



# The 2<sup>nd</sup> Meeting of the China-Africa Think Tanks Forum

October 12-13, 2012  
Bishoftu, Ethiopia







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
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## Message from the Director Institute of African Studies Zhejiang Normal University

Entering the 2<sup>nd</sup> decade of the new century, the political, economic and cultural cooperation between China and Africa has enjoyed rapid development within the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). China, the largest developing country, and Africa, the continent with the most developing countries, boast enormous potential for promoting world peace, stability and development through solidarity and cooperation.

China-Africa Think Tanks Forum (CATTF) is a high-end platform for academic exchanges and ideological dialogue between China and Africa. While sticking to the governing tenets of *Civil Initiative, Government Support, Frank Dialogue and Consensus Building*, CATTF aims to promote academic research, boost mutual understanding, and expand Sino-African consensus. We are looking to generate policy recommendations for the sustainable development of Sino-African relations in the new era, to benefit the Chinese and African people.

CATTF is organized by Zhejiang Normal University, with generous support from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, and China Development Bank. Collaborating institutions include China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), the Institute of West Asian and African Affairs (IWAAS) under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS).



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As a sidelined event of the 8<sup>th</sup> Senior Officials Meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the 1<sup>st</sup> Meeting of the China-Africa Think Tanks Forum (CATTF) was held in Hangzhou and Jinhua of east China's Zhejiang Province in October 2011. This meeting was attended by more than 300 officials, scholars and entrepreneurs from China, African countries, the African Union Commission and other regional organizations. The meeting was widely praised and acknowledged for its open atmosphere and academic output. In a speech delivered at the 5<sup>th</sup> FOCAC Ministerial Meeting, President Hu Jintao acknowledged CATTF as one of the main events for boosting Sino-African cultural exchanges. Article 6.4 of the 5<sup>th</sup> FOCAC Ministerial Meeting Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015) notes the holding of the first FOCAC Think Tanks Forum and its results and acknowledges that the forum has created a new pattern of interactions and exchanges between the academia of China and Africa, and pledges to institutionalize the forum and promote the building of long-term and stable cooperation between the academia of China and African countries.

To further develop CATTF, the Institute of African Studies (IAS) of Zhejiang Normal University and the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University has joined hands to host the 2<sup>nd</sup> Meeting of the CATTF in Ethiopia October 12<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup>, 2012. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Embassy in Ethiopia provided generous support for this gathering. This is the first time for CATTF to be held in an African country in partnership with African think tanks. Over 80 officials, scholars, and media/enterprise representatives from China, Africa, international organizations and some western countries are attending the meeting.

The theme of the 2<sup>nd</sup> CATTF meeting is "Chinese and African Common Interests: Current Issues and Future Perspectives in Governance, Peace and Security". We expect and believe the jointly-hosted 2<sup>nd</sup> CATTF meeting will achieve positive results and elevate the cooperation and dialogue between Chinese and African think tanks to a new level.

**Prof. Liu Hongwu**





## Message from the Director Institute for Peace and Security Studies Addis Ababa University

China-Africa relations of modern times began in the 1950s, when the new China was established and when African States were breaking free of their colonial yoke. China's relationship in the initial years was mainly focused on supporting African liberation movements, mainly guided by ideological beliefs. The dynamics of the relationship changed after the Chinese economic reforms of the 1980s and coincidentally after most African countries won their fights for independence. Economic and geo-strategic interests rather than the desire to export a specific political philosophy drive China's current relationship with Africa.

Frustrated by complex donor policies and the high overhead costs of multilateral development projects, African governments continue to appreciate the alternative presented by China in an increasingly multipolar world. China is a nation that knows what it means to be poor and it is considered as a nation that has developed, and perfected, a successful wealth creation formula, which it is willing to share with developing countries. As a result, China's importance in African politics, governance and development is growing. The launching of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) at the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and the increasingly higher participation of African Heads of States and Governments in the Forum is evidence to this growing importance.



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This growing relationship has become the focus of much scrutiny in Africa, Europe and North America. Many argue that Chinese policies in Africa are inferior to its western counterparts. A close examination however, illustrates that such allegations do not hold water.

Chinese investment in Africa is accused of focusing on consumer goods; a business strategy that apparently benefits African consumers by offering affordable goods of reasonable quality, while at the same time increasing unemployment as African industries are unable to compete. As much as this is true, the same can be said about Africa's trade with the North America or the European Union trade blocs, in which agricultural subsidies for their own produce and higher tariffs for certain African produce continue to weaken the competitive edge of African producers and exporters.

Chinese investment in the continent is also criticized for being opportunistic, in the sense that companies look for niche markets regardless of the political environment, often taking up investment opportunities ignored or even relinquished by others. Chinese companies are also perceived to be willing to take greater financial risks than their western competitors. While it is true that Beijing is backing the expansion of its private and state-owned enterprises into Africa through soft loans and export credits, this policy is not inherently different from the behavior of other governments. It is also true that governments and companies from Europe and North America are quite willing to ignore bad governance and human rights abuses, despite the strict regulatory frameworks they swear to adhere to. This is clear in places such as Angola, Chad, Equatorial-Guinea, Nigeria and recently Eritrea, where oil and other precious minerals exploration rights are at stake. It would be hypocritical to expect China and others to adhere to higher ethical standards than their competitors.

China is also accused of supplying arms to 'rogue states' in Africa but again, a close examination of the available evidence shows that these accusations are unfounded. The Middle East and Asia are the main destinations of Chinese arms exports, a mere 7% of Chinese arms exports reach Africa. In terms of global sales in the decade between 1998 and 2007, the United States, Russia and Germany were the biggest exporters of arms to Africa, while China held the tenth position. Even in Sudan, a country of key strategic importance to Beijing, 87% of all arms procurements between 2003 and 2007 came from Russia, with China accounting for only 8% during the same period (SIPRI, 2008).



Therefore, one can conclude that Beijing's role in Africa is operating much like other, more established, powers such as the United States, Great Britain or France. The historic track record of Western governments in propping up dictatorships, clandestine arms transfers and the promotion of trade interests through financial aid is every bit as bad as Beijing's current controversial policies, a point often overlooked outside the continent.

The key problem for us, Africans, is that our economies are weak in value creation. What our workers and factories produce is produced more efficiently, with better quality and at lower cost, by other economies. In such circumstances, making money is easier through rent than through value creation. African governments should be capable of guiding their private sector towards value creation, a key factor for achieving a sustainable competitive edge in the global market. Furthermore, partnerships that Africa forges should be targeted to enhance such an environment. By the same token, a 'rent collecting' Africa cannot be a long-term partner for China. A relationship forged around this drive is the only relationship that can be considered as a genuine South-South cooperation.

Discussing the China-Africa relationship can only be of any practical significance if taken from the perspective of whether or not it is driven by a genuine spirit of South-South cooperation in a sustainable manner. Chinese foreign policy led by a policy of 'non-interference' should by no means be misconstrued as 'indifference' to African problems and realities. We know China participates in development assistance, humanitarian aid and UN-led peace support operations in Africa. It is therefore in line with its policy to tailor its relationships to African realities.

The FOCAC provides a unique and genuine opportunity for both entities to mold their relationship in a way that serves their long-term interests on the basis of mutual respect and equality. Furthermore, the CATTF serves as a platform for African and Chinese scholars and academics to critically question Sino-African relations and propose alternative pathways. This gives African researchers and scholars the opportunity to learn from past mistakes and assist their governments in developing a sustainable and fruitful relationship, which enormously benefits the African people.



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The 2<sup>nd</sup> CATTF, under the theme, “Chinese and African Common Interests: Current Issues and Future perspectives in Governance, Peace and Security”, is designed to facilitate ways for the exchange of ideas and conduct cooperative works in the stated areas.

The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University envisages becoming a center of excellence in peace and security research, training and outreach in Africa through the provision of valuable knowledge and insight to national and international governments and organizations, as well as creating a network of key personalities and institutions in Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa and Africa as a whole. It is based on this vision that the Institute decided to co-host this 2<sup>nd</sup> Meeting of CATTF.

The Forum is organized in a manner that promotes free discussion under the basic tenets of “Civil Initiative, Government Support, Frank Dialogue, and Seeking Consensus”. Papers and the notes written by several researchers will not be presented in their entirety to the Forum, and while included in this booklet, they are only meant to serve as starters to the discussions that will be generated during the Forum. The Forum is organized into plenary sessions, group discussions and breakaway sessions, which will deliberate on specific in-depth themes. Discussion groups will be organized around the following four sub-themes:

1. Perspectives on the potential of China-Africa relations to improve governance, peace and security
2. Debating the effectiveness of China’s role in regional integration, peacebuilding and the non-interference policy
3. Chinese alternative to economic and social development in Africa
4. Challenges and opportunities in China-Africa relations: cases from Eastern and Southern Africa.

Each group is expected to produce consolidated points to be presented to the plenary through group representatives. Through this process, we expect serious policy recommendations as a result of the Forum’s deliberations.

It is the hope and firm belief of IPSS that the Forum will be a great success in attaining its aims for promoting mutual understanding, consolidating friendship and developing policy options and recommendations to China-Africa policy organs.

**Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe**



## Background Information on the China-Africa Think Tanks Forum

The China-Africa Think Tanks Forum (CATTF) is an initiative launched by Zhejiang Normal University (ZNU) in 2011 to create a shared platform for dialogue and exchanges between Chinese and African think tanks. It has since been warmly acknowledged and supported by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a growing number of government, corporate and academic partners.

CATTF is built on the governing tenets of *Civil Initiative, Government Support, Frank Dialogue and Consensus Building*. With ZNU as its host, CATTF is organized under the auspices of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).

The People's Government of Zhejiang Province, China Development Bank and the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs have also provided enormous support. Collaborating institutions include the Institute of West Asian and African Affairs (IWAAS) under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) and China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) at Addis Ababa University has joined the network in 2012 as a co-host for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Meeting of CATTF. IAS and the China-Africa International Business School (CAIBS) at ZNU act as CATTF's standing secretariat.

CATTF meetings bring together officials, think tank representatives, scholars, entrepreneurs and media from China, Africa and other parts of the world to discuss Sino-African relations and Africa's development issues, in a bid to generate insightful analyses and policy recommendations for the betterment of the evolving Sino-African relationship.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Meeting of CATTF was held in Hangzhou and Jinhua in east China's Zhejiang Province October 27-29, 2011 with the theme of *Sino-African Relations in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Decade of the New Century*. As a sideline event of the 8<sup>th</sup> Senior Officials Meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the three-day meeting was attended by nearly 300 officials and scholars from China and 27 African countries, and



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representatives from the African Union Commission and other regional organizations. Former Ghanaian President Jerry John Rawlings and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun delivered keynote speeches at the meeting.

The Beijing Action Plan of the 5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting of FOCAC (2013-2015) points out that CATTF has created a new pattern of academic interactions and exchanges between the academia of China and Africa and will be institutionalized for nurturing a long-term and stable cooperative relationship between Chinese and African academics.

## Background Information on the Organizers

### I. Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University

IPSS is a premier institute of higher education for peace and security studies in the region. Its mission is to promote peace and security in Ethiopia and Africa at large through education, research and professional development. The Institute produces skilled professionals in conflict prevention, management, resolution as well as in peace building, and promotes the values of a democratic and peaceful society.



### History

The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) was established at *Addis Ababa University* (AAU) in 2007 following a tripartite agreement between AAU, the *Royal Danish Embassy in Ethiopia*, and the *University for Peace Africa Programme*. The vision of a premier higher learning and research institution on peace and security studies in the Horn of Africa received further stimulation when AAU named IPSS one of its five Centres of Excellence as early as 2010.

Since its inception, IPSS promotes peace and security through research, education, and outreach. We provide above-standard academic and professional training for conflict analysis and conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and peacebuilding with an all-African outlook. The Institute organises conferences, panel discussions, briefing sessions, and seminars both to conduct and disseminate research and expertise and to promote values of a democratic and peaceful





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society. With our activities, we reach out to communities as much as to international and Africans institutions to build a community of knowledge and practice for solving contemporary challenges to peace and security in Africa.

### **In a nutshell, IPSS engages in:**

- Training for peace and conflict prevention, management and resolution
- Linking scholarly research with policy development
- Reaching out to make peace enforcement a community effort
- Developing and enriching students' inquisitive abilities, fostering creativity and personal commitment

### **Mission and Vision**

Within this outlook, the partnership with the African Union (AU), *the Africa Peace and Security Programme*, operates with the vision of a premier source for AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of substantial and high-quality contributions towards promoting practical African led-solutions for peace and security challenges. The APSP mission includes capacity development of professionals by:

1. The provision of substantial, first-rate practical *education and training* based on a deep understanding of the issues as well as on cutting edge adult education methodologies;
2. Developing data and concepts further through applied *research*;
3. Helping to develop conceptual orientation for action and programme design among top decision-makers and experts and to provide relevant practical advice to AU and RECs;
4. Bringing together institutions with relevant expertise from all sectors of African social and political life and facilitate their collaboration with the AU and RECs; and by supporting the AU in reaching out to them.

### **The Africa Peace And Security Programme (APSP)**

APSP is a joint programme of the African Union and Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of the Addis Ababa University, mandated by the African Union's Executive Council to take up the intellectual challenge of finding African-led solutions to peace and security in Africa.

Our vision is to be a premier source for the AU and RECs of substantial and high quality contributions towards promoting the practice of African-led solutions for peace and security challenges.



## II. Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University

The Institute of African Studies (IAS) at Zhejiang Normal University (ZNU) was founded in 2007. It is the biggest and first of its kind dedicated exclusively to the comprehensive study of Africa at Chinese higher-learning institutions. IAS seeks to build on its experiences and expertise in African studies to integrate academic research, personnel training, policy recommendations and international exchanges, and strives to contribute to China's foreign policy-making, regional development and the development of ZNU.



ZNU has been involved in Africa-related work since the 1990s. In 1996, ZNU established the Chinese Language Teaching Center (which was transformed into a Confucius Institute in 2007) at the University of Yaoundé II. In 2001, ZNU began to undertake educational aid and training programs within the framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). In 2003, ZNU was designated as a Ministry of Education (MOE) Base for Delivering Educational Aid to Foreign Countries. The Center for African Educational Studies was founded in the same year. In 2006, ZNU hosted the first China-Africa University Presidents Forum organized by the MOE.

**On September 1, 2007, IAS was founded with the support of the MOE.** Following the founding of IAS, the Center for FOCAC Studies was established with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). ZNU is also designated as the MOE Base for Area and Country-specific



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Studies, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) Training Base for Delivering Aid of Primary Education to Foreign Countries.

ZNU is selected by the MFA and the MOE as a key partner institution for the implementation of the “Sino-African Joint Research and Exchange Program” and the “Chinese and African Universities 20+20 Cooperation Plan”. ZNU is also listed as an institution for African studies in the “International and Area Studies Program” supported by China Scholarship Council.

IAS has Professor Liu Hongwu (chair professor of Zhejiang Provincial Government), an international renowned expert on African studies and the winner of the Award for Contributions to China-Africa Friendship, as its director. IAS currently has 29 full-time personnel, of whom four are professors (of whom two are PhD supervisors) and ten associate professors. The research team of IAS is made up of PhD graduates from China’s distinguished universities. Some of the faculty members have won state-level awards for teaching achievements.

IAS has four research centers, namely, the Center for the Study of African Politics and International Relations, the Center for African Economic Studies, the Center for African Educational Studies and the Center for African Historical and Cultural Studies. IAS is commissioned by the MOE to compile the yearly Africa Development Report (Chinese), and is listed as a Key Research Base for Philosophy and Social Science of Zhejiang Province. Its faculty is listed as a Key Innovation Team of Zhejiang Province.

IAS has an Africa Museum and a library specialized in African studies. IAS has set up a professional database for African studies and an academic website (<http://ias.zjnu.cn>) in Chinese, French, Hausa and Swahili. It has launched the journal of *African Studies* (Chinese), highlighting the latest developments in China’s African studies. IAS offers three-year master programs in African politics, African education, African history, etc. and jointly trains postgraduates with several partner institutions in Africa.

IAS sticks to the ideals of “Affection for Africa, Chinese Characteristics and Global Perspective”, and focuses on the comprehensive study of Africa’s development and Sino-African cooperative relations. The institute has undertaken various international cooperation projects and a number of projects supported by the State Social Science Fund, the MOE, the MFA, the International Department of the Central committee



of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and China Development Bank. IAS has hosted international conferences in Africa and has sent faculty members to various African countries to do field research. IAS produces occasional policy recommendations, some of which have been accepted by various departments of the Chinese government. IAS has launched a long-term project to compile the 120-volume *Series of African Studies* (Chinese). In 2011, IAS successfully hosted the 1<sup>st</sup> Meeting of the China-Africa Think Tanks Forum (CATTF), creating a shared platform for dialogue and exchanges between Chinese and African think tanks.

Since its founding, IAS has welcomed numerous senior officials from African countries and the AU (including heads of state and government), senior Chinese officials, as well as a continual flow of renowned Africa experts and representatives of prestigious institutions/organizations visiting ZNU. The network of academic advisers, honorary/guest professors, visiting scholars and international students is rapidly growing.

With its top-class research facilities and atmosphere of Africanness, IAS has become an ideal place for the study of Africa. IAS seeks cooperation of various forms with institutions/organizations around the world for the advancement of African studies and the study of Sino-African relations.



## Tentative Programme for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Meeting of the China-Africa Think Tanks Forum

*Kuriftu Resort, Bishoftu*

**October 12, 2012  
Morning (9:00 - 12:00)**

**Venue: Balambaras Hall**

### **Opening Ceremony (Time 9:00-10:20)**

**MC - Liu Hongwu**

No.	Speakers	Affiliation	Time
1	TBC	MoFA, Ethiopia	9:00 - 9:10
2	Zheng Jiwei	Vice Governor, Zhejiang Province	9:10 - 9:20
3	Carlos Lopes	Executive Secretary, UNECA; Under Secretary-General, UN	9:20 - 9:30
4	Lu Shaye	Director-General, Department of African Affairs, MOFA, P. R. China	9:30 - 9:40
5	Xie Xiaoyan	Ambassador, Embassy of the P. R. China to Ethiopia	9:40 - 9:50
6	Admasu Tsegaye	President of AAU	9:50 - 10:00
7	Chen Dexi	Chairman, University Council, Zhejiang Normal University	10:00 - 10:10
8	Kefyalew Ayana	Mayor, Bishoftu Town	10:10 - 10:20

**10:20 - 10:40 - Tea Break and Group Picture**

### **Keynote Speeches (Time 10:40 - 12:00)**

**MC - Michelle Ndiaye Ntab**

No.	Speakers	Affiliation	Time
1	Tian Wedong	Deputy Director General, Global Cooperation Department, China Development Bank	10:40 - 10:50
2	TBC	African Union (AU)	10:50 - 11:00
3	Yang Lihua	Institute of West Asian & African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences	11:00 - 11:10



4	Wang Yizhou	Associate Dean, School of International Studies, Peking University	11:10 - 11:20
5	Andreas Eshete	Prime Minister's Office, FDRE	11:20 - 11:30
6	Zhu Liqun	Vice-president, China Foreign Affairs University	11:30 - 11:40
7	Mulugeta Gebrehiwot	Director, IPSS	11:40 - 11:50

**11:50 - 12:10 - Press Conference**

**12:00 - 13:00 - Lunch Break**

**October 12, 2012  
Afternoon (13:00 - 20:15)**

**Parallel 4 Breakaway Sessions**

Breakaway session 1: Perspectives on the potential of China-Africa relations to improve governance, peace and security				Venue Tiruwork Hall
No.	Title	Presenter	Moderator	Time
1	China's rise and Africa's strategic opportunity	Abdul Mohammed	Wang Yizhou and Bernard Mumpasi Lututala	13:00 - 13:10
2	China's engagements with Africa: implications for South-South cooperation	Amadu Sesay		13:10 - 13:20
3	Constructing the new partnership relations: the role of China-African cooperation in building the new international relations	Su Changhe		13:20 - 13:30
4	China-Africa relations: areas of reform for a sustainable partnership	Mehari Taddele Maru		13:30 - 13:40
5	Sino-African relations in the perspective of the new global political-economic structure	Shi Zhan		13:40 - 13:50
Discussion				13:50 - 15:00



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Tea/Coffee Break			15:00 - 15:30
6	China's potential for aiding governance, peace and security in Africa: understanding the state-society complex	Ian Taylor      Su Changhe and Abdul Mohamed	15:30-15:40
7	Sino-African relation in the perspective of the new structure of global political-economical relations	Zhu Liqun	15:40 - 15:50
8	Development through peace: practical steps for deepening China-Africa cooperation in the field of peace and security	Daniel Kipkosgei Kiptugen	15:50 - 16:00
9	What's new role for emerging China in Africa peace process: some thoughts and clues for discussion	Wang Yizhou	16:00 - 16:10
10	Challenges and opportunities for China-Africa cooperation in developing governance, peace and security in Africa in the new global era	Bernard Mumpasi Lututala	16:10 - 16:20
11	On China's role in promoting peace and security in Africa	Sheng Hongsheng	16:20 - 16:30
Discussion			16:30 - 17:30
Dinner			17:30 - 19:00
12	Fostering African governance and development through multilateral cooperation between China and traditional donors: the case of the China-DAC Study Group	Anna Katharina Stahl      Ian Taylor and Zhu Liqun	19:00 - 19:10



13	What about civil society? The need for a debate on differences and consensus on the role of civil society in Sino-African relations	Sarah Vaes	19:10 - 19:20
14	China-Africa cooperation without meaningful engagement with women will fail	Madelein Mkunu	19:20 - 19:30
Discussion			19:30 - 20:15

Breakaway Session 2: Debating the effectiveness of China's role in regional integration, peacebuilding and the non-interference policy				Venue: Mintewab Hall
No.	Title	Presenter	Moderator	Time
1	New dimensions for African unity, integration and development: sharing the Chinese experience	Phyllis Johnson	Pang Zhongying and TBC	13:00 - 13:10
2	Africa regional integration and Sino-Africa cooperation: opportunities and challenges	Tang Xiao		13:10 - 13:20
3	China's evolving policy towards peace and security in Africa: Constructing a new paradigm for peacebuilding?	Chris Alden		13:20 - 13:30
4	China and UN peacekeeping operations in Africa	K. Mathews		13:30 - 13:40
5	Strengthening China-Africa peacekeeping support operations for peace and stability in Africa	Lazarus Kubasu Nolasco		13:40 - 13:50
Discussion				13:50 - 15:00
Tea/ Coffee Break				15:00 - 15:30



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6	Africa and China's non-interference policy: towards peace enhancement in Africa	Admore Mupoki Kambudzi	Tang Xiao and Chris Alden	15:30 - 15:40
7	Africa in a multi-polar world and the prospect of Sino-Africa cooperation	Yang Lihua		15:40 - 15:50
8	Issues of non-interference in China's East African oil and gas sector	Ross Anthony		15:50 - 16:00
9	The principle and its practice: the re-adaptation of China's "non-interference" to the new context of China-Africa ties	Pang Zhongying		16:00 - 16:10
10	Analysing the extent to which China uses the non-interference policy to promote peace and security in Africa	Takavafira Zhou		16:10 - 16:20
Discussion				16:20 - 17:30
Dinner				17:30 - 19:00
11	Between pragmatism and non interference: China in Africa's complex security challenges	Bonnie Ayodele	Ross Anthony and Yang Lihua	19:00-19:10
12	Diplomatic and strategic position of China in the Arab Spring	Ahmed Hagagg		19:10 - 19:20
13	China's relations with Sudan and South Sudan and its role in peace between the two Sudans	Jiang Hengkun		19:20-19:30
Discussion				19:30 - 20:15





Breakaway Session 3: Chinese alternative to economic and social development in Africa				Venue: Balambaras Hall
No.	Title	Presenter	Moderator	Time
1	China-Africa cooperation under new situation: opportunities and challenges	Peng Keyu	Adeolu O. Adewuyi and Sheng Hongsheng	13:00 - 13:10
2	Harnessing Chinese enterprise in Africa for better governance, peace and security	Bob Ezeh		13:10 - 13:20
3	Challenges for Sino-African relations in the new era and policy proposals	Liu Youfa		13:20 - 13:30
4	China – Africa relations, with special reference to North Africa	Hussein El Kamel		13:30 - 13:40
5	Booming Sino-Maghreb economic relations: incentive towards a new European cooperation governance and partnership?	Thierry Pairault		13:40 - 13:50
Discussion				13:50 - 15:00
Tea/Coffee Break				15:00 - 15:30
6	New impetus of African development and new path to sustainable development of China-Africa relation	Liu Hongwu	Liu Youfa and Hussein El Kamel	15:30 - 15:40
7	How to stipulate the Chinese private business to go to Africa?	Zhang Xiaofeng		15:40 - 15:50
8	The main characters and trends of China's FDI in Africa	Yao Guimei		15:50 - 16:00



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9	Understanding African perception of China: a case study through CSR practice of Chinese corporations	Sean Ding and Marjorie Perry	16:00 - 16:10
Discussion			16:10 - 17:30
Dinner			17:30 - 19:00
10	Chinese investment in Africa: an investigation of the opportunities and challenges for peace and security in Zimbabwe	Lawrence Mhandara Yao Guimei and Marjorie Perry	19:00 - 19:10
11	China's role in oil resource governance in Niger Delta region	Wang XueJun	19:10 - 19:20
12	Governance and security challenges associated with China-Nigeria trade and investment relations	Adeolu O. Adewuyi	19:20-19:30
Discussion			19:30 - 20:15

Breakaway Session 4: Challenges and opportunities in China-Africa relations: cases from Eastern and Southern Africa				Venue: Girum Hall
No.	Title	Presenter	Moderator	Time
1	Beyond humanitarianism: China's role in Darfur	Hassan E. Ahmed	Liu Guijin and Njunga M. Mulikita	13:00 - 13:10
2	Analysing China's contribution to peace in the North and South Sudan conflict: pre and post Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)	Getachew Zeru and Dawit Yohannes		13:10 - 13:20
3	BRICS and Sino-African cooperation	Chen Yugang		13:20 - 13:30



4	Balancing politic with economic realities: China intervention in Sudan and South Sudan oil and border conflicts	David Udofia	13:30 - 13:40
5	How far could China's non-interference policy be practical in protecting Chinese and African peoples' interests? The case of Sudan-South Sudan conflict before and after the secession	Khalid Ali El Amin	13:40 - 13:50
6	The reluctant peacemaker: China and the two Sudans	Steven Kuo	13:50 - 14:00

Discussion	14:00 - 15:00
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Tea/Coffee Break	15:00 - 15:30
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7	The ambiguity of China's non-interference policy as a drawback to peace and stability in the Sudan	Valery Ferim	Chen Yugang and Hassan E. Ahmed	15:30 - 15:40
8	China's relations with Sudan and South Sudan: how to define common interests?	Liu Guijin		15:40 - 15:50
9	Chinese investment and African peace and security: the case of Ethiopia	Yejoo Kim		15:50 - 16:00
10	China in Ethiopia's infrastructure sector: responsibility and sustainability	Xiao Yuhua		16:00 - 16:10
11	Between the Orient and the Horn: China-Africa Cooperation over the Development of Transboundary Rivers	Fasil Amdetsion		16:10 - 16:20
12	China's engagement in the diplomacy of conflict management in the Horn of Africa region	Anita Kiamba		16:20 - 16:30



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Discussion			16:30 - 17:30
Dinner			17:30 - 19:00
13	Zambia's 2011 political transition: what impact on China-Zambia relations?	Njunga M. Mulikita      Anita Kiamba and Shi Zhan	19:00 - 19:10
14	Evading punishment: an analysis of Zimbabwe's relations with China in an age of sanctions	Ronald Chipaike	19:10 - 19:20
15	China, a critical factor in the Zimbabwe's political crisis and solutions	Charity Manyeruke	19:20 - 19:30
Discussion			19:30 - 20:15



October 13, 2012  
Morning (8:15 - 11:40)

Venue: Balambaras Hall

Wrap-up (8:30 - 10:30)

Moderator: Liu Hongwu and Andreas Eshete

No.	Speakers	Affiliation	Time
1	Abdul Mohammed	Representing Breakaway Group 1	8:30 - 8:50
2	Pang Zhongying	Representing Breakaway Group 2	8:50 - 9:10
3	Liu Youfa	Representing Breakaway Group 3	9:10 - 9:30
4	Michael Njunga Mulikita	Representing Breakaway Group 4	9:30 - 9:50
Discussion			9:50 - 10:50
Tea/Coffee Break			10:50 - 11:10
1	Liu Guijin	China-Africa International Business School, Zhejiang Normal University	11:10 - 11:30
2	Mulugeta Gebrehiwot	Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University	11:30 - 11:50
Lunch			11:50 - 13:00
Check out			13:00 - 14:00
Visit to Eastern Industrial Zone, Dukem			
• Bus Ride			14:00 - 14:30
• Site Visit			14:30 - 15:30
Visit to the African Union Compound			
• Bus Ride			15:30 - 16:30
• Site Visit			16:30 - 17:30



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


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## Summary Papers and Abstracts

### Breakaway Session 1: Perspectives on the potential of China-Africa relations to improve governance, peace and security

#### China's Rise and Africa's Strategic Opportunity

*Abdul Mohammed*

The two regions of the world rising the fastest today are China and Africa. In barely a generation, China has undergone an astonishing economic transformation, which has social and political consequences for the entire world. Africa is also rising, on the verge of embarking upon a major economic and political transformation that at last fulfils the promise of independence half a century ago.

There is a universal acknowledgement, as recently expressed in an article in the Economist magazine that Africa now looks like South-East Asia a few decades ago – ready to take off. And Africa's rise is facilitated by China's: the new superpower is not only fast becoming the continent's major trading partner and source of foreign investment, but is also providing an alternative paradigm for social and economic development.

In economic terms, the rise of Africa is based on the new global environment, with its high demand for African resources and commodities. This demand is driven by the emerging economies, such as China and India. As a result, the emerging countries are flooding Africa with new investment and an unprecedented level of economic activity. In many countries across Africa, we can now see the preconditions of industrialisation.

On an economic level, China is therefore important to Africa in a number of respects:

1. In providing finance;
2. In helping to construct critical infrastructure such as roads, which are key to development (as seen in Ethiopia, which has transformed the accessibility of its rural areas over the past five years);
3. In supporting institutions that are conducive to such development;
4. Through appropriate skills transfer; and
5. Through trade. In this area, though, Africa needs to seek a fairer



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balance, so that the sale of cheap Chinese products no longer undermines the continent's small businesses.

As well as in terms of economic relations, China is also important to Africa as an economic model. In the 1970s and 80s, African development was forced into the straitjacket of the so-called "Washington consensus", with its structural adjustment programmes. Even though that model was partially discredited, it has become clear that aid remains the main component of the relationship between Africa and the West, which has reached its limits. The concept of "Fair Trade" was tried, but did not advance. The primary focus of the US and European countries in Africa continues to be their existing model of development assistance.

