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## Smuts House Notes

It has become customary at the close of a year to reflect on the major happenings marking its progress — a practice now virtually universal with news magazines and political commentators.

The year 1988 has been difficult for South Africa. Despite encouraging diplomatic developments in the regional equation, the country has yet to slip its pariah moorings and to regain safe anchorage among the community of nations. The major reason for this has been the wearying impasse over domestic political reform — the kindest description of government attempts in this direction would be 'second rate'.

Ensnared by an over-regulated economy and society, mesmerised as a rabbit confronted by a snake by the inflamed passions of the right, and misdirected by utopian social engineering, the powers that be failed lamentably to light a fire in the nation's heart. In more ways than one, South African politics and economics have entered what Fleet Street journalists call the 'banana skin period'. The symptoms of this include a further slump in the buying power of the Rand, high inflation and foreign debt, a marked decline in the living standards of most South Africans, further smothering of the press, the continuation of a national state of emergency, and a tendency to *Willkür* (the exercising of arbitrary discretionary power).

Perhaps the governing elites suffer from political *folie de grandeur* — a case of losing touch with the people?

In retrospect, the events of 1988 underscored Noel Malcolm's maxim that 'political crises, like Frankenstein's monster, are man-made things which suddenly develop lives of their own'.<sup>1</sup> Malcolm continues by enunciating the challenging proposition that 'the most active ingredient in any governmental crisis consists precisely of the efforts which the Government makes to avoid a crisis'.

The year, notwithstanding its underlying threnody, has not been entirely wasted. Diplomatic progress in regional affairs — notably on Angola and Namibia — and rising costs maintaining the *status quo*, may in fact have moved South African society closer to negotiation and a post-apartheid future.

Perhaps the real importance of the Angola/Namibia negotiations has been the extent to which escalating costs influenced the thinking which brought the principal parties to the table, where agreement was reached not on the basis of trust but on the pragmatic understanding that the cost of non-settlement would outweigh the risk of settlement.

The unwonted and disarming constructive role of the Soviet Union in these negotiations, coupled with the improvement in relations between Washington and Moscow and their cooperation on Angola/Namibia may indeed have far-reaching implications for South Africa and for one of the

principal contending parties — the ANC. In short, the prospects of third party mediation may in fact have been significantly advanced.

Finally, a warm word of thanks and appreciation to all our contributors and readers. We hope that 1989 will be a prosperous and kinder year to all.

André du Pisani

Editor

January 1989

**Notes**

1. Noel Malcolm, 'Fighting the Government tooth and nail', *The Spectator*, 5 November 1988, p.6., 5 November 1988, p.6.

S. Akritides

## **Pax Americana: Expanding National Power — Constraining an Empire**

(An analysis of the prominence of idealism in US foreign Policy)

**Critics say that America is a lie because its reality falls far short of its ideals. They are wrong. America is not a lie; it is a disappointment. But it can be a disappointment only because it is also a hope.**

Samuel P. Huntington<sup>1</sup>

### **Animus Americanus: Isolationism versus Messianism**

'Man is not born to solve the problems of the world', Goethe once wrote, 'but to search for the starting point of the problem and remain within the limits of what he can comprehend: not only of what he can comprehend, but also of what he can accomplish'.<sup>2</sup> In relation to the initiative of containment, the bedrock of its foreign policy since the late 1940s, its commitment to 'peace, democracy, liberty and human rights',<sup>3</sup> and also its perceived duty 'to transform the world environment in accordance with those primary goals, values, and ideas',<sup>4</sup> the United States, particularly during its last three presidencies, has lacked — or so it is argued — Goethe's sense of limits, to the extent that 'American foreign policy is presented to the public, wrapped in sweeping rhetoric that commits the country to grandiose and often unrealistic objectives'.<sup>5</sup>

The rational limitation of a state's power would present an intractable task — great expectations are placed on a state's ability to exert itself to uphold and defend the norms intrinsic to the existence of its people and its allies. In this respect, the United States has been regarded, by its own people and by its allies alike, with the greatest of expectations.

'The United States of America' is a name that, in modern history, has come to embody powerful images, and persistent ideas. Since the dawn of

This paper is the work of a student in the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand and was considered to have sufficient merit to justify publication in the *Bulletin*, notwithstanding the relative inexperience of the contributor. The Institute hopes from time to time to present other papers of a similar nature in the expectation that it will encourage diligence and the pursuit of excellence among other young potential researchers.

its existence, the United States 'was the object of numerous utopias, fantastic notions of an unspoiled, pure and ideal territory that attracted the increasingly claustrophobic, post-medieval European mind'.<sup>6</sup> To the outside world, the United States, conceived as a nation in the forward-looking values of the European Reformation and Enlightenment,<sup>7</sup> personified liberal, democratic, individualistic and egalitarian values. Indeed, the Europeans perceived America as the bastion of hope and opportunity, fostered on those very tenets rejected by the states that rose from the ashes of the First World War in favour of less idealistic *Realpolitik* considerations. Consequently, 'every wave of immigrants to America, carried with it the baggage of European hopes and dreams regarding the New World'.<sup>8</sup>

Belief in America's moral uniqueness is deeply entrenched in US history. The 'founding fathers' of America, who declared the United States' independence from Great Britain, saw their young country as occupying a separate moral category from the rest of the world.<sup>9</sup> Among the first colonists, the founders of Massachusetts Bay Colony differentiated sharply between America and the old Eurocentric world, proclaiming that America 'is the place where the Lord will create a new Heaven, and a new Earth in new Churches, and a new Commonwealth'.<sup>10</sup> Massachusetts Bay governor, John Winthrop, declared in 1630 that 'we shall be as a City upon a Hill, the eyes of all people are upon us'.<sup>11</sup> America was thus to represent — both to its inhabitants and to the outside world — the qualities of freedom, opportunity, progress, tolerance, social mobility and social justice.

These perceptions gave rise to a faculty of thought intrinsic to any regard or manifestation of United States institutions and operations. Interchangeably referred to as 'Americanism',<sup>12</sup> 'American Exceptionalism',<sup>13</sup> the 'American self-image',<sup>14</sup> or the 'American Creed',<sup>15</sup> this faculty of thought propagates the notion that the United States is a unique national entity, upholding (with unprecedented fervour) those libertarian concepts that inform its social, economic and political institutions — the very antithesis of the corruption, belligerency and elitism of a world gone wrong. Against the backdrop of a machiavellian Europe, for centuries the arena of political intrigues, immorality, social oppression, religious persecution and endless dynastic warfare undertaken at the expense of the common folk, the young America, united in the fraternalism of its populace's anti-monarchic sentiments (which spearheaded the American War of Independence), became 'the Israel of our time', 'God's own country', 'a chosen people', and a 'beacon on the hill'. American exceptionalism did not therefore only herald the uniqueness and special virtues of the United States but also elevated America to a higher moral plane than other countries.<sup>16</sup>

Although the normative precepts of the American Creed have generally

prevailed within the realm of US domestic affairs — albeit with varying degrees of success and incidence<sup>17</sup> — ‘Americanism’ lies also ‘at the heart of the persistent moralism prevalent in American foreign policy’.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, ‘exceptionalist ideas have influenced American foreign policy throughout US history, but the consequences have varied greatly’.<sup>19</sup>

With the notion of its moral uniqueness as a starting point, America saw the *raison d'être* of its conduct in world affairs as being imbued with a ‘mission’ to uphold, defend and propagate its unparalleled values on a global scale. This sense of mission is expressed both in declarations that the United States must convert the world to its values both by serving as an example and in a more activist crusading spirit. Like the notion of ‘American Exceptionalism’, of which it is a constituent part, the sense of mission can be traced to colonial America and the founding fathers. The New England Puritans felt that they had embarked on a ‘mission of cosmic significance’ and that they would provide ‘a moral example to all the world’.<sup>20</sup> Even the more dispassionate John Adams ambitiously asserted that the United States ‘will last forever, govern the globe and introduce the perfection of man’.<sup>21</sup> In 1804, James Madison, US Secretary of State at the time, proclaimed that ‘the United States owes to the world as well as to themselves to let the example of one government at least, [to] protest against the corruption which prevails’.<sup>22</sup> Woodrow Wilson explained US intervention in World War I in the context of the American sense of mission, equating the United States’ participation in that conflict to a philanthropic crusade — ‘to serve and save the world at whatever cost for America’ — a crusade that would end all wars (wars being essentially an un-‘Americanist’ feature), and make the world safe for the American-endorsed institution of democracy.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, in the words of Geir Lundestad: ‘While other states had interests, the United States had responsibilities: its prime mission [being] nothing less than to save the world’.<sup>24</sup> Edward Burns expands on the influence that the sense of mission has over the American *Weltanschauung*:

Perhaps no theme has ever dominated the minds of the leaders of this nation to the same extent as the idea that America occupies a unique place and has a special destiny among the nations of the earth. It is an idea which characterizes not simply flamboyant orations and pervades the writings of critical philosophers and distinguished historians and social scientists. No period of our history has been free from its seductive influence ... As the years passed, the prophets of a glorious and expanding America placed more and more emphasis upon the duties and moral responsibilities of greatness.<sup>25</sup>

On the other hand, emanating from the perception of America’s unique virtue and innocence, is the contention that US foreign policy is necessarily more virtuous and altruistic than that of other states. By this rationale, American foreign policy is itself exceptional and therefore cannot be judged or conducted by the same standards applied to the foreign policy initiatives of other countries. This perception is reflected in the frequent reluctance of



the United States to resort to 'anti-Americanist' power politics-oriented foreign policy initiatives, such as military intervention in foreign conflicts and expedient participation in alliances with countries that uphold 'anti-Americanist' norms. Louis Halle accounts for the xenophobic aspects of American exceptionalism by referring to

[t]he sense of escape ... [which] has dominated the attitude of Americans towards Europe, toward the Old World. Europe was the dungeon from which they [the founding fathers] had fled to the wide-open American continent, where all men were equal, where all men were free, where opportunity was unlimited. Europe was the ancient prison house on which they had so gladly turned their backs — forever ... The sense of escape from the Old World with which those who were to become Americans arrived in the New World was reinforced by a pervasive Utopianism in their thinking. This Utopianism is perhaps the main philosophical factor that has shaped American foreign policy from the first colonizations of our own time ... Yet one weakness of all Utopians lies in their necessarily low opinion of the external world, and in an anxious hostility toward it.<sup>26</sup>

