challenges and prospects of PAP for sustainable peace, security and development.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Apart from desk top research for secondary data, the survey research method was deployed to source primary data for the study. Four research instruments; in-depth questionnaire, social activists (ex-militant) questionnaire, key informant interview schedule and focus group discussions (FGD) are utilized. The questionnaire and FGD were administered in the three core Niger Delta States, while the interviews were conducted in the core Niger Delta States and the Federal capital city of Abuja. The questionnaire, FGDs and interviews focused on obtaining the perceptions and opinion of diverse people (local and urban elite, ordinary people, youth, women, community activists, ex-militant activists, officials of governments, civil society organizations, oil companies, and others in the region) about the conflict in the Niger Delta and Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) in the period before, during and since the declaration of Amnesty.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

In this section, the post conflict transition to peace (PCTP) along with related concepts of demilitarization, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDR), as well as peace and peace building are interrogated and clarified. Further, the dynamics and challenges of the management of PCTP and DDR are examined.

THE POST CONFLICT TRANSITION TO PEACE

Post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation is a crucial set of activities that are undertaken after the cessation of violent conflicts to prepare the ground for recovery and peace building. It involves physical reconstruction of basic infrastructures and basic social services that were destroyed during the war or armed resistance. Furthermore, it involves societal rehabilitation which includes the resettlement of displaced persons, assistance and support to victims of violence and destruction, humanitarian support for the wounded and disabled as a result of the war and trauma counselling to the victims of violence, rape and human rights abuse. It also involves peace building which is a process that ensures or creates an environment that prevents the re-emergence and re-escalation of tensions and violent conflicts. Peace building further embraces activities that build and consolidate peaceful relations and co existence among peoples, groups and communities.

A post conflict transition to peace (PCTP) is a very complex sensitive, delicate, and fragile process. It requires comprehensive planning that embraces critical issues pertaining to root causes and emerging tensions, institutional platforms and processes for managing the transition and achieving desired changes of

orientations, attitudes and perceptions required for conflict resolution, peaceful co-existence and peace. Delicate management is required for reconciling violent inter group rivalries, tensions and conflicts, and for ensuring sustained interests and satisfaction of parties in the PCPT process. There is at once the management of military and security engagements and socio-political engineering of agreements and arrangements, for peace, inclusive benefits and participation in the peace process. The managers of PCPT have to thread a delicate balance between state centric and non-state solutions and participation, and broad based and narrow based rehabilitation, reconstruction and socio-economic recovery initiatives.

Table 2.1: Stages in the Management of Post Conflict Transition to Peace

Goals	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration	Post-conflict reconstruction	Post conflict recovery	Conflict Transformation	Peace Building
	Safe and Secure Environment	Physical Reconstruction, Renovation and Reconstruction of decadent/destroyed infrastructure	Economic recovery Regeneration of local economies, employment and employment opportunities	Institution of better resource distribution to communities and groups	Promotion of Peaceful relations and co-existence
Activities	Preventing violent conflict reversals controlling & reducing propensity and incentives for further violence	Renovate social services and amenities build infrastructures, amenities	Control underground & illegal economies re-orient attitudes towards production	Identify & address group & communal grievances & marginalization	Redress past abuses through reconciliation
		Reopen/reinvigorate education systems, health care systems provide assistance /support to internally displaced and those that suffered losses etc	Revitalize rural livelihood sources, occupations and improve social wellbeing, and reduce poverty	Address issues of equity and justice between MNOCS & OPCS, between communities & groups.	

Ikelegbe (2010:14)

The post conflict transition to peace which is sometimes equated to peace building, has tended to be seen in a unilinear form, comprising stages of activities or interventions in a continuum from the military or security interventions to peace building. These stages and their sequencing tend to vary according to the perceptions of scholars and practitioners. Four broad sets of rehabilitation activities or tasks have been identified (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009:175). These are security rehabilitation involving maintaining of security, law and order; political rehabilitation; pertaining to rebuilding of political institutions; economic rehabilitation – providing humanitarian assistance, economic reforms; and social rehabilitation which pertains to “justice, reconciliation” and capacity building for peaceful engagements (Table 2.2). The security stage seeks to establish a sense of security and guarantee a minimum level of law and order (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009:173) and thus establish the conducive conditions for more sustained peace building activities.

Though there has emerged standard strategies, methods and programmes of transitions to peace and PB, particularly in the operations of the United Nations, regional organizations and international organizations, the actual process and workings has to be flexible. As Bercovitch & Jackson 2009:173 note, peace building has to be *responsive to the specific needs of the situation and flexible enough to adapt to changing political dynamics*.

PCPT requires delicate management. Many times, there is too much focus on “security and political dimensions” to the neglect of the economic and social; and too much state centric and top down approach to the neglect of the non-state sector and indigenous actors (Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009: 182). There is sometimes, the lack of legitimacy of managers of the process, “in the eyes of recipients and target groups”, the “lack of agreement over the acceptance of roles

and implementation responsibilities by parties (Miller 2005: 58) and overall failure to address the root or underlying “causes of the conflict”. Quite related, the involvement of all levels and sectors, particularly leadership at different levels including top, middle and community leaders is crucial. According to Lederach (2001: 843), “no single level of leadership is capable of delivering and sustaining a peace process on its own” which means that patient and responsive partnership of indigenous actors” is necessary for peace building.

Table 2.2: Framework of Peace building Aims and Tasks

	Interim/Short-Term Measures	Medium-Term Measures	Long-Term Measures
Military/Security	Disarmament, demobilization of factions, separation of army/police, maintaining law and order, protecting civilian populations	Consolidation of new national army, integration of national police	Demilitarization of politics, transformation of cultures of violence
Political/Constitutional	Negotiate a political pact, manage problems of transitional government, constitutional reform, institution-building	Overcome the challenges of the second election, deepen the reform process	Establish tradition of good governance including respect for democracy, human rights, rule of law, development of civil society within genuine political community
Economic/Development	Humanitarian relief, essential social services,	Rehabilitation of resettled population and	Stable long-term macro-economic policies and

	communication	demobilized soldiers, progress in rebuilding infrastructure and demining	economic management, locally sustainable community development, distributional justice
Social	Overcoming initial distrust, facilitating inter-communal dialogue, consultation with local actors	Managing conflicting priorities of peace and justice	healing psychological wounds, long-term reconciliation, peace education

Source: Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009: 174

Though transitioning connotes the movement from violent contentious war and mutual destruction, towards peace, security, stability and development, there is a sense in which it is rarely comprehensively completed and achieved in terms of a perfectly peaceful and secured society. For example, some transitions from conflict to peace have occurred without peace agreements and the resolution of the pre-existing conditions or root causes that gave rise to the initial problem” (Adekanye 2007:186). This has occurred in the transitions that did not substantially alter the marginalization of the north in Mali and the marginalization of the majority Hutu ethnic group in Rwanda. Such transitions tend to be tentative and fragile.

Peace building is a process that ensures or creates an environment that prevents the emergence and escalation of tensions and violent conflicts. It can be defined as “all actions undertaken in a conflict continuum to consolidate peace and prevent recurrence of armed confrontations (Annan, 1988). Its goal is to “build on, add to and re-orient peacemaking activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of the

resumption of conflict, and create conditions conducive to reconciliation and recovery (Juma, 2002).

From a conflict resolution perspective, peacemaking aims at removing the tensions between parties in conflict by addressing the causes of violence. Peace building achieves positive peace by creating structures and institutions of peace based on justice, equity and cooperation, thereby permanently addressing underlying causes of conflict and preventing the return to violence (Galtung 1975: 297-304; Gawerc 2006: 439). Adekanye (2007c: 359; 2007, 188-189) regards peace building as a complex incremental and multimodal process comprising:

- i. Cessation of hostilities through the instrumentalities of ceasefire, peace agreement, termination of hostile activities or war and Amnesty.
- ii. Military reorganization or restructuring, which sometimes includes the integration of ex combatants into the military.
- iii. Political transition programmes which may include *conduct of elections*, formation of national governments, programmes of reconciliation between erstwhile warring groups.
- iv. Social and economic reconstruction, which may include *repairing the physical and psychological damage of war, resuscitation of national infrastructures*, and *programmes of economic recovery, reforms and growth*.

MANAGING THE DYNAMICS OF POWER AND INTEREST CONFIGURATIONS IN PCTP

The Balance of Forces among Parties in Conflict in the PCTP Phase

It is critical to craft arrangements whether through peace agreements or ongoing allocations of values that create a status of satisfactory power and benefit outcomes, or some fair sharing of gains and losses from the post conflict settlement and situation. A “win-win outcome for all the parties” is critical to

PCPT stability even though it is difficult to “equally satisfy them on all” (Adekanye 2007:197).

The issue of satisfaction of leadership of parties with allocation of gains and losses in PCPT situations is challenging because of changing perceptions, changing patterns of benefits and losses as implementation of PCPT progresses, and probable misjudgements about expected balance of gains and losses within and between parties and groups. Dissatisfaction arising from the perceptions and judgements of emergent balances of power and benefits may be strong enough to destabilize PCPT through threats or actual withdrawal or violation of existing cease fires, re-arming of ex-militants and renewal of hostilities or resurgence of militancy.

Hierarchical Distribution of Stakes

Though rebel movements and insurgent groups tend to have a few elite nuclei, they actually involve a broad spectrum of participants such as commanders, combatants, combat assistants, supporters at diverse levels such as national, Diaspora, provincial and communities. There is thus a hierarchy of participants, assistants and supporters as particularly some rebellions and insurgencies had regional, ethnic and community bases of support and some mobilization of a mosaic of groups who performed diverse roles in the struggles. A major challenge that arises in PCPT arrangements is the inclusiveness of benefits, because most stakes tend to be concentrated among the top elite and commanders who participate in the discussions and agreements leading to a PCPT governance (Adekanye, 2007:199).

The gaps in benefit structure between elite/top commanders and combatants, combat assistants and the mass of supporters, collaborators and activists, generates social and political tensions and conflicts. There are usually demands for better

and broader spread of post conflict benefits and fall outs. Sometimes these tensions are strong enough to generate rifts, factional fighting, threats of resurgence of hostilities, and the recourse to violent criminality and political violence.

Managing the Underground Economy Formation in the Conflict and PCTP Phases

Conflict environments generate a peculiar formation of economic actors who take advantage and profit from the conflict situation by engagement in underground economies such as smuggling, mineral theft, illegal mining and trading, piracy, illegal processing, racketeering and money laundering. There is thus a local war economy, and a local formation of powerful businessmen and mercantilists, which constitutes “an alternative system of profit and power” (Chingono 1996 as cited by Adekanye 2007:200). This formation often has interests either in the continuation of the conflict to sustain profits, or *could afford to allow the warring political and military groups...to end their armed conflicts, transit to peace...provided those changes did not substantially affect the grassroots economy* (Adekanye 2007:200).

However, the ex-war leaders are often inextricably linked to the war economy which itself was linked to the funds for prosecuting the armed conflicts, just as state military officers who also profited there-from. This means that the actors in the war economy are not just influential, but have complex linkages with political leaders, ex-militant leaders, ex militants, and military officers. Dismantling the local war economy is therefore a difficult exercise which has to be handled delicately.

CONSTITUTING AND MANAGING A FRAMEWORK OF TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE

The Conditions for Sustainable Peace

The evidence from conflict situations and PCTP is that of fragility and proneness to breakdown of the peace, and the tendency of return to violent conflicts. There are many reasons for this tendency of reversal from peace to war or violent conflicts (Adekanye 2007:204-205). These include:

- i) The non resolution of basic issues and root causes that pre-disposed or triggered the conflict.
- ii) The realization of less than expected advantages from the post conflict situation by one or more parties.
- iii) The existence of conditions in the post war situation that are less lucrative, profitable and prosperous for one or more parties and groups.
- iv) The perpetuation or consolidation of violence entrepreneurs, underground economy entrepreneurs and other protagonists of impunity and violence that continue to be associated with huge pay offs.

Ordinarily, PCPT provides an environment and a time space for managing or curtailing the fears, conditions and grievances that triggered the violent conflicts, preventing further causes and triggers of insecurity and violent conflicts, and undertaking other structural objectives such as infrastructure development, socio-economic empowerment, and security sector reforms. The failures of reconciliation and conflict transformation efforts could be central to the uncertainties, tensions and instability that plague PCTP outcomes.

Adekanye (2007), in response to the uncertainties and fragility of PCTP programmes, identifies a set of potentially destabilizing social forces and the countervailing interests and forces that could neutralize them within the PCPT environment. These compete for dominance in the *typical post conflict political scene*

and the balance between them determines the *way that a post conflict transition will go*, whether towards the consolidation of peace or relapse into violent conflicts or war.

The social forces that threaten PCPT programmes and peace building include the existence of the following:

- i) *Possible losers from the peace process that may become strong rejectionist political forces.*
- ii) Elements of the old administration which may be political, military and bureaucratic elite that are dissatisfied with the peace programme.
- iii) Ex-warlords and groups of ex combatants with interests and preference in what the pre-peace situation offered.
- iv) Angry and disillusioned repatriated ex refugees and non returning internally displaced persons who remain unemployed, poor and dissatisfied.
- v) Marginalized and politically disenfranchised social forces of youth, peasants, workers, women and children who were hitherto mobilized in the pre-war situation but are now excluded from PCTP programmes and seek empowerment, representation and inclusion.
- vi) Vulnerable social groups such as the poor and unemployed youth who have been impoverished through reforms and changes in the PCPT era.
- vii) Proliferation and widespread distribution, trading and flows of small arms and light weapons (SALW).
- viii) Rising incidence of violent criminality, political violence and acts of banditry (Adekanye 2007:206).

However, there are interests and forces which may exist or could be mobilized as forces of peace stability, and which could neutralize the threats posed. These include the following:

- i) New interests, sentiments and orientations of non violent resolution of conflicts.
- ii) The existence of post conflict governments and governance systems that are adaptable, responsive and could speedily manage demands by diverse groups and interests for broad based participation.

- iii) New systems and safeguards of controlling and transforming military and security agencies.
- iv) Civil society, parliamentary communities and related interests that work for and ensure accountability and transparency of PCTP institutions to the public.
- v) Sense of deep and extensive war weariness that makes for reluctance of a return to war.
- vi) A global environment that is supportive of peace, democracy and human rights, and
- vii) More importantly, the ability, commitment and positive outcomes of post conflict governments in tackling post war reconstruction and conflict transformation.

The countervailing forces could be created, mobilized manipulated and strengthened to neutralize the threats that occur. The support for the construction of this countervailing formation, and more particularly forms of post conflict governance, is therefore necessary. This is exactly what Adekanye (2007:209) challenges governments and government agencies, policy makers, practitioners and civil society activists to crucially do in order to manage, build and consolidate peace, security and democracy in post conflict environments.

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, REHABILITATION, REINSERTION AND REINTEGRATION: CONCEPTUAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

The PCPT has essentially two dimensions. The first is the security dimension and more specifically DDR which involves disarmament and demilitarization, for the purpose of creating a secured environment such that the goals of peace building can be achieved. The second is the political dimension which precedes the PCPT and continues through the entire process. This involves political dialogue, negotiations, settlement, agreements and programmes that become the tentative format and framework for PCPT. This is what builds the trust, commitment and

common ground for the entire process. The commitment of political leaders and stakeholders is what sustains the entire process.

The typical post conflict transition involves disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, reinsertion into the military and police forces, and reintegration into civilian social-economic life. Within these sequence may be reinsertion, rehabilitation and resettlement. In Mali and Mozambique, PCTP involved disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In Uganda and Ethiopia, PCTP, did not involve reintegration into the military, as the state military were defeated. In South Africa, PCTP involved reintegration into the armed forces, disarmament, demobilization (Adekanye, 2007:192) and reintegration of some into civilian life. Most of the DDR programmes have been targeted at armed opposition groups. In national conflicts such as in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Cote d' Ivoire, DR Congo, Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan and Chad, there were programmes of demobilization of the armed forces, DDR, security sector reform and restructuring of the armed forces. Adekanye (2007:192) has noted that the actual components and the sequence of the PCTP tasks are determined by *particular conditions and circumstances of each country*.

Table 2.3 Programmes of DDR Management of Ex-Combatants

Demilitarization	Disarmament	Demobilization	Rehabilitation	Reinsertion	Reintegration	Resettlement
<p>*Withdrawal or restrictions in deployment and location.</p> <p>*Reduction of operations</p>	<p>Surrender of arms</p> <p>*Arms collection at centres</p> <p>*Arms destruction</p> <p>*Arms monitoring and control</p>	<p>*Surrender</p> <p>*Registration</p> <p>*Transportation</p> <p>*Cantonment & encampment.</p> <p>*Pre-discharge orientation</p> <p>*Discharge</p>	<p>*Post discharge orientation</p> <p>*Cash allowances</p> <p>*Food and health assistance</p>	<p>*Diverse support and assistance</p> <p>*Housing support</p> <p>*support for children education</p>	<p>*Skills and education verification/identification</p> <p>* Vocational training, skills development</p> <p>* Educational support</p> <p>*Employment and employment support</p> <p>* Business development</p>	<p>* Access to and acquisition of land and water resources</p> <p>*Provision of seeds, tools and credit for agriculture</p> <p>*Social benefits</p> <p>*Pension support schemes</p> <p>*Disability support schemes</p>

Source: Ikelegbe 2010:14

The criteria for determining and identifying combatants and inclusion into DDR are crucial because combat groups tend to inflate their numbers to heighten their importance and profit there-from. The idea is to provide a criteria that transparently identifies ex combatants such that the trust among groups and the legitimacy of the programme is ensured (Carames & Sanz 2009). To ensure these, there is the common use of proof of the use of arms, and membership of armed groups, either determined by the group itself through its listing (internal or subjective) or by an external evaluation (objective). Given its importance, many countries use both internal and external verifications (CAR, Colombia, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Cote d'voire, Eritrea), but others such as Sudan, used internal or subjective verification, while Angola, Burundi, Colombia, Cote d'voire and Indonesia used external verification.

Disarmament

Disarmament is a major challenge in PCTP and most programmes of DDR tend to be associated with incomplete and ineffective disarmament, no matter how successful the programmes of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants are (Adekanye 2007:196). The task of disarming ex-militants is complicated by several issues. First, as Adekanye (2007:196-197) notes, the typical combatant possesses at least four to six guns at the point of demobilization but submits one at the point of disarmament while hiding the rest in some underground cache, for use when the need arises such as in the failures of the PCT, the reintegration effort and sustainable means of livelihood. In CAR, the PRAC that executed DDR reported that “the average combatant possessed three firearms (Carames 2009c).

As long as loose arms and arms caches continue to exist, PCTP's security and peace building remain under threat. Adekanye (2007:197) sees arms in the hands

of ex-militants as a *force –in being, potentially available for hire to the highest bidder, and for possible use in any mercenary activities or engagements*. Furthermore, continuous proliferation and possession of SALWs has been associated with rising insecurity which manifests in political violence, violent criminality, armed banditry and breakdown of law and order. Sustained SALW possession and caches, indicating ineffective and incomplete disarmament have occurred in South Africa, Mozambique, Mali, Ethiopia and Indonesia. In Indonesia, incomplete disarmament left weapons in circulation that was responsible for growing criminality (Sanz, 2009 c).

