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## **Crime, Political Transition and Urban Transformation in South Africa and Brazil**

**Karina Landman**

REPORTS

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**Crime, Political Transition  
and Urban Transformation  
in South Africa and Brazil**

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# **Crime, Political Transition and Urban Transformation in South Africa and Brazil**

Karina Landman<sup>1</sup>

## **Introduction**

Cities are not static. A conglomeration of people, places and political and social agendas all contribute to continuous changes. In many cases, these changes are initiated politically, experienced socially and expressed physically. In other cases the link between political, social and physical changes is not so clear.

Urban transformation is a critical part of any well-functioning city. The ability to modify and improve existing infrastructure, opportunities, facilities, etc. is essential to stay competitive in a global world.<sup>2</sup> It is also necessary to adapt to the changing needs of the residents of cities. This is even more so in South Africa. Given our past and the current challenges we face, urban transformation must be a critical part of the reconstruction and development of South African cities. Fortunately, this has occurred to some extent. Since the transition to democracy in 1994, South African cities have witnessed numerous changes: politically, socially, economically and spatially. Some changes received widespread support from the

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<sup>1</sup> KARINA LANDMAN is a research architect / urban designer with CSIR Building and Construction Technology.

<sup>2</sup> Competitiveness can be argued to be relative, but most people would agree on its basic aspects, including economic stability and growth, social welfare, spatial diversity and functionality and political goodwill. In short, it would probably be measured by a combination of a diversity of opportunities and the quality of life experienced by residents of cities.

majority of the population, but others left some people disgruntled, annoyed or disappointed.

Change per se, does not, in itself imply positive transformation, although this is very often the case. Changes in urban structure and form have consequences for spatial and social development in urban areas, as a comparison with Brazil indicates. These changes also have an impact on institutional reform and ultimately on political transformation and crime prevention too. Given this, a comparison between South Africa and Brazil can provide valuable insights for the urban future of South Africa.

Urban transformation is shaped by a complex web of interacting factors, including the political, social, economic and spatial dynamics present in our cities today. It is generally accepted that there is a link between political transition and increased levels of crime in South Africa. This report aims to give a broader perspective and to argue that political transition not only has an impact on rising crime levels, but also on urban development patterns and spatial transformation currently occurring in South Africa. This is not to deny that similar links exist between, for example, the political transition and the current socio-economic conditions in urban areas. This report will, however, focus on the link between political transition, crime and urban transformation, especially spatial transformation. It will attempt to understand the link between these issues through a comparison between South Africa and Brazil. The primary aims of this report are:

- to understand crime in both countries;
- to highlight several responses to the increased crime levels in both countries;
- to reflect on the consequences or impact of these responses to crime.

The approach of the study is to compare these issues by reviewing the Brazilian situation (bearing in mind that Brazil has been a democracy longer than South Africa has) and to draw some lessons for the urban future of South Africa, with regard to policy-formation, government decision-making and urban development in general.

### Why comparisons?

In attempting to explain the numerous changes that occurred in South Africa in the last decade, it is very useful to keep in mind that although South Africa certainly has its own very unique local conditions, it does have several similarities with other countries.

South Africa is but one of a number of countries that has experienced political transition in the last decade or two. Other countries include several in Latin America, such as Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Peru, the former communist regimes of Eastern and Central Europe (for example Russia, the Ukraine and Poland) and other African countries such as Nigeria and Mozambique. Along with dramatic political transition, many of these have experienced social, economic and spatial transition as well. Some of these changes included growing levels of crime accompanied by a range of responses to address it. Comparisons of the links between the transitions and the growth of crime suggest valuable insights for future crime prevention initiatives, urban development practices and policy formation.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA) hosted a conference on *Crime and Policing in Transitions: Comparative Perspectives* from 30 August to 1 September 2000. This conference highlighted important conclusions in terms of the key causal features which generate crime and which areas of policy focus may have the greatest impact (Shaw M, *Crime and Policing in Transitions: Comparative Perspectives*. Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2000). This emphasises the importance of comparative studies.

## Why Brazil and South Africa?

Brazil and South Africa have many similarities. They share key characteristics, which are central to the South African urban problem and the question of urban transformation. Some of these characteristics are:

- the level of national wealth (expressed in GDP per capita or similar measures);
- an unequal distribution of wealth;
- a political transition from authoritarian rule to democracy;
- an increase in crime; and
- urban development patterns.

Brazil and South Africa are both regarded as upper middle-income countries (World Bank Classification) and they are ranked closely to each other in terms of their GNP per capita (1999), both according to the Atlas method, where Brazil is ranked slightly above South Africa and the Purchasing Power Parity, where South Africa is ranked slightly above Brazil.<sup>4</sup>

In addition, Brazil and South Africa have the highest income inequality coefficient in the world. For a long time South Africa's Gini coefficient<sup>5</sup> (currently 0.58) was the highest in the world. However, today Brazil's (0.63 in 1991)<sup>6</sup> is higher.<sup>7</sup> One can also express income inequality by looking at the shares in total income of groups of households arranged in order of income level. In South

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<sup>4</sup> World Bank World Development Report 2000/2001. <http://www.worldbank.org>

<sup>5</sup> The Gini coefficient is one of the indicators for income inequality and it ranges from 0 (absolute equality) to 1 (absolute inequality).

<sup>6</sup> Caldeira PR, *City of Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in São Paulo*. California: University of California Press, 2000, p.119.

<sup>7</sup> May J, Budlender D, Mokate R, Rogerson C & A. Stavrou. *Poverty and Inequality in South Africa. Report prepared for the Office of the Executive Deputy President and the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality* (<http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/reports/poverty.html>, 1998).

Africa the poorest 10% of the population receive only 1.4% of the total income, while the richest 10% receives 47.3% of the total income. In Brazil, the poorest 10% of the population receives only 0.8% of the total income, while the richest 10% receives 47.9% of the total income.<sup>8</sup> Although very similar to South Africa, the figures indicate that the poorest 10% of the population in Brazil is even more marginalised than its counterpart in South Africa. In addition, both countries reflect inequality of income distribution between race groups. The inequalities reflected in terms of the distribution of wealth is generally considered as a major contributing factor to the high crime rates and to reactive responses to crime in both countries since their transition to democracy. Therefore, although their overall economic positions are regarded as middle-income countries, due to the large number of poor people, they are in many cases considered as developing or transitional countries. Lawrence (1990) calls these 'advanced third world countries'.<sup>9</sup>

They are also transitional countries in a political sense. Both countries have changed from a military (Brazil) or apartheid (South Africa) regime to a democracy at the end of the twentieth century. The end of dictatorship in Brazil was gradual. It started in 1974 with the announcement that there would be a gradual opening or 'abertura'. This process took until 1986, when particular elections (not all inclusive) were held. Therefore, 1986 is considered by many people as the end of the dictatorship. However, although the commission that was in charge of the reformulation of the new constitution was elected in 1986, the new constitution was only

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<sup>8</sup> CIA World Factbook 2002 — South Africa (<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sf.html>) and Brazil (<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/br.html>).

<sup>9</sup> Lawrence, R. 'Comparing patterns of governance in Argentina, Brazil and South Africa', in *Unisia Latin American Report* 6, 1, March 1990. Lawrence highlights a number of characteristics of 'advanced third world countries'. These include the size of the countries, the presence of a colonial legacy, relatively sophisticated economies, grossly unequal distribution of wealth, urbanisation, inequality of well-being or social inequality and political uniqueness.



promulgated in 1988. The first all-inclusive election was held in 1989. In South Africa, the transition took place much later. Although the Group Areas Act was abolished in 1990 and many political parties were unbanned, and although many negotiations were undertaken during the early 1990s, the actual transition to democracy occurred with the first all-inclusive elections held in 1994.

In addition, both countries experienced a dramatic increase in crime levels, especially violent crimes, after their political transitions. These patterns will be described in more detail later in the report. Several responses to the rising crime rates, as well as the consequences of these responses, also reflect many similarities. High crime rates are often associated with factors characteristic of urbanisation, such as overcrowding, unemployment and increased consumer demands and expectations. High levels of gang activity and the availability of firearms are also evident mainly in urban areas and are known to be related to criminal activity.<sup>10</sup>

<b>Table 1: Urbanisation trends, size and growth of urban population</b>					
<i>Country</i>	<i>Level of urbanisation (% of total population in urban settlements)</i>		<i>Urban population</i>		
			<i>Thousands</i>		<i>Annual Growth Rate (%)</i>
	1975	2000	1975	2000	1975–2000
Brazil	61.15	81.21	66.10	142.00	3.06
South Africa	47.97	53.12	12.30	25.00	2.76
Source: <i>An Urbanising World: Global Report on Human Settlements 1996</i> . UN: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), 1996, p.449.					

<sup>10</sup> Schonteich M & A Louw, *Crime in South Africa: A Country and Cities Profile*. Halfway House: ISS Paper 49, April 2001, p.2.

Both countries experienced rapid urbanisation. Although the rate of urbanisation in Brazil was considerably higher than in South Africa (see table below), the two countries reflect similar spatial responses or development patterns in terms of urban growth.

