

FROM AID EFFECTIVENESS TO POVERTY REDUCTION

Is foreign donor support to SADC improving?

Elling N. Tjønneland



FOPRISA Research for Regional
Integration and Development

REPORT 4

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Published by LIGHTBOOKS

a division of

LENTSWE LA LESEDI (PTY) LTD

PO Box 2365, Gaborone, Botswana.

Tel: 3903994, Fax: 3914017, E-mail: publisher@lightbooks.net

on behalf of Botswana Institute of Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA), Private Bag BR29
Gaborone, Botswana. www.bidpa.bw

First published 2008

This study was commissioned by the Botswana Institute of Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA) and is published as a report from the FOPRISA research programme on regional integration in southern Africa, www.foprisa.net.

ISBN 978-99912-71-40-8

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Typesetting and design by LENTSWE LA LESEDI (PTY) LTD

Printed by Printing and Publishing Botswana (Pty) Ltd

CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>	<i>v</i>
<i>Abbreviations</i>	<i>vii</i>
Executive Summary	1
The Windhoek Declaration	1
Achievements	1
New partners	2
Conclusion	3
Background: Aid Delivery, Resource Mobilisation and Declarations	5
Aid delivery and resource mobilisation	5
The Action: What is Happening?	11
The Action Plan	11
Thematic groups	12
Strengthening capacities	14
What are donor agencies funding?	16
New Opportunities or New Challenges for SADC? – The Rise of New Partners	19
Conclusion	25
<i>Notes</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Annex 1: The Windhoek Declaration</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Annex 2: An Overview of Regional Support</i>	<i>39</i>

PREFACE

In March 2006 FOPRISA published a first report on the evolving relations between SADC and its international cooperating partners. That report was published ahead of the April 2006 consultative conference between SADC and its foreign donors. This conference adopted the Windhoek Declaration which provided a framework for improving delivery of external assistance to SADC. The Windhoek Declaration was closely modelled on the Paris Declaration – a global platform for improving aid effectiveness.

This second report is published ahead of the April 2008 consultative conference in Mauritius which focuses on poverty and development. The report reviews both the status of the Windhoek Declaration and progress in its implementation. The first chapter provides background, and presents the Declaration and what it seeks to achieve. The second and main chapter looks at progress and achievements, including a review of what foreign donor agencies are funding. Finally, the report looks at the role of emerging donors and South-South cooperation and the implications for SADC, regional cooperation and aid effectiveness.

Data for this report has been collected through several meetings and interviews in 2007 with officials in the SADC Secretariat and with embassies and resident missions of donor agencies (mainly located in Pretoria and Gaborone). In addition the report has benefited from data collection related to several studies carried out by the author in 2007, *viz.*: *Aid Effectiveness: Trends and Impacts of Changing Policies and Shifting Financial Flows to Civil Society Organisations in Southern Africa* (with Nobi Dube, commissioned by the Southern Africa Trust, March 2007); a mid-term review of the Swiss southern Africa programme (with Chris Albertyn, unpublished September 2007) and a report commissioned by the Scandinavian and Dutch donor agencies evaluating donor management of aid transformation in South Africa (with Pundy Pillay, forthcoming 2008).

The report has benefited from a presentation of an early draft at FOPRISA's annual conference in Durban in November 2007. Parts of the study were also presented at a workshop in Thswane on *SADC – Achievements and Challenges in the Pursuit of Human Security in the Region*, hosted by the Institute for Security Studies in December 2007.

The author would like to take this opportunity to thank the numerous officials in the SADC Secretariat, officials at the resident missions of several donor agencies, the many resource persons interviewed, and to BIDPA and the FOPRISA Secretariat for assistance provided. They have all given graciously of their valuable time to provide information, analysis, interpretations and explanations. Their views were crucial in helping the author to formulate assessments and views.

Needless to say, the flaws and omissions are entirely mine. I am also responsible for the assessments, views and recommendations expressed in this report.

Bergen, February 2008

ABBREVIATIONS

ACBF	African Capacity Building Foundation
ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ADB	African Development Bank
AMEST	African Monitoring for Environment for Sustainable Development
APF	Africa Partnership Forum
ARF	African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund
AU	African Union
BCC	Benguela Current Commission
BENEFIT	Benguela Environment Fisheries Interaction and Training Programme
BIDPA	Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
CCR	Centre for Conflict Resolution
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CMI	Chr. Michelsen Institute
DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DFID	Department for International Development, UK
DFRC	SADC Development Finance Resource Centre
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
€	Euro
EC	European Commission
ECOFAC	Central African Forestry Management Programme
EISA	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
EU	European Union
FANR	Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources directorate, SADC
FANRPAD	Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FFEM	Fonds Français pour l'Environnement Mondial
FOPRISA	Formative Process Research on Regional Integration in Southern Africa
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
ICART	Implementation and Co-ordination of Agricultural Research and Training Programme
ICPs	International Cooperating Partners
IBSA	India Brazil South Africa
IDASA	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
INFOSA	FAO Infopeche Unit for Southern African countries
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
I&S	SADC Infrastructure and Services directorate
IRD	Institute de Recherché pour le Développement
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
IUCN	World Conservation Union
IWMI	International Water Management Institute

JTF	Joint Task Force
KfW	KfW Entwicklungsbank
£	Pound
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MEFMI	Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute of Eastern and Southern Africa
MiET	Media in Education Trust
MISA	Media Institute of Southern Africa
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NEPRU	Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NOK	Norwegian Kroner
NSJ	NSJ Southern African Media Training Trust
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ORGAN	SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation
OSISA	Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa
PROBEC	Programme for Basic Energy and Conservation in Southern Africa
PSG	Project Support Group
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
REPSSI	Regional Psycho-social Support to Orphaned and Vulnerable Children
RERA	Regional Electricity Regulator
RISDP	SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RPTC	SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCA	SADC Accreditation
SADCC	Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SADC PF	SADC Parliamentary Forum
SADPA	South African Development Partnership Fund
SADRN	Southern Africa Development Research Network
SADSEM	Southern African Defence and Security Management Network
SAHRIT	Southern African Human Rights Trust
SAPP	Southern African Power Pool
SARCAN	Southern African Regional Climate Action Network
SARDC	Southern African Research and Documentation Centre
SARPN	Southern African Regional Poverty Network
SAT	Southern Africa Trust
SDI	Spatial Development Initiative
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SHD	SADC Social and Human Development and Special Programmes directorate
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SIPO	SADC Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
SMME	Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises
SNC	SADC National Committee

SQUAM	Standards, Quality, Assurance, Accreditation and Metrology
TIFI	SADC Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment directorate
TIPS	Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies
TRALAC	Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
US	United States of America
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USD	US Dollar
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report was commissioned by the Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis under the auspices of its research programme for regional integration and development (FOPRISA). The report seeks to present and analyse progress and achievements in implementing the Windhoek Declaration on a new partnership between SADC and its international cooperating partners. The Declaration was adopted at the consultative conference between SADC and its foreign partners in Windhoek in April 2006. This report is published ahead of the next consultative meeting between SADC and donor agencies – SADC's international conference on poverty and development in Mauritius in April 2008.

The Windhoek Declaration

The Windhoek Declaration is closely modelled on the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. It is structured around the five Paris principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, management for results, and mutual accountability.

Donor agencies and partners are making progress in implementing the Paris Declaration, but they are lagging substantially behind the implementation targets. It has also become more challenging because of the proliferation of aid instruments and fragmentation of support provided.

In southern Africa both SADC and the donor agencies have committed themselves to making development assistance more effective. This includes stronger ownership by SADC, and more efforts by donors to harmonise and deliver aid in accordance with SADC priorities. Structures are also to be established at different levels to facilitate communication and dialogue.

However, the principles underlying the Declaration are largely derived from official development aid to country-level developments. The Declaration is weak on the implications for regional support and the commitments required to ensure alignment between SADC regional development objectives and national development efforts, and between the regional and country-level support provided by donor agencies.

Achievements

An action plan for the implementation of the Windhoek Declaration is currently being developed. It contains a list of activities for each of the five Paris principles. A total of 10 objectives, 16 outcomes and 15 activities are listed in the most recent draft. Time frames and indicators are provided for most.

The draft action plan is an important step forward, but it is kept at a general level. It is strong on intended outcomes, but still too weak on identifying activities that may help achieve those outcomes. This applies to the operationalisation of commitments by SADC as well as by donors.

This report identifies the establishment of the thematic groups as possibly the most important achievement since Windhoek. These groups are envisaged as the key drivers for achieving greater aid effectiveness. Thematic groups will be established in SADC's priority areas. Each thematic group will have one lead donor agency which will assist the relevant directorate in the Secretariat in facilitating donor harmonisation, resource mobilisation and capacity building.

and in implementation. Agreement has been reached on the establishment of nine such groups of which eight have been established.

The most advanced thematic group is the one focusing on HIV/AIDS. Here all donors have agreed with SADC on a common work plan, and some of the donors have also decided to pool their resources in a basket fund. Progress in the other groups is much more limited so far. A particular challenge is facing the thematic group dealing with support to capacity building at the Secretariat and SADC institutions. There is an urgent need for improving external support in this area.

The report attempts to identify the main components and features of the regional support provided by foreign donor agencies. Regional support is provided directly to the Secretariat, to SADC subsidiary organisations and implementing agencies, as well as to other regional public and private institutions, to national institutions with regional programmes, and to projects involving two or more SADC countries.

Most external funding is provided directly to subsidiary organisations and implementing agencies. Few donors provide direct support to the SADC Secretariat. An increasing share of donor funding for regional programmes is provided through pan-African initiatives and institutions. It is also noted that nearly all donor agencies provide significant funding to a range of private institutions and NGOs. This is especially evident in the politics, defence and security areas.

New partners

There are a number of important external developments that may have an impact upon SADC, and on how foreign donors implement the Windhoek Declaration. The report identifies and examines implications of changing donor approaches to the role of South Africa, and to the emerging role of China, India and Brazil in Africa.

Several of SADC's main cooperating partners are emphasising the importance of working with South Africa as the regional economic and political power in southern Africa and beyond. This has more recently also led to efforts to work with South Africa in aid-funded development projects in a third country (trilateralism). This has not yet led to many projects. In the SADC region trilateralism is most strongly evident with donor-funding for a number of projects implemented by South Africa in the DRC, and also in the use of training facilities in South Africa. Several donor agencies are preparing to increase funding for such initiatives with South Africa. These efforts have gained momentum with the emerging initiatives from South Africa to establish a development aid mechanism for support to Africa.

The EU, a major financial supporter of SADC, has for a long time made portions (up to 10%) of its aid programme with South Africa available for regional purposes and activities in third countries. The UK development agency DFID has in its new regional strategy strongly emphasised the importance of South Africa as a strategic partner in southern Africa. Most recently, the Nordic countries have prepared a draft Declaration of Intent for a partnership with South Africa in Africa. The draft Declaration emphasises the importance of the principles outlined in the Windhoek Declaration, and the ownership by the third country in any such trilateral engagement.

This report emphasises that the rapidly expanding engagement by China, India, Brazil and other Asian and South American countries in (Southern) Africa opens up new opportunities and new challenges for development and regional cooperation. The importance of these

new international partners is not primarily as providers of development assistance but more as providers of development support and political and economic cooperation. There are also important differences between them with only India giving priority to engaging directly with SADC.

Conclusion

The Windhoek Declaration is an important platform for improved cooperation between SADC and their international cooperation partners. It is too early to pass any judgment on the outcome of this Declaration, but the report concludes that a strong potential for better cooperation has been created.

Five challenges are singled out as being particularly important in making the Windhoek Declaration an effective instrument in regional cooperation. One is to ensure that SADC has ownership of donor-funded initiatives. We may have a situation where donor agencies move towards strong alignment, but where SADC ownership remains weak.

Secondly, the strengthening of thematic groups may lead to fragmentation if the capacities of the Secretariat and the directorates are not strengthened.

Thirdly, it is important that SADC engages with the new partners in the South and involves them in the further implementation of the Windhoek Declaration.

Fourthly, the report emphasises that only SADC member states can provide SADC with the support, resources and authority required to take the regional integration agenda forward. The Windhoek Declaration is only an instrument to assist this process.

Finally, this report notes the need for better alignment between national and regional efforts to reduce poverty. This applies to donor agencies as well as to SADC and its member states.

BACKGROUND: AID DELIVERY, RESOURCE MOBILISATION AND DECLARATIONS

In Windhoek in April 2006 the Consultative Conference between SADC and their International Co-operating Partners (ICPs) adopted the *Windhoek Declaration on a new SADC–ICP Partnership*. The Declaration was intended to provide a framework for improved external assistance to SADC and regional cooperation and integration in southern Africa. The Declaration is attached as Annex 1 to this report.

Aid delivery and resource mobilisation

The Windhoek Declaration is closely modelled on the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* adopted in 2005.¹ The Paris Declaration was signed by donor countries, multilateral aid agencies, recipient countries and a few international NGOs. It is the latest and most advanced expression of recent global efforts to improve delivery and effectiveness of aid.

