International Affairs Bulletin

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Editor/Redakteur
  Sara Pienaar
Assistant Editor/Assistent-Redakteur
  Alan Begg

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Smuts House Notes

Looking back over the last few issues of the *Bulletin* — since no. 1 of 1985 in fact — one cannot but be impressed (perhaps 'dismayed' would be a better word) by the bewildering speed with which events have moved across one's vision. In South Africa now there is, at least for some, a sense of being part of some Orwellian fantasy — as if we were at one and the same time the audience and the performers in an early melodrama.

This disturbing realisation possibly has its origin in the fact that, for too many years, so many Whites have only been spectators in the game of government — taking refuge in commercial or academic achievement, enjoying what is a most benevolent climate and falling back, when disturbed by events, on some vague sense of *laissez-faire*, left over from 19th century liberalism. Earlier explosions of group resentment, successfully stifled, only encouraged a sense of false security — a mis-applied *déja vu*.

So here we stand, at some two and a half years' remove from the heady days of early 1984 — of Nkomati and the reforming 'Constitution'. The old 'outward' policy lies in ruins, notwithstanding substantial bilateral trade in Africa — and despite official reporting, reminiscent at times of the Wehrmacht's 'victorious' retreat from the USSR during the Second World War. Yet, could we but learn to accept the realities of our situation — to sort the wheat from the political chaff of rhetoric — then recent experience and events still to come, might present tremendous opportunities to forge a new and united nation. History, whether past or 'contemporary', is not bunk (nor did Henry Ford himself intend the simplistic, dismissive interpretation of his classic comment). This Institute, therefore, through its publications, will continue to pursue a path which, one hopes, by reasoned interpretation of past and current events at home and abroad, will encourage its members to exercise their own critical faculties to the ultimate benefit of this sub-continent as a whole. However discouraging it may seem at times, we must live not only for today but also for tomorrow. To this end, we would commend the closing lines of Jon Inggs' review of the *Economic History of West Africa* by A. G. Hopkins on p. 47 of this journal.

The articles in this issue are a mixed bag — not we hope in quality but only in variety — ranging from our own regional interests in Southern Africa to further afield in West Africa and across the Indian Ocean. The latter in particular, though seemingly remote, touches on our wider maritime

concerns: the security of the Western Pacific, spilling over into the Indian Ocean. Since being written, the USSR has established relations with the miniscule island states of Kiribati and Vanuatu in that area, and the US has this month (August) withdrawn its guarantee of protection from New Zealand, its erstwhile ANZUS Treaty partner, as a direct result of New Zealand's objections to the visits by nuclear powered or equipped vessels of the US Navy. However, a reassessment of the US role in the region seems imminent, with a less paternalistic attitude emerging in response to the developing Soviet interest; US ties with Australia, however, seem to be surviving the strain surrounding ANZUS.

The USSR has also entered into a 'fishing' agreement with Argentina, which embraces in Argentinian maritime law, hypothetically at least, Las Malvinas (the Falkland Islands). Ironically, Britain does not seem to be in a position even to provide a fisheries protection vessel to police the territorial waters, according to a recent report. It is significant to note the movement into the Southern Ocean and South Pacific of Soviet maritime activity, bearing in mind the acknowledged dual role of Soviet fishing fleets as listening posts on behalf of their navy.

Finally, a word of welcome once again to Professor J.E. (Jack) Spence, with us for some weeks as the Institute's fifth Bradlow Fellow. It is reassuring in these times to receive a visitor of distinction by whose research abilities and academic integrity one sets great store. His research paper on the Soviet Union and Southern Africa will appear in the course of next year and if the large attendance at his Bradlow Lecture at Jan Smuts House was a portent, it should be assured of wide distribution.

Alan Begg
Assistant Editor

Tom Lodge

The African National Congress: Kabwe and After

Last year, between 16 and 23 June, the ANC held what it termed its Second Consultative Conference at Kabwe, in Zambia. It was the largest internal meeting arranged by the organization for two decades. There were in attendance 250 delegates including some who represented those ANC units active inside South Africa. The largest proportion of delegates came from the Umkhonto training and holding camps in Angola and Tanzania. The ANC spreads its main administrative facilities across three African countries, it has representatives and offices in another twenty or so, and it has smaller groups of members scattered in several others. The organization of a delegate conference is for the ANC a major undertaking. It clearly marks an important stage in the history of the organization and the cause it represents.

Since the banning of the ANC in 1960 it has held only three major general meetings at which leaders and rank and file have discussed and reviewed policy. The other two were in Lobatsi in 1962, very shortly after the decision had been made to begin guerrilla operations, and in 1969, in Morogoro, after nearly a decade of political and military setbacks culminating in the abortive ZAPU/ANC military expeditions into what was then Southern Rhodesia and the resulting discontent in the military camps. The Morogoro conference, the first 'Consultative Conference' of 1969, occurred at a point of crisis in the ANC: its internal organization had been largely destroyed by police action, within South Africa there was little evidence of any popular susceptibility to revolt, and outside the country ANC cadres were reportedly demoralized by the experience and prospect of many years of apparently futile exile.

In contrast, the Kabwe conference marked the end of a decade of success for the ANC. Since the opening up of the former Portuguese territories, and the upsurge of internal political assertion in South Africa in 1976, the ANC had succeeded in once again establishing a formidable presence within the country. Urban guerrilla warfare taking the form partly of sabotage of government buildings and economic infrastructure, and partly attacks on state functionaries, had succeeded in re-establishing the ideological

Dr Lodge was brought up in Nigeria, Malaysia and the United Kingdom. Prior to becoming Senior Lecturer in the Dept of Politics in the University of the Witwatersrand, he was a Research Fellow in the University of York. This paper is based on a talk delivered to the Windhoek Branch of the SAIIA in July 1986.

ascendancy of the ANC in the eyes of the disaffected youthful casualties of a run-down industrial economy. From the late 1970s the ANC's legitimacy had been further enhanced by the growth of a legal black opposition, which in certain respects represented a revival of the popular mass movement which the ANC had led in the 1950s. Popular demonstrations, speeches and symbols at funerals, public opinion polls, international recognition — all were testimony to the ANC's political supremacy and its success in re-establishing itself at the centre of gravity in black politics.

Nevertheless, while the ANC may have succeeded in capturing the hearts and minds of a majority of at least the urban black population, its degree of internal organization lagged considerably behind the extent of its popular support. The Umkhonto campaign of 'Armed Propaganda' was carried out by, at most, a few hundred military activists who were, before 1984, mainly trained abroad. Military activity had *preceded* and *outpaced* political organization — reversing the sequence normal in many guerrilla campaigns conducted by liberation movements elsewhere. Certainly the men from Umkhonto had succeeded in capturing public imagination, but as the events of late 1984 were to demonstrate, the graduates of Angolan training courses were by no means to have a monopoly on insurrection. The Nkomati Accord earlier that year had tellingly demonstrated the vulnerability of a political and military movement which became too dependent on external lines of communication and logistical support. Yet clearly the post-1976 ANC Umkhonto campaign of 'Armed Propaganda' had accomplished one of its objectives; it had re-created the ANC's political following. Now the question was, what next?

The Kabwe conference was to provide some of the answers to this question. It also gave to us an opportunity for an assessment of the character of the ANC's organization and leadership. The ANC chose to make the proceedings at Kabwe the occasion for an unusual degree of publicity — and indeed since Kabwe the organization has become much more open and informative towards outsiders. The conference provides a good starting point for an understanding of the ANC's current development. In this paper I will describe the conference's main decisions and I will attempt to relate them to subsequent ANC activity during the last year.

It is possible to distinguish between three different sorts of decision at Kabwe: (a) military/strategic, (b) political, (c) administrative. I will discuss each in turn.

Concerning military matters two decisions stand out: the modification of the ANC's embargo on soft targets and the adoption of a policy of 'People's War'. First, soft targets. The first point to emphasize is that the ANC did not say after the conference that from then onwards its guerrillas would have a free rein to attack civilian targets. Some newspapers reported that a resolution authorizing Umkhonto to strike at soft targets was passed. This

may have been the case but in subsequent press conferences, both immediately after the conference and since then, Tambo and other ANC leaders or sources have been more ambiguous. A typical public formulation has been that in the in the escalation of the armed struggle planned by the ANC what constituted a hard or soft target would be a grey area. Tambo said he thought the distinction between hard and soft targets was being erased by the development of the conflict, but he also said that the conference did not use the words 'soft targets'. Most commentators have understood the general implication of the ANC's new posture on soft targets to imply that in future the ANC may not take such pains as in the past to avoid incidental civilian casualties. In some cases it would be difficult for the ANC to make hard and fast distinctions between military and non-military people — border farmers are called by the ANC "soldier farmers" because of their involvement in civil defence and a radio communications network linked to the SADF. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the possibility of a larger number of innocents dying as a result of Umkhonto attacks, attacks on civilians *per se* would not become a tactical or strategic objective. Tambo explicitly said at the beginning of this year that the ANC would not attack supermarkets; other ANC people have used the example of sports stadiums, schools, and cinemas.

It does seem likely that there was a debate about the extent of violence the ANC should employ. It is the case that people on the executive have differing feelings about this — though it would not appear to be an issue which provokes passionate arguments. I think it is very possible that the previous line of restraint was one which leadership was finding increasingly difficult to defend against rank and file pressure. Subsequent events seem to have confirmed this.

Of all the decisions made at Kabwe, the 'soft target' issue has received the most press attention. I think its significance has been overestimated or, rather, misunderstood. For it can be linked with the determination to broaden the struggle to embrace a much wider range of violent activity than the fairly specialized operations carried out by relatively highly trained Umkhonto we Sizwe cadres.

The second military decision was the one to intensify 'People's War'. The origins of this concept can be located in the discussion, earlier in the decade, in articles in *African Communist* and *Sechaba* on the question of 'arming the masses'. 'People's War' is in essence the expansion of the social base of guerrilla operations through the distribution of simple weaponry with brief instruction sessions on its use inside the Republic. 'People's War' involves bringing under Umkhonto leadership (and, to a limited extent, Umkhonto discipline) the autonomous youthful insurrectionary movement which developed through the street-fights between residents and police in the wake of the Vaal uprising. The immediate objective of 'People's War' is to build an

organized following in townships — to convert emotional sentiment favouring the ANC into disciplined support. The policy implies a switch in emphasis from spectacular 'high-tech' sophisticated operations directed at targets chosen for maximum propaganda impact to more numerous but smaller-scale attacks concentrated on government personnel or conservative politicians residing within the townships. 'People's War' is a military response to the political movement which began as a reaction to the 1983 black local government reforms and elections. The ANC did not instigate the movement to make the townships ungovernable, but the organization has responded swiftly and intelligently to the opportunities it created.

At Kabwe the strategic thinking seems to have been influenced simultaneously by feelings of euphoria and urgency. Widespread communal revolt, international anti-SA agitation, and the ANC's success in recovering from the effects of Nkomati had all stimulated perceptions of the government's vulnerability. Some ANC and SACP leaders began publicly referring to the possible parallel with Iran: a situation in which an apparently strong administration collapsed without being challenged militarily. In Iran, though, this happened in a virtual political vacuum, at least as far as organized politics was concerned. In South Africa, the possibility of a vulnerable administration intensified the need for a tighter degree of integration of the ANC's army with the manifestations of popular opposition, undertaken on local initiatives. 'People's War' was also motivated, possibly, by a more pessimistic consideration: the prospect of South Africa being increasingly able to isolate the ANC's external bureaucracy from its internal cadres and to interrupt the latter's supply lines through Nkomati-style diplomacy. 'People's War' would help to promote the internal self-sufficiency of the guerrillas. Many ANC speeches and statements since Kabwe have included exhortations to followers to steal weapons, or to improvise other ways of fighting or obstructing the workings of the political and economic system. There have even been appeals to black policemen and soldiers to turn their guns over to the forces of liberation. 'People's War', finally signals a final departure from the fairly orthodox conceptions of guerrilla insurgencies which used to influence ANC strategists.

Turning to political issues, the Kabwe conference did not witness any major innovations in ideology. The Freedom Charter was confirmed in its status as the ANC's essential programme. The working class was characterized in the statements produced after the meeting as the 'leading social element' in the struggle — an upgrading of its position as specified in earlier ANC documents — at Morogo the working class was called a 'distinct and reinforcing layer of our liberation'. The centrality now accorded to the working class is of course a reflection of the huge gains in labour organization made in the last decade, but there is not yet a firm unequivocal commitment to socialism. The role of the working class and class-based action is

understood to be of major significance in contributing to the ANC's eventual victory and the struggle towards it but, at least in formal terms, it does not define the essential purpose and nature of that struggle — not yet anyway.

