



As many countries on the African continent move out of a situation of armed conflict the demand for additional peace support activities increases. The concept and practice of peacekeeping has changed dramatically in the past decade to meet the shifting trends of conflict that today encompass complex political and humanitarian emergencies. Post-conflict reconstruction is gaining more importance as stakeholders recognise that for any peace process to be sustainable there needs to be long-term commitment to address social, political and economic reform. In a world focussed on combating terrorism and where there are diminishing resources for development aid, the major challenge remains as to where the resources will come from for peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction activities.

This special edition of *Conflict Trends* is dedicated to giving an overview of peacekeeping in Africa. It explores peacekeeping from a global United Nations and African perspective, and examines various African case studies. It is our hope that it will contribute to the debate on the role and function of peacekeeping on the Continent.


ACCORD recognises the important role that peacekeeping plays in establishing long-term sustainable peace in war-torn societies. The Peace and Security Unit at ACCORD is focused on capacity building in the peace and security field in Africa, for both military and civilian peacekeepers as well as civil-military co-ordination officers. Its two core programmes are the Training for Peace (TfP) in Southern Africa Programme, supported over the last eight years by the Norwegian Government, and the African Civil-Military Co-ordination (CIMIC) Programme supported by the Government of Finland. This special edition is produced in partnership with the TfP Programme which is supported by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Peace and Security Unit works closely with sub-regional peacekeeping training centres to ensure that military and civilian peacekeepers have the opportunity to be deployed, and that peacekeeping training curriculum is standardised on the continent. The Peace and Security Unit has also, through the TfP Programme, supported the establishment of an African Chapter of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) called the African Peace Support Training Association (APSTA) to further advance this objective.

Several countries on the African Continent continue to experience protracted civil conflicts. This is a reality that Africa will have to face for the foreseeable future. In this context it becomes important for Africa to develop the necessary capacity for peacekeeping and to secure adequate resources to ensure that any peacekeeping deployment it makes will be able to execute its task effectively.

Peacekeeping may be an answer to securing peace in Africa but it should only be considered as a means to an end. Our best answer to securing sustainable peace in Africa is to promote leadership, dialogue, and development. These are the foundations on which we will build sustainable peace. Leadership that is divisive, ethnocentric, intolerant and self serving will produce conflict. Leadership that resorts to war and stifles the development of its people serves as the catalysts for protracted conflict. We need to build leadership that is visionary which will use both dialogue and development to mediate the variety of interests that characterise contemporary African society. We must move to a situation in Africa where peacekeeping is subsumed by peace-building and our efforts must be directed at maintaining peace and not preparing to keep it. ♣

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SIMON MAINA/AFP

RAMESH THAKUR

FEATURE

Where US unilateralism meets UN-centred multilateralism

The United Nations (UN) has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. But the vision of a collective security system proved as Utopian and unattainable after the Second World War as it had proven after the First. Peacekeeping emerged somewhat haphazardly and untidily, as a halfway house between the pacific settlement of disputes under chapter 6 of the UN Charter and collective enforcement under chapter 7. Africa has been the setting for some of the most challenging missions. Some were largely successful, as with the emergence of an independent Namibia in the late 1980s; others were shambolic, as with Somalia in the first half of the 1990s. The Congo operation in the early 1960s anticipated to a remarkable degree some of the structural dilemmas inherent in the more muscular peace operations of a generation later.

During the Cold War, UN peacekeeping forces were interposed between warring parties and used

to forestall major-power confrontations across global faultlines. The number of peacekeeping operations increased dramatically after the end of the Cold War as the UN was placed on centre-stage in efforts to resolve outstanding conflicts. However, the multiplication of missions was not always accompanied by coherent policy or integrated military and political responses. When the missions encountered problems, the 'crisis of expectations' of the late 1980s and early 1990s in turn gave way to a crisis of confidence-cum-credibility in UN peacekeeping in the late 1990s, and member states began to limit their military, political and financial exposure.

Yet the need for UN peacekeeping remains and will continue. Compared to just 16 missions during the 1945–90 Cold War period, 41 new missions were established during 1990–2003. In April 2004, over 51 000 UN peacekeepers (soldiers and police officers) from 94 countries – almost half the total UN

**Kofi Annan, the
Secretary-General
of the United
Nations (above)**



The United Nations Security Council convenes for a meeting on Africa at the UN headquarters in New York

membership – were deployed in 14 missions around the world.² The causes of conflict are many, but the fact of conflict remains a constant feature of international affairs. More and more conflicts break out within borders, not between countries. They still pose major challenges to regional stability. How, in the end, can we reconcile “the temporary nature of specific operations with the evident permanence of peacekeeping and other peace operation activities as core functions of the United Nations”;³ that is, the imperative of ad hoc missions with the persisting reality of permanent engagement?⁴

There is a second set of considerations that is crucial to the maintenance of international order. Peace and stability cannot be achieved on the basis solely either of the UN as the front of legitimate international authority or the military might of the United States (US) as today’s only superpower. Rather, it depends on the most judicious mix of American power being harnessed to UN authority. The Iraq war brought to a head what has sometimes been a troubled and uneasy relationship between the UN as the world’s premier international organisation and the US as its most important member state. The tension between the competing imperatives towards unilateralism and multilateralism in US foreign policy has long bedevilled relations between the UN and US with respect to international peace operations, since well before the advent of the administration of President George W.

Bush. The UN Security Council is the proper locus for authorising and legitimising the creation, deployment and use of military force under international auspices. The major powers were given permanent membership of the Security Council and the veto power in recognition of their special role and responsibility in underwriting world order and collective security. When collective security proved unattainable and peacekeeping emerged as a substitute technique for keeping the major powers out of competitive involvement in armed conflicts, direct military involvement by the five permanent members of the Security Council was not welcome. But they still had to consent to the creation, deployment and financing of the UN peacekeeping missions. When the nature of the types of crises into which UN peace operations were deployed changed fundamentally, especially after the Cold War, the blue berets were often confronted with the challenge of military enforcement. It did not take long for the realisation to sink in that the Security Council is singularly ill-suited to being the proper locus of the command and control of fighting forces. The UN’s own panel on peacekeeping, chaired by the distinguished North African diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, concluded that “the UN does not wage war”.⁵

The burden of responsibility for international military engagement typically falls on the US, as the country having the power to make the most

difference. What is the optimal 'mode of articulation' between the UN as the authoritative custodian, on the one hand, and, on the other, the US as the de facto underwriter of international peace and world order?

Contrary to popular belief, the US remained essentially multilateral throughout the 1990s, with signs of unilateralism surfacing only in 2001 with President George W. Bush with respect to a raft of issues from the Kyoto Protocol on climate change to arms control treaties and the International Criminal Court. But what did change over the course of the 1990s was the centrality of the UN in the US scheme of multilateralism. Learning from experience in a world no longer divided by the Cold War blocs yet facing messy internal conflicts, Washington progressively divided its multilateral impulse between the UN as the global mobilising and legitimising organisation, and NATO as the strategic enforcement arm for peace operations in Europe. Outside Europe, Washington progressively drew back from direct participation but not necessarily all forms of involvement in UN peacekeeping. By the end of the last century, the peacekeeping pressure on Washington was channelled through the UN, the security response through NATO or coalitions of the willing, and diplomatic efforts through the European Union or other regional organisations. Thus multilateralism remains important to US foreign policy and the US remains the pivot of multilateral action in the maintenance of international peace and security.

At times US power and international authority can operate in isolation of each other, for example with respect to the multinational force in Beirut in the early 1980s⁶ or the international control commissions in Indochina in the 1950s.⁷ At other times, force and authority can work in tandem. Using the metaphor in its exact sense, the UN can lead and America support, which is the preferred US model today with respect to peacekeeping duties in Africa; or Washington can lead and the UN can support, as in Korea in the 1950s, the Gulf War in 1991 and allied troops in the Balkans today.

Peace operations enlarge the spectrum of capabilities available to the international community to respond to threats of chaos on the periphery. Participation symbolises solidarity and encapsulates shared responsibility. But the UN does not have its own military and police forces. The

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is under-staffed and under-resourced. It manages a number and range of military missions and personnel around the world with resources and under conditions that the Pentagon would find simply intolerable and unacceptable. A multinational coalition of allies can offer a more credible and efficient military force when robust action is needed and warranted. The UN would be hard pressed to achieve anything of note without active US engagement, let alone against its vital interests and determined opposition.

In the other direction, the UN helps to mute the costs and spread the risks of the terms of US international engagement. It is a means of mediating the choice between isolationism – disengagement from the world – and unilateralism, or going it alone; between inaction through refusing to be a cop and intervention through being the world's only cop. In the 1990s, the UN forum enabled successive US administrations "both to legitimate interventions and to spread the burden to a wider group of countries".⁸ But in order to maximise these benefits, they need to instill the principle of multilateralism itself as a norm in its own right: states must do X because the UN has called for X, and good states do what the UN asks them to do. The promotion of multilateralism and globalism can thus become foreign policy goals in themselves.

The 'alienation' and institutionalisation of fundamental US value preferences would greatly reduce the compliance and transaction costs of the US pursuing national interests directly and without the mediating framework of global multilateral machinery. And so, at the time of Gulf War I in 1990–91, the language used to construct Iraq as a major threat to international peace (as distinct from US material interests) emphasised the danger of Iraq's action to the system of codified order (the so-called 'new world order') whose basic tenets were being challenged and defied. An international consensus was forged and maintained and US national interests were subsumed within that international consensus. Moreover, being the virtuous power, the US, and no-one else, had both the moral standing and the material capacity to provide international leadership

The UN Security Council is the proper locus for authorising and legitimising the creation, deployment and use of military force under international auspices



US crew members onboard a 3HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopter

and galvanise the UN into action. Sometimes Washington may also have an indirect interest in supporting UN peace operations, in that these may be of more direct interest to other countries whose support the US will need on unrelated issues: political horse-trading is integral to UN policy-making.

The benefits of UN peacekeeping, although uneven, are considerable. For decades, UN peace operations have served US security interests in the Middle East, southern Africa, Central America, Southeast Asia and Haiti. By their very nature, peacekeeping operations cannot produce conclusive results either on the battlefield – they are peace operations, not war – or around the negotiating table – they are military deployments, not diplomatic talks. Criticisms levelled at UN peace operations can be fundamentally misconceived, intentionally ill-conceived, grossly exaggerated or designed to deflect criticisms from the failures of the administration.⁹

Conversely, the disengagement of the US from UN peacekeeping has had a spill-over effect in partially eroding the legitimacy of UN operations, and therefore the effectiveness of the UN as the primary manager of international security. In turn this has reduced US leverage in spreading the burden of providing international security and lessening the demands and expectations on the US itself to take up the slack directly. At the same time, scapegoating the UN has produced a backlash among other nations and so reduced the US ability to use the UN in pursuit of US goals where the

interests of the two do coincide.

Somalia and Rwanda became metaphors in the US political discourse for the UN as a failed international organisation, and that perception helped Washington to rally support for action outside the UN framework in Kosovo. Yet the US bore significant responsibility for both, through acts of commission in Somalia where US troops went on a hunt for General Aideed like cowboys beyond UN control, and of omission in Rwanda where any possible timely action by the Security Council was stymied by US refusal to get involved in, or even support, enforcement action at any level in Africa in the post-Somalia atmosphere. Although many human rights organisations were bitterly critical of the US complicity in the scandalous lack of action by the international community in Rwanda, not one member of Congress called for American action there.¹⁰ Indeed, American officials went to extraordinary lengths to avoid using the word genocide to describe the events in Rwanda, since that would have generated legal obligations and public pressure to do something.

Because the world is essentially anarchical, it is fundamentally insecure, characterised by strategic uncertainty and complexity because of too many actors with multiple goals and interests and variable capabilities and convictions. Collective action embedded in international institutions that mirror mainly American value preferences and interests enhances predictability, reduces uncertainty and so cuts the transaction costs of international action in the pursuit of US foreign policy. 'America First' nationalists are sceptical of the value of the UN to US foreign policy, viewing it more as a constraint. Why should US power be harnessed to the goals of others? Multilateralism implies bargaining and accommodation, and compromise is integral to such multilateral negotiation. But US power and assets are such that Washington does not need to compromise on core values and interests. Liberal institutionalists believe that multilateral organisations externalise such bedrock US values as respect for the rule of law, due process and human rights. Multilateralism – the coordination of relations among several states in accordance with certain principles¹¹ (such as sovereign equality) – rests on assumptions of the indivisibility of the benefits of collective public goods like peace (as well as international telecommunications, transportation,

and so on) and diffuse reciprocity (whereby collective action arrangements confer an equivalence of benefits, not on every issue and every occasion, but in aggregate and over time¹²).

Nine propositions

Nine propositions may be offered on the US unilateralism–UN multilateralism debate.

- 1 The power, wealth and politics of the US are too deeply intertwined with the cross-currents of international affairs for disengagement to be a credible or sustainable policy posture for the world’s only superpower.
- 2 If isolationism is not an option in today’s globally interconnected world, unilateralism cannot be the strategy of choice either. A world in which every country retreats into unilateralism is not a better guarantee of US national security, now or for the foreseeable future, than multilateral regimes. The most authoritative forum for constructing an effective anti-terrorism regime, like other global regimes, is the UN.
- 3 Exceptionalism is also deeply flawed. Washington cannot construct a world in which all others have to obey universal norms and rules, but the US can opt out whenever, as often, and for as long as it likes on global norms, for example with respect to nuclear testing, the use of landmines, international criminal prosecution, climate change and other regimes – what Richard Haass, Director of the Policy Planning Unit at the State Department, called “à la carte multilateralism”,¹³ or what some others in private call, even more dismissively, disposable multilateralism.
- 4 Because peacekeeping is likely to remain the instrument of choice by the UN for engaging with the characteristic types of conflicts in the contemporary world, the US approach to peace operations will continue to define the nature of the US engagement with the UN. Perceptions of US disengagement will in turn erode the US ability to harness UN legitimacy to causes and battles that may be more important to the US than peacekeeping in messy conflicts in far-away countries whose names can neither be pronounced nor remembered by US voters or members of Congress, and sometimes even by

presidents.

- 5 Because the US will remain the main financial underwriter of the costs of UN peacekeeping, it will continue to exercise unmatched influence on the establishment, mandate, nature, size, and termination of UN peace operations. At the same time, the level of informed interest about the UN is so low in the American body politic that any administration will always be able to distance itself from spectacular failures of UN peacekeeping.
- 6 The overarching US policy goal with respect to UN peace operations is to make them efficient, cost effective and selective. Part of the last point includes leaving war-fighting – peace enforcement – to multinational coalitions acting under UN authority. Part of the efficiency drive includes a campaign to increase the professional military capabilities of the DPKO at the expense of some other units which, in Washington’s view, are bloated and top-heavy. UN peacekeeping rests on a conjunction of interests in overseeing peace. That consensus has difficulty surviving any effort to transform the mission into keeping the peace by force. There is the requisite convergence of wishes to supervise peace in the larger interests of the international security. Force cannot be used effectively without the participation of major powers. The international consensus collapses because the use of force by great powers is inseparable from calculations of national interest. As this reality was internalised by US decision-makers in the 1990s, they progressively shifted the task of enforcement from the UN to NATO or ad hoc coalitions of the willing, while retaining the UN framework for legitimising multilateral enforcement operations.
- 7 US participation in chapter 7 operations under direct UN command can be ruled out in the foreseeable future. The contribution of US infantry troops to UN peace operations under chapter 6 with no or little likelihood of fighting is also very unlikely. US participation in UN peace operations, whose creation and continuation requires US consent, is likely therefore to remain limited to the provision of unique

If isolationism is not an option in today’s globally interconnected world, unilateralism cannot be the strategy of choice either

capabilities like transportation, communications and logistics units and skills, as well as bearing the main burden of the costs of the operations.

The main theatre of expansion of UN peace operations in recent years has been Africa. The continent plays but a marginal role in US foreign policy in general, and US peacekeeping policy in particular. In the last five years, stung by criticisms of double standards with regard to differential reactions to the humanitarian crises of the Balkans and African hotspots, Washington has been prepared to offer political support, in the form of affirmative votes, for starting up new missions in Africa. But the US is still not prepared to commit US military personnel to these missions, preferring instead to regionalise African peacekeeping through train-and-equip programmes. Not surprisingly, other Western countries have followed the US lead, despite the clear demonstration in Sierra Leone of what a difference even one Western country (in this case the UK) can make by providing professional troops and determined leadership. The lack of US political, logistical, financial and military support for UN peacekeeping makes complex peace operations more costly and more prone to failure, and therefore leads to other countries also trying to limit their exposure to such risky operations. Non-US involvement and backing thus has a negative multiplier effect on UN peacekeeping.