Development aid has a history of being delivered in the context of patronage and dependency, with too many conditions attached. It has often been provided in a manner that is unpredictable, packaged in geo-strategic terms, poorly coordinated and tied to the procurement of goods and services in donor countries. Recent efforts to address these issues have increasingly revolved around operationalising the ideas of alignment, harmonisation and ownership. *Alignment* basically means that donors are expected to base their overall support on partner countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures. Furthermore, donors should work together in this process to be collectively more effective and less burdensome on recipients (*harmonisation*), e.g., by establishing common arrangements at country level for planning, funding and implementing development programmes. This will help, it is assumed, to ensure improved *ownership* by developing countries – they should exercise effective leadership over their development policies, strategies and coordinate development efforts. *Mutual accountability* goes to the heart of these challenges. Recipients are highly accountable to donors, but donors are seldom accountable to recipients.

The Paris Declaration elaborated upon these principles and outlined some 50 specific commitments to improve the delivery of aid. For the first time it was agreed to measure progress with a set of indicators and targets. The Paris Declaration has emerged as a practical blueprint for many traditional donor agencies seeking to deliver aid in a spirit of mutual accountability.

There has also been a noticeable improvement in the actual delivery of development aid to many countries, especially related to the harmonisation objective. This is perhaps most evident in countries receiving support for the state budgets and sector-wide programmes. Here we have seen a growing tendency for many (but far from all) bilateral and multilateral donors to pool their resources and reduce transaction costs for donors and recipients. However, available data suggest that many countries are lagging substantially behind their progress in improving aid effectiveness measured against the agreed 56 specific actions, from which 12 indicators were established and targets set for 2010. Or to quote from the findings of the OECD survey, “in half of the developing countries signing on to the Paris Declaration, partners and donors have a long road ahead to meet the commitments they have undertaken.”²

Parallel to the harmonisation efforts there is also an expanding *proliferation* of aid agencies and instruments. There has been a dramatic increase in the number of organisations and

instruments providing aid to recipient countries. The number of international organisations, funds and programmes providing aid, and listed by the OECD Development Assistance Committee, are now exceeding 220. To this could be added the large number of multi-bilateral programmes where bilateral donors channel funding through multilateral agencies but earmark them for specific purposes. This growing complexity of the aid architecture is also combined with a *fragmentation* of official development assistance: the growth in the number of donor-funded activities, the financial size of aid commitment, and the dispersion of small-scale technical assistance.³ This can be damaging to the effectiveness of the development aid.

Parallel to the effectiveness debate, the other key issue has been mobilisation of resources and development finance. The *Millennium Summit* in 2000 sought to lay the foundations for renewed global efforts to reduce poverty. At the subsequent 2002 *International Conference on Financing for Development* (Monterrey) world leaders agreed to make aid one of the central pillars of a global development partnership geared towards the reduction of poverty. This was followed by commitments, first in 2002 and reinforced in 2005, by the major donor countries (the G8 and the European Union) to increase official development assistance. By 2010 development aid should have increased by USD 50 billion compared to the level in 2004. Of this amount USD 25 billion would be for Africa.

The donor countries are providing more development aid than a few years ago, but they are not on track to reach the 2010 targets. Aid flows actually decreased by 4.5% from 2005 to 2006. Aid to Africa is increasing, but it is increasing far less than suggested by the 2002 and 2005 pledges. The aid volume to the continent increased by around 27% from 2005 to 2006, but most of this increase is accounted for by exceptionally high debt relief operations. Most of the debt relief is accounted for by Nigeria followed by DRC. Excluding debt relief aid to Africa increased by around 13% from 2005 to 2006 (statistics for 2007 are not yet available). Debt relief is important, but it does not involve genuine transfer of new resources into the economies of African countries.

How are these pledges reflected in southern Africa and in the actual aid flows to SADC's 14 members? Table 1 below reproduces the OECD-recorded figures for all official development assistance provided to the 14 SADC countries in the 2000–2006 period.

The table suggests annual fluctuations but there is a general increase in aid which began in 2002. However, when debt relief operations are excluded the table reveals that aid to the region has remained remarkably constant throughout the period, with no significant changes following the pledges made from 2002 on. Of the USD 64 billion provided in Official Development Assistance (ODA) to these countries in the period about USD 15 billion was for debt relief. Of this amount more than half – nearly USD 8 billion – was for DR Congo (and the rest mainly for Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia).

The Windhoek Declaration – what does it say?

The Paris Declaration is organised around five key principles, and the Windhoek Declaration – attached as Annex 1 to this report – is structured around the same principles. They are:

- *Ownership* – SADC should exercise effective leadership, including coordination of development efforts. Donors are responsible for supporting this and to help strengthen the implementation capacity. The principle objective is to ensure that SADC exercises effective leadership in coordinating and implementing its programme of action;
- *Alignment* – The principle objective is to ensure that donor agencies base their overall

support on SADC's strategies and policies as expressed through SIPO and the RISDP;

- *Harmonisation* – donors must aim to be more harmonised, collectively effective, and less burdensome; and to establish common arrangements for planning, funding and implementing development programmes;
- *Management for results* – both donors and SADC should improve decision-making for improving results, and donors should support efforts by SADC to improve performance assessment and measurement of progress. This includes commitments to link regional and national development strategies, and – for donor agencies – to link regional programming to bilateral country programming; and
- *Mutual accountability* – Donors and SADC pledge that they will hold each other mutually accountable for development results based on the above principles.

Under each of these principles the Windhoek Declaration lists a number of commitments which SADC as well as the donors have to address. Under the *ownership* principle SADC commits itself to develop, implement and monitor the regional development agenda as expressed through protocols and regional agreements, and to translate RISDP and SIPO into results-oriented operational programmes expressed in annual budgets. The donor agencies commit themselves to respect SADC leadership and to help strengthen SADC's capacity to exercise it at regional and national levels.

A number of commitments are specified under the *alignment* principle. Essentially they revolve around SADC commitments to develop systems and management structures for reliable

Table 1: Total Official Development Assistance to SADC member countries, 2000–2006 (Constant prices, 2005 USD million)

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Country							
Angola	408,79	396,32	528,17	548,94	1174,80	436,87	165,42
Botswana	40,51	39,04	44,55	30,56	48,42	47,64	63,17
Congo, Dem. Rep.	246,78	344,00	1517,21	6052,82	1860,78	1827,25	1998,29
Lesotho	52,92	78,06	99,15	89,52	97,87	68,62	70,10
Madagascar	414,71	503,5	475,10	604,78	1273,78	913,98	738,23
Malawi	579,14	550,57	484,00	580,22	514,61	577,57	649,27
Mauritius	28,54	29,66	32,55	-16,96	33,03	34,22	18,44
Mozambique	1207,30	1308,29	2954,44	1170,72	1268,10	1276,56	1572,93
Namibia	213,90	155,62	179,09	163,70	177,50	115,10	141,13
South Africa	662,94	594,80	667,72	725,72	642,06	679,95	699,25
Swaziland	15,58	40,21	28,49	38,34	22,23	46,31	34,63
Tanzania	1315,78	1699,92	1639,42	1928,28	1790,77	1480,95	1775,31
Zambia	1067,90	481,21	831,19	667,85	1151,98	934,96	1387,98
Zimbabwe	220,88	221,42	251,39	211,53	191,46	375,97	271,63
Total	6475,67	6442,62	9732,47	12796,02	10247,39	8815,95	9585,78
Total, excluding debt	5894,63	5498,27	7609,62	6917,87	7693,56	7652,82	7767,30

Source: Extracted from OECD's statistical data base on ODA

assessments of performance, transparency and accountability. This includes strengthening of financial management capacity, improved procurement systems and a strong emphasis on building capacity at all levels of the organisation. The donors commit themselves to support SADC in these efforts, and to use SADC systems and procedures to the maximum extent possible. This includes aligning their analytical, financial and technical support with SADC's capacity development objectives and strategies; to make effective use of existing capacities; and to harmonise support accordingly. The donors shall also provide reliable indicative commitments of aid over a multi-year framework and disburse aid in a timely and predictable fashion. They shall also continue to untie aid.

Under *harmonisation* the donor agencies are making several commitments to implement arrangements and simplify procedures. This includes: implementing, where feasible, common arrangements for planning, funding, disbursement, monitoring, evaluation and reporting to SADC on donor activities and aid flows; working together through conducting joint missions, sharing of analytical work and information; and making full use of their respective comparative advantage at sector or regional level by delegating, where appropriate, authority to a lead donor agency for execution of programmes, activities and tasks, and generally working together to harmonise procedures. SADC commits itself to providing clear guidance in these matters, taking into account the donor agencies' comparative advantage in the areas of cooperation.

The *management for result* principle also includes several commitments. Most importantly SADC commits itself to establishing a results-oriented reporting and assessments framework that enables a better monitoring of progress and achievements. The donors shall harmonise their monitoring and reporting requirements with SADC to the maximum extent possible on joint formats for periodic reporting – until they can rely more extensively on SADC's statistical, monitoring and evaluation systems.

The final principle – *mutual accountability* – specifies that SADC and the donors shall jointly assess their efforts to improve aid effectiveness. The donor agencies shall provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable the SADC Secretariat to present comprehensive budget reports to Member States.

Finally, the Declaration also outlines the structure for dialogue between SADC and the donors. This will take place both at the political, policy and technical level. At the highest level there is the Ministerial/Consultative Conference. Previously the Consultative Conference was an annual or biannual event, but since 2000 this body has only met twice – in Gaborone in 2002 and in Windhoek in 2006. It is envisaged that it now will meet every two years with the next meeting scheduled for Mauritius in April 2008.

A SADC-ICP Joint Task Force (JTF) will operate as the link between top-level political decision-makers and the groups on the ground. It will consist of a wider group of ICPs and SADC representatives, and will be co-chaired by the EC Delegation in Gaborone and the SADC Secretariat. The Core Group will manage and coordinate the day-to-day operations of the JTF. It is expected to meet on a monthly basis and will also be co-chaired by the EC Delegation in Gaborone, and the SADC Secretariat. It is composed of representatives of the SADC Secretariat and donor agencies based in Gaborone but will also be open for the participation of other members of the JTF. The Declaration also indicates the establishment of thematic groups in SADC's priority areas.

The principles underlying the Declaration are largely derived from official development aid to country-level developments. The Declaration is weak on the implications for regional support and the commitments required to ensure alignment between SADC regional development

objectives and national development efforts, and between the regional and country-level support provided by donor agencies.

The Windhoek Declaration, like its Paris model, is essentially about the technical delivery of aid and preconditions both at the donor and recipient side which must be in place for this delivery to take place as intended. This will increase the effectiveness of aid, and thereby, it is assumed, also lead to improved development and poverty reduction.

How much has been achieved as we approach the April 2008 Consultative Conference between SADC and its international cooperating partners?

THE ACTION: WHAT IS HAPPENING?

Are we witnessing improvement? Is a new partnership between SADC and foreign donor agencies emerging? Are donors harmonising their support and aligning their assistance with SADC priorities? Is SADC exercising leadership in the partnership? It is easy to conclude that not much has changed since April 2006. This, however, would be an incorrect conclusion. It overlooks a number of important and promising initiatives by both SADC and the donors which have both the potential to strengthen SADC and improve the delivery of aid.

In the following sections we shall examine crucial dimensions of the emerging new relationship focusing, in particular, on the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Windhoek Declaration, and new thematic groups, including support for capacity-building at the SADC Secretariat.

The Action Plan

Following the Windhoek Consultative Conference a working group composed of representatives from a few ICPs and the SADC Secretariat was established to develop an Action Plan for the implementation of the Windhoek Declaration. It is essentially intended to be an implementation matrix operationalising the Windhoek Declaration. It contains a list of activities with time frames and indicators. The last draft is from November 2007.⁴

The matrix is organised around the five principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. A total of 10 objectives, 16 outcomes and 15 activities are listed in the current draft. Time frames and indicators are provided for most (but not all) of the activities identified.

The current draft is an important step forward, but it is still kept at a general level and needs further elaboration and specification of activities, indicators and timeframes. The matrix is generally strong in listing intended outcomes but weak in identifying activities that may help achieve those outcomes. This has also led to a situation where timeframes have been revised in every draft prepared. The establishment of thematic groups, the one activity listed to help ensure that SADC can lead and coordinate development assistance, on the other hand, is progressing well (see more on the thematic groups below).

These shortcomings also apply to activities to be implemented by the donor agencies. The matrix is kept at too general a level or remains silent on key issues and activities that need to be implemented. One outcome mentioned is that "ICPs shall link their regional programming to bilateral country programming" but there is no listing of activities, timeframes or indicators, or reflections on how this ambitious goal can be achieved.

Many of these shortcomings will be addressed in subsequent versions of a *de facto* rolling plan. The challenges will revolve around developing an implementation framework with detailed activities and realistic time frames for implementation.