It was also stressed at Kabwe that the ANC would not consider negotiating with the South African government, unless: (a) negotiations were limited to the technicalities of the transfer of administration from the minority government, and (b) negotiations took place in an open political climate with public assent. The leadership was concerned to dispel rumours that it had been engaged in secret contacts with the South African administration and to thwart the possibility of an externally imposed compromise settlement of the Lancaster House variety. At Kabwe, leadership seemed to leave itself with little room for manoeuvre and seizure of power remained the slogan of the day. This was a reflection of both the exuberance of the meeting itself and the context within which it was conducted, and possibly, the pressure emanating from rank and file delegates.

The final political decision which was made public was the opening of the National Executive Committee to non-African ANC members — bringing the ANC in line with non-racial organizations within South Africa. In fact, ANC constitutions had never explicitly barred non-African membership. Whites, Coloureds and Indians were admitted to the external organization in 1969. To bring them into the leadership echelon was not, apparently, an issue which stimulated much dissension. There are no indications that it is likely to do so in future. The non-racialism of the movement's leadership is a significant feature of the ANC; it represents more than just a formal acknowledgement of a principle. It provides substance to the ANC's claim to a white constituency.

Finally, the conference made various administrative decisions. All ANC members in future are supposed to undergo military training (not the case in the past). They will be subject to a new code of conduct. A grievance procedure was established. In future, no more than five years should elapse between elections and conferences. These moves may have reflected some rank and file tension. They are also probably intended to offset the effects of being a secret and hierarchical organization. These measures and the conference itself may help to revitalize internal vertical communications and strengthen whatever democratic structures exist within the ANC.

An enlarged National Executive (from twenty-two to thirty) was elected in a secret ballot from a list of forty candidates. Three of the old executive were either not re-elected or did not stand. The elections resulted in strengthening of numbers of younger men on the Executive. The proportion of identifiable Communist members on the Executive after the elections was roughly the same as before. Four groups are now represented in the ANC's new leadership:

1. Working class leaders from the 1940s and in one case the 1930s. These

people gained their initial experience in trade union activity, and include SACP members.

2. Populist nationalists from the 1950s period of mass mobilization.
3. 'First wave' Umkhonto we Sizwe veterans of the 1961–1965 campaign. These are younger men whose initial experience was in clandestine organization.
4. Exile diplomats and administrators in their forties and fifties, some with virtually no internal political experience.

Note the absence of the post-1976 generation only partially compensated for by the later reported co-option of Thomazile Botha. There has been considerable press speculation about left-right divisions on the Executive. I am not sure that these at present merit as much attention as they receive. Experience, friendship and familiarity serve to bridge or even blur ideological distinctions. The differences which do exist over an issue like the extent of violence that Umkhonto should deploy do not necessarily coincide with any left-right dichotomy. It is wrong to think of ANC as being beset by factional strife. There is ideological diversity, reflected for example over what the nationalization clause in the Freedom Charter implies or may imply in the future — but this does not seem to lead to important disagreements over currently relevant strategic or political matters.

What have been the effects of the resolutions adopted at Kabwe? Within South Africa the shifts in ANC policy have been most evident in the military sphere. First of all, there has been a very considerable increase in the number of violent actions attributable to the ANC. The scale and nature of the current Umkhonto offensive can be gauged from the table below:

Umkhonto we Sizwe activity, July 1985 to June 1986

	30 Jun 1985–31 Dec 1985	1 Jan 1986–30 Jun 1986
Guerrilla attacks on police or police facilities; police/Umkhonto clashes:	25	50
Attacks on SADF personnel or buildings:	6	0
Attacks on homeland politicians, community councillors and other individuals:	22	9
Landmine explosions:	6	11
Limpet mine attacks on economic infrastructure mainly Escom sub-stations:	9	26
Limpet mine attacks on railway facilities:	2	3
Limpet mine or bomb attacks in or outside hotels or restaurants during business hours:	0	4
Limpet mine or bomb attacks on commercial premises used by civilians, during business hours:	1	4
Gunfire attacks on commercial premises during business hours:	0	1
Grenade thrown in crowded central business districts:	1	0
Limpet mines in central business districts out of business hours: }	15	3
Limpet mines in or outside recreational facilities out of hours: }		2
Attacks on government or public buildings:	1*	0
Others/unspecified:	0	5
Total	88	118

* This compares with ten such attacks in the preceding six-month period.

In contrast to previous years individual attacks are, on the whole, less ambitious. A previously popular guerrilla target: government offices and buildings, has been scarcely affected by Umkhonto activity. On the other hand there is a much higher incidence than before of guerrilla attacks on policemen, or of fighting between guerrillas and police. Despite post-Kabwe exhortations to 'take the war into the white areas' the larger proportion of ANC violence has been located in townships. The most favoured weapons are the limpet mine and the hand-grenade, neither of these possessing complicated mechanisms requiring lengthy periods of training to use. This feature of the offensive together with its escalation (almost as many incidents this year up to June as in the whole of last year) is probably a symptom of the ANC's success in enlisting as its auxiliaries the self-constituted youthful township elements of the Comrades movement and the Amabutha in the Eastern Cape. Certainly the ANC is hardly short of manpower and moreover has been able to move large quantities (than in the past) of military equipment into the country to fuel its 'People's War'. One effect of the ANC's hardware now being in the hands of township-based groups previously outside the scope of the ANC's logistics, is the use of grenades against 'collaborator' politicians, people whom previously Umkhonto had refrained from attacking.

It is likely that a profuse growth of clandestine organization has accompanied the military offensive. The ANC speaks of the way it has been 'legalized' in the townships. The overt signals of such a process, the presence of ANC and SACP flags at funerals and similar shows of defiance, are, the South African Police believe, evidence of an organized ANC presence in many urban centres. Of course, the growth of violence has put a premium on political direction and while it is likely that since Kabwe considerable effort has been devoted to developing permanent underground structures, it is probable that these are still very embryonic. At Kabwe, the ANC's leaders conceded that their internal organization was rudimentary.

Clearly Umkhonto's effectiveness has reached a new peak; its attacks are more frequent and probably involve in total much larger numbers of people than ever before. It is a long way, though, from constituting an impressive military threat; in fact with 'People's War', operations have become simpler, and with certain exceptions less potentially disruptive of the untroubled operation of the main institutions of government and the economy. Umkhonto's record should also be measured against the achievements of the South African police and army. The police have unearthed four times as much weaponry as has been used by Umkhonto and those under its tutelage. Portions of the informer network still appear to be functioning despite the hostility directed against informers in the townships. Police are sometimes able to anticipate ANC attacks, as in Gugulethu, Cape Town, earlier this year. There is no evidence though, to suggest that the police have been able to

infiltrate ANC command structures despite the signs of these being situated to an increasing extent within South Africa's borders. The ANC tells journalists that it is currently dispatching back to South Africa about fifty trained men or women a month, and that moreover it is recruiting more people than it ever did during the 1976 Soweto pupil exodus. If these claims are true (I see no reason to disbelieve them), then the rising number of police-inflicted losses (fifty or so this year to date) would indicate that at best counter-insurgency is matching the pace of the guerrilla offensive rather than exceeding it. But the army and the police still have forces and resources which are being held back in reserve.

Possibly as a consequence of the popularization of guerrilla techniques, the insurgents have become less discriminating in their choice of objectives. Since Kabwe, ANC spokesmen to the press have been guarded about the content and implication of the Kabwe decision on 'soft targets'. There has been less caution, though, in the addresses on Radio Freedom in which some of the language used by ANC broadcasters can be interpreted as encouraging violence against both active supporters and more passive beneficiaries of white minority rule. Certainly the scope of targets seems to have broadened. In this context the introduction of landmines to the conflict is significant. The landmine is a weapon the effects of which are less easy to control or regulate than a timed explosive or a grenade thrown at a specific target. Many of the landmine casualties have been either farmworkers or other civilians in the countryside. The proliferation of rural landmine attacks does point to an important ANC success, for the organization appears to have transcended its historical — and until recently customary — urban constituency and to have begun a programme of rural recruitment. Whether or not farmers perform the military duties attributed to them by the ANC, it is conceivable that for many people in the countryside they may represent popular targets. Consider the situation in Sekhukuniland, an area where there have been reports which suggest that the ANC has been recruiting among farm workers and attempting to mobilize them against their employers. Not a very difficult thing to do, with average wage rates of R2 a day as well as high levels of rural unemployment providing plenty of reason for bitter disaffection.

In the cities, although ANC cadres for the most part have hesitated to respond to the radio injunctions to take the war into the white areas, there have been a few attacks of the sort from which until last year the ANC would have dissociated itself. In December 1985 there was the Amanzimtoti bomb blast and more recently, especially since the declaration of the Emergency, there have been a number of limpet mine attacks directed at civilians in central business districts in Johannesburg and Durban. In the case of the Amanzimtoti incident, Tambo apparently insisted that the attack was not a reflection of new ANC policy — but stopped short of uniquivocal condemnation. His reaction was complicated, and it illustrates rather well the

mixed emotions which the issue of violence arouses for even the gentler ANC leaders. He reportedly said that, if he had been approached by an ANC unit and asked whether they should go and plant a bomb at a supermarket, he would have said 'no'. But when their units were faced with what was happening all around them, he could understand that some of them could say that, even if they had to face being disciplined, they were going to do it. All this meant that they were beginning to move into stormy times in South Africa, which would involve everyone, because of the fundamental problem of the apartheid system. Tambo also referred to the alleged SADF incursion into Maseru, a few days before the Amanzimtoti incident, when nine people were killed, and to an earlier occasion in Mamelodi, when women had been marching and the security forces had opened fire, with people being killed. Why then, he argued, should he be cross-examined on Amanzimtoti, as if it were more important than the many other people, including children, being shot by police. According to him, no mention was being made of these 'massacres', and yet he had to face questions about whether the ANC was involved or not in the Amanzimtoti incident. He thought this was a mistaken approach.

The harsh fact is that, as Tambo himself pointed out later in the same conference, after Amanzimtoti there had been celebrations in South Africa among some black people. ANC leaders thus do not give the appearance of relishing the scope and effects of violence, but increasingly this is an issue over which they are inclined to take their cue from popular sentiment — to follow a mass line, as it were. Particularly if by not doing so they would call into question the loyalties of their supporters.

The final area I would like to touch on is the subject of negotiations. Though the issue appeared to be resolved at Kabwe and though I do not think the ANC is predisposed to consider negotiations without very substantial prior inducements and concessions by the other side, I do not think the issue is as simple as Kabwe appeared to make it. The Commonwealth initiative seemed to have caught the ANC off-guard; at least one ANC spokesman at its inception at Nassau last year referred to the possibility of a cease-fire. On this the Commonwealth, through the Frontline States is in a position to exert some leverage on the ANC. None of the Frontline States would welcome the economic implications of a protracted guerrilla insurgency in South Africa. At the moment I think it is most unlikely that the Government will create the climate in which the ANC could meet it across a negotiating table. It is the case, though, that the ANC's stand on preconditions for negotiations appeared to soften significantly during the final weeks of the Eminent Persons' Group mission. The logic, though, of the ANC's development since last year may be to have taken it further rather than nearer to the possibility of an externally-prompted negotiated resolution to the conflict. For the most important decisions at Kabwe seem to have been taken in

response to the development of popular opposition to apartheid. As I have said with reference to the specifics of violence, increasingly the ANC appears to be strategically guided by public opinion. It would need formidable organization and very great qualities of leadership to call the children's army off the streets. It would require even greater gifts to hold its allegiance during the complicated compromises and give and take of a negotiating process.

Just as with the Government, for the ANC the risks at present are too substantial to consider with equanimity the prospect of an early negotiated peace. It would have to be convinced that none of its recent gains could be placed in jeopardy and that it would be negotiating from a position of impregnable strength. But for all the growing effectiveness of the organization and the wider movement it heads, it still has a long way to go before it is perceived by the government as an inescapable and fundamental feature of South African political life.

Karl P. Magyar

Namibia's Development: A Third World Perspective

Viewing Namibia's development within the context of the Third World in general is a productive exercise as it places Namibia properly among a group of states which share similar characteristics and hence certain future problems can be anticipated. However, in some respects Namibia is not the typical colony as were so many of her continental predecessors. Namibia's colonial master for over six decades has been a contiguous African neighbour who extended a sophisticated economic and social infrastructure to the colony. There are elements of traditional colonial characteristics in Namibia but there are some profoundly unique qualities that require a new analytic and developmental approach.

