



Conference Report

A critical look at the 2011 North African revolutions and their implications

ISS Conference Report

Edited by
Issaka K. Souaré and Berouk Mesfin
Hilton Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 31 2011

As a leading African human security research institution, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) works towards a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy, collaborative security and gender mainstreaming. The ISS realises this vision by:

- Undertaking applied research, training and capacity building
- Working collaboratively with others
- Facilitating and supporting policy formulation
- Monitoring trends and policy implementation
- Collecting, interpreting and disseminating information
- Networking on national, regional and international levels

© 2011, Institute for Security Studies

Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of both the authors and the publishers.

The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute, its trustees, members of the Council or donors. Authors contribute to ISS publications in their personal capacity.

ISBN 978-1-920422-63-9

First published by the Institute for Security Studies,
P O Box 1787, Brooklyn Square 0075
Pretoria, South Africa

www.issafrica.org

Cover photograph PictureNet

Cover design COMPRESS.dsl +27 21 886 9387

Content design, layout Marketing Support Services +27 12 346-2168

Conference Report

A critical look at the 2011 North African revolutions and their implications

Edited by
Issaka K. Souaré and Berouk Mesfin

Hilton Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 31 2011

Contents

| | |
|--|-----|
| Preface | iii |
| <i>Ambassador Olusegun Akinsanya</i> | |
| Introduction and general overview | iv |
| <i>Issaka K. Souaré and Berouk Mesfin</i> | |
| SECTION ONE: ROOT CAUSES AND DYNAMICS OF THE CRISES | 2 |
| <i>Mehari Taddele Maru</i> | |
| Chapter One | |
| ‘You can revolt but you can’t rule’ | 3 |
| Views about democracy and political participation from predominantly young Tunisian activists after the revolution | |
| <i>Raoudha Ben Othman</i> | |
| Introduction | 3 |
| Behind the façade | 3 |
| Major problems | 4 |
| The study | 4 |
| Dichotomies | 5 |
| Conclusion | 6 |
| Further reading | 6 |
| Chapter Two | |
| A general overview of the popular revolutions in North Africa | 7 |
| Their roots and dynamics with special reference to Egypt | |
| <i>Mohamed Helmi Sharawy</i> | |
| Introduction | 7 |
| Post-Arab exceptionalism and Afro-pessimism | 7 |
| The challenge and response, or the dialectics of social conflict | 8 |
| The dynamics of North African popular protests | 9 |
| The revolutions and their surrounding spheres of influence | 10 |
| Conclusion | 11 |
| Chapter Three | |
| The Libyan revolution | 12 |
| Causes, dynamics and future scenarios | |
| <i>Mohamed Ashour</i> | |
| Introduction | 12 |
| Economic and social factors | 12 |
| Tribal factors | 13 |
| Historical and political causes | 14 |
| Explaining the stalemate in Libya | 16 |
| Conclusion and future scenarios | 17 |

| | |
|---|----|
| SECTION TWO: CHALLENGES FACING GOVERNMENTS AND TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITIES | 19 |
| <i>Francis N. Ikome</i> | |
| Chapter Four | |
| The political reforms recently announced in Algeria | 21 |
| An overview | |
| <i>Mohamed Hennad</i> | |
| Introduction | 21 |
| The phenomenon of Algerian protests and the reaction of the authorities | 21 |
| The proposed reforms | 22 |
| The particularity of the Algerian case within the transition context | 22 |
| Conclusion | 23 |
| Chapter Five | |
| The protest against the Arab political regimes and the exception of Morocco | 24 |
| <i>El Houari Setta</i> | |
| Introduction | 24 |
| The importance of individual contexts | 24 |
| Anatomy of the protest movement in Morocco | 24 |
| The democratisation process in Morocco | 25 |
| Deeper political reforms since 1999 | 26 |
| The catalogue of demands of the 20 February youth movement | 27 |
| Conclusion | 28 |
| Chapter Six | |
| The potential for contagion into sub-Saharan Africa of the popular revolts in North Africa | 29 |
| <i>Issaka K. Souaré</i> | |
| Introduction | 29 |
| The disposition to revolt in SSA: North Africans are catching up | 29 |
| Possibilities of contagion | 30 |
| Negative effects: possibilities of regional instability | 31 |
| Conclusion | 31 |
| SECTION THREE: TOWARDS POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS | 33 |
| <i>Ambassador Samuel Assefa</i> | |
| Chapter Seven | |
| Reflections on the adequacy and potential of the APSA for responding to popular uprisings | 35 |
| <i>Solomon A. Dersso</i> | |
| Introduction | 35 |
| Normative and policy framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture | 35 |
| Considerations for determining the legitimacy of popular uprisings | 36 |
| Role of the AU | 37 |
| Response | 38 |
| Nature of the AU response | 39 |
| Conclusion | 39 |
| Conference programme | 41 |
| About the speakers and chairs | 43 |
| About the ACPS | 46 |
| About the ISS | 47 |
| Notes | 48 |

Preface

Ambassador Olusegun Akinsanya

Director, ISS Office in Addis Ababa

The African Conflict Prevention System (ACPS) of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the broader ISS family strive to complement and support the work of African institutions, particularly the African Union (AU), on issues of peace and security on the continent. The ISS is a Pan-African policy research institution and think-tank focusing on human security issues in Africa. The institute's research activities and engagements are both practical and policy orientated, and its mission is to conceptualise, inform and enhance the debate on human security in Africa in order to support policy formulation and decision making at various levels.

The overarching objective of this conference was to assist a variety of African policy and decision makers and other stakeholders to formulate informed policies for an effective management of the crises in North Africa at these interesting but extraordinary times for the continent. As ISS Executive Director Jakkie Cilliers has written in a 2010 monograph on *African Futures 2050*:

[T]hese are extraordinary times in Africa and indeed in the global landscape. Africa is witnessing amazing developments with events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya with re-vibrating social and political consequences and unrest in Algeria, Morocco, and Djibouti with [the potential to] spread in various forms to other parts of the continent. The world and indeed Africa is changing before our own eyes in a complex world of shifting alliances, networks and increasing roles for the CSOs, research institutions and the social media to shape the future in these countries.

Specifically, the conference aimed to discuss and generate policy responses to peace and security challenges in North Africa and thereby contribute to continuing efforts for sustained democratisation and human security in the region and elsewhere in the continent. It brought together experts on North Africa, both from the region and from within the ISS, as well as representatives from the AU, European Union (EU) and the League of Arab States (LAS). In addition to the speakers, the conference recorded the participation of more than 100 scholars, diplomats, practitioners and students, including some that had travelled from as far as Mozambique specifically to attend the conference.

The present report contains the papers presented at the conference as well as one paper whose author was not able to present it at the conference due to other commitments. The main rationale behind this report is to ensure a wider and durable reach of the insights and analyses presented during the conference and for these insights to go beyond those that attended the conference. While some elements contained in the report may have been overtaken by events in the period between the date of the conference on 31 May 2011 and the publication of this report, I believe that the analyses and expert insights contained in it still remain pertinent in shaping our understanding of both past and present events, and even some future ones.

In conclusion, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to all the participants at the conference and our various donors and stakeholders that made it possible.

Introduction and general overview

Issaka K. Souaré and Berouk Mesfin

Egypt today is like a time bomb that is only awaiting a trigger to explode. And the trigger will come through popular anger and resolve for societal revenge from the corrupt elite. You should thus set your clock for the promised hour and set it on one of two triggers: when prices of basic commodities go up, or when Mubarak dies and don't ask me – please – about which of the two scenarios is closest!

– Abdul-Halim Qindil, *Al-Ayyam Al-Akhirah [The Last Days]*, 2008, 27.

When people one day desire life; destiny must obey
Night must unveil and chains must be broken

When I intend on something; I aim
for it with no regard to the risks

For those who don't like climbing mountains will forever stay in the trenches

– Aboul-Qassim Eshhabbi, young Tunisian poet
[The Desire for Life], 1934

The end of the Cold War saw a wind of political change blowing across the world. In Africa, it led to or coincided with the (re)establishment of multiparty political systems throughout the continent. So much so that, in the early 1990s, almost all the African countries adopted new constitutions providing for multiparty democratic systems and the holding of competitive elections at regular intervals. North Africa was 'largely' spared this wind of democratic change and associated political upheavals that gripped other parts of the continent in this period. Although the regimes in the region were arguably more autocratic than many regimes in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), their foreign backers turned a blind eye to their oppressiveness because of a purported threat posed by 'extremist elements' and the imperatives of the 'war on terrorism'. The North African regimes themselves justified their unwillingness to open their national political spaces in terms of the need for domestic political stability and national cohesion.

In the period from the early 1990s to the 2010/11 revolutions, the political situations of Egypt and Tunisia could be described as 'reversed reform'. In Egypt, attempts at political reform began around 2002. As a way to get the

support of the Arab street for its planned invasion of Iraq in late 2002 and early 2003, or at least secure its indifference, the United States (US) administration under George W. Bush tried to justify its actions on the pretext of wanting to democratise the Middle East. This put almost all Arab countries under some sort of pressure to 'open up' the political space.¹ It is against this backdrop that President Hosni Mubarak announced a series of reforms, including the amendment of Article 76 of the Constitution to allow direct multi-candidate elections for the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for 7 September 2005.

But, although the presidential elections of 2005 went ahead with other candidates listed on the ballot paper and some reform programmes were acted upon – timid ones, such as allowing dissidents to express themselves through the media – the implementation of other programmes and the subsequent reversal of some vindicated sceptics.²

Tunisia was in a similar situation, although it had already begun the process at the end of the 1980s. For, in the mid-1980s, Tunisian politics was characterised by mismanagement, an unending presidential succession debate, political crisis and economic stagnation. Thus, when Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali overthrew then-President Habib Bourguiba (in power since Tunisia regained its independence from France in 1956) in a 'medical-constitutional' coup in October 1987, he committed himself to opening up Tunisian society by restoring democracy and granting greater freedom to ordinary citizens. First, he abolished the position of 'life president' that his predecessor had adopted. He then freed scores of political prisoners who had been detained by Bourguiba. Two years later, in April 1989, Tunisia had its first presidential and parliamentary elections since Bourguiba had put an end to this about a decade earlier. But, Ben Ali remained in power more through the manipulation of the political process and constitutional arrangements (such as the June 2002 amendment of Article 40, abolishing presidential term and age limits) than by any transparent democratic way. Moreover, political opponents were either oppressed or reduced to silence.³

The political process in Mauritania and Algeria since the early 1990s can be described as a constant struggle

between military and civilian elites. Mauritania has seen an authoritarian military-cum-civilian regime overthrown in a military coup d'état (2005), followed by an encouraging transition leading to the emergence of the first democratically elected leader in the country's post-independence history, only for the latter to be overthrown in yet another military putsch in August 2008.⁴ Algeria's attempt at establishing a multiparty democratic system was halted by the annulment of the results of the first such legislative elections in 1991, leading to a decade-long fratricidal civil war in the country.⁵ The political process that emerged at the end of the war in 1999 has been quite promising. However, the constitutional amendment of November 2008 (particularly the abolition of presidential term limits) and the dominant role still being played by the military cast a cloud on the process of political liberalisation in the country.

Morocco seems to be the most encouraging story in terms of political reforms and steps towards democratisation, with a pluralistic and competitive process for electing parliament.⁶ But even this encouraging story is relative given that the king is still the executive monarch whose decisions cannot be challenged by the elected parliament and media freedom is restricted on many issues, particularly with regard to Western Sahara and the king himself.⁷ This remains true even after the July 2011 constitutional referendum.

This state of affairs in the region was bound to unravel. Many are now asking why the upheavals of early 2011 were not 'predicted' by specialists. However, it is not the work of intellectuals to engage in predictions as though they were fortune tellers. After all, it is better to be approximately right than to be absolutely wrong.⁸ And indeed, specialists made it abundantly clear that a huge stratum of the population of the region had steadily grown disillusioned with oppressive policies, illegitimate institutions and disconnected leaders.⁹ Decades of injustice, widespread corruption, human rights abuses, social inequalities and a lack of freedom of expression enraged millions of people, who readily took to the streets at the opportune moment. Tunisia was the first to witness the outburst of peoples' anger in the form of mass protests that eventually led to the downfall of Ben Ali on 14 January 2011. Egypt closely followed this, where street protests equally brought down long-term ruler Mubarak on 11 February 2011.

With mass protests going awry an armed rebellion erupted in Libya, leading to an international military intervention, supposedly intended to 'protect civilians' against the background of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's rather ruthless crackdown on the rebellion and his unwavering resolve to cling to power. Outside of Africa, many countries in the Middle East (i.e. Yemen, Bahrain,

Jordan, Iraq and Palestine) have been faced with similar protests.

But, while the protests appear to have some common threads, they have tended to follow different paths and to take on different dynamics. This is partly because the various countries concerned face different realities and challenges. Meanwhile, the AU attempted to craft a political proposal in view of finding a solution to the crisis in Libya, which was largely ignored by countries that engaged in implementing UN Security Council resolutions 1970 (26 February 2011) and 1973 (17 March 2011). While the UN had authorised an international force to ensure the 'protection of civilians' and initiate political dialogue, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries that decided to implement the resolutions sided with the Libyan rebels fighting Qaddafi and refused to consider the option of political process unless on their condition of regime change, which they eventually did (i.e. regime change) at the end of August 2011.

There was therefore a need to unpack these dynamics and challenges and suggest possible ways forward. Could the crises in North Africa spread to SSA? Many other questions merit close scrutiny.

This report is based on the papers presented at the conference and, as such, is divided into three main sections. The first section looks at the root causes and dynamics of the crises in North Africa. The second section analyses the challenges facing North African governments while the last one is concerned with the peaceful resolution of the crises, with a specific focus on Libya.

In the first section, Raoudha Ben Othman, of the University of Tunis, focuses on the views and position of young Tunisian activists regarding the revolution. She begins by giving a brief historical-political background and discusses the recent youth revolution in Tunisia. She then tries to map young Tunisian activists' conceptions of democracy and political participation. She also discusses the transition and prospects for future and genuine youth political participation. When Tunisians fought for their independence in the 1950s, they were told they would be free as soon as they got rid of the French colonisers. However, she notes, 55 years later they found themselves forcing Ben Ali out of power in order to be free. At first, protesters made social demands for employment, equity and justice, which were soon elevated to political demands. Nobody had predicted either the time or the mode of exit of the Tunisian dictator, although a few had predicted that he would only be toppled by the citizenry as he had almost crushed any possibility for the army or the elite to do so. Now, a few months after the ousting of Ben Ali, young people, the major players of the Tunisian revolution, complain about

being excluded and accuse senior politicians of 'stealing their revolution'.

Ben Othman concludes by noting that the youth seem to demand more political rights while the elite appear to resist change and insist on the adoption of a perspective that reduces democracy to formalist reforms. Political representatives and an elite perspective for handling democracy and democratisation in isolation from the society are a real threat to putting into practice the legal reforms necessary for enacting a framework for an adjustment process.

In his presentation, which provides a general overview with a focus on Egypt, Professor Mohamed Helmy El Sharawy, of the Cairo-based Arab and Africa Research Centre, notes that a wave of liberation swept North Africa in a short span of time. This is not simply a window of change; according to him it is rather a wave of liberation. Professor Sharawy then discusses the waves of liberation that had swept Africa since the 1960s. He outlines the history of liberation movements in the 1960s, the armed struggles of the 1970s, and the popular conferences in some SSA states in the 1990s following popular uprisings in the 1980s, which were termed the 'Third Wave of Democratisation'. He contends that the ongoing Arab revolutions may indeed turn out to be the fourth wave, overcoming predictions that the region may not democratise. As one journalist humorously said, in relation to Muslim countries becoming democratic, 'democracy is becoming halal'. He further argues that the ongoing popular protests in the region can be said to be somehow inspired by the black consciousness and anti-apartheid struggles.

The Mubarak government was known for its harsh measures in stifling freedom of speech and its brutal approach in denying any democratic activities. Sharawy notes that in Egypt 160 000 families controlled the wealth of the nation, which is now to be found in billions of dollars in Western banks. He indicates that there were different actors of revolutions, but that the main driver for change was the youth, which managed to topple the past government by mobilising the people in every walk of life. Sharawy criticises international development reports such as the UN Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Report, which 'falsely' applauds the economic records of the Egyptian state. According to Sharawy, we have been deceived by these 'unfounded reports', which tried to paint a rosy picture of Egypt. He concludes that statistics did not, however, discourage the youth from revolting against the Mubarak regime.

In the last paper of this section, Dr Mohamed Ashour, of Cairo University, looks at the causes, consequences and future scenarios of the Libyan uprising.

He perceptively notes that 'when the winds of change and revolution on both Tunisia and Egypt erupted, many thought that the wealth of Libya was enough to prevent the Libyan people from revolting; but Libyans themselves had a different opinion!' Ashour states that the eruption of both the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions uncovered many myths related to these regimes, the most important one being the myth that no power could overthrow the Qaddafi regime. The revolutions of Egypt and Tunisia overcame the perception of Arab repressive regimes as possessing high capabilities for predicting events, crushing rebellions and eliminating their members. In this context, Egypt's revolution was the trigger that unleashed the Libyan one, especially in the eastern provinces of Libya.

Regarding the main factors that may have led to the uprising-cum-civil war in Libya, he points to economic, social, historical, political and tribal factors. He states that not long ago unemployment was the highest in the region at 21 per cent, while annual inflation rates had risen significantly due to the increase in public wages and the increase in prices of imports, especially food. Historically, there had been a latent competition between Libya's eastern and western provinces over status and political control. While the eastern provinces, and particularly the city of Benghazi, had supported the Qaddafi coup in 1969, more so than other provinces, soon this city became the stronghold of political dissidence and a source of unrest and coup attempts against the regime. The mistrust between Qaddafi's regime and the city created a vicious circle of exclusion and repression that led to protests and rebellions, which in turn led to more repression and exclusion. Ashour believes that Libya was a country in which the population was split up among different tribes or clans (estimated at 140, of which 30 are very powerful tribes). Qaddafi had revived and encouraged the tribal sense as a tool to support his regime, and had a tribal following of supporters who would fight for him against the rebels in the East.

Ashour indicates that, unlike Egypt or Tunisia, there was no power that had the capability and resources to overthrow the Libyan dictator. So it was unlikely that the army could play a major role in resolving the crisis in Libya. At the time this paper was presented at the conference, the author believed that a clear stand by the Western countries was lacking, which had also contributed to a stalemate in Libya, reflecting the contradictions and complexity of interests of various Western countries in Libya since the end of the Cold War. Ashour advances three scenarios for the future. The first scenario concerns the partition of Libya into eastern and western regions, in light of continued fighting without a decisive victory in favour of any of the parties. This scenario

seemed to have been undermined by the events of August 2011 when the rebels managed to topple Qaddafi, at least from Tripoli. The second scenario entails the fall of Qaddafi and the control by opposition forces over the entire country, which at time of the conference Ashour thought was the most likely scenario in that the rebels were provided with weapons, or that the regime would increasingly come under pressure and collapse from within. It is this scenario that has indeed materialised. But he was concerned that this would lead to continued instability in parts of the country, even affecting some neighbouring countries, an analysis that was still valid at the time this report went to print. The third scenario is based on the ability of the Libyan regime to overcome all the challenges and hostile alliances it then confronted, and regain control of the country using its tribal and regional alliances and its financial surplus. However, this scenario can only play itself out in the continued instability and possible guerrilla warfare that Qaddafi and his supporters may launch against the Libyan rebels now in control of the country.

In the second section of this report, Dr Mohamed Hennad, of the University of Algiers, looks at the political reforms that have taken place since the beginning of the street uprisings in Algeria. He shows that each country in the region is different in terms of living conditions and opportunities for successful transition. But, it goes without saying that there is a similar thread that we can easily identify: a craving for the establishment of systems of governance that promote human rights and human dignity, and that are legitimate and effective. He contends that it is more appropriate to describe the recent developments in the Arab world as 'Arab uprisings' rather than as 'Arab revolutions' because the word 'revolution' denotes a situation where substantial and irreversible changes have taken place in view of established political practices in a given country. In contrast, the term 'uprising' denotes a serious challenge to established order, but without clear evidence of a design to change established practices irrevocably and without clear objectives or detailed programmes and leadership to drive the change. It is clear that the aspirations of the protesters – in the countries mentioned as in others – are still confused because of the apparent lack of unity of purpose among these protesters. This is so especially in societies that suffer from a deficit in socio-political cohesion anchored on virtues of dialogue to settle disputes peacefully and effectively. It is this deficit that has paved the way for the domination of the political regimes that succeeded in silencing a majority of their populations over the years.

Hennad further discusses the phenomenon of protest in Algeria and how the authorities have treated it. Many

observers expected a revolution in Algeria similar to that of Tunisia, but it has not happened. In trying to explain this, he notes that Algeria had its revolution as recently as 1988 and the same kind of revolution as in Tunisia and Egypt could hardly happen now. In January 2011, riots took place in the country against the high cost of living and they lasted only a few days since the authorities reacted immediately by responding to the grievances. In being prepared to meet the demands regarding the high costs of living, public authorities are obliged to delay the timing of reforms imposed by the need to revive the economy. Algeria today, more than ever, needs to rationalise its economy, including through: (1) the fight against corruption and smuggling; (2) reversing the trend towards trade instead of production; (3) the return of confidence among investors who complain of legal instability and bureaucracy; and (4) the combating of large-scale tax evasion, in addition to the dangers inherent in the informal economy in terms of public health and environment. But, he observes that the announced reforms by the incumbent government have brought nothing new since they merely repeat what has been said since 1999. This includes the revision of the constitution and some basic laws such as the law on parties and those relating to elections.