The growth of informal settlements at the periphery of cities, the upgrading of informal settlements and the legal development or illegal occupation of land by lower income residents close to or in the inner city, are but a few spatial similarities. So are the spatial responses to crime such as defensive architecture and fortified enclaves. Even the historical urban development patterns reflect remarkable similarities. Caldeira<sup>11</sup> highlights three different spatial development patterns that she claims have promoted social segregation in São Paulo throughout the last century. These are what she calls the 'concentrated city' (late 19<sup>th</sup> century–1940s), the centre-periphery city (1940s–1980s) and walled city (1980s–present). The concentrated city was characterised by dense and concentrated developments in close proximity to each other. Social segregation was expressed through housing arrangements. The centre-periphery city was dispersed, not concentrated; the social classes were separated by space and distance and the transport system was based on the use of roads. The walled city is more diverse and fragmented than the city of the 1970s. Segregation assumed a different form. Although the centre-periphery opposition still continues, various social groups and urban functions are moving around the city. Space alone is not enough to create separation today. The implementation of various forms of walls, fences, gates etc. is leading to the creation of a growing number of fortified enclaves in Brazil, especially in São Paulo.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Caldeira PR, 'Building up walls: The new pattern of spatial segregation in São Paulo' in *UNESCO Report ISSJ 147/1996*, United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishers, pp.55–66.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.55–59.

These same broad patterns can be distinguished in many South African cities, such as Johannesburg and Cape Town. During the early part of the twentieth century both Johannesburg and Cape Town experienced concentrated urban development around what is today called the inner city. The period between the 1940s and the 1980s saw the development and implementation of the apartheid planning policies, with characteristics such as separate neighbourhoods for different race groups. The neighbourhoods for the coloured and black population groups were predominantly established on the urban peripheries, as in the case of São Paulo. Neighbourhoods were separated from each other by spatial barriers, such as rapid transport routes and green open spaces. This pattern of development officially continued until the 1990s when new urban development policies and legislation called for a different integrated planning model. Although many low-income areas are still being developed on the urban periphery, a focus on infill-development and densification has led to the incorporation of many lower income groups throughout South African cities. Inner city areas are also increasingly occupied by lower income groups who need to reside closer to employment and opportunities. In addition, many residents in urban areas in South Africa, especially in the larger metropolitan areas, are increasingly reverting to walls, fences and even the closure of entire neighbourhoods to protect themselves from crime.

These similarities between Brazil and South Africa, together with the fact that Brazil has been a democracy for longer, and has experienced reactions and responses to crime for a longer period, allowing the impact of some of the responses to crime to emerge, means that there are valuable lessons for South Africa in a comparison with Brazil.

## Why a focus on urban areas?

The cities, the megalopolises particularly, were the testing-ground of controversial political ideas and became the crucial site of political struggle.<sup>13</sup>

Lawrence argues in his paper<sup>14</sup> that the vehicles of political transformation (trade unions, the working class more broadly, civil rights groups, sections of the Catholic church, the urban poor, especially those in squatter settlements and tenements, sporadic guerrilla movements) in South America were concentrated in the cities and thus the cities became the stage for political struggle. In the same way, they also became the site for dramatic political, economic, and social transitions. This is also the case in South Africa.

Crime rates worldwide are also higher in cities than in rural areas. Most of the factors associated with high crime rates generally are more prevalent in cities than in smaller towns. The growth of crime, especially violent crime, is to a great extent concentrated in the larger urban areas, both in South Africa and in Brazil.<sup>15</sup> Clearly, this will lead to increased responses to crime in urban areas, and it will also ultimately necessitate focussed interventions to address crime in urban areas, especially given the fact that increased levels of urbanisation are expected in both countries over the next 24 years.

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<sup>13</sup> Lawrence R, 'Transition to democracy: South America and South Africa' in *Unisa Latin American Report* 7, 1, March 1991.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p.52.

<sup>15</sup> de Mesquita Neto P, 'Crime, violence and political uncertainty in Brazil'. Paper presented at the Conference 'Crime and Policing in Transition: Comparative Perspectives', at the South African International Affairs, Johannesburg, South Africa, 30 August–1 September 2001.

## **Political transition and crime in Brazil and South Africa**

### **Period of transition**

Both South Africa and Brazil have experienced profound changes after the transition to democracy. These changes included political, socio-economic and spatial changes, especially in urban areas. Both countries also experienced a dramatic increase in crime. These experiences are consistent with those of other countries undergoing transitions to democracy, as has already been mentioned. As change and the processes of democratisation proceed, the instruments of social control (both formal and informal) in society are also transformed. The result is that new possibilities for the development of crime open up. However, it is dangerous to assume that the increase in crime is purely due to the transition.<sup>16</sup>


### **Crime trends after transition**

It is very difficult to do a direct comparison of crime statistics in South Africa and Brazil due to the nature of the crime statistics available. In addition, it is generally accepted that more victims report crime in developed countries than in developing countries, such as South Africa and Brazil. Therefore the crime statistics might not reflect the whole picture. It is not the purpose of this report to do a detailed statistical analysis, but rather only to sketch a background for further discussion.

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<sup>16</sup> Shaw M, *South Africa: Crime in Transition*. ISS Paper 17. Halfway House: ISS, March 1997, p.1; and Schonteich M & A Louw, *op.cit.*, p.3.

Figure 1: Percentage change in number of crimes recorded, 1994/95–1998/99 in South Africa



Source: CIAC. Graph: ISS<sup>17</sup>

During the first three years after the political transition in South Africa, the overall crime levels stabilised, albeit at very high levels, especially with respect to violent crime. The number of recorded crimes increased by 3% between 1994 and 1996, while the population increased by an estimated 4% over the same period of time. In 1996, levels of recorded crime, measured from one year to the next, increased at an escalating rate. The greatest increase was 4.8% in 1997-98, reaching an all-time high of 7% in 1998-1999 (see figure 1).<sup>18</sup>

Despite a general lack of information regarding crime trends at a national level, the information available is sufficient to show there

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Schonteich M & A Louw, *ibid.*, p.2.

has been a significant growth in crime and violence since the transition to democracy in Brazil.<sup>19</sup>

In South Africa, not all crimes increased or decreased at the same rate between 1994 and 1999. The greatest increase, of 121%, was in common robbery, while residential burglary, assault with the intent to commit grievous bodily harm (assault GBH), rape and car hijacking all increased by over 20%. Robbery with aggravating circumstances increased by 15% — approximately at the same rate as the 20 most serious and most prevalent crimes taken together. An interesting fact is that both murders and car thefts decreased between 1994 and 1999 (Figure 2).<sup>20</sup> However, overall, recorded violent crimes (murder, attempted murder, rape, attempted rape and all forms of robbery and assault) have increased consistently since 1994 (from 618,000 in 1994 to 751,000 incidents in 1999). Between 1994 and 1999, violent crime increased by 22%. In 1999, a third of all crimes recorded by the police in South Africa were of a violent nature.<sup>21</sup>

In Brazil it was especially homicides that increased significantly. The number of violent deaths or deaths resulting from external causes increased from 70,212 in 1980 to 117,603 in 1998 (+67.5%). The number of deaths resulting from homicide or aggression also increased considerably during the same period, from 13,910 to 41,916 (+201.3%). The homicide rate increased from 11.7 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 1980 to 25.90 per 100,000 in 1998 (121.4%).<sup>22</sup>

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
<sup>19</sup> de Mesquita Neto P, *op.cit.*, p.3.

<sup>20</sup> Schonteich M & A Louw, *op. cit.*, p.2.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> de Mesquita Neto P, *op.cit.*, p.3.

**Figure 2: Percentage change in selected crimes recorded between 1994 and 1999 in South Africa**



Source: CIAC. Graph: ISS<sup>23</sup>

Despite the huge increase in murders (homicide) in Brazil between 1980 and 1998, and the slight decrease in murders in South Africa between 1994 and 1999, Interpol statistics still showed that the

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*



number of murders recorded per 100,000 of the population in 1998 was much higher in South Africa (59) than in Brazil (21). This was also the pattern for the total number of offences recorded per 100,000 of the population, in 1998, with 5,065 offences occurring in South Africa compared to 1,404 in Brazil.<sup>24</sup> Masuku points out that if one compares South Africa to many other countries in the world based on the Interpol figures for 1998, South Africa has high but manageable levels of property crime, but an extraordinarily high level of violent crime. He goes on to argue that it is exactly this high level of violent crime that sets South Africa apart from other crime-ridden societies.<sup>25</sup> Pinheiro argues the same for Brazil and points out that although violence has increased worldwide, it is the extremely high rates of homicide combined with widespread impunity that is aggravating the situation in Brazil.<sup>26</sup>

## Distribution of crime

In both South Africa and Brazil, crime is unequally distributed in different geographical areas (in terms of states/provinces, cities and within cities) and in terms of different social groups. In addition, the growth in crime types also varies significantly across different geographical areas and social groups.