Today's Third World comprised yesterday's colonial network. At the outset, it must be noted that it is misleading to talk of a homogeneous Third World. Indeed, it is often divided into four or more distinct worlds. Some of the major oil producers and exporters in the Middle East enjoy GNPs per capita which exceed those of Sweden or Switzerland. Another group of Third World countries is referred to as the 'Newly Industrialized Countries' — the NICs. These have managed to stimulate domestic industrialization to fill the gap in manufactures vacated by the members of the First World who have channelled their production into high-technology goods and services. Another substantial group of Third World countries shows signs of positive economic management — however modest — based usually on extractive industries or on a heavy reliance on externally-originated investments but their economic growth is impeded by high population growth rates and by the fragility of their economic systems which are vulnerable to external economic disruptions or to natural disasters.

Finally, there are the archetypal Third World countries often referred to as the 'basket cases'. These have given the Third World its popular reputation in that they demonstrate the usual mix of political instability, lack of resources, high population growth rates and economic mismanagement on a grand scale. And when one reviews Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda, Yemen, Mozambique, etc, it is disheartening to note that this latter

Professor Magyar is Associate Professor of Political Science and Philosophy at the University of Durban-Westville.

category, which is the least able to afford the luxurious extravaganza of war, exercises this expensive pastime as if it were its sole prerogative.

Data concerning such a collection of different states must be analysed carefully as they are characterized by great disparities individually. Roughly speaking, 75 per cent of the world's population lives in the Third World, which produces only 21 percent of the world's wealth.[1] And to emphasize the true Third World perspective, only five per cent of the world's wealth was produced in countries which comprise a group representing 47 per cent of the poorest people in the Third World.

Population rates in the Third World are rising while the economic performance of the bottom sector is declining, thereby widening the gap not only between the Third World and the industrial market countries, but also between the poorest and the richer sectors in the Third World itself. A World Bank study notes that although income per person grew at 1,7 per cent annually in India from 1955 to 1980, the corresponding figure in the US was two per cent. In meaningful terms, individual annual incomes in India rose from 170 to 260 dollars, while in the US they rose from 7030 to 11560 dollars. These data illustrate the care which must be taken when analysing aggregate performance statistics in the Third World. As the study observed, '. . . much of the world's output is produced and consumed by relatively few of its people.'[2]

We can add to this yet a further provision, as the World Bank does not examine internal income distribution: what little wealth is produced in the poorest sector of the Third World is produced and consumed by relatively few within these countries. We need to remember that aggregate national data does a greater disservice to the average members of the Third World than to the members of the industrialized countries, where a much greater proportion of the inhabitants share the incomes. Overall, the World Bank estimates that as of 1981, one-half of the world's population resides in low-income developing countries which the bank defines as those with a GNP per capita of less than 410 dollars (US). The average however was only 275 dollars.[3] During the 1970s their per capita real incomes declined by 0,3 per cent.[4]

When discussing the Third World, it is customary to focus attention on the generally dismal economic data and then to propose various economic solutions. Most of the literature in the field recognizes also the other side of the problem: the social and political aspects, which require attention as much as does the economic dimension. In fact, a UN study 'The future of the World Economy' released in 1976 was blunt when it stated:

> The principal limits to sustained economic growth and accelerated development are political, social and institutional in character rather than physical. No insurmountable physical barriers exist within the 20th century to the accelerated development of the developing regions.[5]

But again characteristically, it went on to address the development issues only in their economic perspectives.

The problems of economic and political development are two sides of the same coin but the Third World has suffered — greatly I believe — because international and individual bilateral efforts to alleviate poverty have avoided the political dimension of development.[6] The reasons are understandable as they derive from the established diplomatic practices of non-interference in the internal political affairs of states. Individual economists have recognized the futility of addressing the economic development problems as if they existed outside the active political system. Yet the entire field of economic development is inherently a political matter. At the centre of the process lies policy formulation and choices which determine in which direction scarce public funds will be utilized.

The UN, the World Bank, the European Community and many other development sources have occasionally sought to address the social dimension of development, especially in the field of education and health. But advice in economic planning has usually come only after certain economies have all but been destroyed and the IMF then steps in with very austere measures as a condition for further aid. Without going into additional data on the usual indices of mortality or literacy rates, or coups and revolutions, one indication of just how serious is the political problem of managing the Third World concerns military expenditures. As noted previously, it is paradoxical that it is the poorest who fight the major wars today — where in a previous age it was the wealthiest! Since 1945, there have been over 120 wars in the Third World in which 35 million have died. In only a twenty-year period the Third World share of military expenditures rose from 6 per cent to 25 per cent.[7] These data more than any other serve to illustrate that the poverty problems of the Third World should perhaps be first addressed in the political realm, and that the application of mere financial resolutions may not only be ineffective but may indeed prove to be counterproductive and at times may even exacerbate the fragile situation in the Third World.

Sensitivity to Third World concerns was first raised at the Bandung Conference in 1955, when only 29 Third World states met. However, they did lay the foundations for their subsequent cohesion, which presently represents a force of some 120 members. By 1964, the original 'Group of 77' was formed, reflecting rapid decolonialization and the emergence of a new group of actors on the international stage, historically occupied by first the 'Eurocentric' powers of the Concert of Europe system; then the conveners of the 1884 Berlin Conference, subsequently the League of Nations signatories. Finally, the centre-stage had been dominated by the two major antagonists of the Cold War system, neatly dividing the world between them, until the Third World asserted its preference for non-alignment.

Prospects for the Third World were promising at the time of independence but the rapid deterioration in outlook suggested that neither politicians nor academic analysts had done a good job in anticipating the structure of these new countries. Economists sought answers to the unexpected problems first in 'single instrument' explanations. According to S.F. Coetzee, early attempts to stimulate economic growth concerned rather simple solutions such as *capital accumulation, import substitution, export promotion, dualism, etc.*[8] It was recognized that these new entities lacked 'something' — but inevitably it was either material foundations such as minerals, productive lands or harbours, or start-up capital for investment in infrastructure. This approach was followed by explanations which sought to universalize for all historical societies. Most notably, W.W. Rostow presented his famous 'stages of economic growth' theory.

What came to be known as the first two 'development decades' of the 1960s and 1970s stressed the need to integrate the Third World economies rapidly into the world market network — meaning the system dominated by the major industrial powers. With these ties, government-led, export-orientated programmes, industrialization, trade, aid and private investments were to provide the key to development. All of these were the usual economic solutions but applied through new techniques. There was little success as these fragile governments had incorrect priorities — agriculture was neglected, prestige projects were undertaken, financial aid was misused and governments were too unstable. The NICs managed to acquire diverse aid and trade concession advantages, but they had no positive impact on the least developed states.[9]

Political analysts reassessed the social dimension of these new entities and began to theorize about the process whereby traditional societies moved to the transitional stage in their attempts to modernize. René Dumont was an early critic of development theory. Writing with Marie-France Mottin, he commented that Africa would not develop by reliance on the external world. Africa must develop by itself with its own internal resources. In line with many other economists, he considered that the terms of trade equation has always favoured the external suppliers. These same writers also observe that Africans have a special problem, in that they accept a Western cultural model, one rejected by the Chinese and by the Islamic states. While this is an interesting observation, I doubt its essential validity. Both China (PRC) and the Islamic nations trace their cultural histories as literate and settled peoples for thousands of years, during which period they were the dominant regional if not 'world' powers — all attributes which Africans, as historical societies, lacked.[10]

Modernization and development, it was realized, were innately tied to cultural transformation. Donald G. Baker sought to understand the role of human motivation in the development process. He noted that development

can be seen at three levels: structurally (differentiation in institutional roles), as a process (capacity to adapt), and normative-based (fulfilment of goals and values).[11] Similarly, Henry Bienen observed that many African leaders have identified political development with modernization while including an ethnic component in their formulations.[12] And Monte Palmer writes that '... it is virtually impossible for a state to progress economically without making corresponding and often radical changes in its political and social systems'.[13] According to Palmer, the acceptance of traditional modes of production in the Third World is accompanied by the absence of such virtues (prized in industrial soieities) as innovation, achievement motivation, or entrepreneurial risk-taking.

Another study addressed an old academic debate within the African context: the role of ideology and the evidence of economic performance, that is — does it really matter which ideology one accepts as a guide to development? Crawford Young examines the extant systems labelled 'Afro-Marxist', 'Populist Socialist', and 'African Capitalist'. Not surprisingly, the results are very tenuous due to the transitory nature of so many African regimes. Kenya and the Ivory Coast did demonstrate some good growth tendencies as capitalists but so did Tanzania as socialist and Benin as marxist. But overall, Young concludes, 'My reading of the evidence does not lead to a single, unambiguous conclusion.'[14] This is partially echoed by Edgar Pisani, who referred to the simplistic classical free-enterprise solutions to the dilemma of the poorest members of the Third World: 'To expect their salvation as a result of the benevolent working of market mechanisms or commercial activity is to be utopian or fraudulent.'[15] In essence, it may be asked: how may we expect the Third World to adopt capitalism — when they have no capital with which to start? And how can they succeed with socialism when there is nothing to socialize except poverty? As Karl-Heinz Bechtold observes: 'there is no such thing as a general theory of regional economic development theory'.[16]

While it should be clear that there is no universal panacea for these development problems, Michael P. Todaro elicits six common characteristics of developing nations:[17]
1. Low levels of technology;
2. Low levels of productivity;
3. High rates of population growth;
4. High rates of unemployment and underemployment;
5. Dependence on agricultural production and primary product exports;
6. Dominance, dependence and vulnerability in international relations.

Africa, of course, features very prominently in any discussion of the Third World. The World Bank issued a study devoted to Africa in which it was noted that[18]

- African countries are often too small and underpopulated with 24 countries having less than 5 million inhabitants;
- Between 1960 and 1979, per capita income grew by less than one per cent, with 15 countries experiencing a negative per capita growth rate;
- Only Nigeria in Black Africa had a GNP greater than that of Hong Kong;
- Only 20 per cent of the people are urbanized and only 10 per cent are in the wage sector of employment;
- Africans' life expectancy is the lowest in the world;
- Food production per capita has shown a decline from the 1960s to the 1970s.

Of the world's 31 least developed countries, two-thirds are in Africa. Up to 30 per cent of the total African population of the continent is considered to be starving. Such data—and stories of political ineptitude and mismanagement—are now 'old hat' to the jaded student of African affairs reports.

In the case of South Africa—and Namibia—there exists a generally inappropriate sense of accomplishment, as the overall economic data appear to indicate that South Africa's blacks have escaped the continent's abysmal economic problems. Yet the existing dual economy has reproduced to a remarkable degree the usual pattern to be found in the Third World. A. Thomashausen notes that in the First World, 28 per cent of the population produces 79 per cent of the world product, while in South Africa, non-blacks comprise 27 per cent of the population, producing 74 per cent of the GNP.[19] Precise data for Namibia are not available but it would be surprising if they differed significantly.

The foregoing data and the accompanying brief analysis should serve to demonstrate convincingly the classic dual nature of the South African and Namibian economies, which combine a substantial modern sector for one segment of society in parallel with a very low level of economic achievement characterizing the underdeveloped mass of inhabitants who still live, in cultural terms, by more traditional values. The bulk of theorizing about developing traditional societies has not really addressed itself to the unique problems of South Africa and Namibia where the dualism is, or has been until recently, expressed primarily along racial lines. Dualism in Nigeria, by contrast, concerns the emergence of an indigenous 'new class' that is not determined by race.

Namibia's traditional sector represents about 80 per cent of society and is the source of agitation for change, inspired by the continent-wide independence movements which have already attained liberation on the one hand and the troublesome, even though anticipated, rising expectations of Third World peoples on the other hand. There are many myths attached to

this historically over-romanticized independence process as well as many disappointments, as has been related elsewhere in this paper. One dares suggest, notwithstanding, that in the case of Namibia, should majority rule and independence be attained peacefully and in co-operation with South Africa as the region's economic superpower, the future need not be as bleak as that faced by so many others on this continent.