Professor Elhouari Setta, of Hassan 1st University, discusses the situation in Morocco. In spite of the waves of popular protests, Morocco seems to have been untouched by protest so far. Professor Setta discusses why he believes Morocco is an exception, by analysing the historical-political background of the current Moroccan state. He notes that, as early as 1962, Morocco had developed a constitution, which was one of the first constitutions in Africa. He argues that the monarchy had also opened political space for opposition parties in the 1990s. However, there had been attempted coups d'état in the past. These incidents had persuaded the monarchy to compromise on its position and the expansion of opposition parties had been one of the results. It could be said that the opposition had also accepted the reforms as they were now operating in the country. Setta notes that the Palace had also introduced an Equity and Reconciliation Council. The second initiative concerned elections, although the nature of the elections could be a point of further discussion. In this regard, the monarchy had shown its willingness to compromise. In conclusion, he underscores that the capacity of the monarch to adapt to national and international demands has worked to Morocco's benefit. The monarchy, for instance, in February 2011 formed the Economic and Social Council to respond to certain economic and social issues. All these reforms, including constitutional reforms made by the monarch before and after the outset of the Arab

Spring, have tended to immunise the monarchy from being swept along by the wave of uprisings in neighbouring states.

The final paper in this section is authored by Dr Issaka K. Souaré, who focuses on the contagion potential of North African uprisings into SSA. In order to unpack this problem, he raises the following questions: Is it possible that sub-Saharan populations may be inspired by their counterparts in the Maghreb to revolt against their leaders in popular protests? Are there other possibilities that events in North Africa could have any impact on sub-Saharan countries? The author notes that many wonder about the possibility of having popular uprisings in sub-Saharan countries similar to what we have seen recently in some North African countries. Others ask if it is possible that the wave of popular revolution may spread over to the rest of the continent.

In answering these questions, Souaré expresses his belief that there is indeed a capacity to revolt in other parts of Africa. Moreover, he contends that it would not be an exaggeration to argue that the Maghreb was catching up with the rest of the continent regarding popular revolts. Certainly, the dynamics and shapes were different, but there were popular revolts in several sub-Saharan countries in the early 1990s, leading to revolutionary changes. This was the case, for example, in regard to 'national conferences' in Benin, Niger and Gabon. Admittedly, not all countries organised conferences, and of those that did some adopted durable democratic systems while others restored the old autocratic system with cosmetic changes.

In addressing his first question, he maintains that it is quite normal to start something in one place that goes somewhere else and comes back to the first place in a different form. It is therefore possible that populations

in some SSA countries could be inspired by what happened in the Maghreb, and thus decide to revolt against their rulers, with various claims. Souaré then looks at the possible negative impacts of the revolution on SSA, which he believes relate mainly to the Libyan civil war, underscoring fears of regional instability.

In the third and final section, only one of the three papers suggested at the conference is reproduced here in full. Ironically, this is the paper that was not presented owing to the inability of the author to attend the conference. The first two papers presented by the representatives of the AU and the European Union, respectively, are not fully reproduced, but instead a summary is provided. This is partly because of the brief nature of the papers and partly because of the unavailability of the two authors at the time the report was completed. In his paper, Dr Solomon Dersso focuses on the suitability or lack thereof of the current African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and other mechanisms to address the uprisings in North Africa properly. After acknowledging their extraordinary nature, he argues that one cannot necessarily conclude that the events are entirely beyond the purview of the normative and policy instruments of the APSA. He nevertheless observes that the nature of the events as well as the issues to which they gave rise and the response of the AU beg important questions, which he tries to investigate throughout the paper.

As noted earlier, certain aspects of some of the papers may have been overtaken by events, particularly the paper on Libya, but we believe that the analysis is still relevant. Where there is a need to contextualise a specific section of any paper, we do this in an endnote as 'editors' note', which seeks to update the paper without having to refer to the author.

Section One

Root causes and dynamics of the crises

Mehari Taddele Maru

Chair of the Session



Photo 1 L to R: Dr Ben Othman, Professor Sharawy, Mr Mehari and Dr Ben Othman

Section One

Root causes and dynamics of the crises

Mehari Taddele Maru

Chair of the Session

The North African popular uprisings remain striking for both their origins and dynamics. Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, former president of Tunisia, fled the country and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt had to leave office after three weeks of defying internal and external calls for his resignation. Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has now been toppled in an armed struggle with segments of his own people (in what is now a civil war) and sections of the international community. Egypt and Tunisia still face serious challenges regarding democratisation. The roles of the military establishments in both Tunisia and Egypt were critical, but with a varying degree of involvement. These uprisings, despite similar causes, have resulted in different outcomes. They have also shown

that freedom from hunger is not enough – freedom from fear is also important. They further indicate the popular belief that change is possible, as without hope for change no one will be ready to take such serious risks. These uprisings have challenged the notion that the wave of democratisation has ended, and signify rather the beginning of what may be termed the ‘Fourth Wave of Democratisation’.

This section of the report looks at some of the factors that may have accounted for these uprisings. It begins, logically, with a paper on Tunisia, as this is where it all started in December 2010. This is followed by a general overview that zooms in on Egypt, with a paper on Algeria concluding the section.

Chapter One

‘You can revolt but you can’t rule’

Views about democracy and political participation from predominantly young Tunisian activists after the revolution

Raoudha Ben Othman

University of Tunis

INTRODUCTION

On 14 January 2011, Zeine el-Abidine Bin Ali fled Tunisia after several weeks of non-violent street protests that started with Mohamed Bouazizi immolating himself in early December 2010. A few days later, protests spread all over the country. At first, protesters made social demands for employment, equity and justice that soon scaled up to political demands. Nobody had predicted either the time or the mode of exit of the Tunisian dictator, although a few had predicted that he would only be toppled by the citizenry as he had almost crushed any possibility for the army or the elite to do so.¹⁰

Now more than four months after Bin Ali was ousted, young people, the major players in the Tunisian revolution, complain about being excluded and accuse all kinds of politicians of stealing *their* revolution. Recently there seems to have developed a dual discourse separating the activists who orchestrated the resistance from those who are seen as fit to decide about the democratic transition. Young activists seem to have the right to plan demonstrations, but are excluded from decision-making. They often complain that the interim government does not listen to them. This chapter tries to map the perceptions of young Tunisian activists with regard to democracy, political participation and transition, and discusses prospects for their genuine political participation in the future.

BEHIND THE FAÇADE

When Tunisians fought for their independence in the 1950s, they were told they would be free as soon as they expelled the French colonisers. Some 55 years later, they find themselves having to evict the dictator to be free.

Although many Tunisians are thrilled with the new and marvellous sensation of freedom, they feel deeply betrayed and used. Most of them cannot believe that they allowed themselves to be governed by such a dictator or that Bin Ali, and the circle of his extended family in-laws and friends, could cause so much corruption and injustice.

Bin Ali came to power in 1987 through a bloodless coup, ousting his predecessor Habib Bourguiba, who had ruled Tunisia since the end of the French protectorate. Bin Ali managed to maintain a very good grip of the country by repressing any forms of political dissent. He started by making promises of democratic transitions that he never kept. He skilfully ran elections that were ‘largely constrictive, uncompetitive and illiberal’.¹¹

Although some opposition parties participated in the elections, the hegemony of the ruling party was so big that opposition parties won less than 3 per cent of the votes. However, they were granted many more seats in parliament. These parties are often referred to as ‘card box’ or ‘décor’ opposition parties as they were granted seats in parliament in accordance with their degree of loyalty to Bin Ali. The other two remaining parties, the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) and the Democratic Forum for Work and Liberty (FDTL), which were reluctant to show signs of loyalty to Bin Ali, were made legal but were not recognised. They were not allowed to hold public meetings or engage in any public criticism of the regime.

The regime’s best ally was a police and security apparatus that kept the country under control. Tunisians were so terrified of the police and especially the political police that one of their first demands after the revolution was the dissolution of the political police, which the government in transition consented to. In Bin Ali’s regime,

the press was heavily controlled and monitored, helping the regime to build the image of a stable, prosperous and democratic country. Censorship, and, even worse, self-censorship, was rife.

The Tunisian revolution shook the 23-year-old argument of the Tunisian model, often praised particularly by Europe. Tunisia's 'achievements' in education, women's rights and health were considered at best as the pre-condition to democracy and at worst as a substitute for democracy.

MAJOR PROBLEMS

Unemployment

The high unemployment rates among young people and especially university graduates made the situation difficult particularly for families who are traditionally in a difficult economic situation. The unemployment among graduates increased people's frustration as they felt they filled their part of the contract by graduating but the government failed to deliver on its part of the contract by not employing them. The number of unemployed people is over 700 000, with the 170 000 students graduating from university this year expected to increase this number.

Corruption

All forms of political, economic and even academic corruption grew in extent and importance. The Bin Ali and Trabelsi (Ben Ali's in-laws through his second wife, Laila Trabelsi) families controlled all lucrative businesses. They started associating with existing businessmen, who often found themselves giving up their business to them. Some members of the family took bribes even from poor Tunisians in return for administrative or legal favours. The real problem is that corruption has become institutionalised and needs to be studied in terms of its causes and as a phenomenon on its own rather than as a form of illicit behaviour that disappears when the causes themselves cease to exist.

Weak political parties

Just after 14 January 2011, a great number of parties obtained their visas (became legalised); some of them were in opposition to but most of them were a reaction to the political upheaval and the dissolution of the Constitutional and Democratic Rally (RCD), the ruling party since 1956. Whether old or new, the political parties are still weak, lacking financial resources and especially experience. Some of the new parties have been created

by opposition activists who were able to return home, such as the *Conseil pour la République* (CPR) created in exile by Moncef Marzouki and legalised after 14 January.

Whether created by opposition activists or not, whether legalised before or after the revolution, all parties aim at participating in and winning control of the Constituent Assembly and parliament. Many observe that any party that does not win any seats in the next election is going to disappear afterwards. Such a claim seems to be too hasty right now as Tunisians are still discovering their voting behaviour and style.

Well-established parties such as the FDTL, PDP, Tajdid and Nahdha are logically going to win more seats in parliament than the new parties or especially the contested parties that have been started by ex-ministers or former RCD members. The FDTL and PDP have never been qualified as acquiescent opposition parties, have never received public funding and have never been granted seats in parliament. They have built the image of respectful opposition parties, although the image of the PDP was eroded after its leader, Ahmed Najib Chabbi, joined Mohammed Ghannouchi's first interim government and left it only when Beji Caid-Essebsi made it a moral condition that ministers serving in the interim government would not run for the presidential election.

Similarly, Ettajdid's Secretary General, Ahmed Ibrahim, also joined Ghannouchi's first interim government and left it for the same reason. However, Ettajdid had been granted funding and two seats in parliament for the former regime, which made its image less appealing to young people. This is notwithstanding the fact that Ettajdid's secretary general ran in the presidential election in 2009 and was not tainted with being a 'card box' opposition party as the other five parties were.

THE STUDY

This was a survey with a sample of young activists. The main objective was to ascertain their views and perceptions about their level of participation in the running of post-revolution Tunisia. Twelve young activists aged between 19 and 32 were interviewed (female and five male). Three were undergraduates, two graduates, four self-employed and three were civil servants. They were asked the following questions:

- How they perceived democracy
- How they identified the challenges of initiating and consolidating democratic reforms in Tunisia
- How they saw the future

The young people responded to an invitation placed by the author on Facebook asking to meet and talk to young

people who saw themselves as activists. Six responded to the first call and recommended more people for the author to interview.

The interviewees answered the questions in no particular order. They often complained about being 'excluded from the revolutionary process, now that Bin Ali is ousted' (Samia, postgraduate). These young people described politicians as being unwilling to listen to them, explaining that the politicians either refuse 'to waste their precious time on listening to immature frivolous youth' (Borhene, employee) or think that 'they know better' (Mohamed Ali, student) and: 'If they know better ... why didn't they *degage* [oust] the dictator?' The interviewees generally did not trust the political parties either and reported that even when they attended different political meetings, they could not help but express how disappointed they were that the political parties showed signs of hegemony similar to or even worse than the RCD.

The interviewees regarded themselves as the only guarantors for real democracy as they continue to ask for meaningful changes that broke with the past. They were suspicious of the interim government led by Beji Caid-Essebsi. To them, the old guard was still in a position to influence the future direction of Tunisia's political transition.

Many young people have denounced the interim government for being insensitive to the many demands for real reform. They refuse to let anyone trade their new hard-won freedom for stability even after the long weeks of chaos that the country lived through following 14 January 2011. Day after day they grow increasingly suspicious of the real intentions of all political players, who do not see this revolution as a real chance for change, but rather as a crisis to be managed with as few concessions and losses as possible.

The activists feel bitter about the slow rate of change and find it hard to see why some people are not as keen on freedom as they are. Even when they showed signs of optimism, they kept saying that they trusted no one but themselves and kept threatening to go back to the streets as often as it takes to see a growing but sustainable democracy become reality in the country.

DICHOTOMIES

Islamist vs democratic

Tunisians have long been scared of Ennahdha or any party that bases its theoretical foundation on Islam. Some Tunisians have simply become allergic to any participation of Ennahdha or any other Islamist party in the political scene. Although young Tunisians have been

clear about their decision to break with the hegemonic past and reject Bin Ali's policies, they stop short of rejecting Ennahdha, although they know that Bin Ali overemphasised the danger of Islamists in and out of Tunisia. Few Tunisians admit that Ennahdha may play a positive role in the democratic transition. Print and social media abound with debates and accusations by politicians, academics and young activists, suggesting that the Ennahdha party, once in power, will abolish the code of social status, reintroduce polygamy, or abolish the constitution to apply the rule of the Islamic *Shari'a*. The average Tunisian is often torn between adherents and opponents of Ennahdha.

The problem with this argument is that anyone who wants to position themselves as *hadathi* (or modern) has to attack Islamists and such attacks might result in verbal or even physical violence. The Ennahdha party has tried publically to distance itself from any *salafi* practices and even condemn them. However, this might be of little use in convincing people who are confident that Islam is the enemy of democracy. Islamists in Tunisia have yet to elaborate a model of Islamist democracy that is convincing to hesitating and doubtful Tunisians. Most of the young people interviewed showed positive attitudes to Islam but they fear that any Islamist party is likely to turn easily to authoritarianism, which may be even worse than secular authoritarianism. The author believes that Ennahdha or any other Islamist party should elaborate a working model of Islamist democracy and should fight the old tendency of many Islamists that claim that no model exists other than that found in *Shari'a*.

Asking young Tunisians who have peacefully demonstrated to topple the dictator to go back to the roots and follow a theocratic regime is too minimising or their efforts to be followed. Tunisians feel a strong need to make sure that no other dictator, either secular or Islamic, will rule them in the future. Ennahdha often compares itself to the successful example of Turkey's current ruling party that has similar religious references and this seems to be less convincing to young Tunisians than to the Ennahdha leadership itself.

If you are not a democrat you can't participate in democracy

All Tunisians seem to agree that liberal-democratic rights and freedoms serve their interests. However, the political elite seems to think that democracy results when all differences between Tunisians are levelled out. They particularly want to squeeze Islamists into the liberal-democratic discourse and take their refusal to participate in this discourse as a sign that they are unfit for

democratic rule. This provides the elite with an excuse to remove them from the political scene. Tunisians need to realise that diversity rather than conformity is more likely to lead to full democracy.

CONCLUSION

Tunisians have long suffered from a reduction in their roles as citizens in the decision-making process. They had practically no voice and any opposition, however small, was fiercely hushed. Tunisians, like most other Arabs, have inherited a traditional form of rule that saw no place for political legitimacy that was based on citizen activity. The long line of Beys, khalifates and Sultans assumed that only they, the guardians, could know what the common good is. As a consequence, although the first republic was built immediately after independence from France, new notions have been introduced such as elections, parliament and presidents. However, the role of citizens as democratic subjects was ignored. Habib Bourguiba, the first president of Tunisia, also considered himself as having the sole right to decide what was good for Tunisia and to punish whoever stood against him. Democracy was reduced to voting for a one-party system, one president for 30 years, where all opposition was eliminated well before the election day.

The fundamental argument of this chapter is that the Tunisian youth who ousted the dictator demand more political rights than are deemed necessary by the elite. The elite resists change and insists on the adoption of a perspective that reduces democracy to formalist reforms. The perspective of the political/representative elite, which advocates handling democracy and democratisation in isolation from broader society, is a real threat to putting into practice the legal reforms necessary for creating a framework for an adjustment process.

The author is seriously worried that Tunisians will pass up this great opportunity for involvement in the national political life. Tunisians are interested in politics and keep discussing all forms of governance and democracy in organised public and spontaneous debates. Such interest may wane and Tunisians may return to a low level of political participation. Such interest is currently well represented in the youth, who have experienced only two major forms of political participations: demonstrations and sit-ins. These forms of political activism need to multiply and prosper or any political leader could easily turn them into a threat to security.

FURTHER READING

- Cassarino, JP. Confidence-building in Tunisia after the popular uprising: strategies and dilemmas of the interim government, IAI Working Paper 1104, February 2011, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Available at <http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiw1104.pdf>.
- Delacoura, K. Islamist terrorism and the Middle East democratic deficit: political exclusion, repression and the causes of extremism, *Democratization* 13(3) (2006), 508–525.
- Diamond, L. Why are there no Arab democracies? *Journal of Democracy* 21(1) (2010), 93–112.
- Hermassi, A. State, legitimacy, and democratisation in the Maghreb. In E Goldberg et al. (eds), *Rules and rights in the Middle East – democracy, law, and society*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993.
- Hermassi, A. Socio-economic change and political implications: the Maghreb. In G Salamé (ed) *Democracy without democrats: the renewal of politics in the Muslim world?* London: Tauris, 1994, 227–42.
- Hermassi, A. The rise and fall of the Islamist movement in Tunisia. In L Guazzone (ed), *The Islamist dilemma: the political role of Islamist movements in the contemporary Arab world*. Reading: Ithaca, 1995, 105–27.
- Heydemann, S. Reform or restoration? Tunisia's canary-in-the-coalmine indicators, *Democracy Digest*, 19 January 2011. Available at <http://www.demdigest.net/2011/01/reform-or-restorationtunisias-canary-in-the-coalmine-indicators/> (Accessed in May 2011).
- Mahjoub, A. Labour markets performance and migration flows in Tunisia. In European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, *Labour markets performance and migration, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria*, Occasional Papers 60(2) Brussels, Belgium, 2010.
- Marzouki, N. Tunisia's wall has fallen. *MERIP*, 19 January 2011. Available at <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero011911.html> (Accessed in May 2011).
- Montinola, GR and Jackman, RW. Sources of corruption: a cross-country study. *British Journal of Political Science* 32 (2002), 147–170.
- Sadiki, L. Political liberalization in Bin Ali's Tunisia: facade democracy. *Democratization* 9(4) (2003).
- Transparency International. *Global Corruption Report 2007: corruption in judicial systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- World Bank. *Country assistance strategy progress report for Republic of Tunisia for the period 2005-2008*. World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007. Available at http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/08/29/000310607_20070829095117/Rendered/PDF/38572main.pdf (Accessed in May 2011).
- World Bank. *Global economic prospects 2010*. World Bank, Washington, DC, 2010. Available at <http://go.worldbank.org/OE8NEB3JPO> (Accessed in May 2011).

Chapter Two

A general overview of the popular revolutions in North Africa

Their roots and dynamics with special reference to Egypt

Mohamed Helmi Sharawy

Arab and African Research Center, Cairo

INTRODUCTION

This chapter attempts to provide a general overview of the recent events in North African countries, by examining their roots and dynamics with special reference to the case of Egypt, which, in addition to Tunisia, witnessed a fully-fledged revolution during the first months of 2011. The author is aware that there are many detailed studies of these countries, which explains why this chapter is limited to the common traits of these events and includes a comparative scrutiny of the role of different actors, either in the Intifada or revolution. Such a study shall of necessity touch on the historic background of the events, their relations with their surrounding regions and the relevant questions as to their possible paths of development. The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section deals with the perceptions of the concepts of 'Arab exceptionalism' and 'afro-pessimism', which partly account for why many observers were surprised by the turn of events. The second section looks at the dialectic between the various social-political factors and actors in contributing to the rise of popular protests. The third section relates to the dynamics of the protests in various North African countries, while the fourth section puts the protests in their wider regional and international contexts.

POST-ARAB EXCEPTIONALISM AND AFRO-PESSIMISM

We may still feel surprised at the rate and extent of the revolutionary events that erupted in North Africa from December 2010, hitting particularly Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, with many repercussions for Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania. More repercussions have even been noted in

other countries of the Arab world. The surprise was not so much because of the effects such actions had inside and outside the given countries, but rather because of their simultaneous occurrence to oust seemingly stable regimes that were taken by surprise by the wave of popular demonstrations, such as the millions in Tahrir Square in Cairo and other cities of Egypt. These were the developments of the Tunisian 'initiative', and forerunners of the Libyan uprising, and tell a long story of the social and political phenomena that were put into full view by this 'Arab Spring' that we witness.

