

**DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

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CHESTER CROCKER ON AMERICAN
POLICIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Reproduced below is the text of a statement by US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, before the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa (Chairman: Howard Wolpe) in Washington, DC, on September 16, 1981. It is followed by the text of Mr Crocker's speech in Honolulu, Hawaii, on August 29, 1981.

September 16, 1981

Mr Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today to discuss an issue which is of primary concern both to you and to this Administration -- our policies in Southern Africa.

During the first eight months of this Administration, there is no part of Africa on which we have devoted so much energy and attention. As a result, we have formulated a strategy designed to address the major challenges and opportunities facing us in the region, a strategy responsive to our global and regional interests and to the aspirations of the peoples of Africa. The major elements of that strategy were outlined in some detail in my speech before the American Legion in Hawaii on August 29.^x Allow me to briefly underscore its central points.

First, Southern Africa is a region of unquestioned importance to US and Western economic and strategic interests. Its potential as a focal point of African economic progress warrants a substantial effort on our part to reinforce those prospects and to forestall heightened conflict and polarisation.

Second, this region has the tragic potential to become a magnet for internationalised conflict and a cockpit of East-West tension. It contains an explosive combination of forces -- Soviet-Cuban military involvement, African guerilla operations across and within borders, and a politically isolated, but militarily and economically strong, South Africa. It is imperative that we play our proper role in fostering regional security,

* Full text of August 29 speech reproduced below.

countering Soviet influence, and bolstering a climate that makes peaceful change possible. We seek equitable and durable solutions to the region's conflicts, and the emergence and survival of genuine democracy and strong economies. Above all, we seek to dampen the chances for expanded turmoil by encouraging negotiated solutions and an opportunity for the peoples of this strategically located region to build their own futures. This will not happen if organized violence becomes the principal arbiter of relations between states or the means of effecting needed change.

Third, Southern Africa is a region characterised by both substantial interdependence and an absence of a political basis for regional cooperation. It contains within itself the seeds of growing violence. In Namibia there is a low level but increasingly dangerous conflict over the question of how independence -- accepted in principle as a goal by all parties -- should be brought about. In Angola, foreign intervention complicates and prolongs an ethnic and factional struggle that prevents economic progress and spills across borders. Between South Africa and its African-ruled neighbours, there are growing pressures as well as substantial linkages. That country's apartheid policies are anathema to its neighbours who are torn between the urge to build upon existing ties with its neighbours and the determination militarily to deter guerilla action aimed at South Africa itself.

In these circumstances, there is no easy course for American foreign policy. Some would have us conduct ourselves as though the future of Southern Africa had already been written. While all of us can conjure up gloomy scenarios, it does not befit a great power and a free people to act as though we have written off the peoples and potential of Southern Africa to a future of revolutionary strife. This Administration is well aware that in seeking to sustain the chances for negotiated solutions and bolster those committed to evolutionary change, it is walking in a minefield of contending fears, emotions and ideologies -- in Africa and beyond. But our analysis leads us to conclude that any other course would be cowardly and irresponsible.

Some would have us play down the seriousness of Southern Africa's conflicts, pursue our short-term interests but channel our major efforts to other priorities. This may be a superficially attractive course. But it is inconsistent with our African interests and our worldwide responsibilities as the leader of the Western Alliance. It would ignore our own nature and history as a successful multiracial democracy with substantial and growing ties of culture, economics and national security -- to Africa. We have concluded that, whatever the difficulties, it is incumbent on the US to help shape a regional climate of greater confidence, strengthened security, economic advance and, ultimately, greater justice for all who live in Southern Africa.