Crime is unequally distributed across the various provinces in South Africa. This is true for the overall crime rate, as well as for the different types of crime. In 1999, the recorded number of murders, for example, was the highest in the Western Cape (81), followed by KwaZulu Natal (70) and Gauteng (69). The number of murders recorded in these provinces was considerably higher than those in

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<sup>24</sup> Masuku S, 'South Africa: World crime capital?' in *Nedbank ISS Crime Index*, 1, 2001, pp.16-21.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> Pinheiro PS, 'Democratic governance, violence, and the (UN) rule of law' in *Deadelus*, ('Brazil: The burden of the past; the promise of the future), 129, 2, Spring 2000, pp.119-143.

the North West Province (34) and the Northern Province (17) during the same period.<sup>27</sup> Similar patterns are evident in Brazil. In 1998, some states, for example Rio de Janeiro (55.52) and São Paulo (39.64), had far higher homicide rates than for example Parana (17.54) and Piaui (5.23).<sup>28</sup>

Crime is also unequally distributed across various cities in South Africa and Brazil. In South Africa, the recorded crime figures for 1999 show that Johannesburg had by far the highest crime rate (violent and property crime) compared to Pretoria, Cape Town (West Metropole Police Station Area) and Durban (Figure 3).<sup>29</sup>

Again, Brazil showed similar patterns. The two largest Metropolitan Regions (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) registered 15,896 homicides or 37.9% of the total homicides in Brazil. The two largest cities, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, registered 8,826 homicides or 21% of the total number of homicides in the country.<sup>30</sup> In 1998, 56.7% of all homicides happened in the state capitals.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Louw A, 'Comparing crime in the provinces: Trends since 1994' in the *Nedbank ISS Crime Index*, 6, 2000, p.9.


<sup>28</sup> de Mesquita Neto P, *op. cit.*, p.13.

<sup>29</sup> Schonteich M & A Louw, *op. cit.*, p.2.

<sup>30</sup> de Mesquita Neto P, *op. cit.*, p.4.

<sup>31</sup> UNDCP — Brazil: Country profile. April 2001. <https://www.undcp.org:444/field/field/brazil/countpro/briefing.html>.

**Figure 3: Violent and property crime rates in police areas, 1999**



Source: CIAC. Graph: ISS.<sup>32</sup>

In South Africa it was also found that townships and poorer areas experience the highest per capita levels of violent crime in cities. A victim survey conducted in 1997 indicated that individuals in poorer households experienced the highest levels of violent crime and that individuals living in the wealthiest households were the least likely to be victims of violent crimes.<sup>33</sup> This confirms the fact that the growth of violence is to a significant extent concentrated in urban and metropolitan areas, as well as in particular areas within cities.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> Schonteich M & A Louw, *op. cit.*, p.2.

The distribution of crime among different age groups in society also differs. In both South Africa and Brazil young people are disproportionately more likely to be victims of crime — especially young males — than older people.<sup>34</sup>

The growth in crime types also varies significantly between different geographical areas within cities. In Johannesburg for example, violent crime increased by 17% between 1994 and 1999 (despite the fact that the overall crime rate decreased by 2%). Caldeira indicates a similar pattern with respect to the crime trends for São Paulo specifically. She points out that greater increases occurred in more violent forms of crime than in less violent forms. At the beginning of the 1980s violent crime (homicide, attempted homicide, aggravated assault, rape, attempted rape, robbery and felony murder) represented 20% of the total of reported crimes; after 1984 they represented around 30% of the total, reaching 36% in 1996.<sup>35</sup>

### Reasons for crime increases

It is impossible to pinpoint accurately the reasons for crime in a particular place, due to the fact that crime increases can generally be ascribed to a complex web of interacting factors. However, crime analysts in both South Africa and Brazil have pointed to a number of reasons for the increase in crime rates. In South Africa, some of these reasons are the following:

- the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy;
- a culture of violence;
- poverty, inequality and a large and increasing wealth gap;
- the spread of HIV-Aids;
- rapid urbanisation;
- the proliferation of firearms;

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<sup>34</sup> de Mesquita Neto P, *op. cit.*, p.4-5; and Schonteich M & A Louw, *op. cit.*, p.5.

<sup>35</sup> Caldeira PR, *op. cit.*, 2000, p.119.

- organised crime; and
- a weak criminal justice system.<sup>36</sup>

As in South Africa, there are multiple factors contributing to the growth of crime and violence in Brazil since the transition to democracy. De Mesquita Neto points out that political analysts from different disciplines, theoretical backgrounds and political positions tend to highlight different reasons for the increase in crime:

- Leftist analysts point towards the contribution of economic factors like poverty, unemployment, economic inequalities and class conflicts.
- Rightist analysts emphasise the contribution of factors undermining the state's capability to maintain law and order, and to prevent and repress illegal and violent actions.
- Centrist analysts highlight the contribution of factors undermining society's capability to ensure the rule of law and basic civil, political and social rights of the majority of the population.<sup>37</sup>

Additional factors contributing to the growth of crime and violence in Brazil include the dissemination of drugs and firearms in the society and the growth of criminal organisations associated with the illegal commerce of drugs and firearms.<sup>38</sup>

Although many of these factors can probably be said to contribute to increased levels of crime worldwide, it is interesting that the reasons given for the increase of crime in South Africa and Brazil show remarkable similarities.

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<sup>36</sup> Schonteich M & A Louw, *op. cit.*, p.5; and Pelser E, Rauch J & S Henkeman, *DFID-SA Review: Safety, Security & Access to Justice* (Discussion Document). Halfway House: ISS, 2001.

<sup>37</sup> de Mesquita Neto P, *op. cit.*, p.6.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p.7.

Both in South Africa and Brazil there was a variety of responses<sup>39</sup> to crime from various groups and at various levels. Generally, these ranged from very formal state responses to more ad hoc responses from community groups and individual urban residents.

## **State responses to crime in Brazil and South Africa**

In Brazil, the initial and main response of the state to crime and violence was the increase in the number of agents employed in the public security services and in the amount of public expenditure on security services.

Due to the federal character of the government of Brazil, the country has a number of different police forces, each one with its own function and field activity. At the federal level, there is the federal police; at the state level, each state has a civil and military police; and on the municipal level, there are the Municipal Guards (see Figure 4).

There has been a considerable increase in police officers in Brazil since the transition to democracy. The number of military policemen in Brazil increased from 234,700 in 1985 to 339,762 in 1995. The number of civilian policemen increased from 105,200 in 1985 to 154,400 in 1995. Between 1985 and 1995, the number of police agents and municipal guards increased from 339,900 to 494,162 (45.4%). The number of soldiers in the armed forces also grew significantly, from 272,550 in 1981 to 336,800 in 1994. The Federal Constitution of 1988 and the complementary law 97/99 established that the armed forces and not only the police, are responsible for the maintenance of law and order within Brazil.<sup>40</sup> There has, therefore, been a significant


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<sup>39</sup> It is not the intention of this report to document each and every response to crime in both South Africa and Brazil. In addition to the fact that the scope of the study does not allow for this, the purpose is rather to focus on a few major responses to enable a comparison between the two countries and to draw some lessons for South Africa.

<sup>40</sup> de Mesquita Neto P, *op. cit.*, p.6.


focus on law enforcement and the implementation of additional law enforcement officers. This has been accompanied by a significant public sector expenditure on security. A recent study estimated that the public sector spends R18 billion a year on security services (approximately \$2.2 billion).

**Figure 4: Structure and functions of the Brazilian police**



Adapted from diagram in UNDCP — Brazil: Country profile. April 2001.  
<http://www.undcp.org:444/field/field/brazil/countpro/briefing.html>.

Figure 5: Structure of the police in South Africa



In South Africa, there has been a significant increase in public sector expenditure on security. The budget of the criminal justice system (referring to the departments of justice, safety and security and correctional services) has grown from 5.9 billion in 1990/01 to R28.5 billion ( $\pm$  R3.6 billion) in 2001/02.<sup>41</sup> The number of South African

<sup>41</sup> Pelser E et al, *op. cit.*, p.26.



Police Service (SAPS) employees, however, decreased by 14,356 (10,5%) between January 1997 to November 2000. Although the number of civilians employed by the SAPS remained constant, the number of uniformed members and detectives decreased from 116,206 to 102,354 (12%) over this period.<sup>42</sup> South Africa only has one Police Service operating at various levels. At local (city) level, a few municipalities have recently started to employ municipal police as well (see Figure 5).

From these diagrams, it is clear that the structure of the Brazilian police differs considerably from that of the police in South Africa.

Attempts at restructuring the criminal justice system have varied in the two countries. Despite the transition to democracy in Brazil, there has been very limited restructuring of the criminal justice system.<sup>43</sup> In South Africa, there was significant restructuring of the criminal justice system after transition. This was accompanied by the abolition of a number of laws, policies and operating procedures, as well as the rapid formulation of a range of new ones.<sup>44</sup>

These responses to crime in both countries occurred within guiding policy frameworks for safety and security and crime prevention. In Brazil, crime control and prevention are largely seen as the state's responsibility. Recently, however, the federal government and the city governments have been increasingly pressurised to also respond to crime in a significant way. In June 2000 the Federal Government announced a National Programme for Public Security, which includes both crime prevention and crime control measures. Before that, in 1996, the federal government had announced a National

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<sup>42</sup> Criminal Justice Monitor in *Nedbank ISS Crime Index*, 4, 1, 2000.

<sup>43</sup> Kant de Lima R, 'Bureaucratic rationality in Brazil and in the United States: Criminal justice systems in comparative perspective' in Hess DJ & RA DaMatta (eds), *The Brazilian Puzzle: Culture on the Borderlands of the Western World*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995; and Pinheiro PS, *op. cit.*, 2000.

<sup>44</sup> Pelsler E et al., *op. cit.*, p.26.

Programme for Human Rights, which included a series of measures relevant to crime prevention. In addition, many city governments have recently started to become involved in local crime prevention partnerships.

