



**Australian High Commission Accra**

## **REPORT**

### **EXPERT-LEVEL SEMINAR ON REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND EXPERIENCE ON SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS AND PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS**



**Busua Beach Resort, Ghana**

**12 to 13 December 2012**



**Australian High Commission Accra**

**Expert-level Seminar on regional Perspectives and Experiences on Security Sector Reform  
and**

**Protection of Civilians**

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**Report**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An Expert-Level Seminar on Regional Perspectives and Experiences on Security Sector Reform and Protection of Civilians was held at Busua Beach Resort from the 12 to 13 December 2012. It was organised by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in collaboration with the Government of Australia and the Security Sector Reform Unit of the United Nations. “The overall objective of the seminar was to identify experiences from Africa, in national and regional terms, which could enrich the development of and inter-linkages between the Protection of Civilians (PoC) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) concepts with a focus on strengthening the long-term capacity and political will of national authorities to fulfil their responsibility to protect civilians. The event was a build up to previous work and discussions, including the event on “Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations: Capacity-building and Transitions” held in New York on 13 June 2012. The meeting provided an open forum for experts and practitioners to share their experiences and views on SSR and PoC.

Generally, participants discussed the broader frameworks of PoC and SSR, their inter-linkages, challenges to and recommendations for their effective implementation. Throughout the discussions, participants acknowledged that though SSR and PoC are critical concepts especially for Africa where changing trends in conflicts require that states strengthen their security institutions and make extra efforts to protect their citizens from eminent harm; nevertheless the concepts remain controversial and their regulatory frameworks archaic and obsolete. Additionally weak judicial systems, heightening corruption, lack of political will, institutional capacity, funding and early warning systems were identified as some of the challenges impeding the effective implementation of SSR and PoC. Consequently, participants raised the following questions:

- How can the UN address and deal with non-statutory security forces?
- How can we apply the concept of PoC, if there is a lack of clarity of who is a civilian?
- How can we improve training and assistance programmes for peacekeepers to better ensure that military and police contingents and their leaders are trained and prepared to act to protect civilians in the field and do so with an awareness of SSR principles?
- How can SSR contribute to government efforts to provide protection of civilians? (top-down perspective)?
- How can local communities and civil society become preventive actors and what role can police and military play in encouraging bottom-up self-protection activities?
- How can regional actors (AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)) contribute more effectively to PoC and SSR?
- Should there be a different PoC/SSR doctrine for Africa?

With regard to progress made, it was indicated that countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia are making efforts to building strong security institutions and protecting their citizens from violence. For example in Sierra Leone, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in partnership with the Government of Sierra Leone established a human rights section that reported and monitored human rights abuses; provided training in international humanitarian law for both peacekeepers and members of the security sector; established special offices on gender

and child protection; and successfully disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated over 75,000 ex-combatants. The case of growing states such as South Sudan was also highlighted. It was expressed that although South Sudan is an infant state the government is making efforts and as such requires the support of the international community to successfully implement PoC and SSR.

## **Recommendations**

At the end of the seminar, the following were some of the key recommendations:

- Capacity building on PoC and SSR should not only focus on the military and the police but also the judiciary and the correctional services;
- The process of building capacity must include local communities, the government and politicians to build their understanding and strengthen their ability to implement the policies;
- For SSR and PoC to be effectively implemented, there is the need for clarity of the concepts at the international, regional and national levels;
- There is the need to use flexible and acceptable term such as “Security Sector Governance/Management” to facilitate the interest of relevant groups such as national governments;
- Synchronize the inter-linkages between SSR, PoC, DDR and Human Rights in planning and implementation processes;
- There is the need to mainstream gender in PoC and SSR processes;
- Include civil society organizations and local communities in PoC and SSR processes;
- Recruitment policies in the security sector must take into consideration gender and ethnic compositions;
- There is the need for countries to integrate regional security concerns into national security sector policies as well as establish effective collaborations with neighbouring states;
- There should be reviews of all regulation and legal frameworks on PoC, especially discriminatory practices, in order to give equal access to justice; and
- There is the need for civic education, sensitization and awareness creation on the rights and responsibilities of individuals.

Finally, the above mentioned outcomes from the seminar are expected to feed into a high-level forum scheduled for early 2013, which will bring together high-level decision-makers from relevant African Member States, regional and multi-lateral organisations and civil society.

Following issues need to be addressed:

- **Mission Planning and Mandates:** SSR and PoC policies should be integrated into the planning of mission start-ups and their inter-linkages reflected in mission concepts and the concept of operations to enhance the cooperation of the two communities.
- **Monitoring and Oversight:** SSR and PoC policies must include monitoring and oversight mechanisms for all actors and stakeholders; benchmarks and indicators need to be established to assess the development of the reforms and the reduction of violence against civilians.

- **The Changing Face of Violence:** PoC and SSR efforts need to respond to emerging trends of contemporary conflict patterns (criminal violence resulting from trafficking in drugs, human beings, weapons; piracy; gang and urban warfare; political violence resulting from resource conflicts, disputed elections,
- **Regional Challenges:** Due to the transnational nature of security challenges, regional security frameworks need to be implemented and reflected in national security policies. The collaboration on SSR and PoC with neighbouring countries and within regional organizations need to be strengthened, guidelines need to be developed;
- **The Role of Non-state Actors:** In post-conflict situations, where the state is not able to protect the population, non-statutory security forces are likely to undertake this responsibility. The accountability of non-state actors and the possible options for regulation within legal frameworks need to be discussed on the national, regional and international level. The focus should particularly be placed on traditional African security providers;
- **Capacity Building:** Both PoC and SSR communities should enlarge the focus beyond initiatives targeting military and police, but also include judiciary, corrections, oversight institutions, and civil society; specific training courses on the inter-linkages of SSR and PoC should be developed; and
- **Partnerships:** With the increasing number of stakeholders and changing powers on the global political level, new partnerships should be explored.

## MAIN REPORT



**From Left to Right: Dr Thomas Jaye (KAIPTC), Dr Kwesi Aning (KAIPTC), Brigadier General Benjamin F. Kusi (KAIPTC) Col Emmanuel Kotia, (KAIPTC) Ms Miriam Imesch (UN SSR Unit) and Mr Edwin Adjei (KAIPTC) during the opening ceremony.**

## WELCOME AND OPENING SESSION



**Brigadier General Benjamin F. Kusi, Deputy Commandant KAIPTC, delivering the Opening Address.**

### **Opening Address**

The opening address of the Expert-level Seminar on Regional Perspectives and Experiences on Security Sector Reform and Protection of Civilians was delivered by Brigadier General Benjamin F. Kusi, Deputy Commandant of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC).