We will now turn to the establishment and role of thematic coordination groups. These groups are emerging as the key arena for SADC's interaction with foreign donor agencies. The launch of these groups has been the most important outcome of the Windhoek conference.

Thematic groups

Thematic coordination groups are envisaged as the key drivers for achieving greater aid effectiveness. Since April 2006 SADC and the main donor agencies have reached agreement on the establishment of such groups, their objectives and functions, and the role of the Secretariat and the lead donor agencies.

The thematic groups shall evolve in a flexible manner, but the basic intention is that such groups should be established in SADC's core intervention areas as they emerge from the RISDP and SIPO, and the priorities and work plans of the Secretariat's directorates.⁵ The purpose of thematic groups is essentially to facilitate harmonisation of donor support, resource mobilisation, and strengthening SADC's capacity in this area. Each thematic group will have one lead donor agency. This lead agency is to facilitate coordination of donors involved or interested in a thematic area, and to advise SADC on comparative advantages and individual priorities of support. This will also include help in identifying, facilitating and mobilising support for priority programmes, projects and implementation mechanisms, and to strengthen SADC's capacity in this thematic area.

The current status (end 2007) of the thematic groups is provided in Table 2.

Table 2: Status of the thematic groups

Directorate	Thematic Group	Lead donor	Status
Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (TIFI)	TIFI	EC Delegation (Gaborone)	Established, first meeting in December 2006, last meeting June 2007
Infrastructure and Services (I&S)	Water	GTZ (Gaborone)	Established. Last meeting October 2006
	Transport	DFID (Pretoria)	Established in January 2007, last meeting in September 2007
	Energy	Norway (Maputo)	Established in January 2007, last meeting in November 2007
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR)	Agriculture and Food Security	DFID (Pretoria)	Established, first meeting in February 2007, last meeting in October 2007
	Natural Resources and Environment	FAO (Harare)	Established, first meeting in February 2007, last meeting in October 2007
Social and Human Development and Special Programmes (SHD)	HIV/AIDS	Sweden (Lusaka)	Established and operational
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security	Focus to be defined	The Netherlands (Pretoria)	To be established
Cross cutting	Institutional capacity building	SADC/ICP Core Group (Gaborone)	Operational as the core group

Source: Memo from the SADC Secretariat prepared for the meeting in the core group in November 2007, and personal communication.

It is not yet possible to draw any firm conclusions about these emerging thematic groups. Most have only had one meeting in addition to the launch. Only two groups can be classified as operational at this stage (end 2007). The thematic group in HIV/AIDS is most advanced. The donors providing support to SADC in this area (SIDA/Sweden, Netherlands, Irish Aid, DFID, GTZ, USAID, EU, ADB and UNAIDS) have all joined the thematic group and agreed on a common

work plan (Japan is not a member of the group, but has reallocated an unspent contribution to SADC). Six of the agencies (Sweden, Netherlands, Irish Aid, DFID, UNAIDS and GTZ) have also agreed on a pool or basket funding – the Joint Financing and Technical Cooperation Agreement. However, the agencies that do not channel their fund through the basket do target their funding to activities to be implemented under the joint work plan.⁶

The members of the HIV/AIDS thematic group have also provided significant funding for the employment of a number of (regionally recruited) technical advisors. The staff complement of the HIV/AIDS unit is now 10 (plus two support staff) of whom two are funded by SADC and eight by donor agencies. Interestingly one of the eight is funded by a South African-based regional NGO, the *Regional Psychosocial Support Initiative* (REPSSI). This Swedish/Swiss-supported NGO provides funding for one technical advisor dealing with psychosocial support to children. This advisor services both for the directorate in general as well as the HIV/AIDS unit.

UNAIDS played a key role in facilitating the establishment of this thematic group, while Sweden acts as a lead donor. Swedish SIDA (in cooperation with Norway) has a technical team on HIV/AIDS based at the Swedish Embassy in Lusaka which performs this task. This team also has a number of other tasks related to, *inter alia*, technical assistance and management of Swedish and Norwegian support to HIV/AIDS programmes and projects.

The thematic group for water is also operational. This group has a long history – it was established as the water reference group when SADC's Maseru-based sector coordinating unit was in existence and coordinated by UNDP.⁷ Now GTZ in Gaborone has been elected as the lead donor for the new thematic group. GTZ works closely with the water division in the SADC Secretariat's Infrastructure and Services directorate. Many donor agencies are active in this sector, including the EU, ADB and the World Bank, several UN agencies and a number of bilateral donor agencies, including the Nordics, Switzerland, USAID, and France. The group has (by end-2007) formally met twice and there is good progress in developing a common approach and work plan based on SADC's water policy and activity plan (which currently lists 20 priority projects). However, this thematic group has found it difficult – despite strong political commitments in several agencies – to establish facilities for basket funding. The practical hurdles and transactions costs have so far proved to be too high. A major obstacle to progress has also been the limited staff capacity of SADC's water division which has made it very difficult to pursue and implement the work plan. Strengthening of the water division will have to be central to any support strategy from donor agencies.

Other thematic groups are not yet fully operational. In many groups the current efforts are focused on further developing and operationalising work plans based on business plans and project lists presented by the directorates at the Windhoek conference. Most activities are in the infrastructure area. Energy, in particular, may emerge as a challenging area with strong interests both from public and private actors. Norway will manage its lead functions out of its Embassy in Maputo. Norway is so far the only lead donor to recruit new staff for this coordinating function (other lead donors have so far added this task to the work of existing staff).

SIPO and SADC's work in the governance and security areas have attracted strong interest from donor agencies, but SADC's capacity to receive and absorb donor funds in these areas, have been particular difficult. There has been reluctance from SADC in involving foreign donor agencies too much in this area. Much of SADC's activities here have also been funded directly by member states (such as the preparation for the establishment of a SADC standby force). One donor agency (GTZ) is currently providing financial support to the Organ directorate (funding of two positions in addition to some project expenses, mainly related to election management,

and observation). UNDP have also in the past provided some project support. Donor agencies have been awaiting the development of a work plan from SADC with priorities for the Organ and how they would like the donor agencies to contribute. Moves were made in late 2007 to set up a thematic group in this area. In November SADC and donor agencies decided to invite the Netherlands (through its embassy in Pretoria) to be the lead agency for a thematic working group. The group may be launched in the first half of 2008.

Donor agencies have provided substantial financial support to a large number of activities and projects in the governance, peace and security areas outside SADC structures. In particular, funding has been provided to a range of national (mainly South African) and international NGOs active in this sector. This has helped facilitate the emergence of a few particularly well-resourced NGOs and research based institutions in the region. This support has partly been justified by the importance of strengthening civil society, but also because donor agencies, in responding to SADC's limited ability to absorb, have turned to NGOs as project implementers.⁸

Donor agencies providing regional support in the governance and security areas have also established informal forums where most of them meet and exchange information. In the governance area USAID's regional office invited all donor agencies active here to a meeting in Gaborone in late 2005. This group has met twice a year since then. In the peace and security area UK's regional conflict advisor based in Pretoria has invited all aid agencies to an informally constituted forum. They have since late 2006 met frequently (initially every six weeks) in Pretoria.

Strengthening capacities

A major challenge and a key objective in the Windhoek Declaration is the institutional strengthening of SADC. It was agreed not to establish a special thematic group between SADC and donors providing support in this area. Instead the intention was that the core group, comprising representatives from the SADC Secretariat and donor agencies based in Gaborone, should act as the thematic group for the cross-cutting area of institutional capacity building. The main donor agencies providing support in this area are the European Commission, Germany through GTZ, and to a lesser extent the World Bank.

Three important studies dealing with SADC's capacity needs became available in 2007.⁹ This was an Institutional Assessment financed by the European Commission, a Capacity Needs Assessment (covering both the Secretariat and the National Committees) financed by the GTZ and a Job Evaluation and Organisational Structure Analysis. The EC-commissioned study reviewed the structure and management of the SADC Secretariat and made a number of recommendations for further adjustment and restructuring. The main focus was on a series of steps to improve financial management, especially accounting, procurement, internal control and audit. This was considered necessary for SADC to be able to exercise ownership and financial control along the lines outlined in the Windhoek Declaration. The GTZ-sponsored study is much shorter (54 pages compared to a bulky 333 pages in the draft EC study) and covers a wider set of issues, but together these studies and the Job Evaluation report provide a good platform for assessing needs and devising actions to strengthen the capacity of both the Secretariat and other SADC structures.

In October 2007 the Secretariat prepared a summary report of these studies.¹⁰ This was intended as a first step towards developing a comprehensive framework for external support to capacity building. A smaller subgroup of the core group is expected to be set up to support SADC's efforts to develop this.

The EC Delegation – the main external provider of financial support to the institutional strengthening of SADC – has developed a proposal to provide 12.5 million Euro in capacity building support to be funded from the 9th European Development Fund.¹¹ Six main intervention areas are identified. They are:

- improvement of the Secretariat's mechanism and procedures for accounting, procurement, internal control and external audit (1.51 million Euro);
- support both to the Secretariat and member states for the integration of the regional agenda into national policies (3.875 million Euro);
- support to increase SADC's capacity for administering SADC-ICP cooperation (3.19 million Euro);
- support for increased involvement of non-state actors in regional integration (1.07 million Euro);
- strengthening the Secretariat's capacity for collecting and disseminating regional statistics (1.33 million Euro); and
- mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues in SADC Secretariat activities (0.95 million Euro).

In addition the EU has a technical cooperation facility with funds available for technical assistance (see Annex 2).

Germany, through GTZ, is another major donor active in providing capacity building support. It is mainly channelled through a 2002–2010 governance and reform programme which involves long-term advisory services in the areas of strategic planning, RISDP monitoring, and short-term advisory services.¹² In addition GTZ also provides technical assistance and project funds related to the TIFI, I&S and Organ directorates. Through KfW Germany is also preparing to fund a SADC project preparation and development facility. The World Bank, which mainly provides IDA loans to major regional and cross-country projects in energy, communication and agriculture, is also making some grant resources available for capacity building in the SADC Secretariat.

The thematic group has not yet made much progress in harmonising donor support in this area. At this stage it appears mainly to operate as a forum for sharing information. The smaller subgroup mentioned above may help to develop a common framework.

A main challenge is also to ensure that the core group is able to facilitate good communication and information sharing between support channelled directly to the Secretariat and the evolving capacity support projects provided through the other thematic groups. A key challenge for this to succeed is also that SADC itself is able to take ownership, decide on priorities, provide directions and set a framework for external support to capacity building. This will be challenging, but important steps are being taken which may yield results. New efforts are being made by the Executive Secretary to ensure a stronger involvement by member states. Several steps are also being made to strengthen the technical capacity of the Secretariat and its directorates. In mid-2007 a number (19) of regionally recruited (and donor-funded) technical advisors were hired to help ease capacity constraints. The draft Action Plan mentions that a framework for capacity-building support shall be in place in the first quarter of 2008. A draft report was ready in October 2007 (see above).

What are donor agencies funding?

In the short time period since the adoption of the Windhoek Declaration not much has happened in terms of changing funding patterns and harmonisation. We do not have a full picture of what donors are doing and what they support. As part of the efforts to implement the Windhoek Declaration it has been decided to launch a dedicated website on SADC-ICP relations. Once operational this should be able to give us more data.¹³ One challenge is that for most donor agencies regional support covers many different programmes and interventions. They are also classified differently by the agencies. Regional support is provided directly to SADC and to SADC subsidiary institutions as well as to other public and private regional institutions, to national institutions with regional activities, and to project activities involving two or more SADC countries. Table 1 above, which is based on OECD statistics, only records support provided to countries. In the OECD statistics “regional support” is classified under individual countries or as “Africa unspecified”.

Annex 2 provides an overview of donor-supported regional activities classified according to areas covered by each of the thematic groups. The Annex is based on data collected by SADC and the EC Delegation in Gaborone, supplemented by this author’s own additional data collection. The Annex is not complete and is uneven. Some donor agencies have included regional support which other donors have opted not to include as regional support. It also includes projects which may be closing and there are new projects not included. In particular, it is uneven in presenting regional support provided outside SADC structures. The Annex should therefore be read carefully. Still, some clear trends are emerging and several observations can be made.

First, the Annex reveals that there are many donor countries and agencies providing regional support, but the dominant ones are the European Union, Germany, United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries and the US, together with the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

Secondly, most regional support provided is channelled outside the SADC Secretariat. Much is provided to SADC subsidiary organisations, or to other intergovernmental institutions, such as river basin commissions, the SADC Plant Genetic Resource Centre, the Southern Africa Power Pool, the SADC Development Finance Resource Centre, SADC Accreditation, or the SADC Parliamentary Forum. There is nothing inherently strange or surprising about this. The restructuring of SADC and its development approach is strongly anchored in the principle of subsidiarity with implementing capacity to be established at lower levels and with the Secretariat focusing on policy development, harmonisation and assistance to member countries and subsidiary organisations. There is still some way to go before SADC functions as intended. The thematic groups may have an important role to play in helping to ensure that donor support is aligned with overall SADC priorities, that SADC exercises sufficient leadership, and that the many small and big project activities do not lead to fragmentation.