Consequently, America, by rejecting the Eurocentric features of 'shifting political alliances, frequent and unnecessary wars, an uneasy and immoral balance of power, and restrictive economic relations among nations',<sup>27</sup> propagated 'unrestricted international economic intercourse, the abolition of war, abstention from alliances which produce war, and the promotion of international law to promote peace everywhere'.<sup>28</sup> To this end, almost from its very foundation, the *leitmotiv* of US foreign policy became isolationism — a profoundly unilateralist approach to diplomatic relations. Americans saw the Eurocentric world as a threat to their democratic purity, innocence and security. George Washington's Farewell Address urged a cautious foreign policy of nonentanglement. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 not only warned the states of the Old World to keep out of the Western Hemisphere, but also reiterated the distinction between the young American republic and the old monarchies of Europe. Historian Dexter Perkins described the Monroe Doctrine as 'an ideological tract, praising the democratic principles and exalting democratic forms, in contrast to the monarchies of Europe'.<sup>29</sup> That much of American isolationism was made possible by the power of the British navy did nothing to reduce the significance of isolationist sentiments.<sup>30</sup> America, it was felt, had a different historical fate to that of Europe. It had a 'manifest destiny'.<sup>31</sup> America was to be a new Athens, a new Rome, a new Jerusalem. Europe was the past; America the future.<sup>32</sup>

The 'American Creed', therefore, has had two contrary effects: interventionism and abstention. On the one hand, America was to be the 'saviour', 'teacher' and 'leader' of freedom and democracy in the world. On the other, although it would endeavour to be a beacon of democracy in the world, America would guard its purity by refraining from active interventionism, believing that the mere regard of the American democratic example would generate democratic progress in other countries.

According to Louis Halle, the two-pronged nature of the 'American Creed' is perhaps the decisive characteristic of traditional American foreign policy culture:

One constant theme runs through the history of American foreign policy, from our first experiences as an independent unit in the world to the charged and revolutionary events of the twentieth century. It dominates virtually every debate and significant decision throughout this period ... It takes the form of a tension, a polarity in our thinking, a conflict in our national desires which at critical moments in history has divided our people, sometimes bitterly ... The tension is that between participation in world politics and withdrawal or aloofness, or abstinence; between involvement and isolation, between alignment and neutrality.<sup>33</sup>

The ambivalence in the American debate concerning the nature of the United States' role in foreign affairs has been a burden for the conduct of US foreign policy. Having introduced the precepts and ambiguities of the 'American Creed', one can go on to examine the two divergent themes of American idealism — isolationism and messianism — in the realm of the foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the Nixon, Carter and Reagan Administrations.

#### **Eagle Entangled: The Scenario**

**Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.**

US President John F. Kennedy (1961-63)<sup>34</sup>

The inauguration of Richard Nixon's presidency early in 1969 saw US foreign policy at a low ebb. Having discarded the predominantly non-interventionist foreign policy which it had practiced for nearly two centuries and having opted for the role of the 'global gendarme' since the late 1940s, the United States, overburdened by its inauspicious amassment of politico-military commitments, was being transformed — like Great Britain before it — into a 'weary titan', struggling 'under the too vast orb of its fate'.<sup>35</sup>

'Statesmen', George Kennan<sup>36</sup> once noted, '... inherit from their predecessors predicaments and dilemmas to which they can see no political solution'.<sup>37</sup> By the early 1970s, it had become clear that the Nixon Administration would bear the brunt of the policy errors of former US presidencies.

The cumulative process that gave rise to America's precarious international standing at the time of the Nixon presidency, reached its climax with the advent of the Tet Offensive in January 1968. Arguably the most decisive confrontation in the Vietnam War, the Tet Offensive<sup>38</sup> not only fostered the conviction that a US military victory in Indochina would

not be forthcoming, but also highlighted the loss of American hegemony in the post-World War II international system.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, the Vietnam War put an end to the 'illusion of perfect efficacy' in US foreign policy.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, the war in Indochina raised questions about America's omnipotence: there were now limits to what the United States could do. Washington came to realise that the continuation of the Vietnam conflict at the late 1960s levels of US military participation was no longer politically acceptable. Consequently, President Johnson rejected the request of the US commander in Vietnam, General Westmoreland, for the deployment of an additional 206 000 American soldiers in Indochina.

Most adversely affected by the tragic culmination of events in Indochina was the notion of the American sense of mission. There was a loss of confidence in the ability of the United States to discharge 'the responsibilities of moral and political leadership'.<sup>41</sup> America's support for an autocratic government in Saigon and the actual course of the war seemed to demonstrate that America was no more altruistic than earlier imperial powers.<sup>42</sup> The sharp distinction between good and evil — an inherent component of the concept of mission — became blurred in Indochina. Events relating to US military brutality, such as the infamous massacre at Mai Lai and the bombing of Hanoi and Cambodia, cast a grim shadow on American claims to exceptional virtue in world affairs. Large numbers of Americans, including many of the people who had endorsed America's intervention in Southeast Asia during the Kennedy years,<sup>43</sup> were now joining the ranks of the previously 'tiny minority'<sup>44</sup> who had formerly denounced US intervention for its stupidity and immorality and were now asserting that American participation in the Indochinese conflict had progressed from a folly to a crime. The more radical critiques of US foreign policy that had emerged during the Vietnam War went so far as to invert the theory of American Exceptionalism in international relations. Writers such as Gabriel Kolko concluded that the United States had played not an exceptionally good but an exceptionally evil role on the world stage throughout much of its history.<sup>45</sup> The American people were beginning to lose faith in the political institutions of their country.

Vietnam was not, however, the sole cause of the decay in US power: it was merely the particular event which had brought the reality of the finite nature of American power to the fore. Even without Vietnam it was clear that the international system of the 1960s — and America's role within it — was very different from that of the late 1940s and 1950s.<sup>46</sup> Western Europe and Japan had emerged as important economic competitors of the United States. The Soviet Union had attained nuclear parity with America, and US Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, conceded that the notion of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) would henceforth be the basis for

strategic relations between Washington and Moscow. These developments, which had come about by the late 1960s, symbolised the end of a period of US hegemony.

The events that led to the incremental decline of US omnipotence may be traced back to the articulation of the Truman Doctrine, which adumbrated America's superiority in the immediate post-World War II era. Reacting against Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East during the late 1940s, and realising that the resurgence of an 'isolationist spirit' would ignore the realities of the geopolitical landscape shaped by World War II,<sup>47</sup> the United States, under the auspices of the Truman Doctrine, undertook 'to help free people maintain their institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes',<sup>48</sup> since such regimes, 'imposed on free people by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace, and hence, the security of the United States'.<sup>49</sup> This US undertaking heralded the birth of the concept of 'containment'.<sup>50</sup> Officially articulated by George Kennan in 1946-47, containment had constituted the bedrock of US national security policy from the Truman to the Johnson presidencies. Containment *per se* was seen as 'a predominantly defensive theory according to which various means, other than direct military confrontation, [would be] employed with the objective of deterring Soviet expansionism particularly in those regions of the world deemed to be of vital importance to the United States'.<sup>51</sup> In the context of the Truman Doctrine, however, containment was viewed as the necessary course of action that America had to take to accomplish its mission of protecting and upholding US values of freedom and democracy on a global scale. With this in mind, the United States, perceiving Soviet expansionism as the greatest threat to freedom and democracy, embarked on a self-endowed mission of 'long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies',<sup>52</sup> because 'the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence'.<sup>53</sup>

Consequently, the United States endeavoured to contain Soviet expansionism by providing economic aid to and entering into defence alliances or treaties with its allies, to alleviate their financial and security predicaments which increased their vulnerability to Soviet penetration.<sup>54</sup> Although each US administration between 1947 and 1968 applied the policy of containment in slightly varying forms — Truman was concerned with opposing Communism directly, by forming a network of alliances to encircle the Communist bloc;<sup>55</sup> Eisenhower extended US assertiveness to include the expansionist designs of non-Communist powers linked to the Soviet Union, such as Egypt;<sup>56</sup> Kennedy embarked on a more indirect

manifestation of containment whereby the Soviets would be restrained by dialogue with the US, while opportunities for Soviet penetration in the Third World would be mitigated by a more extensive US involvement in *Third World conflict areas, such as Vietnam*;<sup>57</sup> and Johnson expanded on Kennedy's approach of dialogue with Moscow and with participation in Third World conflicts<sup>58</sup> — nonetheless, there appeared to be no substantive deviation from the fundamental foreign policy emphasis of 'limiting the spread of Soviet power'.<sup>59</sup> America seemed to be committed to its mission. In the twenty years preceding the Nixon Administration, the United States felt that it could be trusted to fulfill its mission because it was the 'Chosen Nation', 'the justest, the most progressive, the most honourable, the most enlightened nation in the world'. As such, it had not only the right but also the duty to use whatever means necessary, including force, to do justice and to assert the rights of mankind.<sup>60</sup> Against the backdrop of this blatantly messianic stance, the United States conceded the necessity of power politics to achieve its mission, committing itself more and more to interventionary initiatives in Lebanon, Korea, Cuba, the Congo, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam.<sup>61</sup> Indeed, it seems that messianic America had found 'something sacred and holy in ... warfare' and thus 'refused to cry "peace" as long as there is a sin and wrong in the world'.<sup>62</sup> In the late 1960s, the time to cry peace had not yet arrived. 'When we are gone', President Johnson asked in March 1968, 'what other nation in the world is going to stand up and protect the little man's freedom everywhere in the world?'<sup>63</sup> A few years earlier, John F. Kennedy had referred to 'our right to the moral leadership of the planet'.<sup>64</sup>

In the climate of defeatism following its frustrated policies in Vietnam, the United States came to realise that its ordained policies had to be reconsidered. Speaking shortly before he became special adviser on foreign affairs to President Nixon, Henry Kissinger stated that 'Vietnam is more than a failure of policy, it is really a very critical failure of the American philosophy of international relations ... We have to assess the whole procedure and concepts that got us involved in [Indochina] ... if we are not going to have another [foreign policy] disaster that may have a quite different look but will have the same essential flaws'.<sup>65</sup> A new epoch in US foreign policy was dawning.

