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FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE
An Analysis of the 1980 Elections and an Assessment of the Prospects

Martyn Gregory

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Martyn Gregory, the author of this report, is a postgraduate research student at Leicester University in Britain, working on a thesis entitled "International Politics of the Conflict in Rhodesia". He recently spent two months in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, during the pre- and post-election period, as a Research Associate at the University of Rhodesia (now the University of Zimbabwe). He travelled widely throughout the country and interviewed many politicians, officials and military personnel. He also spent two weeks with the South African Institute of International Affairs at Smuts House in Johannesburg.

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It should be noted that any opinions expressed in this report are the responsibility of the author and not of the Institute.

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*FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE:
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Introduction

Before attempting to analyze the four month period which started with the arrival of the British Governor, Lord Soames, in war-torn Rhodesia on 12 December, 1979, and ended with the peaceful emergence of an independent Zimbabwe on 18 April, 1980, it is worthwhile to reflect upon the preceding six months. The Lusaka and Lancaster House Agreements, which paved the way for Britain to assume colonial power in Rhodesia and for an internationally supervised ceasefire and internationally observed elections to take place, were the result of both agreement between the previously warring Rhodesian parties and an unprecedented degree of co-operation between states with very different interests in the outcome of the Rhodesian conflict. The period of intense diplomatic and political activity that culminated in the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement by the British, Salisbury and Patriotic Front delegations, less than a year after the British Labour government had concluded that the chance of an all-party conference succeeding was nil, requires some explanation before the election period itself is examined.

Paving the way to Lancaster House¹

As the August 1979 Commonwealth Conference approached, the perennial Rhodesian "problem" overshadowed all other issues on the agenda; it seemed that there would be at least a serious rift between member states, if not the dissolution of the Commonwealth itself. Commentators pointed to the apparently irreconcilable positions of the Front Line States (FLSs) as represented by Tanzania and Zambia, and the newly elected Conservative government in Britain on the question of Rhodesia. The FLSs, as the historic allies and supporters of the black Rhodesian nationalist movements had, since the 1976 Geneva Conference on Rhodesia, transferred their exclusive support to the Patriotic Front (PF) of Mr. Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU, and Mr. Robert Mugabe's ZANU. The FLSs had also played an important role in ensuring that Bishop Muzorewa's "Government of National Unity", elected in April 1979, remained unrecognized throughout the world, and they remained committed, with the PF, to the Anglo-American plan for Rhodesia formulated by David Owen and Andrew Young. Mrs Thatcher had come into office on 3 May, 1979, with a mandate to recognize Bishop Muzorewa's government and lift sanctions against Zimbabwe Rhodesia following Lord Boyd's assessment that the April elections were "free and fair". Although she refrained from pursuing this course of action immediately, Mrs Thatcher announced in Canberra, four weeks before the Commonwealth Conference, that she would not seek the reimposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe Rhodesia in November when they were due for renewal, but that recognition "might take a little longer".²

The "Plan for Zimbabwe" which emerged from Lusaka and prepared the ground for the Lancaster House Conference represented a marked shift in the positions of both Britain and the FLSs. Britain conceded that the Zimbabwe Rhodesian constitution was "defective in certain respects", that the PF should be invited to an all-party conference and that the "international community as a whole" had a legitimate interest in the transition to "genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia". The FLSs abandoned their former insistence upon the need for UN supervised elections and accepted that elections could be held under British

authority. In another significant shift the FLSs agreed that Lancaster House should be a "constitutional" conference. (Under the Anglo-American plan a ceasefire would have had to have been agreed to before negotiations concerning the constitution could commence.) The main reason that the FLSs and Britain were prepared to make concessions was that to have continued to follow their declared policies on Rhodesia would have been injurious to other, more important policy objectives. Had Britain decided to recognize the Muzorewa government unilaterally it would have incurred the wrath of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth, and damaged relationships with the Carter administration (which had remained officially committed to the Anglo-American proposals), and the EEC which had declared its support for the PF. In addition to condemnation by international bodies, the possibility of economic measures being taken against Britain by African states was a concern of the British policy makers; Nigeria's decision to nationalize BP during the build up to the debate on Rhodesia at the Commonwealth Conference emphasized the dangers that might attend unilateral recognition of Bishop Muzorewa. Thus, the British Foreign Office was keen to steer the new Conservative government away from the arguments of the increasingly influential "Rhodesia lobby" which advocated the immediate recognition of Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Another factor operative in the Conservative government's reformulation of its approach to the Rhodesian problem was that unilateral British recognition of Zimbabwe Rhodesia would not only be detrimental to Britain's wider interests; it would also be of dubious benefit to Bishop Muzorewa and his government. Isolated British recognition, supported only by South Africa, would have almost certainly resulted in an intensification and further internationalization of the war and provided Salisbury with little in return.

Tanzania and Zambia, as the FLS representatives at Lusaka, had even stronger motives to ensure that the Lusaka Conference succeeded, for the continuation of the war would pose a threat to their most vital interests. The Zambian economy had been seriously disrupted by the effect of international sanctions against Rhodesia; as ZIPRA's host country, Zambia was being subjected to increasingly heavy air and ground assaults from the Rhodesian forces. Tanzania, facing equally serious economic problems, had over-extended itself militarily and economically by its invasion and continued occupation of Uganda. Thus, although they remained committed to the PF and to supporting the guerrilla war, Tanzania and Zambia had strong motives for attempting to seek a peaceful resolution to the Rhodesian conflict.

Within Rhodesia itself the PF had made significant military advances during 1978 and 1979 but stood short of precipitating the collapse of the Zimbabwe Rhodesian administration. Since the "internal settlement" of 3 March, 1978, eighty-five per cent of the country had been placed under martial law. As a result of the war, expenditure on the war was consuming an increasingly large proportion of the country's human and material resources. By 1979/80 the defence budget accounted for thirty-seven per cent of projected total government expenditure.³ The Commander of Combined Operations, Lieut.-General Peter Walls, had conceded that the war was unwinnable from the Security Force's point of view and Bishop Muzorewa's appeals to the PF guerrillas to surrender had had little effect. Thus, a military stalemate had been reached by mid-1979. The impasse provided both sides, and in particular the Muzorewa/Smith coalition, with incentives to attend the Lancaster House Conference. Without international recognition, and the lifting of sanctions, the "internal settlement" was doomed; the only lifeline for Salisbury would have been continued economic and military assistance from

South Africa, and Pretoria had made it clear to Muzorewa immediately after Lusaka that he could not depend upon indefinite South African support. Not only was involvement in the Rhodesian war costing the Republic approximately R50m per month⁴, but it was also hindering its objective of normalizing relations with independent African states, especially those affected by the war, with a view to creating the much vaunted "constellation of states" economically dependent upon South Africa.

The PF leaders viewed the Lusaka Agreement with intense suspicion; they regarded it as a British manoeuvre designed to legitimize the Muzorewa administration and remove the dispute from the international arena by imposing British colonial authority and thereby ignoring OAU and UN resolutions. It was only after what Mugabe described as a "forthright" meeting with the FLSs at the Non-Aligned Summit in Havana, that the PF agreed to attend the Lancaster House Conference despite grave reservations about departing from the Anglo-American proposals and about Britain's intentions.⁵

As the British, Salisbury and PF delegations battled through over three months of negotiations at Lancaster House, the influence of those international interests which had helped to shape the Lusaka Agreement continued to be evident. Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda and the South African Foreign Minister, Mr. Pik Botha, all visited London at crucial moments in the talks, and the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr. Shridath Ramphal, was actively involved throughout. When the Conference reached its first major crisis, Britain's proposed constitution, which resulted in the PF delegation being excluded from the negotiations, it was American intervention that solved the impasse, by offering to help finance a multinational fund to assist in the agricultural and economic development of an independent Zimbabwe (following appeals by Mr. Ramphal and Dr. Nyerere). The Americans enabled the PF to return to the Conference and accept the British position on land tenure which had previously been the sticking point.

Thus, although the trilateral Lancaster House Agreement (providing for an independence constitution, a transition period leading to elections, and a ceasefire) was reached as a result of the desire on the part of the two Rhodesian delegations to settle their differences politically rather than militarily under British colonial auspices, the contributions made by international interests was considerable and reflected the degree to which the war in Rhodesia had become internationalized. By assuming full colonial responsibility for Rhodesia, Britain attempted to deinternationalize the issue, but, at the same time, recognized the legitimacy of limited international involvement. Thus the Lancaster House formula provided for the ceasefire to be monitored by Commonwealth forces and for the election process to be observed by a Commonwealth group and a host of other international representatives.