- 8 UN peace operations are only one of many foreign policy tools available to the US, others being multilateral action through standing alliances such as NATO, or an ad hoc multinational coalition as in the Gulf War, or even unilateral US action if the interests involved are sufficiently vital to the US.
- 9 In the case of non-UN operations, the US would prefer to obtain the legitimating approbation of the UN if possible, in the form of enabling UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions authorising the operations. But the US is most unlikely to accept a prior UNSC resolution as a mandatory requirement for the use of military force overseas. The problematic element in this comes from the equally compelling US interest in promoting the norm of the UN as the only collective legitimator of international military

action as far as anyone else is concerned. Washington thus faces an unresolved, and irrec- oncilable, dilemma between instilling the principle of multilateralism as the world order norm, and exempting itself from the same principle because of the sustaining and enduring belief in exceptionalism, in its identity as the 'virtuous' power. ▲

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Endnotes

- 1 The phrase is taken from Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer, (eds.), *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s*, Boulder: Westview, 1995.
- 2 Up-to-date figures can always be found by navigating through the UN home page, www.un.org
- 3 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, New York: General Assembly/Security Council, 21 August 2000, p. xiii.
- 4 Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, (eds.), *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001.
- 5 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, para. 53.
- 6 See Ramesh Thakur, *International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United Nations Authority and Multinational Force*, Boulder: Westview, 1987.
- 7 See Ramesh Thakur, *Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland and the International Commission*, Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984.
- 8 Barry M. Blechman, 'Emerging from the Intervention Dilemma' in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources and Responses to International Conflict*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996, pp. 287-95.
- 9 See, for example, the systematic rebuttal of persistent US criticisms of UN peace operations by a former New Zealand Secretary of Defence who is anything but anti-American, having been pilloried in the second half of the 1980s in his home country for having been too pro-US; Denis McLean, 'Peace Operations and Common Sense', in Crocker and Hampson, pp. 321-32.
- 10 Michael G. MacKinnon, *The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton: A Fairweather Friend?* London: Frank Cass, 2000, p. 108.
- 11 John G. Ruggie, 'Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution', in John G. Ruggie, (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 8-11.
- 12 Robert Keohane, 'Reciprocity in International Relations', *International Organisation* 40:1, Winter 1986, pp. 1-27.
- 13 Quoted in Thom Shanker, 'Bush's Way: 'A la Carte' Approach to Treaties', *International Herald Tribune*, 1 August 2001.



FESTUS AGOAGYE

PEACEKEEPING

The African Mission in

Burundi

Lessons learned from the first African Union Peacekeeping Operation

In 1993, prospects for the peace and stability of Burundi were disturbed in the wake of the assassination of President Francois Ndadaye. At the end of peace processes led by the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania,¹ as well as under the facilitation and mediation of Madiba, former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa (June 1998), the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation for Burundi was signed on 28 August 2000, with the support of the Regional Peace Initiative (RPI) and the international community.

Subsequently, the peace processes were consolidated with the signing of two ceasefire agreements. The first of these agreements was signed on 7 October 2002 between the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB) and the Burundi Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs).² The second agreement on 2 December 2002 was

between the TGoB and the CNDD-FDD of Pierre Nkurunziza.³ It is worthy of note that the Palipehutu-FNL of Agathon Rwasa did not participate in these processes. It continued to wage war and insisted on direct negotiations with the power-brokers in Burundi, which, in its view, was the Tutsi-controlled army.

Article 8 of Protocol V of the Arusha Agreement provided that 'immediately following the signature of the Agreement, the Burundian Government shall submit to the United Nations (UN) a request for an international peacekeeping force'. Under Article III of the October 2002 ceasefire agreement, the TGoB and the APPMs agreed that the "verification and control of the ceasefire may be conducted by a UN mandated mission, or an African Union (AU) [mission]." In contrast, Article III of the ceasefire agreement of December 2002 provided that the

“verification and control of the ceasefire agreement shall be conducted by an African Mission”.

Given these ambiguities, and the fact that the UN would not mandate the deployment of a peacekeeping mission in the absence of a comprehensive and all-inclusive ceasefire in Burundi, Mandela first used his good offices to obtain the consent of the government of South Africa to mandate the deployment of the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) in October 2000, to provide protection to designated returning leaders. Subsequently, the AU also accepted the challenge to mandate the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in April 2003.

Following the signing of two protocols in Pretoria in October and November 2003, as well as a comprehensive ceasefire agreement between the TGoB and the CNDD-FDD of Nkurunziza on 16 November 2003, the mandate of AMIB came to an end on 31 May 2004. With effect from 1 June 2004, the responsibility for peace operations in Burundi was assumed by the UN Operations in Burundi (ONUB) which was mandated on 21 May 2004 by Security Council Resolution 1545 (2004).

The deployment of AMIB aimed to achieve synergy in peace efforts within the Great Lakes

This article will provide an overview of the establishment, mandate and concept of operations of AMIB. Against that background, it will also undertake a brief assessment of the rationale for the establishment of AMIB, as well as its strategic and operational challenges.

It will conclude with objective recommendations for the UN system in Burundi and for the capacity of the AU system for future peace operations.

Establishment of the African Mission in Burundi

The AU has been engaged in Burundi since the events in 1993. But, in light of the significant and positive developments in the peace process in the Great Lakes Region, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, the AU seized the opportunity to mandate the establishment and deployment of AMIB, the first fully fledged AU peace operation on the continent.⁴ Thus, the deployment of AMIB aimed to achieve synergy in peace efforts within the Great Lakes region by adding momentum to efforts to implement the

agreements signed and resolve outstanding issues.

The 91st Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the [Organisation of African Unity] Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, meeting at ambassadorial level on 2 April 2003, mandated the deployment of AMIB for an initial period of one year, subject to renewal and “pending the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force to be mandated by the UN Security Council”.

The endgame, objectives and mandate

In its preface to AMIB’s mandate, the Central Organ anticipated that the “African Mission would have fulfilled its mandate after it has facilitated the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreements and the defence and security situation in Burundi is stable and well-managed by newly created national defence and security structures”.

With this in view, AMIB’s deployment aimed to achieve the following objectives:

- ▲ oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreements;
- ▲ support disarmament and demobilisation initiatives and advise on the reintegration of ex-combatants;
- ▲ strive towards ensuring that conditions were created for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission; and
- ▲ contribute to political and economic stability in Burundi.

To this end, AMIB was mandated to carry out the following tasks and missions:

- ▲ establish and maintain liaison between the parties;
- ▲ monitor and verify the implementation of the ceasefire agreements;
- ▲ facilitate activities of the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) and Technical Committees for the establishment and restructuring of the national defence and police forces;
- ▲ secure identified assembly and disengagement areas;
- ▲ facilitate safe passage for the parties during planned movements to designated assembly areas;
- ▲ facilitate and provide technical assistance to the Demobilisation, Disarmament, and

- Reintegration (DDR) process;
- ▲ facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance, including to refugees and internally displaced persons;
- ▲ coordinate mission activities with the UN presence in Burundi; and
- ▲ provide VIP protection for designated returning leaders.

The concept of AMIB


Like a UN peace operation, AMIB was an integrated mission, comprising a civilian component and military contingents. The Head of Mission (HoM) and Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Ambassador Mamadou Bah (Guinea), was assisted by two deputies from South Africa (Ambassador Welile Nhlapo) and Tanzania (Retired Lieutenant General Martin Mwakalindile); a third deputy from Uganda did not deploy.

The Force Commander of AMIB's military component was Major General Siphso Binda (South Africa), while his deputy, Brigadier-General G. Ayele, was from Ethiopia. Altogether, AMIB had a total strength of up to about 3 335 with military contingents from South Africa (1 600), Ethiopia (858) and Mozambique (228), as well as the AU observer element (43) drawn from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia.

AMIB's deployment started the establishment of its headquarters on 27 April 2003, followed by the transition of SAPSD, which was already deployed in Burundi. After the arrival of advance elements from Ethiopia and Mozambique on 18 and 26 May, the force headquarters and components were integrated on 1 June 2003. Consequently, South Africa beefed up its troop presence to nearly its authorised established strength of 1 600 troops. However, it was not until the arrival of the main bodies of Ethiopia and Mozambique from 27 September to 17 October 2003 that the force became fully operational.

Conceptually, the force was concentrated in Bujumbura. From this stronghold, the South African and Ethiopian contingents respectively were to establish two demobilisation centres at Muyange (Bubanza Province) and Buhinga (projected, Rutana Province). The establishment of a third demobilisation centre was contingent upon mission and operational exigencies. Overall, AMIB

African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)



was expected to canton and disarm an estimated total of 20 000 ex-combatants, at a daily rate of about 300 from a number of assembly areas (between 6 and 11) to the demobilisation centres.

In addition, the Mozambican contingent was to provide escorts for sustainment convoys and all other movements, including those of humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs), while the special Protection and Reaction Unit (South Africa) provided protection to the returned leaders.

In respect of the cantonment exercise, AMIB established Cantonment Site 1 (Bubanza) on 25 May 2003. With effect from 26 June 2003, it was able to canton up to 200 ex-combatants at this site; comprising elements from the CNDD-FDD of Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye and the Palipehutu-FNL of Alain Mugabarabona. With the exception of this undertaking, AMIB was unable to proceed with the DDR. The maintenance of Cantonment Site 1 entailed the sustainment of the ex-combatants. To be able to do this, AMIB's Head of Mission used his good offices to mobilise resources mainly from the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), European Union (EU), United Nations Children's



A South African National Defence Force soldier in Bujumbura, as part of the Africa Union Mission in Burundi

Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organisation (WHO).

By far the most visible mission task of AMIB was its protection of the returned leaders by the Special Protection Unit (SPU). The SPU undertook this task with about 260 special forces troops within the framework of a provisional service level agreement that provided for the scope, privileges and responsibilities of the parties and AMIB. Upon the termination of AMIB's mandate, this mission task fell into abeyance as the UN expunged it from ONUB's mandated missions.

AMIB's operations were also subject to clear rules of engagement and codes of conduct that accorded with international humanitarian law, the laws of armed conflict and the principles and standards of the UN.

Civil-military cooperation in AMIB

Civil-military cooperation played no less a role in AMIB than in other UN peace operations. In practice, CIMIC play in AMIB focused on three main activity areas:

- 1** humanitarian support to the civilian population and ex-combatants,
- 2** DDR, and

- 3** civil-military relations with the host nation authorities.

In actual fact, it was to facilitate support to the UN and the international humanitarian agencies and NGOs operating in the mission area that AMIB established a Civil Military Coordination Center (CIMICC). The CIMICC liaised and consulted with humanitarian agencies and NGOs on planning the operational requirements of humanitarian delivery, in order to ensure proper and effective coordination of all AMIB military and other support to the recipient agencies and NGOs.

In technical terms, the DDR programme also constituted another dimension of CIMIC as far as coordination and consultations with the UN Office in Burundi (ONUB), AMIB, NCDDR, APPMs and the players, including the World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) were concerned. In this respect, the DDR-CIMIC was conducted within the framework of the JCC, aiming at a negotiated Joint Operations Plan (JOP) to provide the framework for effective and sustainable DDR in Burundi.

The third dimension of CIMIC also related in technical terms to traditional civil-military relations.

In this area, ONUB and AMIB, as well as key players of the peace process, undertook consultations and negotiations with the TGoB and its ministries, departments and sectors over numerous aspects of the implementation of the peace process. In contrast with traditional CIMIC, these organisations and institutions pursued the resolution of issues not within the traditional CIMIC, but in such institutions as the Interim Monitoring Committee (IMC), the presidency and cabinet, and informal consultations. For example, AMIB had to consult with the sector ministry, as well as the Burundi Civil Aviation Authority, over the interpretation and execution of the taxation clause in the Status of Force Agreement. In order to resolve issues of conflict between members of AMIB and the Burundian authorities and public, AMIB established a special committee, which included the participation of the Burundian civilian police authority, for weekly meetings to amicably iron out social breaches by AMIB.

Administration logistics, budget and funding

Though minuscule in relation to a UN peace operation, the AU Commission enhanced the civilian component of the mission headquarters, improving its managerial capacity. Again, being without capacity for in-mission sustainment, the administration and logistics of AMIB was streamlined through Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with the troop-contributing countries (TCCs). Among provisions covering the terms for the contribution of resources to AMIB, the relevant MOUs required TCC self-sustainability for up to 60 days, pending reimbursement by the AU commission, and the possibility of in-mission supply of water and fuel.

The budget for the deployment, operations and sustainment of AMIB was estimated at about US \$110 million for the first year; at the end of its 14-month mandate, the total budget of AMIB amounted to US \$134 million, covering the real costs of troop and equipment deployments, reimbursement for specialised equipment at appropriate depreciation rates and common mission costs for items such as vehicle markings, insignia, and medical health facilities. It also included the budget for the integrated mission headquarters and the

military observer element. The applicable rates of reimbursement that were approved by the Central Organ were:

- 1 US \$1.28 as individual troop allowance;
- 2 US \$10 per troop for food; and
- 3 US \$500 per troop as operational costs.

Without adequate funds in its peace fund, the AU expected to fund AMIB's budget from redeemed pledges and donations from its traditional partners, who had given indications of sufficient goodwill towards the peace efforts of the AU. Incidentally, the pledges from the partners, amounting to some US \$50 million, fell far short of the budget. Even worse, actual donations into the trust fund amounted to just US \$10 million, even though this excluded in-kind assistance from the US (US \$6.1 million) and UK (US \$6 million), to support the deployment of the Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents respectively.⁵

Cooperation with the UN and the international community

One aspect of strategic AU collaboration with the UN and the international community was the understanding that the deployment of AMIB was a holding operation pending the deployment of a UN Security Council-mandated peacekeeping mission. The AU also pursued strategic-level AU-UN engagement for the mobilisation of resources, as well as in-theatre administrative and logistical assistance from the UN system, including the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to enhance AMIB's technical capacity in the areas of public information, headquarters administration and DDR. However, these did not yield the desired results, even though operational collaboration between AMIB and ONUB, including participation in the activities of the IMC and the JCC, both of which are chaired by the UN, were according to the book.

Operational-level collaboration also involved consultation with international humanitarian agencies and NGOs, particularly in terms of the implementation of the DDR programme. In this respect, the mission collaborated with the EU, GTZ and the World Bank/MDRP, in sourcing for funding and material assistance for the DDR programme and the wider implementation of the agreements.

Challenges, best practices and lessons learned

AMIB was able to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, contributing to the creation of conditions suitable for the deployment of ONUB on 1 June 2004

In terms of its own end-game, AMIB cannot be said to have fully facilitated the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, nor was it able to fully ensure that the defence and security situation in Burundi was stable and well managed by newly created national defence and security structures. Failing agreement with the TGoB on the designation and

security of identified pre-assembly and disarmament centres, as well as the lack of full cooperation from the APPMs, the mission was also unable to fully support the DDR initiatives and advise on the reintegration of ex-combatants. Even though it established and maintained liaison between the parties, monitored and verified the implementation of the ceasefire agreements and facilitated the activities of the JCC, it found it difficult to

facilitate the work of the technical committees, including the establishment of Joint Liaison Teams and the implementation of the Forces Technical Agreement, for the establishment and restructuring of the national defence and police forces.

These failures notwithstanding, the mission could be credited with efforts towards the stabilisation of about 95 percent of the country, with the exception of Bujumbura rural, which remained contested by the Palipehutu-FNL of Agathon Rwaswa. In this way, it was able to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, contributing to the creation of conditions suitable for the deployment of ONUB on 1 June 2004. AMIB was also able to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, coordinate mission activities with the UN presence in Burundi, and provide protection to the designated returning leaders. In spite of these achievements, the contribution of the mission to political and economic stability in Burundi was limited.

At both the strategic and operational levels, it is equally pertinent to note that the establishment and deployment of AMIB was affected by considerable challenges. The mission's logistical sustainment and funding was particularly problematic, owing to the lack of substantive support from within Africa, as well as from the UN and the international

community to provide requisite assistance.