Finally, there are some who would have us take the easy road of aligning ourselves with one side or another in these issues. At first glance, such a course might appear attractive -- whether on grounds of diplomatic expedience or emotional identification with the issues or actors involved. This Administration has no intention of permitting our hand to be forced to choose between South Africa and its neighbours. That course will only ensure our ultimate isolation or irrelevance in the issues at hand. Our task, together with our key allies, is to maintain communication with all parties -- something we in the West are uniquely able to do. We intend to engage constructively in the region as a whole. Today, we enjoy fruitful ties with most of the

states in Southern Africa, and we are determined to build on that foundation -- through our trade and investment, our diplomatic efforts to dampen and resolve conflicts, and our cultural and foreign assistance programs.

Similarly, in South Africa it is not our task to choose between black and white, but rather to foster conditions in which all South Africans can more fully share and participate in the economy and political process. We seek through our policies neither to destabilise South Africa nor align ourselves with apartheid policies that are repugnant to us. The time has surely come for us Americans to be humble enough to recognise that our influence over events there is limited, realistic enough to grasp the awesome task facing South Africans of all races who seek to dismantle apartheid, and honest enough to recognise that a measure of change is already under way there. We seek a more constructive relationship with South Africa based on these principles, on our shared interests, and on a reciprocal willingness to act in good faith where, as in Namibia, our policies intersect. At the same time, we are conducting a purposeful diplomacy and a reinvigorated commercial and development effort with African governments throughout the region.

Let me be absolutely clear in summing up our strategy. There is a significant change in our approach when compared to that of previous administrations. To those who would say we have adopted an ambitious policy, full of pitfalls, we would insist that there are few alternatives consistent with the complex variety of our regional interests. To those who charge that we have introduced an East-West dimension into Southern Africa, we reply that that element is already inherent, aggravated by the past actions of our global adversaries, as one significant factor in the situation. Our talk is to control this factor, not delude ourselves. To those who would say this Administration has decided to tilt in favour of South Africa's government or its white population, we simply reject the charge. If there is a tilt in our policies, it is towards developing greater influence and credibility as a regional partner, acting together with our Western allies and seeking to bolster the security of this key region. We fully recognise that this approach -- in Namibia and Angola and throughout the region -- makes us a convenient whipping boy on issues that are highly emotive. But this is a price that can be paid if it produces results. That is the basis on which the policy should be judged.

I would now like to indicate how we have applied these principles and this strategy to the inter-related questions of Namibia and Angola over the past eight months. First, we did not inherit a blank slate. Rather, we inherited a longstanding and highly contentious issue with the potential to damage our relationships with the nations of Africa, strain our Alliance ties and generally undermine the Western position in the region. We also inherited a stalemated diplomatic process involving the question of implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435. There could, in our minds, be no question of abandoning Resolution 435 to which all parties had given concurrence in principle. Rather, the question was how to get it implemented and to ensure that its implementation would in fact produce the intended results: genuine independence for Namibia and strengthened security for the region. We have from the outset determined that these objectives are only attainable in the context of a settlement that would be internationally acceptable.

Second, we have operated on the basis that the Namibia issue is indeed an urgent one. Our interests are in no way served by an indefinite delay in the process, and we know it. At the same time, we seek results. The negotiation of Resolution 435 during previous years represents a substantial achievement. But it is not enough by itself to produce the early settlement we seek. We are confident that it can be strengthened without unravelling or dismantling the previously agreed framework.

It is in this context that we are presently developing, for discussion with the parties, a set of constitutional principles that would provide greater assurance to all Namibian parties prior to the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly whose task it is, under Resolution 435, to draw up a constitution.

Third, we are working closely with our British, Canadian, French and German allies in the Western contact group on these issues. We have had extensive discussions in this forum at many levels. These discussions are under way as we meet here today and they will continue. On September 24, contact group foreign ministers will meet in New York to review progress achieved and determine the next steps with the parties in Southern Africa. The contact group is a key element in the negotiating process, because of the variety and depth of relationships and experience it represents.