The Arab world has long missed the phenomenon of a 'former president', as our leaders have so far been removed either by death or a military coup d'état. The common political discourse always promotes the concepts of paternalism and the accompanying wisdom and hence the son's inheritance, and dynastical successions in power. The prevalent religious discourse extols the values of obedience to the ruler, and abhors the 'sin of mutiny' or *Fitnah* in Arabic.

This discourse led to the concept of Arab exceptionalism with regard to democracy, a concept frequently uttered by liberals all over the region, hence the surprise. Indeed I believe such concepts depart from a wrong approach based on fixed judgments about the stability of colonial or autocratic conditions under which our peoples suffer. We noted such concepts in the works of some Orientalists and anthropologists and even some social scientists that keep speaking of mutinies and *Fitnah*. This type of thought ignores the revolutions in Cairo and Tunisia, for example, all through the 19th and 20th centuries. The same wrong approach also ignores thousands of protest actions that have occurred over the last few years in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and the Sudan. In Egypt such protest was sometimes

expressed negatively by abstention when not more than 10 per cent of the voters attended elections or referenda because they did not trust the process and thought that the outcome would surely be forged. This is sometimes referred to as 'resistance by silence'.

We have the same reservation about the concept of Afro-pessimism that gained popularity after most African countries had suffered for long periods under colonial rule, and later under autocratic and military rule. They forget that many sub-Saharan peoples had carried out national liberation revolutions, and some had held what was called 'sovereign national conferences' in the early 1990s that looked at the country's political system and proposed profound changes. (See Chapter 6 of this report for a more detailed analysis of this theme.) Partly as a result of this, many sub-Saharan countries have many former presidents.¹² The correct approach is, therefore, to acknowledge that this is the lesson given by the people that must be heeded by all the rulers of Africa and the Arab world, and even beyond.

THE CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE, OR THE DIALECTICS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT

Many Arab and African regimes held fast to the concept of 'stability' of the people to consolidate the everlasting rule of this or that historic or charismatic leader, or the paternalistic or Pharaonic leadership. When the challenges of change came about, these regimes responded with the discourse of 'challenge and response', which calls for historic national, popular, Arab, renaissance or other projects. All these boiled down to the constant role of the 'leading party', the continuous 'liberation revolution', or other references that lead to the 'dialectics of continuity' rather than the 'dialectics of change', as realities should dictate, or studying the social conflicts that toppled these 'perpetual' regimes.

What was the outcome of this discourse of stability that brought about all this turmoil in North Africa, and in such rapid succession, calling for radical change, and facing such determined resistance from the systems in power? To be brief, we shall concentrate on the common roots of all these cases.

First, many observers could not imagine that the youth in Tahrir Square, and their counterparts in Libya, had only known one ruler since their birth some 30 or even 40 years ago. So similar were these rulers that one could substitute Sharm El Sheikh for Hosni Mubarak, or Aziziya for Muammar Qaddafi, all of whom promised to perpetuate their rule through their children. These leaders brought about a political malaise or stagnation by lengthy autocratic practices such as forged elections

and referenda in Egypt, sudden changes of populist slogans and policies in Libya, mobilising the ruling party in Algeria to prevent any change, or the 'Revolution of Reforms' in Tunisia that lasted for a quarter of a century. The result has been scores of protesters calling for the autocratic leaders to step down. But the seeds of the 2011 Egyptian revolution had been sown with the *Kefaya* ('enough is enough') movement from around 2004. And this was reminiscent of the 18–19 January 1977 revolt, and the mutiny of Central Security Troops in 1986.

The second is what may be described as the power of lies and delusion. The media played a huge role in engulfing Arab and African peoples under the ideological hegemony or 'soft power'. For example, many lies were spread about stability in Egypt and Tunisia, popular reconciliation in Algeria, popular leadership in Libya, and the democratic model in Mauritania, or even the freedom of the press in Egypt. Similarly, there were many false international or local reports on the rate of economic growth and human development in Egypt (by UN bodies),¹³ the reformist new thought in Libya, the opposition to imperialism in Algeria, and the innocence of the military in Mauritania. There were repeated lies about Egypt's leading diplomatic role, which was in fact really ineffective, and the world was bored with the frequent acrobatics of Qaddafi in Libya, yet the economic indicators in Libya were often praised, all of which fuelled the potential for uprisings even if somewhat delayed.

The third factor is found in social marginalisation. Besides the miserable social and economic conditions that prevailed in all the North African countries, there were many policies of exclusion of the masses, which in the end provoked their revolt. For example, seven families held the bulk of the wealth of Tunisia, and 150 000 businessmen in Egypt lived in exclusive resorts around Cairo and the north coast in what was called 'Egyptian Apartheid', while millions lived in 1 500 slums similar to the 'Bantustans' of apartheid South Africa. Billions of dollars were deposited in tax havens by the ruling family in Egypt, while the Qaddafi family and the ruling mafia in Algeria squandered billions of dollars. All these practices eliminated any role for a healthy middle class, which was marginalised in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, and seldom existed in Libya.

Political marginalisation and hypocrisy is the fourth factor. The regime in Egypt was not described as totalitarian although it had been nothing but that for the last four decades, despite the existence of some 25 décor parties alongside the ruling party. The same situation existed in Tunisia and Algeria, but was even more comic in Libya. It was not only the usual social marginalisation within the liberal economies, but rather in the political sphere and the popular participation as is common in

sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Religion was also used to segregate Muslims and Christians inside their religious institutions (examples were Al-Azhar and the Church in Egypt, Al-Zeitouna in Tunis and the Sophists of Libya). The response of some was found in 'political religion', which can never lead to effective social opposition, but may end in mutiny or terrorism.

The power and strength of the masses make up the fifth and final factor. The trigger of the protests was a small incident that happened to a young man in a remote town of Tunisia, humiliated by a policewoman, prompting him to set himself on fire. In Egypt, it was a policeman beating a young man to death in Alexandria that triggered the mass movement. The masses were roused by these incidents so they moved to the capital Tunis, or directed their anger against the minister responsible for the police in Egypt where they started their protest movement on the Police Day (25 January). On the march to Tunis, and among the millions gathered at Tahrir Square in Cairo, the feeling of popular solidarity (i.e. the collective mind) gave the masses a new feeling of strength quite different from their weakness when confronting the security forces individually. A new feeling of fearlessness not experienced in previous protests with *Kefaya* came about. This feeling of mass solidarity meant the complete absence of any threat to any person during the events except those perpetrated by the security forces on 28 January 2011.

THE DYNAMICS OF NORTH AFRICAN POPULAR PROTESTS

North Africa has its common traits in that it shares the culture of the Arab and Islamic worlds, and that it is on the African continent. Yet the North African countries' liberation movements developed separately, as did their nation-building processes. Their reactions to political events are therefore sometimes different. However, the revolutionary spirit gave prominence to the common traits once again. Let us examine, in a few observations, the dynamics of popular revolts seen in these countries since December 2010 in order to explain their effects on the experience of uprisings and revolutions in the region.

The first observation is about the legacy of protest movements and mechanisms of the 'social' and 'political'. There are many differences between Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. In Egypt there have been some 1 500 protest actions in the last three years, staged by workers and peasants in the form of strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations. While most of these had primarily social claims and few political repercussions, several political actions took place, mostly by middle-class citizens such as those behind the *Kefaya* movement (intellectuals), the 9th

March movement (university staff), the 6th April group (youths) and the campaign by supporters of Mohamed Al-Baradei in 2010. In Tunisia, the security crackdown on such movements was much harsher. In Libya the tradition of Omar Al-Mokhtar in resistance and jihad was somewhat faint and even exploited by the regime, while the regime itself had verbally extolled the massing crowds of the people (*jamaheer*). This somehow led to some confusion between the 'social' and the 'political' in most of these popular revolts.

The widening gap between rich and poor in Egypt gave the social marked prominence in the country for years, while the political action was easily contained by the regime, by security means, but also by the 'liberal mantle' and frequent invitations to hollow dialogue with those weak parties of the opposition that took place even after the beginning of the revolution. In Tunisia, the politicians were better prepared, and put the labour movement and civil society to good use. Civil society in Egypt had been contained by the regime, while it did not exist in Libya. In Algeria and Morocco there were occasional protest actions, but they had been suppressed in Mauritania.

The second dynamic observed is the prominent role played by the youth in organising the uprisings in all the countries. This role was salient in Egypt where it was mainly directed against police brutality and their minister, and started by middle-class youth who were previously stigmatised as badly educated and having a weak sense of loyalty. In Tunisia it was mainly the petty bourgeoisie and the working class that organised the uprisings, and mainly in the coastal towns, while in Egypt the action was mostly concentrated in urban areas in Cairo, Alexandria and Lower Egypt. The use of Facebook and other social networks showed that the youth were self-educated and made use of means of modernity. In the end, the youth in all three countries learned that they had to face the violence of the authorities by standing firm and answering back if necessary. This mutual violence was most marked in Libya, and probably this somewhat restrained the Algerians.

The third dynamic relates to the role of the army and Islamic movements. Despite the immediate participation of many players such as the independent trade unionists, university staff, journalists and even some capitalists in the youth movement at Tahrir Square, the army and the Muslim Brotherhood had an important role. The army in both Egypt and Tunisia refused to use violence against the protesters, and thus avoided a bloodbath in both countries. The Egyptian army is a national technocratic institution that has taken neutral positions in such conflicts before, despite its mainly US training and religious background. The Muslim Brotherhood is a strong, organised political force that long contested the ruling party

over governance or bargaining in Egypt and was always contained by brute force. Thus they refused to join the protest movement before 25 January, but were forced to do so when they realised that they had to join or else miss the bandwagon of change, and even lose many of their youth members who had joined on their own initiative.

Although late to join, the Islamists in Egypt are now aiming at containing the revolution by strengthening 'Political Islam' as well as the traditional religious forces, such as Salafists and Sofists. They in fact campaigned for the 'yes' vote on the constitutional amendments that were overwhelmingly passed in the 19 March referendum. They have also been very active since the establishment of the new regime in Tunisia. In Libya some traditional religious trends from the Sanusiyah heydays in the 1930s and 1940s have a significant influence on the rebels. In Egypt, the revolution shed light on the strategy of the old regime to bolster its security by emphasising the role of Al-Azhar and the Church in keeping devout Egyptians under the direct control of their respective religious leaders. Most of the latter call for peace and absolute obedience to the authorities as being the duty of all devout individuals. This call for apolitical attitudes has now deteriorated into participation in religious clashes pitting Muslims against Christians as part of the counter-revolutionary plot already underway in Egypt.

A fourth observation to make is about the problem of civil society. There was no participation or remarkable role of civil society organisations during the revolution in Egypt. This may be attributed to these bodies having too strong ties to globalisation issues, or to the narrow specialisation of some of the issues they are supposed to work on. This, however, presents a challenge to these organisations concerning their relevance: they have to be able to take hard decisions if they are to remain effective and relevant.

The fifth observation concerns the dynamics of the counter-revolution. After the demonstrations by millions in Egypt's Tahrir Square, the crowds made a point of calling for a peaceful ousting of the head of the regime (as in Tunisia). Although the crowds were fearful of confronting the more than a million-strong security force, the strategy of chaos adopted by the ministry of the interior to withdraw their troops and free their thugs to frighten the people, served only to infuriate the crowds, motivating them to call for Mubarak and his whole regime to 'step down' and go away. Here the reactionary forces of the ruling party started their own counter-revolution by using hired thugs and camels to subjugate the crowds, getting their guidance from the Sharm El-Sheikh focal leadership (where Mubarak resides). They also roused their allies from the religious sectors (Sofis and Salafists) that terrorised many Christians. Similarly, conflicts were

incited along regional lines in Tunisia, and along historical tribal animosities in Libya. Indeed, such internal animosities exist in most countries of North Africa, and have their origins in poor education systems and media provocation in order to keep such animosities alive and undermine national unity and obstructing unified revolutionary action for social and economic reform, in favour of the narrow interests of minorities and small groups.

Finally, there is the call for stability. After January in Egypt, the call for stability took precedence over all revolutionary mechanisms. Both the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in Egypt and the new conservative leadership in Tunisia aimed at conserving stability over the proceeding of the objectives of the revolution. In Egypt, this tendency was demonstrated by their decision to give priority to establishing constitutional legality by setting an early date for parliamentary and presidential elections. The traditional parties mobilised their forces against this while groups of religious activists took to the streets to claim their 'rights'. All these activities took place before the true revolutionary youth had taken the first steps towards forming their democratic organisations that would be able to protect the revolutionary legitimacy. No one really called for parliamentary and presidential elections that early, but it meant giving priority to the call for stability in response to the repeated threats of the old regimes that the choice was between stability (= continuity) and chaos. It remains to be seen how far the SMC is ready to relinquish the old concept of 'stability'.

THE REVOLUTIONS AND THEIR SURROUNDING SPHERES OF INFLUENCE

This chapter doesn't provide a comprehensive analysis of the international aspects of the revolutions in North Africa. Rather, the impact of the new identities of the revolutions on their surrounding spheres of influence is analysed as the region has long-standing international relations on the Arab, African and European or Atlantic fronts. It is a sphere rife with political, social and economic conflicts, such as those between modernity and traditionalism, the Arab-Zionist conflict, the confrontation between Arabism and Africanism, and even the confrontation between the US African Command (Africom) and the so-called Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel countries.

Generally, post-revolution countries have to give priority to putting their own house in order, but the countries in question had to face all these complicated conflicts in their first weeks, which could place undue stresses on any new order. The reason for this was the close relations between the ousted regimes and their

foreign allies, a relationship that was mainly based on each group's perception of their own 'security' rather than any national considerations for the North African countries. Thus the Tunisians were anxious about the French response to their uprising and, in turn, the Egyptians worried that the Americans might intervene in favour of their close ally, the Mubarak regime. The Israelis were worried about the fate of the 'strategic treasure' that Mubarak represented to them. The Gulf States were also cautious in their responses to North Africa since they also faced the prospect of ousted presidents (or kings), and tried to broker certain compromises. Shortly after uprisings broke out in Libya, the revolution found support from NATO.

In this atmosphere, the African Union tries to play a role by following a discourse of negotiation in Libya where the crisis engulfs the 'leader' who once had gone out of his way to express his African identity and the rebels who are determined to get rid of him. Indeed, what is taking place in Libya could be closer to a coup rather than a matter for negotiation under Article 4 of the UN Charter.¹⁴ There were no popular democratic institutions in Libya that could have facilitated negotiations as Qaddafi had banned their existence, so the AU is forced to remain powerless to act, while NATO takes the reins. As for the Arab League, it has of late become the umbrella of the Gulf States who are in close alliance with Western countries, and thus it remains inactive.

The Tunisians are lucky not to be embroiled in this conflict of big powers (i.e. Gulf states, Israel and the West with regard to Egypt), except as far as Libya is concerned, and the French reaction in view of the fate of the thousands of Tunisian immigrants in France. However, Egypt had to adopt a revolutionary attitude towards the Palestinian question, but is somewhat bureaucratic in its approach to the problem of the Nile Basin, despite the urgency of a revolutionary attitude to take into consideration the emergence of a new nation in South Sudan, and the development needs and activities of Ethiopia, pushing it to build hydroelectric dams on the Nile.

CONCLUSION

Whether we admit that we have escaped from Arab exceptionalism, or claim the Afro-pessimism was lightened, we still need to enquire whether these countries have a chance to 'return to the past' with certain degrees of political independence, as was the case in the era of Bandung during the Cold War. Can the political and social developments that gave rise to the euphoria of independence in the Third World in the 1950s and 1960s confront the pressures of globalisation that have engulfed the world since then? Can the revolutions of

the Maghreb countries and their repercussions in the rest of the Arab world change the image of Egypt and the Arabs in Africa drastically?

The challenge that confronts this second wave of liberation is the mechanisms of globalisation that are now much stronger than they were during the 1960s and 1970s. They now have soft power, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which are currently in Cairo trying to salvage lost ground. They try to coerce the new regime to remain within their overall sphere of globalisation. If we remember the setbacks of many African revolutions in the 1990s under the pressures of the IMF, we shall realise the grave dangers of the present situation.¹⁵

The greatest of these challenges is the military aspect of globalisation, alongside the so-called 'threats' of the dangers of al-Qaeda and its terrorist activities, as an excuse for continued alliance with the West and consolidating the position of Israel in the region. There are several indications of such moves, such as the meetings of Africom lately in some African capitals; the over-arming of the Gulf States and pulling them to support NATO's intervention in Libya. Another indicator is the attempts to co-opt Morocco into membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Such moves raise grave doubts about the future of the Arab League and the AU, which have already shown their sluggish reaction to the Libyan conflict, leaving it to deteriorate into a civil war.

This same ineffectiveness of the Arab League and AU gave an opportunity for religious forces (the Brotherhood and the Salafis) to re-emerge in Egypt as a force to be reckoned with, and also the emergence of the Turkish Model as an alternative favoured by the Military Council. There was even a new mention of a wider Islamic Middle East Project as a modification of an earlier American project for the region that made use of the imaginary Iranian threat.

Some difficulties now arise about a new approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question, since Israel and its American protector are worried about the democratic trends of the new revolutions in the region. Thus the new revolutionary democracy becomes the force confronting the American and Israeli stand, belying the long-time discourse about Arab exceptionalism and its regressive role. This explains the flow of promises of aid from the US and even the IMF, while Israeli acts of violence against the Palestinian people and the possible two-state solution show the hollowness of such promises.

A final question remains as to the effectiveness of the popular and cultural Arab and African actions to consolidate the new spirit of freedom, democracy and social justice as expressed by these revolutions.

Chapter Three

The Libyan revolution

Causes, dynamics and future scenarios

Mohamed Ashour

Cairo University, Cairo

INTRODUCTION

When the winds of change and revolution blew over both Tunisia and Egypt, many thought that the wealth of Libya would be enough to prevent the Libyan people from revolting, but Libyans had a different opinion. In fact, the popular protests there soon escalated to become an open armed clash between the regime and its opponents. This begs the question as to why Libyans chose to revolt against their government despite their apparent wealth and well-being.

This chapter argues that the causes of this situation are manifold, most notable being the widespread corruption; the lack of justice in the distribution of the country's wealth among the various segments of society; the state of underdevelopment which the people suffered despite their country's oil wealth; the absence of real opposition; and the blockage of channels of communication; as well as 'oppression' by the revolutionary committees, which stretched arms of repression abroad to persecute all who disagreed with the system. This latter factor led to the accusations that the Libyan regime was repressive at home and supported terrorism abroad.

The aim of this chapter is to analyse the most important causes of the insurgency in Libya, which has escalated into a civil war, and the factors that may account for the current stalemate. These factors will be classified under two main categories: economic and social factors, on the one hand, and historical and political factors, on the other. In the concluding section, I will try to draw some possible scenarios for the future, based on an in-depth analysis of these factors, particularly the country's recent political history and sociological makeup.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS

Indicators of human development reports reveal that Libya is one of the Arab countries that have made progress according to the human development index (HDI), which measures health, education, income, etc. For example, from the rank of 64 in 2000, and 61 in 2001, Libya jumped to the rank of 53 in the world, and first in Africa in 2010.

Compared to its neighbours, Libya enjoys a low level of both absolute and relative poverty. Meanwhile, its abundant oil revenues and small population (5.5 million people) result in one of the highest GDPs per capita in Africa.¹⁶ Life expectancy at birth for males increased from 46 years in 1970 to 77 years in 2010, and from 48 years to 80 years for females for the same period. Equal opportunities in education are offered by the state, while basic education is free to all and compulsory up to secondary level. The literacy rate is the highest in North Africa, as nearly 88 per cent of the population can read. Since the 1970s, the number of university students has increased gradually to more than 200 000, in addition to 70 000 students enrolled in the higher technical and vocational sector in 2010. The rapid increase in the number of students in the higher education sector has been mirrored by an increase in the number of institutions of higher education. By the end of 2010, there were 15 universities across the country (although educational services provided by these universities were poor in proportion to their infrastructures).¹⁷ Libya's higher education is mostly financed by the public budget, although a small number of private institutions have been accredited lately.

Despite forced cutbacks in recent years, the Libyan population has enjoyed a high degree of social and

public security, thanks to the state subsidy policies, public health insurance, and the security grip of the regime. While criminal activities have been increasing in the last two decades, some have attributed this to the inflow of 'African' migrants.¹⁸

In a report published in 2007, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) praised Libya for its achievements in the field of economic diversification, pointing to the rapid growth in non-oil activities (7,5 per cent) as well as in oil production (4,7 per cent) in 2006.¹⁹ Moreover, since 2004, Libyan officials have carried out economic reforms as part of a broader campaign to reintegrate the country into the global capitalist economy. (These reforms have had negative political consequences, as will be shown below.)