So, what lessons can and should be learned from the instructive experiences of AMIB? Out of the many, the following is only a short list of nine key lessons:

- 1** The division of responsibilities between regional forces and UN presence should be formalised. This could be facilitated by UN involvement in the planning of regional missions, with a view to achieving a smooth transition to UN peace operations. In that transition, including planning for a UN peace operation, the UN should closely consult with the AU and regional peace initiatives, and not only troop-contributing countries.
- 2** The implementing institutions at the operational level, such as the IMC and JCC, should endeavour to ensure the implementation of key provisions of the instruments of peace; for example the release of political prisoners and detainees, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and the establishment of relevant security mechanisms (such as the Neutral and Negotiated Commission of Inquiry, the International Monitoring Mechanism and the Mixed Monitoring Commission) to monitor borders, the flow of small arms, activities of negative forces, and so on.
- 3** The integrity of the regional force and its mandate should not be compromised by unwarranted reliance on the transitional government whose efforts will be contested by members of its own coalition or by the opposing APPMs.
- 4** The civilian component of the leadership of regional forces should be endowed with the requisite capacity for the administrative and technical management of the regional peace operation.
- 5** Mandates for regional missions should aim at addressing fundamental issues in ceasefire and peace agreements.
- 6** Particularly in situations of incomplete ceasefires, the concept of operations of the regional force should ensure that:
 - ▲ All critical mission tasks contributing to security are included.
 - ▲ The deployment of the force, as much as possible, ensures that opposing forces are separated and the activities of armed elements in pre-assembly or cantonment

- areas are monitored.
- ▲ The cantonment of APPMs, the confinement of government forces, including the monitoring of their heavy weapons, and the DDR of the APPMs, are simultaneously undertaken.
 - ▲ Integrated security command and control bodies are established in a transparent manner through the appropriate institutions of the peace process.
 - ▲ The establishment of mixed units for essential security tasks, and the restructuring of the national defence, police and intelligence forces, are pursued in a transparent manner, and not left to ad hoc arrangements between the TGoB and the preferred APPMs.
- 7** The conduct of regional peace operations should be based on standardised doctrine and operating procedures and not those of the individual troop-contributing countries. Efforts are also needed in this direction to achieve a reasonable degree of inter-operability in the areas of equipment maintenance.
- 8** External assistance packages should be provided within multilateral regional arrangements and, in addition to strategic lifts, should also cover communication and office electronic equipment and consumables, as well as logistical sustainment, and funding for reimbursement.
- 9** Mission-level arrangements should be made for competent translation or interpretation to address the linguistic problem between the working languages of the AU system, namely Arabic, English, French and Portuguese.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while AMIB has contributed its due in the face of serious limitations to peace and stability in Burundi, ONUB will still face formidable operational challenges arising from political difficulties in the implementation of the peace agreements. The accomplishment of ONUB's mandate will be determined by the extent to which the UN creates space for strategic and operational collaboration with the AU, the Facilitation Team and the RPI, to ensure that the underlying causes of the Burundian conflict, centring on the dynamics of power politics and the politics of political and

economic exclusion, are addressed.

As ONUB digs its teeth into the hard flesh of the Burundian conflict and peace process, the AU needs a sober reflection on its first fully fledged peace operation. It needs to undertake a best practices and lessons learned exercise, among other things, to inform its efforts towards the operationalisation and future operations of the ASF.

The UN and the international community may well learn the hard lesson that they need to assist the AU in its critical areas of need, beyond the limited 'soft' assistance towards training. The UN and the international community should see themselves as partners in arms with the AU. They ought to help Africa build real capacity for African regional bridging operations, in order to plug the gap in the global security architecture arising from the hesitance of UN intervention and the abdication of the West from UN-mandated peace operations in Africa. ▀

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Endnotes

- 1 The takeover was necessitated by the death of Nyerere in October 1999.
- 2 In addition to the signatures of the Facilitation Team, the party signatories were: Pierre Buyoya (Major), President; Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye (Colonel) for the CNDD-FDD; and Alain Mugabarabona for Palipehutu-FNL.
- 3 Pursuant to Article 13 of Protocol II of the Arusha Agreement, the 36-month transition was planned in two phases of 18 months each. The first phase ran from 1 November 2001 to 30 April 2003, while the second phase commenced on 1 May 2003 and is expected to end on 31 October 2004.
- 4 The AU decision was in accordance with of the 19th Regional Summit in Arusha from 1-3 December 2002, which was ratified by the 7th Ordinary Session of the AU Central Organ in Addis Ababa at the level of Heads of State and Government on 3 February 2003.
- 5 The contributions and pledges were: (1) AU Peace Fund: US \$300 000; (2) Italy: €200 000; (3) EU: €25 million, earmarked for Burundi, with the understanding that unless peace was restored in Burundi, any investment would be wasted and would not achieve its desired ends; (4) USA: US \$6.1 million for airlift of Ethiopian contingent and 60 days' sustainment in the mission area; (5) UK: US \$6 million for the Mozambican contingent; (6) South Africa: funding for the Mozambican contingent; (7) Denmark: approximately US \$1 million for insignia and medals; (8) Germany: €400 000; and (9) other unspecified commitments when redeemed.



GEORGES SOBET/AP

PEACEKEEPING

DESMOND MOLLOY

The **gender perspective**

as a deterrent to spoilers: The Sierra Leone experience

The Success and failure

In February 2004, the Government of Sierra Leone declared the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes as an aspect of the peace process in the context of the Lomé Peace Accord, completed. As with most peace initiatives, the initial period after the signing of the Accord in 1999 was a bumpy ride, with progress followed by disappointment as warlords, their sub-regional collaborators and power brokers maneuvered for advantage. In 2001 decisive action by the international community and military defeat of the most belligerent faction enabled the implementation of the process. Now deemed as the most successful implementation of a UN supported peace process to

date, it is under intense academic scrutiny, seeking lessons learned and designing replicable templates to address other conflicts.

One unequivocal admission by all stakeholders in the delivery of the peace is that the process failed women, not only as beneficiaries but also as participants with a huge potential to deliver an improved peace process. At the stage of the articulation of the Peace Accord, very little attention was given to the issue of female combatants as well as the so-called camp followers who ultimately escaped the reintegration net. In the process of implementation, very many organisations with expertise in dealing with female combatants as well as other victims of war were either underutilised or marginalised. Consequently any attempt to redress the situation

of these women during the DDR process was bound to be of an ad-hoc nature with minimal impact on their future life. In this short paper I review the extent of this challenge and suggest how the gender perspective formally included in peace negotiations offers an improved method of delivering peace

A gender perspective as an aspect of community security

In the discourse on security, human security is a term that has gained currency due to a global move towards extending the meaning of security beyond its original bounds into one characterised by many facets. Human security includes among other things, access to fundamental human rights as enshrined in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. An evolving and generic concept of security is that of community security.

“Community security embraces public cultural, political, social and economic concerns. It is about physical security and freedom of movement of people and goods, maintenance of law and order, sustainable livelihood, access to social services and markets as well as reconciliation and democratisation. It is closely linked to the root causes of the war and the dissatisfaction with the authorities, mismanagement of public assets and lack of communications between people, interest groups, authorities and civil society”¹.

Community security is a state of mind and a sense of belonging. It is a broad concept that forms the foundation for human and national security. Its absence was the root cause of the conflict in Sierra Leone; the perception and reality of exclusion.

In reviewing aspects of communities security which contributed to what is deemed a successful peace process in Sierra Leone, with the benefit of hindsight and in the light of the Women Waging Peace report (Jan 2004) on women and girls in the DDR process in Sierra Leone,² it would appear that an effective mechanism in deterring spoilers was under-used in the early phases of the peace process – the gender perspective. While the role of women in contributing to peace has received increasing lip service in recent years, and its very own UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on the role of women in

promoting international stability – October 2000, the implementation of gender mainstreaming in peace processes, including that in Sierra Leone, has suffered from the absence of commitment and political will by the parties to the negotiations, and an unwillingness to address the aspirations of women in the post-conflict arrangements. A close look at the circumstances under which the agreements are concluded indicates that very often the negotiators including custodians are preoccupied with a desire to bring the spoilers into the fold of the negotiations and tend to consider other issues as potential explosives that should be carefully handled at an appropriate time. This primary consideration appears to have obviated any meaningful discussion on gender and related issues. In the charged atmosphere of a peace negotiation, compromise and expediency often sees difficult questions and commitments left in abeyance. This includes aspects of the gender perspective on the causes of the conflict, the crimes of the belligerents and the conditions necessary for peace. As in almost all cases, the problems that had not been provided for in the agreements were left to the mercy of the custodians of the Accord. Since the pledging conferences organised to support the peace process tend to identify requirements on the basis of the goals stipulated in those documents, half-hearted attempts are made to address gender related issues at mid-course. That notwithstanding, current quantitative and qualitative analysis in relation to the role of women and women’s groups in civil war, is identifying the critical role of women in peace advocacy and implementation, at a national level, in the community and in the family. From political advocacy often through peaceful protest, domestic advocacy and coercion, women have strongly influenced the establishment of the peace process and aspects of its implementation.

Very little attention was given to female combatants who ultimately escaped the reintegration net

The experience in Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone, action by a group of elderly women representing faith-based organisations precipitated the incident that led to the removal of the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Foday Sankoh. Ridiculed by Sankoh when they visited his

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A mother feeds her child at the Handicap International camp in Freetown, which shelters the victims of mutilations

home seeking compliance with the Lomé Peace Accord, they placed the worse possible curse from their tradition on him and stood on their own dignity by baring their posteriors to him. By so doing they succeeded in pricking the collective conscience of society. Members of the community, usually fearful of the RUF, now emboldened by the women's action and defending their honour, mobilized and marched on Sankoh's home leading to his arrest.

At a domestic level, women had a significant influence over men in encouraging them to join the disarmament process to avail of the immediate reinsertion benefits and the longer term benefits of the reintegration programmes, at a time when the commanders were reticent, maneuvering for position and delaying the process. This contributed to the creation of a wedge between combatants and those who sought to frustrate the process, thus raising concern at being side-lined and forcing them to re-establish the lead into the process. Women have also played a major and largely unsung role in the reintegration of ex-combatants into their communities through the maintenance of a domestic base, the enhancement of reconciliation and by discouraging a return to the influence of former commanders.

While it is clear that violence against women is often endemic in societies where women are perceived as second-class citizens and somewhat as chattels of men, as is the case in many areas of West Africa, women do hold a venerable position in civil society and in the community in Sierra Leone by virtue of culture and tradition and their specific position and gender related tasking in the family. The targeting of women through rape, amputation and murder by the fighting forces, as was prevalent in Sierra Leone, was a statement of the rejection of traditional values and an abomination directed at perpetuating terror and the illusion of potency, in an environment of impunity. When the weapons fell silent, the unacceptability at the abandonment of common decency in relation to women, and in disrespecting the traditional position of women in civil society, was evident through the testimonies at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; the insistent and fraudulent denials of crimes against women by the by Civil Defence Forces (CDF), the Government supported faction; the hiding and retention of women ex-combatants and captives even throughout the peace process, and the inclusion of crimes against women as an indictable offence within the purview of the Special Court.

It is significant that while women make up not

less than 50 percent of civil society in Sierra Leone, only 7 percent of the fighting forces that were included as beneficiaries in the DDR process are identified as women. While women must be seen as perpetrators as well as victims, the vast majority of women remained aloof from the perpetration of the worse excesses of the conflict, and many of those who were part of the fighting forces attempted to have a moderating influence on their comrades, commanders or masters.

Generally, while women were the most victimised sector of the community in the conflict in Sierra Leone, they were also the sector of the community most likely to prevail over male combatants and bring moderation to the conflict. Sadly they are the sector least consulted in developing the peace and the sector to least benefit directly from the programmes associated with the peace process.

Of the twelve signatories to the Lomé Peace Accord, the primary active agreement delivering peace to the country, none is a Sierra Leonean woman. It is worth considering that those who represented the major victim group were not afforded the opportunity to record their consent, or otherwise, to an internationally brokered Accord that was to have dramatic impact on their lives. It is hardly surprising that only one paragraph in the Accord refers to the position of women, under the heading “War Rehabilitation and Reconstruction”:

“Given that women have been particularly victimised during the war, special attention shall be accorded to their needs and potentials in formulating and implementing national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development programmes, to enable them to play a central role in the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Sierra Leone”³.

This pious nod in the direction of more than 50 percent of the population of Sierra Leone, patronisingly reaffirms the view of women as victims, casting them as a passive and non threatening constituency to be accorded special attention. It is also worth noting that in the transitional justice mechanisms in Sierra Leone, there is only one female Sierra Leonean Commissioner in the TRC and no female Sierra Leonean judge in the Special Court. If the proof is in the implementation, studies of the DDR Process candidly admit that the process

failed women who were associated with the fighting forces. How much more has the peace process failed those women who were not associated with the fighting factions!

A gender perspective as a deterrent to spoilers

The role of women remains on the margins of the negotiations, in the small print of the Accord and omitted from the formal aspects of the implementation! The overarching fact is that in failing to formalise the gender perspective in peace negotiations as well as in the implementation, the process has failed to capitalise on the significant strengths of women, initially as a deterrent to the spoilers and to ensure that benefits contribute to the strengthening of community security, the base of the security triangle. Women appropriately empowered through inclusion, can provide active input to all phases of the peace process and create a formidable deterrent to those who attempt to manipulate the process, driven by “individual corporate greed,” their primary objective being “power, money and self-aggrandisement”. As evidenced by the critical role of the Mano River Union (MRU) Women’s Peace Network in the recommencement of the MRU summits, there is no doubt that women could have played a much more robust role in all stages of the peace process. If women’s organisations are accorded equal status in the negotiations as the fighting factions, the aspirations of the war lords can be moderated and provisions which address primary needs, particularly those which fall inside the sphere of community security, are likely to receive due prominence in the Accord. The same organisations must then be represented in the joint implementation mechanisms including the technical coordinating committees. ♫

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Endnotes

- 1 B. Ljunggren (2004), Draft, *Community Security – Generic*, UND, March.
- 2 Carlson and Anderlin, *From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone*, Mazurana, January.
- 3 The Lomé Peace Accord, 7 July 1999, Section XXXVIII, par. 2.



ISSOUF SANOGO/AFP

PEACEKEEPING

CEDRIC DE CONING

Refining the **African Standby Force** concept

The African Union and the African sub-regional organisations are busy implementing the African Standby Force (ASF) Framework. Two sub-regional organisations have thus far announced their intention to establish sub-regional standby systems. The East African Chiefs of Defence Staff met in February 2004 to adopt a draft protocol and framework for the establishment of an Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG).¹ Similarly, the Defence Chiefs of Staff of the Economic Community of Central African States met in Brazzaville at the end of October 2003 and decided to create a brigade-sized sub-regional

standby force.² The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are also in the process of developing implementation plans and are scheduled to present these to their decision-making bodies later this year.

This article raises a concern regarding the focus of the ASF Framework on traditional peacekeeping and complex peace operations, whilst operational and financial realities suggest that the AU and sub-regional organisations are more likely to deploy military observer missions and short robust peace enforcement operations. It argues that a focus on

the latter missions will increase the likelihood of achieving the ASF goals and objectives, while the capacity for the former should rather be developed in the framework of the UN Standby System (UNSAS).

The African Standby Force

In May 2003, the African Chiefs of Defence Staff agreed on the modalities for an African Standby Force (ASF).³ The ASF provides for five sub-regional standby arrangements, each up to brigade size (3 000-4 000 troops), which will provide the AU with a combined standby capacity of 15 000 to 20 000 troops.⁴ Between 300 and 500 military observers are trained and ready to deploy on 14 days' notice. A police standby capacity of at least 240 individual officers and two company strength police units (gendarmerie), which should enable the AU to staff two complex peace operations, each with a police component. There is also a centrally managed roster of civilian specialists in mission administration, human rights, humanitarian, governance, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).

The ASF design was developed on the basis of six possible mission scenarios, including:

- 1 military advice to a political mission;
- 2 an AU observer mission co-deployed with a UN peacekeeping mission;
- 3 a stand-alone AU observer mission;
- 4 a traditional peacekeeping or preventative deployment mission;
- 5 complex multi-dimensional peace operations;
- 6 peace enforcement or what the ASF Framework document refers to as intervention missions.

The ASF recommends a two-phased implementation process: the first phase is aimed at developing the capacity to manage scenarios 1 to 3 by mid-2005, while the second phase is aimed at developing the capability to manage the remaining scenarios by 2010.

It should be noted that concept of a 'force' is perhaps misleading, because what is in fact proposed is not a standing force but a standby system. The various military, police and civilian components will remain in their countries of origin, but are organised, trained and exercised in a synchronised and coherent fashion so that they

would be ready to be deployed together when the appropriate authorisation has been received.

