


DÉTENTE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA : TWO VIEWS

Ronald Ballinger
and
Gerrit Olivier

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

Professor Ronald Ballinger, as an honorary research associate of the South African Institute of International Affairs, is presently doing research work at Jan Smuts House. During 1961-62 he was *inter alia* visiting scholar at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, and is currently professor of history at Rhode Island College, Rhode Island, USA. He was chairman of that department, as well as the council of the institution from 1967 to 1975. He has published widely on South and Southern African affairs, and addressed branches of the Institute on numerous occasions.

Professor Gerrit Olivier is currently professor in the Department of Political Science and International Politics at the University of Pretoria, and is editor of *Politikon*, the South African journal of political science. He has published a number of articles and contributions to books, mainly on South African foreign policy, the subject on which he did his doctoral thesis. He is a member of the Pretoria Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs.

These papers were read on the occasion of the 46th annual council meeting of the South African Institute of Race Relations in Johannesburg on 21 January, 1976, at a conference on *South Africa in Africa : An Evaluation of Détente*.

It should be noted that, as the Institute is precluded by its Constitution from itself expressing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs, opinions expressed in these papers are solely the responsibility of the authors and not of the Institute.

CONTENTS

	Page
Détente - A Global View	1
Détente in Perspective	20

ISBN : 0 909239 18 5

The South African Institute of International Affairs
Jan Smuts House
P.O. Box 31596
BRAAMFONTEIN
2017
South Africa

April, 1976

Ronald Ballinger

In this paper I should like to explore briefly, without any claim to originality save for its shortcomings, the tentative steps in my own response to the subject of this conference, namely *South Africa in Africa: An Evaluation of Détente*. I hope that treated in this way, they may collectively throw something more than simply an ephemeral light on the grave issues involved. The first has to do with the contrast between the international responses, on the one hand to South Africa, and on the other to inequality and the curtailment of liberty in other countries. How do we explain this undeniable yet unparalleled international concern with one country? A concern whose expression is not confined to any one group of countries and which often appears indifferent to the appalling facts of life elsewhere.

I

Dr. Eschel Rhoodie in his book *The Third Africa* said it was not his sole purpose "to unmask the indifference, cynicism, double standards and self-interest revealed by other countries", but that to do so would serve at least to put the external attacks on Rhodesia and South Africa in their proper perspective.¹ I do not for one moment doubt his sincerity, but I cannot help wondering if the matter is really as simple as that and whether he succeeded.

There are two obvious difficulties about the emphasis upon emotive terms such as "cynicism", "double standards" and "self-interest", however well-founded each might be in a particular context. In the first place, what they refer to is at one level or another part of the ordinary currency of international affairs and, in particular, of what we might call today's plebiscitary diplomacy. As historians know, there is little new in this. Secondly, they may in themselves often appear to constitute an explanation of something which they merely serve to obscure, mystify or dismiss. Few have been as forthright as the late Mr. Eric Louw in exposing the double standards of a number of South Africa's critics, but I am not at all certain that this, however necessary and natural, did much to explain the extra-ordinary unanimity of condemnation among so many disparate members of the international community. Yet if we are fully to understand the international dimensions of the South African dilemma - and to discuss or evaluate détente in their light - this is what has to be explained. We might do better, therefore, to begin with Abraham Lincoln's observation that: A universal feeling, whether well or ill-founded, cannot be safely disregarded. The feeling which confronts South Africa is itself an expression of a still more profound change in modern consciousness, which we call anti-colonialism. That anti-colonialism is held and expressed with widely differing degrees of emotional intensity and varying content in different parts of the world, cannot conceal the fact that as a distinct mode of thought it is now universal. As such,

whatever the reasons, it is shared alike by former colonialists and their opponents and unaffected by the discrepancy between past expectations and the sobering realities of the present.

It is a commonplace of historical explanation that since the end of the Second World War we have been experiencing a world revolution, which has both transformed the geopolitical map and produced profound and collective changes of outlook and behaviour. Among its many familiar manifestations two, the rise of Asian and African nationalism and the end of the European empire, might seem too well-known to require further general treatment here. And this may well be so. Nevertheless, there is a certain tendency - or even a temptation perhaps - to explain the second as the result of the first and to describe anti-colonialism in similar terms. This does not square with the facts. More important in this context, such an approach conceals an essential element in the causal connection between the two which South Africans can ignore only at their peril.

Undoubtedly the rise of Asian and African nationalism is a reaction against European domination, but of and by itself it does not explain, any more than do two world wars and the anti-colonial stance of the two post-war super-powers, the extraordinary rapidity and co-incidence in time and circumstance of the European retreat from empire.² The European powers were not so weakened, impoverished or deprived of arms, wealth and resources that the immense gulf between them and their colonies was seriously diminished. On the contrary, that gulf has steadily increased with the years. Nor is it by any means clear that countries such as Britain and France lacked the strength to maintain their hold on the colonies, or that the colonies possessed enough seriously to challenge, let alone throw it off. Obviously, something else must also have changed radically - or at a radically changed pace - during the three decades since the institution of the League of Nations. What had changed and then underwent a complete transformation, both at home and abroad, was the attitude to empire. The European conquerors, for moral as well as other reasons, were hard put to it to resist the demands of their subject peoples and unable to reject them. In the metropolitan countries, the will to maintain colonial domination and the readiness to justify it - even in high-minded paternalistic terms - evaporated and finally disappeared. In its place came not only the rejection of the idea of empire, but also a condemnation of colonialism in all its forms. This was itself part of a general shift of attitude in the world at large towards non-self-governing peoples. It also reflected parallel changes taking place in the structure of Western society without reference to which any analysis of decolonization would be incomplete.³ But suffice it to say that at this point, anti-colonialism, from being an international problem, became a universal disclaimer of the old order.

As each newly independent state, each former colonial territory entered the community of nations, it added its voice to the swelling international chorus which condemned and rejected that order. It did so in terms which almost wholly echoed European ideas concerning democracy, self-government, individual freedom, justice and administration; and it does so still. Whether or not its spokesmen fully understood the institutional framework necessary for the realization of democracy and individual freedom,

or represented say, a military dictatorship, is less important to this inquiry than the fact that the appeal was and is made to principles and slogans that are now universally accepted. The application of those principles, whether in the international or the domestic sphere, is, of course, another matter. But the cumulative effect of these developments has been to bring into question a great deal more of the international order than simply the legitimacy of any formal colonial relationship.⁴

This being the case, there should be no great occasion for surprise when those countries which have done the most to give meaning and practical effect to such principles at home are attacked by the new states - whose legacy included those principles - either for past misdeeds or the thwarting of present aspirations, or for hypocrisy. The former include those who once possessed the largest empires. The latter include many whose élites always regarded that imperial rule as alien and then came to see it as oppressive and racist. Today with formal political independence achieved, these élites confront the ever increasing world-wide inequalities between the rich and their own often poverty-stricken states. It would be surprising if they did not equate, in some measure at least, this great discrepancy in wealth and power with the era of European colonialism and Western domination.