Brigadier General Kusi recalled that Dag Hammarskjöld, the first United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, once said that “peacekeeping is not for soldiers but only soldiers can do it”. In the same vein, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the Protection of Civilians (PoC) are the duty of the military and other security institutions. In the humanitarian context, security agencies are expected to create a secure and protective environment for civilians. There are situations where the entire security apparatus has collapsed and no distinction between regime security and national security remains. Often times, security officers who are responsible to protect civilians are the ones who are perpetrating the violence. This creates a difficult situation for peacekeepers on the ground.

Mission mandates are increasingly tasking the peacekeepers to protect civilians through support and assistance to national security forces. International law attributes the primary responsibility to protect to the host state. The question arises at what point peacekeepers intervene when the national forces have failed to protect their own citizens. During the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, for example, this kind of dilemma surfaced, but was only resolved by the UN Security Council Resolution 1975, which authorised the mission to protect civilians from heavy weapons used by pro-government forces. While the rhetoric and fine print as well as the various books on PoC are helpful, the realities on the ground are very daunting and complex. Hence, following questions need to be addressed:

- How well are peacekeepers trained?
- How do they respond to national caveats?
- How resourced are they in terms of their ability to protect civilians?

It is important to note that without responding to these questions, it remains difficult to decide to intervene when civilians are in threat or danger.

Another aspect that needs to be critically analysed is how the concept of PoC has emerged. How have PoC and SSR been manifested and operationalised in the West African context? What can be learned from West Africa about effective strategies for bridging the gaps in protecting civilians from imminent threats or physical violence? How can we build long-term capacities of national security institutions and what role play regional and international actors?

Apart from these issues, there are other operational realities that need to be taken into consideration. One such example is intelligence gathering to determine the need for protection. How can peacekeepers perform their duty effectively when they lack intelligence information to assess the situation on the ground or deliberate on pre-emptive deployments?

Another critical issue is the question of mission capacity in relation to the size of the population it is mandated to protect. Without these assessments peacekeeping missions might raise too many expectations among the local population.

Furthermore, during operations, soldiers need to be able to distinguish between national security and regime security. This is imperative because in many cases soldiers are deployed to protect regimes even when the governments have lost their legitimacy with the people.

Brigadier General Kusi concluded expressing his hopes that the two-day seminar will raise these important questions and explore some guidelines and recommendations that would clarify some of the questions regarding the inter-linkages of PoC and SSR.

## **Goodwill Message from the Australian High Commissioner to Ghana,**

### **His Excellency Mr. William Williams**

I am very pleased that the Australian High Commission is supporting the KAIPTC once again to organise an event that brings together leading authorities on a subject of critical importance to regional and international peace and security.

As the international community seeks responses to the multifaceted crisis in Mali, and as Côte d'Ivoire rebuilds after its recent post-electoral crisis, security sector reform and protection of civilians have taken on particular importance in the West African sub-region.



Australia is committed to finding lasting solutions to international peace and security challenges through bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts. We are delighted to have in the KAIPTC such a proactive partner. Our recent support for the KAIPTC includes initiatives in counter-terrorism, civil-military interaction and of course this workshop. We look forward to further collaboration.

As Australia prepares to take its non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for 2013-14, we will continue to work closely with the KAIPTC and other regional and international partners including the African Union, ECOWAS and UN agencies. I am delighted representatives of these organisations, among others, are also taking part in this event. While I am unfortunately unable to attend, I wish you all the best in your discussions. I look forward to reading the report of workshop outcomes and recommendations to build capacity in security sector reform and protection of civilians.

**Day 1**

**SESSION 1: SETTING THE AGENDA; WHERE ARE WE NOW, WHERE DO WE WANT TO GO?**



**From Left to Right: Mr. Cecil Griffiths (National Law Enforcement Association, Liberia) and Ms Aissatou Jobe (UNOWA)**

## **SSR in the Past, Now and in the Future**

While the concept of SSR may have emerged in relatively recent years, the issue of civil-military relations is as old as the birth of the institutions that comprise the security sector narrowly defined in militaristic terms. Historically, each historical period has an impact on the purpose and nature of the sector. It determined also the nature of efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, transparency, local ownership and donor security assistance, which are concerns and principles of SSR today.

The period of the Cold War particularly in Africa was characterised by authoritarian and autocratic regimes which committed vast human rights violations yet received enormous donor security assistance due to their affiliation to either the East or the West. Classic examples are Mobutu Sese Seku and Mengistu Haile Mariam of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (then Zaire) and Ethiopia respectively. Elsewhere on the continent, similar experiences prevailed. Yet, discourses on SSR and security sector governance (SSG) focused only on legislations and technicalities with little reference on security governance even in countries that have been hailed for successful SSR programmes and processes.

Post-Cold War experiences highlighted the relationship between security and development. This is a result of the changing conflict dynamics from inter-state to intra-state conflict, where issues of internal development, poverty, natural resource governance became the drivers of violent conflicts resulting in casualties, deaths, displacements and influx of refugees. Thus, the emerging post-Cold War environment led to rethinking about security; it also led to the need to begin soul searching; there was a clarion call to examine and re-examine; to define and re-define the way we did things in the past. Increasingly, it was understood that poorly structured security services were a principle obstacle to development

Hence, the post-Cold War period influenced a sort of marriage of the development and security agendas because they were inseparable. Nonetheless, there are concerns today that the conceptual framework of SSR could be undermined by the global “war on terror” which may lead to an increased militarisation. A crystal example is Pakistan which spends half of its budgets on the military. What appears to lack here is the governance element of the process.

Although some progress has been made in professionalising the security sector and ensuring efficiency, SSG remains weak due to weakness of the judiciary, archaic and obsolete legislations and corrupt practices which makes implementation a challenge.

Hence, the future of SSR needs to be critically examined and re-examined, taking into consideration the security environment, the timeliness of the process and political dynamics. How do we build national security institutions that can deal with emerging trends like the maritime security, drug trafficking, human trafficking, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, terrorism and others? Understanding the future of SSR is about understanding and explaining the current security challenges and how they could possibly impact on future security situation. Terrorism for instance has become a critical feature in African politics after 9/11 and today countries such as Mali, Nigeria and Somalia are grappling with this threat.

More importantly, the values that characterise SSR processes should be locally sensitive, while the national security interest of donors should not be the central factor in SSR agendas. Security as a policy goal requires not only accountable and responsive institutions, but also broader government arrangements that ensure stability, prevention and management of the conflict as

well as the rule of law. Finally, SSR and PoC processes require local demand and buy in; those who are targets of reform should be involved. If they do not accept it, any effort taken is a waste of time, energy and resources.

### **Addressing Three Dilemmas of Interlinking PoC and SSR from a UN perspective**

“WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind; and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small (...)”.

The above quotation from the UN Charter is a reminder that people stand at the centre of the Organization. The UN was created after the Second World War precisely because it sought to protect civilians from the devastating effects of violent conflict.