But, in spite of the aforementioned indicators, many observers believe that since Qaddafi came to power through a military coup against King Idris Al-Sanussi in September 1969, Libya has lost many development opportunities. Personal rule confined to Qaddafi's family and a very close circle of his relatives and followers has deprived Libyans of their wealth. He even used that wealth to buy more followers, and tame the opposition or suppress them.²⁰

Despite the relative affluence of Libya compared to other Arab states (excluding the Gulf countries), there is a noticeable degree of disparity in wealth distribution. Billions in Libya's oil revenues go to a narrow circle of Qaddafi and his family. It seems that those four decades of the 'Colonel's' domination can be described as the lost decades of development.²¹ In addition to what Qaddafi and his sons spent on buying weapons, they accumulated financial wealth in the West. The same period witnessed growing networks of smuggling and money laundering in which senior officials were involved, without any fear of accountability or responsibility, thanks to the embargo imposed on Libya for decades, during which the system could attribute the failures of its policies to the blockade.²²

Openness to the West and the inflow of foreign investments and companies from 2003 to get a share in the regime's ambitious infrastructural projects, estimated to cost about \$150 billion, did not bring about much change in the equation of power, wealth and corruption. To the contrary, it exacerbated the situation as it synchronised with the policy of privatisation and the sale of public enterprises. This raised the fears of many unions and social groups about the accelerated pace of privatisation and the rise of the cost of living. The regime's attempts to fix the high cost of living by increasing salaries and wages did not reduce the negative effects of the economic policies on a broad sector of society. Instead, unemployment became the highest in the region, its rate

going above 20 per cent in 2009.²³ Annual inflation rates rose significantly due to the increase in public wages and the increase in prices of imports, especially food.²⁴

Perceptions of the unfair distribution of wealth and that wealth was looted prompted the Libyans to form protest movements that varied in strength, but which led to clashes between the protesters, on the one hand, and the regime and its supporters, on the other. These protests added to conflicts between the old guard and the new around the reform programmes advocated by al-Islam Qaddafi, son of Colonel Qaddafi, and carried out by Prime Minister Shukri Ghanem (2003–2006). This conflict eventually led to the resignation of Ghanem, who was succeeded by his conservative deputy, Al-Baghdadi Al-Mahmoudi.²⁵

Demographic factors have also played a key role in escalating protests against the regime. Since 1990, the youth population aged between 15 and 29 has grown by 50 per cent in Libya. Meanwhile, about 88 per cent of the population is urban, mostly concentrated in the three largest cities, Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata. Added to the liberalisation policies, all these factors pushed young Libyans not to accept the contradictions between slogans and reality. Slogans continued to emphasise the values of socialism, social justice and people's ownership, on one hand, whereas, on the other, the realities in people's lives were totally different as a result of the policies of economic liberalisation and privatisation, which threatened large segments of the youth, and even the interests of some supporters of the regime. This created a feeling of dissatisfaction against those policies.²⁶

Contrary to the HDI indicators mentioned above, many Libyans expressed their opinions on Facebook that although their country was at the forefront of the oil-rich Arab countries, it came in the bottom list of the Arab developed countries. Moreover, they saw their country looking like 'a very poor Third World country'.

TRIBAL FACTORS

Libya is a country in which the population is split up between an estimated 140 different tribes or clans, of which there are 30 powerful tribes. Although at the beginning of his reign Qaddafi made the abolition of tribal connection in the public arena one of the basic principles of his revolution, it seems that after more than four decades of rule he had failed to achieve this goal. Moreover, he revived and encouraged tribal identity as a tool to perpetuate his regime. Qaddafi does have a tribal following of supporters who will fight for him and he is therefore able to maintain attacks on the rebels. In 1994, aiming to infuse more dynamism and popular participation in his institutions, Qaddafi established popular

committees for social leadership, which consisted primarily of tribal leaders. This became more pronounced in 1997 with the signing of what was known as the 'Pact of Honour', in which these leaders pledged loyalty to the El-Fateh Revolution (Qaddafi's coup in 1969), and undertook to unite their efforts against any clan or tribe that tried to launch an armed opposition to the regime.²⁷

For long, Qaddafi manipulated internal rivalries between tribes as a key tool in tightening his grip on power and preventing the emergence of any credible rival.²⁸

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CAUSES

Historically, there has been latent competition between Libya's eastern and western provinces over status and sovereignty. The eastern provinces, particularly the city of Benghazi, supported Qaddafi's coup in 1969 more than any other provinces of the country. But soon this city became the stronghold of Islamic and non-Islamic opposition, and a source of unrest and coup attempts against the regime. Violent confrontations between the government and opposition from the 1970s resulted in a brain drain of professionals from the eastern cities, who left Libya. It is estimated that about 30 000 of them emigrated in the 1980s, mostly to Europe. All this added to the climate of mistrust between Qaddafi's regime and those cities.²⁹ A vicious circle of exclusion and repression emerged that led to protests and rebellions, which in turn led to more repression and exclusion, and so on.

Politically, the Qaddafi regime's legitimacy depended on four main pillars: revolutionary nationalism; egalitarianism and social justice; the legitimacy of dignity and national identity; and the symbolic value of Qaddafi as a fighter against international imperialism.

The Libyan regime emphasised repeatedly that the Libyan revolution was an extension of the 1952 revolution in Egypt, and that Qaddafi had inherited the trusted mission of Arab unity from the famous Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdel-Nasser. This perception has had repercussions for the directions of internal and external policies of Libya, and has led to a series of adventures in both the regional and international arenas. Before the regime tried to cope with the post-Cold War changes, the 11 September 2001 event, among other things, led to Libya's renunciation of its weapons and projects of mass destruction, and to the country's payment of compensation to the victims of the two incidents of Lockerbie³⁰ and the French UTA flight 772.³¹

Libyan foreign policy moved between the pursuit of Arab unity and the chasing of African unity, and between bilateral plans for federation and plans for continental unity. Nevertheless, the regime's adventures

in support of many violent organisations and rebel movements in all corners of the world³² created a sense of bitterness among broad segments of the Libyan population. These sections of the population saw their wealth dissipate as a result of these adventures, which eventually led to reparations imposed on their country,³³ while many of them suffered from poverty and relative deprivation in terms of education, health, public services and infrastructure.³⁴

As the coup of Egypt's Free Officers of 1952 had inspired Libya's coup of 1969, so Egypt's revolution of 25 January 2011, which eroded the legitimacy base of the 1952 revolution, inspired the youth revolution in Libya in 2011. It is not surprising that the first spark of the Libyan revolution started at Benghazi, which has been affected over the centuries by what happens in Egypt.

Domestically, Qaddafi was able to maintain his power and his regime through a policy of divide-and-rule, and by preaching a set of very general ideas, such as 'partners, not employees', 'the house is for whoever lives in it', 'Earth belongs to nobody', which are referred to in his 'Green Book' and what he called the 'Third Global Theory', which he drew from different ideologies (e.g. Arabism, Islamism and socialism).³⁵ Qaddafi also promoted what he considered as the fundamental values of Libyan culture, which were framed in such institutions as the people's congresses and committees, which added a degree of structural legitimacy and enabled the regime to control society.³⁶ With its huge economic fortunes, thanks to oil revenues, the regime tried to disseminate Qaddafi's ideas to a far greater extent than was warranted by their real value.³⁷

The practice of severe repression by the Qaddafi regime of all forms and symbols of opposition inside and outside the country reached its peak in the 1990s, taking advantage of the international ban on dealing with the Libyan regime.³⁸

Despite all banners, organisations and structures that aimed at translating the Green Book philosophy into a democratic rule of the masses, which included people's congresses (the legislative branch of Qaddafi's regime) at different levels and the people's committees (the executive branch), in practice all power was concentrated in Qaddafi's hands. This state of affairs was ensured by the revolutionary committees, established in 1979 and consisting of groups of enthusiastic youths committed to the ideas of Qaddafi's Green Book. In the same year, Qaddafi and his colleagues resigned from the General Secretariat of the General People's Congress. He thus declared a separation between revolution and authority, assuring the Libyan population that the traditional form of government had vanished, and stressing that the leadership of the revolution should not assume any position

of a political or administrative nature, but rather devote itself to the achievement of the revolution's goals and correcting the diversions that spoiled these goals. Since then, Qaddafi's official title has been 'Leader of the Revolution'.³⁹

Theoretically, Qaddafi tried to achieve a kind of direct democracy where people govern themselves by themselves and for themselves. However, his inner circle and revolutionary committees were the real power holders in the state and society. The revolutionary committees have played an important role in Libyan politics over the past decades and have served as a parallel line of authority in Libya, adding more complications to political life.⁴⁰

The people represented in both basic and general people's congresses were responsible for discussing general policies and legislation, and conducting state administrative affairs and political security. The revolution's power chain started at the command of Qaddafi and the still-remaining members of the Revolutionary Command Council, followed by the members of the revolutionary committees, whose task it was to monitor the people's committees and urge participation in their meetings. To do so, the committees were given a broad and strong authority. The revolutionary committees took advantage of confrontations with foreign powers, especially with the United States (US), to gain more power and influence, internally and externally.⁴¹

The fragility of political institutions and the oppression by revolutionary committees have prevented real popular participation in political affairs.⁴² A recent study estimated popular reluctance to participate in politics by people who have the right to participate as being in the range of 50 to 80 per cent.⁴³ Above all, a class of beneficiaries and monopolists of power and wealth has risen to become rooted to an extent that makes it difficult to eradicate the climate of corruption that is widespread in society, including at the highest levels of the regime.⁴⁴ This situation is compounded by the absence of genuine civil society institutions independent of the system.⁴⁵

There have been frequent criticisms raised by the United Nations (UN) Commission on Human Rights and several human rights defence organisations against the repressive practices of the Libyan regime. For example, Amnesty International has expressed concerns about the large number of alleged cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary killings.⁴⁶ According to a report by Amnesty International in 2010,

Freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association are subject to severe restrictions, the authorities did not show any tolerance towards opposition. Critics of the government's record on human

rights were punished, former detainees at Guantánamo Bay whom the US authorities have returned to Libya re-detained, so arrested and jailed some members of the victims' families, who were seeking to know the truth of their relatives. It was unclear the fate of hundreds of forced disappearances and other gross violations of human rights committed in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, the Internal Security Agency that was involved in such violations continued exercising its work immune ... from accountability and punishment.⁴⁷

While some had hopes regarding the reform project of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, who tried to reduce the influence of the revolutionary committees,⁴⁸ others saw the project as merely a tool in the conflict between reformists and conservatives over power and influence, or between elites within the regime.⁴⁹ Many Libyans were suspicious of this project in light of the corruption and tyranny they had endured since 1969 and the era of the international embargo.⁵⁰ These suspicions increased as the basic anti-corruption policy set up by Qaddafi failed to achieve its purpose and was selective in performing its functions in a manner that made it another tool for imposing trusteeship and control over economic and financial entities that dealt with foreign companies, through subjecting them to the supervision of the regime's loyalists.⁵¹

Thus, despite – or perhaps because of – Libya's economic reform programme, which began with the lifting of the UN sanctions in 1999, and accelerated from 2003, tensions escalated and a stronger opposition to the regime grew. But the opposition was not able to get rid of the regime by itself. Meanwhile, foreign powers were not confident that the opposition inside and outside Libya could undertake this role due to its fragmentation and the ambiguity of its goals and objectives.⁵² For this reason, the West bet on change from within through the reform project of Qaddafi junior.

However, the advent of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions changed the situation as they uncovered many myths related to these regimes, the most important being the myth that no power could overthrow these regimes. The revolutions of Egypt and Tunisia overcame the stereotyped image of Arab repressive institutions as possessing high capabilities of predicting events, crushing rebellions and eliminating their members. In this context, Egypt's revolution was the trigger that unleashed the Libyan revolution, especially in the eastern provinces.

Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi's reaction to peaceful protesters revealed the fragility of his reform project, as he fully supported the repressive policies of his father in the face of peaceful demonstrations. Thus, the West's confidence in the credibility of political reform in the

country faded. At the same time, the Libyan revolution represented a historic opportunity to get rid of the Qaddafi regime, which was a thorn in the flesh of many, not only at the international level but also at the regional level, including Arab and African countries.

EXPLAINING THE STALEMATE IN LIBYA

The inability of the rebels to achieve military victory despite foreign support makes one doubt that the Qaddafi regime will fall soon. But the inability of Qaddafi's forces to remove the rebels from their positions has resulted in a stalemate. So, what are the causes of this deadlock? A few explanatory factors can be identified.

Personal nature of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi

Qaddafi is characterised as stubborn and intransigent in attitude, and irritated in reaction, and is not expected to give up or accept to the rebels' demands easily. Historically, he has not conceded to the demands of his colleagues in the Revolutionary Command Council, and has dealt with his opponents ruthlessly.

Lack of a military institution and a national army

There is no strong army in Libya, unlike in Egypt and Tunisia. It is said that Qaddafi fears the army, does not trust it, and considers it a threat to his regime, which has meant that he has weakened it under the banner of 'armed people' as an alternative.⁵³ However, while under the 'armed people' initiative the regime has trained people to use arms, it has kept the weapons and the ammunition warehouses under the control of the regime, Qaddafi's militias, and the Special Security Forces headed by his sons or members of his tribe, at the expense of the country's official army.⁵⁴ This goes back to the first coup attempts led by Omar Abdullah Mahici, who was a member of the Revolutionary Command Council.

Also, unlike in Egypt or Tunisia, there is no power that has the capability and resources to overthrow the dictator. So it is unlikely that the army will play a major role in resolving the crisis in Libya. Moreover, the Libyan regime learned from the experiences of Tunisia and Egypt that the hesitation of the two regimes in responding firmly and bloodily to the demonstrators led to their fall. Thus, the Libyan regime has mobilised its repressive repertoire to quell the popular uprising.

Lack of a clear Western position

Despite using all its cards, including warning against an Islamic emirate in eastern Libya if the region falls into the hands of demonstrators and the repercussions of the regime collapse for migration to Europe, the Libyan regime has failed to convince Western countries to support it. Western countries are mostly hostile towards the regime.

Nevertheless, because of the lack of clear information about the composition, components and intellectual and political orientations of the opposition forces,⁵⁵ apart from the fear of what the post-Qaddafi era might look like,⁵⁶ a degree of hesitation and uncertainty has shaped the Western position towards Libya. There was an attitude of preferring to help the opposition through financial and human aid, along with a no-fly zone and strikes against the forces of Qaddafi and their military installations to protect civilians, but not to supply the rebels with the weapons or ammunition vital for them to confront the regime's superior armed forces.⁵⁷ It was also argued that NATO should refrain from sending any ground troops to end the battle in favour of the opposition. All that has led to a degree of inertia on the ground, as each side of the conflict is unable to end it militarily.⁵⁸

It seems that the current stalemate in Libya, in essence, reflects the contradiction and complexity of interests in the international system after the end of the Cold War. The BRICS group (Russia, China, India, Brazil and South Africa) confirmed, in its third annual meeting on 14 April 2011, the need for a peaceful settlement to the Libyan crisis, rejecting any military intervention of NATO in Libya. On the other hand, France, from the outset of the crisis, recognised the Transitional National Council (TNC) in Benghazi and pushed for military intervention. The US stood hesitant at the outset, while Britain tried to catch up with the international scramble for Libya with a position somewhere between the French and American ones. NATO members such as Italy, Turkey, Germany and Greece also hesitated and adopted ambiguous positions towards Libya's crisis, each based on complex calculations concerning interests and losses.⁵⁹

The US position is shaped by three views, each prevailing in one of its foreign policy institutions. The first is expressed by American oil companies that want access to Libyan oil, even if the price is to divide Libya; the second is held by the US Department of Defense, which does not want to fight a war for the benefit of oil companies or to have a new Afghanistan or Iraq in North Africa; and the third view is espoused by the hawks in the US administration, such as Susan Rice and Hillary Clinton, and perhaps President Barack Obama himself,

who stress the need for the departure of Qaddafi as a precondition to end the war in Libya.⁶⁰

We may understand the desistance from sending ground troops in light of its possible consequences, namely the split of internal, regional and international fronts regarding defining the role of those troops and their mission. There is also the fear of a post-Qaddafi era, which explains the reluctance of the West to support the rebels fully and supply them with the necessary quantity and quality of weapons sufficient to win the conflict.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCENARIOS

There are many paths that Libya's crisis could take in the short to medium term. The following scenarios are among the most likely paths of the crisis.

The partition of Libya into eastern and western regions:

This first scenario is the worst-case scenario for the country, but it is plausible in light of the continued fighting without a decisive victory for any of the parties. The result would be more suffering and loss of life, where the tribes of both sides would take revenge on their enemies in the region under their control, thereby following the Iraq, Somalia or Afghanistan models.⁶¹

The forceful overthrow of Qaddafi, and the control by opposition forces of the entire country: This scenario appears to be the most likely outcome, provided that the rebels are given weapons, or that the regime increasingly comes under pressure and is pushed towards collapse from within and its capabilities curtailed.⁶² We see the role of NATO and the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor's warrants for the arrest of the Colonel and his son in this context. However, this scenario will have a number of side effects, such as the possible split of

the opposition into many fronts after it has succeeded in getting rid of Qaddafi and his regime, which is its common, uniting goal.⁶³ Consequently, this scenario may require international intervention in the form of peace-keeping forces, or something more effective to restore security and stability to Libya. Yet this would, in turn, raise many concerns and questions about, for example, who would provide troops or bear the costs.⁶⁴

The third scenario involves *the possibility that the Libyan regime will overcome all the challenges* and hostile alliances it confronts, and restore its control over the country by using its tribal and regional alliances and its financial surpluses. Despite the fact that this scenario is less likely than the others, given the military and political facts on the ground, it will carry more complications to regional and international relations if it materialises. The emergence of this scenario may convince the international and regional powers that they must either overthrow the regime through covert or direct action, or modify the behaviour of the regime through economic and other tools in the same way that Qaddafi was persuaded to give up weapons of mass destruction before.⁶⁵

In sum, there are many actors and variables with regard to the crisis. No one can tell what will happen next. But what is certain is that, whatever the outcome of the crisis, it will have serious repercussions for internal, regional and international affairs. Libya after this war (with or without Qaddafi) will never be the same again. But the main lesson is that the longer an autocratic regime stays in power, the greater the potential for instability after it disappears, especially if it is overthrown by force. That points to the strong need for consolidating peaceful rotation of power and strong civil society to prevent the existing authoritarian regimes in the region from staying in power longer.⁶⁶

Section Two

Challenges facing governments and transitional authorities

Francis N. Ikome

Chair of the Session



Photo 2 L to R: Dr Souaré, Dr Ikome, Dr Hennad and Prof. Elhouari

Section Two

Challenges facing governments and transitional authorities

Francis N. Ikome

Chair of the Session

There are challenges faced by the North African states that have already successfully undergone the first phase of revolution (i.e. Egypt and Tunisia); those that are yet to experience the full weight of revolutionary verve (e.g. Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania); and by Libya, which is in a distinct category in that its revolution appears to have gone terribly wrong, degenerating into a civil war. Although for several years the Maghreb region was seen as being different from the rest of Africa, there were nevertheless differences among these countries – socially, politically and even economically – which partly explains the differences in the pace of the spread and character of the revolutions in each of these countries. For example, the slowness of the revolution to reach Morocco could be partly explained by the duality of the Moroccan political system in terms of its combination of traditional monarchical features and elements of modern statehood – represented by the king and the prime minister respectively. It would seem that the strong identification of many Moroccan people with the monarchy makes the prospects of pushing for an overthrow of the political order slim – hence the notion of ‘Moroccan exceptionalism’. Similarly, although speculations have been rife that Algeria was an attractive destination for the North African revolutionary train, it

would seem that Algeria’s fatigue with wars and uprisings has been a partial explanation for its being spared a revolution thus far. Other factors accounting for the absence of an uprising in a country include the pre-emptive responses by the regime in power.

With regard to the likelihood of a contagion effect on sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), two schools of thought seem to animate the debate. One school of thought argues that SSA had its share of popular uprisings in the 1990s, during Africa’s second wave of democratisation, whereas North Africa was shielded by ‘Maghrebian exceptionalism’, and therefore the North African uprisings may not necessarily spread to SSA. The second school believes that the so-called second wave of democratisation in SSA was not deep enough and that much of the democratic space in SSA is still very constricted. Therefore, some Sub-Saharan peoples are most likely to be positively inspired by developments in the North to take to the streets. However, if this were to happen, it would manifest itself differently because of the specific realities of individual African countries. There are already signs of popular uprisings in some countries of SSA – such as Swaziland and Burkina Faso – but none has yet been of the scale of what happened in North Africa. These are some of the issues discussed in more detail in this section.

Chapter Four

The political reforms recently announced in Algeria

An overview

Mohamed Hennad

University of Algiers

INTRODUCTION

From the outset, it should be noted that we speak about the 'Arab Spring', forgetting that after spring comes summer. And the 'Arab Summer' can be hot!

For months, North African countries have experienced an unprecedented dynamism in their political history. It is obvious that each country in the area is different from the others from the point of view of its conditions and the opportunities for a successful transition from authoritarian rule. However, although there are similarities and differences between these countries, the motivation remains the same – to establish governing systems that are legitimate and efficient. Successful transition is more about the differences in the means of achieving it rather than the goal itself.

Also, how can what is happening in some countries in the area be described? Is it really about 'revolution'? This question is not a simple theoretical controversy, but a real practical concern requiring caution.

It seems that the terms 'uprising' or 'revolt' are more appropriate here since the term 'revolution' designates a process, more or less long, at the end of which it is clear that substantial and irreversible changes have taken place in the political practice of a given country. On the other hand, the term 'uprising' denotes a simple reversal of the existing order, but without an apparent purpose (apart from what can be guessed from the displayed signs) based on a detailed programme and a chosen leadership to lead the change.

Similarly, it is obvious that the protesters' hopes – both in the North African countries and in others – are still unclear since we cannot imagine that they have a unity of purpose, particularly in those societies affected

by the lack of a democratic socio-political practice that is based on solving conflicts through dialogue.

THE PHENOMENON OF ALGERIAN PROTESTS AND THE REACTION OF THE AUTHORITIES

At the outset it must be pointed out that since its independence, but especially over the last two decades, Algeria has been unclear about its future, so that the same question returns again and again, like a leitmotif – 'Where is Algeria going?'

