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## Smuts House Notes

In 1894 the Chief Justice of the South African Republic, Mr Justice Kotze, declared that a state which disclaims the authority of international law places itself outside the circle of civilized nations. He went on to say that it is only by a strict adherence to the principles of international law 'that our young state can hope to acquire and maintain the respect of all civilized communities, and so preserve its own national independence'.<sup>1</sup>

Sentiments of this kind have guided South Africa's leaders since the time of the Union. A succession of lawyers charged with responsibility for foreign affairs — J C Smuts, J M B Hertzog, Eric Louw, Hilgard Muller and R F ('Pik') Botha — have ensured that South Africa has sought to conduct its foreign policies within the confines of international law. Indeed South Africa has on occasions been accused of adopting an unnecessarily legalistic approach to its handling of foreign policy. Here one thinks particularly of South Africa's reliance on a strict interpretation of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which prohibits intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of a state, an interpretation that served as the cornerstone of South Africa's foreign policy for many years.

Of course, South Africa and the international community differ substantially over the status, content and applicability of certain legal rules — particularly those relating to human rights and self-determination.<sup>2</sup> Although the South African Government has disputed, and still disputes, accusations of human rights violations and the non-recognition of the TBVC states on the ground that their creation is contrary to contemporary notions of self-determination, it is important to stress that this debate has been conducted within the parameters of international law.

While the Department of Foreign Affairs is clearly aware of the importance of adhering to the rules of international law, it is not so clear that the South African Defence Force shares this view. Indeed there are suggestions that it frequently acts without regard to the rules of international law and without consulting the law advisers of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In other words, the SADF seems increasingly to view itself as being above the law, to see itself as an agency of state that is not required to act within the law.

This is a serious accusation that requires substantiation. The following instances of *prima facie* illegality do, however, suggest that there is at least a case for the SADF to answer.

### 1. *South West Africa/Namibia*

The international community (South Africa excepted) is unanimous in its depiction of the South African presence in Namibia as illegal. The International Court of Justice, the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations have all labelled South Africa's occupation

of Namibia as illegal. No state in the world recognizes the legality of South Africa's administration in the territory. In these circumstances it is absolutely essential, first, that South Africa move rapidly towards internationally accepted independence for Namibia and, second, that, while its occupation of the territory continues, it acts with due regard to contemporary human rights standards. Alas, neither of these requirements seems to be understood by the SADF. In the first place, it seems clear that the SADF is the principal obstacle in the way of Namibian independence as a result of its determination to maintain a military presence in the territory. Secondly, there are repeated allegations of brutality towards the local population on the part of the security forces. Some of these have been proved in the courts.<sup>3</sup> However, earlier this year the State President himself prohibited the trial of members of the security forces on charges of murder by invoking the indemnity from prosecution contained in the Defence Act.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. *Cross-Border Raids*

The SADF has invaded neighbouring states on numerous occasions. Some of these actions might conceivably be justified as lawful acts of self-defence. However, the SADF has seldom sought to justify its actions in legal terms. Instead it seeks to explain its actions in terms of 'revenge',<sup>5</sup> or 'hot pursuit' — which are justifications for the use of force unknown to modern international law. Many of its actions cannot be justified in law — however much one stretches the law. Here one thinks particularly of the assassination raid into Botswana on 28 March 1988<sup>6</sup> and the abortive raid into Botswana on 20 June 1988 which resulted in the capture of two members of the South African security forces.

## 3. *Bophuthatswana Coup*

The SADF intervention in Bophuthatswana in February 1988 is difficult to justify in international law if one takes the view that Bophuthatswana is an independent state. Attempts to justify such action in terms of a treaty between South Africa and Bophuthatswana are difficult to consider seriously until the treaty is produced for public scrutiny. In the absence of such a treaty, this intervention must be seen as a gross intervention in the domestic affairs of a neighbouring state.

## 4. *Aggression against Angola*

It is generally accepted that South Africa's intervention in Angola is unlawful and constitutes an act of aggression under the UN Charter. Indeed for over a decade the SADF has been annually condemned by the Security Council for its 'aggression against the People's Republic of Angola'. In justification for this action South Africa has argued that it has invaded Angola in defence of Namibia. Needless to say this argument carries little weight as

South Africa's occupation of Namibia is itself viewed as illegal.

The rule of law is as important in international relations as it is in domestic affairs. There is something strange about a government that prides itself as being a government *under* law within its own territory, but is prepared to tolerate a lawlessness on the part of its armed forces in their international behaviour. The SADF would do well to recall the admonition of Chief Justice Kotze that a State endangers its national independence if it shows a disregard for international law.

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3. For a description of some of these allegations, see the Human Rights Index in the *South African Journal on Human Rights*.
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Hennie Kotzé, Pierre du Toit and Jan Gagiano

## **Sanctions and South Africa: on Dealing with Desperate Men — Some options for the US**

### I

'South Africa is the graveyard of predictions'.<sup>1</sup> We contend that this proposition will once again become operative as the effect of sanctions on South Africa becomes evident. The aim of this paper is to address the specific argument that the policy of sanctions will promote the likelihood of a democratic outcome to the South African conflict, and to argue the case for an alternative approach to the problem.

The motives, goals and objectives of the policy of sanctions against South Africa can be classified into three broad categories of people. First, those who favour sanctions for reasons of moral purity and exoneration. Secondly, those who promote sanctions for revolution. The expectation is that sanctions can weaken the regime to the point of collapse by undermining its military strength and creating enough internal dissent so as to ease the way for insurgent forces to succeed in the violent overthrow of the established order. The third category consists of those who promote sanctions for peaceful transformation. They argue that South African society can be transformed without a violent, revolutionary overthrow of the regime, and that sanctions can galvanize the regime into initiating such a process. There are two different schools of thought on how this process of self-transformation can be induced. The thumb-screw approach relies on putting pressure on *white* South Africans, steadily increasing the costs of apartheid to a level that they would consider intolerable, at which stage they will pressure the National Party government into effecting fundamental change. This model of change relies on a process of steadily mounting pressure which, once it reaches a decisive threshold of tolerance for the white population, will translate into comprehensive and fundamental change by the regime. It approximates what John Galtung called the 'naive theory of sanctions',

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which relies on a crude stimulus-response model, with political acquiescence presumed to follow directly from economic deprivation, virtually ignoring other responses such as adaptation and retaliation. A second approach to peaceful transformation can be called the evolutionary model. This relies on focusing pressure on specific rather than general aspects of the regime. It is hoped that continued incremental changes will eventually lead to a fundamentally new order.

Most supporters of sanctions for peaceful transformation agree that the ultimate objective of sanctions is to initiate a process of negotiation between the incumbent regime and its serious challengers. This process must inevitably (in their view) produce a democratic society, (although there appears to be some divergence of opinion as to whether this means majority rule or power sharing), egalitarian, stable, pro-Western and capitalistic. Indeed, sanctions '[signify] the US commitment to save capitalism in South Africa'.<sup>2</sup>

The policy based on the notion that sanctions against South Africa can induce peaceful transformation of that society, makes numerous assumptions. These include the following: an idea that the problem of political conflict in South Africa is not intractable and can be resolved; that this resolution can be achieved in a short- to medium-term time scale; that movement towards such a resolution can be encouraged through the intervention of third parties; and that the US has a moral responsibility to involve itself as such. Although these assumptions may be open to question, it is not proposed to do so in this paper. We do, however, wish to take issue with some further assumptions which include the following: that resolution of this conflict requires a process of bargaining and negotiation; that this process can succeed in producing a settlement which can in substance lead to a stable, liberal-democratic, capitalistic, egalitarian and pro-Western society. Furthermore, it is also assumed that all parties to the conflict except the present South African regime are willing and prepared to negotiate for such a settlement; that sanctions will make the regime more amenable to negotiation; and finally, that sanctions will create the conditions under which negotiations can succeed and subsequent democracy can thrive.

## II

These assumptions subsume a number of highly contestable propositions. The first one is that sanctions will create the attitudes of moderation, empathy and amenability which are a prerequisite for negotiations to be initiated. This proposition is held to apply especially to *white* South Africans, as they represent the target of sanctions, according to the thumb-screw approach. It is furthermore assumed to operate within a system of (albeit limited) public accountability: the proposition is that ordinary white South



Africans will find the costs of sanctions unbearable and then call on the regime to institute fundamental change.

This erroneous proposition is based on a complete misconception of Afrikaner political culture. In the analysis of Afrikaner political culture a prominent feature is its insular nature. Other prominent aspects of this political culture have been and to some extent continues to be a single-minded pursuance of group goals and an exclusive cultural and language-based nationalism. These features are strengthened by South Africa's political ideology of apartheid which compartmentalised communities resulting in the 'socialisation of isolation' in the majority of Afrikaners. The major agents of political socialisation that shape the perceptual maps, through which most members of the Afrikaner community interpret their political experiences, are still well integrated and consonant despite the breach of the National Party hegemony through the defection of a right-wing faction in the early 1980s.

These agencies of socialisation such as the Afrikaans churches, cultural organisations, schools and political organisations more or less deliberately generate and foster feelings of legitimacy towards the Afrikaner-controlled state, its symbols and its institutions. We offer the suggestion that at the subliminal level, at least, the 'family farm' model of the South African polity is still operative for most members of the Afrikaner community. This means that — by capturing power through their political embodiment, the National Party, in 1948 — the Afrikaner community appropriated the state as their 'own', as one would establish ownership of a farm. It is well known that any farmer worth his salt has the sole authority over his domain. Thus it is very common for an Afrikaner to speak of 'our' Minister of this or that, 'our' Defence Force, 'our' Police Force and so on, but much more rare for his other countrymen to do so. This sense of 'ownership' helps to legitimize minority rule and the demands for loyalty to the state and its institutions.

Attacks on the legitimacy of the political system are still associated with a more or less diffuse sense of undermining the integrity of the Afrikaner community and raise some doubts about the mettle of the attacker's patriotism. Similarly, attacks on the characteristics of the polity by outsiders, whether domestic or foreign, are frequently construed as in reality being directed at the Afrikaner community. This does not mean that criticism of the regime among Afrikaners is circumscribed — certainly not in private discourse where irreverence towards the powerful is vigorously expressed. The observer is left with the impression that the parameters of licence extended to public critics are set by opinion leaders in the political centre, and that one takes the cues for where the limits to the courage of one's convictions lie from this source rather than from the convictions themselves. Afrikaner political culture thus stresses the well-being of the 'own' group and its values

to the exclusion of everything which might not ultimately benefit it in the Afrikaner's view. This also leads to a zero-sum perception of the conflict in the country.

From the above one can thus reasonably expect that, despite the disquiet and anxieties generated in the larger political community by the turn of events introduced by the institution of sanctions and the threat of even stricter sanction measures, their impact would not seriously disturb perceptions of the legitimacy of the political system in the Afrikaner community. A serious threat to the legitimacy of the system will only develop if the dominant leadership of the major corporate and cultural institutions, from which the rank and file in the Afrikaner community take their cues, breaks ranks with the government on major issues (such as constitutional policy, social justice and attempts to muster support for their cause by publicly attacking the fundamental characteristics of the policy).

The net result is that the prediction by Ferguson & Cotter that '... we can, by using selected pressures, increase the cost of Afrikaner intransigence, support the internal efforts of Blacks and, perhaps *cause moderate Whites in the society to take to the streets in civil disobedience* against what will surely be increasingly harsh restrictions on their own freedoms'<sup>3</sup> (emphasis added) has not materialized. A recent Markinor Gallup Poll (25/11/1986) showed that Afrikaans-speakers blamed the government and the international community in equal numbers (22 per cent) for their economic ills. It is notable, however, that 46 per cent of the English-language respondents in the survey blamed the government for South Africa's economic woes.

The next question, given this disaffection within a sizable sector of the white electorate, is whether these tensions translate into pressure on the white leadership to concede to the demands made by the international sanctions lobby? We think not, as an analysis of the 1987 white election shows.

The National Party (NP) emerged from the 1987 election with slightly more than half the votes (52,5 per cent) cast nationally. The far right garnered roughly a third of the votes (29,5 per cent) — the CP gained 26,4 per cent and HNP 3,1 per cent, while the liberal PFP and NRP alliance could muster the support of only 16 per cent of the electorate. It is interesting to note that whereas the elections were initially called to measure support for continued political reform, the NP soon changed the tone of the campaign so that it degenerated into a plebiscite on security. The old, tried and tested 'total onslaught' theme (which includes the 'sanctions onslaught' theme) was trotted out once again.

On the surface, at least, the election results showed a rightward trend. The ultra-right trend (nearly 30 per cent support for the CP and HNP) evident in the election result is not entirely devoid of meaning in terms of class conflict. The recent downturn in the South African economy has been particularly harshly felt by the working classes of all races. The political response of the

vast majority of black workers has been a heightened commitment to the resistance movement. The white working class — a privileged coopted group — on the other hand, has no immediate tradition of working-class resistance to turn to. In the elections the CP filled this void and presented voters with visions that harked back to the days of grand apartheid. At that time this strategy saw a majority of the Afrikaans working class supporting a party promising to pay special attention to their interests. Similarly, farmers in the northern provinces have started to abandon the NP. The downturn in *the economy plus the farmers' perceived vulnerability* have soured the special relationship they had with the NP government. Like their working-class brethren, the farmers have sought a return to the political strategies that brought them affluence and guaranteed them security.

The bulk of the Afrikaans-speaking NP support seems to have come from the ranks of the civil service, the young professionals and the business community. A *Rapport* survey indicated that the NP had more support from English speaking voters (43 per cent) in the election than the PFP/NRP alliance (38 per cent) did, which traditionally had an English-speaking support base. On this phenomenon a partisan NP columnist commented that the unprecedented English-speaking vote mustered by his party at long last signalled the end of the Anglo-Boer War. One of the reasons that can be advanced for this turn of events is that through clever media manipulation a majority of English speakers were herded into the 'laager'. This could only be achieved because the electorate increasingly resented what they perceive as foreign 'interference' and fear what they experience as intolerable local 'agitation'. By 1987 this mixture of resentment and fear had become such an integral part of the white South African political culture that it acquired a potency as a political force in itself — best described as 'laager politics'.

The white political leadership has thus far been extremely successful in adapting to the pressure of sanctions by selling the Moving Goalposts Theory,<sup>4</sup> blaming the outside world for their own shortcomings as leaders, invoking the obvious double standards of outside critics (irrespective of how relevant such criticism may be) and by passing the real effect of sanctions on to black South Africans (to whom they are not electorally accountable) as well as onto neighbouring states. The regime has been able to increase its support amongst the white electorate by converting the pressure of sanctions on white South Africans into electoral support by exploiting their susceptibility to perceiving their conflict in zero-sum terms, where the choice is between outright victory or unconditional surrender. This leads to a hardening of attitudes (rather than moderation), reinforcement of negative stereotypes (instead of greater empathy), and the setting up of absolute demands. We conclude that sanctions have the effect of making the white population of South Africa less likely to enter into a bargaining process with their main adversaries.

The second flaw in the 'sanctions for peaceful transformation' argument centres on the assumptions that, first, sanctions will create conditions under which a bargained settlement can be concluded, which in substance reflects capitalist, liberal-democratic values, and second, that sanctions can also create conditions under which such a deal can be upheld, sustained and consolidated.

