



International
Affairs **Bulletin**

Vol. 10/No. 3/1986

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International Affairs Bulletin

Published by the South African Institute of International Affairs and supplied free of charge to members. Three issues per year. Subscription rate for non-members R16 per annum (South Africa), R24 per annum airmail Africa and Europe, R26 elsewhere. Price per copy R6 (plus postage overseas airmail).

Uitgegee deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede en gratis aan lede verskaaf. Drie uitgawes per jaar. Intekengeld vir nie-lede R16 per jaar, R24 per jaar lugpos Afrika en Europa, R26 elders. Prys per eksemplaar R6 (plus posgeld).

ISSN No. 0258-7270

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International Affairs Bulletin

Volume 10, No. 3, 1986

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Die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede word deur sy Konstitusie daarvan weerhou om 'n mening oor enige aspek van internasionale aangeleenthede uit te spreek. Dit is daarom nie verantwoordelik vir enige sienswyse wat in hierdie publikasie weergegee word nie.

Smuts House Notes

These Notes constitute my personal farewell as editor of the *International Affairs Bulletin*. They are also intended as a comment on editorial policy over the last two eventful years.

The years 1985 and 1986 will surely be remembered as two of the most critical in the history of this country. That the domestic and the international cannot be separated has become one of the truisms of South African life but, like most platitudes, it is based on self-evident, factual experience. Certainly, for example, the visual impact of this country's domestic turmoil on American television screens was a potent source of pressure on recent United States government policy towards South Africa.

During the period that has elapsed since I arrived at Jan Smuts House, white South Africans' perceptions of their country have radically changed and it must be accepted that, for all our attempts to adopt a 'colour blind' approach to South Africa's issues, each of us is to some extent the prisoner of her or his skin colour. Not only has the economy noticeably weakened without curbing runaway inflation, but the government appears to have run out of the steam which, whether intentionally or not, fuelled its 'reform' drive in the earlier 1980s. We have seen political polarisation, the development of a siege mentality and, when travelling abroad, only the most confident is still happy to be identified as a white South African. Despite its manifest fragmentation, the black community is perceived to be growing in strength and confidence in inverse proportion to the loss of white morale.

The world as a whole is viewed, as it always has been by South Africans, through a specifically South African prism. Only the most major events that do not relate directly to this country attract interest. We have seen a virtual obsession with the United States and in particular with its legislation designed to reduce economic and other contacts as a form of pressure on Pretoria. There has been a rising tide of anti-Americanism among whites, who accuse Washington of 'double standards' and among many blacks who believe that the USA is still backing Pretoria. This has coincided with Washington's abandonment of constructive engagement. Relationships with Britain and the Commonwealth eclipsed the pervading preoccupation with America only briefly, during the visits of the 'Eminent Persons' Group' earlier this year and when trade sanctions were imposed by the European Economic Community.

White South African perceptions of international relations are apt to be

based on economic and ideological/emotional factors. While the former may be rational and pragmatic, the latter are still dominated by a Cold War mentality which divides the world into good (the 'West', within which South Africa likes to include itself) and bad (the Eastern Bloc and in particular an aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union). There is, furthermore, a tendency to draw close to other isolated states such as Israel and Taiwan and to make much of the relationships. It must be concluded that the formulation of South African foreign policy is not an entirely rational process, nor are people's responses to it and we have therefore tried to encourage a more objective assessment of our position in world affairs.

A connection between the purely domestic and completely external is to be found in South Africa's regional relationships, where the optimism of 1984 has rapidly given way to the expression of South African regional clout in the form of punitive raids on neighbouring states suspected of harbouring members of the African National Congress. While the Nkomati Accord still technically exists, Pretoria's Renamo connections and Mozambique's chronic poverty and instability had raised major questions about the continued viability of the Accord well before the air crash of 19 October 1986, which cast still further doubts on Mozambique's future and South Africa's part in it. Meanwhile, the Cuban presence still seems to constitute an impasse to any solution on the other side of the subcontinent, in Angola and Namibia.

All in all it cannot be said that the two years have been either peaceful or prosperous. They have, however, also not been without incident and the *Bulletin* has, as far as possible, responded to what has happened and to the interests of its readers. Glancing back through the five issues that have appeared under my editorship, it is interesting to note the obsession with US disinvestment which gripped South Africa during 1985 and on which we published several articles. The last issue of 1985 was devoted to the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, while the first of 1986 covered various aspects of the USSR. For the rest, we have cast our net more widely, but we hope relevantly, on topics such as the ANC, ANZUS, Antarctica, constitutional models for South Africa and, whenever possible, on southern Africa. Believing that the region is of prime importance to South Africa's international relations, we have tried to gather in this present issue a number of articles about it.

This brings me to some of the difficulties that we have encountered in our attempt to make the *Bulletin* as interesting and relevant as possible. We have tried always to act as a forum for the widest possible range of views without compromising academic standards. It has to be accepted, unfortunately, that not everyone approached will write for us. We have drawn blanks, for instance, when trying to find black writers within South Africa to write articles on international issues and scholars abroad have also on occasion

refused to contribute papers, in a fashion that leaves little doubt that their reasons are political.

Another related problem concerns desirable standards of academic detachment. Anger, disillusionment, fear, a desire for vengeance even, all are understandable in a society such as this and so are similar reactions within the region as well as further afield, to South Africa's domestic and regional policies. We believe, however, that in their naked form they have no place in a journal such as ours where critical analysis and well-substantiated information have more, not less, effect than blinkered propaganda or hysterical outpourings from whatever source. This does not mean that we have been afraid to publish material to which we believe our readers should be exposed, despite the State of Emergency's draconian but dangerously vague directives which tend to encourage more, not less, self-censorship. Newspaper people have to tread this delicate divide every day. For us it has been only three times a year, but we have not been cowed into rejecting or bowdlerising academically-sound but controversial material.

Thus we have been faced with some challenging problems and only our readers can judge whether or not the *Bulletin* has risen to them. We have also scored a number of successes, amongst which must be counted the establishment of a distinguished and very helpful Editorial Advisory Board, to the members of which all thanks are due. The *Bulletin* has also been appearing regularly and more or less punctually which, as any editor will know, is not easy to achieve. Articles submitted or commissioned have nearly always been of a high standard, although on one occasion we unwittingly published a paper which had already appeared in another South African journal. Well, you live and learn and so, we hope, did the American scholar concerned, who pleaded inexperience as his excuse.

A journal such as the *Bulletin* depends on its contributors but also on the people who put it together and I have been fortunate in my editorial team which could no doubt have run the *Bulletin* quite as well without me. Alan Begg, as Assistant Editor, Bryan Bench and Jackie MacKenzie have cheerfully endured the fortnightly meetings I imposed on them and in which we exchanged ideas and learned a lot from each other. It is thanks to them that we decided to devote certain issues of the *Bulletin* to specific themes, which has been welcomed by some of our readers, while leaving other issues as 'catch-alls' for other excellent but not strictly classifiable material.

It's been an eventful two years in which the Institute has played a part to which I am proud to have contributed in a small way and I fear that I shall be taking away more, in terms of experience, than I have put into it. André du Pisani, who has often written for the *Bulletin* and whose work appears again in this issue, will be its Editor from the first issue of 1987 and he will also hold the post of Manning Director of Research. He is a more than worthy

successor and I look forward to reading the *Bulletin* under his editorship, as it benefits from his particular skills and expertise.

Finally, I must congratulate you, the Institute's members and other *Bulletin* readers in South Africa and beyond. Your membership and readership are proof of your interest in the global environment and also of your understanding that South Africa's domestic dilemma is the main cause of the present crisis in its international relations. It furthermore shows that you are aware of the significant impact of that crisis on our domestic politics. If more people in high places would understand this dialectic instead of merely dismissing it, the sub-continent's future might be a less uncertain one.

Sara Picnaar
Editor
November 1986

Note from the SAIIA Director General

The Institute has been very fortunate indeed to have had a scholar of such great merit and personal integrity as Sara Picnaar as its Manning and Research Director and Editor of its publications for the past two years. She has served the Institute with great distinction, and I am sure all our members, corporate and individual, would wish me to express their deep gratitude to her. As she returns to her own special field of interest, the teaching and writing of history, we wish her well, and we look forward to her continued involvement with the research activities of the Institute.

We also look forward to the forthcoming publication by the Witwatersrand University Press, on behalf of the Institute, of Dr Picnaar's book on: *South Africa and International Relations between the two World Wars: the League of Nations Dimension*. It will undoubtedly be a highlight of the Institute's publications programme in 1987.

John Barratt

South Africa in Namibia: Variations on a theme

The purpose of this exploratory article is to isolate, identify and describe the salient features of South Africa's policies towards Namibia, and to reflect on the prospects for an internationally recognised settlement of the Namibian conflict.

Some Fundamentals

South Africa's policies towards Namibia are based upon certain fundamentals and shaped by domestic, regional and international factors and considerations. The first, and arguably most salient aspect, of South Africa's policies is that they are regional in scope and intention. Especially after the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule in Southern Africa and the coming to power of the Mugabe Government in Zimbabwe, South Africa's regional concerns and interests became much more central to its Namibian policies. Regionally, South Africa followed policies directed at three interlinked dimensions. These were and remain: a deliberate war strategy directed at SWAPO and the ruling MPLA government in Luanda, policies of controlled change inside Namibia and conventional diplomacy.^{1,2}

Given the regional scope and import of South Africa's Namibian policies, which interests are at the heart of these policies? A detailed examination of them and of their evolution will reveal three sets of interrelated interests. These are: first, regional security interests, which are defined in terms of both the Namibian and the Angolan sides of the equation. Secondly, interests relating to the political transition of Namibia itself, and, finally, interests relating to the Namibian/South African interface.

As far as regional security interests are concerned, these include: the destruction of SWAPO's guerrilla capabilities; the prevention of a buildup of heavy weapons and sophisticated military technology in southern Angola; the increase in and consolidation of UNITA's political and military clout; the removal of all foreign forces, notably the Cubans, from the Southern African theatre and to create the conditions under which the MPLA could reach a political accommodation with UNITA.

André du Pisani is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa, Pretoria. In the new year he takes over as Manning Director of Research at the SAIIA.

The Botha war strategy evolved mainly in response to growing SWAPO guerrilla capabilities, security and military developments in southern Angola, and political developments in Namibia and elsewhere, notably the change of government in Washington. It was, however, increasingly preemptive and aggressive in nature.³

Reflecting on South African interests relating to the process of political transition in Namibia, major points of consideration include: the establishment and consolidation of a 'moderate' political alternative to SWAPO which is perceived as 'radical'; demonstration of the government's resolve in the face of armed insurgency, and its determination not to be forced into making political concessions because of military weakness. 'Moderate' in the context of South Africa's Namibian policies means 'compatible with South African interests'.

As far as the interests relating to the Namibian/South African interface are concerned, these are directed at minimising the radicalising demonstration effect on South African Blacks if SWAPO were to come to power by means of force and successful guerrilla warfare. While white political interests are not unimportant, the dominant and overriding fear seems to be that 'radical' political movements in South Africa, notably the ANC, will be greatly fortified in the event of a SWAPO take-over in Namibia. The fraternal relations that exist between SWAPO and the ANC, coupled to joint training of SWAPO and ANC cadres in Angola, give special salience to this consideration.

In addition to being a regional approach to Namibia, South Africa's policies are premised on the realisation that economic dominance is both preferable and cheaper than costly military dominance.^{4, 5} South African investments in Namibia amount to some R20 billion, while Namibia is dependent upon the South African centre for capital, services, security and infrastructure. The second premise of South African policies is also meant to impress upon the inhabitants of the region the viability of capitalist development, and its inherent superiority over socialism.

A further salient feature of South African policies towards the region as a whole, has been an attempt to limit the role of the West and other powers, notably the Soviet Union, in transitional processes. As far as Namibia is concerned, these policies imply a more limited role for the Western quintet (France, West Germany, Great Britain, Canada and the USA) and for the United Nations in the territory's transition to independence. South Africa passionately desires to demonstrate not only its economic hegemony in the region, but also its diplomatic skills.

Finally, when trying to understand South Africa's often contradictory behaviour in the region and towards the Namibian issue, two facts need to be remembered. First, the process of South African foreign policy decision-making itself has become much more complex and diffuse over the years.

Military, security and bureaucratic interests are often at odds, while the process and structures of decision-making have become more diffused. South Africa's Namibian policies can only be adequately understood within the context of the rise and growing influence of the military technocracy in South Africa itself. While various local and overseas scholars have emphasised the growing influence of the military in South African society,^{6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11} the role and impact of the military in matters relating to Namibia have not been adequately appreciated. Secondly, South Africa's foreign and regional policies cannot meaningfully be separated from its domestic crisis. Despite South Africa's economic, military and technological dominance in the region, it is in more ways than one a weak state. With a problematic base of legitimation and a considerable conflict potential, South Africa has always longed for the restoration of a lost *cordon sanitaire* which it enjoyed in the heyday of British and Portuguese colonialism.

Namibia: the politics of controlled change

Having concerned ourselves with some of the fundamentals of South Africa's policies towards Namibia, we now turn to a discussion of the practical import given to these policies in the most recent past. Presently, the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) instituted on 17 June 1985, forms the platform for these policies. Accordingly, special attention is given to an analysis of this body.

Spawned by the Multi-Party Conference (MPC) of November 1983, the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU), although different in composition and structure from the earlier National Assembly and Ministers' Council, signifies a basic continuity in South Africa's Namibian policies. This continuity exists in the sense of South African attempts over the last decade to establish and consolidate a viable political alternative to SWAPO and to isolate that organisation from political developments inside Namibia.