Some of the DDR programmes have included more broad disarmament projects. In Southern Sudan, there were Community Security and Arms Reduction Control projects, under which SALWs were collected and destroyed in 2007 (Sanz, 2009f). In fact, disarmament is well beyond surrendering arms because SALW proliferation, availability and flow are crucial to stability. PCTP practices in other countries that have implemented DDR include:

- i) *Disarming the population by recovering SALWs in civilian hands.*
- ii) *Disarming all those that “represent a threat to peace and security.*
- iii) *Forcible collection of fire arms and taking legal actions against possessors of guns.*
- v) *National plans of action for reducing the proliferation of SALW (Carames, 2009c)*

2.4 METHODS OF CONDUCTING DDR AND ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA

Country	Programme	Arms Surrendered	Individual Commitment to DDR	Group Commitment to DDR	Objective & External Assessment of Membership	Subjective & Internal Assessment of Membership	Freedom from Prosecution
Afghanistan	DDR						
Afghanistan	CIP						
Angola	GPDR						
Burundi	NCDDR						
Chad	PNRD						
CAR	PRAC						
Colombia	AUC						
Cote d'ivoire	NDRRC	NA					

D R Congo	NPDDR						
Eritrea	EPDR						
Indonesia							
Liberia	DDRR						
Nepal	AMMAA						
Rwanda	RDRP						
Sudan	DDRP						
Uganda	Amnesty						

Sources: Caramés and Sanz (2009). Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

Programmes in the World during 2008; Bellaterra: School for a Culture of Peace, 2009.

REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMES

Reintegration into a civilian life is a crucial component because its poor implementation and failure has huge consequences for security and peace in the PCTP era. As a result, much time, efforts and resources are deployed for effectiveness, just as most reintegration is supported by technical and financial assistance from donor countries, agencies and multilateral organizations. Almost all PCTP programmes excepting in Nigeria (1970; 2009-2015) have taken place with external support and technical assistance.

Reintegration could be social or economic. Economic reintegration provides counselling, training, financial support and empowerment in order to generate sustained economic survival and independence. Social reintegration on the other hand seeks integration into social, family and community networks thus facilitating settlement and social cohesion and preventing stigmatization (Carames 2009c). The extent of reintegration has tended to differ from country to country just as the length. Reintegration programmes has tended to be prolonged to between three to six years usually because of delays in commencement, and problems of funding and implementation. In Indonesia, while DD ended in 2006, reintegration continued until December 2009 (Sanz 2009).

Inadequacy of work employment opportunities after reintegration was common to most of the programmes. In Angola, a survey on reintegration revealed that 60% of ex combatants were self employed (Carames 2009). In Liberia, more than a quarter of reintegrated ex-combatants were employed particularly in agriculture as at 2006 (Sanz 2009e). There are few instances of fairly successful social integration. In Rwanda, there was improved mutual trust and acceptance between ex-combatants and communities, which reduced the perception of ex-combatants as *threats to local security* (Carames 2009c).

Adekanye (2007: 194-196) has listed several factors that are crucial to determining the success or otherwise of reintegration. These are:

- i) The level and adequacy of incentives and economic assistance of ex-militants.
- ii) The education and skills acquired before engaging in militancy or military service or during the hostilities, and the rapidity of transition into civilian roles and employment
- iii) The length of service in combatant roles. Long service tend to be associated with difficulties in willingness and ability to reintegrate into society.
- iv) The age at the point of demobilization, tend to be associated with reintegration challenges with the older and officers having more difficulties.
- v) The community background of ex-combatants, particularly community perception about the war, and the patriotic-ness or otherwise of the activities of particular ex combatants, determines their acceptance and resettlement into the community.
- vi) The cultural attitudes towards arms possession militant resistance, and combatant service determines societal acceptance of ex-militants

The positive factors of each ex combatants, and the overall tilt of balance between positivity or minus of these variables differs, but aggregate of positive factors would tend to be associated with higher level of reintegration.

DDR programmes usually include resettlement which according to Ikelegbe (2014), pertains to:

the creation of access to and acquisition of land, tools and credit to ex-fighters that require employment in agriculture such as farming and fishing, and the provision of social benefits, disability support schemes and pension support schemes that are provided somewhat more permanently to enhance survival and welfare of ex-combatants (Ikelegbe 2014).

The access that ex-militants have to ‘‘natural capital as arable and grazing land, water, forests, fisheries and game, is critical to both poverty reduction and social peace’’ (Addison 2001:4).

QUALITIES, CONTENT AND CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL DDR

DDR is a complex process with political, military, security, humanitarian and socioeconomic dimensions which should be planned and closely coordinated as part of broad post-conflict stabilization interventions and political and reconstruction efforts, that seek longer-term stability and make peace irreversible (Conoir 2007:13-14).

Elsewhere, Ikelegbe and Onokerhoraye (2016) have noted that DDR is a complex, delicate and sensitive process of military and political solutions whose effectiveness is dependent on competent, inclusive, impartial, credible and transparent planning and management. DDR has been relatively successful in building stability, peace and democracy in post conflict situations (Doyle & Sambanis 2006). Yet, it is not an automatic post conflict peace building panacea (Gwinyayi 2007:74). Though DDR designs ought to be rooted in peculiar security and socio-political conditions, there are objectives, pre-conditions and best practices that facilitate high impact designs and implementation (Colletta et al, 1996:x,13; Fusato 2003; Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbam 2006:1-19). Current reasoning in DDR management raises concerns about inclusiveness of the process and comprehensiveness that includes women, children, vulnerable groups and communities, in terms of targeting, benefits and incentives (Humphreys & Weinstein 2007: 561; Arnold & Alden 2007:11).

There are other elements and conditions that contribute to the success or otherwise of DDR (Ikelegbe and Onokerhoraye (2016). First is the inclusion of all ex-belligerents and factions to avoid the resurgence of violence. Second is the existence of fair eligibility criteria. The idea is to provide a criterion that transparently identifies ex combatants such that the trust among groups and the

legitimacy of the programme are ensured (Carames & Sanz 2009). Third is inclusive DDR that embraces critical and vulnerable groups such as those that performed support roles to combatants, women and children, *dependents of ex-combatants* such as spouses, children (TatjanaStankovic & StinaTorjesen, 2012), disabled combatants, female ex-combatants, (Carames, 2009a), amnestied political prisoners, war affected civilians, separatist activists, ex-combatant communities (Sanz 2009a) and internally displaced persons. The lessons from comparative experiences of several countries reveal the necessities of the following in DDR success.

Breadth of DDR: From DDR to RRR

In Indonesia, there was a resettlement component as part of reintegration, which meant that sufficient arable land was provided for those who wished to go into agriculture (Sanz 2009c). In Liberia, the DDR included Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Recovery (RRR), because its target was beyond ex-combatants and included the war affected populations. In Sudan, DDR included reintegration and reconciliation (Sanz 2009f). In Uganda, DDR included Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Reintegration which enabled thousands of ex-combatants to receive *cultivable land free* (Sanz 2009 g).

Inclusive DDR Programming

The coverage of packages and benefits of DDR programmes differs in breadth. An emerging best practice in DDR is the inclusion of disabled combatants, dependent children of ex-combatants, female ex-combatants. In the CAR, ex-combatant females partook in demobilization programme and received assistance towards employments while 1,675,000 members of communities were assisted to improve their surroundings (Carames, 2009c). In Indonesia, the DDR programme in Acer provided for ex-combatants, female combatants, amnestied political prisoners, war

affected civilians, separatist activists and ex-combatant communities (Sanz, 2009c). Some DDR programmes such as that of Liberia, provided for special needs including women, child soldiers, disabled ex-combatants, dependents of ex-combatants, women partners of ex-combatants and vulnerable persons. In Sudan, special needs groups included youth, women ex-combatants, disabled persons and elderly persons connected to armed groups (Sanz 2009f). In Uganda, internally displaced persons were provided for in the reintegrated programme (Sanz, 2009g).

DDR and Employment

Some of the DDR programmes provide employment to ex-combatants through integration into the military, police and para-military agencies. In Uganda, several ex-combatants were recruited into the military, police and security sector (Sanz 2009c,g). Some other DDR include programmes of public employment and public works.

DDR and Peace Building

DDR is weaved into a programme of peace building. Most DDR programmes proceed from peace agreements such as memoranda of understanding as in Indonesia. Several DDR programmes include issues of reconciliation and transitional justice. In Indonesia, apart from Amnesty, DDR management established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Human Rights monitoring and a Court of Human Rights.

There may be special peace building programmes such as the Community Conflict Resolution and Peace Building Project supported by the European Commission in Uganda in 2008, that focused on reintegration and reconciliation in conflict affected communities (Sanz 2009g). It could be oriented to building social cohesion, human rights monitoring and a Court of Human Rights. The establishment of platforms, forum and even organized consultative meetings on

reconciliation of diverse groups, sectors and interests, is necessary in PCTP. Such platforms could generate dialogue, negotiations and reconstruction of diverse broken relationships in the communities and economy.

International Organizations and DDR

External involvement in PCT is crucial for several reasons. First, external agencies help to build involvement, generate trust and confidence, and guarantee impartiality and integrity. The United Nations have provided the technical assistance for the disarmament, demobilization, security sector reform and armed restructuring in many countries. In several countries, a United Nations Mission was established with a mandate of the United Nations such as in Liberia. The UNDP was responsible for the implementation and provision of technical assistance for the reintegration component of the DDR programmes in several countries such as Liberia. Other agencies of the United Nations such as UNICEF was responsible for youth and child soldiers rehabilitation. International organizations such as the World Food Programme were partly responsible for reinsertion programme in Sudan.

The World Bank usually provides financial assistance and manages multi-donor Trust Funds. Development agencies including Britain's DFID, the German Technical Cooperation, the United States Agency for International Development and others have provided funding and diverse support to the programmes. Local and international NGOs including churches are usually involved in the rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. Regional and continental organizations such as the OAU, African Union, European Union, ECOWAS and individual countries such as the United States, Germany, France, Japan, Norway, Denmark, France and others have financed and supported DDR programmes.

In the Afghanistan DDR programme (2003-2008), the German Aid Agency provided support in training and resources for the creation of small businesses.

The World Food Programme (WFP) assisted in reintegrating 4,455 women and medical assistance to 153,915 children dependents of ex-combatants, while the UNDP implemented the Reintegration Support for Ex-combatants (RSPE) (Sanz 2009). In Angola, some international agencies and NGOs provided food aid to combatants and their families (Carames 2009).

The Private Sector, Civil Society and DDR

The role of the private sector in peace building and in reintegration programmes has begun to receive attention in relation to the stability and suitability of PCTP. The private sector can complement and collaborate with the state and international organizations in employment generation, empowerment programmes, social assistance and human capital development. In Afghanistan, national and international NGOs and agencies, and private businesses were involved in the DDR.

Community Reintegration

The role of communities in facilitating resettlement and reintegration of ex combatants into civilian and community life has been identified as crucial to sustainable and effective DDR (Carames & Sanz 2009). The host communities are now regarded as part of reintegration programme and thus should be empowered to participate in the design, planning and execution of reintegration programmes.

Poor community reintegration makes ex-militants reluctant to return to home communities. The “ex-combatant versus society dichotomy” is more effectively broken through community involvement and projects in DDR (Carames 2009c).

The lack of community integration is also responsible for relocation of ex-combatants to urban areas with less likely potential for social stigmatization rather than return to home communities as has happened in Angola (Carames 2009b).

In Central African Republic (CAR), the ex-militant Reintegration and Community

Support Project that administered DDR included the following community initiatives which helped to break the *ex-combatant versus society dichotomy* (Carames 2009c):

- i) Demobilization and reintegration of ex combatants in home communities or communities'' of their choosing.
- ii) Training communities to receive ex-combatants and improve community receptivity to ex-combatants.
- iii) Strengthening community capacity for ex-combatants including infrastructures destroyed in the war.
- iv) Reconciliation of ex-combatants to home or host communities.
- v) Assistance to 1,675,000 inhabitants of identified surroundings through participation in social economic and cultural activities
- vi) Adoption of special measures for returning ex combatants by communities.
- vii) The institution of processes and activities of dialogue and reconciliation in the communities (Carames 2009a)

Table 2.5: Countries and DDR Programmes

Country	DDR for Armed Forces	Security Sector	Restructuring of Armed Forces	DDR for Armed Opposition Forces	Demobilization of Militias/Paramilitary Armed Opposition Groups	Child Soldiers & Women	Amnesty
Afghanistan							
Angola							
Burundi							
Chad NPDR							
Colombia							
Cote d'Ivoire							
CAR							

DR Congo DDRR							
Eritrea EPDR							
Indonesia (Aceh)							
Liberia							
Nepal							
Rwanda							
Sudan							
Uganda							

Security Sector Reform

The restructuring, reorganization and reforms of the military, para-military and police forces are sometimes a component part of PCTP. This may involve behaviour modification, reorientations, human rights management, management of conflict situations, operations, security strategies and responses to post PCTP security challenges.

New perceptions on DDR regard “DDR and security sector reform as inextricably linked” (Carames CAR 2009, 29-44). In the CAR, the DDR programme comprised elements targeted at improving national and human security management, which included (Carames 2009c): support for vulnerable individuals which reduce insecurity and prevent conflict; ensuring security and development, through technical, logistic and operational support and identifying ways for better community security.

Good Governance

There is need for good governance that empowers the people through open and transparent public administration and financial management, political representation and leadership. It is through the principles of good governance that effective and efficient public administration can be achieved. Leadership and effective systems of political empowerment are also essential to ensure development and social inclusion. There is recognition that democracy must be implemented in accordance with local circumstances.

Economic development

One of the root causes of conflict is widespread poverty. Therefore programmes focusing on economic development are central to ensuring positive peace. To

achieve economic development, the importance of infrastructure development is a priority. Among infrastructure needs, telecommunications, quality roads, water and sanitation, and electricity and energy are basic requirements for development.

Human and social development

Basic conditions that allow citizens a good quality of life that sustains the human and collective spirit, such as education, health, water and sanitation, gender equality and job creation are fundamental to human and social development. Effective programmes that protect and strengthen the most vulnerable and reach the most remote and inaccessible areas are critical to both sustainability and stability.

ASSESSING DDR PROGRAMMES

Though DDR has been a frequently deployed programme of managing armed conflicts in Africa and has been implemented in several countries in Western, Eastern, Southern and Central Africa, the experience in Africa is mixed. (Dobbins et al. 2007; Paris, 2004; Duffield, 2007; Ismail, 2008). That is why Krause and Jutersonke (2005:448) conclude that at the global level:

not only do about half of all peace support operations (including both peacekeeping and more expansive peace building operations) fail after around five years, but there also seems to be no clear idea of what 'success' or 'failure' actually means, nor of what an appropriate timeframe for measuring success might be.

Poor DDR designs and implementation has been associated with renewal of hostilities (Angola), widespread insecurity (Namibia), uncontrolled proliferation of small arms (Mozambique) and high crime rates (Mozambique) (Kimba 1999:43; Keen 2006:16; Gwinyayi 2007:75). The problems generally associated with DDR in Africa include poor management, poor funding, lack of trust and confidence,

reintegration failures, lack of positive impacts on individual combatants, and the emergence of migrant fighters (Colletta et al 1996:71; Kimba 1999:43; Humphreys & Weinstein 2007:534; Pugel 2007; Keen 2006:16; Gwinyayi 2007).

The implementation of DDR programmes has tended to be associated with delays, challenges of misinterpretations of entitlements and sharing, disputes between parties, scarcity and delays in release of funds by international agencies, and late distribution of reinsertion, resettlement and reintegration kits and packages. The delays in the demobilization and reintegration stages of the programmes have generated loss of confidence and mistrust among ex-combatants. Some of the public authorities, NGOs and companies involved in reintegration sometimes lacked technical capacity and material resources as was the case in Uganda.

In terms of conception and planning, most programmes of DDR do not have substantive projects of long term peace building and sustainable development. In some of the programmes, there was more concern with sharing of funds, patronage, subsidies and contracts. In Eritrea, conception and planning was non inclusive as ex-combatants and the communities were not involved (Sanz 2009 b). In Indonesia, there were accusations of corruption and incompetence among public authorities (Sanz 2009c). Reintegration programmes have been associated with inequality in the allocation and distribution of slots for training, reintegration subsidies and support. There have been disputes over distribution and tensions over lack of transparency in the implementation of DDR programmes. The nature of management of DDR could impact on the direction of peace. Disgruntled ex-combatants have been linked to violent criminality, such as armed robbery, kidnapping and extortion in Indonesia, Mozambique and South Africa.

Ikelegbe and Onokerhoraye (2016) have noted elsewhere that the DDR components of the Amnesty programme in the Niger Delta, fits into a typical

traditional DDR which has been replaced with the second generation DDR as a result of the weaknesses of the former. Whereas traditional DDR focuses mainly on combatants that are present within military structures, the focus of Second Generation programmes shifts away from military structures towards the larger communities that are affected by armed violence. Traditional DDR involves a range of activities falling under the operational categories of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Second Generation programmes, on the other hand, include a number of different types of activities that can be implemented to support the peace process, build trust, contribute to a secure environment and help build the foundation for longer term peace-building.

Scholars who have studied the current PAP in the Niger Delta have pointed to the somewhat neglect of conflict transformation issues such as developmental neglect, resource control and oil economy transformation (Ikelegbe 2010:81-83; Asuni 2011:171; Oluwaniyi 2011:52), the focus on only the ex-militants and exclusive concern with their reintegration (Joab-Peterside, Okodudu, Ekekwe & Obipi 2011:323), absence of broad based participation, stakeholdership and agreements, and the neglect of reinsertion and resettlement, security sector reform and transitional justice (Ikelegbe 2010:72; Joab-Peterside et al 2011:xxi; Aghedo 2011:16-17). Some scholars have also described the Amnesty as treating the symptoms (Joab-Peterside et al 2011:323), insensitive to gender (Omotola 2011), failing in disarmament (Ikelegbe 2010:68-69; Aghedo 2011:17; Asuni:2011:166), huge in costs because of extensive payments and patronage, (Asuni 2011:166; Oluwaniyi 2011:51), ad hoc and haphazardly designed and implemented (Ikelegbe 2010:72) and flawed in implementation particularly in the rehabilitation and reintegration stages(Asuni 2011:158; Oluwaniyi 2011:53). As a result, there are fears about the sustainability of the peace and security attained (Ikelegbe & Onokerhoraye 2016).