With respect to the first part of this proposition, we maintain that the actual effect of sanctions is to create a pay-off structure to the present conflict in South Africa which *reinforces* the existing perceptions of a zero-sum condition among both Whites and Blacks in South Africa, and therefore cuts away the middle ground of moderate opinions and organisations which is needed to sustain and successfully conclude a bargaining process, once initiated.

Consider the job market in the South African economy. On the average at least 50 000 Whites and 250 000 Blacks enter the labour market each year. Over the last five years approximately 60 000 in all of them have found gainful employment every year. Thus, at present, every black South African gains employment at the expense of a white South African, and *vice versa*. This zero-sum pay-off structure is greatly exacerbated by the impact of sanctions. Our estimates show that by 1991 close on half a million jobs will have been lost because of the effect of sanctions on the South African economy. With more comprehensive sanctions, including a trade boycott, this figure could rise to well over one million jobless by 1991.

Consider next the impact of sanctions on income levels and poverty. It has been calculated by Operation Hunger that on average *fourteen* black people are dependent upon the income of every one wage earner.<sup>5</sup> If the impact of sanctions on jobs is therefore multiplied fourteenfold, the extent of suffering created by this policy becomes apparent. Such conditions create desperation, not moderation! The basic trust of our critique is that once a zero-sum definition of a conflict exists, then costs and the concomitant hardships of unemployment, poverty and starvation serve to increase this real and perceived zero-sum condition. Against this background the rhetoric of sanctions as a means to enhance mutual trust and cooperation, and as an instrument to bring the regime 'to its senses', sounds painfully weak. All that it does (given the existing predispositions of white South Africa) is to turn an intransigent regime into a desperate regime.

Furthermore, in the unlikely event of a negotiated agreement being concluded in these conditions, the likelihood of a democracy being sustainable in a post-sanctions South Africa is remote, to understate the point.

Even without the strains imposed on the South African situation by the effects of sanctions, the prospects for the development of a pluralist competitive type of democratic regime are poor. The depth of the cultural

cleavages in this society, reinforced by the superimposition of major socio-economic inequalities along these lines of cleavage, makes the development of a social consensus that could sustain the type of mutual security needed to support the inauguration of the regime which allows an open contest for political power, highly unlikely. The forebodings of cultural obliteration, social and material humiliation and loss of political influence appear very real and persuasive to the incumbents when a yielding to democracy means bringing to power the hitherto poor, powerless and racially and culturally very different formations in society. The seat of security for the dominant racial segment in South Africa is the *State*, and as long as the *State* continues to occupy its present dominant position over the major economic and coercive resources in the society, the costs of yielding to democracy are likely to appear higher than the costs of sanctions (high as they might be).

The concentration of economic resources both in terms of institutional control and their geographical location combined with the coercive predominance and the highly centralized character of the *State* is in itself a state of affairs that is counter-indicative for the development of democracy in South Africa.

The present South African regime is highly illegitimate to those black elites who are demeaned by its social practices and excluded from its key benefits. Their influence and stature have grown in the black communities and they have used this influence to systematically weaken allegiance to the regime. They cannot be expected to commit themselves and their constituencies to the piecemeal liberalization of the polity if this requires (as it must if it has hopes of white support) accommodation to the inevitable inequalities associated with the operation of a modern economy in a Third World environment. The spirit of the democratic challenge in South Africa is populist, socialist and at times nationalist and thus not very hospitable to the deployment of liberal-democratic strategies to regulate political (and for that matter, physical) conflict.

Liberal beliefs are a declining asset in South African political culture, both on the part of the dominant white segment and their major challengers for political power — a discouraging sign for those who take a commitment to a liberal consensus as the bedrock that supports competitive politics.

It is unclear how sanctions are going to contribute to the creation of mutual security between the communities in South Africa — and how they are going to contribute to the deconcentration of capital in the economy and political power in the polity. It is counter-intuitive to accept that they are going to be instrumental in activating the spirit of tolerance, co-operation and compromise that lies at the heart of the liberal-democratic notion of political competition.

The third fundamental flaw in the sanctions approach to a peaceful transformation of South Africa concerns the nature of the bargaining

problem at hand. Implicit in the appeals for a negotiated settlement is the notion that the bargaining problem concerns finding the common ground, i.e., a range of substantive constitutional formulas within which all the parties concerned can negotiate until one option finds all-round acceptance. This perspective is fundamentally flawed and has already led to a number of failed projects. For example, repeated attempts to promote substantive bargaining on the constitutional future of South Africa have failed (the EPG mission is probably the most celebrated instance) because the contending parties have not as yet demonstrated any serious commitment to bargaining at all! Likewise, attempts to impose preconditions for substantive negotiations, such as the release of political prisoners, the unbanning of political organisations, lifting of restrictions on the mass media, and renunciation of violence, to name a few, cannot succeed before parties have committed themselves to dealing with the conflict through a process of bargaining, rather than going for victory on their own terms. Lastly, even those commentators who accurately assess the fact that the major contenders for power in South Africa still perceive outright victory to be possible, are misled when they advise a redistribution of (bargaining) power as a remedy. This merely invokes the Tragic Theory of Bargaining, where the incumbents with an eroding power position, who eventually accept the need for a bargained resolution to the conflict, end up facing challengers who, sensing themselves to be in the ascendancy, decide that they have no need to bargain any more. We will argue that these misconceptions can only be eliminated once it is accepted that bargaining about bargaining constitutes the first and most decisive step in the negotiating process.

To conclude this section, we contend, as the main proposition of our argument, that, given the flaws of the sanctions approach to a peaceful transformation of South Africa, the US cannot logically maintain a position of being anti-apartheid and at the same time pro-sanctions while simultaneously doing justice to its foreign policy objectives of advancing capitalism and liberal democracy. If sanctions can eliminate apartheid, it must be implemented within the context of a revolutionary strategy. Sanctions cannot, however, eliminate apartheid from South Africa, and at the same time save South Africa for capitalism and democracy.

### III

The fact that the US is the foremost capitalist state in the world, and the leading liberal-democratic state in the First World, is the most important constraint on US policy options in South Africa.

In the South African conflict, the challengers of apartheid are increasingly defining the issue as being not merely one of racial discrimination, but rather that of systematic domination and exploitation. The explicit association of South Africa's brand of capitalism with racism, and of the South African

business community with the apartheid regime is but one aspect of this perspective. In addition, an explicit linkage of the system of domination and exploitation within South Africa with the perceived international system of exploitation, is increasingly being made by significant opposition groups inside South Africa.

When Senator Edward Kennedy visited South Africa in January 1985, the UDF, who supported his visit, justified it by stating that 'the struggle against imperialism begins with the struggle against apartheid', and as a tactical move it made sense to 'make as many friends and deprive apartheid of as many friends as it is likely to get'. By drawing on an analogy with Vietnam it was argued that American public opinion could be mobilized to support an anti-imperialist objective. The bottom line, however, was that 'we [the resistance movement] will cooperate on the question of apartheid, but we can't be expected to cooperate on the question of American Imperialism'. The ANC took a similar position, also relying on the Vietnam analogy.

The Black Consciousness organisation, AZAPO (Azanian Peoples' Organisation), on the other hand, was even more explicit in its opposition to Senator Kennedy: 'We regard the Kennedy visit as promoting imperialism and international capitalism . . . He came here to fight against apartheid, *thus reducing our struggle to a civil rights struggle . . . apartheid is only a point of departure in our struggle . . . We are fighting against racism and capitalism and for an anti-racist, socialist workers' republic of Azania*' (emphasis added). It also opposed American attempts to promote the idea of a National (constitutional) Convention. 'It fits this diabolical strategy to propagate the idea that Reagan's constructive engagement policy and not American imperialism itself is our enemy.' In general, the AZAPO point of view is that 'the struggle against apartheid is only the departure point for a struggle against the *monolith of racism and capitalism, and imperialism needs to be extirpated root and branch from Azanian soil*'.<sup>6</sup> We share the conclusion drawn by one author that 'what emerges from examination of AZAPO's writings is a veritable demonizing of America in particular and the West in general, all under the rubric of "anti-imperialism"'.<sup>7</sup> To restate the basic thrust of this anti-American stance rather bluntly, it is claimed that the South African regime's exploitation and domination of its part of Africa is but an echo of what America is doing to the Third World. Thus, when Bloom states that 'in a very real sense, business is on trial in South Africa',<sup>8</sup> we would argue that the US as well as international capitalism within a First World/Third World context is also on trial in South Africa. If it is accepted that sanctions will not promote a process of peaceful transformation of South African society (and we aver that it unlikely to do so), then, in order to respond to the overwhelming pro-sanctions call from the black leadership within South Africa, the US as the leading capitalistic liberal-democratic state in the First World is faced with only three options, all of them with drastic implications.

**The first option** is to concede the claim by some black leaders in South Africa that one cannot be 'anti-apartheid' if one is not also 'pro-sanctions'. To many of these black leaders in South Africa this position implies that capitalism and apartheid in South Africa are inseparable, symbiotic social systems. The one cannot operate and survive without the other, and one cannot be eliminated without bringing about the demise of the other. Furthermore, this position implies that capitalism is inherently a system of exploitation, and as far beyond reform and redemption as apartheid is said to be. Finally, it is held that the extreme form of capitalist exploitation is 'imperialism', and that the most exploitative political, social and economic relationship is between the First and the Third World, between North and South, with the USA being the biggest global exploiter. In short, for a significant sector of the black leadership inside South Africa, to be anti-apartheid requires one to be pro-sanctions, anti-capitalist as well as anti-American.

Accepting this linkage also entails acceptance of the proposition that sanctions can only be employed with the aim of eliminating both apartheid and capitalism from South Africa by means of a violent revolution. This approach has high risks, higher costs, and grave consequences. It will polarize South Africa completely, with both the incumbents and the challengers viewing the conflict in absolute zero-sum terms. Such conflict can either end in outright victory or unconditional surrender. These outcomes are, in the words of Breyten Breytenbach, equivalent to a choice between murder and suicide. We envisage four possible scenarios to such a conflict: *the first*, (and in our opinion least likely) is that the revolution can succeed within a short- to medium-term time-scale. A new regime, which will possibly be Marxist, probably authoritarian, and unlikely to be capitalistic or liberal-democratic will emerge, and will endeavour to establish a socialist economy, removed from First World influence (The Vietnam analogy). *The second*, more likely scenario is that no outright winner emerges, but numerous rivals maintain a foothold within a shattered society and a ruined economy (The Lebanon analogy). *The third possibility* is that of victory for the challengers, and unconditional surrender for the incumbents after a long and protracted civil war. A new tyranny, bent on revenge for the past replaces the old one, with mass reprisals against the losers (The Rwanda analogy). *The fourth* scenario (although unlikely) is that the incumbents end up victorious, exacting unconditional surrender from the challengers. The existing tyranny reasserts itself, and entrenches its position also with mass reprisals against the unsuccessful rebels (the Burundi analogy). In no event, however, do we see any outcome which collectively embodies all the features of a capitalistic, stable, egalitarian, pro-Western liberal-democratic society in the post-apartheid and post-sanctions South Africa.



**The second option** for the US would be to contest the claim that First World/Third World relations in general, and those of American companies who deal with oppressed people inside South Africa in particular, are inherently exploitative, and that international capitalism is the highest form of exploitation (imperialism); to contest the claim that capitalism in principle is a system of exploitation, and in particular cases where it is exploitative, that it cannot be remedied and reformed; and to contest the claim that the exploitative and repressive system of apartheid is symbiotically linked both to domestic capitalism inside South Africa, and to international capitalism.

In order to do this, the US will have to prove that *enlightened self-interest* for capitalism in general, and American capitalism in particular, is not an empty catch-phrase. (South African big business will have to prove the same, irrespective of US policy towards South Africa, i.e. with or without sanctions). US companies will have to prove that *socially responsible investment* is possible, and they will have to prove that capitalism is a worthwhile system for the Third World on the basis of *real structural changes* to the South African economic system. Only then can capitalism outbid the radical Third Worldism of the revolutionary socialists inside (and outside) South Africa.

If the US is to meet this challenge, it will have to move beyond sanctions, beyond Sullivan codes of employment practice, beyond constructive engagement and *massively* (although selectively) reinvest in the South African economy. Nothing less than a *Marshall Plan for the Third World* needs to be implemented in Southern Africa.<sup>9</sup> We readily concede that to invest in Africa in the 1980s is a far less lucrative proposition than it was to invest in Europe after World War II. Even after the war the levels of technological skill, physical infrastructure, industrial capacity and hence potential profitability of Europe far exceeded that of most African states today. The challenge to face up to, however, is similar in one respect. Capitalism will have to prove itself by actually delivering the goods. In another respect the challenge is far more daunting than it was in post-war Europe. Capitalism will have to prove itself *amidst* and *not after* a political and military contest for power in the region. Herein lies the crux of our argument: to withdraw from the arena until after the political conflict has been decided, in the hope of having a 'significant role to play' afterwards, is a naive form of self-delusion. 'Withdrawal' by means of sanctions can contribute to creating conditions which preclude the possibility of any US presence being influential. We argue that the political and economic conflicts are being contested simultaneously, with the values of liberal democratic capitalism having to measure up to both those of the apartheid regime, and the Third World revolutionary socialism. The Marshall plan option is the only way in which the existing zero-sum conceptions of the conflict by both the incumbents and the challengers inside

South Africa can be broken down. More importantly, it is the only way in which black bargaining power can be increased enough for them to effectively negotiate for democracy in South Africa.

**The third option** for the US would be to try to enact the worst-case scenario foreseen by Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien, namely the deployment of a full-scale military blockade, sending in the Marines, and pointing a gun at the head of P W Botha, forcing him to negotiate a deal with his adversaries (the Grenada analogy). In the unlikely event of this happening, the US will also have to budget for a long-term occupation force to uphold such an agreement, which all parties will, at best, accept grudgingly.

#### IV

How can massive reinvestment in the South African economy favour black bargaining power and make a negotiated democratic outcome to the conflict more likely? The experience over the last number of decades, and especially during the era of constructive engagement appears to provide overwhelming evidence to support the opposite conclusion: investment strengthens the regime, and makes the apartheid rulers more smug and arrogant in their position of power.

We suggest that much of the policy advice and implementation surrounding the 'politics of negotiation' inside South Africa thus far has been misguided and ineffective, and at times even counterproductive, because the nature of the bargaining problem at hand has yet to be clearly thought through. The problem is to induce adversaries to negotiate when they prefer not to do so. Instead both the regime and its more radical challengers prefer (and still perceive this to be achievable) to win on their own terms. The first and most important stage in the process of conflict resolution, therefore, consists of *bargaining about bargaining*: to persuade all the parties that the best way of dealing with the conflict is by negotiation, rather than by each trying to impose their own will.

We suggest that at the core of this debate lies the question of the nature of the conflict. As long as one or more of the parties perceive it to be a zero-sum conflict, with total victory and total surrender as the only possible outcomes, the conflict cannot be negotiable. Conflicts which can either be won or lost in absolute terms leave nothing to negotiate about. Only if alternative solutions are seen, such as the possibility of all parties prospering or failing together, (i.e. a non-zero-sum conflict), does the conflict become potentially negotiable.<sup>10</sup> The key objective in bargaining about bargaining is to establish a shared perception amongst all the contenders that the nature of the conflict involves a non-zero-sum pay-off structure.