### **The Nixon Administration: The Limits of Cooption?**

**If I lived in another country that wanted to be sure and retain its rights to self-determination, I would say: Thank God that the United States exists at this moment in history.**

US President Richard M. Nixon (1969-74)<sup>66</sup>

The Nixon Administration came to power at a moment when the cohesion of American diplomacy had totally disintegrated.<sup>67</sup> President Nixon therefore declared that his Administration was to seek an alternative

to 'old policies that have failed'.<sup>68</sup> The Vietnam tragedy had yielded some salutary lessons: the United States was not an omnipotent power and was not capable of extending its activities to all parts of the globe.<sup>69</sup> It had thus to avoid a state of affairs where its commitments exceeded its resources;<sup>70</sup> and it had to take into account the cultural diversity within the international community and to realise that its allies or adversaries may not be favourably receptive to American attempts to promote and protect American values and norms.<sup>71</sup> While seeking to redefine the tenets of the American *Weltanschauung*, the Nixon Administration was equally aware that a toned-down Pax Americana embodied dangerous repercussions. In this respect, Kissinger asserted that 'we certainly have to keep in mind that the Russians will judge us by the general purposefulness of our performance everywhere'.<sup>72</sup> That assertion was of particular relevance to the Vietnam question. In Nixon's words: 'If the United States leaves Vietnam in a way that we are humiliated or defeated ... this will be immensely discouraging to the 300 million people from Japan, clear around to Thailand in free Asia. And even more important, it will be ominously encouraging to the leaders of Communist China and the Soviet Union who are supporting the North Vietnamese. It will encourage them in their expansionist policies in other areas'.<sup>73</sup>

Against that backdrop, therefore, the 'Nixon Doctrine' was promulgated by the US President in a background briefing at Guam on 25 July 1969. The elements of the doctrine were described as follows in the presidential report to Congress on foreign policy at the beginning of 1970:

1. The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.
2. We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation aligned with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.
3. In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its own defence.<sup>74</sup>

Despite its messianic undertones, the Nixon Doctrine attempted to address and come to terms with the erosion of the Pax Americana in a world conscious of the growth of Soviet military power. In a nutshell, the Nixon Doctrine embodied a US strategy of co-option<sup>75</sup> with which the United States would minimise the impact of the decline of American power by co-opting both allies and adversaries into an American foreign policy design. This design consisted of three components:

(1) **Allies and Surrogates** — As stated by President Nixon on 18 February 1970, 'the central thesis [of the Nixon Doctrine] is that the United States will participate in the defence and development of all allies and friends, but America cannot — and will not — conceive *all* the programs,

execute *all* the decisions and undertake *all* the defence of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest'.<sup>76</sup> By this rationale, there would be a greater measure of burden-sharing between the US and its allies. America's allies were now expected to do more to solve their own security dilemmas. In his second report to Congress on 25 February 1971, Nixon asserted: 'In the Western Hemisphere [the US has] shifted from paternalism to a more balanced partnership',<sup>77</sup> and on 3 May 1973, he declared that, in the context of the United States' relations with its allies, '[i]t was time to move from a paternal mission for others to a co-operative mission **with others**'.<sup>78</sup> As one consequence, the Shah of Iran was encouraged to purchase large quantities of American weapons and to become Washington's 'surrogate gendarme in the Persian Gulf'.<sup>79</sup> Indirect US assistance — as Nixon and Kissinger hoped — would nurture America's allies into becoming regional powers that would act as the United States' proxies and bear the burden of containment in specific regions.

The Nixon Administration's envisaged network of proxies and surrogates did not succeed — Vietnam may be cited as a case study. Washington's attempts to transform the fledgling South Vietnamese regime into a powerful proxy failed dismally. As Norman Podhoretz ruefully asserts: 'In the case of Vietnam, not only was the surrogate power unable to hold the line on its own, but in the event, the United States refused even to provide it with the promised aid to defend itself against a military invasion encouraged and supplied with massive quantities of Soviet arms'.<sup>80</sup>

A network of pro-US surrogates functioning with a minimal amount of US assistance also failed to take shape in Europe. According to the precepts of the Nixon Doctrine, Western Europe was regarded as an area from which the United States could have achieved an orderly disengagement, leaving the maintenance of stability to the European armed forces, while doing its best to add to the strength of any European defence organisation. Although there was talk during the initial phases of the Nixon presidency of a rift in US/European relations, fostered by European antagonism towards the US/Soviet and US/Chinese *détente* (see below), by 1974, however, there was no sign that Washington intended to put forward any scheme for a 'devolution' of responsibilities to a unitary Europe, nor was any plan discernible to increase the capacity for self-defence of the United States' European allies. Its paramount geopolitical importance precluded the United States from reducing its European commitment.<sup>81</sup>

(2) **The 'China Card'** — Kissinger and Nixon tried to co-opt the People's Republic of China (PRC) into a system of triangular diplomacy.<sup>82</sup> The Sino-Soviet hostility of the 1960s and 1970s opened up new opportunities for Washington, as it gave both Moscow and Peking the incentive to cooperate with the United States. The Nixon Administration,

in an attempt to undermine Soviet strategic and political designs, entered into a rapprochement with Beijing. This so-called 'China Card' initiative signalled a remarkable *volte face* in US foreign policy attitudes. For the first time, the United States initiated diplomatic interaction, motivated purely by political expediency, with a state that did not uphold or support 'Americanist' values. Nixon justified the Washington/Beijing concord on the grounds that 'there did not seem to be major clashes of national interest between our two countries over the longer term. Our policies could be less rigid if we and the Chinese did not treat each other as permanent adversaries'.<sup>83</sup> National interest rather than ideology was the criterion by which the Nixon Administration justified its cooperation with Beijing. The United States' decision to cooperate with a country whose Communist ideals were the target of Washington's *strictu sensu* presaged its admirable accommodation to the international community's cultural and ideological diversity. In Nixon's own words:

Accommodation to the diversity of the world community is the keystone to our current policy. That does not diminish our clearly-stated preference for free democratic processes and for governments based thereon ... But it does mean that we must be prepared to deal realistically with governments as they are, provided, of course, that they do not endanger security or the general peace of the area.<sup>84</sup>

It ought to be kept in mind, however, that the incipient rapprochement between the United States and a Communist nation such as the PRC did not signify a *de facto* negation of the containment of Communism. On the contrary, the affiliation between Washington and Beijing was undertaken to accentuate the containment of the most prominent and most assertive Communist power: the Soviet Union.

(3) **The Advent of Détente** — Under the auspices of the Nixon Doctrine, the Soviet Union was to be integrated into a US-articulated, legitimate international order, in which it would behave in accordance with the notions of restraint and the norms of permissible behaviour established by the United States.<sup>85</sup> This forward-looking approach with regard to the Soviet Union was called 'détente' and heralded the beginning of a new era in relations between Moscow and Washington. In this new era, proponents of détente argued, a 'structure of peace' would be fostered in the cooperation between the two superpowers which would replace the condition of 'confrontation'.<sup>86</sup> Negotiations between them would seek to limit the proliferation of strategic nuclear weapons. The Americans and the Soviets would also agree to exercise restraint in their dealings with third parties so that the danger that Moscow and Washington would be drawn into direct conflict with each other would be minimised.

The maintenance of the condition of détente was to be given paramount importance in the realm of US foreign policy initiatives. Nixon himself conceded that the aim of the policy was to bind the Soviet leaders by a



number of agreements whose total effect would be to limit Moscow's freedom of action but at the same time redound to the advantage of Soviet interests in other respects: 'We hoped that the Soviet Union would acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of negotiations and that it would become convinced that its interests would be best served if the entire process [of détente] unfolded'.<sup>87</sup> In this respect, the United States would try to lure the Soviets to the negotiating table by means of arms limitation agreements (such as SALT I and Mutual Force Reductions), agreements on economic cooperation, technological agreements (cooperation in space programmes, the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and the option of general political consultation if any risk of nuclear war appeared.<sup>88</sup> In this way, the Soviet Union and the United States would enter into a symbiotic relationship from which both would have great difficulty in disentangling themselves without damaging their own interests.<sup>89</sup> Professor Hartley asserts:

Crudely, one might speak of a bargain whereby the Soviet Union would renounce international expansion in return for the advantages expected from political, economic and technological co-operation with the United States. On a more sophisticated level, one might describe the policy [of détente] as one of encouragement of change within the Soviet Union and the consequent 'embourgeoisement' of Soviet foreign policy.<sup>90</sup>

The policy of détente had not, however, taken Soviet political expediency into account; indeed, Moscow had aspirations of its own which were not compatible with the structure of the stable international community that Nixon and Kissinger had envisaged. Although the Nixon Administration saw the concepts as a means of disciplining Soviet power, Moscow saw it as offering new opportunities for exercising power, and doing so safely.<sup>91</sup> This divergence in outlook undermined the attempt at co-option. The Nixon Administration was not prepared, however, to sacrifice its geopolitical concerns to Soviet expediency merely for the sake of adhering to the precepts of détente. In this respect, *Realpolitik* prevailed during two Middle Eastern crises: US assertiveness effectively countered the Soviet-endorsed Syrian attack on Jordan in September 1970,<sup>92</sup> while Kissinger's tactful diplomacy prevented the Soviet Union from extracting any tangible benefits from the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973,<sup>93</sup> thus, where Washington deemed its interests threatened, it would oppose rather than cooperate with Moscow's initiatives.

In conclusion, Nixon and Kissinger believed that a combination of surrogate force with positive economic and political incentives, would restrain Soviet adventurism.<sup>94</sup> This was not to be. It soon became apparent to the Nixon Administration that co-option had its limits and that the United States had to resort to interventionist policies (as it did in the Middle East during the early 1970s) when Soviet expediency defied the rules of détente. The United States therefore continued to act in the international

community under the aegis of its 'mission' to control Soviet power and Communist penetration — and without reliance on surrogate forces, especially in regions crucial to its 'mission'. Nonetheless, the co-option strategy was not well understood within the United States, and Nixon and Kissinger were increasingly attacked as the architects of American decline. Norman Podhoretz denounced 'co-option' as a manifestation of 'strategic retreat'.<sup>95</sup> In fact, the Nixon Administration was attempting to stave off the effects of the relative decline in American power and to minimise the impact of increased domestic constraints on Washington's Soviet policy. In the aftermath of the Watergate furor and the assault on presidential power, the realisation of the goals of co-option seemed practically impossible.