Division of labour between the UN and regional organisations

What type of missions are the AU and African sub-regional organisations most likely to undertake? Past precedent, operational capability and financial constraints suggest that the AU and sub-regional organisations are unlikely to undertake multi-year traditional or complex peace operations (ASF scenarios 4 and 5).

All the AU operations to date (and those of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity), with the exception of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), were unarmed military observer missions (ASF Framework scenarios 1 to 3). Most sub-regional operations, in contrast, were peace enforcement missions (ASF scenario 6), for example the various ECOMOG missions in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the SADC operation in Lesotho.

The new AU military observer mission to Darfur in Sudan is a good example of the former. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) authorised the deployment of the AU observer mission on 25 May 2004. The mission is authorised to have up to 120 military observers and a possible protection force of 270 military personnel. The mission's mandate is to ensure that the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed in N'djamena, Chad, on 8 April 2004 by Khartoum, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) would be implemented; to define routes for the movement of forces; to assess requirements for mine-clearance operations; and to receive, verify and judge complaints related to ceasefire violations.⁵ The European Union has announced that it has mobilised €12 million (about US \$14.5 million), through the newly established Africa Peace Facility (APF), in support of the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur.⁶

AMIB was a hybrid mission (somewhere between ASF scenarios 4 to 6) as it operated in a complex mission environment with a peacekeeping mandate even though a comprehensive ceasefire

The concept of a 'force' is perhaps misleading, because what is in fact proposed is not a standing force but a standby system



Heads of State and other delegates attend the third ordinary session of the African Union in Addis Ababa in July 2004

agreement was not in place.⁷ However, apart from a political office that linked with the larger ongoing peacemaking process, it did not perform any of the multidimensional civilian functions typically associated with a complex peace operation. Instead, its functions matched the hybrid operation model⁸ where a multi-national force typically provides the security dimension alongside a UN civilian peace operation. Other examples are the NATO KFOR mission in Kosovo that operated alongside the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) mission, and the International Stability Force (ISAF) that operated alongside the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Although there was no comparable civilian UN peace operation in Burundi, the UN did

have a political office in Burundi (ONUB) headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and AMIB related to ONUB, the rest of the UN System, donors and NGOs in ways typical of the hybrid model of peace operations.

The point is that the AU and African sub-regional organisations like ECOWAS and SADC have neither the resources nor the mandate to undertake humanitarian assistance or post-conflict reconstruction programmes, and therefore do not have the capacity to undertake complex multidimensional peace operations on their own. The UN is the only institution that has the authority and is capable of undertaking complex multidimensional operations because it has departments, offices, funds and agencies that span the peace, security, humanitarian and development continuum. The only regional organisation that may develop that capacity in the foreseeable future is the European Union.⁹ That is why regional organisations like NATO, the AU and ECOWAS have typically deployed peacemaking and military peacekeeping missions, while the UN has continued to take the leading role for the humanitarian and development aspects whenever such regional deployments are required.

The AU and African sub-regional organisations thus do not have the capacity to undertake complex peacekeeping operations on their own. They would need to join forces with other institutions like the UN, donor agencies and NGOs whenever they were to deploy in a complex peace operation context, and as such, their role would be of that of a hybrid operation, where they provide a military, and perhaps a political-peacemaking function, alongside a UN civilian operation as part of a larger complex peace-building system.

Recent trends

Over the past 24 months, a number of events have taken place in Africa that point to a further refinement in the division of labour between the UN and regional organisations in Africa. The trend suggests that regional and sub-regional organisations are the first to respond to emerging crisis situations. They undertake short robust stabilisation or peace enforcement operations, and after a few months these regional missions are transformed into complex UN peace-building operations.

This trend could be observed in 2003 when, in

Ituri in the DRC and in Liberia, the EU and ECOWAS respectively deployed short but robust peace enforcement missions to stabilise a conflict zone while the UN prepared a more comprehensive peace-building response.¹⁰ Once the situation has been stabilised and the UN has made its preparations, which in the Ituri and Liberia cases took approximately 90 days, the UN replaced the regional operations with complex peace-building missions. AMIB followed a similar trend but it took 15 months for the UN to take over with the follow-on mission. In Liberia and Burundi, the forces deployed by ECOWAS and the AU remained behind to form the core of the UN peacekeeping force.

These regional military interventions are limited in the long-term positive effect they can have on a peace process. They can play a crucial role by stabilising a crisis situation for a limited period of time, but the momentum is lost if the stabilisation phase is not immediately followed by a peace-building phase. The UN is the only institution that can coordinate the various multidimensional components needed to form a complex peace-building system.

This division of work between the UN and regional organisations appears to play into the strengths and compensate for the weaknesses of both types of organisation.¹¹ The UN is slow to respond to immediate crises. The regional organisations are not fast either, but they seem to be able to deploy sooner than the UN. This is because the units that deploy under regional and sub-regional auspices currently do not have to meet the same minimum standards that the UN has adopted. For instance, they do not require the same level of support, for example medical evacuation standards, to be in place prior to deployment. Nor do they require units to meet the same levels of operational readiness, e.g. in terms of pre-deployment training and equipment tables, which the UN requires and monitors through pre-deployment inspections.

The relatively balanced multinational force structure and command systems of UN peace operations are not well suited for peace enforcement. Regional operations, on the other hand, are typically led and commanded by a strong lead nation, and this type of force structure is better suited for peace enforcement and enforcement operations. However, regional organisations like the AU, and sub-regional organisations like ECOWAS and

SADC, do not have the international credibility, financial burden-sharing arrangement, or multidimensional capacity to undertake post-conflict recovery operations. The UN is the only body that has the international authority and multidimensional institutional capacity to undertake these complex peace-building operations. This division of work may well be a model that will be favoured in future crises, where similar circumstances prevail.

Resource constraints

Another factor that seems to support this division of work between the UN and regional organisations in Africa is the financial realities of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations are by their very nature costly affairs. The AU experience is that even the relatively small and less logistically demanding unarmed military observer missions the OAU undertook were so costly that it was not able to finance them from its own budget. The OAU had to rely on donor funding to finance the relatively small missions it deployed to Rwanda (NMOG), Burundi (OMIB), the Comoros (OMIC), Ethiopia/Eritrea (OLMEE) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (JMC) over the past decade.

The African Mission in Burundi, in contrast, was considerably larger than any mission the AU, or the OAU before it, had undertaken to date, with up to 3 335 personnel and an operational budget of approximately US \$110 million per year.¹² This is a significant expense in the African context. In comparison, the budget of the AU Commission for 2004 is approximately US \$32 million. The problems the AU experienced with obtaining financial support for AMIB will have an important bearing on the kind of peace operations the AU is likely to undertake in future.

South Africa, as the AMIB lead nation, has spent approximately R850 million, or approximately US \$140 million, to sustain its troops and to supply most of the logistical needs (e.g. fuel, flights and medical requirements) of the mission.¹³ Although the AU is technically supposed to reimburse some of these expenses to South Africa, it is unlikely that it will ever be in a

The AU and African sub-regional organisations like ECOWAS and SADC have neither the resources nor the mandate to undertake humanitarian assistance or post-conflict reconstruction programmes

position to do so. Similarly, the Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents were only able to deploy because the Ethiopian contingent was supported by the United States, while the United Kingdom supported the Mozambican contingent. Even then their deployment was delayed, and once deployed their operational status was affected by ongoing financial constraints and uncertainty.

It is instructive to compare the cost of AMIB with the cost of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) where the UN will be spending US \$608 million in 2004. South Africa is contributing a similar size force to MONUC as it did to AMIB, at about half the cost (approximately R400 million or US \$66 million) because the UN provides most of the logistics South Africa is responsible for in Burundi. In the case of MONUC the UN will reimburse approximately 60 percent of the expenses incurred by South Africa. The advantage for African countries of contributing to UN operations, as opposed to AU or sub-regional peacekeeping operations, is thus not difficult to grasp.

It is clear that, for the foreseeable future, AU and sub-regional peacekeeping missions would be dependent on donor support and/or self-financed regional hegemonic powers such as South Africa and Nigeria.¹⁴ This is problematic because the funds

AU and sub-regional peacekeeping missions would be dependent on donor support and/or self-financed regional hegemonic powers such as South Africa and Nigeria

available for this purpose are limited. The international donor community is heavily committed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans. In Africa, peace operations like AMIB have been competing for funds against the humanitarian and developmental needs of the fight against HIV/Aids and the food crisis in southern Africa, for example. The money that was available to support peace operations in Africa in 2003 was spread across five non-UN missions: Burundi, the Central African Republic, Côte

d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sudan. For example, the cost of the ECOMOG operation in Côte d'Ivoire was approximately US \$1.3 million a month in 2003.¹⁵

However, with limited funds available the donor community appears to be committed to trying to support Africa to develop a meaningful peace operations capacity. The European Union has announced

the creation of a €250 million Africa Peace Facility in 2003,¹⁶ but apart from the €12 million announced for the AU mission in Darfur, no details of how this fund will operate or whom it will benefit have yet been announced. At the G8 Summit that took place at Sea Island, Georgia in the United States in June 2004, the G8 pledged to train 50 000 African peacekeepers over the next five or six years. Further details are sketchy at this point, but the initiative appears to follow up on the Africa Plan of Action adopted at the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada.¹⁷

These initiatives seem to be aimed at supporting the implementation of the ASF Framework and support AU and sub-regional peace operations. It is unlikely, however that these funds will provide the AU with enough resources to develop a sustainable capacity to undertake AMIB-type long-term peace operations. One can thus conclude that from a financial perspective, the only viable complex peace operations in Africa are UN peace operations. If so, it would be preferable for the AU and regional organisations to pursue the development of such capacities in the context of the UN Standby System (UNSAS).

UNSAS is currently configured around troop-contributing countries. There is nothing, however, that prevents a regional or sub-regional organisation like SADC from negotiating with the UN to include a SADC standby brigade and/or other sub-elements of such a standby system. In fact, the report of the UN Panel on Peace Operations,¹⁸ the so-called Brahimi report, has expressed a preference for such brigade-sized regional deployments. Past precedent for the use of multinational brigades exists in that the UN has already made use of the Multinational Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) on two occasions.¹⁹ In fact, UN operations may prove an ideal operational environment within which to further develop and test the sub-regional standby brigade concept, both because it will provide those responsible for the brigade, at all levels, with an opportunity to learn how they work together under the relatively controlled environment created by UN procedures and systems, and because UN operations are funded through a burden-sharing system and individual countries thus do not have to bear the cost of their individual contributions. This means that a sub-regional brigade can gain operational experience within a UN peacekeeping environment, without the costs



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normally associated with regional and sub-regional deployments and field exercises.

Large UN troop contributors such as Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Ghana and Zambia may find it difficult to maintain their current deployment levels in UN peace operations and to participate meaningfully in sub-regional standby brigade initiatives. In fact, most of these countries are the obvious choices for playing a leading role in the sub-regional standby brigade framework. By synchronising AU and sub-regional standby initiatives with current UN operational deployments, African troop-contributing countries could leverage UN mission funding to support regional standby capacities. For example, the various SADC countries that are contributing troops to the UN Mission in Burundi could start working together as if they were deployed as part of a SADC standby brigade, and individual troop contributors, like South Africa, could start to form composite battalions by including companies from other SADC countries. If this is done in a synchronised fashion with the aim of furthering the sub-regional standby brigade system, it should prove to be a very

cost-efficient and practical way in which countries can both maintain their level of exposure to UN peace operations and meaningfully contribute to AU and sub-regional standby capacity development.

UN South African peacekeepers deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Conclusion

On the basis of the financial constraints explained above, the institutional and operational limitations of regional organisations to undertake complex peace-building operations and the emerging division of labour between the UN and regional organisations, one can conclude that it is unlikely that the AU or regional organisations will often undertake AMIB-type long-term peace operations in the foreseeable future. Instead, more often than not, the AU is likely to undertake Darfur-type military observer operations and regional organisations like ECOWAS are likely to undertake short-term stabilisation missions such as the ECOMIL mission in Liberia.

If this conclusion is correct, the ASF Framework that is designed around brigade-sized sub-regional forces may have to be refined to focus on the operational needs of scenarios 1 to 3 (observer missions)

and scenario 6 (intervention missions), while preparations for scenarios 4 and 5 (sustained peacekeeping and complex peace operations) should rather be undertaken in the framework of the UN Standby System.

Most donor-driven peacekeeping capacity-building programmes in Africa, most national peacekeeping training programmes in Africa, and the ASF Framework itself,²⁰ are however all focused on developing capacity for peacekeeping and complex peace operations (scenarios 4 and 5 in the ASF Framework). There is thus a discrepancy between the focus of the capacity-building efforts and the types of missions the AU and sub-regional organisations are most likely to be called upon to undertake in the foreseeable future. If it was clear, however, that the ASF scenario 4 and 5 operations were anticipated to be UN operations, with limited exceptions, then it would make sense for the AU and regional organisations to work closely with the UN Standby System to develop these capacities according to UN requirements. There is scant evidence at present that this is indeed clear in African circles, or that there is meaningful engagement between the UN, the AU and sub-regional organisations on the relationship between the ASF Framework, regional standby brigades and the UN Standby System.

More research on the type of peacekeeping missions African institutions are likely to undertake will enable all the stakeholders in the international peacekeeping system to position and adjust their own capacities accordingly. It will enable the AU, the various sub-regional organisations, the individual African countries, the UN, and the various donor countries that have an interest in building African capacity in the peacekeeping field, to focus their policy development and capacity-building efforts on those modalities, mechanisms, equipment, training and preparation that will best enable Africa to undertake missions within its chosen framework and scope. This should result in a much more focused approach, which in a resource-weak continent like ours, will have a bigger impact and result over the short to medium term in increasing the chances of success (measured as sustainable capacity) of the various capacity-building initiatives. ♣

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Endnotes

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- 7 By the time AMIB was deployed in 2003 most of the parties in Burundi had signed the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and formed a transitional government. However, two parties – the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) and PALIPEHUTU-FNL (Rwasa) – continued with hostilities and remained outside the peace process.
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- 18 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, Report of the Secretary-General to the 55th Session of the General Assembly, A/55/502, United Nations, New York, 20 October 2000.
- 19 The Multinational Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) was deployed as a rapidly deployable headquarters in both UNMEE (1999) and UNMIL (2004), and is likely to play a similar role in the upcoming UN mission in Sudan.
- 20 Para. 2.10, p. 7, *Policy Framework for the Establishment of an African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part 1)*, footnote 4.



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ERIC BERMAN

PEACEKEEPING

African regional organisations'

peacekeeping experiences and capabilities

Since the United Nations Security Council began to champion Chapter VIII of the United Nations (UN) Charter some ten years ago, African countries acting through numerous regional organisations have shown themselves willing to take the lead in peace operations on their continent. While only three such organisations had undertaken eight by 1994, by mid-2004 this total had jumped to 25, under the auspices of eight regional bodies. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan,

like his predecessor Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has supported the Security Council's growing reliance on regional organisations and ad hoc 'coalitions of the willing'. Western capacity-building programmes to develop African peacekeeping capabilities have continued to expand. Indeed, during the past year, they have become significantly more generous. But, while progress has been made, shortcomings persist and there is reason to question if the ambitious goals these organisations have set for themselves

Acting President of the African Union, Mozambican president Chissano gives a speech at the formal launch of the Peace and Security Council at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa



Soldiers of the peacekeeping mission to Liberia (ECOMIL) arrive in Monrovia, Liberia

with the support of the donor community will be attained. This article reviews these 25 missions, highlights accomplishments as well as challenges that remain, and suggests ways to move forward.

The 25 Missions

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU),¹ are together responsible for more than half of all the missions that African regional organisations have sponsored. The OAU undertook two in Chad (in 1980–82), three in Rwanda (1990–1993), one in Burundi (1993–1996), three in the Comoros (1997–99), and 2001–2002), one in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (1999–2000), and one in Eritrea and Ethiopia (2000 to date). Besides extending the mandate of the OAU-initiated mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia, the AU has authorised two new operations since it replaced the OAU in 2002: in Burundi (2003–04) and in the Sudan (2004 to date).