Only *after* all parties to the conflict have committed themselves to bargaining itself can the next stage, i.e. *preliminary bargaining* proceed. This

involves negotiating about tactics, agendas, preconditions and arenas for *substantive bargaining*. Successful bargaining about bargaining is a *prerequisite* for preliminary bargaining. This is probably one of the biggest blind spots in the current advice being offered to South Africans on how to deal with their own future. Persistent demands that political prisoners be released, banned organisations be legalised, or press restrictions be lifted in order to 'create a climate for negotiations' are largely futile. All it will do is to induce the Tragic Theory of Bargaining. The *climate* for negotiations must be created before the questions of preconditions, agendas, tactics (especially the issue of violence) and arenas for substantive bargaining can be addressed.

Once these issues have been settled, through negotiation, *substantive bargaining* about the issues which created the original conflict of interest can be initiated. Although these three stages of bargaining are analytically distinct, and can (and often will) be linked for tactical reasons, we feel that as far as useful policy advice is concerned, they serve to clarify some confusing prescriptions on the theme of negotiations.

The most important shortcoming of all is the fact that the current debate on bargaining/negotiation is virtually devoid of any analytical perspective on what comprises the *bargaining power* of the main contenders for power inside South Africa. We subscribe to the view that the bargaining power of negotiators is derived from the resource context within which the conflict occurs and is determined by the dependence relationships between the opposing parties. The core proposition of this perspective is that 'An increase in the dependence of bargainer A on opponent B increases opponent B's bargaining power'.<sup>11</sup>

A final and even more basic aspect of bargaining and negotiation which is often overlooked, is that it involves an interactive process of reciprocal contingency, where the decisions and actions of each negotiator are calculated on the expected responses by his opponent upon these actions. This occurs in situations where the outcomes of each negotiator's actions are at least partially controlled by his opponent.<sup>12</sup> The important implication for *Third Parties who decide to involve themselves in such a relationship*, is that an approach to any one of the contenders immediately influences the perceptions, decisions and actions of his opponent. Third Party mediation, therefore, needs to address all contending parties simultaneously.

Given the analytical perspective on bargaining and negotiation, how can the Marshall Plan option contribute to a negotiated resolution to the conflict inside South Africa? *First*, massive capital reinvestment in labour-intensive industries, which result in more jobs, higher living standards and incomes, can supplant poverty, unemployment and destitution for the support groups of *both* the incumbents and the challengers. If black and white South Africans can find economic prosperity together instead of the one group achieving it at the expense of the other, it becomes so much easier for political leaders to

convince their followers that the conflict is not a zero-sum contest. *Secondly*, in the field of capital redistribution, newly invested capital can be distributed in stocks and shares to every employee as a standard item in his conditions of employment, enabling companies to broaden the base of their corporate membership,<sup>13</sup> thereby expanding the definition of the private sector to include labour as well as capital. Socially responsible investment on the scale of the recent proposal by BP SA on the re-development of District Six in Cape Town is equally noteworthy.<sup>14</sup> Finally, the business sector must not only grow and prosper, so as to create conditions which can be used in a process of bargaining about bargaining, but the (redefined) business community must use its bargaining power to serve an ultimatum in order to get a fundamental commitment to bargaining itself from both the incumbents and the challengers. In this context the bargaining power of the various components of the private sector is of pivotal importance. The most important sector is arguably that of organised black labour. We claim that a Marshall Plan option will massively increase the *dependence* of capital as well as the regime on black labour, and the bargaining power of those organisations which have their power base there, will be enormously enhanced. With a stagnant, or collapsing economy, the converse applies: the regime with its control over resources gains bargaining power at the expense of both labour and capital.

As for the question of how this new bargaining power can be utilized to appropriate effect, outsiders as well as their fellow citizens need to pay some 'cognitive respect' to black South Africans. The latter possess an instinctive understanding and grasp of their own strategic position and its tactical advantages. Lastly, the US as an involved Third Party, should recognise that relationships of reciprocal contingency apply, and should extend a 'parallel set of diplomatic relationships'<sup>15</sup> to both the incumbents and the challengers. This network of communication should extend across the rival leadership groupings as well as into their respective support bases, encouraging leaders to convince their opponents, as well as their own followers, that 'less is more', that compromise is not capitulation, and that moderation is not cowardice. It is self-evident that scaled down diplomatic representation, as a concomitant to cultural and academic boycotts, merely increases the isolation of the antagonists from each other, feeding and strengthening the myopic and parochial perspectives which serve the needs of those political entrepreneurs with a vested interest in a polarized society.

In sum, we support neither the conventional 'liberal' view that orthodox economic growth will automatically lead to a breakdown of racial barriers and an equitable share in the country's wealth for all South Africans, nor the orthodox 'radical' view that economic growth necessarily entrenches the privileged position of Whites and, therefore, economic recession, not to say collapse, is a necessary requirement for removing the present political

system. We do argue that economic growth increases the potential bargaining power of some of the most important challengers in South Africa, relative to that of the incumbents, and creates opportunities where this power potential, if skilfully deployed, can produce a fundamentally different power equation inside South Africa. There is, however, nothing automatic or inevitable about this process.

## V

We modestly claim that our proposals measure up to the requirements of common sense. Our conclusion is that a fully implemented policy of sanctions against South Africa increases the likelihood of a violent confrontation between the incumbents and certain challengers, compelling the challengers to take on the regime where it is the strongest: we all know that the regime can comprehensively outgun its opponents at this stage. Thus, in a violent confrontation the possibility exists that the regime may win, and reassert itself. Irrespective of who wins and who loses, such a confrontation inevitably produces poverty—poor winners and poor losers.

The Marshall Plan option for Southern Africa *does not* decrease the likelihood of conflict, but it does provide an arena where bargaining power becomes more appropriate than coercive power. In fact, it can diminish the need for coercive power. In this context Henry Kissinger's comment on the US nuclear arsenal could be said to apply with equal force to the military might of the South African regime: 'Power has never been greater, and it has never been less useful'.<sup>16</sup> In a bargained conflict in the South African context it is more likely that the challengers will emerge as winners than in the case of violent conflict. In the arena of the Marshall Plan option, the outcome will produce both rich winners and rich losers. In such a conflict the present rulers and their followers will be far less recalcitrant: the prospect of being rich, powerless and integrated is far more attractive than the prospect of being poor, powerless and integrated. The rich winners will be more likely to be magnanimous, and less likely to insist on revenge. The rich losers will be more likely to be loyal, to consider the new regime legitimate, and less likely to act as a subversive force bent on retribution.

The options we offer to the US in Southern Africa all involve drastic actions and commitments. We do not consider that any muddling through will be able to produce satisfactory tangible results for anybody interested in the South African issue. We acknowledge that the US is once again faced with a dilemma similar to that with which it had to deal in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran, Nicaragua and Grenada. The problem is that 'we live in an imperfect world that is bettered only with great difficulty and easily made worse—much worse'.<sup>17</sup> The crucial challenge for the US is not merely to eliminate apartheid from South Africa, but also to replace it with something better—not worse.

## End Notes

1. The coining of this phrase is attributed to the American sociologist Pierre van den Berghe. See Bloom, J B, *Black South Africa and the Disinvestment Debate*, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1986, p. 33.
2. Adam, H 'Options for Transforming South Africa', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 40, No. 2, Winter/Spring 1987, p. 295.
3. Ferguson, C and W R Cotter 'South Africa: What is to be done?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 2, January 1978, p. 273.
4. The proposition underlying this theory is that as soon as the demands of the international sanctions lobby are met, they are replaced by further, more stringent demands. The lesson to be drawn from this, according to the exponents of this theory, is that compliance does not remove pressure, but merely compounds it.
5. Operation Hunger is a non-profit private sector organisation created to alleviate conditions of starvation among the poor inside South Africa, primarily through the financing of self-help projects. See Bloom, *op. cit.*, p. 212.
6. These organisations are quoted in Bloom, *op. cit.*, pp. 87, 88, 89, 108. INKATHA arguably represents the most consistent opposing viewpoint within black politics, as far as the sanctions issue is concerned.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 239. We rely on a number of this author's arguments in the following section.
9. The regional context cannot be ignored. Any notion that the effects of economic warfare against South Africa can be stopped at its borders completely underestimates the economic, geographic, political and military interrelatedness of the region.
10. One of the more elegant expositions of how such a non-zero-sum conflict can provide a basis for conflict resolution is provided by Robert Axelrod in *The Evolution of Cooperation*, New York: Basic Books, 1984.
11. Bacharach, S B and E J Lawler, *Bargaining: Power, Tactics and Outcomes*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1981, p. 61.
12. Young, O R (ed), *Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation*, Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1975, pp. 3-19.
13. The Standard Bank Investment Corporation (Stanbic) recently announced an offer of three million shares to customers and staff, of which one million shares will be privately placed with black customers. This is in line with similar schemes by the Anglo-American Corporation and the Pick 'n Pay Group. *The Star National Weekly*, 13 October 1987, p. 19. Needless to say, these moves have been met with derision by those organisations with a vested interest in polarizing South Africa.
14. *The High Road*, Cape Town: A Leadership Publication, 1987.
15. Ungar, S J and P Vale 'South Africa: Why Constructive Engagement Failed', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 2, Winter 1985-1986, p. 237.
16. Quoted in Cox, J *Overkill*, New York: Penguin Books, 1977, p. 99.
17. Collier, P and D Horowitz 'Who killed the Spirit of '68' *Encounter*, September/October 1985, p. 73.

## **The International Community and South Africa: Penetration, Intervention and Isolation**

South Africa has for nearly four decades now been subjected to the seemingly contradictory external forces of penetration, intervention and isolation. *Foreign states simultaneously pursue policies of engagement and disengagement vis-à-vis South Africa.*

Some countries wish to maintain a 'presence' in the Republic, whether diplomatic, economic or socio-cultural. This type of involvement, a universal phenomenon, can be classified as penetration. It is a state of affairs that the South African government desires, accepts or at least acquiesces in. Intervention is a form of coercive and thus unwelcome foreign involvement, designed to compel the South African government, in the first instance, to change its behaviour. Some of the penetrating states also practice intervention and they relate their techniques of intervention to the nature of their penetration of South African society. Other interventionist actors have no comparable ties with the Republic. Isolation is another way in which foreign actors try to coerce groups or targets in South Africa into altering their behaviour. Existing ties with the Republic are curtailed or severed and no new links are established. This kind of disengagement means reducing external penetration and also forfeiting some instruments of peaceful intervention.

The themes of penetration, intervention and isolation have, at least in combination, received scant scholarly attention in the voluminous literature on the international community's relations with South Africa. The object of the present study is to draw the outlines of an alternative framework for the analysis of South Africa's international relations, focusing on these three inter-related phenomena.

### **1. Penetration**

For analytical purposes, foreign penetration can be broken down into four categories. It can occur in the broad areas of politics and diplomacy,

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economics and technology, defence, and socio-cultural affairs. In each of these, a variety of specific types or forms of penetration can be distinguished. For the purposes of this essay, it will suffice to consider only the major types of foreign penetration to which South Africa is exposed.

Foreign *political penetration* can be regarded as external political involvement related to the structures of political authority in the target state. The agents or practitioners of such penetration are foreign individuals and institutions outside government.

The flood of foreigners continuously visiting South Africa to 'examine' the political situation — be they politicians, officials, journalists, academics, clergymen, or private individuals — is a case in point. In some instances, the South African government welcomes their involvement — and may indeed invite them as 'official guests' — while in others it finds it politically prudent to tolerate such penetration. Pretoria would no doubt prefer that many of the foreign groups and individuals stayed away from South Africa; good illustrations are the highly publicised visit of Senator Edward Kennedy in 1985 and a subsequent visit by a group of US congressmen.

Governments and societies commonly display limits of tolerance of foreign penetration, although these are ill-defined and in constant flux.<sup>1</sup> The South African government's frequent denial of entry to foreigners who wish to visit the Republic — presumably on the grounds of their political unacceptability — indicates a relatively low level of tolerance (a feature not uncommon among authoritarian regimes). Reference can also be made to the severe restrictions on media reporting of events in South Africa — applicable to local and foreign journalists — imposed under the nationwide state of emergency declared in June 1986. These measures are in part designed to curb foreign political involvement in South Africa.

The examples mentioned raise an important yet difficult conceptual question: where does penetration end and intervention begin? There is clearly a very fine line between the two processes. It could be argued that foreign political involvement crosses this line when the actions from abroad involve some elements of coercion or threat. A penetrative action can thus subsequently become interventionist, for instance when a visiting politician upon his return home from South Africa declares his support for the ANC. Another distinction between the two processes is that a government would normally resist intervention more strongly than penetration. We could then class as political penetration all those instances of foreign political involvement in South Africa of which the government is aware but welcoming or about which it may even have reservations yet tolerates them. In the latter instance, the authorities may attempt to counter perceived negative fall-out of penetration by, for example, trying to discredit a highly critical foreign visitor during or after his stay in South Africa.

On the whole, the Republic experiences a degree of external political



penetration that is probably much higher than that found among 'non-controversial' states.

The most obvious formal indicator of *diplomatic penetration* is that of foreign diplomatic missions in South Africa. In 1986, 27 states (including South Africa's four 'independent' former homelands) maintained embassies in Pretoria. As will be seen in the subsequent discussion of isolation, this is a relatively small foreign diplomatic presence. More relevant to this essay is the 'active' penetration practised by foreign diplomats in South Africa, if the mere presence of diplomatic missions is conceived as 'passive' penetration. It happens not infrequently that Western diplomats stationed in the Republic (there are in any case no communist states and only one black African state represented in Pretoria) make condemnatory public statements about the local political situation and convey critical messages — through normal diplomatic channels — on the same subject to the South African government. A more dramatic diplomatic confrontation was the decision of several Western governments to recall temporarily their ambassadors in protest against the imposition of a state of emergency in South Africa in 1986.

The information and educational programmes run by some foreign embassies in South Africa can also be classed as active diplomatic penetration, particularly when these are designed to influence South Africans' opinions on their own country's affairs, or when these actions are intended to promote political change, assist the 'victims of apartheid' or help to train the manpower that would be required in a future 'free South Africa'. Again, a thin line may separate such endeavours from intervention.

The Reagan Administration's policy towards South Africa is an example of active diplomatic penetration. The premise of the policy, according to Secretary of State George Shultz, is that 'we (i.e. US) dare not ignore South Africa . . . We cannot play the part of Pontius Pilate, washing our hands of a gross injustice that demands solution'. The United States therefore needs to be 'engaged' and to represent a force for 'good' and 'decency'. The American private sector and churches are for Shultz leading actors in this regard. American policy consists of more than a presence, however active, in South Africa. Pressures, 'appropriately designed' and constructive rather than destructive, were according to Shultz 'an integral part of our diplomacy toward South Africa'.<sup>2</sup> American penetration is thus combined with intervention, since many if not most of the pressures are aimed at forcing an unwilling South African government to change its behaviour, often under threat of punishment.