The ceasefire arrangement

Although Britain insisted upon assuming full colonial responsibility for Rhodesia at Lancaster House, the Governor's powers were circumscribed in two important respects. Firstly, the skeleton British administration lacked the independent means to implement its decisions. Thus, although executive and legislative authority was vested in the Governor, by an order in Council at Westminster, the Lancaster House Agreement saw "no practical alternative" to working through the existing public service.⁶ The second important factor was that, although the forces of the PF and the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF)

agreed to accept the Governor's authority and comply with his directives as part of the Lancaster House Agreement, Britain lacked any form of military power with which to enforce compliance in the event of disobedience. The all-important arrangements for the ceasefire and the disengagement of forces were therefore entirely dependent upon the co-operation of the commanders of the RSF and the PF. The role of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) was strictly limited to monitor but not to enforce observation of the ceasefire. The 1 200 strong CMF was composed of 600 British troops and contingents from Australia, New Zealand, Kenya and Fiji. In keeping with its monitoring role, the CMF was only lightly armed for self-protection and was under instructions to withdraw if fighting broke out between the PF and the RSF.

The composition of the Ceasefire Commission, whose task it was to ensure compliance with the ceasefire arrangements and to investigate breaches of the ceasefire reflected a major tenet of the Lancaster House Agreement, i.e. that Rhodesians should not only agree upon a solution themselves but that they should also be responsible for its implementation under British colonial stewardship. Chaired by the Governor's military adviser, Major-General John Acland, the six man Commission comprised Brigadier Grundon of the British Army, ZANLA Commander Rex Nhongo, ZIPRA Chief of Security and Military Intelligence Dumiso Daberigwa, Zimbabwe Rhodesian Air Force Director of Operations, Group Captain Slatten, and Zimbabwe Rhodesian Chief of Staff Operations, Major General Barnard. Although hostilities continued well beyond 28 December, 1979 - the ceasefire date - and many PF forces had not moved to the Assembly Points within the seven day period agreed at Lancaster House, there was a significant decrease in the level of military activity during January. By 13 January, when PF leader Nkomo returned to the country, nearly 22 000 guerrillas (16 000 of Mugabe's ZANLA and 6 000 of Nkomo's ZIPRA) were gathered at the Assembly Points and the RSF had for the most part observed its part of the reciprocal disengagement process. Despite small fluctuations, the total of 22 000 guerrillas in the Assembly Points remained constant throughout the transition period and no serious incidents were reported in the assembly areas. Although the RSF initially explained the discrepancy between their estimate of PF numbers (15-16 000) and the number of guerrillas that arrived at the Assembly Points by claiming that the guerrilla commanders had left their best fighters in the bush and sent untrained supporters to the Assembly Points, members of the CMF expressed surprise at the standards of military drill and discipline demonstrated by many of the guerrillas.

From the first meeting of the Ceasefire Commission, a clear pattern emerged; although the definition of a "breach" of the ceasefire was broad, covering anything from a five second "contact" to a full-scale engagement, the Commission found that over half of all confirmed violations were attributable to ZANLA at every meeting. In mitigation, ZANU(PF) officials pointed out that their forces outnumbered ZIPRA by a three to one ratio, that they had been operating in a larger area of the country and that, due to ZANLA's decentralized command structure, it was difficult to reach all the cadres operating in the bush. In this context the Governor's decision to employ only the RSF to deal with breaches of the ceasefire surprised many observers. The Lancaster House Agreement stated, "If there are breaches of the ceasefire, it will be for the Commanders... on both sides... to deal with these".⁷ However, the Governor decided to ignore the offer made by the PF commanders at the beginning of January to discipline their own forces which did not comply with the ceasefire. This decision led to allegations that the PF did not enjoy equal status with the RSF in the Governor's eyes.

The final Ceasefire Commission communiqué attributed the following totals of confirmed breaches: ZANLA, 99 and 35 occurred in former ZANLA operational areas; ZIPRA, 24 and 12 occurred in former ZIPRA operational areas; RSF, 2

and 12 "incitements" to breach; bandits, 17; unattributable, 18.⁸ During the Commission's deliberations a high degree of mutual respect and understanding developed between the formerly opposing commanders; the co-operation between the PF and the RSF on the Commission and in observing the ceasefire on the ground led to the successful initiation of "Operation Merger" which made a substantial contribution towards reassuring those who had feared a post-election coup or a continuation of the war. The PF delegation to the Lancaster House Conference argued consistently for an integrated, national army based on its own forces and "acceptable elements" of the RSF; as the electorate went to the polls, 1 200 guerrillas, 600 ZIPRA at Essexvale and 600 ZANLA at Rathgar began training to become conventional soldiers and an integral part of the new National Army of Zimbabwe under the supervision of Commonwealth, British and Rhodesian instructors. At the start of the joint training, some of the guerrilla Assembly Points closed; at the others small contingents of Rhodesian soldiers joined the guerrillas and the CMF shortly before polling. This move allayed fears that, as the CMF withdrew, the Rhodesian Air Force would launch surgical strikes against the vulnerable camps after the election results became known. Mugabe and Nkomo responded by ordering their forces to stay in the Assembly Points whatever the result of the poll. Thus it was against the background of a sometimes fragile but ultimately resilient ceasefire that preparations for the elections started and election campaigning began.

Organization of the elections

(i) Election machinery

The task of organizing the elections fell to the existing Rhodesian administration under the overall authority of the British Election Commissioner, Sir John Boynton. To ensure the impartiality of the Rhodesian administration, which was viewed with intense suspicion by both ZANU(PF) and the PF, a large team of British election supervisors worked closely with district and provincial commissioners throughout the country. The British officials were selected on the grounds of their experience of organizing elections in Britain. To ensure that the voting process itself was above reproach, 570 out of 657 polling stations had a British policeman in attendance throughout voting hours.

The Election Council, chaired by the Election Commissioner, exercised a general consultative function during the campaign. The Council was made up of representatives of all the parties contesting both white and black elections and was charged with investigating allegations of electoral malpractice and also had the power to make recommendations to the Governor. Lord Soames' decision to ban singing, dancing and the chanting of slogans within 100 metres of the polling booths was taken following a unanimous recommendation from the Election Council.

The National Election Directorate mounted a massive information campaign to ensure that all voters knew of the location and timing of the vote and believed that the ballot was secret. The campaign, each item of which was approved by Sir John Boynton, included television and radio spots, educational films shown at cinemas and by mobile units in the rural areas, cartoon strips and advertisements in newspapers. All parties were allowed three political broadcasts on the radio and television to argue their case and, in addition, were allowed to purchase a limited amount of time for transmitting slogans and propaganda. There was no limit on newspaper advertising, posters and placards.

The entire election process was overseen by scores of international observers - a vital element of the Lusaka and Lancaster House Agreements. The observers fell into three categories. The first and most important group was the Commonwealth Observer Group (COG). The COG was made up of representatives of eleven Commonwealth states, chaired by Ambassador Dayal of India, and was the only group charged with a collective inter-governmental mandate. The COG report was recognized as being the most important report, in that it would have a direct influence upon the degree of recognition likely to be afforded to the government emerging from the elections. The second group of observers comprised representatives from a variety of governments not represented in the COG. These National Observer Groups carried out their observations completely independently of one another and reported to their respective governments. The final category of observers consisted of non-governmental representatives from organizations such as the Canadian Human Rights Group, the International Defence and Aid Fund and the American Committee on Africa.

(ii) Voting systems⁹

Different voting systems were employed for the election of the twenty white members of the House of Assembly, held on 14 February, and for the eighty black members, held between 27 and 29 February. For the white elections, which included all Coloured and Asian voters, the country was split into twenty constituencies as determined by the Delimitation Commission, 1978. The only departure from previous electoral practice was that candidates were chosen by preferential voting, i.e. voters could place candidates in an order of preference (where more than two candidates were contesting a constituency) and if no candidate gained an overall majority (i.e. fifty per cent of the votes plus one), the candidate with the least number of votes would be eliminated and his second preferences distributed among the remaining candidates until one candidate gained an overall majority. All White, Coloured and Asian voters registered on the White Roll before 31 December, 1979, were entitled to vote.