By contrast, the hallmark of China's relationship with Africa is that it is not complicated either by a colonial history, or an agenda of moulding the continent in its preferred, imposed image. China does not preach. During the Cold War, African countries had a difficult choice between the two opposing blocs, neither of which reflected Africa's identity and aspirations. China's rise, unencumbered by an ideological agenda, allows African nations to choose their own path. China does not demand emulation, but rather allows Africa to develop its own model of multilateral interaction, engaging not only with China, Europe and the U.S, but also with other emerging powers such as India, Turkey and Brazil.

The new African model has been developed by a new generation of African economic leaders, exemplified by the late and much-missed Prime Minister Meles, President Mbeki, and the other architects of NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa's Development. This institution aims to take the lead in designing a comprehensive approach to the continent's development. The core of such an approach is not aid but reform: economic reform founded on and grounded in reform of the state.

In the era of structural adjustment, the state was vilified as an obstacle to development, while the private sector was glorified as its engine. But when the state was seen as the problem, and side-lined, it became clear that the whole economic system suffered. While the new approach acknowledges the problems presented by past predatory regimes, it insists that the state is indispensable. Development in Africa must have at its core capable, democratic and legitimate state structures. Their role is to manage development, to direct investment, to build infrastructure and to facilitate the activity of the private sector.



In this context, some elements of the Chinese model are hugely attractive to Africa, in particular a strong state and accelerated economic growth. There are some key lessons Africa can learn from Chinese development. First, in terms of *governance*, and the reconstitution of a credible and predictable developmental state. Second, the high premium China puts on *stability*, with the concepts of harmonisation and a social compact between the state and society to promote growth. Third, the need for *efficiency*, resulting in a good performance and increased credibility on the global stage. And finally, the need for *leadership* to achieve these goals, in the context of a redefinition of true leadership in Africa.

Nevertheless, the Chinese model does lack one important element. The relatively poor development means that the state can easily be constrained, introducing distortions that Africa must hope to avoid. Moreover, other elements of the African reality demand different strategies: for example, the challenges of ethnic and religious diversity, and the division of the continent into more than fifty sovereign entities. Africa can adapt its human rights philosophy from one continent, its institutional development and economic strategies from another.

In conclusion, Africa has a historic opportunity to break its cycle of aid and dependency. Breaking that cycle begins with intellectual emancipation: analysing the African situation objectively, with African interests at the centre, to develop specifically African goals, models and policies. Never before have the stars aligned so well for Africa: the continent should not miss this chance afforded by the rise of the BRICS to follow their path to middle-income status.

On recent evidence, China is ready to embrace Africa as a strategic partner. This was clear at the January summit of the African Union, at which the Speaker of the Chinese National Assembly spoke, putting forward a challenge to Africa to engage China strategically on economic, political and security issues, in order to shape a more equitable world order. To respond to this challenge, Africa needs to engage as a whole continent, and not to interact piecemeal on the tactical basis of short-term interest. The aim must be a common strategic approach centred on China's support to Africa's integration and internal trade.



## China's Engagements with Africa: Implications for South-South Cooperation

*Amadu Sesay and Lemuel E. Odeh*

Contemporary South-South cooperation between African, Asian and Latin American countries dates back to the historic Afro-Asian Bandung Conference of 1955. It is broadly perceived, especially in Africa, that South-South collaboration is a refreshing departure from the continent's traditional relations with its former colonisers in Europe and their American ally, and could promote economic and technological development of African countries and enhance the wellbeing of their citizens. However, and with specific reference to China's diverse engagements with Africa, this argument is worrisome for the important reasons provided below:

- While China seems to have a clear idea in terms of what it wants from Africa; access to strategic mineral and other resources to power its industrial growth and consolidate its new status as the world's second biggest economy, with the attendant increase in its political stature and influence across the world; African countries, with a few exceptions, do not seem to have a coherent template on what they want from China, apart from their eagerness to do business with the Asian country. Indeed, African countries are, at a level, in competition with one another for trade with China because of the nature of their exports to that country.
- Arising from the above point, it is doubtful if African countries are really getting a "fair deal" from China not only in their trade with Beijing, but also with respect to their efforts to promote sustainable peace, economic and technological development at home in the long-run, to improve the living standards of the African people. This point is particularly worrisome for two reasons; first because Africa's trade relations with China are believed to be different from those of their traditional partners in the North. Second, it is doubtful if African countries are investing the proceeds from the export of mineral and other vital resources to China in the critical sectors of their economies, to enhance their economic development and industrialization, which is indispensable if they are to reduce their



marginalization and enhance their relevance in global affairs in the future. We are not aware, for instance, that proceeds from the sale of Nigeria's oil and other important natural resources to China are being judiciously utilized to achieve the goals of its widely touted Vision 20-2020 agenda, to bring Nigeria to the largest 20 world economies by 2020. In other words, what is presently perceived as a 'favourable environment' in Africa's dealings with China may turn out to be ephemeral and could leave many countries and the continent much worse off than they now are in the future. If such a trend should continue, some African countries would end up, for want of a better word, falling in the deep "south" as the least developed and most disadvantaged set of countries in the Global South.

- China's policy of "non-interference" in the internal affairs of African countries is both deceptive and divisive, and could have the effect of preventing amicable resolution of conflicts such as that between Northern and Southern Sudan. Furthermore, Beijing's support for some African regimes irrespective of how obnoxious their domestic policies are, frustrates the struggle for human security, peace and democracy not only in the affected African countries but also and in the continent as a whole. Accordingly, African countries that have strategic economic and other relations with China should exert pressure on China to change its policies and stance on conflicts which majority of African states or continental and regional organizations like the AU, ECOWAS and other regional economic communities, RECs, are collectively interested in bringing to an amicable end to alleviate human suffering.
- Finally, African markets are flooded daily with sub-standard products from China, as a result of which young industries; textiles and even construction, have been put out of business in many African countries, thereby aggravating the labour situation. Aside from that, dumping sub-standard goods in Africa constitutes a serious health hazard and a financial haemorrhage, since such imports are sometimes financed by recourse to the foreign currency black market at exorbitant exchange rates.

If African countries are to derive long term sustainable 'gains' from their trade and political engagements with China, they must put in place a number of measures at the continental, regional and national levels. A good starting point will be for them to try and fully understand the Chinese's motives—and those of other major Southern countries like



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Brazil and India—for coming to Africa in the last couple of decades, a development which some analysts have described as “a new scramble for Africa”. Secondly, African countries should establish think tanks at the national and regional levels that are devoted to critical study and analyses of various aspects of China’s diverse relations with them. To do that effectively, however, would require specializations by African scholars in Chinese culture, economy and politics. Such experts should also ideally be readily available to advise their national governments and international organizations, as and when the need arises. This could lead to much more critical, dispassionate and focused relationships between Africa and China in the long run. That is not the case at the moment in many, if not most, African countries. Also, African scholars must engage their Chinese counterparts effectively to explore creative ways of promoting mutually beneficial long-term relations, devoid of exploitation and suspicion. As well, RECs should invest in programmes that would enhance their bargaining power with China. They should, for instance, create “China Desks” in their organizations that would be manned by personnel that are versed in Chinese culture, language, economy and politics. If that were to be done, the present suspicion and even open hostility against China’s presence in Africa would be mitigated in the long run.





## South-South Cooperation and China-Africa Relations

*Chen Yugang*

China-Africa relations are part of South-South relations with certain specific definitions. First is the political implication. Both China and African countries experienced Western colonialism. Independence was valuable and served as the first priority of national strategy. China and Africa can support each other and share their experiences. Second, political independence was the first step of liberalization from Western colonialism. Afterwards, both sides faced huge pressures in national building, including in economic development, social welfare and equality, a working political system, efficient and responsive government, law making, etc. There is also much experience both sides can share. Third, the end of the Cold War brought an end to the confrontation between East and West and the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism. However, it did not end the contradiction between North and South. On the contrary, this contradiction grew worse. The current global political economic system makes it difficult for the South to develop. Besides its battle with the North, South-South cooperation gets its special and particular meaning under this context. Finally, issues such as global warming arise under fast developing globalization. Developing countries become more disadvantaged in the fight of climate change, and developed countries have a particular obligation in this fight. Meanwhile, South-South cooperation can empower the capability of actors on either side.

Under the current situation, China-Africa relations can discuss several issues to enhance their mutual cooperation. First, because both China and Africa are in a similar stage of development in national building, the two sides can exchange their experiences in national governance. This could include party-building, social and economic development planning, crisis management, etc. Second, the two sides can discuss their economic cooperation based on the model of comparative advantage. African countries have abundant natural and labor resources. China has a big market and certain technologies. This cooperation is not so-called resource colonialism. China's own developing experience tells us that every country has to focus on its comparative advantage. In addition, we must keep in mind the environmental impact while exploiting natural resources. Third, the two sides can act together to fight global



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challenges. For example, there are many opportunities to collaborate on an issue such as food security. China and Africa can also develop green energy together for example solar power and hydropower.

Last but not least, education and cultural exchange is very important for both sides. China should host more students from African countries in various disciplines; meanwhile, African countries can host more visiting Chinese technicians and engineers. African countries can also



## Constructing the New Partnership Relations: The Role of China-Africa Cooperation in Building New International Relations

*Changhe Su*

Development is a key agenda for the 21<sup>st</sup> century world. China has experienced much in the area of development over the last six decades, and Africa as the largest developing continent is facing great opportunities in the development agenda. China and Africa have many opportunities for fulfilling the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and are expected to share their development experiences. China and Africa have the willingness and capability to establish new forms of international relations, regional relations, partnership, and development models for the rest of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.



## China-Africa Relations: Areas of Reform for a Sustainable Partnership

*Mehari Taddele Maru*

### **The two opposing narratives of the China-Africa partnership**

The China-Africa relationship is being interpreted through two diametrically opposed narratives. The Pro-China narrative depicts China as a savior and genuine partner of Africa. For the proponents of this view, China is a partner without a history of colonial aspirations, and also shares with many developing countries a similar historical background. The PRC is also a partner that provides much-needed funding without any conditional strings attached, and which appears to understand Africa's priorities. China also has a reputation among African countries, for respecting other cultures and states.

In contrast, the Sino-phobic narrative depicts China, as the US Secretary Mrs. Hillary Clinton has done, as the new colonial power in Africa. Many western governments see China's engagement in Africa as a cause for concern. For them, China is a spoiler of peace and security and a supporter of despots in Africa. Moreover, China is a resource and energy hungry giant, an exploiter of corrupt and incompetent governments, a trade opportunist, a massive polluter of the African environment.

### **Africa's China and the West's China: The bless and blame game**

Consequently, in the views of Africans, Africa's China and West's China are different. For Africans, China's three major attractions: unconditional soft loans and access to capital, quick delivery of services and cheap goods, and inspirational alternative development history will remain strong. In this regard, there are three fundamental causes of such shortcomings in the Africa-China relationship. These are:

1. The weakness of African states and their legislative, regulatory and enforcement mechanisms coupled by self-serving governments;
2. The Chinese tendency to do business irrespective of concerns related to sustainability, business dealings are clearly incompatible with the national interests of African countries, and corrupt practices; and
3. The deflationary role of China in the democratization process in Africa.



While addressing these shortcomings would require significant reforms on both sides, such reforms, if carried out, would contribute significantly to the sustainability of the China-Africa relationship. The cardinal question is whether Africa is prepared to make the best out of this partnership and the competition between the west and the east. China's dealings in Africa reflect the character of the host states and governments. Chinese companies acclimatize quickly to the system of the partner state; with transparent systems Chinese companies operate in transparency. If faced by corrupt system, they deal accordingly in a corrupt manner. Indicative of the weak legislative, regulatory and enforcement systems of African countries and their corrupt officials, Chinese and other companies exploit this weakness for their advantage. In this regard, Africans take the lion's share of responsibility for these weaknesses. However, China also shares the blame as it has contributed, albeit with a varying degree, to these weaknesses due to a lack of normative principles and mechanisms for oversight of its dealings in Africa.

Nevertheless, Africa and China need more democracy.

Thus, China has to encourage the legitimacy of the exercise of power by its partner governments in Africa. Only in that way can China hope to lay the foundation for a sustainable partnership in Africa. China's standing on the global arena gradually depends on the integrity of its dealings and the credibility of those governments dealing with it. China's engagement with Africa will increasingly face requests to integrate its standing on human security and democracy with its economic partnership. China ignores such pressure only at serious risks to its interest in Africa. Future generations and newly elected governments such as in Zambia and Senegal may judge China not only on economic achievements, but also more so on the political front. Consequently, China, like other African partners, needs to examine its policy of engagement in Africa, not only for the sake of Africa, but also for its own interest. Such introspective investigation would help China to revise its assumptions and enable the PRC to design new approaches. Accordingly, China should infuse in this partnership conditionality to encourage democracy and support human rights.

But does China have the capacity to influence politics in Africa? Yes. Does China have the internal orientation or willingness to influence the political systems in Africa immediately? Probably not.



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China is famously pragmatic. The practically miraculous economic achievement is a result borne out of experience and progressive appreciation of the forces at play both inside and outside of the country. Chinese pragmatism is summarized by what Deng Xiaoping, a former leader and transformer of China's economy reportedly said that "It does not matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice." So far there is no case where China rejected demands of partnering countries for change in their dealings. Unlike western countries, which demand that Africa aligns its plans and priorities to their conditions, China has aligned with the priorities and development plans of African countries rather than imposing its own. It is unlikely that China would try to impose its will on an African country or even reject a request to negotiate the terms of partnership. Accordingly, re-negotiation of the existing partnerships to address the above-mentioned negative aspects should be possible. Chinese capability to carry put these reforms resides in its pragmatist approach. In many cases such as Somalia, South Sudan, the Republic of Sudan, Libya, and other countries that faced political crises, indicative of its pragmatism, China gradually followed the tide in the international community.

Clearly China could not be the champion of human rights in Africa and the most serious binding constraint in this regard is the human rights record of China itself. But in both sides, democracy, equally with and even more acutely, will be increasingly demanded by the younger and future generations. This does not mean China needs to adopt the West's prescriptive and sometimes arrogant approach toward Africa and African democracy. While capacitating African states to deliver, at the same time China should also encourage African countries through various means to be responsive to public demands in political affairs.

The AU needs to initiate this discussion and FOCAC could serve as an excellent entry point to address this normative and other problems in the partnership. The AU should engage Chinese policy makers to consider focusing on establishing the political will from both sides. Demands for a stronger political stance by China on the governance track record of many African governments need to be included in the governing principles of FOCAC. Through FOCAC, China could also support the efforts of the AU technically in the implementation of the APSA and AGA towards peaceful, democratic and human rights protective regimes in Africa. Through this multilateral platform, China could assist Africa, while at the same time; it would be insulated from



the accusation of interference in the domestic affairs of countries. Perhaps more crucially, this approach would also mitigate attacks on China's reputation at global level as a spoiler of peace and supporter of despots in Africa.

The question should rather be how to move the debate to new frontiers of the partnership to ensure maximum benefits for Africa in the context of "mutual benefit". While policies at the FOCAC level will be important in setting the overall guiding normative framework for engagement, bilateral cooperation will still need to be governed by national policies on development priorities and investment. China should continue to align its support for African countries in their priority areas. African countries could have benefited more from China's partnership if they had strong regulatory and enforcement mechanisms as well as policies on how to negotiate with China. The ultimate responsibility of designing an adequate legislative and regulatory policies and building effective enforcement mechanisms rests on Africans.



## Sino-African Relations in the Perspective of the New Global Political-Economic Structure

*Shi Zhan*

China established formal diplomatic relations with African countries in the 1960s. It has been 50 years since the two sides created a steady friendship begun by their first generation of leadership, especially those in politics. However, since China made reforms to the opening-up policy in late 1970s, in particular after the country entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, it has developed from a staggering central planning economy to the world's second largest economy. This has remarkably changed the global political-economic structure and imposed new challenges to the traditional Sino-African relationship. Therefore, this article is going to re-examine the development of bilateral and multilateral relations between China and African countries in this environment.

The article consists of four parts, which discuss the new global political-economic structure since the rapid development of China, the mutual influence of Chinese and African economic structure, a new path of development for the African continent, and the political premise of the new path.





## China's Potential for Aiding Governance, Peace and Security in Africa: Understanding the State-Society Complex

*Ian Taylor*

This paper is an attempt to provide an overview of China's potential for aiding, governance, peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with a specific focus on Chinese efforts in West Africa. The subject of China in Africa has provoked some degree of criticism in both Africa and the West as some commentators have put forward the argument that China poses a negative influence on such matters, particularly with regard to governance. While major donor countries and institutions have embraced the notion that good governance and respect for human rights are an integral part of any foreign policy toward Africa, the sense that China's diplomacy and economic outreach in Africa are not contingent upon this fundamental requirement and may undermine important development goals in Africa has been a constant criticism of Beijing's Africa policy. Such critiques are quite serious and are indicative of some of the expressed concerns about China's role in Africa and how this might play out with regard to building peace, security and development in Africa. However, what is often missed out in such critiques is the issue of African agency and the dominant political economies and cultures that exist on the continent and which are arguably the real barriers to the renewal and stability of Africa. Thus the criticism of China is somewhat unfair.

In order to understand the security and development environment in Africa, it is vital to grasp the extant political culture(s) dominating the processes as these inevitably and intimately shape the diverse milieus across SSA and the types of regional economic governance structures we see in place. It is argued that the particular political cultures in SSA have been decisive in shaping the character and nature of governance modalities and that this has had a crucial—if not decisive—impact on the security and development situation across swathes of Africa. Indeed, a discussion of the dominant features of governance in Africa is a prerequisite for understanding security and development in Africa and where China fits in. In the long-run, China's potential for promoting governance, peace, security and development in Africa will, like all other external players, hinge upon how Chinese actors navigate their relationship(s) with the extant political economies found on the continent.



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This paper discusses Chinese contributions to peacebuilding in Liberia, a country that is emerging from many years of civil war. The common interests of China and Liberia are discussed and how this has helped prompt cooperation and dynamic relations. The problems that Beijing faces in helping to contribute to development and peacebuilding in Liberia are also discussed. Overall, it seems that China has a set of coherent policies in Liberia and has great potential to contribute to Liberia's future. Yet, there are also challenges to China's role, located mostly in the dominant political culture that prevails in Liberia.



## Development through Peace: Practical Steps for Deepening China-Africa Cooperation in the Field of Peace and Security

Bernardo Mariani

Africa has become, on the whole, a more peaceful continent. However, as the on-going crises in Sudan and South Sudan—and elsewhere in places like Somalia or the DRC—demonstrate conflicts and insecurity continue to act as major obstacles to socio-economic development. The World Bank considers 17 countries in Africa to be fragile. It also estimates that ‘civil conflict costs the average developing country roughly 30 years of GDP growth, and countries in protracted crisis can fall over 20 percentage points behind in overcoming poverty.’ No low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has yet to achieve a single Millennium Development Goal.

Outside actors cannot solve these problems. As the last FOCAC Action Plan states, the ‘Chinese Government appreciates the concept and practice of “Solving African Problems by Africans.”’ *However, in today’s globalised world insecurity is not only the problem of Africans. Nor are the solutions.* Outside actors can have both a positive and negative impact on peace and security, directly and indirectly, intentionally and not. China—which has so dramatically deepened its relationship with Africa—is one such actor.

At the recent FOCAC, Hu Jintao called for a deepening of the China-Africa relationship in five key areas, one of which directly addresses issues of peace and stability. He emphasised the need to “promote peace and stability in Africa and create a secure environment for Africa’s development.” In the Beijing Action Plan (2013-15), there exist clear commitments for cooperation in several important areas. Most notable is the agreement to create the “Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security”.

There are three specific areas—which are already made reference to in the Beijing Action Plan where cooperation in the field of peace and security could be deepened. First, is the issue of diplomacy. Second is the problem of small arms proliferation. Third is the issue of post-conflict reconstruction. There are some tangible and practical steps that can be taken in each of these three areas.



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Firstly, greater focus on what political and diplomatic measures China can take to de-escalate crises and prevent conflict is required. The ongoing dispute between Sudan and South Sudan has shown that China not only has great influence over the conflicting parties, but that it should actively use this leverage to promote peace. Through sending Special Envoys and taking the lead in the UNSC, the Chinese Government has tried to meet these expectations. Nonetheless, its interpretation of the policy of non-interference has meant that in crises elsewhere on the continent China has often stayed silent or only reacted at the last moment. The “Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security” presents an opportunity for exploring how *China can lend the weight of its influence in support of the AU and other African actors who are trying to deal with crises but often lack the necessary leverage over conflict parties.*

Secondly, one crucial security issue in Africa is the proliferation Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). There are millions of illegal SALW in circulation in Africa and an unlimited capacity by rebel groups, terrorists, pirates and other criminals to obtain such weapons, both old and new. African states have made efforts to address the problems of SALW proliferation, establishing national strategies while at the same time agreeing to various regional initiatives. However, Africa’s governments and regional bodies require significant international support to implement their commitments. *Given that over 95% of SALW originate from outside of the continent, the international community has a responsibility to provide this support.* At the FOCAC meetings in 2000, 2003 and 2006, China made explicit commitments to assist African countries to tackle the problem of SALW. However, progress on the ground was non-existent and in 2009 no mention was made of SALW. In a welcome development, however, at FOCAC 2012 a new commitment was made by China “to support African countries’ effort to combat illegal trade and circulation of small arms and light weapons.” This provides the basis for China to *start to provide practical support for African-led efforts to tackle the problems associated with SALW.* For example, as it has already done for Latin America, China could commit financial assistance for the implementation of regional, sub-regional and national initiatives that are hamstrung by a lack of resources. Saferworld is creating an expert’s working group of African, Chinese and international experts that will make clear recommendations for how China could provide such support.



Furthermore, greater focus on the proliferation of SALW presents an opportunity for a frank discussion between African and Chinese governments and civil society on *what constitutes a responsible arms transfer*. Criticism of China's arms exports are often exaggerated because they present only half the story. Often, they are unfair because they point the finger only at China despite the fact that there are other much larger weapons suppliers. However, just because claims are exaggerated does not mean there is no truth to them: Chinese-made weapons have too often fallen into the wrong hands and been used for the wrong reasons. And just because larger arms suppliers are irresponsible does not mean China can ignore its own faults.

A final issue that merits serious attention is the great potential China can play in post-conflict reconstruction. *China's financial assistance for development projects, especially in the area of infrastructure, can have an extremely positive impact in countries emerging from war*, where schools, universities, hospital, roads, railway lines, and power facilities all need to be re-built or, as is often the case, built for the first time. China's win-win approach to economic development has been welcomed across the continent and provided benefits, such as jobs and services, which may be more sustainable and transformative than Western aid. While Western donors shied away from funding infrastructure development in post-conflict Angola, oil-for-infrastructure deals with China contributed to the reconstruction of the country. In South Sudan, future assistance for infrastructure has been promised and in DRC, Chinese companies will build schools, roads and hospitals. Economic growth after conflict can help address the root causes of instability and in this regard China can support long term peacebuilding efforts.

However, assistance for economic development does not build peace on its own. It can even fuel conflict and resentment when it is seen to favour one group at the cost of another. China's role in pre-secession Sudan holds important lessons in this regard: in the South, where economic marginalisation fuelled conflict, people widely believed China only provided development assistance to the North. *Perceptions of where, and to whom, the benefits of economic assistance are distributed often matter more for peace and stability than whether economic assistance is delivered at all*. These challenges are not unique to China. All actors playing a role in development face them. In order to help minimise these risks, *there is need for greater conflict sensitivity* by Chinese economic actors, including state-owned banks, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and both state-owned and private companies.



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A three-step approach is required to be conflict-sensitive: Firstly, providers of development assistance and commercial actors must work together to better understand the conflict context in which they operate in. Systematically consulting with all the stakeholders—including governments, civil society groups and local communities—will be crucial. Secondly, they must clearly identify how their assistance impacts on conflict dynamics. Thirdly, they must act on this analysis to minimise negative impacts and promote positive ones. In short, *China's economic and development assistance can no longer be isolated from the context in which it is delivered.*

China is not the answer to Africa's security challenges, nor its wider development aspirations. Instead, *solutions lie in the hands of African governments, political leaders and civil society. What matters is how China chooses to involve itself in these efforts.* Starting to improve crisis response and conflict prevention, paying greater attention to the problem of SALW and providing more thoughtful development assistance to countries emerging from conflict would be strong foundations to build upon.



## Challenges and Opportunities for China-Africa Cooperation in Developing Governance, Peace and Security in Africa in the New Global Era

*Ebrima Sall & Bernard Mumpasi Lututala*

### **The need for a paradigm shift**

This paper argues that China-Africa cooperation aimed at developing governance, peace and security can, and should be premised on new grounds. Dealing with complex emergencies is necessary. However, rather than adopting an exclusively 'first-aid' approach to peace and security by narrowly focusing on the ongoing conflicts or the immediate security challenges, China-Africa cooperation should take a longer view of governance, peace and security in Africa by putting at the heart of the security paradigm the promotion of social progress, development and the well being of the peoples of Africa and China. Lasting peace and security are difficult to guarantee in the absence of the security of livelihoods, the provision of high quality social services, and the respect for the dignity and fundamental freedoms of the people concerned. Cooperation to develop governance, peace and security should therefore not be completely separated from trade, investments, and cooperation towards broad-based growth, and sustainable development.

China-Africa cooperation has led to the widening of the policy space for African decision makers in several areas, thanks both to the volume and strategic nature of Chinese engagements with Africa (trade, aid, investments...), and to China's policy of non-interference in African affairs. The absence of political conditionalities is good. However, it is also important that the notion of "non-interference" in the internal affairs of African countries is not interpreted to mean total indifference to authoritarian practices, massive human rights violations, or corruption, each of which may end up weakening the states or leading to social unrests.

Some of the most vibrant sectors of African societies are the youth and the civic sectors, which are behind the most profound positive changes in governance in recent years. What need to be built into China-Africa cooperation are mechanisms for addressing issues such as youth employment, and democratic environmental governance. Strengthening institutions of justice and mechanisms of public accountability could also help. In the process, it would also be a way of building a broad constituency for China-Africa cooperation among Africa's young



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people. In other words, China-Africa cooperation aimed at developing governance, peace and security will achieve that objective if it addresses Africa's security challenges in ways that acknowledge and strengthen African agency and African institutions of governance.

### **The main security challenges**

Many African states are today faced with threats to their security and the security of their peoples emanating from armed groups, drug trafficking networks, and terrorist and other extremist movements. Human security, particularly food security and the security of livelihoods, is also threatened by the effects of climate change; the commoditisation and militarization of natural resources such as forests and minerals; land grabbing; pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and cancer; and large numbers of refugees and displaced people. In addition to these trends, the number of countries in Africa where conflict and insecurity are grave concerns is still too high (the two Congos, Nigeria, the two Sudans, Cote d'Ivoire...). The high and growing number of foreign military bases in Africa and arms dumping also do not make Africans feel any safer. Neither does the circulation of millions of small arms, the cross-border movement of combatants enrolled in militias linked to official armies or rebel movements, and the free floating mercenaries who are willing to fight for whoever is willing and able to buy their services (what an ECOWAS parliamentary commission report on the impact of the 2002 Ivorian civil war called 'an African legion').

### **Beyond strategies of containment: towards peace and security sensitive development cooperation**

In the first edition of the *European Report on Development*, published in October 2009, 27 out of the 53 African states that existed at the time were classified as "fragile states". State fragility is a contested notion. However, if the majority of African states are considered to be 'fragile', then one can see how Africa's security challenges could become global security challenges if they are not addressed. Therefore, implicit in some of the debates on peace and security in Africa is the belief that Africa must be assisted in order to contain or limit the spread of terrorism, the exodus of young people out of Africa towards Europe, North America and other regions of the world, the spread of religious fundamentalism, etc.





Therefore the risk of there being more foreign interventions in Africa in matters of governance, peace and security is very real, especially with the proliferation of extremist movements in Somalia, Mali, and Nigeria. Foreign interventions could even be in total disregard of the positions of the African Union, African Regional Economic Communities, or individual African governments on the matters at hand, as was the case with the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011.

Even among African scholars, the concept of a *Pax Africana* (as the great Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui calls it), is sometimes interpreted to mean that the big and strong states should be encouraged and assisted to play the role of sub-regional hegemons whose roles would include the enforcement and preservation of peace in the weaker or more conflict prone countries.

However, whether they are of foreign origin or part of so-called 'African solutions' to the conflict and security problems of the continent, such interventions are unlikely to lead to lasting peace based on principles of justice, or to the strengthening of African institutions of governance. Many of the security challenges have their root causes in global processes such as climate change and the effects of neoliberal globalisation, or in the poverty and loss of hope, by many of the young people of Africa, of seeing meaningful positive changes in their conditions of living.

There have also been many positive developments in Africa, indicating progress towards the consolidation of democratic governance systems thanks in part to the active involvement of individual citizens and social movements, and to the economic and social progress achieved. However, the interventions in conflict and peace processes seem to be disconnected with the positive developments also going on in Africa.

It follows therefore that what we need is transformational, democratic and developmental governance that will take the peoples of Africa out of the insecurity that poverty and underdevelopment have plunged them in. More than selling arms to Africa, building arms factories in some African countries and participating in UN peace-keeping operations, a surer way of making China-Africa cooperation yield greater benefits to China and Africa in the medium and long term, we would further argue, is to share experiences in matters of developmental governance, and support each other in their efforts to make their states democratic and developmental.



## On China's Role in Promoting Peace and Security in Africa

*Hongsheng Sheng*

In recent years, positive changes have emerged in security building both at the regional and domestic plane in Africa. Armed conflicts have decreased, and a majority of war-torn regions and States have reached cease-fire and restored peace. Under the guidance of the principles of “respect for state sovereignty” and “non-interference in internal affairs”, China firmly supports African states in maintaining peace and stability and promoting their joint efforts of self-reliance by playing an active and constructive role in African affairs. In terms of African affairs, besides contributing a large number of military personnel and civilian staff to the United Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa, China has always advocated the notion that “peace should parallel development”. The key method to eliminating war is to eliminate the causes from which wars arise. No political conditions have been attached to China's assistance to African states, making China remarkably different from the countries that conduct contradictory practices. In the past years, China has supported African States' efforts to tackle regional hot issues by themselves, and to facilitate African integration so as to achieve lasting peace and social stability in the continent. In prospect, China will continue to provide political, economic and diplomatic help for peace and stability in Africa, and as a tangible measure will launch the “Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security”, deepen cooperation with the African Union and African countries for peace and security in Africa, provide financial support for the African Union peacekeeping missions in Africa and the development of the African Standby Force, and train more officials in peace and security affairs and peace-keepers for the African Union as well.



## Fostering African Governance and Development Through Multilateral Cooperation between China and Traditional Donors: The Case of the China-DAC Study Group

Anna Katharina Stahl

### Introduction

The African continent is faced with major security challenges, such as the Arab Spring, organised crime and terrorism in the Sahel region and ongoing conflicts in Sudan and Somalia. Scholars have argued that these security threats are mostly caused by a combination of a lack of both domestic governance and economic development<sup>1</sup>. This complex relationship between African governance, development and security has to be situated in the broader international context characterised by growing multipolarity and increasing Chinese engagement on the continent. Similar to traditional donors, China is starting to face the consequences of operating in an unstable African security environment<sup>2</sup>. The economic loss that Chinese companies endure because of piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden is only one of many examples.