There are also several instances of *ad hoc* diplomatic penetration. Official courtesy or 'business' visits by foreign heads of government — a rare occurrence in South Africa's case, as will be seen — can represent diplomatic penetration. More relevant are those visits by representatives of foreign governments or inter-governmental organisations undertaken with the

express purpose of influencing South Africa's political situation. One such is the Commonwealth's so-called Eminent Persons Group (EPG) which visited the Republic in 1986 and subsequently produced a report setting out its diagnosis and prognosis in no uncertain terms.<sup>3</sup> Another example is the visit by the Commission appointed by President Reagan to advise him on US policy towards South Africa. The South African government allows this kind of penetration not so much because it welcomes the interest, but because the diplomatic costs of putting up the shutters are perceived as greater than the possible risks involved in permitting foreign involvement. This, however, implies no prior commitment on Pretoria's part to heed the suggestions or demands eventually resulting from such investigations. The government thus rejected the EPG's proposals on political change.

The nature and extent of foreign *economic penetration* of South Africa have been thoroughly documented elsewhere and there is no need to cover the same ground once again.<sup>4</sup> Only the salient features of foreign economic penetration of South Africa will be listed.

The Republic is firmly locked into the international economic system. The main indicators are its extensive foreign trade (both exports and imports), massive foreign investment in the country, South Africa's involvement in international money markets (taking up considerable foreign bank loans in the past) and the transfer of foreign technology to the Republic. South Africa's international economic and financial links find institutional expression in its membership of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), among others.

Foreign economic penetration is predominantly Western in origin. In recent years, Western states' economic ties with South Africa have become intensely politicised. There are powerful interests at work at international level (e.g. the UN, Organisation of African Unity and the Commonwealth) and also within individual Western countries that insist on a total severance of all economic links with South Africa. The most drastic way of achieving this is through mandatory collective sanctions. A lesser form is unilateral disinvestment, which has gained much support in the United States. And then there are attempts to make foreign economic involvement in South Africa conditional. The conditions have a strong socio-political flavour; consider, for example, the (American) Sullivan Principles and the European Economic Community Code of Conduct for companies doing business in the Republic. Foreign economic penetration consequently serves not only external economic interest but indeed also political interests. Far from being 'neutral', external economic penetration of South Africa has become prescriptive in the socio-political domain. This kind of involvement is once again not neatly separable from intervention. The fact that these conditions were imposed with the South African government's knowledge and consent

(albeit without its encouragement), leave the actions in the realm of foreign penetration rather than intervention.

Foreign governments and corporations opposing disinvestment typically justify a *continued economic presence in South Africa in socio-political terms*. US Secretary of State Shultz, for example, portrays American capitalism as 'an engine of peaceful change' using US companies in South Africa as 'the building blocks of our influence'.<sup>5</sup> The South African government, in turn has developed a by now standard inventory of arguments in favour of continued foreign economic engagement in the Republic. The crux of the official line is that a large (and preferably expanding) foreign economic presence promotes economic growth which, in turn, spreads prosperity among all South Africans and thus contributes to stability, both of which are conducive to political change. In this way, the government in effect recognises that external economic penetration is not politically neutral. On this issue, at least, Pretoria and Washington seem to agree.

Universally, the typical forms of *military penetration* include the supply of arms and equipment, the provision of advisers/experts to train local forces, the establishment of military bases on foreign soil, and combat support for a foreign government engaged in an armed conflict.

With the qualified exception of arms purchases from abroad, South Africa does not experience any of the other types of military penetration listed here. The UN Security Council in 1977 imposed a mandatory arms embargo on the Republic. Although South Africa can still obtain some military hardware and technology clandestinely, it is no longer able to procure modern Western armaments on a significant scale — or at any rate not to an extent approximating its foreign arms purchases before 1977.

There are numerous forms of *socio-cultural penetration* to which modern states are exposed and most originate from foreign non-governmental sources. Similarly, the 'targets' of such penetration are generally private institutions and individuals. A mere listing of the major types evident in South African society should be sufficient to illustrate the depth of socio-cultural penetration from abroad.

- Art and entertainment, ranging from American TV soap operas and movies to visiting Italian opera stars.
- Sport, although suffering under extensive international isolation, still provides for considerable interchange at both individual and team levels between South Africans and foreigners.
- Academic exchange, in the form of foreign educators, researchers and students visiting the Republic.
- Interaction in the area of religion, with foreign churches and individual clergymen and missionaries working in or visiting South Africa.

- Foreign media — press, television and radio — are well represented in South Africa.
- Tourists from abroad.
- Immigrants and other expatriates living in South Africa.
- Foreign aircraft and vessels regularly visiting the country for commercial purposes.
- Postal and telecommunications links.
- Foreign publications (books, magazines and newspapers).
- Foreign radio services broadcasting to South Africa, among others.
- International service organisations, such as Rotary International, Round Table, Lions International and Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, with South African affiliates.

Although several of these forms of socio-cultural interaction have been materially affected by international moves to isolate South Africa, the Republic is on the whole still extensively penetrated by socio-cultural forces from abroad. Although the sources of this penetration are varied, American influence is probably predominant, ranging from television programmes<sup>6</sup> to such omnipresent symbols of American 'culture' as Coca Cola, hamburgers and blue jeans.

To conclude the consideration of foreign penetration, it must be acknowledged that only the more tangible forms of involvement have been taken into account. One should also have regard for the power of 'foreign' ideas or philosophies. These cover the whole spectrum from variations of national socialism to thorough-going marxism. The South African population, whether White or Black, is far from insulated from the international market place of ideas. This is not to say that local groups are slavishly following foreign trends; it is rather a case of the domestic organisations reinforcing their views by aligning with particular segments of international opinion.

## 2. Intervention

Beloff defines intervention as 'the attempt by one state to affect the internal structure and external behaviour of other states through various degrees of coercion'.<sup>7</sup> This definition is in two respects too restrictive. First, the targets of intervention may also include non-authority structures and groups outside government, for example, political parties, segments of public opinion, commercial and industrial enterprises, youth groups, churches and individuals.<sup>8</sup> Second, the actors, i.e. those intervening in a target state, can likewise be a very mixed cast, such as government agencies and officials (including spies), military advisers, (non-military) technical experts, trade unionists, businessmen, journalists and also international governmental and non-governmental organisations.<sup>9</sup>

South Africa, needless to say, is not unique in finding itself the target of coercive foreign involvement in its internal affairs. Intervention is, in Bull's words, 'an endemic or built-in feature of our present international arrangements'.<sup>10</sup> South Africa nonetheless seems a special case because it offers some rather exceptional pretexts, or a combination thereof, for foreign intervention.

Universally, a widely used pretext for foreign intervention is civil strife. This, according to Mitchell, 'implies behaviour within a conflict situation which involves organised violence between groups, directed against people or property'.<sup>11</sup> A broader but related concept — and more appropriate for the present purposes — is that of internal war. Eckstein defines internal war as 'any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, government or policies'.<sup>12</sup> (The designation 'civil war' is commonly used to describe the same phenomenon.)

Rosenau distinguishes three main types of internal war: personnel, authority and structural wars. South Africa, Rosenau wrote over twenty years ago, was a possible example of the latter type. Structural wars are not only contests over personnel and the structure of political authority, but are also fought over other societal 'substructures' (e.g. systems of education and ownership) or major domestic and foreign policies. Rosenau furthermore argues a direct correlation between the scope of an internal war and its external implications. Other states are bound to attach greater significance to the course and outcome of a structural war than of the other kinds. Third parties may therefore be more inclined to get involved in structural wars abroad than in other types.<sup>13</sup>

One of the principal parties to the internal conflict in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC), has since its formation in 1912 internationalised its political dispute with the white government. The extent of internationalisation increased greatly with the establishment of the UN. When the conflict entered its present violent phase in the 1960s, the ANC called upon external patrons — notably the Soviet Union and other communist states — for active support in its armed struggle in South Africa. The Western powers' economic stake in South Africa is one reason for their particular interest in the outcome of the conflict and indeed of their attempts to influence the course of events; in this sense, internationalisation flows from penetration. Political considerations, both domestic and international, probably provide more compelling reasons for their involvement in the South African situation — whether through intervention or isolation.

A factor that could weigh heavily with external parties contemplating intervention in civil strife, is the existence of affective linkages. Among these are ideological, religious, ethnic and racial ties. A situation of penetration may facilitate such intervention, for as Mitchell argues:

much formal *intervention* takes place as a result of the existing *involvement* of external socio-economic, religious, ethnic or political groups in the various social and economic systems operating within the jurisdictional boundaries of the disrupted state.<sup>14</sup>

In the case of South Africa, such cross-national affective linkages exist and are indeed used as further pretexts for foreign intervention. One ideological link is that between the (banned) South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Soviet Union. Foreign churches, both Catholic and Protestant, typically use their long-standing ties with South African churches as a justification for coercive interference. Racial linkages are particularly relevant in the African context, where black states engage in interventionist behaviour in support of their 'oppressed brothers' in South Africa.

Another relevant theoretical insight concerns the recent trend towards expansion of the grounds for armed intervention so as to include a range of human rights violations. Walzer, for example, regards the right of 'humanitarian intervention' — in cases of genocide or other 'crimes against humanity' — as one of few exceptions to the principle of non-intervention.<sup>15</sup> Slater and Nardin are among those who take a more permissive view of the 'morality of intervention'. They maintain that intervention is justified, at least in principle, in many cases where governments commit 'substantial and systematic violations of human rights', even when the actions are not of genocidal proportions.<sup>16</sup> The humanitarian argument is indeed used by some advocates of foreign intervention in South Africa.

Reference can also be made to the notion of precautionary intervention, as used by Halpern. As long ago as 1964 he singled out South Africa as probably 'the most foreboding case' confronting the US: 'Do we intervene now or after the bloodbath starts?' Since the Republic was 'clearly heading for the kind of catastrophic internal and external explosion that will make intervention by outside powers unavoidable', the 'real choice' for America was between precautionary intervention and 'subsequent intervention under much more unfavourable terms'.<sup>17</sup> More than two decades later, American advocates of intervention in South Africa would probably argue that the 'much more unfavourable terms' are already upon them.

A further, more contextual, pretext for external intervention in South Africa is the perceived nature of Pretoria's regional policies. By deliberately destabilising neighbouring countries, it is widely argued, South Africa is undermining their security and prosperity, if not endangering their very existence. Intervention is then called for to counter South Africa's regional aggression.

Finally, many of these grounds for intervention can be extended to the argument that the situation within South Africa and/or Pretoria's actions in Southern Africa threaten world peace. Intervention can then of course be ordered under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The trend is indeed

increasingly towards collective rather than unilateral intervention in South Africa. This not only reflects growing international consensus on the need for concerted action against South Africa, but it also has to do with the very structure of international society. Unilateral intervention, Bull argues, 'threatens the harmony and concord' of international society. Where intervention, however, 'expresses the collective will of the society of states', it would not jeopardise that harmony and concord.<sup>18</sup> Collective intervention, authorised by an international body, generally 'possesses a legitimacy which is normally denied to unilateral intervention', according to Luard.<sup>19</sup>

A mere consideration of the pretexts of intervention of course cannot fully explain the phenomenon with regard to South Africa. Reference can also be made to a number of structural and functional components of intervention which, together with the motives, provide a possible framework for analysis. First, the actors or interveners include international governmental organisations (e.g. UN and Commonwealth), international non-governmental bodies (such as the World Council of Churches), numerous national states and national non-governmental organisations (e.g. foreign trade unions). Second, the targets inside South Africa are primarily the government and its agencies. Secondary targets include a range of non-governmental organisations (business enterprises, sports bodies etc.) and tertiary targets refer to the general public or segments thereof (e.g. Afrikaners). The objectives of intervention, in the third place, can be characterised as either macro (a fundamental restructuring of society) or micro (which refers to such limited purposes as the unbanning of the ANC). Fourth, the means of intervention range from material support for the ANC's armed struggle to a diplomatic note demanding the release of detainees. Sanctions can also be regarded as a technique of intervention if these are designed to exert political pressure on Pretoria and are not merely a 'walk-away' option (as disinvestment — known as informal sanctions — sometimes is: an attempt to free American companies of the 'hassle factor' over their South African connections, rather than to pressure Pretoria in the first instance). Isolation then becomes an instrument of intervention. In their selection of targets and techniques of intervention, finally, actors will be guided by the perceived vulnerability of a particular target.

### 3. Isolation

There are two basic types of isolation: a state can voluntarily withdraw, to a greater or lesser extent, from 'normal'<sup>20</sup> international interaction, or a state can against its will be denied full (or any) involvement in normal international transactions. Enforced isolation; which is relevant here, is an external attempt to curtail or cut the target state's contacts with the outside world. The objective is to compel the particular state — often dubbed a 'pariah' or 'outcast'<sup>21</sup> — to change its policies and actions at home and/or abroad and

thus to submit to external demands. The target state is, to put it differently, placed in international quarantine until it is prepared to behave according to international norms (or at least willing to heed the demands of its isolators). South Africa is obviously a case in point.

Externally imposed isolation affects both the inward and outward flow of people, goods and even ideas to and from the target state. Other states must be prepared to limit or even completely sever their relations with the target. The links could be of a diplomatic, economic and technological, military or socio-cultural nature. These can be regarded as four broad areas of isolation; they coincide with the four categories of penetration outlined earlier. In each sphere, a number of specific indicators of isolation will be distinguished. These are particular aspects of a state's diplomatic, economic, military or socio-cultural relations that can be subjected to external political manipulation.

Sanctions are the typical technique of isolation. They are international punitive measures — applied in the four areas mentioned — against a state that violates its international obligations or international law or in some other way falls foul of a sizeable segment of the international community.

Sanctions, it was suggested earlier, are an instrument of isolation as well as of intervention. The connection between isolation and penetration should also be noted. For a state to be cut off from the international community — against its will — there have to be ties to sever. External penetration, as defined earlier, provides such links. Given the extensive foreign penetration of South Africa, the country offers considerable opportunities to those wishing to isolate it.

Isolation, whether of the voluntary or coercive variety, can today only be a relative condition; a state, in the modern sense of the word, simply cannot exist without any international relations at all. Nor does isolation represent a fixed or immutable situation. The extent of a state's isolation may vary over time, even profoundly.

A state's ostracism, like its economic wealth or military power, only makes sense in a comparative context. Space does not permit comparisons between South Africa and other so-called outcast states (e.g. Taiwan, Israel and Chile), nor between South Africa and 'normal' or non-isolated countries.<sup>22</sup> The proposed series of indicators of (or measuring devices for) isolation will thus be applied to South Africa only.

South Africa's *diplomatic isolation* can readily be measured by five indicators. The first is its foreign diplomatic representation. In 1986, South Africa had embassies or legations in 29 countries, including its four 'independent' ex-homelands.<sup>23</sup> This means that the Republic had diplomatic missions in only about 16 per cent of the states represented in the UN. The scarcity of diplomatic ties is of course a reflection of the South African government's lack of international legitimacy.