CHAPTER THREE

THE PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTY PROGRAMME: IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE

The Presidential Amnesty Programme

The Amnesty programme is traceable to three major incidents. First is the South-South Legislative Retreat convened by Vanguard and sponsored by the governors of South-South States in Port Harcourt, August 2008, whose communiqué anchored on abrogation of some petroleum laws as they affect the region and Amnesty for Militants, was presented to the president. Chaired by Justice Karibi-White(RTD) and attended by eminent persons like Chief E.K. Clark, the conference was declared open by then vice president Goodluck Jonathan, who facilitated the presentation of the communiqué to president Yar'Adua (Mavua,2014). Second were the efforts of the Security and Peace Committee headed by then vice president Goodluck Jonathan, who through 2007 and 2009 embarked on peace missions to the militant camps in the region to convince them on the need for cessation of hostilities and embrace of peace. Third was the Niger Delta Technical Committee which was chaired by Mr. Ledum Mitee. Among others, the committee recommended an Amnesty Programme for the militants.

IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPLEMENTATION STRUCTURES

Militants were expected to embrace the Amnesty within a 60 day moratorium between 6th August and 4th October 2009. A Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament of Militants in the Niger Delta was set up to manage the process. At the expiration of the 60-day grace period on October 4, 2009, a total of 20,192 militants surrendered their arms and ammunition to the Federal Government and accepted the offer of amnesty. In fact, most of the militant group leaders and members embraced the amnesty and came out of their camps to surrender arms

and ammunitions at arms collection centres, designated for arms collection in Edo, Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Ondo and Rivers. However, further opportunities were instituted for those who accepted amnesty after October 4, 2009. Thus 6,166 persons were enlisted into the second phase in 2010 and another 3,642 in October 2012. The third phase was a product of a verification exercise conducted by a committee set up by the Chief of Defence Staff and chaired by Air Vice Marshall James Gbum (Ameh, 2013).

The subsequent inclusion of more ex-militants into the programme between October 2009 and 2012 was a result of agitations for participation. There could be several reasons for this. First is that the genuineness or sincerity of programme intentions became clearer as progress was made. It has been argued that some militants were wary of PAP and stayed out of it. Some may have stayed back as part of organized back up force in the event of failure of PAP. Second, is that hitherto disarmed groups from previous state government driven peace projects such as the Itsekiri National Youth Command (500 ex militants) sought inclusion. Third is that those who were excluded initially such as some followers of late John Togo and the Latu group from the Bakassi Peninsula had to be incorporated.

To be sure, there have been attempts to incorporate some community youth into PAP particularly at the reintegration stage. In the second phase, about 842 youths who were non militants were selected from communities impacted by armed violence and oil pollution, and included in PAP (<http://www.thewillnigeria.com/politics/17460.html>08/12/2012.accessed 21/8/14). This also further proves that non armed youth has been part of PAP either surreptitiously or by deliberate policy actions. (<Http://www.punchng.com/news/jonathan approves 3642 ex militants for-inclusion-in-amnesty programme/>Accessed 13/8/2014

The actual implementation of the programme began with the disarmament component of the Amnesty programme, which was managed by the Amnesty Implementation Committee. This was essentially a military exercise conducted by the Nigerian Armed forces. The arms surrendered included 287,445 different types of ammunitions, and about 2,760 assorted arms and 18 gunboats among others (Ifeatu, 2010). Disarmament was concluded in December 2009 but the arms and ammunitions collected were stored at the 82 Division of the Nigerian Army in Enugu and in compliance with extant DDR codes as spelt out by the United Nations, were destroyed by the Nigerian Army in Lokpanta, Enugu State on May 25 2011 under the watch of the Amnesty Office (Nigeriamasterweb.com, 2012).

The demobilization exercises involved the identification, registration and documentation of militants in designated camps. In December 2011, the Amnesty Office completed the Demobilization component of the Presidential Amnesty Programme (Ugbolue, 2012). The rehabilitation of ex-militants began in June 2010 at the Obubra camp in Cross River State in batches. The programme entailed biometric documentation, wellness check, nonviolence transformational training, and series of counselling and career classification of the ex-agitators. The transformational and reorientation activities in the Camp were tailored to destroy the belief of the ex-agitators in violence and provide them the more powerful alternative of nonviolence.

The expenditures on PAP have been huge. In 2010, N8billion was expended on the programme. This rose to a staggering N102.2 billion in 2011 and N66.8billion in 2013. In 2011, N21.9billion was spent on the monthly stipends of ex-militants (Thisday18/02/14). The 2014 proposed budget for the PAP is more than the capital budget for several sectors such as Defence and Water Resources. As at February 2014, it was claimed that PAP had received about

N243,133,9177,590,03 since it began (Soriwoe,2014). As at February 2014, PAP was said to have gulped N248 billion for monthly stipends and training of ex-militants. Training had gulped N160 billion. About N74b was spent on PAP in 2012, N88b budgeted in 2013 and N63b proposed in the 2014 Appropriation bill (<http://thecitizenng.com/headline-2/> Feb 16 2014 Accessed 27/8/14). The budgets for Amnesty indicate that in 2013, over 35% was spent on stipends and allowances of 30,000 ex-militants, while over 55% went for reintegration of ex-militants. Thus there was no provision for several items that go along with inclusive DDR.

Table 3.1: The DDR Programme in the Niger Delta

S/N		Number of person involved	Time
1	Accepted Amnesty	20,192	October 4,2009
		6,166	Second Phase
		3,642	Third Phase 2012
	Total	Total 30,000	
2	Demobilization	15,434	June 2010-May 2011
	Transformational Training		
3	Reintegration: Formal Education Vocational Training Centre Skills acquisition	6,067 transformed ex-militants being processed for reintegration. 2,500 in higher institutions. 13,000 in local and foreign training centres	2014
4	Facilitating employment	113 employed in maritime, welding fabrication. Others in some agencies at	2013-2014

		home and abroad	
5	Economic empowerment	Pilot scheme of start up funds for specialized businesses for trained ex militants	2014

Source: Authors research work

PAP has been training middle and high level manpower in petroleum, agro allied industries and marine sector. About 2,500 were in higher institutions at home and abroad while 13,000 were involved in vocational training and skills acquisition in local and foreign training centres. About 834 were placed in about 100 universities at home and abroad in 2013 and 459 ex-militants were placed in private universities in Nigeria for 2012/2013. In 2013, 2,400 were deployed to vocational training centres at home and abroad (<http://www.informationng.com>, March, 2014, accessed 17/8/14). As at September, 2013, 16,683 ex-militans had been sent for training while it is planned that 6,000 would be trained in 2014 and another 6,000 in 2015 ([http://thecitizen .com/headlive-21 fg-spend-n260b-on 3000 ex militants, 16. Feb 2014. Accessed v27/9/2014](http://thecitizen.com/headlive-21 fg-spend-n260b-on 3000 ex militants, 16. Feb 2014. Accessed v27/9/2014)). Reintegration trainings have taken place in Ghana, Russia, Ukrain, USA, SA, Israel, Phillipine, Sri Lanka, Polland and India in such vocational skills as ICT, pipeline welding, Ocean diving, air piloting, boat building and sea faring.

Table 3.2: Ex-Militants Trained in Vocational Skills

S/N	Skills	Number
1	Agriculture	239
2	Automobile	207
3	Welding \$ Fabrication	2,204

4	Entrepreneurship	2,2798
5	Carpentry and Plumbing	298
6	Oil Drilling & Marine	916
7	Electrical Installation	89
8	ICT	273
9	Crave & heavy duty machine	1,030
10	Boat building	299
11	Pipe fitting	250
12	Entertainment	60
13	Others	618
14	Total	9,192

Business Day 18: August 2014 <http://businessday online.com/2013/04 youth-empowerment>\Accessed 18/8/14

Over 9,192 have graduated from skills programme in various fields majorly welding and fabrication (Table 3.2). About 2,204 have graduated from entrepreneurship training, 2,798 from oil drilling and 916 from marine courses. The graduates from crane and heavy duty training were 1030; boat building 299; and agriculture 239. PAP as at June 2014 had produced 66 airplane and helicopter pilots and 61 aviation maintenance engineers trained in United Kingdom, South Africa, UAE, Jordan and Greece (<http://eworldmagazine.com/index.phpleworld-news/national-news>, 23 June 2014, accessed 14/8/14).

PAP has however being soliciting for employment for trained EM with poor results. Of the over 11,700 graduates of trainee programmes, the Nigerian Custom Service is reported to have employed six, the Nigerian Army enlisted 10 out of 40

that indicated interests, while in response to recruitment advertisement in the Petroleum and Energy Sector, 40 were employed by Century Energy Group and five by SAP Drilling Oil and Gas Limited (Soriwei, 2014). A few former trainees have been offered appointment abroad such as five (5) welders & fabricators in South Africa, and 30 in United Arab Emirates. Altogether, PAP has facilitated employment of 113 former militants as at early 2014(<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news> Friday August 2014 accessed 17/8/2014). Though PAP has been making appeals to companies, stakeholders and partners in the petroleum sector and elsewhere, efforts have not been substantively adequate and successful in the generation of employment opportunities. However, in 2014 PAP began a pilot scheme for post- training employment and start up business funds in which about 300 were provided support for specialized businesses such as welding, fish farming and retail business (Soriwei, 2014).

Table 3.3: The DDR in the Niger Delta

S/N	Benchmarks for Success in DDR	Niger Delta
1	Quantity of arms surrendered in relation to estimated stockpiles and availability	Very poor. Number not commensurate with militia firepower, number of participants in amnesty programme.
2	Control of access to further arms, arms inflow, arms trading and opportunities for rearmament.	Very poor.
3	Number of person disarmed.	High and perhaps exaggerated
4	Equipping of demobilisation and orientation camps in terms of infrastructures, services and logistics.	The second and third phases do not Seemed to have been demobilised and reoriented.
5	Payments to support ex-militants usually 6-12 months.	High, more than national minimum wage. Prolonged payments since 2009.
6	Inclusiveness, reintegration benefits to affected families, communities, disabled combatants.	Not applicable.

7	Resettlement into agriculture.	Not existent
8	Resettlement of disabled, displaced, wounded ex-combatants and community members.	Not existent
9	Standards and qualifications for inclusion into DDR.	Not clear, strict and standard definition thereby allowing all kinds of entrants and later day agitators.

Source; Authors research work

Surveillance contracts were awarded in 2011 by NNPC to ex-militants leaders, worth N6.36billion. The specific contracts range from Mr. Tompolo Ekpomupolo (N3.6 b), Asari Dokubo (N1.4 b), Ebikabowei Boyo of (N608 m) Ateke Tom (N608m) <http://citizenng.com/headlive-2> Feb 16, 2014, Accessed 27/8/14). The idea of surveillance contracts to ex-militant leaders to secure the nation's pipeline infrastructure, was first mooted in 2008 by the Yar' Adua presidency, as a way of engaging the ex-militant formation in a post-conflict era. NNPC was even involved then in contractual relationship with some ex-militant leaders and communities over policing of the pipelines, and paid some militants a monthly ransom of \$6m to secure and enable the repairs of the Chanom crude oil pipeline in Delta State.

The ex-militant leaders are now in a class of influence and wealth. They move around in large entourage and convoys accompanied by security men, and followers. Several of them have access to government houses, live in palatial houses and patronize the best hotels. There are allegations that some are political appointees, big wigs, enlisted political thugs and close associates as political leaders (Daily Times, 2014).

THE PERFORMANCE OF PAP

Most assessments of PAP tend to be related to cessation of armed militancy and violence, increased production of crude oil and gas, the increased revenues

accruing to the Nigerian governments because of uninterrupted production of crude oil and gas the resulting investment flow, and stabilization and growth of the economy. Others point to the disarming of 30,000 ex militants and diverse training and skills acquired or being acquired by them through the reintegration programme.

The critical interrogation of the components and management of PAP however reveal several weaknesses and challenges. The disarmament programme was incomplete and excluded the disarming of the civil population and the control of arms proliferation (Table 3.3). Very few quality arms were surrendered particularly when related to the number of ex-militants that surrendered. The demobilization process was accompanied by inadequacies of facilities and provisions. The subsequent phases of PAP have only had partial demobilization and rehabilitation. The rehabilitation programme which was only for two weeks according to Oluwaniyi (2014) was inadequate to demilitarize the mindset of ex-militants and make them to fully embrace the values of nonviolence. Several ex-militants were not demobilized while others had their demobilization delayed up till the rehabilitation and transformation stages. Subsequent phases of PAP have enjoyed less recognition, facilities and benefits in terms of demobilization and rehabilitation. The reintegration programme is ongoing but though considerable progress has been made, it has suffered from poor monitoring and poor reintegration of ex-militants into communities.

The eligibility methods have tended to shift with subsequent phases being more tedious in terms of allocation of one or two slots to several guns submitted. Several groups have claimed to have been disarmed by submitting arms to JTF without being included in the phases 2 and 3. There have been allegations that the third Amnesty phase was arbitrary and hijacked by external forces. There are also

allegations of subjective judgements in the determination of the strength and membership of each militant group, which has meant that the allotment of reintegration spaces to ex-militant leaders and groups may have been inequitable and imbalanced, thus creating a situation of favouritism, deprivation and conflicts. There were protests among ex-militant leaders that their camps were allocated very few slots for monthly stipends relative to the number of persons who surrendered and the arms they surrendered in the third phase of the Amnesty in Edo and Delta States.

The Amnesty package was initially associated with a rush by criminal bands, armed gangs, thugs, cultists and others who suddenly acquired militancy status, in order to become beneficiaries. This tended to crowd out the real militants who were initially cautious and some of whom remained in the creeks to watch and see in terms of the sincerity and outcomes before making more commitments. Some of these militants who later became convinced attempted to enter the programme at the second and third phases, but had limited chances for accommodation and reintegration. This is partly the reason for continued protests over exclusion.

The forces of nepotism and patronage have allegedly played roles in the declared membership list of ex-militant groups and in the selection of participants into the reintegration programmes. Given the benefits of reinsertion and reintegration in a region with huge youth unemployment, it could be expected that there could be clamour for listings and false claims to membership, which pressure could generate non transparency in the listing of members and recommendations for reintegration.

There have been numerous protests by former ex-militant groups over non inclusion in the second and third phases of the project, even though they had surrendered arms. Some of these groups include Italibabon Revolution Movement

(3,000 ex-militants led by General Nomukeme (Keity Sese) (Utebor,2014). In March 2013, ex militants protesting non documentation of 315 militant camps in Delta State and non inclusion in the third phase to the Presidential Inter- Agency Task Force, set ablaze a gas pipeline in OML 30, in Ughelli North LGA of Delta State. Up-till October 2013, some excluded ex-militants were still allegedly planning to stage protests in Abuja, over agitation for inclusion in another phase of the PAP (Ameh, 2013).

Table 3.4: Status of Inclusion in PAP

Activities	Ex Militants	Ex Militant Leaders	Other Niger Delta Citizens
Rehabilitation	Engaged	-	Exclusion of activists , youth, lack of societal Rehabilitation
Reintegration	Huge expenses on Amnesty reintegration benefits	Huge benefits for themselves, boys, families.	Exclusion of the youth and Citizens; dependents, disabled, communities, victims etc
Economic Empowerment	Few EM have benefitted because of little efforts and poor priority attention	Surveillance, contracts, other contracts Access to top government officials	Exclusion of youth and other citizens
Reinsertion Benefits	Reinsertion benefits 2010-2016	Huge reinsertion benefits made through ex militant leaders	Exclusion of youth. Little attention to youth and other citizens as indicated by increased expenditures or budgeting to NDDC/Ministry of Niger Delta

Source: Authors research work

PAP has had a narrow beneficiary and stakeholder base. This is because militancy was dominantly an Ijaw phenomenon with a sprinkle of youth from the other ethnic groups in the region. Thus the settlement through monthly payments, human capacity and economic empowerment of 30,000 ex militants is largely like a settlement of Ijaw youths. Thus, PAP and the DDR are concentrated among the youth of Bayelsa, and parts of Rivers, Delta and Ondo States. Consequently, in the main, it can be claimed that PAP by leadership and beneficiaries is dominantly Ijaw. This settlement in the later phases has included a sprinkle of youths who were part of the Ijaw led militia movement from the Itsekiri, Urhobo and other groups. However, the non Ijaw ethnic groups and the youth from Aqua Ibom, Cross Rivers, Abia, and Edo have been agitating for more inclusion in the activities of PAP and even in the appointments and development activities of the federal government.

There have been allegations of preferential treatment of some generals and ex-militants of selected camps. Ex-militants in Aqua Ibom state protested in Uyo in September 2012, over non inclusion in surveillance contracts awarded by the NNPC, and lopsided and deliberate neglect of Aqua Ibom people in the Amnesty Programme (Ekpimah, 2012). There have been some protests by former ex-militant groups over non inclusion in the second and third phases of the project, even though they surrendered arms (Utebor, 2014). In March 2013, ex militants protesting non documentation of 315 militant camps in Delta State and non inclusion in the third phase the President Inter- Agency Task Force, set ablaze a gas pipeline in OML 30, in Ughelli North LGA of Delta State.

Though there were extensive efforts in the training and education of EM as part of the reintegration programme, there were challenges. The training institutions to which the EM were enrolled in Nigeria and abroad are not properly equipped and

lacked capacity to give expected knowledge and skills. Some ex militants complained that the institutes were often vocational centres rather training institutes. Sometimes, the duration of training was not sufficient to acquire desired skills. Most of the ex-militants were not given the real training and the real training skills. For example, instead of pipeline welding, they were engaged in canopy and gate fixing.

There is no public employment or short term recruitment programme. Support for ex militants in the form of subsidies, empowerment programmes, loans and equipment has been scanty, just as support for resettlement into agricultural activities such as fishery, bee keeping, animal husbandry, land preparation, agricultural loans, and creation of cooperative and support associations. The lack of employment opportunities particularly for the ex-militants who have been trained and even those who were excluded but unemployed is generating frustration and inclinations to resort to making a living through armed robbery, stealing of crude (oil theft) in the creeks and kidnapping.

Table 3.5: PAP DDR in the Context of Best Practices

BEST PRATICE	NIGER DELTA DDR
Female ex-combatant and Assistants/and assistance Dependants and families ex-combatants Disabled Ex-combatants/ vulnerable persons , child soldiers	No provisions and engagements
Involvement/technical and humanitarian support/implementation/funding/	Promises of funding. No involvement.

Settlement of ex-combatants in home, communities or communities of their choice. Communities renewal and reconstruction programme	Lack of community involvement in reintegration, ineffective reintegration in communities	
Psychological counselling, Psychosocial assistance, trauma management, recuperation support, medical and economic assistances, training and business start up support for disabled ex-combatants Aid assistance to families of ex-combatants	Largely not available excepting for some counselling effort probably at demobilization centres.	
Security Sector Reform	Restructuring/reform of Armed forces/Security Integration of some ex-combatants into the security agencies. Retraining/Re-orientation	None

Source: Authors research work

PAP did not pay adequate attention to social integration issues such as reunifying ex militants (EM) with their communities, re-unifying EM with their families, facilitating acceptance and combating stigmatization of ex-militants in the communities.