A third observation is that few donor agencies provide direct support to the SADC Secretariat. The main external funder of the Secretariat is the European Union followed to a smaller extent by Germany through the GTZ.¹⁴ The World Bank also provides support but it has not yet reached the stage of implementation. Additional support for capacity building at the Secretariat may most likely be forthcoming through the thematic groups (which we have already seen in the HIV/AIDS group – see above). It will be important for the SADC/donor core group to provide both leadership and coordination to help ensure that such support does not pull the Secretariat in different directions.

Fourthly, there is also an emerging tendency to provide support to SADC (and other

regional economic communities) through the African Union/ NEPAD and other pan-African institutions. This trend is not captured in the Annex. The increasing donor focus on NEPAD and AU programmes has led to an emphasis on providing support for capacity building of implementing institutions at the subregional level. The European Commission, for example, is through its African Peace Facility with the AU, also providing capacity building for the regional economic communities. In 2007 an amount of 2.5 million Euro was made available for a three-year programme to strengthen SADC's capacity to plan and conduct peace support operations.¹⁵ Similarly, in the infrastructure area, substantial funding is being made available from the EU through the AU.¹⁶ The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, established in 2005 and bringing together the main multilateral and nine bilateral agencies, is another important vehicle for channelling aid to this sector.¹⁷

Fifthly, nearly all donor agencies provide significant funding to a range of private international, regional and national NGOs. They are supported as a way of strengthening the voice of civil society, but also in many instances as implementers of donor-funded regional initiatives. This may include international organisations such as the IUCN, WWF or Conservation International (implementing several regional environmental projects); regional NGOs such as the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa or the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre; or national NGOs with regional programmes such as the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (Zimbabwe) or the Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (South Africa).

Funding to or through NGOs have been particularly extensive in the areas falling under the politics, defence and security sector. Main regional partners for the donor agencies include;

- Media: Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), NSJ Training Centre;
- Anti-corruption: Southern African Human Rights Institute, Institute for Security Studies;
- Elections: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa; and
- Peacebuilding, Policing, Defence and Security: Institute for Security Studies, Southern African Defence and Security Management Network, Centre for Conflict Resolution, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, SaferAfrica and smaller projects with institutions like IDASA or the Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa

The main regional public institution receiving external support is the SADC Parliamentary Forum. Support was also provided in the past to the Harare-based SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (mainly from Denmark), but this has mostly faded away because of the political situation in Zimbabwe.

The support is also strong to NGOs in the trade and investment area, but there the support tends to supplement support provided to SADC institutions. The main NGOs supported are the Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (Stellenbosch, South Africa), Trade and Industry Policy Strategies (Pretoria), South African Institute of International Affairs (Johannesburg) and the Institute for Global Dialogue (Midrand, South Africa) as well as a number of more nationally-focused and advocacy-based NGOs in several other SADC countries.

Several donor agencies are also eager to support monitoring of SADC and regional integration through research-based NGOs and universities. The FOPRISA project implemented by the Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis in cooperation with several other institutions is one such example (it is also a project which combines research and monitoring with technical assistance and support to the SADC Secretariat). Another example is the annual

Yearbook in Regional Integration in Southern Africa which has been published for several years by the Trade Law Centre in Stellenbosch and Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit.

This donor support to NGOs takes us to a *sixth* observation. This support to or through NGOs is partly captured in the Annex, but the related donor support channelled from and through northern NGOs to civil society in southern Africa is generally not captured in the Annex or affected by aid harmonisation issues. Most of this support is channelled to national civil society actors, but there is also significant support provided to regional NGO networks, churches and trade unions.

Seventh, there is also a very interesting trend related to the role of philanthropic foundations and global special purpose vehicles such as the various funding facilities in the health sector. The role of these actors is not captured in the Annex – not are they involved in aid harmonisation efforts with SADC. The new global health initiatives have not directly engaged with SADC and regional initiatives but may very well become an emerging actor also here. Some of the philanthropic foundations are however, also active in the regional arena; but mainly as provider of finance for smaller, but sometimes strategic, initiatives implemented by NGOs and other private actors. Among the important players we find both some American foundations (such as Ford) and some of the German stiftungen (such as Friedrich Ebert). Two southern African foundations are also important; the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa and in particular the Southern Africa Trust. The Southern Africa Trust is funding a range of projects, including technical assistance to the SADC Secretariat, to strengthen poverty reduction and advance the role of civil society in poverty reduction.¹

A *final* note: Annex 2 – and the discussion in this report – is confined to the role of official development assistance. It does not discuss other dimensions of the foreign policies of donor countries and how this may impact on SADC's development efforts. Their foreign policies are not always coherent with what these countries are seeking to achieve through their regional aid programmes. Examples of this may be the trade policies and the European Union's efforts to establish Economic Partnership Agreements with countries in southern Africa. Other illustrations are defence and security policies with the United States's efforts to establish an African Command (AFRICOM) as a prime example. These issues may not necessarily be appropriate for discussion at the level of thematic groups, but they are issues which should be central in the political dialogue between SADC and their international cooperating partners.

More recently, the issue of climate change is emerging as a key priority area for many donor countries in their engagement with developing countries. This is likely to become a major issue in the political dialogue with SADC and SADC member countries. It is also expected to lead to a number of donor initiatives for regional projects to address these issues. It will be important for SADC also to engage the donor agencies on these issues, not just in political dialogue fora, but also at the level of the Joint Task Force, the core group and relevant thematic groups.

NEW OPPORTUNITIES OR NEW CHALLENGES FOR SADC? – THE RISE OF NEW PARTNERS

There are a number of external developments that are likely to have a major impact on SADC and the role of the foreign donor agencies in the implementation of the Windhoek Declaration. In this final section we shall examine the role of emerging powers in the South.

First, the report looks at recent trends in donor-relations with one of SADC's member states – South Africa. Donor countries are emphasising the importance of South Africa as a strategic partner and anchor country in Africa. How will that impact on regional support?

Secondly, the report looks at Brazil, India and especially China and their role as emerging new powers in Africa. How will that impact on SADC, and on donor approaches to regional support?

South Africa – regional power and trilateral cooperation

Several donor agencies are emphasising the importance of working closely with South Africa in southern Africa. There are some obvious reasons and a certain logic to this, but it also raises important questions and challenges. It is generally recognised that South Africa is an economic giant in the region in particular and on the continent in general. South Africa moreover drives African growth, with the country's growth rate showing an unusually strong correlation with growth in the rest of the continent. South Africa constitutes 40 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP – its nine largest cities alone account for close to 24 percent of Africa's GDP. Growth spillovers to the rest of the continent are exceptionally large by international standards: an additional percentage point of South African growth is associated with 0.5 to 0.75 percent GDP growth increases in the rest of Africa (not just neighbouring countries), independent of common regional shocks.¹⁹ This is larger than global average spillover effects.

Furthermore, South Africa is also an assertive political player in the region and beyond, and she has skills, institutions and resources in high demand in poorer neighbouring countries and on the continent. South Africa is strongly committed to SADC and regional cooperation in Africa and is active in mobilising international development finance for the continent. South Africa is also active in providing development support to a range of countries in the region. This is perhaps most strongly evident in the DRC where a range of South African government departments and agencies – under the auspices of the binational commission between the two countries – are working together with their counterpart institutions on a range of development projects.

South Africa is also at an early stage in defining and developing its own instruments for delivering aid to other developing countries. South Africa has a special fund for cooperation with African countries and regional institutions – the *African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund* (ARF) which is expected to be the core of a proposed new aid facility.²⁰ This fund was established through an Act of Parliament in 2000 as a mechanism to foster cooperation with other African countries, to promote good governance, prevent and resolve conflict, advance socio-economic development and integration, and to provide humanitarian assistance and human resource development. It is managed by the Department of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the National Treasury. At the ANC's national conference in December 2007 the resolution on international relations called for the establishment of a South African Development Partnership Fund (SADPA) and that the Fund should be located in the Department of Foreign Affairs, functioning as the ARF.²¹ The Government is expected to make a final decision on this matter in the course of 2008.

Western donor countries have increasingly come to regard South Africa as a strategic partner and as an anchor country in Africa in their foreign policy. This has also had implications for the aid strategies and policies. Several trends are emerging. One is that many donor agencies are increasing allocations – for some very significantly – to regional projects involving South Africa and South African resources.

This began already in the mid-1990s, but has gained more prominence in recent years. This is often part of the donor agencies' changing relations with South Africa. Several (but not all) donor countries are now reducing the volume of aid to South Africa in the light of South Africa's middle income status, strong macroeconomic base, and its considerable financial resources. Continued aid is justified by focusing on the "value-added" – i.e., what development cooperation can contribute to beyond finance. In addition agencies emphasise the need to work with South Africa in Africa. Some have incorporated and subsumed their South Africa programme into a bigger regional programme. In 2005 the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) ended its 10-year South Africa programme and replaced this with a 5-year, ZAR 250 million regional programme. This included a South Africa component which was gradually reduced in the period while a number of new regional projects with South African partners were launched.²² In 2006 DFID, a major donor to regional cooperation efforts, launched a new regional programme for southern Africa, turned its South Africa office into a regional office and incorporated a reduced bilateral programme with South Africa into this.

South Africa's biggest donor, the European Union, has prepared a joint country strategy paper with South Africa for the 2007–2013 period. This strategy paper together with the indicative budget indicates that the EU will provide up to 10% of its 1 billion aid programme in South Africa for regional and pan-African projects (a similar arrangement was also in place in the previous country strategy).²³ The EU is still to develop guidelines for the allocation of the regional funds in the South Africa programme. One may expect that it will be aligned with the EU's regional support to SADC as implemented by the Commission's mission in Gaborone, but we may also see a number of bottlenecks in the disbursement because of the different origins of the support programmes (the South Africa programme is allocated from the Commission's own budget while the SADC programme is coming from the European Development Fund). In the past the regional component in the South Africa programme was used to support, *inter alia*, South Africa's role as SADC's sector coordinating unit for finance (and the development of the finance and investment protocol), but also to NEPAD activities.

More recently some donor agencies have taken this one step further and introduced the notion of trilateral cooperation – the donor agency should not only seek to involve and make use of South African resources in the region and beyond, but also make South Africa a partner in supporting development in third countries and in strengthening pan-African and sub-regional organisations. DFID was probably the first donor agency to elaborate and formulate a strategy giving expression to such objectives. Its 2006 *Southern Africa Regional Plan* outlined the ambitions of working with South Africa as a strategic partner in advancing development in the sub-region.²⁴

The focus on trilateralism has become particularly evident in relation to peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction in individual countries. In the SADC region this trilateralism is mostly evident in relation to development efforts in the DRC. Many donor countries are supporting a range of activities implemented by South African government departments and agencies. Typically this has involved financial support for South African institutions to assist counterpart institutions in third countries in carrying out tasks – from organising elections, to

restructuring the public service and strengthening the capacity of the police force.

The current extent of trilateral cooperation between South Africa and donor agencies is however, limited. With few exceptions it is mostly *ad hoc* with limited long-term contributions. It is also limited in regional projects, but the interest in exploring possibilities is gaining momentum, e.g., by channelling funds for regional infrastructure development through institutions like the Development Bank of Southern Africa, or in making use of South African training facilities.

South Africa, on its side, has generally responded positively to such invitations for trilateral cooperation. This has mostly been confined to receiving financial support for activities in third countries. The South African Treasury in cooperation with the Department of Foreign Affairs has also developed a draft policy framework for trilateral cooperation in Africa between South Africa and their development partners.²⁵ A key feature of this framework is the strong emphasis on the Paris and Windhoek principles, aid effectiveness and ownership by the third party. Most recently, the Nordic countries have developed – based on this framework and the Windhoek Declaration – a draft Declaration of Intent for cooperation (partnership) with South Africa in Africa and in regional programmes.²⁶

The new focus on trilateral cooperation has so far led to few projects, but some observations and challenges emerging from this new emphasis can be made. The *first* is that although South Africa has strong commitments and resources, its ability to deliver is still limited. Some of the strongest contributions have been in areas such as financial management where South Africa can rely on strong institutions and training facilities (like the South African Revenue Services), but also in development of physical infrastructure (e.g., through the Development Bank of Southern Africa). South Africa is struggling more in areas involving institutions focusing on service delivery, decentralisation, poverty reduction, security sector reform and post-conflict reconstruction, and in strengthening regional institutions.