For the eighty black seats, the party list system was employed. The country was divided into eight electoral districts, as in the April 1979 elections, and each district was allocated a number of seats based on the estimated number of voters normally resident in that region. The parties then nominated the required number of candidates for each electoral district. All black Rhodesians over the age of eighteen and black non-citizens who had been permanently resident in Rhodesia for a continuous period of two years before the date of the election were entitled to vote. As no black electoral roll had ever been drawn up, voters had to dip their hands into an indelible fluid which prevented multiple voting. Seats were distributed on a proportional basis in each electoral district to those parties that gained more than ten per cent of the vote.¹⁰

The White Election

Any dissatisfaction that the white electorate might have felt about the Lancaster House Agreement was not reflected at the polls by an anti-Rhodesian Front (RF) vote, although the low 57,6 per cent turnout was perhaps an indication of a lack of enthusiasm about the settlement. The White, Coloured and Asian voters returned RF candidates with overwhelming majorities in the six seats that were contested; the other fourteen seats went automatically to the RF as its candidates were unopposed. Opposition to the RF was fragmented and disorganized; eight independents stood against the RF in the six contested

constituencies. In every constituency the RF candidate gained an overall majority on the first count and so the preferential voting system did not come into effect.¹¹ The closest result occurred in the Kopje constituency where former RF Chief Whip, Mr. Dennis Divaris (1 999 votes) easily overcame Dr. Timothy Stemps (1 053), a city councillor.

The campaign for the twenty white seats was very low-key and excited little interest amongst the voters or the media. The only organized party opposition to the RF came from Mr. Nick McNally, leader of the Liberal National Unifying Force; McNally stood against the will of his Party, however, which voted to boycott the elections as they were racially segregated. Mr. Smith was sufficiently confident that the RF would win to leave the country on the eve of polling. While in the USA, Smith launched a fierce attack on "pure democracy" and branded the PF and ZANU(PF) as "terrorists".¹² In Rhodesia, however, the RF adopted a more conciliatory tone during its campaign amid rumours that former Finance Minister, Mr. David Smith, was preparing to lead an anti-Ian Smith faction. While refusing to renounce the principles of UDI when questioned, RF candidates stressed the need for Whites to stay united and to keep faith in the country. Of greater significance than the entreaties of RF candidates and Smith's outburst, however, was the appeal by the Commander of Combined Operations, Lieut.-General Peter Walls, regarded by the white electorate as the most important leader in Rhodesia, to "face forward and join hands" as the black majority rule elections approached.¹³

The Black Election

(i) Contesting parties

A total of nine parties contested the election for the eighty black seats in the House of Assembly although the UNFP fought only four electoral districts and UPAM only stood candidates in the two Matabeleland electoral districts. Although there was never any serious doubt that the vast majority of seats would be won by the three main parties, Nkomo's PF, Muzorewa's UANC and Mugabe's ZANU(PF), at least two of the smaller parties, Sithole's ZANU and Chikerema's ZDP, hoped to gain enough seats to be influential in a coalition should none of the major parties gain an overall majority. As the founder of ZANU in 1963, Sithole spent ten years in prison between 1964 and 1974 during which time he was deposed as the leader of the party by fellow detainee, Robert Mugabe, in a prison vote. Having failed to win back the leadership of ZANU, and with Mugabe having established himself as the political spokesman for ZANU's guerrilla force, ZANLA, Sithole returned to Rhodesia and renounced the armed struggle in favour of peaceful negotiations. As a signatory to the "internal settlement" of 3 March, 1978, Sithole was a member of the four-man Executive Committee which governed Rhodesia until the elections of April 1979. In the April elections Sithole won only twelve seats and his party boycotted the new Zimbabwe Rhodesian parliament for three months on the grounds that the elections were rigged. Sithole's hopes of winning seats in the February 1980 election thus rested on his past record as a nationalist leader and his participation in the internal settlement. ZANU was boosted by the decision of 37 of the 64 ZANU(PF) detainees released from Mozambique to join the party. The dissidents, who had been detained after allegedly plotting to overthrow Mugabe, included former members of Mugabe's central committee, such as Mukudzei Mudzi and Henry Hamadziipi, some of whom stood as ZANU candidates.

The ZDP was formed by James Chikerema after the April 1979 elections when Bishop Muzorewa ignored his claims to a cabinet post. Together with seven other UANC MPs, all from the second largest Shona-speaking tribe in the country, the Zezuru, Chikerema left Muzorewa's party accusing the Bishop of nepotism and tribalism. Chikerema himself first emerged on the nationalist scene in 1956

when he was elected as the First President of the African National Youth League. Although frequently changing from one nationalist grouping to another during the course of the struggle for independence, Chikerema hoped that his political credentials and his party's Zezuru base would guarantee him a seat in parliament.

*(ii) Manifestos and the issues*¹⁵

A striking feature of the manifestos produced by the three major parties was the large area of common ground that they shared. The PF, the UANC and ZANU(PF) were all agreed, for example, upon the need for free primary school education, major improvements in the health service and the necessity to provide better housing. The policy differences that did emerge, such as the role of private capital in the future economy of an independent Zimbabwe, tended to be concerned with questions of degree rather than principle; all parties were agreed upon a mixed economy. Even ZANU(PF), considered to be the most left-wing party fighting the election, stated in its manifesto that it would "allow private enterprise to continue". The Marxist Leninist philosophy espoused by the party in exile was tempered by a recognition of the "historical, social and other existing realities of Zimbabwe". Although committed to a "socialist economy", ZANU(PF) resolved to "examine the need for state involvement" in the key sectors of agriculture and mining; although few Whites or foreign investors appeared to accept the ZANU(PF)'s departure from a hardline Marxist stance until after the election, the manifesto and Mugabe's conciliatory tone during the campaign, provided a measure of reassurance.

As a result of the many areas of policy agreement, the election campaign centred around the political credentials of the parties and their leaders. In this respect Mugabe and ZANU(PF) possessed a number of advantages from the start of campaigning. Firstly, as leader of the largest guerrilla army which, in African eyes, forced the Salisbury government and Britain to accept majority rule elections, Mugabe returned to Rhodesia from exile as a conquering hero. Approximately 250 000 people gathered to welcome him home - the largest crowd ever to attend a political meeting in Rhodesia's history. By the time Mugabe returned to the country, only four weeks before the election, 16 000 ZANLA guerrillas had obeyed his orders and made their way to the Assembly Points. As a result, the level of violence in the country had decreased significantly and Mugabe was seen by the voters to be demonstrating his power to stop the war, something which Bishop Muzorewa had failed to do in nearly two years since he signed the 3 March, 1978, agreement. A second major advantage possessed by Mugabe was that he had not been tainted, in the eyes of the electorate, by any previous association with Ian Smith or South Africa, unlike his two major rivals. Bishop Muzorewa was, of course, closely identified with Smith as a result of his participation in the internal settlement. This in itself might not have proved fatal to the Bishop - he did after all gain a large majority in the April 1979 elections over a year after signing the internal accord - had he been able to deliver some of his campaign promises, the most important of which were ending the war, gaining international recognition and securing the lifting of sanctions. Having failed to achieve his three major objectives the Bishop thus found it increasingly difficult to implement even a modest programme of economic and social reform as the PF intensified its war effort. The Bishop's waning image as a genuine nationalist leader was dealt further blows by his total dependence upon the Rhodesian Security Forces to protect his political kingdom and the increased reliance his government had to place upon South Africa to prop up its counter-insurgency campaign. Eschel Rhodie claimed that Muzorewa had received thousands

of Rand from the South African government which was known to be subsidizing the Rhodesian war at the rate of R1,5 - R1,75 M per day by mid 1979.¹⁶ During the February 1980 elections the UANC was the only African party to support the presence of South African troops in the country during the campaign and the party also promised to trade "by day and not by night" with South Africa, i.e. to expand and develop economic and trade ties if it formed the next government.

Although Nkomo never succeeded in reaching an agreement with Smith he had made several attempts to do so since his release from prison in December 1974 (as part of the "detente" exercise of the mid-1970s, sponsored by South Africa and the Front Line States, which aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement and the ending of the war). Although the Victoria Falls Conference of 25 August, 1975, broke down after only 24 hours, Nkomo and Smith announced a "declaration of intent" to negotiate a settlement on 1 December, 1975. When these talks collapsed in March, 1976, Nkomo's political standing slumped and, although he struck a more militant and uncompromising posture after the formation of the Patriotic Front for the October 1976 Geneva Conference, he conducted more talks with the Salisbury government in 1978 that further undermined ZANU's confidence in him. After ZANU(PF) had decided to contest the 1980 election alone, a move that was a great disappointment to Nkomo who had hoped for a common platform, ZAPU changed its name to PF in order to stress its campaign theme of unity and reconciliation. Unfortunately for Nkomo, however, Smith chose to remind the African electorate of his often stated preference for Nkomo when he publicly disowned his former partner Muzorewa and urged white employers to encourage their black workers to vote PF in order to keep Mugabe out of power.