Most of these operations were small observer missions. Only four of the 13 – the two in Chad, the last of the three in Rwanda, and the second mission in Burundi – included formed military units. The largest of these missions was the second mission in

Chad, which included some 3 500 troops.² The other nine operations have ranged in strength from 13 to 66 observers. The AU Observer Mission in the Sudan, authorised in May 2004, was in the early stages of being fielded at the time of this writing. As currently envisaged, it could include as many as 120 observers. A 270-strong protection force might also join this mission if deemed necessary.³ At least 21 OAU/AU member states have contributed personnel to the 13 OAU/AU missions.

The Treaty on Non-Aggression, Assistance, and Mutual Defense (known as ANAD from its acronym in French)⁴ was the second African organisation to authorise a peacekeeping operation. It dispatched a small observer force in 1986 (with logistical support from the Ivorian army) along the Burkinabé-Malian border. ANAD folded in 2001. All eight ANAD members had participated in its one mission.⁵

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)⁶ was the third organisation in Africa to undertake a peace operation. Since its first mission in Liberia in 1990, ECOWAS has since authorised five more operations: in Sierra Leone (1997–2000), Guinea-Bissau (1998–99), Guinea and Liberia (2000), Côte d'Ivoire (2002–04), and Liberia again (2003). The mission destined for

Guinean-Liberian border never deployed. The first three ECOWAS missions were known as the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The organisation has since discarded that name, taking on ECOMICI and ECOMIL for its missions in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, respectively. More significant than the new names has been the change in the nature of the forces deployed. Whereas the first two missions included more than 12 000 troops each, more recent undertakings have been much more modest, ranging from 700 to 3 500 troops. Thirteen of ECOWAS's 15 members – all but Cape Verde and Liberia – have sent troops to at least one of the regional organisation's peace operations.⁷

The Southern African Development Community (SADC)⁸ has fielded two missions.⁹ Both were undertaken in 1998. The first deployed to the DRC and the second to Lesotho. At its height, the mission in the DRC numbered more than 15 000 troops from SADC countries. Only five of SADC's 14 members have contributed personnel to its missions. Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe sent military contingents to the DRC while Botswana and South African troops served in the Lesotho force.

Three other African regional organisations have

undertaken a peace operation: the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (known as CEN-SAD, for its name in Arabic),¹⁰ the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (known by its French acronym, CEMAC),¹¹ and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).¹² Because they are relatively less well known than those mentioned above, their missions are discussed in greater detail.

CEN-SAD authorised a peacekeeping operation to the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2001. The mission consisted of troops from three countries: Djibouti, Libya, and the Sudan. Its strength numbered about 300 men: 200 from Libya and 50 each from Djibouti and the Sudan. Burkina Faso had also agreed to contribute troops, but did not do so before the mission was withdrawn in 2002.

CEMAC replaced the CEN-SAD mission with a somewhat larger force. The initial deployment consisted of about 180 Gabonese troops, 140 from Congo-Brazzaville, and 30 from Equatorial Guinea. Cameroon and Mali were to provide military personnel to the CEMAC force, but these contributions did not materialise.¹³ After the March 2003 *coup d'état* in Bangui, troops from Chad replaced the

Table 1: OAU and AU Missions in Africa

ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU)		
CHAD	1981–1982	
RWANDA	1991–July 1993 Aug–Oct 2003	Neutral Military Observer Group I (NMOG I) Neutral Military Observer Group II (NMOG II)
BURUNDI	Dec 1993–July 1996	OAU Mission in Burundi (OMIB)
COMOROS	Oct 1997–May 1998 Dec 2001–Feb 2002 March–May 2002	OAU Mission in Comoros I (OMIC I) OAU Mission in Comoros II (OMIC II) OAU Mission in Comoros III (OMIC III)
DRC	Nov 1999–Nov 2000	Joint Monitoring Commission
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA	Aug 2000 to date	OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE)
AFRICAN UNION (AU)		
BURUNDI	2003–2004	African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)
SUDAN	2004 to date	Observer Mission

contingent sent by Malabo, with a slightly larger force. The mission has continued.

IGAD is currently fielding a peace operation known as the Verification Monitoring Team (VMT) in the Sudan. Five of the organisation's seven members have provided military officers: all but Djibouti and Somalia. Five Western countries – Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) – have also contributed officers to the VMT, which commenced operations in 2003. These 10 countries have together supplied about 35 observers, mostly from IGAD countries. The Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) has also provided six observers and Kenya has made available a similar number of civilians to backstop the mission at its Nairobi headquarters.¹⁴

Assessments

The scope of this article does not permit an analysis of each of these missions. Just as with UN peace-keeping, there have been successes and failures. Peace operations are inherently risky endeavours. This section highlights some developments regarding decision-making and administrative structures of African regional organisations.

Much has been made of the mechanisms many of these and other organisations have created to help manage and resolve armed conflicts.

In the past year the Security Council has authorised UN missions to replace African-led peace operations in three countries in Africa: Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Burundi

Certainly, there have been improvements in certain decision-making structures. The new AU Peace and Security Council, for example, represents a significant departure from the Central Organ that it replaced. Whereas the OAU Organ required decisions to be made by consensus, the 15-member AU Council demands only a two-thirds majority. In theory, this change should allow for a more interventionist and active deliberating body. Of course, the absence of such a

mechanism does not preclude an organisation from undertaking a mission. This was true of CEN-SAD and CEMAC. The existence of a formal structure, moreover, does not mean it will be followed. Neither the Zimbabwe-led 'SADC' mission in the DRC nor the South African-led 'SADC' mission in Lesotho adhered to the procedures that had been agreed

upon. Such a mechanism should serve as an important part of a series of checks and balances and provide much-needed administrative and political oversight of military undertakings.

Financial considerations will continue to dampen the enthusiasm of African countries and their regional organisations in making full use of these new decision-making structures. ECOWAS member states have agreed to contribute 0.5 percent of their imports from outside the regional bloc to a fund to support their peace operations. Although this scheme was approved in December 1999 after years of discussion, it is still far from being implemented effectively. The result is that member states know that the organisation cannot offset their costs in peace operations as called for in the mechanism. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that contributions to ECOWAS peace operations have been very modest. Member states together could muster only about 1 250 troops for the mission along the Guinean-Liberian border and a similar number for the operation in Côte d'Ivoire, even though the military requirements were much greater. One might well ask if this is so, what explains members' generous commitments of troops to the ECOWAS force in Liberia? The answer is simple: all participants knew that the UN Security Council would quickly authorise a UN operation to replace the ECOWAS mission, and that all troops would be blue-hatted. In fact, this occurred less than two months after they had deployed. By contrast, countries that contributed troops to ECOMICI had no assurance that the UN would take the mission over. (This did eventually happen, but only after 18 months had passed.)

Under the OAU's conflict resolution mechanism, 6 percent of its annual budget was earmarked for its peace fund.¹⁵ This translated to an annual contribution of roughly US \$2 million to the fund. Such levels permitted only very small observer missions to be undertaken without significant levels of outside financing. Whereas donors, mostly from the west, have provided additional funding on an ad hoc basis, such support has tended to be rather limited and short-lived. This will change with the recent agreement between the AU and the European Union to establish the Peace Facility for Africa with €250 million (about US \$300 million). While a welcome development, it is important to place this support in perspective. A relatively

modest undertaking such as the 2 800-strong AU Mission in Burundi was said to cost US \$165 million for a year.¹⁶

African-led peace operations also face severe logistical as well as command and control constraints. Very few militaries on the continent can deploy their troops abroad with national assets. Donors have at times offered such assistance. Once in theatre, however, these missions do not have the means to sustain their operations. Communication problems add another challenge – which is made more difficult by troop contributors’ sometimes competing agendas.

Recognising these shortcomings, donors have undertaken programmes to develop African capabilities. Many of these initiatives are well known and need not be repeated here.¹⁷ Considerable energy has been expended on providing African countries with peacekeeping field training and classroom instruction. Emphasis has also been placed on constructing and equipping regional training centers. The provision of materiel and logistical support has received comparatively less attention. This may be changing. The Group of Eight industrialised countries (G8)¹⁸ announced an Action Plan at its most recent annual summit in June 2004 for ‘Expanding Global Capacity for Peace Support Operations’. The goal will be to train, and where appropriate equip, 75 000 troops by 2010 with an emphasis on Africa.¹⁹

At the same time donor countries are redoubling their efforts to develop African peacekeeping capabilities, the UN Security Council has finally acknowledged African regional organisations’ limitations – at least for the moment. While the Council continues to espouse the virtues of using Chapter VIII as a viable tool in the promotion of peace and security (for which the Charter gives the Council primary responsibility), it has acted otherwise. In the past year the Council has authorised UN missions to replace African-led peace operations in three countries in Africa: Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burundi. The same will soon happen in the Sudan. Whereas there were some 30 000 African troops serving in regional peace operations five years ago, today the numbers have dwindled to fewer than 500.

This is a welcome development as it places the onus for the promotion of peace and security on the Security Council, where it belongs. African regional organisations certainly have a role to play, which



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includes undertaking peace operations. But during the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Blue Helmets in the mid-1990s, regional peacekeepers took on more than they could handle – or should have been allowed to handle. Oversight was lax and support was limited.

An ECOMOG soldier deployed in Liberia

Possible next steps

What is needed now is for donors and recipients to enter into a more serious and meaningful dialogue than has taken place to date. The ‘P-3 Initiative’ of France, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US), dating back to 1997, was clumsily packaged and the timing was not propitious. There was legitimate concern among many African countries that these countries’ various efforts to assist them were essentially policies of disengagement. At the time, Nigeria, a major peacekeeping player, would not receive the support it required because it was

ruled by an unpopular dictator. South Africa was not yet ready to assume a leading military role in the sub-region, let alone the continent. Many donor countries were not yet aware of what the 'P-3' were planning and were still developing their own programmes. All this has changed for the better.

Donors need to provide greater logistical support to African-led missions as well as to African contingents in UN operations

The UN Secretariat should convene a meeting whereby donors and recipients engage in a frank discussion and attempt to lay plans for how best to move forward. The G8 and EU each ought to designate a representative to address the gathering, as should African regional organisations. This should not be limited to the six existing bodies mentioned above. Other African organisations such as the Arab Maghreb Union, the Economic Community of Central African States, and the East African Community should be invited. So

should the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (known as by its acronym in Portuguese, CPLP), the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the Commonwealth, and the Francophonie group, all of which have significant levels of African membership.²⁰ Finally, a representative of the Multinational Standby High-Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG) should also be invited. Although SHIRBRIG has no African members, Senegal is an observer and two other African countries have seconded officers to its headquarters staff. Moreover, SHIRBRIG has assisted ECOWAS with planning its mission in Côte d'Ivoire.

In the meantime, donors, recipients, and regional organisations can do much on their own to improve African peacekeeping capabilities. Donors need to provide greater logistical support to African-led missions as well as to African contingents in UN operations. The French 'RECAMP' depots in Dakar, Djibouti, and Libreville need to be expanded not just with lethal material, but also with vehicles, generators, communication gear, uniforms, spare parts, and humanitarian relief items. The UK and the Netherlands have supported the US-led depot in Freetown so a precedent exists for countries to contribute to such initiatives that are not under their control. Ideally, regional organisations should take over such depots or create their

own, but this represents a medium- to long-term objective. Much more can be done in the short-term to build on current donor-led programmes.

Donors should also review their 'train-the-trainer' programmes. On paper, these are a great idea. However, in practice, they are problematic. Few recipients will have the capacity and structures in place to impart the lessons learned to others. Emphasis should be placed on just-in-time training whereby those selected for an operation are given mission-specific skills and trained in general international humanitarian law principles.

For their part, Africans have to stop asking for whatever it is they think they can get and focus on what they really need. For example, it is ill advised for countries to deploy troops without adequate weapons for self-protection on the promise that a donor would provide for it when the recipients could easily assume this responsibility. Despite the best of intentions, US-supplied machine guns for use with some ECOMIL contingents did not arrive for many months after the troops had arrived in the mission area.

African regional organisations and their member states also need to do a much better job of providing their secretariats with appropriate levels of staffing. For example, planning cells remain far below what is required. What good are fully-equipped early warning centers and situation rooms if there are not sufficient and capable personnel employed to do the work? Also, regional training centres should share information on 'graduates' of their workshops and seminars with regional organisations or a central clearing house of some kind that would maintain a database so that suitable candidates for missions could be readily identified. Other training programmes run by NGOs and universities should be encouraged to contribute to such efforts. Indeed, some institutions are significantly more advanced in this regard and could provide a useful framework that regional organisations could further develop.

Finally, if African organisations in the short term are to assume the role of 'quick-reaction forces' before becoming blue-hatted, then a way must be found to ensure that these troops deploy with sufficient levels of equipment to enable them and the UN mission to operate effectively. Currently, this is not the case. The Security Council's willingness to re-engage Africa at unprecedented levels provides

some welcome breathing space. Having said this, one must note the Council's failure to authorise an appropriate force to Darfur in light of alarming reports of ethnic cleansing that some have described as genocide. The AU Observer Mission, by itself, is not an adequate response.

It seems clear that African regional organisations will once again be called upon to re-assert themselves in taking a bigger role in peace operations on the continent. Expensive long-serving missions in the DRC and Sierra Leone show no signs of wrapping up anytime soon. With the upcoming mission in the Sudan, it is conceivable that the UN peacekeeping budget could approach

US \$5 billion a year – an unsustainable level. African regional organisations provide potential political oversight, administrative guidelines, and financing to field effective peace operations. To date, the rhetoric has far outpaced the accomplishments. However, it appears that significantly enhanced levels of support are being made available, which is likely to continue. Donors and recipients must use this downtime and these resources effectively. ▀

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Endnotes

- 1 The AU has 53 members, consisting of all the countries one would expect except for Morocco. Rabat left the AU's predecessor, the OAU, in 1984 when the organisation recognised the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).
- 2 This force comprised three battalions from Nigeria and one battalion each from Senegal and Zaire. (A small number of observers from four other African countries were also attached to the mission.) The first undertaking in Chad consisted of a single battalion from Congo (Brazzaville). The second Neutral Military Observer Group in Rwanda included two platoons of Tunisian troops. The AU Mission in Burundi included battalions from Ethiopia and South Africa, as well as a company from Mozambique.
- 3 See European Union @ United Nations, 'EU mobilises funds to support African Union peacekeeping operation in Darfur, Sudan', 10 June 2004, europa.eu-un.org/article.asp?id=3566, accessed on 25 June 2004.
- 4 ANAD had eight members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
- 5 Benin had observer status at the time of the peace operation, but sent two peacekeepers anyway. The organisation's other observer, Guinea, did not contribute to the mission.
- 6 ECOWAS has 15 members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Mauritania is no longer a member of the organisation.
- 7 When Mauritania was a member of ECOWAS, it did not contribute any troops.
- 8 SADC has 14 members: Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In 2003, the Seychelles announced that it wished to withdraw from SADC.
- 9 Both operations might more accurately be described as ad hoc coalitions of the willing comprising SADC member states. The proper decision-making structures were not utilised in either instance. For a discussion of this concern regarding the mission in Lesotho, with reference to the operation in the DRC, see C. de Coning (2000). 'Lesotho Intervention: Implications for SADC Military Interventions, Peacekeeping and the African renaissance', in *Africa Dialogue*, Monograph Series No.1, ACCORD, Durban.
- 10 CEN-SAD has 22 members: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, the Sudan, Togo, and Tunisia.
- 11 CEMAC has six members: Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.
- 12 IGAD has seven members: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, and Uganda.
- 13 Mali is not a member of CEMAC, but its president had commanded an ad hoc coalition peacekeeping force known as MISAB that served in CAR during 1997-98.
- 14 Written correspondence with Stephen Jones, former Public Information Officer, IGAD Verification Monitoring Team, 22 June 2004.
- 15 When the mechanism was established in 1993, the figure was 5 percent. It was subsequently augmented. There has been discussion to raise the figure to 10 percent, but no decision has been taken.
- 16 See Boshoff, H. and Francis, D. 2003. 'The AU Mission in Burundi: Technical and Operational Dimensions', *African Security Review*, Vol. 12, No. 3, p. 43.
- 17 See, for example, E.G. Berman (2002), 'French, UK, and US Policies to Support Peacekeeping in Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects', *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) Working Paper*, No. 622, February.
- 18 The G8 consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the US. The European Union also participates in the G8's work.
- 19 See US Government, "G-8 Action Plan for Peace Support," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 10 June 2004, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/print/20040610-27 html accessed on 29 June 2004.
- 20 African countries represent five of CPLP's eight members, ten of the Arab League's 22 members, 27 of the OIC's 57 members, four of the IOC's five members, 16 of the Commonwealth's 53 members (Zimbabwe pulled out of the Commonwealth last December), and 29 of the Francophonie's 51 members.