Against this background, this paper argues that innovative forms of multilateral cooperation between China and traditional donors are needed to foster African governance and development. Taking the case study of the China-DAC Study Group, this paper examines the gains and drawbacks stemming from this original collaboration. The paper is structured around two main sections. The first part provides a brief comparison of Chinese and Western development assistance to Africa, looking in particular at their influence on African governance and security. This is followed by a second part, which studies the case of the China-DAC Study Group, as an early attempt of multilateral coordination between China and traditional donors regarding Africa. Finally, based on the example of the China-DAC Study Group, a set of necessary conditions is identified for multilateral cooperation to become a long-term option.

<sup>1</sup> Duffield, M. (2001), *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*, London: Zed Books. Collier, P., Elliott, L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M., Sambanis, N. (2003), *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, A World Bank Policy Research Report, Washington and Oxford: World Bank and Oxford University Press, Online: [http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/00536\\_breakingconflict.pdf](http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/00536_breakingconflict.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> Saferworld. (2011), *China's growing role in African peace and security*, January 2011, London, Online: <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Chinas%20Growing%20Role%20in%20African%20Peace%20and%20Security.pdf>  
A. K. Stahl (2011), *Contrasting Rhetoric and Converging Security Interests of the European Union and China in Africa*, *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 4/2011, pp.147-173.



## Comparing Chinese and DAC aid

Traditionally, multilateral aid is channelled through international organisations like the United Nations (UN) or the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). While China has increased its contribution to UN development programmes, it is not a member of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). This part of the paper therefore provides a brief overview of the main differences between Chinese aid and Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by OECD DAC members. It puts a particular emphasis on the diverse impact of Chinese and DAC aid regarding African governance and security.

## The OECD's outreach strategy and the China-DAC Study Group

In recent years, traditional OECD DAC donors have come to realise that they can learn from the unique experience of so-called "emerging donors" like China. Consequently, a dialogue between DAC-donors with non-DAC donors was initiated at the third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF) in September 2008 in Accra. This dialogue was further formalised by the fourth HLF in December 2011 in Busan, which adopted the "Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation". The recent Busan declaration calls on DAC-donors to engage in a broader development cooperation partnership with emerging donors. As part of this partnership, the OECD DAC has undertaken particular collaboration efforts with China related to Africa.

Following initial exchanges between OECD DAC and Chinese officials, the China-DAC Study Group was established in January 2009. As a joint body, the Study Group is composed of representatives from China, the DAC secretariat and DAC member states. Its main objective is to provide for a flexible platform of knowledge-sharing and mutual learning of aid practices to foster African governance and development. Unlike other multilateral initiatives, the China-DAC Study Group focuses specifically on China's development cooperation with Africa. Originally, the Study Group's primary duty was the organisation of four international conferences, each with a different thematic focus. Yet, following the initial work phase from 2009 to 2011, the mandate of the Study Group was shifted to more practical issues, including the organisation of field visits to Africa with the purpose of examining concrete projects run by China and DAC members. Based on this first phase of work, this paper identifies a series of advantages and limitations of the China-DAC Study Group.



## **Conclusion: The potential of multilateral cooperation between China and Western donors to promote African governances and development**

This paper concludes by reminding that African security threats cannot be tackled either by African states, Western donors or China individually and multilateral cooperation therefore represents a cardinal solution. At the same time the paper stresses that it is still too early to draw explicit conclusions from the work of the China-DAC Study Group in terms of overall prospects for multilateral cooperation between China and Western donors and African countries. Nevertheless, certain conditions can be identified, which need to be fulfilled in order for this new form of multilateral cooperation to be mutually beneficial for all three partners.

First of all, from the *African perspective* concerns remain regarding African ownership of multilateral cooperation initiatives. In the case of the China-DAC Study Group only a limited number of African representatives have been involved. Hence, some experts argue that the UN might provide better opportunities for African participation.

From the *perspective of Western donors*, multilateral cooperation efforts like the China-DAC Study Group are often driven by erroneous expectations of socialising China into the standards of the traditional donor community<sup>3</sup>. While Chinese officials are indeed interested in learning from some of the practices of traditional donors, it is rather unlikely that Chinese aid will resemble that of traditional donors. Western donors should therefore focus on pragmatic types of cooperation with China in Africa, which would entail a rather limited set of common rules and procedures.

From this derive an obvious condition, which is the acceptance of *China's* refusal of joining the OECD DAC and other official donor's settings. From the Chinese perspective, China is still a developing country and the OECD represents a Western dominated organisation of rich countries. Chinese leaders fear that by joining the OECD, China would lose its status as a developing country. Hence, multilateral cooperation needs to be based on a pragmatic set of principles and concrete projects. The organisation of joint field studies as part of second work plan of the China-DAC Study Group presents a positive step in this direction.

<sup>3</sup> S. Stähle (2008), *Towards China's Integration into the Aid Donor Architecture: Learning from Chinese Participation in International Regimes*, *China aktuell* 3/2008, pp. 131-163.



## What about civil society?

### The need for a debate on differences and consensus on the role of civil society in Sino-African relations

*Sarah Vaes*

#### Civil society as missing actor?

China-Africa relations are currently the subject of unprecedented scholarly and political attention, and not without reason. Since the late 1990s China's engagement in Africa has been on the rise, which is reflected in political discourse and policy as well as in the scale of economic exchange and assistance. A steady build-up in trade and investment flows during the 1990s, and an explosive growth during the 2000s, made China Africa's largest trading partner by 2010. This economic development was accompanied by the launch of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, China's adoption of fundamental principles underpinning its Africa policy in 2006, the development of a 2006 Africa Policy document planning substantial increases in aid, investment and trade with Africa, and a continuing string of friendly diplomatic exchanges since then. But in contrast to private sector and government, both prominent players in the burgeoning bilateral China-Africa cooperation, civil society on both sides seems to be seeing much less action. Despite the policy intentions to promote cultural exchange 'between people's organizations and institutions' and despite the growing importance of forums such as the China-African Think Tank Forum and other events, Chinese civil society and civil society in the African partner countries are still not playing a very significant role in their nations' interrelationships at this time. This feature of current Sino-African cooperation contrasts with the emphasis traditional western donors place on civil society as a crucial ingredient for development.

#### Civil society, governance and development policy

In mainstream western theory on development and governance, civil society is considered (next to the state and the private sector) as one of three indispensable and complementary actors in good governance, making it a focus point for promoting human development in



developing countries. As UNDP (1997)<sup>4</sup> stated: “Governance includes the state, but transcends it by taking in the private sector and civil society. All three are critical for sustaining human development. The state creates a conducive political and legal environment. The private sector generates jobs and income. And civil society facilitates political and social interaction - mobilising groups to participate in economic, social and political activities”.

As a consequence, traditional western donors have, since the late 1980s invested a great deal of attention and funds in fostering civil society in their partner countries, in order to promote good governance and democratisation.

This pluralist view contrasts with other interpretations of civil society, where the role of civil society as a (political) counterforce to state power is not considered desirable and where civil society is in practice often used as an extension of the state apparatus<sup>5</sup>. This corresponds more with the Chinese civil society landscape. Since a policy reorientation towards building a ‘harmonious society’ and placing higher priority on social reform, China has seen an increased tolerance towards sectors outside government. This coincided with more government recognition for the added value civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can have in service provision and the mobilization of societal resources<sup>6</sup>. Yet, out of fear that CSOs might challenge government policy and undermine political stability, Chinese government keeps firm and effective control over CSOs. As a result Chinese CSOs often have a more (financially and institutionally) dependent and more collaborative relation with the state<sup>7</sup>. In line with the pivotal role the state is attributed in Chinese views on governance, China has been committed to a strict non-interference policy, making political conditionality and any actions undermining state sovereignty a ‘no go’ for its South-South cooperation. Yet, to what extent its specific views on civil society and its strict non-interference policy explain the current missing connection between China and civil society in its partner countries, and to what extent this is the result of an explicit policy choice, remains unclear.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations Development Program. (1997), *Governance for Sustainable Human Development*. UNDP, New York, 9 p. Available at: <http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/policy/>

<sup>5</sup> Whiting, S.H. (1991), *The politics of NGO development in China*. In: *Voluntas*, 2, 2, pp.16 - 48.

<sup>6</sup> Yongnian, Z., & Fewsmith, J. (2008). Introduction. In: Yongnian, Z., & Fewsmith, J. (Eds.), *China's Opening Society. The non-state sector and governance*. Routledge, London & New York, pp. 1 - 14; Tao, F. (2008), *The position of civil society organisation in China today*. In: Guerrero, D., Manji, F. (Eds.) *China's new role in Africa and the South. In search for a new perspective*. Fahamu & Pambazuka, Cape Town, Nairobi and Oxford, pp. 238 - 245; Beja, J. (2008), *The changing aspects of civil society in China*. In: Yongnian, Z., Fewsmith, J. (Eds.), *China's Opening Society. the non-state sector and governance*. Routledge, London & New York, pp. 71 - 89; Yuwen, L. (2011), *Challenges and opportunities for NGOs in Different parts of the World*. In: Yuwen, L. (Ed.), *NGOs in China and Europe. Comparisons and contrasts*. Ashgate, Farnham & Burlington, pp. 1 - 20.

<sup>7</sup> Lu, Y. (2008), *NGOs in China. Development dynamics and challenges*. In: Yongnian, Z., Fewsmith, J. (Eds.), *China's Opening Society. the non-state sector and governance*. Routledge, London & New York, pp. 89 - 105; Yuwen, L. (2011).





## Obstacles for civil society involvement

Additional explanation for the limited role of civil society in Sino-African relations can be found without a doubt in the very different civil society landscapes, which poses a challenge for governments as well as for CSOs on both sides. Actors on both sides lack knowledge of each other, and this also prevents them from knowing what added value rapprochement might bring. The outspoken political identity of civil society in different African countries as a watchdog or a promoter of bottom-up political participation may also be an obstacle. Linked to that, a mismatch in used tactics might bring an additional explanation: In traditional Chinese culture, to maintain face is vital for the government, as well as for individual citizens. The use of name and shame tactics by many African (and Western as well as international) CSOs risks having little effect and could alienate Chinese actors more from African civil society. Additionally, the privileged relationship between many African CSOs and Western donors, as well as accounts of corruption in CSOs have made China question whether African CSOs are a legitimate interlocutor to begin with<sup>8</sup>.

## Implications for South-South cooperation

Reconsideration of the current low profile of civil society in Sino-African relations could serve both China and Africa's interests. Different scholars place a very high importance on the role of civil society in maximising the potential of Sino-Africa relations, as exchanges and understanding between cultures are highly important for building a peaceful relationship and world<sup>9</sup>. At the same time the similar interests of African and Chinese civil society in ensuring the equitable distribution of the benefits and opportunities arising from economic development could be a strong foundation for future cooperation and mutual learning<sup>10</sup>. At the same time the negative side-effects of Chinese investments in Africa are receiving increasing attention and issues such as the impact on local producers or labour conditions in Chinese enterprises are triggering increasing criticism. It is to be expected that the debate on how African civil society can contribute to safeguarding national and individual interests, and a true win-win nature in the relations with China or Chinese corporations will increase. Chinese government and business could therefore expect to be confronted with an increasingly organized, critical and vocal civil society on African soil.

<sup>8</sup> Othorah, N. (2007), *Who's afraid of China in Africa? Towards an African civil society perspective on China-Africa relations*. In: Manji, F., Marks, S. (Eds.), *African perspectives on China in Africa*. Fahamu & Pambazuka Press, Cape Town, Nairobi and Oxford, pp. 35 - 55.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Tao, (2008)





Understanding what holds back mutual understanding, increased dialogue and rapprochement between Chinese government and civil society on the one hand and African civil society on the other is an important starting point for answering a key question: What role should civil society have in the future Sino-African relations, in order to contribute to governance, peace and security? A Sino-African debate on the differences and consensus on the role of civil society, both amongst CSOs as on government level is timely.



## China-Africa Cooperation without Meaningful Engagement with Women will Fail

Madelein Mkunu

### Introduction

Undoubtedly, over the past decade, China and Africa have seen an ever stronger economic and trade relationship, with bilateral trade surging to a record high of 166.3 billion U.S. dollars last year. It is true that Africa needs true partners for development; China has appeared as a true friend to Africa. Rise on direct investment, construction of roads and railway, building of schools and hospitals, massive tariff cuts, debt exemptions, training to name but a few, these symbolize the commitment and the friendship offered to Africa by China.

The cooperation has emerged at all levels: political, economic, development cooperation and social. In the midst of the global financial crisis, the Chinese commitment to Africa has helped boost the continent's economic growth. Despite this successful and mutual beneficial collaboration, the past months have witnessed slower economic growth in China, higher economic uncertainties, increased risk of a hard landing, and more limited policy scope for Beijing to support the economy<sup>11</sup>.

Upholding noninterference and offering unconditional aid to Africa are not the only principles that will contribute in developing lasting relations between the two regions. Without tying strong knot with the Africans on the ground, the relationship is due to fail. It is worthwhile to remember that just over 50% of African population is represented by women, who hold the key to economic transformation of the continent and who are capable of adding value to the sustained success of China-Africa cooperation.

Like in many other policies, the issue of gender has been overlooked in the China-Africa policy. This can even be proven through the recent Ministerial report which, in one simple sentence at the bottom of the report, summarizes the leaders' commitment to women in these terms: *"The two sides expressed satisfaction with the achievements in the China-Africa women exchanges in recent years. The two sides will continue to enhance exchanges and strengthen cooperation and promote the common*

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<sup>11</sup> English.news.cn



*development of women on both sides through dialogue between women leaders, paired exchanges in various sectors, study of women-related issues, practical skills training and other forms of exchange". The fifth ministerial conference of the forum on china-Africa cooperation Beijing action plan (2013-2015).*

China-Africa cooperation without the inclusion of women is due to fail. And China cannot afford to exclude women as key stakeholders in its plan of action (2012-2015). Many empirical researches have concluded that involving women developmental frameworks is a *smart economics*.

### **Women of Africa have identified a loophole in China-Africa Cooperation**


Many will agree with the South African President Zuma when he recently voiced the opinion of many Africans at the summit in Beijing by saying that Africa's economic relationship with China is unsustainable. Could this be a sign that African leaders might be looking to turn this trend around? Africa's past economic experience must have taught a lesson of being cautious when entering into partnerships with other economies.

In a recent report produced by South African researchers<sup>12</sup>, it was reported that China is looking for new way to ponder how it can help ameliorate economic headwinds with its African partners. China is looking for more meaningful engagement with Africa and in the quest to creating a more sustainable relationship, over the next three years, China-Africa cooperation is exploring a new strategy under the theme of "build on past achievements and open up new prospects for the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership".

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<sup>12</sup> English.news.cn

## The Gap in China-Africa cooperation



While pursuing meaningful engagement with Africa, China has forgotten and continues to neglect to establish a meaningful win-win partnership with women of Africa, the backbone of the continent’s future economy. China should keep in mind that a partnership with Africa without women’s participation will not and never will be able to reach the objectives set in the new measures to strengthen bilateral cooperation in trade, investment, finance and African integration.

## How can China build a strong partnership with women of Africa?

**China needs to invest the “SMART ECONOMICS” way: Invite women as Partners:** In recent years, Africa has experienced a surge of women involved in infrastructure development in areas such as construction, transportation, science and technology ..., despite skills and financial limitations. Recently the African Development Bank has reported Africa’s quest for greater connectivity and improved intra-regional trade after the continent’s leaders agreed to increase public spending on infrastructure and set in motion a programme to create a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by 2017. The Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), a multi-billion dollar initiative that will run through 2040, has been endorsed by the African leaders early this year. Across the continent, China is involved in several multi-billion dollar infrastructural projects. How much of these projects are being



allocated to women? Are women being integrated in such projects? It is critically important that women's interests, views and full participation in the designing and planning of infrastructure development be taken seriously not only by African governments but as well as all partners for development, and in this case China. The presence of multiple women's construction, engineering, and IT companies proudly led by women themselves prove that women of Africa are capable of playing a positive role in the process of establishing a solid and sustainable China-Africa economic cooperation. There are even over growing confirmations that integrating women into the mainstream economy will contribute in achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Africa.

China must come to consider women participation and access to economic opportunities in terms of women economic empowerment policy frameworks and regulations. A partnership between China and women of Africa is of a high importance and should be treated as a priority because of its ability to create reliable channel leading to a sustainable economic growth in both regions. This could considerably help China ameliorate its economic headwinds with its African partners.

Across Africa, women are mobilizing themselves to find ways to ensure their active and massive participation in the process of rebuilding Africa through designing and planning infrastructure projects in Africa.

*Leading Women of Africa*, a Pan-African Women's Platform has recently launched, *Women Investors Programme (WIP)*, platform that aims to appeal to African governments and African partners for development, to invite women as key stakeholders in the process of development of Africa. Women investors and entrepreneurs across Africa are ready to partner with China on a win-win basis terms.

## **Recommendations**

African Women would like to invite China to collaborate with them by investing in them through the win-win partnership model. China needs to be more visible on the ground and establish solid partnership with Africans in general and women in particular. This move will allow china to confidently demand more meaningful engagement with Africa through active participation of women in planning and design of infrastructure projects in Africa. Among the priorities needed to be taken into consideration by China-Africa Cooperation framework, include:



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- ***Women inclusion in infrastructure projects:*** Deliberate requirement need to be made for Chinese companies bidding for major infrastructural projects to include women owned companies as partners and investors. Encouraging Chinese companies already in Africa to subcontract or supporting women's initiatives
- ***Creation of infrastructure development fund for women:*** Corporate, public and commercial financiers be identified that might support and facilitate women investors and entrepreneurs access to business finance. Commitment should be made to assist serious committed women to access the necessary capital for investment in viable projects.
- ***Access to infrastructure development skills:*** African women would like to invite China to collaborate with them by investing in women through the creation of an infrastructural skills transfer program, to provide training and skills transfer to women of Africa.
- ***Building bridge between women leaders from China and Africa:*** women of China and Africa should be given a solid platform for sharing opportunities, expertise, best practices....
- ***LWA as a strategic African partner at the heart of co-operation with China in driving and enhancing the economic development of African women:*** This is in line with our mission to promote the role of women of Africa entrepreneurs in participating in the design and planning of infrastructure development in Africa as a whole and in their respective countries particularly.

LWA has already been part of "A dialogue between women professional and entrepreneurs in Asia and Africa: Creating a win win partnership", a forum organized by China Africa Business Council (Hong Kong) CABC (HK) on the 28 August 2009 at Hong Kong Baptist University. The organization continues do so by engaging with similar institutions in China.

By considering the above recommendations and many others, China will not only be putting emphasis on women's role and contribution to the process of development and reconstruction of Africa's economy but also understand the importance of women's contributions in China's economic growth and sustainable economic cooperation with Africa.



## Breakaway Session 2: Debating the effectiveness of China's role in regional integration, peacebuilding and the non-interference policy

### New Dimensions for African Unity, Integration and Development: Sharing the Chinese Experience

Phyllis Johnson

This paper explores African integration in the context of sharing experiences from China in three dimensions, namely, economic, political and military.

The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) formally recognized for the first time that African integration and regional trading blocs are a priority for support, within a core theme of development, highlighting diversification, innovation and sustainability through collaboration at all levels of society. The FOCAC Declaration contains the following commitment to: “Strengthen China’s cooperation with the AU and sub-regional organizations in Africa, take joint measures to promote Africa’s solidarity, harmony and strength through unity, and support measures for African regional integration and sustainable development...”<sup>13</sup>

As a new measure for deepening practical cooperation, China and Africa will focus on transnational and trans-regional infrastructure development, and China will prioritize the demands of African countries or African regional organizations in the planning and construction of trans-boundary infrastructure.<sup>14</sup> This recognizes Africa’s potential to be the next global emerging economy;<sup>15</sup> and draws on the experience of China in building its economic transformation on strong infrastructure development.

This cooperation offers significant opportunities for accelerating African goals of unity, integration and development; but also introduces challenges of defining new operational methods. China-Africa cooperation traditionally has been bilateral, developed over the past 50 years as individual African countries gained their independence,

<sup>13</sup> Beijing Declaration of the 5th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing, 20 July 2012.

<sup>14</sup> Reading of Economic Cooperation and Trade Promotion Measures Announced at the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, FOCAC Briefing note, Beijing, August 2012

<sup>15</sup> Johnson, P. (2011). New dimensions in ACP-EU relations: Seeking relevance among shifting perspectives and emerging regional trade blocs, ECDDPM Conference on Global changes, emerging players and evolving ACP-EU relations: towards a common agenda for action?, Maastricht, June 2011; Li Anshan, (2007). Africa in the Perspective of Globalization: Development, Assistance and Cooperation, “analysis of the Eight Principles. West Asia and Africa, Issue 7, 2007



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some with assistance from China.<sup>16</sup> Africa's emergence as an integrated economic power requires, in addition to trans-boundary infrastructure development, new ways of thinking and new perspectives on governance, integration and policy-making, as distinct from the inherited colonial systems and perspectives.

This paper is about the current stage of African integration and development through the African Union and Regional Economic Communities, and the experiences that can be shared from China in strengthening, not only infrastructure development, but management, governance and sustainability, with African characteristics. There are significant integration targets for the next decade, and one is the Tripartite Free Trade Area of 27 countries in the eastern half of Africa from South Africa to Egypt made up of three regional economic communities – the Southern African Development Community, East African Community, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. These 27 countries have a combined population of almost 600 million people; a total GDP of about US\$1 trillion; half of the membership of the African Union; 57% of the total population of the AU; and, just over 58% of contribution to GDP.<sup>17</sup>

The decision by the leaders of independent Africa in 1963 to accept the national boundaries imposed by European colonising powers, left the continent divided into more than 50 separate national entities. This decision continues to have its own challenges. Now, more than 50 years after the beginning of political independence, but just 18 years after the completion of political liberation marked by the end of apartheid in South Africa,<sup>18</sup> Africa has begun a process of gradually reducing the impact of national boundaries through greater integration in economic, political and military spheres.<sup>19</sup> Thus, in addition to the essential development of key infrastructure that drove China's development and can drive Africa's, the policy agenda should consider soft aspects of the regional dimensions of cooperation in broadening the perceptions of governance and security integration through deeper knowledge of the Chinese experience.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Johnson, P. (2009). *China's Role in Africa's Development: Past, Present and Future*, A brief review, presentation to the 2nd SARDC Symposium on China-Africa and China-Zimbabwe Relations, Harare, 19 May 2009

<sup>17</sup> Tripartite Free Trade Area, (2011). *Communiqué of the 2nd COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit*, South Africa, 12 June 2011

<sup>18</sup> OAU Liberation Committee. (1994). *Mission Accomplished*, Closing document on Arusha conference, OAU, Addis Ababa.

<sup>19</sup> OAU. (2000). *The Constitutive Act of the African Union*, Lomé Summit, Togo; OAU. (1991). *Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community*, Abuja, 1991; SADC Treaty, Windhoek, 1992; EAC, Customs Union Protocol, East African Community, Arusha, 2005;

<sup>20</sup> Zu Ming, "The Perception-Capacity Complex Gap of Africa-China Relations", paper at SIIS 2nd International Conference on China-Africa/Zimbabwe Relations and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa, Shanghai, 15 March 2012; Li Weijian et al. *Toward a New Decade: Research on the Sustainable Development of FOCAC*, Report of SIIS Project, September 2010. Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, Shanghai, 2010





This concept extends from initial exploration into African integration comparative to Chinese governance and decision-making methods, where consultations, plans and policies cover 1.3 billion people of 56 ethnic groups in a system with strong central policy guidance but local administration and consultation.<sup>21</sup> In Africa the decisions for more than 1 billion people take place in many disparate ways in 55 different countries, using different largely inherited colonial systems, with lengthy debate, and often with external interference. In China, the annual plans are scrutinized publicly and frankly critiqued; the leadership transition currently underway is planned well in advance; and ethnic groups, sectors and political parties are represented in the bicameral structure of the NPC and the CPPCC.<sup>22</sup> Africa has more than 55 different ways of doing these things. Yet most Chinese provinces are bigger than most Africa countries. Most members of the African Union (about three-quarters) have populations of 15 million or less, while one-third have populations of 3 million or less.

The context for this part of the discussion is drawn from the Declaration of FOCAC 2012 which, in addition to support for regional integration, commits to strengthen political consultation and dialogue, and share experience in governance: *Further strengthen political consultation and strategic dialogue, increase high-level visits, enhance the sharing of experience in governance, and respect and support each other's core interests on such issues as sovereignty, independence, security, unity, territorial integrity and national development, so as to increase the political trust and strategic consensus between China and Africa.*<sup>23</sup>

Most members of the African Union are still enclosed in development and governance agendas inherited from the colonial powers in Europe who continue to provide funds, and informed by how each member state achieved its independence. Southern Africa for example may be more cohesive due to the experience of taking up arms to fight for independence, but the structure of governance still relies on acceptance of the European model and its "international norms". This experience of governance is quite narrow, and impacts on the integration agenda due to different systems inherited from Portugal, Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands and Spain.

<sup>21</sup> National Peoples Congress, broadcast and records, session March 2011 and March 2012; Yin Zhongqing, *China's Political System*, translated by Wang Pingxing, China Intercontinental Press, Beijing, 2010; P. Johnson, "Aligning History, the Economy and Security in Southern Africa: China's Role", paper at SIIS 2nd International Conference on China-Africa..., Shanghai, 15 March 2012

<sup>22</sup> Professor Hon. Li Wuwei, Vice-Chairman CPPCC and Vice-President CPAPD, SARDC Seminar, Harare, 24 August 2011; Yin Zhongqing, *China's Political System*, Beijing, 2010

<sup>23</sup> Beijing Declaration of the 5th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Beijing, 20 July 2012



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There are strong centrifugal forces pulling African countries apart from each other, yet the AU Commission agenda can be disrupted or advanced by individuals as shown in recent experience, while Chinese leadership is more collective. The continental structures need stronger focus, especially the AU Commission, Pan-African Parliament, and the Peace and Security Council. There are many challenges to Africa's goals for regional integration, but the framework targets have been met, notably the African Economic Community in 1994 and the African Union in 2002. The Common Agenda includes strengthening capacity to maintain peace and security as a prerequisite for sustainable development, and therefore the third dimension for study is the role of the military.

The African Union has established an Africa Standby Force made up of standby forces from the regions. The case study is again the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as half of the members retain governments from the liberation struggle and it is the most cohesive bloc militarily with a strong regional standby force, and an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.<sup>24</sup> A Protocol provides the legal framework, and a Mutual Defence Pact commits the State Parties to maintain preparedness individually and collectively, and facilitates joint training of military personnel. The SADC Standby Brigade launched in 2007 has a multidimensional capability that anchors regional peace support operations under the framework of the Africa Standby Force. A comparative observation from the Chinese experience shows how the security forces relate to the state and governance. The main message for those who studied liberation strategy in China was that "politics rules the gun" and the military fall under a political leadership.<sup>25</sup> However, the military personnel are not viewed as separate from society and their knowledge is incorporated into China's unique political system that encompasses most sectors. The Peoples Liberation Army has seats in the NPC.<sup>26</sup>

### **Are there lessons for African development, governance, peace and security?**

The conclusion is that yes, there are, although differences are recognized. A detailed analysis of these dimensions is too broad for the scope of this paper, but some of the issues are identified. This paper does not

<sup>24</sup> SADC, (2012). *Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation*, 2004; SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation; Chigora, Percyslage, "Challenges and Prospects for Peace and Security in Africa: Why China Matters", paper at SIIIS 2nd International Conference on China-Africa..., Shanghai, 15 March 2012

<sup>25</sup> J. Tongogara interview in *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, David Martin & Phyllis Johnson, Faber, London 1981

<sup>26</sup> Yin Zhongqing, *China's Political System*, Beijing, 2010



study these in depth, the subjects are too wide, but it presents a case for why there should be more comparative studies of what Africa can learn from a country with a similar population size to the continent and a rapid trajectory of development.

This is an important topic for African and Chinese scholars and researchers to pursue, study, develop and expand in seeking to understand the challenges and opportunities, the commonality and differences of these dimensions, and the opportunities that can be addressed together for the greater benefit of both parties. In doing this, it is instructive to revisit the historical dimensions of this cooperation, notably the early discussions between Julius Nyerere and Zhou Enlai.<sup>27</sup> The late *Mwalimu* Nyerere, who chaired the South Commission, often said that “South” is not a geographical definition but a way of thinking. And it is the thinking in Africa that needs to emerge from the colonial strictures, to encompass the rich experiences of the south and east as well as the north and west. Nyerere’s message when he hosted Premier Zhou almost 50 years ago has resonance today; both leaders had a very long vision. Nyerere could see that, for Africa, “the Long March is an economic one”,<sup>28</sup> noting that underdevelopment “tempts us to slothfulness, when all our energies are needed for the work ahead. ...And Mr Premier, in this respect too, we can learn from China. The single-mindedness with which the Chinese people are concentrating on development was the thing which most impressed me during my visit to your great country.”<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Johnson, P. (2011). *From Zhou Enlai and Julius Nyerere: The roots of modern relations between China and Southern Africa. paper at SIIS 1st International Conference on China-Africa...*, Shanghai, 16 March 2011

<sup>28</sup> Nyerere, J.K. (1968). *Tanzania's Long March is Economic*, In: *Freedom and Socialism/Uhuru na Ujamaa: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1965-1967*, OUP, 1968

<sup>29</sup> Nyerere, J.K. (1967). *State Visit to the People's Republic of China*, In: *Freedom and Unity/ Uhuru na Umoja: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952-65*, OUP, 1967



## Regional Integration in Africa and Sino-Africa Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges

*Tang Xiao*

Regional integration is the way for Africa to seek peace and development through unity. Great progress has been achieved in peace and security, trade, foreign cultural exchanges and other significant areas. Africa has long been subjected to war, internal conflict and political instability and the economic and industrial structures are not conducive to internal trade, which in turn motivates regional economic integration. The international financial crisis and other external forces have also affected regional integration; it has a long way to go, and this is a long process. However, regional integration in Africa is an irreversible historical process of the continent's development; China-Africa cooperation and African integration are two great arms for Africa to make use of for Africa's development and rehabilitation. Combining regional integration in Africa with Sino-Africa cooperation is an important strategic opportunity and cooperation platform for China to achieve industrialization, urbanization, modernization and sustainable development. Therefore, the combination of both to promote each other is very important. China-Africa cooperation, for the most part, is not yet fully engaged with the process of African integration at the regional and sub-regional levels. The two sides need to carefully nurture a new foundation and favourable environment. The Forum for China-Africa Cooperation is the framework and platform for China and African countries to conduct bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Based on bilateral cooperation within the framework, China and African countries can nurture and promote the combination of the China-Africa cooperation with African regional integration, to achieve bilateral cooperation complemented with multilateral cooperation. At the 5th Ministerial Conference of FOCAC, the Chinese government proposed new measures to boost China-Africa ties, highlighting China's support for Africa integration processes and helping Africa to enhance its own capacity for overall development. How to transform these ideas and policy measures into practice is a topic for further discussion and research.