Clearly they do; and we see the recognition of this in the elaboration of such myths as the Third World or the North-South or white-coloured confrontation to describe the resulting international alignments on certain issues. As examples of such issues we may include Rhodesia, South West Africa and *apartheid*, the distribution of wealth and the demand for change in the international economic order and monetary decision-making bodies, the newly added Arab-Israeli conflict and before long, perhaps, the Panama Canal. What gives metaphors like the Third World the verisimilitude of reality is the degree of unity and coherence provided by a common view that the countries so described have been exploited under Western industrial and political domination. This is held to override all other differences between them. In reality it does not and cannot conceal important ideological and geographical differences which, in the nature of things, must make this unity a fragile one. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that they do share a powerful emotion and a common outlook, perhaps more easily defined by what it is against, but which informs a determination to remove all the vestiges of subjection and all the inequalities which they associate with the colonial era.⁵

It was much in evidence at the UN sponsored Stockholm *Conference on the Human Environment*, in June, 1972 - which some 110 states officially attended - and even more so two years later, in August, 1974, at the UN *Conference on World Population*, held in Bucharest. Like the first, the second was largely the result of United States initiatives. Nevertheless, it provided the occasion for a still stronger denunciation of the developed countries and the inequities and inequalities of the existing international structure by the less developed countries.⁶ It was also very much in evidence at Mexico City in July, 1975, at the *World Conference of the International Women's Year*.⁷ In short, it is anti-colonialism. But the former colonies have now become its front-runners. And so one is led

back to the mainstream of recent history and human endeavour and the development of a body of generally accepted ideas which must now briefly be examined.

The United Nations Charter in Article 73, obligated those of its signatories responsible for non-self-governing territories to develop self-government in them. It said nothing about timetables and accepted that the process would be conditioned by the "particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples" and their "varying stages of advancement." Like the earlier Covenant of the League of Nations, it still reflected the European notions regarding trusteeship and the fitness for self-government. In 1955 at the Bandung Conference, 29 Asian and African countries laid down categorically that "colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end." Using the language of the UN Charter they condemned all alien rule as a denial of fundamental human rights. At the same time at the UN, the United States was endeavouring to secure the adoption of specific timetables for self-government and independence. Five years later, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the UN *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, better known, perhaps, as the UN Declaration on Colonialism. This repeated the language of fundamental human rights, referring specifically to the Charter, and condemned all alien rule as a denial of them. It stated quite flatly that all peoples have the right to self-government by virtue of which they determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. It rejected categorically the ideas of trusteeship and fitness for self-government, denying that inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness could be legitimately used for delaying independence. In the general debate, the United States representative who abstained from the voting, nevertheless insisted that all forms of colonialism, whether benevolent or not, were undesirable and went on to define colonialism in terms capable of very wide application:

First, let me say what we mean by colonialism. There is no need for a formal definition. We have learned from history certain of its characteristics. It is the imposition of alien power over a people, usually by force, and without the formal and free consent of the governed. It is the perpetuation of that power. It is the denial of the right of self-determination - whether by suppressing free expression or by withholding necessary educational, economic and social development.⁸

The UN has always from its foundation condemned racism - if most vociferously white racism - and the Declaration reiterated its stand on fundamental freedoms for all "without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion." It also laid great stress on the obligation to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of any territory in question.

The formula for this, like the basis of the Declaration, as all subsequent debates have shown, is one-man one-vote and majority rule, and sovereign control over natural resources. No doubt this helps explain why SWAPO is internationally acceptable but South West Africa's Constitutional Conference of 1975 is not.

The Declaration was a watershed in anti-colonialism. Its main propositions were taken up again in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and in the two UN Covenants on Human Rights adopted without dissent in 1966. Against this mainstream of ideas and UN resolutions, France, Britain and Portugal respectively, struggled hard but totally without success to keep Algeria, Rhodesia and the Portuguese "overseas provinces" off the UN agenda. The inalienable right to self-determination, civil liberty, education, economic freedom, democracy, one-man one-vote and majority rule, national unity, territorial integrity and the exercise of sovereign rights over natural resources: these were what now constituted, as it were, the Wilsonian principles, the new legitimacy, the international framework - and the verbal currency - of yet one more attempt to reconstruct a post-war world in the light of prevailing concepts of social justice and Western nationalism. South Africa, with regard to the administration both of South West Africa - its non-self-governing territory - and its own internal racial policies, is universally held to have deliberately rejected the principles and placed itself outside the framework.

One does not have to go to the so-called Third World nations to seek evidence of this. It was not a member of the Organization of African Unity but the United Kingdom representative to the United Nations, speaking fifteen years ago in the UN Debate on Apartheid, who said:

We see the deliberate adoption, retention and development of a policy specifically based on total racial discrimination. This is further distinguished by the circumstance that it is discrimination amongst and against the permanent inhabitants of the country itself.⁹

And it was the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs who, on July 24, 1975, told the Senate Sub-committee on Southern Africa that in this matter the situation remained fundamentally unchanged.¹⁰ Five days later, he enunciated the official United States policy with respect to South West Africa/Namibia entirely in terms of the familiar UN resolutions, which have long since become the generally accepted position in international law as well as world opinion. Those who consult *Hansard* for December 4, 1974, will find a similarly clear and authoritative statement of the British position by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, according to which South Africa is in illegal occupation of the Territory. He went on to say:

The Government looks to South Africa to heed the United Nations calls on her to withdraw from this international territory, and we shall lend our support in the international community to help bring this about.¹¹

It is against this background, as well as the immediate pressure of events in Southern Africa, that détente must be viewed. But I should like now to turn to consider détente itself.

II

In a recent editorial in *The Round Table*, the writer drew a distinction between East-West détente as conceived by President Nixon and the Russian leaders, and Southern African détente as conceived by Mr. Vorster. The article concedes that parties to serious détente reserve areas of policy where they are not prepared to make concessions, but argues that whereas in East-West détente there is the implicit hope that successful negotiation on specific matters will lead to further co-operation and benefits that go beyond the accommodation of limited interests, this is not the case for Mr. Vorster. The article goes on:

It is here that Mr. Vorster's conception of détente is deficient. He is not interested in détente being effective beyond the limited goals he has set himself. He does not want to see liberty broaden out from precedent to precedent throughout Southern Africa. He wants to prevent it doing so. Détente is intended to halt at the banks of the Limpopo.¹²

If one puts aside for the moment the question of whether Mr. Vorster's conception of détente is deficient and ignore the one-sided introduction of liberty broadening from precedent to precedent into the comparison, one may still ask if this is a valid description of Mr. Vorster's détente. This, of course, is a separate question from asking if what Mr. Vorster has said about détente in the past is a sufficient basis for bringing about a permanent détente in the future. Presumably, Mr. Vorster would hold with Dr. Kissinger that if policy-makers do not resolve immediate problems, they cannot hope to resolve the long-term ones. The difficulty here is to know which are which and the fact that yesterday's long-term problems have a habit of appearing as tomorrow's crises.

But in any event, I assume this is not an adequate description. What then is détente? I must confess to some difficulty in fully understanding the furore and the excitement aroused in the Republic by the diplomatic initiatives of the past eighteen months. I assume détente to have been the only practical response to the new realities in Southern Africa created by the suddenness of Portuguese decolonization; hardly a matter in which given any opening there could be any real alternative and certainly not a new departure or an adventure in foreign policy.