A further problem faced by the PF was that, ever since he emerged as a nationalist leader in the early 1950s, most of Nkomo's support had come from the Bulawayo area and the Ndebele groups in Matabeleland. Thus a major thrust of the PF campaign was to shed its traditional image as a regional, tribally-based party; with only 16 out of 80 seats being contested in Matabeleland the PF's hopes of forming a government depended upon the success of this effort. Nkomo had been careful to maintain a balance between Ndebele and Shona-speakers on his executive when in exile in order to counter allegations of tribalism and, for the elections, he stood some of his senior party officials such as Joseph Msika, Josiah Chisamano and Willie Musarurwa in Mashonaland constituencies. Nkomo himself stood in the Midlands electoral district which contains a mixture of Ndebele and Shona.

Although the three major parties were agreed over certain policy priorities their campaign styles differed significantly. The UANC campaign managers, with the experience of the April 1979 elections behind them, ran a well-organised, European-style campaign. Aided by a massive injection of funds from South African and Western business interests,¹⁷ the UANC produced tens of thousands of colour posters of the Bishop; T-shirts, hats and stickers were distributed free at UANC rallies and the Bishop and his entourage used four West German helicopters to tour the country. At the Bishop's final rally, a massive four day feast in Salisbury, 60 000 free meals a day were provided in addition to free overnight accommodation, and the party hired nine trains and five hundred buses to ferry supporters to the capital and back home again. The Bishop's tone was vitriolic from the start, characterizing Nkomo and Mugabe as "Ayatollahs operating a slaughter house" immediately after he signed the Lancaster House Agreement. Muzorewa's major theme was to warn the electorate of the dangers posed to Zimbabwe's traditional values by "Marxism" and "Communism". Much of the UANC's election material was devoted to attacking ZANU(PF) and the PF, and their alleged desire to impose a Mozambique-style regime upon Zimbabwe, and not to promoting

Muzorewa himself. In one, almost hysterical, attack upon his opponents shortly before the election the Bishop wrote, "In Mozambique the people are literally dying of starvation... if ZANU(PF) or the PF are allowed to impose the same kind of government upon us you will lose your house, your land, your cattle, goats and chickens... your children will be taken away... /and/ taught to hate the ways of their parents and their tribe... to hate both God and the ancestral spirits. Machel is now vomiting this kind of government; why do ZANU(PF) and the PF want us to eat other people's vomit?"¹⁸

In stark contrast to the Bishop, Nkomo assiduously refrained from attacking other party leaders. In the first press conference that he gave on his return from exile, Nkomo stressed the need for unity and reconciliation among Zimbabweans. The PF campaign symbol, an unarmed guerrilla cradling a small child above a hoe and ploughshare, emphasized the party's commitment to peace and reconstruction. PF election material stressed Nkomo's experience as a trade union and nationalist leader of thirty years standing, his role in initiating and pursuing the armed struggle and his ability to unite Zimbabweans of all races and tribes. Nkomo's avuncular image as "Father Zimbabwe" was captured on campaign clothing.

The ZANU(PF) campaign had a military theme. Indeed, the party's original election symbol, a black hand clasping an AK47 rifle, was banned by the Governor. In both the manifesto and the campaign, however, ZANLA's dominant role in the guerrilla war was stressed. While Mugabe spoke of the need for peace, he also made it clear that if the Governor banned ZANU(PF) or attempted to exclude the party from power then the war would continue. Mugabe himself appeared only three times in public during the whole campaign following two attempts on his life. Although ZANU(PF) would obviously have liked the party leader to travel around the country, Mugabe's absence from many major rallies served to heighten the mystique that surrounded him. The campaign symbol eventually adopted by ZANU(PF) proved to be a masterstroke - a cockerel crowing against the background of a sunrise. This symbol of an emergent Zimbabwe inspired supporters throughout the country to invent songs, dances and slogans exhorting the electorate to 'Vhoterayi Jongwe' - Vote for the Cock.

(iii) Observers' verdict

In reports presented on or before 2 March, the day before counting started, the overwhelming majority of observers found that the elections were sufficiently free and fair as to constitute a genuine expression of the electorate's wishes. The observers, therefore, concurred with the decision of the Election Commissioner to allow the election to go ahead in all areas of the country. Despite evidence received from his election supervisors which suggested that intimidation was likely to influence the result of the poll in the majority of Victoria Province (particularly in the Gutu District), in Buhera in Manicaland, in Belingwe and in the Tribal Trust Lands in Charter, Chilimanzi, Selukwe and Shabani in the Midlands province, Sir John Boynton accepted the majority verdict of his advisers and recommended to the Governor that the election should proceed as planned throughout the country.¹⁹ This was an important recommendation, for two weeks before the election Lord Soames had given himself the power to declare the elections abrogated in any area where he considered that it would be impossible to hold a free and fair poll. As a warning to ZANU(PF), Lord Soames banned the party treasurer, Mr. Enos Nkala, from campaigning in the remainder of the election, after Nkala stated publicly that ZANU(PF) would return to the war if it lost the election, and ZANU(PF) was banned from electioneering in certain areas.

Observers were united in their praise for Britain's management of the election from a technical point of view. That the massive information campaign had been successful was reflected in the very high turnout of voters: 2 02 275 people voted in the February 1980 elections (representing 93,6 per cent of the estimated electorate) as compared to the 1 869 077 (representing 64,9 per cent of the estimated electorate) who voted in April 1979.²⁰ Criticisms of the election process, from the observers and from international forums and foreign governments, were mainly directed at some of the Governor's decisions, the presence of South African troops in Rhodesia throughout the election period and the vexed question of intimidation.

Vital to the degree of international recognition likely to be afforded to the new government emerging from the elections would be the verdict of the Commonwealth Observer Group (COG). During the transitional period several Commonwealth countries had been sharply critical of Lord Soames. Two of the principal architects of the Lusaka Agreement, Tanzania and Zambia, accused Britain of rigging the elections and President Nyerere threatened to break diplomatic links with Britain over the issue. Nigeria announced it would support continued guerrilla warfare if Britain attempted to exclude Mugabe from power. In London, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr. Shridath Ramphal, informed Lord Carrington of the Commonwealth's "crisis of confidence" in the British administration of the elections only four days before polling started.²¹ In Rhodesia the COG's interim report was more restrained. The report criticized "deficiencies" in the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement and discerned a "lack of impartiality" exhibited by the administration in dealing with the interests of the different parties.²² In the COG's final report, released at the beginning of April, the group was more specific in its criticisms of the Governor; "intimidation by the guerrillas was by no means as widespread or as brutal as official spokesmen claimed", the report concluded.²³ The conclusions of the COG's interim and final reports were the same, however; the elections were an "adequate and acceptable means of determining the wishes of the people in a democratic manner".

The presence of South African troops in Rhodesia throughout the election campaign damaged Lord Soames' credibility in the eyes of many observers, and was one of the major reasons that the UN Security Council passed a unanimous resolution at the beginning of February calling on Britain to ensure "full and impartial implementation of the letter and the spirit of the Lancaster House Agreement".²⁴ Of the election contestants only Bishop Muzorewa publicly supported the South African presence; ZANU(PF) and the PF alleged that the presence of the South African Defence Force (SADF) at Beit Bridge and the deployment of South African troops in the south of Rhodesia contravened the Lancaster House Agreement. In response to considerable domestic and international pressure, Lord Soames instructed the SADF to leave Beit Bridge on 31 January, but South African soldiers and equipment remained in the country until after the election. Mugabe claimed that there were never less than 6 000 South African troops in Rhodesia throughout the transition period and, although he did not quantify the extent of his country's involvement, South African Prime Minister, Mr. P.W. Botha, acknowledged that South African forces finally left Rhodesia only after the election had finished. He also stated that Lord Soames was aware of their presence.²⁵

Lord Soames' decision to use the Rhodesian Security Forces, including the pro-Muzorewa auxiliaries, to maintain law and order was a constant source of concern to many observers. Mugabe and Nkomo frequently pointed out that the

Lancaster House Agreement stated that "the task of maintaining law and order in the transition period will be the responsibility of the civil police".²⁶ Related to the controversy surrounding the enforcement of law and order was the question of intimidation. Although British officials and the Rhodesian media focused almost exclusively upon allegations of intimidation by ZANLA, many observers formed the impression that intimidation by the Security Forces, and in particular the auxiliaries, was often overlooked. The COG's final report stated, "The one-sided picture projected by the authorities and reflected by the media, which attributed blame for intimidation solely to ZANLA and ZIPRA, was grossly misleading and must be corrected."²⁷ In one survey of the five main African hospitals in Harare, Marandellas, Rusafe and Umtali, areas where ZANU(PF) intimidation was allegedly rife, 65 per cent of all the patients being treated for injuries related to the war or the election campaign reported that they had been wounded by the Security Forces, police auxiliaries, District Assistants or UANC supporters.²⁸