### **The Carter Administration: Virtue Unrewarded?**

**It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy — a policy based on constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision.**

US President Jimmy Carter (1977-81)<sup>96</sup>

The belief in American exceptionalism reached its nadir as the Vietnam conflict ended. The Nixon Administration's attempts to prolong the American retreat from Vietnam had floundered. The United States was ejected from Indochina and a grim shadow of doubt was cast over America's invincibility and virtue. The realisation that poverty and racism still existed in the midst of the affluent US society, as well as urban violence, student unrest, Watergate, and reports of domestic spying by the CIA, precipitated a tremendous crisis of faith and pride among Americans. Daniel Bell was hardly alone in concluding that Americans had abandoned their traditional belief that the United States is 'the most generous and responsible nation in the World'.<sup>97</sup> The Cornell University political scientist, Richard Rosecrance, entitled a 1979 book, *America as an Ordinary Country*, a phrase unthinkable several decades earlier, when the belief in the 'American Creed' was still firmly rooted.<sup>98</sup>

President Jimmy Carter began his term with an effort to restore America's belief in itself and to reinvigorate the dying idea of a special American 'mission' in the world. Promising the United States a foreign policy 'as good as its people'<sup>99</sup> and pledging 'to regain the moral structure we once had', Carter assumed the mantle of an earlier era's rhetoric, proclaiming that 'our policy is designed to serve mankind',<sup>100</sup> at a time when the Soviet Union risked becoming 'historically irrelevant to the great issues of our time'.<sup>101</sup> Carter's inaugural address was laden with self-conscious invocations of American Exceptionalism.<sup>102</sup> The new US President argued that by defining 'itself in terms of both spirituality and human liberty', the United States had acquired a 'unique self-definition which has given us an exceptional appeal', affirming that 'we are a proudly idealistic nation'.<sup>103</sup>

If the Carter Administration was to steer America towards the path of greatness, it would not utilise the foreign policy methodology of its immediate predecessors, which had led the United States to the brink of decline. The disaffection of the American public with the *Realpolitik* foreign policy approach in the immediate post-Vietnam era was also prevalent among the ranks of the Carter Administration. Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, reiterated this contention, claiming that 'a nation that saw itself as a "beacon on a hill" for the rest of mankind, could not content itself with power politics alone'.<sup>104</sup>

Consequently, the Carter Administration promised to achieve deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union and to restrict the level of global armaments, unilaterally and through agreements; to enhance worldwide sensitivity to human rights and ensure the progressive and peaceful transformation of Southern Africa; to form a web of bilateral relations with the new 'regional influentials' of the Third World and improve the state of multilateral North-South relations; to re-evaluate American relations with Western Europe, Japan and other advanced democracies in the West; to come to a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East; conclude a treaty on the status of the Panama Canal; and to normalise US-Chinese relations.<sup>105</sup>

Two basic assumptions lay behind the policy goals envisaged by the Carter Administration. The first was that the Soviet Union no longer represented a global threat, and was expounded by Carter at Notre Dame University on 22 May 1977, where he declared: 'We are now free of that inordinate fear of Communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear'. To be sure, the Soviet Union was to remain a major problem for US foreign policy, but it no longer represented the central problem. The 'implicitly apocalyptic conflict' between the US and the USSR of the 1950s and 1960s, as Brzezinski noted in 1973, had been replaced by 'an explicitly relativistic competition', which took place within an entirely new global context,<sup>106</sup> in which the industrial 'technocratic societies' and the 'new influentials' of the Third World were competing in drawing the boundaries of a new equality that resulted from a general devaluation of military power.<sup>107</sup> By this rationale, the traditional 'East-West' alignment was being replaced by a 'North-South' polarity.<sup>108</sup>

The second assumption underpinning Carter's foreign policy was based on the belief that war had become an outmoded institution in international relations. According to the Carter Administration, colonial, civil and foreign wars had repeatedly shown that the subjugation of groups of people that are determined to organise and resist would necessitate suppressive military measures and repressive political actions that might become so costly that statesmen would instead tolerate the costs of failure and secession.<sup>109</sup> Indeed, pushing the argument to the extreme, some of Carter's

theorists even reasoned that the world was moving into an era in which war between major states might disappear altogether.<sup>110</sup> Given this devaluation of military force, a foreign policy geared to the military containment of the Soviet Union was 'too narrow', and power realism — preoccupied as it was with the traditional issues of international relations — had become 'deceptive'.<sup>111</sup> Instead, a broader vision (i.e. the Carter Administration's vision) would present the world 'as a unit beset by certain common problems'.<sup>112</sup> In such a world, the Soviet Union, whose major asset was its military power and whose historical creed was inequality, had become increasingly irrelevant. It was 'not even a rival' of the United States.<sup>113</sup> Therefore, '[w]hereas Nixon, Ford and Kissinger saw "détente" as an adaptation of containment to a set of changing circumstances ... the Carter Administration seemed to see no need for containment at all'.<sup>114</sup>

Carter's idealism did not reap beneficial results: its emphasis on human rights 'bewildered the Soviet authorities, which interpreted [this emphasis] as an orchestrated attack against them'.<sup>115</sup> If, therefore, as Simon Serfaty contends, 'the Carter Administration could not be held solely responsible for the deterioration of America's relationship with the Soviet Union in 1977, it could nevertheless be declared liable for exacerbating it mildly'.<sup>116</sup> This state of affairs was vividly illustrated by the increasing tension between the US and USSR during 1977, which left the whole process of arms negotiations dangling.<sup>117</sup>

Carter's zeal in pursuing reconciliation between Egypt and Israel caused great confusion and uncertainty among the Egyptians and Israelis.<sup>118</sup> Although the Camp David Accord of 17 September 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Accord reconciled the two countries and foreshadowed a policy triumph for the Carter Administration, it has been conceded that 'Carter's involvement caused an enormous drain on his time and energy, which diverted his attention away from the unfolding turbulence elsewhere. The price of Carter's triumph was high. Nowhere was this more evident than in and over Iran'.<sup>119</sup>

In 1977, Carter, despite his rhetorical affiliation to human rights and democratic imperatives, did not insist on the political reforms in Iran that might have reversed the revolutionary trend, as some of his own foreign policy analysts advised. Instead, by confirming the Shah as 'America's island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world',<sup>120</sup> and by endorsing extensive arms transfers to the Iranian regime,<sup>121</sup> Carter greatly accentuated the anti-American sentiments among the revolutionary factions in Iran. The Carter Administration's failure to prevent the overthrow of the Shah severely tarnished America's reputation, for, 'if the Americans would not support the Shah, under what circumstances would they be expected to move? If the Carter Administration did not judge Iran to be a vital interest of the United States, what ally could consider itself truly secure?'<sup>122</sup> Similar

anxieties were voiced at the lack of US assertiveness when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. America's approach to the international scene was changing once again.

As early as mid-March 1978, Carter warned against the 'ominous inclination on the part of the Soviet Union to use its military power'<sup>123</sup> — by 1979, his fears had been vindicated. The United States' foothold in the Middle East was precarious, to say the least, and Carter had reverted to the policy of containment in the Carter Doctrine, which enunciated that '[a]n attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the US ... [and will] be repelled by the use of any means necessary, including military force'.<sup>124</sup> This rhetorical assertiveness was supplemented by operative measures such as an increase in military expenditure, a sudden endorsement of strategic weapons and the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). These measures, however, were not enough to satisfy the American public, which was by now disillusioned with the United States' inability to act. The time was ripe for the advent of yet another messianic mood in America — and for a new presidency.

### **The Reagan Administration: America gets tough?**

**[It is an] undeniable truth that America remains the greatest force for peace anywhere in the world today ... the American dream lives — not only in the hearts and minds of our countrymen but in the hearts and minds of millions of the world's people in both free and oppressed societies who look to us for leadership. As long as the dream lives, as long as we continue to defend it, America has a future, and all mankind has reason to hope.**

*US President Ronald Reagan (1981-88)*<sup>125</sup>

In a speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in March 1980, Presidential Candidate Ronald Reagan commented on the failure of détente during the Carter years and declared: 'We have all been dishonoured and our credibility as a great nation has been compromised. To say the least our shield has been tarnished ... Pride in our country seems to be out of fashion in [this] era of vacillation, appeasement and aimlessness'.<sup>126</sup> This statement seemed to capture the mood prevalent in the United States by the late 1970s. The events that unfolded in Iran and Afghanistan dealt savage blows to American prestige. Ronald Reagan entered the 1980 presidential race promising to restore America's reputation. Whereas in the pre-Nixon era there was discontent with America's assertive role, the mood in the US in the post-Carter era was one of dissatisfaction with a passive US role in world affairs. Messianism was once again the order of the day, and seemed to be propounded by Reagan with a fervour unprecedented since the time of Woodrow Wilson.<sup>127</sup>

Time and again, the Reagan Administration reminded the American people of the United States' uniquely virtuous role. In February 1985, in his State of the Union address, President Reagan declared:

Freedom is not the sole prerogative of a chosen few; it is the universal right of all God's children. Look to where peace and prosperity flourish today. It is in homes where freedom is built. Victories against poverty are the greatest and most secure where people live by laws that ensure free press, free speech and freedom to worship, vote, and create wealth.

Our mission is to nourish and defend freedom and democracy, and to communicate these ideals everywhere we can.

... We must stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives — on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua — to defy Soviet supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth.<sup>128</sup>

Dismissing the Soviet Union as 'an evil empire' and 'a focus of evil',<sup>129</sup> the Reagan Administration propagated a containment strategy reminiscent of John Foster Dulles' policy of 'rolling back Soviet power'.<sup>130</sup> Indeed, according to Strobe Talbott, Reagan's policy declarations 'sounded to Soviet ears very much like the revival of ... "rollback" [and] contributed to the impression that the USSR was dealing with a new phenomenon — an administration that seemed truly and unprecedentedly committed to the goal of doing the Soviet Union in' — or at least of rolling back the Soviet system 'right to the gates of the Kremlin itself'.<sup>131</sup>

Under the auspices of the Reagan Doctrine, the United States considered its 'mission' to be the provision of aid and moral support to 'people around the world risking their lives against Communist despotism'.<sup>132</sup> Hence the US, within the ambit of the Reagan Doctrine, has afforded substantial support to anti-Communist insurgency movements, such as the Mujahedin in Afghanistan, the Contras in Nicaragua, and the UNITA movement in Angola.

America seems once again to be in danger of succumbing to the messianic mood, although it is difficult to predict how long this trend will last, in the light of changes in Soviet policy. Americans will have to continue to make choices based on their ambivalent ideological heritage. Hartz aptly describes this ambivalence: 'We have been able to dream of ourselves as emancipators of the world at the very moment we have withdrawn from it. We have been able to see ourselves as saviours at the same moment that we have been isolationists'.<sup>133</sup> Scholars and politicians alike would be advised to follow the debates and trends concerning the American Creed's applicability to US foreign policy. Failure to do so could lead to some irrevocable foreign policy miscalculations.