Fourth, we recognise openly and without embarrassment a simple fact: there will be no settlement in Namibia without South African concurrence. Though its continued control of Namibia is legally rejected by most, including ourselves, in the international community, its physical position is strong. South Africa is unlikely to implement any settlement it considers to jeopardise its fundamental interests. Our task, using that measure of influence available to us, is to devise a settlement framework that addresses those concerns, that is acceptable in Africa and that takes proper account of the United Nations' own role in the Namibia issue. We are doing so while seeking to persuade South Africa that such an internationally acceptable settlement is in fact the only course consistent with its own interests. This naturally entails developing a dialogue of mutual trust on Namibia, an issue that is from the South African standpoint, central. We believe that, whatever the public rhetoric, all parties understand that our options are limited, and that such a US-South African dialogue will be essential. We know from our extensive contacts throughout Africa -- and particularly in Southern Africa -- that our decision to give Namibia our highest priority is understood.

As we have repeatedly stated, in public and in private diplomacy, there is an intimate relationship between the Namibian and Angolan conflicts. There is little debate about that observation, either as a matter of fact or logic, as the Angolan government has itself recognised. But we do not accept the proposition that the Cubans will automatically depart or that the Angolan Civil War will automatically end as South Africa withdraws from Namibia. More important, we do not believe that proposition is persuasive to others -- especially those who must live with the results in the region. Inevitably, the presence of some 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola affects the calculations of all parties in the region. This Administration does not believe they contribute to regional security. Neither do we accept the argument that violence across the Namibia-Angola border has a single cause, as we made clear in our decision to veto a one-sided Security Council resolution on the recent South African attack.

Our approach on the Angolan question is increasingly understood in our diplomatic dialogue, and I want to make certain it is understood here at home. We have established no Angolan preconditions for a Namibian settlement, just as we do not believe there can be a Namibian precondition for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. We are seeking to inject greater candour into the discussion and to stimulate creative thinking about how progress on such agenda can contribute to progress on the other. In our view, a satisfactory outcome will only occur if there is parallel movement in both arenas. We are committed to this as an approach with benefits for all, one that can address the need for confidence and security on all sides. The US Government is not taking sides in the Angolan conflict which we believe cannot be resolved on the battlefield. We have been and will be in contact with all parties to play our proper role in bringing about an outcome that can address the basic security issues of this part of Southern Africa, and thereby enable governments and peoples to turn from war to constructive pursuits.

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August 29, 1981

I am pleased and honoured to be addressing the American Legion on a subject of vital national and international significance. Africa is an integral and increasingly important part of the global competitive system. The United States did not cause this to come about, but it is a reality, one which many Americans have only recently begun to perceive. Africa is part of the large, interdependent world system within which the position of the United States is critically important, and thus the quality and the maturity of our relationship with African states is a potent force for international, as well as our own national security and well being.

The Reagan Administration has established some tough goals for our country in the area of foreign affairs just as it has in the area of domestic policy. They are goals which are supported by the American people and which are based upon the values which we as a nation have subscribed to for over two hundred years.

As Secretary of State Haig has said:

- We will be consistent in the pursuit of US interests,
- The United States will be reliable as a force for peace and stability,
- There will be balance in our approach to individual issues and orchestration of policy in general.

We, whose job it is to help shape and implement this Administration's foreign policy, take these principles seriously, and I believe that progress is evident. Let me enumerate what this Administration has set forth as its objectives in Africa:

- America seeks to promote peace and regional security in Africa, and to deny opportunities to all those who seek contrary objectives,
- We will support proven friends and be known as a reliable partner, in Africa as elsewhere,
- We support open market opportunities, access to key resources and expanding African and American economies.
- The US actively supports regional security and peaceful solutions to the problems of Southern Africa.
- We seek to expand and assist that group of nations whose development policies produce economic progress and which have working democratic institutions.
- The US will do its share in meeting Africa's humanitarian needs and in supporting basic human liberties, in keeping with both American principles and American interests.

To reach those objectives, we must each day address a number of natural and man-made problems. Let me touch on just a few of them in the African context.