Like South Africa, Namibia has a minority of ethnically delineated members of the First World, with the majority of the population still living in the Third World — but both occupy the same national space. The disparities between these two worlds is evident in all social, political and economic dimensions. The classic tenets of political development in the pursuit of a nationally integrated society have barely been started. Two broad racial groups have assimilated only partially but inevitably in the economic realm, as both have recognized the need for each other. Beyond this limited mutual interest, exercised mostly by day, no community of outlook has emerged in the sense of shared expectations, mutual defence against external threats and a division of supreme power and authority to allocate advantage more equitably throughout the realm. Modern political institutions have not been created to match the required extension of differentiated political structures and the rational division of labour and rewards, which allow the individual to assess and to develop his own position within the whole.[20] Modernization was slowed down once the socio-political aspirations of the ruling elite had been attained and the further expansion of which would have fragmented the effective core-authority of the state. Nor has legitimacy been attained beyond its coercive dimension: the moral foundation has yet to be established.[21]

In short, Namibia has developed in many respects like a typical colony but it differs in that the transition from colonial to self-rule is faced with the retention of an indigenously-developed racially-delineated élite in alliance with the colonial power — which has not demonstrated its enthusiastic intention to establish an integrated modern state in all of its prevailing contemporary African manifestations. The transitional process in the case of Namibia is twofold: not only is it the last major independence movement which will put a period to a volatile era of colonialism, but it is at the same time a struggle for re-ordering the modus operandi of the internal power structure.

Ideally, these two problems should be solved in sequence. South Africa could yield its hold over Namibia within the context of UN Resolution 435 or perhaps by its own unilateral declaration, reflecting its assessment of the changing circumstances since 1978. A government of national reconciliation would then proceed to re-establish and re-orientate the economy in line with its internal developmental needs. Only after a few years of such administrative control should elections be held to determine which team of leaders are to preside over the subsequent political direction of the country.

The point under this ideal scenario would be to allow the public to evaluate the actual performance in the field of the chief contestants and in turn, to encourage the competitors to address the needs and aspirations of the national constituency. This would also encourage a synthesis of political and cultural identity essential for national reconciliation.

The present arrangement, although fraught with much uncertainty, may go some way towards realizing this ideal situation but it is difficult to conceive of popular legitimacy being bestowed upon this effort in the absence of SWAPO's participation. In a sense, the present MPC government is working under a very great handicap: it must accomplish within the next year or so what SWAPO, should it attain power in the near future, would have ten to fifteen years to achieve—judging by the tolerance shown for so many other African governments on this continent before the first major governmental upheaval.

Traditional theorizing about political development in the Third World usually starts from a position of attained independence. Again, this is not the case in Namibia, where serious efforts are under way to develop legitimate political institutions before formal independence is achieved. In view of the numerous participating and competing interests involved in Namibia's independence which include internal and external factions (themselves not necessarily cohesive); the differing perceptions of members of the Contact Group; Angola, Cuba and Unita; neighbouring states; and of course South Africa, it is scarcely conceivable that the next twelve months will see a consensus on the legitimacy of governmental institutions. Namibia's ultimate political future could take generations to determine.

In this regard, the attempt to devise at this stage a constitution whether in violation of UN Resolution 435 or not, should be re-examined. Certainly the perspective of the MPC government needs to be recorded to serve as a broad statement of its negotiating position in any further discussions in the future. But this could perhaps be better expressed in the form of a 'Basic Law' — analogous to West Germany's 'constitution' which awaits national reconciliation of all Germans before a final constitution is negotiated among all its members. The initiative would demonstrate to the world that the work of the MPC government is merely preparatory to a future 'all parties' conference, at which point SWAPO's requirements would also be examined and negotiated in arriving at the final constitution. This should also serve to demonstrate that the MPC government is open to compromise and would allow it eventually to contest elections on a record of administrative accomplishments.

Should SWAPO continually reject such negotiations and the implied challenge to participate in national reconciliation, it would demonstrate that its guise as a liberation movement in pursuit of independence is subordinate to the pursuit of its own dogmatic ideological values and structures which it

(SWAPO) would not have permitted the national constituency to have evaluated before its attainment of power. In short, SWAPO could win initial elections based on its established leadership of the independence movement, but the appeal of its ensuing ideological package would not have been tested. Hence the suggestion of negotiating only 'Basic Law" at this stage. The pursuit of an administrative government of national reconciliation during which period national economic reconstruction would be the predominant concern, followed then by the convening of a broad-based constitutional council which would determine a final constitution — after which elections would be held.

Namibia's right to independence is not contested, only its timing and conditions. So much does the solution to this problem depend on numerous powerful external influences that this important political act of will could hardly be accomplished by the actions of Namibians alone. Yet while the political dimension is being debated, the economy is in dire need of attention. It is not only quite evident that the economy has been suffering because of political uncertainty, but it can also be argued that existing internal resources should be utilized more appropriately and that the present Transitional Government should assert its authority over economic planning and development. The government must be capable of issuing guidelines for economic planning purposes, of introducing institutional reorganization should this be necessary, and initiating development projects to reflect its own perception of national requirements.

At the present time, what little economic development is taking place reflects antiquated priorities and is managed by a bureaucracy which has evidently suffered from too many governmental changes over the past decade. The locus of planning authority remains nebulous, and under the circumstances the private sector has remained confused and consequently reluctant to expand, diversify, develop new markets, and to invest. Also significant is what I believe to be the most destructive element and perhaps SWAPO's greatest problem: white skills and capital fleeing Namibia. These will not return soon. Economic planning is an inherently political process and hence it cannot succeed solely by bureaucratic initiative. The financial bias in economic development is towards economic growth in terms of output, but proper economic development concerns 'output and changes in the technical and institutional arrangements by which it is produced and distributed', in the words of Kindleberger and Herrick.[22] Financial development calls for the investment of scarce funds into projects which will reap a financial return, but economic development inevitably pursues political returns.

The task of the Transitional Government is to take charge of economic development as soon as possible and quickly to introduce its own perspective. Here, the lessons suggested in my introductory comments become evident. Namibia experiences the problems pointed out by Robert

Taylor when he noted that Third World countries suffer from only a partial commitment by the developed world or the colonial power to help in national development; that resources are not invested properly; low food production prevails; rural areas are depopulating; uneven development creates new élites and class tensions; and import bills — especially in energy resources — are too high to be sustained by exports.[23] Todaro's comments need to be recalled when he characterized Third World economies as those with low levels of technology, low productivity, high population growth rates, high unemployment, dependence on agricultural and on primary production, and vulnerability to external control. This is an apt description of Namibia today.

Namibia's economy is very narrow-based. As Professor W. Thomas observed: 'In 1980 about 80 per cent of Namibia's mining output, 45 per cent of its GDP, 75 per cent of its export value, and approximately 50 per cent of government revenue, came from only two mining companies.'[24] Such realities alone should exercise a sobering influence on SWAPO's economic thinking and planning for reorganization. Given the harsh terrain, the narrow economic base, the volatile international market, the reliance on economic ties with South Africa, the lack of industrialization, the depressed subsistence sector and the small population base, a concerted effort to contrast economic planning under the MPC and under SWAPO will no doubt reveal only very few areas of serious disagreement if the welfare of all of Namibia's people is to be respected. In its fight for independence, SWAPO has addressed its energies to the past, yet the pressing problems concern the present and the future.

The MPC government would be advised to undertake the rapid establishment of a 'mini-economic plan' to address the pressing developmental issues of the day — while awaiting the emergence of the lengthier and more elaborate comprehensive development strategy. This more comprehensive document, which was initiated long before the advent of the MPC government to power, should, like the final constitution, await realistically the eventual prospects for negotiations with all parties to be involved in Namibia's future.

With an estimated 75 000 unemployed and another 40 000 underemployed, and 25 per cent of the white population having emigrated, and with nearly 80 000 refugees outside Namibia, the major economic development effort will have to be directed at manpower development.[24] Agricultural modernization usually releases far more people from the land. In Africa, nothing urbanizes like the attainment of independence. With the mining sector's expansion prospects being determined primarily by external factors, and with industrialization supplying only 5 to 6 per cent of the GNP, there should be little doubt that the secondary sector has been neglected. Independence will mean an end to government subsidies from South Africa

but that country will continue to exercise vast influence over the economy of Namibia. This suggests that realism will reveal little effective difference in the economic planning of SWAPO or the MPC, hence the developmental process ought to get started as soon as possible. Should economic reconstruction begin under the MPC government, the private sector would have this one last opportunity to demonstrate its ability to survive under future governments, who will have to rely on this sector to expand the commercial infrastructure and to supply the bulk of the jobs. Only then can social services be expanded without otherwise spreading government revenues too thin.

Namibia's economy can be expanded but this will not be accomplished under conditions of political uncertainty, and it is this which lies largely in the hands of South Africa. Where the present impasse reflects South Africa's own political interest, the economy suffers and this in turn only diminishes the prospect that the MPC government will attain the measure of success required to bargain with SWAPO from a position of strength. In this sense the MPC government is caught in a paradoxical situation of not having sufficient control over the management of its own affairs to ensure its own success. The development of the economy, which I believe is the best avenue towards political legitimacy, is hindered by the lack of political certainty. This problem can be overcome, but it will require a quick and thorough re-examination of South Africa's intentions with regard to Namibia.

Notes

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22. See Kindleberger and Herrick, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
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24. 'The Economy in Transition to Independence' in Robert I. Rotberg, *Namibia: Political and Economic Prospects*, Cape Town: David Philip, 1983. p. 64.
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Terrel D. Hale

The Cartesian Model and dependency in Mitterrand's African policy: the case of Senegal

This paper seeks to extend the scope of dependency theories by considering the part played by the French Cartesian legacy both in inspiring and legitimating French colonial and post-colonial practices. Even the Mitterrand government, despite its ideological commitment to the cause of decolonization, continues many of its predecessors' practices under the influence of the French Cartesian heritage. A case perhaps of *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose?*

Senegal's relationship with France from the very beginning was marked by dependency. Economic, political and cultural life in Senegal revolved around the metropole[1] — the highly centralized administrative and political institutions of France, located in Paris, dominated the Senegalese periphery. But Senegal's dependency was not merely economic or political. French policies towards Senegal primarily aimed at intellectual and cultural goals[2] and were in some cases economic and political liabilities to the metropole. In this respect, the Senegalese case did not correspond to traditional theories of dependency which stress the overall importance of economic interests. Furthermore, the nature of this dependency does not appear to have significantly altered, although the political orientation of the French government has changed greatly since the colonization of Senegal. The character and development of this phenomenon, along with its implications for current French policy, will be considered here in light of the French worldview, with particular reference to the Cartesian ideal.

Historical Background

By the end of the 17th century, France had begun to extend her authority to West Africa and laid the foundations for what later became a great Franco-

Mr Hale is Secretary for the Africa Collection of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, California.

African empire. Bourbon France attempted to create a highly centralized form of government, both within France and in the French overseas dependencies. Dependency therefore became as much a reality for the Africans living in Senegal as it was for the French of Dijon and Bordeaux. Colonial subject and French citizen alike were brought together into a unified whole.[3] The desire for the logical ordering of things into a systematic whole was the same, in the French mind, not only for France but for her responsibilities around the globe. Whether in Africa, Indochina, Oceania (the Pacific) or the Caribbean, policy was standarized.[4]

Senegal, however, enjoyed very early certain political rights and freedoms that other African colonies never experienced until after their independence. Senegal became the centre of administration for French West Africa, and from this, Senegal very quickly perceived the rudiments of French administration and knew from first-hand experience how the French valued centralization, order and universal wholeness.[5] Senegal's early participation in the French political process also enabled the Senegalese to acquire knowledge of Western parliamentary principles and practices which enabled Senegal to function politically without many of the scars that came to disfigure so many other newly emerging African nations.

By the Fifties and Sixties of the present century, Senegal had greatly advanced in terms of political awareness. It was during this time that De Gaulle looked upon Senegal and the other French-speaking African territories as his 'children'.[6] It never occured to De Gaulle or his policymakers that Senegal would ever want to become politically independent. For the Senegalese élite, cultural equality was much more important and more talked about than any movement to separate politically from France.

Continued Dependency

After a series of complex political maneouvres, Senegal finally acquired independence from Franc in 1960. But the Senegalese thereafter learned that even political independence did not guarantee freedom from French influence.[7] Without qualified Senegalese to work in administrative and managerial positions, Frenchmen were employed, and French ideas continued to inspire the largely French-run Senegalese government and industries. France went on to provide very significant subsidies for Senegal's ground nut crop, and French continued to be the language of instruction in Senegal's schools. The French government still gave large amounts of money for aid and development projects, and the University of Dakar remained staffed mostly with French nationals. Degrees and programmes of study continued to emulate their French equivalents.