*The second indicator of diplomatic isolation is membership of intergovernmental organisations. South Africa is no longer a member of most of the 15 specialised agencies of the UN, having been expelled or effectively forced to withdraw. The Republic nonetheless remains a member of the UN, although it has since 1974 been denied participation in General Assembly proceedings. It also belongs to three other international agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It also remains a full participant in the Antarctic Treaty, to which the Republic was a founder signatory in 1959. South Africa is not a member of any of the major sub-global political organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity and the Commonwealth. It does, however, maintain membership of some 45 functional intergovernmental organisations, including the Southern African Customs Union.*

Foreign visits by South Africa's heads of states and/or government and their counterparts' visits to the Republic are a third indicator. Between 1961 and 1984, South Africa's successive (ceremonial) heads of state paid a mere eight official visits to other countries — five of which to 'independent' former homelands. No South African head of state or of government has visited either the UN or the United States since Prime Minister J C Smuts was there in 1946. Mr P W Botha, in his capacity as Prime Minister (1978–1984) and since then as South Africa's first Executive State President, made (known) official visits to Taiwan in 1980 and to Britain, Portugal, West Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and Italy in 1984. During this Western European tour, Botha also paid unofficial visits to France and Austria. In 1986, he again visited France unofficially to inaugurate a South African war memorial. Reference can also be made to Botha's meeting with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda in Botswana in 1982. As regards the reverse flow of visitors, the last leader of a major foreign power to visit South Africa was British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1960.

The UN's avalanche of denunciations and punitive measures against South Africa provide further evidence of the country's alienation from the international community. Except for Rhodesia, no state has yet been subjected to such persistent pressure by the UN as South Africa. Since the 1960s, the bulk of UN resolutions on the Republic have been explicitly designed to isolate the country.

Reference can finally be made to the degree of diplomatic support that South Africa receives in international forums. Although the vast majority of member states of international organisations are consistently ranged against the Republic, some Western powers are still prepared to protect South Africa on two vital issues in the UN specifically: membership and comprehensive mandatory sanctions. This would suggest that some Western states do not wish to isolate South Africa to the same extent as they had Rhodesia — at any rate not at this stage. Leading Western powers have nonetheless in the

meantime implemented a wide range of unilateral and collective punitive measures against the Republic. Western protection of South Africa is neither unconditional nor automatic and the sword of more serious punitive measures is forever suspended over its head.

In the area of *economic isolation*, South Africa provides a rather mixed picture. On the one hand, this is the sphere in which South Africa is least isolated or, conversely, where it is most integrated. Yet, on the other hand, the Republic's external economic relations have become a prime target of the isolators.

Five indicators of economic and technological isolation can be distinguished, the first three of which have already been touched upon in the earlier discussion of economic penetration.

Although the Republic conducts most of its trade with industrialised Western states, it also trades — mostly clandestinely — with 49 of the 51 African states<sup>24</sup> and with the Soviet bloc. The South African economy is heavily reliant on foreign trade — which constitutes roughly 57 per cent of its GDP — and this of course makes it vulnerable to trade embargoes. From various foreign quarters — inter-governmental, governmental and non-governmental — attempts have long been made and some effective measures have indeed been taken to sever or reduce South Africa's external trade links.

Foreign investment in South Africa is another prime target of those favouring its isolation. The focal point of international efforts to stop such investment shifted to the United States in 1985, where the disinvestment campaign has developed a seemingly unstoppable momentum. These non-governmental actions have been supplemented by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Sanctions Act passed by the US Congress in 1986. The measure *inter alia* bans new American investment in South Africa. A number of other Western countries, including Sweden, France and Austria, have likewise imposed official restrictions on investment in the Republic. The UN is also active in this field, with a Security Council resolution of 26 July 1985 calling on states to suspend all new investment in South Africa.

The Republic's ability to raise foreign loans was dealt a severe blow in July 1985 when Chase Manhattan decided not to provide South Africa with any further loans. Scores of other foreign banks thereupon declared their unwillingness to roll over existing loans to the Republic, plunging the country into a serious foreign debt crisis. To aggravate matters for Pretoria, the US government in September 1985 banned all loans by American financial institutions to the South African government or its agencies, with certain limited exceptions. Many of South Africa's current problems in the attraction of foreign loans and investment are not in the first instance the result of its low international standing. It is rather a case of the protracted domestic unrest causing concern among foreign bankers and investors about the country's future political stability. The end result may nonetheless be that

South Africa is denied important financial facilities — ironically in a manner far more drastic and damaging than that which advocates of economic isolation could thus far achieve.

The provision of foreign technology to South Africa has, not unexpectedly, also become a political issue abroad. Measures to restrict or prohibit South Africa's access to foreign military and nuclear technology, or technology that could have a military application, have been in operation for some years now. Again, the UN has taken the lead. More recently, the Republic has also been encountering political obstacles in acquiring non-military technology from abroad. This trend, which is bound to grow, is related among other things to the withdrawal of transnational corporations from South Africa and the increasing unwillingness of individual scientists and scientific institutions abroad to maintain contact with South African counterparts.

The first of two indicators of *military isolation* is military agreement with foreign powers. South Africa has not been a member of a military alliance since the Second World War. The Simonstown Agreement (1955–1975) only provided for naval cooperation and the use of South African bases by British forces. South Africa's exclusion from alliances is externally imposed and not of its own choosing; in fact, the country has since 1948 repeatedly expressed a desire to join the Western defence alliance. The Republic's difficulties with the procurement of arms, the second indicator, are well known. South Africa is the only state against which the UN Security Council today maintains a mandatory arms embargo (although it came close to achieving another against Iran over the Persian Gulf).

Most of the indicators of *socio-cultural isolation* do not relate to direct interaction between governments, but concern interaction between a foreign government and local non-governmental organisations (and private individuals) or between domestic and foreign non-governmental organisations. Nine possible indicators are mentioned briefly.

- South Africa's international sports isolation is common knowledge and well documented.<sup>25</sup>
- In the field of art and entertainment, the UN blacklist of foreign artists and entertainers who have performed in the Republic (and its ex-homelands), is one instrument used to discourage interaction.
- Academic interchange between South Africa and other countries, both at an individual and institutional level, is increasingly jeopardised by the Republic's international political problems.
- The precise effects of South Africa's low international standing on its tourist industry are difficult to calculate; the protracted racial unrest no doubt deters many prospective foreign tourists. It is nonetheless reasonable to conclude that the Republic's international ostracism prevents the full realisation of its tourist potential. There are moreover

intensifying efforts by some foreign governments and private organisations to discourage tourism to South Africa.

The next indicator refers to the reverse flow of visitors, i.e. South Africans visiting foreign countries. Holders of South African passports generally speaking have fewer problems obtaining visas for states with which the Republic maintains diplomatic or consular relations. Some of these, however, issue visas only to *bona fide* businessmen and tourists and have already refused entry to South African politicians, officials and sportsmen; Australia and Japan are cases in point. South African passport holders as a rule find it far more difficult to obtain travel documents from countries in which the Republic has no official representation. This applies to Eastern Europe, Arab states (except for Saudi Arabia which, until recently at least, allowed South African Muslims to visit Mecca), Asian countries such as the People's Republic of China, North Korea and Indonesia, some Central and South American states such as Guatemala, Venezuela and Mexico and most black African countries.

- South Africa presently has an official cultural agreement only with Paraguay. The Netherlands, Belgium and West Germany have for overtly political reasons suspended their cultural accords with the Republic.
- South Africa experiences relatively few difficulties with regards to postal and telecommunication links with the outside world. Despite having lost its membership of the International Telecommunications Union and the Universal Postal Union, the flow of post and telecommunication to and from South Africa proceeds largely unhindered. Only two countries, Somalia and Saudi Arabia, formally (if not in practice) maintain a complete postal embargo against South Africa. Seven other countries including Lebanon and Uganda, have imposed partial postal bans.
- Turning to other forms of international communication, South Africa's position is far less favourable. A large number of states — including most in Africa — deny South African aircraft landing and overflying rights. The same applies to docking facilities for South African ships. Conversely, many countries prohibit their aircraft and ships calling in South Africa.
- The final indicator is religious contact with the outside world. In this context, it is only necessary to refer to the three Afrikaans Reformed churches, which experience a combination of self-imposed and enforced isolation from the international ecumenical movement.

#### 4. **Concluding Remarks: The Interplay of Penetration, Intervention and Isolation**

Each of the processes of foreign penetration, intervention and isolation is, on its own, an established feature of international relations. With the growing interdependence of members of the international community, foreign

penetration of countries inevitably increases. Intervention is a phenomenon as old as the history of international relations and few countries are today immune to unwanted coercive interference from outside. Isolation is not as common a feature of contemporary international relations as either penetration or intervention. Relatively few states are presently experiencing enforced isolation from the international community, or at least from significant segments thereof.

The three features may appear in different combinations. Thus the mere condition of external penetration of a particular state gives the isolators of that country a potential handle or lever, or something to isolate. Intervention too can be related to penetration, with existing foreign penetration providing useful instruments of intervention. Penetration can also serve as a pretext for intervention, where a foreign power for instance intervenes to protect its material (particularly economic) interests under perceived threat in another (i.e. penetrated) state. Although penetration may in some circumstances facilitate or encourage intervention, it is by no means a general prerequisite; interventionist powers need not have a material stake in a target state. The remaining link is between isolation and intervention. An illustration is the imposition of a blockade against a target state, an action that may in intent or effect isolate that state to a greater or lesser extent.

Given the interrelationships, it is difficult to draw clear boundaries between these international phenomena. It was noted earlier that a fine line may separate penetration and intervention, or intervention and isolation. In the dynamics of international relations, penetrative action beyond a certain point becomes interventionist (at least in the perception of the target), just as an interventionist move may develop into an act of isolation. It is only penetration and isolation that are distinctly contradictory actions, in that one can only proceed at the expense of the other. Although isolation at first requires a situation of external penetration of a target state, the logical end result of successful total isolation will be the complete withdrawal of a foreign presence from that state. In practice, such an extreme outcome is virtually impossible.

Aware of the linkages between penetration, intervention and isolation, some foreign powers may deliberately try to find some kind of balance in applying these instruments of foreign policy. In the case of South Africa, major Western powers remain keen to retain some presence in the Republic, not least for their economic benefit. They also maintain that continued engagement in South Africa would be conducive to political change away from apartheid. But then the Western powers clearly have doubts as to whether their ("positive") presence *per se* can significantly promote political change. These countries are moreover under constant international and domestic attack over their economic links with South Africa, the critics

maintaining that these ties merely reinforce the apartheid system. So the Western states combine penetration with intervention and isolation in dealing with the Republic.

Western powers are evidently still in search of the appropriate 'mix' of these techniques in their relations with South Africa. Among the many complicating factors is that none of the three is a neat mechanical process with a predictable outcome; the actors applying the techniques have to consider the possibility of their actions becoming dysfunctional in terms of their objectives. Also, a heavy emphasis on isolation is bound to reduce the degree of foreign penetration and thereby deny the actors some instruments of peaceful intervention. Notwithstanding such difficulties, the Western world seems determined to intensify pressure on South Africa.

Looking at it from a South African angle, external pressures are by no means the only or even a major factor shaping the course of political events. A crucial force is black resistance to the regime, which has over the past three years been more widespread, intense and violent than ever before. White security has been eroded to an extent previously unknown. Black opposition has domestic roots and is sustained by internal political dynamics; external involvement plays at best a marginal role. In future, however, domestic and external pressures on Pretoria may increasingly interact but the precise relationship is difficult to foretell. On the one hand, stronger government resistance to external demands for political reform, coupled with greater repression of black opposition, may prompt outside powers to intensify their pressures through more isolation and intervention (the latter conceivably taking the form of open moral and humanitarian support for the ANC). If, on the other hand, the white power structure becomes progressively weaker and the government is increasingly incapable of suppressing black resistance, foreign actors may seek to capitalise on this vulnerability: a sharp and short intensification of pressure could finally bring about the collapse of the present order, they might believe. Should the South African government, however, seriously embark on political reform, external pressures may as a reward be eased somewhat. Yet it could also be argued that some states would perceive such reforms to be the result of their pressures and that more isolation and intervention would produce greater political changes. So Pretoria could find itself in a double bind: whether it represses or reforms, external isolation and intervention are bound to continue.

It can reasonably be concluded that the 'price' South Africa will have to pay for an end to the pressures of isolation and intervention, is the end of apartheid and white minority rule. The nature and extent of foreign penetration of a post-apartheid South Africa is a different matter. Will a successor government welcome penetration from the same foreign sources as the present rulers do? And will today's penetrating powers want to maintain or strengthen their presence in a new South Africa?

## End Notes

1. See Richard W Cottam, *Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp. 36 & 37.
2. *Address by Secretary of State George Shultz at the State Department Conference: 'The Church as a Force for Peaceful Change in South Africa'*, Washington, June 2, 1986, Mimeographed transcript (Johannesburg: United States Information Service, 1986), pp. 4-6.
3. See The Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons, *Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books for the Commonwealth Secretariat, 1986).
4. See Jacqueline Matthews, ed., *South Africa in the World Economy*. (Johannesburg: McGraw-Hill, 1983).
5. Shultz *op. cit.*, p. 6.
6. According to one estimate, the South African Broadcasting Corporation buys 70 per cent of its television programmes from the United States. W A de Klerk, quoted in *Beeld* (Johannesburg), 15 April 1984.
7. Max Beloff, 'Reflections on Intervention', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 2, (1968), p. 198. Also see R J Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 13.
8. Andrew M Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft: Intervention in an Age of Interdependence* (Durham, NC: Duke Press Policy Studies Paperbacks, 1982), p. 23.
9. Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 10, 140-142.
10. Hedley Bull, 'Conclusion', in Bull, ed., *Intervention in World Politics*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 181.
11. C R Mitchell, 'Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2, (June 1970), p. 171.
12. Harry Eckstein, quoted by Richard A Falk, 'The International Law of Internal War', in James N Rosenau, ed., *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 217.
13. James N Rosenau, 'Internal War as an International Event', in Rosenau, ed., *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, pp. 63-66.
14. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pp. 185 & 192.
15. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 101-108.
16. Jerome Slater and Terry Nardin, 'Nonintervention and Human Rights', *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 1, (February 1986), p. 92. Also see Michael Akchurst, 'Humanitarian Intervention', in Bull, *Intervention in World Politics*, p. 99 and Walzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-103.
17. Manfred Halpern, 'Morality and Politics of Intervention', in Rosenau, *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, pp. 269-274.
18. Bull, 'Conclusion', p. 195.
19. Evan Luard, 'Collective Intervention', in Bull, *Intervention in World Politics*, pp. 157-158.
20. This assumes that an average level of interaction, based on such features as membership of international organisations, diplomatic ties and foreign trade, can be quantified for different categories of states (e.g. super powers, great powers, middle ranking powers, small states and micro states).
21. See Robert E Harkavy, 'The Pariah State Syndrome', *Orbis*, Vol. 21, No. 3, (Autumn 1977), pp. 623-649 and Efraim Inbar, *Outcast Countries in the World Community* (Denver: Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1985).

22. For some comparisons of South Africa's isolation with that experienced by Israel, Taiwan and Chile, see Deon Geldenhuys, 'South Africa's International Isolation', *International Affairs Bulletin*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (1987), pp. 29-37.
23. Republic of South Africa, *Department of Foreign Affairs List*. (Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs, September 1986).
24. Glenn Babb, an official of South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs, in an interview on SABC-TV news, June 30, 1985.
25. See, for instance, Richard E Lapchick, *The Politics of Race and International Sport: The Case of South Africa*, PhD dissertation (Denver: University of Denver, 1973).