The National Government in South Africa responded with two main policy documents to guide the improvement of safety and security and encourage crime prevention. They were the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) (1996) and the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998). The NCPS addressed four key focus areas: re-engineering of the criminal justice system, reducing crime through environmental design, community values and education and transnational crime. The NCPS also outlined a multi-departmental approach to crime prevention, which focused on increased and necessary co-operation between different government departments, and different spheres of government and coordination of their respective activities. The White Paper on Safety and Security emphasised two pillars of intervention: law enforcement and social crime prevention (which includes crime prevention through environmental design). It focuses on three key areas to meet delivery requirements, namely law enforcement, crime prevention and institutional reform.<sup>45</sup>

At this stage in South Africa there seems to be a greater focus on the development of social crime prevention, in addition to law enforcement efforts. In Brazil, the focus is still to a large extent on increased law enforcement: an approach of 'getting tougher on crime'.

Despite a firm response from the state to crime in both countries, crime, particularly violent crime, has continued to increase, especially in urban areas. This has been accompanied by a growing feeling of insecurity and a fear of crime, as well as a perception or

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<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

belief that the institutions responsible for crime control and reduction are ineffectual. In both South Africa and Brazil, crime was identified as one of the three major concerns in the country. Although investments in public security have increased by 30% between 1995 and 1999 in Brazil, the people's perception is that the state seems to be helpless to control violence.<sup>46</sup> This is also true for South Africa. Feelings of safety have decreased from 73% in 1994 to 44% in 2000.<sup>47</sup> In addition, there is a growing realisation that government alone cannot cope with the situation.

## **Citizen Responses to Crime in Brazil**

Citizen responses in Brazil have been many and varied. This report will focus only on physical responses in urban areas, as well as responses in terms of the control of urban spaces.

### **Physical changes in cities**

#### *Defensive architecture*

Responses from the business sector in Brazil varied. Some reacted by moving towards increased security measures to protect their businesses from crime. These included added security features on buildings (burglar bars, gates, etc.), electronic devices (CCTV cameras, alarm systems, etc.) and even physical relocation (to areas perceived to be safer, for example in shopping centres or closed urban areas).

Private residents also responded similarly. Many of them added fences or walls around their properties, as well as burglar bars to


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<sup>46</sup> UNDCP—Brazil: Country profile, *op. cit.*, 'Major characteristics of crime', p.2.

<sup>47</sup> Schonteich M, 'Sleeping soundly. Feelings of safety: based on perceptions or reality?' in *Nedbank ISS Crime Index*, 5, 2, 2001.

their houses. The extent and nature of these physical changes vary, depending on the homeowners, the neighbourhood, their financial capabilities, etc.

**Figure 6: Fences in front of houses in São Paulo**



**Figure 7: High walls around housing estate in lower income area of Curitiba**



For some, the reinforcement of homes is, however, not enough. The growing feeling of insecurity and fear of crime has led to what Caldeira calls 'fortified enclaves' in Brazil.<sup>48</sup> Although the urban changes that occurred in many larger Brazilian cities cannot be ascribed to the political transition and the increase of crime and violence alone, these were definitely two of the main contributing reasons. Fortified enclaves include office complexes, shopping centres and increasingly other spaces that have been adapted to conform to this model: schools, hospitals, entertainment centres, theme parks, etc. The main characteristics of fortified enclaves are:

- they are private property for collective use;
- they are physically isolated, either by walls, empty spaces or other design devices;
- they are turned inwards and do not face the street; and
- they are controlled by armed guards and security systems.<sup>49</sup>

The residential component of fortified enclaves is closed condominiums. These can be vertical (luxury apartments) or horizontal (enclosed neighbourhoods). Condominiums are not new to Brazilian cities. There are, however, several differences between the condominiums of the 1970s and the closed condominiums of the 1980s and 1990s. One difference is location: earlier apartments were concentrated in central neighbourhoods as opposed to the outlying location of the newer ones. In addition, earlier apartments were integrated into the urban network, whereas recent condominiums tend to ignore it. Thirdly, closed condominiums are enclosed by walls, whereas the earlier apartments were open to the street. Finally, the new types of condominiums tend to have large areas and facilities for common use, whereas the common spaces in the previous ones were generally limited to garages, corridors and lobbies, small playgrounds and a room for parties. A good example


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<sup>48</sup> Caldeira PR, *op.cit.*, 2000, p.119.

<sup>49</sup> Caldeira PR, 'Fortified enclaves: The new urban segregation' in *Public Culture*, 8, 1996, p.314.

of a closed condominium is *Iha do Sul* (Island of the South). This is a middle-class high-rise complex of six high-rises, each with eighty three bedroom apartments, located in the western zone of São Paulo.<sup>50</sup> Today, however, many older apartment blocks in central city areas have in fact been converted to closed condominiums, with all the necessary security features, such as guard houses, intercom system, etc.

**Figure 8: Vertical closed condominium in Rio de Janeiro with access controlled gates and security guards**



### *Defensive neighbourhoods*

Horizontal closed condominiums started to be built in the late 1970s, mostly in the outer regions of the metropolitan areas in Brazil. In São Paulo, developers began building living places with similarities to the American new towns or edge cities. These were suburban areas that combined residential developments with office and commercial

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<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.257-8, 260.


centres. Some of the most famous of these types of developments are Alphaville and Tambore, which are located on the outer periphery of the larger São Paulo Metropolitan area west of the central city.

Alphaville was begun in the late 1970s, and was constructed by the same developers who built *Ilha do Sul*. It is divided into many walled residential areas (*residencias*), each enclosed by 3.5 metre high walls and accessible only by one controlled access point: the main entrance gates. These gates in themselves become a symbol of safety, an architectural feature expressing identity and prominence.

Figure 9: Closed condominium in São Paulo with fences and gates



**Figure 10: Entrance gate to a residencia within Alphaville, São Paulo**



**Figure 11: Vertical closed condominium (for residential purposes) in the centre of Alphaville. The photograph clearly shows the entrance gate and the security house next to it to the left**



Between the various residential areas there are small commercial nodes with smaller neighbourhood shops, restaurants, etc. To one side of the larger Alphaville there is an office-building complex and a



larger commercial hub containing a shopping centre. This more 'urbanised' area also contains several vertical closed condominiums for residential purposes.

The main reason for the development was security. People feel safe inside and they feel in control of their immediate environment. Security is also one of the main elements in its advertising. The Alphaville concept is increasingly spreading to other cities in Brazil, where similar developments have either been built or are in the process of being built. These cities include Forteleza, Salvador, Goiania, Curitiba, Campinas, Maringa, Londrina, Ribeirao, Preto and Bela Horizonte. Plans are also on the table to build Alphavilles in Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre.

As Caldeira explains, 'only with "total security" is the new concept of housing complete.'<sup>51</sup> Security in this sense means fences and walls, twenty-four-hour guards, as well as a wide array of facilities and technologies, such as guardhouses with bathrooms and telephones, double sets of doors in the garage and video monitoring.<sup>52</sup>

Another form of fortified enclave in Brazil is enclosed neighbourhoods. These are existing neighbourhoods that are closed by road closures, which allow access to be controlled. Some of the cities that have experienced this type of response to crime include São Paulo, Rio, and Curitiba. In São Paulo, people are increasingly receiving permission from the city government to close their streets. Such actions mainly occur in higher-class areas. Similar trends are evident in Curitiba, where the city government also grants permission for road closures if these closures do not disrupt the regular management of the city. In Rio de Janeiro enclosed neighbourhoods tend to occur in areas that are located next to lower-income areas (*favelas*).

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<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p.266

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

It is also interesting to note that the distribution of fortified enclaves is to a large extent concentrated in the larger cities in Brazil, which also have the highest crime rates. However, as crime and violence spread to the medium and smaller cities, fortification, both of buildings and neighbourhoods, is becoming increasingly widespread, as can be seen by the burgeoning of Alphavilles across Brazil, as well as the enclosure of neighbourhoods in smaller cities such as Curitiba.

The result of all of these urban developments is that many cities in Brazil, especially São Paulo, today are cities of walls, with physical barriers around houses, apartment buildings, squares, office complexes and schools. Fortified enclaves are changing the way in which upper- and middle-class people live, consume, work and spend their leisure time. It is also changing the lifestyles and everyday activities of all urban residents in general, as well as public interclass interactions. Changes are, however, not restricted to social aspects. Fortified enclaves are also changing the city's landscape, its spatial patterns and the character of public space.<sup>53</sup>

## Changes in the control of urban spaces

### *Police practices*

One of the problems concerning the police in Brazil has been the increase in police violence and brutality since transition, especially towards the poorer citizens who are considered the 'dangerous classes'. In 1991, the military police alone killed 1,140 people in the state of São Paulo, increasing to 1,470 in 1992. The majority of police killings have occurred in the state of São Paulo (87.5% in 1992) and its metropolitan region.<sup>54</sup> Police killings have also increased dramatically in Rio de Janeiro. The number of people killed by the

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<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p.138.

police increased from 155 in 1993 to 209 in 1996. The total number of people killed by the police from 1993 to 1996, was 942.<sup>55</sup>

Police violence, such as torture, largely remains unpunished in Brazil. It is also mostly directed at the poorer classes and rarely affects the wealthier classes.<sup>56</sup> Many people living in poorer areas are terrified of the police and experience victimisation on the basis of race, appearance and place of residence.

The result is a growing mistrust of the police and an increasing reliance on private security companies and vigilante groups to provide security and to control urban spaces. These groups are increasingly seen as substitutes for the police and as the only effective means to enforce order in communities.