Even under the socialist administration of Mitterrand, certain patterns of dependency for Senegal stayed the same. Subsidies in terms of aid and educational programmes continued. Mitterrand's previous Foreign

Minister, Claude Cheysson, like his predecessors, was quick to point out the educational benefits for Senegal in keeping the traditional standards of French education. Traditional insistence on French cultural superiority never really changed with Mitterrand. Attempts to change the language of instruction from French into a native tongue met with failure, because of the inability of Africans to converse in their native dialects with other ethnic groups. French was the language that brought unity and cohesion not only for Senegal itself, but also served as a means of communication with other Francophone African nations. Although a majority of the Senegalese speak Wolof and write in French, the influence of French on Senegalese communication, especially in literature within and without Senegal, is significant.

Economic dependence upon the metropole has not changed any more than the influence of the French culture and language. Senegal continues to receive aid and subsidies, even though Senegal has developed other trading partners besides France. The introduction of other donor countries has not affected the trading relationship between France and Senegal to any significant degree, because other countries in the European Economic Community see France as the only benefactor, and are reluctant to give substantial amounts of money to Senegal.[8]

Each of the characteristics of centralization, order and universal wholeness which make up the Cartesian ideal can still be found to some extent in the policies towards Senegal coming out of the Elysée Palace, despite their socialistic bent and their political and economic liability for France. Here appears the continuity that is unique for France. No other former colonial power maintained their policy with such devotion and in such a unified way.[9] Considering the size of the French colonial empire, this is a considerable achievement. Few colonial powers have gone to the length France did in pursuing policies that would ensure clear and direct lines of power and communication. And few of the colonial powers ever attempted to proselytise their culture with the vigour which the French have shown even under a socialist government.[10]

The Cartesian Legacy

There are many ways of explaining French policy in Senegal. Political theorists have stressed economic and political factors. Equally noteworthy, however, is the French philosophical inheritance, based on a Cartesian world view that has profoundly influenced the French rulers' thought for centuries.[11]

Scholars have long associated Cartesianism with French policy in Africa.[12] Sheldon Gellar, a noted writer on African and particularly Senegalese affairs, has characterized Cartesianism as a uniform system based on a clear-cut set of rules which are universally applied.[13]

The philosophy of Cartesianism's namesake, René Descartes, is described in *The Cambridge Modern History* as:

> the most original and the most productive of all intellectual systems that existed on the Continent in the period of the Thirty Years' War. Its essential characteristics were its conception of reason, which it regarded as the common centre of knowledge, life, science, morality, and religion. It signified the re-establishment of order and reason in the intellects and in the souls of men.[14]

Descartes' philosophy permeated many aspects of French life until the American Revolution, when France had already established settlements in St Louis on the Mississippi and Gorée in Senegal. Although Isaac Newton's ideas of the physical world eventually gained precedence in science, Cartesian philosophy left a definite mark upon France, where 'the love of clearness and of the logical connection of ideas is a part of the national temperament'.[15]

In Descartes' metaphysics, God, as the creator of man, was the centre of study. God was perceived as maintaining a created order, where reason is continuously illustrated, throughout the universe. That God did this was a principle of reason. There could be no order if there were no God. Interwoven in the very idea of order is reason, which for Descartes is an absolute state in the realm of God, just like order.

Even those phenomena that existed outside the realm of reason were marshalled into some kind of order. They formed in some manner a whole in which reason was incorporated. Therefore, any collection of things which really existed was ordered in a definite unity. This stress on order and of the necessity for ordered things was not unique in Descartes' philosophy; it was something that previous philosophies had sought for. However, Descartes came to exemplify such an approach to the French and to others.

Universal application of order was essential in Descartes' treatment both of physics and of metaphysics. Concerning motion in Nature, for example, he believed that it operated in conformity with fixed laws which were themselves universal. These laws were the creation of God who introduced them in Nature, to be applied throughout the creation. Metaphysics, like motion, was treated by him as applying certain rules to the discovery and understanding of the nature of God and his workings within His creation, in a universal and comprehensive way. Regarding Nature, Descartes believed that it was not only diversified but that its wealth was beyond detailed assessment. Because of this, 'the human accountant must despair of reckoning with Nature's riches unless some relatively simple and universal principles of accountancy can be disclosed'.[16]

Descartes' preoccupation with clarity of thought strengthened his desire for a complete articulation of knowledge in one system. This necessitated perceiving some things as being separate at first. After seeing things apart, it

was paramount that the same things be seen together in a unified systematic whole. This attitude, however, did not remove the distinctions. The soul and body, for instance, remained distinct despite their union. God's intervention with man, like his welding together of the soul with the body, was seen by Descartes as a welding of a number of disconnected fragments into a meaningful whole.

Descartes' ideas on the relation between body and soul illustrate a view of unity as such which has obvious application to the French view of the relation between colony and metropole—unified yet distinct. More significant, however, to the question of dependency theory is the Cartesian vision of a central, unifying, ordering and necessary God, the same position held traditionally by Paris in relation to its empire. This view of the world makes intelligible those aspects of French policy in Africa — especially in Senegal — which otherwise would remain inexplicable.

Traditional theories of dependency have usually centred on its economic aspects.[17] Although this was and is a reality for Senegal, it does not fully explain Senegal's dependence on France. To understand this dependent relationship between Senegal and her former colonial master, other aspects need to be considered because of the nature of French policy as it was practised in Senegal. The fact that Senegal was integrated into a French systematic whole certainly included not only economic realities, but also political and cultural ones. In the formation of attitudes, the economic aspects proved but part of a broader concept in the French world view. This generally meant cultural and intellectual superiority for the French and implied the inferiority of the African.[18] It created situations in which Senegal came to think she needed French enterprise for her survival[19] and it was precisely this attitude that in other territories made them an economic liability for the metropole.

To understand the way the French made sense out of their relationship with their former colonies, one must understand their world view. By gaining access to it, seeing the political horizons as they did, it may be possible to give a more coherent account of French foreign policy than has yet been given, especially with regard to Mitterrand's socialism. The Cartesian model — the point bears repeating — rests on the rules of order that have universal application and exhibit systematic wholeness.[20]

This is not to suggest that every aspect of Cartesianism can be traced back to the thinking of Descartes. In fact, Descartes' thought may well have been an embodiment of a way of thinking already extant in 16th century France.[21] Whatever the case, Descartes provides a complete synthesis of this way of constituting the world.

Descartes and Mitterrand

Mitterrand's election in May 1981 was viewed as the beginning of a change bound to alter the traditional attitudes and institutions that France had

encouraged in Senegal. Because of the French Socialist Party's affirmation of ending French neo-colonialism there, it was presumed that change would come. But despite his tenure in office, the same parts of Africa continued to revolve around a twentieth-century metropole. There was continued dependency through aid packages, subsidies, technological assistance and, of course, the continued emphasis on the *mission civilisatrice*.

Mitterrand has attempted to change traditional patterns of African (including Senegalese) dependency, but is not likely to succeed in his endeavour. There are too many historical obstacles to be overcome. For instance, the removal of French troops and the encouragement to remove other foreign troops has not stopped French military intervention, particularly in Chad. Even the expressed desire of Mitterrand's party to have decisions concerning Africa made in Africa itself has remained ephemeral at best, in light of the recent Franco-African summit in Paris.

The traditional dependence of Senegal and other African French-speaking states continues, and cannot be changed so rapidly, even after Mitterrand's seven years in office. His government now looks at the same parts of Africa, including Senegal, as 'responsibilities' needing French management.

The cultural influence still radiates from the centre. Economic dependence is still encouraged by the world market economy and their trade relations with France. Military involvement has been another political liability as well as the promises to Senegal and Africa under Giscard d'Estaing's government which Mitterrand's socialists were obliged to carry out.

In an interview with a French journalist, Mitterrand's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Claude Cheysson, was asked whether the government would continue to protect the order that France has established in Africa even though the Socialist Party has criticized the intervention of France on that continent. In response, Mr Cheysson said:

> France has responsibilities particularly in Africa, this is evident. These responsibilities are more structured, more marked in francophone Africa than in anglophone Africa . . . It's necessary that we play our role there as we may be required to do regardless of risk, including political risk. Where there exists a juridical commitment, we will be satisfied with it, even if it is a commitment that we have not taken as a socialist government. As for the new commitments, they can be of any nature: political, economic or military. There will be in the future some principles that we will respect in all cases. For the moment, we don't consider the decisions concerning African countries . . . as having necessarily to be made in Paris. They must be made domestically and with the neighboring countries concerned. We will never take a position on an African problem without having previously consulted the country in question and all other countries concerned in the region.[22]

The ideals of Mitterrand's government were opposed to the continuation of the colonial ethic. But Mr Mitterrand himself has continued the role France has traditionally played in Africa with very few changes to the Cartesian Model and the historic French world view. Mitterrand, despite his socialist

convictions, could not bring himself to do this and rid his policy of neo-colonialism.

More than 860 million dollars has been given to Africa in terms of both gifts and loans. Mitterrand's government must have now realized the continued heavy reliance upon France for skilled labour and expertise. France still sends a large number of cadres to many African nations, including Senegal. The election of a socialist did not change the fact that eighty per cent of the jobs requiring a college education are still filled by Frenchmen. In Gabon, for example, the *cooperants*, (Frenchmen sent to help run African governments) feel that Gabon would not be able to run without them.

According to the French Cartesian world view, Paris stood to the colonies as a surrogate God; the colonies appeared as a French creation. It was the God-given order of things for these spokes of a wheel, so to speak, both colonies and provinces, to depend upon the metropole for their very existence. It was this manner of looking at the world that underlined supposed superiority of French culture and facilitated the exploitation of Senegal by France. The Cartesian Model can help make clear the nature of Senegal's current relationship with France in economic, political and cultural terms. Traditional dependency theories have rightly considered the importance of economic factors in the political rule and also exploitation by one country of another. French governance in Senegal, however, requires a broader interpretation, one linked to the way in which Frenchmen have come to look at the world since the 16th century.

Footnotes

1. See William B. Cohen. *The French Encounter with Africans — White Response to Blacks, 1530–1880*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980.
2. See Raymond Betts. *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890–1914*. New York: Columbia University Press. ('mission civilisatrice')
3. See William B. Cohen. *Rulers of Empire: The French Colonial Service in Africa*. Stanford University Press, 1974.
4. See Raymond Betts. *Tricouleur. The French Overseas Empire*. New York and London: Gordon & Cremonsel, 1978.
5. See Michael Davis. *European-African Interaction in the Precolonial Period. Saint-Louis: Senegal, 1758–1854*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms Int., 1979.
6. See Wladyslaw W. Kulski. *De Gaulle and the World, The Foreign Policy of the Fifth Republic*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1960.
7. See Ladipo Adamolekun, 'The French Tradition of Administrative Training in Africa: The Senegalese Experience.' *Administration* (January 1969): 93–102, and Rita Cruise O'Brien, 'Some Problems in the Consolidation of National Independence in Africa, the Case of the French Expatriates in Senegal', *African Affairs* 73 (January 1974): 85–89.
8. See, for instance, Amin Semir, *New Colonialism in West Africa*. Penguin African Library.
9. See James Berlin Webster, and A.A. Bohanen, *History of West Africa* (New York: Prager, 1970).
10. See Raymond Betts, *Assimiliation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890–1945* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1976).

11. See Sheldon Gellar, *Structural Change and Colonial Dependency: Senegal 1885–1945* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1976).

12. See, for instance, Thomas Hodgkins, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (New York University Press, 1957), pp. 33–40.

13. Sheldon Gellar, 'The Colonial Era', in *Africa*, ed. by Phyllis M. Martin and Patrick O'Meara (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 140.

14. *The Cambridge Modern History*, ed. Sir A.W. Ward, Sir G.W. Prothero and Sir Stanley Leathes, volume IV, The Thirty Years' War (New York: The Macmillan Company/Cambridge: University Press, 1934), p. 792.

15. *Ibid.* p. 790.

16. Albert G.A. Balz, *Descartes and the Modern Mind* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 242.

17. See Ronald H. Chilcote, 'Dependency: A Critical Synthesis of the Literature', *Latin American Perspectives* 1, 1(1974): 4–27; Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics, The Search for a Paradigm* (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1981); Gary A. Gereffi, *The Pharmaceutical Industry and Dependencies in the Third World* (see introduction) (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983); Vincent A. Mahler, *Dependency Approaches to International Political Economy. A Cross-National Study* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); and Dudley Seers, ed., 'Dependency and Development: A Critical Overview', *Dependency Theory, A Critical Reassessment* (Frances Pinter, Ltd., 1981).

18. See William B. Cohen. *The French Encounter with Africans — White Response to Blacks, 1530–1880* (see 'mission civilisatrice') (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1980).

19. See 'Economic achievements of the colonizer: an assessment' by Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann in *Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960*, volume 4, The Economics of Colonialism, ed. Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 673–696.