The management of the programme has been associated with diverse protests. There were several protests in Yenagoa and Port Harcourt over the problems faced by ex-militants at the demobilization and rehabilitation stages of the PAP. There have been protests over the non payment or delayed payment of monthly stipends.

The Forum for Ex-militant Leaders led by one General Gift Tare of Iduwini Volunteer Force, threatened resumption of attacks on oil infrastructure in November, 2011, over non payment of regular monthly allowances of disarmed militants, and preferential treatment of some generals and their ex-militants (<http://www.pilotafrica.com/2011/11/07>. Accessed 21/8/14)

There have been protests by some ex-militants since 2013 over non payment of allowances. At a point, ex-militants were turned back from getting to Abuja for protest of non payment of allowances. They alleged that their payments are allegedly diverted with connivance of their camp commanders, and the Amnesty Office, and that they were asked to sign off to forfeit N30,000 of their allowances for payment to their bank accounts to be restored (Bassey, 2014). There have been protests too by ex-militants participating vocational training in Ghana over non payment of their monthly stipends (<http://elombah.com/index/php/lates/11740>. Accessed 13/8/14.)

There are allegations that the PAP is being mismanaged on the following grounds:

- i) Many ex-militants are excluded even after submitting arms particularly in the phases 2 and 3.
- ii) Several ex-militants were not demobilized or had delayed demobilization at the rehabilitation and transformation stages.
- iii) Places of genuine ex-militants were taken over by cronies, associates and relations of ex-militant leaders and political leaders.
- iv) Some non genuine ex-militants have had to share their monthly stipends with ex-militants leaders and others who incorporated them.
- v) Connections and influence are crucial in selection for training abroad and several of those selected are not genuine ex-militants.
- vi) Some ex-militants have had more than one slot at trainings.
- vii) The centres of training and trainers particularly those abroad, are not competent and capable in terms of capacity, equipment and demonstration.
- viii) Inequitable distribution of reintegration slots among ex-militant groups and camps.
- ix) Subsequent phases of the PAP have enjoyed less recognition, facilities and benefits.

- x) Several ex-militants have been deported from South Africa and other countries for daring to complain or protest poor facilities and treatment.
- xi) Some ex-militants sent abroad were forced into trainings/skills other than those expressed (Oluwalana, 2012)

The huge role that ex-militant leaders are playing in PAP is a deficit to the objectives of security and peace. Involving ex-militant leaders in the determination of eligibility of ex-militants had clear advantages. However, the subsequent roles of paying monthly stipends through ex-militant leaders, irrespective of advantages of control and discipline that may be derived violates a major objective of DDR programme, which is disconnecting groups and controls such that there is less possibility for re-grouping and return to violence.

PAP is a tokenistic, monetized, or cash based exclusionary settlement of the armed segment rather than a resolution of the crisis. It has trained and pays 30,000 youth but has not settled the problems and satisfied the demands and aspirations of the communities and people of the Niger Delta. Such exclusionary settlement without conflict transformation is fragile and cannot be a basis for sustainable peace and security. Any accentuation of the ND problematic or threat to regional interests, and major developments that affects the fortune of the region can be expected to generate or accentuate grievances, frustration and anger that can drive ex militants to the forest and creeks in a new resistance. Already the demand of the region for resource control and increased derivation funds in the 2014 constitutional conferences had led to threats by the Niger Delta People Salvation Front led by Majahid Dokubo to mobilize and return to the creeks to resist Nigeria's exploitation of the region ([http:mail. Iyep.com.ng/news/item](http://mail. Iyep.com.ng/news/item) JULY 18, 2014. Accessed 21/8/14

The payment of monthly stipends, which is much higher than the nations' minimum wage has been quite prolonged. It does appear that the nation has to

continue PAP and its payments as part of the purchase of peace. Some ex-militant leaders such as Ramsey Oyakemeagbegha are already warning that the termination of the Amnesty could trigger fresh crisis (Imoh, 2014). The ex-militant leader of Ebipa-Opre Ex-militants Forum argues that apart from the fact that the conditions which trigger militancy are yet to be addressed, idle ex-militants without further reintegration payments could tend towards violence, criminality and militancy.

There have been threats of resurgence of militancy and violence, and attacks on oil and gas infrastructure particularly since 2014. MEND was reported to have attacked oil facilities at Ogbegbagbene in Burutu LGA in Delta State in early 2014. There were earlier attacks in 2012. Following the attack, the House of Representatives mandated some committees to investigate the performance of bodies with relevance to PAP(<http://www.theNigeriavoice.com/nvnews/82211/1/houseinvestigates.html>29/8/14).

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSES 1

Two survey research instruments were designed and administered to two sample categories respectively. The social activists schedule is a partly structured and partly unstructured questionnaire, administered to a social activist sample (SAS) which comprised **443** persons who are involved in the Niger Delta struggle as activists (76.5%) and militant agitators (16.7%). They are largely male (81.9%), aged between 25 and 34 years (80.1%), Christian (90.1%), married (53%) and unemployed (41.3%) and earned monthly incomes of between ₦20,000 and ₦100,000 (50.8%). They were largely from the Ijaw ethnic group (67%) and are drawn from the core Niger Delta states of Bayelsa (39.9%), Delta (31%) and Rivers (29.1%); based on purposive sampling technique.

Table 4.1: Dominant Social Characteristic of the Social Activist Sample (SAS)

S/N	Social characteristics	Dominant characteristics
1	Age	25-34 years (80.1%)
2	Sex	Male (81.9%)
3	Religion	Christian (90.1%)
4	Marital Status	Married (53%)
5	Employment	Unemployed (41.3%)
6	Monthly income	₦20,000 – ₦100,000 (50.8%)
7	Ethnic group	Ijaw (67%)

The In-depth schedule (INIS) is a partly structured and partly unstructured questionnaire that was administered to the general public in the core Niger Delta States (Bayelsa 33%; Delta 37.4; Rivers 29.6%) using purposive sampling. There

are 2,444 respondents who are majorly drawn from the age sets 15-24 (25.5%) and 24-34 (65.1%). They are mostly male (62.8%), Christian (81.5%) and educated at the secondary school level and above (77.2%). About half of the sample (48.8%) are married. Most of the respondents are either unemployed (39%) or engaged in business, trading, farming and artisanship (36.1%). Only 25.6% are employed in the government and private sector organizations. The respondents' monthly income is majorly below ₦100,000 (95.3%). The data elicited from the two questionnaires are presented in percentages, and bar and pie charts.

Table 4.2: Dominant Social Characteristic of INIS

S/N	Social characteristics	Dominant characteristics
1	Age	25-34 years (65.1%)
2	Sex	Male (62.8%)
3	Religion	Christian (81.5%)
4	Marital Status	Married (48.8%)
5	Highest Education	Secondary (77.2%)
6	Occupation	Not employed (39%)
7	Monthly income	₦20,000 – ₦100,000 (55.5%)

PERCEPTION OF MILITANCY AS METHOD OF ENGAGEMENT IN THE RESOURCE STRUGGLE AND CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA

The SAS see militancy as resulting from a combination of political challenges (64.6%), which are derived from the sense of regional and minority ethnic deprivation amidst resource endowment. The political challenges including marginality, resource control and underdevelopment are driven by governance based claims of resource and development entitlements and benefits. However,

youth unemployment (20.3%) and poverty (8.4%) are also issues that explain the youth vanguard role in the militancy.

In the INIS sample, the region based socio-economic and political conditions of lack of development and social amenities (22.8%), resource injustice and the struggle for resource control (19.6%), and marginality and deprivation (18.9%) are also seen to be the source of the militancy (Figure 4.1). The regions high level of youth unemployment (26.4%) is the single most important factor that is perceived to have generated militant agitation in the region.




Figure 4.1: Causes of Militancy in the Niger Delta (INIS)

These results indicate that there were certain conditions that generated grievances, frustration and anger among the people of the region. These pertain largely to issues of relative deprivation. The region is seen as disadvantaged in the benefits from its resource contributions, and marginalized in developmental attention and outcomes, in spite of its enormous resource endowments and contributions to the national revenue profile. However, as noted in both samples, unemployment and poverty particularly among the youth are crucial to the youth involvement in the militancy.

If militancy was brewed from the socio-political conditions and grievances of the region, it would mean that it had grass-root and popular support. The investigation of the perceptions of respondents on militancy and nature of militant engagements in the struggle for resource control is however divided. In the INIS sample, 50.8% perceive militancy and militant engagements as positive, worthy and proper while 49.2% see it otherwise.




Figure 4.2: Positive Perception of Ex-militant Engagement in the Militancy

As Figure 4.2 indicates, the ex-militants are seen as being right to have engaged in the struggle against underdevelopment and marginality (77.2%) and for resource control (5.6%). Militancy is also seen as the choice instrument of engagement because of the results that violence could achieve in terms of attention and solutions (11.8%), given the insensitivity of government (1.6%).

However, those who perceived militancy and militant engagement negatively (49.2%) see the very act of carrying arms against the state as wrong and negative (50.5%). Furthermore, the ex-militants activities had very negative consequences in the region (20.5%). Quite significantly, the ex-militants were involved in violence and criminality, killings and atrocious activities such as kidnapping (29%). These undermined the peace, security and development thereby accentuating poverty.

The results indicate that militancy did not have predominant support and that the activities of the militant formation alienated some of the population. The result also reveals that armed engagement of the state is still seen as wrong and unacceptable by a segment of the population. Though the struggle was seen as necessary, it is the nature of the state and youth frustration that made the resort to violence inevitable.

INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN THE PAP

The study investigated the level of inclusion or exclusion in PAP. This is in terms of which groups were favoured in the access to PAP and its benefits.

The INIS sees the PAP as having favoured male ex-militants and major ex-militant groups, (48.6%), ex-militant leaders (30.9%) and the Ijaw ethnic group (11.7%). This means that militants that belonged to smaller militant groups, less powerful militant leaders and that were non Ijaws did not have fair access to inclusion in PAP. This may be the explanation for the numerous protests over non inclusion by some ex-militants and ex-militant groups as well as protests by ex-militant leaders over discriminatory benefits.

The issue of exclusion from PAP, given the number of ex-militants that were registered, which is quite huge relative to the scale and extent of the militancy and the military and militia confrontations, raises the need to investigate the content of participants.

Both the INIS and SAS believe very strongly that non ex militants were registered into and do participate in PAP (Figure 4.3). The INIS sample thinks that the number of the ex-militants in the DDR that are not actually ex-militants is quite high (80%).




Figure 4.3: Responses to Allegations that many DDR participants are not actual Ex-militants

The reasons adduced by both INIS and SAS for the situation is majorly corruption, reward, political influence and politicization of the process (Figure 4.4). Thus participation in the Amnesty has been allegedly bloated because of selfish and corrupt behaviour of the big political, ethno-regional and ex-militant leaders. This category of DDR participants emerged because the process of registration was corrupted, politicized and manipulated to extend the anticipated benefits of training and reinsertion payments to wards, relations, loyalists and associates of politicians, ex-militant leaders and ethno-regional leaders (Figure 4.4). What is clear is that some ex-militant leaders and politicians took opportunity of the Amnesty to access benefits for their boys, loyalists and associates.




Figure 4.4: Reasons Adduced for Registration of Non Ex-Militants into DDR

The programme is seen as fairly exclusionary as only some ex-militants were accommodated (49.5%). Particularly excluded is the non-armed youth (19.4%). Further investigation reveals that the PAP is perceived as not fair to the small militant groups (44%) and non-militant youth (54.2%). The exclusion of the non-militant and non armed youth from the PAP is seen as having very negative consequences for sustainable peace and security. Apart from it not being fair (27.3%), it could lead to a new regime of arms proliferation, violence and social unrest (44.8%) and youth restiveness (8.8%) (Figure 4.5). Since arms and violence have become a ticket to prolonged monthly payments, education and training, the non-militant youth has to wait for the next regime of violence to demonstrate their independence and proclivity to violence in order to position themselves for the next Amnesty.




Figure 4.5: Perception of exclusion of non-militant youth from the Amnesty programme (INIS)

The fairness and equitableness of PAP to diverse groups was investigated in INIS (Figure 4.6). The results indicate that PAP is not seen to be fair and equitable to any of the groups. Particularly, it is seen to be unfair and inequitable to the victims of the struggle (59.7%), communities affected by violence (56.5%), children affected by violence (55.4%), vulnerable citizens (54.9%) and non militant youth (54.2%). It is evident that PAP ignored these groups in its implementation conception and activities.




Figure 4.6: Assessment of the Fairness and Equitability of the PAP to Groups Involved or Affected By the Conflict (INIS)

IMPLEMENTATION OF PAP

The success or otherwise of the implementation of PAP is perceived from the perspective of specific assessments of its sub programmes or component parts of DDR and aspects of inclusive DDR.

SAS assesses implementation as very successful or successful (56.4%). To INIS however, implementation is not successful and failing (54.3%). SAS predicates its assessment on the peace and security that PAP has brought about and the assistance to ex-militant youth (Figure 4.7). For the INIS, the assessment of PAP's implementation as not successful is based on issues of corrupt management (72.6%) and lack of inclusiveness (27.4%) (Figure 4.8).




Figure 4.7: Reasons for assessing of the implementation of the Amnesty programme as **successful (SAS)**

For those who assessed implementation as successful in INIS (45.7%), the reasons alluded to are the impacts on reduction in violence and thug-gery (33.5%), and reduction in criminality (28.5%). What is evident here is that for SAS, the assessment of implementation is based mainly on issues of impacts rather than the management and outcomes of implementation. For INIS, the assessment of

implementation is based on the nature of management. Thus by nature of management and implementation, PAP could be assessed as not successful and but failing.




Figure 4.8: Reasons for assessing the implementation of the amnesty programme as failure (INIS)




Figure 4.9: Reasons for Assessing implementation of the Amnesty programme as successful (INIS).

The outcomes of the implementation of components and sub-programmes of PAP are identified and used as indications of implementation success or otherwise. In Figure 4.10, the INIS assesses all items excepting retraining (68.3%) and resettlement (66%) of ex-militants as un-successful. The most unsuccessful are the lack or poor management of compensation and assistance to victims and reconstruction of communities destroyed during the struggle.




Figure 4.10: Performance of the Amnesty Programme in Managing DDR (INIS)

Similarly, the sub-programmes of compensation and assistance to victims (74.5%) and reconstruction of communities (74.7%) are seen as unsuccessful by SAS (Figure 4.11). The point is that apart from retraining, the other items were not on the agenda of PAP even though they are component parts of inclusive DDR.




Figure 4.11: Assessment of Reintegration Programme of Amnesty (SAS)

The investigation of sub-programmes of DDR in Figures 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13 indicate that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are assessed as successful in both INIS and SAS. Apart from this, the employment programme is also assessed as unsuccessful by both INIS and SAS. In the other programmes, there are marginal differences in the assessments which indicate that the outcomes may not have been clearly overwhelming. Thus, entrepreneurship and self employment programme is assessed as marginally successful in INIS but marginally failing in SAS, while post reintegration programme is marginally unsuccessful to INIS, but successful to SAS.




Figure 4.12: Assessment of Implementation of the Amnesty Programme (INIS)

What emerges from the investigation is that the core programme focus of PAP has been disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and retraining. In these areas, the assessment of implementation is successful. However, the other areas such as compensation, reconstruction and employment are assessed as not successful.




Figure 4.13: Assessment of Sub-Programmes and Concerns of PAP (SAS)

MANAGEMENT OF THE PAP

PAP is seen by INIS to have been hijacked by some persons and focused only on ex-militants. Its management is seen as not transparent and accountable and have not won the confidence of ex-militants, youth and Nigerians.




Figure 4.14: Assessment of Management of the Amnesty Programme (INIS)

In Figure 4.15, the issue of accountability and transparency is further investigated in the INIS sample. Apart from corruption, the other major issue is the fact that ex-militants are not paid their full stipends. For the SAS, the main issue is corruption (Figure 4.16).




Figure 4.15: Assessment of the levels of accountability and transparency in the management of PAP (INIS).




Figure 4.16: Assessment of the levels of accountability and transparency in the management of PAP (SAS).

The INIS believes that the managers of PAP have not implemented it in the interest and to the benefits of the ex-militants and youth (72.2%). The reasons are that the nature of implementation has been exclusive (37.1%) and incomplete (18.8%). Besides, the managers are not transparent (27.9%) and are careless and fraudulent with PAP funds (Figure 4.17).




Figure 4.17: Assessment of nature of implementation by managers of PAP (INIS).

Though the deficiencies of poor funding (16.9%), poor attention to regional grievances (8.1%) and exclusion of non-militant youth (7.2%) exist, the core weaknesses of PAP pertain to the poor planning and management (26.2%), poor transparency and accountability (33.2%) and unequal distribution of benefits among ex-militants (7.9%). These indicate that internal weaknesses are central in the identification of challenges faced by PAP (67.3%) which further point to poor legitimacy, and confidence by the INIS in the management of the PAP in the period up till 2014.




Figure 4.18: Major challenges of the Amnesty programme (INIS)

The major challenges faced by PAP as seen by SAS have to do with unequal distribution and exclusionary nature of benefits (15.1%), the nature of programme management that lacks transparency and accountability (33.2%) and poor nature of planning, data base and management (26.2%). The Amnesty programme is also seen as poorly funded (16.9%) and has been poorly committed to and actually contributed little to addressing the region's grievances (8.1%). The challenges identified here, just like INIS have majorly to do with the nature of management.




Figure 4.19 Identification of the **weakness and deficiency** of the Amnesty programme (SAS).

The reasons for the weaknesses and challenges are investigated in INIS (Figure 4.20). These pertain largely to management including weak coordination and monitoring, selfish interests, corruption and poor foresight, planning and conceptions. This means that management constitutes the biggest challenge of PAP.

Figure 4.20: Assessment of factors responsible for the weaknesses and deficiencies of the Amnesty programme (INIS)

ASSESSMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE OF PAP

The investigation of the performance of PAP revolves around whether PAP has satisfied the objectives of militancy, perception of PAP, levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, the major strengths and the contributions.




Figure 4.20: Assessment of factors responsible for weaknesses and deficiencies of the amnesty programme

The reasons for engaging in social activism and militant agitation have not been achieved or assuaged by PAP (72.9%) (SAS). This because, the goals of development, elimination of deprivation and availability of youth employment which were sought are not yet achieved (Figure 4:21)




Figure 22: Opinion about the Amnesty Programme

In the SAS, those who believe that their objectives for engagement in the militant struggle have been achieved did so because of the PAP benefits to them, in terms of payments, youth empowerment and other opportunities (56.7%), rather than any alleviation of regional grievances. The other reasons were greater international (9.2%) and national attention and sensitivity (11%) and benefits that emerged from existing security in the region (13.3%).

The perception of PAP by INIS is coloured by its achievements in respect of peace and security, and reductions in the levels of militancy and youth restiveness (Figure 4.22). Thus the programme is good, but there are deficits in the areas of

non inclusiveness in participation and benefits, corruption and fraud, and poor design and management.