In building clarity on the conceptual understanding of SSR and PoC, the speaker defined SSR as a tool for strengthening national security architectures which ensure the protection of the safety, dignity and integrity of all human beings in times of war. SSR aims at building security institutions that are able to sustainably and consistently protect civilians from physical violence on the basis of non-discrimination, full respect of human rights and the rule of law, while acknowledging that the state bears the primary responsibility for the protection of its citizens in times of armed conflict. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) have proposed a basic framework to conceptualize the role of UN peacekeeping operations in PoC under three tiers.

- Tier 1: protection through a political process;
- Tier 2: protection from physical violence; and
- Tier 3: supports efforts to build a protective environment (this is where SSR is most relevant).

Interlinking the concepts of SSR and PoC raises certain questions. The three key challenges identified:

- The short and long term imperatives of SSR and PoC;
- The ambivalent role of the state: Legality versus legitimacy; and
- Who is a civilian?

Firstly, the dilemma between short- and long-term imperatives of SSR and PoC looked at the tension between the two different phases in both PoC and SSR, which outline the quandary between short-term delivery of basic safety and security and the long-term need of creating sustainable and accountable institutions that protect the people, based on local ownership. In many conflict and post-conflict situations the security sector itself is a threat to the citizens. They see themselves as victims instead of beneficiaries of security institutions, because there is no organic link between the police, military and the population. How can the UN deal with this dilemma of immediate protection needs and the long-term security sector transformation? This is where SSR and PoC step in to re-create the necessary organic link and transform the power relations as well as the mindset of the security services and the beneficiaries.

Secondly, the issue of legality *versus* legitimacy raises the question of how to address the ambivalent role of the state in peacekeeping environments. With governments increasingly being accused of perpetrating violence against civilians, the state and the UN are losing their credibility with the local population. As a result, non-state actors like traditional security providers have taken steps to provide security to local communities. Although these non-state actors might not be legal, they are considered as legitimate in the eyes of the population that is effectively protected. How can the UN mitigate the impacts of an abusive state?

Thirdly, it needs to be asked who is a civilian today. In the context of West Africa, the relationship between the security forces and the larger society is often complex and multidimensional. Traditionally armed groups like the Kamajors in Sierra Leone, the Dozos in Côte d'Ivoire or the land guards in Ghana were used by the government to fight against rebel movements. Complicating the situation in many current conflict settings is the diluted concept of "civilians". The fundamental questions then are:

- How can the UN address and deal with non-statutory security forces? and
- How can we apply the concept of PoC, if there is a lack of clarity of who is a civilian?

This is where the UN *Human Rights Due Diligence Policy* is important. It helps to ensure that UN support for non-UN security forces is consistent with the UN Charter and the obligations under international Law.

As a way forward, linking PoC with SSR is useful, since PoC strives to ensure the long-term safety and security of individuals and communities. Secondly, SSR reinforces POC by working toward building institutions that are able to effectively protect civilians. There is the need to adopt a PoC lens in undertaking SSR to bear in mind that people stand at the centre of any reform. Moreover, a key role for the UN is to facilitate a broad national dialogue and to help defining a national vision of the security sector. If discussed and negotiated with all key stakeholders, SSR can assist in re-establishing the missing organic link between security institutions and citizens after conflicts.

The Interagency SSR Taskforce, which includes over 14 UN agencies and departments, chaired by DPKO's SSR Unit and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is considering the development of guidance notes on the Protection of Civilians and SSR. They may help field colleagues to better link PoC and SSR.

### **Relevance of SSR and PoC**

The presentation looked at the relevance and the interconnectedness of SSR to PoC. It was highlighted that due to the fluidity and ambiguity of the PoC concept, the effectiveness of measures may depend on whether basic SSR principles are applied, especially on conceptual and operational issue. The first part of the presentation looked at the spectrum of narrow to broader PoC and the relevance of SSR throughout these approaches.

Narrow PoC focuses on the provision of direct protection to vulnerable civilian populations from imminent harm, grounded on the principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977. Direct protection involves:

- The establishment of a visible presence through patrolling vulnerable areas;
- The use or threat of use of force to protect civilians from violence; and

- The active use of military forces to deter or weaken hostile forces such as by raiding weapons caches.

Intermediate PoC activities involve:

- Monitoring;
- Early warning of tensions and flashpoints;
- Intelligence collection;
- Documenting human rights violations;
- Liaising with local communities; and
- Exerting political pressure to deter potential spoilers.

The broader PoC focuses on the protection of human rights and needs deriving from different aspects of international law, such as:

- International human rights law;
- International criminal law; and
- International refugee law.

Operationalising the PoC approach with SSR is not a simple process. For example, in refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, there is sometimes extreme insecurity for the inhabitants, with physical attacks on inhabitants by government or rebel groups, intimidation and intergroup violence. Also, there are increasing attacks on IDPs when they venture out of the camp, especially women collecting firewood, tending fields or going to markets. To resolve this problem, DIS (*Détachement Intégré de Sécurité*) units were established in Chad, which are special police units drawn from the Chadian police and gendarmerie, vetted by the international community, trained and mentored by the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). They assist in providing security to IDP camps and humanitarian workers. In addition, gender desks were established by the UN/African Union (AU) Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) at community policing centres in IDP camps. Gender advisers encouraged female IDPs to report sexual and gender violence cases to local and international police.

The second part of the presentation outlined some of the principles of good SSR which are relevant for effective PoC. These include:

- Accountability;
- Legitimacy;
- Responsiveness;
- Inclusiveness; and
- Operational effectiveness.

Failure to adopt a holistic approach to SSR will likely limit the effectiveness and sustainability of measures, including those involved in providing direct protection from imminent harm. Critical examples are the cases of refugee and IDP camps in Darfur and Chad.

Efforts to improve policing and safety of IDPs that are not accompanied by effective measures to prosecute perpetrators of crimes and violence are not sustainable over the long term. DIS patrols and presence did suppress attacks or carjacking against humanitarians and attacks on IDPs in camps, but pushed insecurity further out into the local community and into areas beyond the responsibility of the units. Furthermore, the DIS in Chad made arrests, but had to release

suspects later on because of lack of evidence due to extreme deficits and dysfunctions in the justice sector.

MINURCAT attempted to strengthen the formal justice sector but it remained weak and impunity remained a problem. Moreover, local authorities and justice authorities discriminated against lower class Chadians and certain ethnic groups. Fear of discrimination led refugee women to seek recourse in traditional justice mechanisms. MINURCAT tried to innovate and develop mobile courts to travel through the area, especially to deal with cases of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV). However, local provincial authorities considered the trained judicial personnel as rivals for their authority and therefore resisted.

The DIS was also resented by regular Chadian police and gendarmerie because it received the best equipment and training. Furthermore, there were fears that these well-equipped police could resort to banditry once the mission left.