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A.W. Stadler

## **A Contribution to the 'Conditions of Democracy' Debate: A Working Paper**

Influential elements in the South African academic and corporate communities have long argued that the most important condition for a future democratic society is a sustained rate of economic growth. In some versions, it is specified that this must exceed the rate of population growth. The most influential early version of this argument, developed by M.C. O'Dowd, predicted that high growth rates would lead to the establishment of a liberal democracy, and in due course, to a welfare state.

Contemporary versions differ from the O'Dowd case in that they address the measures which would be required to restore the conditions of economic growth (which, in the circumstances of the 1960s, O'Dowd understandably took for granted). They commonly imitate proposals by British and American neo-conservative politicians, economists and publicists for the economic reconstruction of the advanced countries to resolve the periodic cyclical stagnations in the world economy, such as the one which set in during the early 1970s. The package varies but usually includes the privatisation and deregulation of the economy and a change in political arrangements designed to limit the powers of the state — such as federalisation or cantonisation — as well as measures to demobilise the political actions of unions.

The welfare state, which was an important feature of O'Dowd's agenda, has not disappeared from these current proposals, but it remains in an appropriately attenuated and privatised form. The arguments in favour of a privatised welfare state neglect or disregard the issue that the whole point of state-run welfare services is that their administration may be made politically answerable in a public forum. What has also disappeared is O'Dowd's assumption that economic inequality constituted the basis of racism and his optimism that economic growth would produce the conditions for increasing equality.

This paper was read to the conference of the South African Political Science Association at Broederstroom in October 1988. Professor Stadler is Head of the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand.

O'Dowd's optimism reflected the same basic beliefs that British conservatives of all party persuasions showed during the 1960s: that economic growth would legitimise capitalism, and that capitalism was compatible with democratic institutions. Although O'Dowd derived his argument from W.W. Rostow's *Stages of Growth*, it lay in line with the argument which came to dominate mainstream American political sociology during the 1950s and 1960s: that under conditions of growing affluence, capitalism had accepted the welfare state, and that workers had given up utopian aspirations to socialism.<sup>1</sup>

In metropolitan countries, the great consensus gave way during the 1970s to the explicit espousal of measures to control oppositional forces, particularly trade unions and urban protest movements, though it is important to note that these compromised corporatist, rather than repressive, measures of control, and were carried out on the basis of parliamentary majorities freely elected through universal suffrage.

In South Africa, continued adherence to the thesis that economic growth provides the condition for reform apparently reaffirms a commitment to democratisation. It has, however, been interleaved with a critique, recognisably similar to neo-conservatism in the advanced countries, that it supports democratic institutions in a purely formalistic sense. In imitation of libertarian arguments elsewhere, the critique characteristically displaces democratic criteria, which emphasise popular participation in and control over state policy as a means to achieving greater equality, in favour of public choice ones. As with Lipset and other theorists of liberal democracy, the liberal corporatist reform establishment in South Africa seems to regard the purpose of democratisation to lie in its potential to provide legitimation, rather than democratic control.

For instance, the Urban Foundation is explicitly committed to the establishment of democratic institutions in South Africa, but reveals a preference for limited and restricted forms. This preference can be pieced together from various constituencies within the Foundation. Ann Bernstein, the Foundation's policy director, writes that 'it was the urgent requirement to build an inclusive, non-racial democracy and thereby create effective and legitimate institutions which (in turn) can facilitate the ongoing choices which are needed to meet the challenge of economic development and provide the mechanisms to manage urban growth'.<sup>2</sup> There is a presumption here that the overall policy directions for a future democratic state have already been set, and that these will not be significantly shifted through democratic decision-making.

Jan Steyn, the executive chairman of the Foundation, is even more explicit in his assumption that democratic institutions should deliver limited popular participation in government. Indeed, he couched his reservations about

democracy in terms strongly reminiscent of the conservative version of the thesis of 'overloaded government'.

Some social scientists have observed that democracy is often most stable where most of the basic problems of the society have been solved and the population at large has been able to reduce its political fervour. In developing situations, including our own, our most basic problems of material inequality and deprivation, under the most favourable circumstances, will take many decades to alleviate to the extent that they no longer generate political passion.

In societies with large masses of undifferentiated need, the popular demands on government are immediate and powerful — and very easily exploitable by democratic opposition to the point that no government can enjoy the security to pursue its longer-term priorities. Prompted by the many acute needs of the masses, a competitive democratic opposition can make facile promises, and thus create expectations that no government can meet.<sup>3</sup>

This does not necessarily mean that Mr Steyn was opposed to democracy, but it does suggest that by democracy he understood a system in which government was limited, and that the prevailing democratic institutions were those of representative democracy, rather than any more radical version.

What is overlooked in these arguments is that in those societies where neo-conservative policies have been systematically instituted, the economic consequences are increased unemployment and inequality. The political conditions and consequences are greater authoritarianism, the curtailment of democratic practices, the evisceration of democratic institutions where these exist, and the postponement of democratisation where they do not. Brief reference to Chile and Britain during the 1970s and 1980s give some idea of the challenge that neo-conservative policies pose to a future democracy in South Africa.

The leading critic of privatisation in Chile, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, has argued that the 'performance of national output has been deficient ... the concentration of wealth and income has been marked, and ... the bases of production have been weakened by the adoption of the particular economic model ... in Chile'.<sup>4</sup> He suggests that none of the three main claims made on behalf of orthodox monetarism in Chile — that the privatisation and the suppression of state intervention rapidly results in 'integrated, flexible and well-informed markets' and spontaneously generate a dynamic development; that processes of adjustment are 'stabilising and characteristically speedy'; and that competition 'leads to greater well-being for the majority' — have been fulfilled.

On the contrary, he argues that the economic policy has benefitted speculation to the detriment of production and investment. The concentration of wealth and income has been 'dramatic'. Competition has intensified differences between different classes and income groups. Far

from promoting integration and flexibility, indiscriminate privatisation has produced a macro-economic context which is unpropitious for the coexistence of 'growth, equity and national autonomy'. It has produced a concern with economic considerations over other human activities, deepened unemployment, discouraged investment, and intensified vulnerability to external forces. It was, he argued, a failed experiment.

The *political* requirements of the privatisation experiment in Chile are particularly ominous in a country like South Africa, for they suggest that it would require the permanent postponement of democratisation.

Karen Remmer traces the process of political 'demobilisation' in Chile after 1973: the massive violence and coercion employed by the military, unprecedented in Latin American history; the institution of a more or less permanent state of emergency; the execution of between 10,000 and 30,000 people; the imprisonment of up to 80,000 persons within six months of the coup; and the violations of human rights: denial of legal defence, summary executions, imprisonment without trial, suspension of all constitutional liberties, imposition of a curfew, restrictions of meetings and gatherings, the dissolution of the National Congress, the outlawing of parties, and the suspension of the activities of those permitted to continue in existence. This repression was particularly directed against parties of the left and trade unions.<sup>5</sup> Remmer's paper stresses that these political methods were required by the economic objectives of the new regime: the significance of the military takeover was the

reversal of the fundamental economic policies that had established the basis for (and had also been the product of) political mobilisation. The tasks that the junta appointed for itself were the extirpation of Marxist ideology, the formation of a nationalist and authoritarian political order, the reduction of the state sector of the economy in favour of private enterprise, and the acceleration of economic growth of the basis of private investment and competition in the world market. These goals ... constituted in every respect a rejection of the social, political and economic accommodations that had developed under Chile's constitutional democracy over a period of decades.<sup>6</sup>

Remmer emphasises that the goals pursued by the junta's economic team

could not be realised within the framework of a political system responsive to the demands and needs of the bulk of the population. They required instead the imposition of authoritarian controls to close forcefully channels of popular influence on policy — particularly trade unions and political parties...<sup>7</sup>

The British experiment with privatisation did not pursue the extremes of the Chilean one, and was carried out with the consent of the majority of the electorate, some sections of which enthusiastically welcomed the vision of a revitalised Britannia propagated in Thatcher's populist rhetoric. Nevertheless, like Chile, it required an increase in authoritarianism. According to Paul Hirst, Mrs Thatcher

quietly buried full-blooded monetarism and discovered 'electoral Keynesianism' in time for 1983 and strongly revived it for 1987. What Conservative rule has not done is to reverse Britain's economic decline. What Mrs Thatcher has done is to reinforce the authoritarian tendencies of British party government.<sup>8</sup>

Bill Jordan has written a graphic commentary on both the economic decline of Britain and the possible consequences of chronic unemployment, especially on the class of 'small shopkeepers and people in small provincial towns', to whom Mrs Thatcher appealed in 1979, and who turned during the early 1980s to the Social Democratic Party. Jordan compares this class to those elements in German society which were attracted to Nazism, but suggests that in Britain, a neo-fascist party would need merely to reassert

the major themes of Thatcherism in a more authoritarian way. The Conservative populism of 1979 did much to legitimate the politics of racism, of 'law and order' themes such as punishment and hanging, of attacks on the welfare state, the unemployed and the disadvantaged.<sup>9</sup>

For all the differences in the extent to which privatisation was taken in these countries, and the different political contexts within which they occurred, they both corroborate Peter Self's broad claim that 'a privatisation philosophy is liable to produce a more unequal, divided and perhaps violent society'.<sup>10</sup>

It could be argued that in periods of economic decline, such as that which began in the early 1970s, and which is likely to persist for at least another decade (if indeed its reversal is foreseeable), the prospects for democracy anywhere in the world are bleak. This paper will, however, suggest that the premises of both O'Dowd and contemporary growth-based theories of democratisation were wrong in presuming that economic growth is the condition for the *establishment* of democracy. None of the political conditions for the establishment of democracy seem to be linked directly to economic growth. The basis for this argument lay in the presumption that economic growth provided the basis for the establishment of a consensus between people enjoying political rights and those hitherto excluded from them. There is little evidence to support this contention.