It should be remembered that the Algerian street rose relatively early, in 1988. Immediately after this, steps were taken towards establishing a democratic regime. Unfortunately this attempt was soon to fail and Algeria suffered a real 'national tragedy', the effects of which continue to be felt to this day, even if dramatic improvements have been made in this area.

In January 2011, several riots against the high cost of living took place in Algeria. These riots lasted only a few days, as the public authorities acted immediately to meet the protesters' demands. However, it seems as if these authorities have forgotten what rioting against living conditions means. First of all, rioting is accompanied by a mood that does not express only a certain social fragility, but also, and maybe in a special way, a feeling of the loss of human dignity. When things reach the point at which riots occur, it is indeed an issue of social justice, here the reaction to a governing deficit combined with a failure to communicate.

For a while now Algeria has been facing an increasing number of strikes and demonstrations across various parts of the national territory and at almost all social levels. When facing these types of events, public

authorities often choose to meet the material demands of the protestors, but exercise control when the demonstrations are about political demands. However, these authorities make a mistake when allowing themselves to understand these demands at face value, i.e. as being without political implications. This they feel they can afford to do because of the financial comfort provided by the country's oil revenues. Thus, Algeria may expose itself to the risk of social disturbance due to the corporatist character that these demands continue to take, since each social group expects to obtain satisfaction at its level. Thus, the increase in corporate selfishness keeps the society from thinking and doing things as one.

Moreover, by being ready to satisfy these types of demands, the public authorities have no other choice than to delay the deadlines of the reforms made necessary by the need to improve the national economy. More than ever, today Algeria needs to rationalise its economy, particularly through: (1) fighting against the informal economy and smuggling; (2) reversing the current trend of preferring trade to manufacturing; (3) restoring the trust of the investors that complain of legal instability and bureaucracy; (4) fighting against tax evasion on a large scale; and (5) fighting against the dangers that the informal economy presents to the health of the population and to public peace, as well as the environment.

THE PROPOSED REFORMS

It must be pointed out that the reforms that have been announced in Algeria since the speech of the President of the Republic in mid-April 2011 have not been the result of a 'revolution' that has led to the collapse of the regime and its replacement with provisional authorities, as happened in Tunisia and Egypt. These reforms have taken place in a 'revolutionary' regional context, as an attempt to shake up a political impasse that has been blocking the human and material abilities of the country for a long time, an impasse revealed through ongoing protest movements.

In reality, the announced political reforms have not brought anything new or nearly so, since they are only a repetition of what has been unsuccessfully presented since 1999. These include, in particular, the revision of the constitution and certain fundamental laws, such as the laws on parties and on elections. But there were no immediate strong decisions mentioned in the mid-April presidential speech, particularly regarding the reorganisation of a failing government and the dissolution of a 'rump' or figurehead and rubber-stamp parliament.

Given the way these reforms will be carried out, officially they will have three vital characteristics: (1)

they will give priority, as is customary, to the security aspects, owing to the role reserved for the Ministry of Interior in preparing texts relative to the laws on parties and on elections; (2) the reforms will be chosen through the advisory committee appointed by the President garnering the opinions of different parties, associations and political figures concerning which reforms to consider, purportedly by mutual agreement (this committee is not an independent national committee, just as it has only advisory, not bargaining, powers; this means that it is representative of one party only, in this instance, the government); (3) the reforms will also have a populist appearance since the National Economic and Social Council (CNES) – which depends on the presidency – has been asked within a limited time to convene a meeting in which hundreds, if not thousands, of association representatives discuss the reforms.

The ongoing contacts between the President of the Council of the Nation (upper house of parliament), assisted by two advisers of the President of the Republic, and the different socio-political forces are not based on a partnership that is well understood by all parties, but on the basis of a simple listening exercise that in the end does not commit anyone. Moreover, the contacts are signed behind closed doors and without debates open to the broader public. The state television broadcaster, whose presence is vital to the success of the promised reforms, is barred from these debates. Consequently, a number of parties and political figures have refused the invitation to participate in these consultations, to which, according to them, 'anyone was invited', even 'political corpses'. On the other hand, this lack of openness is also motivated by the government's adopted approach, which involves the deferment of the amendment to the constitution until after the revision of the laws on parties and on elections. For the government, the order of things cannot be reversed and must start with the second reform before the first.

All this means that Algerians will be forced to accept 'granted' basic reforms instead of 'negotiated' consensual reforms.

THE PARTICULARITY OF THE ALGERIAN CASE WITHIN THE TRANSITION CONTEXT

In order to explain the particularity of the Algerian case we have to return to the question of why no revolution started in Algeria, more or less at the same time as other countries in North Africa, despite what was predicted by many observers.

Indeed, there are many reasons that can be given to explain why Algeria has never known this revolution

and why there is very little probability that it will take place. (This is not to exclude the possibility of revolution completely; human nature is what it is, essentially unpredictable.) These reasons include the following:

- The traumas that have affected Algeria since the onset of the deadly violence, which still continues even if its intensity has decreased considerably. The 'national tragedy' seems to have implanted in the Algerian subconscious the belief that the desired changes should be imposed, not by rebellion, but through insisting on claims that are mainly of a socio-economic nature, but also political.
- The ability acquired by the government over this period to manage crises by using a carrot and stick policy.
- The skills acquired by the security services over the same period, not only in the fight against terrorism, but also in observing social movements and being able to operate on the scale of the social and political forces present on the national scene.
- The importance of questions related to human rights and corruption in conjunction with the national tragedy.

From the preceding list, but also from the moment where Algeria has in place most of the mechanisms of the democratic system (institutions and laws), it can be argued that what Algeria needs today to ensure its successful transition is not a 'paper revolution', but rather compliance with the following mechanisms in particular:

- Opening the public broadcasting field – still unique and, hence, highly selective politically – to various political and thought debates. This is how the government can reach a minimal national consensus, able to provide favourable conditions for the successful transition to a democratic regime.
- Making the solemn commitment to ensuring the necessary conditions for the future legislative elections (spring 2012) to take place peacefully and in full transparency and to recognising their legitimacy, no matter what their outcome. It is obvious that these conditions must be the fruit of a national consensus.

The guarantees of free and transparent elections will help to regain the people's lost confidence, especially if they are accompanied by the dissolution of the so-called 'Presidential Alliance' and a change of government, some ministers having been in power for almost two decades without being success stories.

CONCLUSION

It is obvious that the proposed reforms will not be credible unless the current governing regime recognises that it is time to 'pass the torch'. The generation that fought colonialism and has presided over the destiny of the country since its independence continues to think that to surrender power – even in the name of democracy and the spirit of citizenship – is pure self-denial and that it is out of the question for it to admit the necessity of a change among the political elite of the country. This idea of a generation does not refer to a biological generation only, but also to a certain spirit, named 'the spirit of November 1st', so that one of the forces that has seemed to carry more weight in political decisions since the independence of the country remains what is called 'the revolutionary family', made up of organisations of national liberation fighters (*mujahedeen*), the children of *shouhada* (martyrs) and of *mujahedeen*. This generation desires to perpetuate a historic income based on an oil economy.

It is also obvious that the feeling of confidence in the commitment of the government to real elections will not fail to open the way for a keen interest in the creation of new parties, often opportunistic, including populist parties that may affect the future of transition negatively. In the present situation in Algeria, it would be better to try to be less formal and more pragmatic in this area. It is thus that it would be wise to *continue*, even illegally, but by explaining why, to refuse to accept the registration of new parties, apart from those that have been requesting registration for years without obtaining it, despite the fact that they have always met all the requirements of the current laws. It is clear that this measure, which operates by excellence, remains temporary, subject to the conducting of the elections, the result of which, once accepted by everyone, will surely create a different national political landscape.

Chapter Five

The protest against the Arab political regimes and the exception of Morocco

El Houari Setta

University of Hassan 1st, Settat

INTRODUCTION

The protest against the authoritarian Arab regimes that continues to shake up certain Arab states (Libya, Syria and Yemen) also continues to give rise to reactions and questions, in particular among the leaders of European states. This can certainly be explained by their fear of the political instability on the southern bank of Europe (i.e. Maghreb countries in North Africa), a possible growth of Islamism (al-Qaeda), and an increase in illegal emigration. As far as observers of the Arab world are concerned, some have attempted to bring answers to the table and to provide relevant forums for reflection to explain the phenomenon of this movement,⁶⁷ others have rushed into it, without trying to be prudent, by simplifying the process, which seems much more complex to us.⁶⁸ This chapter tries to adopt a more nuanced approach.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL CONTEXTS

Irrespective of the approach adopted to understand and interpret the process of challenging authoritarian regimes, it seems that one has to guard against thinking that the whole Arab world is identical by failing to consider the individual political and social history of each country. In trying to understand the situations in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, it wouldn't be possible to use a single interpretation grid. The situation in each country is dictated by its sociocultural, economic and political history, the nature of the regime put in place after independence, the categories of bodies and role-players that work towards the representation of the popular sovereignty, and the mode of governance.

If one observes what is currently happening throughout the Arab world, the Moroccan monarchy seems to be one of the regimes that have, up to now, been spared the protests and popular rejection. The question is whether it will later be reached by the wave of protest or if it will indeed be an exception. Will it have the capacity and the resources in its ideological reservoir to face up to the conflicting aspirations of the youth movement of 20 February and the various prevailing currents?⁶⁹ What trump cards does it hold that its neighbours don't have? What should one read into the movement of the Moroccan anti-establishment youth launched on 20 February 2011?

ANATOMY OF THE PROTEST MOVEMENT IN MOROCCO

Looking at the protests of the youth movement launched on 20 February and their catalogue of demands, it can be said that the monarchic regime is not part of the equation. Compared to its North African neighbours and the Middle East, the regime remains uncontested and incontestable. The reason is simple. Unlike other Arab countries, although it shares a certain number of cultural and religious reference points, the Moroccan monarchy has made different political choices since independence to consolidate its power and to survive and perpetuate the entire political system without much protest from its citizens and political opposition parties.

It has also demonstrated its skill at integrating its opponents into the political game and its capacity to react against those who contest its monopoly on power. Finally, it has managed to adapt to, and continue in, its environment by including any anti-establishment expression, including Islamists, to maintain a central position in the institutional mechanism.

THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS IN MOROCCO

In drawing up an extensive possible balance sheet of the mechanisms of 'democratisation' put in place, in the institutional and electoral domains, by King Hassan II and by King Mohamed VI after his accession to the throne, it is necessary to turn our attention to what constitutes, in our view, the most significant options in terms of the liberalisation of the political game in the history of Morocco. Whereas the Arab political regimes have wavered, since their independence, between the status quo and instability or even maintaining a despotic regime, the Moroccan monarchy has initiated a process of institutionalisation of the monarchy and reform in order to preserve the perpetuity of the regime, and at the same time eliminate any opposition and integrate those who accept its operating methods at the level of management.

But before exposing these options for liberalisation it should be emphasised, as explained by Stora in comparing the Moroccan and Algerian political systems, that:

[T]he deep-rootedness of the monarchy which is found in Morocco, the profound commitment of all Moroccans and in all layers of society to this system makes it necessary to set apart at first glance the two countries – Morocco and Algeria. The continuity of the State in Morocco, spread over centuries and not subdued by the French protectorate, brings the Moroccans to maintain a relationship with history which in no way resembles the one observed in Algeria, where reference is always made to a brief, revolutionary history of rupture.⁷⁰

The monarchy, while maintaining its historic legitimacy, has made political choices since the first years of independence that are poles apart from those of its North African neighbours. Different choices, certainly, but they retain its prerogatives without affecting the bases of its power. Firstly, the monarchy has since 1956 become attached to the national construction around the throne while favouring:

- The establishment of political pluralism, which still exists, as the underlying principle of the political system. This being said, the monarchy has refuted the one-party system.
- The adoption of a very liberal code of public freedoms, regulating the right of association, the right of public gatherings and the regulation of the press (1958). In this way, the opposition, not to mention the media and role-players of civil society, has always been able to express itself, sometimes in

spite of harassment and repressive measures, while benefiting from the spaces of the freedoms.

- The reorganisation, since 18 November 1962, of the powers by the adoption of the first constitution, thus paving the way for the constitutional history of Morocco.

Since the promulgation of the constitution, different constitutional reforms have been undertaken⁷¹ without stripping the first constitution of its original intention, namely the institutionalisation of the regime and the predominance of the monarch within the institutional mechanism.⁷² The powers are, admittedly, shared between the governing institutions, but according to an arrangement by virtue of which the monarch governs. As such, Benabdallah writes:⁷³ 'without doubt Morocco has known five constitutions, but they remain cast in one and the same mould: that of the governing monarchy'.

Be that as it may, in terms of a painstaking progress and despite sometimes violent conflicts between the political opposition parties stemming from the national movement, not to mention the army (refer, for example, to the two attempted coups of 1971 and 1972), a consensus around the institutions could be found from the beginning of 1998 between the monarchy and its opponents. It should be noted that 'in spite of the constitutional recognition of their function of organisation and representation of the citizens, the Moroccan monarchy has deployed a strategy of decline and marginalisation of the formations stemming from the national movement, while perpetuating a multi-party system which serves to maintain and reinforce its leadership'.⁷⁴

In fact, King Hassan II, after months of negotiations with his competitors, appointed Abderrahmane Yousoufi,⁷⁵ opponent of long standing, to the post of Prime Minister on 4 February 1998. This appointment not only signifies the integration of the opposition parties in the political game shaped by the monarchy, but also their confinement 'in the secondary functions of civic education and selection of the elite which will participate in "the management of the common affairs" without intending to conquer the power'.⁷⁶ The left of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires or USFP), which previously contested the power monopoly of the monarchy, ended up recognising the legitimacy of the regime and switching from contesting it to criticising government.

After the integration of the left and its recognition of the primacy of the monarchy in the institutional mechanism, the latter has been deployed in order to control the Moroccan Islamists⁷⁷ and at the same time expand the political space beyond its opponents from the very

beginning. In doing so, the monarchy has succeeded in winning over the moderate Islamists 'which seemed to them to be the most respectable and likely to be the interface between the Islamic movement and the Palace'⁷⁸ and in marginalising the radicals, to begin the movement Justice et Bienfaisance (al-Adl Wal Ihssan). In 1997, nine members of the Party of Justice and Democracy (Parti de la Justice et de la Démocratie, or PJD) were elected to Parliament.

It should be kept in mind that the process of opening up and of instituting reforms was initiated during the 1990s, i.e. well before the succession of King Mohamed VI. The most significant measures arising from this process are:

- The creation of the Consulting Human Rights Council (Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l'Homme) (08 May 1990) to 'put an end', as King Hassan II emphasised, 'to what some people have to say on Human Rights, to close this file'⁷⁹
- The setting up of an independent arbitration body (Instance d'Arbitrage Indépendante), responsible for fixing the amount of the compensations in aid of the victims of the 'forced disappearance' and 'arbitrary detention' or of their legal claimants
- The release of political prisoners starting from 1991
- The creation of a 'Ministry responsible for Human Rights' (November 1993)

King Mohammed VI, on succeeding his father, committed himself further to a process of opening up and of reforms that his father had initiated a few years earlier. The democratic aspirations of King Mohammed VI are undeniable, as shown by the reforms carried out, starting with:

- The creation of the Equity and Reconciliation Body (Instance Équité et Réconciliation, or IER) (in January 2004), whose mission it is to 'establish the nature and scale of the serious violations of human rights committed in the past, examined in their context and in the light of the norms and values of human rights as well as the principles of democracy and of the Constitutional State'; in addition it must determine 'the responsibilities of the State bodies or of any other party in the serious violations of human rights'. By this initiative, the young King particularly wants to shake off the heritage of his father by finally turning over the page following the 'years of the bullet'.
- The adoption of the family code (on 23 January 2004), which led to equality between women and men in a couple.

- The adoption of a new law on political parties (on 17 March 2005) whose objective it is to give more credibility to political action and to ensure transparency in the management of political parties, with a view to allowing them to contribute actively to the success of the democratic process and to put an end to certain practices which harm the political process.

DEEPER POLITICAL REFORMS SINCE 1999

It will be noted that one of the striking facts of the first decade of the reign of the new sovereign has been the normalisation of the electoral processes and the holding of regular elections (two legislative elections, in 2002 and in 2007, and two municipal elections, in 2003 and in 2009). Moreover, these elections have been marked by their transparency, unlike those organised under Hassan II, which were marred by irregularities and manipulated by the Minister of the Interior at the time, Driss Basri.

From the above it is clear that the monarchy, despite its troubled institutional and political life (the battle for the real exercise of power), is one of the rare regimes of the Arab world to have succeeded. It did this by adjusting permanently to the transformations of its national and international environment; and by having its leadership accepted both by its opponents from the very beginning of independence and by the moderate Islamists. It integrated them into the political game shaped under its leadership, imposed its political choices on them, compelled them into the subordinate role of administrator of the State and, imitating the style of El Maslouhi, made members of the radical opposition employees of the State.⁸⁰

From this point of view, asserting that 'the monarchy finds itself in a very precarious situation'⁸¹ in the face of the youth protest movement of 20 February is an error of judgement. Although the protests in Tunisia, Egypt (Libya/Syria) have led to the collapse of the regimes in some of these countries, the Moroccan monarchy is more stable than in the past.⁸²

Reading the discourse conveyed by some, with the exception of a few discordant voices of a very small minority,⁸³ listening to the slogans and deciphering the banners of the protesters, it can be affirmed that the demands of the youth movement revolve around two axes: social and economic integration, and bringing the political system in line with international standards. In other words, the protest does not concern demands aimed at conquering the apparatus of the State or bringing about the fall of the regime, but rather is concerned with access to material resources, for fear of sinking into

poverty or a drop in social status, and the deepening of the democracy.

THE CATALOGUE OF DEMANDS OF THE 20 FEBRUARY YOUTH MOVEMENT

Before examining the lexicon of the demands of the youth movement, one thing should be clarified. The manifestations of protest in the public space are not a new phenomenon in Morocco. The 'bread riots' of 1981, 1984 or indeed of 1994, not to mention the challenging movements aimed at the regime, still remain in the collective memory.⁸⁴

What is new, though, is the sudden emergence of the 'social categories' since the beginning of the 1990s, and their contribution to the protest space, as well as the emergence of new forms of expression of protest and mobilisations. In this connection, El Maslouhi remarks: 'With a few exceptions (Islamic network), the present context of eradication, domestication, indeed even making the radical oppositions, old and new, work for the State, is at the origin of a notable shift of the forms of opposition towards previously unknown collective protest practices and mobilisations where the partisan and parliamentary arenas are obviously losing speed with regard to the politicised social movements.'⁸⁵

These social categories, over and above the diversity of the individual trajectories of their role-players, declare themselves to be situated outside the political parties and trade unions. By way of illustration, unemployed graduates regularly organise sit-ins in front of Parliament.

The protest movement has a multiplicity of demands, such as respect for children's rights, employment, access to drinking water, an end to price increases, and the improvement of transport. Populations of certain regions have also marched against their marginalisation. In brief, with a few exceptions, the protest movement concerns demands with a socioeconomic character.⁸⁶

All in all, Morocco has experienced its share of protest manifestations and will continue to do so as long as the socioeconomic problems persist. At the time of this contribution (May 2011), pensioners of the *Office Chérifien du Phosphate* are holding demonstrations at Khouribgha, demanding jobs for their unemployed children.

The question that is now worth asking is: what distinguishes the catalogue of demands of the Facebook youth movement at the origin of the 20 February protest from those of the other protest movements that Morocco has experienced and that it continues to experience?

If, at the outset, the objective of the youth was to mobilise the followers of the social networks and the

virtual movements to create support around the question of 'political reforms', one has to say that the desired trigger mechanism was not triggered. The watchword was diluted in a multiplicity of demands and objectives. Housing, education, health, employment, the improvement of the public service, social justice, the fight against corruption, the protection of the public monies, the respect of human rights, the resignation of the current government and the dissolution of Parliament, a democratic monarchy, a constitutional monarchy, a monarchy that reigns but does not govern, a new constitution, 'the King is loved, he is the guarantee of our unity', etc., such is the catalogue of demands that observers can derive from the slogans of the protesters, placards and interviews of the participants in the media.

In other words, the virtual fever that has given enthusiasm to those who desired to supplant the political parties and the parliamentarians that are 'losing speed' with regard to the social protest movements and to channel the movement towards a downward revision of the prerogatives of the monarchy has been transformed into several ill-assorted movements with specific demands. It seems that the participation of the different ideological tendencies and the diversity of those who have answered the call have in some way transformed the march into a fun fair of specific petitions. In fact, the call of the youth has found an echo not only among human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs), extreme left militants, Islamic sympathisers of the sphere of influence 'Al Adl Wa Al Ihssan' and members of the youth of the USFP and of the PJD but also among journalists, entrepreneurs, dropouts and those left behind by the socioeconomic reforms that have been implemented over two decades, not to mention the anonymous ones, whether they are onlookers or imitators.

It should be noted, however, that although the demonstrators have attacked in particular certain government personalities and members of the King's the entourage in all their outings, they have never crossed the line by chanting offensive slogans with regard to the monarch or the monarchic institution. Even 'the most radical protesters', as Tozy emphasises, 'think and say that a revolution could only take place with the king'.⁸⁷ This said, 'the deep-rootedness of the monarchy and the profound commitment of all Moroccans and in all the layers of society to this system' is indisputable.