SAS is however not satisfied with PAP (65.2%). The bases for dissatisfaction are the lack of post amnesty social infrastructure provisioning and development (23.5%), There is also the post reintegration training lack of unemployment, and the lack of achievement of the purpose for the agitation (Figure 4.23).




Figure 4.23: Reasons for dissatisfaction with the Amnesty programme

For the few who are satisfied with PAP (Figure 4.24), the reasons advanced are economic empowerment and human capital development of the youth through PAP, the achievement of peace and security and reduction in violent criminality.




Figure 4.24: Reasons for satisfaction with the Amnesty programme

The INIS are largely not satisfied with PAP (58.5%). The reasons are that there is lack of substantive benefits even to the ex-militants (33.7%), lack of substantial impact (20.9%), poor accountability and transparency (21.9%), and the subsisting deplorable condition of the region of the region (8.8%). Those who were satisfied alluded to human capital and economic empowerment for the youth (36.7%), peace and security (31.9%) and reduced criminality, violence and social vices (31.4%).

What is evident here is that while the majority of INIS and SAS are dissatisfied, the basis is the lack of substantial impact of PAP on the region's development, the condition of unemployment and the lack of achievement of the reasons for agitation. Those who are satisfied are concerned with the direct benefits to the ex-militants and the peace, security and crime reduction that now exists that could be attributed to PAP.

The major strengths of PAP are investigated in INIS and SAS. For INIS, these are the achievements in terms of ex militant employment, monthly payments and human capital development, and the peace and security in the region (Figure 4.25). For SAS, peace and security, and the youth based benefits of employment, monthly payments and employment are also primary (Figure 4.26). Thus the major strengths or advantage that PAP has brought to the region is the allocation of benefits to ex-militants and the ensuing peace and security that resulted from the DDR.




Figure 4.25 Major strength / advantages of the Amnesty programme (INIS)




Figure 4.26: Major strength / advantages of the Amnesty programme (SAS)

The contributions of PAP to the region are investigated in INIS and SAS (Figure 4.27). There are three main contributions: peace among communities, human capital development and better life for ex militant youth, and the reintegration payments and employment for the ex militants. Other contributions such as to the development of the region and declining criminality are quite minor.




Figure 4.27 Major Contributions of the Amnesty Programme

The performance of PAP can be regarded as poor. It has not achieved the purposes for engagement in militancy and the people are dissatisfied with it. The entire achievements and basis for any positive assessment revolves around the benefits accruing to the ex-militants, and the resulting peace and security and reduced criminality and violence in the region. Otherwise, PAP has contributed little to the region.

ASSESSMENT OF IMPACT OF PAP

PAP is assessed to have overall positive impact (86.3%) which is predicated on the change of ex-militants from criminal and armed lifestyle to peaceful and productive one (26.4%) through training, skills development (30.1%) and the associated relative disengagement of the youth from criminality and violence (22.5%). The reintegration monthly payments of the youth in the PAP have also provided them a better life (20.5%) (Figure 4.28).




Figure 4.28: The Impact of the Amnesty Programme

More specifically, PAP has had very little effects on the conditions of the region, in the areas of unemployment, infrastructure, development, land degradation and oil spillage, and the demands of the region for resource control and increased derivation benefits (Figure 4.29).




Figure 4.29 How Amnesty has addressed the Conditions of the Niger Delta (INIS)

In terms of impact on regional security, PAP is seen to have brought youth restiveness, violent crimes and kidnapping, bunkering and illegal refining under some form of control (Figure 4.30). For the INIS (Figure 4.31), the impact on regional security is similar. What is clear from the investigation is that political violence has not been so positively affected as to bringing it under control.




Figure 4.30: Impact of Amnesty Programme on Regional Security (SAS)




Figure 4.31: Impact of Amnesty Programme on Regional Problems (INIS)

As in the assessments of performance, PAP has positively impacted on youth restiveness, and violent crimes and economic sabotage and thus has impacted positively on regional security. But these are because of the engagements of ex-militants in training, payments and productive reintegration activities. It is these that have impacted on the relative peace and security that now exists. The assessment of impact thus indicates that apart from peace and security, the only benefits accruing from PAP are to the ex-militant formation.

There are perceptions that the adoption and implementation of PAP have generated in the region.




Figure 4.32 Lessons learnt from the Amnesty Programme (INIS)

These perceptions pertain to the attitude and role of the State in the management of the agitation and violence in the region. First is that government sensitivity and responses to citizen agitation generates peace because there would be no need for violence if government listens (42%). Second is the importance of discussions,

dialogue and negotiations, which is seen as better than violence (16.6%). Had there been substantive and meaningful dialogue, violent militancy may have been unnecessary. Third, is that violence tends to pay in the sense of providing better results (11%). Those who engage in violent agitation also tend to be rewarded by reintegration benefits. Fourth, leadership and leadership commitment is crucial for conflict resolution. In this instance, the Yar'Adua Administration's commitment to the resolution of the region's crisis led to the establishment of PAP. Finally, the absence of equity and justice tends to lead to violent conflicts.

PAP AND PEACE BUILDING

Perception of PAP Contributions to Peace and Security

INIS believes that peace has returned to the region with the introduction of PAP (87.2%). SAS also thinks that there has been peace since PAP was established (88.5%). The reasons given by SAS (Figure 4.33) are that PAP has taken away the militants (63.6%) and that there are no more sustained clashes between ex-militants and security agencies (16.7%). A few however allude to some form of peaceful political settlement ostensibly between the federal government and the region.




Figure 4.33: Reasons for current peace & stability in the Niger Delta

However, INIS thinks that the current peace and security would not last (43.5%). However, about 17.3% of the sample is not sure. SAS is more certain that the current peace and security is not durable (61.9%). The peace is seen by SAS as fragile because of the numerous conditions that are seen to possibly trigger reoccurrence of violent conflicts. They are largely youth based (59.5%), youth grievances,(31.8%) exclusion of youth (9.9%) and lack of employment opportunities (17.8%) and militant youth groups such as MEND (2.5%). Others are failures to successful implement and achieve Amnesty benefits (12.9%) or discontinuation of the PAP (5.4%). Only few of the SAS sample alluded to regional development challenges (10.6%), poverty and deprivation (1.8%) and regional fortunes on the national political configuration (6.1%). The latter is interesting because the fate of former president Goodluck Jonathan, the insurgency in the north and national politics were seen as threats to peace in the region in the period before the 2015 general elections.




Fig 4.34: Forces/Group/persons/ that could triggered the reoccurrence of violent conflict in the Niger Delta (SAS)

The study further investigated the forces, groups and persons that could possibly cause violent conflict reoccurrence in the INIS. The groups are the possible emergence of aggrieved youth, including those excluded from PAP (28.9%), and aggrieved beneficiaries of the PAP (21.6%) and militant groups that could emerge in addition to the existing MEND and cult groups (8.9%). Apart from groups, there are conditions such as poverty and development deficits, unemployment and environmental pollution that could also trigger violent reoccurrence.




Figure 4.35 Forces / Groups / Persons that could trigger the reoccurrence of violent conflict in the Niger Delta (INIS)

The INIS sees conditions such as lack of employment and employment opportunities (37.7%) and PAP related challenges and potential regional conditions as major triggers for violent conflict reoccurrence. Poor implementation, poor benefits and failure of the PAP would generate failed expectations and sense of denied entitlements, (18.3%) while the termination of the PAP is seen of possibly generating frustration and anger among ex-militants and the region’s citizens (18.8%). The conditions of the region such as poverty and economic deprivation, and continued lack of development are also important, but

national politics and the fate of the former president Jonathan in the 2015 elections are not. The latter was regarded as threatening to national stability, before the elections, but it turned out otherwise.




Figure 4.36: Conditions that May likely lead to reoccurrence of violent conflict in the Niger Delta (INIS)

The content and the nature of implementation of PAP are perceived by INIS as possibly truncating the sustainability of the peace and security in the region. This could occur should the programme be terminated or un-sustained (35.3%). Furthermore, the continued poor management (34.9%) and particularly the lack of transparency in the payment of allowances (12.2%), corruption (6.5%) and the lack of post training employment could generate so much frustration as to cause the reoccurrence of violent conflicts.




Figure 4.37: Nature of the Amnesty Programme and its management that can lead to reoccurrence of violent conflict in the Niger Delta

PAP AS SOLUTION TO THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS

The effectiveness and outcomes of PAP in the resolution of the region's crisis is investigated.

PAP is not seen by INIS as lasting and inclusive solution to youth restiveness and militancy (54.5%). It does not address youth restiveness and agitation adequately (6.4%) and its economic empowerment programme is not effective (7.7%). However it has granted freedom from persecution of the ex-combatants who have now withdrawn from the creeks (17.7%) and enhanced their human capital development (14.5%) (Figure 4.38).




Figure 4.38 Amnesty Programme as Solution to Youth Restiveness and Militancy in Niger Delta (INIS)

For the SAS (Figure 4.39), PAP has had no broad and sustained effects on the restive youths in the region because it excluded most of the youth (43.6%). However, it has engaged allot of youth (14.2%), though it was embraced as a means of survival (19.9%). The engagement of the militant youth has brought relative peace and security (15.3%).




Figure 4.39 Effects of the Amnesty programme on the restive youths in the Niger Delta (SAS)

However, though PAP is not a sustainable and comprehensive solution to youth restiveness, it has controlled the phenomenon (64.4%), through enhancing youth empowerment (34.1%) and peace and security (11.3%), while reducing militancy (17.8%) and violence (9.3%) (Figure 4.40).




Figure 4.40: Effectiveness of Amnesty Programme in containing youth's restiveness in the Niger Delta (SAS)

The investigation of the effects of PAP on some of the region's problems in SAS reveals very poor outcomes. In all the identified regional problems and areas of agitation and demand, with the exception of youth restiveness, PAP is assessed as not having addressed them (Figure 4.41). Earlier in Figure 4.29, our investigation revealed that PAP has not addressed other problems such as unemployment, infrastructure and social services, and oil spillage.

However, the effect on regional security is different as indicated in Figures 4.30 and 4.31. Here PAP is assessed to have effected some control over youth restiveness, violent crimes and kidnapping, bunkering and illegal refineries. There

is less effect on political violence. Thus the only areas of PAP's effectiveness are the control of youth restiveness and regional security issues.




Figure 4.41: Effects of the AP on the Niger Delta Problems (SAS)

Since PAP is not seen as a sustained and comprehensive solution to most of the region's problems apart from regional security, the issue of what solutions that could be prescribed was investigated (Figure 4.42). In order of preference, the solutions to the Niger Delta crisis is seen by SAS in youth employment, resource control, improved livelihoods and economic empowerment, massive infrastructure and rural development and environmental restoration. For INIS, the only difference from SAS is less prioritization of resource control.




Figure 4.42: Suggested Solutions to the Niger Delta Crisis (SAS & INIS)

The study also investigates the kind of interventions that the region needs in INIS (Figure 4.43). The results reveal interventions around development: extensive development (29%), social services and infrastructure (11.5%), and commitment of the federal government to develop the region (8%). Besides direct physical development, the other issues are job creation (37.5%) and a human capital development programme that is inclusive in benefits and accountably managed (4.4%).




Figure 4.43: Interventions that could put an end to the conflict in the Niger

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 11

THE SAMPLE

The research investigation in addition to the structured and unstructured questionnaire (SAS and INIS) depended on key informant interviews (KII) and focus group discussions (FGD). The KII and one FGD each were conducted in four local governments areas each in Bayelsa (Yenagoa, Ekeremor, Sagbama and Southern Ijaw), Delta (Warri South, Warri Southwest, Bomadi and Burutu) and Rivers (Port Harcourt, Okrika, Gokana and Asari Toru). The key informant survey (K11) consisted of interviews conducted among members of the public who were social activists, opinion leaders, community leaders, members of civil society and youth organizations, and top officials of government agencies and oil companies. A total of 116 key informant interviews were conducted in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States and the Federal Capital Territory. The results of the interviews were presented in excerpts and summaries. The FGDs which comprised of between 8 and 12 discussants each comprised community, youth and civil society activists and opinion leaders drawn from identified communities in the local government areas but including the major cities of Port Harcourt, Warri and Yenagoa. A total of 11 FGDs were conducted in the sample local government areas in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States. The results are presented in summaries and excerpts.

CAUSES OF MILITANCY

Several reasons are given by our respondents for the causality of the militancy and violence conflicts in the Niger Delta. They are lack of development and poor infrastructure, exclusion from oil economy, unfair revenue allocation system that

disadvantaged the region leading to resource control struggle, youth unemployment, extensive poverty, and marginalization in political representation. According to a respondent at Nkpogwu community, Port Harcourt (12/5/ 2014), it is *the exploration of crude oil without commensurate development and compensation that made the youth to take up arms against the state*. Another respondent, (Deeyor community, Gokana, 28/5/14), asserts that *the Amnesty programme was as a result of the youth of the Niger Delta fighting for economic right and against the exploitation of their resources*. According to a key informant in Trans-Amadi community, Port Harcourt, (14/5/14), *the youth have been agitating that they want to control the resources because since the government has been in charge, there is no improvement in their lives or their communities*. To a respondent in Amassoma community in Southern Ijaw,(18/5/14)

the people have been neglected by the Federal Government and the top Ijaw leaders betrayed Adaka Boro that was fighting for our rights. We were forgotten for long, our crude oil has been taken in our communities, oil spillage everywhere, no good water to bath or drink, the suffering was becoming too much for us. That was when we reacted and protested.

Other respondents identified other causes as linked to *the resistance against dispossession of the Niger Delta; the eradication of inequality; inappropriate distribution of the national revenue; the struggle for derivation principle which at its best has been very erratic and disproportional; and the struggle for development for the host communities to the oil companies* (Interviews with respondents in Nkpolu-oroworukwo, Port Harcourt city, 10th June, 2014; Okrika, Kalio-Ama community dated 30/7/14; Abonnema wharf community in Port Harcourt city dated 25/5/2014).

IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT

There have been substantial efforts in the implementation of PAP's DDR, even though the outcomes and results may not be incredible in relation to best practices, inclusiveness and transparency. According to a respondent, *A lot has happened since*

we left the creeks, a lot of boys have benefited including myself, I was trained in welding which I am using today to feed myself plus the allowances too (Interview at Abuloma community, 19/6/14).

However, the management of the PAP is assessed quite poorly. An interviewee in Buguma community in Asari-Toru LGA (3/5/2015), asserted that,

there is a total failure and diversion in the implementation, nepotism is the character of the administrators, all these are attributed to the high level of corruption and low minded personnel at the apex administrative level of the programme. Also, there is the lack of mental and creative capacity on the part of the managers which contribute to the failure.

Other key informants opine that: *there is no effective quality and technical measures and transparent contracting system. There is also wrong prioritizing in the selection of the training programme which leads to total redundancy of the participants after training (Interview at Buguma, Asari-Toru LGA 3/5/2015). Not well managed because the ex-generals would not have been the ones to pay us, we should receive our money through the bank not cash at hand (Interview at Port Harcourt 11/5/ 2014); our ex-militant generals have taken over the programme, they are now the managers of the programme (Interview at Abonnema Wharf, Port Harcourt 25/5/2014); has not been managed and executed as conceived because some unscrupulous elements have hijacked the whole thing by cutting down on the promises by the federal government (Interview at Buguma, Asari Toru LGA 12/5/14).*

According to our interviewee in Amassoma, Southern Ijaw LGA in Bayelsa (18/6/14), *the late president had good plans for the people of the Niger Delta. We thought it will favour our region but those managing the programme perverted it. We are betrayed and enslaved by our leaders. According to FGD respondents (Izonfade, Burutu, Delta State, 28/6/14):*

the personnel in charge of Amnesty programme are not implementing it to the benefits of every individual but rather for their selfish reasons. There is high level of corruption in the management of the programme by the managers of which they are not to be trusted. Majority of them are greedy and selfish; there is mismanagement of funds by the managers and those in charge of the programme. No accurate account can be given.

The major problem we face in Amnesty programme is corruption. No one is to be trusted in the affairs of this programme; the salaries of ex-militant are short-changed, the leaders and managers are using this to enrich themselves; there is mismanagement of funds, corruption. There is no adequate monitoring of this programme. The personnel are just doing things on their own. There is lack of funds to run the programme; Politicians are using this programme to enrich themselves.

Field observations and experiences with the ex-militants in different project locations during the field work reveal the following:

- i) Some ex-militants lament that the Amnesty Programme is a total failure and that they regret participating. They are dissatisfied with the programme and think that if care is not taken, they would fall back to militancy.
- ii) Many of the ex-militants live poor-shitty life as their feeding allowance was cut short by more than half and they do not have anything to fall back on. More specifically, some of the ex-militants were short paid by their ex-militant leaders and are thus paid between N20,000 and N45,000 instead of the monthly N65,000 approved by the Federal Government.
- iii) Many of the actual ex-militants have not undergone training while the relatives and loyalists of big politicians were enlisted and sent for training abroad.
- iv) Those that were sent to skill acquisition centres were not properly trained, hence most of them cannot not perform the skills they were trained for.
- v) Ex – militants that have been trained have not been employed and some have no hope of employment.

- vi) Some of the ex-militant fighters were not sent to reorientation and re-integration programme at Obubra and without attending that programme, they do not have any hope of being sent on training/studies.
- vii) The ex-generals are reported to have made millions of naira from the Amnesty programme. They are now big time contractors and business tycoons.
- viii) The generals sell slots at will; replace the names of their boys with that of their relations and boys. As a result only very few ex-militant have actually gone for training.
- ix) Amnesty programme is now characterized with high level of corruption and fraudulent practices.
- x) The foot soldiers of some ex- militants leaders /commanders were excluded even though they surrendered arms particularly in Phases two and three.
- xi) Some ex-militants were abandoned by their commanders, and are thus not enlisted in the Amnesty Programme

A key informant highlighted the following management and implementation problems faced by the Amnesty Programme:

- i) The management of the Amnesty Programme gave preference to some of the ex-generals to the detriment of others.
- ii) Some ex-generals initially did not participate in the Amnesty Programme because they thought it was a set up by the government until they realized that the programme was genuine, hence they later came out and enlisted in the programme but they were sidelined in the management of the Amnesty Programme and some of their boys have not gone for training up till now.