The MPC, a tactical alliance comprising six political organizations, namely the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA),¹² the Labour Party of South West Africa, the National Party of South West Africa, the Rehoboth Free Democratic Party (RFDP), one faction of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), and the SWAPO Democrats (SWAPO-D), was established on 12 November 1983 in Windhoek. Amongst its objectives, the MPC stated its commitment to 'peace, national reconciliation, independence and economic prosperity'.¹³ The MPC also expressed its dissatisfaction with the existing political and constitutional order, and pledged to devise a constitutional framework 'acceptable to our people as a whole' within the guidelines of the constitutional principles agreed to by the South African government and the Western Contact Group. These principles provide for a 'unitary, sovereign and democratic state'; the supremacy of the constitution; the division of governmental authority; an independent judiciary; a

declaration of fundamental rights, and equality and freedom in education and the civil service.¹⁴

Significantly, reference was only made to an 'internationally recognised independence', there was no unequivocal recognition of Security Council Resolution 435 as the only basis of settlement. In line with the South African position, the MPC parties implicitly accepted that Resolution 435 had been overtaken by events, that it had to be amplified and that other avenues leading to an internationally recognised settlement ought to be explored. Amplification of Resolution 435, meant that agreement on constitutional issues had to be reached prior to elections and formal independence, that the UN had to demonstrate its impartiality prior to elections and that Cuban military personnel had to be withdrawn from Angola by means of a bilateral agreement between the South African Government and the MPLA in Luanda.¹⁵

Following consultations between the MPC parties and the South African government in Cape Town, the MPC secured the support of the South African government. Having done so, the MPC set out on the arduous task of gaining recognition in Africa and further afield. Representatives of the MPC engaged in talks with SWAPO in May 1984 in Lusaka under the joint auspices of the elder statesman of the Frontline States, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, and the former Administrator-General for South West Africa, Dr Willie van Niekerk. The MPC parties proposed that SWAPO sign a joint communiqué in which it renounced violence and agreed to join the internal process with a view to resolving the Namibian conflict. SWAPO declined to do so, insisting instead on an immediate ceasefire with South Africa followed by the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435. While Lusaka temporarily enhanced the standing of the MPC, in the sense that it negotiated directly with SWAPO on the basis of parity, it also highlighted divisions within this body. The reality was that the MPC parties did not agree among themselves on an agenda for transition to independence. Some of the constituent parties, notably the National, Republican and Rehoboth Free Democratic Parties, insisted on Cuban withdrawal as a condition for settlement, and introduced the issue of UN impartiality into the equation. Moreover, lack of clarity as to the mandate of the MPC parties, and a hardening of SWAPO's stance, resulted in Lusaka achieving very little in concrete terms.

In a further attempt to gain credibility in Africa and abroad, the MPC delegation thereafter visited Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Togo, Senegal and the United States, where it paid a courtesy call on the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Repeated attempts by Kenneth Kaunda, Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and President Eyadema of Togo, to engage the MPC and SWAPO in direct negotiations in the course of 1984 and the first half of 1985 proved unsuccessful.

It was against this backdrop that the General Assembly of the MPC adopted a resolution on 30 October 1984 in which it called on 'other significant political parties, including SWAPO' to participate with the MPC in a conference to promote national reconciliation and independence. The resolution also called for the cessation of all hostilities before 31 December 1984. The resolution noted further that if the conference came to nothing as a result of a lack of interest on the part of the other parties, the MPC would engage in negotiations with the South African government about the most appropriate manner in which to secure the independence of Namibia. The MPC began to formulate its proposals in this regard on 15 January 1985. The salient features of these proposals, which have been incorporated into Proclamation R101 of 17 June 1985,¹⁶ are as follows: —

Structure and Composition of the Transitional Government

Proclamation R101 of 17 June 1985 makes provision for Executive and Legislative Authority and for the establishment of a Constitutional Council assigned to draft a constitution for the country within a period not exceeding 18 months.

In terms of the said proclamation, the TGNU takes over all the legislative and executive powers previously exercised by the Administrator-General, who henceforth acts on the advice of the Cabinet of the Transitional Government. Bills are signed by the Administrator-General who may withhold his assent if he deems the bill contrary to the provisions of Proclamation R101/85. The South African State President is empowered to veto or amend any bill that has been signed by the Administrator-General.

Executive Authority is vested in an eight-member cabinet, nominated by the National Assembly. Each party in the National Assembly is entitled to one representative in the cabinet, except the DTA, which has three representatives. The cabinet may appoint a minimum of eight deputy ministers. The chairmanship of the cabinet will rotate every three months in alphabetical order.

The following table lists the names of the ministers and deputy ministers, their respective portfolios and their party political affiliation.

<i>Minister (and party affiliation)</i>	<i>Deputy Minister</i>	<i>Ministry</i>
Dawid Bezuidenhout (LP)	G K Tibinyane (DTA SP)	Transportation
J G A (Hans) Diergaardt (RFDP)	Lucas de Vries (RFDP)	Local Authorities and Civic Affairs
M N (Moses) Katjjuonga (SWANU)	S T (Siegfried) Tjijoroksa (SWANU)	Manpower, Health and Welfare
F J (Fanuel) Kozonguizi (DTA NUDO)	Katuutire Kaura (DTA NUDO)	Information, Justice, Posts and Telecommunications
A N (Andrew) Matjila (DTA NDP)	P M (Piet) Junius (DTA RBA)	National Education and Central Personnel

<i>Minister (and party affiliation)</i>	<i>Deputy Minister</i>	<i>Ministry</i>
C F (Dirk) Mudge (DTA RP)	H D (Harry) Booysen (LP)	Finance and Governmental Affairs
A Z (Andrias) Shipanga (SWAPO-D)	Sakaria Shikomba (SWAPO-D)	Mining, Commerce, Tourism and Nature Conservation
Eben van Zyl (NP-SWA)	M S (Thinus) Blaauw (NP-SWA)	Agriculture, Water Affairs and Sea Fisheries

Legislative Authority is vested in a National Assembly, comprising sixty-two members nominated by the parties that participated in the MPC Conference. Seats are allocated on a proportional basis according to the following formula: twenty-two members nominated by the DTA, and eight members nominated by each of the other constituent parties, namely the Labour Party (LP), the National Party of SWA (NP), the Rehoboth Free Democratic Party (RFDP), the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), and the SWAPO-Democrats (SWAPO-D).

Initially the Supreme Court of Namibia was given the power to inquire into any act passed by the executive and the legislature, and into South African security legislation that pertains in the territory, and pronounce on its validity. Most recently, the South African State President amended Proclamation 101/85, and removed the latter competence from the Namibian judiciary,¹⁷ an action which dented the credibility of the TGNU.

Provision is also made for a *Constitutional Council*, assigned to draft a constitution for the country within a period not exceeding eighteen months. The Council comprises sixteen members from the National Assembly of whom six come from the ranks of the DTA and two each from the other constituent parties. The Constitutional Council will be guided in its deliberations by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Objectives agreed upon by the MPC on 18 April 1984.¹⁸

Having concerned ourselves with the environment that gave rise to the establishment of the TGNU, as well as with its composition and structural features, we now reflect upon its strengths and weaknesses.

Strengths and Weaknesses

In assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the TGNU, some factors need to be kept in mind, notably the legacies of South African policies of ethnic fragmentation, the state of the Namibian economy and the time factor. The reality is that the TGNU has to govern within a context largely determined by extraneous factors such as regional developments, notably in Angola, and developments within South Africa itself. Moreover, the dependence of the TGNU on South Africa for finance and security, tends to undermine the efforts of this body to generate its own legitimacy.

However, given these factors, the TGNU does represent an improvement over its predecessors such as the National Assembly and the Ministers'

Council, especially in its legislative programme and its emphasis upon socio-economic issues. Unlike the previous interim government, the TGNU is more aware of socio-economic inequalities and this awareness is reflected in its legislative programme. Whether all these socio-economic initiatives will ultimately be successfully implemented depends largely on the state of the Namibian economy, which is presently under severe pressure, particularly in view of sanctions directed at the South African economy. The dependence of the Namibian economy upon that of South Africa, remains a vulnerability of considerable political import.

Despite internal dissension within the ranks of the constituent parties of the TGNU over some political and socio-economic issues, this body has contributed positively towards addressing some of the pressing problems facing Namibia as a transitional society. Within this context, the Report of the National Assembly on Education, released in October 1985, does signify progress. This Report recommended the establishment of a single Ministry of Education, the integration of teacher training, and the introduction of six years compulsory schooling for all. Similarly, while the *Conditions of Employment Act* of 1985¹⁹ can be criticised for not providing for a minimum wage, it does contribute towards improved working conditions and a more streamlined labour process.

The Academy Act,²⁰ giving the Academy of Tertiary Education university status, also signifies progress in an important field vital to the training of manpower for the future needs of the society and economy. As far as labour relations are concerned, the TGNU made progress with the establishment of a National Labour Council consisting of representatives from both the private and the public sectors.²¹ While the *Rehoboth Investment and Development Corporation Loans Act* No. 24 of 1985, provides for the granting of loans to the Corporation for development projects.

To its credit the TGNU has made significant progress in the localisation of a civil service for Namibia. At the time of writing, there are some 313 seconded civil servants from South Africa working in the Namibian bureaucracy, compared with 3 500 in 1980.²² Clearly, this is an important contribution to the future administration and stability of Namibia.

Finally, the TGNU can claim some credit for the release of twenty-two SWAPO long-term prisoners, among them Eliazer Tuhadeleni, in November 1985. However, various other bodies such as the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN), had agitated for their release long before the establishment of the TGNU, while attempts by the TGNU to use their release to enhance its legitimacy proved largely unsuccessful.

The TGNU has to contend with a combination of factors that undermines its attempts to generate a legitimacy of its own, and in the words of Louis Pienaar, when Administrator-General, 'establish itself as a viable alternative to SWAPO'.²³ These factors range from security issues via the composition

of the TGNU, to socio-economic factors.

One of the pervasive factors that undermines the credibility of the TGNU is the fact that it is essentially dependent upon South Africa for its security. To complicate matters, South Africa still controls the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF), which remains an integral part for administrative and operational reasons of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in Namibia. While *Koevoet* (literally 'Crowbar'), a special police unit, now falls under the administrative control of the SWA/Namibian Police as from 1 May 1985, and has been named as the Counter Insurgency Unit (COIN) of that force, this administrative change has not enhanced the credibility of COIN in the perceptions of many Namibians. Moreover, many aspects of South Africa's security legislation, notably the *Terrorism Act*, Act 83 of 1967, still apply in Namibia. This has complicated matters for the TGNU, especially since the local Supreme Court has pronounced that South Africa's security legislation conflicts with the Fundamental Rights and Objectives accepted by the MPC in 1984. An Annexure to Proclamation R101/85, it provides for the 'Right to Liberty, Security of Person and Privacy' (Article 2); 'The Right to Equality before the Law' (Article 3); 'The Right to Peaceful Assembly' (Article 6); 'The Right to Freedom of Association' (Article 7), and 'The Right to Participate in Political Activity and Government' (Article 8).²⁴

While the Report of the Van Dyk Commission into security legislation has yet to be released, it can be safely assumed that the TGNU will review South African security legislation applicable in Namibia early in the new year. The drafting of its own security laws to replace South African legislation can be expected in the near future, while the appointment of an Ombudsman has been mooted. Clearly, the present situation with regard to security legislation is politically untenable and costly to the TGNU.

In addition to the issue of security legislation and its political implications for the TGNU, that of an amnesty needs mentioning. In terms of *Amnesty Proclamation*, AG 3 of 1980, amnesty is offered to SWAPO guerrillas that turn themselves in to the authorities. Over the past five years only 183 people have made use of this offer.^{25, 26} Clearly, the amnesty exercise has been relatively unsuccessful so far and has not made any real impact on SWAPO support inside the country. The credibility of the TGNU has in no way been enhanced by it.

Internal schisms within the ranks of the TGNU, for example over the issue of the appointment of a senior official of the Department of Justice in South Africa, Mr Pieter C van der Byl, as first chairman of the Constitutional Council, and differences over the 1986/87 budget, have done little to confirm its legitimacy. Acrimonious and costly legal battles have not endeared the TGNU to many Namibians, while they served to underline the fractiousness and sub-nationalisms that beset this body.

The TGNU has also come in for severe criticism following the passing of

the *Residence of Certain Persons in South West Africa Regulation Act*, No. 33 of 1985.²⁷ This Act controls and restricts the right of certain persons to remain or stay in Namibia, and makes provision for them to be deported from Namibia. This Act has been widely seen by parties both to the right and the left of the TGNU as a means to restrict freedom of movement, residence, association and the right to participate in political activity. In the perception of many Namibians, it has further eroded the commitment of the TGNU to human rights and democratic government, and as such, has further undermined this body in the public eye.

Similarly, the *Wage and Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act*, which prohibits non-residents of the territory from becoming officials or members of a local trade union, or of helping in their establishment, has been seen to be in conflict with the Fundamental Rights and Objectives accepted by the MPC in 1984. This Act amends the *Wages and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance*, No. 35 of 1952, which in turn is based upon the prevailing South African legislation, the *Industrial Conciliation Act*, of 1937. Another major problem facing the TGNU is its unrepresentative nature.

Significant political groupings and churches do not support the TGNU, nor are they represented in this body. While the most important opposition comes from SWAPO, various other parties have formed themselves into a tactical alliance, which opposes the TGNU. The /A-//Gams Conference held under the auspices of the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN) assembled in Windhoek on 29 and 30 April 1986. After their deliberations, the various participants, ranging from political parties to churches to interest organisations, issued the /A-//Gams Declaration in which they reaffirmed their commitment to Security Council Resolution 435 as the only basis for settlement of the Namibian conflict, and rejected the TGNU on the grounds that 'it is imposed on our people by South Africa; it is kept in power only by the brutality of the army occupation i.e. security police, koevoet, etc.; it is not elected; and it has no mandate from the Namibian people'.²⁸

The /A-//Gams Declaration was signed by the following organisations:

Churches

Evangelical Lutheran Church

Roman Catholic Church

Anglican Church of Namibia

African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME)

Methodist Church

Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN)

Political parties

Damara Council

Mbanderu Council

Namibia Independence Party

NUDO Progressives

South West Africa National Union (headed by Kuzeeko Kangueehi)

SWAPO

Interest organisations

Namibia National Students' Organisation

Namibia Women's Voice

Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA)

Although the Christian Democratic Action Party (CDA) of Peter Kalangula participated in the /AI-//Gams Conference, it did not sign the Declaration. Clearly, the TGNU is not representative of significant political and social groupings in society, while its electoral vulnerability is one of the reasons why the South African government is unlikely to risk an election under international auspices.

Finally, the state of the Namibian economy is likely to influence the political fortunes of the TGNU to a considerable extent. Not only is unemployment high and on the increase, but the issue of manpower development is bound to put excessive pressure on economic resources. With an estimated 75 000 unemployed and another 40 000 underemployed, and with nearly 80 000 refugees from outside Namibia, the TGNU faces a problem of major proportions.²⁹ Available figures suggest that unemployment in the Windhoek area alone has risen from some 287 in July 1977 to 5 047 in August 1985 (Reported in *The Namibian*, 13 September 1985, p. 11).