## China's Evolving Policy Towards Peace and Security in Africa: Constructing a new paradigm for peacebuilding?

*Chris Alden and Dan Large*

Devising an approach towards post-conflict environments and fragile states has come to pre-occupy Chinese policy makers and researchers working on African affairs in recent years. Engaging with this complex topic, however, has highlighted a number of difficult issues for China such as the issue of non-interference that render a simple adaptation to established approaches if not untenable, then certainly unpalatable.

While Chinese engagement in post-conflict and fragile African states was growing, multilateral intervention into countries emerging from the throes of civil war and state collapse has itself been on the increase. The aim of these UN-led interventions aimed at tackling the root causes of conflict by embarking on socio-political and economic transformation through democracy promotion and market liberalism, an ambition that set them apart from previous UN operations.<sup>30</sup> As Wang Xuejun explains:

(T)he driving thought of Western countries' involvement in 'peacebuilding' is 'liberal democracy' through a realization of a democratic political system as precondition for a country's internal peace and stability, China believes that every country has its own priorities and to promote democratic systems immediately after the end of conflicts is not necessarily an immediate priority.<sup>31</sup>

### China's emerging norms on post-conflict intervention in Africa

The Chinese literature on post-conflict reconstruction (*'chongtu hou chengjian'*) in Africa, and peacebuilding (*'jianshi heping'*) more generally, is comparatively small, reflecting its position as a comparatively new subject of research and policy engagement.<sup>32</sup> It is spurred on in part by the formative debate and process of developing the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) and coupled to the relentless press of events seemingly demanding international responses.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Mats Berdal, *Building Peace After War* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009); James Mayall and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira eds., *The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States* (London: Hurst, 2011).

<sup>31</sup> Wang Xuejun, 'China's Security Cooperation with Africa under the Frame of FOCAC', in *Papers for Conference on China, South Africa and Africa*, SAIHA/ZNU, November 2010, p. 128.

<sup>32</sup> Interview, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing, 16 December 2010. More generally, peace studies 'as a named discipline' was 'virtually new' in China some eight years ago. Alan Hunter, 'Introduction: The Chinese Century', in Alan Hunter ed., *Peace Studies in the Chinese Century: International Perspectives* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p.5.

<sup>33</sup> Discussion with Chinese academics, Africa Studies Institute, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua, December 2010; interview, CASS, Beijing, 14 December 2010.



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What is informing the deepening engagement with peacebuilding in China, according to Zhao Lei, is a desire to become a 'norm maker', rather than merely being reactive:

(T)here is a subtle but significant shift in Chinese strategic culture from passively following international norms to actively making them...Chinese leaders have begun to focus on China's institutional contribution, placing an emphasis on "discourse power" and the principle that a great power should constructively set agendas, not just follow the rules set by others.<sup>34</sup>

This formative process of norms making can be seen in four broad areas. First, Chinese scholars like Liu Hui assert, 'development, stability and harmony is more attractive' than 'democracy, freedom plus market economics for Africa'.<sup>35</sup> Political stability is more important than holding elections; peace can be an outcome of longer-term development but there is not any necessarily peaceful means to achieve this.<sup>36</sup>

A second aspect of China's approach to post-conflict intervention emphasises indigenous African ownership or agency to define and pursue their own solutions according to their own circumstances. According to Chinese thinking, responsibility for resolving conflict or advancing development after conflict is first and foremost held by those directly affected.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, greater efficacy for long-term solutions is ascribed to indigenous agency and any external assistance ought to respond to this and be tailored to local needs.<sup>38</sup>

Strong belief in the efficacy of economic process to achieve peace is a third aspect of the Chinese approach to post-conflict and fragile environments. Chinese scholars stress meeting basic needs first – 'housing and food not just democracy or human rights' – and the timely delivery of the material infrastructure on which economic development can proceed as the proper starting point for post-war reconstruction.

<sup>34</sup> Zhao Lei, 'Two Pillars of China's Global Peace Engagement Strategy: UN Peacekeeping and International Peacebuilding', *International Peacekeeping* 18, 3 (2011), p. 351; Zhao Lei, 'For the Sake of Peace': An Analysis on China's Peacekeeping Operation in Africa', *Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 94, No. 1, spring 2007, pp. 29-36.

<sup>35</sup> Liu Hui, 'Minzu zhuyi shijiao xia de Sudan nanbei neizhan' [Sudan's North-South Civil War from the nationalism perspective], *Shijie Minzu* (World Races), 2005, No.6. Also see Wang Xuejun, *op.cit.*

<sup>36</sup> Discussion with Chinese academics, Africa Studies Institute, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua, 17 December 2010; Pang Zhongying affirms this view, saying that in China's '...bilateral and multilateral relations with many developing and non-Western countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, China continually and repeatedly insists that it will not abandon these principles but instead will maintain them – a position that has generally been well-received in the developing world.' Pang Zhongying, 'China's Non-Intervention Question', *Global Responsibility to Protect* 1, 2 (2009), p. 238.

<sup>37</sup> Interview with Chinese academic, China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, 20 December 2010; interview with Chinese official, Khartoum, January 2011.

<sup>38</sup> As one analyst noted: 'we should give what the Africans need, not what we think Africa needs.' Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua, 17 December 2010.



A fourth aspect is China's assertion that the role of the state is crucial. China's engagement with state institutions is a normal, established part of regular bilateral relations, covering routine cooperation as well as such areas as human resource development training. 'Capacity building' of state institutions, critical to creating the administrative means needed by fragile states presents dilemmas arising from non-interference commitments, though recent trends suggest a greater receptiveness to supporting it.<sup>39</sup> Flowing from this focus on the state is a general predilection towards enhancing the standing of regional organizations in the global architecture of security management.

### Conclusion: A separate peace?

The emerging modalities of China's post-conflict engagement amount to an alternative to the prevailing international peacebuilding system in terms of ideas, practical actions and, in different ways, results. This is not an alternative in the sense of direct purposeful competition, or an emerging challenge to the current system; it affirms support for the AU crisis response system. In places, this is being applied to longstanding problems, with the hope that China can be more successful where 'liberal peacebuilding' is held to have fallen short of expectations. As China's Ambassador to the UN declared categorically:

'There cannot be a unified standard for peacebuilding endeavors. Different peacebuilding strategies should be formulated in accordance with different conditions of the countries concerned.'<sup>40</sup>

African sensibilities towards the necessity for multilateral involvement in peacebuilding have already inspired unprecedented shifts in Chinese foreign policy in places like Sudan and, the active attempts to forge a common programme through such initiatives as FOCAC's 'China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security', are likely to produce more changes. Though areas such as the contentious issue of fragile states remain problematic, the growing and unprecedented confidence that the Chinese policy making community bring to the theorizing of peacebuilding and the positive engagement with African counterparts suggest that a new agenda is in the making.

<sup>39</sup> See 'China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation' (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, December 2010), section 4: 'Strengthening Building of Development Capacity'.

<sup>40</sup> Statement by Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, Security Council Open Debate on Post-conflict Peacebuilding, 22 July 2009.





## China and UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

*Kuruvilla, Mathews*

### Introduction

More than ever before peace and security is becoming a prominent issue in the deepening China-Africa relations. Until recently China's policy on Africa has been largely defined by its desire to prevent Taiwan from making diplomatic inroads in the region and its pursuit of the continent's supply of oil and raw materials to fuel its economic growth. But of late, China is struggling to burnish its reputation and act as a responsible great power. The *Beijing Action Plan 2013-2015*, adopted at the 5<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) on 20 July 2012 rightly stressed the need for enhancing cooperation with Africa on peace and security issues. China also decided to launch the new initiative on "*China-Africa Cooperation Partnership for Peace and Security*" and provide financial and technical support to the African Union (AU) for its peace support operations, the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), personnel exchanges and training in the field of peace and security and Africa's conflict prevention, management and resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and development. Insecurity in Africa adversely affects Chinese interests, investments and its energy security and even safety of large numbers of Chinese nationals working on the continent particularly in conflict affected countries like Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), among others. It is not surprising that China's emerging security policy in Africa including its role in UN peacekeeping operations, which is one instruments of Chinese influence in Africa, is assuming greater relevance and significance.

### China and UN peacekeeping operations in Africa

Peacekeeping operations are a low cost effective means of contributing to conflict resolution and international peace and security. China is a latecomer to UN peacekeeping operations. China's approach to peacekeeping has evolved considerably since it assumed its legitimate seat in the UN Security Council in 1971 with the strong support of the African nations. At that time China expressed its long held view that the superpowers were ultimately in control of international interventions. However, things have changed over the years. Beijing's foreign policy standpoint shifted particularly after the reform and opening up of the late 1970s. The ideological stance of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism shifted toward a policy of engagement with the





world driven by China's rapid economic expansion. As a result in the 1990s Beijing began to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, for instance by sending observers to the Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission in 1991. In the mid-1990s China sent small numbers of observers to do peacekeeping in Mozambique, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Beginning in 2000 China contributed ten observers to the UN Mission (UNMEE) along Ethiopia-Eritrea border. China sent more than 200 troops to DRC in 2001 and contributed about 600 troops and police to the UN Mission in Liberia in 2003. China is also providing financial assistance to the AU for its peacekeeping missions in Darfur. As of 2011 China had over 5000 military peacekeepers, observers and police participating in a number of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Thus Beijing has slowly but steadily increased its participation in UN peacekeeping operations. As of 2012, there have been more than 21,000 Chinese soldiers participating in 18 UN peacekeeping operations around the world. Beijing made support for peacekeeping operations part of its African policy statement in 2006 and backed it up with tangible assistance.

## Analysis

China's involvement in UN/AU peacekeeping in Africa has been welcome by African leaders and the international community. While Beijing has contributed to UN peacekeeping in Africa, it has, nonetheless resisted liberal reforms toward more intervention based on its adherence to the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Prior to 2006 Beijing insisted on the principle that UN peacekeeping operations can only be undertaken at the invitation of the host nation. However, China's role in the Darfur crisis reflected critical shift in Beijing's strategic appraisal regarding its peacemaking role in Africa. By actively engaging with Khartoum, Beijing moved away from its traditional position of Third World solidarity against neo-imperialist interference toward the position that China is a responsible great power and therefore, will use its influence to persuade Khartoum to accept UN Security council proposals. For the first time, during its permanent membership of the UN Security Council, Beijing applied pressure both privately and publicly in order to persuade a sovereign state (Sudan) to accept UN peacekeeping operations.

A negative ramification of Chinese engagement is that Chinese arms reached both sides of the Ethio-Eritrea conflict, conflicting parties in DRC and Sierra Leone and the Sudanese government and rebels



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in Darfur and Chad. This has clearly caused an embarrassment for China. However, it may be noted that Beijing's participation in UN peacekeeping in Africa and its participation in peace negotiations is helping to build an image of a responsible great power.

The Libyan crisis of 2011 has also helped to change the traditional perception that China does not have a direct security stake in Africa. In Africa it is no longer possible for Beijing to declare business is business and not get involved in political and security issues. Beijing's desire for the leadership position of the developing world also means that we can expect increasing participation in diplomatic negotiations and support for the UN, AU and Regional Economic Communities and peacekeeping operations in Africa. Overall, China's growing role in UN peacekeeping operations is helping to fill the growing shortfall in capacity and resources. As a low cost effective means to contributing to international peace and security, China's increasing participation in UN/AU peacekeeping operations in Africa should be appreciated and encouraged in the wider interest of promoting African peace and security.



## Strengthening China-Africa Peacekeeping Support Operations for Peace and Stability in Africa:

Lazarus Kubasu Nolasco

African countries have made laudable contributions to fellow African peace processes under *ad-hoc* arrangements, as contributors to UN missions, and through regional and sub regional organizations, such as the AU and ECOWAS. However, African-led peacekeeping and, more notably, peace enforcement operations have faced huge stumbling blocks. Many African militaries lack the requisite training, equipment and logistic capability to effectively undertake and sustain such operations – either alone or as part of multinational missions. While the AU, ECOWAS and other sub-regional groups are trying to develop more capacity, such efforts are still nascent. In view of *Brahimi UN peacekeeping 2000 report* on UN Peacekeeping in the world which observed several limitations as regards peacekeeping mission particularly those in fragile states in Africa by African nation peacekeeping where most violent conflict exists, China-Africa Peace Security Governance Partnership could be strengthened around this area. Considering that several studies have acknowledged the linkages between stability in Africa and security concerns. It is important that China – Africa partnership contributes towards addressing failed and failing states, regional disputes and conflicts. When violence erupts and states falter, China could work with other African countries to help alleviate suffering and restore stability. Specifically, China, would help strengthen Africa's fragile states by training and equipping African militaries to respond to peace support and complex humanitarian requirements through African Union (AU); build and enhance sustainable African peace support training capacity; build effective command and control; promote commonality and interoperability; enhance international, regional and sub regional peace support capacity in Africa. This is in recognition that peacekeeping through AU will nurture new democracies; lower African tide of refugees and prevents small wars from growing into large scale conflicts with much higher costs in terms of lives and resources. Peacekeeping also allows African countries and international community to share cost and risks of international security and helps resolve long standing conflicts in Africa. This paper critically discusses key challenge areas of peacekeeping cooperation that China-Africa Security Peace Governance Partnership could be strengthened without jeopardizing and compromising the whole principle of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of African countries to promote peace, stability and governance in the African continent.



## Peacekeeping operational challenge and China support in filling the gaps

Peacekeeping missions are important and essential in the maintenance of security and stability in Africa yet they have received very little support or attention from the international community. The inability or unwillingness, for instance, of the international community to respond in Rwanda revealed the limits of UN operations. So too did the failure of UN peacekeepers to contain violent attacks in the Congo in the 1960s, Somalia in the 1990s and Sierra Leone in 2000. Elsewhere, peacekeepers may have succeeded in a narrow sense, while failing in the broader international response to conflict. In earlier missions in Liberia, for example, UN peacekeeping deployed alongside international assistance that was poorly adapted to creating the conditions and structures for a sustainable peace. Peacekeepers departed, perhaps too early, only to return.

The 2000 Brahimi report was a turning point in setting out a renewed vision for UN peacekeeping and putting in motion major reforms to make peacekeeping faster, more capable and more effective. Subsequent reform initiatives have maintained the momentum for improvement and for adapting UN peacekeeping to changes in the strategic environment. These changes include unanticipated levels of peacekeeping demand and activity, new sources of insecurity, significant new peace and security actors, and an international community that finds itself under greater political and resource strain. Brahimi report has identified five key challenges for the UN peacekeeping operations which China could help particularly in supporting peace-keeping challenges in Africa.

***Supporting ceasefire agreements that are never negotiated:*** Long-standing monitoring and observation missions in DRC and Western Sahara continue to help deter violence. These missions are limited in size, mandate and cost. But in some cases their presence encourages Member States to divert attention away from finding a political solution.

- *China could use her growing leverage in Africa in collaboration with AU in helping to find a political solution since peacekeeping is part of a broader political solution, not an alternative.*

***Limited support to the peace process after conflict:*** UN peacekeepers face distinct challenges in helping to lay the foundations for sustainable peace. A troubled transition in the DRC and a difficult peace process between northern and southern Sudan are straining two UN large missions.



- *China could help initiate sustained dialogue and exchange between the disputing member states or between the centre and the periphery. It could play this role behind the scene through AU.*

***Extrapolating initial security-stability support to longer term peace:***

Peacekeeping missions also serve as early peace-builders. In Liberia, UN peacekeepers have succeeded in establishing basic security and supporting political processes. The conditions for sustainable peacebuilding are in place.

- *China through AU, various regional economic blocks and bilateral agreement with the affected country could get involved in stabilization programs of the affected country through business and infrastructural investment program that are conflict sensitive.*

***Provision of Civilian and humanitarian protection:*** In Chad and Darfur, Sudan, UN peacekeepers are trying to minimize the effects of ongoing conflict. Their activities are focused on protecting civilians and providing security for humanitarian efforts. The willingness of major parties to these conflicts to accept and cooperate with peacekeepers is critical. The scale and remoteness of the territory make these two missions among the most expensive and difficult UN operations ever.

- *China could leverage her influence by negotiating with the disputants and assisting in civilian monitoring framework with high level military technical equipments and satellites imagery information that facilitate better protection of civilian in conflict.*

***Supporting peacekeepers through capacity building:*** In recent years, UN peacekeepers have been tasked to contribute to the capacity of other partners to respond to conflicts. The UN provides technical and capacity building support to AU peacekeeping, which includes support to AU deployments in Darfur, Sudan and in Somalia.

- *China could help project future technical needs to African countries as regards peacekeeping through AU. Current and likely future demands for UN peacekeeping require a high degree of mobility and specialization of military, police and civilian capabilities. Identifying, recruiting and retaining diverse police and civilian specialists for newer peacekeeping tasks are particular challenges that China could help address through the UN or the AU.*



## Conclusion

Simply put, the scale and complexity of peacekeeping to address peace and security challenges in Africa today are mismatched with existing capabilities both at the continental and at the global level. The demands of the past decades have exposed the limitations of past systems and structures. It is the reason why, with growing economic and political might of China that it must be engaged to help African states improve their basic security. Peacekeeping in its current form requires more predictable, professional and adaptable capacities that China could significantly contribute on. It needs a global system to match the global enterprise it has become. Peacekeeping is a core function of the UN—to which China is a critical member.



## Africa and China's Non-Interference Policy: Towards Peace Enhancement in Africa

*Admore Mupoki Kambudzi*

Africa and China have a longstanding relationship, mainly shaped by the struggle against colonialism on the African continent, from 1955 to 1994. China provided support to the African struggle for independence and the dismantlement of apartheid. Equally, through the “long March”, as led by Mao Tse Tung, in the 1930s and 1940s, China fought against foreign domination, colonialism and imperialism on its own soil. There upon was found a link to develop a closer relationship between the two. The absence of a colonial history between Africa and China is the single biggest opportunity accounting for lack of destabilizing tension and for the ever growing spirit of cooperation and solidarity.

A step further in building their bilateral relations came when China started its campaign to get a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Africa wholeheartedly supported that campaign. Yet, in various international fora, Africa and China have continued, on an incremental basis, to unify their voices on global issues. Alongside this trend came China's gigantic economic development, at home and abroad. In Africa, China not only found an old reliable friend, but a vast base of raw materials and a growing market. On its part, Africa found China to be a reliable partner that, while being economically stronger, is prepared to associate Africa its own scientific, technical, technological and economic success.

It is noteworthy that China has constructed a huge office and conference facility for the African Union, which was inaugurated during the 18<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the African Union of January 2012. Notably, the relationship between Africa and China in the domain of peace and security is quite new and comparatively far less developed. But there are vast opportunities for both sides to expand common interests and commitments in this domain. Africa has explained its peace and security architecture, as established in 2002, *the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)*, to China. The latter has shown interest in assisting Africa in the implementation of APSA. Notable landmarks in this new bilateral connection are:

- The visit of the AU Peace and Security Council to China in 2011, to discuss common steps for the promotion of peace and security in Africa;



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- The negotiations in course for the establishment of an Africa-China Peace Facility;
- China's capacity building support for the African Standby Force;
- China's financial and technical support for Somalia and other parts of Africa.

In supporting the implementation of APSA, China postures its non-interference policy: accordingly, Africa remains master of its strategies on peace, whilst China simply provides support. Indeed, APSA shares similar features with non-interference policy in that, through such a policy, Africa simply wants to make peace at home; it avoids interfering in the affairs of other continents and countries. In this approach, Africa wants its own leadership and ownership; it opposes interference from outside in managing peace and security, and other affairs, at home. While Africa still has to grapple with the phenomenon of residual external domination and imposition of conditionalities, it has found, in China's non-interference policy, a supportive policy instrument. China's approach is to provide support for Africa to pursue its home-made priorities and to attain its home-set objectives.

In summary, APSA, a purely African idea and practice, with inbuilt functional symmetry, is founded on the following:

- Common values, objectives and institutions in the promotion of continental peace, security and stability;
- Peace and Security Council (PSC), with the African supreme decision-making organ on peace and security in Africa;
- Institutional supports to the PSC: African Union Commission; Panel of the Wise; African Standby Force; Continental Early Warning System and Peace Fund;
- Relations between the PSC with African Regional Economic Communities, and civil society organizations, and,
- Relations between the PSC and the UN Security Council, as well as between the PSC and other international organizations dealing with peace and security.

Africa, so long traumatized by crises and violent conflicts, needs peace and security. It needs them for creating an environment conducive to socio-economic development. The main challenge, nowadays, is for Africa to put in place all the components of APSA. Whilst the PSC and some components are functioning, their effectiveness is compromised by other components that are not yet well functioning. Given the availability of several partners, especially China, willing to assist,





there is an urgent need for Africa to take advantage of that window of opportunity.

Refreshing the essence of China's "non-interference policy" in international relations, Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference recently stated that: "the Chinese government pursues and will continue to pursue the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of African and other countries. China pursues a win-win strategy of opening up, which means that China aims to develop itself amid the common development of developing countries."

China took the choice of non-interference, based on considerations of the international order, especially from the 1950s to the 1990s. Several western powers used to interfere in the internal affairs of weaker countries in Africa, Asia and South and Central America. For Africa, that external interference included regime change, coups d'état and mercenarism. The continent opposed the interference, but with considerable difficulties. China came to its side. Indeed, China sought solidarity with the then newly emerging developing countries, to mark its distance away from the policies of interference of western powers. Hence, the way forward for it was to avoid doing anything that would amount to interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Thus, China became part of the Non-Aligned Movement and other fora that stood for a new world order. In so doing, China won the hearts and minds of numerous developing countries. It continues to win and keep them today, with its huge investments, large infrastructure projects and financial loans and assistance to Africa and other developing regions.

Indeed, China's external policy and its mutations are subject to changing global conditions. Just as non-interference emerged as a result of a changing international environment, changes to that policy are also likely to be triggered off by a changing global environment. China's friends are growing and changing. India is following China's footsteps in making gigantic economic strides. Brazil is doing the same. Various potential African economic giants are beginning to show a strong posture. The world is changing, putting more demands on global powers, as they are leaders, to behave in a certain way. China, therefore, cannot afford to stand idle without reviewing its external policy.

Critically viewed, as China grows into a global power, a status that comes with obligations and responsibilities, its non-interference policy is most likely to be challenged. Certainly, as much as China's



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non-interference policy is a good intention for international practice, China's increasing political, economic, commercial and financial involvement in the world would have a reformist impact on the policy. It is unlikely that China will sustain non-interference its classical form. As an emerging global superpower, China will not be able to avoid obligations and responsibilities that accompany such a global status, especially with regard to: protection of life, protection from degrading poverty, preservation of peace and security, promotion of a stable global political and economic order, protection of the environment, and other essential tasks that benefit the humankind.

Africa and its member countries are stakeholders in pursuit of the above concerns. Inevitably, Africa's choices will impact on China's policies and China's options, as it responds to global demands, will affect Africa's choices. Thus, as a global power, China may be compelled by the dynamics of international relations to adjust its non-interference policy with a view to injecting an element of constructive involvement that would enlist China's support to safeguard human life, property and the environment.



## Africa in a Multi-Polar World and the Prospect of Sino-Africa Cooperation

*Yang Lihua*

China-Africa relations need to be examined in a broader sense of the global framework. The world we are currently facing is shifting away from unilateralism towards multilateralism. One of the decisive factors for this change is the collective rise of developing countries and regional groups. Globalization based on regional integration will be the new trend. This will challenge the hegemony of big powers.

If Africa is to be an independent pillar in this increasingly interdependent world, at least two things are relevant: her vision and strategy for development, and her capacity to become an indispensable part of the world's sustainable development. Africa needs to lay the necessary foundation to steadily and innovatively take advantage of new technology in order to promote the continent using an African approach.

Africa is growing more confident in playing an international role and the continent is also in a better position to choose cooperative partners. China-Africa cooperation is developing rapidly in both breadth and depth. The key for sustainability in this cooperation is mutual respect and mutual benefit. Necessary adjustments will be made to deal with any emerging problems in this fast growing relationship. We need to “think big and long-term” in building a strategic partnership, so that a more stable and just world will be in place.



## Issues of Non-Interference in China's East African Oil and Gas Sector

*Ross Anthony*

### Introduction

As China continues its quest for energy security, East Africa is becoming increasingly important. Both Chinese state and non-state companies have gained a foot-hold in Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Kenya, where they are involved in both upstream and downstream activities. The growing presence will have broader implications for China's geopolitical role in the region. This paper examines two shifting dynamics in China's political engagement with Africa via the hydrocarbon industry: the potentially growing role of trans-national infrastructure and the rise of State Owned Enterprise (SOE)/multi-national joint ventures. Because both phenomenon challenge common understandings of territorial integrity, the continued development of such trends in the region may oblige Beijing to develop a more nuanced approach to its strict African "non-interference" policy.

### Transnational development

Within East Africa, many significant oil fields lie in troubled border areas and disputed territories, including the Abeyi sector of Sudan, northern Kenya, the Ogaden and the Sool region which is located between the Somali secession territories of Somaliland and Puntland. Chinese companies are significantly involved in infrastructure and exploration projects which traverse sensitive international borders. Oil reserves in the Lake Albert region, where CNOOC is involved, lie between Uganda and the DRC. Another proposed project is to connect recently independent South Sudan's oil fields to the port of Lamu in Kenya, thereby offering South Sudan a way to transport its oil to market without having to go through its adversary, Sudan. However, recent visits between Chinese delegates and South Sudan President Salva Kiir, seem to suggest that China remains non-committal toward the costly project. An additional project seeks to connect gas finds in the Ogaden Basin (Ethiopia) to Berbera, a port in the autonomous region of Somaliland; Hong Kong-based PetroTrans President, John Chine, has expressed interest in this project, although construction has not yet begun.



Because oil and gas prospecting in East Africa is still relatively new, with only 480 wells drilled thus far (as opposed to 14,500 in West Africa), the possibility of additional trans-nationally located basins and linkages being developed is still significant. For instance, potential additional reserves have been located in Madagascar and, more recently, in Northern Kenya and on the Tanzanian/Malawian border.

### **Multi-national joint ventures**

Another potential future pattern of hydrocarbon exploration in East Africa is the rise of joint ventures involving Chinese SOEs and western multinationals. Along with China are numerous other companies with which the Chinese have to compete in East Africa, including Norway's Statoil, British Gas and Cove Energy (UK); America's ExxonMobil; France's Total; Italy's ENI; India's GAIL and ONGC; Thailand's PTTEP. In certain instances this has led to partnerships, such as the construction of Sudan's 1600km Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, which involved Indian, Malaysian and Chinese companies (the latter of whom, China National Petroleum Corporation, own 40 per cent stake in the operation as well as managing the operational aspect of the pipeline); a more recent development is CNOOC's one third stake, along with UK's Tullow and France's Total in the development a refinery and pipeline within the Lake Albert region of Uganda, where reserves are estimated to be at around 2.4 billion barrels. While China is already significantly involved in the development of refineries on the continent, they are usually constructed in conjunction with the given African country's state-owned oil company. This is what sets the Ugandan refinery apart: it involves a conglomerate of foreign firms rather than an exclusively Chinese-African state owned enterprise venture. The cost of such a project obliged all partners to cooperate, as they exceeded Tullow's capacities. If more African countries containing oil oblige the construction of domestic refineries, it is possible that such partnerships may be more common in the future. More specifically, the challenge of overcoming specific problems in under-developed infrastructure and geological complexity make East Africa a potential site for further joint co-operation projects.

### **Re-thinking China's non-interference policy**

China's policy governing engagement with African countries is based on the principle of non-interference. Underpinning this approach is the assumption that the states involved possess stable, un-shifting sovereign territories. However, in the above scenarios, we see examples in which



understandings of clear state-to-state integrity become blurred. With regards to trans-national oil development, the geo-political instability of significant parts of Africa entails that the very principles upon which sovereignty is based, are frequently contested to begin with (and often governed by weak states unable to effectively police their own borders). Furthermore, it has been argued that the rise of the oil industry in developing countries often further de-stabilizes sovereign integrity (Ross, 2012). Thus China, along with various other states and multi-nationals, is now a part of a larger process of commercial engagement which has the potential to exacerbate state fragmentation.

In the second instance, we see a different kind of possible blurring of state boundaries. China's oil SOE's function at once as arms of the state but also as money-making ventures. The fact that the oil they extract often goes on the international market, as opposed to being sent to China as part of a grand energy strategy, points toward this. Chinese SOE/multi-national ventures may potentially challenge traditional understandings of the state particularly in light of security concerns. A hypothetical event in which Chinese state firms, in conjunction with western firms, are obliged to jointly defend oil assets (either through domestic state defense or private security firms) against domestic African incursion, challenges China's oft-touted line that its engagements in Africa are fundamentally different from those of the west. Moreover, such a scenario entails an alignment, or conglomerate of western and Chinese interests positioning themselves against the African party.

In recent years, several Chinese scholars have argued for a more flexible approach to the issue of non-interference. Nowhere has such a re-thinking been so applicable as in the recent secession of South Sudan. China, who initially supported Sudan both politically and economically (often at the expense of the South's SPLA) was forced to reconfigure its alliances following secession, not least because oil reserves and pipelines (owned in conjunction with multi-nationals) lie across both countries. China has proved remarkably flexible in its re-alignment and now courts both countries and is in a unique position to arbitrate between them. If similar such challenges lie in wait in its development of the East African oil and gas sector, then China might do well to better align its static, high-level rhetoric of non-interference with its flexible, nimble practices on the ground.



## The Principle and its Practice: The Re-Adaptation of China's "Non-Interference Policy" to the New Context of China-Africa Ties

*Zhongying Pang*

The history of the world's diplomatic system shows that an unchangeable foreign policy principle does not exist. Since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, China's "non-interference" or "non-intervention" has been a global focal point when discussing China's relations with Africa. We should consider that the principle and its practice by Chinese foreign policy in the past decades has stabilized the African continent and promoted China-Africa relations positively and significantly. While different from the EU and the US, no doubt, China will continue to practice this principle in implementing its African policy. However, as the principle faces challenges in both the international community and the African continent, China, as a responsible global power, has to adapt its principles and practices to local realities and trends. This adaptation is not just a philosophy for survival but also a strategy for success. If China had failed to adapt in the past, there would not be a new generation of China-Africa relations. In fact, as "non-intervention" can be problematic and helpless, a fundamental question that China is now facing is: how should we intervene in Africa both legitimately and effectively?