As I understand it, what Mr. Vorster did was to offer South Africa's assistance and co-operation in finding peaceful solutions to the problems on its frontiers and preventing the escalation of violence in Southern Africa. He described it as the normalizing of relations between South Africa and other African states. This I take to mean the establishment of diplomatic relations and normal intercourse and co-operation in social and economic

matters. In short, a choice of conventional diplomacy as an alternative to past ideological conflict and the existing threat of violent confrontation over Rhodesia. Mr. Vorster was undoubtedly correct when he said in 1969: "To the extent that we establish the right relations with Africa, to that extent will our problems diminish in other parts of the world." ¹³ He still is.

An examination of the famous "crossroads" address to the Senate on October 23, 1974, leaves little doubt that Mr. Vorster hoped and looked for spillover effects from détente which would not only ease South Africa's immediate international position, but ensure increasing exchange and co-operation between, at the least, the states of Southern Africa. One sees this in his emphasis upon the need for stability and development in Africa and the priority he assigned to economic, technical and monetary problems. With respect to these and particularly where close neighbours are concerned, Mr. Vorster stressed the readiness of South Africa to play its part and to contribute as full a share of assistance as its means allowed. ¹⁴ But this, surely, was also a major plank in détente's predecessor, the "outward looking" policy? But is there not also another clear continuity with past policy, a policy which has not hitherto been conspicuously marked by its success?

Mr. Vorster referred specifically to Rhodesia, Mozambique and South West Africa. With regard to the first he said that the time had come for a durable and just solution which would restore Rhodesia to a normal place in the community of nations, and he believed that one could be found. Since the only basis on which the African leaders within or without Rhodesia can accept a settlement is the implementation of majority rule - the issues for negotiation being when and how - presumably Mr. Vorster envisaged this. With regard to Mozambique there was no problem. The South African Government had already accepted the idea of an independent Mozambique under a Frelimo Government and held firmly and wisely to its oft-reiterated policy of non-interference and non-aggression. He stressed the importance of orderly development and drew attention to the common economic interests which it shared with South Africa, and the benefits which derived therefrom, not only for the two countries but the whole of Southern Africa.

But when it came to South West Africa, Mr. Vorster made it clear that a Rhodesian-type approach was not acceptable and that he still regarded the matter largely as a domestic one. While he accepted the goal of eventual self-government, he rejected completely the idea of outside participation in the process, or the withdrawal of South Africa in favour of the United Nations. Such a withdrawal, he argued, could only result in chaos. He insisted that the peoples of South West Africa must be allowed to decide their own future without outside interference. At the same time he spoke of the need to gain experience for the exercise of self-government. This conflicts directly, as does Mr. Vorster's interpretation of self-government here, with the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the resolutions of the UN, and the explicit positions taken up by the Organization of African Unity and the Western powers alike. And it points, as does Mr. Vorster's speech, to the same emphasis on domestic sovereignty as formed the basis

of the "outward looking" policy. In short, there is the same insistence that the finding of some solution to South Africa's external difficulties carries with it no implications for the conduct of its internal affairs. There is the same belief that the "normalization" of relations with Black African states can be sought and achieved in spite of the policies of apartheid and without reference to them. Or so it would appear.

There was a moment when it seemed otherwise and when something else might be intended. It must have been the juxtaposition of Mr. Vorster's speech and the statement by Ambassador R.F. Botha in the Security Council on October 24, 1974, in which he said:

My Government does *not* condone discrimination purely on the grounds of race or colour. Discrimination based solely on the colour of a man's skin cannot be defended. And we shall do everything to move away from discrimination based on race or colour.¹⁵

And this was followed by Mr. Vorster's speech in Nigel on November 5 of the same year, when he told his listeners that many would be surprised to see where South Africa stood in six months time. The context, however, made it clear that he was referring to the diplomatic initiatives and not to any fundamental changes in the structure of apartheid.¹⁶

I would not wish it to be thought at this point that I am maintaining that South Africa has shown itself to be completely unresponsive to external pressures. This is not the case. But the stance of the Government in this respect remains essentially the same. Peaceful co-existence and diplomatic and economic co-operation must take place on the basis of non-interference in domestic affairs. It is here, I suggest, that we come to the real crux of the comparison with East-West détente. President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger - although not their critics - could agree with the Soviet leaders in their contention that détente must not include any attempt at interference in domestic affairs; and that peaceful co-existence was more important than domestic differences, no matter how great. No one is seriously likely to challenge Russia on this. But for most African states the normalization of relations with South Africa and the development of economic and diplomatic relations are not more important than "decolonization" and apartheid. For them, therefore, détente is, at one level, simply a response to a new regional crisis and, at another, a temporary alternative to the policy of political isolation and confrontation to be judged by its success in achieving the same goals.

This becomes much clearer when we examine in a little detail the major policy statements of the Organization of African Unity. To these I should like to turn next. They cannot be ignored because South Africa's disputes in the last resort are really disputes with other African states about Africa and must ultimately be resolved or, at least, be diffused in Africa before South Africa's position in the world at large can be improved. What the statements reveal, among other things, is the identification of apartheid with the issues of anti-colonialism, and the key role it plays in the relations between South Africa and the other African states.

One should need no reminding that the Organization of African Unity is a "league of post-colonial" countries, the African expression of the world revolution to which reference was made earlier. Article 11(1)(2) of its Charter calls on all its signatories "to eradicate all forms of colonialism in Africa". Its sixth principle enjoins all members to "an absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent". No sooner was the first conference held in Addis Ababa in 1963, than the Organization adopted resolutions against both Portugal and South Africa. These included decisions to break off diplomatic relations with both and to impose a boycott on South Africa.¹⁷ The measures went further than that, for the Organization set up a Liberation Committee for the task of co-ordinating the various officials, parties and "governments" in exile. It was also made responsible for creating funds to support the various nationalists and provide for their training in the independent states. So far as Portugal and South Africa were concerned, they were now fair game and it was virtually a declaration of open season on them. And so, of course, it was, especially at the United Nations.

In September, 1969, the OAU adopted the Lusaka Manifesto earlier issued by the Conference of East and Central African States. The same Manifesto was subsequently endorsed in a General Assembly resolution of the UN by a vote of 119-2-2. It is a remarkable document with a significance which goes well beyond my reference to it here. But it is important in this context because it makes quite clear - if further clarification were necessary - the identification not only of Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia and South West Africa with anti-colonialism, but South Africa too. Although it recognises South Africa as an independent, sovereign state, a member of the UN and the most highly developed and richest in Africa, it also speaks of "a ruthless denial of the human rights of the majority of the population" and contends that the will of the people and the equality of every citizen is the basis of liberation. It asserted that:

The South African government cannot be allowed to reject the very concept of mankind's unity and to benefit by the strength given through friendly international relations. Certainly Africa cannot acquiesce in the maintenance of the present policies against people of African descent.¹⁸

Two years later, in the Mogadishu Declaration adopted by the Conference of East and Central African States, October, 1971, the issues dealt with in the Lusaka Manifesto were taken up again and restated, but this time without the emphasis on a peaceful alternative.