A *second* observation is that South Africa is still in the early stages of defining how it should deliver development support and assistance to other African countries and regional institutions. As an aid receiving country South Africa is very vocal on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, but it has not yet developed procedures and mechanisms to ensure that it adheres to the same principles in its own relations with other African countries.²⁷ South Africa is largely absent from donor-coordinating forums and efforts to improve harmonisation and effectiveness of aid provided. It also lacks proper implementation capacity for its funds. South Africa's 2007 draft policy framework for cooperation in Africa between South Africa and development partners does, however, provide a solid platform for developing and professionalising South Africa's capacity to deliver development aid.

Thirdly, South Africa may be classified as an “emerging donor”, but it has first and foremost an identity as a developing country strongly committed to work with other African countries as a partner, and – in the case of southern Africa – as a member of SADC. South Africa has a broad engagement with African countries with development assistance in most cases being just a small component and part of a broader effort to provide development support. South Africa may be willing to engage with northern donor agencies – and importantly with other South countries such as China, India or Brazil – and to work with them where it is in South Africa's interest to do so, but there is clearly also a wish not to be seen as an instrument for other countries.

Fourthly, there is – as pointed out in the previous chapter – a strong trend among donor agencies to subcontract South African and South African-based NGOs to implement projects in southern Africa. This is particularly evident in the peace and security area. It has been reinforced

by the weak absorption capacity of SADC and regional organisations. Strong capacity has been created in a handful of South African NGOs over the past ten years (and with funding from foreign donor agencies). Some of these NGOs have strong technical skills and are able to deliver. Their role is important and will continue to be so in the years to come. However, they are no substitutes for public institutions and intergovernmental organisations. Putting too much emphasis on NGOs as an alternative to working with African intergovernmental organisations may also lead to tensions between NGOs and these institutions. More importantly, South African NGOs – like the government institutions – are still on a steep learning curve in trying to work outside South Africa. In particular, many are still paying insufficient attention to partnerships and capacity building support to NGOs in other countries.

The *final* lesson from this is that there is much to be gained from engaging more with South Africa on development issues in Africa. There are many important lessons and best practices emerging out of programmes and projects supported since the mid-1990s. It is crucial to study these experiences when donor countries are moving to a new phase with increased emphasis on working in trilateral arrangements directly with South Africa in Africa. For such trilateral partnerships to work all three partners will have to benefit and to contribute. And it must be aligned with the principles for aid effectiveness as outlined in the Windhoek Declaration. For SADC it is important that these issues and any regional trilateral project that may be launched are also discussed in the relevant thematic groups.

The “Emerging Donors” and South-South Cooperation

One of the most important external developments is represented by the emerging global influence of China and other regional powers in the South. What impact does this have on SADC and regional integration? How will it impact on the regional support and financial resources provided by other donor agencies?

There is limited interaction and cooperation between these new powers and SADC itself, but the cooperation with member states, especially through trade and investment, is expanding rapidly. China, in particular, is emerging as a major trading partner and source of investment for many countries in the region and may soon become their most important economic partner. This opens up both new opportunities and new challenges for development and regional cooperation in southern Africa.²⁸

China is a very active economic development partner with nearly all SADC countries. In the period from 2005 to December 2007, the value of total trade with SADC increased by 26% for Chinese imports, (reaching about USD 21 billion in 2007) and by 21% for exports (USD 10.5 billion).²⁹ The trade is however, almost completely dominated by trade with two SADC countries – Angola and South Africa. China mainly imports oil and other raw materials required by its economic growth and exports manufactured goods. It is also investing significantly in African energy and mining, communications and infrastructure, and in financial services. There has also been a significant Chinese migration over the last few years. The biggest concentrations of Chinese people are in South Africa, Mauritius and Madagascar, but with a growing number also in most other SADC countries. This is linked both to employment by Chinese companies (especially in Angola) and as self-employment in retail, restaurants and other sectors.

In the past several southern African countries maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but nearly all have now shifted their diplomatic allegiance to the Peoples Republic. Following the most recent shift by Malawi (in early January 2008) Swaziland is the only SADC country maintaining diplomatic links with Taiwan.

China emphasises cooperation with African countries and has made great efforts over the past few years to develop and strengthen political ties. This has also included a strong commitment to support development and poverty reduction in Africa. At the Africa-China Summit in Beijing in November 2006 a 2007–2009 Action Plan was adopted based on a number of significant pledges by China. This included a doubling of Chinese development aid from 2006 level within 2009; preferential loans amounting to USD 3 billion and preferential buyer's credits of USD 2 billion; creation of a development fund of USD 5 billion to support investment by Chinese companies in Africa; cancellation of some loans and debts; and increases in scholarships and technical assistance (mainly in health, education and agriculture). In addition China promised a major expansion in the list of zero-tariff products that African products can export to the Chinese market, and the establishment of Chinese economic cooperation zones in Africa.

The size of Chinese development aid is not known. Development aid is also classified differently from traditional donors (China does not, for example, usually classify cancellation of debt as development aid). Some conclusions can however, be drawn. First, Chinese aid to Africa is significant and it is expanding rapidly. It may well be approaching USD 1 billion annually and could reach USD 2 billion by 2010. Secondly, Chinese aid is intimately linked to overall Chinese economic policy and trade expansion. Thirdly, Chinese aid is very tied to the purchase of Chinese goods and services. Fourthly, Chinese aid is typically provided as project aid and with a strong focus on infrastructure. Fifthly, the aid is firmly anchored in the principle of “non-interference” in domestic affairs of the aid recipient. This contrasts sharply both with political conditionalities and the emphasis on governance/institutional development central to many of the traditional donors. Finally, although China has signed the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, it has refrained from engaging with other aid donors to facilitate harmonisation of external assistance (with some modest but growing exemptions related to multilateral aid).

Chinese aid is also essentially provided as bilateral assistance to individual African countries with no or limited assistance provided directly to regional organisations or programmes. Engagement with the African Union and NEPAD is small but expanding. SADC has been invited to attend the various Africa-China Summits as an observer together with the African Union and other regional economic communities. China's role in supporting regional integration in southern Africa has so far primarily been indirect – through its very active role in rebuilding infrastructure and stimulating economic growth in several SADC member countries. Three of the five planned economic cooperation zones that China is preparing to establish in Africa will be located in southern Africa (in Zambia, Tanzania and Mauritius).

Brazil and India are also emerging as important economic and political actors on the African continent and in the SADC region.³⁰ Brazil is much smaller than India which in turn lags far behind China – not least when it comes to the financial resources available. There are many similarities – but also differences – in the way India, Brazil and China approach development cooperation with Africa. For all these countries development assistance is a small component of a much bigger development support approach focusing on trade and investment. Their development aid is also much focused on project support and – especially in the case of India and China – a strong emphasis on infrastructure. Brazil's aid component has a stronger emphasis on technical assistance and human resource development. India also provides technical assistance alongside its financial assistance. Aid from these countries also tends to be heavily tied and linked to the purchase of goods and services from the aid provider. On the other hand, these countries do not attach political conditionalities in their support.

These countries are not in any substantive way engaged in harmonisation of their bilateral development cooperation. Brazil and India are however, working with South Africa through the IBSA alliance. This also includes a small joint development fund with projects in Africa and managed by the UNDP. Brazil (like South Africa) has also entered into trilateral arrangements with bilateral northern aid agencies (Canada, Japan) in third countries.

It is important to note that India is developing close links with SADC. A Memorandum of Understanding between India and SADC was signed in 1997 and in April 2005 the India-SADC Forum was inaugurated.³¹ In 2007 missions from India visited the SADC Secretariat to explore possibilities for support and assistance, and this may lead to direct support and technical assistance. Through its High Commissioner in Botswana, India has also become an active member of the Joint Task Force between SADC and its international cooperating partners.

The growing importance of South-South cooperation, and the role of the “emerging donors”, have led to much debate among the traditional donors. What are the implications for poverty reduction and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals? Will it undermine the Paris agenda and aid effectiveness? Will it weaken the traditional donor emphasis on democratisation and good governance? And how will it impact on traditional donors? How will the northern donor respond to the competition from new donors and regional powers?³²

At this stage we may be left with more questions than answers. It can imply “more of the same” and further consolidate southern Africa as an exporter of raw materials to the world economy. But it can also, if properly managed and regulated, create new opportunities for development and even increase the bargaining power of SADC and its member states *vis-à-vis* their international partners. For SADC the most immediate benefits may be a possible reinforced focus on infrastructure development – also because the Chinese and Indian engagement here, especially, may mobilise additional resources from traditional donor countries, including Japan. For SADC it will be important to engage both at the policy and technical level with these new “emerging donors” and to exploit the possibilities opening up through South-South cooperation. This will also include engaging these countries and cooperating partners at the level of the thematic groups. The groups dealing with infrastructure (especially energy and transport) will be particularly important.

CONCLUSION

The Windhoek Declaration is an important platform for improved cooperation between SADC and their international cooperation partners. It is too early to pass any judgment on the outcome of this Declaration, but we can conclude that a strong potential for better cooperation has been created. By the time of the next consultative conference between SADC and its international partners – April 2008 in Mauritius – progress in a number of areas should be recorded.

There are a number of delays in implementing the Declaration and the action plan. Even the frequency of formal meetings between SADC and the donor agencies have been far less than envisaged. The Joint Task Force, for example, met for the first time since the Windhoek conference in December 2007. The current draft Action Plan has scaled down the original ambition. The Joint Task Force is now scheduled to meet once a year while the core group should meet quarterly. Informally, SADC and the key donors agencies have met more frequently and both sides have undertaken parallel activities to implement the Declaration.

The most important achievements are in the process of establishing thematic groups – in agreeing on their objectives, the role of the lead donor agency and the prerequisites for SADC leadership. It is still early days with few groups having been able to make an impact. Four major challenges are however, already emerging as particularly important in making the Windhoek declaration an effective instrument.

One is the relation between SADC ownership and alignment. Donor-funded and -supported activities should not only be aligned with SADC policies and priorities. There should also, in accordance with the Windhoek Declaration, be a SADC ownership. With the current weak capacity of the Secretariat there is a real risk that we may end up with a move towards improved alignment coupled with weak ownership. Donor agencies are developing projects which they believe are in line with SADC priorities and are relying on subsidiarity organisations or project management units to carry them out. This may lead to familiar problems associated with poor ownership and sustainability.

Secondly, weak capacity in the Secretariat and strong donor focus on thematic groups and subsidiarity organisations may lead to the unintended effect of fragmentation. This may be a particular challenge in the infrastructure area. One danger here is that we may end up with several strong thematic groups and weak directorates and a Secretariat unable to provide overall direction. There is currently a missing link between the lead donor agency of the various thematic groups and the core group/Joint Task Force. The core group needs to take a strong role in facilitating communication and dialogue between the thematic groups, donor agencies and the Secretariat in order to help reduce the risk of such developments.

Thirdly, progress may be recorded in improving relations between SADC and its traditional donors or ICPs. However, a number of other countries are, increasingly, also making their impact in the regions as trading partners, investors and – but still on a more modest scale – as donors. These “emerging donors” and South-South cooperation will be increasingly important for the future trajectory of SADC. It is important that SADC uses its influence to engage with the new actors and involves them in the further implementation of the Windhoek Declaration.

Fourthly, the implementation of the Windhoek Declaration crucially depends on the strength and capacity of SADC and its institutions. International cooperating partners can, and should, support efforts to strengthen such capacities, but ultimately the responsibility lies with SADC's member states. Only they can provide SADC with the resources and authority required to take the regional integration agenda forward.