(iv) Results

As soon as the results were declared, Lord Soames invited Mr. Mugabe to form a government as thousands of people throughout the country celebrated the ZANU(PF) triumph. By capturing 62,99 per cent of the poll, ZANU(PF) won 57 seats in the House of Assembly, sufficient to ensure an overall majority.²⁹ The PF received 24,11 per cent of the votes cast to gain 20 seats and the UANC won 3 seats with 8,28 per cent of the poll. Thus the major parties shared 95,38 per cent of the poll and no other party won any seats.³⁰ Of the minor parties, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole's ZANU came closest to winning a seat with 5,368 per cent of the vote in Manicaland. Although the "10 per cent clause" (which required parties to gain 10 per cent of the vote in a given electoral district to be included in the allocation of seats) militated against the smaller parties winning seats, only Mr. Sithole's ZANU, with 2,013 per cent of the total vote and James Chikerema's ZDP, with 1,064 per cent of the total vote, gained more than 1 per cent of votes cast.

In three of the areas where ZANLA guerrillas had been particularly active throughout the eight year war - Mashonaland Central, Manicaland and Victoria - ZANU(PF) won all 28 seats. In the constituencies of Mashonaland East and West ZANU(PF) won 20 out of 24 seats, dropping 3 seats to the UANC and 1 to the PF. As expected, Nkomo's PF won 15 out of 16 seats in Matabeleland North and South, dropping one seat to ZANU(PF), but was unable to break out of the Matabeleland ghetto; after 30 years in the forefront of the nationalist movement, Nkomo was bitterly disappointed with less than a quarter of the black vote and a fifth of the seats in parliament. Only in the Midlands electoral district, where Nkomo was a candidate, was there a significant division amongst the votes: ZANU(PF) won 6 seats and the PF won 4.

The almost complete eclipse of Bishop Muzorewa was a major surprise. Although UANC officials acknowledged privately during the campaign that they did not expect to win an overall majority, the party hoped to gain a sufficient number of seats to be the leading partner in an anti-Mugabe coalition with Nkomo's PF and, possibly, the RF. In the April 1979 elections the Bishop swept all 27 seats in the Mashonaland constituencies in the north of the country in an average poll of 77,7 per cent³¹; in February 1980 the Bishop won his only 3 seats in these same constituencies. The total disintegration of the UANC's support can be attributed to the party's failure to achieve any of its election pledges when in office and the alienating effect upon the voters of Muzorewa's acceptance of South Africa's warm embrace.

Prospects for the future

As soon as Lord Soames asked Mr. Mugabe to form a government, the ZANU(PF) leader moved to consolidate the military and political progress that had been made since the Governor's arrival in the country in December. Having assumed the defence portfolio himself, Mugabe appointed the Rhodesian Commander of Combined Operations, Lieut.-General Peter Walls, to head a committee responsible for integrating the future National Army and capitalizing upon the progress made by "Operation Merger". The other leaders on the committee are the ZANLA Commander, Mr. Rex Nhongo, and a member of his High Command, Mr. Agnew Kambue; the Commander of the Army, Lieut.-General Maclean, and the Commander of the Air Force, Air Marshal Frank Mussell; and the ZIPRA commanders, Mr. Lookout Masuku and Mr. Dumiso Dabengwa. The ceasefire was unexpectedly well observed during the pre-election period and, during this time, the leaders of the formerly opposing forces developed a degree of understanding and co-operation which will be vital if the integration process is to continue to proceed smoothly. The leaders of most political parties have expressed confidence in Lieut.-General Walls' ability to direct the operation; and he will clearly continue to play a pivotal role.

Mugabe kept his pre-election promise that ZANU(PF) would seek to form a coalition with the PF. Within a week of the results, it was announced that Nkomo had agreed to support ZANU(PF) in government in a coalition representing 77 out of the 100 seats in the House of Assembly and 87 per cent of the votes cast in the black election. The PF's share of power, however, is small: of the 35 cabinet seats the PF were given only 6, i.e. 4 out of 22 ministerial posts and 2 out of 13 deputy ministerial posts.³² The most influential PF member of the cabinet is Nkomo himself who accepted the post of Minister of Home Affairs after several days of intense negotiations; Nkomo insisted upon a position from which he could contribute towards the reconstruction of Zimbabwe and refused the titular post of President. The Ministry of Home Affairs portfolio has been slightly enlarged to incorporate responsibility for certain areas of police work; the police were formerly under the Ministry of Combined Operations which has now been abolished. Nkomo does not, however, have complete responsibility for the police; the Department of State Security, in the Ministry of Defence, is in charge of certain police functions such as the Special Branch. In a significant conciliatory gesture towards the white community, Mugabe appointed two of its prominent members to cabinet posts. The former RF Finance Minister, Mr. David Smith, is the new Minister for Commerce and Industry and the president of the National Farmer's Union, Mr. Dennis Norman, is the new Minister of Agriculture. Both are important appointments to key posts and have helped to reassure those whites who feared that Mugabe would pursue an anti-white policy.

The 40 member Senate, which has powers of scrutiny over legislation, reflects ZANU(PF)'s dominance in the House of Assembly. Of the fourteen members elected by the House of Assembly, thirteen are ZANU(PF) and the one PF member, Mr. Joseph Msika, the Minister for Natural Resources and Water Development, had ZANU(PF) backing. The ten white members are all from the RF, and the Council of Chiefs has elected ten senators. Mugabe's six nominees to the Senate, to make up the full complement of forty members, included Dr. Bernard Chidzero, the Minister for Economic Planning and Development, and Mr. Simba Mubako, the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs; both ministers required seats in the Senate, as they were not elected to the House of Assembly. The other four Mugabe nominees are Mr. Garfield Todd, former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mrs Sunny Takawira, widow of the nationalist leader, Mr. Leopold Takawira, who died in detention, Mr. Joseph Culverwell, a leading member of the Coloured

community, and the former freelance radio and television personality, Mrs Tsitsi Munyati. The new President, the Rev. Canaan Banana, is a shrewd choice; a ZANU(PF) nationalist of long standing, but also an Ndebele.

The size of Mugabe's election victory made an important contribution to the immediate post-election tranquility by giving ZANU(PF) an incontestable mandate to govern. Looking to the future, in the context of ZANU(PF)'s position of parliamentary dominance, it seems likely that intra-party, as opposed to inter-party, conflict will have the more decisive influence upon policy. Most of the smaller parties that contested the elections and failed to win seats can be expected to disappear or become irrelevant. Already leading members of the UANC, ZANU, NFZ and ZDP have demonstrated the nomadic qualities so characteristic of Zimbabwean nationalists during the struggle for independence and left their parties for ZANU(PF). The possibility that Zimbabwe will become a one-party state, however, is remote in the short term, despite ZANU(PF)'s large majority. The 20 white seats in parliament will guarantee white representation and the PF, having met to consider the election results, has announced its intention to reorganize itself and fight the next election. In view of the deep fissures in the Zimbabwean nationalist movement that have appeared frequently since the ZAPU/ZANU split in 1963, and the historic division between the Shona and the Ndebele, the probability is that these differences will continue to manifest themselves in a plurality of political parties. In the short term, however, it is the cleavages within ZANU(PF) that must be examined in order to assess the prospects for the new nation.

During the eight year guerrilla war ZANU was often seriously split by factionalism resulting from military, political and tribal disputes. The Nhari rebellion, the death of Herbert Chitepo and the detention of scores of dissidents in Mozambique in 1978 were all manifestations of internal power struggles. Mugabe's emergence as undisputed leader of ZANU in late 1976 can largely be attributed to his ability to unite the party's diverse tendencies, or, where this proved impossible, to lead the strongest faction, and, in close alliance with the late Josiah Tongogare, remain at the head of the ZANLA guerrillas. Mugabe's philosophy, expressed as early as 1960 after the historic "March of the 7 000" from Highfield Township to Salisbury, has always been to strive to achieve a blend of people from all sections of society within the nationalist movement, from graduates and professional men to illiterate peasants and industrial workers. The ZANU(PF) of 1980 reflects the success of Mugabe's efforts; (the party is peasant-based, but the party elite is highly qualified, the cabinet contains seven doctorates, and the 1980 election revealed strong support for ZANU(PF) in the urban areas of Mashonaland, although the PF retains the allegiance of industrial workers in Matabeleland).