Having defined the objectives of the liberation of Southern Africa, the leaders of independent Africa made it known to the whole world and, in particular, the Republic of South Africa and Portugal, that there could be no compromise or concession made about the freedom, dignity and respect of the oppressed peoples of Southern Africa. Consequently, the only alternative left to Africa is to use all means available

to them to change the abominable and hateful policies of apartheid, colonialism and racialism.¹⁹

There is, as one might be led to suppose, the specific bracketing of Rhodesia and South Africa as minority, racist governments. In January, 1973, at its meeting in Accra, the OAU Liberation Committee drew up its Charter of African Liberation in which it described the Mogadishu Declaration as the only basis on which to liberate Southern Africa. It was at this session of the Liberation Committee that the decision was made to give immediate priority to the independence movements in the Portuguese colonies.²⁰ Two years later, in January, 1975, the same Committee met to reconsider its strategy in the light of the impending withdrawal of the Portuguese, and drew up what ultimately became known as the Dar es Salaam Declaration on the New Strategy for the Liberation of Africa. This recommended that priority now be given to "Zimbabwe and Namibia" and:

At the same time the struggle and offensive against the inhuman system of apartheid must be intensified at all levels.²¹

The Declaration looked back this time to the Lusaka Manifesto and stated that the OAU would prefer to achieve its objectives by peaceful means. This meeting was the prelude to the extraordinary meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers later in the year. They met from April 7-11 to consider African strategy towards Southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular. And they adopted the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa, the penultimate paragraph of which reads:

While being cognizant of the fact that South Africa stands as the final major obstacle to Africa's march to liberation, the Council of Ministers reaffirms their unflinching determination to realize the freedom and independence of Rhodesia and Namibia and the total destruction of apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa.²²

Just as significant, but less well-known, perhaps, are the twenty-six "principles" adopted by the 1972 UN-sponsored Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment to which has already been referred. For the purposes of this argument one needs concern oneself only with the first, which opens the statement of principles. This reads:

1. Man had the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permitted a life of dignity and well-being, and he bore a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations. In this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating *apartheid*, racial segregation,

discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domination stood condemned and had to be eliminated.²³

And, of course, one could cite many other examples of the similar use of this language. This is the authentic voice of the UN's new majority and the language of anti-colonialism. There can be little doubt, however, that most people in the Western world - no matter how irritated or infuriated they might be by the tactics and methods, or the selective morality of that majority - would find themselves in agreement with its attitude to racism.

As matters stand, the problem of South Africa's domestic policies is of less immediate concern internationally than the issues of Rhodesia, South West Africa and more recently, and still more urgently, the tragic developments in Angola. In the case of the former this is so because the international community in general and the West in particular has been increasingly willing to support and press for a settlement along lines acceptable to the African states; in the case of the latter because détente has been overtaken by the events in Angola and may indeed have been lost in them. But it is détente that is being considered and here one is forced to conclude that any South African approach to it which begins with the proposition that the policies of apartheid are solely matters of domestic concern to South Africa, is not only deficient but completely unrealistic. It is the issue of apartheid which provides the key to the "normalization of relations" with Black African states. It is, in consequence, also the key to South Africa's political difficulties with the rest of the world, including her most important economic allies and associates. Most of these are increasingly embarrassed by them and find them a steadily growing barrier to their good relations with the African states.

III

Let me turn now to consider the attitudes of the West, using as examples Britain and the United States, both of whom have major economic ties with South Africa. For neither of them have the problems of Southern Africa featured very prominently in their list of priorities. From time to time Rhodesia caused Britain some embarrassment, but hardly more. Neither of them has been prepared to acquiesce in the more extreme resolutions generated by the anti-colonialism crusade at the UN. Both abstained from the voting on the Declaration on Colonialism as much, perhaps, from a distaste for its language, its unsupported assertions and broad claims as for any pragmatic reasons. In 1971, both of them terminated their association with the "Committee of 24," as the Special Committee set up to implement the Declaration on Colonialism became known, unable, it would appear, to endorse its methods or tactics. And neither of them voted for the Programme of Action for the full implementation of the Declaration, which that Committee produced and the General Assembly adopted in 1970.²⁴ Its open calls for violence were unacceptable to both governments.

The Programme of Action, incidentally, asked the Security Council to consider the need to widen the scope of sanctions against Rhodesia and to impose sanctions upon South Africa and Portugal. The same year saw the United States cast its first veto against a Security Council resolution. The resolution would not only have condemned Britain for its refusal to use force against the now illegal regime in Rhodesia, but imposed sanctions against Portugal and South Africa. Both countries were increasingly disturbed by two aspects of anti-colonialism at the UN in particular. The first referred to the majority's readiness to assume that, contrary to the Charter, a General Assembly resolution once achieved, created legal obligations. The second was the attempt of the "Committee of 24" and the General Assembly majority to involve the Specialized Agencies in the efforts of the various liberation movements, and the anti-colonialism campaign.

For both Britain and the United States, the increasing trend over the years towards the tactics of confrontation and away from the use of negotiation in the world body has been very disturbing.²⁵ Both have, thus far, set their faces firmly against every attempt to apply enforcement measures in terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter - threats to international peace - against South Africa. And equally they have opposed the attempt to impose mandatory obligations on members without the use of the proper constitutional procedures laid down in the Charter.²⁶ A little more than a year ago the Security Council gave South Africa a period of six months to comply with the UN resolutions regarding Namibia and to withdraw from it. The deadline, which was May 30, 1975, came and went without South Africa's compliance, and on June 6, Britain, France and the United States cast a triple veto against a resolution which involved the "threat to international peace" language and decreed mandatory action against the Republic. Similarly, all three Western powers have insisted on the principles of universality and refused thus far to approve attempts to expel South Africa from the UN.

From the past record then, it is apparent that the Western powers had no desire to intervene or see the UN become directly involved in Southern Africa. And on this South Africa has up to now been able to count. This, together with the fact that political ostracism is a far cry from political and economic isolation, has enabled South Africa until recently, to maintain the *status quo*. The withdrawal of the Portuguese has changed all that. Détente was the response to that change, but détente also made a resolution of the disputes over Rhodesia and South West Africa an urgent matter. And on both issues the position of the Western powers is now essentially the same as that of the other African states and the UN. How then do Britain and the United States view détente? The immediate and simple answer is that they welcomed it and paid tribute to Mr. Vorster's statesmanlike initiatives. They wanted a negotiated, peaceful resolution of both these disputes - and so did those most immediately concerned in Africa. Nevertheless, their positions with regard to the requirements of détente are significantly different from that of the government of South Africa. And moreover, like the other African states, they refer to three major issues, namely, Rhodesia, Namibia and apartheid - not two.