- iii) The 3rd phase/batch of training of ex-militants did not go round. It did not carry along all the remainder of genuine ex-militants.
- iv) Some of the ex-militants that are loyal to some powerful ex-generals have gone for training more than once.
- v) Some of the ex-generals receive the money meant for the payment of stipends to ex-militant boys in block and distribute same in piecemeal to the ex-militant boys.
- vi) Some of those that have gone for training were never paid stipends again.
- vii) Wives and children of ex-generals who died in the struggle were not taken care of in the Amnesty Programme.
- viii) Pipeline surveillance contract jobs were given to only few ex-generals to the detriment of the majority of the ex-militant leaders.
- ix) Some of the ex-generals who did not get a fair share of the money offered to them by the government went back to the creeks.
- x) Aggrieved and neglected ex-militants are the ones involved in kidnapping, oil bunkering and piracy in the Niger Delta.
- xi) The Governors of core Niger Delta states are using the ex-generals and creating discord among the ex-militants.
- xii) The reintegration process is faulty; some of the ex-militants who have gone for training are still roaming about without jobs.
- xiii) Some of the ex-militants are angry because what led them into the struggle have not been addressed.
- xiv) The running cost of the Amnesty Programme Office in Abuja is extremely high (Interview at Benin, 19/4/14)

The issues raised demonstrate that the ex militants are not happy, satisfied and contented over the management, outcomes and impact of PAP. There is an

emergent formation of dissatisfied ex-militants who are frustrated over issues of non inclusion, delays and irregular payment of their allowances, the withholding and non payment of their allowances, the short- payment of their stipends, poor facilities and hence poor competences derived from vocational training, the lack of employment after integration trainings, the lack of opportunities for reintegration training because of the trickle allocation of slots to militant camps and the problems of enlisted ex-militants who have not gone for training. A key informant claimed that *some groups are not satisfied with the Amnesty Programme.*

These are the non violent youths in the Niger Delta, agitators that were excluded; ex- agitators that were short paid or not paid at all, communities ravaged by violence. For instance ex- agitators are not satisfied with the Amnesty Programme due to the refusal of the generals/ warlords to pay them their stipends and absence of employment for those that have acquired various skills” (Interview at Tamigbe, Burutu, Delta State, 21/5/14)

In fact, in some communities, the ex-militants did not allow our Research Assistants to administer questionnaires on the ground that they were not happy with the management and implementation of the Amnesty Programme. Some of these ex militants complained about the corruption and mismanagement of Amnesty funds and the replacement of ex-militants as beneficiaries of the Amnesty by loyalist to political and ex-militant leaders.

There are numerous complaints by ex-militants against the ex-militant leaders and the roles that they have been allowed to play in the management of programme. Excerpts of them include the following: *There is greed by the managers and top generals, ex-generals go to Abuja to exchange the names of their boys who refused to pay homage to them (Interview at Biogbolo Community, Yenogoa, 6/6 /14); We have been short paid. Instead of N65,000 we were given N10,000 or N20,000 (Interview Bundu community, Port Harcourt 13/5/2014); I have not been paid for 3 months so where is the justice*

(Interviewee, Bundu community, Port Harcourt 13/5/14); the ex-generals are doing well (getting richer) while the followers are getting poorer and nothing to write home about (Interview, Abonnema Wharf, Port Harcourt 25/5/14); A lot of the boys we call foot soldiers were abandoned by their commanders in collaboration with some traditional rulers and generals and the ones that were included have their allowances totally slashed (Interview, Trans-Amadi Port Harcourt 14/7/14).

According to other key informants, the ex-militants who fought are still begging for their stipends to be paid, while others are already living in millions and benefiting from the programme (Orogbum Community, Port Harcourt 20/5/2014). According to FGD respondents, (Point Bar, Rumukoru, Port Harcourt, 23/6/14):

their salary is not paid directly into their accounts, the money gets to the hands of the leaders first thereby giving them the opportunity to split the money; there is no peace because their money is not complete and they are not happy. So there is no peace. The boys are not completely paid; the salary is not completely paid to them, because some receive 10,000, or even 5000 whereas the stipulated amount meant for them is 65000. So they are not happy and satisfied;

The poor management of PAP is a threat to sustainable peace and security. According to key informant from Amarata, *Poor management and greed on the part of the managers and the generals could lead to reoccurrence of conflicts in the region* (Interview at Amarata, Yenagoa Local Government Area, Bayelsa State, 16/5/14). There are recommendations for better management of PAP. According to one respondent (*Bugoma community, Asari Toru 20/5/2014*), *what is required is frequent interface with ex-militants and provision of stewardship on the progress of the programme to the public.*

EXCLUSION, PEACE AND SECURITY

The Amnesty Programme excluded several groups that participated in the agitation for equity and justice in the Niger Delta region. For instance, the militants who did not initially give up arms to participate in the first phase of the programme were largely excluded. Even in the second phase of the programme, only the leaders of some groups had the opportunity to be included. Some of the ex-militants enlisted in the Phases one and two have not benefited from the reintegration programme of the Amnesty Programme, particularly the boys or foot soldiers of the later groups. Only the arm bearing male militants were included in the programme. The female ex-militants were largely excluded.

There have been numerous protests by ex-militant groups over non inclusion or non enlistment, non payments and lack of access to reintegration trainings. The Forum for Ex-militant Leaders led by one General Gift Tare of Iduwini Volunteer Force, threatened resumption of attacks on oil infrastructure in November, 2011, over non payment of regular monthly allowances of disarmed militants, and preferential treatment of some generals and their ex-militants (<http://www.pilot.africa.com/2011/11/07>. Accessed 21/8/14). The presence of non militants in PAP programmes has contributed to the anger and frustration of those who consider themselves to be the real, or “core” militants, but have been excluded from these benefits.

A critical interrogation reveals exclusion in conception, selection, eligibility, participation, the content or breadth, implementation and the management of PAP. Conceptually, several crucial dimensions of the transition from war to peace and peace-building such as peace agreement, post conflict reconstruction, post conflict recovery, transitional justice, post amnesty programme and security sector reform were left out.

The Amnesty package has tended to use the subjective criteria of internal lists submitted by the armed groups, supported by some form of verification by military committees set up by the Defence Headquarters. The weakness of the criteria is demonstrated in the over-bloated size of ex-militants, which seemed to have crowded out the real militants who tended to have come out in later phases. The eligibility methods have tended to shift with subsequent phases being more tedious in terms of allocation of one or two slots to several guns submitted.

The poor initial eligibility standards made PAP to be crowded by criminal armed gangs, thugs, cultists, cronies, associates and relations of ex-militant leaders, and ethnic and political leaders and others who suddenly acquired militancy status, in order to become beneficiaries (Daily Times, 2014). This made the entry of some of the genuine ex-militants who were initially wary or stayed back as part of organized back up forces in the event of failure of PAP very difficult.

According to a key informant, *initially those that made themselves available were all accommodated in the Amnesty programme* (Interview at Agalabiri Community, Sagbama Local Government Area, Bayelsa State, 12/6/2014). According to another key informant:

They did not accommodate all the agitators in the Niger Delta region, because when they pronounced the Amnesty Programme, some of them thought it was a set up. That is why some of the agitators were afraid and thus refused to join the programme (Interview at Ubeji, Warri South Local Government Area, Delta State, 10/6/14).

Consequently, PAP has been plagued by continued agitation and protests over inclusion into the programme and particularly the admission of new ex-militants in Phases two and three. There are those who have surrendered their arms but have not been admitted into PAP and those who have been admitted but have not

participated in the demobilization and reintegration programmes. Up-till October 2013, some excluded ex-militants were still allegedly planning to stage protests in Abuja, over agitation for inclusion in another phase of the PAP (Ameh, 2013).

Some ex-militant leaders and ex-militants camps are alleged to have been given preferential treatment in the selection of ex-militants for demobilization and reintegration as well as payments of reinsertion benefits. There have been complaints too about the privileged and inequitable treatment of some ex-militant leaders to the detriment of others. For example, surveillance contracts were awarded in 2011 by NNPC to ex-militants leaders (<http://citizenng.com/headlive> accessed 2 Feb 16). There have been protests over the discriminatory nature of post amnesty contracts, largess and benefits. Ex-militants in Aqua Ibom State protested in Uyo in September 2012 over their exclusion from these benefits (Ekpimah, 2012).

The infiltration of non arm bearing associates and relations of big politicians, ethnic leaders and ex militant leaders into PAP is a major source of tension and concern by ex militants. A key informant stated that:

Everyone that fought for this struggle knows how we suffered for years, until Amnesty was introduced. When it was introduced, many politicians see it as opportunity to favour their love ones and relatives while those who suffered for the struggle were left out. Many people who did not participate in the struggle are now benefitting from it. It is not allegation, it is a true (Interview at Amasoma, Southern Ijaw Local Government Area, Bayelsa State, 18/5/2014).

According to some of our respondents '*prominent people put their relatives instead of the real persons that fought the fight (Interview at Bori, Rivers State 23/5/ 2014); some of them are boys of these big politicians. We know them, but they do not associate with us (Interview at Abuluma, Port Harcourt, 19/6/14).*

There are those however, who think that PAP should be exclusionary to them. According to one interviewee:

there are social tensions and disputation on who will benefit or not. To the extent that the militants are of the opinion that amnesty is for them who bore the pains, they see no reason why non armed bearing youth should benefit, they should be the only ones to benefit from the programme (Foropa community, Bayelsa State 25/6/2014).

PAP excludes the victims of militancy and hostage taking in the region' (Akinwale, 2010), mothers who lost children, children who lost fathers, families that lost homes and persons who were displaced by the conflict (Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2010), disabled ex-militants, dependent children of ex-militants, war affected civilians, amnestied political prisoners, elderly persons connected to armed groups and communities which were devastated or plagued by military and militia and intra militia confrontations. PAP excludes community youths and the youths of the region, though a late effort to include youths from several oil impacted and polluted communities was made in the second Phase ([Http://www.punchng.com/news/jonathan approves 3642 ex militants for-inclusion-in-amnesty programme/](http://www.punchng.com/news/jonathan_approves_3642_ex_militants_for_inclusion_in_amnesty_programme/) Accessed 13/8/2014. Given the nature of conception of Amnesty, women have been largely excluded, in spite of immense gender challenges, roles played during the conflict, what they suffered as victims and burdens they bore as mothers, wives and female associates of militant actors and activists.

Though some women have been trained in specialized skills centres, in general, there seems to have been no plans for the inclusion of the wives, girl friends, female combatants, cooks, informants and couriers in the militant formation (Agbegbedia, 2012). For instance out of 20,192 militants enlisted in the first phase of the Amnesty programme, only 133 were women. But the women performed critical roles in the camps and served as informants and spies for the ex-militants.

According to a key informant, *the women were the strength of the militants in terms of cooking, buying of things for them, sex, carrying of juju and meeting people such as politicians and influential men or women to gather information that are important* (Interview, Foropa Community, Bayelsa State, 25/6/14).

There is also an ethnic dimension to the exclusion. PAP has largely been an Ijaw and associated dialectical groups' programme because they dominated the armed resistance or militia phenomenon which was largely in the creeks and waterways. Thus the reinsertion payments, human capacity and economic empowerment of 30,000 ex militants is like the settlement of Ijaw youths in Bayelsa, and parts of Rivers, Delta, Edo and Ondo States. The non Ijaw ethnic groups in these States and in Akwa Ibom and Cross Rivers have been agitating for more inclusion in the activities of PAP and even in the appointments and development activities of the federal government. However, in the later phases, a sprinkle of Itsekiri and Urhobo youths and other youths from other ethnic groups who were part of the Ijaw led militia movement have been admitted.

The resettlement component of DDR which would have facilitated reintegration and post reintegration engagements in such occupations as farming and fishery which are traditional to the region was also excluded. Finally, PAP did not mainstream an employment programme for products of reintegration. There are no quotas of any kind for engagement into specified agencies or programmes of short term public works employment to engage ex-militants and the youth.

ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE

PAP is assessed to be fairly successful because of the relative peace it has brought about and reintegration benefits. Some ex-militants have been marginally integrated into normal civil life, free from arrests and intimidation in the

communities rather than the creeks. Several ex militants have now been trained and some are living productive lives. There is now decline in youth militancy and restiveness.

Some of our respondents see PAP as having contributed immensely to the state of security and peace in the region. According to FGD respondents (*Izonfada, Burutu, Delta State, 28/6/14*): *PAP has reduced crisis/youth restiveness in Niger Delta; It also reduced violent crime, kidnapping, bunkering and oil theft; Illegal Refineries controlled; resettlement/training of ex-militant is in progress now; Amnesty programme has been of help and supportive in Niger Delta.* FGD respondents in Amarata, Yenagoa (19/06/2014), *assessed PAP thus:*

amnesty has brought about a high degree of peace and security in the Niger Delta because the incessant killings and kidnapping has reduced so much and the whole place is better than before; programme has brought relative security because some of the boys are now been employed, and engaged in various activities that will better their life and well being; Due to the monthly payment to the ex-militants, pipeline vandalism has gradually been reduced to the minimum level;

The study reveals that there are a host of persons and groups that are dissatisfied with PAP. These include the following:

- i) EX-militants leaders /commanders whose foot soldiers were excluded even though they surrendered arms particularly in Phases two and three.
- ii) Niger Delta youths who have not benefitted from the programme.
- iii) Victims of Niger Delta conflicts from host communities.
- iv) Unemployed school graduates of Niger Delta who were excluded from training and empowerment programme.
- v) Host communities which suffered from the violent phase of the conflicts.

- vi) Beneficiaries of amnesty reintegration programme who are still jobless.
- vii) Ex-militants who were either abandoned by their commanders, short paid or not enlisted in the Amnesty Programme
- viii) Persons who suffered losses during the struggle (lost of loved ones, properties etc)

A key informant identified groups that are not satisfied with the Amnesty Programme, but located the sources of dissatisfaction among others in the management of the programme. According to him:

These are the non violent youths in the Niger Delta, agitators that were excluded; ex-agitators that were short paid or not paid at all, communities ravaged by violence. For instance ex- agitators are not satisfied with the Amnesty Programme due to the refusal of the generals/ warlords to pay them their stipends and absence of employment for those that have acquired various skills” (Interview at Tamigbe, Burutu, Delta State, 21/5/14)

Other key informants allude to the following: *a lot of boys who were foot soldiers were abandoned by their commanders and generals. Even the ones that were included have their allowances totally slashed (Interview at Trans-Amadi, Port Harcourt 14/5/14); we are not satisfied because most of us (ex-agitators) have been excluded in the programme (Rumuwoji community, Port Harcourt 11/5/2014); Amnesty has not solved our problems, only our leaders are those benefiting from the programme and left us but soon, everything will change (Rumukuchi Community in Port Harcourt city dated 11th May, 2014); Amnesty has not addressed the problems of the region because we are short paid by our leaders since Musa Yar’dua died (Bundu community in Port Harcourt dated 13/5/2014); According to a key informant in Rumukuchi Community in Port Harcourt (11/5/14): As far as I’m concerned, the programme should be scrapped and let everyone return to the creek. In the creek, I use to make good money but now I’m hardly paid my monthly salary by the Federal Government.*

According to an FGD respondent, (Point Bar, Rumukoru, Port Harcourt, (23/6/14) *the programme is not carrying everyone along because he and his fellow ex-militants in the area are not benefitting from the programme, and some of them are being owed because the money is not coming into their account.*

The reasons for dissatisfaction are numerous. The issue of not paying ex-militants directly apart from the generals or leaders of the militant group is a major source of dissatisfaction in the PAP. The issue of inclusion is itself a source of division, disputation and social tensions among the ex-militants and youth. Ex-militants believe that they are sole claimants to PAP benefits because they bore the pains of the armed struggle. Other reasons for dissatisfaction with Amnesty Programme include: lack of job opportunities/job creation; lack of inclusion of some ex-militants; exclusion of female associates/activists in the amnesty programme; lack of prompt payment of monthly stipend; extensive unemployment even among reintegrated ex-militants; and lack of attention to the development of the region.

The issue of non-inclusion of non-arm bearing youth is a sore point for some respondents. According to a respondent, *many youth are dissatisfied with the PAP, because those that carried arms were paid attention by the government and politicians while those who went to school and did not carry arms were not encouraged* (Borokiri, Port Harcourt 11/4/2014). According to another interviewee in Abonnema Wharf community in Port Harcourt (25/5/2014), *the excluded youths remain prone to involvement in criminal acts and other social vices such as cultism among others.*

PAP AND PEACE AND BUILDING

PAP is seen to have contributed to the restoration of relative peace and security in the region in three areas: The first is that PAP has calmed down restive youths, thereby reducing associated tendencies such as youth violence, youth crimes and associated social tensions. Second, by disarming youths and enabling surrender

and disengagement of youth militias, there is a general feeling and sense of security to conduct individual and family social activities and businesses. According to a respondent in Tombia, Port Harcourt (23/5/14), *PAP has helped by taking the ex-militants from the creeks and ended the destruction of petroleum installations.* Third, the engagement of the youths in training, skills acquisition and education has occupied them such that the inclination and space for criminality and violence has declined.

The key informant interviewees believe that current efforts of peace building through the PAP have been weakened by three factors. The most major is the lack of inclusion of PAP. By not ensuring broad participation and engagement, a large section of the youth and population are left out, thereby constituting a large population of persisting frustration, which could be the social base for the next militant engagement. Second, the lack of attention and even political commitment to address the grievances of the region, pertaining to resource control, participation in the oil economy and the development of industries and infrastructures, is weakening PAP and the overall efforts at conflict resolution and peace building.

Third, the nature of funding, implementation and management of PAP is weakening it as the major plank of peace building effort. The interviewees think that PAP is poorly funded, poorly implemented and monitored and poorly managed. The majority of the KII think that the ex-militants have not been empowered enough to prevent a return to militancy and the creeks. The training and education programmes and the employment opportunities thereafter are not effective enough to prevent violent conflict reoccurrence.

The KII believes that the Federal government is doing a lot by way of training, empowering and engaging the ex-militants, but it is not doing enough in two

areas. The first is that it has not tackled the grievances that led to militancy. Second, all the stakeholders in the region have not been engaged. PAP has excluded the majority of the youth and population of the region. As a result, it could be argued that the government is not doing enough to checkmate the renewal of militancy or violent conflicts.

The termination of PAP is also seen as threatening to peace and security in the region. According to some respondents, *if the payment is stopped and the amnesty comes to an end in 2015, there will be violence (Interview at Oporoma, Port Harcourt 20/5/2014); if there is still marginalization in the region and money that was supposed to be paid to beneficiaries is not directly paid into their bank account, there could be further violence (Interview at Marine Base, Port Harcourt 12/5/ 2014),*

Our key informants tend to think that continued unemployment and poverty, continued lack of developmental deprivation and stoppage of the Amnesty Programme without a better option could lead to reoccurrence of violent conflicts. Other issues that could cause reoccurrence of conflict are *non-implementation of agreements, abandonment of the Agitators, non-compensation of victims of the struggle and non-settlement of ex-militants (Tombia, Port Harcourt 23/5/ 2014).*

PAP AS SOLUTION TO THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS

Our key informants believe that Amnesty does not seem to be the solution to the Niger Delta because it has not been able to solve the Niger Delta problems of poverty, environmental degradation, and massive youth's unemployment. Though the Amnesty ought to be a commencement point for providing more permanent solutions to the problem of the Niger Delta, it has remained a short term solution to security and peace. It cannot be a long lasting solution because it has not addressed the causes of the crisis. *-According to an interviewee in Buguma community in Asari-Toru Local Governmnet Area (3/5/2015):*

Amnesty is not the solution rather it will make the situation worsen. In practical terms, the majority of the youth who are the hope of the future of the region are left behind due to the amnesty programme from the beginning. The huge and unpatriotic lifestyles of the administrators of the programme have helped to worsen the entire process which is a total injustice to the average youth from the region.