20. See *The Cambridge Modern History*, ed. Sir A.W. Ward, Sir G.W. Prothero and Sir Stanley Leathes, vol. 4, The Thirty Years' War (New York: The Macmillan Company/Cambridge University Press, 1934).

21. 'Supposedly, it was . . . (the) Latin-Christian tradition which originally gave France her universal outlook and her emphasis on equality. Certain elements of Stoic philosophy incorporated into Roman thought and Roman law provided the basis for universal law while the Christian emphasis on the equality of man before God provided the basis for secular equality. Here are found the root of the French love of order, the desire to codify all laws natural and human in a logical fashion, and the tendency to express everything in universal terms.' See Raymond Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory*, pp. 26–27.

22. Ministère des Relations Extérieures, *La Politique Étrangère de la France, Textes et Documents* (La Documentation Française, juillet-août, 1981), pp. 13–14.

Stuart McMillan
ANZUS in the Defence Balance

The treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, originally intended to provide American protection to the Pacific Region from a resurgence of Japanese militarism, has never been invoked. Nevertheless, it has been a firm bond and is said to have been the justification for the participation of Australian and New Zealand forces in Vietnam. Shaken by the recent dispute over nuclear policy between New Zealand and the United States, an unease has crept into the relationship which has been the basis for regional stability for decades.

The ANZUS Alliance is a collective security arrangement which links Australia, New Zealand and the United States in the Pacific. In practice its concerns have mainly been in the South-west Pacific. All countries in the area are well disposed to the West. If reasonable stability is maintained, then it may be assumed that they will remain so. Although many of the states are tiny, the area involved is vast. To the extent that stability is maintained and the present disposition of the area remains the same, the contribution that Australia, New Zealand, and the United States through their association, make to the interests of the West generally and therefore to the strategic defence balance, is important.

It will be the argument in this article that the ANZUS Alliance, partly because of its easy-going informality, has been a useful factor in maintaining that stability and that its continuation is more likely to benefit the region as a whole than if the Alliance were brought to an effective end. For reasons I shall advance later I do not think that ANZUS will be brought to an end formally, but it has already been affected severely and little more would need to be done to end the remaining defence links binding New Zealand and the United States. The links remain strong between the United States and Australia and New Zealand and Australia.

There is no denying that the ANZUS Alliance is under great strain. At one level, the strain comes about because of the action of the New Zealand Government which was elected on 14 July 1984 of denying port access to

Stuart McMillan is a New Zealand journalist who writes on international affairs for the Christchurch Press. This article is reprinted from vol. 30 No. 8 of 'Nato's Sixteen Nations' by kind permission of the Editor, Frederick Bonnart.

ships that are nuclear powered or might be nuclear armed. At another level, it is a question of whether the ANZUS Alliance is to be regarded as one of a series of alliances which are part of a global posture, or one in which the regional aspects are the compelling features. The row over the nuclear ships is one immediately concerned with co-operation among the Armed Forces; in the beginning the treaty had more of a diplomatic and political significance.

Link with peace treaty

The Pacific Security Treaty, which came to be known as the ANZUS Pact, was negotiated at the same time as the peace treaty with Japan. The pact was signed on 1 September, 1951, and the Japanese Peace Treaty was signed on 8 September 1951. The Japanese Peace Treaty entered into force on 28 April 1952 and ANZUS came into force the day after. The United States had determined on a lenient peace treaty with Japan and New Zealand and Australia were afraid of a Japan free to rearm. The ANZUS treaty was largely an American guarantee to New Zealand and Australia against the revival of a militarist Japan.

An indication of how closely the two events were related is given in the fact that during October the documents relating to the establishment of the ANZUS pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the 30-year limit having expired, were published in a single volume in New Zealand.[1]

The treaty has a preamble which says that the parties reaffirmed their faith in the principles of the United Nations Charter, noted that the United States already had arrangements for the stationing of its armed forces in the Philippines and might also station armed forces in Japan, recognised that Australia and New Zealand, as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, had military obligations outside the Pacific area, and said that the parties desired further to co-ordinate their efforts for collective defence. The treaty has eleven articles. Article 7 is the most important: 'Each party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific on any of the other parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.' Article 7 sets up the only machinery: the three countries would establish a Council, consisting of their foreign ministers or deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of the treaty; the Council would be organized so as to be able to meet at any time. Article 10 says that the treaty would remain in force indefinitely.

At the time of the treaty negotiations, the only other country seriously proposed as a member was the Philippines. A message from the then New Zealand Minister of External Affairs, F.W. Doidge, to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Wellington said of views expressed to John Foster Dulles, the United States Special Representative of the President: 'Mr Spender (Percy Spender, Australian External Affairs

Minister) and I expressed the view that there were special factors distinguishing Australia and New Zealand from any of the other island nations in the Pacific, which would make a three-party treaty the most practicable and desirable arrangement. While it is appreciated that there were special circumstances which made it desirable for the United States to conclude defensive arrangements with the Philippines, we suggested that these could best be made on a bilateral, rather than a multilateral basis.'[2] New Zealand and Australia got their tripartite treaty and the United States concluded a separate treaty with the Philippines. There was some concern particularly in New Zealand about concluding a treaty without Britain, but the only other country whose inclusion has been proposed in recent times, though not very seriously, is Japan. Considering the origins of the treaty, there is a fine irony in that.

Because the treaty concerns the Pacific and Australia's west coast is in the Indian Ocean, there was a reassurance made at a later time that the treaty applied to the whole of Australia.

Not invoked

The treaty has not been invoked directly. During the years of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, Australia tried to get the United States to spell out how it saw the treaty in relation to Indonesia, but remained unsatisfied on the point.

Since the time the treaty was signed, New Zealand, Australian and American forces have served together in the United Nations force in Korea, in Vietnam, and in the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai set up after the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. While ANZUS was not the justification given, the preservation of ANZUS was the decisive factor in the commitment of New Zealand and Australian troops to Vietnam. The commitment of troops to the Sinai force was even further removed from the geographical area to which ANZUS applied but again its importance to New Zealand and Australia meant that they agreed under American pressure to commit troops to the Sinai. During negotiations for the treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was seen as something of a model, but in the end no permanent force structure or secretariat was established.

Until this year there has been an annual formal meeting of the Council set up under the treaty. The meetings have been held in turn in the capital cities of the parties. The last formal meeting was in Wellington in July of 1984, which had an air of eccentricity, as the Labour Party had won the election two days previously but had not been sworn in and New Zealand was represented by Mr Warren Cooper, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government which had just been defeated. Mr David Lange, leader of the Labour Party and soon to be the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, travelled to

Wellington to greet Mr George Shultz, the Secretary of State, but was not himself involved in the ANZUS Council meeting.

ANZUS Council meetings consisted of three main parts. There was a political review in which each of the countries took it in turn to lead a discussion on some part of the world, an exchange of military information, and an exchange of economic information. There were a number of opportunities for military chiefs and others to talk to one another. Successive governments in New Zealand and Australia have regarded this exchange of information as immensely useful. To a certain extent the Council meeting ensured that the Secretary of State and some of the most senior State Department and Defence Department people would focus for a day or two on the part of the world which most directly affected Australia and New Zealand.

The ANZUS connection has had benefits for New Zealand and Australia because their foreign ministers had ready access to the Secretary of State, and their Ambassadors had relatively easy access to the President of the United States. The prime consideration for Australian and New Zealand Governments in ANZUS has been that for all the treaty's terms of commitment to collective defence, the United States has been regarded as the ultimate guarantor of their defence.

There have been major advantages in shared military exercises and in the access to American intelligence. Intelligence was shared among the United States, Canada, Britain, New Zealand and Australia. The land, sea, and air military exercises enabled Australian and New Zealand Armed Forces to train with American forces who were technologically more advanced. What the treaty did, in one way, was to give a formal recognition to shared democratic traditions, to shared aims, to similarities in culture and language, and to similar defence outlooks; how it worked in practice was that there was a club-like air about it all especially among the military people, and the Foreign Service and Intelligence officials.

The link extended to a certain co-operation among the micro-states of the South Pacific. The United States was content to leave most of the diplomatic work and the thinking about the South Pacific to New Zealand and to Australia, both of which had long association with the area. Both are members of the South Pacific Forum, which is an important regional body. Despite the very great distances involved, very little happens in the South Pacific without other South Pacific peoples knowing about it. Under these circumstances it was possible to run what has been described as a doctrine of strategic denial to the Soviet Union. None of the small island states, for instance, has a Soviet mission in residence.

Defence issues do not figure highly in the thinking of the smaller South Pacific countries, though one of the larger ones, Papua New Guinea, has a

problem of people crossing its border from the Indonesian part of the island either as refugees or as guerrillas fighting the Indonesian authorities. A Commonwealth meeting held in Wellington last year to discuss the security problems of small states found that economic security was the main concern of the small South Pacific states. Nevertheless, there has been a sense of stability about the South Pacific that is the more remarkable because it is the region which has had the most nations becoming independent over the last few years.

The association between the United States and New Zealand and Australia has been viewed less enthusiastically by various groups within both New Zealand and Australia than it has by the defence and foreign affairs establishments and the National Party Government in New Zealand. In Australia, there has been longstanding and widespread concern about a number of American defence facilities to which Australia is host. (Desmond Ball, in 'A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia' [Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1980], describes the importance of these facilities to the United States and their significance within Australian political life.) In New Zealand the protests have focused on visits by American warships, the most common argument being that by becoming host to the warships, New Zealand is actively associating itself with the nuclear posture of the United States. Australian governments of various persuasions have remained committed to Australia being the host to these facilities, some of which are vitally important to America's nuclear posture. The facilities are the subject of separate agreements and not part of the ANZUS Pact as such. The National Party Government in New Zealand remained committed to allowing port visits by American warships. That was until the election in 1984 and the rise to power of the Labour Party.

Nuclear dilemma

The Labour Party had a policy of denying port access to ships that were nuclear armed, and implemented the policy. This brought it into conflict with the American policy of neither confirming nor denying whether any particular ship is carrying nuclear weapons. For a while hopes were held that a way round the issue could be found but, in a decision that was made public on 4 February this year, the USS Buchanan, a destroyer, was denied access to New Zealand after a port visit had been requested. The ship was conventionally powered but was fitted with an ASROC anti-submarine system that could take both conventional and nuclear warheads. It was determined by the New Zealand Government that its entry to a New Zealand port would contravene the policy.

The immediate American response was to cancel the ANZUS naval exercise in which the three countries were due to take part. Subsequent moves have been to cancel further military exercises and to cut off most of the

intelligence flow. The annual ANZUS Council meeting was also cancelled. The United States has described the ANZUS Alliance as 'inoperative'. The New Zealand Government's position is that it wants to remain a member of ANZUS but does not want to be under the United States' nuclear umbrella and would like the South Pacific to be regarded as a suitable area for conventional defence. Even if the Government wanted to change its policy, which it has shown no sign of doing, the policy has such backing within the Labour Party, and the country as a whole has such a strong anti-nuclear feeling, that the Government would not only put itself at enormous political risk but would risk destroying the Labour Party itself. One of the effects of the strength of the American response was that it increased the support for the Government's policy. The country's two main opinion polling organisations find a clear majority for the Government's policy of denying port access to ships carrying nuclear weapons.

The United States has continued to conduct military exercises with Australian forces, and the Secretary of State and the Australian Foreign Minister have held talks without the New Zealand Foreign Minister being present. Australia has taken the attitude officially that the denial of port access for nuclear powered ships and ships that might be nuclear armed is a matter between the United States and New Zealand. One of the most important consequences of the row between the United States and New Zealand is that it has altered some of the traditions in the relationship between Australia and New Zealand. Australia is being scrupulous about respecting the instructions of the United States about not passing on American intelligence information. The result is that they have to treat each other rather more as foreign countries than they are accustomed to doing.

The strains in the ANZUS Alliance have brought about more uncertainty in both the South Pacific and in South-East Asia. New Zealand has troops stationed in Singapore and, although these are there under the Five-Power Defence Arrangements which link Britain, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand, the New Zealand connection with the United States under ANZUS provides a certain sense of comfort to some South-East Asian countries.

Defence thinking within New Zealand and Australia over the last few years has been turning towards more self-reliance. This has been influenced in Australia by an assessment that in the event of high tension elsewhere in the world, then Australia might have to fend off threats from other powers on its own. New Zealand has had a spate of reviews of defence over the last few years and more are expected. The last one says that New Zealand and Australia should be regarded as one strategic entity.