We are concerned about the influence of the Soviet Union and its surrogates in Africa. The Soviets seek to exploit for their own ends existing differences and actual conflict, and they seek to create and sustain situations of conflict from which they can profit. They are aided in these efforts by their client states (such as the Cubans and the East Germans), but also by less traditional partners who also pursue their own aims to the detriment of their neighbours. Under the leadership of Colonel Gadhafi, Libya has been transformed into a leading Third World arsenal of Soviet-supplied hardware. Libyan arms and cash are at the center of a skillful and sinister campaign of subversion that has become a major source of African instability. The activities of the Soviets and their partners threaten the security of Africa in every corner of the continent, and in accordance with our objectives the US is working to frustrate these activities and to help African states resist them.

I would like here to emphasise a point I have made elsewhere on this subject, and that is that the United States has no desire nor, for that matter, any mandate to act as the policeman of Africa. But let there be no misunderstanding: this country will not hesitate to play its proper role both in fostering the well-being of friends in Africa and in resisting the efforts of those whose goals are the opposite. Without a minimum of regional political order, our other regional interests -- humanitarian, economic, commercial -- cannot be pursued. Equally important, without political order, African states will fail in their crucial tasks of nation-building, economic development and, in general, assuming Africa's rightful place in the community of nations. As leader of the West, the US has a responsibility to help shape the strategic context that impinges on Africa. As I stated at the outset, Africa is an integral part of the world political system. It is time for us Americans to recognise this reality and cease indulging in the romantic illusion that Africa is somehow uniquely buffered from the effects of destabilisation, whether it is of external or regional origin.

We are also alert to the danger inherent in the economic crises which are affecting Africa. Several factors have combined to produce one of the most serious economic situations since African countries became independent.

The causes are several: policies which bloated government's role in the economy and distorted the pricing mechanism; severe droughts that cut food production; the recession in the Western industrialised countries which sharply reduced Africa's export earnings; and the higher oil prices which hurt the poor countries even worse than the industrialised ones. The result is that, across Africa today, countries which are already among the poorest in the world are facing stagnant economies, debt burdens which they cannot meet, oil import bills which eat up most of their foreign exchange earnings, food shortages which threaten famine in some cases, and spiralling costs for basic necessities that create deep social tensions. We are well aware that others are eager to exploit these tensions. African governments, still in the early stages of institutional maturity, are easily shaken, often overthrown in the face of such crises. Some of the governments so threatened today are those which have consistently supported the United States in such international situations as Iran and Afghanistan, and some of those which today provide us with access to key military facilities in our reach to the Persian Gulf.

The United States cannot be the financial "angel" for Africa, any more than we intend to be Africa's policeman. But we have no intention of allowing this economic threat any more than the threat of terrorism or subversion to undermine basic American interests in Africa. This Administration aims to meet this threat by emphasising our strengths -- specifically by helping bring the poorer African nations more into the mainstream of the free market economy which is the soundest and surest way to growth. Strengthening our own economy is a vital part of this, for this enables us to fulfill our international financial responsibilities, and it increases the potential markets for African countries. Our bilateral assistance program will be an indispensable element in Africa during this period. Under the Reagan Administration, our bilateral aid will be targetted on those areas where our interests are most clearly manifest and focused more to produce policy changes of broad and lasting impact. These changes include giving a much greater opportunity to the private sector, both within these countries and from abroad. Multilateral assistance agencies, such as the World Bank, provide the bulk of assistance resources to Africa, far more than we can or need to provide bilaterally. This Administration will play a strong role in these institutions, pushing for combining this aid with the kind of basic structural and policy changes that are essential if Africa is not to reel from one economic crisis to another. We believe that, if helped through this crisis period with the right mix of aid, policy reform, and a strongly reinvigorated role for the private sector, African peoples will opt for the growth and the freedom -- the personal, economic, and political freedom -- that is inherent in the free world's international economic system.