## Analysing the extent to which China uses the non-interference policy to promote peace and security in Africa

*Richard T. Nenge, Takavafira M. Zhou, Tompson Makahamadze*

The growing presence of China in Africa is evidenced by increased trade from US\$10.6 billion in 2000 to US\$166.3 billion in 2011. More than 2000 Chinese enterprises have started business in 50 African countries as of July 2012<sup>41</sup>. These investments have attracted a mixed reaction from scholars, politicians and the general public. Much as this paper acknowledges some positive aspects accruing from China's non-interference policy in the internal affairs of other countries, it also argues that the policy is a cloak cover for China's political expediency; economic expansionism; arms trade; and therefore a source of insecurity in Africa.

The non-interference policy is part of the Five Principles formulated by China as far back as 1954: mutual respect for each other; territorial integrity; non-aggression; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence<sup>42</sup>. Since the end of the Cold War China's bilateral relations with African states have mostly been induced by this principle of non-interference. For this reason, China has developed close relations with regimes that Western countries only engage with in a manner that is conditional on improvements in governance.

Admittedly, some advocates of the Chinese policy argue that it has promoted peace in Africa. They point that China-Africa cooperation has over the last 10 years shown robust growth and the recovery of African economies which is a basis for durable peace and security<sup>43</sup>. China claims her promotion of peace in Africa by maintaining close communication and coordination with African countries at the UN Security Council. She also increased the number of Chinese peacekeepers in Africa particularly, in Burundi, Somalia and Sudan<sup>44</sup>. China has also carried out escort missions in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. She appointed a Special Representative of the Chinese Government on African Affairs, and engaged in the mediation of African hot-spot issues. China in particular played a crucial role in securing Khartoum's acceptance of the deployment of peacekeepers

<sup>41</sup> FOAC Documents, *First to Fifth Ministerial Conferences, Beijing, 2000-2012*.

<sup>42</sup> Taylor, I. (2008). *Sino-African Relationships and the problem of Human Rights. African Affairs*, Vol 107: 63-87.

<sup>43</sup> FOAC Documents, *First to Fifth Ministerial Conferences, Beijing, 2000-2012*.

<sup>44</sup> FOAC, 2012





in Darfur after 2006 while in late 2008 she pushed the governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda to resolve the conflict in eastern DRC, where Rwanda was backing rebel groups<sup>45</sup>.

While it is undeniable that Chinese trade, investment and 'development' assistance (including debt cancellation) have increased over the past years, her developmental thesis, and promotion of peace and security in Africa is questionable. China has used her policy non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states to gain unrestricted access to Africa's mineral and oil resources which she badly needs for her domestic markets<sup>46</sup>. Research indicates that such countries as Sudan, Nigeria, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa have been the major suppliers of those resources. Much as the African continent is not a homogenous entity, China's economic policy has been a source of conflict in Africa<sup>47</sup>. Southern Africa in particular, is now enjoying the worst of the two worlds as producers of Chinese raw materials and consumers of her manufactured products. Consequently, flooding of markets, the collapse of internal industries, underdevelopment and the escalation of poverty have become sources and ingredients for strife and insecurity. Above all, trade between African countries and China has been a blessing to Africa's leaders; a resource-curse to the majority of Africans, and a source of conflict particularly in Nigeria, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Revenue from Zimbabwe's diamond mines just as oil in Sudan, has allowed a patronage-based regime to maintain its grip on power and enrich elitist 'economic bandits'.

China also uses the policy of state sovereignty to "bolster her international position to manoeuvre within the Security Council"<sup>48</sup>. She needs the support of Africa to cement the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan and strengthen her own international position against Western countries which is critical about her human rights record<sup>49</sup>. Nigeria and Gabon blocked the Western backed resolutions against China for human rights violations in 2004, an indication of a strong bond between Africa and China. China has not only blocked the Security Council resolution to impose sanctions on Sudan, but she also opposed Western attempts to bring Omar al-Bashir to justice over violations of human rights in Darfur on the basis of diplomatic immunity. In Zimbabwe, when Mugabe violated human rights toward the June 2008 run-off

<sup>45</sup> *Saferworld*, (2011). *China's growing role in African Peace and security*. London.

<sup>46</sup> Mittelman, J. H. (2010). *Hyper-Conflict: Globalization and Insecurity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

<sup>47</sup> Taylor, I. (2008)

<sup>48</sup> Tull, D.M. (2006). *China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences*. *Journal of Modern African Studies*. Vol 44: 459-479.

<sup>49</sup> Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company; Mittelman, (2010)



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election, China consigned weapons and military equipment, a clear indication that she wanted to retain the Mugabe regime and protect her economic interests<sup>50</sup>. While it is a fact that good governance cannot be imposed from outside, China's commitment to the non-interference policy in Africa's domestic affairs impedes Africa's efforts to promote democracy and good governance as she sometimes props up rogue regimes.

It can be noted that China's military and arms agreements with African states which are used to cement political ties as part of her wider diplomacy have increased conflict rather than peace. Chinese trained Guinea commandos killed 150 protesters in 2009, while the Chinese trained national armies of the DRC and Zimbabwe have been accused of violations of human rights<sup>51</sup>. Additionally, China's state-owned defence industry has supplied large quantities of small arms and light weapons to African states that exacerbated conflict and insecurity in some state, in particular Sudan, DRC, Somalia, Nigeria, Guinea and Mali.

In conclusion, China's policy of non-interference has aggravated conflict in Africa through plundering of Africa's energy and resources, propping up of rogue regimes, and provision of arms and gross abuse of human rights. China can however play a crucial role in promoting peace and security in Africa by using her strong historical ties with the continent, pursue a win-win economic development, and distinguishing between the interests of leaders and those of led in her economic investment.

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<sup>50</sup> Taylor, I. (2008).

<sup>51</sup> *Saferworld*. (2011).



## Between Pragmatism and Non-Interference: China in Africa's Complex Security Challenges

*Bonnie Ayodele*

The attention of scholars, politicians and governments has been drawn to China's rising influence in Africa. Despite her foreign policy framework of pragmatic diplomacy and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, China is challenged by the reality of the post-Cold War global politics of interventionism. Regarded as a great and global power, China's robust economy presents her an opportunity to play greater roles in global affairs than ever. With her transition from developing to developed economy, and its gradual movement from a 'closed state' to a 'free market' country, the changing status of China and the dynamics of global politics have no doubt thrown her into the ring of global politics. The reality is that China must play, live and act in the new world order. Today, China is the second biggest economy after the United States and has one of the largest military.

While it could be argued that China's economic fortune contributes in no small measure to its global standing, it must be noted that China's policy of seeking friends among the developing countries is also informed by its economic wisdom rather than political pragmatism. In recent years, Africa has become a bride of sort to the Chinese technocrats and business interests. The reasons for this are not farfetched. As said earlier, China's economy is growing and needs energy resource which Africa has in abundance but lack required technology to explore. The Chinese with reluctance of the West to invest in Africa has cashed in on this. Besides, these industries need expanded market. Thus Africa fits into the whole scenario especially with high handedness of the West's conditionalities attached to every aid and loans.

Therefore, this study centres on how the foreign policy of China which is principled on pragmatic diplomacy and non-interference in a country's domestic affairs interrelates with her economic and political interest. Taking from this is the question of how does China with her huge investment in Africa deal with an unstable political climate and conflict ridden continent without compromising her foreign policy as well as hurting her economic interest. The central thrust of this paper is to examine China's foreign policy of pragmatic diplomacy and non-interference within the complex security challenges in Africa and China's economic interests.



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In our analysis, we therefore intend to examine some areas of common interest on China's Africa relations and how it affects its policy in Africa, its interventions in some of the conflicts either in terms of peacekeeping efforts or partnering with African Union and also in terms of arms sales. While examining these areas, the study brought to fore that doing business in Africa is not without a risk as many African states are politically fragile and economic unstable. However, in the past two or three decades China has emerged as a leading investor in Africa and recently promised to deepen its political and economic cooperation with African countries.

Many African countries have been provided with loans and aid to chart a new path in development. It is also noted that China has been supportive of Africa in the area of conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. China's participation in Africa's high intensity and low intensity conflicts has been acknowledged. As China continues to play prominent roles on issues relating to peace and security, its foreign policy toward Africa is evolving in line with its greater commercial presence. In fact, the UNPKO states that almost 75 % of China's peacekeepers are deployed in Africa. While the need for stable markets in Africa is a *sine qua non* to a positive trade environment, the growing responsibility of China as a leading global power is seen in its increasing commitment to UNPKOs in Africa.

China has one of the largest military, the capacity of its military, in terms of personnel numbers and investment in military development, cannot be compared to any state except the US. China is rated as the second biggest military spender after the US. China's role in Africa has not been totally done without a clash with its foreign policy. There are many challenges facing China as it intends to pursue her foreign policy of pragmatic diplomacy and non-interference. China's economic interest has been constantly threatened by Africa's political instability.

There is increase in Chinese arms sales to Africa. Since 2000, China has delivered Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) to at least 27 African countries. The largest recipients have been Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Côte d'Ivoire. Unfortunately, three of these countries, Sudan, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire, have been experiencing internal conflicts since 2000. There is a growing concern that China, because its inexpensive small arms, is becoming the provider of choice for the generic version of the AK-47 and related assault rifles which has been finding its way into Africa's low intensity conflicts. In fact,



China's most controversial military sales concern Sudan where there have been two major conflicts – the North-South civil war and the crisis in Darfur. China provided up to 90 percent of the SALW delivered to Sudan between 2004 and 2006. China also helped build three weapons factories outside Khartoum. Chinese small arms became widely used in Darfur and found their way to the conflict in neighbouring Chad. Most ammunition used by all parties in Darfur is manufactured in Sudan or in China.

Finally, the paper concludes that China plays significant roles in Africa development as well as in conflict resolutions. China's contribution to Africa in terms of its economic intervention has raised the development of some African countries. Her conflict resolution efforts have also been very effective. However, the study finds that the non-interference of China in the domestic affairs of other countries may not hold within the prevailing global political reality.



## Diplomatic and Strategic Position of China in the Arab Spring

*Ahmed Hagagg*

The paper starts with a brief analysis of relations between China and the Arab world since Egypt established full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1956. These relations were based almost for 25 years on ideological and political reasons. Before the 1990s, economic and trade relations were minimal since China had not developed its economic power and Egypt was just starting to develop its industries. However, there were continuous consultations between the two sides on regional and international issues, especially regarding the Palestinian issue which the Arab world in general and Egypt in particular made a great emphasis in securing China's support for Palestinian statehood.

China prefers to have relations based on stable conditions. It does not prefer to be faced with sudden and dramatic changes in those countries. Its motto of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries was apparent in her relations with the Arab world and especially Egypt. There were numerous exchanges of visits at the highest levels between the Chinese and Egyptian leadership. Therefore, when the Arab Spring started in Tunisia followed by Egypt spreading to Libya, China like the rest of the world was completely surprised by the quick succession of events. It took a non-committal attitude and kept silent and preferred not to make public statements at the beginning. Certainly, Chinese diplomatic missions in those countries were briefing Beijing about the rapid developments and the orientations of the newly emerging leadership. The new leaders that emerged in the aftermath of the public protests were also anxious to keep good relations with China as a major power especially in the economic field. But as they were so preoccupied by internal developments, which they did not start to have proper contacts with the Chinese leadership. In all these countries, there were different factions competing with each other. In Egypt, till the situation was settled by the free and transparent elections which led to the election of President Mohamed Moursi, there was uncertainty.

In Libya, however, China's stakes were high. It invested a lot in economic relations with the Qaddafi regime. China adopted a cautious attitude towards the Security Council resolution rendering assistance



to protect the Libyan people which the NATO alliance took as a pretext to intervene militarily in the situation. China was forced to evacuate tens of thousands of Chinese experts and workers from Libya on short notice. It mobilized all the resources of the state for this purpose. China stressed that the NATO powers took advantage of the Security Council resolution in order to pursue their selfish interests in Libya at the expense of other countries. Therefore, we could understand its cautious position vis-à-vis the situation in Syria.

In the case of Egypt, both sides seem to be anxious to continue on close relations as it is mutually beneficial. We could understand the first visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister to Egypt to assess the situation by himself together with numerous visits by China's special envoy for the Middle East who happened to be the former and knowledgeable Ambassador to Cairo. President Moursi's visit to Beijing is a good signal about the wish of the new Egyptian leadership to maintain close relations with Beijing. The Egyptian leadership would like to enhance relations with Beijing especially in the economic field offering China some attractive projects to use Egypt as a stage for her exports and investments not only in the Middle East but also in Africa, using the strategic location of the Suez Canal in this regard as the main artery of trade in the world.

Some western commentators try to portray the Arab Spring as a worrying signal to China. But, the new leaderships of those countries which were rocked by the Arab Spring do neither have the intention nor the interest to export their revolution to any part of the world. This is due to the fact that the protest movements in the Arab world were homegrown and carried out by popular forces without any outside assistance, with the exception of Libya's case.

In post-Qaddafi Libya, China has not really started to warm up its relations with the new leadership. This is due to the fact that Libya has not yet developed to the stage of having a genuine and stable leadership with whom China could deal. China is not alone in this predicament but it shares a position of many other countries including Arab countries themselves.



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China relies greatly on the Arab Gulf states for providing a major part of its energy needs and the trade relations between Beijing and those countries have tremendously increased in the last decade. China also disagrees with the US and the other western powers about imposing economic and political sanctions on Iran.

The Middle East, including the North African region, is important for China's global policy. It could not ignore what is happening in the region and it must adapt to the new situation. The newly emerging leadership in the Arab world also seeks to reorient their foreign and economic policies towards Asia and foremost with China.





## Breakaway Session 3: Chinese alternative to economic and social development in Africa

### Harnessing Chinese Enterprise in Africa for better Governance, Peace and Security

*Bob Eze*

In recent times, China has been investing in Africa. Prior to the Chinese, there were the Americans, Soviets, and Europeans. There is an impression that the Chinese are in Africa to help achieve the goal of social/economic development. However, that has not always been the case. The Europeans, the Americans and Soviets, had always taken advantage of Africa's natural resources, and in return gave little to the continent.

Europeans were much less pretentious about their intentions in Africa, conquering, and forcefully colonizing Africa. They carted away African human and natural resources that formed the bedrock of their subsequent growth and development. In return, Africans got little or no rewards from the activities of the Colonialists. Much of the backwardness in Africa today may be traced to colonial policies. In the wake of independence, many African countries were engulfed by conflicts. Many of these conflicts can be tracked to colonial policies of divide and rule. The colonial powers arbitrarily created territories which later became independent African nations with no commonalities or foundational objectives for being together. At independence, political powers were handed to those tribal groups that did not have majority control; those that were not favorably disposed towards colonial rule were deliberately denied access to state power. Independence was used to reward tribal groups and stooges, hence the immediate falling apart of nation states and degeneration into civil strife at independence. Afterwards, the Americans and the Soviets came with their own brand of ideological colonization based on aid. Aid was given in exchange for adherence to their economic and social ideological beliefs.

During the cold war, African nations were divided on ideological lines. The two superpowers interfered in the internal affairs of African nations. Soon conflicts ensued along ideological lines, leading to challenges for governance, peace and security. With the fall of the Soviet Union, America had uninterrupted sway in the affairs of African nations, until the economic crunch forced her to relent its quest for power and influence. This created room for the rise of China's influence in Africa.



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China focuses, without being pretentious, on economic pursuits, acquiring land and mining rights across Africa, and its influence is growing by the day. The objectives here are overwhelmingly economic, securing vital natural resources that it requires for its own economic growth at home, while selling cheap manufactured goods that sometimes do not meet minimal manufacturing standards<sup>52</sup>. Chinese outreach in Africa seems directly motivated by a plan to establish China as a power throughout the continent.

China is not making pretences in taking advantage of ineffective policies that exist in African states. The policy of non interference in internal affairs is a welcome development for an African continent that has had undue interference from others, leaving nothing to show in terms of development and growth. However, in economic adventures, there are no sentiments, China wants, China buys and takes away. African leaders take advantage of this situation, using China as a front for development that benefits the ruling class, and the rest of the people do not that much appreciate the positive aspect of Chinese investment in Africa and continue to complain about substandard Chinese goods in the market. China hardly enters into joint venture initiatives, nor does it like technical partnerships that will help to develop the knowhow of African professionals. China's development programs in Africa are not in manufacturing either, and where they enter into manufacturing, it is only to create value for better export potentials. So what is the hope for Africa in this relationship?

Africans have made too many excuses for too long for their woes. Chinese policies in Africa will be beneficial if Africans look out for African interest while welcoming the Chinese non interference policy. It is time for Africa to use Chinese policies to meet her own needs the way the Chinese used the Americans in bringing American investments into China that are now Chinese.

### The Forum

The establishment of the CATTF is a welcome development for a viable and mutually beneficial Chinese and African relationship that is based on mutual respect and interest. It creates ground for a welcome dialogue at the dawn of yet another out of African (permit the use of the term) aggressive investment drive inside of Africa. The underlying idea for CATTF is stated as *a shared platform and regular mechanism for dialogues*

<sup>52</sup> Gerson, M. (2011). *China's African Investments: Who Benefits? Washington Post Opinion*, Washington Post. Accessed on July 16, 2012 at [http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-african-investments-who-benefits/2011/03/28/AF8G7mqB\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-african-investments-who-benefits/2011/03/28/AF8G7mqB_story.html)



*and exchanges between think tanks of the two sides. With the purpose of letting “people-to-people exchanges play the major role with participation from the government and candid dialogues to accumulate consensus”.<sup>53</sup>*

Dialogue is the essential bedrock for mutual understanding that leads to enhanced good governance, peace and security. Towards this end, former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Anan, in declaring the year 2001 as the year of dialogue among civilizations stated: “I see ... dialogue as a chance for people of different cultures and traditions to get to know each other better, whether they live on opposite sides of the world or on the same street”. This forum is indeed an opportunity for both Africans and Chinese from two different cultures to get to know each other for mutual understanding of our varied and common goals in the coming years as we do business together as equal partners seeking common ground for our integrated goals.

As this dialogue progresses, it is pertinent that we understand that we have different rationale for our mutual investment drives. What China seeks and what it gets from Africa is different from what Africa seeks and desires to get from China. While China seeks to strengthen its investment drive in Africa through well focused economic and intellectual understanding of Africa, Africa, on the other hand, still does not seem to have a clear understanding of what it wants to get from China.

So we dialogue, for different reasons, but for reasons that are all the same good for all concerned. Dialogues, no matter the underlying reason, are good, they help the participants to understand who they are and what they ought to do. There is this story about an anthropologist who lived for a long while with a North American tribe. It was a small group of about fifty people. The story buttresses the need for dialogue, even when it seems to be aimless “... Now, from time to time that tribe met like this in a circle. They just talked and talked and talked, apparently to no purpose. They made no decisions. There was no leader. And everybody could participate. There may have been wise men or wise women who were listened to a bit more – the older ones – but everybody could talk. The meeting went on, until it finally seemed to stop for no reason at all and the group dispersed. Yet after that, everybody seemed to know what to do, because they understood each other so well. Then they could get together in smaller groups and do something or decide things.”<sup>54</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The People's Republic of China. (2012). Think Tanks Forum: Shared Platform for China-Africa Dialogues and Exchanges. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Accessed on July 16, 2007 at <http://www.focac.org/eng/xsj/t894943.htm>

<sup>54</sup> Bohm, D. (1996). On Dialogue. Routledge London, England.



## Challenges for Sino-African Relations in the New Era and Policy Proposals

*Liu Youfa*

Sino-African relations, which have withstood the changing international situation over the past five decades, have become an important component of China's foreign relations. Politically, China and Africa have become strategic partners of mutual trust; economically, the two sides have become cooperative partners of mutual benefit; culturally, the two sides have built up a modality of mutual assimilation; and security wise, China and Africa have been regarding each other as a strategic cushion. However, since the international financial crisis, both China and Africa have found themselves in a disadvantageous position in the international division chain. Both have faced various bottleneck factors in realizing sustainable economic growth, and cooperation between China and Africa has been experiencing both visible and invisible barriers by the traditional global powers, as well as growing impediments from domestic politics and public opinion. Therefore, in order to maintain the momentum of sustainable and mutually beneficial cooperative relations, both sides need to step up efforts to effectively manage the new issues, face new challenges and formulate new modalities for closer cooperation, using new ways and means as well as effective policy measures.



## China-Africa Relations, with Special Reference to North Africa

*Hussein El Kamel*

### Introduction

China is the largest developing country in the world and Africa is home to the largest number of developing countries. The combined population of China and Africa accounts for over one third of the world's total. China-Africa economic and trade cooperation is a major component of South-South cooperation. Relations between China and the North African countries were developing especially in the political and economic fields. Algeria and Egypt were the most remarkable partners of China in the region. .

Relations with Sub-Saharan countries are steadily developing over the last fifteen years due to mutual benefits of the two sides. China became Africa's largest trading partner since 2009. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established in 2000, and the following Summit and ministerial forums marked a development of economic, trade, investment and infrastructure cooperation between China and Africa. Within the frame work of FOCAC, China developed a strategic partnership with African countries by pledging \$ 20 billion in loans over the next three years. This is double of what China has pledged in the FOCAC meeting three years before in Sham El Sheikh, Egypt.

Development is the one of the urgent tasks of African nations. China in its cooperation with Africa stressed on the following fields: Educational and training by offering scholarships, Human resource development programs, transfer of managerial and practical skills and sending Chinese experts to Africa. China's cooperation policy depends on dealing with each African country according to mutual interests and needs

### China and North Africa

We aim in this part to examine the development of relations between China and North Africa together with the Chinese presence in Africa as a whole. The Barcelona Process in 1995 and the European neighborhood policy which followed gave its members in North Africa some economic and trade advantages which were elements of interest in the development of Chinese-North African cooperation especially in the joint access to European markets.



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In addition, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have experienced significant advantages in their governance model compared to countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa which many of them face an unstable internal situation and weak economy. China designed its cooperation policies with North Africa according to working together for the development of joint objectives. North African countries enjoy diversified economy compared to Sub-Saharan Africa. Their purchasing power is more than in Sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, this meets the characteristics of Chinese exported products: medium quality products which do not have exorbitant prices and are accessible to most of the population. Foreign direct investments were important due to the countries interest to improve their business environment, in addition to the creation and expansion of networks of banks and the insurance companies. This area achieved a great deal of progress on trade liberalization and was also an attractive element for China to develop its relations with North Africa.

### Chinese objectives in North Africa

From North African countries Algeria is the primary supplier of raw materials, energy and minerals, to China. China seeks to achieve two objectives through its presence in the area: 1) to find new suppliers of raw materials, and 2) to have access to a regional market.

North Africa is becoming a key market for the Chinese construction and engineering companies, especially in those countries that have extraordinary natural resources. Textile, mining, agriculture, processing and manufacturing and telecommunications are sectors of Chinese interest in the area. In Africa, China has a large dependence on oil, raw material, goods that are usually produced in emerging economics. Chinese imports of African oil are to reach 75% in 2020. Oil and gas are accounted for more than 60% of African exports to China.

**Egypt:** The Egyptian-Chinese relations are the oldest: since 2000 years ago through trade routes. In modern times, Egypt was one of the first countries to recognize China and on March 30, 1956 diplomatic relations were established. Recognizing Egypt's strategic position in the area, China kept warm political relations and remarkable economic, investment and trade relations together with some military cooperation. Egyptian strategists believe that close ties with emerging China can act as a potential check on US influence in the region.



In the economic field, it is expected that Egypt will be the first trading partner with China within the next 10 years. The project of the “Suez Economic & Trade Cooperation Free Zone” is one of the most important within the framework of China-Africa cooperation. Egypt’s trade with China developed from \$ 3 billion in 2006 to \$ 6.24 billion in 2008 and still rapidly developing. The January 25 revolution in Egypt temporarily slowed down investments. Chinese and other investments are expected to slowly flow back to Egypt after stability and establishment of a new government. The General Manager of China-Africa TEDA Investment Company declared that: “when the new government in Egypt comes into office, China investments will recover and grow”.

**Algeria:** China’s close cooperation with Algeria depends on Algeria’s oil and natural gas. On the other hand China launched the largest investment in construction within many important projects there, with about 12,878 workers recruited from China.

**Tunisia:** From 2000 to 2012 China has offered 214 million Tunisian dinars in loans and 54 million dinars in grants. The total volume of trade reached 635 million Euros in 2008. China exports tea and light industrial products and imports Tunisian phosphate and fertilizers. Investment is mainly in construction. Over 5 billion dinars of investments have been provided by China over the last 12 years.

**Morocco:** Chinese entrepreneurs have opened business in the textile sector.

**Libya:** Relations between Libya’s Qaddafi and China were not good. Chinese firms have invested heavily in Libya in several infrastructure and services projects. During the revolt against Qaddafi, about 13 Chinese enterprises reported losses amounting \$ 627.5 million. After the collapse of Qaddafi’s rule China announced the respect of choice of Libyan people but relations with the new regime is not yet in order especially concerning the Chinese worries about the \$ 18.8 billion contracts mainly on oil.

**Mauritania:** Relations with China, though stable, are limited to exchange of visits, fishing, infrastructure, telecommunication and mining. In December 2011 a joint commission for economy and trade was held but no actual results have materialized.





## Remarks

The most evident features of Chinese strategy in North Africa:

1. China is searching for energy resources as well as wood and fish resources to support its economic growth.
2. China is facing industrial overproduction and market saturation in several sectors such as textiles and electronics. It needs new markets for its economic and trade expansion
  - China is willing to promote a sustainable model of cooperation to ensure a long term presence and enhance an alternative model of development different to the west especially to the US. Nevertheless, the establishment of Chinese small enterprises in North Africa leads to a clash of interest in Morocco and Algeria while in Sub-Saharan Africa the Chinese are involved in more profitable economic activities such as the timber industry and oil extraction.
  - China tends to “and can” replace the traditional existence of European and American firms and establish itself as reference power to contribute to the development of the area.
  - The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have posed challenge to China since economic cooperation and interests are an important factor in determining foreign policy. On the other hand Egypt expects that China may be playing a very important role or an alternative to the west in terms of the need for financial and economic policies. Egyptians look for a Chinese cooperation especially in new technology, energy and renewed energy, scientific research ...etc.

## China and Sub-Saharan Africa

In 2010 Africa – China trade reached \$ 166 billion and China’s direct investments are nearly \$ 15 billion. Over 150 commercial attaches and staff work in Chinese embassies in Africa while only 5 US commercial departments are in their embassies.

US exports to Sub-Saharan Africa in 2011 were \$ 21.1 billion and imports from Sub-Sahara Africa were \$ 74.2 billion for a total of \$ 95.3 billion which represents just 57% of China’s bilateral trade figures. The US interest in Africa’s petroleum is going to increase as expected. The





US national intelligence council forecasts that US oil imports from Africa will rise to 25% of its consumption within 3 years, primarily from Angola, Nigeria and Guinea.

### **Recommendations and conclusions**

1. China has an excellent opportunity to upgrade its relations with North African countries and Africa as a whole to reach new dimensions. Countries like Egypt, Tunisia and Libya who established democratically elected presidents, governments and parliaments will welcome a Chinese approach which rapidly helps in building up their economy and financial resources.
2. There is a big difference between China's policy for development and non- interference in internal affairs compared to some other countries which put certain conditions for its economic assistance.
3. China is recommended to follow more dynamic policies and re-access, analyze and decide its policies towards internal and external changes covering some countries in Africa especially in the North. Cautious Chinese policy towards these changes which may take long time will lead the train to stop in the wrong station!
4. At the end, it is recommended that China sends to Africa experts and technicians who speak English or French to guarantee direct link with the local partners. It is also recommended that Chinese investments in Africa hire the needed workmanship from the African country. This is to help building up a class of African professional technicians.



## Booming Sino-Maghreb Economic Relations: Incentive towards a New European Cooperation Governance and Partnership

*Thierry Pairault*

Relations between China and African countries are getting better known even if sub-Saharan Africa is more often documented than Maghreb. The organisation of strikes by Algerian workers employed by Chinese firms or the repatriation of Chinese workers from building sites in Libya has been widely reported. On the other hand, little is said about the part China might effectively play in the economy of Maghreb countries and about the diversity of the situations of these countries in their economic relations with China. Even less is said about whether Chinese presence in Maghreb might foster the emergence of a new and more balanced partnership between European countries and Maghreb countries and promote new European cooperation governance. To address this issue I shall bring together statistics published by international institutions (UNCTAD and Eurostat) and by China statistical services to assess the forces involved and the actual part played by each actor. Successively, I shall attend to the question of the foreign direct investment to Maghreb countries, and then I shall deal with the exports of goods from Maghreb countries and imports of Chinese goods by these countries. Finally I shall examine whether China is actually contending European Union countries in Maghreb and to which extent this state of affairs might promote a new partnership and cooperation governance.

This paper will first show the youth of the Sino-Maghreb economic relations. It will also point out the actually weak level of these relations although their current progression is extremely fast. It will also observe that the Sino-Maghreb economic relations do not appear as the fruit of a specific Chinese strategy towards the Maghreb but rather as expressions peculiar to each of the Maghreb countries out of a Chinese strategy that is not the mere reflection of an overall strategy regarding developing countries. Actually, if one takes account of the *de facto* autonomy enjoyed by the Chinese enterprises investing abroad, it is quite obvious that there is not one Chinese strategy but a plurality of strategies (as much as actors). In this context, conflicts are potentially unavoidable: upstream between the Chinese government and Chinese enterprises (the policy objectives of the former clashing with the financial objectives of the latter) and downstream between host countries' governments and Chinese enterprises (the developmental objectives of the former



clashing with the financial objectives of the latter)—this second type is an effect agency finding its most favoured expression with the use of Chinese labour.

This remark in turn suggests that the Chinese presence in Maghreb would not reflect a South-South cooperation strategy but would fit more with the idea we have of economic relations between developed and developing countries. If it is indeed the case, the traditional partners such as the countries of the European Union will have to face even greater challenges. It would not be any longer China—the workshop of the world making its purchases in Africa to feed industrialised countries relocated factories—to which they would be confronted. It would be China as a competitor in sectors as transportation and telecommunications equipment... that might use Maghreb as a springboard first toward African countries then toward European countries. In its ambition, China will indeed be helped by Maghreb countries that will see an opportunity to increase their economic activities by tying a privileged relationship with China. In such circumstances, the partnership between the European Union and Maghreb might experience hard times. Hence the European Union would have no alternative but to change its cooperation governance to protect its own economic interests in the Maghreb countries.



## New Impetus for African Development and a New Path to Sustainable Development of China-Africa Relations

*Liu Hongwu*

In the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the African continent has experienced a period of development and whereby the economy has remained relatively stable. In the second decade of the new century, the politics and economies of African countries have become more complex. The uncertainties of the continent's development have reappeared. Beginning in 2010, when the events in North Africa largely changed and affected Sub-Saharan Africa, the historical wheels of this continent came to a crossroads where it is again facing an uncertain future.

Overall, the continent is under the influence of two forces, upward development and downward decline. The trends of development and chaos are integrated together leading to a complex status. With the development of these trends, the unbalanced development of various African countries and regions will become more and more apparent. Some countries may become "emerging countries" and "countries with a large impetus for development". These countries will become the leading force for the African regions and sub-regions to move towards stability and active development, while other countries may experience continuous instability or even go into an abyss of disruption.