In addition, growing housing needs and economic dependence on South Africa limit the freedom of action of the TGNU. An analysis of the *Appropriation Acts* for 1985-1986 and 1986-1987, clearly underscores the financial vulnerabilities of the TGNU. Although the revenue derived from own sources has increased by twenty-six per cent (R743,8m in 1985-1986 to an estimated R938,2m in 1986-1987), South Africa's direct contribution to the Namibian treasury rose by R131,9m to R466,9m in 1986-1987.³⁰

Customs and excise payments from the joint Customs Union Agreement with South Africa are up from R250m (1985-1986) to R350m in 1986-1987.

Although the Namibian economy has improved in certain respects, notably with reference to external trade (a trade surplus of R342m was recorded in 1985 as opposed to a trade deficit of R72m in 1984), and the surplus on the current account of the balance of payments has increased from R140m in 1984 to R341m in 1985, the longer-term prospects, especially in the secondary sector, are not encouraging.

The continuation of the war in northern Namibia demands substantial spending on defence, which is showing a steady increase in relation to other crucial portfolios such as National Health and Welfare and National Education. For example, defence spending increased from R141 961 000 in

1985–1986 to R160 604 000 in 1986–1987. The comparable figures for National Health and Welfare and National Education for the same period are as follows: National Health and Welfare — R24 507 000 (1985–1986) and R64 726 000 (1986–1987); National Education — R64 699 000 (1985–1986) and R77 695 000 (1986–1987).

The cumbersome and expensive ethnically-based second tier system, established in terms of Proclamation No. AG 8, *Representative Authorities Proclamation*³¹ of 1980, not only undermines the legitimacy of the TGNU, in the sense that it is seen as an apartheid mechanism, but also proves to be costly. For example, financial assistance to these second tier ethnically-based authorities amounts to R314 445 000 in the 1986–1987 financial year.³² Attempts by the TGNU to reach agreement on an alternative system for second tier government have been hampered by sub-nationalism and an overemphasis upon group as opposed to national interests.

While the TGNU has the potential to remove the remaining vestiges of discrimination and apartheid, for example at the second and third tiers of government, it will not be able to structure the process of transition unilaterally. It is imperative that a resolution of the Namibian conflict be worked out by people of Namibia themselves at a truly national forum, embracing representatives of all political persuasions.

Prospects for settlement

In conclusion, what are the prospects for an internationally recognised settlement of the Namibian conflict? To be blunt, they are not very encouraging. South Africa's insistence on a firm agreement on Cuban withdrawal from Angola as a condition for settlement, coupled to its own regional designs militate against the speedy implementation of Security Council Resolution 435.

The TGNU itself has set three conditions for elections under United Nations' supervision. These are: steps by the United Nations to demonstrate impartiality prior to elections;³³ a reciprocal cessation of hostilities, and the convening of a Constitutional Conference at which all Namibian parties would agree on a constitution, including a Bill of Rights, before elections.³⁴ While these conditions may be seen as eminently reasonable, the political will to commit themselves irrevocably to an international settlement is lacking on the part of both SWAPO and the South African government. Both SWAPO and Pretoria have made a significant symbolic investment in the long-winded conflict over Namibia. Both seem only interested in resolution on their own terms. Both desire to secure a position of impregnability in a human drama involving Africa's last colony.

One wonders whether the prospects for resolution would not be significantly enhanced within a purely national context that truly envisages reconciliation between SWAPO and the other significant political groupings,

rather than within the more universal context of the United Nations. Such a context should provide for direct communication between all the contending parties on the basis of equality and parity, and be part of a more comprehensive settlement backed by the United Nations and African States.

Notes

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- 8 Grundy, Kenneth *The Rise of South African Security Establishment the Changing Locus of State Power* Bradlow Series, No 1, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1983
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- 11 Frankel, Philip H *Pretoria's Praetorians*, Cambridge University Press, 1984
- 12 The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) comprises an alliance of eleven groupings, among these the National Democratic Party (NDP), the National Union Democratic Organisation (NUDO) and the Republican Party (RP)
- 13 *Caprivi Special*, Special Edition, No 2, 1985
- 14 Du Pisani, André *SWA/Namibia the Politics of Continuity and Change* Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 1986, pp 477-478
- 15 Du Pisani, André 1985 *op cit* p 67
- 16 Proclamation No R101/85, *Establishment and Powers of Legislative Authority for Territory of South West Africa* Government Gazette, No 9790, Vol 240, Pretoria, 17 June 1985
- 17 Section 3 of Proclamation R101/85 has been amended by the State President of South Africa
- 18 For the full text of 'Fundamental Rights and Objectives', see Annexure 1, *RSA Government Gazette*, No 9790, Vol 240, 17 June 1985, pp 19-22
- 19 This Act provides for improved working conditions and has contributed to a recognition of the rights of employees
- 20 Academy Act, No 9 of 1985 *Official Gazette of South West Africa*, No 5104, 1 October 1985, Windhoek
- 21 National Labour Council Act, No 9 of 1986 *Official Gazette of South West Africa*, No 5215, 26 May 1986, Windhoek
- 22 *The Namibian*, 18 July 1986, p 7
- 23 *The Namibian*, 30 August 1985, p 11
- 24 Proclamation R101/85 Annexure 1, pp 19-22, *op cit*
- 25 *The Namibian*, 10 January 1986, p 4
- 26 *The Namibian*, 4 April 1986, p 2
- 27 Residence of Certain Persons in South West Africa Regulation Act, No 33 of 1985 *Official Gazette of South West Africa*, No 5155, 18 December 1985, Windhoek

- 28 A-//Gams Declaration Para 5
- 29 'The Economy in Transition to Independence' in Robert I Rotberg, *Namibia Political and Economic Prospects* Cape Town David Philip, 1983, p 64
- 30 The 1986/1987 budget provides for state expenditure of R1 435,6m See Appropriation Act, 1986, No 17 of 1986 *Official Gazette of South West Africa*, No 5242, 31 July 1986, Windhoek
- 31 Representative Authorities Proclamation, No AG8 (1980) *Official Gazette of South West Africa*, No 4127, 24 April 1980, Windhoek
- 32 *Appropriation Act, 1986*, No 17 of 1986, p 9
- 33 The United Nations provides funds to SWAPO and has accorded it permanent observer status, *inter alia* on the basis of the General Assembly's designation of the organisation as the 'sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia'
- 34 Cleary, Sean 'Coming of Age' *Leadership SA*, Vol 5, No 2, pp 35-41, 1986

J E Spence

Why is South Africa so unpopular abroad?

An edited version of the fifth Bradlow Fellow Address, delivered at the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 27 August 1986

The question I pose as the title of my lecture may seem so obvious as to warrant a short and simple answer — Apartheid and all its works. But even if you allow for academic long-windedness, the short answer, of course, begs too many questions. A more detailed and comprehensive one requires an account of how the international society of states has changed with respect to legal and moral values, structure and process. It also requires some account of how South Africa has reacted to those changes, and why, in the last analysis — in the view of many both here and abroad — it has failed to come to terms with those changes. What I emphasise here is how the states system as a whole and individual states within it have changed — as new ideologies, or value systems, call them what you will, new legal norms, innovations in weapons technology, in economic and political structures have combined over time to exert pressure on both the form and the substance of the states system and its individual members.

First, a brief historical excursion, to illustrate the truth of this proposition. The state system, as we know it, emerged some 300 years ago from the ruins of a catastrophic war — an ideological war between Protestants and Catholics. The system that emerged, partly out of exhaustion with the ravages of that war, was based on the principle that the state was the sole source of law, authority and order within its jurisdiction. The system was, and remains, a competitive one, with power the primary goal as well as the determinant of status. It also remains a decentralised one, with no overarching, legitimised political authority to regulate disputes between its members. The consequence was, and still is, that states have had to look to their own resources to protect their interests against the competing claims of rivals.

Nonetheless, the system's anarchic tendencies have been checked (more so, perhaps, in the earlier period of its existence) by a set of norms,

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conventions and legal rules. And the most important of these rules was the principle of sovereignty which, in effect, defined and safeguarded the status and function of the state. Moreover, state sovereignty implied state equality in formal and legal terms. Furthermore, the concept of sovereignty implied that all states had the right to order their internal affairs as their governments saw fit. And from this primary notion of sovereignty evolved the doctrines of domestic jurisdiction, the separation of foreign from domestic policy, and thirdly, the principal and reciprocal obligation of non-interference in each other's affairs. Thus the principle of sovereignty made possible a degree of order within and between states, checking what otherwise might have been a Gadarene descent into anarchy and Hobbesian chaos.

Bear in mind that this classical state system, as it is sometimes described, was essentially Europe-centred, Europe-dominated — even when it spread in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to incorporate non-Continental European powers such as Japan and the United States. Bear in mind, too, that at various times, most notably in the high noon of the 18th century, that age *par excellence* of an international, cosmopolitan aristocratic culture, in varying degree, even thereafter, the European society of states was a genuine community sharing common values and abiding by tacitly accepted conventions on the conduct of peace and war. States, it is true, went to war, but the selfconscious regulation of a balance of power, prevented any state from overwhelming the rest. More important, defeat in war did not mean the destruction and removal from the system of the vanquished party. Of course, if you were a Pole in the 18th or the 19th centuries, certainly in the 20th century, you might have taken and might still take, a different view, as the great powers used your territory as a battleground, dividing and subdividing it as the legitimate spoils of war. (In some respects, I suppose, and I'm not going to the stake on this proposition, the Poles might be described as the 18th century equivalents of South Africans, put upon by everyone else and denied any prospect of international legitimacy!)

The classical system survived even the battering it received from the French Revolution with its emphasis on the 'Rights of Man'. And for over a century until 1914, it proved equally strong enough to contain the waves of nationalism that swept eastern and central Europe. The maintenance of order in the system as a whole took priority over the claims for justice from subject nationalities, and states could, and indeed did, combine with each other in alliances regardless of ideological differences.

After the First World War, and largely as a consequence of that traumatic experience, new ideologies, new value systems — three in particular — arose to challenge the traditional values of order and mutual respect characteristic of the classical international system of the two previous centuries. The first was Liberalism. This found expression in the League of Nations and in effect, was an attempt to reform that system, by curbing state sovereignty through

doctrines such as collective security and the principle of national self-determination to provide the basis of a new international order. The assumption, understandable as it was at the time and proved sadly wrong since, was that if the world was organised on democratic principles, if states were ruled by parliamentary governments, then war would disappear from the face of the earth.

The second ideology which challenged the primacy of the pre-1914 system was Marxism. That purported to abolish the state altogether and replace it with a proletarian community of peoples. Thirdly Fascism, which aimed, simply and horribly, at the creation of an Aryan superstate.

In other words, international politics by 1939 had become ideological with a vengeance. That sense of shared community, that sense of order and civility governing state behaviour, so characteristic of pre-1914 Europe, had disappeared. To adapt Wilfred Owen's marvellous phrase: nations had indeed trekked from progress and the world in 1939, resembled that 'darkling plain where ignorant armies clashed by night', the vision that so disturbed Matthew Arnold in his prophetic poem, 'Dover Beach'. This ideological discord affected the way the Second World War was fought, the terms on which it was ended, and the new values that emerged in its aftermath. Hence, the insistence on unconditional surrender, the establishment of new democratic regimes on the ruins of Fascist tyranny, the punishment of war criminals for crimes against humanity, and, in particular, the barbarous treatment of European Jewry. All these developments represented radical departures from the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states, representing at one level, at least, an erosion of the sanctity of domestic jurisdiction — a cardinal principle of the old European state order. I cannot overemphasise the impact that the belated discovery of racial genocide by the Nazis made on the post-war value-system. The result was that human rights became a central issue in interstate relations. In particular, racial equality became a human right which acquired, over time, a status qualitatively different from other such rights.

Another human right to acquire global significance was that of national self-determination. Its standing was reinforced by the Atlantic Charter of 1943 with its emphasis 'on the right of all peoples to choose the form of governments under which they live'. Now this right had particular significance, as we shall see, for the anti-colonial struggle of the post-war period. And again, the events of World War II did much to give this particular right salience in the international system. The defeat of Britain and France during the war by Japan, an Asiatic power, convinced Asian and African nationalists that white men were not morally, psychologically or technologically superior simply by virtue of being white.

Both these demands for racial equality and national self-determination were pressed in an international climate where the victorious Second World

War powers had lost the will, and perhaps the capability, to maintain imperial rule. Britain set the example by giving independence to India and Pakistan. That precedent, once admitted, could hardly be denied or resisted with respect to colonial empires in Africa, elsewhere in Asia, or in the Caribbean. Of course the criteria for granting independence changed. No longer did governments in the 1950s and 1960s insist on political and economic viability, as they had done in the 1940s.

Thus by 1945 the stage was set for a fundamental change in the structure (the numbers of states entering the system), in the process, and in the values of the international society of states. The state, nonetheless — the dominant unit in both the theory and practice of international politics — survived as African and Asian nationalists opted to express their demands for freedom through the medium of the state. There were, of course, attempts to establish federal or confederal systems: the West Indies and the Central African Federation are cases in point, but these proved abortive.

Nationalist movements were therefore conservative in so far as they accepted a western definition of statehood, symbolised very clearly in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. Here the emphasis was placed on sovereign equality, the inviolability of existing frontiers and the principle of non-intervention. But if African and Asian nationalist elites were conservative in their choice of mechanism through which to express their aspirations, they were revolutionary in terms of the demands they made upon the international system as a whole. There were three in particular: first, the aspiration to remove the inequality in wealth and resources between the First and the Third World; secondly, they pressed for an end to colonialism; thirdly, they demanded the recognition and implementation of the principle of racial equality between and within states. These aspirations fused together to produce a new value system — an ideology, if you like — namely, anti-colonialism. And like all such ideologies it had an inherent dynamism because it had the capacity to explain the past — the colonial past — to analyse present discontents and to offer a vision of the future. The value at the heart of that ideology was that of justice — not simply within states but between states as well. And under attack was the notion of 'unjust enrichment' by which colonial powers had allegedly exploited their colonies.