### *Vigilante groups*

Vigilante groups tend to operate in the urban areas where the poor live. They operate as individuals or in groups and can be either regular urban residents or state agents. Generally two categories can be distinguished: *justiceiro* (vigilante) and *matador* (gunman). The differences between these groups are not always clear-cut.<sup>57</sup>

Many policemen participate in vigilante activities. Civil and military police, both on and off duty, participate in private death squads. They are part of a legacy. During the military dictatorship in Brazil, death squads were formed with the support of the authorities to kidnap or kill political dissidents especially in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Although most of these groups were dismantled after the transition, many of their practices survived in different forms. Death

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<sup>55</sup> Cano I, *The Use of lethal Force by the Police in Rio de Janeiro*. ISER publication, 1997, p.30.

<sup>56</sup> Pinheiro PS, *op. cit.*, p.125.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

squads involving the police continued to be active in several states in Brazil.<sup>58</sup>

Gangs and the 'private armies' of drug lords, although probably not strictly speaking vigilante groups, also take action to keep the streets safe in their own areas. They play an important role in the control of urban spaces in many *favelas* across Brazil.

### *Private security*

Paid-for private security is mostly reserved for the wealthier groups in urban areas who can afford to pay them. The private security industry has increased dramatically in Brazil. Private investments have surpassed public investments in security. A recent study estimated that the public sector spends 18 billion *real* (hereafter R\$), while the private sector spends R\$22 billion a year. The number of people employed in the private security services increased from 640,500 in 1985 to approximately 1 million in 1995. This number does not include the number of police officers who have second jobs in private security and other people who are not legally or regularly employed by private security companies.<sup>59</sup>

Similar patterns of dramatic increases in private security have also been evident in the state of São Paulo. In June 1991 there were 111 private security enterprises, employing 55,700 registered guards. Compared to the police officers at that time, there were 1,6 policemen for every security guard. By 1996, there were 281 enterprises and 7 armoured-car enterprises. These companies employed 100,000 guards compared to the 105 000 policemen of the state (military and civil); thus private security guards are almost equal to the number of policemen.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> de Mesquita Neto P, *op. cit.*, p.9.

<sup>60</sup> Caldeira PR, *op. cit.*

Private security officers are employed both in closed condominiums and enclosed neighbourhoods in Brazil. In vertical closed condominiums the range of their tasks varies, including manning security gates and controlling access into these areas. In horizontal closed condominiums they play an even bigger role. For example, private security in Alphaville plays an important role in keeping the areas safe. Alphaville's private security has more than 800 guards and 80 vehicles. Each *residencia*, office centre and commercial centre hires its own security force to maintain internal order. Apart from these, there is a common security force to take care of the public spaces (the avenues and even the highway connecting it to São Paulo).<sup>61</sup> Generally police do not come into these areas and neither are they expected to.

There is a very fine line between police officers, vigilante groups, legal and illegal private security officers. Many active policemen take second jobs as private security guards or even illegally operate as part of either security companies or vigilante groups. Many of the legal private security guards are also ex-policemen. This makes the regulation of the private security industry very difficult and poses many questions in relation to the nature of their activities and controlling it. It also makes it easier for many of these groups to get away with illegal activities.

Fortified enclaves in Brazil are, therefore, not only changing the city's landscape and people's urban use patterns, but also the control of urban spaces. This has various implications for the interpretation of law within these spaces, as well as the application of 'revised versions' of what is allowed to suit the purpose of those controlling urban spaces and the needs of those residing within these controlled spaces. It also has implications for conflict resolution, the use of violence to enforce control, and the interpretation and implementation of human rights in Brazilian cities.

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p.262.

South Africa has also experienced increased crime rates since its transition to democracy and many of the state responses are similar in several respects to those in Brazil. So are the responses from citizens in South African cities. The nature and scope of these responses, both in terms of the physical changes, and of the control of urban spaces, will be discussed below in order to understand the similarities with Brazil and the implications for the urban future in South Africa.

## **Comparing citizen responses in South Africa**

### **Physical changes**

#### *Defensive architecture*

As in Brazil, businesses in South Africa also responded by taking increased security measures to protect their properties. They make use of various methods that range from changes to the interior of buildings, for example CCTV cameras and bullet-proof glass in banks and in 24 hour garage shops, etc., to exterior changes such as burglar bars in front of windows, security gates on doors, big shutters in front of the entire façade, high fences or walls around properties, access control entrances, etc. Many also make use of sophisticated alarm systems to reduce crime. Some have opted for physical relocation to areas perceived to be safer, such as shopping centres or access-controlled office parks protected by private security.

Private residents have also responded with increased security measures, as in the Brazilian case. These vary from the installation of electronic devices such as cameras, alarm systems, panic buttons, electronic gates, intercom systems, etc., to physical modifications such as burglar bars, security gates, fences and walls around properties, etc. The extent and nature of the changes depend, among other things, on the location of their residence, their financial


capabilities, the measure of security perceived to be necessary, etc. These responses are not restricted to private homes, but many apartment buildings and other high-rise buildings are also increasingly making use of similar measures to improve their own security. This is especially the case in the central neighbourhoods of large cities in South Africa, such as, for example, Hillbrow in Johannesburg, Sunnyside in Pretoria, Green Point in Cape Town, Albert Park in Durban, etc.

However, for many South African urban residents the implementation of these measures is not enough. They also want to live in a more secure environment in terms of the larger environment surrounding their homes. This has led to the increase in the number of security villages and enclosed neighbourhoods in South African cities.

### *Defensive neighbourhoods*

Security villages include a number of different types of developments with different uses, ranging from smaller townhouse complexes to larger office parks and luxury estates. The emphasis is on the fact that these areas are purpose-built by private developers, with security being the uppermost requirement, although lifestyle requirements are also important.


Figure 12: Large secure office complex in northern Johannesburg



Secure townhouse complexes, which are mainly for residential purposes, and office parks are located throughout the cities, from central neighbourhoods to the higher income neighbourhoods on the urban periphery. Larger security estates are mostly located on the urban periphery where bigger portions of land are available, as well as many natural elements such as rivers, dams, patches of trees, etc. that are important features of these types of development. These estates offer an entire lifestyle package, where the features to be enjoyed in a secure environment include a range of services (garden services, refuse removal etc.), as well as a variety of facilities and amenities (golf courses, squash courts, cycle routes, hiking routes, equestrian routes, water activities, etc.).



**Figure 13: Small security townhouse complex in Pretoria**




Although they reflect many similarities with the character, services and facilities of the horizontal closed condominiums in Brazil, the size and extent differs considerably. Most of the luxury security estates occupy only between 10 and 50 hectares. Some of the most ambitious security villages to date in South Africa include Heritage Park in the Cape Town Metropolitan Area, close to Somerset West, that occupies 200 hectares, while Dainfern in Johannesburg is 320 hectares. Alphaville alone (excluding other similar areas in São Paulo close to Alphaville), at present occupies 19,000 hectares with 35,000 residents. Thus Alphaville alone has more residents than the entire population of many of the smaller towns in South Africa, for example Port Shepstone (in Natal) and Bloemhof (in the Free State) which both have a population of 30,000 people.

**Figure 14: Entrance to luxury security estate in Randburg, Johannesburg**




**Figure 15: Entrance to large luxury security estate in Edenvale, Johannesburg, with many natural features, such as a river, etc**



Another form of gated community or fortified enclave in South Africa is the enclosed neighbourhood. These neighbourhoods are

closed off by way of road closures, as well as fences or walls around entire neighbourhoods in some cases. Roads are closed either temporarily by gates or booms spanning the road, or permanently by fences. Access into these neighbourhoods is restricted and controlled by a few access control points, either in the form of remote controlled gates or security manned gates or booms (See Figures 17 and 18). The size of enclosed neighbourhoods varies from small cul-de sacs with fewer than 10 houses to large neighbourhoods with up to 1,000 houses. Residents must apply for the right to restrict access to their local municipality and can only do so for security reasons. However, not all local municipalities in South Africa allow this kind of neighbourhood enclosure. Many refuse permission due to problems related to traffic control, urban management, access, etc.

**Figure 16: Road closure through gates  
(enclosed neighbourhood in Johannesburg)**




Despite this, it is likely that enclosed neighbourhoods will continue to grow, both in numbers and in size, in those local authority areas that do allow the closure of roads and entire neighbourhoods for security reasons. The areas that are closed off are increasing in size, for example Gallo Manor in Johannesburg, and the proposals for the closure of neighbourhoods in Lombardy East and Hyde Park in

Johannesburg. Should this trend continue, it is likely that the extent of gated communities in South Africa might start to resemble those in Brazil in the not too distant future.

A recent survey by the City of Johannesburg indicated that as of June 2003 there were 49 legal neighbourhood closures and 37 that expired since approval. In addition, there were an estimated 188 illegal closures and 265 pending applications (Security Access Restriction Policy for the City of Johannesburg 2003). This situation partly arose due to a two-year moratorium that was placed by the council on the approval of applications or the reconsideration of expired ones, as they were drafting a revised policy for the new City of Johannesburg. The draft policy was submitted to Council for approval in April 2003 and approved. The outcome of the Council Meeting was that all illegal neighbourhoods (those with illegal road closures), as well as those whose closures had expired and had not re-applied, were given a grace period of three months to apply for permission to close off their neighbourhoods. After this period (the end of July 2003), the City of Johannesburg will proceed to remove all illegal structures within its jurisdictional area.