Looking forward, the development progress of the 50-plus countries in Africa will become an inevitable trend, where the development of countries will be divided and uneven.



## How to Stipulate the Chinese Private Business to go to Africa?

*Xiaofeng Zhang*

There are two types of Chinese private enterprises operating in Africa. The first mainly covers trade in goods, services and technology. The second is through investment. Enterprises need the cross-border flow of essential factors, such as capital, technology, information and talent. This is also known as cross-border direct investment. Currently, China-Africa economic relations have entered into a new stage of investment, which encourages further increase in trade. Pure trade makes it difficult to support the sustainable development of local economies and meet requirements of African resources.

Strategies for overseas businesses concentrate on the second form. We have carried out studies on the above two aspects and place particular emphasis on studying Chinese investment in Africa.



## The Main Characters and Trends of China's FDI in Africa

*Yao Guimei*

The international financial crisis did not seriously dampen Chinese enterprises' investment in Africa. Thus Africa continues to be the most dynamic destination for China's outward foreign direct investment. Reviewing recent years, the four features characterizing Chinese enterprises' investment in Africa are as follows: fast growth of investment volume with big potential for development; various investment destinations yet concentrated on several countries; expanding investment areas where natural resource-related projects are still the focus, and; quickly emerging small and medium enterprises. Looking ahead, the Chinese government will further encourage its enterprises to invest in Africa; areas such as agriculture, manufacturing and infrastructure building will become the main areas for investment. The key to strengthening China-Africa cooperation is to further enhance the international competitiveness of Chinese enterprises. To be truly integrated with Africa, Chinese enterprises need to pay close attention to the issues of corporate social responsibility. China's investment should not only benefit Africa with more jobs, but also improve the skills of African young people, which is a necessary path to better competitiveness of Chinese enterprises.



## Understanding African Perception of China: A Case Study through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Practices of Chinese Corporations

*Sean Ding and Marjorie Perry*

### Introduction

China has a long history of involvement with Africa since the 1960s. Historically, China has maintained and developed its relationship with African countries by emphasizing bilateral cooperation at an official-to-official level, mainly for specific diplomatic and political goals. In the past two decades, with the advent of the “Going-Out” strategy and the emergence of the African market, Chinese companies have increasingly taken on more direct engagements with local communities at the grassroots level. However, despite the ample amount of resources being used on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) measures, local African perceptions of Chinese enterprise remains less than rosy. This paper analyzes the hurdles to improved perception of China’s involvement with the Horn of Africa via an analysis of several CSR case studies.

### Background: China’s involvement in Africa and local perception thereof

The Chinese presence can be seen in many corners of the Horn of Africa, and they elicit diverse responses from local people. On the political front, China’s traditional non-interference policy generally receives praise from African governments, while it increasingly suffers criticism from the international community; China is accused of embracing repressive and corrupt regimes that undermine human rights and democratization processes, especially in the context of Darfur. On the economic front, China’s investments in oil and mine extractions, as well as financing infrastructure construction projects, bring money and jobs to the host countries. At the same time, there are criticisms that the companies observe low environmental, human rights, and construction standards. Local Africans fear Chinese investments will bring detriment to the local environment and local people. Chinese arms exports are also blamed as a source of local instability, and accused of being integral in the conflict in Sudan and Somalia. Additionally, reports of protests and attacks against Chinese companies show the growing local resentment of the Chinese bribes to the local government and a low labor rights standard in Chinese companies.



## Stakeholders shaping the African perception

The African perception of China's local involvement is shaped by a collection of entities, mainly business organizations and state-related actors. This study selects and analyzes the three most influential groups of players. The first group includes Chinese companies and corporations, including State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), such as Sinopec, CNPC, and ZTE, and large private firms. The second category covers Chinese governmental agencies, such as the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Commerce, the Export-Import Bank of China, and the China Development Bank. The third group contains institutions related to education and cultural exchanges, such as study programs and Confucius Institutes. These three groups constitute the various entities that shape African perception of China's presence. By outlining the African perception of their involvement and activities, this paper hopes to achieve a better understanding of how various Chinese stakeholders shape and influence the perception of China in Africa.





## Chinese Investment in Africa: An Investigation of the Opportunities and Challenges for Peace and Security in Zimbabwe

*Lawrence Mhandara*

### Introduction

The summary paper presents key findings on the impact of China's investments, tied to its non-interference policy, in Africa in relation to peace and security using evidence collated from the Zimbabwean experience. However, before that is accomplished, it is compelling to have a brief conceptual overview of what peace and security entails in the contemporary discourse. Peace can be understood as an environment of tranquillity within a society at a particular interval and security can be construed as deliberate measures adopted by authorities within a political system to ensure the survival and safety of citizens. Traditionally, the conceptualisation of security was limited to regime survival. Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic environment fundamentally changed and the 'new world order' prompted a re-conceptualisation of the whole notion of security. The result was a shift from state-centric to human-centred security where aspects related to economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security have assumed prominence. The findings of this paper were therefore based on the broader conceptualisation of the concept of security.

### China's foreign policy: The guiding principles

The understanding of the current China-Zimbabwe engagement may be difficult, and perhaps impossible, without identifying the guiding principles of China's foreign policy which are also cherished by Zimbabwe. Since its ascent to state power in October 1949, the China Communist Party adhered to the following key principles: Independent approach to world affairs and opposing hegemonic tendencies, maintenance of world peace to facilitate Chinese modernisation efforts, solidarity and friendly cooperation with developing states, establishing relations with other countries on the basis of the five principles (mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in domestic affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence).



## Explaining China-Zimbabwe relationship

China has a long history of political contact with Africa dating back to around 759 A.D. when the country was under the tutelage of the Han Dynasty. With respect to Zimbabwe, the political contact was most visible during the war of liberation when China supported the nationalist fighters against the colonial government. As the Cold War ended, China rejuvenated its drive to strengthen its strategic cooperation with developing countries like Zimbabwe. The adoption of the official 'Look East' policy by Zimbabwe in 2003, whose primary hub is China, was further evidence of this expanding Chinese strategic outreach. It is this reinvigorated engagement with Zimbabwe that has attracted wide scholarly interest particularly at a time when Zimbabwe has been rebuked by its traditional Western partners for disregarding Western values and value preferences. Despite the relentless and incessant Western opposition and chastisement, China has remained committed to the non-interference policy in dealing with Zimbabwe and has continued to invest in new projects in key sectors of the economy such as mining and infrastructure development without 'strings attached'.

## The impact of Chinese investment on Zimbabwe's security

**Political Security:** Findings indicate that although China's 'non-interference policy' has helped the isolated government to survive the Western onslaught, it brought immense challenges for the institutionalisation of democracy in the country. The Chinese investment companies help the ruling government to survive. Assuming the Chinese were not investing in Zimbabwe, the government could have possibly instituted the Western-demanded political and economic reforms, but with China's support the political system has not fundamentally changed. China has financed and allowed the culture of authoritarianism to grow in the country as it does not concern itself with 'good governance' or 'human rights' issues. This does not guarantee personal security as people are at the mercy of the authorities. For China, human rights and political security should not stand above sovereignty (regime security) and this is amply demonstrated in Zimbabwe.

**Economic Security:** It was also established that despite the negative implications on good governance, human rights and rule of law, China's investments have improved economic security of Zimbabweans. Statistics from Zimbabwe Investment Centre (ZIC) show that China is the leading investor in Zimbabwe with some 35 key projects having



been undertaken in 2012. The Chinese companies such as Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Company (AFECC) and China Gezhouba Group, are involved in infrastructure projects including road rehabilitation, hotel construction and rehabilitation of rail infrastructure. AFECC, also partnered locals to form Anjin Investments and is involved in mining diamonds in Marange fields and North Industries Corporation (Norinco) is into platinum mining. Zimbabwe was notorious for its record unemployment levels which were almost 90% at the peak of the multi-layered crisis owing to lack of investment, but the Chinese have threw a lifeline into the economy and the employment levels are gradually picking. For example, Anjin Investments alone employs more than 4000 locals at its mining plant. The contributions to the national purse are also evident in the improving economic performance with figures indicating a 5.9% growth by year end. China's investments are therefore contributing to human security in Zimbabwe at two levels: injecting life into the fragile economy and providing a source of earning and livelihood through employing locals.

**Food Security:** Research indicated that Zimbabwe was once the breadbasket of the Southern African region but the land reform process arguably obliterated that status. However, the Chinese are changing the face of agriculture and are contributing to food security which is central to the essence of humanity. Wanjin Agriculture Company and Anhui State Farms in partnership with locals were the leading producers of the maize grain and wheat in 2011/2012 farming season.

## Conclusion

The Zimbabwean experience indicates that China's investments are contributing positively to human security especially economic security dimension. However, the biggest challenge remains political as China's non-interference policy imply that it cannot use its economic leverage to force the government to guarantee minimum political liberties. The Chinese are therefore part of the governance question in Zimbabwe.



## China's Role in Oil Resource Governance in Niger Delta Region

*Xue Jun Wang*

China's role in the exploitation of oil in the Niger Delta region has risen in recent years. Meanwhile, with the aim of fulfilling corporate social responsibility (CSR) and due to the increasing interaction between Chinese actors, Nigerian actors and other stakeholders, China has begun to play an increasing and secondary role to the oil governance of Nigeria. However, on the whole, the role of Chinese oil companies (COCs) can be recognized as an unintentional result rather than a deliberate objective. After all, COCs have been keeping a low profile for security purposes ever since they entered into Africa's troubling oil business. One basic objective of COCs in the Niger Delta is expanding access to crude oil so as to meet China's quickly increasing need for oil. At the same time, the CSR activities of COCs are also moving towards becoming a responsible stakeholder. It is not only due to the pressure of constructing a responsible image of China on the world stage, but also due to the need to develop sustainable survival in the competitive oil and gas sector.

It should be recognized that the presence of COCs in the Niger Delta have the potential to influence oil governance, which will not result from specific CSR, but from the very presence of the COCs in this region. COCs are also on track to become responsible stakeholders in the Niger Delta and in the world as a whole. During this process, China will not jeopardize the international consensus that is emerging between oil and mining multinationals, NGOs and OECD governments about improving resource governance. On the contrary, it is very possible that China will add to the consensus by placing emphasis on genuine accountability and action embodied in the mode of infrastructure exchanging for resource use, instead of only emphasizing transparency, democracy and human rights. Certainly, safely speaking, it is too early to evaluate the longer-term implications of increased Chinese presence in the extractive sector in sub-Saharan Africa.

Although concerns and debates about China's role in Nigerian oil governance may help COCs become more responsible actors, they should not divert attention from where it properly belongs, sovereign state's governments. After all, Nigerian government and civil society groups are the crucial actors addressing this resource curse.



## Governance and Security Challenges Associated with China-Nigeria Trade and Investment Relations

Adeolu O. Adewuyi & T. Ademola Oyejide

### Introduction

Views on the role of institutions, governance and security in trade and investment are diverse in the literature. Institution-dependent economy tends to experience increased production which may lead to increased export to countries with weak institution. The inflow of goods to the country with weak institution in turn reduces product prices and increases purchasing power. This may partly explain the influx of sub-standard products from China to Nigeria<sup>55</sup>.

Insecurity acts as a hidden tax which must be incorporated in the analysis of trade. Cross-country variation in the effectiveness of institutions and consequent variation in the prices of traded goods accounts for disproportionate trade between countries. High levels of corruption increase bureaucratic red tape, decrease the quality of regulations, reduce FDI, and even impede trade<sup>56</sup>. Weak governance like high level of corruption can be trade inducing. The size of bribes by different economic agents could reflect their different opportunity cost and therefore, better firms are more willing to buy lower effective red tape. If bureaucratic burden and delay are exogenous, bribe payments may help firms reduce the effective burden and delay they face and increases trade<sup>57</sup>.

China-Nigeria trade and investment relations have brought a number of benefits and costs, including the issues of governance and security, which form the focus of this paper.

### China-Nigeria trade and investment trends<sup>58</sup>

Nigeria's merchandise export to China increased significantly from US\$73.3 million in 2002 to US\$1.44 billion in 2010. China's share in Nigeria's exports rose from 0.5 % in 2003 to 1.7% in 2010. China is now Nigeria's third largest export market destination after the US and EU.

<sup>55</sup> Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson. 2003. "Unbundling Institutions." Working Paper no. 9934 (Sept), NBER, Cambridge, MA.

<sup>56</sup> Pushan, D. and T. Daniel (2010), "Corruption and Bilateral Trade Flows: Extortion or Evasion?" *Review of Economics and Statistics*, November, 92:4.

<sup>57</sup> Kaufmann, D and S. Wei (1999). "Does 'Grease Money' Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce? NBER Working Paper No. 7093.

<sup>58</sup> Analysis is based on data obtained from the International Trade Centre (ITC) data base and website of China Commerce Ministry ([www.english.mofcom.gov.cn](http://www.english.mofcom.gov.cn)).



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In the same vein, Nigeria's import from China increased from US\$740.6 million in 2002 to about US\$7.30 billion in 2010. Crude materials constituted over 60% of Nigeria's exports to China. 50% of the 30 top imports from China are textile materials, which confirm the misfortune of Nigeria's textile sector. Nigeria's imports from China are more diversified than its exports. Most of Nigeria's imports from China are labour intensive, light manufactures.

Foreign direct investment from China to Nigeria rose from US\$75.6 million in 2004 to over US\$1.21 billion in 2010. The grant elements of China's loans to Nigeria have hovered around 25-30%. Given the trade and investment pattern between the two countries, there is growing concern that it may be inconsistent with, and dangerous to, Nigeria's industrialisation aspiration.

### Governance and security challenges in China-Nigeria trade and investment relations<sup>59</sup>

China-Nigeria trade and investment relations have generated *unfair competition* between producers in the two countries as well as between contractors or investors. The influx of cheap Chinese imports into Nigerian markets has raised concerns since they rendered locally made products uncompetitive and squeeze the profit margin. This has led to business closure, job insecurity and losses which in turn leads to social and political vices<sup>60</sup>.

With respect to compliance with rules and regulations, it was found that Chinese failed in a number of respects. It was reported in a survey that only 12% of products met three of the import requirements established by the Standards Organisation of Nigeria. Forty eight percent of the products met only one of the import requirements, while 36% complied with two import requirements<sup>61</sup>. Also, a survey of consumers reveals that some goods originated from China caused some discomforts to them<sup>62</sup>.

<sup>59</sup> The discussion is based on recent studies supported by the Nigerian government (Nigerian Economic Mgt. Team) and African Economic Research consortium (AERC) based in Nairobi Kenya as well as other relevant literature.

<sup>60</sup> Ogunkola, E. O., Adewuyi, A.O., Oyeranti, O., and Bankole, A. S. (2010), *The Impact of China-Nigeria Economic and Trade Relations. A Final Report submitted to the Nigeria's Economic Management Team (NEMT)*, Abuja, Nigeria.

Oyejide, T.A., Bankole, A.S., and Adewuyi, A.O. (2009), *China-Africa Trade Relations: Insights from AERC Scoping Studies*, European Journal of Development Research, 21 (4).

Oyeranti, O., Babatunde, M. A., Ogunkola E. O and A S. Bankole (2010), *The Impact of China-Africa Investment Relations: The Case of Nigeria. A Final Report Submitted to the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC)*, Nairobi, Kenya.

Adewuyi, A.O., Aminu, A. and Kareem I.O (2010), *Impact of China-Africa Trade Relations: the Case of Nigeria. A final report submitted to the African Economic Research consortium (AERC)*, Nairobi, Kenya

<sup>61</sup> Ogunkola et al., 2008

<sup>62</sup> Adewuyi, A. and Kareem, 2010



Poor labour relations and violation of human rights law characterize Chinese enterprises in Nigeria. These include poor working conditions, hostile attitudes by Chinese employers towards trade unions, violations of workers' rights, and unfair labour practices. Besides, workers are often employed as "casual workers", such that they will not be entitled to any retirement benefits. Basic rights such as leave bonus or payment during annual leave are often ignored and workers are forced to work overtime (at times without any extra benefits). Chinese enterprises pay very little attention to health and safety issues as they neglect precautionary measures and relevant training. Chinese firms discriminate in the areas of recruitment, training and payment for Nigerian and Chinese workers. Thus, there is absence of employment contracts<sup>63</sup>.

Further, some Chinese firms in Nigeria have been accused by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) of violating health and safety standards as well environmental rights in their host communities. In Lagos Nigeria, NGOs have accused the Chinese metal working firm, WAHUM, of discharging noxious substances into the air which amounts to systematic violations of occupational safety and health standards.

With respect to corrupt practices, it was revealed that Nigerians and Chinese are involved in series of corrupt practices including reneging in contract execution, over-invoicing, tax evasion/avoidance and duping as well as lack of transparency<sup>64</sup>. It was also reported that some Chinese collaborated with some Customs Officials in the importation and open sale of contraband goods at the Chinese-town (market) at Lagos, which led to a temporary closure of the market. Members of the National Association of Nigerian Traders emphasized this issues of corruption and lack of transparency<sup>65</sup>.

In the area of security of lives and property, there have been disturbing reports. Fourteen Chinese were recently reported kidnapped by militants in two different incidents in Nigeria<sup>66</sup>. Recently, Nigeria faced some security challenges ranging from militancy in the Niger Delta, armed robbery attacks and thefts to the Boko Haram insurgence in the country.

<sup>63</sup> Ogunkola et al., 2008

<sup>64</sup> During the dissemination workshops.

<sup>65</sup> Ogunkola et al., 2008; Adeguyi, Aminu and Kareem, 2010; Oyeranti et al., 2010

<sup>66</sup> Brautigam & Gaye, 2007; Ogunkola et al., 2008





## Recommendations/concluding remarks

In order to address the problem arising from low quality and health hazards, the government should intensify efforts at applying the standard and sanitary and phytosanitary measures to control import of harmful products to the country. The Standard Organisation of Nigeria and National Agency for Food and Drug Commission as well as the Nigeria Customs Service should put more effort at eliminating substandard products from the country. The activities of the Consumer Protection Council should be intensified such that consumers could be able to report any harmful product in the markets to them for appropriate actions<sup>67</sup>.

Prevention of smuggling is a measure that the government could use to help domestic producers cope with *unfair competition*. Local content policy can be used to keep some activities for domestic producers and contractors. The safeguard measures of the WTO can be used by the government if it could provide evidence of losses incurred by local firms as a result of China import surges. Further, voluntary export restraints could be negotiated with the Chinese Government so as to reduce the massive influx of Chinese products into Nigeria.

The fight against corruption and lack of transparency should be intensified. The activities of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission should be depoliticised and made more effective. The corruption among the government machineries<sup>68</sup> should be curtailed.

Chinese traders and firms should be encouraged by the government to comply with local laws<sup>69</sup>. The NGOs, labour unions and the media as well as the general public should support government in this process.

<sup>67</sup> The CPC should educate the consumers on their right and how to seek counsel or redress in case of any undesirable effect of any good on their welfare.

<sup>68</sup> Such as civil servants, law enforcement agents, the Customs Service and the judiciary

<sup>69</sup> Particularly labour/human rights laws as well as environment/health and safety laws.





## Breakaway Session 4: Challenges and opportunities in China-Africa relations: cases from Eastern and Southern Africa

### Beyond Humanitarianism: China's Role in Darfur

*Hassan E. Ahmed*

Chinese involvement in Sudan stimulated a plethora of media coverage, most of the contents tended to portray Chinese engagement as passive, apolitical, and confined to its energy interests in Sudan. But with close scrutiny, China's engagement in Sudan and specifically in Darfur is active and vibrant. It increased markedly and became multifaceted. This paper aims to investigate the role being played by China in Darfur, where the conflict became complex involving local, regional and international players. It attempts to analyze how China struggled to maintain a balance between the principle of non-interference, on one hand, and increasing its engagement on issues of peace, security, and governance on the other. The paper suggests that while China's global impact is increasing, its active engagement to address local and regional crises will eventually increase.

China is seeking to foster its image globally and in Africa. In a poll conducted in 2010 by BBC/Globescan of 28 nations, China's global image remains mixed. Only in Africa and Pakistan it is consistently positive<sup>70</sup>. In this regard, the use of soft power is gaining momentum, and is becoming one of the techniques preferred by Chinese policy makers. China tends to use its soft power, as the case of Darfur illustrates, to maintain the balance between active engagement and non-interference in the domestic affairs of the country. The "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" which was proposed by Premier Zhou Enlai and later incorporated into the declaration of the 1955 Asian-African Conference, still guide China's foreign policy. They include the following: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

An important sign of the growing influence of China in Sudan is the appointment of Ambassador Liu Guijin as China special representative for Darfur in 2007, despite the fact that China has an African affairs

<sup>70</sup> David Shambaugh. (2010). *China Flexes Its Soft Power*, International Herald Tribune, June 7, 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/opinion/08iht-cdshambaugh.html?ref=global>



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special envoy distinct from Darfur, there is a division of labor in this regard. In a recent visit to Sudan on 27-29 August 2012, the Special Envoy on African Affairs Zhong Jianhua held talks in Khartoum with a number of Sudanese officials as part of the Chinese government efforts to facilitate the negotiation between Sudan and South Sudan. China has played a key role in persuading Sudan to accept a joint African Union/ UN peace keeping force (UNIMAJ) in Darfur in 2007.

Chinese soft power mechanisms in Sudan include: peace-building measures, delivery of public goods, capacity building, and bureaucratic training. These mechanisms are orchestrated and reinforced through the clout of the office of the special representative. Although significant cooperation between China and Sudan goes back to 1970 when the two countries signed an Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation and a Cultural, Scientific and Technical Protocol, the context and pattern of Chinese aid changed significantly due to the economic and political restructuring that accompanied the post-Mao era. During Mao's phase aid was determined by political and ideological considerations, while economic and strategic interests dominate during post-Mao era. Concerning aid to Darfur, China has delivered five batches of assistance to the Darfur region, with a combined value of 80 million yuan (US\$11 million)<sup>71</sup>. In addition to building of schools, hospitals, and digging wells.

China is considered the largest single provider of loans and grants to Sudan. According to one report: "one feature of the Chinese aid and development assistance offered to Sudan is that Chinese aid to Sudan mainly provides project aid although some of the aid is utilized for technical assistance and training"<sup>72</sup>. A significant part of this aid is allocated to Darfur. Chinese companies have spent about 50 million dollars on development projects in Darfur.

When China joined the UN Security Council in 1971, it perceived, at that time, peacekeeping missions with suspicion on the basis of violating the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries. This view, however, was reversed in 1989. Since that time China has sent more than 10,000 peacekeepers on 22 peacekeeping missions worldwide. China currently has over 2,000 peacekeepers in UN peacekeeping operations, second to France among the five permanent members<sup>73</sup>.

<sup>71</sup> "China envoy: more humanitarian aid to Darfur", China Daily, 2/26/2008 [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-02/26/content\\_6483392.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-02/26/content_6483392.htm)

<sup>72</sup> Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour. (2010). *Impact of China-Africa aid relations: the case of Sudan*, Final Report for African Economic Research Consortium. April 29, 2010.

<sup>73</sup> International Crises Group. (2009). *China's growing role in UN peacekeeping*. Asia Report N°166 – 17 April 2009. p.1.



China's contribution to the peacekeeping budget grew from around 0.9 per cent throughout the 1990s, to 1.5 per cent by December 2000, and was just above 3 per cent by 2008<sup>74</sup>. One of the missions which China contributed peacekeeping personnel is Darfur. China sent a 315-member multi-functional engineering unit in 2008 to the region as part of the peacekeeping force. This is in addition to Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan (UNMIS). Personnel are being rotated annually. It is becoming obvious that the Chinese intervention in Sudan marked a significant shift from a previous policy focusing on economic/development concerns to a broader perspective including issues of peace, security and governance.

Chinese policy towards Africa, in general, and towards Sudan and Darfur in particular, is not confrontational stressing sanctions, isolation and boycott, but to the contrary it prefers dialogue, grass-roots development projects, and constructive engagement. For this reason Chinese participation in peacemaking and peacebuilding is not being perceived by the Sudanese government as hostile and threatening. China's engagement in Darfur is multifaceted encompassing aid, peace-building, governance, and capacity-building.

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<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p.8.



## Analysing China's Contribution to Peace in the North and South Sudan Conflict: Pre and Post Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

*Getachew Zeru and Dawit Yohannes*

This paper examines China's engagement and its contribution to peace in the North and South Sudan conflict prior to, during, and in the post Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) era. Critically looking into the recent conflict, this paper also analyses the prospect of China's role in establishing and consolidating the peace between the two Sudans. In doing so, the study relies on primary and secondary data sources.

The main argument of this paper is as follows. Prior to 2005, reflecting on its practical consequences, China's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Sudan had a contested interpretation as a policy of indifference to the conflict between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A. Albeit a dynamic political landscape in the Sudan which necessitated flexible interpretation of non-interference, unrelenting adherence to this policy impacted China's ability to play a bigger role in establishing peace in the Sudan during the CPA implementation period.

In the post 2011 era, the long standing policy of non-interference which guided China's engagement in the Sudans has two consequences with regard to how Beijing deals with the dispute between Juba and Khartoum. On the one hand, still overshadowed with the legacies of this policy, due to its previous support for the "one Sudan" policy and compounded with its lack of experience, China was not able to play a direct role so far in resolving the conflict between the two neighbouring states. On the other hand, China can still continue to play an indirect role given its vested economic interests in both Sudans, as a permanent member of the UNSC, and as a growing global power wielding its influence in different parts of the world including Africa.

### China's engagement in the Sudan prior to the CPA period

China became Sudan's most significant international ally in the 1990s following Khartoum's isolation from the international community over its alleged support to Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism. Khartoum's turn to China was a direct consequence of the United States' unilateral embargo on Sudan, which prohibited US companies from operating in Sudan.



Subsequently, China maintained close political, economic and military relations with the Government of Sudan during the second phase of Sudan's civil war (1983-2005) and during the CPA period. According to Daniel Large:

Beijing's strong relations with Khartoum came to be manifested in government-to-government relations (with close ties between senior leaders and different branches of government), party-to-party co-operation between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the NCP (involving "rituals of rhetorical solidarity, and occasional gestures of more active support"), military co-operation (including capacity development and the sale of arms) and state-directed industrial – commercial engagement (between Chinese state-owned enterprises, the NCP and a number of Sudanese ministries (Large cited Attree, 2012, p. 16).

During this period, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Sudan was one of China's cardinal mottos dictating its strategic partnership with Khartoum (Large, 2009) with contested practical implications for peace during the civil war. Proponents of this policy argue that through its adherence to this principle, China did not exacerbate conflict "as non-interference is inherently peaceful" (Safer World, 2011, p. 27).

In contrast, critics of the policy, including the SPLM, interpreted non-interference as interference through support for its enemy<sup>75</sup> (Large, 2009, p. 622). According to Philip Aguer, part time lecturer at the University of Juba, this policy revealed the Chinese government's indifference to the issues the SPLM/A was advocating for.

Mirroring the same argument, Xiao Yuhua, a Chinese researcher based in Ethiopia (interview, 28-08-2012), also argued that the principle of non-interference prohibited China from dealing with non-state actors including the SPLM/A, since China considered Sudan as a single political entity. This in turn contributed to Beijing's failure to acknowledge the conflict politics in Sudan. The policy also antagonized the SPLM/A against Chinese interest in Sudan.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Chinese engagement was perceived by the South as a policy which, "facilitated the devastation and economic exploitation of the South and aided in preserving the country's fundamental centre-periphery problem" (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 3).

<sup>76</sup> SPLM launched several attacks against the oil industry in which the Chinese maintained major concessions. Interview with Col. Philip Aguer, 21-08-2012.



By critically looking into the relationship between Sudan and China as highlighted above, one can argue that China's exclusive strategic engagement with the Government of Sudan underwritten by the principle of non-interference had an adverse impact on bringing lasting peace between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. China's strong relationship with Sudan - economically, militarily and politically - also provided the Government of Sudan with much needed support to prolong the civil war with the SPLM/A, in effect making peace illusive for the few years to come.

### **China's engagement in the Sudan during the CPA period**

China's role during the negotiations that led to the CPA was insignificant. However, China became a de facto CPA guarantor after observing the CPA signing on 9th January 2005 (Large, 2012). In the years that immediately followed the implementation of the CPA, China continued its relationship with Sudan and evidently supported the "one Sudan" policy like other countries (Interview with Philip Aguer, 24-08-2012) such as Ethiopia, United States and Eritrea. Following the entry into force of the CPA in 2005, SPLM/A became a government party, sharing power with the Government of Sudan within the Government of National Unity.

During the CPA period a swift rapprochement between China and the SPLM/A began to develop (Attree, 2012). As the likelihood of Southern secession loomed large, China deepened its new ties with the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and acted to reinforce its interests, guided by the realization that the majority of Sudan's oil would lie in South Sudan in areas under GoSS control. The rapprochement was evident by the exchange of high-level visits beginning in 2005, the signing of a friendship agreement, and the opening of a Chinese consulate in Juba in 2005 (Atree, 2012). In sum, during the CPA period, China played a pragmatic balancing act between Khartoum and Juba, pursuing a dual track of nurturing their existing friendship with Khartoum while cultivating a new one with the South.

During the CPA period, China pledged its "rhetoric support to peace" (Large, 2012, p.9) between the Government of Sudan and SPLM/A. In practical terms, this was not adequately matched with substantial Chinese influence in consolidating peace between the two sides of the civil war. Beyond the usual expression of concern, Beijing played minimal role in averting crisis situations in Sudan apparently not to go against its non-interference principle by applying different forms of practical



politics involving direct, public-diplomatic role (Ibid). In addition, China's historic support to Sudan and its demonstrated advocacy to a "one Sudan" policy might have contributed in undermining Beijing's role in playing a conducive role for peace in the area during the CPA period.

### Post-2011 China's engagement in the Sudan and South Sudan

Strategic interest-based considerations continue to steer China's engagement in Sudan and South Sudan in the wake of the historic 2011 referendum. Following the referendum, China became one of the first countries to recognize the independence of South Sudan and took further steps to cement its ties with the new nation. In early 2012, Beijing expressed its interest to loan South Sudan US\$8 billion for infrastructure development (Sudan Tribune, 2012). China's growing engagement is also exemplified through the increasing number of Chinese businesses in South Sudan. In light of its concession in the oil industry and the prospect of untapped investment opportunities in infrastructure development, it appears economic motives are largely guiding Beijing's emerging relations with South Sudan.

Beijing has also maintained its relationship with the Government of Sudan albeit a slight decrease in new Chinese investment<sup>77</sup>. Given its existing investment in Sudan's oil industry and its continued political and diplomatic support in the face of mounting pressure from the West, Beijing is still considered Khartoum's main ally.