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## **José Sarney's Brazil: The Political and Economic Context**

In the last few years, elected governments of various sorts have surged up in Latin America.<sup>1</sup> A quarter of a century ago, the democratic pretensions of the *Alliance for Progress* swiftly collapsed into headlong proliferation of military regimes.<sup>2</sup> Conversely, Praetorian administrations have unexpectedly yielded a windfall of electorally-based governments scattered across the subcontinent. Needless to say, there are neither perfect patterns nor complete success, and some old dictatorial hands have so far withstood these latter day 'winds of change'. Paraguay, Chile and Cuba persist with undemocratic structures of widely divergent types. Certain Central American republics devised 'death squad democracies' with elected leadership constructed on the citizens' terror of the consequences of failure to have their I.D. cards stamped at the polling booths.<sup>3</sup> Such countries as Venezuela, Colombia and Costa Rica never established authoritarian states in the first place,<sup>4</sup> and so now lie outside the scope of current re-democratisation. In the course of this century, Mexico has solidified effectively into a one-party state, devoid of genuine electoral choice.<sup>5</sup> Euphoria at this stage over democratic progress would therefore seem inappropriate.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, enough swallows have assembled to indicate a definite change of season in Latin American politics. More than ten countries, including several major ones, have restored civilian rule during the past decade. Prominent on the roll call are Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and Panama, while even the long-suffering Haitians finally deposed Duvalier *filis*<sup>7</sup> and had two stabs at general elections. Examples also come to mind from other regions such as the collapse of the Marcos regime in the Philippines.

Some part of this ubiquitous polling is doubtless US-orchestrated as a distraction from the Reagan Administration's squalid offensive against Daniel Ortega's Nicaragua.<sup>8</sup> But the overall phenomenon is too broad, well-rooted and admirable to be entirely the handiwork of those worthies who paraded before the Conragate hearings in Washington DC. Both President Alfonsín of Argentina and President Sarney of Brazil have angrily denounced Reaganite claims to the credit for the democratic upsurge.<sup>9</sup> If they had not taken independent initiatives, the Kirkpatrick doctrine<sup>10</sup> would have left

them confronting bureaucratic authoritarianism in indefinite isolation from the 'grand designs' of the United States.

The motives for the general return to barracks in Latin America are numerous and certainly vary in priority from one republic to another. One common feature, though, was that when assuming power, the incoming military regimes had announced fixed periods in office to correct national defects according to a definite timetable. It is therefore deeply revealing that, in practice, the restoration of civilian rule has come almost as abruptly as the original armed coups that had displaced it. The military regimes have no more completed their self-prescribed terms in office than their civilian predecessors, whom they had arbitrarily prevented from completing theirs. Far from setting the seal on an 'historically necessary' phase in national development, military withdrawal from government is more accurately viewed as a scramble to get off the hot seat before the consequences of the armed forces' period in power had to be faced.

Economic failure on a vast scale provided the main impetus for the precipitate handover to elected governments. The debt crisis had now reached proportions which many experts consider beyond servicing, let alone repayment, with over 300 billion dollars owed by the Latin American countries. Brazil alone was responsible for more than one-third of the total.<sup>11</sup> Inflation was out of control, reaching levels of 800 per cent a year. Conditions attached to further loans by the IMF seemed to imply local de-industrialisation, exacerbated social tension and greater coercion. In the measured words of James Petras there was 'an unbridgeable gap between IMF stabilisation rhetoric and the generalised instability that these same policies provoke'.<sup>12</sup> How could the masses be reconciled to the rigours of stagflation, least of all by military rulers enriched by corruption involving millions — if not billions — of dollars stolen from the public purse? Every feature of the economic scenario indicated that the time was ripe for the recrimination-less departure of Praetorianism.<sup>13</sup> The sense of discouragement that may come with any retrospective assessment was particularly compounded in Argentina, where the armed forces had won an unconventional war by the foulest means and lost a conventional one by crass incapacity.<sup>14</sup> While human rights abuses and incompetent leadership also form part of the Brazilian record, it is fair to say that seven years of military rule in Argentina did more harm to the country and to the armed forces' reputation than three times that span in Brazil. To that extent, Brazilian democracy is less protected from a military comeback than the Argentinians.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, when twenty-one years of military government in Brazil ended on 15 March 1985, it was attended by the worst possible omen, in a society where such portents really matter. The new president-elect, Tancredo Neves, was already on his deathbed, and the Maranhao senator, whose qualities admirably fitted requirements for the observer position of vice-president, was catapulted

overnight into the infinitely more demanding office of head of state. José Sarney was a defector from the pro-military PDS (Partido Democrático Social) and, in the judgement of an able foreign researcher, his 'selection as vice-president was originally little more than a sop to skittish politicians who were formerly pro-government'.<sup>16</sup> In the Brazilian politician's own judgement,

Thus it was that I, without wishing it, without having any time to prepare myself for it, became the holder of the largest foreign debt on the face of the earth, as well as the greatest internal debt. My inheritance included the deepest recession in our history, the highest rate of unemployment, an unprecedented climate of violence, potential political disintegration and the highest rate of inflation ever recorded in our country's history — 250 per cent a year, with the prospect of reaching 1,000 per cent. I took into my hands the fifth largest country in the world — 8,4 m square kilometres, 130 million inhabitants — the eighth largest economy in the non-communist world, the largest of the world's Catholic nations . . . . The greatest optimists thought I might last 90 days at most . . . . The question was whether we would return to a harsh military regime and total dictatorship or if we were on the road to civil war.<sup>17</sup>

President Sarney's predicament cannot be properly appreciated without an analysis of the last twenty years or so of Brazil's political economy, not least because the worst problems are concentrated in his own North-Eastern region.<sup>18</sup>

The acute problem area in modern times has been the vast territory which forms the hinterland for the coastal cities of Recife, Fortaleza and Salvador. In the early days of the Portuguese Empire, this used to be the premier region of the Brazilian economy, based on the sugar plantations.<sup>19</sup> It should be remembered, however, that even in those days North-Eastern prosperity was only possible on the basis of a slave social order and high living standards were never extended to the whole population. Moreover, after the collapse of the Brazilian sugar cycle in the mid-17th century, the region dropped into virtual economic oblivion. Today it is one of the most poverty-stricken areas in Latin America. Why is the North-East so terribly backward? Various explanations are offered: some people attribute North-Eastern underdevelopment to the innate conservatism of the area. It is also said that the North-Easterners have social and cultural characteristics that leave them unresponsive to change, unconcerned about improvement. This is like saying that their condition is their own fault. A second version is that the North-East has been relegated to the status of a tributary economy serving the South-East of Brazil, with sugar, cotton, other foodstuffs and raw materials sustaining the industrial development of the South-East. This amounts to saying that the North-East is a victim of internal colonialism.

As regards the first suggestion, the only solid evidence is that the North-East is climatically enervating. As regards the second, what needs to be asked is, if the North-East is a victim of internal colonialism, how is this

subordination brought about? The answer is by political manipulation. The citizens of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, the key cities of the South-East (though neither is now the capital — that is Brasilia in Central Brazil), long ago captured control of federal politics in Brazil. This means that they are able to turn federal rule to the advantage of the South-East and to the detriment of the North-East. Before Sarney, only one federal president of Brazil has ever come from the North-East and that was Epitacio Pessoa way back in the 1920s. The same applies to nearly all currently important figures in the federal government.

With growing strength in the 20th century, protest and resentment built up in North-East Brazil against the treatment of the region by the federal government. Since the North-Easterners were so inadequately represented politically, much of the social protest took a literary form. One of the greatest works of Portuguese literature, *Os Sertaos (Rebellion in the Backlands)*<sup>20</sup> by Euclides da Cunha, deals with a true historical event, the vast Canudos Revolt of 1896 and its savage repression by federal troops.

The federal government paid not much more than lip service to the idea of developing the North-East. Such projects as were set in motion were generally based on the assumption of the so-called 'hydraulic societies', made much of in the well-known book by Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*. The 'despot' was identified not as the Brazilian federal government, but simply as the dry climate of the North-Eastern region. Projects concentrated on water supply, irrigation to facilitate agriculture, although these never had the aim of rescuing the North-East from its subordinate rôle. It was to remain an internal colony. As a result of these limited ambitions, for the first half of the 20th century, there was no discernible progress in North-Eastern Brazil.

One event brought a complete revolution in the federal government's attitude to the North-East. Overnight the policy changed from one of virtual indifference to hysterical concern about North-Eastern underdevelopment. What accounted for this about-face in federal policy? None other than the 1959 Cuban Revolution. Fidel Castro's success in Cuba was expected to lead on to the subversion of the Latin American mainland. Indeed, Cuba's openly declared foreign policy was to promote revolution overseas. There was, moreover, some reason to fear that the Cubans would start promoting guerrilla activity in North-Eastern Brazil. Why? At that time, the North-East had the lowest *per capita* income of the republic — indeed, one of the lowest in Latin America — a mere 100 dollars per year compared to 300 dollars per year in the South-East. One-third of Brazil's population lived in the North-East, but the region commanded only fifteen per cent of national resources. With such profound discontent, there was every reason to think that the North-Easterners might embrace the Cubans. Usually, in those days, the Cubans expected to have to initiate guerrilla actions from scratch, without prior preparations. In North-Eastern Brazil, however, there was an existing

tradition of peasant leagues established by the great rural organiser, Francisco Juliao. It was feared that these farmers' organisations might go into partnership with Cuban infiltrators to pose a serious threat to the federal government.

There was, in short, tremendous alarm that the North-East was ripe for communist takeover, and this apprehension was as strong in Brazilian political circles as in Washington DC. The general response of the North Americans to the political dangers of the Cuban Revolution was to announce a vast aid programme for the Latin American subcontinent called the *Alliance for Progress*, which was intended to make communism unnecessary. The 'alliance' was to be made up of the United States of America with liberal elements of Latin America. Latin American politicians were to organise elections to bring democratic government to replace the sort of crude dictatorships (like the Cuban Batista government) which had provoked Castro's revolution. These new democratic governments would then qualify for aid under the massively financed *Alliance for Progress* sponsored by the USA. Reform would render revolution superfluous to Latin America.

Under this general aid programme for the whole of Latin America, the top priority area was North-Eastern Brazil. This neglected region was now construed as the most serious danger spot on the entire subcontinent, so much so that US President John F Kennedy took a personal interest. He appointed Brazil's top economist, Celso Furtado,<sup>21</sup> one of the few North-Eastern Brazilians to have achieved fame at home and abroad, to take charge of the huge regional development project for the North-East, known as SUDENE (the Superintendancy of the North-East), a landmark in 1960s development.

Celso Furtado's strategy was to extract North-Eastern Brazil from its subordinate relationship to the South-East — to assist it in achieving parity, in fact, Furtado devised three main approaches to the solution of North-Eastern underdevelopment. Insofar as agriculture would remain an economic activity, it was to be concentrated in the smaller humid zones of the North-East instead of struggling on in arid zones which required constant irrigation. The official boundaries of the North-East were to be re-drawn in order to include the vast state of Maranhao, a region of abundant rainfall and few people, which would encourage settlement from the arid areas.

The truly radical aspect of Furtado's proposals was to emphasise the basic unsuitability of the climate for agriculture. As modern factory industry is practically oblivious to climatic conditions, why not concentrate on industrial development in the North-East?

The other project was to transfer the capital of federal Brazil away from Rio de Janeiro in the South-East to the newly-planned capital city of Brasilia, brainchild of the renowned architect, Otto Niemeyer. This also had the purpose of diverting attention away from the over-emphasised South-East.

Both this and the North-Eastern project were conceived as ways of achieving a proper regional balance in Brazil and turning the entire republic's territory into a genuine integrated country. The SUDENE project would put the North-East onto the map seriously; Brasilia would do the same for Central Brazil. The historic concentration on the South-East coast would therefore be dispersed and one-third of Latin America would at last be a unified state. The 1960s could have been an epoch-making decade in the national development of Brazil.

Note, however, the use of tense: 'could have been'. These projects designed to rescue North-East and Central Brazil from poverty and neglect were really born of anxiety and not out of true concern for the underprivileged. The original fear had been that communism would spread among the poor people in the neglected zones of Brazil. The theory was that poverty would stimulate the communist menace so that the Republic of Brazil would be assailed by a *revolution from below*. In the early 1960s, however, the basis of anxiety in Brazil changed.

In the USA in the 1950s, McCarthyism, the political message of Senator Joseph McCarthy,<sup>22</sup> had taught that the danger to the security of the United States came not from the toiling masses, but from the intellectuals who were much too partial to left-wing ideas. As a result, in the United States of the 1950s, many of the best brains in the country were hounded by a remorseless witch-hunt that ruined many fine careers. Brazil experienced the equivalent political phenomenon in the 1960s. It was increasingly argued that the danger to the security of Brazil was not really posed by the poor as such, but by the intellectuals recruited to staff the very development projects which were designed to save Brazil from communism. Subversion of Brazil's security, it was said, was by the intellectuals who were working for a *revolution from above*.

In this Brazilian version of McCarthyism, the government of President Joao Goulart, including some of its key officials like Celso Furtado, was exposed to a barrage of abuse and the accusation that it constituted the true 'Red Menace'. The right-wing in Brazilian politics united increasingly in this refrain and its challenge to this great reforming movement was presented in such terms. Behind this political smear campaign lay the determination of the South-East oligarchy to hold onto its pre-eminent position in the federal republic. The North-Eastern project was much too successful. Nobody had ever minded token efforts to develop the North-East, but Furtado's SUDENE was actually raising the North-East from its subordinate status, and the construction of Brasilia was bringing the central regions to the fore, threatening the hegemony of the South-East.

The only option remaining to the threatened South-Eastern power interests was to bring down the government. What reason could there be for such drastic action against Brazil's legitimate and democratically elected

government? A rumour was increasingly circulated that Goulart's government had turned communist — the danger to Brazil, it was said, was the government itself. The Republic was being betrayed by its own leaders and it was therefore the duty of the armed forces to act in order to save the country from the menace of communism. Although CIA involvement has always been denied,<sup>23</sup> it is generally thought that the military coup that brought down Goulart's government in 1964 did have US encouragement and support. Since 1964, Brazil has had continuous right-wing dictatorship, the South-East has reasserted its ascendancy in Brazilian life, and the imaginative development projects of the early 1960s have been so watered down as to become meaningless. After 1964, Brazil was promoted as the great conservative bulwark of Latin America and simultaneously portrayed as the 'Brazilian Model', worthy of emulation by others.

According to official publicity, Brazil was soon on the way to becoming a great power. First, from 1964 onwards, the military government claimed an 'economic miracle' had taken place. It is undeniable that Brazil's economy exhibited some remarkable features under military rule. From 1968 to 1974, the economic growth rate was ten per cent per annum. The Mexican Revolution settled into a six per cent annual growth between 1940 and 1970, and though this was a star performance, Brazil outdid it for a time. Secondly, Brazil's success in attracting foreign capital after 1964 was officially interpreted as an external vote of confidence in Brazil's military leadership. The imagery of voting was much deployed in relation to foreign finance, as if this somehow offset the rape of democracy in the country. Thirdly, it was heavily emphasised that Brazil had developed a diversified export trade in manufactured goods. Latin America is generally thought of as a primary products zone, so Brazil appeared to have escaped from the traditional structure of dependence. Finally, the show piece of the 'economic miracle' was the city and state of Sao Paulo, which constitutes the largest industrial complex in Latin America. Most publicity literature has photographs of the industrial skyline as the epitome of the vaunted Brazilian Model.