As in the case of Brazil, the distribution of gated communities (including security villages and enclosed neighbourhoods) also tend to be related to the cities with the highest crime rates, such as Johannesburg and Pretoria. Although Durban has a slightly higher overall crime rate than Pretoria, it does not have many gated communities. The reason for this is partly that enclosed neighbourhoods are not allowed in Durban. This is also the case in some of the areas in Cape Town, where enclosed areas are not allowed.

**Figure 17: Road closure through booms  
(on the KwaZulu Natal South Coast near Margate)**



Defensive neighbourhoods in South Africa are not only changing the use patterns of urban residents as well as the spatial development patterns, but are also likely to change the control of urban spaces as well. The first signs of this are already evident.

## **Changes in the control of urban spaces**

### *Police practices*

Recent statistics indicate that the number of residents per police officers in Brazil (329) was lower than that of South Africa (408) in 1999. This means that there is one uniformed policeman or detective for every 408 people in South Africa, compared to one for every 329 in Brazil.<sup>62</sup> Although the difference is not that great, many people in South Africa do in fact believe that there are not enough policemen to combat crime effectively.

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<sup>62</sup> Schonteich M, 'The thin blue line: Police resources in the provinces' in *Nedbank ISS Crime Index*, 4, 2, 2000.

There is still a general perception in South Africa that the police are ineffective in the maintenance of law and order, or are not providing sufficient services. A recent survey indicated that nearly half of 13,659 respondents believed that the quality of policing in their areas had deteriorated in the last four years. A third believed that there was no change at all, despite the fact that crime levels had increased. In addition, there are high levels of distrust of the police. These perceptions, however, varied between different groups within the general population. Those who have never dealt with the police tended to have very negative perceptions of the police, whereas those who have dealt directly with the police generally tended to have much more positive perceptions of the police.<sup>63</sup>

Given this situation, many residents and communities are turning to private security or vigilante groups to protect them from crime.

### *Vigilante groups*

The number of vigilante groups has rapidly increased in South Africa since transition. These groups are mainly active in poorer communities across the country although some businesses and private residents in wealthier areas are also making use of their services. The nature of these groups varies, but in general includes the following features:

- acts of severe violence including the serious assault and even murder of alleged criminals;
- excessive punishment of suspected criminals;
- illegal activities such as kidnappings, damage to property, robbery and sabotage;
- alleged perpetrators accosted by violent mobs;

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<sup>63</sup> Pelser E, 'A critical distance: Public perceptions and police service' in *Nedbank ISS Crime Index*, 5, 3, 2001, p.7.

- lack of a clear organisational structure with clear rules and limitations; and
- absence of communication lines between the groups and state organs such as the police.<sup>64</sup>

The character and focus of these groups also varies. In Soweto, the group 'Youth Against Crime' mainly focuses on the youth. In the Western Cape, Pagad (People Against Gangsterism And Drugs) also has a religious and social focus. Mapoga a Matamaga, a vigilante group operating mainly in the Northern Province and Gauteng, was initially established to serve businesses. However, since then their activities have broadened to include private residences, as well as other concerns.

Problems related to vigilante activity includes a disregard for the law, an attitude of 'taking law into our own hands', and corruption within these organisations. However, as long as the criminal justice system remains blocked and the public perception of the police services remains negative, people will probably continue to turn to a type of criminal justice that is cost-effective, time-saving and produces results they can see.<sup>65</sup>

### *Private Security*

In South Africa, the private security industry is one of the fastest growing economic sectors. The estimated turnover of this industry, in excess of R10 billion per year, is rapidly approaching the annual budget of the SAPS (R15.3 billion for the 1999/2000 budget year).<sup>66</sup> As in the case of Brazil, the number of private security officers has

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<sup>64</sup> Sekhonyane M, 'Using crime to fight crime? Tracking vigilante activity', in *Nedbank ISS Crime Index*, 4, 2000, pp.21-22.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> Irish J, *Policing for Profit: the Future of South Africa's Private Security Industry*. ISS Monograph, 39, August 1999.

increased dramatically over the past few years. Between September 1997 and March 2000 the number of active registered security officers increased by 44% from 115 000 to 166 000. Most of the security officers were located in Gauteng (54%). Apart from these there are an additional 50,000 in-house security officers in South Africa.<sup>67</sup>

Compared to the 216 000 private security officers, there are approximately 90 000 uniformed policemen. Private security officers therefore outnumber the police by two to one.<sup>68</sup> This ratio is twice the number of that in Brazil, where the number is now estimated to be almost 1:1 (at least in the state of São Paulo where the largest number of private security officers is located). However, it is difficult to say whether the private security industry has grown faster in South Africa than in Brazil due to the insufficiency of available data.

As in Brazil, private security tends to operate in wealthier areas in South Africa, and private security officers are increasingly performing functions which used to be restricted to police officers. Their objectives, however, are entirely different. While the police seek to protect the public at large, the private security industry operates on a profit motive and is accountable to its clients only. There is also a high degree of competition between different security companies. In some cases this results in the provision of cheap, but substandard services which tarnish the image and reputation of the entire industry.<sup>69</sup>

The private security industry in South Africa is regulated by a statutory body, called the Security Officers' Board. The board oversees the regulations that govern the private security industry and lay down minimum training standards for security guards. There is also new legislation on private security in the country

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<sup>67</sup> Schonteich M, 'Guarding the guardians: New regulations for the private security industry', in *Nedbank Crime Index*, 4, 3, 2000, pp.15-16.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> Irish J, *op. cit.*, p.2.



(including the Private Security Industry Regulation Bill, 2001). The uncertainties regarding the role and extent of private security in South Africa underlines the urgent necessity for such legislation. It is expected that the legislation will have a significant impact on the management and operation of private security in the future and that there will be a number of developments in this regard.

### *Residents' associations*

In a few neighbourhoods in South Africa, residents themselves are taking control of their immediate urban spaces without physically enclosing their areas and not through vigilante groups. Some neighbourhoods in Johannesburg have established vibrant community organisations that initiate and manage a range of crime prevention projects. These include safety patrols, regular neighbourhood clean-up campaigns, sharing crime prevention information, distributing monthly newsletters with 'tips' and warnings to the community, etc. The residents also work closely with the local authority and police to ensure that the maximum impact is achieved through their efforts.

In conclusion, as was the case in Brazil, South Africa has also experienced a number of responses to crime in urban areas related to the physical transformation of urban spaces, as well as the control of these spaces. Remarkable similarities in this regard, therefore, mean that comparisons yield important lessons for the future of urban cities in South Africa.

## **Learning from Brazil**

### **Recognising similarities and differences**

Although there are many similarities between South Africa and Brazil, a number of significant differences also exist which should be taken into account. Brazil is geographically much larger than South

Africa with many cities far bigger in size, both geographically and in terms of the number of people residing in these cities. This is evident if one compares the two largest cities (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) with the largest cities in South Africa (Johannesburg and Cape Town).

<b>Table 2: Urban agglomerations: Population size and growth rate, 1975–2000</b>								
	<i>Estimates and projections (thousands)</i>						<i>Annual growth rate (%)</i>	
	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	1975–1985	1985–2000
<i>Brazil</i>								
São Paulo	9,890	12,101	13,427	14,874	16,417	17,803	3.06	2.01
Rio de Janeiro	7,875	8,789	9,156	9,515	9,888	10,213	1.51	0.77
Curitiba	1,035	1,315	1,579	1,894	2,270	2,637	4.22	3.63
<i>South Africa</i>								
Johannesburg	1,493	1,554	1,613	1,702	1,849	2,074	0.74	1.37
West Rand*	489	565	653	753	865	996	2.89	2.81
East Rand*	943	991	1,041	1,111	1,217	1,372	0.99	1.56
Cape Town	1,339	1,609	1,934	2,294	2,671	3,073	3.68	3.23
Durban	894	939	985	1,049	1,149	1,296	0.97	1.54
Pretoria	643	730	830	942	1,073	1,229	2.55	2.57
* Although these three areas are currently governed as two metropolitan areas (Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Councils), they are spatially one large urban agglomeration. In this sense it can be argued that the larger Johannesburg urban area has a population of 4,442,000.								
Source: UN, <i>An Urbanizing World: Global Report on Human Settlements 1996</i> , New York: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), 1996, p.451, 455.								

Rio de Janeiro is, therefore, almost three times the size (in terms of population) of the larger Johannesburg area and São Paulo almost four and a half times Johannesburg's size. As crime may increase in relation to the size of the city and its population, this could be one of the reasons for the high levels of crime in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. However, in such a case one would expect that the smaller

cities in South Africa should have lower crime rates than in Brazil. Although direct comparison is very difficult, this does not seem to be the case. As already mentioned, crime is caused by many factors and although the size of cities and the number of people within them do play a role in determining crime rates, it is not the only factor.

Although the inequalities in terms of income distribution are greater in Brazil than South Africa, the level of unemployment is much lower in Brazil (7.5%) than in South Africa (30%). As unemployment is usually given as one of the reasons for crime, it could be argued that the high levels of unemployment in South Africa contribute to crime in a significant way.

In addition, the structures of the criminal justice system and public police service in Brazil differ dramatically from those in South Africa. Responses to crime within these structures will, therefore, also differ. Another difference is related to the institutions responsible for crime control and prevention. Whereas crime prevention and control in Brazil are generally considered to be the responsibility of the state government (similar to provincial government in South Africa), the tendency in South Africa is to have a much more centralised approach to crime prevention. In this sense the national government plays a very important role in the initiation, implementation and management of crime control and crime prevention programmes.