In the post South Sudan independence era, the contribution of Chinese strategic involvement in resolving the ongoing dispute between Juba and Khartoum remains contested, as reflected by the diverse views surrounding this issue. On the one hand, there are many who believe China, as a country which "trades with both sides and a big loser from a renewed conflict" (The Economist, 2012, p. 29), could have played a bigger role in resolving the dispute between Khartoum and Juba. Philip Aguer argues that China's role in mediating the two Sudans was minimal largely because of its pragmatic and interest-based considerations, which guided its foreign policy. Instead of playing a more active and visible mediating role, China's policy assumed a "wait and see" approach while issuing statements urging Khartoum and Juba to settle their differences through negotiations (Sudan Tribune, 2012).

<sup>77</sup> A telling example of slowing down of Chinese investment in Sudan can be Beijing's refusal to fund agricultural project in Sudan for lack of oil collateral. See Sudan Tribune <http://www.sudantribune.com/China-refused-to-fund-agricultural,41864>.





Others argue China is doing its level best to diffuse the dispute between Juba and Khartoum. According to one Sudanese diplomat based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, what the Chinese can do at best and what they have managed to do so far is to urge the two sides to give up the military option and come to the negotiation table. In his opinion, the Chinese cannot do much more as the political will to reach a deal does not lie in their hands but in the hands of the governments of the Sudan and South Sudan respectively (Interview with Sudanese diplomat, 28-08-2012). This view is also echoed by Xiao Yuhua, who further pointed out the fact that China cannot be a good mediator because of its history between the two Sudans, as well as its lack of capacity in the field of African conflict resolution. In his opinion, neither its diplomatic offices nor its companies are best placed to mediate the two sides (Interview, 28-08-2012). According to Xiao Yuhua, African-led mediation is the better option in negotiating the two sides.

### **China's strategic engagement in the two Sudans: prospects for peace and security**

As explained in the previous sections, China is not unhindered in playing a more direct role in resolving the conflict between the two neighbouring states, in light of the legacies of its policy of non-interference, its previous support for the "one Sudan" policy and its lack of experience in mediating African conflicts.

Nonetheless, due to its vested economic interests in both Sudans, permanent membership in the UNSC, and as a growing political power with profound influence in regional and global issues, China's contribution to peace and stability between the two conflicting neighbours is also indispensable. China's contribution in this regard is, however, indirect and the full potential of realizing its engagement in ensuring peace between the two Sudans relies on the following elements:

- China should strengthen its existing support to the African Union (AU) and other sub-regional bodies such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in their efforts to deal with the North and South Sudan conflict;
- China can play a role in maintaining the link between the two sides and bringing the two sides together through the good offices of its Special Representative for African Affairs;





- China can also make a meaningful contribution by focusing on infrastructure development, which is beneficiary to both communities on the two sides of the border. These include the construction of pipelines, railways and intrastate roads;
- Chinese oil exploration should be connected to economic recovery and social responsibility in communities residing in both Sudans as failure to do so would exacerbate existing crises at the grassroots level as in the case of the Niger Delta;
- In order to boost the fruition of the ongoing peace negotiations between Juba and Khartoum, China should also live up to its commitment to cover Khartoum's revenue gap<sup>78</sup> up to US\$3 billion as part of the AU proposal to end the dispute.

<sup>78</sup> Chinese and other oil companies have agreed to transfer \$3.028 billion to Khartoum to plug part of the financing gap resulting from its secession from the north last year after decades of civil war. See Financial Times at < <http://www.bullfax.com/?q=node-us-seeks-3bn-sudan-oil-deal>>.



## Balancing Politic with Economic Realities: China's Intervention in Sudan and South Sudan Oil and Border Conflicts

*David Udofia*

With trade volume of \$166 billion between China and Africa in 2011 against \$10.56 billion in 2000, and an estimated trade volume of \$300 billion by 2015, ignoring any violent conflict in Africa could jeopardize such exponential trade growth. Hence, China's strategic intervention in Sudan and South Sudan conflict over oil and border issues could be justified. China seeks to balance politics with economics for the sustenance of trade between itself and the two Sudans. This would benefit the three traders, though not at a symmetrical proportion. China trade and investments in Sudan cut across oil, agriculture, infrastructures, mining, and military equipment. It is applauded by the government as stated by Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir in 2009 that "the success of the Sudanese experiment in dealing with China without political conditions or pressure encourages other African countries to look toward China"

The intervention in the two Sudans crisis is a recent paradigm shift from its noninterference foreign policy dogma occasioned by contemporary reality. Similarly, China realized that strict adherence to its old foreign policy doctrine would have been antithetical to its advancement as an emerging global power. Christen<sup>79</sup> argues, in the Chinese current worldview, the international system consists essentially of atomistic nation-states locked in perpetual struggle for power. Therefore, Chinese decision to involve in the conflict between the two Sudan is a calculated attempt to exercise more power in the international arena. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), China could not afford to be a mere spectator but rather active actor in the unending tussle.

From our studies, what propels Chinese intervention in the two Sudans war includes:

1. Chinese national interest;
2. International pressure; and
3. Acceptance of warring parties (Sudan and South Sudan).

<sup>79</sup> Christensen, T. *Chinese Realpolitik. Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 5 September/October 1796, pp 37-52.



It is in Chinese national interest to secure raw materials, especially oil, and protect its huge investment in the two countries. A shutdown of oil flow in January, 2012 deprived China of about 260,000 barrels of oil a day. It cut short revenue to China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and other Chinese oil subsidiaries investing in the Sudans. Similarly, the invasion of the oil rich *Heglig* by South Sudan destroyed Chinese oil installations. Liu Guijin, Chinese Special Envoy to African Affairs, during a mediation trip to the region ascertained this when he warned, “repercussion would be very serious for all involved if the situation were not resolved”. When agreement for resumption of oil flow was signed, Chinese Foreign Ministry stated, “we urged South Sudan to resume the normal production and transportation of crude oil, and take substantial measures to protect the interests of its cooperation partners”.

With respect to international pressure, China as a permanent member of UNSC was expected by the international community to demonstrate leadership by encouraging both nations’ members of UN General Assembly to adhere to UN provisions on maintenance of peace and security. Furthermore, as a major trading partner of both Sudan and South Sudan, the international community especially, the West expected China to use its powers to settle the dispute peacefully for the interest of the region and the world at large.

China is accepted as the best mediator by both parties since China identified with the United Sudan with several investments and development projects when the West had abandoned them with imposition of sanctions during the decades of wars. Some of China’s major investments in United Sudan were oil explorations, construction of Merowe Dam, contribution to the Consortium Fund, Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (ESRDF), and several infrastructure projects in Darfur and Southern Sudan. With the independent of South Sudan, China promised in April, 2012 to loan \$8 billion for various infrastructure projects including roads, bridges, hydroelectric power plants, and agriculture and telecommunications networks. In August, 2012, China promised \$158 for construction of a new airport in Juba.

The nature of intervention to resolve the conflict is both multilateral and bilateral. As party to the multilateral intervention, China contributes both military and police troops to United Nations Peacekeeping operations in both countries and supports the African Union High Implementation Panel’s (AUHIP), the central mediator. Within



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the bilateral process, China visits both countries periodically and encourages them to resolve the conflict peacefully. It also continually embarks on numerous development projects in both countries as a strategy to encourage peaceful settlement of the crisis.

The Chinese political intervention strategy resulted in the signing of the recent agreement by both countries to resume crude oil exploration and export. This will benefit the three parities. To the two Sudans, it might jumpstart their crippled economies. It will also revamp the legitimacy of the two governments which had been threatened due to austerity measures that caused hardship and resentment in both countries. In Sudan austerity measures resulted in public protest that threatened the government. In the South, within the top echelon of the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) and other organized security forces there was rumor of coup to overthrow the nascent government due to reduction in their salary as part of the austerity measure. However, they could not get support from the masses due to the euphoria that prevails in South Sudan at the birth of an independent nation. For China, oil flow will fulfil its energy need that was threatened.

With the signing of agreement on resumption of oil flow, will China continually balance politics with economic interest in mediating for the settlement of the border demarcation? If China relaxes, it means its mediatory process was for economic reasons (oil) alone. But if it intensifies the mediation process, as it did for the resumption of oil flow, it indicates that China truly is balancing politics with economics for peaceful coexistence of both nations. The best option is continuous balancing for both economic and political interests.



## How far could China's Non-Interference Policy be Practical in Protecting Chinese and African Peoples' Interests? The case of Sudan-South Sudan Conflict before and after the Secession.

*Khalid Ali El Amin*

### **Introductory background**

North South Sudan conflict started decades earlier but the civil war intensified and expanded into unprecedented levels by the 1990s when the National Islamic Front (NIF) took over power in Khartoum and declared jihad (religious war) against Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM-SPLA). The civil war displaced millions of Southerners and took tens of thousands of lives from both sides.

SPLM-SPLA aimed at overthrowing the NIF-NCP regime to establish a united new Sudan, i.e., a deconstruction and reconstruction of the Sudanese state into a secular one that would respect the country's religious, ethnic and cultural diversity, based on equal citizenship rights, and guarantee a fair distribution of power and resources to all Sudanese within a united country; specially marginalized regions and peoples.

These SPLM-SPLA slogans attracted youth from the marginalized regions of the Blue Nile and South Kordofan (and later some Darfur's armed factions) to join in SPLA-SPLM armed struggle to establish a secular state that addresses marginalized peoples' demands and grievances. In addition large sections of the population in the North, forming SPLM-North, supported SPLM-SPLA call for a united *new* Sudan.

### **The two Sudan's: who shoulders the post South Sudan secession consequences?**

While the 2005 CPA has led to the secession of South Sudan, it has not resolved the root causes of the conflict (the governance issue of peaceful diversity management, fair distribution of power and resources in an economically and political inclusive system of government). This has had grave implications for Sudanese, African and Chinese peoples' interests.



The Sudanese peoples (in both the North and the South) suffered from the governance failure to manage ethnic, cultural and religious diversity (exclusion, denial of citizenship rights, alienation and oppression) before and after the secession of the South; ii) violence, displacement, damage to livelihoods and personal security; iii) the deterioration of economic conditions, both because of expenditure on violence and the loss of oil revenues; iv) disruption of normal life, vulnerability to constant threats and the unpredictability of the future.

Although the secession of the South is inconsistent with the one China policy that opposes secessionism, China's respected the right of South Sudanese to secede, recognized the South Sudanese state, and shouldered the serious damage to its interests by a process in which it was marginally, if not at all involved; i) China's huge investment in oil got torn apart (oil production installations are in the South while the infrastructure to treat and transport it is in the North); ii) insecurity and violent conflict in the South of North Sudan, and between the latter and South Sudan threatened oil production and ultimately later halted its export, and China lost a valuable oil source in which it has invested so heavily; iii) loss of oil revenue to Chinese companies and the Chinese government; and, iv) the security threats to Chinese personnel working in oil and other infrastructure projects and their vulnerability to killings and abductions.

For Africa, the split of the Sudan would strengthen armed regional movements and enhance the tendency for secession in countries with similar governance problems. The AU has persistently discouraged separatist movements that questioned established post colonial borders.

While the Sudanese peoples in both the North and the South suffered the consequences of the violence and conflict that ensued within and between the two Sudan's, China and Africa whose interests have been also been damaged, were called upon to curb the violence and halt the deterioration of security within and between the two Sudan's. China and Africa helped manage to halt the two Sudan's from going into open war and the AU Envoy has been exerting efforts to find a resolution to issues the 2005 CPA left unresolved (The UNSC Resolution 2046).

While supported the unity of the Sudan before the secession and respected the choice of Southern Sudanese after the secession, China which suffered from the consequences, did not take an active role in the negotiation, formulation, nor the implementation of the 2005 CPA. Despite the participation of IGAD member states, Africa's active



involvement in Sudan's conflicts also came rather late. However, both Africa and China had to deal with the CPA fallout and thus their actions seem to be reactions and responses to contingencies and not based on a strategy of their own that serves their own peoples interests.

### **The lessons learned for the future**

The experience of the Sudan highlights some crucial issues for consideration in China-Africa relations to deal with governance and security issues:

1. The huge cost to Chinese and African peoples of not taking the initiative to resolve issues of shared concern;
2. China's need to find some ways to be more actively and fruitfully involved in African governance and security issues;
3. Rather than being receptive and responsive to strategies to deal with the continent's governance and security issues developed elsewhere, Chinese and Africans need to jointly take the initiative to develop strategies, plans and actions, based on mutual interests, in the spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding (partnership); and,
4. Given the rapidly developing China Africa relations, and the complex current international conditions, China's shared interests with the continent justify and warrant greater China's engagement in Africa's governance and security issues in the interests of both Chinese and African peoples (not necessarily only governments), based on mutual interests and understanding; and that
5. In rational political terms of *quid pro quo*, African regimes which China protects in the UNSC from punitive sanctions and UN sanctioned military intervention should take actions in return to strengthen governance and the security for their own peoples internally. While this would better secure African and Chinese people's interests, such actions would simultaneously support China's position internationally, (elsewhere in the global space), as governance and security failures of African regimes associated with China, are often used to tarnish China's image, put hurdles to its peaceful rise and weaken its global position;



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6. The need to find common ground with the West to work together on issues when there are shared interests, but the bottom line should always be Chinese and African peoples interests;
7. An economically and politically inclusive system of governance that ensures equal citizenship rights, addresses social and regional inequalities and positively responds to ethnic, religious and cultural groups grievances and demands early on is more likely to ensure peaceful coexistence between different national groups within a nation state; i.e., ensures unity and the territorial integrity of a nation.





## The Reluctant Peacemaker: China and the two Sudans

Steven C. Kuo

While the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a major contributor of peacekeepers to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and is now the largest investor and trading partner to the continent, it continues to be reluctant to take a leading role in peacemaking, preferring to take a supportive stance. This is despite criticisms from the West for security free-riding on the part of China in Africa as well as direct calls for greater involvement by the Government of South Sudan. This paper examines the emerging Chinese perspective on African security with specific reference to the case of the current crisis between the two Sudans. By examining Beijing's rationale for its current (but still evolving) policy stance, the paper explores the strengths and weaknesses of the emerging Chinese 'peace' perspective on peacemaking on the African continent.

Peacemaking, according to Roland Paris<sup>80</sup> is: "the attempt to resolve an ongoing conflict, either by peaceful means such as mediation or negotiation, or, if necessary, by the authorisation of an international military force to impose a settlement to the conflict." The dominant discourse on peacemaking in Africa at present is the 'liberal peace' where the installation of multiparty politics and free market economics is seen as the one-size-fits-all solution. However, the liberal peace has been largely unsuccessful and is criticised as *liberal hubris* and little different to neo-colonialism by critics in the West, the South as well as by the Chinese. As the liberal peace and western interventionism becomes increasingly discredited and as the West begins to focus more on its own economic crisis, it has become apparent that local, regional as well as emerging powers need to shoulder greater responsibility to find lasting solutions to conflicts in Africa. Undoubtedly, the greatest of the emerging powers in Africa is China and given the expressed Chinese intention to support peace in Africa, the Chinese perspective and evolving policy on peacemaking in Africa warrants critical examination.

Conflict within the Sudan and now between Sudan and South Sudan has long been testing for Beijing on its desire to remain outside the spot-light of African politics and to maintain the principle of non-interference. However, given the dominant position of the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation in the country and China's status as

<sup>80</sup> Roland Paris. (2004). *At War's End*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 38.



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Khartoum's political and economic patron, China has had little choice but to become engaged. Since *geigekaifang* (Reform and Opening-up), Beijing has preferred to focus on its mercantile interests and rely on regional and international organisations such as the UN and the AU to mediate security issues. Presenting itself as the messenger for the UNSC and the AU, Beijing was successful in 2008 in lobbying Khartoum to accept the UN-AU hybrid force. It is with reference to Beijing's successful "diplomatic manoeuvring on the question of Darfur" that Vice President Riak Machar of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), NGO observers as well as the African diplomatic community in Juba expects Beijing to play a greater if not a leading role in ending the impasse between the two Sudans.

It is unlikely that Beijing will take the leading role in the peacemaking process between the two Sudans. There are three main reasons as to why the Chinese approach to Africa security will be different from that adapted by France, Britain and the US despite its increasing presence and enmeshed interests. First, Beijing prefers a multipolar world order where no single great power can intervene unilaterally in domestic conflicts. This is because Beijing fears western intervention in its own domestic affairs chief among which are issues regarding Taiwan, Tibet and Xingjian. Secondly, Chinese scholars and policymakers hold that the cause of the insecurity between the two Sudans (as well as other African conflict) as a legacy of colonialism and continued neo-colonial interference into African politics by outside forces. Therefore, Beijing prefers local and regional stakeholders who understand the conflict to be the lead peacemakers. Finally, despite China's economic presence in Africa, this was not translated into political influence on the continent. China needs African support in international arenas such as the UN against western sanctions and therefore has little political leverage on the vast majority of African countries. China's political leverage over African countries is also constrained by its own criticisms of western interference in African affairs. Given the failures of unilateralism on the part of the West, the Chinese peace approach should be cautiously welcomed in Africa.

The major shortcoming of Beijing's engagement in African politics is its emphasis on courting the ruling elite and ignoring local realities. Beijing has focused on the African state as the counterpart in negotiating loans, investments and 'co-development' programs. The typical post-colonial



African state is characterized by neo-patrimonialism where the state is a personalized system of domination and power is maintained through patrimony. In other words, the African state is not neutral towards its domestic constituency (as is the case in China) and the ruling-class does not necessarily desire development. By investing in resource rich states, Chinese investment is inadvertently diverted to support the incumbent ruling elite and its patrimonial network.

It is not in China's long term security interest to support the ruling-class of a resource rich but poorly governed African state. As Chinese investments in Africa deepen, its national and security interests is steadily becoming dependent on the stability of African countries such as the two Sudans and it is increasingly important that Beijing become more nuanced when engaging with fragile African governments.

While I agree with the position that China should not insert itself unilaterally into African issues (as the West too often does) that it does not have a complete understanding, there is a great deal more that Beijing can do to support continental and regional efforts at peacemaking. Beijing and Chinese companies need to be aware that supporting a neo-patrimonial state does not necessarily mean it is supporting development in that country and that greater efforts needs to be made in engaging with the entire society and country that it invests in.



## The Ambiguity of China's Non-Interference Policy as a Drawback to Peace and Stability in the Sudan

Valery Ferim

China's traditional policy of unconditional aid and non-interference in Africa's domestic affairs has made the country Africa's preferred alternative to Western powers. Traditionally, aid to Africa was accompanied by conditionalities based on structural adjustment programmes imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions. These programmes have been labelled as developmental failures<sup>81</sup> and largely criticized for perpetuating dependency and underdevelopment in Africa. There have also been concerns by African leaders about criticisms of their regimes based on a 'Western approach' of human rights and liberal democracy.<sup>82</sup> It is cognisant of the fact that prescriptions imposed by the West to solve African problems are not befitting or might be resisted, that the Chinese foreign policy is based on principles of non-interference. The country released a 'China-Africa Policy White Paper', which reiterates a strategic partnership with the continent through a commitment to the five principles of peaceful coexistence: Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, Mutual non-aggression, Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, Equality and mutual benefit, and Peaceful co-existence.<sup>83</sup> The policy of non-interference is thus founded on China's prioritization of state sovereignty. However, there are growing concerns that the policy is merely to benefit the country's business and investment interest in Africa<sup>84</sup> as it largely overlooks socio-political realities.

China's growth in Africa can partly be attributed to the fact that the country has positioned itself as having similar developmental challenges as African states. Both Sudan and South Sudan supply China with oil needed for the latter's mega economy. On the other hand, these countries benefit from China in the form of construction, telecommunications and even supply of arms.<sup>85</sup> The supply of arms to the government of Sudan indicates a paradigm shift in China's non-interference foreign policy. This ambiguity in the country's foreign policy raises concerns about China's neo-imperialist ambitions on the continent. Critics of the policy also argue that it promotes human rights abuses, exploitative labour standards, bad governance and failed states.

<sup>81</sup> Condon, (2012). *China in Africa: What the Policy of Non-interoention Adds to the Western Development Dilemma*, *The Fletcher Journal of Human Security*, Vol. XXVII, pp. 5-25.

<sup>82</sup> Taylor, I. (2006). *China's Oil Diplomacy in Africa*, *International Affairs*, 82(5), pp. 937-959.

<sup>83</sup> Official Chinese Government White Paper (2006) 'China's African Policy', 12 January. Available at: [http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-01/12/content\\_156490.htm](http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-01/12/content_156490.htm).

<sup>84</sup> Aning, K. and Lecoutre, D. (2008). *China's Ventures in Africa*, *African Security Review*, 17(1), March: 39-50.

<sup>85</sup> Large, D. (2008). *China and the Contradictions of 'Non-interference' in Sudan*, *Review of African Political Economy*, 35:115, pp. 93-106.



Peace and stability is a precondition for mutually beneficial long-term bilateral trade and economic prosperity. In recognition of this, China's policy of non-interference has become ambiguous and complex in the Sudan. The country supplied arms to the Sudanese government in spite of the Darfur crisis which was considered by the United Nations as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.<sup>86</sup> This reinforced perceptions that China supports pariah regimes on the continent especially after the latter's involvement in Zimbabwe.

There is thus a need for China to acknowledge that its policy of non-interference does not fall in line with the realities and verities of conflict and political instability in the Sudan region. It goes against the norm of the responsibility to protect which holds not just states, but also the international community as being responsible for the welfare of citizens. As evil prevails when good men do nothing, China, which is Sudan's greatest trading partner<sup>87</sup>, needs to abandon its official non-interference policy and address the political crisis in the country. China's second largest economy in the world is a tremendous power capability. Economic prowess provides the capacity to punish and the ability to reward, making it a strategic leverage in conflict resolution. China needs to muster this power potential, coupled with its veto power status in the United Nations Security Council, to mitigate the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan. It needs to change perceptions that the country is merely exploiting African countries and is Africa's new colonial master rather than a developmental partner.

Inasmuch as both the republics of Sudan and South Sudan are sovereign states, sovereignty is not just a privilege but also a responsibility; the responsibility to cater for citizens. Where states are unable or unwilling to carry out that responsibility, it shifts to the international community.<sup>88</sup> The long-term consequences for China's unconditional aid, bilateral trade, neglect for good governance and ambiguous foreign policy will be disastrous both for Chinese investments and for peace and stability in the region. With a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and the extensive investments and strategic partnership it has established in the oil sector in the region, China can utilize that advantage to establish sustainable peace and stability in the region. Inasmuch as there is a preference for African solutions to African problems, China can act as a mediator especially given the frequent deadlocks that negotiation and dialogue between Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan have encountered.

<sup>86</sup> [http://www.un.org/News/dh/dev/scripts/darfur\\_formatted.htm](http://www.un.org/News/dh/dev/scripts/darfur_formatted.htm) Accessed 10th July 2012.

<sup>87</sup> Kleine, A. and Small, A. (2008). China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs? *Foreign Affairs*, 87(1), 38–56.

<sup>88</sup> UN General Assembly. (2005) 2005 World Summit Outcome, Resolution A/RES/60/1, September 15. Available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r60.htm> Accessed 11th July 2012.



## Chinese Investment and African Peace and Security: The Case of Ethiopia

*Yejoo Kim*

The increasing rate of youth unemployment in Ethiopia has heightened the instability in the country. In Ethiopia, as elsewhere in Africa, more than half of the total population of 93 million are youths, and 24.9 per cent of these are unemployed. Researchers and policymakers regard job creation as one of the most effective means for long-term peace and stability. Consequently, current Chinese business activities in Ethiopia face expectations to contribute to job creation by absorbing the youth workforce. Against this backdrop, the implications of Chinese investment in terms of resolving the unemployment issue are explored in this research. There exist many debates on Chinese investment and actual commitment and outcome in the African continent; the aim of the research is to explore the rhetoric and the reality of Chinese investment in Africa and its impact on youth unemployment.

At the micro level, empirical research based on interviews with Chinese investors, most of them answered that they feel their business operations in Ethiopia have contributed to resolving the unemployment issues.<sup>89</sup> However, at the macro level, the unemployment rate of Ethiopia has been volatile, even though Chinese investment as well as GDP has constantly increased over the course of the last decade.

The focus of this research is on three sectors where Chinese investment has been prominent: agriculture, construction, and manufacturing, and on the potential of Chinese investment for creating jobs. These three sectors, generally speaking, are labour intensive and merit a closer look. Firstly, the agriculture sector, which is the backbone of the Ethiopian economy, employed 80 percent of the total labour force of Ethiopia in 2010. Consequently, the Chinese investment in the sector merit closer scrutiny. However, according to the 2010 data, only 4.3 percent of the overall number of projects in this sector was undertaken by Chinese investors, reflecting that Chinese investment in agriculture is still at the nascent level; the job creation effects are consequently also marginal thus far. Secondly, Chinese investors are dominant in the construction sector, ranging from new construction to restoration and maintenance.

<sup>89</sup> Geda, A. and Meskel, A. (2009). *Impact of China-Africa Investment Relations: Case Study of Ethiopia*. African Economic Research Consortium Collaborative Research. [Online] Available: [http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/32411/1/Ethiopia-China\\_Eth\\_Invest\\_Fina.pdf?1](http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/32411/1/Ethiopia-China_Eth_Invest_Fina.pdf?1) [22 July 2012]



The construction sector is labour intensive in nature; therefore, there are job creation effects. These activities are to be seen in the light of the Ethiopian government's programme on public works through construction in order to address youth unemployment. Thus, Chinese investment in the construction sector has created work opportunities. The closer inquiry will have to explore how much Ethiopian labour and how much Chinese labour is created. Thirdly, in terms of the manufacturing sector in Ethiopia, the Chinese-led special economic zone in particular is expected to contribute to employment. However, it is still under construction and investors are still being sought; therefore, the effect on unemployment remains insignificant.

While, overall, the potential for job creation is substantial, the effects on the ground are less path breaking than sometimes expected. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the major challenge might be unrealistic expectations. Foreign investors are only one element that contributes to economic growth. The major factor in growth is with the domestic government and the unleashing of domestic potential. In addition to Chinese investment, there are other investors in Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia accounts for 24.2 per cent of total foreign investment, and the United States, at 17.1 per cent. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the country has imported Ethiopian labour, and their remittances account for a large part of the GDP. However, these workers are mainly housemaids and drivers, and these jobs do not contribute to sustainable job creation. In the case of the United States, the country has focused on the agricultural sector but also become a major investor in the service sector, yet with little effects on employment. Compared to these two countries, China at 6.4 per cent is the third-largest foreign investor; it seems to have more potential to contribute to job creation.

However, it is difficult to discern any significant contributions made by Chinese investment especially in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Many commentators have stated that Chinese investors often bring their (highly skilled and other) workers from their home country. The Chinese embassy in Ethiopia acknowledged that there were more than 10,000 Chinese workers in Ethiopia.<sup>90</sup> Many of them were unskilled workers who could have been recruited from Ethiopia. This was already discussed as an important issue by the Ethiopian parliament. However, the recent empirical study<sup>91</sup> shows that the trend has been

<sup>90</sup> Shinn, D. and Eisenman, J. (2012). *China and Africa*. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania.

<sup>91</sup> Brautigam, D. and Tang, X. (2012). *An Overview of Chinese Agricultural and Rural Engagement in Ethiopia*. International Food Policy Research Institute. Discussion Paper 01185.





reversed and more local employees are now hired; this is observable even at the managerial level. A third challenge arises from the form of employment. The construction sector, the largest employer, typically generates an immediate and massive number of jobs for specific tasks. This, however, is only for a fixed period of time during construction. Therefore, job creation is not sustainable in this sector unless there is a sustained construction boom and/or skills transfers are happening at a substantial level.

Nevertheless, the potential exists for Chinese investment to contribute to job creation in Ethiopia. Rising labour costs in China—and thus economic disincentives to ‘import’ Chinese labour, combined with a trend to outsource activities abroad—are likely to create more employment opportunities in Ethiopia, especially in the manufacturing sector. Although the Chinese-led special economic zone is still looking for investors, the number of Chinese entrepreneurs is likely to increase due to support from both the Chinese and Ethiopian governments. Furthermore, the formation of joint ventures between Chinese and Ethiopian local firms has been encouraged. There were already 120 such joint ventures in 2009, and the numbers are expected to grow. Finally, the increase in Chinese investment in other sectors as a consequence of greater overall engagement can provide opportunities if upgrading of skills are worked at. To be named here is particularly the service sector and its demand for well-educated labour. Chinese investments are substantial in Ethiopia; more work needs to be done on data collection and data transparency.





## China in Ethiopia's Infrastructure Sector: Responsibility and Sustainability

*Yuhua Xiao*

China's growing role in Ethiopia's infrastructure sector is giving a lot of boost to the Horn of Africa country's drive to economic growth and transformation, but has also created challenges facing stakeholders on both sides. Ethiopia's increasing reliance on Chinese financing for its massive infrastructure development, and China's willingness to do so, is a testimony to South-South cooperation but raises critical issues about corporate responsibility/sustainability. As most contemporary literature on Chinese involvement in Africa focuses on what Chinese financing and investment holds for Africa, it is even more important to examine the relationship from a Chinese perspective by investigating what such a relationship holds for the Chinese financiers, project implementers, and the Chinese people working on such projects.

China's "walk-out" strategy, the stringent trade barriers leveled against Chinese exports to the US and Europe, and the increasingly unprofitability of investing in US state bonds has forced China to seek alternative ways to manage its massive foreign reserves. A growing number of African governments have become adept at persuading China to provide non-quoted credit lines to finance their countries' development ambitions while Chinese enterprises seeking international development have become active lobbying groups to use state-backed financing to tap into the African market. The synergies seem to be unavoidable after the 2008 credit crunch.

For the Chinese state, it is positioned to project itself as a responsible world power by demonstrating its sincerity in assisting Africa's endogenous development. And based on its own experiences and capacity, infrastructure is taken as a viable entry point.

Though wary of the political and cultural impact a socialist China might have on the EPRDF-led Ethiopian government, which has its own Marxist-Leninist heritage, the opportunities brought about by China in terms of infrastructure development seems to have won the hearts and minds of most Ethiopians. It would be fair to say that infrastructure assistance from China to Ethiopia demonstrates the complexities of contemporary Sino-African relations, that is, China's interests in Africa are not limited to extractive resources, and international development



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cooperation with resource-poor African countries is not only a fulfillment of the international responsibilities expected from the world second-largest economy, but also presents enormous opportunities for the giver country's industries exploring new markets.

Yet, beneath and beyond the enthusiasms and criticisms of China's involvement in Ethiopia's infrastructure sector and its impact on Ethiopia's development path, lies the tricky issue of responsibility and/or sustainability of Chinese contribution. This issue is further complicated given China's rare experiences in supervising its overseas private and state investment and financing activities. The opportunities created by Chinese financing and entrepreneurship is being pulled back by increasing institutional, infrastructural and technical barriers which compromises the efficiency and sustainability in the long term.