This ideology was important in providing coherence for some 150 or so new states — states which otherwise might have had little in common in terms of culture, traditional and political complexion. And it is the common experience of economic deprivation and racial stigma which divides the Third from the First and Second Worlds and finds concrete expression in the United Nations and in its specialised agencies. For the First World, security has always been the most important function of the United Nations. That was why it was set up originally. For the Third World, by contrast, the UN has become a forum for asserting an anti-colonial ideology. The Charter of

the United Nations has been described by Professor Ali Mazrui as a global 'Bill of Rights' and the UN was, therefore, seen as an instrument for the collective legitimisation of new states as they entered the international system. It has been seen also as a forum for asserting the demand for economic and racial equality. And the UN again, by receiving petitions, by offering a platform to liberation movements, internationalised the indigenous struggle for independence, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. In effect, what the UN did was to legitimise the ideology of anti-colonialism both as ideology and as strategy. And in the process it elevated racial equality and national self-determination to the status of norms by which the actions of states in both domestic and foreign policy could be judged. As my old teacher, Geoffrey Goodwin, once perceptively remarked, the UN 'has become a mechanism through which race relations are apt to be transformed into international relations'.¹

The scope and substance of international law has also undergone a transformation in the post-war period, and again, this has been largely through the mechanism of the United Nations. Consider the position—in historical terms—twenty-five years earlier in 1919 when the Japanese delegation—members of a state in good standing, as it was thought—tried to get the designers of the Covenant of the League of Nations to insert a clause asserting racial equality. They failed. Consider the Charter, in 1945, where there is clear reference to fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion. In the United Nations over the next thirty years, a series of declarations and covenants were passed, largely the work of the Third World majority, affirming the sanctity of human rights and legitimising resolutions for obtaining those rights. There were many—I will only mention three: the Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples of 1966; the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.

These covenants and declarations have been interpreted by an influential school of legal theorists as a source of customary international law, binding on all states. Professor Rosalind Higgins, for example, argued that 'human rights have long since passed . . . into that realm which is of legitimate international interest . . . that specific resolutions directed at individual states have been widely tolerated as a legitimate method of bringing pressure upon a state and yet, not falling foul of the prohibition against intervention in Article 2, Paragraph 7²—the domestic jurisdiction clause of the UN Charter. This is a considerable achievement: over a forty-year period Third World states have succeeded in injecting new legal norms and new moral values into the international system, and the implications have been far-reaching. It is no longer possible to defend the proposition that what happens inside a state should be a matter of indifference to the international community. To this extent a traditional value of international politics, the

doctrine of domestic jurisdiction, has been considerably weakened and South Africa, as we shall see, has correspondingly become an object of intense international concern.

But there have been other changes beside those in structure and values, which I've tried, in a crude and simple way, to bring to your attention. I would refer to one in particular which does have importance and about which, I know, white South Africans feel strongly—the technological revolution in mass communication. The role of the media in promoting consensus on the new values which have been articulated in international society over the last forty years has been crucially important. Raymond Aron, the distinguished French sociologist, puts it like this: "The diplomatic universe is like an echo chamber: the noises of men and events are amplified and reverberated to infinity. The disturbance occurring at one point of the planet communicates itself, step by step, to opposite sides of the globe."³

Of course, the presentation in the media is highly and inevitably selective. The tone of the Western media in the post-war period has been predominantly liberal, reflecting indeed, reinforcing that post-war consensus on such issues as racial discrimination and social and economic deprivation. Equally, the media have been important in reflecting that consensus which stresses the state's responsibility to remedy the evils of deprivation and inequality; that the rich and the powerful have an obligation to help the poor and the weak. After all, would Bob Geldof have succeeded quite so magnificently in articulating that sense of moral outrage and moral obligation unless the technology had been available? And it's been very difficult, understandably, for Western conservatives to argue against this consensus. Few can be found to defend racial discrimination or economic injustice.

I would also draw your attention to the impact of the media on the tone and the quality of decision-making. One effect of the technology available to media coverage is that crises are exposed very quickly. There is immense pressure on politicians, as a result, to make quick, often hasty and ill-considered decisions. After all, the response that the politician makes has to be intelligible in terms of those new values implicit in the notion of the international obligation of the strong to the weak, the rich to the poor. It is difficult for decision-makers to be indifferent, to appear callous in the face of what appears to be harsh repression of human rights. A decision-maker facing a battery of cameras has to give an impression of control, of capacity to influence events. He cannot admit to weakness. He cannot adopt the traditional conservative view that there is no easy solution to most of the problems that confront statesmen in international politics—whether in South Africa or the Lebanon. That may be true in theory, but it's a difficult admission to make in practice.

In other words, the politician faced with the kind of pressure articulated by

the post-war consensus via media technology has to assume that solutions *are* possible. Lack of time when crises break, the pressure of the media, mean that he has to make a statement, issue a communique. The statement itself becomes news and that in turn influences events. The media, therefore, has a significant political role, as well as the more orthodox one of distributing news and information. And bear in mind that the international media are the prime source of news and debate about the rights and wrongs of international politics.

Statecraft, therefore, must allow for the sensitivity on issues of racial and economic inequality that many throughout the Western world feel. George Sheppard's superb book analysing the growth of lobbies and pressure groups in the Western world focusing solely on apartheid makes this point very well.⁴ And this sensitivity is not necessarily malicious or sentimental. An example, drawn from my own personal experience, although only impressionistic evidence, is perhaps worth quoting in this context. Some months ago an old friend invited me to Sherborne, a rather sleepy town in Dorset. Sherborne's sole connection with Africa before my arrival was the fact that its famous school housed the Swazi king, as a sixth form student. I went down on a cold June day, a typically English summer's day. I expected a small audience. To my astonishment some eighty people of all political persuasions turned up. What was fascinating about their response was that they wanted some understanding, some explanation behind the fleeting glimpse of television film they saw night after night in their living rooms. But that the interest was there is important and has to be acknowledged.

Let me turn now to the second half of my analysis. I hope I've said enough to suggest what the major changes have been in international society in terms of structure, process and values. The question I want to ask now is what the impact of those changes has been on South Africa's position in international politics. The point I must emphasise, beforehand, is that change is endemic in the international system, that no state is immune to it, that the test of statecraft can only be, in the very last analysis, the degree of success or failure with which states adapt to pressure from within and without. The state that fails to adapt may complain, may feel bitter about what it perceives to be undue and unfair pressure, but what must be remembered is that adaptation, particularly for a small state, is a condition of survival. There is no God-given law (ask any Estonian) that guarantees survival for a state in a harshly competitive state system—a system where assertion and protection of national interest is imposed upon all because of the absence of any legitimate central authority capable of adjudicating conflict over interests.

South Africa's position has fluctuated over the last fifty years. In the inter-war period, during the war, and for a short time thereafter, South Africa remained a respectable member of international society, a member in good standing in the Commonwealth. It was a faithful ally in times of war and both

in 1914 and 1939 it made some significant contribution. It had, in General Smuts, a leader who enjoyed high prestige in the councils and capitals of the West. In the 1950s and 1960s, despite mounting hostility from the Third World coalition at the UN and elsewhere, South Africa successfully kept the outside world at bay. It employed a variety of stratagems to integrate itself more closely into the political economy of the Western world, and this on the assumption that the closer the integration, the more difficult it would be for the West to disengage from South Africa. There were other strategies: a degree of order was imposed at home by harsh and repressive legislation. The black opposition at that time was dormant, its leaders in prison, banished or in exile. The Nationalist government was confident enough to mount an outward movement in foreign policy designed to win friends and influence states beyond its northern borders. The growth rate in economic terms was impressive, putting South Africa on a par with West Germany and Japan. The Republic was also deemed a good candidate for the Nixon Doctrine, first enunciated in 1969, which took the view that certain states in the international system might help the United States promote regional order and economic development. Australia, Japan, Brazil, South Africa—all were good candidates.

That period may well be described as the golden years of South African diplomacy and indeed, the sense of isolation probably seemed more apparent than real. Yet I would argue that a fear of isolation did dictate government policy. There was, throughout that period, a repeated emphasis on South Africa's *strategic significance in military terms*. There was a stress on South Africa's role as a hegemonic power in the region, protecting Western interests. There was stress on South Africa's value as a trading partner—a repository for Western investment. Certainly, some degree of success was achieved in this period, but I think the driving imperative was the fear of isolation. There was, however, one major failure—to win incorporation into Western alliance structures. South Africa, then and now, could not threaten unfaithfulness to the West, largely because of its anti-communist posture. *If war came in the southern oceans, then South Africa would have no alternative but to place its bases, its men, its military facilities at the service of Western governments.* The West, then (and even now) had it both ways.

South Africa also enjoyed a degree of acceptability, however briefly, in the post-1976 period. This was the result of the efforts of the Western powers, and in particular Dr Kissinger, to promote a settlement of the Rhodesian crisis. And Dr Kissinger was a statesman with whom South Africa could do business. Kissinger, a distinguished philosophical conservative who had *thought deeply and profoundly about the international system*, believed in the primacy of order as the key value in international politics, eschewed moralistic postures in foreign policy, and was a believer in détente and diplomacy as a means of achieving that détente. For a brief moment South

Africa could treat with the United States on terms of philosophical equality. The values that Dr Hilgard Muller, South Africa's Foreign Minister, articulated at that time as the basis of his country's foreign policy in the region: tolerance and mutual respect, the recognition of the sovereign independence of all states, non-interference in each other's domestic affairs — good old-fashioned values — were those of Dr Kissinger. In that instant of time there was a harmony of interest and outlook.

Nonetheless, this patchy record of success disguised a series of more subtle and, ultimately, damaging developments. One effect of the transformation of values in international society was to give the black opposition in this country a global constituency to which it could appeal for redress of grievance. In other words, apartheid was effectively internationalised via the instruments of the United Nations and a host of lobbies and pressure groups abroad. And a major failure of South Africa in this period was the denial of international recognition to the Homelands. That, after all, was the policy on which the South African government had pinned its hopes as a way of solving domestic problems and lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the outside world. But the Homelands policy was doomed by the prevailing interpretation of the concept of national self-determination. A series of declarations by the UN had asserted that although states had the right to choose their political systems without interference from the outside, nevertheless this right was ultimately subordinate to a higher principle endorsed and indeed legitimised by UN declarations. One in particular, the Declaration on Non-intervention, states 'that all states shall contribute to the complete elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations'. Hence, according to Rupert Emerson, a distinguished authority, the 'inalienable right of a state to choose its social-political system vanishes and is replaced by the international mandate to secure a non-discriminatory regime.'⁵ In effect, the principle of national self-determination could only apply to South Africa as a whole and not to a part — the Transkei, or indeed any other homeland. As Professor Higgins remarked, the Transkei did not meet the criteria of self-determination 'as the right of the majority within a generally accepted political unit to the exercise of power'.⁶ In terms of this argument, the Transkei was the artificial creation of the South African state and the only unit deemed worthy of self-determination was the Republic as a whole and, in racial terms, the black majority within it.

This brief analysis of the Transkei issue illustrates very clearly two aspects of South Africa's changing position in international politics. First, the impact of new values — in this case the redefinition of the concept of national self-determination in terms of majority rule. Secondly, it illustrates the tendency of the outside world to see South Africa as the last and final act in the post-war drama of decolonisation. White South Africans may cavil at this perception

of their country's position. They may, indeed, resent the double standard employed in making moral judgements about South Africa. Visiting fact-finders, visiting statesmen — no names, no packdrill — not, I'm glad to say, visiting lecturers, often receive lectures on the subject from the State President. Equally, the government often points to its record in raising black living standards in contrast to their neighbours elsewhere on the continent. This is the traditional defence that white South Africa offers.

But what all these assertions of virtue miss is the crucial sense of collective humiliation that black elites elsewhere feel at the spectacle of their South African counterparts subjected to institutionalised discrimination. As the late Hedley Bull, a distinguished scholar who thought carefully about the Third World, put it: 'for the Third World coalition, racial and national dignity represent a more vital human right than any of those things [i.e. economic and social benefits] even if those who have always taken them for granted find this hard to grasp.'⁷

South Africa, therefore, in this context is perceived as a microcosm of the struggle taking place at the global level to redress the balance of inequality between rich and poor, black and white. Hence the doctrine of the indivisibility of black freedom and dignity, for so long as the black majority is perceived to be oppressed in South Africa, the black struggle to achieve equality at the global level remains incomplete. South Africa has therefore fallen foul of two dominant values in modern international politics — racial equality and majority rule. The universal consensus on those values in the Western world explains why few can be found to defend apartheid, explains the pressure on corporations, governments, bankers and churchmen to exert pressure on the South African government to move away from institutionalised discrimination, especially at the political level.

But South Africa's unpopularity abroad is not simply because of a profound conflict of values. It has a good deal to do with interests as well, and in particular the interests of the Western powers. Events after 1976 are important here, for after the Soweto disturbances a general perception arose, haphazard and inchoate as it was, that South Africa had lost the capacity to deter violence which it had earlier possessed. It was, of course, recognised that it retained the capacity to defend against such violence. Western governments began to recognise that a more self-conscious involvement was required to protect their own economic and political interests against the worst happening at some indeterminate point in the future. Hence the doctrine of 'constructive engagement', the notion that by a variety of pressures and incentives, South Africa might change, might be moved down the path of fundamental reform.

It became increasingly difficult after 1976, therefore, to treat South Africa as just one repressive state among many. Moreover, in the case of South Africa, interest and the prevailing standards of international morality

coincided. This is what distinguishes South Africa from, say, the Soviet Union where interest and morality do not coincide. In the Soviet case, for example, the debate over the utility of trade and investment by the West has centred on the contribution that economic linkages can make to détente. Where there has been a demand for punitive measures against Moscow, it is because of the external record of the Soviet Union—the invasion of Afghanistan, for example, rather than because of its treatment of dissidents and minorities within. To push the Soviet Union hard on its human rights issues, would, it is claimed, damage both the Super-Powers' efforts to maintain the delicate balance of terror and hence threaten the maintenance of peace. In other words, in relations between the West and the Soviet Union, the maintenance of international order is given priority over the achievement of justice. But South Africa presents no such obvious threat to the peace and this in part explains why a double standard operates. And that double standard is not necessarily the product of malice and ignorance. Its use in part derives from the very nature of the state system itself, where, as I have tried to explain earlier, considerations of force and capability, perceptions of threat to economic and political interest, dictate the strength or weakness of a nation's response to human rights derelictions elsewhere.