To another key informant in Rumuwomasi Community in Port Harcourt city dated (6/6/14):

As it stands, the post amnesty needs of the Niger Delta people have not been met and some of the promises made by the Federal Government during the consultation preceding the amnesty have not been redeemed. Therefore, the resolution of the crisis in the region goes beyond amnesty programme to the substantive solution, the solution is for the Federal Government to create employment and develop the region.

According to another key informant:

The Amnesty Programme has not addressed the causes of militancy and restiveness in the Niger Delta. How can amnesty address the issue of environmental degradation? Even if you settle the boys that picked up arms, what about the affected environment? The solution to Niger Delta crisis is that the Federal Government should address the main issues of unemployment, resource control, environmental pollution and infrastructure development in the region (Interview at Agbasa, Warri South Local Government Area, Delta State, 22/5/14).

Another key informant thinks that:

Amnesty is not a solution to Niger Delta crisis. Amnesty was granted to the Niger Delta militants to pacify them to lay down their arms in order to pave way for discussion on the matter. Amnesty has not addressed the fundamental issues of development of the region and resource control. Amnesty has attempted to address the effect and not the cause” (Interview at MNDA, Federal Secretariat, Abuja, 12/5/14).

According to a key informant, Amnesty has still not solved our problems, only our leaders are those benefiting from the programme and left us but soon, everything will change (Rumukuchi Community in Port Harcourt city dated 11th May, 2014). Another interviewee asserted that Amnesty has not addressed the problems of the region because we are short paid by our leaders since Musa Yar’dua died (Bundu community in Port Harcourt dated 13/5/2014). According to another key informant:

Amnesty programme has addressed only but few of the causes of militancy and youth restiveness because the issues of deprivation is still there unresolved. The oil spillage is still affecting the people. To let you know how bad it is, some people living in a community close to oil company facilities have packed or vacated the community because of disease and death of their children (Interview at Amassoma, Southern Ijaw Local Government Area, Bayelsa State, 25/6/14).

At best, PAP is seen as having limited utility for the resolution of the Niger Delta crisis. *To some respondents, Only the programme cannot work. The only solution is to stop oppression of the region by the Federal Government (Interview at Elekahia community, Port Harcourt, 10/6/14).* According to a key informant in Federal Capital Territory (Abuja) dated 5th June 2014,

as much as the amnesty is a starting point, there is need to sustain the programme mapped out to empower and reintegrate the ex-militant into the larger society. If the government continues to pay the ex-fighters without empowering them and the government stops doing that, the militants will go back to the creek.

The point is that the root causes of Niger Delta conflicts have not been addressed. In the circumstance, the Amnesty Programme seems to be a temporary solution to the issues of militancy in the Niger Delta.

THE RESOLUTION OF THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS

The resolution of the Niger Delta crisis is predicated on four core issues by the KII. These are inclusive training, job creation and economic empowerment of the region's youth; the extensive developmental attention to the region particularly in the areas of infrastructure; increased resource control, share of derivation funds and share of oil and gas revenues and profits by communities; and the extension of PAP beyond 2015, and broadening of the programme to include non-militant youth.

Some of our respondents think that there are alternatives to Amnesty Programme in achieving peace in the Niger Delta. *According to FGD respondents (Izonfade, Burutu, Delta State, 28/6/14):*

Amnesty is not the only solution or answer in terms of peace achievement, youths can do much better than this amnesty programme in the sense that the government can create jobs for them to work and earn a good standard of living; there can be skill acquisition through training, the government can also release funds for them to start businesses and for them to be independent; All of this is another means of survival not just the Amnesty programme.

The implications of the continued non resolution of the crisis in the region could be dire because of the somewhat possibility of a return to violent agitation. Our respondents list the possibility of continued agitation for resource control; increase in criminality such as oil pipeline vandalism, oil theft, sea piracy and kidnapping; resurgence of militancy and lack of peace in the region. A key informant stated that: *There will be a lot of oil pipeline vandalization, bunkering everywhere, kidnapping every day, there will be illegal refineries in every creek and communities, then all ex-militants will go back to the creeks and there will be no looking back because we have been taken as fools the second time* (Interview at Amassoma, Southern Ijaw Local Government Area, Bayelsa State, 18/5/14). According to another interviewee at Nkpolu-oroworukwo, Port Harcourt (10/6/14), *if the programme (PAP) fails, if the government fails to implement the terms of agreement, then there could be reoccurrence of violent.* Another interviewee states that *I see war in the region if there is no resolution of the conflict* (Interview at Fimie community, Port Harcourt 19/6/14).

The failure or stoppage of PAP is also predicted to have dire consequences for the nation. *Violent conflict reoccurrence is bound to occur if the amnesty programme finally comes to an end because it will make the boys to go back to the creeks.* According to several key informants, *the crisis will be worse and this time, children too will be recruited and they will join the struggle* (Interview at Rumukuchi Community, Port Harcourt 1/5/14); *there will be total chaos and anarchy in the region and the country will lose billions of dollars from oil revenue* (Interview at Trans-Amadi, Port Harcourt 14/5/14); *the youth will go back to the creek and fight for an independent state* (interview

at Port Harcourt 11/5/ 2014); there will be violence and insecurity, exploration activities in the region will be brought to a halt over the continuous marginalization of the minority ethnic groups (Interview at Gokana, Bera community, 28/5/2014);and the situation will lead to crisis and if it is not properly managed, could lead to war (Interview at Orogbum community, Port Harcourt 13/5/2014).

Two sets of policy activities are crucial to preventing the occurrence or non-reoccurrence of violent conflicts in the region. The first set of policies is first and foremost, policy or reforms that address core grievances and demands of the region. These are in order of preference, the issue of re-federalization of the country through strengthening regional autonomy and reducing the powers and resources at the centre. The second is the satisfaction of the demands for massive developmental attention. The third is the issue of resource control or at the least, significant increase in the benefits from crude oil and gas resources. The second set of policy activities pertain to PAP. The effective funding, management and performance outcomes of PAP are seen as crucial to sustainable peace and security.

CHAPTER SIX

THE AMNESTY PROGRAMME AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS: PROGRESS, CHALLENGES AND PROGNOSIS.

There are issues that emerge in the consideration of the effectiveness and progress made by the Amnesty programme towards the resolution of the Niger Delta crisis. These include issues of management and inclusion, challenges to security, the frameworks for peace and post Amnesty programmes, and how all these affect the resolution of the crisis and the achievement of sustainable peace and security in the region.

THE MANAGEMENT OF PAP AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND SECURITY

The total number of weapons and ammunitions handed in by the militants totalling 1,798 rifles, 1,981 guns of various types, 70 RPGs, 159 pistols, one spear and six cannons (Agbo, 2011) are certainly low when compared with 26, 358 militants that registered for the amnesty programme as at the second phase. The region is still ridden with arms and this is evident in the various violent attacks, kidnapping, sea piracy and criminality that have occurred since the disarmament exercise (Joseph, 2010; Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012).

The command and control structure of ex-militant groups were not disconnected, contrary to expectations in DDR. Rather, PAP's mode of payment of reinsertion and reintegration benefits, and access to reintegration has been through their commanders/leaders. This shows that the foot soldiers are still loyal to their commanders. The retention of the command and control structure has created numerous problems. The ex-militant leaders are alleged to have hijacked the programme. Some ex-commanders replace or exchange the names of their boys who refuse to pay homage to them, and thus exclude them from receiving stipends (Biogbolo Community, Yenogoa 6/6/2014). The nature of management has made

the ex-militant leaders to benefit immensely from the PAP, while the foot soldiers are deprived and denied of stipulated benefits.

The management and implementation of PAP has been exclusive. The governors and governments the South-South States have not been involved or even kept abreast of the details of PAP. There is thus no intergovernmental structure that integrates and synergizes efforts and activities. Though several international agencies, international nongovernmental organizations, regional and continental organizations, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations and community based organizations could have added value in the peace building and reintegration programmes, they have not been encouraged to play substantive roles.

There are allegations of low levels of accountability and transparency, poor management and misuse of funds, inappropriate expenditures, improper monitoring, deficiencies in the training programmes, poor management of stipends payment and personal aggrandizement. There is very little confidence in the leadership of PAP and there is the general belief that PAP is not being managed in the broad interest of ex-militants.

There are conditions in the management of PAP that can lead to conflict reoccurrence including the fact that the majority of the youths have not benefitted from the programme, the hijack of the programme by the ex-militant commandants, the lack of inclusive benefits even among the ex militant formation, and poor and corrupt leadership. More specifically, the nature of the management of PAP could lead to reoccurrence of conflict in the Niger Delta due to the following factors;

- i) Non accommodation of all ex- militants and non militant activists in the Niger Delta struggle.
- ii) Continued lack of employment for those that have been trained under the Amnesty Programme.
- iii) The conduct of ex-militant generals particularly in respect of non payment, delayed payments and short payment of their foot soldiers.
- iv) Exclusion of some ex- militants from enlistment in the programme particularly in 2nd and 3rd phases.
- v) Exclusion of some enlisted ex- militants from reintegration (training and payments of stipends).
- vi) Existence of some aggrieved ex- militant who pose a threat to the current relative peace in the Niger Delta.
- vii) The nature of Amnesty Programme management which allowed ex- militants commanders and politicians to hijack the programme

EXCLUSION AND THE CHALLENGES OF SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND SECURITY

PAP could be regarded as a tokenistic, monetized, or cash based exclusionary settlement of the armed segment rather than a resolution of the crisis. It has trained and pays 30,000 youth but has not settled the problems and satisfied the demands and aspirations of the communities and people of the Niger Delta. Such exclusionary settlement without conflict transformation is fragile and cannot be a basis for sustainable peace and security. Any accentuation of the Niger Delta problematic, threat to regional interests, and major development that affects the fortune of the region can be expected to generate or accentuate grievances, frustration and anger that can drive ex militants to the forest and creeks in a new resistance. Already the demand of the region for resource control and increased derivation funds in the 2005 and 2014 constitutional conferences had led to threats

such as that by the Niger Delta People Salvation Front led by MAJAHID Dokubo to mobilize and return to the creeks to resist Nigeria's exploitation of the region ([http:mail. Iyep.com.ng/news/item](http://mail.Iyep.com.ng/news/item) JULY 18, 2014. Accessed 21/8/14.

The narrow basis of PAP is further manifested in the Ijaw dominance of the ex-militant formation. Though there is a sprinkle of youth of other ethnic groups in the Ijaw led militia movement, the reinsertion payments and human capacity empowerment of 30,000 ex militants is like, a settlement of Ijaw youths because PAP by leadership and beneficiaries is dominantly Ijaw. This means that the beneficiaries of the programme are not spread among the ethnic groups of the region.

The Federal Government is regarded as a major beneficiary of the Amnesty Programme because it provided security in the region for extensive exploitation of crude oil and gas with accompanying high revenues to the government. Again, the most favoured segment is the arm bearing youth and particularly the ex militant leaders. In short, a major social base of protests since the PAP are those ex-militants who tend to have lost out or been marginalized in the cash payments, oil surveillance contracts and other largess from the government. Those who have lost out since the PAP include unemployed youth, women, community members, victims and the aged ones who are excluded from the PAP benefits.

Even though the current ex- militants of the Niger Delta have been settled, there is no guarantee that other segments of the youth will not rise to protest the persistent problems of the region. Therefore the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict goes beyond PAP. PAP has only made peace with arm bearing segment of the agitators by providing them training and payment of stipends. Militancy has largely stopped and militant camps in the creeks have mostly been closed. But the Amnesty

Programme that brought this about does not incorporate the resolution of the problems of the region that warranted militancy.

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO SECURITY AND PEACE

The Amnesty programme has not eliminated conflict source points, conflict drivers and threats to security and peace. The grievances that constituted the root causes of the conflict have not been addressed and conflict ridden and broken relationships within and between communities, and between oil companies and communities have not been restored. There are subsisting threats in the social, economic and political environment that undermine the prospects for peace and security. The contemporary challenges to peace and security in the region are therefore enormous. These include the following:

- i) Deepening poverty and unemployment.
- ii) The nature of political governance at all levels that is still plagued by corruption, impunity and exclusion
- iii) Proliferation of SALWs which has continued unabated
- iv) Violent criminality which has tended to increase in Bayelsa, Rivers, Edo and Delta States in recent years.
- v) Boundary and resource disputes between communities.
- vi) Environmental conflicts which is being accentuated following subsisting environmental pollution.
- vii) Persisting disputes between oil companies and communities.
- viii) Persisting underground oil economy particularly in terms of crude oil bunkering and illegal petroleum refineries.
- ix) Frustration and disillusionment among ex- militants.
- x) Intra-Ex Militia rivalries and divisions.
- xi) Persistence of private armies, armed gangs and armed cultists.

- xii) Fragile systems of rule of law and maintenance of law and order.
- xiii) High levels of political and electoral violence in Bayelsa, Rivers and Delta States in which ex militants, new militants and cultists are playing a major roles.
- xiv) Deployment of ex militants, new militants and cultists in the violent struggles for power by the political elite
- xv) Persisting state of abuses and human insecurity following continuation of military operations in the communities and during elections.

MILITIA RESURGENCE AND THE FRAGILITY OF CURRENT PEACE AND SECURITY

Few months after the introduction of the programme, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta threatened to resume hostilities because it was not comfortable with the amnesty due to the following reasons among others:

- The government was not ready for broad and meaningful dialogue on the issues at the root of the crisis.
- The government was pretending to be talking peace, but was actually arming and equipping the military through hardware purchases for a military onslaught.
- The reasons for militia fighting have not been addressed.
- The JTF deployment was still intact and constituted a threat to militants during the 60 day moratorium.
- The extant reports of commissions and committees on the region were not being implemented.
- International organizations were not involved in the amnesty. Such involvement would build trust and reputation that can guarantee security and safety of what has been promised.

Since then, MEND has been periodically on the path of militant engagement. Most recently, MEND claimed to have resumed hostilities directed at the oil infrastructure and particularly at cutting oil production to zero by 2015 under the code name Hurricane Exodus (Ikelegbe 2014). MEND was reported to have attacked oil facilities at Ogbegbagbene in Burutu L.G.A in Delta State in early 2014. The Joint Task Force (JTF) raided and destroyed seven alleged MEND camps and allegedly invaded some communities in search of MEND militants in Bayelsa State in April, 2013.

Besides, MEND, there has been sporadic emergence of new and resurgent militia activities such as those of John Togo in the western Delta in 2011, Keiti Sese's camp at Foropa in Bayelsa State in 2010, and Coastal Revolutionary Forces, and the Idiot Family in Bayelsa State in 2014.

Table 6.1: Militia Resurgence and Violent Attacks 2009-2014

S/N	Date	Militia attacks/Militant Organisation	Target	Outcome
1	October 1, 2010.	Nigeria's 50 th independence Celebration. Allegedly MEND	Abuja Federal Capital Territory	Detonation and blast of 2 car bombs killing 2 persons and wounding 36 others
2	October, 2010	Agip Pipeline in Bayelsa. MEND	Agip Pipeline in Bayelsa.	Explosion
3	March 5, 2010	Post Amnesty Conference at Warri, Delta State. MEND	Warri, Delta State.	Car bombing near event. 1 person killed and 11 injured.

4	November 8, 2010	Raid on Oil rig and kidnapping of seven foreign staff. MEND	Oil rig	Kidnapping of seven staff
5	November 15, 2010.	Attack on Exxon Mobil Oil platform. MEND	Oil platform	Kidnapping of seven Nigerian workers.
6	February 4, 2012.	Attack/ bombing of Agip trunk pipeline. Allegedly MEND	Brass, Bayelsa State.	Bombing of Agip trunk Pipeline
7	March 20, 2013.	Attack on Oil Pipeline. Allegedly MEND	Chevron facility, near Warri.	Bombing and destruction
8	April 13, 2013.	Attack on Shell oil well in Nembe L.G.A, Bayelsa State. allegedly MEND	Nembe L.G.A, Bayelsa State.	Bombing and destruction
9	July 4, 2013.	Attack on oil pipeline. Allegedly Militants affiliated to MEND	Rivers State.	Bombing and destruction
10	December 20, 2013.	Attack on Oil Plant	Oil Plant	Kidnapping of 4 South Korean Oil workers.
11	January 15, 2014.	Agip facility in Nembe-Brassanbiri, Bayelsa. Allegedly New group of MEND trainee fighters	Nembe-Brassanbiri, Bayelsa	Kidnapping of vessel staff. Hostages released (Ransom allegedly paid)

12	January 25, 2014	Police gun boats in Azuzuama Waterways, Southern Ijaw L.G.A, Bayelsa State. Allegedly MEND	Peremabiri Southern Ijaw, Bayelsa	Attack on 2 Police gun boats and escorts of former militant leader at Peremabiri
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Source: Ikelegbe 2014

MILITIA RESURGENCE, ECONOMIC SABOTAGE AND CRIMINALITY

In spite of the marked reduction in violence and increased oil production, the post-amnesty period has also witnessed more reports of crude oil theft, illegal refineries and related criminal activities. The arms and personnel for the illegal businesses have not been in short supply, and because the region’s grievances remain unresolved and the deprivation from oil economy benefits and participation continues, citizens and others have not had any qualms in continuing with the illegal activities.

Though maritime and waterways piracy declined after the Amnesty in 2009, there has been a sharp rise since 2011. There were attacks on 39 vessels and coastal crafts in Nigerian waters with about 7 deaths and 33 hostages taken between December 2012 and March 2013, and 29 piracy incidents on Nigerian waters with two hijackings, boarding of 11 ships and attacks on 13 vessels and attempted attacks on three others in 2013 (www.shipsandport.com/niger-delta-militants-threaten-to-blow-up-vessel/march-26-2013); Anaesoronye 2013). The new trend of piracy may be linked to the resurgence of hitherto criminally bent militants, new criminal elements or groups that have emerged since the post Amnesty period and disgruntled elements of the ex-militant formation.

Table 6.2: Piracy, Oil Theft and Kidnapping of Sailors 2011-2014: The new face of Militancy.