Ultimately, the example of the DIS in Chad illustrates the interrelated nature of security and justice problems, even in cases of narrow PoC. Solutions cannot focus only on one institutional element of the security sector, but must be developed and coordinated within the broader context of interlinked security and justice processes.

The Kalma IDP camp in Darfur is another example in this respect. UNAMID increased night patrols and firewood escorts for female IDPs. These were effective in reducing attacks and increased women's sense of safety, but their impact was not sustainable. The patrols were short and sporadic, and the women became vulnerable once the patrols stopped. More fundamentally, the firewood patrols did not address the conflict between the camp inhabitants and the pastoralists groups in the surrounding areas over access to resources. Thus, without mediating between these groups and without efforts to apprehend, arrest and prosecute suspected perpetrators, the patrols were merely a stop-gap measure, with inconsistent and temporary effects on safety of the IDPs.

The final part of the presentation focused on questions concerning peacekeeping missions and peacekeepers. Some of the critical questions included:

- How can we improve training and assistance programmes for peacekeepers to better ensure that military and police contingents and their leaders are trained and prepared to act to protect civilians in the field and do so with an awareness of SSR principles?
- What are the doctrinal and operational differences between PoC activities carried out by military peacekeepers or by police peacekeepers? How do these doctrinal differences affect their involvement in SSR?
- How do PoC roles for police differ in stabilisation settings compared to missions that are longer running and have entered the phase of building rule of law institutions?
- How can SSR contribute to government efforts to provide protection of civilians? (top-down perspective)?
- How can local communities and civil society become preventive actors and what role can police and military play in encouraging bottom-up self-protection activities? and
- How can regional actors (AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) contribute more effectively to PoC and SSR? What work is being done on the doctrinal guidance

level? Are the AU and RECs following the UN lead on this? Should there be a different PoC/SSR doctrine for Africa?

## **Summary of Discussions**

Discussions after the presentations touched upon following issues:

- Capacity building gaps in SSR and PoC;
- Clarity of the concepts;
- The inability or unwillingness of states to protect its people;
- Terminology;
- The linkages between SSR, POC, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Human Rights.

### *Capacity Building*

- It is important to build the capacity of various actors to ensure the effective implementation of SSR and PoC, recognising that they are new concepts.
- Capacity building should not only focus on the military and the police but also the judiciary and the correctional services.
- The process of building capacity must include local communities, the government and politicians to build their understanding and strengthen their ability to implement the policies.

### *Clarity of the Concepts*

- There is the need for clarity of the concepts at the international, regional and national levels, for SSR and PoC to be effectively implemented. Without clear understanding of the concepts it will be difficult for countries to domestically implement the mandates and principles of SSR and PoC. PoC is a fluid term which has several meanings to different people.
- It is important to draw the scope of PoC particularly in peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping contexts. Related to this is the lack of clear mission mandates. For instance, in the face of violent conflict between armed combatants and non-armed combatant, with civilians caught in between, what needs to be done? Field based challenge should be made clear in PoC mandates.

### *The Inability or Unwillingness or incapacity of States to Protect its People*

- On the issue of the inability or unwillingness of the state to protect its people, Nigeria was cited as an example of state unwillingness. The government has failed to protect the population in the wake of the Boko Haram insurgency.
- An example of the inability to protect its citizens is the case of South Sudan. As a newly independent state, South Sudan lacks the financial and security capacity to protect its citizens in the wake of violence. Instead of merely pressuring the government, the international community should provide long term support rather than quick impact projects and funding for South Sudan to be able to effectively strengthen its security sector and protect its civilians.

### *Terminology*

- The use of the term SSR prevents the buy in of some major actors particularly the government. Hence, it would be expedient to use flexible and acceptable term such as “Security Sector Governance/Management” to facilitate the interest of such groups.

*The linkages between SSR, POC, DDR and Human Rights*

- There are interlinkages between SSR, PoC, DDR and Human Rights and these must be streamlined and synchronized in planning and implementation processes.

**SESSION 2: CASE STUDIES; LESSONS LEARNED FROM PEACEKEEPING CONTEXTS**

**Sierra Leone**

During the Sierra Leone civil war civilians were the main targets and victims of violence and human right abuses. The police and the military were involved in the conflict together with rebels groups. As a result, SSR and PoC became very relevant in the post-conflict period. The government of Sierra Leone with the support of international donors undertook a SSR process to ensure:

- The combat readiness of the security services;
- The protection of civilians from attacks.

The first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in Sierra Leone gave SSR the highest priority because it was seen as the conduit for ensuring the protection of civilians. It is instructive to note that the SSR process did not only focus on the combat readiness of the security sector but also SSG. However, with the exception of the police and military, little attention was given to other security sector actors.

The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) also factored in PoC in their work. The mission, which had a Chapter VII UNSC mandate, was tasked to ensure the security and freedom of movement of people and also to protect civilians under imminent threats or physical violence. Right from its inception, the mission had the mandate to address PoC.

Regarding human rights, the mission adopted and implemented a number of programmes with a key focus on protecting civilians. Firstly, the missions established a human rights section that worked assiduously on reporting and monitoring human right abuses. Secondly, the mission deployed human rights officers to the field to ensure that human rights abuses were reported and monitored. Thirdly, training in international humanitarian law for both peacekeepers and members of the security sector was provided. Fourthly, the special needs of vulnerable groups such as women, children, refugees and displace persons was given particular attention. Special offices on gender and child protection were created.

The major achievements of the mission, among others are:



- The successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration over 75,000 ex-combatants;
- Provision of a the safe environment for the 2002 elections;
- Provision of protection to special courts.

However, Sierra Leone's post-conflict interventions were seen as externally-driven and owned. This impacted negatively on the sustainability and ownership of the process and affected the effective reintegration of ex-combatants.

## **Liberia**

According to one participant from civil society, in the Liberian context, the decision was made to demobilise the entire armed forces targeting 2000 personnel. The involvement of the civil society in the process was weak. UNMIL trains and mentors the Liberian police, and supports them in policy development. . However, according to civil society, too much emphasis was placed on the technical processes leaving out the governance processes. While the reform process has gone on for almost ten years, there are no policies regarding the promotion of police and also the civilian oversight by the legislature remains weak. There are many security-related policies that were not addressed by the legislature which could have enhanced the reform process. For example the Prison Reform Act and the Drugs Law.

The question was raised by civil society, as to how UNMIL and other international partners can encourage the government to focus more on the governance aspects of the reform process. There have been disagreements over the structure that the oversight body should take, with the government wanting to focus on the police and complaints, and civil society calling for a comprehensive mechanism that looks more broadly at complaints and governance issues.

Going forward, it will be important from a civil society perspective to determine, including with international support, how they can play a more active role in an inclusive and locally-owned SSR process.