KATE GERAGHTY/AFP

COMMENTARY

Mc HENRY MAKWELERO

Democracy and conflict management: The **media in Malawi**

The media has an important role in consolidating democracy and managing conflict. In Malawi, the media has contributed to democratisation and conflict management in the country, however, it has been faced with challenges in undertaking its role. This article gives an overview of the position of the media in consolidating democracy and managing conflict in Malawi and provides recommendations for addressing the challenges the media faces in performing these roles.

The media in Malawi

Prior to 1992 limited freedom of expression was allowed and public broadcasting and newspapers were state controlled. However in 1992-93 the wind

of political change started blowing due to increasing criticism and political pressure from both within and outside Malawi. The political space widened and it was during this time that the independent media surfaced. People who opposed the one-party system took advantage of these developments to openly criticise the political system.

Subsequently the first multi-party elections were conducted and a new republican constitution was adopted which enshrined the freedom of the press to report and publish freely and to obtain access to public information. In response new radio stations, both private and public, were opened and people were free to publish independent newspapers and write what they wanted as long they did not infringe on other people's rights. Today the

public broadcaster has two radio stations, namely the Malawi Broadcasting Cooperation (MBC) and Radio 2FM. There are approximately four community and three commercial radio stations. In the television sector the public broadcaster operates a free-to-air television service, Television Malawi (TVM). There is also a private satellite broadcaster Digital Satellite Television (DSTV) owned by the South African company, Multi Choice¹. In the print media there are over eight major newspapers that are circulating in the country at the moment. Almost all the newspapers are privately owned except for the Weekly newspaper that is owned by the government. The ruling party has its own paper called the UDF News

The role of the media in democracy

The media played a key role in facilitating the process of change in Malawi. Even though under the previous one-party state freedom of expression was disallowed, those people who opposed this system used the media in neighbouring countries to enlighten and educate the general public on the advantages of a multi-party system of government as many people were, at that time, tuning to these radio stations to get the information they sought.

In any democratic state the media plays a crucial role in providing information to the general public. Lack of or inadequate information leads to conflict. After the introduction of multi-party politics, the media continued its role in providing key information to the general public to help them make their social, political, economical and spiritual decisions and has thus continued to influence public opinion. The independent media has tried to update the general public on the developments taking place in the country. For example, the media is at government functions and workshops, political rallies, church functions, and civil society activities providing coverage in either the electronic or print media. The people who do not have access to the print media have the opportunity to know what the newspapers have written through a special programme on MBC radio.

In terms of coverage the MBC has the widest range while the commercial and community radio stations, TVM and the newspapers only reach a limited number of Malawians. However, despite the varying ranges in coverage the public broadcaster

has lots of programmes aimed at educating people about democratic issues.

Despite the progress the media has made in facilitating democracy in Malawi, it has been criticised, at times, for its lack of neutrality in reporting. This had been raised in reference to the recent elections held on 21 May 2004 in which commentators argued that the coverage of the electoral campaigns was not balanced.

It has also been argued that women's views are grossly under represented in the media. This was a finding according to the Malawi Gender and Media Baseline study conducted by Gender Links based in South Africa.² The study showed that the views of women in general and those of women politicians specifically, are often under represented and misrepresented in the media. The survey also revealed that there are still cases of sexist reporting in the media. Issues of women are said to be accompanied with language that reinforces stereotypes of women as mothers, wives, and victims of beauty and not as professionals and individuals in their own right. The study also revealed that women and children are given the least voice in both print and electronic media.³

The media and conflict management

The media, in collaboration with other actors in democracy, also play a vital role in conflict management. Most of the organisations involved in conflict management work with the media to educate the citizens to prevent conflicts. For instance the media publicises workshops that conducted in non-violent conflict to make sure that even those who are not participating should have access to the information.

Stakeholders like the faith communities, political parties, and pressure groups use the media to appeal to the general public to prevent conflicts. For example in the run-up to the May 2004 elections, civil society used the media to make appeals to the citizens to desist from political violence. In addition to this special programmes have been organised by the radio stations to educate the people to stop engaging in political violence. The print media has also been publishing anti-violence articles.

It should be pointed out, however, that the media in Malawi have not maximised the contribution they

The media played a key role in facilitating the process of change in Malawi



Voters waiting in a queue at the polling station in Thyolo district, in Malawi's third democratic general elections

can make to conflict management and resolution. This has largely been attributed to the lack of neutrality in reporting. Neutral and balanced reporting is a strong tool in managing and resolving conflict. Further, conflict has arisen due to the nature of relationships the media and political parties and civil society.


The way forward

This paper has attempted to give an analysis of the role of the media in and challenges affecting the media's contribution to consolidating democracy and managing conflict. In addressing some of these issues, the following recommendations are made to enhance the media's current efforts.

The views of women politicians are often under represented and misrepresented in the media

The first is to ensure neutrality in the presentation of information by the media. In addition to this there is also a need to ensure that the voice of women, which is usually under represented, is taken on board. This may be undertaken through

encouraging women to be active and take part in democratic issues. This can be done in conjunction with the non-governmental organisations focusing on gender and women that are operating in the country.

Another approach is to improve the relationship between the various political institutions and the media. This may be addressed in a joint forum between the media and the political institutions to discuss the various issues and develop possible solutions. 

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Endnotes

- 1 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2003), 'A Comparative Overview of the Laws and Practice in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa', *SADC Media Law: A Handbook for Media Practitioners*, Vol. 1, December.
- 2 *The Chronicle*, March 21, 2004. Available at: <http://www.allafrica.com>
- 3 Ibid.



MARCO LONGSARI/AFP

SARA SVENSSON

COMMENTARY

Rwanda

Finding the path forward

As a decade passes, the extremes of the African continent are illuminated in the celebrations of the birth of South African democracy and the ten-year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide. Reflections, paths taken and lessons learned are shared as we are reminded of the events that took place.

The massacres in Rwanda between April and the beginning of July 1994 left an estimated 800 000 to one million victims and a further exodus of around two million people to neighbouring countries. Multiple examinations have since mapped the complex factors behind the genocide and renewed determination embodies efforts in securing effective prevention and intervention mechanisms. Today focus shifts towards the current state of Rwanda, aiming to establish the prospects for stability and conflict management.

Past, present and future

Factors such as ethnicity and identity, the role of the international community, land scarcity, power

struggles and political manipulation, residues of colonialism, and demographic pressures have been laid out and analysed as contributing to the genocide. While this seeks to trace the path between the past and the present, today the question focuses on how to find a way forward. How is a society to be transformed from a culture of violence to one of unity and reconciliation? If the genocide had occurred in an environment of chaos and anarchy, as is commonly assumed, it would have come down to a matter of establishing order and security. But in a society where the entire administrative machinery facilitated genocide, ensuring lasting human security, political stability, and economic growth may seem an impossible task.

Indeed, the obstacles the Rwandan Government has been facing and continues to address are rife and inherent in most aspects and levels of society. When the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) first claimed victory after the genocide, they faced governance of country with ransacked administrative infrastructure and facilities, lack of adequate food, clean water and health facilities, and severe social

STR/AFP



A UNHCR truck in Cyangugu, Rwanda, transports displaced people

fragmentation, to name a few of the effects of the genocide.

There are two ways of viewing the genocide. First, the genocide is the cause of the country's current problems or, secondly, the genocide was a symptom of a destructive social fabric that continues to fester in the current society. Elements of this fabric include, but are not limited to, policies of exclusion, policies towards refugees, economic dependence on international aid, suppression of political opposition, resource conflicts, inadequate access to land, and the friction between Hutus and Tutsis.

That said, the developments that have taken place since 1994 have been significant and now call for attention. These involve the first parliamentary democratic elections since independence in 1962 which were held in 2003, positive economic growth and macroeconomic stability, issues of good governance at the forefront of government policy and the establishment of relative internal peace and stability.

The Rwandan Government of National Unity (GNU) was established after the genocide according to the provisions of the 1993 Arusha Accord.

An initial five-year transitional phase was extended to nine years and ended with the country's first parliamentary elections. President Paul Kagame and the RPF achieved victory with 73.78 percent of the votes. Although some criticism was made against the elections, it should be noted that democratisation, is a long and gradual process rather than a one-off event, meaning that it may still be too early to put Rwanda's democracy under evaluation.

The Rwandan government has nevertheless succeeded in establishing some legitimacy among the general population, primarily because it has managed to secure relative levels of internal peace, order and stability. This is reflected economically as GDP growth was measured at 5.2 percent in 2000 after output levels declined by about 50 percent in 1994, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is said to be satisfied with the country's achievement in macroeconomic stability.¹

Rwanda is now approaching the difficult challenges of nation building in three different ways: military security, the establishment of national unity, and development through decentralisation.

Military security

Many international commentators worry that Rwanda's emphasis on external security may overpower its focus on the reform of internal politics. The basis of this concern lies in RPF's heavy dependence on its security forces to maintain security after the genocide and the subsequent strengthening of the military. Rwanda's civil war, beginning in 1990, was effectively transported across its borders as extremist Hutu found refuge in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The intensification of and inter-linkages between the conflicts within and between Rwanda, the DRC, Burundi, and Uganda hinder the resolution of these continuing breakouts of violence. This rationalisation of the conflict is due, in part, to the conflict's geographical proximity to the neighbouring countries, migratory population flows and a game of alliances which entangles a large web of international and sub-regional actors.² Further, the support from neighbouring countries for various groups has added to the current complex state of the region and heightened hostility between actors.

On the other hand, Rwanda's focus on this perceived security threat is said to be a contributing factor to the relative internal peace that has been maintained since the genocide in that the war against a common enemy and strong leadership by the RPF is expected to strengthen national unity.³ The implication of this perception is that 'war' could paradoxically be regarded as a national reconciliatory tool.

Establishing national unity

The emphasis on 'national unity' is also tied to the government's reluctance to open up the political sphere to numerous political parties. While the government is committed to democratisation as stipulated in the Arusha Accords, democracy is seen as multi-dimensional, in terms of being a tool for development, and not just as the popular, but limited, view of holding 'free and fair elections'. In Rwanda, multi-party elections are viewed as 'dividing divided people' and are subsequently held only to the extent that they do not compromise national unity and reconciliation.⁴ Some commentators have remarked that one of the reasons why the Arusha agreement failed to deliver results after it was signed

in 1993 was because of the contradictions inherent in a dialogue that seeks both peace and democratisation simultaneously. A peace process seeks to unite political, military and civil society factions in order to embark upon a path of reconciliation and reconstruction. Democratisation, on the other hand, has its basis in the competition of political groupings and divisions may be exacerbated as the decision-making process of 'voting' results in one group of winners and one group of losers.⁵ Thus, some argue, there may be an understandable fear behind the RPF's reluctance to opening up the political sphere.

This suppression of political opposition is specifically connected to the fear of political parties building their base of support along ethnic or religious lines. As this may prove incompatible with the national aim of reconciliation, opposition is instead inadvertently forced to express itself outside the country. For example, organised groups can now be found in Europe and the United States where they constitute what is being termed 'Internet opposition', though without a strong support base. International commentators are worryingly asserting that this development of quelled voices may increase violent opposition, blurring the lines between the internal and external security threat.⁶ Additionally, the restriction of political discourse and tight political control is seen as undermining the GNU's intention of establishing a 'true democracy' which it defines as "political majority rule based on a genuine programme uniting all Rwandans".⁷ Regardless of this, the district elections in 2001 and the parliamentary elections in 2003 were largely seen as 'free and fair' with three parties opposing the RPF, malpractice was considered at a minimum, a voter turnout of more than 99 percent, and no violent incidents were reported. These are major achievements for a newly democratic state.⁸

Development through decentralisation

Democratic decentralisation has been one of the primary objectives in the democratisation process. Rwanda's National Decentralisation Policy was adopted in May 2000 as a tool for dismantling the administrative machinery that bore much of the responsibility in facilitating genocide. By shifting central government services, functions, resources and powers toward local government levels, it seeks

to establish a new political culture founded on participation, collective decision-making and accountability. The previous system is, according to the government, unable to “support economic and social development precisely because the concerned people’s energies are not adequately mobilised to initiate, plan and implement development action based on locally identified needs”.⁹ Decentralisation is therefore viewed as targeting poverty and strengthening reconciliation through public empowerment. Its implementation so far has proven successful by many standards, especially at sector level where Rwandans have shown their ability to “take over management of their own communities when given the opportunity, training and resources”.¹⁰

While the international community has largely welcomed this move towards decentralisation, a number of questions remain. First, the policy has received criticism for being too complex and open to manipulation. Second, decentralisation is dependent on a constant flow of financial resources to local government and, in a country where limited resources are heavily allocated towards the security apparatus, the sustainability of the decentralisation policy may depend on sufficient foreign financial support. There are fears that in the absence of this financial support, public expectations will not be met and could lead to a serious negative political reaction.¹¹ Rwanda’s GNP, however, has long been largely constituted by official development aid. Before the civil war erupted in 1990, official development aid (ODA) accounted for 11.4 percent of Rwanda’s GDP and in many respects, neither the state machinery nor the civil society structure could operate without this infusion of development aid.¹² In 1999, ODA amounted to about 19.1 percent of GDP, evidence that the foreign support in helping to create a relatively stable and secure political environment is indeed forthcoming.¹³ Considering the wealth of issues and problems facing a post-genocide country as well as a government seeking to implement a ‘true democracy’ in a historically autocratic country, this reliance on foreign support and aid is understandable.

Conclusions

As observers, scholars, the media and politicians consider the state of the world ten years on,

demands are placed on multi-dimensional prevention mechanisms and intervention to ensure human security in the region. When evaluating the Rwandan case, the reconciliation of its ethnic, political, economic and international divisions need to be linked to its history of genocide and war. Considering that rebuilding a country from ‘scratch’ without internal cohesion is not a welcome task, the progress made in the past decade has been substantial. The hurdles that have been overcome to reach today’s ten-year milestone have proved arduous but not, as many were fearing, impossible.

What is certain is that in today’s increasingly interconnected world, more factors are playing a crucial role in deciding Rwanda’s way forward than its internal wounds. The blurred borders in the Great Lakes region cause conflicts to abound, inherently linking the path toward stability to the fate of the entire region. ♣

Sara Svensson is currently undertaking an internship at ACCORD.

Endnotes

- 1 E. Sidiropoulos (2002), ‘Democratisation and Militarisation in Rwanda – Eight years after the genocide’, *African Security Review*, Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 78 and p. 83.
- 2 V. Parqué and F. Reyntjens (1999), ‘Shifting Alliances, Extraterritorial Conflicts and Conflict Management’ in publication of the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation (ed.), *Searching for Peace in Africa – An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities*, Netherlands: Utrecht, p. 181.
- 3 International Crisis Group (2001), ‘“Consensual Democracy” in Post-Genocide Rwanda- Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections’, *Africa Report*, No. 34, p. 2.
- 4 *Ibid.* p. 4.
- 5 R. Andersen (2000), ‘How multilateral development assistance triggered the conflict in Rwanda’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 446.
- 6 International Crisis Group, *op cit.*, p. 22.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- 8 H. Vesperi (2003), ‘President’s party wins historic Rwanda elections’, www.reliefweb.int 1 October.
- 9 Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Local government and Social Affairs, 2000, ‘National Decentralisation Policy’, Imprimerie nouvelle du Rwanda, May.
- 10 International Crisis Group, *op cit.* p. 10.
- 11 *Ibid.*, pp. 5-10.
- 12 P. Uvin (1998), *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, Inc, pp. 41-42.
- 13 Sidiropoulos, *op cit.*, p. 83.



UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

- Sierra Leone
- DRC
- Liberia
- Côte d'Ivoire
- Burundi
- Sudan

Compiled by:
Tshiliso Molukanele
Grayden Ridd
Jamila el Abdellaoui

UN MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE: UNAMSIL

The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), was created on 22 October 1999, by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1270. Operating under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, UNAMSIL has a mandate to:

- 1** assist with the implementation of the peace agreement;
- 2** assist the government in the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programme;
- 3** ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel;
- 4** monitor adherence to the ceasefire of 18 May 1999;
- 5** facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- 6** support the operation of UN civilian officials; and
- 7** provide support, when requested, with regard to elections as constituted in the constitution of Sierra Leone.