These features of the Brazilian economic scene certainly stand out and can impress. But are they worthy of the term 'miraculous'? Social scientists should use the vocabulary appropriate to their discipline. The Scottish philosopher, David Hume, defined a miracle as a suspension of nature, an occurrence unknown in the natural order of things!

After 1964, Brazil adopted a growth strategy which no socially responsible economist would contemplate. In economic strategy there are two fundamental choices: (1) a growth-maximising policy, and (2) an employment-maximising policy. Generally speaking, a democratic government, which has to fight periodic elections, will have to adopt employment-maximisation in order to satisfy the electorate which keeps it in power. People will not vote themselves out of jobs. Goulart's democratically

lected government had concentrated on employment-maximisation. This policy has the virtue of promoting social welfare, which is believed by many to be a strong enough reason for adopting it, but it also has some disadvantages:

1. By emphasising manpower rather than machinery, it will fail to achieve the economies of large-scale production.
2. It may produce a less refined commodity than machine production.
3. Employment-maximisation may logically lead to backing agriculture rather than industry.
4. To the technocratic establishment, employment-maximising policies may seem a maddeningly slow way of developing a country.

By 1964, Brazil's technocratic establishment had grown exasperated with the slow pace of economic growth under the employment-maximisation policies of Goulart's government. They wanted to speed up Brazil's economic growth by adopting the growth-maximising alternative. With the electorate in favour of high employment and social welfare, the only way around this problem was simply to ignore public opinion by abolishing democracy. Nonetheless, the armed forces did have to worry about one thing — they would be wrecking the strong tradition of constitutional government in the Republic of Brazil. A very persuasive justification was needed for that drastic step. The justification offered was that military government soon produced the 'economic miracle', which excused the assault on Brazilian democracy.

It turns out that Brazil's 'miracle' is not an economic assessment but a political slogan amounting to no more than the fatuous message that 'military government works'. The economic record from 1964 to 1985 can now be re-examined in this light. First, the fast growth rate was obtained at the expense of social welfare. Such a performance can only be secured by brutal regimes. In the 1930s, Stalin's Russia had an industrial growth rate of 13,5 per cent per annum, but its admirers (one hopes), with the advantage of hindsight, would be few. In any case, a large component of what appears as 'Brazil's growth rate' is actually the expansion of foreign establishments located in Brazil. It used to be said that, for example, US enterprise located in, for example, Latin America, remained tied to the staid growth percentages of the First World through dependence on the US capital market. But US companies in Brazil attract Brazilian capital much more readily than do national firms and so are able to profit from the more buoyant growth rates of this semi-developed state.

Secondly, the massive concentration of foreign capital in Brazil ultimately became a millstone around its neck. For many years it was predicted that the Brazilian armed forces would either provoke a left-wing revolution, which would be saddled with the responsibility for default, or hand over to



moderate citizens who would have to conduct the embarrassing negotiations. In the event, it is the latter prediction that has come to pass. Moreover, Brazil exports such a high level of manufactures because most of its own people cannot afford to consume enough to maintain industry. In 1960, the poorer half of the population had fifteen per cent of the national income. Today it is below thirteen percent. In 1960, the wealthiest tenth of the people held thirty-nine per cent of national wealth, while they now command fifty-one per cent.

In the first half of the 1980s, Brazil plunged into the deepest depression in the country's modern history. The GDP *per capita* dropped by over fifteen per cent between 1980 and 1983, industrial production fell to 1977 levels, while employment was no better than in 1976 when the 'model's' élan had already petered out. Hardest hit was the showcase capital goods industry, which closed 1983 at sixty per cent of 1980 production.<sup>24</sup>

This economic collapse combined with the debt crisis to bring final exasperation with Brazil's military government. To the stubborn opposition of the masses was added large-scale defection of the regime's previous bourgeois supporters. External finance was no longer forthcoming, so that the cement had gone out of the middle class/military coalition. Repeated popular rebuffs of government policy no longer elicited sympathy from any sector for the military, and the broad democratic opposition was ultimately victorious halfway through this crisis-bound decade.

Civilian rule therefore began in March 1985, attended by a triple crisis. On the one hand lay all the state apparatus of twenty-one years of dictatorship, still in place, while on the other there was mounting populist and regionalist sentiment without legitimate means of expression. These were to be addressed by the first congressional elections in two decades, after which a new constitution — Brazil's eighth — would be drafted by the congressmen. Dwarfing all these was the huge social problem which left some thirty million Brazilians living in abject poverty in the wake of the so-called 'economic miracle'. Overall social indicators placed Brazil in about fiftieth place on the world welfare scale. President Sarney announced that the social objective of his administration was to raise Brazilian living standards to the levels of Mediterranean Europe. The economic crisis was to be tackled in a scheme for economic stabilisation known as the Cruzado Plan.<sup>25</sup>

When spoken of with formality, the *cruzado* was the new monetary unit that replaced the *crucero*. Until the Cruzado Plan was actually announced as Decree No. 2.283 on 28 February 1986, it was a top secret known to a mere fifteen people in the whole of Brazil — an astounding feat of discretion in a region where leaks and rumours enliven every coffee break.

The plan was the brainchild of a group of young economists, adherents of the new Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, based at the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro and the University of Campinas in Sao Paulo.

They worked under the direction of Finance Minister, Dilson Funaro, and Planning Minister, Joao Sayad. There were three reasons for the secrecy and timing of the Cruzado Plan. First, there would have been intense speculation, as the main thrust of the policy was to de-index wage awards in tandem with a price freeze. Secondly, the introduction of the Austral Plan in Argentina on 15 May 1985 had caused harmful repercussions, particularly to interest rates, so the Brazilians sought to manage their affairs better by keeping control in a few hands. Thirdly, Brazilian agriculture was suffering under the worst drought for forty years and the planners wanted to see that over before announcing the Cruzado Plan, so that it would be launched under favourable general conditions. Indeed, by waiting, they got what they hoped for: the growth rate for 1985 was 8,3 per cent; the export surplus at 12,8 billion US dollars was the third largest in the world; oil prices and interest rates fell steeply from the high levels of the early 1980s; and skillful negotiations rescheduled one-third of the debt on much improved terms.

While accepting the validity of some criticisms, it must be constantly borne in mind that it is a stabilisation scheme and not a national growth programme. Though not an IMF measure, the Cruzado Plan initially went some way towards meeting monetarism, while not closing the door to structuralist proposals, such as land and agrarian reform. Politically, the *abertura* opened the floodgates to a broad anti-austerity front, which triumphed in March 1987 by forcing interest payment suspension on the other two-thirds of the external debt. The reasoning was that Brazil had nothing to lose, as more foreign funds were not forthcoming. On the other hand, the ailing world of the 1980s could not afford to lose a gigantic economy like Brazil's.

Reviewing the current position, this seems the perfect formula for a conciliatory default on debts which could not be blamed on Brazilian democracy. Meanwhile, structuralism surges forward through the growing influence of SUDENE veteran, Celso Furtado,<sup>26</sup> as economic adviser to the *Partido do movimento democratico brasileiro*. It has been suggested that Brazil's new Republic of the 1980s resembles the USA of the 1880s.<sup>27</sup> It may be so, but a worthier aim would be a revival of the ambitions of pre-1964 Brazil.

#### Endnotes

1. For a leading Brazilian view of the general phenomenon, see Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 'Democracy in Latin America', in *Politics and Society*, 15, 1, 1986-1987, pp. 23-41. Professor Cardoso, with Enzo Faletto, wrote the pathbreaking book *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), though first published in Spanish in 1969. Of the many assessments of this work, the most up-to-date is Ian Roxborough, 'Unity and Diversity in Latin American History', in *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 16, 1984, pp. 1-26. He is now a rising politician and one of the chief founders of the *Partido do movimento democratico brasileiro*.

2. Abraham F Lowenthal, 'Alliance Rhetoric vs Latin American Reality', in *Foreign Affairs*, 48, 3, 1970, pp. 494-508.
3. Noam Chomsky, 'Intervention in Vietnam and Central America: Parallels and Differences', in *Monthly Review*, 37, 1985-1986, pp. 1-29.
4. John A Peeler, *Latin American Democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela* (Chapel Hill: University of Carolina Press, 1985).
5. Donald Hodges & Ross Gandy, *Mexico 1910-1982* (London: Zed Press, 1983).
6. Roland Dallas, 'Will Latin American Democracy Last?', in *The World Today*, 43, 4, April 1987, pp. 70-72; Edward S Herman & James Petras, 'Resurgent Democracy: Rhetoric and Reality', in *New Left Review*, 154, pp. 83-97; Paul Cammack, 'Resurgent Democracy: Threat and Promise', in *New Left Review*, 157, pp. 121-128; Harold Blakemore, 'Dictatorship and Democracy in Latin America', *South America, Central America and the Caribbean 1986* (London: Europa, 1985) pp. 10-14.
7. Dallas, 'Democracy Last?', 70.
8. John A Booth, *The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, 2nd ed) is a fine recent study.
9. Tamar Jacoby, 'The Reagan Futnaround on Human Rights', in *Foreign Affairs*, 64, 5, 1986, pp. 1066-1086; Raoul Alfonsin, 'The Transition to Democracy in the Third World', in *Third World Quarterly*, 8, 1, January 1986, pp. 39-50; José Sarney, 'Brazil: A President's Story', in *Foreign Affairs*, 65, 1, 1986, pp. 101-117. The best single study in English of Brazilian development is Peter Flynn, *Brazil: A Political Analysis* (London: Ernest Benn, 1978).
10. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, 'Dictatorships and Double Standards', in *Commentary*, November 1979, pp. 34-45; 'US Security and Latin America', in *Commentary*, January 1981. She had written earlier a long monograph called *Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina* (Cambridge, Mass, 1971) but it was the short articles which drew her to the attention of the Reagan Administration.
11. Jeffrey A Fielden, 'The Brazilian Borrowing Experience: From Miracle to Debacle and Back', in *Latin American Research Review*, XXII, 1, 1987, pp. 95-131; Stephen G Bunker, 'Debt and Democratisation: Changing Perspectives on the Brazilian State', in *Latin American Research Review*, XXI, 1, 1986, pp. 206-223.
12. James Petras & Howard Brill, 'The IMF Austerity and the State in Latin America', in *Third World Quarterly*, 8, 2, April 1986, pp. 425-488. The quotation appears on p. 426.
13. George Philip, *The Military in South American Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1985) chapter 9, pp. 217-245, is excellent on the gradual approach to democratic restoration in Brazil; Alexandre de S C Barros, 'Back to the Barracks: an option for the Brazilian Military?' in *Third World Quarterly*, 7, 1, January 1985, pp. 63-77; for the Brazilian military background, Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974, 2nd ed); Riordan Roett, *Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society* (New York: Praeger, 1978, 2nd ed); Fernando Uricoechea, *The Patrimonial Foundations of the Brazilian Bureaucratic State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
14. Alain Rouquié, 'Argentina: the departure of the military — end of a political cycle or just another episode?', in *International Affairs*, 59, 1982-1983, pp. 575-586.
15. Other comparisons are well drawn out by George Philip, 'Democratization in Brazil and Argentina: Some Reflections', in *Government and Opposition*, 18, 2, Spring 1984, pp. 269-276.
16. Fielden, 'Debacle and Back', p. 121.
17. Sarney, 'President's Story', pp. 105-106.
18. Stefan H Robock, *Brazil's Developing North East* (Washington: Brookings Institute,

- 1963) is good on pre-coup development; and Georges-André Fiechter, *Brazil since 1964: Modernisation under a Military Regime* (New York: John Wiley, 1975) for post-coup; Ronaldo Munck, *Politics and Dependency in the Third World: The case of Latin America* (London: Zed Books, 1984) pp. 203–232, is a good, succinct critique.
19. Stuart B Schwartz, *Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia 1550–1835* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) is a superb recent history.
  20. This great writer described North-Eastern Brazil as an 'inland sea'.
  21. Celso Furtado served as Minister of Planning (1962–1963) under President Joao Goulart, and after the 1964 coup, his rights of citizenship were withdrawn. In France, he was made Professor of Economic Development at the University of Paris, where he had received a doctorate on the colonial economy of Brazil in the 16th century. From this base, his publications were prolific for the next twenty years. They were mainly a running critique of Brazil's military regime, but included broader works such as the widely-used textbook, *The Economic Development of Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), which is still the best structuralist treatment of the subject. He returned to Brazil after the handover of power, but became Minister of Culture, not Economics. Celso Furtado, *No to Recession and Unemployment: An Examination of the Brazilian Economic Crisis* (London: Third World Foundation, 1984) is a compilation (introduced by Teresa Hayter) of the advice he has been giving to the *Partido do movimento democratico brasileiro*.
  22. From the huge literature on McCarthyism, three excellent studies are: Robert Griffith, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R McCarthy and the Senate* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1970); David Cate, *The Great Fear* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979); Edwin R Bayley, *Joseph McCarthy and the Press* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981). It is hoped that a similar literature can now arise on the Brazilian experience. An understandable nervousness is indicated in the following remarks: 'Furtado's programme is a programme of reforms. He is not a Marxist, although he has at times been influenced by Marxist ideas.', Teresa Hayter's introduction to *No to Recession and Unemployment*, p. xvii.
  23. Thomas E Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil 1930–1964* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967). The issue of CIA involvement is tucked away in an appendix; Philip L Kelly, 'Geo-political Themes in the Writings of General Carlos de Meira Mattos of Brazil', in *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 16, 1984, pp. 440–461; Ronald H Chilcote, 'Towards the Democratic Opening in Latin America: The Case of Brazil', in *Monthly Review*, 39, 9, February 1984, pp. 15–24, which has a short discussion of the *eminense grise* rôle of General Golbery de Couto e Silva.
  24. Fielden, 'Debate and Back', p. 96. The economic criticism in the text is developed particularly from Werner Baer, *The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development* (New York: Praeger, 2nd ed, 1983); Werner Baer, 'Growth with inequality: the cases of Brazil and Mexico', in *Latin American Research Review*, XXI, 2, 1986, pp. 197–207; more generally from *oeuvre* of Professor Celso Furtado, which I can no longer itemise in detail.
  25. Peter Flynn, 'Brazil: The Politics of the Cruzado Plan', in *Third World Quarterly*, 8, 4, October 1986, pp. 1151–1194, is a first-rate explanation drawn from an ongoing research project. The vicissitudes of the Plan and the politics can be followed conveniently in *Latin American Monitor*, especially 3, 7, September 1986; 2, 9, November 1986; 4, 1, January–February 1987; and 4, 2, March 1987. See also *Veja*, 15 de abril 1987; and *Integración latino americana*, No. 122, abril 1987, which is entirely devoted to Brazilian economic cooperation with Argentina.

- 26 Peter Evans, 'Three Views of Regime Change and Party Organization in Brazil: An Introduction', in *Politics and Society*, 15, 1, 1986-1987, pp. 1-21, is good for clarifying the deliberate confusion surrounding this issue. Further clarification can be gained from Ciaran O Maolain (ed), *Latin American Political Movements* (Harlow: Longman Group Ltd, 1985) pp. 29-37; *Industria & desenvolvimento*, January 1987, is very interesting as regards the pressures of Sao Paulo business groups on the Sarney administration.
- 27 Fielden, 'Debacle and Back', p. 125.