The sanctions debate provides a telling example of how protection of interest can, and does, dictate state responses to South Africa's domestic politics. The fact that Western governments are, very reluctantly, about to impose selective sanctions on the Republic can, I believe, be explained in part as a recognition on their part that past strategies have failed. That the middle ground between doing nothing and simply relying on the impersonal forces of a market economy and the political skills of the South African government to produce structural reform—the choice between that and going down the sanctions route—that middle ground—has been eroded by what is perceived to be a profound reluctance to move with speed to the political incorporation of the black majority. The decision to go down the sanctions route, however reluctantly, is also a response to domestic and external pressures from a variety of sources, and in so responding it must be recognised that Western governments have been concerned to protect their interests, and those interests do not inevitably or necessarily coincide with South Africa's. Clashes of interests are nothing new, as I've tried to stress, in modern international society. Given the nature and structure of that society, it is as well to recognise that those who oppose Pretoria have legitimate interests, as they define them, indeed are compelled to define them, by the nature of the international system of which they are a part. The possession of sovereign statehood, and all that implies in terms of domestic jurisdiction, has certainly given South Africa protection in the past, but equally, statehood, in the absence of some universal political authority, exposes a government and a people to challenge and to danger. That is a fact of

international life. And, while in the last analysis, the state still retains the right to take what measures it can to protect its interests, it cannot expect understanding, let alone forgiveness, if the measures prove to be mistaken and ultimately damage the state's capacity to survive over the long term.

South Africa, after all, is a small state, out of step with prevailing norms. It has, therefore, no means of evading the application of a double standard. To claim that it is unfair to have to submit to the invocation of that standard by others is to misunderstand the nature of an international system where the policies of states have to be based on calculations of power and interest and which, with respect to South Africa, are buttressed by the canons of international morality. In other words, the states system and the way it works is unfair, but this is inevitable in the absence of some superior authority, capable of dispensing justice to those states whose leaders believe they are unfairly treated. In any case, the status of those invoking the unfairness of the double standard also requires some examination. It is, after all, in one sense a question of perception. A black South African might take a different view, be entitled to express some scepticism about claims of unfairness made by his political masters to the outside world.

Finally, in this context, let me cite a paradox. South Africa makes much of its standing as a Western state, and the contribution it supposedly makes to the defence of Western values and Western interests. But this argument can be, and has been, turned against Pretoria by, for example, no less an authority than Mrs Thatcher. Some years ago in a brisk exchange of correspondence between Mrs Thatcher and one of her backbench MPs, Mr Ian Lloyd, the latter complained about the fact that South Africa was always in the international limelight. He received a characteristically forthright answer: 'But since the South Africans assert that they belong to the Western world, they must expect to be judged by Western standards.'⁸ The ties of kinship to Britain, for example, the historical links that go back many decades, the common factors of a political and judicial system modelled, until recently, on Westminster, the academic tradition of the 'open' universities, the relative freedom of the Press (until recently) — all these combine to produce what a Canadian colleague of mine, Robert Jackson, has called a degree of 'cultural proximity'. And it is that 'cultural proximity' which provokes expectations that 'South Africa should comply with Western standards and procedures of race relations'.⁹ And where these expectations are not met, criticism is the inevitable result.

Perhaps an example drawn from the role of the media in this country might be pertinent in this context. South Africa, again until recently, has been a 'penetrated' state, open to the world's media. Yet Pretoria gains no credit because of the bleakness of the message that media carries to the outside world. And again, questions of perception arise for a black South African, who might take a different view. For him, media exposure of apartheid has

been instrumental in bringing his plight to the notice of the outside world.

Let me conclude. I have tried as best I can to explain why South Africa has acquired pariah status over the last thirty years or so. I've tried to analyse the changes that have occurred in the structure, the process, and the values of the international society of states. I've done so on the assumption that what was required of me as a Bradlow Fellow this evening was not bland platitudes, bland certainties or, worse still, comforting, reassuring noises. Some of my audience may feel that the changes I've described and their impact on South Africa represent changes for the worse, both in the history and current experience of the international system. Some may feel that it's a pity, indeed a tragedy, that we cannot restore the world we have lost, that world of order, civility, community of culture, so characteristic of 18th and 19th century Europe. We may indeed lament its passing, but that world went in 1914, and some, depending on their historical or political perspective, would say: a good thing too! Certainly, who could deny that the world as it is—unfair, discontented, discordant, harshly ideological in its condemnation of this country—who could deny, nonetheless, that that world has had an impact on its policies? Indeed, it could be argued that Dr Verwoerd's perverted attempt to 'decolonise' the homelands in the 1950s, the reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s, even the Tricameral Constitution, the changes that have occurred in areas such as influx control, black property rights, trade union reform—all those owe something, at least, to external pressures. Had South Africa remained cocooned in some secure, domestic order, free of such pressures, would anything have happened?

Finally, let me quote another of my old teachers, that distinguished conservative political philosopher, Michael Oakeshott, on the task of statecraft in an uncertain and hostile world. In a famous passage in his inaugural lecture, he argued that 'in political activity . . . men sail a bottomless and boundless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting point nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel . . .'¹⁰ South Africa, it is true, has managed to keep afloat. But it has paid a high price in terms of domestic repression and external hostility. Whether it can continue to do so is another story.

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* This lecture draws in part on material first published in 'The Most Popular Corpse in History', *Optima*, vol. 34, No. 1, March 1986, pp. 3–22. The author is grateful for permission to quote therefrom.

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Guy Beresford

Playing Apartheid to Win or to Lose?

An Examination of the Sports Boycott of South Africa, Changes in the Organisation of South African Cricket and Changes in Government Policy Since the D'Oliviera Affair, 1968.

This is the only thing that hurts South Africans where they feel it.

—Helen Suzman MP, Speaking in Parliament on the Sports Boycott, 22 April 1971.

By means of sport a new dimension is being given to our policy of multinationalism and to the South African set up, which, since 1652, has been in embryo what it is today. Sport is being used to create a spirit and attitude which have a positive value, a spirit and attitude which are giving new dimensions to our national set up.

—Dr Piet Koornhof, Minister of Sport and Recreation, speaking in Parliament on Government Sports policy, 18 May 1977.

... he is adamant that by the different population groups playing together the non-racial society, which is bound to come, will be achieved sooner and more peacefully.

—Jack Bannister, British journalist, writing in *The Times* (London) in 1986 on the attitude of Dr Ali Bacher, Managing Director of the South African Cricket Union.

Introduction

The presence of the 'rebel' Australian cricket team in South Africa in 1986–1987 has focused attention once again on the continued existence of the sports boycott. Conflicting views exist in South Africa and internationally as to the relevance of the boycott, given the reforms that have taken place, particularly in cricket. In an article in *The Times* (London) on 22 April 1986, entitled 'Playing Apartheid to Lose', David Miller¹ argued that the sports boycott has lost its effect as a means of enforcing socio-economic and political change, because the Government refuses to negotiate on the issue of 'one-man-one-vote', which the international protest movement has made the condition for the ending of isolation.

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In a recent interview, reported in *The Times*, Dr Ali Bacher, Managing Director of the South African Cricket Union (SACU), claimed that the SACU had more than met the demands of the International Cricket Conference (ICC) and should be allowed to play official 'Test' matches. He also claimed indirectly that the playing of mixed sport had helped to break down apartheid over the whole of society and would continue to do so.

On the other side of the scale the non-racial South African Council on Sport (SACOS) and its cricketing affiliate, the South African Cricket Board (SACB), believe that the sports boycott must be continued as part of the wider struggle against apartheid. They see any co-operation with bodies such as the SACU as giving legitimacy to the Government's programme of the removal of 'petty apartheid' while leaving the main structure intact.

This paper will address these conflicting viewpoints. It will ask the questions, 'Has reform in sport caused the Government to reform other more central areas of the apartheid system?' and 'Does the sports boycott continue to have a relevance in the struggle against apartheid?' The paper will thus consider the most important issues in South Africa today, reform and political power sharing, by looking at one of the most controversial and widely discussed topics of recent years, the sports boycott.

The Choice of Cricket as a Case Study

There are certain limitations to a study of reform by looking at the game of cricket in South Africa which should be made clear. Cricket is played the least widely of the three major team sports, behind rugby and soccer. It is not played to a great extent by Africans, except for a fairly elite group, often professional people. Historically cricket has been an English game. It was brought to the Cape by British settlers in the early 19th century. The game spread as the British moved into the interior. Often settler farmers would play cricket with their labourers, but the game spread most rapidly with urbanisation following the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley and gold on the Witwatersrand. There is evidence that Afrikaners played the game in the 19th century.² However, this interest died after the Boer War and the formation of the Imperial Cricket Conference³ in 1901, with South Africa as a founder member. Afrikaner interest in cricket only revived after South Africa had left the Commonwealth and so lost its membership of the ICC. This also coincided with the great success of the national team, the Springboks, in the 1960s which helped to popularize the game.⁴ Since then the (white) South African Cricket Association (SACA) and, since 1977, the SACU, have attempted to market the game to Afrikaners from school upward—with great success.⁵ However, among Whites the game is still played largely by English speakers. For this reason any assessment of the extent of reform in cricket must be seen in the context of a following which would be more likely to be liberal-minded than, for example, rugby supporters and players.

The reason for choosing cricket as an index of social and political change is that it fits neatly into the Government's programme of reform of the 1970s and 1980s. There are three important reasons for this. Firstly world cricket is controlled by the ICC. After South Africa lost her membership of this body an Afro-Asian majority developed on the Conference in the 1960s. Ironically these countries could not have gained membership status without the consent of South Africa as a founder member.⁶ These countries have successfully blocked all moves to have South Africa admitted to the Conference (the SACU cannot be readmitted because formerly the now-defunct SACA represented South Africa). As a result the SACU faces a very similar situation to the Government, which has to contend with international bodies such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth, both heavily influenced by Afro-Asian votes. The same applies to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and to FIFA, the world soccer body. However, it does not apply to rugby, which, as a result, has been able to avoid total isolation.

The second important point is that in South Africa cricket is very popular among Coloureds (especially in the Cape) and Indians (in Natal and the Transvaal). Due to the expense and time involved in playing the game, it again tends to be only a relatively wealthy elite which participates. These are exactly the people to whom the Government is trying to appeal with its reform programme. As a result participation in mixed sport, and particularly cricket, has become a very important issue among the Coloured and Indian communities. It is these people above all who have politicised the sports boycott.

The final reason for the choice of cricket is its close ties to the business community, through sponsorship deals. The SACU is run by very business-minded leaders who have gone to great lengths to market the game in South Africa and to inform the world of the progress it has made. This has involved huge sums of money which have been provided by the business sector. This subject will be covered in more detail when the 'rebel' tours are discussed. For now it is sufficient to say that by accepting finance from business, which is greatly aided by huge Government authorised tax concessions, the SACU has tied itself to the Government reform programme which has co-opted business with its catch-phrases 'reform' and 'free enterprise'. One has to assume that if the Government is prepared to pour huge sums of taxpayers' money into SACU enterprises, it cannot be unhappy with the way the SACU is marketing both the game and reform in South Africa.

Part One: Playing Apartheid to Win? International Pressure and Reform in Cricket⁷ to 1977

It is necessary to show how South African cricket came to be in a position where it had to change, both to make the game acceptable to the ICC and to Coloured, Indian and African cricketers within South Africa. In this context,

'international pressure' should be understood as 'isolation', since this was the principal weapon used to force South Africa to reform sports organisation. The isolation of South African cricket was brought about by a dynamic interplay between internal and external forces. Cricket is therefore an interesting case for a study of the cause-effect linkage⁸ between international pressure and domestic change in South Africa.

When looking at international pressure via the sports boycott it must be remembered that the objectives of the boycott changed after 1977, when the issue was politicised. In a recent paper Geldenhuys and Van Wyk,⁹ setting out a model for international pressure on South Africa, identified the 'objectives' of such pressure as 'micro' and 'macro'. It will be seen that before 1977, particularly in cricket, the objectives of the boycott were 'micro': changes in the organisation of cricket, whereas after 1977 they became 'macro': no mixed sport until South Africa had a 'one-man-one-vote' constitution.

In 1968 South African Prime Minister John Vorster refused to allow Basil D'Oliveira, the Cape-born Coloured England cricketer, to tour South Africa as a member of the England team. The 'D'Oliveira Affair' has been seen as the catalyst of South Africa's sports isolation, not because it was a notably more serious racial incident than others that had occurred in the 1960s, but because it happened just at the time when the international campaign to ostracise South African sport was beginning to gain momentum.

This international campaign¹⁰ was led by the South African Non-Racial Open (formerly 'Olympic') Committee (SAN-ROC), which operated from exile in London after 1967. SAN-ROC was formed in 1962 by members of the non-racial South African Sports Association (SASA) as a rival to the South African Olympic Committee (SAOC). Once in exile, after the imprisonment of some of its leaders by the Government, SAN-ROC sought to increase international awareness of the plight of non-racial sportsmen in South Africa. In this it was aided by the formation of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA) in 1966 and the increased importance of Afro-Asian countries in world sport. The threat of an SCSA/SAN-ROC-inspired Afro-Asian boycott of the 1968 Mexico Olympic Games caused the IOC to withdraw the SAOC's invitation to compete and to expel it from the Olympic movement in 1970. From the point of view of cricket, the most important manifestation of SAN-ROC's success was the creation of local anti-apartheid-in-sport pressure groups. These included the Campaign Against Racism in Sport (CARIS) in Australia, Halt All Racist Tours (HART) and the Citizens' Association for Racial Equality (CARE) in New Zealand, and the Stop the Seventy Tour Committee (STST) in Britain.

The activities of such groups as these played an important part in the two events which brought an end to South Africa's participation in world cricket—the cancellation of the Springbok cricket tours to Britain in 1970 and Australia in 1971–1972. *Despite the international outrage after the*

D'Oliveira Affair the English cricket authorities continued with plans for the 1970 tour. The STST was formed by anti-apartheid groups in Britain. Led by South African exile Peter Hain, it successfully disrupted¹¹ matches on the Springbok rugby tour of Britain to show the folly of allowing the cricket tour to go ahead. Eventually the issue escalated to include law and order in Britain (a possible election ticket for the Opposition Conservative Party in 1970) and the future of race relations within Britain and between Britain and the Commonwealth. An Afro-Asian boycott of the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh in 1970 was threatened if the cricket tour were to take place. Eventually the tour was cancelled at the request of the Labour Government.

In Australia in 1971 the protest against the tour spread to include churches, trade unions¹² and the State Governments of South and Western Australia, which promised to refuse all facilities to the Springboks. Although the Prime Minister, William MacMahon, refused to intervene, the Australian Cricket Board (ACB) cancelled the tour citing three main reasons. ACB President, Sir Donald Bradman, explained that firstly the tour would provoke unnecessary bitterness within Australia, secondly the financial and physical costs of policing the tour would be hard to bear and finally the Springboks would be under unfair pressure while in Australia.