The British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in December, 1974, reported to the House of Commons that the government's review of its policy towards Southern Africa was now complete, and that it was essential that Britain make its stand against the policy of apartheid and racialism quite clear. The UN embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa would be reimposed; the government would not interfere with organizations or individuals but asked them to take serious note of the government's objections to sporting contacts while apartheid in sport persisted. The Simonstown Agreement, obviously, had become an embarrassment, for he indicated that it would be brought to an end. He gave a very careful review of the British Government's reservations concerning the 1971 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. At the same time, he indicated that the government regarded South Africa's occupation of Namibia as unlawful, her withdrawal as necessary and the involvement of the UN as essential, as was also the recognition of SWAPO. When Mr. Callaghan was challenged by a member of the Opposition who asked if he did not think that the best way to combat apartheid was to increase, not decrease contact with South Africa, Mr. Callaghan replied: "The experience of the last year or two does not bear out the Hon. Gentleman's view".²⁷

The Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Mr. David Ennals, speaking ten months later, made it clear that, in his view, détente was based on three propositions which defined the South African Government's policy. They were, first, to safeguard apartheid and the right of White South Africans to work out their policies in their own time; secondly to normalize international relations; and lastly to establish close, mutually beneficial relationships with their African neighbours. He did not think détente could survive unless it soon produced some results. But in any event, he pointed out that it was unacceptable to Black Africa on the government's terms. And he stated that the trouble with Mr. Vorster's détente was that it was intended to entrench apartheid, not to change it. The key, he said, remained White supremacy, and it would be quite wrong to see any fundamental change in the basic structure of apartheid.

With reference to South West Africa, he added one further qualification not open to Mr. Callaghan at the time of his parliamentary statement. He indicated that the British Government did not oppose the Windhoek constitutional talks, despite their ethnic basis, but his government could not regard them as definitive. In any case the UN must be involved.²⁸

When one turns to look at the policy of the United States, one finds an almost identical position and a similar growing embarrassment concerning the effect of these issues on her relations with the other African and Third World states. It was the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs who said that "the most significant aspect of US policies with respect to South Africa was that they affected the United States' identity as a nation and its interests throughout." On Namibia/South West Africa, he held even more firmly than the British Government to the necessity for moving from the Windhoek talks to UN supervised elections and the withdrawal of the South African administration in accordance with UN resolutions. On Rhodesia, he reiterated that the only basis for a negotiated settlement was majority rule. The third major issue in détente, was apartheid.²⁹

The approach of both governments to détente remains pragmatic. It is, perhaps, best expressed in the words of the British Minister, Mr. Ennals, in the speech already referred to:

We shall associate ourselves at the United Nations with proposals aimed at ending Apartheid, while reserving the right to use our own political judgement on each particular issue.

But its direction is clear and the pressure of men and events is steadily increasing. The outbursts of Dr. Moynihan at the UN can have escaped nobody in South Africa. The relevant question at the present time is not whether one approves, applauds or deplors them, but rather of what are they the increasingly visible evidence. They are, in fact, part of what is now quite a long-standing conflict between the United States and the UN majority, which in recent years has been growing more serious. It covers a range of UN activities and issues and it has now surfaced. It is also clear evidence of the fact that the Southern African disputes, among a few others, are seriously affecting the West's relations with other countries. The United States finds itself in a position of relative isolation, increasingly confronting the UN majority on issues which are intensified by the passions of anti-colonialism. In the end it will need to seek an accommodation.

IV

In conclusion, I should like to make passing reference to two important matters upon which, among many others, I have not touched at all. The first has to do with the strategic considerations affecting the United States stance towards South Africa and what is then described locally as the defence of the Cape Route. I cannot help the feeling, whether it is soundly based or not, that there is in the Republic, an assumption - amounting almost to a fundamental conviction - that South Africa is axiomatically a vital part of the defence of the Western world, whatever that means. And, moreover, that certain obvious consequences flow from this. Let me confess immediately that I have no intimate knowledge of such matters and no professional expertise in them. But I do not believe that South African security is viewed in this way by the United States or the Western world. On the contrary, I find myself in agreement with the conclusions of that recent and impressive paper by Dr. Christoph Bertram⁺ on this subject. I can see no evidence that the United States in the present circumstances views the defence of South Africa as one of its national interests. Nor do I believe that the post-Vietnam mood in the United States is properly characterized as a loss of confidence or nerve, or what you will. I suggest, however, that what is taking place there is a close reappraisal of just what those national interests are. The United States too, is seeking the ways and means of adjustment to a changing world.

⁺ *South Africa in the World Strategic Situation* (a paper presented to a symposium on *South Africa in the World: The Realities*, held by the Pretoria Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs, Pretoria, June 6, 1975).

The second matter, of course, is the situation in Angola. In the absence of any really reliable information - I have access to the newspapers - any comment is simply that. But if the trends described in this paper have any validity at all, I am bound to conclude that South African involvement in Angola was not well-advised. And in the absence of African international support and Western co-operation it should not be prolonged. There can be little doubt that the long-term prospects of détente, whatever they were, have been made immeasurably more difficult and as it persists, more remote by the war. Whatever its effects upon the negotiations between Mr. Vorster and the leaders of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, the war cannot but undermine the prospects for early negotiated peaceful settlements in Rhodesia and South West Africa. It has changed both the circumstances and the psychological climate of détente.

REFERENCES

1. E. Rhodie, *The Third Africa*, Nasionale Boekhandel, Cape Town, 1968, p. 15.
2. For an examination of the issues involved here see Elie Kedourie, (ed. and intro.) *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, Meridian Books, New York, 1970; Colin Cross, *The Fall of the British Empire 1918 - 1968*, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1969; Rupert Emerson, *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Independence*, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1964; and Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.
3. One thinks here of the impact of two world wars on the social and economic structures of Europe and the development of the welfare state, changes in educational policies and the recruitment of élites and the erosion of traditional authority and hierarchies - of the deferential order.
4. Thus, in a lengthy article entitled "Wealth and Power: The Politics of Food and Oil", *New York Review of Books*, August 7, 1975, Professor Barraclough could write:

In the wider perspective of history, it may well turn out that the long-term significance of the "oil crisis" is the way it has served as a catalyst for the wider and more fundamental confrontation between the poor nations and the rich which threatens to engulf the world. The issue today is not oil, in any narrow sense, but whether the existing economic system, upon which Western predominance is based, can withstand the challenge from the Third World.

5. How else may one explain the Third World's solidarity with the OPEC countries during the oil crisis? The post-independence period of the last two decades has seen an ever-increasing demand on the international stage for equality of status. But the Western countries, it would seem, did not foresee the speed or the effectiveness with which the Third World might combine. Fourteen years ago in an effort to describe the increasingly difficult and unique position in which South Africa found itself, I wrote:

South Africa may be described, therefore, as being at the centre of a world problem - the struggle of the non-white states for recognition of their claim to equality with the more powerful and wealthier Western and white states. To the African and Asian states, South Africa is the epitome of their universal struggle and a symbol of all that runs counter to their aspirations. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that no more binding emotional force exists within this group than their common hostility to the South African political, economic and social structure. (*South Africa and the UN: Myth and Reality*, South African

Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg,
1973, p. 27.