Southern Africa

But it is to Southern Africa that I would like to direct the thrust of my remarks. The African policy of this Administration places a very high priority on addressing the problems and opportunities of this key region. We have dedicated a substantial effort, engaging the energy and attention of the highest levels of government, to reviewing the regional situation, weighing our options, and consulting in-depth with all the key players, including our allies and the governments of Southern Africa. During the early months of this year we concluded that US and Western interests can only be advanced by serious and determined US leadership aimed at strengthening the region's security and backing its development potential. We have defined a new regional strategy, responsive to our national security, economic-

commercial, and political interests. That strategy is based on three basic realities of Southern Africa:

First, US economic interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are heavily concentrated in the Southern third of the continent. Nearly 3000 million dollars of direct investment, or about 10 percent of the Sub-Saharan total, is located there. Our Southern African trade totals over 1000 million dollars. This concentration of our interests reflects Southern Africa's tremendous mineral wealth and the relative sophistication of the area's economies -- especially those of South Africa and Zimbabwe. Southern Africa accounts for over 40 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's GNP, 70 percent of its industrial and 60 percent of its mining output, 80 percent of the steel and 85 percent of the electricity consumed. The area contains immense deposits of many strategic minerals which are vital to industrial economies like ours including: the platinum group (86 percent of world reserves), manganese (53 percent), vanadium (64 percent), chromium (95 percent), and cobalt (52 percent), as well as a dominant share of world gold and diamond output and internationally significant output of coal, uranium, copper and other minerals. Many of these minerals are vital to Western defence and high technology industries.

There is no longer much debate about Southern Africa's economic significance. With regional stability, the area can prosper and serve as a focal point of African economic progress. Trade and private investment flows from the US, and other Western nations can reinforce this potential and provide a solid basis of mutual interest for US-African relations. If there is a slide toward regional turmoil, however, Southern Africa's potential economic dynamism becomes a mirage. This Administration strongly supports Southern African economic development through encouragement of trade and investment throughout the area, and through the provision of timely and carefully tailored foreign assistance. Equally important, we support regional development by an active diplomacy aimed at addressing outstanding conflicts and thus discouraging the recourse to violent solutions and foreign intervention.

A second reality is that Southern Africa is an increasingly contested arena in global politics. The worldwide significance of the region derives from its potential -- unless nations of the area can find a basis to resolve outstanding conflicts and coexist -- to become a cockpit of mounting East-West tension. Despite the ending of the drawn-out struggle in Rhodesia and the successful transition to independent Zimbabwe, there remains a combination of local and external pressures that could lead to expanded conflict and polarisation. Since Portugal's departure from its ex-colonies in 1975, the USSR and its clients have shown every interest in keeping the pot of regional conflicts boiling. Six years after Angola's independence, substantial Cuban combat forces, plus Soviet advisers, remain there, as participants in a still-resolved and tragic civic war. This external factor inevitably shapes the calculations of Angola's neighbours. Warsaw Pact countries have arms agreements with four nations of the area and provide the bulk of external military support to guerilla groups aimed at Namibia and South Africa. Faced with large-scale foreign intervention, the pressure of African guerilla groups, and strains in its relations with its traditional Western partners, South Africa has significantly expanded its defence potential in recent years. The Republic, through a sustained self-sufficiency drive, is now an important regional military power. It has clearly signalled its determination to resist guerilla encroachments and strike at countries giving sanctuary.

Let us make no mistake. This is an explosive combination. The potential damage to Western interests is enhanced by Southern Africa's geopolitical

importance along the strategic sea routes around Africa and by its growing importance as a source of critical minerals. It is imperative that we play our proper role in fostering the region's security and countering the expansion of Soviet influence. We intend to do so by building the confidence necessary for equitable and durable solutions to conflicts and by encouraging the emergence and survival of genuine democratic systems and productive economies. We will not lend our voice to support those dedicated to seizing and holding power through violence. If the peoples of Southern Africa are to have the change to build their own futures, it is essential that military force not become established as the arbiter of relations between states or the means of effecting needed political change. In this respect, Southern Africa could become a crucial arena for defining the rules of international conduct in the decade ahead.