## Between the Orient and the Horn: China-Africa Cooperation over the Development of Transboundary Rivers<sup>92</sup>

*Fasil Amdetsion*

It is one of nature's cruelest ironies that so little of the abundant water available on earth is accessible to human beings. Ninety-seven percent of the planet's water is salty and in oceans; of the remaining three percent, seventy-nine percent is frozen and twenty percent lies underground. It is estimated that only a minute 0.014 percent of the world's water is easily retrievable and usable freshwater. The challenges posed by scarcity are compounded by disputes over allocation and utilization since the majority of global freshwater is found in 263 transboundary rivers, some of which cross as many as ten different countries' borders.

Analysts estimate 158 of these rivers are either contested or may give rise to future disputes. Among the most emblematic of these is the Nile, both because it is intimately intertwined with the history of the countries through which it flows and because the discord concerning its use reflects the challenges of managing transboundary water resources. China too, has been enmeshed in multiple wrangles with its neighbors given its determination to exploit several international rivers—ten of whose headwaters lie in China proper—which flow through countries as diverse and disparate as India, Kazakhstan and Cambodia.

A trifecta of manmade pressures: population growth, climate change and greater exploitation of the rivers themselves aggravates scarcity, and in turn, tensions. Both the East Asian press and reporters covering developments in the Nile Basin have taken to writing alarmist stories with attention-grabbing headlines such as: "Countries sharing Mekong Brace for a Water War;" "Regional Security is implicated by Water Development on the Lacang River;" "China Will Capture Water in the West area of Siberia;" "Ethiopia and Egypt Move Closer to War Over Nile River Water;" and "Ethiopia Challenges Egypt Over Nile Water."

Prognostication of imminent conflict has not been the sole province of the media. In recent years, politicians across the Nile and Mekong Basins have issued threats and counter-threats. Whether these are reliable indications of potential future clashes or mere saber-rattling of

<sup>92</sup> The views contained herein do not necessarily reflect the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.



obsequious politicians pandering to their electorates remains to be seen. Concerns regarding the potential for conflict over water gained currency during the post-Cold War era with scholars and policymakers propounding that the battles of the future would be over resources, not ideology. Among the most prominent advocates of the water war thesis have been Gleick and Homer-Dixon, the former arguing that history is replete with instances of clashes over water and the latter positing in 1994 that, “The renewable resource most likely to stimulate interstate resource war is river water.”

Since the late nineties, however, critics have called into question the validity of the water war thesis. Some observe that while conflict over water has indeed taken place, it has rarely taken the form of state-to-state conflict. Others, attempt to debunk the water war thesis by arguing that examples of cooperation outnumber outright conflict.

Indeed, countries with deep-seated enmity towards one another have overcome historical animosities in order to collaborate over transboundary water resources. India and Pakistan concluded the Indus Water Treaty and established the Indus River Commission which survived two major wars between the two states. Israeli and Jordanian negotiators held discussions over the utilization of the Jordan River during the fifties and beyond, even though the two countries were technically at war with one another until the 1994 peace treaty. Similarly, Armenia and Azerbaijan—perpetually at odds with one another over Nagorno-Karabakh—have collaborated with regard to the Kura-Araks river basin.

Yet it is not anecdotes, but empirical evidence which is most helpful to policymakers, and this is now available in the form of a database compiled by Oregon State University researchers which reports every interaction between two or more states (whether it be conflictive or cooperative) over water. Researchers documented 1,831 such interactions over 50 years and found that the number of conflicts was minimal when compared to instances of cooperation. States mostly limited themselves to verbal salvos, seldom going beyond. The researchers, however, also found that there were certain conditions under which the eruption of conflict was more likely: when water basins underwent rapid political and physical changes and when basin institutions were unable to grapple with such changes.

Under these circumstances, the Nile Basin and East Asia would seem to be paradigmatic examples of conflicts waiting to happen. In both areas,



countries have undergone rapid population growth, environmental changes have affected the basin, and there exists a lack of comprehensive basin wide agreements subscribed to by all riparians. Yet even if conflict were never to erupt, the status quo is untenable. There are multiple scenarios short of outright war which can be injurious to stability and development. For instance, Egypt has historically sponsored proxy forces to destabilize and divert Ethiopia's attention from the issue of the Nile. The presence of simmering tensions will not promote basin-wide cooperation both in the Nile Basin and in East Asia.

This paper will examine the merits and demerits of the water war thesis (as it applies specifically to the Nile Basin and East Asia) and then continue by arguing that regardless of the thesis' validity, the status quo is injurious to security, stability and development. Cooperation between China and various East African states can occur in multiple areas in a mutually beneficial fashion. But the paper will also emphasize that this collaboration is a two-way street: both China and the Nile Basin states can learn from one another.

The first and most critical component of enhanced cooperation within basins is the conclusion of basin-wide agreements. In this regard, the Cooperative Framework Agreement signed by most upper-riparian states in the Nile Basin may serve as a model for the types of agreements to which the Chinese may wish to adhere, as China has yet to conclude or join any comprehensive water-sharing agreements. This is unfortunate as agreements over the basic principles governing allocation are likely to facilitate specific water-sharing agreements. On the other hand, Nile Basin states may also learn from China in the realm of international agreement making as China has signed a number of agreements with neighbors on issues as diverse as fish resource management, pollution control, and environmental protection. Though these agreements do not address issues of allocation, they do grapple with important issues and can help build confidence between parties in anticipation of more concrete allocation agreements.

Furthermore, China and East African states can cooperate to advance the progressive development of international water law by further bolstering the notion of reasonable and equitable utilization, ensuring that it can gain further currency in treaties and custom.

On the political front, China and her East African counterparts may cooperate in the area of developing early warning mechanisms which may aid in the task of conflict prevention and response. Identification



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of contentious issues which may lead to discord and the resort to pre-established tension-reducing measures may, for instance, avoid the vitriol and possible escalation emanating from pollution incidents such as that affecting the Songhua River.

Another area for China-Africa cooperation is in the administrative set-up of respective governmental institutions. Chinese authorities have been criticized internally over the administrative confusion with regard to water management. Some have complained that there are “nine dragons administering water” in China; most prominently the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the State Development and Reform Commission. East African states suffer from a similar bureaucratic miasma. Experience sharing in this area may prove to be mutually beneficial.

Finally, both China and the Nile Basin States may cooperate in the strengthening of their respective basin-wide institutions, given that international basin institutions are becoming a more internationally accepted method of dealing with disputes.

Flexibility, creativity, and cooperation in some of the ways enumerated above—going beyond the realm of mere technical cooperation—can help ensure that transboundary rivers, the wellspring of ancient civilizations, not be a source of conflict, but a catalyst for socio-economic development.



## China's Engagement in the Diplomacy of Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa Region

Anita Kiamba

China is a major power and the world's second largest economy. With its rapidly growing economy as the basis of its international relations, China is interacting increasingly with states outside its immediate neighbourhood in the pursuit of its foreign policy goals. For that reason, it is in China's best interests to promote peace, security and stability in the world and also in regions where its interests lay. Certainly, China has been pressured by major powers like the United States of America to help manage conflict in parts of Africa. As a result, China will have to reconsider its policy of non interference in relation to its emerging global leadership position.

China's policy of non interference in the internal affairs of other states has made it a favourable partner of developing nations around the world. Indeed, its policy of non interference resonates the principles of *bon voisinage* which have been the guiding pillars of interstate relations in Africa. The policy of non interference continues to elicit debate among scholars and policy makers alike. The debates have pitted those who argue that interference is an attack on state sovereignty against those who argue that events such as crises and conflict necessitate prompt attention and action described as intervention rather than interference. Consequently, in the last two decades we have witnessed a shift in diplomacy and the foreign policies of major powers towards African states experiencing conflict. The interventions are done for a number of reasons including protecting and safeguarding interests and ensuring stability and security in the region. Depending on the choice of intervention mechanisms, the diplomacy of conflict management has yielded positive as well as negative outcomes. Since China cannot remain passive due to its interests in the region, the following synopsis provides China with lessons on which direction its foreign policy and eventually its diplomacy of conflict management in the Horn of Africa should take.

China is perceived by African states as a development partner which does not interfere in their internal affairs. It is also considered to be impartial and balanced, qualities that may be desirable for intervention in conflict. Being an impartial third party, China can exercise persuasive power over parties to manage their conflict because it is trusted and is considered fair. Having such qualities can assist the relationship



between China and parties in conflict since it remains acceptable to all parties. For instance, China has development projects in South Sudan and Sudan, however each of the parties may query its relationship with the other; its position on the ongoing conflict and its unwillingness to intervene. China's intervention in the conflict should be founded on achieving political stability in the region rather than biased support. However, it should take care not to delay its contribution and intervention in the resolution of conflict neither should it put its interests before the parties' interests.

China's relationship with African countries is described as one of common bonds and experiences shaped by history. As a major power seeking to manage conflict, China's rapport and influence in the Horn of Africa region (especially along the East coast of Africa) is an added advantage that not only makes it an acceptable major power in the region but also one that has created allies based on respect and equality of states. Consequently, China will need to avoid projecting itself as a state which will intervene in conflict to broker power or as a sign of dominating the region. Although parties may reach a settled agreement in the presence of major power intervention, most agreements are partially implemented as a result of threats and pressure. Alternatively, China's diplomacy of conflict management should seek to resolve conflict by encouraging parties to negotiate.

Depending on its level of engagement, China may seek to deal with the entire process of managing conflict or it may decide to deal with both procedural and substantive issues. Procedural issues include facilitating communication between the parties and expressing concerns of the parties. This is the lowest level of involvement and is considered to be a passive role for third parties. On a higher level, procedural activities may include the formal control of the process, of the parties' constituency, the media and the parties' resources. Procedural engagement generally aims at having parties resolve conflict with minimum assistance. Managing the substantive issues, entails a direct and active role in which China would seek among others specific solutions to conflict by offering proposals and putting pressure on parties to resolve the conflict. This is the most powerful form of intervention because interveners seek to change the behaviour of parties while also providing incentives. Consequently, if parties in conflict are promised incentives which outweigh the costs and risks associated with continued hostilities, there is impetus to resolve conflict.





The discussion above describes the policies that China can consider during the formulation of policies for its diplomacy of conflict management in the Horn of Africa region. Although there has been prior intervention by major powers in the Horn of Africa region, more specifically in Sudan and Somalia, China can learn from previously unsuccessful interventions by avoiding to offer biased support, because by doing so, for instance supporting either Sudan or South Sudan, it will harm its interests; it will also encourage other major powers to intervene in support of the other party. In addition, overt biasness can lead to suspicion from other parties and withdrawal from peace processes. Secondly, China may use the strategy of promising reward rather than using threats or punitive measures which have often been used by major powers. Unlike promises of rewards, threats and the use of force make parties bolder and resistant to resolve conflict. Finally, China has a choice of options with regard to the type of intervention. Its diplomacy of conflict management could consider appointing a special envoy to South Sudan and Sudan; it could also consider providing resources to the current African Union mediation effort and rewarding Sudan and South Sudan for their efforts at managing the conflict.



## Zambia's 2011 Political Transition: What Impact on China-Zambia Relations?

*Njunga M. Mulikita*

### Background and context

In September 2011, the opposition Patriotic Front (PF) defeated the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) that had been power since 1991. The PF's leader Michael Sata, who became Zambia's fifth President won the election by tapping into latent groundswell of public resentment against Chinese investors, whom he accused of flouting Zambia's labour laws as well as taking away jobs from Zambians. Indeed Sata promised to "rein-in" the Chinese, especially in the copper mining industry. Zambia has historically enjoyed strong political ties with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), since the 1970s when the PRC constructed the TANZAM rail link to connect landlocked Zambia to the Indian Ocean. After defeating United National Independence Party (UNIP) in 1991, the new MMD government sought to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan. However, the PRC used Zambia's TANZAM debt to China to coerce the new government into canceling plans to recognize Taiwan. Currently the strong external demand for Zambia's key mineral export, copper emanates from the PRC's solid economic growth.

### The impact of donors on political governance in Zambia

Donors such as the European Union, UK, Germany, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and to a lesser extent the USA have had a significant role on the evolution of the quality of democratic governance in Zambia since the reintroduction of multi party politics in 1991. Support to democratic governance in Zambia has taken the form of technical and human capacity support to the various constitution reform exercises which commenced in 1993, and to formulation of the National Capacity Building Programme for Good Governance in 1996. Other Governance reforms that donors have supported have sought to make the judiciary more efficient in dispensing justice and making parliament more accessible to citizens through opening of parliamentary field offices.

The MMD government's relations with donors soured in 1996 when Zambia's second President Fredrick Chiluba amended the country's constitution to bar Zambia's first President Kenneth Kaunda from



challenging him in 1996. Whereas western donors broadly deplored this reversal in democratic governance, the PRC took the position that it would not interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. This stance suited the then ruling MMD which proceeded to establish a strong relationship with the *Chinese Communist Party (CCP)*.

In 2001, President Chiluba tried to amend the constitution to enable him to seek a Third Presidential term. His attempt to amend the constitution was blocked by a broad coalition of opposition parties and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) which campaigned to prevent him from pushing through constitutional amendments. Chiluba's Vice-President at the time led a faction of Cabinet Ministers in an internal revolt against the President. The broad coalition that opposed the amendment to the constitution was called the OASIS Forum which enjoyed the quiet financial and logistical support of Western donors. The PRC on the contrary remained on the sidelines, preferring to refrain from taking sides in the Third Term debate.

### **Post Chiluba era; strengthening of Sino-Zambian ties**

The Third Term debate led to a splintering of the MMD into a number of factions. Two factions emerged led by Chiluba's ex Vice President's late Christon Tembo and Godfrey Miyanda. Chiluba's decision to pluck from obscurity Levy Mwanawasa as his successor triggered the resignation from the MMD of Michael Sata who had built a strong power base within the MMD which he had served as Administrative Secretary. Sata went on to form the Patriotic Front (PF). Mwanawasa narrowly won the 2001 election, while Sata's new PF only secured one parliamentary seat. Mwanawasa embarked upon strengthening the economic ties between China and Zambia. He actively sought more Chinese investment in the country in line with the MMD's Open Door Policy towards foreign investment.

### **Michael Sata's anti China rhetoric and rise to power**

In the 2006 General Elections, Michael Sata used populist rhetoric to incite Zambia's urban population against Chinese investors whom he accused of treating Zambian workers badly. He accused the MMD government of being more interested in abstract economic growth statistics while foreign investors' particularly Chinese firms were ill treating Zambian workers. Sata's populist anti China rhetoric struck a responsive chord among urban Zambians and not only did he almost defeat MMD's Levy Mwanawasa but also propelled the PF



to be Zambia's major political opposition party ahead of the longer established United Party for National Development (UPND)

In the 2011 elections, Michael Sata, who had been in opposition for 10 years defeated President Rupiah Banda in elections that were certified free and fair by local and international observer groups. In the run-up to the election, there were reports that China preferred an MMD victory as the MMD had cultivated very strong ties with PRC. There are reports that the USA was supporting Sata because of the expectation that Sata, once elected would curb Chinese investments in the country. The UK was reported to prefer the PF over the MMD partly because of Dr. Guy Scott; a White Zambian of British ancestry, PF Vice President and now Vice President of the country.

### **Zambia-China relations after 2011 political transition**

In the aftermath of the regime change that occurred in September 2011, the new PF government and President Sata have quietly dropped their anti-Chinese investor rhetoric to the alleged bewilderment of the US and UK Ambassadors in Lusaka. Evidence of the warming in relations between the Chinese government and the new Zambian government is provided by a number of trips PF party leaders have undertaken to China as well as the downgrading of Chishimba Kambwili, the fiercest critic of Chinese investment in Zambia to the inconsequential Ministry of Youth and Sport. The PF government's commitment to carry through key governance reforms; namely *Freedom of Information legislation*, new *Constitution* and overhaul of *labor relations legislation* in the first 90 days of PF rule already looks shaky. The PF, like the MMD is encouraging participation of Chinese investors which it ironically criticized as an opposition party. The PF, like the MMD, will encourage participation of Chinese investors which it ironically criticized as an opposition party



## Evading Punishment: An Analysis of Zimbabwe's Relations with China in an Age of Sanctions

Chipaike Ronald

### Introduction

The imposition of sanctions by selected Western countries on Zimbabwe following the land grabs, which in themselves were symptoms of a historical social justice problem that needed urgent attention, was a sign of disapproval by the West. However Zimbabwe sought a quick solution or partial panacea through a revival of relations with China. The Chinese themselves responded by increasing aid, trade and investment opportunities together with important diplomatic support at the United Nations. China has continued to support Zimbabwe in various sectors through different initiatives including the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). However Zimbabwe's relations with China have lacked important elements to do with the improvement of governance, respect of human rights and discouragement of corruption. This is possibly a result of China's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. There is also a lack of skills transfer, appropriate technology and a salient quietness on value addition of extracted raw minerals such as diamonds. The Zimbabwe-China partnership can therefore be improved through the inclusion of good governance practices in the matrix, as well as encouraging and aiding in value addition of minerals and skills transfer to Zimbabwe.

### Discussion

Zimbabwe-China relations are anchored in the former's liberation struggle. Initially, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), sought logistical support from the Soviet Union, but when they realised that Soviet Union was not forthcoming, they got assistance from China<sup>93</sup>. This proved an important strategy for both parties since it set the base for future cooperation.

Soon after independence, Zimbabwe enjoyed good relations with the West and this trend stretched to the late 1990s. In this phase Zimbabwe-China relations were not so pronounced, though China maintained cordial relations with the Southern African country.

<sup>93</sup> Mtshunganyi, T. (2010). *China in Zimbabwe: Exploring the political and economic impacts of Chinese engagement in the Zimbabwe crisis*, MA International Relations dissertation, Wits University, South Africa.



With the Zimbabwe-United Kingdom fall out, beginning in 1997, China-Zimbabwe relations experienced a phenomenal resurgence, and by 2002, ties had been firmly 'restored'. The much publicised 'Look East Policy' of 2003<sup>94</sup>, although focusing on Malaysia, Indonesia, United Arab Emirates and other Asian countries, mainly focuses on China. It can be argued that it was out of desperation that the Zimbabwe government proclaimed the Look East Policy as it looked for a big friend to help it stave off the punishment meted on it by its former Western allies. Arguably, the Look East Policy was the first 'sanctions busting' strategy implemented by the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe but has had modest results. What follows is a summary of how China has and continues to help the Zimbabwean government fill the gap left by the West.

### Trade, investment and development assistance

FES (2004) noted China-Zimbabwe trade increased from Z\$600 million in 1997 to 6.9 billion in 2000. The main export commodity was and still is tobacco. Chrome, platinum and other raw minerals are also purchased by China. With the beginning of alluvial diamond mining around 2006, Chinese firms including Anjin snapped profitable mining deals in partnership with Zimbabwe Mining Development Cooperation (ZMDC). The Chinese have also invested in cement manufacturing and brick moulding industries together with ventures in cotton ginning and spinning through the Sino-Zimbabwe company. To give testimony to the intensity of relations between Zimbabwe and China, bilateral trade is reported to have increased substantially<sup>95</sup>. However, Zimbabwe has frequently recorded trade deficits over the years in which it has traded with China.

In addition China is reported to have given Zimbabwe \$25 million in various donations since 2009 to deal with various challenges the country was facing. China International Mining Group Cooperation (CIMGC) is reportedly keen to invest \$21.2 million into Bindura Nickel Cooperation (BNC) which ceased operations as a result of operational challenges. Zimbabwe has also accessed loans from China for infrastructural development projects such as the \$160 million agreement for the upgrading of Victoria Falls Airport<sup>96</sup>. Other initiatives are noticeable in

<sup>94</sup> Frederick-Ebert Stiftung. (2004). The 'Look East policy' now focuses on China, Policybrief, Harare.

<sup>95</sup> Herald, May 7, 2012

<sup>96</sup> Herald, April 7, 2012



agricultural production support, for example, the demonstration centre at Gwebi College and various other facilities. In the Energy sector, a project was commissioned in which the Chinese government would provide a loan for the construction of three thermal power stations at Hwange Colliery station<sup>97</sup>. In addition, the China Development Bank provided loans of more than \$350 million in 2011 to assist in mining, agriculture, transport, manufacturing and other critical sectors.

Despite the intensity of relations between Zimbabwe and China, the latter is a distant fourth in terms of export destinations for Zimbabwean products with a 5.6% share. The number one destination for Zimbabwean products is South Africa. Some of China's exports in the Zimbabwean market are of poor quality to the extent that local textile and other manufacturing industries have suffered because of competition from these low quality and low priced goods. China has also not been forthcoming in appropriate technology transfer, value addition of extracted minerals. Moreover, due to its policy of non-interference, China does not encourage its partners to respect human rights and the rule of law. Additionally, Chinese diamond mining firm, Anjin, in partnership with Zimbabwe Defence Forces, assisted in the building of National Defence College in Harare by the Chinese. This more or less signifies the militarisation and 'securitisation' of diamond mining in Zimbabwe and a misplacement of development priorities with the help of the Chinese.

On the diplomatic front, in 2008, China vetoed a United Nations Security Council Resolution to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe. This development, together with China's increasing economic ties with Zimbabwe in its 'sanctions era' reveals the Chinese ability and potential to shield African countries under punishment from the devastating effects of the punishment(s).

## Conclusion and recommendations

In sum, China-Zimbabwe partnership displays signs of positive economic partnership but could be improved if appropriate technology transfer can take place from the Chinese to the Zimbabweans. There is also a need for the Chinese to provide substantial loans to Zimbabwe for infrastructural development and repair especially within the context of Zimbabwe's land reform. These funds could be channelled towards

<sup>97</sup> Edinger, H. and Burke, C. (2008). *AERC Scoping study on China-Africa relations: A research report on Zimbabwe*, Centre for Chinese studies, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa.



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road dualisation, purchase of railway locomotives and irrigation development. China as a global power could also play a meaningful role in the democratisation of Zimbabwe through lobbying for respect of human rights and violence free elections. Transparency in China-Zimbabwe military relations and economic partnerships could also help in China-Africa relations.





## China, a Critical Factor in the Zimbabwe's Political Crisis and Solutions

*Charity Manyeruke*

The Security Council failed to adopt sanctions against Zimbabwe's leadership as a result of a veto by both China and Russia. This paper analyses the role that China has played in Zimbabwe's governance, peace and security during the crisis period from 2000 to 2008 and currently. The framework of governance, peace and security during that period was analyzed with the implications it had on Zimbabwe, Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC), Africa and the international community at large. Specific issues of democracy, elections, rule of law, human rights, land reform and mineral resources in Zimbabwe are also discussed in this paper. All these aspects are analysed with a focus on the role played by China to influence governance, peace and security in Zimbabwe during the period under study. This paper focuses on the China-ZANU-PF factor, China's veto power, China's economic reform and muscle, Zimbabwe's sanctions situation, the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the South Africa-SADC factor and the African Union's position. This study used a documentary search and analysis of the issues investigated. Data for this paper was analysed through content analysis.

Zimbabwe has been a long standing friend of China. However Zimbabwe has been on the spotlight for its governance, peace and security where both SADC and African Union (AU) have been concerned. China has maintained its 'non-interference' foreign policy to the Zimbabwe's internal political crisis. This paper anchors on the specific issue of political crisis and sustainable development in Zimbabwe but with an emphasis on the China factor in this matrix of problems and suggesting solutions where both parties can benefit mutually.

China has become the nerve-centre for Zimbabwe's trade and investment especially with the sour relations that developed with the western community over the past decade. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China's veto power has also immensely saved Zimbabwe from unjustified imposition of sanctions.

The past decade has witnessed Zimbabwe deep-rooted in political, social-economic challenges that compromised the lives of the general populace. With the adoption of the land reform policy in early 2000, sour relations with the international community resulted and subsequently,



Zimbabwe was placed under “illegal sanctions” by United States of America and European countries on the accusations of human rights violations and undermining the rule of law. Since the United States’ promulgation in December 2001 of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA), Zimbabwe has reeled under tightened economic sanctions that include the prohibition of budgetary assistance by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as well as other sources. The crisis period was characterised by political instability, dilapidated infrastructure, escalation of poverty levels, high unemployment levels, economic meltdown coupled with hyperinflation levels. Since then, Zimbabwe’s trade and investment with the western countries dramatically declined leading to economic decline and escalating poverty.

Confronted with these numerous challenges, the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) adopted the ‘Look East Policy’ as a sustainable option for trade and investment. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been on the forefront in implementing this policy, guided by government’s policy, vision and strategy documents designed to increase Zimbabwe’s cooperation with a number of countries in East Asia. Consequently, a deliberate decision was made to initially focus on China, Iran, Indonesia, India and Malaysia in effecting the above policy, hence broadening the scope of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy. This paper focuses on how China has played a critical role in Zimbabwe’s political crisis and solution. Both China and Zimbabwe have common interests on democracy, human rights, development, trade and investments.

Zimbabwe-China relations dates back to over 600 years ago during the days of Admiral Zhenghe (now celebrated as the ambassador of peace). It was during the Ming and Qing dynasty when the Chinese established relations with the Munhumutapa Empire, based on trade and cultural exchange. China supported the Zimbabwean guerrilla fighters with weapons and military training. The two countries formally established diplomatic relations on 18 April 1980, the day of independence. When Zimbabwe implemented the Land Reform Program in 1980 she became an enemy of the West. She then declared openly her Look East policy in 2003, which largely meant her predominant relationship with China, even though other countries like Malaysia and Indonesia are also included in the matrix. In fact the ties intensified as Zimbabwe became more isolated from the EU and US as a result of the decade long political turmoil. Since then China has been described as one of the major international supporters of Zimbabwe due to its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries like Zimbabwe.



Since then president Robert Mugabe has cultivated relations with Asia and notably China, making the ties between them sound and notable (Manyeruke and Mhandara, 2011).

China's ties with Zimbabwe have developed in agriculture, mining, manufacturing as well as infrastructural development, allowing notable economic recovery in the country. Its capacity to invest in Zimbabwe has been evident in various spheres. China is the second largest economy in the world and it is geared to overtake USA at least by 2020. China has forex reserves which can bail out Zimbabwe's investment and trade requirements. China is a favourable destination for Zimbabwe's products since it has a culture of negotiation which is deeply rooted in its Confucius and Taoism doctrines. China is bailing out Europe, US and the International Monetary Fund from the financial crisis and cannot afford to be ignored. Fortunately for Zimbabwe, she has always had good relations with China, more prominently since the liberation struggle.

This paper concludes that Zimbabwe-China relations are very powerful and significant to Zimbabwe's political problems and solutions. This paper has demonstrated the pivotal role played by China in bailing out Zimbabwe from its decade-long crisis and how the relations have been maintained. Zimbabwe's Look East Policy has benefited Zimbabwe's investment and trade portfolios during the crisis and beyond. China has remained Zimbabwe's all weather friend-in good and bad times. Zimbabwe therefore should continue to nurture the common interests with China.



## Host Town

### Location

Bishoftu is located in the Great Rift Valley, 47 km south east of Addis Ababa and at the center of Adea Liban district. The town, with a total population of 111,963, was founded in 1917 when the Ethio-Djibouti Railway was established.



The natural topography of Bishoftu town is characterized in the north and east by flat land locked by swampy lakes. In the south and west, the land is dominated by rolling hills.

### History and cultural attractions

The term Bishoftu is derived from the Afan Oromo language “Bishaanoftuu” which refers to “the land of excess water body”. The town is known for its numerous crater lakes such as Bishoftu, Hora Arsadi, Cheleleka, Kuriftu, Kilole, Green Lake and Babogaya.

In Bishoftu town, there is “Hora Arsaden”, a remarkable “Wakefeta”-praying area, where the “Irrecha Ceremony” takes place. This is the most famous cultural site in Bishoftu, and in the greater region as well. The ceremony is conducted once a year in September on the first Sunday following the Meskel holiday. Other cultural facilities include a museum and a public library.



As part of the administration's garden city program, the town has constructed guesthouses, high quality lodges and recreational sites. The seven major lakes serve as both natural and cultural tourist attraction sites.

### **Economic activities**

The town's economy is mainly based on trade and other business activities in which many people participate. The geographical location of a town plays important role for the development of trade.

The existence of a favourable agro-climatic zone and fertile soil also makes the city more suitable for any type of urban agriculture. Many households base their economy on urban agriculture as the source of their livelihood. The major urban agricultural activities in Bishoftu include horticulture, dairy farming, poultry, pig husbandry, cattle fattening, gardening, and other related activities

The development of hotel facilities has a great share in the development of tourism and other social relations. Many standardized hotels with diversified services are available in the town.

### **Important travel tips**

#### **Altitude**

The altitude of Addis Ababa is 2500 meters and may affect some visitors. You may feel a little tired or sleepless for the first 24 hours. Therefore, do not over exert yourselves by doing tiring exercises. The altitude of Bishoftu, ranging from 1900-1995 meters is considerably lower.


#### **Currency**

The "Birr" is the Ethiopian currency. one USD is equal to about 18.04 Birr. As the Birr is floating, check before you change your currency but all banks have the same rate. ATM machines are available and international bank cards such as Visa and MasterCard are accepted.

#### **Weather**

The average temperature and annual rainfall of the town are 27°C and 746.6 mm respectively. May is the hottest month of the year, while November is the coldest. February and August are the driest and most rainy months of the year in the town, with 0 mm and 241 mm of rainfall, respectively.

The month of October is usually sunny. The average day temperature will be around 27 degrees Celsius and will be considerably less in the evenings (around 9 degree Celsius). Bring a warm jacket for the evenings.



### Venue and accommodation

The 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the China-Africa Think Tanks Forum will take place in Kuriftu Resort, a resort surrounded by Lake Kuriftu on one side and beautiful tropical gardens on the other.





Kuriftu, Bishoftu, Ethiopia

Few minutes drive away from the conference venue is Babogaya Resort, the other location for accommodation of the forum participants. It is a resort in the heart of the Lake District and with a world of excitement.



Babogaya, Bishoftu, Ethiopia



## Conference Team




*From left-right, top row: Fana Gebresenbet, Dr. Kassahun Berhanu, Dalaya Ashenafi, Mahlet Bistrat, Mercy Fekadu, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Dr. Asnake Kefale, Getachew Zeru, Medhanit Kidanekal, Demelash Fesehagiorgis, Beakal Yejotiwor, Markus Koerner, Michelle Muita; bottom row: Dr. Xiao Yuhua, Helen Yosef Hailu, Tariku Wasihun, Seid Negash, Nebiyat Yusuf, Mikias Yitbarek, Seble Mulugeta, Dawit Yohannes.*



*From left to right  
Standing: Prof. Liu Hongwu & Yang Wenjia  
Sitting: Zhengru, Yu Genying, Prof. Chen Mingkun, Prof. Xu Jinya, Shen Hong, Zhang Yueying, Wu Hui, Dr. Li Pengtao and Dr. Zhang Zhe (not in the picture)*





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- China Development Bank
- Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs
- Ethiopian Airlines
- Ethiopian Government Communications Affairs Office
- Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- German International Cooperation (GIZ)
- Mayor's Office, Bishoftu Town Administration



The 2<sup>nd</sup> Meeting of the China-Africa  
Think Tanks Forum  
October 12-13, 2012  
Bishoftu, Ethiopia