However, if there is are new facts to be learned about the phenomenon of the protest movements, they concern:

- The emergence of a youth situated on the fringe of the traditional political parties that have become a

sort of factory that manufactures the future administrators of the public services

- A more politicised youth compared to the movements that Morocco has experienced, with an ambition to play the role of political mediation
- A youth with the audacity to challenge the decision-making power of the monarchy
- A youth that has re-appropriated demands carried by several political role-players before independence (M.H. Ouazzani and others), but put away again by the political parties stemming from the national independence movement: to live under a monarchy with a real separation of the powers
- A youth that has enriched the political field, benefiting at the same time from the current events of the Arab world and the lack of planning of the Moroccan political parties

Ever since the protests, the youth has become a political role-player that can't be ignored. Proof hereof lies in the consulting committee for the review of the constitution

inviting the leaders of this movement, like the other role-players of the political scene, to present their vision of constitutional reform.

CONCLUSION

The King didn't take long to contain the youth protest movement and anticipate it at the same time. Thus, three significant measures were taken: the creation of the Economic and Social Council (21 February), substitution of the Consulting Human Rights Council with the National Council of Human Rights (4 March), and the creation of a Consulting Committee for the Review of the Constitution just after his speech (9 March).

Since then, a debate between the institutional role-players and those of civil society has developed around the question of the constitutional review. Thus, these demands have eventually obtained the support of the monarchy, political parties as well as civil society. All these factors, and many others, distinguish the Moroccan regime from the other Arab regimes.

Chapter Six

The potential for contagion into sub-Saharan Africa of the popular revolts in North Africa

Issaka K. Souaré

Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria

INTRODUCTION

Many ask whether the revolutionary train that started in North Africa in December 2010 ‘can’ reach sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Others, more nuanced, ask whether it ‘would’.⁸⁸ There are two questions herein. The first one is related to the capacity (both psychological and energetic, or even genetic) of other African peoples to rise against their rulers as some North Africans have done, particularly the Tunisians and the Egyptians. Those that ask the other question seem to have accepted the existence of this capacity with sub-Saharan peoples but wonder if it would indeed materialise.

The thrust of this chapter is therefore to analyse the possibility of contagion into SSA of the popular revolts being witnessed in North Africa. But if they do not spill over to SSA, is there any other way in which the events in the North could have an impact – either positive or negative – on sub-Saharan countries? To this end, the chapter is divided into three main sections. The first looks at the capacity and the disposition or lack thereof of sub-Saharan peoples to initiate similar revolts against their rulers. The second one is concerned with the real possibility or lack thereof of them engaging in such protests, while the last section deals with the possible consequences of North African revolts on some socio-political events in SSA.

THE DISPOSITION TO REVOLT IN SSA: NORTH AFRICANS ARE CATCHING UP

Regarding the disposition of sub-Saharan peoples to revolt against their rulers in the same way as some of their North African counterparts have done, affirming the existence of this is an understatement. In fact, it

may not be exaggerated to argue that North Africans are only catching up on something that their sub-Saharan counterparts started in the late 1980s and early 1990s. True, the dynamics and the circumstances may be different, but it should be recalled that the populations of many sub-Saharan countries revolted against their autocratic and/or long time rulers calling for political liberalisation and the (re)establishment of multiparty democratic systems. In the face of these popular pressures, combined sometimes with an external one, some sub-Saharan leaders (such as those of Benin, Niger and Gabon) organised what was called ‘national conferences’, while others (such as those of Zambia, Madagascar and Malawi) accepted a transitional period followed by competitive multiparty elections. In many instances, these developments led to revolutionary changes.⁸⁹

It is true that not all sub-Saharan countries organised such conferences and those that did so followed different paths, some adopting durable democratic systems while the leaders of other countries re-established the erstwhile autocratic system following some temporal and cosmetic changes.⁹⁰ However, several autocratic rulers and dinosaurs of the sub-Saharan political scene were removed from power through the ballot boxes that followed popular uprisings. Examples are legion and include the cases of Aristide Pereira in Cape Verde, who was removed from power in February 1991 after a decade and a half at the helm of his island nation, as he had acceded to power in July 1975. They also include Mathieu Kérékou of Benin, in power since October 1972 and defeated in elections in March 1991; Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia (October 1964 to November 1991); Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo (February 1979 to August 1992); Didier Ratsiraka of Madagascar (June 1975 to March 1993); Moussa Traoré of Mali (November 1968

to March 1991); and Kamuzu Hastings Banda of Malawi, in power since July 1964 but defeated in elections in May 1994.⁹¹

In a recent event in 2007 in Guinea, the populations massively responded to the call of trade union and civil society organisations to protest against the autocratic regime of late President Lansana Conté, calling for and achieving the resignation of the entire cabinet and the formation of a new government, none of whose members had served in any previous government of the contested president since 1984.⁹²

But this does not mean that because sub-Saharanans initiated such protests they are immunised against a spill-over effect from the North African ones, hence the need to engage with the possibility of this development.

POSSIBILITIES OF CONTAGION

It is very normal that one starts something that gets adopted by others and then returns to its original creator in another form. It is therefore not impossible that some sub-Saharan populations get inspired by what is happening in North Africa and start a revolt against their rulers, with various demands. We have indeed seen signs of this in Zimbabwe, Cameroon and Angola, and there have been actual revolts in Swaziland, Malawi and, with the involvement of soldiers, in Burkina Faso. But at least three points need to be made here in order to allow for a more nuanced and context-specific analysis. First, it should be noted that each country has its own internal dynamics that facilitate or complicate the success of popular protests. Secondly, the Tunisian and Egyptian protests were largely apolitical, which allowed nationwide mobilisations that transcended socio-political and religious cleavages in the two countries. And there is finally the important role that 'sequence' and timing play in all these.

Regarding the first issue, this is even evident among the countries of North Africa, and particularly between the North African and sub-Saharan countries. For example, Morocco has a dual system of governance epitomised by a traditional system represented by the monarchy and a modern one illustrated by the elected parliament. Thus, the majority of Moroccan citizens that have so far taken to the streets have called for political reforms at the level of government and that the King should devolve more executive powers to the latter, rather than call for the abolition of the monarchy. Likewise, due to the tribal differences and regional historical fault lines in its society, particularly between the East and the West, the Libyan protests soon turned into an armed rebellion, unlike the situation seen in either Tunisia or Egypt. Yet, and in addition to differences

between sub-Saharan countries and North African ones, the various sub-Saharan countries are faced with different socio-political realities.

Concerning the second point related to the apolitical nature of Tunisian and Egyptian protests, this assertion does not deny the fact that political parties and movements did play a role in the mass protests in both countries, for their members are part of the larger society. However, the participation of various citizens did not happen under the banner of distinct political parties. Rather, they participated in the protests as mere citizens, which allowed them to stand alongside members of other political parties and religious groups with whom they would ordinarily have differences. This was very evident at gatherings at Cairo's Tahrir Square as well as Tunis' Gasba, where people met from various political movements and religious as well as ideological obediences. Thus, in order for similar revolts to succeed in SSA, or any other country for that matter, the protests must transcend regional, ethnic, political and religious cleavages in the country concerned, as was the case in Guinea in 2006 and 2007 and in many sub-Saharan countries in the early 1990s. Failure to do so carries the risk of not having the support of populations that belong to other political, regional or ethnic groupings. It would also make it easy for ruling regimes to crush the protest, ignore it and sabotage it, describing it as 'non-representative'.

As far as timing and sequence are concerned, it is very important to take it into consideration, for 'enlightened' leaders and ruling elites often draw lessons from past events and strategise accordingly. Indeed, many Egyptians interviewed in March 2011 thought that former President Hosni Mubarak might have saved his power had he not deployed counter-revolutionary forces on camelback against the protesters in early February. Others added that he would have done well had he pronounced, on 28 January 2011, the passionate speech he made on 10 February, which indicated his readiness to make compromises.⁹³

The conciliatory speeches made and socio-political reforms announced by the leaders of Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco could be viewed in this context. It is by the same token that one can read the announcement made by President Omar el-Bashir of Sudan in March that he would not be a candidate in the presidential elections of 2014. The same goes for the authorisation, by the regime of President Abdoulaye Wade, for opposition supporters to march in central Dakar in March and June 2011.⁹⁴ Evidently, making such concessions does not mean that the populations will automatically back off and abandon their plans to revolt, as this might even spur some to go further, seeing the concessions as a sign of weakness on

the part of the regime. But all this depends, often, on the extent of concessions made and how the populations and leading figures in society perceive their seriousness.

NEGATIVE EFFECTS: POSSIBILITIES OF REGIONAL INSTABILITY

Whereas the North African revolts have the potential to lead to some induced or pre-emptive political and socio-economic reforms in the rest of the continent, it is also possible that they beget negative consequences in some respects. But this is related more to the Libyan situation, which is not a popular protest but rather an armed rebellion, as noted above. Given the civil war and the accusations by the rebels that Qaddafi recruited 'African mercenaries', many African migrants in Libya have been forced to flee the country in very difficult conditions, while others have been killed. The first negative impact of this is the loss of lives, followed by the loss of income and ability of these migrants to support their loved ones through remittances. Having returned home in huge numbers, this is likely to put socio-economic pressure on the meagre resources and poor social services in their home countries, a situation that could lead to conflict over scarce resources.

A second negative effect of the Libyan civil war emanates from the fact that the Libyan rebels attacked military barracks and went away with weapons that they distributed among their fighters, and that the Qaddafi regime did the same. Because of this, weapons are now circulating in the country at an alarming rate, which is likely to lead to a proliferation of weapons in the region, with the possibility of some falling into the hands of criminal and terrorist groups such as the so-called Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

And given the forceful fall of Qaddafi from power in August 2011, it is likely that he and his supporters

will continue resisting the rebels now in charge of the country. The latter are also likely to fall apart on different accounts, sowing the seeds of instability in Libya, which could affect many countries in the region. It is for all these reasons that it is important to highlight the opportunity that the African Union's Road Map for a political process presented, if only Western countries that supported the rebels had listened.

CONCLUSION

This chapter looked at the possibility of contagion of North African revolts into SSA. Two main issues were highlighted: the disposition of sub-Saharan populations to revolt and the possibility of this disposition materialising into real and concrete action. The existence of a disposition was established, and it was in fact noted that North Africans are catching up on their sub-Saharan counterparts as far as such revolts against autocratic leaders are concerned. Regarding the materialisation of revolt actions, it was noted that this is indeed possible, but success is conditioned on a number of factors. These are mainly the internal socio-economic and political dynamics in various countries, the transcendent nature of mobilisations, and the preventive or corrective measures adopted by the leaders faced with such revolts.

The Libyan case was noted as one with the highest possibilities of begetting negative effects, given its transformation from a popular revolt to an armed rebellion. Among the possible consequences of this are the killing of many African migrants in Libya and the forceful departure of many others from the country. Another possible consequence is to be found in the proliferation of weapons in the country and beyond, while regional instability is the third possible consequence of the Libyan civil war.

Section Three

Towards Possible Solutions

Ambassador Samuel Assefa

Chair of the Session

The editors



Photo 3 L to R: Dr Okoko-Esseau, Dr Samuel and Colonel Wade

Section Three

Towards possible solutions

Ambassador Samuel Assefa

Chair of the Session

The editors

This section looks at possible solutions to the crises in North Africa, particularly with regard to the Libyan civil war. Three papers were meant to be presented at the conference as part of this session. Of these three presentations only one is included here, as Chapter 7. In the absence of the full papers of the other two presentations, one by a representative of the African Union (AU) and the other by a representative of the European Union (EU), a summary is provided below. Chapter 7 deals with the African Peace and Security Architecture and its adequacy or lack thereof to deal with the kind of popular uprisings we have been seeing in North Africa.

In his presentation on the Libyan crisis, Dr Abraham Roch Okoko-Esseau, from the Political Affairs Directorate of the AU, started the discussion by citing a number of AU declarations and protocols that serve as instruments to promote democratic change of government in Africa. However, the North African situation has stirred a different wave of debate on how to address the situation. The AU has actively engaged itself in addressing the issues. The Peace and Security Council aggressively analysed and also sent representatives to discuss the matter when it was happening. He noted that the AU is also very concerned about human rights issues in these countries, particularly in Libya. Referring to the AU Roadmap on Libya, he noted that the organisation strongly believes that only the people of Libya have a right to determine their future. He said that external forces, which had their own divergent interests, should not seek to determine the future of Libya on behalf of the Libyan people.

He added that the quest for democracy had always been an African issue and what was going on in North Africa was not an exception. The AU acknowledges the role that civil society can play in bringing the North African people from the quagmire of the current crisis.

He concluded that the AU does not seek, contrary to some misleading media reports, to keep Colonel Qaddafi in power, but it does not make his immediate departure a precondition for the dialogue that its Roadmap is calling for, which, he noted, is in line with diplomatic practice everywhere and at all times.

Following this presentation, Colonel Sandy Wade, Military Advisor at the EU delegation to the AU, made a presentation on the EU's response to the North African crises. He discussed Europe's engagement in Africa, noting that peace and security have always been a top priority of Europe's relations with Africa. Europe has a strong stake in Africa in general and in North Africa in particular. In this regard, the EU mainly focuses on helping the people rather than the governments. Colonel Wade noted the EU's support had always been conditional upon progress and respect for the rule of law and principles of good governance. The problem is who should measure this progress and on what grounds? However, there was more or less agreement and consensus in measuring these indicators, albeit with some debate.

In discussing the Libyan case he said that the EU engagement was political and humanitarian. The EU had opened a technical office, not a political office, in Benghazi. It is mainly to ensure the distribution of EU humanitarian aid. The EU official position is that Qaddafi should stand down. According to the presenter, reiterating the views of the EU, 'Qaddafi has lost legitimacy and is a threat to his own people.' The EU's engagement in North Africa is a long-term process and things cannot be improved overnight. He also praised the EU-AU partnership and said it should be a two-way partnership. The EU wants to help the African governments and peoples, he argued, but partnership cannot be imposed.

Reflections on the adequacy and potential of the APSA for responding to popular uprisings

Solomon A. Dersso

Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa

INTRODUCTION

The popular uprisings that swept through North Africa took the world by surprise. It was the self-immolation of the 26-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi that triggered the popular unrest that engulfed Tunisia and spread like wildfire to the rest of North Africa and the wider Arab world. Both the scale and speed of the popular uprisings and their results have been startling. The uprisings proved to be events for which even the governments in those countries were ill prepared, let alone the rest of the world. They were extraordinary events whose occurrence could hardly have been anticipated. As such, they are not like any other crisis situation which can be envisioned and for which response mechanisms of inter-governmental entities can ordinarily prepare themselves.

Extraordinary as these events are, it cannot necessarily be concluded that they are entirely beyond the purview of the normative and policy instruments of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Nevertheless, the nature of the events, the issues to which they gave rise and the response of the African Union (AU) raise important questions regarding the adequacy of the APSA for handling such kinds of events. This is the question that this chapter seeks to investigate.

NORMATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK OF THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

One way of interrogating the adequacy or lack thereof of the APSA vis-à-vis such popular uprisings is to look at whether the popular uprisings fit in any of the APSA

instruments. This mainly entails an examination of the APSA norms and policy instruments through the prism of the popular uprisings and the underlying issues that precipitated them. More specifically, it is important to examine the threats and issues to which APSA normative and policy frameworks address themselves.

The normative and policy framework of the AU's peace and security regime is founded on a number of the organisation's legal and policy instruments. The Constitutive Act (herein after the Act) is the foundation of these instruments.⁹⁵ The other instruments⁹⁶ include the AU Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol)⁹⁷ and the Common African Defence and Security Policy.⁹⁸ The normative framework of the AU peace and security regime comprises the norms/values and principles enunciated in these and related instruments.

The Act enunciates under Article 4 the founding principles underlying the AU's legal and institutional framework. Of the 18 principles listed, the ones that are of particular importance with respect to popular uprisings are respect for human rights, sanctity of human life and democratic principles, and good governance; rejection of impunity and unconstitutional changes of governments; and the right of the AU to intervene in a member state in case of grave circumstances. The two objectives of the AU relevant in this context, as set out in the Act, are to 'promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance', and to 'promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments'.⁹⁹

The PSC Protocol recognises 'the fact that the development of strong democratic institutions and culture, observance of human rights and the rule of law, as

well as the implementation of post-conflict recovery programmes and sustainable development policies, are essential for the promotion of collective security, durable peace and stability, as well as the prevention of conflicts'.¹⁰⁰

The normative basis for the AU's peace and security regime is further elaborated in the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP).¹⁰¹ This Declaration identifies human security as an important basis and measure of the continental collective security system. Accordingly, it draws attention to the need to focus on human rights, good governance, democracy, and equitable social and economic development. The policy also identifies as common security threats not only inter-state conflicts or tensions and external threats, but also intra-state conflicts or tensions. Given the high incidence of intra-state conflict, these threats pose the greatest danger to peace and security on the continent. The threats identified under this category include the following:

- The existence of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity
- Lack of respect for the sanctity of human life, impunity, political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversion
- Coups d'état and unconstitutional changes of government, as well as situations that prevent and undermine the promotion of democratic institutions and structures, including the absence of the rule of law, equitable social order, population participation and electoral processes
- Improper conduct of electoral processes
- Absence of the promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights, individual and collective freedoms, equitable opportunity for all, including women, children and ethnic minorities
- Poverty and inequitable distribution of natural resources
- Corruption

Of the various themes covered in the APSA norms, those that are of particular importance for managing popular uprisings include the prohibition of unconstitutional changes of government, and combatting the lack of functioning democracy, poverty and inequitable distribution of and access to resources and opportunities, absence of respect for and protection of human and peoples' rights, and absence of good governance, including corruption.¹⁰² It is important to note that there are various instruments that in detail elaborate these norms and establish mechanisms for their institutionalisation within the AU decision-making processes. These include

the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981), the African Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance (2007), the Cairo Agenda for Economic Recovery and Social Development in Africa (1995), the Algiers Decision on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (1999), the Grand Bay Declaration and Plan of Action on Human Rights in Africa (1999), the Lomé Declaration on the OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (2000), the New Partnership for Africa Development of the African Union (2001), the OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa (2002), the Kigali Declaration on Human Rights in Africa (2003) and the AU Convention on the Prevention of and Fight against Corruption (2003).

For the AU, the major challenges have thus far been establishing a systematic and coherent implementation mechanism and operationalising effective functional linkages between these commitments to democracy, human rights and governance and the APSA. The elaboration of a governance architecture that is currently under way should serve as an opportunity to overcome these challenges and systematically integrate the works of governance/human rights institutions such as the African Commission and Court on Human and Peoples' Rights into the processes of the APSA such as PSC of the AU.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETERMINING THE LEGITIMACY OF POPULAR UPRISINGS

While many of the normative and policy frameworks of the APSA, as briefly explored above, are relevant, they offer no systematic and particular guidance on how to respond to popular democratic uprisings. As former South African President Thabo Mbeki recently put it, 'The stark choice Africa faced was – should we side with the demonstrators or with the governments they demanded should resign!'¹⁰³ At the heart of this lies the difficulty of distinguishing between legitimate uprisings and those that may amount to situations that APSA norms and policy instruments proscribe.

On the basis of the purpose and object of the APSA norms and policy instruments and the experience from North Africa, it is necessary to identify the considerations for determining the legitimacy of popular uprisings. This may help in developing guidelines for the AU to respond in a principled way to similar events in the future. In this regard it is possible to identify six considerations that are key in responding to popular uprisings.

The first consideration relates to the existence of what the CADSP refers to as 'situations that prevent and

undermine the promotion of democratic institutions and structures, including the absence of the rule of law, equitable social order, population participation and electoral processes’.

As an examination of the uprisings in North Africa reveals, what precipitated the popular uprisings included the existence of circumstances that undermined democratic institutions and structures. The existence of these circumstances leave citizens with no institutional mechanism for redressing their grievances and holding their leaders to account, forcing them instead to resort to protests and popular uprisings. The popular uprisings in North Africa express deep-seated anger and frustration of ordinary citizens against corrupt, tyrannical and undemocratic political orders.

The other consideration is the organisation and nature of the mobilisation of protestors. The test here is whether the uprising involves an attempt on the part of a particular political grouping or section of society to impose its political agenda. In terms of organisation and mobilisation, the popular uprisings in North Africa were not driven by and associated with prevailing political groupings and ideological divisions in these countries. As Omar Ben Yeder writes on Tunisia’s uprising, ‘[t]his was a spontaneous uprising by the people, not sparked by any particular political leader or movement’.¹⁰⁴ The uprisings did not involve a partisan political agenda, nor did they seek to impose a political agenda of one political grouping or section of society over others. Rather, they espoused popular aspirations and expectations for a reformed political and socio-economic order. They were mostly mobilised through social media, with young activists serving as catalysts and organisers.

The third consideration is the popularity of the uprisings. Here the question is whether or not participation in the uprisings transcends prevailing ideological, religious, ethno-cultural and other sectoral cleavages in society. Seen from this perspective, it emerges that one of the features of the North African uprisings that gave them their democratic character was that they were popular. The involvement in the protests was not limited to a particular section of the society. While most of the people who were active in the uprisings were the youth and people from middle- and lower-income backgrounds, the uprisings nevertheless attracted people from almost all walks of life and age groups as well as people from different religious, cultural, ideological and political affiliations. In this regard, Ben Yeder is right when he states ‘[t]he show of solidarity throughout the country, its diaspora and across all social classes was unique, unexpected and intensely uplifting’.¹⁰⁵

The fourth consideration is the peacefulness of the uprisings. As suggested above, various instruments of

the APSA, particularly the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, guarantee the right of peaceful assembly. One of the most notable features of the North African uprisings, with the exception of Libya, was that they were largely peaceful, except for the sporadic expressions of anger and defiance against efforts at countering the demonstrations.