While ZANU(PF)'s widespread appeal served it well during the war and in the elections - its very breadth widens the scope for intra-party cleavage in the future - now that the objective that unified the party and its supporters, the struggle for power, has been achieved. The debates between the intellectuals and the peasants, the politicians and the military, and the radicals and the moderates that characterized the deliberations of ZANU's Central Committee when in exile, will now assume a greater importance as the party is in government. Both the substance of these debates and the form they take will be of crucial significance to Zimbabwe's future direction. One central and sensitive issue facing Mugabe immediately is the nature of the relationship between his party

and the State. ZANU(PF)'s committee structure, an intricate web stretching from the rural cells to the Central Committee, was a source of strength for the party and for Mugabe during the war. Although Mugabe was sometimes accused of weak leadership when in exile and at Lancaster House, mainly by Western commentators, as he referred all important decisions to his Central Committee, in fact this process of consultation considerably strengthened his position within the party and reinforced the party's confidence in his leadership. In government, Mugabe's definition of the limits of his party's control of the apparatus of the State will inevitably be fiercely debated within the Central Committee, the majority of whom are not in the cabinet. In this context the relationship between Mugabe and the ZANU(PF) cabinet ministers on the one hand and the Central Committee on the other, and also between the military commanders and the party, will be crucial.

Zimbabwe's external relations are not only likely to be influenced by past loyalties, but also shaped by present realities. Thus while the new government has already begun to re-establish links with its black neighbours, Mugabe was quick to announce a policy of "peaceful co-existence" with South Africa immediately after his election. In Lusaka on 1 April, at a summit meeting of black Southern African states which agreed to a programme of action to lessen their economic dependence on South Africa, Mugabe stressed that political independence without economic independence was incomplete, but recognized Zimbabwe's existing links with Pretoria. If the signatories to the Lusaka communiqué are to succeed in reducing their dependence upon South Africa, then Zimbabwe will be required to play a key role in the process. Also of significance to South African-Zimbabwean relations will be the government's response to the African nationalist movements currently banned in South Africa and in particular the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC), both of whom were invited to the Independence celebrations and are committed to the armed overthrow of the South African government. Mugabe quickly disappointed any hopes that the ANC might have entertained of training guerrillas in Zimbabwe or obtaining transit facilities when he stated, "we cannot be seen to be taking up arms against South Africa".³³ This position is likely to be reinforced by the fact that relations between ZANU(PF) and the ANC have often been strained in the past, partly as a result of ideological differences, and it is known that the ANC was hoping for an Nkomo victory in the elections as PF/ANC links have always been strong. The ANC and the PF were both based in Lusaka until the Lancaster House Agreement allowed Nkomo to return home to campaign, and both enjoy the material and political support of the Soviet Union, whereas ZANU(PF), like the PAC, has tended to adopt a Chinese orientation. Zimbabwe will undoubtedly denounce South Africa's apartheid policies in forums such as the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth, but its support for those opposing the South African government is not likely to take the form of material aid. In this sense, Zimbabwe's policy towards South Africa will be revolutionary rather than revolutionary.

The Non-Aligned Movement recognized the PF (alliance) in 1979 as the "legitimate representatives of the people of Zimbabwe" and the new government's application to join the Movement will be a formality. Although the Non-Aligned Movement is currently under the chairmanship of Cuba, it will be most surprising if Mugabe adopts a pro-Soviet stance. During the war the Soviet Union was generous in its support to Nkomo's army, but refused to supply ZANLA with arms unless the party denounced China, which it has consistently refused to do. Although ZANLA did obtain Soviet weapons, mainly through the OAU, considerable

friction has remained between the party and the Eastern bloc. When Mugabe left Maputo to return to Rhodesia at the end of January, the Russian, East German, Polish, Bulgarian and Czechoslovakian ambassadors to Mozambique snubbed the ZANU(PF) leader by their absence from his official send-off.³⁴ Now that Mugabe is in power, the Soviet Union has quickly established diplomatic links with Zimbabwe, but noticeable absentees from the list of countries invited to the Independence celebrations were East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The raising of the Zimbabwean flag just after midnight on April 17 by the ZANLA commander, Rex Nhongo, at a ceremony in Rufaro stadium, Salisbury, attended by representatives of governments from all over the world symbolized the new nation's two most important assets - peace and international recognition. Mugabe has appealed to all Zimbabweans to beat their swords into plough-shares and join together in the task of reconstruction and nation building. Although there is a great deal to be done before the Prime Minister's goal is achieved, and no one is more fully aware of the problems that lie ahead than Mugabe, at Independence the prospects for Zimbabwe are unexpectedly healthy.

APPENDIX I

BREACHES OF THE CEASEFIRE

	Date of Ceasefire Commission meeting				
	9/2	13/2	16/2	20/2	23/2
Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF)	1		2		2
RSF 'Incitement to breach ceasefire'	12				12
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA)	63	77	83	93	99
Breaches in former ZANLA operational areas	24	31	33	35	35
Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA)	17	20	21	23	24
Breaches in former ZIPRA operational areas	6	7	10	11	12
Bandits		4	5	17	17
Unattributable	9	13		15	18
				Total	219

Source: Ceasefire Commission Communiqués as reported in 'The Herald'.

APPENDIX II

AN EXAMPLE OF FORMULA FOR THE
'PARTY LIST' VOTING SYSTEM
Manicaland - (11 seats)

Party A	248 013	58,83%
B	102 604	21,03%
C	133 721	27,41%
D	2 560	0,52%)
E	1 013	0,21%) Eliminate
Total votes cast	<u>487 911</u>	

$$\text{Quota} = 487\ 911 - (2\ 560 + 1\ 013) = \frac{484\ 338}{11} = 44\ 030$$

Party A	$\frac{248\ 013}{44\ 030} = 5,63 = 6 \text{ seats}$
B	$\frac{102\ 604}{44\ 030} = 2,33 = 2 \text{ seats}$
C	$\frac{133\ 721}{44\ 030} = 3,04 = 3 \text{ seats}$

Source: 1980 Election Simplified, The Ministry of Information, Salisbury.

APPENDIX III

THE WHITE ELECTION RESULTS

The results in the contested constituencies:

<u>Constituency</u>		
WESTERN	Moseley (RF)	1 575
	Bronson	<u>124</u>
	Majority	1 451
	Spoilt papers	15
	Percentage poll	49,8
KOPJE	Divaris (RF)	1 999
	Stamps	<u>1 053</u>
	Majority	946
	Spoilt papers	27
	Percentage poll	54,0
BULAWAYO SOUTH	Stuttaford (RF)	3 715
	Bertrand	289
	Betch	<u>36</u>
	Majority	3 390
	Spoilt papers	19
Percentage poll	55,57	
MAKONI	Tapson (RF)	1 396
	Van der Merwe	<u>431</u>
	Majority	965
	Spoilt papers	6
	Percentage poll	57,83
SOUTHERN	Smith (RF)	2 253
	Hulley	113
	Speedie	<u>37</u>
	Majority	2 103
	Spoilt papers	19
Percentage poll	60,32	
MOUNT PLEASANT	Andersen (RF)	2 683
	McNally	<u>698</u>
	Majority	1 985
	Percentage poll	57,8

Source: 'The Herald', 16 February 1980, and
Rhodesian Mission in South Africa

APPENDIX IV

LIST OF BLACK PARTIES AND LEADERS

<u>Initials</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Leader</u>
NDU	National Democratic Union	Henry Chihota
NFZ	National Front of Zimbabwe	Peter Mandaza
PF	Patriotic Front	Joshua Nkomo
UANC	United African National Council	Abel Muzorewa
UNFP	United National Federal Party	Chief Ndiweni
UPAM	United People's Association of Matabeleland ⁺	
ZANU(PF)	Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	Robert Mugabe
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union	Ndabaningi Sithole
ZDP	Zimbabwe Democratic Party	James Chikerema

⁺ There is no reliable information on this party apart from its name.