The third reality is that Southern Africa is a highly complex arena which must be understood on its own regional merits if we are to succeed in our efforts. There are powerful linkages -- transport systems, labour migration, electric power grids, flows of capital and expertise, active and vital trade ties that bind together the states of Southern Africa. Interdependence is reinforced by the presence in the region of six landlocked states. Economic pragmatism is strengthened by the many nearby examples of negative growth rates and falling living standards. But there are also deep-rooted sources of conflict within the region itself. The political basis for regional cooperation is strikingly absent. The racial and ethnic pluralism of these societies -- and the raw emotions generated by colonialism and white minority rule -- make it difficult for them to come to terms with themselves and their neighbours.

- The legally entrenched apartheid policies of South Africa are anathema to its African-ruled neighbours. They see lessened dependence on South Africa and increased political pressures on it for domestic change. All parties are aware of the enormous price that will be exacted if the pressures in and around South Africa degenerate into destructive revolutionary violence.
- Angola has been plagued since independence by continuing ethnic and factional struggle, complicated by foreign intervention, that spills into neighbouring countries and diverts attention from needed development. It is unlikely that the struggle between the MPLA government and opposition forces - chiefly UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi - can be resolved militarily. Cuban troop withdrawal and national reconciliation would be supported by all Angola's neighbours, but these if turn are intimately related to the question of Namibia.
- The low-level guerrilla conflict over Namibia's status has gradually expanded in recent years, as Western-led efforts to find a negotiated basis for independence from South African control continue. All parties accept the principle of independence, and some measure of agreement exists about the procedures for a transfer of power. But talks under UN auspices led by the Western contact group states - US, Great Britain, France, Germany and Canada - had stalled by early 1981. It is clear that Namibia is a focal point of regional conflict and African diplomatic concern. It is also clear that the war could continue and expand unless the core concerns of all parties, including South Africa, are addressed in a settlement.

Thus, it is clear that Southern Africa contains within itself the seeds of growing violence. To ward off this possibility we must have a realistic strategy, one that assures our credibility as a regional partner. We cannot and will not permit our hand to be forced to align ourselves with one side of another in these disputes. Our task, together with our key allies, is to maintain communication with all parties -- something we in the West are uniquely able to do -- and to pursue our growing interests throughout the region. Only if we engage constructively in Southern Africa as a whole, can we play our proper role in the search for negotiated solutions, peaceful change and expanding economic progress.

In South Africa, the region's dominant country, it is not our task to choose between black and white. In this rich land of talented and diverse peoples, important Western economic, strategic, moral and political interests are at stake. We must avoid action that aggravates the awesome challenges facing South Africans of all races. The Reagan Administration has no intention of destabilizing South Africa in order to curry favour elsewhere. Neither will we align ourselves with apartheid policies that are abhorrent to our own multiracial democracy. South Africa is an integral and important element of the global economic system, and it plays a significant economic role in its own region. We will not support the severing of those ties. It does not serve our interests to walk away from South Africa, any more than it does to play down the seriousness of domestic and regional problems it faces.

The Reagan Administration recognises that the future of Southern Africa has not yet been written. It would be an act of political irresponsibility and moral cowardice to conduct ourselves as though it had been. We need policies that sustain those who would resist the siren call of violence and the blandishments of Moscow and its clients. The US enjoys fruitful ties with most of the African states in this region -- Zaire, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and Tanzania. We seek to strengthen and expand these relationships through diplomatic efforts on the interrelated conflicts in Namibia and Angola, through strong programs of foreign assistance, and by fostering expanded trade and investment. The US also seeks to build a more constructive relationship with South Africa, one based on shared interests, persuasion, and improved communication. There is much ferment in South Africa today, centered on the question of how all South Africans can more fully share and participate in the economy and political process. We recognise that a measure of change is already underway in South Africa. At such a time, when many South Africans of all races, in and out of government, are seeking to move away from apartheid, it is our task to be supportive of this process so that proponents of reform and non-violent change can gain and hold the initiative.