However, despite these differences, there are many similarities that justify comparisons.

### **Considering the impact of responses to crime in Brazil**

Despite the fact that Brazil has been a democracy for more than a decade, many current urban practices do not reflect democratic principles. One of the main reasons for the dramatic changes in the urban environment is the high level of crime and violence. Many of the new urban practices take place mainly as a response to crime and

the fear of crime. The question is whether crime justifies all kinds of responses, even those which are undemocratic. The long-term impact of some of these responses for the consolidation of democracy and the prevention of crime is another question.

Fortified enclaves in Brazil are changing life in the cities. They are changing the urban use patterns and the daily activities of people. Many people never leave their enclaves, while others only do so when absolutely necessary. Fortified enclaves also change traditional urban development patterns. Whereas São Paulo was traditionally based on a more European model where the central city developed in a very dense way and the elite still preferred to stay and invest there, and the urban poor were pushed to the urban periphery, the new patterns result in an increasing migration of upper- and especially upper-middle-class people to closed areas on the urban periphery. Those who still prefer to stay in the central areas do so in vertical closed condominiums.

Fortified enclaves, therefore, have a considerable impact on urban transformation in Brazilian cities on various levels, in terms of spatial, social, institutional and political aspects. Spatially it is exacerbating urban sprawl, fragmentation and segregation. Many would argue that it is creating physical boundaries, or barriers all over the city. It is also leading to the privatisation of public space or the reservation of certain spaces for certain homogeneous social groups alone. In addition, it is changing the nature of the still existing public spaces. People living in enclosed neighbourhoods no longer make use of the streets and public spaces are no longer used and shared by all urban residents as in the past. These spaces are now abandoned to the poor, the homeless and the street children, who are left vulnerable to violence and abuse by various control groups, including criminals and security forces. Therefore, despite the transition to democracy, the pattern of spatial segregation still continues in many Brazilian cities, although now in a different form.

This has many consequences. Socially it is leading to an increasing distance between different social groups in Brazilian cities. It is exacerbating the already high levels of inequality by spatially enforcing certain restrictions in terms of the use of urban space. Consequently residents' daily interactions with people from other social groups diminish substantially and for many people public encounters occur only within protected and homogeneous groups. The impact is substantial, as Caldeira so aptly explains:<sup>70</sup>

In the materiality of segregated spaces, in people's everyday trajectories, ... in their appropriations of streets and parks, and in their constructions of walls and defensive facades, social boundaries are rigidly constructed. Their crossing is under surveillance. When boundaries are crossed in this type of city, there is aggression, fear and a feeling of unprotectedness; in a word, there is suspicion and danger. Residents of all social groups have a sense of exclusion and restriction. For some, the feeling of exclusion is obvious, as they are denied access to various areas and are restricted to others. Affluent people who inhabit exclusive enclaves also feel restricted; their feelings of fear keep them away from regions and people that their mental maps of the city identify as dangerous.

However, apart from increasing social exclusion and distance between various groups this form of spatial segregation complements urban violence. On the one hand, the fear of crime is used to justify almost any form of security and violence. On the other hand, the proliferation of reports of crime in everyday conversation becomes the context in which residents create stereotypes, as they automatically label different social groups as dangerous, and so to be avoided by the affluent and to be targeted by the police and private security officers.<sup>71</sup>

Fortified enclaves create pockets where public law can easily be contested or perhaps reinterpreted. Studies of these developments

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<sup>70</sup> Caldeira PR, *op. cit.*, 1996, p.324.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*

show that citizens prefer to handle and settle problems within the boundaries of their gated communities. The police are rarely involved. Transgressors are confronted by private security officers and their response depends on whether the citizen involved is a resident or one of the workers who daily enter these areas in great numbers. Barriers do not guarantee absolute safety, although the developers would strongly dispute this. It may have reduced certain types of crime considerably, but many crime analysts in Brazil point out that crime still occurs within these areas from time to time.

Fortified enclaves do not only create boundaries or barriers and change social urban patterns and dynamics, but also significantly influence the control of urban spaces. A growing distrust of and disillusionment with the police in Brazil has contributed to the use of private security by the wealthier segment of the Brazilian population. Although private security *per se* is not necessarily a problem, its accountability and relation to the police might be. There have been attempts to regulate the private security industry in Brazil, some with more success than others. However, in many cases, the activities of these officers, especially within the boundaries of closed areas, raise serious questions in terms of civil and human rights violations.

Violence and the use of brutal force are, however, not restricted to private security officers. In Brazil, the police are well known for the use of violence and torture as part of their everyday activities. The training of the police in human rights still has a long way to go before it significantly affects the behaviour of the majority of officers. In addition, police tend to focus on the poorer segment of the population, which is generally considered to be the 'dangerous' and 'criminal' element of the society. Upper-class residents are rarely charged with any crime, as corruption within the police services is also a major problem. Since many wealthier areas make use of private security, the police generally focus on public spaces,

especially in the central city. Many policemen are afraid to go into the *favelas*, controlled by the 'private armies' of the drug lords.

Poorer people are frequently victimised by the police in public spaces. In addition, poorer people can seldom rely on the police for protection within their own areas, where crime levels, especially violent crime, are very high. Consequently, many of these people make use of *vigilante groups* to provide justice within their areas. In this way these urban spaces are controlled by all kinds of different *vigilante groups*, including individual gunmen and death squads.

In this context, the control of urban spaces becomes a question of who is controlling which territory and what kind of activities are used to control these areas. The problems related to the control of urban spaces is further exacerbated by the fine, or in some cases blurred, line between the public and private police and the various *vigilante groups*. Although the fortified enclaves create physical boundaries, they do not necessarily help to establish boundaries between the different groups responsible for safety and security, since many different private security groups can operate in one large area (for example Alphaville) and police are still sometimes called in to investigate serious crimes such as rape, although this does not happen regularly. Coordination within the police, as well as between the public and private police, remains problematic and is one of the main security challenges in Brazil. A recent state initiative has attempted to address this problem. At the beginning of the year 2000, the Minister of Justice formulated a plan linking scattered forces that are officially responsible for security. Some of the ways the plan aims to achieve this include:

- the expansion of the federal police;
- the re-equipment of state police forces;
- the training of 50,000 federal and military policemen to deal with the issue of co-ordination;
- the integration of criminal information systems;

- the expansion of highway patrolling; and
- the creation of community patrolling.<sup>72</sup>

However, it still remains to be seen whether this plan will be sufficient to address the problem. Apart from other gaps, it does not address the issue of vigilante activity, what role (if any) it should play and how to regulate this activity, if, indeed, this is possible. In the meantime, the power struggles for control of urban space and the various endeavours to secure these spaces still remain a major problem, especially in terms of the consolidation of democracy.

Violence and brutality, along with discrimination and victimisation of the poor, whether by public or private police or by vigilante groups, seriously threatens the consolidation of democracy. This contributes to what Kowarick calls the 'dominant image of Brazil'. He maintains that this dominant image is of a country that is unable to progress towards the consolidation of individual and collective rights. What is left is a society of contrasts and inequalities that seems to have killed its own impulses toward further political and social transformation.<sup>73</sup> This leads to the classification of two distinctive categories in Brazilian society: 'first class citizens' and 'third class citizens'. The first class citizens are people with incomes higher than ten times the minimum salary. They make up 3% of the population. 'This is the person capable of defending his or her rights and even privileges, by relying on influential friends, paying attorneys, buying the police...'.<sup>74</sup> On the other end of the spectrum is the third class citizen. This is a person with scarcely any income, who is illiterate or semi-literate, who lives in a shack, *favela*, drainage pipe, *cabeça de porco* (crowded dwelling), or any other type of

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<sup>72</sup> UNDCP–Brazil: Country Profile, April 2001. <https://www.undcp.org:444/field/field/brazil/countprof/briefing.html>.

<sup>73</sup> Kowarick L, *Urban Spoliation, Social Struggles and Citizenship: Aspects of Our Recent History*. Paper of the University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil, 2001.

<sup>74</sup> Carvalho JM, 'Interesses Contra a Cidadania', in Da Matta R et al, *Brasileiro Cidadão*, São Paulo: Editora Cultura, 1992, p.90, quoted in Kowarick L, *ibid.*, p.9.



'subnormal' housing.<sup>75</sup> Although the third class citizen makes up 70% of the population of the country, '... this Brazilian belongs only nominally to the national political community. His or her civil rights are systematically violated. He or she is guilty until proven innocent. At times even after proven innocent'.<sup>76</sup>

The result of this is that people in Brazil are becoming what Kowarick calls 'private citizens', which in itself is a contradiction in terms. Private space is associated with safety and security. Public space, on the other hand is synonymous with fear, disrespect and a sense of defeat. Fear of being in an accident, jailed or tortured. It has also become symbolic of a lack of respect for pedestrians and consumers, a place where social and economic forces exercise ultimate control, and where all is regulated by the 'Do you know who you're talking to?' attitude.<sup>77</sup> This inequality before the law is destroying the very idea of justice in public urban spaces. These spaces continue to be ruled by what Sergio Buarque calls the 'principles of cordiality'. Instead of having a structure of explicit universal laws, these principles are based on criteria for the inclusion and exclusion of rights and duties, marked by favouritism, arbitrariness and violence.<sup>78</sup> In this context the 'private citizen' rules or controls almost all urban spaces through dominance, 'control groups', separation, and distribution of benefits.