In South Africa there was a widespread feeling of disbelief after the cancellation of the tour to Britain.¹³ However, claims that a 'vicious minority' had caused the cancellation were repudiated by an article in *The Star* (Johannesburg) on 17 December 1969 by John Hennessy, the then Sports Editor of *The Times* (London), in which he said, '... below the surface there is the main mass of a disapproving iceberg which remains cold to the prospect of continuing sports relations with South Africa on the present basis.' It was clear that this applied to Australia as well.

Once South African cricket was isolated the SACA was forced to 're-examine'¹⁴ its conscience and try to reform the organisation of cricket. In the 1960s this had been unnecessary because, despite losing membership of the ICC, South Africa had continued to play Test matches against the traditional opponents England, Australia and New Zealand. Such competition at the highest level maintained the high playing standards within the SACA and offered little motivation for change.

In 1972 South African cricket was organised along strictly racial lines. Apart from SACA, the South African African Cricket Board (SAACB) controlled African cricket and the South African Cricket Board of Control (SACBOC) organised Coloured and Indian cricket. Historically, SACBOC development had reflected political events. SACBOC was formed in 1945 by the South African Indian Cricket Union, the South African Independent Coloured Cricket Board (SAICCB) and the South African Bantu Cricket Board (SABCB). It was thus a united 'non-white' body, though each organisation was to continue to run its own affairs. The

impetus for the formation of SACBOC had come from the SAICCB. This reflected the Coloured peoples' desire for a united political front against race discrimination, which resulted in the formation of the Non-European Unity Movement in 1943. This was formed by the Anti-Coloured Advisory Committee and the All-African Convention. In 1958 SACBOC declared itself opposed to all racial segregation and decided to fully integrate its organisation. At this stage the SABC left SACBOC. To some extent this mirrored the subsequent split of the Pan African Congress (PAC), with its slogan 'Africa for the Africans', from the African National Congress (ANC) whose slogan was 'South Africa for All'. However, this should not be taken too far because the SABC's grievances were as much constitutional as ideological. In the mid-1960s the SABC changed its name to the SAACB when the Government began to refer to Africans as 'Bantu'.

In the 1970s, SACBOC was to adopt a militant approach to reform, refusing to cooperate with the SACA, believing this to give legitimacy to the Government's reform programme. The SAACB preferred a more evolutionary approach to change and was happy to accept the few offers of assistance that came from the SACA. One such offer was a grant of R3 000, refused by SACBOC, from the SACA Trust, which was used to finance the first John Passmore African Schools cricket week.

The first significant move towards integrating cricket in South Africa came before the proposed 1971-1972 tour of Australia. Jack Cheetham, SACA President, asked the Minister of Sport, Frank Waring, for permission to hold mixed trials¹⁵ to select the team to tour Australia. This was contrary to Government policy and was rejected, as was a subsequent request to include two Africans in the team, irrespective of merit. On 4 April 1971 the players in a Transvaal against Rest of South Africa cricket match at Newlands, Cape Town, walked off the field in protest at the Government's decision. A note was handed to the press supporting Mr Cheetham and subscribing to the view that merit should be the sole criterion on the cricket field. Such events, though today appearing rather ill-conceived, were proof of the growing frustration among South African cricketers and administrators at their impending isolation.

Events leading to the formation of the non-racial SACU in 1977 will now be set in the context of the broad direction of Government policy and the dynamic within Government thinking for this period. In this way the true significance of the sports boycott can be evaluated.

A series of meetings took place between 1973 and 1975 between the three controlling bodies of South African cricket. Initially there was some disagreement over the question of the formation of an 'umbrella' body to supervise the game while the various bodies continued to work as before. SACBOC criticised this idea for conforming to the newly evolving Government policy of 'multi-nationalism'.

Nationalist Party policy had historically been based on the concept that South Africa was made up of eleven different 'nations'—one White, one Indian, one Coloured and eight African. Each of these 'nations' should develop separately. At the beginning of the 1970s this policy was refined¹⁶ by a Broederbond 'think-tank' headed by Rudolph Opperman. The new policy of 'multi-nationalism' involved the granting of certain rights and privileges to each race group. Inter-racial contact was to be minimized and no social mixing was to take place.

This policy was applied to sport in a statement by the Prime Minister on 22 April 1971.¹⁷ Each nation should organise its sport separately. A few concessions were offered allowing some inter-racial competition at certain, defined, 'open-international' events. Cricket tours were not deemed to be 'open-internationals'. The policy was heavily criticised in the English speaking press for its ambiguity.¹⁸ The proposed 'umbrella' body for cricket conformed perfectly to this policy and as such was tied to the new face of apartheid. Formed in May 1973 by the SACA and SAACB, the Cricket Council of South Africa was not recognised by SACBOC.

After rejecting the overtures of the new Minister of Sport, Dr Piet Koornhof,¹⁹ to discuss plans for integrated cricket between Whites, Indians and Coloureds, Hassan Howa, SACBOC President, challenged the SACA on the question of the legality of mixed cricket. It appeared that, provided private grounds were used and no spectators attended, mixed cricket could be played within the law.

In November 1974 TCU Chairman, Joe Pamensky, announced an agreement with the SACBOC affiliated Transvaal Cricket Federation (TCF) for integrated club leagues in the Transvaal for the 1975–1976 season. The TCF subsequently withdrew from this agreement without explanation. However, it was clear that some cricket administrators were prepared to take a lead in creating the conditions for mixed cricket. Dr Koornhof publicly condemned the TCU but no action was taken. Similarly no action was taken against the Aurora Cricket Club in Pietermaritzburg, formed under a non-racial constitution in 1973. The Aurora club played on a private ground, players did not socialise together after the game and amenities were not shared.

While the TCU stance was in advance of that of the rest of the SACA, the extent of its challenge to Government policy should not be exaggerated. On 5 November 1974 the Prime Minister said that political commentators should give South Africa about six months before significant changes would take place. In January 1975 at a meeting with Coloured Representative Council Representatives, Vorster said that the Cabinet would soon discuss plans for the 'systematic and orderly elimination of unnecessary and purely irritating race discrimination measures'.²⁰ This was the start of the programme for the removal of 'petty apartheid'. Government sports policy reflected this change

of thinking. In 1975 racially mixed invitation teams were allowed to play against a touring French rugby team which included a Coloured winger, Roger Bougarel, and against the Derrick Robins cricket team which included the West Indian, John Shepherd. More flexible arrangements were introduced for the admission of spectators of all races to hotels, restaurants, theatres and sports stadiums in 'white' areas. A more *laissez-faire* attitude was adopted towards sports bodies. So the TCU plan for mixed cricket at club level could be accommodated without the main framework of apartheid being damaged. Clearly sport was an area which could be grouped with 'unnecessary and purely irritating race discriminatory measures'.

In September 1975, in his outgoing address as SACA President, Boon Wallace said, 'Cricket is a game in which a man's colour is neither significant, nor important . . . cricket is indeed a great catalyst of goodwill in the field of race relations.'

The tone of this speech so impressed Rashid Varachia, President of SACBOC, that in October he met Billy Woodin, Wallace's successor, to sort out common ground between the two bodies. A meeting of the three governing bodies was set for 18 January 1976. At this meeting the Normal Cricket Agreement was signed. Cricket was to be played on a mixed basis for the 1976-1977 season. A nine-man motivating committee was set up to investigate the formation of a single, national controlling body under a non-racial constitution. In the Transvaal the 1976-1977 season worked 'remarkably well',²¹ although there were some initial problems for the former SACBOC teams adapting to grass wickets, having previously played on matting.²² In the Western Cape there was no agreement between Hassan Howa's Western Province Cricket Board (WPCB) and its SACA equivalent. However, the prestige of Rashid Varachia in the Transvaal²³ carried the bulk of SACBOC behind the Normal Cricket Agreement.

On 18 September 1977 the SACU was formed at The Wanderers in Johannesburg. Varachia was elected President, with Wallace as Vice-President. One of the principles of the new constitution was, '... an inadmissibility of discrimination against member units or their individual members on racial, political, religious or other grounds and a full, effective and equal participation in or enjoyment of the game of cricket, or the facilities therefor at the venues by any player, official or spectator.'

It has not been the intention of this section to belittle the changes made in cricket organisation over this period. Far reaching changes were introduced which resulted in the game being administered on a non-racial basis as from September 1977. It is also acknowledged that the process had to be evolutionary. However, the thinking of the cricket administrators at no time over-reached the broad drift of Government policy, which was itself evolving over this period. Up until late 1974 no change was suggested or made by SACA which went beyond the confines of the 'multi-national'

policy. After 1975 changes in cricket leading to the formation of the SACU reflected the Government policy of reshaping the face of apartheid by removing certain discriminatory measures while leaving the main apartheid structure intact. Most importantly, the Normal Cricket Agreement made no mention of cricket at school level. Mixed sports participation in schools remains a controversial issue to this day. So, to answer the first question raised in the introduction, reform in sport did not cause the Government to reform other areas more central to the apartheid system up to 1977. However, significant changes were made in the organisation of South African cricket, so the 'micro' objectives of the sports boycott were achieved, at least in cricket.

Part Two: Playing Apartheid to Lose: The Post-1977 Experience

Since 1977 the impetus for the continuation of the sports boycott has shifted from external to internal. In late 1976 the South African Council on Sport (SACOS) was accepted as a full member of the SCSA. SACOS was the voice of the non-racial sports movement within South Africa. In order for South Africa to return to international sport the co-operation of the SCSA and SAN-ROC was necessary. After 1977 that of SACOS was needed as well. Partly due to this increased international significance and partly because of hardening attitudes among the black peoples of South Africa, SACOS became increasingly radical and militant in its demands.

In July 1977 Hassan Howa, President of SACOS, surprised the international anti-apartheid sports movement by stating that SACOS would no longer be satisfied with the 'normalisation' of sport in isolation from the rest of society. In his 'no normal sport in an abnormal society' argument, Howa took the extreme cases of a boy in Houghton and the son of a migrant worker in Soweto. He showed how inequality of opportunity in their early lives made it ridiculous for them to try to play 'normal' cricket at club level.²⁴

This placed the international anti-apartheid sports movement in a difficult position because it was a stance to which previously they had been opposed. By deliberately politicising the sports boycott, SACOS forced the international movement either to break from SACOS or to become hypocritical by aligning itself with the new philosophy. Confusion ensued. Peter Hain showed sympathy with Howa's position but said he would not 'slam the door'²⁵ on sports organisations in South Africa which became non-racial.

In cricket, the result of SACOS' stance was to undermine all attempts by the SACU to gain entry into world cricket. Only two weeks after the formation of the SACU, Howa's WPCB led a break away, mainly by Coloured and Indian cricketers, to form a rival non-racial body, the South African Cricket Board (SACB). There were conflicting claims by the opposing bodies concerning the extent of support for each. The SACU was

strong in the Transvaal and Natal due to Rashid Varachia; the SACB was strong in the Cape under Howa.

However, Varachia, though respected for his commitment to 'normal' cricket, became gradually out of touch with the tide of radical politics.²⁶ This was particularly true during and after the Indian schools boycott of 1980, which focused on Lenasia (Johannesburg). School children began to persuade their parents that it was wrong to continue playing 'normal' cricket while inequality existed in society. As a result, by 1982 'normal' cricket had 'collapsed'²⁷ in Lenasia and much of the Transvaal.

The 'no normal sport in an abnormal society' argument was backed up by the position taken by the Commonwealth Governments in the 'Statement on Apartheid in Sport' made at Gleneagles, Scotland, on 14 June 1977. The statement made clear the Governments' shared abhorrence of apartheid. They would take 'every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa'. There were 'unlikely to be future sporting contacts . . . (with) South Africa while that country continued to pursue the detestable policy of apartheid'.

Against this increasingly hostile international environment the SACU sent a series of submissions to the ICC explaining the changes that had taken place in the organisation of South African cricket. It was made clear that the earlier demands of the ICC for integrated cricket from club level upwards had been more than met. South Africa should be allowed to play Test matches again. An invitation was sent to the ICC to send a delegation to South Africa. However, this invitation was only passed on by the ICC to those member countries which had agreed in an earlier vote to the principle of receiving an invitation from South Africa in the first place.²⁸ As a result, the delegation, which arrived in March 1979, was only representative of those countries on the ICC which were least hostile in their attitude towards South Africa. The following countries were in favour of the delegation visiting South Africa: Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Denmark, Israel, Argentina, Papua New Guinea, Hong Kong, Gibraltar, Holland, Bermuda and America. The following countries asked to be publicly disassociated from involvement with the delegation: West Indies, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Malaysia and East Africa. This information was clearly stated in the report.

In its report the delegation noted the 'considerable difficulties'²⁹ which had been overcome in establishing the SACU. It agreed that the SACU fulfilled the role of 'a truly representative body'.³⁰ However, it recognised that 'sport can no longer be divorced from political considerations'.³¹ There would be 'serious repercussions if any attempt were made to promote SACU membership of the ICC'.³² The ICC therefore agreed in 1977 to the principle laid down by SACOS and the Commonwealth Governments in 1977 that 'normal' sport was anomalous in South Africa while inequality existed in

other fields. South African cricket, therefore, remained isolated.

After this setback certain people among the SACU hierarchy realised that South Africa would have to use other means to promote herself with international competition. So the 'rebel' tour idea was born. By considering these tours this paper will show how the SACU tied itself to the Government's overall strategy. In this way an assessment can be made of the role of mixed sport in bringing about an end to apartheid, as white sports administrators have claimed it will. Also, the continuing role of the sports boycott in South Africa can be analysed.