6. For a brief summary see the Report of the UN Conference on the Human Environment held at Stockholm, 5 - 16 June, 1972, UN Doc. A/Conf. 48/14, p.82; and Daniel P. Moynihan, "The United States in Opposition", *Commentary*, March 1975, where in addition to these two conferences he draws attention to similar developments at a third, the 1974 World Food Conference held at Rome. See also, Lars - Goran Engfeldt, "The UN and the Human Environment - Some Experiences", *International Organization*, Vol.27, No.3, 1973, pp. 393-412.
7. Jennifer W. Seymour, "Women of the World: Report from Mexico City", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1975. In this context it is worth quoting her at length:

By and large, women from the poorer countries view the world from the vantage point of an ideology combining elements of Fabian socialism, Marxism, and most importantly, anti-colonialism. The educated class to which they belong has in recent years become increasingly imbued with this evolving Third World ideology. Thus they are at least on one level anti-Western, reacting against the former colonial powers, but particularly against the United States, as the pre-eminent capitalist power and recent massive antagonist of small, poor, non-white North Vietnam. Like the men in their countries, they are determined to change the current imbalance in the economic and cultural relationship between the industrialized nations and themselves. Therefore they supported quite automatically the introduction of various attendant political issues constituting a litany of oppressions against the Third World (*apartheid*, foreign domination, Zionism, etc.). (p. 176).
8. *UN General Assembly Official Records*, Plenary Meetings, 15th Session, Vol.2, 1960, p. 1158.
9. Quoted in R.B. Ballinger, *South Africa and the UN : Myth and Reality*, p. 5.
10. US Information Service, *Official Text 9/35*, July 30, 1975.
11. Text supplied to the author by the British Information Services, Johannesburg.
12. Editorial, *The Round Table*, April 1975, p. 125.
13. Quoted in John Barratt, *South Africa and World Politics*, (Paper delivered to the S.A. Institute of International Affairs Symposium, Pretoria, 6 and 7 June 1975), p. 12.
14. See *Southern Africa Record*, Number One, (The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1975) for a text of this statement. (p. 4).

15. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 37 - 51.
17. C. Cervenka, *The Organization of African Unity and its Charter*, C. Hurst and Co., London, 1969, pp. 20-22 and pp. 18 - 19.
18. For text see *Current History*, Vol. 58, No. 343, March 1970 (Documents).
19. *Southern Africa Record*, Number Three, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, pp. 31 - 32.
20. C. Legum et al. (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 6, Rex Collings, London, 1974, p. A32; *UN Chronicle*, Vol. 12, No. 6, June 1975, p. 15.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Southern Africa Record*, Number Two, The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, p. 43.
23. *Yearbook of the UN 1972*, Vol. 26, Office of Public Information UN, New York, p. 319.
24. Resolution 2621 (XXV).
25. For a very fine analysis of these issues see Hollis W. Barber, "The United States vs. The United Nations", *International Organization*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1973, pp. 139 - 163.
26. See for example the Official Report dealing with the United Kingdom's reservations concerning the International Court's 1971 Advisory Opinion on the question "what are the legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276". This Report was circulated by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. James Callaghan) during the Commons' debate on Southern Africa, December 4, 1974. Mr. Callaghan made it clear that while the British Government's position on Namibia was in all essentials the same as the UN's, his Government's view of the powers of the General Assembly was not. The Report states:

The Charter confers upon the General Assembly powers, which, with certain exceptions of very limited scope are recommendatory only, and in our opinion the arguments in support of the legal effectiveness of the Resolution are not convincing.
27. See reference 12 above. I am indebted to the British Information Services for both the record of this debate and a copy of the speech by Mr. David Ennals to the Oxford University Labour Club on October 24, 1975.

28. *For the Record*, No. 23, 27 October, 1975, (British Information Services, Johannesburg).
29. U.S. Information Service, *Official Text*, 4 August, 1975. He was addressing the Senate Sub-Committee on Southern Africa in Washington, July 29, 1975.

DETENTE IN PERSPECTIVE

Gerrit Olivier

South Africa's position in the world is one of the great problems of our time. For virtually the entire international community, the prevailing socio-political dispensation in this country is unacceptable. Ever since the Second World War, steps have been taken with escalating intensity by the outside world to persuade the South African Government to change its internal policies, in order to make way for some form of majority rule. However, from the beginning it was clear that an accord or solution to the satisfaction of all concerned was out of the question. What is important however, is the fact that these hostilities forced us in South Africa to come to terms with the realities of contemporary world politics and to realign our thinking, insofar as the perennial problems of the social structure of our society were concerned.

What were the options open to South Africa under prevailing conditions? On the one hand, the Government was obliged to give expression to the mandate it received from the electorate, while on the other hand, external opinion demanded diametrically the opposite type of "solution" to that prescribed by the local White electorate. In response to this dilemma, the Government reformulated certain aspects of its internal race policies with the general aim of bringing them into line with democratic and moral principles. In very broad terms, these eventually amounted to the denouncement of discrimination based solely on colour and the policy of independent Homelands for the various Black ethnic groups.

However, these revised strategies did not have any immediate or dramatic effect on the inhibitory position in world politics into which the Republic was forced. It came at a time when the negative stereotypes depicting South Africa in the world were very firmly entrenched and therefore difficult to neutralize. In retrospect, our thinking on these matters since the war does not seem to have been sufficiently fundamental. Obviously there was something inadequate about our long-term assessment of the forces of change operative in our society and the world at large; a greater concern prevailed with our position at a particular point in time, rather than with future projections. For many years, the only solution we could offer for the problems of multi-ethnicity, was the invention and introduction of ingenious strategic devices, and legal and institutional structures and systems designed to enforce conformity with some preconceived principles. Many of these failed to withstand the test of time and are now being dismantled. We never realised sufficiently that if the perennial problems of our society were finally to be solved, it would be through the understanding of the operative forces, developments and trends taking place within the total society. A correct assessment of these would have led us to the obvious conclusion, that, without mastering the art of collaboration, all the strategic devices in the world would not help us to avoid the consequences of discrimination, domestically and internationally.

For many years, National Party spokesmen denied that the country's internal policies had anything to do with its foreign relations. The contention was that the world should accept South Africa in spite of apartheid.

We could never really appreciate that, in the post-war world, internal policies, which were at variance with certain moral principles, were increasingly becoming internationalized. For many years, the hope was kindled that this was just a temporary phase that the world, especially the West, was experiencing and that a return to "conservatism" was inevitable.

In these years we based our foreign policy on the following principles:

1. A strong pro-Western attitude;
2. a strong anti-Communist attitude;
3. the maintenance of the *status quo* in Africa;
4. South Africa's strategic importance and its value as a trading partner;
5. strict compliance with the basic principles of international law; and
6. rigid observance of the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states.

However, as it became clear that the changes in Africa and the rest of the world were long-term and that the hostilities against South Africa's internal policies would not subside, the following additional policies and strategies were devised:

1. The propagation of peaceful co-existence and regional co-operation in Southern Africa;
2. emphasis on the fact that the Whites of South Africa were also Africans and that South Africa was a permanent part of Africa;
3. efforts to come to an understanding with Black Africa by means of the dialogue efforts of the late Sixties and early Seventies;
4. the drastic extension of the Republic's military striking power;
5. the acceleration of the implementation of the separate development policy in a gradual endeavour to remove certain obvious moral discrepancies in the South African political system; and
6. an active information campaign aimed at the neutralization of the stereotyped negative image of the Republic abroad.

By applying these strategies, the South African policy-makers at least succeeded in realising the basic aims of foreign policy, thus ensuring material prosperity, maintaining the country's territorial integrity, and self-preservation.