For UNMIL, PoC is a central part of its mandate and the Mission is addressing how best to incorporate the links between SSR and POC in its strategy, the development of which presents a unique opportunity to strengthen those links. This is especially important in the context of UNMIL's phased transition, and will provide a platform to engage the government, civil society and other stakeholders to strengthen SSR processes. POC and SSR are also essential components of the Mission's ongoing support to the government, as it addresses challenges along its borders.

In terms of physical protection, UNMIL's transition will be conditioned on ongoing assessments of risks on the ground. During its transition, the Mission will continue to support the government in bolstering the capacity of security agencies to respond to security incidents or emerging

security issues. As per its mandate, UNMIL will increase its FPU capacity during the transition, to strengthen its own response capacity as its Military components are drawing down or repositioning. As it continues to support SSR in Liberia, UNMIL has been reassessing its own capacity in order to identify specialized capacities needed going forward, and has encouraged its troop- and police contributing countries to consider these in their deployments.

Active risk assessment and monitoring of early warning indicators, and information exchange with the government and other stakeholders, are essential to POC in UNMIL, and enhance capacity at national level. UNMIL also considers that addressing the drivers of conflict is essential to creating protective environments.

While Liberia's security sector reform process is well underway and has seen remarkable gains, there are still some challenges that will need to be addressed by the government, with the support of UNMIL and other partners. These include the need for increased budgetary allocation for the security sector, to lessen a reliance on donor funding, and for continued attention to strengthening the institutional capacity, accountability and civilian oversight of the security sector.

The security sector is concentrated in Monrovia. As UNMIL's phased transition proceeds, State authority should continue to extend outward to all areas of Liberia, as it is the State that has a primary role in protection of civilians. The Justice and Security Hubs, for example, will help to enhance the reach of the security and justice sectors to the leeward.

The critical issues that demand attention are:

- How can the civil society organisations (CSO) play an active role in SSR processes?
- How can international partners ensure inclusiveness and local ownership of the reform process?
- An evaluation of the effectiveness of the entire process.

The following are some of the challenges facing the SSR process:

- There is insufficient budgetary allocation for the security sector; donor funding is inadequate;
- Accountability and civilian oversight of the security sector is lacking. The institutional frameworks are also very weak; and
- All the reform efforts tend to concentrate on the capital Monrovia and have failed to be decentralised to other parts of the country. This is affecting the reach of state authority in the country. Therefore, UNMIL is looking at how to extend the state capacity to the rest of the country.

With all these developments, there is still minimal focus on a critical component of the SSR framework, which is the Justice sector.

## Summary of Discussions

Discussions following the presentations included:

- Local ownership of SSR process in Liberia was a challenge and dominated by donor countries (United States and private security companies);
- SSR should also focus on a bottom-up approach (decentralization and less focus on the capital);
- The linkages between SSR with small arms control and DDR need to be enhanced.

## Côte d'Ivoire

In Côte d'Ivoire the operational environment comprised rebel forces, *Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d'Ivoire* (FAFN) in the north and the south, government forces (*Forces de Defense et Sécurité de Cote d'Ivoire* (FDSCI)), various militia groups who were supporting the northern rebels and the government forces, foreign fighters/mercenaries from Liberia, the young patriots and student federation, which was a militant group supporting the government. Impartial forces comprised forces from France and the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). The Ouagadougou Political Accord between the warring factions made the DDR process difficult because the numbers of the groups to be disarmed and dismantled had not been considered. Those who were to be dismantled were paid an equivalent of US\$1000.00. It turned out that this was an incentive for all the groups to feign being ex-combatants.

In terms of PoC, the practical difficulties encountered on the ground were that UNOCI was disowned by the de-facto government, but the Alassane Ouattara government wanted the mission to stay. The mission had to protect Alassane Ouattara, other senior politicians and ordinary civilians. This task was complicated because the mission's freedom of movement was restricted by the Gbagbo forces.

Mobility was a challenge when it came to the protection of civilians in Côte d'Ivoire. UNOCI made an effort to undertake pre-emptive deployments to protect civilians. However, in protecting civilians from heavy weapons used by the pro-Gbagbo forces, the mission was powerless since it had been accused of taking sides previously. Security Council resolution 1975 authorised the mission to take more determined measures against pro-Gbagbo forces. With this new mandate, the mission fought against the pro-Gbagbo forces which finally led to the capture of Gbagbo and the defeat of his forces.

## **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)**

The presentation on SSR efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) highlighted that:

- The situation in the country is complicated;
- Aspirations need to be realistic; and
- SSR efforts undertaken on a sector-wide level.

There is no political support from the government for SSR and with the continuation of hostilities and new peace agreements; the starting position for reform processes becomes increasingly difficult. Furthermore, for more effective SSR processes to take place, the necessary financial resources must be made available. The international community needs to take a comprehensive approach to SSR and to go beyond technical support. While Defense Sector Reform remains an important challenge, there are positive developments like the increased participation of local NGOs.

PoC has been an overarching mandate priority for MONUSCO. The focus lies on community liaison assistance. In Eastern DRC, more than 200 local staff work closely with local communities wherever there is a military presence. They engage in prevention rather than reactive action. Information gathering and analysis support preventive action.

The mandate foresees that the mission works closely with the Congolese army. Yet, in many instances the army is the source of the problem. It was highlighted that an increased cooperation between SSR and PoC offices would be useful and that joint protection teams or assessment missions should be considered.

## **South Sudan**

The presentation pointed out that considerable progress has been made recently, despite the fact that the government of South Sudan still deals with serious challenges like the lack of resources and infrastructure, the humanitarian crises in Abyei, major unresolved conflicts with the northern neighbour and the disrupted flow of oil. The National Security Policy Framework was launched in September 2012. The transformation of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) as well as national police and correction services commenced after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. National disarmament campaigns and the development of Arms Control Bills were initiated.

The support of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in oversight and governance includes:

- Positioning of technical advisors in key government positions;
- Capacity building of national advisors;
- Logistic support to the National Security Policy consultative process at state level; and
- Technical legal support for developing legal frameworks and support to Parliament sub-committees and oversight bodies.

There are still important gaps concerning reform of the intelligence. The support of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) is considered. The DDR process poses another challenge because infrastructure and job opportunities for the integration are lacking. A possible solution might be the allocation of pensions.

Regarding PoC and armed group activities, there is a lack of early warning systems. The focus lies on non-violent preventive action. Cattle raids are another challenge, but close cooperation with civil society and the Church for information gathering helps preventing violence.

The Due Diligence Policy is important when security forces are deployed. One of the greatest challenges relates to “armed civilians”. They do not have an official structure, but are loosely organised civilians. Furthermore, there is a flow of weapons in the country. The question is what protection responsibility the UN has when it is unclear whether people are civilians or part of a militia. Community policing has been a successful tool to ensure community security, however there remains a risk that they could develop into militia groups.