Democracies are seldom established with the permission of the dominant political class, which usually prefers to withhold this permission, nor have democracies commonly been established on the basis of a consensus between this class and elements of the subordinate classes, as implied by writers such as Lawrence Schlemmer.<sup>11</sup> On the contrary, there is considerable support for the argument that a major condition for the institution of democracy is directly or indirectly linked to political and socio-economic dislocation and crisis. Goran Therborn argues that the 'striking absence in the history of bourgeois democracy is that of a steady, peaceful process accompanying the development of wealth, literacy and

urbanisation'. He also shows that of eighteen cases, six (or seven) democracies had their origins in military defeat, and in another eight cases, war was 'causally decisive' in the instalment of bourgeois democracies. Democracy, he declares, is a 'martial accomplishment'.

Therborn points to another category of bourgeois democracies: those which were established as part of a policy of mobilisation for the 'national effort' in the face of an external threat. He shows that this was a most important factor, though in none of the cases was national mobilisation a necessary condition for democracy. But, together with the establishment of democracies by defeat, the national mobilisation democracies corroborate the argument being made here that democracies are more likely to be established during periods of crisis than in periods of sustained growth or political consensus.<sup>12</sup>

These considerations suggest that the important conditions for the *establishment* of democracy lies in political rather than socio-economic circumstances. They lie in events such as war, revolution and economic dislocation, which offer the opportunity to overthrow the prevailing order or sufficiently threaten such an overthrow as to persuade the political leadership to capitulate.

It is even less likely that the reconstruction of an economy such as the South African one by instituting policies and programmes similar to those purportedly instituted in countries like the United States or Great Britain by neo-conservative governments would produce conditions conducive to the establishment of democracies. On the contrary, they would require the entrenchment of authoritarian controls.

Moreover, they would not produce the desired objective of regenerating the economy. The Chilean experiment of the 1970s was an economic disaster, contributing to the destruction of the industrial capacity of the country, to massive inflation, and to the impoverishment of sections of the middle classes as well as the working classes and peasantry. The Chilean experiment had as its political condition the suspension of democratic government, and as its consequence, increased inequality. If, as will be argued presently, the economic condition of stable democracy is equality, then it may have postponed indefinitely the restoration of a stable democracy. The implications for a society like South Africa are not sanguine.

Before considering these issues, it may be noted that the bias towards economic determinism evident in the most important and influential writers on the conditions for democracy in South Africa limits their interest in exploring the *political* conditions of *economic* policy. These conditions are, however, vitally important in two areas which are directly of interest to the student of democracy: unemployment and welfare.



## 1. Unemployment

In an important study of unemployment in sixteen advanced capitalist countries, Goran Therborn draws conclusions which directly challenge the central hypotheses of neo-conservatism, or, as he terms it, 'right-wing liberalism'. He argues that such factors as overall economic growth and labour supply account for only a small part of the differences in levels and increases in unemployment in the countries he studied. Moreover, he found there was no significant relationship between inflation and unemployment, 'none with developments in labour costs, and none with social expenditure and taxation, nor with unemployment compensation'.<sup>13</sup>

More positively, he argues strongly that the main factors affecting levels of unemployment are political. *'The existence or non-existence of an institutionalised commitment to full employment is the basic explanation for the differential impact of the current crisis.'*<sup>14</sup> (Emphasis in original.) There are two explanations for such institutional commitment: the one lies in the presence of a strong working class movement; the other in the concern of the state for social stability. Conversely, the policy he singles out as the route to disaster in this area is neo-conservatism, which enjoys most support from South African 'economic growth first; democracy later' theorists: 'the consistent "cut down the public sector, strengthen the market economy" approach ... has been the shortest and fastest route to mass unemployment. The best examples, both of cause and effect, are Thatcherite Britain and the Netherlands under the right-wing Christian Democrats...'<sup>15</sup>

## 2. The welfare state

Current literature on the welfare state also challenges the hypothesis that the scale of welfare in industrial societies is a simple function of economic growth, the institution of which in a country like South Africa may be predicted when a certain level of affluence is achieved (and which, conversely, may legitimately be postponed before the achievement of that level).

Some of the literature plausibly presents two crucial factors, one demographic and the other political, in determining the level of welfare. The demographic factor is the proportion of elderly people in a population; the political one is the organised strength of the working class.<sup>16</sup> Neither explicitly confirms or rejects the hypothesis, first enunciated by Anthony Crosland, that 'a rapid rate of growth is a precondition for the establishment of the welfare state'.

In an argument which corroborates the main lines of Therborn's study of unemployment, Vicente Navarro shows that there is no correlation between economic growth and welfare state expenditures, but that 'the best predictor for a large welfare state is not the rate of growth of an economy, but rather

the government's willingness and commitment to the welfare state'.<sup>17</sup> It does not take much imagination to guess that the strength of the impetus towards the establishment of a welfare state is likely to depend on the balance of political forces reflected in state policy. In a strong democracy in which the working class is powerful, that impetus is likely to be strong; conversely, when that class is weak, the impetus is likely to be weak. This argument is consistent with the one developed by O'Connor and Bryn's paper, except that they specify that this influence is mediated through 'societal-level bargaining'.<sup>18</sup> Equally interesting, Navarro spikes some other guns in the neo-conservative battery, including the arguments that the transfer of funds from the private sector to the public is at the root of the problem of economic stagnation; that the size of the public sector or of public expenditures injure economic growth rates or increase unemployment; or that the size of government deficits has similar effects or increase inflation rates. Most unkind cut of all is the demonstration that the Reagan Administration has pursued essentially Keynesian policies, but via the instrument of military budgets rather than welfare ones.

### **Conditions of stable democracy**

The conditions for the *establishment* of democracies, considered earlier, ought not to be confused with the institution of *stable* democracies. The establishment of formal institutions such as the universal franchise, the secret ballot, the answerability of governments to elected assemblies, the right to free speech and debate, and so on, does not carry a guarantee that these institutions will persist.

It is therefore of more than passing interest to know what the conditions for the stability of democratic institutions are, once they have been installed. In an important comparative and longitudinal study, Edward Muller considers the two issues separately. His first conclusion is that economic development is irrelevant to the establishment or stability of democracy.<sup>19</sup> *Sic transit gloria* Lipset. The main focus of his study is on the effects of income inequality on the prospects of installing democracies and on the prospects for stable democracies. With respect to the first issue, he inspects the argument that highly unequal distributions of income adversely affect the prospects for installing democratic institutions. His conclusion is that the levels of income inequality have no bearing on the inauguration of democracy — a conclusion consistent with the case made by Therborn, using a very different mode of analysis.

He does, however, find a strong relationship between the stability of democracies and the extent of income equality and, conversely, between income inequality and the likelihood that democratic institutions, once installed, will be unstable. 'All democracies with high income inequality ...

were unstable. These very inegalitarian democracies were highly susceptible to military coups ... By contrast, slightly more than two-thirds ... of the democracies with an intermediate level of inequality ... maintained stability, and all of those with relatively low inequality ... were stable.<sup>20</sup>

The second relevant problem Muller raises concerns the impact of democracy on inequality. In line with other writings, he confirms that democratic institutions have an egalitarian effect on the distribution of incomes, but he asserts that this effect is long-term and incremental rather than immediate. The implications are important. They suggest that, first, once installed in a society in which there are sharp inequalities, democratic institutions will produce a relatively slow effect, taking perhaps two generations to achieve the same levels of income equality which characterise long-established democracies. Secondly, during the process, democratic institutions are likely to be vulnerable to overthrow.

These problems might induce one to despair of the possibility of installing stable democratic institutions in a society like South Africa, where the levels of income inequality are among the highest in the world. I prefer to draw a different conclusion: that priority must be given to the systematic development of policies, strategies and projects that explicitly address the issue of inequality as one which is as important as that of redressing inequalities of access based on racial criteria in an unequal social and economic structure. It is likely that the two issues will frequently suggest convergent solutions, but it is by no means certain that they will do so.

Urgent priority ought to be given to exposing the dangerous fallacies in the local versions of neo-conservatism so that this issue can be addressed via policies which, in other countries, demonstrably exacerbate unemployment, inequality and political violence. It is increasingly likely that this will include the violence which whites, faced with losing privileges in a highly unequal society, are capable of threatening.

The second priority is to seek political methods for bringing about a more egalitarian society. Christopher Hewitt argued, in a paper Muller may have ignored, that while political democracy had little impact on inequality, democratic socialism did.

*Political democracy is not a sufficient condition for the achievement of a more equal society. The crucial matter is what the mass electorate does with the franchise and the other democratic procedures. Only if the lower classes use their votes to elect socialist governments will democracy result in more equality, since non-socialist governments will not be concerned with redistribution and social inequality.*

And again: 'Strong socialist parties acting within a democratic framework appear to have reduced inequalities in industrial societies.' One of the important implications he draws from this conclusion is that 'it encourages optimism about the possibilities for political action to reduce inequality'.<sup>21</sup>

A more specific inference might be drawn for anyone concerned with enhancing the prospects for democracy in a society such as South Africa: that policies, programmes and projects that pursue egalitarian objectives may be the vital elements in advancing the prospects of a stable democracy.

#### Notes

1. It is interesting that neither O'Dowd nor Schlemmer derive their arguments from the mainstream of political sociology: S.M. Lipset for instance, whose celebrated, though mistaken, *Political Man*, might have saved them from the charge of economic determinism. In South Africa, perhaps, they are saved by the fact that the left has already been tried and sentenced *in absentia* on that charge.
2. Ann Bernstein, *Business and Public Policy in South Africa*, Vol.1, No.2, April 1988, p.2, Centre for Policy Studies, Graduate School of Business Administration, University of the Witwatersrand.
3. Speech given in Durban, 8 June 1988.
4. Ricardo French-Davis, 'The Monetarist Experiment in Chile: a Critical Survey', *World Development*, Vol.11, No.11, 1983, p.906.
5. Karen L. Remmer, 'Political Demobilisation in Chile, 1973-1978', *Comparative Politics*, April 1980, p.283.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid*, p.284.
8. Paul Hirst, 'Representative Democracy and its Limits', *The Political Quarterly*, Vol.59, No.2, April-June 1988, p.200.
9. Bill Jordan, 'Unemployment and the Political System', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 1982, p.416.
10. Peter Self, *Political Theories of Modern Government: its Role and its Reform*, London, 1985, pp.51-52.
11. Lawrence Schlemmer, 'Prospects for a Liberal Society', in Jeffrey Butler, Richard Elphick & David Welsh (eds), *Democratic Liberalism in South Africa: Its History and Prospect*, Middletown, Conn & Cape Town, 1987, especially pp.384-389.
12. Goran Therborn, 'The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy', *New Left Review*, No.103, p.21.
13. Goran Therborn, *Why some people are more unemployed than others*, London, 1986, p.17.
14. *Ibid*, p.23.
15. *Ibid*, p.30.
16. Cf Julia S. O'Connor & Robert J. Bryn, 'Public welfare expenditure in OECD countries: towards a reconciliation of inconsistent findings', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol.39, No.1, pp.50-68.
17. Vicente Navarro, 'Welfare States and their Distributive Effects: Is Reagan a Closet Keynesian?', *The Political Quarterly*, Vol.59, No.2, April-June 1988, p.226.
18. O'Connor & Bryn, *op cit*, p.64.
19. Edward N. Muller, 'Democracy, Economic Development and Income Inequality', *American Sociological Review*, Vol.53, No.1, February 1988, pp.64-65.
20. *Op cit*, p.63.
21. C. Hewitt, 'The effect of political democracy and social democracy on equality in industrial societies: a cross-national comparison', *American Sociological Review*, No.42, June 1977, pp.451 and 460-461.