Later, under Security Council Resolution 1289 (7 February 2000), that mandate was expanded to include:

- 1** to provide security at key government installations, important intersections, and airports;
- 2** to facilitate the free flow of people, goods, and humanitarian aid on designated roadways;
- 3** to provide security at the DDR sites;
- 4** to coordinate with and assist Sierra Leone law enforcement bodies in carrying out their duties;
- 5** to safeguard weapons and ammunition recovered from ex-combatants, and assist in the disposal of same.


The Security Council further authorised UNAMSIL to undertake activities necessary to the execution of its

mandate, and to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence. UNAMSIL represents the expansion of UNOMSIL, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, which had been in operation since July 1998.


Approximately five years after its creation, UNAMSIL is now preparing for the end of its mandate in December 2004. Hailed by many as a model of a successful peace-keeping operation, UNAMSIL has, amongst other successes, disarmed some 75 000 former combatants, facilitated significant improvement to infrastructure, expanded state authority, and has almost rebuilt the national police force to its target size of 9 500 officers. Its successes notwithstanding, UNAMSIL still faces significant challenges in its remaining months.

Politically, for example, there is concern that while state authority has expanded throughout much of the country (it was limited to only a third of the country two years ago), the capacity of recently established security, administrative, and judicial structures remains severely limited, and suffers from shortfalls in logistics, infrastructure, and qualified personnel.¹ Corruption remains fairly prevalent in some police units and the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) is considered an unreliable security structure. Such concerns undermine the promotion of respect for rule of law, which remains a high priority for UN officials.² On a broader scale, a number of Sierra Leone and international stakeholders consider the current politico-economic situation as roughly equivalent to the one that existed immediately prior to the beginning of the war in 1991. There are concerns that a


AFRICAN MILOBS CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNAMSIL



AFRICAN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNAMSIL



AFRICAN CIVPOL CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNAMSIL



return to the *status quo antebellum* may foster renewed instability.³ Similar worries exist to the effect that the success of UNAMSIL's peacekeeping operations may create unreasonable political and economic expectations that, when unmet, could be a source of popular discontent.

In spite of UNAMSIL's noteworthy success in ensuring general security, several minor, but significant, challenges persist in this area. The RSLAF is generally acknowledged to be unprepared to assume responsibility for Sierra Leone's external security upon UNAMSIL's departure. The construction of necessary physical facilities has fallen victim to building delays and a significant budget shortfall and may not be complete until late 2005 (or later). Additionally, the transport fleet, donated only two years ago by the United Kingdom, is in dire straits, with the majority of the vehicles no longer usable because of the lack of spare parts. The Ministry of Defence of Sierra Leone recently indicated its urgent need for 130 troop-carrying vehicles and 108 light utility vehicles.⁴ There is a similar scarcity of communications equipment, and the government has petitioned UNAMSIL to donate some of its equipment when it liquidates. The RSLAF is also plagued by disciplinary and morale problems. Continued instability in neighbouring Liberia has also caused some concern, though that is likely to lessen considerably as United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) troops complete their deployment along the border. Further concerns center around the nation's diamond industry, where, even after remarkable



improvement, some 50 percent of diamond-mining activities remain unlicensed.⁵

Further challenges are certain to arise in the withdrawal process itself. Given the low levels of public confidence in the capabilities of the state police and armed forces, the withdrawal process will need to be undertaken with the utmost care to avoid affecting national stability or negatively impacting the security situation. Important co-ordination with the small UN follow-on force (intend as a backstop for the state security organs), will be key, as will proper training to Sierra Leone personnel on any equipment donated by the departing peacekeepers.

Though not without its critics, the UNAMSIL mission has enjoyed considerable success. Should it successful cope with the challenges that still face it, it will represent a major success in UN peacekeeping and a significant step towards long-term stability in West Africa.

1 United Nations Report S/2004/228 at 6

2 Ibid at 10

3 Ibid at 11

4 Ibid at 4

5 Ibid at 7

UN MISSION IN THE DRC: MONUC

The United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was established by Security Council Resolution 1279 (30 November 1999) which transformed the UN Liaison Personnel in the DRC into a UN mission under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN and delegated appropriate mandate and responsibility. MONUC's mandate includes the following elements:

- 1 to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the agreement;
- 2 to establish and maintain continuous liaison with the headquarters of all the parties military forces;
- 3 to supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the parties' forces;
- 4 to develop an action plan for the overall implementation of the ceasefire agreement by all concerned;
- 5 to work with the parties to obtain the release of all prisoners of war and military captives and remain in cooperation with international humanitarian agencies;
- 6 to supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the parties' forces;
- 7 to monitor compliance with the provision of the ceasefire agreement on the supply of ammunition, weaponry and other war-related material to the field;
- 8 to facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring;
- 9 to cooperate closely with the Facilitator of the

National Dialogue, provide support and technical assistance to him, and coordinate other United Nations agencies' activities to this effect; and

- 10 to deploy mine action experts to assess the scope of the mine and unexploded ordnance problems, coordinate the initiation of the mine action activities, develop a mine action plan, and carry out emergency mine action activities as required in support of its mandate.

MONUC was established following the signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreement in Zambia between Angola, the DRC, Rwanda, Namibia, Uganda and Zimbabwe in July 1999. The agreement included provisions for:

- 1 the normalisation of the situation in the DRC;
- 2 the holding of a national dialogue;
- 3 addressing security concerns; developing mechanism for the disarmament of armed groups; and
- 4 the establishment of the Joint Military Commission.


The peace agreement is being implemented with the monitoring of the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the DRC and the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on political arrangements in the national dialogue.

Despite the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement at the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and the establishment of the Transitional Government, progress of key provisions of the agreements has been slow,



particularly with regards to the legislative agenda, extension of State administration, military integration, DDR, and preparations for elections. There are legislative delays, which are also slowing the progress of among other things, the integration of armed forces. MONUC is expected to assist with demobilisation and reintegration of former rebels and this delay will impact on its timeframe. Further the lack of a national DDR programme has also posed challenges for MONUC.

Establishment of an electoral commission to

AFRICAN MILOBS CONTRIBUTIONS TO MONUC



AFRICAN CIVPOL CONTRIBUTIONS TO MONUC




conduct elections due to be held on 30 June 2005 presents further challenges. President Joseph Kabila has asked for help in the organisation of a constitutional referendum and elections and in the co-ordination of international assistance for electoral processes. MONUC has responded by establishing an international technical committee on electoral processes that meets once a week. MONUC should establish expertise in the DRC for handling elections. Monitoring of elections and protection of election material and personnel is also an area that MONUC should look into.

The regional dimension of the conflict means that former rebel groups continue to hold on to regional bases which impacts on the extent of the Government's authority over the entire territory. This situation has placed MONUC personnel, as well as civilians, under threat of attack. Securing civilians in this tense situation will remain a challenge.

The regional dynamics of the conflict have also impacted the functioning of the Transitional Government. Rebel groups have questioned the President's power to appoint provincial governors and his control over the intelligence. The appointment of governors was delayed as regional groups vie for appointments. The new governors need protection and the army does not have

AFRICAN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS TO MONUC



abilities in this regard; however MONUC is assisting in this regard under the civilian police component of the mission. Normalisation of relations with neighbouring states is a major issue especially with the recent fighting in Bukavu and the accusation that Rwanda is supporting the renegade regional army. MONUC's mandate of monitoring withdrawal of foreign forces in the DRC and the verification of this process may come under serious questioning by both the DRC and Rwanda. MONUC should verify the alleged mobilisation of Rwandan forces in the eastern border and quell the potentially dangerous situation through diplomacy.

Reference for graphs as of 31 May 2004: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/

UN MISSION IN LIBERIA: UNMIL

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was created by Security Council Resolution 1509 (September 2003). UNMIL assumed peacekeeping duties 1 October 2003. Operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it functions under a mandate that includes, *inter alia*,

- 1** support to the implementation of the cease-fire agreement and the peace process as outlined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Liberian Government and the various rebel factions;
- 2** protection of UN staff, facilities and civilians; support to humanitarian and human rights activities; and
- 3** assistance to the interim government in national security reform, including national police training and formation of a new, restructured military.

Simultaneous to the initiation of the peacekeeping operations, the UN undertakes a number of development initiatives, some of which would be carried out by UNMIL, and others carried out under UNMIL's protection. These include operations in

- 1** disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation, and reintegration;
- 2** community-based reintegration and recovery;
- 3** capacity building for governance;
- 4** promotion of human rights awareness;
- 5** response to HIV/AIDS; and
- 6** environmental protection.

While UNMIL has been, for the most part, successful in its peacekeeping role insofar as there has not been


widespread resumption of hostilities, it continues to face its greatest challenges in issues of peace and security. Foremost among these challenges is that of the demobilisation. UNMIL first attempted to implement its disarmament programme in early December 2003, at which point it had been operating for only nine weeks and had only 5 000 peacekeepers in country. Ex-combatants, ill-informed and confused with regard to the disarmament process, swarmed over the sole UN cantonment site and went on a three-day rampage through Monrovia that resulted in some twelve reported deaths. Disarmament operations were postponed for five months, during which UNMIL undertook a massive information campaign regarding the disarmament process. Subsequent disarmament operations have been more successful, though not altogether smooth. There has been occasional rioting at cantonment sites, rioting and clashes with UNMIL troops.

Perhaps more troubling still is the amount and nature of the weapons being recovered. While the number of combatants processed at the cantonment sites now slightly exceeds the total number of fighters declared by the various armed factions during the Accra Peace Conference, less than half of them have turned in a weapon. Furthermore, while significant amounts of heavy ammunition have been turned over to UNMIL, the heavy weapons themselves remain largely unaccounted for. There is additional evidence to suggest that these heavy weapons, and, potentially, substantial numbers of small arms, are being cached in areas outside UN control or ferried into neighbouring countries. While leaders of Liberia's various armed groups deny any such activity on


their part, a large weapons cache was discovered by UNMIL in mid-May 2004. Concern over these residual weapons is widespread and the latest report on UNMIL by the Secretary General cites the incomplete disarmament process as a threat to the security situation.

The security situation itself remains somewhat volatile, in spite of the fact that the principal armed groups have largely stopped fighting one another. In addition to the aforementioned violence incident to the disarmament process, there have been occasional outbreaks of intra-faction violence and violent criminal activity. A significant number of these violent outbursts have taken place in

AFRICAN MILOBS CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNMIL




AFRICAN CIVPOL CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNMIL



Monrovia, in spite of round-the-clock patrolling by UNMIL. Additionally, local and regional media outlets have reported groups of armed men operating in the country's hinterlands, setting up road-blocks and subjecting the local citizenry to forced labour, extortion, and sexual assault. These issues indicate a level of volatility and lawlessness that, when combined with the weaponry still not accounted for, could yet pose immense challenges for UNMIL.

These challenges relative to disarmament and security are further complicated by the fact that UNMIL has yet to deploy throughout the country. This facilitates the ferrying and caching of weapons and ammunition, allowing parties so engaged (if any) greater freedom in where to place their caches and greater freedom of movement in general. UNMIL's limited deployment also creates areas wherein violent and criminal behaviour can take place with relative impunity. Expanding the geographical area in which UNMIL operates, however, is itself a considerable challenge. Liberia's limited infrastructure creates challenges with regards to supply, command, and control that multiply as forces extend their area of operations. UNMIL commanders may be hesitant to overextend their troops as UNMIL troops are spread increasingly thin and thus their capacity to perform certain tasks effectively may be reduced.

AFRICAN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNMIL



In spite of sporadic and minor violence, and the dangers to long-term peace incident to the incomplete disarmament process, conditions in Liberia have improved dramatically since UNMIL was first deployed. Fighting in the country is far less widespread, the situation in Monrovia is calmer, and humanitarian aid is reaching a significant portion of the population. With careful attention to the remaining challenges before it, UNMIL may well put itself on track to successfully complete its mandate.

Reference for graphs as of 31 May 2004: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/

UN OPERATIONS IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE: UNOCI

The United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) took over from the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), a political mission set up in May 2003, on 4 April 2004. UNOCI is set up for an initial period of 12 months by UN Security Council Resolution 1528 (2004). UNOCI exercises the authority that was exercised by MINUCI and the Forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). UNOCI has the following mandate:

- 1** monitor the ceasefire agreement and movement of armed groups;
- 2** disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement;
- 3** protection of UN personnel, institutions and civilians;
- 4** support the implementation of the peace process;
- 5** assist in the field of human rights and help investigate violations;
- 6** assist with maintenance of law and order; and
- 7** promote an understanding of the peace process and the role of UNOCI.

UNOCI was established to support the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement signed on 23 January 2003 in the French city of the same name after a roundtable discussion involving the government and rebel movements. The agreement provided for the establishment of the Government of National Reconciliation to be led by a Prime Minister. Former Prime Minister Mrs. Seydou Diarra was appointed to head the government. The government has to, among other things, prepare for elections and restructure the defense force. The agreement also provided for the establishment of a Follow-Up Committee. The agreement envisaged the involvement of the UN and ECOWAS in its implementation.

The implementation of the agreement was faced with


difficulties when the new Prime Minister was prevented from taking up his post by violent protests in the capital in which rebel groups protested the allocation of cabinet posts. The ECOWAS Contact Group on Côte d'Ivoire made a breakthrough when parties agreed on a 15-member National Security Council that includes representatives of the 10 signatories, the army, the police, the gendarmerie, the President and the Prime Minister. A new understanding on the allocation of cabinet posts was also reached.

According to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement the government of national reconciliation has to resolve issues that led to the instability in the country. An annexure to the agreement stipulates the root causes of the instability as the question of citizenship, status of foreign Nationals, eligibility of the presidency candidates, xenophobia and the media. The agreement mandates the creation of a human rights commission.


Following an announcement of intention to protest the slow pace of the implementation of the peace agreement, the President banned all public meetings. On 25 March 2004 demonstrations took place. There were clashes with police and a number of people were injured. There was a request for the establishment of an international commission of inquiry into these events. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) travelled to Côte d'Ivoire and recommended that an international commission be established to investigate human rights violations that have occurred since 19 September 2002; that UNOCI's mandate be expanded; and that a human rights court be established. The commission further identified the need to establish radio UN; to reform and train the police force; and strengthen the judiciary. The situation may overstretch UNOCI and there is a need to balance staff with appropriate skills to carry out this multifaceted task.

The political situation in Côte d'Ivoire threatens the peace process. Following the events in March some opposition rebels have said that they will not disarm until President Gbagbo resigns. There has been an increase in militia activities connected to the Burkina Faso plantation workers. Heightened tension put the civilian and UNOCI staff at risk of attack from rebels. Access to areas under rebel control becomes difficult

AFRICAN MILOBS CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNOCI



AFRICAN CIVPOL CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNOCI



Cameroon 10
Djibouti 3
Senegal 1
Nigeria 5
Niger 1
Togo 1

for government and UNOCI. The government does not have control over the entire territory and rebel forces control some parts of the country and continue to replace state authority. UNOCI personnel are particularly vulnerable in the rebel-controlled territories. The armed personnel should be on alert to assist civilian population against possible aggression by armed groups.

The UNHCR report recommends the establishment of a wider commission of inquiry as envisaged by the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. This commission has not been established, as parties do not agree to its composition and mandate. It is possible that the mandate of UNOCI will be extended until this commission is constituted and has accomplished its provisions.


The peace agreement says that there should be elections in 2005; however the country is not ready for this. Of particular concern is the issue of nationality and citizenship. The new National Identification Supervisory Commission was set up to look at issues of identification; however there is no legislative framework for its work.

The re-establishment of the Independent Electoral Commission is another contentious issue. Parties are concerned with its composition and mandate. The UN dispatched an electoral assessment mission to the country. There was unanimous support for UN involvement in the elections. UNOCI together with the electoral assessment mission should be prepared to offer electoral assistance.

The mission has performed well so far, especially in co-ordinating with other missions in the region.



AFRICAN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNOCI



Disarmament of former rebels is an issue that needs urgent attention and their integration into regular forces remains an issue. UNOCI should provide assistance through training, mentoring and monitoring.

The political stalemate, the fragile security situation, the deteriorating humanitarian situation and fears of a resumption of conflict pose challenges for the UN mission.

Reference for graphs as of 31 May 2004: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/

UN MISSION IN BURUNDI: ONUB

The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was created by UN Security Council Resolution 1545 on 21 May 2004 for an initial period of six months. This resolution decided that the mission would be headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), and would initially consist of the forces of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). The African Union (AU) transferred the authority of AMIB to the UN on 1 June 2004.