The mission follows the policy guidance developed by the DPKO and DFS. In Abyei, the focus lies on the second tier (protection from physical violence) through a strong military presence. The third tier, of which SSR is part, is grounded on a longer-term approach. The mission is facing the challenge of immediate protection needs while the security sector is still not ready to deliver in all areas. The challenging question that remains: how to merge the PoC imperatives with longer term development of SSR activities? Closely related to this is the question of national ownership. How can one own something if one does not understand it yet? Any SSR process needs capacity building in the first place.

### **Training in SSR and PoC at KAIPTC**

The presentation on Training on SSR and PoC found that there remain some gaps in the provision of SSR courses at KAIPTC. Any country that went through armed conflict has to address the reestablishment of security. KAIPTC provides a course on Police and SSR dealing with:

- Peace and security in Africa;
- SSG;
- Peacebuilding; and
- Reform, restructuring and rebuilding of institutions.

The course is aimed at people who are working in the field or SSR practitioners deployed in the AU or UN. There is the need to further bring people from ministries on board to address issues related to parliamentary or judicial oversight.

### **Summary of Discussions**

- The gender perspective was largely missed in the discussions of the previous sessions. The role of women in peace and security has been highlighted in Secretary-General’s report 1325 and 1820. While it is often mentioned that women play a crucial role, they should also be considered as security providers. There have been some achievements in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Côte d’Ivoire, the National Security Council (CNS) has just dispatched a delegation for military and gendarmerie to study gender integration based on the Senegalese experience. It was highlighted that there is a need to promote women. If they do not have the capacity, they should be trained accordingly so that they match their male colleagues.

- Questions on how specific a mission mandate should be regarding PoC were raised. Mandates should give the mission enough room to manoeuvre if the government is reluctant to take up its responsibilities. Another challenge relates to the right timing of PoC. In the case of DRC, the mission is mandated to support the government. Yet, if the government does not take up its responsibility to protect its citizens and there is an imminent threat against civilians, how can the UN react given its limited capacity? The UN's role is not to attack rebels, but rather to resist where it is needed in order to protect civilians or to allow safe passage of displaced people.

### **SESSION 3: CASE STUDIES: LESSONS LEARNED FROM NON-PEACEKEEPING CONTEXTS**

#### **Mali**

After the second peace agreement in 1991, it was decided to undertake SSR. More than 2500 combatants were integrated in the national army. While it was a success in the beginning, it created challenges later on because proper education and training was missing. During the hostilities in January 2012, more than 500 former soldiers deserted. For this reason, the majority of the population is now against the integration of former rebels. This raises the challenging question how non-discrimination of SSR can be ensured.

More than 50 per cent of the country's territory is currently under control of either Islamic movements like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or the Movement for Tawhid and Jihad (MUJWA) or separatist groups like the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). The loss of territorial control including challenges like increased criminal activities, hostage taking, drug trafficking, migration or the attempted coup d'état in the south brought Mali on the brink of state failure. Several international responses were proposed to end the Mali crisis:

- Mediation efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) proposed the deployment 3000 African troops, backed by 5000 Malian troops to reinstate state authority in the north, stabilise the process in the south, and to rebuild the Malian armed forces;
- The UN strategy for the Sahel, which provides for the reform of the armed forces and addressing the failure of military integration;
- An AU Mali crisis strategy; and
- A European Union (EU) support plan.

Following challenges regarding SSR and PoC were identified:

- Failure of military integration;
- Poor support to military operations;
- Satisfaction soldiers' needs;
- Civilian interference in military;
- Politicization of the military; and
- Lack of accountability.

SSR and PoC are included in Security Council resolutions 2056 and 2071. However, the general understanding of PoC remains weak. The presentation identified following challenges that need to be addressed urgently:


- Psychological trauma of the troops;
- Respect for human rights;
- Disputes within the military;
- Respect of human life;
- Full inclusion of military police and military justice;
- Accountability; and
- Democratic and civilian control.

### **Summary of Discussions**

- The politicization of the security sector needs to be addressed
- What are the consequences of a strong involvement of the military into governance issues? Is it only a negative indicator for the reform process or can it also provide an entry point to address military reform?
- What will be the ramifications if the US wants to train and equip ECOWAS troops, given the recent past of the US with counter-terrorism?

## **DAY 2**

### **SESSION 1 & 2: THEMATIC DISCUSSION ON THE AMBIVALENT ROLE OF THE STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN POC/SSR AND ON THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ACTORS IN POC/SSR**



**Ms Nancy Annan (KAIPTC) presenting the main points from the first day.**

### **South Sudan and UNMISS**

The presentation gave an overview of the state and non-state actors in South Sudan relevant for SSR and PoC. The state actors in South Sudan are reasonably well organised. A body called the National Security Council exists on the national level, chaired by the President and recognised in the Constitution. The body meets on a regular basis and decisions are passed on to the state level. Each state has a state security committee, chaired by the governor. However, these committees still lack a legal framework on how they should function, how they receive information or report back to the capital. UNMISS is providing advisory support.

The speaker pointed out that a great number of informal security providers exists on the local level who are not regulated and not held accountable. These “armed civilians” are identified as the main challenge for PoC measures.



The civil society including the media is still very weak and needs to become more relevant. Furthermore, there is no real academic platform (universities or think tanks) that would support policy development within the society.

## **DRC and MONUSCO**

The presentation highlighted that there is some progress regarding the involvement of the civil society in DRC. Weak organisation, unclear structures and the lack of funding remains a challenge.

The role of non-state actors was defined as ambivalent. A plethora of militia groups control the east and in large parts of the country there is no state authority. The speaker highlighted that these non-state actors might have negative implications on the security situation on one hand, but on the other hand might also increase security for local communities in light of the weakness of the state in the area. UN Civil Affairs got involved in the communities to minimize the impact on civilians as the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and MONUSCO planned military initiatives against the militias.

The presentation also highlighted the critical role of the Church in bringing communities together and enabling the exchange of different viewpoints. In Jonglei region, it helped develop better relationships between warring communities and address the mistrust among them. It provides a platform other than the political, in order to point out the challenges, negotiate between the parties and help find solutions. However, the Church is dependent on the political actors and not able to move forward without political backing.

## **Summary of Discussions**

- Civil society is still considered secondary and left out of discussions on security issues;
- International actors, for example, France in francophone countries, still have a lot of influence which might lead to the situation that the implemented reforms are just copies of the French system. This raises the question how true reform in Africa can take place without the post-colonial influence;
- The question was raised what role the private sector in PoC efforts could play, because business is easily affected by any sort of violence and could take up a greater protection role;
- International actors and other celebrities may influence the process in South Sudan by raising attention and providing more visibility outside the country, as long as the information given is accurate. If the information is wrong it can negatively impact on the UN work; and
- Working with the Diaspora is important and developments within the community should be monitored. It is a powerful actor that could incite violence by hate speeches or other campaigns.