Gary van Staden

## **Return of the Prodigal Son: Prospects for a Revival of the Pan Africanist Congress**

### **INTRODUCTION**

*If the prominence and influence of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) in helping to shape South African history over the past thirty years were plotted on a graph, the resulting line would bear a strong resemblance to a roller-coaster track. From a series of peaks and valleys in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the PAC entered a period of protracted decline which was to last for some two decades. Events and developments since the first few months of 1985, however, suggest that the PAC's roller-coaster ride is not yet over and that the organisation's influence may once again be on the rise.*

The PAC is one of the three main South African liberation movements operating in exile, the others being the African National Congress (ANC) and the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCM). Only the PAC and the ANC are recognised as 'official' South African liberation movements by, among others, the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

For most of the period in exile — almost thirty years — the PAC has failed to emerge from the shadow of its 'father', the ANC, but recent evidence suggests that the PAC is showing some signs of revival — both internally and internationally — and the thrust of this paper will be to suggest that under certain conditions the PAC could well re-emerge as a major actor in the South African political drama.

For the sake of context, the paper begins with a brief outline of the movement's early history and problems.

### **EARLY HISTORY OF THE PAC**

This section will look briefly at the formation and early policies of the PAC; the concept of Africanism and the ANC Youth League; and finally, the decline of the organisation.

This article is based on an undated version of a paper presented at the Political Science Association of South Africa Research Colloquium on 6 October 1988.

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## Formation and Policies

The PAC was officially launched at a conference in Soweto on 5-6 April 1959, some four months after years of tension in the ANC had finally led to an Africanist breakaway. The new organisation adopted the philosophy of Africanism and elected Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe as its first president. Sobukwe set about removing the labels of racism and exclusivity that the opponents of Africanism had attached to the philosophy, and his intellectual input helped establish it in the mainstream of political thought in South Africa.

Africanist opposition to the role of white and communist members in the ANC was at the core of the tensions present in that organisation from the early 1940s, but it would be a gross oversimplification to suggest that it was the only cause of dissatisfaction. Some scholars of the South African liberation movements argue that the major criticism of the ANC by the Africanist 'dissidents' centred not on the question of race but on the ANC's political programme — or more precisely, the lack thereof.<sup>1</sup>

Central to the Africanist rejection of white participation in the ANC's liberation struggle was the former's distinction between *cooperation* and *collaboration*. The Africanists departed from the premise that cooperation was possible only when this took place on equal terms from an equal base. As such equality was not present in South Africa then neither was true cooperation, only collaboration.<sup>2</sup> Sobukwe argued that Africanism was a non-racial concept and he repeatedly rejected claims that the philosophy was exclusivist. According to Sobukwe, there was no reason why white South Africans could not be regarded as Africans in a *post*-liberation society. Whatever the validity or otherwise of Sobukwe's intellectual observations, the debate was swiftly swept away by a wide perception that Africanism — and its proponents in the PAC — was anti-white.

This perception was by no means limited to Africanism's opponents and was shared by a significant number of its supporters. There is evidence to suggest that much of the PAC's early appeal was due to its anti-white image.<sup>3</sup> The literature available on the Africanist split from the ANC and the subsequent formation of the PAC is extensive and need not be repeated here. See, for example, the detailed analysis of these events provided by Tom Lodge.<sup>4</sup>

For the purpose of this paper and without attempting to be comprehensive, it is sufficient to point out that several key elements of Africanist philosophy were implicit in the PAC objections to the strategies of the ANC, including:

1. That the liberation struggle in South Africa was an African affair<sup>5</sup> and could only take place under African leadership in African organisations. The role of sympathetic whites had to be limited to organising their

own communities to prepare for liberation. They could play no part in the struggle itself.<sup>6</sup> Such a position firmly excluded the multiracial approach of the Freedom Charter which the ANC had adopted in 1955 (now called simply 'Charterism').

2. That the liberation struggle was essentially a race conflict, not a *class* conflict. The contradiction in South African society was that of white oppressor and African oppressed on the basis of colour. The creation of a race oligarchy in South Africa had placed severe limitations on a Marxist interpretation of the society. The PAC regarded Marxism as a 'foreign import' and alien to Africa.<sup>7</sup>
3. That the principle form of liberation was the armed struggle, with mass participation by the people themselves. It was to be a revolution of the people, by the people, for the people, with the *emphasis on mass action*. Negotiation, bargaining and persuasion were regarded as useless. The Africanists argued that there was no historical evidence to suggest that despots, dictators or oligarchies who held political and economic power could be persuaded to bargain it away. This could only be achieved by force.<sup>8</sup>
4. That the 'new order' in South Africa would be an Africanist socialist democracy based on the principle of *equality* and non-racialism (as opposed to multiracialism). The concepts 'equality' and 'non-racial' implied an absence of groups or racial divisions, with the obvious consequence that no minority 'groups' could expect guarantees or even recognition.<sup>9</sup>

### **Africanism and the Congress Youth League<sup>10</sup>**

Africanism or 'African nationalism' were the products neither of the apartheid nor of the colonial eras and existed long before the first European settlers arrived.<sup>11</sup> During the 20th century, renewed growth in Africanist philosophy resulted in a series of congresses designed to promote its influence<sup>12</sup> and led to the development of a strong movement for unity in post-independence Africa.

Among the leading proponents of the unity drive — and the creation of a United States of Africa — was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, whose philosophy had a profound effect on the Africanists in South Africa. Nkrumah led Ghana to independence in 1957, two years before the Africanist breakaway from the ANC, and subsequently became one of the organisation's strongest supporters. Nkrumah's belief that fundamental change in Africa had been brought about by the sufferings and sacrifices of the African people themselves<sup>13</sup> was taken to heart by the Africanists at the foot of the continent.

Africanism countered the traditional colonial notion that western culture and civilisation were somehow superior. It strived to convince Africans that

African reality could not be related or understood in terms of western systems and that the continent possessed a characteristic wisdom of its own.<sup>14</sup> Above all else, Africanism strived to shake off the inferiority complex which colonialism had instilled.<sup>15</sup>

The immediate post-World War II notion that it would take years before Africa was ready for self-rule was swept away in a rising tide of African nationalism and the dream of independence seemed to be becoming reality almost overnight.<sup>16</sup> As Africa demanded — and received — the right, in the words of Nkrumah, to 'manage or mismanage every inch of Africa', the vision of a United States of Africa was given new impetus.<sup>17</sup> Africanism's triumphant march across the continent inspired the PAC, which pledged itself to the concept of one African nation 'stretching from Cape to Cairo, Madagascar to Morocco'.<sup>18</sup>

The profound influence of Nkrumah on the development of Africanism in South Africa was later reflected in the PAC flag which showed a gold star shining down from a black map of Africa. The star was positioned on the map roughly where one would find Ghana.<sup>19</sup> But while the rise of Africanism in the late 1950s came at exactly the right moment to convince the PAC in South Africa that it was following the correct course, Africanism's revival in South Africa began over a decade earlier.

By the mid-1940s, the philosophy of Africanism had already begun to play an important role in South Africa's political development, following the formation of the ANC Youth League in 1944.<sup>20</sup> Prominent members included Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo. According to Lodge, the Africanist philosophy drew heavily on 19th century Romanticism and Social Darwinism. It lacked clear political theory but this shortcoming was more than compensated for in imaginative strategies used to maximise the effect of spontaneous popular uprisings.<sup>21</sup> Central to these strategies was an emphasis on confrontation and non-negotiation.<sup>22</sup>

By the end of the 1940s, the Youth League had consolidated its position and had six members on the executive of the ANC. In addition, the Programme of Action adopted in 1949 reflected Africanist philosophy and strategies to a significant degree.<sup>23</sup> A scant two years later, however, the Youth League reflected the broad ideological divisions within the ANC and the election of non-Africanists to the positions of president and national secretary in 1951 put the Africanists on the retreat.<sup>24</sup> By then, the men who would play key roles in the development of the ANC — Mandela, Sisulu and Tambo — were counted among the Charterists.

The flag of Africanism was kept flying mainly by Youth Leaguers in Orlando and this group included Potlake Leballo, Zephania Mothopeng and Peter Raboroko.<sup>25</sup> Increasing confrontation between the Africanist faction and the Charterists led to a series of suspensions and in-fighting in the ANC,



coming to a head at a Transvaal provincial congress in February 1958. This congress was supposed to put an end to the squabbles and dissent which had followed the previous congress in October 1957 but instead served merely to accentuate the process of division.<sup>26</sup>

The situation deteriorated rapidly, reaching a low point at the November 1958 provincial congress, where the Africanist supporters had their credentials rejected and were prevented from entering the venue.<sup>27</sup> The split was complete and the Africanists withdrew from the ANC. Four months later they formed the PAC.

### **Division and Decline**

The PAC made no dramatic inroads into ANC support during the first eleven or so months of its existence and remained more or less confined to historical Youth League support bases in Soweto, Alexandra, the Vaal Triangle and Pretoria. Any gains made by the PAC between April 1959 and early March 1960 were largely confined to the Western Cape.

The 21st of March 1960 was to change everything: the events in Sharpeville on that day catapulted the PAC into national and international prominence. As the popular uprisings, sparked by the pass protests, spread across the country, the PAC could well have believed that its emphasis on undirected mass action had been vindicated. The ANC was quick to respond and organised pass protests of its own<sup>28</sup> but the PAC remained the focus of attention.