## Book Reviews

UNDERSTANDING RUSSIA: THE HOLY FOOL AND RUSSIAN CULTURE

Ewa M Thompson

(New York, University Press of America, 1987. No price indicated).

Professor Thompson's subject is that typically Russian phenomenon, the holy fool — the *iurodivyi Khrista radi* or 'fool for the sake of Christ'. Western readers will probably be familiar with Rasputin, the most famous of his kind, but, as Professor Thompson says, in pre-revolutionary Russia virtually every village would have its own fool. Often he or she would be strangely dressed or even naked, bizarre in behaviour, frequently simple-minded and yet viewed with respect and fear as the fount of a strange and arcane wisdom.

Professor Thompson dedicates her book to 'the victims of holy Russia' and towards its end she observes that 'one wishes that the Russian people enjoyed their suffering without involving other nations in it' (p. 192). She thus draws attention to the grievances of those who have been afflicted by Russian/Soviet expansionism in Europe and her intention is to offer an explanation for this behaviour. Of Lithuanian origin, though now Professor of Russian at Rice University in Texas, Ewa Thompson is very personally engaged in this exercise. Her mission and her anger, however justifiable, unfortunately detract from the objectivity of her book.

Her fundamental thesis is that Russia/USSR is not a European state at all but an Asian one, the barbarity of which is thinly overlaid with a veneer of western civilisation. She would agree with the Russian poet Aleksandr Blok who wrote in 1917 that:

Yes, we are Scythians! Yes we are Asiatics!

With slanting and rapacious eyes . . .

We shall turn to you (Europe)

Our Asiatic face!

This is not an original approach. Scholars such as Tibor Szamuely (also of East European origin) were at pains to prove this point more than twenty years ago and I suspect that Russia's 'Asiatic barbarity' constitutes received wisdom in several countries East of the Elbe. Where Ewa Thompson breaks new ground is in her contention that the Russian tradition of holy foolishness offers further evidence for this view. She holds that holy foolishness was nothing more than 'the imposition of Christian legitimacy on shamanic behaviour' (p. ix) and that this duality is an integral component of Russian patterns of belief. Her book is based on nineteenth century journals of religious phenomena and on modern studies which seek psychological/psychiatric explanations for this kind of behaviour.

Professor Thompson contends that the 'massive acceptance of holy fools

in Russian social life left an indelible imprint on Russian conceptions of social priorities, of moral saintliness and sin, wisdom and foolishness, patriotism and indifference to the common good' (p. 9). In this paradoxicality she discerns the roots of the Russian passion for dialectical contradictions and, ultimately, of its fatalistic acceptance of Marxism. She further maintains that if holy fools were accepted as mad but wise, then it is no wonder that both Imperial Russia and today's Soviet Union have experienced difficulty in deciding who is and who is not insane. This 'uncertainty . . . was exploited by the tsars and, in a much more spectacular way, by the Soviet authorities' (p. 49).

A well-researched historical analysis of the similarities between Russian holy fools, saints, and the Finno-Ugrian/Tatar shamans (magicians or medicine men) follows, together with some fascinating descriptions of the rituals and behaviour of these individuals over many centuries. She firmly dismisses the notion that Russian holy fools had any connection with the Byzantine Greek tradition of *saloi*, or holy mystics of the early centuries after Christ. She then turns to her *forte*, which is the literary context of holy foolishness, with a chapter entitled 'The uses of the holy fool in literature'. Holy fools often appear as characters in Russian novels. Pierre Bezukhov in 'War and Peace' might be one and so, less ambiguously, is Prince Myshkin in Dostoevsky's 'The Idiot'. She notes that whereas western readers were initially repelled by the characters themselves and also by the 'chaotic' structure of the nineteenth century Russian novel, they gradually accepted them, especially as Russian authors came to adopt a more stylised and 'western' approach to their writing.

The second half of Professor Thompson's book tends to be disorganised and repetitive because it consists for the most part of papers originally printed elsewhere. In it she argues that the Russian intelligentsia was deeply influenced by the tradition of holy foolishness and cites the 'culture-bound rootlessness' (p. 164) of the *raznochintsy* — the *déclassé* generation of university-educated intellectuals of the later nineteenth century, with their 'addiction to paradoxes' (p. 174) and delight in toppling idols. If ridicule of and hostility to existing structures was a hallmark of both holy fools and revolutionary intellectuals, Professor Thompson asks whether this might not explain the virtually unquestioning acceptance by the innately conservative Russian population of the Bolsheviks' destruction of tsarist institutions. She cites phenomena such as the transformation of St Petersburg's revered Kazan cathedral into the Museum of Religion and Atheism, popularly known as the 'anti-God museum'. Pressing home her point, she suggests that Russia seems to be both 'traditional and anarchistic, a country where respect towards authority can easily change into mockery' (p. 195), concluding that: 'These contradictory characteristics are prominently displayed in the ancient Russian institution of holy foolishness' (p. 199).

Professor Thompson argues that the Russian acceptance that holy fools were wise indicates a fundamental confusion between logic and intuition within the Russian intellectual process. She also suggests that the Russian toleration of extreme and violent behaviour on the part of leaders such as Ivan IV (the Terrible) and Stalin can be explained by the fact that holy fools also behaved in this fashion without in any way detracting from the respect and awe with which they were regarded. In fact, she contends that this savage unpredictability might even have enhanced their aura of power and omniscience.

Does Professor Thompson's book help us to understand Russia? She insists that, 'like a holy fool, Russian culture has its meek and trustful side and its brutal and secretive side' (p. 199). She claims that an awareness of the Russian tradition of holy foolishness will help those who seek to comprehend Russia, its people and its history.

Although this is not a book for the lay person, it is a scholarly *exposé* of a hitherto unexplored facet of Russian character. Whether, however, one can or should extrapolate from this discourse in order to come to general conclusions about Russian/Soviet behaviour, domestic or international, is a moot point. Stereotypical analyses of this kind have a contribution to make, but can be dangerous if taken out of the broader context. A monocausal approach to international relations — in this case that 'national character' dictates a state's foreign policy — should be treated with great caution. Behaviour on a personal, domestic or international level is the result of a complex interaction of conscious and unconscious experience. It cannot be reduced to a single cause, however great the sophistication and scholarship with which it is argued.

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SWA/NAMIBIA THE POLITICS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

André du Pisani

*Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 1986, 534 pp. R39,95*

There is material for an excellent book in this massive account of developments in South West Africa. It is a product of painstaking and methodical inquiry, and will serve as a good reference work for those who wish to find out more about political developments in the territory among both black and white communities, and in international relations, from the German period until 1984.

The reader is likely to be impressed by the impartiality of the writer. He stands above the emotive issues to which the disputes over SWA/Namibia



have given rise, while feeling free to employ his critical judgment as he seeks to understand the motivations of the larger and the small actors in the drama. As the book proceeds, the attention given to the international issues absorbs an increasing amount of the author's attention, down to the attempts by President Kaunda of Zambia to promote a rapprochement between the South African Government and SWAPO early in 1984. At that point it ends somewhat abruptly.

For sake of giving good coverage in areas outside those in which he is explicitly concerned, Mr Du Pisani leans on the evidence of anthropologists for the origins of the various South West African peoples, draws on Helmut Bley for an analysis of German land policy, and repeatedly returns to Dugard, with approval, for his handling of issues relating to international law.

His bibliographical coverage is generally very full, though even with the help of computers it is much harder now than it was a few years ago to be able to boast anything like total coverage of relevant secondary sources. It is therefore in no carping mood that I note, in passing, the absence of H U Wehler, Pogge von Strandmann and H A Turner in his discussion of the origins of German colonialism, and of George Currie's article in the *American Historical Review* (1961) on Wilson, Smuts and the Mandate system, and of Gavin Lewis's excellent thesis on the Bondelswarts rebellion and the subsequent cover-up.

Despite the positive merits noted in the preceding paragraphs, the book is not a work of art. Even allowing for the fact that du Pisani has chosen to write in English, the style is flat and lacks subtlety. There has to be a connection between precision of argument, gracefulness of communication, and the skilful use of words. As an example of how he sometimes sets up barriers between himself and his readers, consider the following summary passage at pp. 37 and 42 (a continuous passage interrupted at \* by four pages of tables:

The subsequent South African administration of South West Africa thus 'inherited' a society that displayed some preconditions, such as the presence of cultural diversity and cultural pluralism, relative integration into a common economic system coupled with political fragmentation, political and economic \* domination by a culturally distinct minority (the Germans) and the preponderance of value dissensus. The following chapters focus on those tendencies that were largely perpetuated by the South African administration, the nature and implications of some changes brought about by this administration, and the South African response to plurality and fragmentation in Namibia.

I think the above passage means something like this:

The subsequent South African administration of South West Africa took over a culturally diverse and fragmented society, dominated

politically and economically by a German minority. How far that administration was able to combat these diversive trends forms the main theme of the ensuing chapters.

Furthermore, in a number of places unnecessary tabulations obstruct the reader's flow of thought rather than promote it, as at pp. 35–36 (a clumsy juxtaposition of 'factors' which would be easier to distinguish if they were not repeatedly given this common abstract designation), or at pp. 72–73, where three different tabulation keys are used — lower case Roman lettering, Arabic numerals, and lower case Roman numbers — for unrelated tables, where tabulation is not really necessary at all. Tabulation of arguments, as distinct from lists of material items, belongs to note-taking rather than to academic presentation, and I think it is the publisher's job to ensure that this kind of practice does not find its way into books.

To sum up, the book is a partly historical, partly legal, partly political study of the author's home territory — a study in which the historical and legal analyses depend fairly heavily on the acknowledged expertise of others, and the chief originality is to be seen in the author's observations as a political scientist. These are generally excellent in substance. I note, for example, his handling of SWAPO and SWANU at pp. 144–159 and 199–203, and his close discussion of Ovambo worker and political activity at pp. 210–216 and 227–240. But the presentation is so overloaded with excessive categorization that the reader can grow weary battling through the verbiage to the substance of the argument. The book could, with advantage, have been cut by at least one-third of its present length. It might then have had the pace to draw the reader on.

TRH Davenport

CONFRONTATIONS AND LIBERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA — REGIONAL DIRECTIONS AFTER THE NKOMATI ACCORD

Editors: S R Msabaha and Timothy M Shaw

*Westview Press, Boulder Colorado 1987, 315 pp \$34,505*

This timely collection, edited by two established Africanists, sets out to explore the sources of conflict in Southern Africa, and examines the prospects for regional development and economic integration.

Informed by a narrow theoretical understanding of the sources and dynamics of regional conflict — white racism and nationalism are singled out as the primary sources of such conflict — the various contributors share a further understanding of the region: South Africa's deliberate attempts 'to resist, divert or undermine the domino effect by capitalizing on the Nkomati Accord'. This assertion is backed-up by material provided by other analysts

of the region, notably Joseph Hanlon,<sup>1</sup> Nicolas Haysom,<sup>2</sup> and Johnson and Martin.<sup>3</sup>

Despite a tendency to explain regional conflict in *theoretical terms that do not take the debate much further*, this collection does offer some useful analytical insights into Southern African studies in the mid-1980s (Shaw and Msabaha). Colin Legum's chapter on 'The Nkomati Accord and its Implications for the Frontline States and South Africa' is well-argued and researched, while Shaw's chapter on the 'Foreign Policy of Apartheid', and that by Davies and O'Meara, 'Total Strategy in Southern Africa — An Analysis of South African Regional Policy since 1978', strengthen the collection.

The normative goal that informs most of the individual contributions to this collection, namely 'the transformation in the regional political economy: (from racism and capitalism to non-racial cooperative relations of production and distribution' (p. 9), laudible as that might be, raises theoretical and practical problems of its own. The tendency to equate racism with capitalism is theoretically suspect (racism is not a necessary condition for the maintenance of capitalism or vice versa) — despite the South African historical experience, while the concrete mechanisms required to effect such a transformation in the political economy of the region remain essentially unspecified. The assertion that the 'harsh light of *praxis*' will bring this about, is more of an ideological than a theoretical statement and assumes that the future history of the region is both predictable and, at least to some degree, inevitable.

Looking at some of the individual chapters, one is struck by a reliance on secondary sources and the absence of the human dimension — so tragically a part of regional conflict. Mhina's chapter on 'Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa after Zimbabwe' is a case in point. Not only does it lack historical depth, but it views liberation struggles in the former Portuguese colonies (Angola and Mozambique), in Zimbabwe, in Namibia and in South Africa, in essentially the same way. The assertion that 'armed struggles necessitated changes in Portugal' (p. 19) is largely unsubstantiated and ignores the importance of economic and other political variables, such as ferment within the Portuguese armed forces, in shaping metropolitan Portugal's decision to decolonise.

Campbell's chapter on the 'Decolonization Process in Namibia' belies a distinct ideological commitment projected in the material and omits important dimensions of the Namibian conflict. The assertion on page 33, to the effect that '... inside colonial Namibia the liberation fighters have beaten back the combined efforts of the USA and South Africa to physically eliminate SWAPO', does not take cognizance of SWAPO's own military decline and ignores the regional objectives of the United States. Far from

operating in cahoots with South Africa, the United States has consistently insisted upon the accommodation of all political formations, including SWAPO, in any future settlement in Namibia.

For Campbell, the complex and tragic events of 1975/1976 in Angola are a simple question of the 'Angolans' defeating the 'Boers' (i.e. the South Africans) 'with the help' of Cuba. The author also equates 'the crisis of capitalism' (which he fails to explain, even in theoretical terms) with South Africa's growing militarization of the region. Again, this important link remains theoretically unexplained. The dimensions of South Africa's strategy in Namibia — political, military and diplomatic — are not systematically analysed, while the relationship among these, as well as their contradictions and weaknesses, remain obscured. Again, the usage of sources is decidedly one-sided — all other sources written from a non-materialist perspective have been omitted.

Lipumba's chapter on 'The State of the Economies of the Frontline States' does not offer much in the form of original material; nevertheless, the analysis is balanced and sober. The author's emphasis upon the revitalisation of the agricultural sector and upon coordinated action is eminently sensible. Likewise, the author's suggestion that the principle of 'each country's comparative advantage' should apply, especially in mining and manufacturing, is realistic and practical.

The value of this collection is further enhanced by the contributions of Anglin — 'SADCC in the Aftermath of the Nkomati Accord'; Austin — 'Peace and Security in Southern Africa: Legal Aspects'; the inclusion of the text of the Nkomati Accord; and by a useful bibliography on post-1980 developments in the region.

Msabaha and Shaw have added a useful — if somewhat uneven — collection to a growing list of publications on South and Southern Africa. On balance, a collection worth reading; however, the temptation on the part of some of the contributors to view regional developments ideologically rather than theoretically, detracts somewhat from the value of the volume.

**Notes:**

1. Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours: apartheid power in southern Africa*. London: CIIR, 1986.
2. Nicolas Haysom, *Apartheid's Private Army, South Africa in the 1980s*. London: CIIR, 1986.
3. Phyllis Johnson & David Martin (eds), *Constructive Engagement: South Africa at war*. Harare: ZPH, 1986.

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