In this sense, although Brazil has experienced a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, the process is still in many cases far from complete. Thus, Brazil can be considered to have what Holston and Caldeira call a 'disjunctive democracy', that is, a democracy

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<sup>75</sup> Kowarick L, *op. cit.*, p.9.

<sup>76</sup> Carvalho JM, *op. cit.*, quoted in Kowarick L, *ibid.*, p.9.

<sup>77</sup> Da Matta R, *Carnavais, Malandros e Heróis*. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1975, p.21. See also O'Donnell G, 'Situações: Microcenos da Privatização do Público em São Paulo', *Novos Estudos*, 22 October 1988, cited in Kowarick L, *op. cit.*, p.10.

<sup>78</sup> Holanda, SB de, *Raizes do Brasil*, 10th edition. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1076, cited in Kowarick L, *op. cit.*, p.10.

characterised by the simultaneous expansion of and disrespect for the rights of citizenship. Although Brazil is a democracy, and although so-called rights are reasonably legitimated, the civil aspects of citizenship are continually violated. Violence and disrespect for civil rights are the main dimensions of Brazil's disjunctive democracy.<sup>79</sup>

Urban space plays an important role in all of this. One thing that is evident from the Brazilian example is the complex link between urban and political issues. This is complicated by changes in both these arenas and their implications for other related factors, such as the rising crime rate in both South Africa and Brazil. Most importantly, however, Brazilian cities, especially São Paulo, are instructive with respect to the role that the built environment can play in terms of the consolidation of democracy in transitional societies. Caldeira describes it very well,<sup>80</sup> '... the built environment may be the arena in which democratisation, social equalization, and expansion of citizen rights are contested.'

In South Africa there are signs that there is good reason for concern in this regard, as a number of publications have already pointed out.<sup>81</sup> The challenge for this country is therefore to consider the long-term impact of urban design, as well as other physical and

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<sup>79</sup> Caldeira PR, *op. cit.*, 2000, p.339.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p.4.

<sup>81</sup> Lipman A & H Harris, 'Fortress Johannesburg' in *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design*, 26, 1999, pp.727-240; Hook D & M Vrdoljak, 'From power to power: Strydom Square and the security park'. Paper presented at the Urban Futures Conference, 10-14 July 2000, Johannesburg; Bremner L, 'Crime and the emerging landscape of post-apartheid Johannesburg' in Judin H & I Vladislavic, *blanc\_architecture, apartheid and after*. Rotterdam: Nai Publishers, 2000; Landman K, *An Overview of Enclosed Neighbourhoods in South Africa*. Pretoria: CSIR Publication 2000, BOU/I 187; Hook D & M Vrdoljak, 'Gated communities, heterotopia and a "rights" of privilege: A "heterotopology" of the South African security-park'. Paper presented at WITS Housing Seminar, 17 May 2001.

management responses to crime, in terms of the principles of democracy as well those of crime prevention.

## **Conclusion: Considering the urban future in South Africa**

The Brazilian case shows a relationship between political transition, rising crime levels and significant urban transformation. Since transition in the eighties there has been a major increase in crime levels. Although political transition cannot be considered the only reason for the increase in crime and violence, it did play a major role. Together the transition and the rising crime levels contributed to a number of urban changes that took place in many Brazilian cities. These included physical changes, such as the fortification of buildings and neighbourhoods, as well as changes in terms of the control of these spaces. In turn, these changes had a significant impact on social, spatial and political transformation in Brazil.

There is not, however, a one-way influence between political transition and increased crime on the one hand and urban transformation on the other, since urban transformation in turn (in many cases as a reaction to the above) influences ongoing political transition and crime prevention. From the Brazilian case it is evident that urban transformation and more specifically the design, nature and control of urban spaces can play a major role in determining whether democracy is consolidated. We have seen that the built environment may in fact be the arena in which many crime prevention initiatives and the implementation of democratic principles are either enhanced or contested.

South Africa has been a democracy for nine years now. Yet, many of the signs already point towards the possible development of similar scenarios as are experienced in Brazil today. Certain types of gated

communities, due to their nature, size and location, are starting to contribute to urban sprawl, fragmentation and separation. They are creating physical barriers in many South African cities. As they increase in the future (both in number and size), so will their impact. This could have significant social repercussions, as was the case in Brazil, where fortified enclaves contributed to higher levels of inequality, fear, suspicion, as well as a feeling of vulnerability in those 'outside' the boundaries. Fortified enclaves in Brazil also significantly contribute to the transformation of urban spaces; some public spaces are privatised (and so prohibit access), while others become neglected, abandoned and increasingly open to various forms of violence and in many cases illegal forms of control. The privatisation of spaces in South Africa has also begun. In some cases previously public spaces are closed off, while in other cases access is merely controlled. It remains to be seen what the implications will be, but judging from Brazil, the consequences could be severe, challenging our current urban planning and development policies to promote urban integration on various levels, as well as the actual process of political transformation and democratic consolidation.


Control over urban spaces in South Africa, whether over controlled access areas or over remaining public spaces, is exercised by various groups, including the public police, private security guards, and various vigilante groups. In Brazil, it has led to power struggles over territories and the use of various methods of control, many of which are illegal and a violation of human rights and citizenship. This raises many questions regarding the roles and responsibilities of various security groups for and within urban spaces.

What does this mean for the urban future in South Africa and what should its residents do to avoid some of the problems Brazil is experiencing today? Firstly, it is important to realise that political transition alone is not enough. Although the first step towards complete democracy (if one can call it that, considering that true democracy is arguably never 100% possible) is clearly political

democracy, that can only be a first step. It is the first phase of a much longer process required to achieve a true or more balanced democracy. Thus democracy cannot only be political, but should also be institutional, socio-economic and spatial. In many aspects, South Africa has reached a respectable level of political democracy, where all people can vote and where there is a focus on addressing discrimination and promoting human rights. However, the danger is that increased crime, together with particular responses to crime, may in fact start to undermine the political achievements of the past nine years.

Many crime and political analysts have in fact already pointed out the need for social and institutional transformation in South Africa. It is often said that the causes of crime are closely related to the current socio-economic conditions in the country. Violent crimes are prevalent in poorer areas and unemployment figures are very high. This highlights the need for democratic social development in the country, as well as a focus on social crime prevention. Although many strategies indicate the importance of social crime prevention initiatives (which is a step in the right direction for South Africa), these must be followed through in terms of implementation. There is also a need for institutional transformation, both in terms of security services and local authorities. The Brazilian case has illustrated the importance of coordination between different role players concerned with security. Given the increase in private security and vigilante activity in South Africa, the general perception that the police are ineffective, and the confusion regarding the role of public and private security, it is important to clarify the role that the various groups involved in crime prevention can and should play, as well as the control of particular spatial areas.

Figure 18: Incomplete democracy in South Africa<sup>82</sup>



It is also important to consider the role of local authorities with respect to local security and crime prevention, both in terms of the role that municipal police should play, as well as the role they can play in terms of local crime prevention strategies. For example, local authorities could play a valuable role as one of the main coordinators of the development and implementation of a local crime prevention strategy, together with the SAPS and other role players. This supports the 'multi-dimensional approach towards crime prevention' promoted in the NCPS and expands the concept to a local level through a focus on local crime prevention partnerships. In addition, local authorities are the main agents initiating and controlling development in urban areas. In this regard, they have the power to implement environmental crime prevention (one of the four pillars of the NCPS), by incorporating the principles of crime prevention through planning and design in their projects. On the other hand, they have the power to control and/or refuse types of


<sup>82</sup> This could be characteristic of many transitional societies.

urban development that may be detrimental to crime prevention and democracy, especially over the long-term.

Given the link between urban and political structures, there is a need for democracy on a spatial level as well. This can be interpreted in two ways:

- *Spatial democracy*: Spatial democracy refers to the democratic distribution of facilities and services such as infrastructure, sanitation, water, etc. to all urban areas. This is very closely related to socio-economic transformation. It also requires a paradigm shift institutionally (that is, institutional democracy). It requires constructive institutional reforms and strategies to guide urban development practices in such a way that these do not raise the needs of one group above those of another. It also necessitates the careful evaluation of all types of urban development according to the principles set out in the main urban development policies, such as the Urban Development Framework (1994), the Development and Facilitation Act (1995) and the White Paper on Spatial Planning and Landuse Management (2001), promoting spatial democracy.
- *Democratic space*: Democratic space refers to open, secure and well-developed public urban spaces for all urban residents where people should be able to mix with various groups and experience the benefits of urban environments. Again, the local authority has a major role to play in promoting and supporting the development of democratic urban spaces throughout the city. It is also needful to reconsider the contribution of security agents to democracy within these spaces, as well as the role of public private partnerships in promoting democratic space.

Figure 19: Diagram showing the elements of true democracy in balance



Brazil has experienced a number of responses to the increased levels of crime in its cities that are in effect challenging the very nature of democracy. Although they are currently implementing various initiatives to address the situation, it has in fact developed to such an extent that certain practices have come to be accepted and are thus unlikely to change, or will require a great deal of effort to be changed. In South Africa, there are already signs pointing towards the development of a similar situation in the future. The question now is whether people will consider these to be the warning signs of future developments or only as the fall-out of the past. The challenge is to complete the process we started in 1994 towards true democracy in South Africa. In order to come closer to true democracy in this country, and so also, ultimately, to crime reduction, political transformation must be accompanied by socio-economic, institutional and spatial democracy.





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