The fifth consideration is the involvement of the military. Given the AU’s rules on unconstitutional changes of government, the constitutionality of the active involvement of the military in movements for toppling governments can be highly questionable. Once again, it is interesting to note that the militaries in both Tunisia and Egypt maintained their neutrality. They were involved neither in instigating nor in actively helping the removal of their presidents. Despite its standing in the history and politics of the country, even the Egyptian army maintained a ‘hands-off’ approach until Mubarak eventually bowed to public pressure to stand down. This is another feature that sets the Libyan case apart, as the situation there has turned into a full-blown civil war following the defection of military personnel to the rebel side and their organisation of what is now an effective army. Despite the similarity that it shares with the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the case of Libya should therefore be treated differently, as a civil war. The AU’s Roadmap for resolving the crisis in Libya does exactly that.

A final consideration is the involvement of external actors. Where external actors are deeply involved in instigating or actively supporting uprisings, the right of the people in that society to self-determination gets compromised with the consequence of rendering the country amenable to the manipulation of outside forces. One of the fine features of the uprisings in North Africa was that they were fully initiated and executed by ordinary men and women. There was also no external involvement or direct support for the protests. The protests were wholly motivated by the internal political and socio-economic ills that had prevailed in their societies for some time. They are people-driven efforts to determine and shape the political and economic directions of their society, an exercise of self-determination par excellence. Again, the Libyan experience deviates from this characteristic, in view of NATO’s military intervention on the side of the protesters-cum-rebels.

ROLE OF THE AU

Broadly speaking, the role of the AU with respect to popular uprisings can be divided into two. First, the AU has a preventive role. This requires the development and implementation of initiatives and strategies for the

progressive realisation and implementation of the norms and principles that constitute the shared values of AU member states. The other role of the AU is to respond to the uprisings and the crises relating thereto.

Increased access to information and technology by a rising number of people in Africa will continue to deepen the political activism of citizens in many parts of the continent. Under such circumstances, citizens in many African countries will tend to be less willing to tolerate autocracy, corruption, lack of socio-economic opportunities and heightened poverty. There is thus deepening expectation that governments show and register tangible progress in building and entrenching democracy and good governance as well as respect for human rights and in pursuing economic policies that enhance economic growth and progressively reduce poverty.

The legitimacy of African governments depends on the degree to which they meet these expectations. In the years to come, whether or not governments will face popular opposition and experience popular rebellion will depend on the success that they register in these critical areas. There is only one choice for AU member states; namely to deliver on the socio-economic and political needs and expectations of their people or face the wrath of an increasingly enlightened and active youthful public. It would not be enough for a government to deliver and focus exclusively on economic growth. Delivery-based legitimacy is not enough. African governments need to put as much investment in achieving functioning democracies and institutionalising and deepening good governance.

As we have seen above, the AU has developed several norms and institutions on democracy, governance, peace and security. The implementation of the commitments to democracy, good governance and human rights as well as equitable socio-economic development has now become imperative. This is the most sustainable guarantee for peace and security and for preventing popular upheavals.

In a statement that he made during the 275th meeting of the AU PSC ministers that was dedicated to a debate on the state of peace and security in Africa, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra raised two points of particular importance:

- Regarding democratisation and the building of good governance, we need to spare no efforts at all, as failure to uphold democracy and good governance brings big dangers to our continent. The continent is witnessing an increase in election related and governance linked crises. This trend must be arrested before it reaches unmanageable proportions. The

deepening of democracy and improving political and economic governance could significantly contribute to our efforts to prevent conflicts on the continent.

- Last, but not least, it is urgent that we invest in employment generating economic policies that would provide jobs and better incomes for the population, especially the youth, and contribute to elevating standards of living across the continent. Indeed, this is one way of preventing future uprisings, like those we are witnessing in North Africa.¹⁰⁶

The uprisings in North Africa show that the role that the AU plays in facilitating and ensuring the implementation of these norms in member states is critical if such uprisings and other crisis situations are to be prevented. This will also be the litmus test for the continuing relevance of the AU in the lives of ordinary people in Africa. For this the AU needs to enhance the effectiveness of some of its normative and institutional frameworks and their implementation. Most notably, there is a need to mainstream the works of the African Commission and Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and Political Affairs Department of the AU into the APSA processes and institutions.

RESPONSE

In terms of response, the APSA normative and policy framework has not equipped the AU with an effective response and enforcement mechanism for all situations identified as constituting threats to peace and security. This is best illustrated by the fact that the prohibition on unconstitutional changes of government is the *only* principle of the APSA for whose breach a sanction is specifically prescribed. Thus, Article 30 of the Constitutive Act provides that 'Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union'.

No similar response mechanism has been developed for breaching other equally important norms of the APSA, such as those situations that precipitated the popular uprisings in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. The AU has not as yet developed effective means for discouraging systematic violations of the human rights of citizens, unconstitutional use of government power and generally bad governance. The failure of the AU instruments as far as responding to deficiencies relating to democracy and constitutional rule is concerned is that they provide very little guidance about how the AU needs to respond to issues of unconstitutional exercise of power. This involves governments that exercise power in a way that undermines constitutional rule – such as by enacting laws that repress freedom of

the press and freedom of expression and association, and by extra-judicial arrest or detention, torture, extra-judicial killings, appointments or dismissals without due process of the law, etc.

NATURE OF THE AU RESPONSE

In examining the response of the AU, there are certain considerations for which one should have regard. The first of these is the principle of the APSA, stipulated in Article 2 (1) of the PSC Protocol, on timely and efficient response. This commits the AU to a speedy and clear response. Such a response means establishing a leadership role for engagement in emerging crisis situations. This is expected to put the AU in a position to shape the course of international engagement and the outcome of such engagement. The lack of such a response creates the pretext for other global actors to take, formulate and implement responses that do not necessarily cohere with the response that the AU may wish to adopt.

Opinion makers in various parts of the continent have expressed the view that the AU has been slow in its response to the uprisings in North Africa. One of the manifestations of the AU's rather slow and hesitant response is the fact that external actors seized the opportunity to project their own response and take the lead in engaging in North Africa, with the consequence of the marginalisation of the AU's voice.

The AU's response has not only been slow but also weak. During the ministerial meeting of the 275th session of the PSC, Rwanda's Minister of Foreign Affairs had the following to say on this:

We are all in agreement that Africa should not condone a Head of State who holds his own people in contempt. And that we shall never tolerate a Head of State that intentionally takes lives of its own people. Despite all this, why has the African Union not responded timely and take a leadership role to put in place practical steps to stop this? ... [W]hy has the African Union, in such grave situations prevailing and potential outbreak of violence in member States, not called for an extraordinary urgent conference of Heads of State and Governments for prompt deliberations and actions?¹⁰⁷

Coming as it does even from a member country of the AU, which is also part of the PSC, this view acknowledges some level of inadequacy or perception of such inadequacy in the AU's response.

When considered in the light of the events in North Africa, the response of the AU, with the exception of its Roadmap and High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya, is regarded to have been weak. For example, when it

was first apprised of the situation in Libya some weeks after the beginning of the uprising, the AU opted for sending an investigation team, instead of acting immediately. Even after the PSC released a communiqué condemning the killing of civilians and excessive use of force, the AU has not taken stronger measures against the Libyan government for its violent response against peaceful demonstrators. Apart from condemnation of violence, other measures that may be considered range from *suspension of the country from participation in activities of the organisation to imposing diplomatic sanctions, including severance of diplomatic relations, and even withdrawal of recognition* and, should circumstances warrant, ultimately *intervention as per Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU*.

Apart from timeliness and robustness of response, other important considerations include clarity and coherence of response. When the AU PSC met on 10 March 2010, it expressed its 'rejection of any foreign military intervention, whatever its form'. But a week later when the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted its Resolution 1973, the three non-permanent African members of the UNSC voted in favour of a resolution that prescribed exactly the 'foreign military intervention' that Africa had rejected. This revealed a lack of coordination and coherence between Addis Ababa and the African members of the UNSC in New York. It also reflected inconsistency in Africa's response to the crisis.

Effective communication of the AU policy response to such events and robust media campaign is another consideration. Apart from timing, part of the reason why the AU voice did not gain the attention of mainstream world media and therefore failed to have an impact, as Thabo Mbeki noted, both 'on Africa and world opinion', was that the AU did not effectively communicate its policy response to the events in North Africa, including Libya, and it did not deploy a robust media campaign. As the comment by the Rwandan Foreign Minister suggests, at some level the AU was also either slow or ineffective in communicating with and mobilising the totality of AU member states on the subject.

CONCLUSION

The popular uprisings in North Africa have shown the role and limits of the normative and policy framework of the APSA. Three areas of limitation that require particular attention for policy action have been observed. The first of this is the lack of any guideline on how the AU may determine the legitimacy of popular uprisings for helping it to adopt clear and effective responses. The second lacuna in the APSA normative and policy framework is that it does not lay down the actions or

measures that the AU needs to take in relation to serious deficiencies in member state compliance with AU norms on democracy, constitutionalism, rule of law and respect for and protection of human rights.

There is a need for an enhanced focus on dealing with structural deficiencies relating to constitutionalism, human rights and democracy. Institutionally, there is a need to achieve integration and enhanced coordination among various AU bodies and most importantly to mainstream and institutionalise fully and systematically the works of the African Commission and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and those of the

Political Affairs Department of the AU into the processes of the PSC.

Finally, certain shortcomings have been identified with respect to the nature of the AU response to the uprisings. These shortcomings have cast doubt on the effectiveness and credibility of the AU. It is imperative that steps are taken to rectify these shortcomings. Institutionally, this may require a mechanism for stronger coordination and cohesion, not only between Addis Ababa and African representatives in New York but also within Africa between the AU and its member states.

Conference programme

Hilton Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Tuesday, 31 May 2011

| | |
|-------------|--|
| 08:30–09:30 | Arrival, Registration and Tea and Coffee |
| 09:30–10:00 | <p>Opening Session</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Welcome and Introductory Remarks <i>Ambassador Olusegun Akinsanya, Office Director, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa Office</i> ■ Opening Statement <i>Representative of the African Union Commission</i> ■ Opening Remarks <i>Ambassador Ahmed Salah-Eldin Noah, League of Arab States</i> |
| 10:00–12:30 | <p>Session 1: Root Causes and Dynamics of the Crises</p> <p><i>Chair: Mr Mehari Taddele Maru, Head, African Conflict Prevention Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa Office</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Tunisia <i>Dr Raoudha Ben Othman, Faculty of Humanities, University of Tunis</i> ■ Egypt <i>Professor Mohamed Helmy El Sharawy, Director, Arab and Africa Research Center, Cairo</i> ■ Libya <i>Dr Mohamed Ashour, Cairo University; Academic Director, Zayed University, Abu Dhabi</i> ■ Discussion |



Photo 4 A section of participants of the conference

| | |
|---------------|---|
| 12:30–14:00 | Lunch |
| 14:00–15:45 | <p>Session 2: Challenges Facing Governments and Transitional Authorities <i>Chair: Dr Francis Ikome, Head, African Conflict Prevention Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria Office</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Algeria <i>Dr Mohamed Hennad, Department of Political Science, University of Algiers</i> ■ Morocco <i>Professor El-Houari Setta, Faculty of Judicial, Economic and Social Sciences, Hassan 1st University</i> ■ The Potential for Contagion into Sub-Saharan Africa <i>Dr Issaka K. Souaré, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria Office</i> ■ Discussion |
| 15:45–16:00 | Tea and Coffee |
| 16:00–17:30 | <p>Session 3: Towards a Peaceful Resolution of the Crises <i>Chair: H.E. Dr Samuel Assefa, Former Ethiopian Ambassador to the United States of America</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ The African Union's Response to the North African Crisis <i>Dr Abraham Roch Okoko, Democracy and Governance Officer, Political Affairs Directorate, African Union Commission</i> ■ The European Union's Response to the North African Crisis <i>Colonel Sandy Wade, Military Advisor, European Union Delegation to the African Union, Addis Ababa</i> ■ Is the African Peace and Security Architecture Adequate for Popular Protests? <i>Dr Solomon Ayele Dersso, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa Office</i> ■ Discussion |
| 17:30 – 17:45 | <p>Closing Remarks <i>Ambassador Olusegun Akinsanya, Office Director, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa Office</i></p> |

About the speakers and chairs

Ambassador Olusegun (Segun) Akinsanya

Ambassador Akinsanya joined the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in June 2010 as Office Director for the Addis Ababa office. He holds a BSc degree in Political Science from the University of Lagos and post-graduate diploma certificates in International Relations, Investment Promotion and Finance from Pakistan Administrative Staff College (PASCA), in Lahore, and from the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru, Nigeria. He also holds a diploma in French Language from the Université de Dakar, Senegal. A former Nigerian Ambassador to Ethiopia and Permanent Representative to the African Union (AU) and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (2004–2007), he was also concurrently accredited to Djibouti. During his tenure as Permanent Representative, he chaired the Permanent Representatives' Committee to the African Union from July 2004 to January 2006 during Nigeria's chairmanship of the AU as well as presiding over meetings of the Peace and Security Council during monthly rotations each time Nigeria chaired the meetings of the continental body. He served as the UNDP Representative to the AU and UNECA from November 2007 to December 2008 in the UNDP liaison office, Addis Ababa. He also served twice with the UNECA as a consultant from 2007 to June 2010.

Ambassador Samuel Assefa

Dr Assefa is a former Ethiopian Ambassador to the United States.

Dr Solomon A. Dersso

Dr Dersso is a senior researcher with the Peace and Security Council Report Programme at the Addis Ababa office of the ISS. A visiting Professor of Human Rights Law at Addis Ababa University and associate researcher of the South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional Law (SAIFAC), Dr Dersso received an LLB degree from the School of Law, Addis Ababa University, an LLM degree in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa from the Centre for Human Rights,

University of Pretoria, and a PhD in Constitutional and International Law from the School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand. His research and teaching interests include human rights, with a focus on the African human rights system and minorities in Africa; constitutional law, including constitutional design in divided societies, particularly relating to federalism and multicultural democracy; and the emerging African peace and security regime, with emphasis on its Peace and Security Council. His recent publications include *Perspectives on the Rights of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples* (Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2010).

Dr Francis N. Ikome

At the time of the conference, Dr Ikome was Head of the African Conflict Prevention Programme (ACPP) at the ISS office in Pretoria. At the time of going to press, he was serving as Governance and Public Administration Officer at the Governance and Public Administration Division (GPAD) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa. Prior to joining the ISS, he had served as Director of the Africa and Southern Africa Programme at the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD). Dr Ikome also earlier served as Director of the IGD's Multilateral Programme, worked for the African Union Commission and served as a university lecturer and external examiner in Cameroon and in South Africa. He holds a PhD degree in International Relations from the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa, an MSC from the University of Ibadan and a BA (Honours) from the University of Yaoundé, Cameroun.

Dr Issaka K. Souaré

Dr Souaré is a senior researcher in the ACPP in the Pretoria office of the ISS. At the time of going to press, he was Acting Head of the ACPP-Pretoria. Before joining the ISS in August 2007, he had lectured at the Université du Québec à Montréal (Canada), where he also obtained a PhD in Political Science. Dr Souaré has worked extensively on issues of governance and political instability in Africa, particularly Africa's international relations,

unconstitutional changes of government, civil wars, political parties and leadership changes on the continent, with a special focus on West and North Africa. He is the author of a number of books, book chapters and journal articles relating to Africa, including *Africa in the United Nations System, 1945-2005* (London, 2006); *Civil Wars and Coups d'État in West Africa* (Lanham, 2006 – also in French, L'Harmattan, 2007), the novel *Samassi* (London, 2004), and, as co-editor, *Somalia at the Crossroads* (London, 2007).

Berouk Mesfin

Mr Mesfin is a senior researcher in the ACPP in the ISS Addis Ababa office. He has a wealth of experience in political, military and international affairs. He holds a BA in Political Science and International Relations and an MA in International Relations from Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia, and a Masters degree in International Security and Defence from the University of Grenoble, France. Prior to joining the ISS, he served as a defence analyst and as a consultant. He also worked as a lecturer of Political Science and International Relations at Addis Ababa University and as a research associate to the Institute of Development Research. His teaching and research interests are in international relations with special emphasis on foreign policy, and conflicts and terrorism in the Third World, and in comparative politics with special emphasis on elections, political parties and federalism. He has conducted and participated in numerous research projects, and has presented and published several scholarly writings.

Mehari Taddele Maru

Mehari Taddele Maru is Programme Head for the ACPP in the ISS Addis Ababa office. A former fellow of prestigious programmes at Harvard University, he holds an MPA from Harvard University, an MSc from the University of Oxford and an LLB from Addis Ababa University. Prior to joining to the ISS, he was Programme Coordinator for Migration at the African Union Commission. Mr Mehari served as Legal Expert at the African Union Commission and as the Director of the Addis Ababa University Office for University Reform. Some of his previous achievements include designing and implementing the AU.COMMIT Campaign to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings at the African Union Commission in addition to making numerous other contributions in treaty drafting, norm setting and diffusion activities, partnership management and preparation as well as implementing AU programmes on migration and development.

Colonel Sandy Wade

After relinquishing command of his regiment in July 1999, Colonel Wade took up a post in the United Kingdom Directorate of Development and Doctrine dealing with lessons learned, UK and NATO doctrine and army experimentation. He moved to HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps in July 2003 as Chief of Information Operations. In August 2003, he moved, on promotion to Colonel, to HQ Multi National Brigade (North West) in Banja Luka, Bosnia, as Deputy Brigade Commander and Commander British Forces Bosnia, where he was responsible for the integration of multi-national/multi-agency operations. In April 2004, he moved to the US Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, as a member of the Information Operations and Strategic Communication branches and later as Information Strategy Division Chief for the Command. Since 2007, he has served in Addis Ababa, initially as Defence Attaché in the British Embassy covering Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somaliland and the AU, and in particular covering Security Sector Reform and Peace Support Operations. In July 2010, he moved to the post of Military Advisor in the European Union Delegation to the African Union. He is still a serving member of the British Army.

Dr Mohammed Hennad

Dr Hennad is a senior lecturer at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Algiers III, Algeria. He obtained his PhD degree in Political Science from the University of Exeter, UK. His main area of interest relates to Algeria's political evolution, on which he has undertaken a number of studies, namely on the erstwhile single party, the FLN, and the transitional process in Algeria. He also does translation work, among others Michael Sandel's book, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (1998). Dr Hennad has been, for a while, a research director in Algeria's National Institute for Strategic Studies.

Dr Mohamed Ashour

Dr Ashour is an Associate Professor at Cairo University as well as at Zaid University in the United Arab Emirates and serves as the Academic Coordinator of the Abu Dhabi Judicial Academy (ADJA) programme of the university. He has considerable experience in teaching and training, including previous lecturer positions at Nasser Military Academy in Egypt, the Egyptian Police Academy and the Egyptian Institute for Diplomatic Studies. Dr Ashour has organised several training courses in diverse fields of human development, through a project funded by Ford Foundation at Cairo University, and is a member

of several professional societies, including the Egyptian Society for International Law and the Arab Society of Political Sciences. Dr Ashour obtained his PhD in Political Science from Cairo University, and a Bachelor of Law and Diploma in International Law from Ein Shams University in Cairo. His numerous publications (in Arabic) include *Ethnic Pluralism: Conflicts and Strategies of Management and Resolution* (2002); *Ethnic Pluralism and the Future of the South African Political System* (2004); *Islam and Muslims in Africa: Realities of the State and Islamic Advocacy* (2005); *Libyan Foreign Policy Towards Africa* (2005); *Handbook on African States* (2007); and *African International Organisation: A Guide Book* (2007).

Professor Mohamed Helmy el-Sharawy

Professor Sharawy is the Vice President of the Arab and African Research Center at Cairo and was its Director from 1987 to 2010. He has worked extensively on African liberation movements and Afro-Arab cultural relations. After graduating from Cairo University (sociology, 1958), he was elected as Coordinator for African Liberation Movements offices at the African Association in Cairo (1960–1975), served as a consultant for the Sudan-Egyptian Integration Program (1975–1980) and worked as Professor of African Political Thought at Juba University in Southern Sudan (1981–1982), and as expert for the Afro-Arab Cultural Relations at the Arab League (ALECSO) in Tunis (1982–1986). He was also elected Vice President and President of the African Association of Political Science (AAPS) from 1977 to 1987, was a member of the Executive Committee of CODESRIA (1995) and the

Arab Association of Sociology, was Permanent Secretariat of the AAPSO, and a member of Egypt's Supreme Council of Culture. Professor Sharawy has 13 published books to his name, in both Arabic and English, including *The Angolan Revolution* (1978), *Arabs and Africans Face to Face* (1985), *Israel in Africa* (1986), *Culture of Liberation* (2002), *Heritage of African Languages* (2005), *Africa in Transition to the 21st Century* (2008), *Political and Social Thought in Africa* (2010), and *The Sudan at the Cross Roads* (2011).