S/N	Date	Incidence	Vessel/ Outcome	Militant Affiliation/Place
1	September 14, 2011.	kidnapping of 14 Filipinos and 9 Spanish sailors	At Mathios. Release of 23 sailors on 26 th September, 2011.	Allegedly MEND
2	October 13, 2011.	Kidnapping of 20 Russian sailors	Mt cape Burd. Sailors released	Allegedly MEND
3	October 19, 2011.	Hijack of Exxon Mobile oil tanker	Ahst Wibert Tide. Large amount of oil stolen. captain released	Allegedly MEND Near Opobo
4	November 1, 2011.	Kidnapping of 2 British Sailors	Chevron oil vessel. Sailors released in December 2011.	Allegedly MEND
5	February, 29, 2012	Kidnapping of 3 Dutch sailors.	Off the Rivers State coast	Allegedly MEND gunmen
6	August 4, 2012.	Kidnapping of 3 sailors. gun battle with Nigerian Navy	Oil carrier 35 miles off Nigerian coast	Allegedly MEND gunmen
7	September 5, 2012.	Hijack of oil tanker, 14 miles off Nigerian coast	Abu Dhabi Star	Allegedly MEND
8	October 15, 2012.	Kidnapping of 7 sailors aboard bourbon liberty 249	Bourbon liberty 249 Allegedly released on payment of ransom on	-

			November.	
9	December 13, 2013.	Attack on oil carrier pm Salem	PM Salem. One person killed and another injured.	-
10	December 17, 2012.	Kidnapping of 5 Indian sailors aboard sp Brussels	SP Brussels. Ship looted and set ablaze. 5 sailors released on ransom in January, 2013	-
11	December 23, 2012.	Kidnapping of 3 Italian sailors Aboard Asso Ventino	Asso Ventino. Sailors released on ransom payment in January 2013.	-
12	February 4, 2013	Hijack of Filipino operated vessel	Kidnapping of one sailor and killing of another.	-
13	February 7, 2013.	Kidnapping of 2 Russian and 1 Romania sailors aboard British cargo ship	Looting and damage of ship. Sailors released on March 13, 2013.	-
14	February 17, 2013	Kidnapping of 6 Russian sailors aboard Armada Tuah 101	Sailors released on payment of ransom	-
15	February 10, 2013	Attack on oil carrier Armada Turgas and oil carrier Walves 7		Allegedly MEND
16	February 22, 2013.	Kidnapping of 2 Pakistan sailors	1 released	-

		aboard oil carrier		
17	March 7, 2013.	Kidnapping of 3 Malaysian sailors aboard Armada Tuah 22	Released following a raid on MEND camp	-
18	March 8, 2013.	Hijack of oil carrier	Looting, theft of oil.	
19	April 22, 2013.	Kidnapping of 4 sailors(Russian and Ukrainian)	Released upon JFT attacks on camp on may 26, 2013.	Allegedly MEND
20	April 28, 2013.	Kidnapping of 9 oil workers from a Shell operated oil installation	-	Allegedly MEND
21	April 29, 2013.	Kidnapping of 5 sailors aboard cargo ship off the coast of Brass	Released after payment of ransom on may 14, 2013.	-
22	May 28, 2013.	Kidnapping of 12 Pakistan and 5 Nigerian sailors aboard Mt Matrix oil tanker	Crew released after payment of ransom.	-
23	June 13, 2013	Hijack of French oil tanker Adour off the coast of Togo.	One sailor seized but released on JTF seizure of camps	-
24	June 19, 2013	kidnapping of 2 Indian and 2 Polish sailors aboard oil vessel MDPL Continental		Pirates allegedly affiliated to MEND
25	July 26, 2013.	Hijack of oil carrier Mt Cotton off the	Crew held hostage. Large amounts of	Pirates

		coast of Gabon	oil stolen.	
26	August 15, 2013.	Hijack of oil vessel Mt Notre	Crew held hostage until Nigerian Navy interception of ship.	-

Source: Derived from various sources including Wikipedia, August 2013.

THE LACK OF A SUSTAINABLE FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE

DDR has political dimensions that precede the PCPT and persists through the entire process. The first is political dialogue, negotiations, and the resulting settlement and agreements that are the tentative format or framework for PCPT. The understanding and agreements reached here and the goodwill, trust and commitment of political leaders and stakeholders are crucial for DDR and the sustainability of the transition to peace. The security dimension of the PCPT and more specifically DDR involving disarmament, demobilization and reintegration pertains to the creation of a secured environment such that the goals of peace building can be achieved

PAP was not rooted in any agreement or concrete document that charted the course of resolution of grievances underlying the agitation and armed resistance. Rather, political settlement was based on consultations, dialogue and promises. The lack of substantive agreements perhaps explains the very slim content of PAP, its exclusionary benefits and the absence of comprehensive PCTP and peace building.

Thus PAP fails to address the issues of rehabilitation; reconstruction of properties, social amenities and communities; and restoration of livelihoods sources that were devastated by the violent conflicts between 1997 and 2009. Furthermore, there are no programmes of recovery from the extensive damages to the economy, human capital and human development. This is in spite of the fact that the people of the

Niger Delta suffered various forms of hardships and mistreatments, and extensive damages to lives and properties, social services, commerce and livelihoods. Several communities were destroyed in the confrontations between security agencies and militias and by intra militia fighting.

The Nigerian state has not been restructured as a framework for resolving the crisis in the Niger Delta that addresses the region's sense of injustice, deprivation and marginality in the oil economy. In other words, the issue of regional dividends of oil wealth remains unresolved. The sense of lack of belonging and fair and just treatment and stakeholder-ship in the Nigeria State has not changed. Given the outcomes of the 2005 and 2014 constitutional conferences, there seems to be no clear agreement among other regions in the Nigerian geopolitical scheme, that the Niger Delta deserves more share of oil wealth, despite the huge social-economic and environmental costs of oil exploitation that it bears. Thus, there is yet no agreement or accord that is acceptable, that is yet regarded as fair, equitable and satisfactory to the Niger Delta that could be a basis for a stable and mutually beneficial and peaceful relationship with the Nigerian nation.

The strategies and methods of the military and security agencies have remained the same in the PCPT period. There are still abuses and rights violations, high handedness and excessive force in the management of security relations with the citizens, resurgent militias and belligerent elements. The JTF has continued to operate with same excessive force and brutality as in the pre-amnesty period. In Edo state, the Ajakurama Community in Ovia South West L.G.A was invaded on July 29, 2013 at 1.00am in search of an ex-militant, Ojuemi Perediseghabota. The wife was reportedly taken away, household properties destroyed and a threat to burn down the community made if they do not produce the ex-militant (Soriwei, 2013).

LACK OF POST AMNESTY PROGRAMME OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

A central failure of the Amnesties for Peace in the Niger Delta is the absence of a Post Amnesty Project. This ought to comprise what was outlined in the initial consultations prior to the commencement and at the initial period of PAP in terms of what government will do in developing the region. The late President Yar'Adua made promises about the resolution of the crisis and the issues that are at the root of it. Unfortunately, these have not been in consideration though initial efforts were made during late president Yar'Adua tenure.

The political leadership since 2010 has concentrated efforts on settling ex-militant leaders and buying their support, rather than substantial development attention to the region. Therefore the issues at the root or base of the crisis remain unresolved contrary to the promises made. The issues of allocation of oil based revenue to the region, land use act and other laws that disinherit the region from their oil resource, the participation in the oil economy, extensive poverty in the region and the grievances of the region in relation of corporate social responsibility, environmental degradation, and development and infrastructure deficits have not been addressed.

There is lack of concerted programmes of development, policy frameworks and political reforms to develop the region and address the region's grievances. In 2010, there was a threat by the governors of the region to pull out of the implementation of the programme on the ground of what the six Governors described as "lack of post Amnesty programme

CHAPTER SEVEN

FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The leadership of the Niger Delta region and its militant formation embraced an Amnesty offered by the federal government based on the perception of the sincerity and political commitment of the late President Yar'Adua's administration. There was no memorandum of understanding, no accord or any form of documented agreement designed and put together, constructed and accepted as a platform for putting an end to the armed conflicts and resolving the resource conflicts in the region. Within the framework of discussions and promises, the Amnesty should have been followed by substantive efforts at resolving the region's grievances and demands.

The implementation of PAP was not done in a comprehensive manner, as part of a broad package of stabilization and peace-building programmes inclusive of political, social and economic programmes. Thus far, the PCTP in the Niger Delta is a very narrow based, exclusionary and non comprehensive package, based solely on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-militants. A post Amnesty programme, which was indicated at the commencement, and which was not clearly outlined remains vacuous and non-existent. In a sense and within the framework of PCPT, PAP has failed in that, either by default of conception and by leadership deficits, political leaders failed to take advantage of the relative peace and security and the fairly conducive environment it provided to resolve the political grievances and address the aspirations, socio-economic needs and environmental remediation sought by the region.

FINDINGS

PAP left out critical dimensions of PCPT: peace agreement, reconstruction, recovery, transitional justice and security sector reform. Poor initial eligibility criteria made criminal elements to crowd PAP, while it became herculean for genuine militants who were initially hesitant to get into the programme. Consequently, PAP has been plagued by continuous agitation and protests over inclusion. PAP is seen to have favoured male ex militants, major ex militant groups, ex militant leaders and Ijaws. Its participants are bloated, while excluding some real militants because of corruption, reward system, political influence and politicization that enabled enlistment of some relatives, loyalists and associates of ex militant leaders, political and ethno-regional leaders. PAP is assessed as not being fair and equitable to victims of the struggle, communities affected by violence, non militant organizations, non armed youth and vulnerable citizens affected by the violence between 1997 and 2009.

Implementation is assessed as poor by its management and outcomes but successful by its impact on the reduction of violence and criminality. It is further assessed as successful in retraining, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Beyond these, PAP failed on the issues of compensation, assistance for victims, rehabilitation of affected communities and employment.

The management of PAP is poor in legitimacy and lacking in public confidence. It is assessed to be corrupt, unaccountable and non transparent. It has performed woefully in the management of payments of stipends, and has allowed exclusion, discrimination and the hijack of the programme by some persons. The major weaknesses of PAP are seen as internal pertaining to poor management and poor outcomes. The conditions in the management of the PAP that could lead to conflict reoccurrence were identified, including the fact that the majority of the

youths have not benefitted from the programme, the hijack of the programme by the ex-militant commandants, lack of inclusiveness, the lack of broad benefits as only a few at the top are actually benefitting from the programme, poor and corrupt leadership, and the possibilities that PAP would fail in the achievements of objectives and desired benefits.

The performance of PAP is poor because apart from the benefits to the ex-militant formation, there is a high level of dissatisfaction. There is considerable dissatisfaction with PAP based largely on the lack of substantial impact on the region's conditions and the reasons for the militant agitation. There is also dissatisfaction with the management of the programme, the roles of ex-militant leaders, discriminatory benefits, contracts and largess, short-changing of stipends, non enlistment in reintegration programmes, joblessness after training and non direct, irregular payments of stipends. PAP's major impact is on ex militants, particularly through training, better life, participation in productive activities and reduction in youth restiveness and violent crimes. The other area of impact is the relative peace and security in the region. It has however had little effects on the conditions and demands of the region.

Peace has returned to the region because PAP has engaged the militants through DDR. However, the current peace and security is not perceived to be sustainable. Besides, the conditions in the region make peace to be not just fragile but susceptible to violent conflict reoccurrence. The situation of youth exclusion, unemployment and grievances; the regional development challenges and the probable failure and termination of PAP make the region vulnerable to violence. A possible emergence of the coalescence of aggrieved groups amidst extensive poverty and unemployment is seen as dangerous to current peace and security. In addition, frustrations arising from failed outcomes of PAP and its termination could also threaten the current peace and security. Furthermore, the levels of

quality training, economic empowerment and employment opportunities of ex-militants are not adequate and effective to prevent the possibility of return to militancy.

PAP is not seen as the lasting, comprehensive, inclusive and sustainable solution to youth restiveness and militancy. Though it has controlled violence and criminality and brought about relative peace and security, it has not addressed the problems and grievances of the region. The resolution of the crisis in the region would revolve around interventions in inclusive human capital development, broadened participation in PAP and attention to the issues of economic empowerment and job creation, poverty alleviation, increased revenue flows, and infrastructure and social service development.

The results of this study indicate that there are still grievances about the conditions of the region, even in the post Amnesty period. These pertain to issues of resource control and increased derivation, continuing state of poor development, infrastructure and industrialization, poor participation in the oil economy, continued devastation of land, water and the coastal region and continuing state of unemployment and poverty. Besides the ex-militant formation, the youth who have not benefitted from the programme, unemployed school graduates who have no access to training and empowerment programmes, host communities which suffered from the violence phase of Niger Delta conflicts, victims of the conflicts from host communities, and persons who suffered losses during the struggle (lost loved ones and properties) are not happy with PAP as it is.

It was noted earlier that the success of DDR is dependent on effective disarmament and the success of reintegration. As has occurred in the region, there is continuing proliferation of SALWs. There are challenges of effective training, employment of trained ex-militants and exclusion of some ex-militants from

reintegration. These have increased the vulnerability of the ex militants to crime, violence and commercialized violence.

We noted earlier that inclusion tends to develop win-win outcomes for stakeholders and satisfactory power and benefit outcomes (Adekanye 2007:197), which is particularly crucial for managing the dynamics of post conflict situations that is usually characterized by volatility, diverse power struggles, plural but conflicting interests and instability. PAP was not broad based and inclusive in terms of participation of all key stakeholders. It has not been accommodative, equitable, fair and just in relation to victims, marginal groups, vulnerable communities, minority ethnic groups, diverse segments of militias and non-militant youth. Particularly, it is not gender inclusive, equitable and sensitive in terms of processes, content and benefits. Communities and victims who were often caught in the crossfire of militia violence and state reprisals are excluded. The high levels of exclusion have generated high levels of dissatisfaction and grievances among the ex militant formation and the youth. The ex militants and the non armed bearing youth are not satisfied and contented with the content, benefits and outcomes of PAP.

CONCLUSION

PAP does not seem to be the solution to the Niger Delta problem, because it has remained at the level of ad hoc, temporary and stop gap solution that is meant to end violence. The Amnesty ought to be a commencement point for providing more permanent solutions to the problems of the Niger Delta. PAP as a short term route to security and peace cannot be the long lasting solution, because it cannot solve the problems of poverty, environmental degradation, and massive youth unemployment. It has not been accompanied by programmes that address the causes of the Niger Delta problem. As it stands, the post amnesty needs of the Niger Delta people have not been met and some of the promises made by the Federal Government during the consultations preceding the amnesty have not been redeemed.

What is clear is that conflict transformation is crucial to sustainable peace and security. For the Niger Delta, sustainable peace and security is a mirage as long as the issues of allocation of oil based revenues to the region, land use act and other laws that disinherited the region from their oil resource, the participation in the oil economy, poverty alleviation and the grievances in relation to corporate social responsibility, environmental degradation and development and infrastructure deficits unaddressed. The way to peace is to redress the exploitation, marginalization, inequity and injustice against the region, in favour of massive development, resource control, equity participation, environmental restoration and economic empowerment. The way beyond PAP is the design and implementation of substantive solutions, including creating employment, alleviating poverty and developing the region.

The relative peace in the Niger Delta is like a time bomb. Widespread violent conflict could explode at any time. The lack of conflict transformation means that

any accentuation of the ND problematic, threat to regional interests, or major development that affects the fortunes of the region can be expected to generate or accentuate grievances, frustration and anger that can drive ex militants to the forest and creeks in a new resistance.

Amnesty Programme has only made peace with the arm bearing segment of the agitators in the Niger Delta by providing them training and paying stipends but the problems of the region that warranted militancy has not been addressed. Militancy has largely stopped and militant camps in the creeks have mostly been closed, but the Amnesty Programme that brought these about does not incorporate the resolution of the problems of the region. Even though the current ex- militants of the Niger Delta have been settled, there is no guarantee that other segments of the youth will not rise to protest the persistent problems of the region. Therefore the resolution of the Niger Delta conflict goes beyond PAP.

The continued existence of security threats in the oil economy and society as indicated by vandalism of oil infrastructure, the persisting high levels of bunkering and illegal refining, high levels of political and electoral violence, and high levels of criminality such as sea piracy, all of which may have some levels of participation of new or former militants, are indications that all is not yet well with the region. There are large numbers of aggrieved youths, dissatisfied ex militants and excluded youths from PAP who remain prone to criminality, cultism and other social vices, and are available for mobilization for violent elite struggles, electoral violence, communal conflicts, bunkering and illegal refining.

The exclusionary focus of PAP on the ex militants is creating the general feeling that violence is being rewarded more than the application of peaceful means to issues. Thus in a sense, PAP is nothing but encouragement of Niger Delta youths to take to arms (<http://www.irinnews.org/report/96403/nigeria-anger-over->

[amnesty-programme](#)). Ibaba (2011) has raised the question as to whether the attention given to ex-militants do not reinforce the frustrations of the non-arms bearing Niger Deltans. Ikelegbe (2014) has stated that the next violence would be quite extensive and intensive as every youth, woman and adult would have to join militant groups, acquire arms and demonstrate capability for violence in order to position themselves for the next Amnesty programme.

The biggest challenge to current peace and security and even the nation is what will happen with the 30,000 trained ex-militants, when the monthly stipends is stopped with the termination of the programme in 2016, as only a trickle of those trained have been employed or provided business start up support. In the situation where industrialization is slow and many existing industries are in dire conditions, and where governments are hamstrung by funding, there would be extensive unemployment among the trained ex-militants, and concomitantly frustration would be inevitable. How will the nation handle this population of youth, trained in arms, hitherto used to armed resistance as a means of livelihood, when they become frustrated and angry and possibly turned on the society, governments, the oil companies and the oil economy and infrastructure? How would their frustration and anger be contained and directed away from violence? What portends does a new militancy conducted by more educated, trained and exposed personnel have in the event of a return to the creeks, swamps and forests in a new armed resistance?

RECOMMENDATIONS

For PAP, there is need to strengthen the legitimacy of the leadership through better management, transparency and accountability, monitoring and coordination, the reduction of the cost of governance and the placement of the interests of ex militants at the centre of concerns. The system of payment of monthly stipends should be transparent and accountable. Payment should be made directly to the ex-militants rather than the current system of payment through their commanders.

The pathway for a broad programme beyond PAP for the resolution of the Niger Delta crisis has been identified earlier. A programme of economy recovery and development has to be established that enables the establishment of inclusive training and skills development, and inclusive economic empowerment as a platform of creating extensive opportunities for everyone. In addition, a broad development framework that involves public- private partnership and synergies particularly between governments, oil companies and communities need to be established to drive the process of extensive infrastructure and social service development and industrialization. There is need for synergy with the oil companies, oil and gas communities, state and local governments and international organizations in the effective implementation of PAP and the recommended post Amnesty programmes of development, along with better systems of governance, through better transparency, accountability and responsive governance.

Policy prescriptions and standards need to be established and pathways charted for building a secured and peaceful society. There is need for the establishment of explicit structural frameworks and structures for peace building and conflict resolution at the community, local government, state government and regional

levels to facilitate social cohesion, reconciliation, conflict resolution and peace efforts. Such frameworks could constitute standby mechanisms for managing security and conflict issues as they arise. There is also need for policy activities and efforts to deconstruct fear, suspicion, hostilities and social tensions. There have to be efforts at reducing resource (land & water) and environmental scarcity and ensuing conflicts through lands and water remediation and reclamation. Finally, there should also be mechanisms for conflict monitoring, early warning systems on conflicts, conflict prevention and peace interventions.

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