Finally, the ultimate objective of the Windhoek Declaration and SADC's regional integration agenda is to help reduce poverty in southern Africa. This also reinforces the need for further alignment both between SADC's regional strategies and the development strategies of member states, and between the donors' regional support, and support provided at the country level. J

NOTES

- 1 OECD DAC maintains a good website on the Paris Declaration and subsequent discussions and implementation (www.oecd.org/dac).
- 2 See the “2006 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration. Overview of the Results”, *OECD Journal on Development*, vol. 8, 2007, No2. The quote is from p. 9.
- 3 See more about the proliferation and fragmentation of aid to Africa in the World Bank’s 2007 discussion paper *Aid architecture: an overview of main trends in official development assistance flows* (available from <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Seminar%20PDFs/73449-1172525976405/3492866-1172526109259/RoleIDA.pdf>).
- 4 The draft – *Windhoek Declaration Implementation Action Plan (Simplified version, November 2007)* – is not in the public domain but is widely circulated in donor circles. The previously circulated draft was from January 2007.
- 5 See also an unpublished memo from the SADC Secretariat in August 2006, *Priority Areas for thematic co-ordination* (5 pages) and subsequent briefings provided to meetings of the core group which has become the forum for donor-SADC dialogue on these groups. This document and information about the thematic groups can be found on the SADC-ICP website – www.sadc.int/icp. The website was still under construction at the time of writing (early 2008), but some documents have been posted and this one is available.
- 6 See also the recently prepared four-page leaflet prepared by the HIV/AIDS unit and the donors supporting it; *SADC and International Co-operating Partners, Framework on Regional Support to HIV and AIDS*, Gaborone: SADC n.d. (2007). (This document is technically still at the draft stage because a formal approval by SADC structures is still to be made).
- 7 See SADC, GTZ, Inwent & UNDP, *Implementing the SADC Regional Strategic Action Plan for Integrated Water Resource Management (1999–2004): Lessons and Best Practice*, Gaborone (2005).
- 8 See more about these developments in E. N. Tjønneland & N. Dube, *Aid Effectiveness: Trends and Impacts of Shifting Financial Flows to Civil Society Organisations in Southern Africa*, Midrand: Southern Africa Trust 2007. (This study together with a shorter policy brief and proceedings from a roundtable in Gaborone in March 2007 is available from www.southernafricatrust.org).
- 9 See Ernst & Young, *Institutional Assessment of the SADC Secretariat*, Draft Assessment Report, March 2007, Gaborone; Delegation of the European Commission in Gaborone, and John Kasanga & Joseph Lisindi, *Institutional Capacity Needs of the SADC Secretariat*, Preliminary Report, Gaborone, SADC & GTZ, February 2007. Subsequently a GTZ-sponsored and SADC commissioned study of the SADC National Committees was also completed. In addition to these studies the Secretariat also carried out a job evaluation study addressing the organisational structure, job grading and remuneration practices.
- 10 See the unpublished *Summary Report on Institutional Capacity Development Needs of the SADC Secretariat*, October 2007. (Prepared by SADC Secretariat, 29 pages).
- 11 The financing proposal was finalised as a draft in April 2007. A financing agreement between SADC and the EC in this area is still to be signed.
- 12 See a presentation on the GTZ website www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/afrika/8446.htm.
- 13 The website – www.sadc.int/icp – was launched in late 2007 but it is still under construction and does not yet provide much data.
- 14 See also a recent comprehensive evaluation of the EU support to SADC, *Evaluation of the Commission’s Support to Southern African Development Community – SADC Regional Level Evaluation*, carried out by a consortium led by Development Researchers’ Network. The final report was submitted in October 2007. (The 2-volume report is available from www.sarpi.org/documents/d0002977/index.php.)
- 15 See EDF Committee Brief, *African Peace Facility – Euro 20 Million Capacity Building Contribution Agreement*, 27/03/2007, AIDCO/C6 (2007) 5832.
- 16 See here the recent joint EU/AU presentation of the new infrastructure fund – www.africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2007/october/IE/EU/doc/CYE-fiche-layout-En_final.pdf.

- 17 A good overview of this is provided in the report *Focus Issue 4: Infrastructure* prepared for the 9th meeting of the Africa Partnership Forum in Algiers in November 2007 (see www.africapartnershipforum.org/dataoecd/11/21/39777451.pdf).
- 18 The Southern Africa Trust was initiated with funding from DFID. See more about the Trust and its activities in relation to SADC on their website – www.southernafricatrust.org.
- 19 Vivek Arora and Athanasios Vamvakidis, “The Implications of South African Economic Growth for the Rest of Africa”, Washington, D.C., IMF 2005 (*IMF Working Paper No. 05/58*).
- 20 See also the Department of Foreign Affairs, *Annual Report 2005–2006, African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund*, Pretoria: DFA 2006 (available from the DFA website, www.dfa.gov.za/departement/report_2005–2006/african_renaissance.pdf).
- 21 See para 21 and 22 in the ANC conference resolution on international relations, available from www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/conf/conferenc52/resolutions-f.html. The issue was first aired publicly in an ANC discussion document on international policy released in March 2007. The document *inter alia* suggested that between 0.2 and 0.5 % of GDP should be set aside for development assistance and be managed by a South African International Development Agency to be located either in the National Treasury or in the Department of Foreign Affairs (see page 2 in the international relations document available from www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/2007/discussion/contents.html). The ANC policy conference in June 2007 endorsed the establishment of such a fund and recommended that it should be located in the Department of Foreign Affairs (see www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/2007/conferenc/international.pdf).
- 22 See more on the SDC South Africa website, www.sdc.org.za. Their *Regional Cooperation Strategy Southern Africa 2005–2010* is available from http://162.23.39.120/dezaweb/ressources/ressource_en_157241.pdf.
- 23 See the *Cooperation between the European Union and South Africa. Joint Country Strategy Paper 2007–2013* and the *Multannual Indicative Programme 2007–2013*. They are available from www.eusa.org.za/en/development/MIPSP20072013.htm.
- 24 See DFID, *Southern Africa Regional Plan*, London: DFID 2006 (available from www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/southern-africa-regional-plan.pdf).
- 25 The *Draft Framework – Co-operation in Africa between South Africa and Development Partners* is available from the Treasury website www.dcis.gov.za/Documents/Draft_Framework_Tripartite.doc.
- 26 This issue was given special attention at the 2006 Annual Consultations on development cooperation between South Africa and the Nordic countries. The Treasury subsequently distributed the draft policy framework on cooperation in Africa which with slight revisions has been developed into a draft Declaration of Intent between South Africa and the Nordic countries concerning cooperation in Africa, under which each country, as they find appropriate, could establish separate agreements with South Africa. The Nordic countries formally submitted the final draft to South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs in November 2007.
- 27 See also the unpublished assessment of the ARF commissioned by the Norwegian and Swedish embassies, C. Albertyn and M. Ngaara, *Pre-appraisal of possible Swedish and Norwegian Support to the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund (ARF)*, 10 November 2006 (draft).
- 28 A range of books and studies on China and Africa have been published over the last year. A good introduction is provided in G. le Pere and G. Shelton, *China, Africa and South Africa: South-South Cooperation in a Global Era*, Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue 2007, as well as in publications from the Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch – www.ccs.org.za. A good overview of this expanding literature is provided in D. Large, “Beyond ‘Dragon in the Bush’: The study of China-Africa relations”, *African Affairs*, 10/426 (2008): 45–61.
- 29 The data is derived from the database maintained by the Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa – www.tralac.org. See also, R. Sandrey *et al.*, *South Africa’s Way Ahead: trade policy options*, Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa 2007 and I. Campos & A. Vines, *Angola and China. A Pragmatic Partnership*, Washington D.C., Centre for Strategic & International Studies, 2008.
- 30 Material on India and Brazil in Africa is much more limited, but see F. Villares (org.), *India, Brazil and South Africa – perspectives and alliances*, Sao Paulo: Editora UNESP 2006, and several briefing papers from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (www.fes.de/globalisation), see especially C. Schläger, *Challenges for International Development Cooperation: The Case of Brazil* (New Powers for Global Change. FES Briefing Paper 3, March 2007) and M. Jobelius, *Challenges for the International Development Co-operation. The case of India* (New Powers for Global Change. FES Briefing Paper 5, March 2007).

- 31 See also the presentation in section 2.10 in G. H. Oosthuizen, *The Southern Africa Development Community. The Organisation, its policies and prospects*, Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue 2006.
- 32 See also the discussion of donor responses in E. N. Tjønneland *et al.*, *China in Africa. Implications for Norwegian Foreign and Development Policies*, Bergen: CMI 2006 (available from www.cmi.no).

ANNEX 1: THE WINDHOEK DECLARATION

(Reduced facsimile)



WINDHOEK DECLARATION

ON

A NEW PARTNERSHIP

BETWEEN

THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATING PARTNERS

ADOPTED ON 27 APRIL 2006

PREAMBLE

In recent years, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as a region has undergone major changes. These include the restructuring of SADC Institutions, a process that has seen the streamlining of institutional structures responsible for implementing and coordinating the SADC Common Agenda; the development of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO).

During the same period important changes have also taken place in the international and global agendas impacting on the SADC region. These include the adoption in 2000 by Heads of State at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly of the Millennium Declaration, and the acceptance of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as a monitoring framework for progress on key development indicators, as well as the September 2005 World Summit Outcome as adopted by the Heads of State at the Summit. The Monterrey Consensus (March 2002), called on (i) developing countries to strengthen their commitment to policies and institutions that can stimulate growth, reduce poverty and achieve the MDGs; and (ii) developed countries to provide more and better aid as well as improved trade and debt policies. Together with the subsequent Rome Declaration on Harmonization of Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery (February 2003), the Marrakech Memorandum on Managing for Results (February 2004) and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (March 2005), these international agreements have highlighted the issue of aid effectiveness as it is affected by ownership, alignment, harmonisation and managing for results.

These major changes at both the regional and international level call for a paradigm shift in the cooperation between SADC and the International Cooperating Partners (ICPs), both which desire a stronger and more effective partnership.

This declaration puts in place a New SADC/ICP Partnership for the implementation of the SADC Common Agenda as outlined in the RISDP and SIPO. The declaration outlines the overall objective, the commitments by SADC and ICPs and the structure for effective dialogue under the new partnership, as well as the key areas of cooperation between SADC and ICPs.

This declaration has been adopted by SADC and ICPs at the Consultative Conference held in Windhoek, Namibia on 27 April 2006. The declaration will guide cooperation between SADC and ICPs.

ABBREVIATIONS

DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
ICP	International Cooperating Partners
JTF	Joint Task Force
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MS	Member States
NCP	National Contact Points
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ
SNC	SADC National Committees
UN	United Nation

SADC means the SADC Secretariat and the SADC Member States.

THE NEW SADC / ICP PARTNERSHIP

INTRODUCTION

1. Lessons learnt from the past and current practices of managing cooperation between SADC and the ICPs as well as the changes on both the regional and international levels, call for a new partnership that would: (i) establish a structure for dialogue on the political, policy and technical levels; (ii) create an environment for more and better aid for greater development impact in the SADC region.
2. In providing and using aid as effectively as possible, SADC and the ICPs have to take into account international agreements such as the Rome, Marrakech and Paris commitments which could be categorized in four broad areas i.e. ownership, alignment, harmonization and managing for results.

PARTNERSHIP OBJECTIVES

Overall Objectives

3. The overall objective of the New Partnership is to contribute towards the achievement of SADC Common Agenda as articulated by SADC, in particular, the attainment of the SADC Mission of promoting sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through efficient productive systems; deeper cooperation and integration; good governance; strengthened capacity and participation of stakeholders; and durable peace and security so that the region emerges as a competitive and effective player in international relations and the world economy.

Specific Objectives of the Partnership

4. The new partnership aims at:
 - (a) Ensuring regular, institutionalised dialogue at the political, policy and technical levels for constructive engagement, information and experience exchange and the promotion of best practices on development cooperation;
 - (b) Improving coordination between ICPs and SADC in order to ensure more effective development cooperation mechanisms with a view to achieving maximum impact.
 - (c) Ensuring alignment, harmonization and streamlining of operational procedures, rules and other practices in the delivery of development assistance to SADC, taking into account local conditions.

12. ICPs commit to:
 - (a) Base their overall support on RISDP and SIPO and periodic reviews (monitoring and evaluation) of progress in implementing these; and
 - (b) Link funding to a joint framework of conditions and/or a manageable set of indicators derived from RISDP and SIPO.

Alignment with SADC Institutions and Systems

13. SADC and ICPs will cooperate in monitoring progress over time in improving operational systems.
14. SADC and ICPs jointly commit to:
 - (a) Work together to establish mutually agreed frameworks that provide reliable assessments of performance, transparency and accountability of SADC systems; and
 - (b) Integrate diagnostic reviews and performance assessment frameworks within SADC-led strategies for capacity development.
15. SADC commits to:
 - (a) Carry out diagnostic reviews that provide reliable assessments of SADC systems and procedures; and
 - (b) On the basis of such diagnostic reviews, undertake reforms that may be necessary to ensure that systems, institutions and procedures for managing aid and other development resources are effective, accountable and transparent.
16. ICPs commit to:
 - (a) Use SADC systems and procedures to the maximum extent possible and where needed establish additional safeguards and measures in ways that strengthen rather than undermine SADC systems and procedures; and
 - (b) Adopt harmonised performance assessment frameworks for SADC systems so as to avoid presenting SADC with an excessive number of potentially conflicting targets.

For SADC to Strengthen its Development Capacity with ICP Support

17. The capacity to plan, manage, implement, and account for results of policies and programmes, is critical for achieving development objectives. Capacity development is the responsibility of SADC with ICPs playing a support role.

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18. SADC commits to: Integrate specific capacity strengthening objectives in national and regional development strategies and pursue their implementation through SADC-led capacity development strategies where needed.
19. ICPs commit to: Align their analytic, financial and technical support with SADC's capacity development objectives and strategies, make effective use of existing capacities and harmonise support for capacity development accordingly.

For SADC to Strengthen its Financial Management Capacity

20. SADC commits to:
- (a) Intensify efforts to mobilise internal resources, and create an enabling environment for public and private investments; and
 - (b) Report in a timely and transparent way on budget execution.
21. ICPs commit to:
- (a) Provide reliable indicative commitments of aid over a multi-year framework and disburse aid in a timely and predictable fashion according to agreed schedules; and
 - (b) Rely to the maximum extent possible on transparent SADC budget and accounting mechanisms; and
 - (c) Provide support to SADC in capacity building for financial management.