Let me now sketch out for you briefly what we are trying to achieve in Namibia and Angola. Much has been said and written on this subject over the past six months -- some of it has even been accurate. We believe that our straightforward and realistic approach is increasingly understood -- at home and abroad.

On Namibia, I would emphasise that this Administration did not inherit a blank slate. We inherited a long-standing and highly contentious issue over which Western-led diplomatic efforts had reached an apparent impasse. We immediately recognised that the Namibia negotiations formed a central part of our developing relationship with Black Africa and South Africa, as well

as an important item on the allied agenda. Namibia, we concluded, was an issue that - unless resolved - could bedevil these relationships and offer splendid opportunities to our adversaries.

All parties shared our view that South Africa held the key to a settlement, and agreed further that the new American Administration was uniquely positioned to explore with the South Africans conditions under which they would be prepared to turn that key. We recognised that UN Security Council Resolution 435 represented a significant diplomatic achievement, having been agreed to in principle by all parties. The issue was to identify the obstacles to its actual implementation and develop a means to address those obstacles. In extensive consultations with all parties on three continents, Secretary Haig, Deputy Secretary Clark and I have explored the issue. We believe that progress has been achieved, and we are now working closely with our European and Canadian allies in the contact group to shape concrete proposals to put before the parties in Southern Africa.

A Namibia settlement is, we believe, desirable and obtainable at an early date. To succeed, it must be internationally acceptable -- under UN auspices and in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435, which must form the basis of a settlement. That framework, in our view, can and should be supplemented by additional measures aimed at reassuring all Namibian parties of fair treatment and at answering certain basic constitutional questions prior to elections that will lead to independence. A Namibia settlement, to be successful, must offer a genuine and equitable resolution of the conflict and lead the way toward an independence that strengthens, not undermines, the security of Southern Africa.

Our diplomacy recognises openly the intimate relationship between the conflicts in Namibia and Angola. We have repeatedly made clear our position that progress toward a Namibia settlement could set the stage for withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. There is little debate about the logic of this proposition which the Angolan government itself accepts in part. But we do not share the view that there is anything automatic or predictable about that relationship, as some would argue. The assumption that Cubans will depart -- or that UNITA will evaporate like the morning dew -- as South Africa withdraws from Namibia, is problematical. What if the civil strife in Angola continues after Namibia's independence? We also wonder how a young government in the fragile new state of Namibia can be expected to survive and prosper with a seemingly endless civil war on its Northern border, with substantial Soviet-Cuban presence nearby and with the consequent prospect of a new sequence of intervention involving perhaps both South African and Communist forces.

Clearly, the relationship between Namibia and Angola cuts both ways. One of our first priorities has been to inject some greater logic and candour into this discussion and to stimulate creative thinking about how progress on each front might contribute to progress on the other. I would like to emphasise that we are not laying down preconditions to any party.

We believe that movement on Namibia can reinforce movement toward Cuban withdrawal -- and vice versa. Furthermore, we are convinced that a satisfactory outcome can only be based on parallel movement in both arenas. In our dialogue with the frontline states, including the MPLA government in Angola, we have repeatedly underscored our sincere commitment to a process with benefits for all -- one that need threaten no one. Thus, as we make

clear our view that UNITA represents a significant and legitimate factor in Angolan politics, we have also maintained our mutually fruitful commercial ties with Luanda as a symbol of the future relationship that could one day be possible.

In conclusion, I believe the objectives and strategy defined here represent an approach responsive to regional realities and consistent with US national security and foreign policy interests. The time has come for us as a nation to erase any shadow of doubt about the importance of African to US interests, and to demonstrate by our actions that we can conduct a serious and sustained diplomacy in Africa.

October 1981.