It is improbable that ANZUS will be brought to an end formally. Australia considers the link vital and would not risk seeing ANZUS scrapped in the hope of getting another treaty. In any case another treaty might impose

more exacting conditions on Australia and this would be likely to produce a backlash within Australia.

The United States is still deciding what to do about New Zealand. A little of the early heat and bitterness has gone out of the confrontation. The New Zealand Government plans to introduce legislation to cement the anti-nuclear policy into law. In New Zealand's unicameral parliamentary system a new government could undo such legislation easily, but the United States is viewing the proposed legislation with concern and some of the bitterness may return.

In deciding what to do about New Zealand the United States has, among other considerations, two interesting questions. If it throws New Zealand out of ANZUS will it not also be throwing it out of the Western Alliance generally and would that not pose some difficulties for America's relations with its other allies? And would it be throwing the baby of regional stability out with the New Zealand bath water?

Book Reviews

TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA. International Legal Issues
Malcolm N. Shaw
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, 428 pp. R175,90

Nation-states are the primary subjects of modern international law. The constitutional basis of this branch of law is the concept of sovereignty, with its starting point that every state enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over its own territory. Dr Shaw starts his book with an introductory chapter on the historical development and function of territory in international law. It is often forgotten that the nation-state is a relatively young phenomenon. Since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 it has, however, grown into the concept that dominates international relations in general. It has become the link between people, their nationality and international status. This has remained the position, despite modern technological developments (cross-frontier pollution, multinational corporations, international communications, etc) and despite calls for a shift away from a state-centrist paradigm in the study of international relations. Not even those Third World countries which demand radical reform in the international order and which do so on the basis of the interdependence of all states, are prepared to abandon their own territorial control and their 'permanent sovereignty over natural resources'.

These trends are all dealt with by the author and are neatly woven into the texture of international law and its recent developments. In this regard this book is also an authority for another contention — that modern international law is still very much alive and relevant for the student of international relations. It has become fashionable to deride the merit of international law for a 'real understanding' of international politics. Representatives at international conferences, on the other hand, often show a more fundamental understanding of the true workings of international affairs when they strive energetically to demonstrate the validity of their arguments in terms of international law. One aspect that has been neglected in the study of the post-World War II international community is the relevance of international law to efforts, by Third World countries in particular, to reshape the international order. This may not be in accordance with the traditional Eurocentric version of it, but that is only in harmony with *de facto* developments. Much of the traditional scepticism about international law among political scientists is probably the result of the discipline's failure to keep track of recent shifts and developments.

The bulk of the book is devoted to the application of the rules of the 'law of territory' in Africa. It starts with the colonization of the continent and how the idea of territorially defined states was introduced by the colonial powers. The various modes of acquisition of territory (by occupation, cession or

conquest) are all dealt with and explained through discussion of the classical decisions handed down by international tribunals and arbitrators.

Of particular interest is the development of the right to self-determination and its relevance for statehood. Decolonization has been based on this concept. Its application within the colonial context, where boundaries were drawn without respect for ethnic realities,. has resulted in numerous problems. Dr Shaw analyses state practice and the interpretation given to the UN Charter in his discussion of the question as to whether self-determination has grown into a rule of international law. A number of specific cases are dealt with to show the practical implications of the implementation of the right of self-determination. The Western Sahara case and Namibia are only two of about fifteen such case studies.

The frequent references to the 'real' problems of Africa only increase the topicality of the work. It is therefore no surprise to find that boundary issues, Rhodesian UDI, Walvis Bay and South Africa's 'independent' homelands all receive attention. With respect to the latter, Dr Shaw argues (on p. 162) that the absence of self-determination (despite South Africa's claim to the contrary), under conditions of racial discrimination disqualifies these homelands as states. This seems to give substance to the inclusion of self-determination as an additional yardstick in estimating eligibility for statehood.

This book is the 'revised, updated and reduced' version of a PhD thesis. (The author is at present Senior Lecturer in Law, in Essex University.) It is rich in footnote material (more than 100 pages) and contains a bibliography, a table of cases and an index. Its prohibitive price is a sad reflection on the declining buying power of the South African currency. This is a pity — it is a highly topical work and could well be included in the curricula of many South African universities. The even-handed treatment given to a potentially controversial subject lends to it a fine academic quality.

<div align="right">Gerhard Erasmus,
Faculty of Law,
University of Stellenbosch.</div>

THE NONCONFORMIST CONSCIENCE: CHAPEL AND POLITICS 1870–1914
D.W. Bebbington (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1982. Pp., 193. R29,50)

In late Victorian and Edwardian Britain, religious and national affiliations and identities were major determinants of political allegiance. Nonconformists and the Celtic fringe identified largely with the Liberal Party, whereas Anglicans tended to identify rather with the Conservative

Party. The famous Liberal 'landslide' victory in the general election of January 1906 was considerably aided by the solidity of Nonconformist support for the Liberals, and the outcome gave Nonconformists a new sense of power. According to the calculations of the *Christian World*, the new House of Commons included more 'Free Churchmen' (181) than Conservatives (156). But as it turned out, 1906 was to mark not only a peak of Nonconformist political influence, but also of membership of the Nonconformist denominations, with some two million Nonconformists in England and Wales. Nonconformist membership was thenceforth to experience an absolute decline, and its political expectations were to remain largely unfulfilled.

What Dr Bebbington offers in his book on the Nonconformist 'conscience' from 1870 to 1914 is an analysis of the Nonconformist role in British politics in a period when, in relation to the overall electorate, they were well placed to 'make their mark' in politics, and when politics was a significant concern of the chapels. Between the Second Reform Act of 1867, which enfranchised the skilled urban workers, and the Franchise Act of 1918, which extended the electorate to include the mass of unskilled workers who shunned organized religion, Nonconformists constituted a significant proportion of the electorate in England and Wales. By 1900, after a century of continuous growth, there were 1 763 000 active Nonconformists in England and Wales, as against 2 043 000 Easter Day communicants in the Church of England. In class terms they were drawn chiefly from the lower middle classes of shopkeepers and clerks, and the 'labour aristocracy' of skilled workers. 'The chapels', Dr Bebbington writes, 'were most attractive to those on the borderline between the classes'.

Dr Bebbington identifies three distinctive features of the Nonconformist 'conscience' that began to manifest itself during the 1870s and 1880s. These were the conviction that politics should be informed by religion, that the two should go hand in hand; the insistence that politicians should be men of the highest character; and a belief that the state should become an agent for promoting the moral welfare of its citizens. Previously, Nonconformists had generally sought to keep religion and politics apart. Political life was something of a dangerous snare; voluntary effort rather than coercion provided the only secure basis for moral behaviour. As the saying had it, 'you cannot make men moral by Act of Parliament'. The decline of the Nonconformist 'conscience' towards the end of the Edwardian period was due to disillusionment at the results of political endeavour, stemming directly from the failure of the Liberal government to settle the education question along lines acceptable to their Nonconformist supporters, as well as to a renewed concern as to the advisability of mixing religion and politics. Political activity was coming to be seen as leading to the secularization of the

chapels. As a Congregational minister complained, while Nonconformity 'has been making numerous and ardent politicians, it has made scarce any saints'.

Dr Bebbington's analysis of the workings of the Nonconformist 'conscience' in its heyday is thematic. He examines five major fields of Nonconformist concern — social questions such as housing, prostitution and drunkenness, Irish Home Rule, imperialism and foreign affairs, and two in which Nonconformity's own interests were directly involved, religious equality and education. His focus is on those who shaped the Nonconformist 'conscience': the lay and ministerial élite who sought to form Nonconformist opinion. The Nonconformist press, notably the *British Weekly* and *Christian World*, constitutes his chief source for this enterprise.

Essentially, Dr Bebbington's book is a study in the politics of protest, and its limitations. The political style of Nonconformity was to embark on moral crusades against major wrongs. These crusades began in protest, and largely ended in failure, in the sense that their long-term goals were not often realized. This was in part due to the fact that Nonconformists never possessed real power. Although they came to constitute a major sectional interest within the Liberal Party, they lacked influence among the leadership and were hamstrung by the fact that there was no other party they could turn to for carrying their programme. 'The essential strategic problem confronting them,' Dr Bebbington observes, 'was that they had no alternative but to seek their goals through the Liberal Party.' But the fundamental problem, Dr Bebbington makes evident, was the Nonconformist temperament itself. First, Nonconformist attitudes were volatile, their agitations took on the character of passing fads, and consequently often failed to leave a lasting mark. 'Politicians,' Dr Bebbington comments, 'could afford to ride out the storm of Nonconformist displeasure, confident that it would die away as soon as a new obsession arose'. Second, and perhaps more important, was the inability of most Nonconformist leaders to accept compromises. When confronted by entrenched opposition, they could not bring themselves to make the necessary compromises to realize the essence of their aims; they found it impossible to compromise with what they regarded as wrong. The failure after 1906 to reverse the Balfour Education Act of 1902, which had placed the Anglican schools in a privileged position, was a case in point. In the end result, Dr Bebbington underlines, the Nonconformists were better suited to mounting protests and agitations when the Liberals were in opposition than to achieving their goals once their friends were in office: 'The Nonconformist conscience flourished during a period, from 1874 to 1905, when the Conservatives were in power for twenty-two out of thirty years. The greatest campaigns — over the Bulgarians, Home Rule, the Armenians and education — all took place during Conservative administrations.'

Dr Bebbington, himself a Nonconformist, has produced a useful survey

of the activities of political Nonconformity for the central years 1874 to 1905, but he is much less satisfactory in his coverage of the period from the Liberal general election victory of 1906 to the outbreak of World War I. Apart from the education issue, which is handled comprehensively, he is generally thin on the role of Nonconformists in the politics of these years, a deficiency which no doubt has something to do with the fact that the book originated in a Cambridge PhD dissertation which terminated at 1902. More serious than the lack of comprehensive coverge is Dr Bebbington's failure to grapple directly with the central problem of how the rise of class politics in the Edwardian period affected the political behaviour of Nonconformists. Whereas he is convincing in explaining why Nonconformists should have become increasingly disillusioned with politics as a means to achieving their sectional goals, he does not probe into the concurrent process whereby class identifications were rapidly coming to replace religious ones in determining the political responses of Nonconformists. His statement that 'Nonconformists, with few exceptions, welcomed the Liberal social policy reforms of the period 1906–11' is left unsubstantiated, and by means of it he simply evades a consideration of the cleavages that opened up within Nonconformity over the direction of Liberal social and fiscal policy.

The book is clear and systematic, though not exactly lively in its presentation of individuals and issues. Some readers might also have welcomed an attempt by Dr Bebbington to locate his study within the existing literature on Nonconformity and politics in the late Victorian and Edwardian periods.

B.K. Murray,
University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg.

AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WEST AFRICA
A.G. Hopkins
Longman, 1973, 337 pp

When first published in 1973, this book was the first full account of West Africa's economic history. Today, it remains the most authoritative work on this subject. Most studies, as valuable as they are, have a mainly political bias. In justifying his coverage of a relatively obscure topic, Hopkins claims the book was 'designed first to fill a gap in African studies, and second to contribute, in a small way, to the economic history of the underdeveloped world' (p. 1). This is achieved by covering themes such as 'the characteristics of "traditional" societies, the nature of pre-industrial exchange, the imperialism of industrial Europe, the economics of colonialism, and the rise of nationalism' (p. 3) — topics so familiar to historians of other underdeveloped regions.

Hopkins sets about surveying the former British and French territories of West Africa from pre-colonial to modern times. Thus the first section of the book could be termed 'economic anthropology' rather than economic history. Along the way he dispels the fashionable 'democracy of poverty' myth in 'Merrie Africa'. He shows that economic man was much in evidence in pre-colonial West Africa. There were complex and efficient markets; new techniques and crops were continually being adopted and a long-established slave trade was efficiently organized. Currencies were used, which, despite their exotic nature, embodied the attributes of modern money.

West Africa's economic potential was limited by its physical environment which consisted of broad bands of monotonously similar climate and vegetation stretching from west to east. The only variation occurred gradually from north to south. Combined with this, the essential barrier to economic growth was underpopulation which encouraged extensive (as opposed to 'intensive') cultivation. This in turn favoured dispersed settlement and generated strong tendencies towards local self-sufficiency. Hopkins refutes the popular belief that the slave trade was one of the major reasons behind the region's economic backwardness.

In the modern period he demonstrates that the growth of 'legitimate' (as opposed to slave) trade mobilized factors in the domestic economy and utilized links with the outside world forged during the days of the slave trade. It also, however, created internal tensions by shifting power from a few large exporters to numerous small-scale farmers.