To Strengthen SADC's procurement system

22. SADC and ICPs jointly commit to:
- (a) Use mutually agreed standards and processes to carry out diagnostics, develop sustainable reforms and monitor implementation;
 - (b) Commit sufficient resources to support and sustain medium and long-term procurement reforms and capacity development; and
 - (c) Share feedback on recommended approaches so they can be improved over time.
23. SADC commits to: Taking leadership and implement the procurement reform process.

24. ICPs commit to:

- (a) Progressively rely on SADC systems for procurement when SADC has implemented mutually agreed standards and processes; and
- (b) Adopt harmonised approaches when SADC systems do not meet mutually agreed levels of performance or ICPs do not use them.

Towards Untying aid and getting better value for money

25. ICPs commit to: Continuation of untying aid as encouraged by the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying Official Development Assistance to the Least Developed Countries.

HARMONISATION

26. For ICPs to implement common arrangements and simplify procedures, they will make the following commitments:

- (a) Implement the ICP action plans that they have developed as part of the follow-up to the Rome High-Level Forum.
- (b) Implement, where feasible, common arrangements for planning, funding (e.g. joint financial arrangements), disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting to SADC on ICP activities and aid flows. Increased use of programme-based aid modalities can contribute to this effort
- (c) Work together through conducting joint missions and diagnostic work, sharing of analytical work and information; and undertaking joint training to share lessons learnt and build a community of practice.

To promote Complementarity in Development Assistance

27. SADC commits to: Provide clear guidance taking into account ICPs' comparative advantage in the areas of cooperation.

28. ICPs commit to:

- (a) Make full use of their respective comparative advantage at sector or regional level by delegating, where appropriate, authority to lead ICPs for the execution of programmes, activities and tasks;
- (b) Coordinated funding arrangements in support of the implementation of the frameworks and interventions set out in the RISDP and SIPO; and

- (c) Work together to harmonise procedures.

To Strengthen Collaborative behaviour

29. ICPs and SADC jointly commit to: Reform procedures and strengthen incentives including for recruitment, appraisal and training for management and staff to work towards harmonisation, alignment and results.

MANAGING FOR RESULTS - managing resources and improving decision-making for result

30. SADC commits to:

- (a) Strengthen the linkages between on the one hand regional and national development strategies. On the other hand strengthen the linkages between the above strategies and annual and multi-annual budget processes and the business plans derived from the RISDP and the SIPO, and
- (b) Endeavour to establish results-oriented reporting and assessment frameworks that monitor progress against key dimensions of the national, regional (spatial) and sector (cluster) level development strategies; and that these frameworks should track a "manageable" number of indicators for which data are cost-effectively available.

31. ICPs commit to:

- (a) Link regional programming to bilateral country programming and resources to results and align them with effective SADC performance assessment frameworks, refraining from requesting the introduction of performance indicators that are not consistent with SADC's development strategies;
- (b) Work with SADC to rely, as far as possible, on SADC results-oriented reporting and monitoring frameworks; and
- (c) Harmonise their monitoring and reporting requirements, and, until they can rely more extensively on SADC's statistical, monitoring and evaluation systems, with SADC to the maximum extent possible on joint formats for periodic reporting.

32. SADC and ICPs jointly commit to: Work together in a participatory approach to strengthen SADC capacities and demand for results based management.

MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

33. SADC and ICPs commit to: Jointly assess through existing and increasingly objective mechanisms, mutual progress in implementing

agreed commitments on aid effectiveness, including the New SADC/ICP Partnership.

34. ICPs commit to: Provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable SADC Secretariat to present comprehensive budget reports to its Member States.

STRUCTURE FOR DIALOGUE UNDER THE NEW PARTNERSHIP

35. SADC and ICPs commit to: A constructive, comprehensive, open and structured dialogue at technical, policy and political levels as follows.

LEVEL 1: MINISTERIAL/CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE

35. Dialogue at Ministerial level for both SADC and ICPs: This will provide a high level guidance to the decision making entities of SADC and the ICPs and the current Consultative Conference will facilitate such dialogue. The mandate of the Group would include:

- (a) Specifying the issues where, from time to time, political decisions about partnership may be required from SADC and the ICPs, and to transmit these issues, with the Group's guiding comments, through to the relevant fora (the Council of Ministers and/or Summit for SADC, and individual governments, the DAC, and other bodies of the ICPs);
- (b) Spelling out the implications of changing political ideas for the scope of partnership, and ensure that cooperation modalities remain in harmony with a shifting environment; and
- (c) Informing both the political authorities and the policy/technical level groups in SADC/ICPs of new policy approaches, and their possible implications for the subject areas/themes of development cooperation, and the forms of support (financial and otherwise) which might be available and consistent with new approaches.

36. Documentation and backup support for the Group's work would come through inputs from SADC Secretariat, development cooperation Ministries (or their equivalents) in ICP countries, and international agencies concerned with development. The Group would therefore act as a powerful filter of political and policy information, shaped in relation to emerging changes in the SADC region.

LEVEL 2: JOINT SADC-ICP TASK FORCE

37. The Joint SADC-ICP Task Force (JTF) will provide a mechanism that operates as links between top-level political decision makers and the groups which work on the ground in key thematic areas, help to ensure effective utilization of resources, and address implementation bottlenecks. SADC's participation in this Group will include the

Secretariat, SADC Double Troika at Senior Officials level, and open to further SADC participation by i.e. SADC Ambassadors as appropriate. The ICPs participation will include Ambassadors and/or Senior Officials. The Core Group of the Joint SADC-ICP Task Force will continue to manage and coordinate the day-to-day operations of the JTF.

38. Thematic groups can evolve in a flexible manner within the context of the JTF and are an efficient route towards partnership and dialogue at the technical level. The advantage of the thematic groups is that all parties have clear commitment and the issues are often ones that readily lend themselves to regional actions. In order to initiate them, the JTF could play a role by suggesting priority areas where delivery of ODA could come in a quicker and more targeted way.
39. In this structure for dialogue, the Secretariat will continue to contribute to the search for improved coordination in aid procedures and practices and disseminate the ideas.

KEY AREAS OF COOPERATION

40. SADC has developed two frameworks RISDP and SIPO that are structured and aligned to respond to the wider goals of supporting SADC Members States achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and poverty reduction strategies being implemented. In addition, they integrate the goals, objectives and implementation framework of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), fully subscribed to by SADC and the Member States.
41. The RISDP is a 15-year framework that sets the policies, strategies and priorities for achieving the long-term goals of SADC of deeper regional integration and poverty eradication. Fifteen, five and one year implementation plans have been developed for the implementation of the RISDP. The priority areas for cooperation as outlined in the RISDP are as follows:
- (a) Cross Cutting Areas:
 - (i) Poverty Eradication;
 - (ii) Combating HIV and AIDS Pandemic;
 - (iii) Gender Equality and Development;
 - (iv) Science and Technology;
 - (v) Environment and Sustainable Development;
 - (vi) Private Sector Development; and
 - (vii) Statistics;
 - (b) Sectoral Cooperation and Integration Areas:
 - (i) Trade/Economic Liberalization and Development
 - (ii) Infrastructure Support for Regional Integration and Poverty Eradication
 - (iii) Sustainable Food Security

(iv) Human and Social Development

42. The SIPO aims at enabling the attainment of the objectives outlined in the RISDP by promoting the creation of a peaceful and stable political and security environment in the region so as to enable SADC Member States to realise their common socio-economic objectives. In this regard, the areas of cooperation include:
- (a) Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations;
 - (b) Democracy and good governance;
 - (c) Disaster management;
 - (d) Combat organized crime including drug trafficking, anti-money laundering and human trafficking;
 - (e) Post-conflict reconstruction and social reintegration programmes;
 - (f) Mine action programmes;
 - (g) HIV and AIDS programmes;
 - (h) Small arms and light weapons control;
 - (i) Drug trafficking control programmes;
 - (j) Joint training exercises; and
 - (k) Food Security;
43. Further to the areas that are listed under the RISDP and SIPO, ICPs support is required for capacity building at both the regional and national levels in order to facilitate effective implementation and monitoring of the programmes.

Funding Arrangements

44. The forms of funding are inseparably linked with the stage of preparedness of the institutions engaged in the process. There has to be a balance between what is desirable, meaning broader funding ranging from sector wide and program support through to direct budgetary support, and what is feasible from an institutional angle.
45. The current international trend is moving towards overall programming rather than the focus on support for individual projects. When ICPs move from being occupiously move into a much deeper involvement in the programming discussions. Thus a shift in the form of funding is interlinked with a change in the nature of dialogue.
46. Funding mechanisms generally require counterpart contributions, in kind or in cash. If SADC and ICPs embark on jointly funded programme approaches, the co-funding automatically becomes part of the dialogue as it impacts on the sustainability of the SADC common agenda.

Monitoring and Reporting

47. Overall comprehensive results-based RISDP/SIPO Monitoring and Reporting System has to be developed at both strategic and operational level with the participation of all stakeholders.
48. At the operational and technical level the SADC Secretariat and the SADC National Committees will be responsible for RISDP monitoring on a regular basis.
49. In consultation with all stakeholders, SADC Secretariat will produce an annual report on the overall implementation of the RISDP. Annual progress reports on the implementation of the RISDP and SIPO will be tabled at the Integrated Committee of Ministers and the Ministerial Committee of the Organ, respectively.
50. ICP Monitoring and Reporting Systems would be aligned with the overall RISDP Monitoring and reporting system.

Annex A

Structure for Dialogue

Level	Nature of Dialogue	Institutional Mechanism	Objectives
1	Political guidance.	Consultative Conference with All SADC Member States and ICPs represented at Ministerial level.*	Review policy changes and political decisions affecting the partnership. This forum will meet every two years.
2	Technical Coordination and Procedural harmonization.	Joint SADC-ICP Task Force (JTF)**	<p>Agree on RISDP/SIPO benchmarks in areas for mutual cooperation and implementation progress.</p> <p>Suggest priority areas to initiate Thematic groups.</p> <p>Prepare regular reports and carry out M&E activities.</p> <p>The Core Group will meet frequently to manage and coordinate day-to-day operations.</p>

* A balanced level of participation is required from both the SADC side and the ICP side. Ideal participation on the ICP side would be Ministers responsible for development cooperation or equivalent.

The above structure for dialogue would enable various institutional levels of the parties to interact constructively and work towards set objectives for each level of the dialogue process. It will:

- i. Shape realistic expectations about what can and cannot be achieved within different periods of time.
- ii. Point towards the areas where it is most likely that development assistance can be delivered effectively within a short time, and those areas where improved delivery will take longer.
- iii. Show the ways in which the SADC Secretariat and various other actors in the SADC region, (Member States, Civil Society and Private Sector) can contribute to the achievement of goals.

** The Joint SADC ICP Task Force (JTF) consists of a wider group of ICPs and SADC representatives. The JTF will provide a mechanism that operates as links between top-level political decision makers and the groups which work on the ground in key thematic areas, help to ensure effective utilization of

13

resources, and address implementation bottlenecks. SADC's participation in this Group will include the Secretariat, SADC Double Troika at Senior Officials level, and open to further SADC participation by i.a. SADC Ambassadors as appropriate. The ICPs participation will include Ambassadors and/or Senior Officials;

The Core Group of the Joint SADC-ICP Task Force will continue to manage and coordinate the day-to-day operations of the JTF; follow-up on proposals made by the wider JTF; ensuring coordination, including meeting preparation, and efficient dissemination of information. The Core Group is composed of ICPs represented in Gaborone and representatives of the SADC Secretariat and open for participation for all members of the JTF. The monthly meetings are co-chaired by a representative of the EC-Delegation and the SADC Secretariat.

ANNEX 2: AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL SUPPORT

The table below provides an overview of ongoing (and in some cases pipeline) projects and programmes in support of SADC and regional cooperation. Support to SADC and other public and intergovernmental institutions are included as well as support provided to non-state actors and international organisations. The activities supported are classified according to sectors and areas covered by SADC's thematic groups.

The Table has been put together based on the database maintained by the SADC Secretariat as presented to the core group meeting in November 2007, but with updates and additional information derived from donor websites and personal information supplied. The information is not complete, but it provides a reasonably good overview of the main components and features in external support to regional cooperation in Southern Africa.