Established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, ONUB was granted a broad mandate to operate in support of the Arusha Agreement. Under that mandate, ONUB is tasked, among other things, with the following:

- 1** monitor the implementation of the peace agreement and investigate violations thereof;
- 2** carry out the disarmament and demobilisation portion of the national DDR and reinsertion plan;
- 3** monitor the quartering of the Armed Forces of Burundi, and, where necessary, carry out their demobilisation and disarmament;
- 4** monitor the flow of arms across national borders;
- 5** establish security necessary for the administration of humanitarian programmes;
- 6** facilitate the return of displaced persons;
- 7** assist in the national election process; and
- 8** protect civilians under imminent threat of violence.


A wide range of UN development and humanitarian activities are concurrently underway in Burundi and involve numerous UN organs. Programmes underway include, but are by no means limited to, efforts in economic planning, development of small and medium-sized enterprise, women's rights, public health, good governance, and infrastructure. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNHCR have long-standing operations in the country.

ONUB begins its mission in the face of a number of significant challenges. Vast numbers of refugees, protracted social conflict, circulation and easy availability of small arms, economic dysfunction, failure of the country's armed groups to sign the Arusha Agreement, and persistent extraterritorial conflict pose serious threats to the nation's fragile peace.

As has been the case with the UNMIL mission in Liberia, the disarmament process may well prove an extremely difficult task. There are an estimated 35 000 combatants in Burundi¹, not counting those belonging to the Armed Forces of Burundi (FAB) which continues to struggle with the disarmament process. Furthermore, armed groups often demonstrate partial disarmament and retain a considerable reserve of arms and ammunition for future use. Burundi's porous borders and history of trans-border military action in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), coupled with ethnic allegiances that extend into both of those countries, could possibly facilitate the transportation of arms into neighbouring countries, where they can be cached beyond the scope of ONUB operations. The continued availability of arms and ammunition represents a significant threat to Burundi's long-term peace. The disarmament process may be complicated still further by the fact that one of the country's armed groups, the Palipehutu-FNL led by Agathon Rwaswa, has yet to sign a ceasefire agreement with the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGoB), and continues to operate militarily. While these activities do not generally constitute major operations, skirmishes, ambushes, and mortar attacks are not uncommon. This continued fighting poses a threat both to the disarmament process and the peace process as a whole, as few of the militant groups are likely to offer up their entire arsenal in the face of continued military action by their rivals and the FAB.

Furthermore, the return of displaced persons brings with it challenges of daunting complexity. Nearly 10 percent of the Burundian population has been displaced, whether internally, or as refugees in neighbouring countries (primarily Tanzania)². The return of the displaced population is complicated by a number of factors.

AFRICAN MILOBS CONTRIBUTIONS TO ONUB



The logistical requirements, alone, of such an operation are weighty as displaced persons will require significant material assistance, including emergency shelter and, in some cases, transport, to restart their lives. That Burundi has the second-highest population density in all of Africa, furthermore, means that space to accommodate returnees is limited, further complicates the matter.


Since Burundi's economy is primarily agricultural, and since, as Secretary General Annan stated, the war "can be described as a competition between the haves and have-nots in a zero-sum game"³, fair distribution of land to the returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP's) will be both difficult and crucial to the success of the peace process. The mid-June arrival in Burundi of some 30 000 refugees from eastern Congo has only served to exacerbate the refugee/IDP situation.

Many of the challenges facing the ONUB mission are worsened by the situation in neighbouring Rwanda and the DRC. Ethnic tension and a history of ethnic violence between Tutsi and Hutu exists in both those countries, and there has been a history of Burundian involvement in Rwandan and Congolese conflict (and vice-versa). In addition to facilitating the aforementioned ferrying of arms and complicating the plight of Burundian IDP's, this situation makes the security situation in Burundi dependent, to a certain degree, on that of its neighbours to the west. Congo's northeastern provinces remain volatile, and rebel activity there has been an ongoing problem.

ONUB has benefited from substantial international participation in the peace process, especially under the auspices of the AU, but even with continued international participation and support, it will nevertheless have to work through daunting obstacles to the successful execution of its mandate. If successful, however, the UN will have made an enormous step towards peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region.



AFRICAN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS TO ONUB



1 UN Document S/2004/210 (2004)
 2 Source: CIA World Factbook
 3 UN Document S/2004/210, section II, subsection E, Paragraph 26

Reference for graphs as of 30 June 2004: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/

THE AU & UN IN SUDAN

The African Union in Sudan

On 25 May 2004 the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) authorised the deployment of an observer mission to Sudan. This authorisation follows the signing of the cease-fire agreement between the government of Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement. The mandate of the mission is to ensure that the agreement is implemented; to assess requirements for mine clearance; and to receive, verify and adjudicate complaints related to cease fire violations. The Mission will initially consist of 120 members and a possible protection force of 270 military observers for a period of 12 months. The mission will be receiving 2 million Euro from the European Union for a period of 12 months.

Further, in response to the worsening security situation in the western region of Darfur, the AU has decided to send an armed protection force to the area to allow refugees to return home and to protect AU observers monitoring the ceasefire. The AU force is expected to consist of 300 troops which include 120 soldiers from Nigeria and 120 from Rwanda. Tanzania and Botswana may also send additional peacekeepers.

The United Nations in Sudan

The UN presence in Sudan has, thus far, been in the form of The United Nations Country Team (UNCT) which comprises of all the UN agencies in Sudan. UNCT is charged with general oversight of planning, implementation and review of UN programmes. The Office of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator leads the UNCT and has the responsibility to provide agreed services and guide the systems of the UN. This office is located in Khartoum, Nairobi, Rumbek in Southern Sudan.

The objective of the UN in Sudan is to provide humanitarian assistance. The framework is derived from the Millennium Development Goals and includes the following objectives: to promote respect, protection and advancement of human rights; to promote good governance through strengthening conflict management mechanisms; to save lives and reduce suffering and deprivation; to help consolidate peace; and to encourage sustainable solutions.

The framework for delivering humani-

tarian assistance to the south is Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). This is a tripartite agreement between government of Sudan, the Sudan's People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the UN to enable humanitarian access. In the south the OLS provides an operating umbrella for six UN agencies and 45 NGOs.

The following UN agencies have a presence in Sudan:

- 1 Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)
- 2 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- 3 World Food Programme (WFP)
- 4 United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF)
- 5 World Health Organisation (WHO)
- 6 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR)
- 7 United Nations Population Fund (UNPF)
- 8 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- 9 United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)
- 10 United Nations Emergency Mine Action Programme in Sudan
- 11 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

UNCT has organised the in-country work into thematic coordination based on the Millennium Development Goals. The coordination is carried out by Goal Groups with one agency coordinating a particular group. (See Table 1).

Funding for UN involvement in Sudan comes from various countries. For the period 2003 to 2004 the budget stood at US \$383,404,353 (See Table 2).

The United States is the most prolific donor standing at 49.5% of the total amount of funding for the period 2003-2004. The most funded sectors are food/

Table 1: The Goal Groups of the UNCT

Thematic Goal Group	Convener
GOAL 1 Eradication of poverty	FAO
GOAL 2 Achieve universal primary education	UNICEF
GOAL 3 Promote gender equality and empower women	WFP
GOAL 4 Reduce child mortality	UNICEF
GOAL 5 Improve mental health	UNFPA
GOAL 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	WHO
GOAL 7 Ensure environmental sustainability	UNDP
GOAL 8 Develop global partnership for development	UNIDO

emergency relief, multi-sector. Health and rule of law/peace building funded in this manner 48%, 17.9%, 11.4% and 4.6% respectively (See Table 3).

The prospects for peace have necessitated a new approach by the UNCT. This approach is spelled out in the Quick-Start/Peace Impact Programme (QS-PIP). The programme aims to have an integrated approach that will realise the 'peace dividend' for people of Sudan. The programme seeks to provide an immediate transitional recovery contribution to accompany the signature of a peace agreement in the form of targeted quick start/peace impact interventions. It is expected to form the core quick-start component of the UN Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for the Sudan Assistance Programme ("ASAP 2004"). The ASAP seeks to outline a shared vision for humanitarian and transitional assistance, including quick-start and capacity building priorities, for the coming year directed toward the

Table 3: Funding allocated per sector²

Sector	Donation (us\$)	% of total
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	183,894,137	48.0%
Multi-sector	68,333,414	17.8%
Health	43,869,861	11.4%
Protection/Human Rights/Rule of Law/Peace Building	21,282,959	5.6%
Coordination and Support Services	15,867,766	4.1%
Agriculture	13,511,866	3.5%
Water and Sanitation	9,712,577	2.5%
Education	9,108,469	2.4%
Social Development	8,868,920	2.3%
Mine Action	3,821,157	1.0%
Security	2,885,045	0.8%
Economic Recovery and Infrastructure	1,258,256	0.3%
Family Shelter and Non-food Items	989,927	0.3%
Grand Total	383,404,353	100%

Table 2: Funding allocate by donors¹

Donor	Donation (us\$)	% of total
United States	189,674,851	49.5%
United Kingdom	35,549,799	9.3%
EC	33,131,081	8.6%
Netherlands	17,329,599	4.5%
Japan	16,368,351	4.3%
Norway	10,877,906	2.8%
Italy	9,980,744	2.6%
Germany	8,830,382	2.3%
France	6,217,195	1.6%
Switzerland	5,976,792	1.6%
Denmark	5,738,371	1.5%
Sweden	5,124,270	1.3%
Canada	4,769,828	1.2%
Finland	2,364,408	0.6%
Ireland	2,283,854	0.6%
Other Donors	29,186,922	7.6%
Grand Total	383,404,353	100%

long-term Millennium Development Goals.

The UNCT is faced with multiple challenges. The Sudan peace process is known for its broken peace accords and unfulfilled promises. This presents a challenge to UNCT to, firstly, instill in the parties the need to maintain the momentum of peace, and, secondly, the UNCT's ability to carry out its task. The question of access to and safety of personnel will remain even during the transitional stage. Return of refugees and resettlement of IDPs also presents challenges as resources may be over extended. Given the magnitude of the challenges in Sudan there is the further challenge of adequate funding and proper coordination.


The UN has, however, made further moves to enhance its response to and presence in Sudan. The UN Security Council welcomed, in resolution 1547 (2004), the proposal by the Secretary-General on 7 June 2004 to establish the UN advance team in Sudan as a political mission. The team will be established for an initial period of 3 months. The team will prepare international monitoring as stipulated under the Naivasha Agreement on Security Arrangements, facilitate contacts with concerned parties and prepare for introduction of peace support operations. The Security Council has also declared its readiness to establish UN peace support operations in Sudan to support the implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreement once signed and have asked the Secretary General to take necessary preparatory steps.

1 <http://www.unsudanig.org/publications/surveys/donorprofile/donor-assistance-profile03-finalrevision.pdf>

2 Ibid

TOTAL AFRICAN CONTRIBUTIONS

AFRICAN CIVPOL CONTRIBUTIONS PER MISSION




UNMIL 791
UNOCI 60
UNAMSIL 116
MONUC 139


RANKING OF AFRICAN COUNTRY CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Rank	Country	No. of members
3	Nigeria	3565
4	Ghana	3306
6	Ethiopia	2673
7	South Africa	2365
10	Kenya	1827
12	Morocco	1545
15	Senegal	1109
16	Zambia	934
18	Namibia	853
24	Tunisia	519
27	Niger	433
30	Benin	356
34	Togo	307
38	Mozambique	232
42	Gambia	212
49	Egypt	103
50	Zimbabwe	89
52	Malawi	68
53	Mali	61
58	Burkina Faso	44
65	Cameroon	30
70	Guinea	24
71	Tanzania	22
73	Uganda	20
83	Djibouti	11
84	Cote d'Ivoire	11
87	Gabon	6
93	Chad	4


AFRICAN MILOBS CONTRIBUTIONS PER MISSION



AFRICAN TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS PER MISSION



Reference for graphs and table as of 30 June 2004: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/



Peace in Africa: Towards a Collaborative Security Regime

Edited by S. Field, Institute for Global
Dialogue, Johannesburg, 2004, 282pp
ISBN 1-919697-67-5

From the League of Nations to the United Nations to the regionalisation of security, one has witnessed the trend from collective security to collaborative security mechanisms and structures. While the earlier approaches to security focused more on collective security and responses to inter-state conflict and upheld the motto 'an attack on one is an attack on us all', the changing international context with the end of the Cold War and increased intra-state conflict ushered in the more cooperative response to security as embraced by the global trend of regionalism. This trend has been largely prevalent in trade and economic considerations; however, the benefits of regionalism in these sectors have promoted the move towards a collaborative framework of security. At the same time, while these benefits did indeed play a contributory role in this move towards regionalisation of security, it was also largely based on the understanding that conflict undermines economic growth and thus preventing and managing conflict is vital for economic stability. Africa is currently building the blocks for a collaborative security regime in Africa as enshrined in the principles of the African Union's (AU's) Peace and Security Council. It is therefore

timely that a book analysing the prospects for collaborative security in Africa is produced.

In essence, the book provides an overview of approaches to collaborative security as adopted by regional organisations across the world, and assesses the lessons learned and best practices which may inform the development of Africa's security mechanism. While the book largely espouses the benefits of such a security regime, it does provide some reflection on the challenges of designing and implementing such a security structure. The emphasis is placed on military structures for collaborative security and dedicates a large portion of the book on the prospects for developing an African Standby Force as key to this security regime.

The first chapter by Gavin Cawthra discusses the security arrangements in the context of the end of the Cold War, globalisation and post-September 11, and how these developments have further encouraged sub-regional organisations to undertake security functions. He further provides an assessment whether the AU's Peace and Security Council contains elements of collaborative or common security, or both. Cawthra argues that in practice security management in Africa should harmonise sub-regional

and regional structures.

Anthoni van Nieuwkerk provides an analysis of the security mechanisms of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the AU and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and discusses the prospects for the Peace and Security Council in establishing a collaborative security framework in which he stresses that political will is vital for the success of Africa's security structures.

The third chapter by Laurie Nathan provides a strong case for mediation as an important element of the Peace and Security Council. This chapter is a fresh perspective on the components of a security structure, moving away from a purely military response to security. Nathan gives a practical guide for the location of a mediation unit and how it could function in the AU.

The next three chapters focus on security regimes from South America, the Gulf, Asia, Europe and Africa and how these structures may provide lessons for the development of Africa's collaborative security structure. Greg Mills, Garth Shelton and Lyal White consider the security regimes of the Americas, Asia and the Gulf, highlighting the similarities between these region's security context and dimensions and Africa's, and emphasising the importance placed on confidence-building between members and the successes of this approach. Bjørn Møller considers the security arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). While Møller highlights the successes of these organisations, he cautions against Africa "uncritically emulating the European experience". An observation, which, in essence, is applicable to all comparisons, applied to developing Africa's security structure. An example from Africa presented is that of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in which Festus Agoagye outlines the institutional and procedural shortcomings of this structure, but also highlights that ECOWAS's strength lies in its members' sustained political will and commitment to deal with sub-regional security issues.

The development and establishment of an African Standby Force is the focus of chapters 7, 8 and 9. While for the most part the arguments presented are in favour of the establishment and operationalisation of such a force, critical issues for consideration are highlighted for the success of such a security response for Africa. Mark Malan discusses the operationalisation of an African Standby Force drawing attention to the importance of UN-AU collaboration for Africa's security structure, but also providing alternative options to a standby force. In chapter 8, Roger Kibasomba provides options for financing the African Standby Force, as well as generating funds for the AU's Peace Fund. In essence, Kibasomba argues that while international contributions to the AU's Peace Fund are required, Africa too can fund the Peace Fund.

As with the implementation of any activity, structure and programme, logistical considerations are vital for success and sustainability. Tsepe Motumi correctly argues in chapter 9 the importance of logistics in preparation, planning and implementation of an African Standby Force and provides a clear discussion on the logistical considerations for such a structure. He also adds a further element on the contribution South Africa can make to the standby force.

Rok Ajulu provides the final chapter and concentrates on how regional organisations, specifically the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), may play a role and contribute to Africa's security system. He concurs with van Nieuwkerk on the importance of political will for sustaining a security structure in Africa, and in his argument that IGAD has lost credibility, Ajulu provides some lessons for developing this structure.

The book presents clear arguments advocating an African security regime, particularly the African Standby Force; however, further clarification on terms like 'collective', 'common' and 'collaborative' would have been relevant. Overall, the book is very informative and, as indicated earlier, a timely contribution for policy-makers and others to consider while developing Africa's security structures. 