Since 1982 there have been six 'rebel' cricket tours of South Africa by English, Sri Lankan, West Indian and Australian teams. Initially the tours were not organised directly by the SACU—however, they were clearly sanctioned by the authorities. One of the aims of the tour by the English team was to prove to the world that South African money could buy international cricketers.³³ When the ICC refused to alter its stance towards the SACU, tours followed by first a weak Sri Lankan side and then, more importantly, by a strong West Indian team. In these cases, the intention was clearly to show that mixed cricket could take place in South Africa and that the sight of successful West Indian cricketers at The Wanderers could inspire a growth of interest in cricket among Africans.³⁴ However, although the tours have been a 'lifeline'³⁵ to the SACU in maintaining standards at the highest level and increasing public interest in the game, the most significant factor in the 'rebel' tour saga has been finance. Huge sums have been poured into cricket by such organisations as South African Breweries, Ambrosia, National Panasonic and Yellow Pages. In the case of the Yellow Pages funding of the one-day internationals during the 1985–1986 Australian tour, a huge tax concession was offered to the sponsors by the Government, without Parliament being consulted. It is clear that the SACU has been drawn into the Government's 'new deal' programme—with its catch phrases 'reform' and 'free enterprise'. There are two major reasons for this. Firstly the rebel tours have provided the Government with important foreign policy coups at a time when it is under increasing pressure internally from both right and left wing forces. This also applies to a large extent to the New Zealand Cavaliers rugby tour. Cricket has been used to promote the new face of apartheid. In particular it is proof that many of the old facets of apartheid have been removed. A credibility is thus given to the programme of reform, without the main apartheid structures, such as the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act, being touched. The second reason for Government's support of the SACU is that cricket is played by an elite of Indians and Coloureds, as mentioned in the introduction, who are exactly the people to whom the Government is trying to appeal with the new deal. Those Coloured and Indian cricketers who have remained loyal to the SACU are also likely to be those who support the tricameral parliamentary system.

Another vital part of the connection between the SACU and the Government has been the issue of mixed cricket at schools level. This is still an important question, particularly for some Afrikaners in the Transvaal platteland. In the Transvaal, schools are able to opt for all-White leagues. In the Cape, regulations stipulate that no contest may take place between white schools and those of other races unless every member of the relevant school authority — committee, council or school board — agrees.³⁶ As a result, the small circle of racially mixed private schools have found that a number of state schools have refused to compete against them — particularly in rugby. In cricket the SACU is desperately trying to improve the standards of black cricket with extensive and well-attended coaching schemes. However, it is not possible to talk about fully non-racial cricket, as the SACU leaders do, until there is a great improvement in the inequality that currently exists at school level. This would seem to be impossible while South Africa retains the system of segregated schools. A 1980–1981 survey showed that there was an 87 per cent shortage of sports facilities at African secondary schools and an 83,9 per cent shortage at primary schools. 72 per cent of all schools sports facilities in South Africa are at white schools. In this important aspect of South African society, the SACU's hands are tied by the Government policy to which it has become wedded.

Conclusion

It has become clear from this study of cricket that sport has been tied to the apartheid system throughout the period since the first official policy statement on sport in 1956.³⁷ In the 1960s, sport conformed to the strict Verwoerdian principle of racial segregation. In the early 1970s, it became part of the multi-national concept. In the late 1970s, reform speeded up as the Government sought to remove the outwardly irritating parts of the apartheid system, without harming the inner structure. In the 1980s, the rebel tours have tied sport via the business community to the Government's 'new deal' and an outwardly credible face has been put on the Government's programme. So while important changes have been made in sport itself (of the 'micro' variety) and while tours by West Indian cricketers have been an important socialising force in South African sport, it is not correct for cricket administrators to claim that mixed sport has helped to break down apartheid. It has only helped in apartheid's reshaping. Very simply, sport has become the front for a Government which has clearly stated that it will not negotiate on the issue of 'one-man-one-vote' and will only share power with 'responsible leaders' — as defined by the Government itself.

As far as the sport boycott is concerned, David Miller is correct in saying that it ceased to be effective once demands began to be made in the field of constitutional reform rather than just in that of non-racial sport.

However, the answer to the question of why so many people inside and

outside South Africa continue to support the sports boycott is to be found in an article by Ameen Akhalwaya in *The Lenasia Indicator* for 26–31 August 1986. In it, Akhalwaya criticises Barry Richards, the former Springbok batsman and the new supremo of the predominantly white Natal Cricket Association, for saying that he is not interested in politics. Akhalwaya says, ‘“Our side” is forced to be interested in politics. It is politics that ensures that our children have such appalling sports facilities at their schools; it is politics that forces them to be educated in apartheid institutions; it is politics that forces them to live in certain areas, it is politics that makes them second-class citizens.’ This statement rings as true in 1986 as ‘no normal sport in an abnormal society’ in 1977.

Notes

- 1 David Miller is chief sports correspondent of *The Times* (London)
- 2 Archer, R and Bouillon, A *Sport and Racism*, London, Zed Press, 1982, p 71
- 3 The Imperial Cricket Conference changed its name to the International Cricket Conference in 1961
- 4 Interview with Dr A Bacher, Johannesburg, 1 September 1986
- 5 Interview with Mr J Pamensky, President of the SACU, Johannesburg, 2 September 1986
- 6 Ibid
- 7 See Odendaal, A *Cricket in Isolation*, Cape Town, Author, 1977 Parts 1 and 2
- 8 See Hirschmann, D ‘Pressures on Apartheid’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 52, No 1, October 1973, p 176
- 9 Geldenhuys, D and Van Wyk, K ‘External Pressure on South Africa Towards a Model’ Paper read at the Conference on the Political Science Association of South Africa, Pietermaritzburg, September 1985
- 10 See Anderson, P G ‘Race and Politics in the Development of South African Sport, 1970–1979’ PhD thesis Stellenbosch 1979 Chapters 8 and 10
- 11 The poor performance of the 1969–1970 Springbok rugby team bears testimony to the effectiveness of the STST campaign
- 12 The most powerful union, the Australian Council of Trade Unions, was led by Bob Hawke, now Australian Prime Minister
- 13 Interview with Dr Bacher
- 14 Ibid
- 15 Interview with Mr Pamensky
- 16 Horrell, M (ed) *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa (1969)*, Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations Annually p I
- 17 SA Hansard Vol 33, 1971, Cols 4990–5003
- 18 *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg), 27 April 1971
- 19 Dr Koornhof succeeded Frank Waring in August 1972
- 20 Horrell, 1975, p 3
- 21 Interview with Mr Pamensky
- 22 Interview with Mr A Akhalwaya, Lenasia, 3 September 1986
- 23 Ibid
- 24 See Streek, B ‘Illusion and Reality in South Africa’s Sports Policy’, *South Africa International*, Vol 16, No 1, July 1985, pp 37–38
- 25 *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 July 1977

26. Interview with Mr Akhalwaya.
27. *Ibid.*
28. Interview with Mr Pamensky.
29. 'Report on their visit to South Africa in March 1979 by Representatives of Member Countries of the International Cricket Conference', London, ICC, 1979, p. 21.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
33. Interview with Mr Pamensky.
34. *Ibid.*
35. Interview with Dr Bacher.
36. Odendaal, A: 'Stop Padding up to Apartheid', *Campus Sport (UCT)*, January 1986, p. 17.
37. The statement was made by Dr Dönges, Minister of the Interior, after the International Table Tennis Federation had expelled the (white) South African Table Tennis Union and recognised a non-racial body in its place.

Book Reviews

SOUTH AFRICA'S CHROME, MANGANESE, PLATINUM AND VANADIUM. FOREIGN VIEWS ON THE MINERAL DEPENDENCY ISSUE 1970-1984; A SELECT AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY.

L E Andor South African Institute of International Affairs, Bibliographical Series 13, 222 pp.

Chrome, manganese, vanadium and platinum (the latter in lieu of platinum-group-elements, of which there are six) are unevenly distributed in the earth's crust: they are concentrated in a disproportionately high degree in South Africa, and have come to be recognized as important strategic elements in today's global trading of exhaustible resources. An immense amount of literature dealing with the economics and politics of these non-renewable resources has been published over the last two decades. In this volume, Eve Andor has collected 587 of such works, published between 1970 and 1984, ranging from books and dissertations to articles in professional journals, newspapers and glossy magazines. She has ably overviewed more than 95 per cent of these writings with brief annotations, from a single sentence to more than 300 words. Viewpoints of scientists, politicians and organisations such as the US Bureau of Mines, the OECD and the UN are summarized.

The bibliography focuses primarily on the dependency of the West on South African minerals, rich in the four elements of the title. Political views and scientific data of resources, reserves and production capacities in South Africa, as well as future scenarios and government policies related to these topics, are the most common themes of the selected articles. Works specifically dealing with mineral exploration-exploitation, industrial usage or marketing are not included. The bibliography is arranged in alphabetical sequence according to author or title — although this is not always strictly adhered to as in cases where large organisations or governments are 'authors'; different OECD publications, for example, are quoted under either OECD or under (partial) title of the article. The volume has an author index and a good subject index. In these times of sanctions and stockpiling, this is a timely bibliography: a must for beginner student or advanced professional interested in strategic mineral policies.

The volume has an eight-page opening chapter entitled 'Mineral supply adequacy: an introduction' by Professor T E Beukes (Rand Afrikaans University). It is essentially an historical overview of raw material supply and vulnerability, seen mainly through USA eyes. Beukes concludes that (1) in today's world such vulnerability and the cost of impact of supply disruption (of minerals) is not static, and (2) 'the ability of the imposition of economic embargoes to achieve politically inspired objectives is yet to be proven'. One assumes that the average South African who might read this article has

already attained a good intuitive feeling for the message of the first statement, following the practical experiences in South Africa over the last few years; one would also hope that they have learnt enough over these same years to refrain from expressing themselves as in the latter statement. Hopefully, this 'pressure period' in the history of South Africa's mineral exploitation-marketing will at least produce some brilliant resource economists/politicians: I am sure that this volume by Eve Andor will be in their libraries.

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TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Mervyn Frost

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986

This is an important and timely book. It is also a courageous book. Let us consider these aspects in sequence.

It is an important book because it addresses political issues on the level they deserve. It has become a South African habit to reduce political debate to endless analyses of policy options. Valuable though these may be most seem to leave the ideological prejudices involved unexamined. Too often the assumption seems to be that the meaning of history is self-evident rather than still unfolding. Politics is not only a debate about means but also about meaning.

It is this latter consideration that makes this book so timely. International politics having passed through the 'might is right' phase, has now entered the 'right is might' phase. The fact that the result is equally warped seems to be escaping notice at the moment. To expect the legitimacy of the cause to guarantee the legitimacy of the actor is as irrational as the reverse. Whereas 'might is right' implies war, 'right is might' implies revolution. The first warps the cause, the latter warps the actor. To balance these two approaches is no mean feat and Frost largely achieves it. He has grasped that the essence of morality is reciprocity rather than uniformity.

Briefly put Frost's thesis is that morality is a process in terms of which the subjects involved constitute one another rather than confront one another in terms of objective norms. In this way the objective complements the subjective and the spirit of the law becomes as relevant as the letter. Although leaning heavily on Dworkin the argument is essentially Hegelian and as such a blending of the real and the ideal. Asserting the self necessarily implies recognising the other since the one is constituted by the other. International

political morality can thus never be a process either of pure imitation or of pure dictation and this insight has, remendous implications not only for international politics in general but more specifically for South Africa's international status at the moment. International morality, like all morality, becomes impossible if the demand becomes solidarity at the expense of autonomy. The international community can prescribe the goal of power but not its source.

Where does that leave the South African state, international society and the ANC? Frost addresses this problem only marginally presumably because the book was written before the issues involved really crystallised. The principle involved is clear: The international community can constitute states but not create them, i.e. —it has a formal function but not a material one. It can decree how states should be governed but not who should govern them. The dividing line has now been reached and if it is crossed the only solution will be for the international community to institute a permanent mandate over South Africa, i.e. imperialism. Power is something organic and it cannot be stopped and started at will without sowing chaos. Ultimately responsibility is impossible without autonomy and autonomy implies reciprocity. Indeed it can even be argued that in this sense the international community is a fiction since it can only exist if it is constituted a moral person by somebody or something outside itself and it is not clear who or what can fulfil that function. On this point I disagree with Frost since a world state, according to his own reasoning, is a contradiction in terms. Morality unilaterally conceived and enforced is a tautology.

The same applies to the question of violence. Violence is morally justified in defence of the self but not in destruction of the other, hence the essential immorality of an atomic attack. Violence is essentially subjective and can therefore never fulfil an objective function. It can legitimately be used in asserting the self but not in expanding the self. Again the moral implication of this is clear: Violence can legitimately be used to achieve a sharing of benefits but not a transferring of benefits. It can be used to check power but not to destroy it. Morality is always reciprocal and any attempt to turn it into something unilateral is essentially ideological and as such morally pretentious. At that point *apartheid* creates its mirror image.

Frost has indeed written a thought provoking book. In present day South Africa it should be extensively analysed and discussed. True morality should cater for both the subjective and the objective and not for the one at the expense of the other.

Responsible politics should start with the realisation that all power is relative and every norm abstract. Without this essential humility all dialogue becomes impossible and without dialogue might and right will forever move

in separate orbits. May this book help to brush away some of the ideological cobwebs blinding most of us whenever right and might is at issue.

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DIE INTERNATIONALE POLITIK 1975–1976, 1977–1978, 1979–1980, 1981–1982,
1983–1984

JAHRBÜCHER DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FÜR AUSWÄRTIGE POLITIK,
R Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich/Vienna, DM 108

The activities of the prestigious *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* (DGAP) in Bonn in many ways resemble the functions of the South African Institute of International Affairs. Among the DGAP's many publications is the series of yearbooks, *Die Internationale Politik*. (Yearbook is somewhat of a misnomer, since this is a biennial publication.) This authoritative yearbook is highly regarded among German-speaking politicians, academics and journalists.

As one would expect from a German publication, the yearbook's main focus has over the past decade been on issues relating to the East–West conflict. These include bilateral relations between the two super powers, their respective ties with the People's Republic of China, developments in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, relations between the two German states and the activities of the European Community and its East European counterpart, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Regional conflicts, particularly those of relevance to East–West relations, are also examined in the yearbooks. The Middle East, Central America and Southern Africa have featured prominently in the latest editions.

In the five yearbooks under discussion, the chapters on Southern Africa were written by Dr Klaus Baron von der Ropp. A familiar figure in South Africa, Von der Ropp is one of only a handful of West German observers who have over a decade or more developed a commendable knowledge of Southern African affairs. Although not without understanding and sympathy for the situation of white South Africans, Von der Ropp nonetheless takes a highly critical view of the South African government's domestic and foreign policies. He repeatedly takes issue with the ruling National Party and its supporters for misreading 'the signs of the time' in both South Africa and Namibia; as a consequence of faulty judgment, Pretoria has in Von der Ropp's view pursued wholly unsuccessful policies in the Republic and in Namibia.

Von der Ropp is also one of the very few liberal Western commentators on the South African situation who never tires of emphasising that the key to liberating black South Africans from apartheid, is to be found in safeguarding Whites' 'right of existence'. It is this crucial consideration that has prompted Von der Ropp to address severe criticism to the West German government over its policies towards South Africa and Namibia. Notwithstanding warnings to the contrary from the West German Social Democrats and from the British and French governments, Von der Ropp points out, Bonn's Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher does not distinguish between the problems of Namibia and South Africa. In so far as Genscher demands a system of one man, one vote in one state for both countries, he is a 'grave-digger' for the Western settlement initiative in Namibia that he himself largely initiated.