Thematic group 1: Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment		
SADC, public institutions	Non-state actors	Others/Comments
1. EU/SADC Investment Promotion Programme (€18.3 million, EU)	1. Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, Stellenbosch (Australian Aid, Danida, Sida, DFID, Netherlands)	1. DFID also has three programmes with a variety of partners focusing on relations between trade, commodity and finance markets and poverty (£22.5 mill.)
2. Customs Modernisation and Trade Facilitation (€ 18 mill., EU)	2. Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies (Pretoria) (IDRC, Australian Aid, DFID)	2. US Trade Hub, Gaborone (USD 34 mill., USAID)
3. EPA Negotiations Support Facility (€ 7.5 mill., EU)	3. Trade and Development Project, South African Institute of International Affairs (Johannesburg), (Australian Aid, Sida)	3. National activities and regional networks in the advocacy area funded by Southern Africa Trust and various northern NGOs
4. SADCA/SQUAM (€14.2 mill., EU; NOK 13 mill., Norway)	4. Macro Economic and Financial Management Training Institute (MEFMI) (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, ACBF)	4. Trade in Services Project/UNCTAD (€1.0 mill., EU)
5. Food Safety/Trade Facilitation (€7.5, EU, new)	5. Economic Justice Network (Southern Africa Trust, northern NGOs)	
6. Finance and Investment Protocol (€13 mill., EU, new)		
7. Trade policy and related macro-economic issues (GTZ)		
8. SMME Training Programme (€0.82 mill., Japan)		
9. Regional trade facilitation (£11 mill., DFID)		
10. Customs/border posts (£0.5 mill., DFID)		
11. Regional Standards Programme (£4 mill., DFID)		
12. Macro-Economic Surveillance Unit (ADB, under preparation)		
13. SADC Development Finance Resource Centre (Denmark and others)		

Thematic Group 2: Water

SADC, public institutions	Non-state actors	Others/Comments
1. SADC Water programme (Denmark)	1. Water Research Fund for Southern Africa (Sweden)	
2. Management – Zambezi River Basin Commission (Denmark)	2. WaterNet (Sweden, Netherlands)	
3. Economic Accounting of Water Use and Hydro Geological Mapping of SADC (€1.34 mill., EU)	3. International Water Management Institute (water and food, Limpopo Basin), (€0.3 mill., France)	
4. Orange – Senqu River Basin (€2.5 mill., EU)	4. Water Research Programme/IRD (Limpopo) (€0.12 mill., France)	
5. Orange – Senqu River Commission (€ 1.5 mill., France)	5. Water Quality/Congo River Basin/FFEM (€0.4 mill., France)	
6. Transboundary Water Management (€5 mill., GTZ)	6. Network for Advocacy on Water Issues in Southern Africa (Denmark)	
7. SADC Water Resources Management (technical assistance to SADC + support to Rovuma and Umbeluzi River Basin Commissions) (USD 0.9 mill., Switzerland)	7. Institute for Water and Sanitation Development (Denmark)	
8. Management – Zambezi River Basin (€1.6 mill., Sweden)		
9. UNDP support (being phased out)		
10. Shared Water Courses Support Project (USD 13.40 mill., ADB)		
11. Zambezi River Action Plan (NOK 6 mill., Norway)		
12. Integrated River Basin Management (USD 11.5 mill., USAID)		

Thematic group 3: Transport

SADC, public institutions	Non-state actors	Others/Comments
1. Rehabilitation of roads – Angola (€25 mill., EU, new)		1. Substantial interventions are planned and supported through the ADB-hosted infrastructure consortium which brings together the major bi- and multilateral donor agencies. This includes the NEPAD project Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System
2. Corridors and SDI Programme (World Bank)		

Thematic group 4: Energy

SADC, public institutions	Non-state actors	Others/Comments
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Southern Africa Power Pool – SAPP (NOK 22 mill., Norway; World Bank; Sweden) 2. Regional Electricity Regulators Association of Southern Africa – RERA (NOK 9.8 mill., Norway) 3. Southern Africa Regional Gas Project – SASOL (World Bank) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town (energy and infrastructure training programme) (NOK 4.9 mill., Norway) 2. Southern Africa Research and Documentation Centre – energy newsletter (Norway) 3. Programme for Basic Energy and Conservation in Southern Africa – PROBEC (GTZ, Netherlands, EU) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Norway has made NOK 14 mill. available to support its role as lead agency for the energy thematic group 2. See also comments under transport. One NEPAD project is the Zambia-Tanzania-Kenya Power Interconnector 3. USAID's Trade Hub in Gaborone is preparing technical assistance to RERA and SAPP

Thematic Group 5: Agriculture and Food Security

SADC, public institutions	Non-state actors	Others/Comments
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Regional Integration – SADC Livestock (€7.9 mill., EU) 2. SADC Agriculture and Research Training Programme – ICART 3rd phase, (€3.7 mill., EU, new) 3. Land and Water Management Applied Research Programme, (€4.85 mill., EU) 4. Regional Foot and Mouth Disease Control Programme (€12.6 mill., EU) 5. Technical assistance to FANR (around €0.1 mill., annually, France) 6. Regional Fund for Agricultural Research (FIRCOP) (€1.6 mill., France) 7. SADC Plant Genetic Resource Centre (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland) 8. SADC Seed Security Network (€1.7 mill., Switzerland) 9. Support to SADC Agricultural Research (USD 1.40 mill., ADB) 10. Water Management and Food Security, Zambezi (USD 87 mill., ADB) 11. Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases (USD 17.75 mill., ADB) 12. SADC multi-country agricultural productivity programme (MAPP) (World Bank) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. African Institute of Agrarian Studies, Zimbabwe (Norway) 2. Community Technology Development Trust, Zimbabwe (Norway) 3. New Seed Initiative for Maize in Southern Africa implemented by the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT) (Switzerland) 4. Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network – FANRPAD (USAID, EU, DFID, Southern Africa Trust and others) 5. Southern African Bean Research Network (CIDA, SDC, DFID) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme (\$4.5 mill., DFID) 2. Regional Land Facility (€0.3 mill., EU) 3. Diversification of Rural Livelihoods (USD 33.5 mill., USAID) 4. Technical cooperation programme, FAO (Harare) (€0.6 mill., France) 5. Several SADC research agricultural networks are also coordinated by international agricultural research centres or regional institutions with donor funding

Thematic group 6: Natural Resources and Environment

SADC, public institutions	Non-state actors	Others/Comments
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. SADC Forestry Colleges (Finland) 2. Management of Indigenous Forests (GTZ) 3. Transfrontier Conservation Park/Limpopo (GTZ) 4. Benguela Environment and fisheries Interaction and Training (GTZ) 5. GOBABEB Training and Research Centre (GTZ) 6. Interim Benguela Current Commission – BENEFIT (NOK 10.7 mill., Norway) 7. INFOSA – FAO Infopeche Unit for Southern African Countries (NOK 4.9 mill., Norway) 8. SADC Biodiversity Support Programme (USD 4.5 mill., GEF/UNDP) 9. Management of Benguela Current Marine Ecosystem (USD 15.1, UNDP/GEF) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Southern African Wildlife College (GTZ, WWF) 2. Regional education programme in fisheries, University of Namibia (NOK 22 mill., Norway) 3. Desert Research Foundation, Namibia (NOK 10 mill., Norway) 4. Governance of Africa's Natural Resources, South African Institute of International Affairs (NOK 11 mill., Norway) 5. Community Based Natural Resources Capacity Building Programme – WWF (NOK 31.1 mill., Norway) 6. Southern Africa Sustainable Use Specialist Group in cooperation with IUCN (NOK 7 mill., Norway) 7. SADC Regional Environmental Education Programme (€2.79 mill., Sweden) 8. Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (USAID, EU, DFID, Southern Africa Trust and others) 9. Three Nations Namib Desert Transfrontier Conservation Area/Conservation International (Switzerland) 10. Southern African Network for Biosciences (Canada and others) 11. Earthlife Africa/Southern African Regional Climate Action Network – SARCAN (Danida and others) 12. Zambezi Wetlands/IUCN (USD 4.9 mill., CIDA) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The EU-funded Central African Forestry Management Programme (ECOFAC) has a component (€5 mill.) on SADC/DRC 2. African Monitoring of Environment for Sustainable Development – AMEST (€3 mill., SADC component, EU) 3. There are several GEF-funded projects involving Southern Africa

Thematic group 7: HIV/AIDS

SADC, public institutions	Non-state actors	Others/Comments
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Joint Financing and Technical Cooperation Agreement with SADC HIV/AIDS Unit (Sweden, Netherlands, DFID, Irish Aid, UNAIDS and GTZ) 2. Multi-sectoral response to HIV and AIDS (€7.6 mill., EU) 3. Technical assistance, orphans and vulnerable children (REPSI) 4. HIV/AIDS, Malaria and TB (USD 29.40 mill., ADB) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Project Support Group (PSG) Regional HIV/AIDS Programme (Netherlands, Norway) 2. Regional Psycho-Social Support to orphaned and vulnerable children (REPSI), (Switzerland, Sweden) 3. Media in Education Trust – MiET (Netherlands, Switzerland) 4. Soul City Institute (Netherlands, DFID, EU) 5. Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information Dissemination Service (Sweden and others) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Other social and human development projects with SADC: a: Health Protocol Implementation Plan (World Bank); b: SADC Gender Unit (Sweden, UNDP and (planned) Canada); c: SADC Occupational Health and Safety (Sweden); d: Health and Development Innovative Consortium/universities (EU); and e: SADC Pharmaceutical Task Force (UNDP) 2. Several donor agencies are supporting cooperation between universities in the region 3. ADB provides USD 24 mill. for capacity building in open and distance learning 4. DFID has £17.3 mill. programme to roll back malaria, and integrated management of childhood disease 5. Several donor agencies are funding a multi-country Health Information Systems Project implemented by the University of the Western Cape and others

Thematic group 8: Politics, Defence and Security

SADC, public institutions	Non-state actors	Others/comments
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Support to Organ directorate (GTZ) 2. Bridging support to SADC Peace Building (pipeline, UNDP) 3. SADC Parliamentary Forum (USAID, ACBF, Sweden) 	<p>A: Media</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Media Institute of Southern Africa – MISA (Nordic countries) 2. Southern Africa Media Training Trust (Nordic countries, Netherlands, GTZ, OSISA, USAID) 3. Highway Africa News Agency/Rhodes University (Switzerland) <p>B: Elections</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (Nordic countries, Switzerland, DFID, USAID, GTZ, Canada, EU, OSISA and others) <p>C: Democratisation</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. IDASA (Switzerland, Norway, USAID) 2. Centre for Social Accountability – Rhodes University (Switzerland) 3. Southern African Human Rights Trust (Sweden, Norway, Netherlands) 4. SADC Lawyers Association (Sweden) 5. Women and Law in Southern Africa, Zimbabwe (Norway and others) 6. Southern African Legal Assistance Network (Canada, Switzerland) <p>D: Anti-corruption</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Institute for Security Studies (Norway) 2. Southern Africa Human Rights Trust (Norway) 3. Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (World Bank and others) <p>E: Migration</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Southern Africa Migration Project (DFID, CIDA) 2. Southern Africa Counter Trafficking Programme – IOM (US State Department, Norway) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Several donor agencies have major Africa wide programmes in peace and security which have components available for SADC. This includes the EU, UK/DFID and Denmark 2. Several donors provide funding for NEPAD/APRM with components for SADC region (EU, DFID, Switzerland and others) 3. USAID has a USD 15.2 mill. programme in improved democratic governance in Southern Africa with several partners.

Thematic group 8: Politics, Defence and Security (continued)

SADC, public institutions	Non-state actors	Others/comments
	F: Peace and Security	
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Institute for Security Studies (Scandinavian countries, UK/DFID, Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada, US, Australia and others) 2. Southern Africa Defence and Security Management Network (Denmark, IDRC, DFID) 3. Centre for Conflict Resolution (Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and others) 4. IDASA (DFID-Kinshasa) 5. African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (Norway, Sweden and others) 6. SaferAfrica (EU, Norway, UK/DFID, Netherlands, Germany) 	

Thematic group 9: Capacity building and crosscutting

SADC, public institutions	Non-state actors	Others/comments
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Regional Integration and Capacity Building Programme (€15.6 mill., EU – old/current) + Capacity building for regional integration (€12.5 mill., EU, planned/new) 2. Statistical Training Programme (€4.8, EU) 3. Technical cooperation facility (€3.7 mill., EU) 4. Disaster Risk Management (€1.8 mill., EU, new) 5. ICT support to Secretariat (Finland) 6. Institutional capacity building and leadership/ management development (GTZ) 7. Capacity building and institutional development (USD 1 mill., Japan) 8. Capacity building and institutional development (USD 0.8 mill., World Bank) 9. Statistical capacity building for poverty reduction (World Bank) 10. SADC Project Preparation and Development Facility (€ 4.8 mill., Germany, under preparation) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA)/FOPRISA (NOK 14.9 mill., Norway) 2. Tralac/Nepru – Yearbook on Regional Integration (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung) 3. TIPS/Southern African Development Research Network – SADRN (IDRC) 4. Southern Africa Trust (DFID, Canada and others) 5. Southern Africa Regional Poverty Network (DFID, IDRC and others) 6. SADC Council of NGOs (Southern Africa Trust) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Many donors agencies also provide funding to the African Capacity Building Foundation which funds a range of projects in Africa, including some linked to regional cooperation in SADC



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ISBN 978-99912-71-40-8