He makes the following observations about the theories of colonialism:

> Two alternative views are commonly expressed about the development of (West African) export economies during the early part of the colonial period . . . The first, and more traditional, argument makes the colonial government primarily responsible for introducing and managing economic change . . . (but) is particularly suspect because it underplays the role of Africans themselves . . . The second, more recent, view . . . is concerned primarily with the mobilisation of land and labour resources in the indigenous economy . . . but tends to exaggerate the case and simplify the process of growth by suggesting that colonial development was essentially a matter of taking up the slack in existing, under-utilised resources — in much the same way as a prefabricated building can be erected by persuading enough men to pull on a rope. (pp. 187–188)

He uses the 'open' and 'closed' model of economies to explain how the multiplier effect of staple exports was stronger in peasant West Africa than in those areas which developed mining and plantation enclaves. Three reasons are given as to why expatriate plantations were of little significance in West Africa. Firstly, there was strong opposition from already established European trading interests afraid of losing their source of supply. Secondly, those plantations that were started, had all failed. Finally and most importantly, Africans had already succeeded in generating an export economy by their own efforts.

In less than twenty years (1892–1911) cocoa shipments from the Gold Coast (Ghana) grew from nothing to 40 000 tons to make it the largest cocoa exporter in the world. Cocoa was not introduced into the country by the British but by an African entrepreneur. Cocoa farming was a thoroughly capitalist enterprise — it involved taking risks with an unfamiliar product, substantial investments of time and money, the ability to plan ahead and a willingness to defer present consumption for the sake of future returns. Neither colonial officials nor expatriate trading firms had much idea of what was happening until after the cocoa industry was firmly established.

Exports of groundnuts from Northern Nigeria were negligible before the First World War. But by the mid-1920s exports had reached over 100 000 tons a year. This was despite British attempts to promote cotton rather than groundnuts. The initial stimulus, however, was the completion of the British financed Lagos–Kano railway in 1911.

In the final section, Hopkins looks at the open economy under strain. Depression and wartime necessity checked expansion and encouraged the rise of nationalism. The postwar boom generated structural change in the economy, which increased prosperity and aspirations. This in turn accelerated the movement towards independence.

· Unlike others, Hopkins is not guided by myopic doctrine and his style is eminently readable. Given the diversity of the material and the method of analysis, it is understandable that chronology and some trains of thought become scrambled in the process. He concludes with the following statement:

> The history presented here has sought to direct attention away from the adventures and triumphs of great leaders, past and present, and towards the activities of the overwhelming majority of Africans, those who have never ranked among the elite ... It may also have some practical use if it reminds those who formulate policy and exercise authority that the skills and energies of ordinary Africans are probably the continent's greatest assets. This is one lesson which the present can, and should, learn from the past. (p. 296)

Jon Inggs,
Economics Department,
University of South Africa.

NEUTRALITY: A POLICY FOR BRITAIN
Peter Johnson
Temple Smith, London, 1985. pp. 133

Compared with the complacent Fifties and the swinging Sixties, the Eighties — likely to go down in the history books as the Age of Thatcherism — are not a particularly pleasant time in which to be living in

England. But in compensation they are proving very much more interesting years — interesting because all the fundamental issues of national life are coming up for debate and discussion: the future of Britain's economy as it is forced to respond to the new technological revolution, the questioning of the principles on which the Welfare State was founded, the implications of the growing divide between a prosperous South and an impoverished North, the changes in the pattern of politics resulting from the emergence of a powerful Third Force, the Liberal–Social Democratic Party Alliance — all these are matters now constantly with us in one form or another.

There is another issue of equal, if not greater importance that provokes rather less discussion — the question of Britain's place in the world. For more than a third of a century — in other words for the entire working life of anyone under the age of fifty — British foreign policy has been based on two firm pillars: alliance with the United States and alliance with the countries of Western Europe, the two alliances brought together in the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

NATO was formed in 1949 when there seemed a very real possibility that Stalin's Russia might attempt to take over the whole of Europe. France and West Germany were still shattered and shell-shocked, slowly recovering from the massive material and psychological damage inflicted by the war. Britain was clearly the most powerful state in Western Europe. But Britain alone could never hope to balance the immense strength of the Soviet Union. American commitment to the defence of Western Europe thus became in British eyes an absolute imperative.

The world of the 1980s is very different from that of the late 1940s. In wealth and therefore in potential military power Britain has been overtaken both by France and by West Germany. At the same time the United States and the Soviet Union, caught up in the ever-ascending spiral of the nuclear arms race, have achieved a degree of military power that makes them different in kind from any other nation on earth.

Both Washington and Moscow live in a state of paranoia, each seeing the other as presenting a mortal threat to its own security. There are also of course political leaders in Western Europe who maintain a fervent belief in the reality of the Soviet threat, a threat that can be countered in their opinion only by the counter-threat of nuclear deterrence. So the British and French governments spend large sums building up their own nuclear strike forces, puny though these are when set beside the arsenals of the superpowers.

But there is another school of thought which takes a much cooler — and, so its proponents would argue, a much more realistic — view of the situation and in particular of the 'Soviet threat'. Those who take this view are to be found not only on the Left. Enoch Powell, the most thoughtful and provocative of right-wing MPs, is on record as affirming that 'the view that Russia has no aggressive designs on Western Europe would have been

commonly canvassed opinion long ago if people were less afraid of being dubbed pro-Communist'.

Those who take the view that there is no serious Russian threat in Western Europe—though they may still believe that the Soviet Union has expansionist designs elsewhere in the world—inevitably find themselves rethinking the fundamentals of current British foreign policy. And if they then turn to a realistic examination of Anglo-American relations, they find themselves forced to conclude that whatever the fashionable rhetoric about the 'special relationship' between the two countries, Britain's national interests cannot possibly coincide with those of the United States—all the more so when the conventional wisdom in Washington favours a highly polarized view of the world, setting all international issues in the context of a simplistically defined East/West conflict.

Yet Britain, with at least one hundred US bases on its territory, is firmly locked into the structure of the Atlantic Alliance. Is it possible, is it desirable that Britain should attempt to free itself from the American embrace? Has Britain got the choice of any other foreign policy?

Most people would say that Britain has no rational alternative to NATO. But they would be wrong. Britain could follow a policy of non-alignment. The practical implications of such a policy have recently been set out in a short but very important book, *Neutrality: A Policy for Britain* by Peter Johnson, a retired RAF officer with a very distinguished wartime record. Written with terseness, clarity and wit, *Neutrality* got off to a flying start with leader page reviews in *The Times* and *The Guardian*. It is a book that deserves, through the compulsiveness of its logic, to become one of the seminal works of our time.

Johnson shares the profound anxiety of any thinking person about the present state of international relations. He draws up a very uncomforable 'Table of Danger', listing all the similarities between the state of the world in the mid-1980s and the situation that existed just before 1914 and 1939. Should it come to a major war, Britain would be in a hapless position. Nuclear war would mean annihilation. But even in a non-nuclear conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, Britain, with most of its forces deployed, according to NATO strategy, in forward positions in West Germany, would be in no position to counter a massive Soviet strike against the rear bases and lines of communication leading from British ports and aerodromes.

So in the last resort NATO offers Britain no real security. As for the argument that Britain's 'special relationship' enables a British prime minister to lay a restraining hand on an American president's shoulder, this is pure political myth which cannot stand up to the detailed examination of particular case studies. So Britain finds itself in the humiliating position of being a satellite of a superpower and therefore of becoming involved in whatever confrontations that power may choose to bring about.

Not all European nations find themselves in this situation. There are in fact no less than five European states — Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia — that have chosen not to get involved in the system of global alliances. There is nothing flabby about their neutrality: all five take national defence very seriously indeed, their strategy being so to deploy their forces as to dissuade any potential invader from entering their territory. 'The well-armed, well-prepared neutral,' writes Johnson in one of the key passages of his book, 'standing aside from the military confrontation of the superpowers, does more to fight communism, totalitarianism and the trampling of human rights than all the sabre-rattling and provocation of the arms race.'

More than a decade ago one of America's elder statesmen, Dean Acheson, gave the British a home-truth: 'You have lost an Empire and you have not yet found another role in the world.' That pointed remark is still absolutely relevant. The Thatcherite 'neo-nationalism' is *folie de grandeur*, a hankering after lost imperial glories, not a realistic assessment of Britain's now modest place in the world.

So is non-alignment the solution to Acheson's missing role? Would the adoption of such a policy — to adapt a phrase from Poland's Solidarity — 'let Britain be Britain'? Each reader of *Neutrality* must make up his or her own mind. For myself I am convinced by Johnson's advocacy into believing that non-alignment is indeed the answer to Britain's uncertain place in the world. But those of us who think like this are a tiny minority. For years public life in this country has been dominated by an Atlanticist Establishment. Ideas about non-alignment exist only on the periphery of British politics — significantly enough, though, both on the Right and on the Left. But the ideas are dynamic. And dynamic ideas, however much they may be ridiculed when first expounded, have the capacity to worm their way from the periphery to the centre. We are going to hear much more about non-alignment. Even those whose natural reaction would be to dismiss the idea out of hand would be well advised to get hold of and ponder on Peter Johnson's short, exciting and profoundly hopeful book.

Mr Hallett is well-known to *Bulletin* readers as the Oxford-educated author, historian and academic, widely travelled in Africa and a frequent contributor to SAIIA publications and symposia.

Robin Hallett,
Sandford St Martin,
Oxfordshire,
March 1986.

The contributors to this essential reference work on the South African economy's domestic, regional and international linkages have provided the reader with a broad overview of the various sectors and institutional arrangements pertaining to economic activities in South and Southern Africa.

All the contributors are recognized scholars in their field and they have generally succeeded in approaching their respective subjects from a political economy perspective, essential in a work of this nature.

The major drawback is in the disparate content of each chapter. This has resulted in a useful, yet insufficient treatment of particular sectors of the economy with scant continuity in some areas. To illustrate, some chapters have a contemporary focus not matched by others. The Preface also provides too limited an introduction to sectoral linkages and to the purpose of the volume.

Those chapters dealing with specific sectors generally start by describing the nature of each one, followed by its position within the domestic economy, the official policies pertaining to the sector and finally the external linkages. As the key focus of the work is on the regional and international dimensions of the South African economy, more attention could have been devoted to these aspects — especially their historical underpinning.

However, the chapters by Lieb Niuewoudt on *Agriculture* (Chapter One), Loet Douwes Dekker on *Aspects of the Labour Market* (Chapter Three), Anne Ratcliffe on *Industry* (Chapter Five) and Jacqueline Matthews on *Foreign Trade* (Chapter Six) are most useful in assessing sectorial dynamics and applied policies in the recent past.

The remaining chapters by Dirk Neethling on *Minerals and Energy* (Chapter Two), Roger Gidlow on *Balance of Payments Trends and Economic Policies* (Chapter Four), Willem Potgieter on *Transport* (Chapter Seven), Graham Muller on *Multinationals* (Chapter Eight) and Jacqueline Matthews on *Southern African Economic Integration* (Chapter Nine) are less detailed treatments of their subject matter.

Arguably, this volume should be supplemented by a basic economic history textbook, as the South African economy's progressive stages of development are not dealt with adequately. Nor is much attention given to its spatial domestic, regional and international aspects, which prevents a comprehensive understanding of these issues. This is especially noticeable in Chapters Two, Four, Five and Seven, which tend to gloss over major lopsided developments in the minerals and energy, payments, industrial and transportation areas. Treatment of these issues is cursory and although

providing some insight into aspects of sectoral and policy dynamics, it falls short in supplying a more complete assessment of the situation.

There are obvious omissions, such as the fishing and forestry industries. Little reference is made to the official and unofficial foreign trade representatives in South Africa and abroad and their roles in fostering trade. Technology transfers and cross-border data flows are inexplicably absent, and all too short a reference is made to the vital role of immigration and skills transfers. (See p. 62.)

The confusion in past and current official economic policy and the extent to which this has impinged upon dichotomies within the various sectors is barely touched upon, nor is the economic leverage South Africa exercises over the majority-ruled states of the region. Annoying factual errors such as the reference to the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Council are inexcusable. Other than good coverage of South Africa's multilateral economic links, little attention is given to purely bilateral economic relationships.

Finally, despite the growing diplomatic estrangement of South Africa internationally since World War II, its spillover into economic sanctions measures is all too briefly treated, as is rationalization of imports and burgeoning counter-trade arrangements.

These shortcomings result in the book losing some of its undoubted merit. It is to be hoped that they will receive attention before the next edition.

<div align="right">
Bryan G. Bench,
Research Officer,
South African Institute of International Affairs,
July 1986.
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