APPENDIX V

PERCENTAGE COMPARISONS WITH APRIL 1979 VOTING
FIGURES, INCLUDING SPOILT PAPER PERCENTAGES
(Common Roll Elections)

<u>Electoral Area</u>	<u>1980</u> <u>+ or -</u> <u>as %</u> <u>on 1979</u>	<u>Valid Votes</u> <u>1980</u>	<u>Valid Votes</u> <u>1979</u>	<u>Spoilt</u> <u>Papers</u> <u>1980</u>	
				<u>No.</u>	<u>As %</u>
Mashonaland West	- 3,96	282 932	294 588	7 212	2,55
Mashonaland Central	+ 2,00	174 930	171 508	4 782	2,73
Mashonaland East	+ 8,24	632 440	548 294	8 741	1,38
Manicaland	+ 71,80	313 786	182 643	7 334	2,34
Victoria	+ 143,21	326 717	134 335	9 844	3,01
Midlands	+ 54,78	350 111	226 202	5 884	1,67
Matabeleland North	+ 104,72	396 505	193 685	5 834	1,47
Matabeleland South	+ 234,17	172 108	51 503	3 115	1,81
TOTAL		<u>2 649 529</u>	<u>1 802 758</u>	<u>52 746</u>	<u>1,99</u>

The number and overall percentage of spoilt papers in 1979 was 66 319 papers, or 3,55% of the total poll.

Source: Election Commission.

APPENDIX VI

DETAILS OF THE COMMON ROLL
(BLACK) ELECTION RESULTS

1. Overall Results by Party: Number of Votes and Seats

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>TOTAL VALID VOTES CAST</u>	<u>% OF VALID VOTES</u>	<u>SEATS</u>
NDU	15 056	0,568	-
NFZ	18 794	0,709	-
PF	638 879	24,113	20
UANC	219 307	8,277	3
UNFP	5 796	0,219	-
UPAM	1 181	0,045	-
ZANU	53 343	2,013	-
ZANU (PF)	1 668 992	62,992	57
ZDP	28 181	1,064	-
TOTAL VALID VOTES	2 649 529	100%	
SPOILT PAPERS	52 746		
TOTAL POLL	2 702 275		
TOTAL SEATS	-		80

Source: Southern Rhodesia. Results of Common Roll Election.
February 1980.

2. Number of Votes Cast by Electoral District

<u>ELECTORAL DISTRICT</u>	<u>VALID VOTES CAST</u>	<u>SPOILT PAPERS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Manicaland	313 786	7 334	321 120
Mashonaland Central	174 930	4 782	179 712
Mashonaland East	632 440	8 741	641 181
Mashonaland West	282 932	7 212	290 144
Matabeleland North	396 505	5 834	402 339
Matabeleland South	172 108	3 115	175 223
Midlands	350 111	5 884	355 995
Victoria	326 717	9 844	336 561
Total	<u>2 649 529</u>	<u>52 746</u>	<u>2 702 275</u>

3. Voting Results by Electoral District⁺

(i) Manicaland (11 seats)

Votes Cast

	No. of Votes	% of Poll
National Democratic Union	1 837	0,585
National Front of Zimbabwe	1 283	0,409
Patriotic Front	4 992	1,591
United African National Council	19 608	6,249
Zimbabwe African National Union	16 843	5,368
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	263 972	84,125
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	5 251	1,673
Valid votes cast	313 786	100
Spoilt papers	7 334	
Total	321 120	

Number of papers without official mark included in count 6

Calculation of Quota and Allocation of Seats

Total valid votes cast	313 786
Less votes cast for eliminated parties	
National Democratic Union	1 837
National Front of Zimbabwe	1 283
Patriotic Front	4 992
United African National Council	19 608
Zimbabwe African National Union	16 843
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	5 251
	49 814
	<u>263 972</u>

$$\frac{263\ 972}{11 \text{ (number of seats)}} = 23\ 997 \text{ Quota}$$

11 seats allocated to ZANU (PF)

⁺ See Appendix II for formula for calculation of quota and allocation of seats

(ii) Mashonaland Central (6 seats)

Votes Cast

	<u>No. of Votes</u>	<u>% of Poll</u>
National Democratic Union	1 216	0,695
National Front of Zimbabwe	1 086	0,621
Patriotic Front	3 947	2,256
United African National Council	14 985	8,566
United National Federal Party	914	0,523
Zimbabwe African National Union	3 671	2,099
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	146 665	83,842
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	2 446	1,398
Valid votes cast	174 930	100
Spoilt papers	4 782	
Total	179 712	

Number of papers without official mark included in count 0

Calculation of Quota and Allocation of Seats

Total valid votes cast		174 930
Less votes cast for eliminated parties		
National Democratic Union	1 216	
National Front of Zimbabwe	1 086	
Patriotic Front	3 947	
United African National Council	14 985	
United National Federal Party	914	
Zimbabwe African National Union	3 671	
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	2 446	28 265
		<u>146 665</u>

$$\frac{146\ 665}{6 \text{ (number of seats)}} = 24\ 444 \text{ Quota}$$

6 seats allocated to ZANU (PF)

(iii) Mashonaland East (16 seats)

Votes Cast

	<u>No. of Votes</u>	<u>% of Poll</u>
National Democratic Union	2 359	0,373
National Front of Zimbabwe	1 668	0,264
Patriotic Front	28 805	4,555
United African National Council	75 237	11,896
United National Federal Party	1 593	0,252
Zimbabwe African National Union	9 499	1,502
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	508 813	80,452
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	4 466	0,706
Valid votes cast	<u>632 440</u>	<u>100</u>
Spoilt papers	<u>8 741</u>	
Total	<u>641 181</u>	

Number of papers without official mark included in count 0

Calculation of Quota and Allocation of Seats

Total valid votes cast		632 440
Less votes cast for eliminated parties		
National Democratic Union	2 359	
National Front of Zimbabwe	1 668	
Patriotic Front	28 805	
United National Federal Party	1 593	
Zimbabwe African National Union	9 499	
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	4 466	48 390
		<u>584 050</u>

584 050
16 (number of seats) = 36 503 Quota

2 seats allocated to the UANC

14 seats allocated to ZANU (PF)

(iv) Mashonaland West (8 seats)

Votes Cast

	<u>No. of Votes</u>	<u>% of Poll</u>
National Democratic Union	2 211	0,781
National Front of Zimbabwe	2 589	0,915
Patriotic Front	37 888	13,391
United African National Council	28 728	10,154
Zimbabwe African National Union	4 688	1,657
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	203 567	71,949
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	3 261	1,153
Valid votes cast	<u>282 932</u>	<u>100</u>
Spoilt papers	<u>7 212</u>	
Total	<u>290 144</u>	

Number of papers without official mark included in count 0

Calculation of Quota and Allocation of Seats

Total valid votes cast		282 932
Less votes cast for eliminated parties		
National Democratic Union	2 211	
National Front of Zimbabwe	2 589	
Zimbabwe African National Union	4 688	
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	3 261	12 749
		<u>270 183</u>

$$\frac{270\ 183}{8 \text{ (number of seats)}} = 33\ 772 \text{ Quota}$$

6 seats allocated to ZANU (PF)

1 seat allocated to UANC

1 seat allocated to the PF

(v) Matabeleland North (10 seats)

Votes Cast

	<u>No. of Votes</u>	<u>% of Poll</u>
National Democratic Union	1 840	0,464
National Front of Zimbabwe	4 517	1,139
Patriotic Front	313 435	79,049
United African National Council	30 274	7,635
United National Federal Party	1 340	0,338
United People's Association of Matabeleland	729	0,184
Zimbabwe African National Union	3 218	0,812
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	39 819	10,042
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	1 333	0,337
Valid votes cast	<u>396 505</u>	<u>100</u>
Spoilt papers	<u>5 834</u>	
Total	<u>402 339</u>	

Number of papers without official mark included in count 0

Calculation of Quota and Allocation of Seats

Total valid votes cast 396 505

Less votes cast for eliminated parties

National Democratic Union	1 840	
National Front of Zimbabwe	4 517	
United African National Council	30 274	
United National Federal Party	1 340	
United People's Association of Matabeleland	729	
Zimbabwe African National Union	3 218	
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	1 333	43 251
		<u>353 254</u>

353 254

10 (number of seats) = 35 325 Quota

9 seats allocated to the PF

1 seat allocated to ZANU (PF)

(vi) Matabeleland South (6 seats)

Votes Cast

	<u>No. of Votes</u>	<u>% of Poll</u>
National Democratic Union	927	0,539
National Front of Zimbabwe	2 494	1,449
Patriotic Front	148 745	86,425
United African National Council	5 615	3,262
United National Federal Party	619	0,360
United People's Association of Matabeleland	452	0,263
Zimbabwe African National Union	694	0,403
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	11 787	6,849
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	775	0,450
Valid votes cast	<u>172 108</u>	<u>100</u>
Spoilt papers	<u>3 115</u>	
Total	<u>175 223</u>	