The dramatic changes brought about in Angola and Mozambique by the *coup d'etat* in Portugal, necessitated a far-reaching reappraisal of South

Africa's position in Africa. In a very persuasive manner this event, coupled with the uncertainties in Rhodesia and South West Africa, forced the South African policy-makers to take urgent and constructive steps to protect the country's national interests. The policy of détente emerged, and for once it seemed as if a willingness was manifested by our foreign policy decision-makers to promote a creative atmosphere at the cost of false certainty of *status quo*.

However, my contention is that if détente is not to fade away in the same verbal dust storm as did dialogue a few years ago, the whole basis from which we operate should be redefined in the same clear terms as described, for instance, by the East and Central African States in the Manifesto on Southern Africa. The position in which we find ourselves, calls for something much more substantial than adhocery and piecemeal policy-decisions. We cannot expect the West to back us solely because of our anti-communist sentiments. Likewise, a role in a Rhodesian settlement seems too ephemeral a device for securing the longevity of détente. Something more substantial and lasting is needed.

Let us concede that a good start has been made by Mr. Vorster. His recent visits to Liberia and the Ivory Coast and especially his talks with President Kaunda and his role in the Rhodesian *impasse* were great strides in the direction of a goal, which he expounded in the South African Senate on 23 October, 1974, in the following terms:

I believe that Southern Africa has come to the crossroads. I believe that Southern Africa has to make a choice. I think that that choice lies between peace on one hand and an escalation of strife on the other. The consequences of an escalation are easily foreseeable. The toll of a major confrontation will be high. I would go so far as to say that it would be too high for Southern Africa to pay. But there is an alternative way. That way is the way of peace. The way of normalizing of relations, the way of sound understanding and normal association. I believe that Southern Africa can take that way. I have reason to believe that it is prepared to take that way. And I believe that it will do so in the end.¹

Unfortunately, as so dramatically demonstrated by the events in Angola, the two basic policy aims of détente, *viz.* the normalization of inter-state relations in Southern Africa and the settlement by peaceful means of the international problems of the region, are still far from being realized. Add to this the present stance of the Muzorewa-faction in Rhodesia and the continued operation of terrorists across the Zambezi and in the northern parts of South West Africa, the long-term prospects for détente do not look particularly encouraging. Nothing worse could have happened to the détente initiative than foreign communist intervention in the faction strife in Angola: for the first time Southern Africa has become the arena of overt big power intervention and conflict.

If UNITA and the FNLA do not get the upperhand in the present conflict,

the revolutionary element in Angola, coupled with the ideological commitments of Mozambique, the OAU, SWAPO and the ANC, will put the political order in South Africa, South West Africa and particularly Rhodesia to an unprecedented test. It is evident that the conflict potential in Southern Africa has increased so alarmingly since the Portuguese withdrawal that the Government's détente initiative will be put to a severe test in the months ahead.

The rather timid reaction of the West to the Russian and Cuban intervention in the Angola conflict put a question mark on the type of support South Africa can expect from these quarters, should a spillover of the conflict occur. The best for which we can hope is the confinement of the conflict to Angolan territory and that the West realises, timeously, the grave dangers of the present situation in Angola. Should this be the case, the Russian presence will probably last until the achievement of an internal accord or settlement. One can only speculate on how long this will take. Once big-power involvement has been eliminated, African problems will again be in the hands of African states and thereafter the détente initiative may be continued and extended. I am fully aware of the many speculations which accompany this scenario, but judging by the diplomatic credit we achieved, both in responsible Western circles and in a number of African states with the initial détente efforts, and the nervous reaction it elicited from our enemies, it is imperative that we should proceed. Détente can become our strongest instrument of foreign policy. I feel, however, that all will not be plain sailing, even after the return to tranquility of Angola, Rhodesia and South West Africa. The resistance to the prevailing South African political system has many deep ramifications.

Domestic factors play a very significant role in our foreign relations; the debilitating effect they have on our diplomacy cannot be ignored. Clearly the value-hierarchy from which our domestic policies emanate, and on which our national interests and foreign policy are based, could and should not be ignored. While we know that Africa and the world will not accept us as we are, I think it is imperative that, without impairing our national interests, we should devise some *modus operandi* that will pave the way for *sustained* and *meaningful* progress in our interstate relations - a blue-print for our future foreign policy. In making this suggestion, I do not wish to minimize or denigrate the role played by our foreign policy-makers and diplomats to improve South Africa's international position. Indeed, we should encourage them and help them where we can. Of scenarios bristling with platitudes, wishful-thinking, inaccuracies and plain guesswork, we seem to have had enough, and I am sure there is no relation between the sensational value of these and their utility for our policy-makers.

Reconciling the desirability of the possible with the possibility of the desirable is extremely problematical in South Africa's case. Therefore one may expect a divergence of opinions as to which action programme would be the best. Let us for once think in terms of a comprehensive inventory of the minimum requirements for a viable foreign policy *vis-a-vis* Africa - which is obviously the key to our future success in world politics - and on this basis devise a strategy for future action. Let us regard it as a

simulation exercise, where I put myself for a brief moment in the position of a Nationalist policy-maker. The line of approach which I think should be followed could be expounded in the following hypothetical terms:

1. It is a sentimental illusion that nations can pursue moral crusades without self-interest. It is equally wrong to believe that a nation has no obligation beyond self-interest. In the world in which we live, policies based on any of these assumptions provoke unnecessary disharmony, disagreement, conflict of interest or different assessments of human priorities.
2. Being the object of a sustained moral crusade since the Second World War, the South African Government has adopted the position that no person can be the judge of another's domestic institutions and requirements. However, while non-intervention in the affairs of other states has remained a touchstone of South Africa's external conduct, the Government and the people of South Africa are not oblivious to the untenable position brought about by internal moral discrepancies and the urgent necessity to evolve a just, morally defensible system, free of discrimination and committed to the dictates of Western, Christian principles of morality.
3. The South African Government realises that, when domestic structures are based on differing conceptions of what is just, settlement of differences becomes extremely problematical.

Yet, while political action must be judged on these principles, "the state has no moral right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival. There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action".²

4. In seeking a solution for the South African situation, it must be borne in mind that, like any other, the South African society finds itself in an environment not of its own making. The pressure of these environmental factors is such that, for those having at heart the peace, progress and stability of all the inhabitants, it permits only one interpretation of its significance, *viz.* multi-national development on the basis of the tried principles of Western, Christian civilization.

We have learned from history that representative democracy in a plural society is unworkable. Experience has taught us that the melting-pot never worked so well as in myth and that the welding together of diverse racial groups in a single nation with actual equality is at best a hazardous project. We believe that the change in the direction of a plural state system taking place in South Africa right now is morally justifiable and that it is the only workable policy for our diverse society. In doing so, cognizance is given to the inner needs of the various ethnic aggregates to live in their own way and in accord with their own ideas in a geographically and politically circumscribed area.