Professor El-Houari Setta

Professor Setta is a Senior Professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of Hassan I, Settat, Morocco, and Expert Consultant at the Moroccan Ministry of Higher Education. He is also in charge of the Laboratory of Security Research, and programmes on Political Sciences and Social Development at the same university. Professor Setta obtained his doctorate in Political Science from the University of Aix-en-Provence (France) and has published extensively on Moroccan politics, the educational system in Morocco, Islam in the West and political and security issues in North Africa.

Dr Raoudha Ben Othman

Dr Ben Othman is Professor of English linguistics at the Faculty of Humanities, University of Tunis and has been a keen observer of Tunisian politics over the last two decades. She obtained her doctorate in English linguistics from the University of Newcastle Upon-Tyne in the UK.

About the ACPS

The African Conflict Prevention System (ACPS) is the ISS research division that seeks to provide continental conflict analysis and early warning to complement the early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms and efforts of the African Union and other regional institutions on the continent. The system consists of four regional hubs that among others feed information into the Peace and Security Council Report that is produced from the ISS office in Addis Ababa – tracking and informing the work of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

The four hubs are based in Addis Ababa (ACPP-Addis), Dakar (ACPP-Dakar), Nairobi (ACPP-Nairobi) and Pretoria (ACPP-Pretoria), each covering specific geo-political zones of insecurity on the continent.

Each hub contributes to the work of the entire system, and in particular, to external stakeholders such as the AU's Peace and Security Council and various Regional Economic Communities in Africa. For example, ACPP-Addis works more on the AU and IGAD issues, ACPP-Nairobi on EAC issues, ACPP-Dakar on ECOWAS related matters and ACPP-Pretoria on SADC related questions.

While focusing on its immediate region, each hub also tries to cover other regions through regional experts and specialists, so that ACPP-Pretoria has West, North, and East African experts in addition to Southern African ones, and ACPP-Addis Ababa has West and North African specialists in addition to those focusing on the Horn of Africa, and so on.

About the ISS

The Institute for Security of Studies (ISS) is a pan-African organisation that undertakes applied policy research, and provides teaching and training as well as technical assistance. The Institute is headquartered in Pretoria, South Africa with offices in Cape Town, South Africa; Nairobi, Kenya; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and Dakar, Senegal. The ISS works for the advancement of sustainable human security in Africa. It seeks to

mainstream human security perspectives into public policy processes and to influence decision makers within Africa and beyond. The objective of the Institute is to add critical balance and objectivity by providing timely, empirical research, teaching and implementation support on sustainable human security issues to policy makers, area specialists, advocacy groups, and the media.

Notes

- 1 Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, *Uncharted journey: promoting democracy in the Middle East*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2005, 8.
- 2 Issaka K. Souaré, Egypt: the political process between 'opening up' and 'control', *ISS Situation Report*, 23 June 2008; Michele Dunne and Amr Hamzawy, The ups and downs of political reform in Egypt, in Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso (eds), *Beyond the façade: political reform in the Arab world*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2008, 17–44.
- 3 Issaka K. Souaré, Ben Ali's 20 years in power in Tunisia, *ISS Today*, 8 November 2007.
- 4 Riccardo Ciavolella, Mauritanie, la démocratie au coup par coup, *Politique africaine*, 114 (June 2009), 5–23; Boubacar N'Diaye, To 'midwife' – and abort – a democracy: Mauritania's transition from military rule, 2005–2008, *Journal of Modern African Studies* 47(1) (2009), 129–152; The August 3, 2005 coup in Mauritania: democracy or just another coup? *African Affairs* 105(420) (2006), 421–444.
- 5 See Habib Souaïdia, *La sale guerre*, Paris: Éditions La Découverte & Syros, 2001.
- 6 Jack Kalpakian, Implications of the 2007 Elections on Moroccan Political Development, *ISS Situation Report*, 25 October 2007; Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, The New Democracy imperative, in Carothers and Ottaway (eds), *Uncharted journey*, 8; Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley, Morocco: top-down reform without democratic transition, in Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoso (eds), *Beyond the façade*, 161–186.
- 7 Lise Storm, The persistence of authoritarianism as a source of radicalisation in North Africa, *International Affairs*, 85(5) (2009), 997–1013, 1004.
- 8 This expression is borrowed from renowned South African scenario-building facilitator, Clem Sunter.
- 9 Examples include Abdul-Halif Qindil, *Al-Ayyam Al-Akhirah [in Arabic: The Last Days]*, Cairo: Dar Athaqafah Al-Jadeedah, 2008 (on Egypt), and, on Tunisia, Nicolas Beau and Catherine Graciet, *La régente de Carthage. Main basse sur la Tunisie*, Paris: Editions La Découverte, 2009; Olfa Lamloum and Bernard Ravel (eds), *La Tunisie de Ben Ali: la société contre le régime*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002.
- 10 See, for instance, M Marzouki, *Dictateur en sursis: une voie démocratique pour le monde arabe*, Paris: Les éditions de l'atelier, 2009. Please note that the name of the former Tunisian leader is spelt in different ways, including the above, Zine and Zaine, as all these are transliterations from Arabic.
- 11 L Sadiki, The search for citizenship in Bin Ali's Tunisia: democracy versus unity, *Political Studies* 50 (2002), 497–513.
- 12 Editors' note: Nigeria, for example, has a Council of Former Presidents that the current president consults on certain important national matters. In fact, in 2010, a forum of former African leaders (the Africa Forum) was established. This forum assembles more than 20 former heads of state and government that seek to help the initiatives of the AU and other African institutions. For more information, see www.africaforum.org
- 13 Editors' note: the author is referring to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that publishes regular indices about human development across the world.
- 14 Editors' note: It should be recalled that the paper was written in May 2011 while Qaddafi was still in power and the leaders of the Libyan rebellion were trying to overthrow him, as they finally did in late August 2011.
- 15 Editors' note: In mid-July, the Egyptian government withdrew its loan request from both the IMF and the World Bank under the pressure of the street.
- 16 Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2010 – Libya Country Report*, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009, 5, http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/Gutachten_BTI2010/MENA/Libya.pdf (accessed 17 May 2011).
- 17 *Ibid.*, 18. See also Mona Mohamed Ammar, Human development indicators at Egypt and other Arab countries, cpsfiles.imamu.edu.sa/ar/documents
- 18 Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2010 – Libya Country Report*, 5.
- 19 *Ibid.*, 13–14.
- 20 Jentleson and Christopher A. Wrytock, Who 'won' Libya?, *International Security* 30(3) (Winter 2005–2006), 56; Martin Asser, The Muammar Qaddafi story, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12688033> (accessed 15 May 2011).
- 21 Hamdy Hasan, Libya second liberation, <http://www.hounaloubnan.com/news/29653> (accessed 16 May 2011).
- 22 Lisa Anderson, Rogue Libya's long road, *Middle East Report* 241 (2006), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25164764> (accessed 13 May 2011).
- 23 This is despite the fact that the country hosts a large foreign labour force, which could suggest that there is mismatch between the local skill set and Libya's economic development need. See The report, *Libya 2010*, Oxford business group, 2010, http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/full_content/economy-122 (accessed at 7 October 2011).
- 24 Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2010 – Libya Country Report*, 11–12.
- 25 *Ibid.*, 12.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 22.
- 27 *Ibid.*, 9–11.
- 28 Tripoli witness: tribalism and threat of conscription, *BBC News*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13380525> (accessed 15 May 2011).

- 29 Oye Ogunbadejo, Qaddafi's North African design, *International Security* 8(1) (Summer 1983), 159.
- Ibid., 66.
- 30 December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 bombing – A bomb hidden in stored luggage explodes, killing 259 people on board and 11 people on the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland. After two years of investigations, the evidence implicates two Libyan government agents, Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah. In November 1991 the US and British governments charge the agents, asking for their extradition. On 31 January 2001, Megrahi is found guilty of murder and sentenced to life in prison. Qaddafi admitted responsibility for the attack in 2003 and paid more than \$2.7 billion to families of the victims, see Corri Zoli, Sahar Azar, and Shani Ross, *Patterns of conduct: Libyan regime support for and involvement in acts of terrorism*, New York: Syracuse University, 2011, 11.
- 31 September 19, 1989 UTA Flight 772, bound from Brazzaville, Congo, to Paris – The plane explodes over the desert in southeastern Niger, killing all 171 passengers and crew members. Reports indicate Libyan planning, authorisation, and support behind the bombing. According to the charges issued on 30 October 1991 by a French magistrate, Al-Azragh, the First Secretary at the Libyan People's Bureau. Ibid, and also Jonathan B Schwartz, Dealing with a 'rogue state': the Libya precedent, *The American Journal of International Law* 101(2007), 55, 577–580.
- 32 Zoli, Azar, and Ross, *Patterns of conduct: Libyan regime support for and involvement in acts of terrorism*, 5–17.
- Mahmood Mamdani, Libya after Nato invasion, <http://english.al-jazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/04/201148174154213745.html> (accessed on 14 May 2011).
- 33 Ogunbadejo, *Qaddafi's North African design*, 159–160.
- 34 Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2010 – Libya Country Report*, 21–22.
- 35 Ronald Bruce St. John, The ideology of Muammar Al-Qadhafi: theory and practice, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 15 (1983), 471; Ogunbadejo, *Qaddafi's North African design*, 155.
- 36 Ronald Bruce St. John, *Ideology of Muammar Al-Qadhafi*, 471–490.
- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Lisa Anderson, *Rogue Libya's long road*, 45.
- 39 The political transformation of Libya under Qadhafi, *Afrika Focus* 4(3–4), 153–168, <http://www.gap.ugent.be/africafocus/pdf/88-4-34-Haghebaert.pdf>.
- 40 Jentleson and Wrytock, Who 'won' Libya?, 61.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 Martin Asser, The Muammar Qaddafi story.
- 43 Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2010 – Libya Country Report*, 9.
- 44 Ibid. 8
- 45 Ibid., 19.
- 46 Arab commission for human rights, <http://www.achr.nu/art299.htm> (accessed 14 May 2011).
- 47 Amnesty Report, <http://www.amnesty.org/ar/region/libya/report-2010> (accessed 14 May 2011); see also Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2010 – Libya Country Report*, 7–8.
- 48 Anderson, *Rogue Libya's long road*, 45.
- 49 Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2010 – Libya Country Report*, 17, 23.
- 50 Anderson, *Rogue Libya's long road*, 47.
- 51 Bertelsmann Stiftung, *BTI 2010 – Libya Country Report*, 22.
- 52 Ibid., 25.
- 53 . Political transformation of Libya under Qadhafi, *Afrika Focus* 4(3–4), 160, <http://www.gap.ugent.be/africafocus/pdf/88-4-34-Haghebaert.pdf>.
- 54 Ogunbadejo, *Qaddafi's North African design*, 156.
- 55 David Gritten, Key figures in Libya's rebel council, *BBC News*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12698562> (accessed 15 May 2011).
- 56 Anderson, *Rogue Libya's long road*, 45; Jentleson and Wrytock, Who 'won' Libya?, 57–58.
- 57 Editors' note: It is now clear that some Western countries have since done this, not least the French.
- 58 Jonathan Marcus, Libya stalemate leaves Nato without 'plan B', *BBC News*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13358885> (accessed 15 May 2011).
- 59 Hamdy Hasan, International competition and Libyan revolution, http://www.aleqt.com/2011/04/22/article_529746.html (accessed 16 May 2011).
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 Mamdani, *Libya after Nato invasion*.
- 62 Walter Pincus, How do we end Libya's stalemate? remove Gaddafi, <http://www.ongo.com/v/728000/-1/5151CA0775BAA543/how-to-end-libya-stalemate-remove-gaddafi> (accessed 13 May 2011).
- 63 Editors' note: It is this scenario that materialised in late August 2011, but it does not exclude the first one in the long run.
- 64 Jonathan Marcus, Libya: a new phase in the Conflict, *BBC News*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13112559> (accessed 15 May 2011).
- 65 Jentleson and Wrytock, Who 'won' Libya?, 61.
- 66 Richard K. Betts and Samuel P. Huntington, Dead dictators and rioting mobs: does the demise of authoritarian rulers lead to political instability? *International Security* 10(3) (Winter 1985–1986), 112–146, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538944> (accessed 13 May 2011).
- 67 Bertrand Badie, *Le Monde*, 24 February 2011; Alain Touraine, *Le Monde*, 18 February 2011.
- 68 André Glucksmann, *Le Monde*, 18 February 2011.
- 69 The 20 February Movement refers to the youth movement that derives its name from the date of its official launch, similar to other movements in Egypt (25 January movement) and Libya (17 February movement).
- 70 Benjamain Stora, Regard sur un Maroc en alternance, *Revue Esprit* 2 (2002), 56–68.
- 71 In 1970, 1972, 1992 and 1996.
- 72 See articles 19, 23 and 106 of the Moroccan constitution.
- 73 Mohammed Amine Benabdallah, Propos sur l'évolution constitutionnelle au Maroc, in Remald, *Revue Marocaine d'Administration Locale et de Développement* 36 (2001), 9–16.

- 74 Jean-Claude Santucci, Le multipartisme marocain entre les contraintes d'un 'pluralisme contrôlé' et les dilemmes d'un 'pluripartisme autoritaire', *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 111–112 (March 2006), 63–117.
- 75 Former right-hand man of Mehdi Ben Barka, co-founder, in 1959, of UNFP, sentenced to two years imprisonment in July 1963, exiled several times, Secretary General of the USFP since 1992.
- 76 Mohammed Madani, *Le paysage politique marocain*, Dar Al Qalam: Rabat, 2006, 42.
- 77 For further details, see among others Mohamed Tozy, *Monarchie et islam politique au Maroc*, Paris: Presses de Sciences po, 1999; Malika Zghal, *Les islamistes marocains: le défi à la monarchie*, Ed Le Fennec, 2005.
- 78 Khadija Mohsen-Finan, Maroc: l'émergence de l'islamisme sur la scène politique, *Foreign Politics* 1 (2005), 73–84.
- 79 Speech of the King on the occasion of the inauguration of the Consulting Human Rights Council.
- 80 See Mohamed Tozy, Rachid Filaly Meknasi and Abdellah Saaf, Crise des élites et restructuration du champ politique par le haut, *Les Cahiers bleus*, Publication de la Fondation Abderrahim Bouabid, 2009, 13.
- 81 Abdeslam Maghraoui, Scénarios politiques au Maroc face à la contestation, *Lakom.com*, 24 March 2011, <http://fr.lakome.com/opinion/62-chroniques-dopinion/235-abdeslam-maghraoui.html> (accessed 30 May 2011).
- 82 The reading of Jean-Noel Ferrie of the stability of the political regimes of the States of North Africa is refuted by the process triggered by the collapse of the regime of Ben Ali. See: Gouvernants et oppositions en Afrique du Nord, Author Manuscript, in Bernard Duterme (ed), *État des résistances dans le sud – 2010*, Monde arabe, 2009, 209–228.
- 83 The extreme left and at their head Annahj Addimocratie, and Al Adl Wa al Ihsan.
- 84 See Jean-François Clement, Les révoltes urbaines, in *Le Maroc actuel*, under the leadership of Jean-Claude Suntucci.
- 85 In Thierry Desrues and Miguel Hernando de Larramendi (dir), *S'opposer au Maghreb*, *L'Année du Maghreb* 2009, CNRS, Paris, 2010.
- 86 For further details, see Abderrahim Al Atri, *Les mouvements protestataires au Maroc: indicateurs d'étouffement et le début des tensions sociales*, (in Arab), Publication of Dafatir Wajhat Nadhar, 2007, 14.
- 87 Interview with the monthly magazine *La Revue* of April 2001, taken from the newspaper *Al Bayan*.
- 88 Indeed, many journalists and diplomats have asked us these questions, which have also been extensively debated in television shows and radio programmes across the world since the beginning of what is now known as the 'Arab Spring'.
- 89 See, for example, John F Clark and David E Gardinier (eds), *Political reform in francophone Africa*, Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1997; Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, Popular protest and political reform in Africa, *Comparative Politics* 24(4) (1992), 419–442; *Democratic experiments in Africa: regime transitions in comparative perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Afize D Adamon, *Le renouveau démocratique au Bénin: la Conférence Nationale des Forces Vives et la Période de Transition*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995; Gérard Conac (ed), *L'Afrique en transition vers le pluralisme politique*, Paris: Economica, 1993; Jean-Pascal Daloz and Patrick Quantin (eds), *Transitions démocratiques africaines*, Paris: Karthala, 1997.
- 90 On this, see Bratton and Van de Walle, *Democratic experiments in Africa*; Mamoudou Gazibo, *Les paradoxes de la démocratisation en Afrique: analyse institutionnelle et stratégique*, Montréal: Presse de l'Université de Montréal, 2005.
- 91 Daniel N Posner, Malawi's new dawn, *Journal of Democracy* 6(1) (1995), 131–145; Béatrice L Gbado, *Bénin: passage d'un régime autoritaire à un Etat de droit – mai 1985–février 1990*, Cotonou: Ruisseaux d'Afrique, 1996; Etienne Le Roy, Mali: la troisième république face à la méfiance des ruraux, *Politique africaine*, 46 (juin 1992), 138–142; Jérôme Lafargue, *Contestations démocratiques en Afrique: sociologie de la protestation au Kenya et en Zambie*, Paris: Karthala, 1996 .
- 92 Alexandre Delamou, *Les 32 jours de grève générale en Guinée: le film des évènements*, Conakry et Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007; Fodé Tass Sylla, *Guinée: du 22 décembre 2006 au 26 février 2007 – cette fois, c'est parti!* Conakry et Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008.
- 93 Personal interviews of the author with several Egyptian citizens and foreign diplomats in Cairo, March 2011.
- 94 Editors' note: this paper was revised in mid-September 2011 to reflect some developments that had happened since the end of the conference.
- 95 For literature on the Act see Kristiana Powell and Thomas Kwasi Tiekou, The African Union's new security agenda: is Africa closer to a Pax-Africana? *International Journal* 60(4) (2004–2005), 947; and Konstantinos D. Magliveras and Gino J. Naldi, The African Union: a new dawn for Africa? *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 51(2) (2002), 415.
- 96 The list of the AU's legal and policy instruments is not exhaustive. Those instruments referred to in the preamble to the PSC Protocol and the 2005 AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact also form part of the peace and security regime.
- 97 African Union, The AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, 2002.
- 98 African Union, The AU Solemn Declaration on the African Common Defence and Security Policy, 2004.
- 99 The Constitutive Act of the AU, Articles 3(g) and (h) respectively.
- 100 PSC Protocol, Preamble.
- 101 African Union, The AU Solemn Declaration, adopted at the 2nd Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Sirte, Libya, 27–28 February 2004.
- 102 It is now widely recognised that the major factors that precipitated the popular uprisings in North Africa were the lack of political freedoms and functioning democratic processes, corruption and nepotism for access to resources and opportunities, decline in the living standards of people, rising youth unemployment and high rise in food prices and cost of living.
- 103 Thabo Mbeki, In Libya the West has marginalised African concerns, *The African Times*, http://www.african-times.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13702:let-us-solve-our-problems-by-ourselves&catid=38:politics&Itemid=54 (accessed 24 June 2011).

104 Omar Ben Yeder, Lessons from Tunisia's uprising, *New Africa Magazine* 503 (February 2011), 20.

105 Ibid.

106 Ramtane Lamamra, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Statement made during the 275th meeting of the AU PSC, <http://www.au.int/en/dp/ps/content/statement-ambassador-ramtane-lamamra-commissioner-peace-and-security-275th-au-peace-and-secu> (accessed 20 June 2011).

107 Louise Mushikiwabo, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Republic of Rwanda, New threats to peace and security in Africa: lessons learned from North Africa crisis and Côte d'Ivoire, remarks made at the 275th Session of the PSC, Addis Ababa, 26 April 2011, <http://www.au.int/en/dp/ps/content/remarks-hon-louise-mushikiwabo-minister-foreign-affairs-and-cooperation-republic-rwanda-27-0> (accessed 20 June 2011).



ISS Head Office

Block D, Brooklyn Court, 361 Veale Street
New Muckleneuk, Pretoria, South Africa
Tel: +27 12 346 9500 Fax: +27 12 346 9570
E-mail: iss@issafrica.org

ISS Addis Ababa Office

5th Floor, Get House Building,
Africa Avenue, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Tel: +251 11 515 6320 Fax: +251 11 515 6449
E-mail: addisababa@issafrica.org

ISS Cape Town Office

2nd Floor, The Armoury Building, Buchanan Square
160 Sir Lowry Road, Woodstock, South Africa
Tel: +27 21 461 7211 Fax: +27 21 461 7213
E-mail: capetown@issafrica.org

ISS Dakar Office

Stèle Mermoz, 100x Elhadji,
Ibrahima Niasse MZ83, Senegal
Tel: +221 33 824 0918/21 Fax: +221 33 824 2246
E-mail: dakar@issafrica.org

ISS Nairobi Office

Braeside Gardens,
Off Muthangari Road, Lavington, Nairobi, Kenya
Tel: +254 20 386 1625 Fax: +254 20 386 1639
E-mail: nairobi@issafrica.org

ISS Pretoria Office

Block C, Brooklyn Court, 361 Veale Street
New Muckleneuk, Pretoria
Tel: +27 12 346 9500 Fax: +27 12 460 0998
E-mail: pretoria@issafrica.org

www.issafrica.org

This publication was made possible through core funding provided to the ISS by the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

CONFERENCE REPORT

ISBN 978-1-920422-63-9



9 781920 422639