## **Role of Regional Actors**

This presentation highlighted some of the challenges the UN is facing on the sub-regional level. Many of the security threats are transnational, like trafficking, historic and ethnic rivalries, cross

borders violence, mercenaries, non-state actors, access and governance, extremism, poverty, spoilers, large movement of people. These need to be tackled on a regional level and cannot be dealt on a state level. For SSR to be viable a sub-regional framework should be in place.

It was pointed out that any sub-regional strategy on PoC or SSR needs to be based on normative principles that are rooted in national ownership and taking into account regional perspectives. Some challenges in the development of principles may include the lack of political will, strategies and normative guidance, lacking institutional capacities and funding. A strategy would need to be standardised, but also adaptable to the context. Member states of regional bodies (ECOWAS, AU or the Mano River Union) have the responsibility to initiate a process. There needs to be a systematic approach to consolidate and create interlinkages. This would help regions to assist their member states in identifying emerging threats.

Based on the primary responsibility of the state for protection, the role of international actors is to support the stabilisation process in regard to development, livelihood, and youth unemployment. Furthermore, international actors can help integrate existing norms and standards. While they need to be adapted to the regional context, they need to be addressed with conceptual clarity.

The presentation concluded by raising the question on how the international community can encourage regional actors to strengthen their own tools to support the overarching policies.

### **Summary of Discussions**

- The UN does not directly deal with private companies in Liberia. It supports the government to look at governance and oversight issues. Furthermore, it works with local communities on how they can advocate for their own rights;
- In the case of South Sudan, the presence of the AU at the launch of the National Security Strategy was an important sign for international partners. The government needs to be sensitized and trained on a regular basis the developments and implementation.
- In DRC, the trainees of today could be the rebels of tomorrow;
- National actors as beneficiaries need to identify their own interests instead of following donor preferences;
- Some see traditional institutions as corrupted and argued that an increased focus on them will create more opportunities for corruption. Other participants did not agree and explained that traditional institutions are too important to be left out, and that involving chiefs and elders can help to link up the international actors with the communities.

### **SESSION 3 (BREAK-OUT SESSIONS): SETTING A FORWARD AGENDA: BRAINSTORMING ON GAPS IN AVAILABLE PRAGMATIC TOOLS, RESEARCH AND POLICY ON SSR/POC**



**From Left to Right: Mr. Alex Melbourne (MONUSCO), Dr Osman Gbla (Expert on Sierra Leone), Ms Serwaa Brewoo (KAIPTC) and Prof Modibo Goïta (Ecole de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye Mali)**

#### **Group 1: Setting up a Training Course for African Peace Support Operations: Interlinkages between SSR and PoC**

In setting up training courses for African Peace Support Operations with consideration of the interlinkages between SSR and PoC, the course should touch upon the generic issues of peace and security. It should cover the following areas:

- Concepts of peace and security in Africa;
- Introduction to contemporary UN/AU/RECs Peace Support Operations;
- Peace and security implementation strategies (examples include preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-making);
- Standards of conduct for peacekeepers;
- Definition and concepts of peacebuilding. This includes defining the period for the inception of peacebuilding; international provisions and practices on peacebuilding (AU, UN, ECOWAS mechanisms);
- Conflict management (including conflict analysis, stakeholder analysis, early warning and early response, alternative dispute resolution (ADR), crisis management);
- Causes of conflict, prevention and transition to sustainable peace. This should include existing and emerging mechanisms for peace and security; actors and challenges; mechanisms and processes to improve interoperability among actors.

More specifically, topics on PoC should focus on legal frameworks based on international humanitarian laws and conventions while SSR should address issues of reform, restructuring and rebuilding for the police, military, judiciary and the correctional services. The latter should focus on organizational development, change management, capacity building of police and military in peacebuilding as well as cooperation and coordination among various actors. The target group for the course should be middle-level or operational level professionals from the military, police and civilian actors.

The table below gives details of specific courses relevant for PoC and SSR.

Protection of Civilians (PoC)	Security Sector Reform (SSR)
Introduction to PoC	Security Sector Governance
Legal Frameworks	Gender and SSR
Thematic Mandates (Child Protection and SGBV)	Reform, Restructuring and Rebuilding (RRR) for the police, military and other actors
Actors and Coordination in PoC	
Implementation of PoC	

Furthermore, it was recommended that cross-cutting components of PoC and SSR should include but not limited to:

- History of conflict in Africa;
- History PSO, PKOs, UN, AU and regional bodies and their role in peace and security in Africa;
- Actors and coordination;

- Legal frameworks;
- Lessons learnt and best practices;
- Gender, SGBV and related issues; and
- Early warning and early response systems.

In conclusion, the group outlined that the development of courses in SSR and PoC should take into consideration:

- Mandate language;
- Legal frameworks and human rights;
- Interlinkages between PoC and SSR: integrating security sector and civilians;
- Integrating PoC in SSR capacity building;
- Building capacity for CSOs, communities and security agents on SSR and PoC;
- Mainstreaming gender in all the modules; and
- Emerging issues of SSR and PoC.

### **Group 2: PoC and SSR: Policy Intersection in the African Context**

It was identified that there are existing frameworks and policies that can guide the SSR and PoC communities in the African context. These include relevant policies from the UN, AU and other sub-regional bodies.

Thematic Areas	UN Policies	AU Policies	Sub-Regional Bodies
<b>Protection of Civilians (PoC)</b>	UNSCR 1894 (2009)  PoC Operational Concept (2010)  Framework for Drafting PoC Strategies (2011)	Draft Guidelines on PoC in AU Peace Operations (still pending for over two years now)	
<b>Security Sector Reforms (SSR)</b>	Relevant Security Council resolutions  Defense Sector Reform Policy	Security Sector Governance Policy	Great Lakes Conference Protocols  ECOWAS SSR Agenda  ECOWAS Small Arms Convention

Gender Mainstreaming	UNSCR 1325 (2000); 1820; 1889	Maputo Protocol on women's rights	
	Human Rights Due Diligence Policy	Banjul Charter on Human Rights	
Human Rights	Human Rights in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Political Missions		

In addition, it was recommended that in inter-linking PoC and SSR policies, following key elements should be considered:

- **Explicit:** The policy must establish an explicit and unambiguous link in the mandate;
- **Planned:** SSR/PoC policies should be integrated into the planning of mission start-ups to ensure that the links are reflected in mission concepts and the concept of operations (ConOps);
- **Flexible:** Policies must be reflective of and constant with established international standards but adaptable to relevant context. Thus, it should not be a “one size fits all” approach but instead case-specific and responsive to changing dynamics;
- **Balanced:** There must be balance between national ownership and international donor priorities in the development of the policies;
- **Coordinated:** The policy should be aligned with integrated coordination structures within the mission and with external actors (including donors);
- **Early Warning:** There must be a built in risk assessment and early warning systems from the onset which include security sector indicators;
- **Monitoring and Oversight Mechanisms:** The policy must include monitoring and oversight mechanisms for all actors and stakeholders;
- **Benchmarks:** The policy must include benchmarks and indicators for security sector development and the reduction of civilian harm.