Number of papers without official marks included in count 0

Calculation of Quota and Allocation of Seats

Total valid votes cast 172 108

Less votes cast for eliminated parties

National Democratic Union	927	
National Front of Zimbabwe	2 494	
United African National Council	5 615	
United National Federal Party	619	
United People's Association of Matabeleland	452	
Zimbabwe African National Union	694	
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	11 787	
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	775	23 363
		<u>148 745</u>

$\frac{148\ 745}{6 \text{ (number of seats)}} = 24\ 791 \text{ Quota}$

6 seats allocated to the PF

(vii) Midlands (12 seats)

Votes Cast

	<u>No. of Votes</u>	<u>% of Poll</u>
National Democratic Union	2 218	0,634
National Front of Zimbabwe	3 087	0,881
Patriotic Front	94 960	27,123
United African National Council	30 245	8,639
United National Federal Party	1 330	0,380
Zimbabwe African National Union	5 792	1,654
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	209 092	59,721
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	3 387	0,968
Valid votes cast	<u>350 111</u>	<u>100</u>
Spoilt papers	<u>5 884</u>	
Total	<u>355 995</u>	

Number of papers without official mark included in count 9

Calculation of Quota and Allocation of Seats

Total valid votes cast		350 111
Less votes cast for eliminated parties		
National Democratic Union	2 218	
National Front of Zimbabwe	3 087	
United African National Council	30 245	
United National Federal Party	1 330	
Zimbabwe African National Union	5 792	
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	3 387	<u>46 059</u>
		<u>304 052</u>

304 052

12 (number of seats) = 25 337 Quota

8 seats allocated to ZANU (PF)

4 seats allocated to the PF

(viii) Victoria (11 seats)

Votes Cast

	<u>No. of Votes</u>	<u>% of Poll</u>
National Democratic Union	2 448	0,749
National Front of Zimbabwe	2 070	0,634
Patriotic Front	6 107	1,869
United African National Council	14 615	4,473
Zimbabwe African National Union	8 938	2,736
Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)	285 277	87,316
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	7 262	2,223
Valid votes cast	<u>326 717</u>	<u>100</u>
Spoilt papers	<u>9 844</u>	
Total	<u>336 561</u>	

Number of papers without official mark included in count 0

Calculation of Quota and Allocation of Seats

Total valid votes cast		326 717
Less votes cast for eliminated parties		
National Democratic Union	2 448	
National Front of Zimbabwe	2 070	
Patriotic Front	6 107	
United African National Council	14 615	
Zimbabwe African National Union	8 938	
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	7 262	41 440
		<u>285 277</u>

$\frac{285\ 277}{11 \text{ (number of seats)}} = 25\ 934 \text{ Quota}$

11 seats allocated to ZANU (PF)

APPENDIX VII

ZIMBABWE CABINET

MINISTRY

MINISTER

Prime Minister and Minister of Defence	Mr Robert Mugabe
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs	Mr Simon Mzenda
Minister of Home Affairs	Mr Joshua Nkomo
Minister of Manpower Planning and Development	Mr Edgar Tekere
Minister of Finance	Mr Enos Nkala
Minister of Justice and of Constitutional Affairs	Mr Simbi Mubako
Minister of Public Service	Mr Richard Hove
Minister of Labour and Social Welfare	Mr Kumbirai Kangai
Minister of Local Government and Housing	Mr Eddison Zvobgo
Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development	Dr Sydney Sekeramayi
Minister of Commerce and Industry	Mr David Smith
Minister of Agriculture	Mr Dennis Norman
Minister of Information and Tourism	Dr Nathan Shamuyarira
Minister of Natural Resources and Water Development	Mr Joseph Msika
Minister of Education and Culture	Mr Dzingai Mutumbuka
Minister of Health	Mr Herbert Ushewokunze
Minister of Public Works	Mr Clement Muchachi
Minister of Posts and Telecommunications	Mr George Silundika
Minister of Mines	Mr Morris Myagumbo
Minister of Youth, Sports and Recreation	Mrs Teurai Ropa Nhongo
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office	Mr Emmerson Munahgagwa
Minister of Transport and Power	Mr Ernest Kadungure
Minister of Economic Planning and Development	Dr Bernard Chidzero

The following were appointed as Deputy Ministers:

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs	Dr Witness Mangwende
Deputy Minister of Home Affairs	Mr Tarisai Ziyambi
Deputy Minister of Finance	Dr Oliver Munyaradzi
Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Welfare	Mr Robson Manyika
Deputy Minister of Local Government and Housing	Adv. Godfrey Chidyausiku
Deputy Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development	Mr Mervin Mahachi
Deputy Minister of Commerce and Industry	Mr Moses Mvenge
Deputy Minister of Agriculture	Dr Simba Makoni
Deputy Minister of Education and Culture	Mrs Victoria Chitepo
Deputy Minister of Health	Dr Simon Mazoredze
Deputy Minister of Posts and Telecommunications	Dr Naomi Nhiwatiwa
Deputy Minister of Mines	Mr J Ntuta
Deputy Minister of Youth, Sports and Recreation	Mr Cephas Msipa

Source: Department of Information, Salisbury

THE MAJOR TRIBAL GROUPINGS IN ZIMBABWE WITH APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGE OF AFRICAN POPULATION

NDEBELE ORIENTATED TRIBES

Tribe	Percentage
1 Ndebele	14%
2 Kalanga	5%

SHONA ORIENTATED TRIBES


Tribe	Percentage
3 Rozwi	9%
4 Korekore	12%
5 Zezuru	18%
6 Manyika	13%
7 Karanga	22%
8 Ndau	3%

OTHERS

Tribe	Percentage
9 Tonga	2%
10 Venda	1%
11 Shangaan	1%

NOTE

1. The three above divisions are based on historical fact. They do not necessarily mean that a modern African from the KALANGA group, for example, automatically considers himself to be NDEBELE orientated in matters of politics, sport or any other aspect of organized life.
2. Some of the above groups have further sub-groups. The NDEBELE, for example, have 12 such sub-groups, the ZEZURU have 8, and the KARANGA have 15.
3. The SHONA language group has approximately 65 sub-groupings.



FOOTNOTES

1. This section is an abbreviated version of an article by the author entitled "Rhodesia: from Lusaka to Lancaster House", The World Today (London, Oxford University Press), January 1980.
2. The Economist, 7 July 1979.
3. BBC Monitoring Service, 28 July 1979, quoting the Zimbabwe Rhodesian Minister of Finance.
4. See The Guardian, 6 October 1979, and Fireforce Exposed (London: The Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1979).
5. Mr. R. Mugabe, co-leader of the Patriotic Front, President of ZANU, in an interview with the author.
6. Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Constitutional Conference. Cmdd 7802 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office), p. 36.
7. Cmd. 7802, p. 49.
8. The Herald, 23 February 1980. See also Appendix I for a more detailed breakdown of ceasefire violations.
9. See "The 1980 Election Simplified" (Salisbury, Ministry of Information) for a more detailed explanation of the voting systems.
10. See Appendix II for an example of this process.
11. See Appendix III for the full results in the 6 contested constituencies.
12. The Sunday Mail, 17 February 1980.
13. The Herald, 9 February 1980.
14. See Appendix IV for a full list of the black parties and their leaders.
15. All quotations in this section are from the party manifestos unless stated.
16. The Guardian, 6 October 1979, and The Anti-Apartheid Movement, op.cit.
17. The UANC refused to disclose the sources of its finance, but the Anglo-American Corporation is known to have donated US\$ 5m. The OAU claimed that Muzorewa and 'other elements' had received US\$ 55m from South African and Western business interests.
18. The Herald, 20 February 1980.
19. See 'Interim Report by Sir John Boynton, MC, British Election Commissioner', (Salisbury, 2 March 1980).
20. See Appendix V for a detailed comparison of voting figures.
21. The Herald, 23 February 1980.

22. See the Commonwealth Observer Group's interim report (Salisbury, 2 March 1980).
23. The Sunday Mail, 6 April 1980.
24. The Herald, 4 February 1980.
25. The Herald, 13 March 1980.
26. Cmd 7802, p. 37.
27. The Herald, 9 April 1980.
28. Survey conducted by Registered Observers with the Canadian Non-Government Observer Team, 25 February 1980.
29. All election statistics quoted are from the results published by the Registrar-General of Elections on 4 March 1980.
30. See Appendix VI for a breakdown of votes cast and seats won by electoral district.
31. The Guardian, 26 April 1979.
32. See Appendix VII for a full list of cabinet members.
33. The Herald, 26 March 1980.
34. See Hennie Serfontein's account in The Sunday Tribune, 9 March 1980.