5. The South African government is acutely aware of the discrepancies in socio-political conditions affecting Blacks, Coloureds and Asians in present-day South Africa. However, it seeks recognition and understanding for its honest aspirations and greater objectivity and realism from the world in regard to progress which is, in fact, being made to improve the situation. This progress can only be assessed in terms of positive indicators of development, e.g. political infra-structure, physical and human resources allocated and utilised, the betterment of social conditions such as schooling and housing and similar measurable or concrete achievements, rather than in terms of racist propaganda clichés.

6. It is a fact of life that individuals do not live in isolation, but belong to national entities and that these national entities are in themselves entitled to protection and are invested with rights which call for recognition and respect. These rights have found some recognition in International Law in relation to religious and national minorities.³

Individual rights and those of the community must not be seen in isolation. The negation of one aspect will surely adversely affect the other. On the other hand, we believe that both aspects should be accorded equal recognition and protection and that the one should not be over-emphasized to the detriment of the other.

7. South Africa could in no way be judged a colonial power; its own struggle for self-determination and independence has engrafted that image permanently in our hearts and minds. It is only natural, therefore, that we have evolved policies to ensure the national self-determination of every national unit in the Republic. The unprecedented action of South Africa in voluntarily fragmenting its territory and granting independence to some of the large and small fragments is a unique process and in no way to be compared with any decolonization situation. By this we believe, we are in our own way fulfilling a sacred trust, for which in non-colonial situations little concern has been shown. We believe that this trust has not received the attention it warrants and that it must be seen as no mere pious declaration, but that much fruitless striving and bitterness can be avoided if it is accepted and implemented with all its consequences. It is a perversion of this trust to limit it to colonial situations; it is not to be debased by referring to it as a saltwater theory. It is a living and dynamic principle of international law and morality, and a sacred duty of mankind.

South Africa is prepared to fulfil this principle. We have no hesitation in stating our intentions openly and boldly and to lay claim to the moral basis of our policies, and in the end be successful in the accomplishment of our aims and desires.

8. The Lusaka Manifesto recognises that for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements for the transformation process to run its full course. It also states clearly that in East and Central Africa, perfect social, economic and political organization has not been achieved, that the struggle towards human dignity is only beginning.

In view of the Republic of South Africa's own aspirations and endeavours to find, along the lines of national self-determination, a lasting basis for the achievement of the good life for all its peoples, it has great respect and sympathy for the struggle in Africa. However, in the light of the stampeding of democratic principles by many African leaders and the brute power politics now being displayed in a country like Uganda, it is gross pretentiousness on the part of the authors of the Lusaka Manifesto to condemn the Republic on the basis of our commitment to human equality and dignity. The invocation of moral principles in support of national policies by the Lusaka Manifesto is, therefore, clearly a pretence. The rigidity and fanaticism conjured up by this type of idealism is detrimental to social and political stability and positive co-operation which is so badly needed at this time. Such unstable conditions have never provided a climate in which basic rights and principles can flourish; such conditions have invariably led to the most appalling human sufferings, lawlessness and chaos.

The South African Government subscribes fully to the principles of universal human rights, and the forces of change it has set in motion, through the policy of multi-national development, are aimed at achieving precisely these ends. The struggle towards human dignity is a never-ending process and we all stand at the beginning of the vast challenge.

Although aware of our shortcomings, we are prepared to accept this challenge to create conditions in which every South African individual will enjoy, to the utmost, the human rights and dignities with which he has been endowed, and we are prepared to recognize, respect and defend these rights.

9. Africa should be a continent of peace and goodwill where all its inhabitants, White and Black, can live together in a spirit of tolerance and good neighbourliness. There are unfortunately many obstructions in the way of this ideal. While the prime objectives of the Lusaka Manifesto are the elimination of colonialism and racialism, other threats to the peace and progress, such as poverty, underdevelopment, external exploitation of natural resources, ideological intolerance and imperialistic infringements are being ignored. Events have shown that colonialism is rapidly being eradicated from Africa. Likewise, through the evolutionary process of multi-national development, racialism will wither away in South Africa. However important the elimination of these discrepancies, it is of no less importance for all of us committed to the future well-being of Africa that conditions favourable to social progress, better standards of living and larger freedom should be created.

10. As an Africa-rooted people, the White population of the Republic of South Africa is willing to work shoulder to shoulder with the other states and peoples of Africa to attain these ideals. We know that stark reminiscences of colonial exploitation, ideological prejudices and paternalism caused similar offers to be shunned in the past by most Black African states. We believe, therefore, that while the Lusaka Manifesto and also the major Western powers are in favour of

co-operation rather than confrontation as far as relations with South Africa are concerned, a new era of inter-Africa co-operation should be introduced. The peoples of Africa need each other in the fields of medicine, education, agriculture, trade, science, technology and numerous related spheres. South Africa has much to offer. Let us therefore, settle our differences in a relaxed, rational atmosphere inspired by common needs, rather than in an atmosphere of hate which may so easily escalate into irrational action.

We believe that the sense of oneness in Africa should not be derived from a fellowship of hate or enmity, but from a sense of mission to liberate Africa from its real enemies - eg. hunger, disease, illiteracy, political instability, underdeveloped and big power imperialism. We call on the OAU, the symbol of African unity, to play a meaningful role in the mobilization of human and material resources to achieve these worthy ideals, rather than to instigate futile terrorist and propaganda campaigns against the Republic. As part of the African family of nations, the Republic can play an invaluable role in making this continent a better place to live in for all its peoples.

11. To this end we sincerely hope the OAU will relinquish its intransigence and open the door for dialogue and co-operation. South Africa's policy *vis-a-vis* African states is clear and reasonable. It is based on peaceful co-existence, non-interference, regional co-operation, anti-colonialism and the elimination of discrimination through self-determination. As far as interregional or international disputes are concerned the Republic rejects the use of force and favours diplomacy, negotiation and co-operation.

12. These are reasonable policies and aspirations. From those states and organizations not willing to accept the Republic's offer of friendship and co-operation, we request similar restraint and reasonableness. We acknowledge these states' sovereignty and legitimate aspirations.

13. Never in its relations with post-colonial Africa has the Republic contemplated the use of its superior military, economic and industrial prowess to enforce its will beyond its sovereign territory. This is also our policy for the future. However, as far as the protection of primary national interests, such as self-preservation, security and well-being of all its peoples is concerned, it will run the highest risks and incur the greatest costs.

We are faced with a highly complicated and dangerous situation in Southern Africa. The forces of change which we have, for so long, watched from the sidelines are now virtually on our borders. We do not want conflict; therefore we have responded with a policy popularly known as *détente*. This policy has raised high hopes here and elsewhere that the differences between White and Black Africa will be settled around the conference table, rather than on the battlefield. If this is to be the case, the *détente* concept will have to be developed into an operational framework for future action with a clear intellectual and practical basis.

The future is too risky and the potential social and material costs too high for rule of thumb, adhocery or the keeping open of options indefinitely. We must declare our premises in clear and unequivocal terms; in a language and terminology that will satisfy certain *reasonable* demands. If not, I am afraid we will have to rely more on weapons than on diplomacy in the turbulent years ahead.

References

1. See *Southern Africa Record* (Number One), The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, March 1975, pp. 4-5.
2. Morgenthau, H.J., *Politics among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fourth Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1966, p. 10.
3. *Vide* Resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 14 December, 1960.