In his numerous publications on South Africa and the region, Von der Ropp has shown that he does not mince his words. His critical yet open-minded and original approach, combined with his undoubted knowledge of the subject, make Von der Ropp's contributions to the DGAP yearbooks highly rewarding reading for any South African political observer.

Although local readers will understandably be most interested in the sections dealing with South Africa and its neighbours, the yearbooks offer valuable insights into a whole range of topical international issues. South Africans, often so preoccupied with Anglo-Saxon views of the world (from both sides of the Atlantic) stand to benefit from another — West German — perspective on international affairs. It is a great pity that, because of the language barrier, the DGAP yearbooks are not readily accessible to South Africans interested in world politics; these publications certainly deserve an attentive local readership.

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ARMED FORCES AND MODERN COUNTER-INSURGENCY — edited by Ian F W Beckett and John Pimlott
Croom Helm, London, 1985, 232 pp.

Taking as their point of departure the prevalence and 'arguably the most subtle form of modern conflict' that together characterise insurgency, Beckett and Pimlott have put together a collection of studies on the process of counter-insurgency employed by several countries between 1946 and 1985.¹

While Beckett has reserved to himself descriptions of the Portuguese

1. Beckett and Pimlott, p. 1

campaign in Mozambique and the campaign in Rhodesia, Pimlott has undertaken to describe the British operations in Dhofar (1970–1975) and the French operations ranging from Indo-China to Chad (1946–1984). The American experience in Vietnam (1965–1973) and the campaign fought in South West Africa/Namibia since 1966 and that fought against the Tupumaros in Uruguay (1963–1973) have been dealt with respectively by Peter M Dunn, Francis Toase and F A Godfrey.

The editors' purpose was apparently two-fold. One stemmed from the premise that most modern insurgency is 'communist-inspired' and aimed specifically, therefore, at 'Western or pro-Western governments'.² The first concern is thus described as being with the emergence of Western counter-insurgency theory since 1945. The second purpose was to highlight in the approach to counter-insurgency, the 'political/international [*sic*], military, socio-economic and psychological dimensions'.

These objectives immediately pose a question, since the title of the book suggests that it should be about the special character of the armed forces engaged in counter-insurgency operations rather than about a general theory of counter-insurgency. In fact the book is far more concerned with describing practice than it is with the theoretical concepts relating to insurgency. Perhaps, however, this might be because the editors could have preferred a title different from that which the publishers considered would have appeal in the market. One cannot say, but this is a phantom that haunts writers.

Books of this kind always tend to suffer from the difficulty of co-ordinating the writings of the various contributors in order to achieve some degree of uniform approach and cohesion of contents. Although the editors themselves have written two contributions each, the work suffers from the common complaint arising from the use of several authors. The various authors have each chosen a direction which expresses their own bias toward the subject rather than the commendable intentions expressed in the editors' somewhat disjointed introduction.

The weakness in editing and coordinating is revealed particularly by the structure of the various chapters which, but for Dunn's, tend to become rather long, sometimes a little rambling, accounts of the various campaigns rather than analyses of the theories and methods used. The result is that the reader is faced not with the anticipated analyses of the special character of the theory and practice of armed forces in modern counter-insurgency, but a rather loose description of events. The inevitable disadvantage is that less space is available for drawing out the lessons of the campaigns. One is left wondering whether the editors began with a clear vision of what it was they intended the book to impart. True, the need to coordinate the political response and military activities is emphasized but little else that would impart significant lessons, except perhaps incidentally.

2. *op. cit.*, p. 10

Admittedly comparison is difficult because of the wide range of factors involved. The cases deal with variations in topography, ranging from Arabian desert through Asian jungle and African savannah to Latin American cities. They deal with varieties of peoples, from pre-industrial dwellers of the countryside to urban populations. The periods in which the events took place vary and, of course, the armies differ according both to nationality and to generation. One is led to ask what the units of comparison of the various campaigns should have been. Should themes have been organised geographically rather than according to armies involved? Could Chad have been related to Namibia or even to Dhofar? Considering the way in which the teaching on counter-insurgency permits the sanguine and uncritical transfer of experience in various countries across the globe, a note on methodological difficulties such as this might have proved a useful addition to the book.

As it happens, the result of the editors' and authors' labours is less useful to the reader seeking to organise his thinking about armed forces and counter-insurgency than it might have been. The absence of the substantial use of primary sources and in most cases their entire absence from the list of sources detracts from the work's value. On the SADF, one would think that the contributor was quite unaware of the biennial Defence White Papers. No sources in Portuguese seem to have been consulted in respect of Mozambique. A strong suspicion that the authors have never been in Southern Africa arises from the chapters on Mozambique, Rhodesia and Namibia. If they have, their writing belies this.

It is a matter for regret that the editors and the contributors found it unnecessary to define terms clearly and carefully. Even a glossary as an appendix would have been welcomed. Some checking for accuracy might have done something for the reader's confidence: Kavangoland appears on no map the reviewer has been able to find and Swakopmund was still on the coast, not inland, when it was last visited in January (Maps 7.1 and 7.2). The well-known author of *Counter-Insurgency Warfare* (1965) was J S Pustay not Pushay as he appears everywhere in the book. And when will English authors discover that veldt is neither Dutch nor Afrikaans?

Having said so much that is negative, the reviewer hastens to add that this book remains worth reading. It is comprehensive, it is written clearly and in simple, direct language — mostly. And it is a usable account of contemporary events summarising long drawn out wars. It is interesting for the wide range of experience which it does cover. Each chapter contains a full account of the campaign it describes. For the South African public, so recently become aware of insurgency, some of the material would have been covered reasonably well in the press while events were taking place. For most South Africans, however, the events in Chad, Dhofar and Uruguay are likely to be quite unknown. These were campaigns which apart from scraps about Chad were never mentioned in the news media. Indeed, for most South Africans

the chapter on South West Africa would be most instructive reading. The campaign there, even for the Citizen Force and Commando soldier who have served in it, has been no more than two decades of disjointed newspaper reports.

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PERMANENT PEACE

Denis Beckett

Sage Press (Pty) Ltd, Braamfontein, Johannesburg, 1985, 153 pp.

Denis Beckett concedes in his introduction to *Permanent Peace* that, 'this book is written in haste and is very much disjointed and less comprehensive than I would like to be' (p. 2). As a consequence, the opinions and arguments expressed in the book are not always easy to follow. In this book Beckett deals with the many popular and critically important issues being debated in South Africa and abroad at the present time as to the future of South Africa.

The opinions and arguments expressed in this book are very much the personal thoughts of the author as to how a future post-*apartheid* South Africa might look and be governed. So often in the past, debates and analyses on South Africa have focused on the workings of *apartheid* and how change is likely to come about or can come about. Not much has been said or written on how a post-*apartheid* South Africa might look and be governed.

Beckett envisages a South Africa 'where all can live their lives in freedom with political contentment and security in an environment that stimulates optimum economic development and distribution.' (p. 1) The author says that if we are to be able to escape *apartheid*, we have to find 'an unusually effective political system' (p. 150) 'that will satisfy the white people of their security beyond *apartheid*. But security for Whites is security for everyone else too. Because we have that need, the system we have to find must be a system which gives better security all round than if we did not have that need.' (p. 150) In order to achieve this goal of security, Beckett advocates the introduction in South Africa of a 'comprehensively democratic structure of government' which he also refers to as 'intensive democracy.' He argues that the problems of South Africa should not be seen in terms of the divisions within society nor in the heterogeneity of the population, but in designing a political system which surmounts these divisions. He believes that a system of 'intensive democracy' can surmount these divisions and reconcile conflict in South African society.

The popular thinking in white circles in South Africa is in terms of 'we' the Whites and 'them' the Blacks. If 'we' give 'them' access to citizenship, power

and civil rights, the black population will secure primacy and the Whites will be relegated to passengers in the political processes. In terms of 'intensive democracy' the white group will not loose out with regard to their participation in the political processes of the country. They will still retain a considerable amount of power and influence in the political processes.

Beckett believes that Whites can retain power and influence through the introduction of a series of councils wielding considerable power. At the lowest level 'local councils' could be established with perhaps several to a city, and at a higher level regional councils, and at an even higher level, supra-regional councils. There would be a non-racial franchise for these councils and voters would have several votes for these different levels of government. Through the mechanisms of coalition building, bargaining and trade-offs, decisions would be made and conflict would be resolved in this new South Africa.

One of the problems with this model, as is often the case with models, is that they lack detail which in turn can be a stumbling block to their wider acceptance. People wish to know how their own lives will be affected in a society governed in terms of this model. As it is, the South African population is reluctant to modify *apartheid* institutions, let alone consider a brand new system of government. An intense amount of persuasion would be necessary to have this model accepted by the South African public.

What is of particular value in this book is that it takes the thinking on South Africa several steps forward to looking at an order in a post-*apartheid* South Africa. This book has its weaknesses, but is nevertheless a beginning and a worthy contribution to a new and hopefully growing public debate on a future South Africa. The urgency of a debate of this nature becomes more apparent as time progresses.

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Correspondence

Dear Madam Editor,

Guy Woolford in his article on the United States disinvestment campaign in *International Affairs Bulletin* (Vol. 9/No. 2/1985, p. 4) makes a most sensible statement regarding USA/RSA relations. He declares (on p. 14) that 'what South Africa needs from a United States which has had its own share of racial violence is encouragement as well as empathy.'

What is called for is encouragement in the human rights/political freedoms field and empathy emanating from the realisation that South Africa happens to find itself on the African continent. The latter fact cannot be underrated — indeed that fact should be one of the dominating issues in the whole debate.

As much as one would like to support morally the United States movement for human rights around the globe, this goal should not be confused with a policy for the indiscriminate promotion of the United States (or typical Democratic Western) political system and institutions. Inasmuch as millions of us do not deny that democratic or representative government is better than the available alternatives, one must not be insensitive to the vast differences in the historical and cultural experiences of the non-Western societies.

Constitutionalism with its corollary of political rights and civil liberties (fundamental freedoms) is the product of centuries of Western political thought and history starting with the Greeks and manifesting itself in the Magna Carta; the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution (and in the Constitutions of, e.g., Western Germany, France etc).

That is why the concept of 'rule of law' or 'due process of law' is indefinable because it is a way of life. It is a political philosophy you are born with. It is either in your bones or it is not!

The \$64 000 question is: Can the ideas of Thomas Jefferson (Locke, Montesquieu) coexist with the ideas of Mao-Tse Tung or not?

Can democracy exist in culture areas where the *individual* has not, as he has in Western culture, been philosophically (and legally) detached from the group?

Can one postulate the existence of a Bill of Rights and fundamental freedoms where *constitutionalism* (absolute acceptance of the constitution, respect for the judiciary, adherence to decisions of the executive and legislature, *due process of law* etc, as a way of life) is lacking?

If the answers to these questions are in the negative, can the missing philosophical concepts and institutions be successfully *grafted* upon another type of public order system? Can the missing concepts be grafted on to the African situation?

Is it not simply naïve to suppose that a system of international human

rights norms can or will descend upon Africa 'like some sort of juridical Pentecost'?

What are the *realities* of the situation in Africa during the past three decades, realities that cannot be refuted?

(i) The twin concepts (so basic to Western political thought) viz, *nation* and *national* unity have been overtaken by distrust, conflict and armed strife between human groupings so divided along ethnic, linguistic or religious lines that amalgamation of the various groupings has proved to be unattainable.

(ii) Constitutional democracy and a few federal attempts have been dismantled or reduced to irrelevance.

(iii) Government is authoritarian everywhere and totalitarian aspects of rule are becoming increasingly common.

(iv) Power and authority are wielded by one man and/or party. Both tend to represent one particular ethnic group.

(v) Many ruling elites come from the lower echelons of the military and in a vast number of instances include Marxist-Leninist cadres.

(vi) Changes in government are commonly brought about by *coups d'état*, attended by violence.

(vii) The presiding autocrat personifies the state. He is omnipotent until challenged by a rival contender for power. Since his hold on the state is so tenuous in the absence of constitutional rules of succession and public trust 'he tends to seek and project a superhuman quasi-spiritual mandate by resort to magic, ostentatiousness and self-bestowed honorifics'. The model for this practice is Kwameh Nkrumah of Ghana whose chosen appellation was 'The Redeemer'. President Mobutu of Zaïre is officially to be known as 'The Guide'. A previous dictator of Equatorial Guinea insisted on being referred to as the 'The True Miracle'.

(viii) The rule of law introduced prior to independence in each case as a carefully structured system of English common law or Latin civil law, has long ceased to protect individuals from excesses of power or to assure them of civil liberties or political freedoms. Arbitrary executions, mass killings and cruel and degrading punishment is routine.

Politically, African states are unstable fields of violence and have to contend with wars of succession, civil wars, revolts, religious feuding, intertribal wars, guerilla warfare, insurgency and counter-insurgency. Many of the last three manifestations are distinguished and defined in the context of Marxist-Leninism. This latter ideology proves attractive to most of Africa's ruling élites because it explains so-called 'just wars' and 'just conflicts'. It also stands unequivocally for the necessity of dictatorship and one-party rule and thus sanctions open opposition to Western norms and values.

This deterioration (or non-existence) of human rights has economic implications too. In relation to the so-called right to a decent standard of

living, the 1984 report of the World Bank points out that African *per capita* income in 1983 was 11 per cent below that of 1980 and that the African continent now has the 23 poorest countries in the world. As described recently by René Dumont: 'As Africans aren't able to pay for their increasing purchase of cereals, they're forced into even greater dependence and reduced to begging.'

It is clear that United States foreign policy cannot, in Africa, count on the evolution of forms of democracy and human rights out of the African context itself. The seeds are simply not there.

Should United States foreign policy in Africa not rather seek out those governments committed to the expansion of the Western concept of democracy and the expansion of the free enterprise system, and actively assist those governments in their evolutionary endeavours — for evolutionary they must be?

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Reply:

Professor Barrie's letter raises a host of interesting and contentious issues, to which we have unfortunately not been able to respond in this issue of the *Bulletin*. Acting on the assumption that anticipation provides the greatest pleasure, we look forward to an adequate riposte in our next issue. Readers are invited to submit measured responses.

Alan Begg (Asst. Editor)

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