### Group 3: Measures to be taken for SSR to be effective in Peace Support Operations for any African State

Group 3 was tasked to discuss the measures that should be taken for SSR to be effective in a Peace Support Operation for any African State. The following issues emerged after the discussions:

- SSR is a national, political process that may be assisted by international actors;
- The preconditions for an effective SSR should be considered;

- The incentives to engage in a SSR Process need to be identified;
- SSR is a success, when there is :
  - An improvement in the knowledge of political actors about their roles and responsibilities regarding security;
  - A consultative process takes place that involves all relevant stakeholders, who define a legitimate and holistic national security vision which will serve as benchmark for any future reform process;
  - Coordination of partners on national, regional, international level.
  - There is the need to define the implementation strategies and policies for the SSR process according to the national security vision.

#### **Group 4 -What Policies in SSR and PoC can be Implemented in Non-Peacekeeping Contexts in Africa?**

Group 4 was tasked to consider what policies in SSR and PoC can be implemented in non-peacekeeping contexts in Africa. The group presented following recommendations:

##### **Policies on SSR**

- Recruitment policies in the security sector must take into consideration gender and ethnic compositions;
- Strengthen capacity of oversight bodies such as parliament and CSOs to actively engage on the implementation of SSR policies to enhance accountability;
- Decentralized national security structures, local, district, national and regional;
- Review outdated or discriminatory security sector institution policies to encourage equal participation and inclusion of women;
- To improve women participation in the security sector, there should be a deliberate investment in building the capacity of women to meet quotas (these must be set out in the legislation);
- Due to the transnational nature of security challenges, there is the need to integrate regional security concerns into national security sector policies as well as effective collaborations with neighbouring countries;
- A national consultative process is a pre-requisite for a national security policy that includes and represents the whole population. Think-tanks and traditional authorities should be actively involved in this process to ensure a sense of ownership;
- Focus on a security-wide approach to reform policies instead of component-level efforts;
- Reform processes must be supported with realistic budgets/investment in the security sector (address affordability and sustainability);
- In post-conflict context, DDR processes must incorporate gender dimensions;
- In post-conflict context, the capacities of communities need to be developed to absorb the returnees;
- Policies/laws on transitional organized crime need to be integrated into national security sector policies;
- For security sector policies to be effective there should be a monitoring and evaluation system for SSR policies (establish benchmarks for monitoring progress/ to check compliance).

## **Policies on POC:**

The recommendations are based on the premise that applying the policies of SSR will ensure human security.

- Proper legislations for all security sector actors (including traditional authorities) with a clear definition of their responsibilities;
- Reviews of all regulation and legal frameworks, especially discriminatory practices, in order to give equal access justice;
- Civic education, sensitization and awareness creation on the rights and responsibilities of individuals;
- Proper consultations to produce evidence-based research that forms the basis for policies. Citizens need to be included in the process to foster ownership;
- Build specialised capacity to deal with Gender Based Violence (GBV) at the local level;
- Develop legislation to protect minorities and vulnerable groups;
- Foster civil society initiatives to increase participation; and
- Youth empowerment policies to priorities education and capacity building programmes.

## **CLOSING SESSION**

### **Closing Remarks**

Dr Thomas Jaye, Deputy Director of Research at KAIPTC, thanked the participants for their enthusiastic contributions that enriched the discussions throughout the meeting. He further acknowledged that matters which were raised during the Expert-level Seminar would be further explored in future meetings, particularly the upcoming Policy Forum in February 2013. He thanked the coordinators of the meeting and all others for their commitment and dedication that made the seminar a successful event.



## KEY RECOMMENDATIONS AND OUTCOMES OF THE SEMINAR

At the end of the seminar, the following were some of the key recommendations:

- Capacity building on PoC and SSR should not only focus on the military and the police but also the judiciary and the correctional services;
- The process of building capacity must include local communities, the government and politicians to build their understanding and strengthen their ability to implement the policies;
- For SSR and PoC to be effectively implemented, there is the need for clarity of the concepts at the international, regional and national levels;
- There is the need to use flexible and acceptable term such as “Security Sector Governance/Management” to facilitate the interest of relevant groups such as national governments;
- Synchronize the inter-linkages between SSR, PoC, DDR and Human Rights in planning and implementation processes;
- There is the need to mainstream gender in PoC and SSR processes;
- Include civil society organizations and local communities in PoC and SSR processes;
- Recruitment policies in the security sector must take into consideration gender and ethnic compositions;
- There is the need for countries to integrate regional security concerns into national security sector policies as well as establish effective collaborations with neighbouring states;
- There should be reviews of all regulation and legal frameworks on PoC, especially discriminatory practices, in order to give equal access to justice; and
- There is the need for civic education, sensitization and awareness creation on the rights and responsibilities of individuals.

Finally, the above mentioned outcomes from the seminar are expected to feed into a high-level forum scheduled for early 2013, which will bring together high-level decision-makers from relevant African Member States, regional and multi-lateral organisations and civil society.

Following issues need to be addressed:

- **Mission Planning and Mandates:** SSR and PoC policies should be integrated into the planning of mission start-ups and their inter-linkages reflected in mission concepts and the concept of operations to enhance the cooperation of the two communities.
- **Monitoring and Oversight:** SSR and PoC policies must include monitoring and oversight mechanisms for all actors and stakeholders; benchmarks and indicators need to be established to assess the development of the reforms and the reduction of violence against civilians.
- **The Changing Face of Violence:** PoC and SSR efforts need to respond to emerging trends of contemporary conflict patterns (criminal violence resulting from trafficking in

drugs, human beings, weapons; piracy; gang and urban warfare; political violence resulting from resource conflicts, disputed elections,

- **Regional Challenges:** Due to the transnational nature of security challenges, regional security frameworks need to be implemented and reflected in national security policies. The collaboration on SSR and PoC with neighbouring countries and within regional organizations need to be strengthened, guidelines need to be developed;
- **The Role of Non-state Actors:** In post-conflict situations, where the state is not able to protect the population, non-statutory security forces are likely to undertake this responsibility. The accountability of non-state actors and the possible options for regulation within legal frameworks need to be discussed on the national, regional and international level. The focus should particularly be placed on traditional African security providers;
- **Capacity Building:** Both PoC and SSR communities should enlarge the focus beyond initiatives targeting military and police, but also include judiciary, corrections, oversight institutions, and civil society; specific training courses on the inter-linkages of SSR and PoC should be developed; and
- **Partnerships:** With the increasing number of stakeholders and changing powers on the global political level, new partnerships should be explored.