A survey conducted among middle-class African men in the PWV (Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging) area by the SA Institute of Race Relations eight months after the Sharpeville tragedy showed significantly more support for the PAC than for the ANC.<sup>29</sup> The survey included university students in its sample.<sup>30</sup> According to the survey, 57% of respondents favoured the PAC while 39% registered support for the ANC.<sup>31</sup> The PAC president, Sobukwe, emerged from the poll with a considerably higher profile than even Chief Albert Luthuli, then head of the ANC.<sup>32</sup> The survey findings indicated that the ANC seemed to be more popular among the older respondents than among students and that a positive correlation existed between support for the PAC and a willingness to accept violent strategies.<sup>33</sup> Although the survey sample was relatively small (150) and its application was limited to the PWV area, there were no structural or methodological weaknesses in the survey design. There was thus no real reason to reject the findings, only to exercise caution in their application. The findings themselves, however, remain significant.

If the Sharpeville tragedy and the resultant insurrections had boosted the PAC's popularity and influence in African politics, it ironically also signalled the beginning of its decline. The pass protests had perhaps been too

successful and the PAC was ill-prepared for the state response which followed, and for the loss of Sobukwe (who had walked into jail as part of the protests on 21 March).

The scale and intensity of the state-inspired restrictions and repression, and the imprisonment of its leadership, threw the PAC into total confusion and disarray. The most important consequence of this was the series of leadership and policy crises which were to dog the PAC for the next two decades. These developments are well-documented and need no repetition here;<sup>34</sup> suffice it to say that the quality of leadership and the frequent, often violent, disputes which erupted around it were sufficient to render the PAC all but useless.

### **PROSPECTS FOR A REVIVAL OF THE PAC**

The PAC can claim an uninterrupted existence of almost thirty years and it could be argued with some validity that to discuss its 'revival' is illogical. The problem is overcome by defining the concept 'revival' to mean renewed growth of influence (and thus support) and not merely the reactivation of organisational structures that have fallen into disuse.

The evaluation of a re-emergence of *influence* depends on three key elements. The first is historical/descriptive in nature and examines developments in the PAC since 1979; the second comprises an analysis of the 'ideal conditions' under which the PAC could expect to extend its influence; and the third involves an assessment of the extent to which prevailing conditions match this ideal and includes an evaluation of the options open to the PAC to *maximise* its influence.

### **Recent Developments in the PAC (1979-1988)**

In June 1979, Leballo's turbulent seventeen-year reign as chairman of the PAC's Central Committee<sup>35</sup> was brought to an end by a palace coup, led by his friend and righthand man, David Sibeko, and Vusi Make. Make, who subsequently became the new chairman, provided some insight into the bitter divisions which had plagued the PAC for almost two decades when he told the OAU's Liberation Committee that the PAC was divided into at least two well-armed factions ready to make all-out war on each other.<sup>36</sup> Leballo's removal from office was apparently backed by the OAU Liberation Committee and Tanzania, which took advantage of Leballo's incapacity (he was ill in a London hospital) to announce that he had resigned the PAC chairmanship and been replaced by a committee of three, including Make and Sibeko.<sup>37</sup> The 'coup' caused a serious division in the PAC, with the Azanian Peoples' Liberation Army (APLA) leadership backing Leballo but with Sibeko, Make and their supporters in control of the PAC structures and, more importantly, its finances.

In the confusion that followed, a group of APLA commanders demanded

that Make and Sibeko meet Leballo at the latter's residence in Tanzania where they had laid a carefully prepared ambush.<sup>38</sup> Sibeko died in the ambush but Make escaped and the plot backfired when the Tanzanian authorities arrested almost the entire APLA high command and imprisoned them. This had the effect of robbing Leballo of his support base<sup>39</sup> and he eventually took up residence in Lesotho.

Two factions, each claiming to represent the 'true' PAC, continued to operate at least up to the time of Leballo's death in Lesotho in January 1985. The fate of the 'Leballo PAC' since his death is unknown but it was the Make/Sibeko faction under the chairmanship of the former which came to be generally recognised as the PAC. Any reference to the PAC in the following discussion refers to this group. The Leballo/Make division and the in-fighting that followed it represented a new low point for the PAC and was the culmination of a series of setbacks suffered by the PAC, since almost its entire underground leadership in South Africa had been arrested and jailed in 1977.

Make held the PAC chairmanship for two years and his successor, John Nyatni Pokela, was to begin the long process of rebuilding the organisation. Pokela, like most of the PAC's early leadership, came from an educational background and had been an active member of the ANC Youth League from its formation in 1944. He was strongly influenced by Africanism<sup>40</sup> and was among those who had fled to Lesotho (Basutoland) in 1963 in the wake of the state crackdown which followed the Poqo uprisings in the Western Cape.

Pokela's chairmanship of the PAC (1981-1985) saw much of the bitter in-fighting within the organisation come to an end. He has subsequently been widely credited with reuniting and rebuilding the PAC and he remained untarnished by the allegations of corruption that clung to other PAC leaders.<sup>41</sup> Pokela inherited the chairmanship in difficult circumstances which soon deteriorated further when the PAC's then Director of Foreign Affairs, Henry Isaacs, resigned in a blaze of publicity. Isaacs released dozens of documents to the media which contained detailed allegations of corruption and inefficiency in the PAC.<sup>42</sup>

Whatever the truth or otherwise of the allegations, Pokela set about tackling precisely those two problems. At the time of his death in June 1985, he had done enough to rebuild and unify the PAC to spare his successor the divisive power struggles that had accompanied previous changes of leadership. His successor was Johnson Mlambo, who had been Secretary for Foreign Affairs under Pokela. That Mlambo had emerged as a natural successor and the ease of the transfer of leadership, which was achieved in a matter of a few weeks, were clear evidence of the new political maturity Pokela had brought to the PAC. Like his predecessors, Mlambo had been part of the PAC from the very beginning, although unlike them, he had not

been very well known at the time. Mlambo had the advantage of recent experience inside South Africa, having fled the country just over a year before his appointment as chairman. The process of rebuilding the PAC, which Pokela had begun, continued under Mlambo's leadership with even more concrete results.

### **Insurgency**

By the first few months of 1986, Mlambo was able to claim that the PAC was gaining a 'strong foothold' inside South Africa, including within the labour movement, and said that PAC insurgents were beginning to operate against targets in the security forces, 'collaborators' and 'puppets'.<sup>43</sup> In a report which appeared in Zimbabwe at almost the same time, Mlambo — speaking in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the PAC's military wing, APLA, said that the 1984 uprising in South Africa had its base in the Vaal Triangle and that this area was now clearly an Africanist and 'Azanianist' stronghold.<sup>44</sup>

The predominance of activists linked to the rival United Democratic Front (UDF), who were subsequently charged for activities directly related to the uprising, would seem to cast some doubt on that statement,<sup>45</sup> but clear evidence of increased APLA activity soon emerged. In March 1986, two APLA insurgents — believed to be part of a party numbering between six and ten — were arrested shortly after infiltrating South Africa from Botswana.<sup>46</sup> At the same time, South African intelligence sources were quoted as saying that 150 PAC insurgents had been trained in Libya since 1982. The PAC subsequently confirmed the claim but denied that the insurgents would be infiltrated into South Africa with instructions to assassinate political leaders.<sup>47</sup>

The PAC did not confine itself to insurgency and set about organising and training cell structures inside South Africa with a view to increasing the role of the local black populace in the armed struggle.<sup>48</sup> In September 1986, six members of the PAC were sentenced to death for the murder of a township official and another five imprisoned for furthering the aims of the PAC.<sup>49</sup> This followed the arrest of five APLA insurgents in Bophuthatswana<sup>50</sup> and the arrest of APLA's second-in-command in South Africa, Enoch Zulu, who had evaded capture since first appearing on the 'wanted list' in 1962.<sup>51</sup>

The PAC also claimed responsibility for the assassination of Brigadier Andrew Molohe in June 1986 but independent confirmation of the claim has not been forthcoming.<sup>52</sup> By late 1986, the then Minister of Law and Order, Louis le Grange, was moved to note in Parliament that there appeared to be a dramatic increase in PAC activity. Le Grange told Parliament that the security forces had detected a strong element of Maoism in the PAC's rural subversion campaign and its inclusion of the 'ordinary masses' in 'terrorist attacks'.<sup>53</sup> This revival of the armed struggle — the PAC's principle strategy

for liberation — continued in 1987. In February of that year, the organisation claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on policemen and 'system collaborators' in Soweto and Alexandra townships.<sup>54</sup> The use of Scorpion automatic weapons in these operations led the media to dub the attackers the 'Scorpion Gang'.

A few days later, the South African Police announced that five more APLA insurgents had been taken into custody shortly after crossing the border from Botswana.<sup>55</sup> Shortly afterwards, the PAC claimed responsibility for a handgrenade attack on municipal police in Soweto. One policeman died and sixty-four were injured in the attack — to date the largest number of security force casualties (deaths and injuries) in a single incident of insurgency. The PAC statement said that the attack was part of its planned intensification of the armed struggle.<sup>56</sup>

In August 1987, three APLA insurgents were killed in a shoot-out with South African security forces. No further details were given in the police statement, which was released ten months after the incident occurred. Security police sources were quoted as saying that the PAC was in the midst of its first serious revival in over a decade.<sup>57</sup> In the same report, security sources said that APLA insurgents were currently undergoing training in Libya, Iran, Lebanon and Syria.<sup>58</sup>

In 1988, the PAC has achieved some consistency in maintaining its new insurgency campaign, but on the debit side, its success rate remains low. The PAC has now decided in principle to undertake most of its insurgency training operations within South Africa's borders, sending only those in need of specialist training to foreign bases.<sup>59</sup> Such a step would reduce the risks involved in infiltrating foreign-based cadres into South Africa but substantially increase the possibility of infiltration by security force operatives.

At the time of writing, the most recent attempts to infiltrate PAC insurgents into South Africa ended in a shoot-out at a roadblock in the Northern Transvaal. Four suspected PAC insurgents died in the clash and another two were subsequently captured. A total of twelve policemen were injured in the incident.<sup>60</sup> By April of this year, there were approximately eighteen people known to be facing charges under the Internal Security Act and other Acts relating to their activities as alleged members of the PAC.<sup>61</sup>

The trials involving the eighteen are taking place in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Springs and Umtata. Five PAC members and two from Qiblah were convicted in October of 'terrorism' and furthering the aims of a banned organisation. (Qiblah will be discussed in the next section.) These figures could be higher because, first, not all trials are reported and, secondly, specific organisations are not always mentioned on chargesheets or reports of the cases. Chargesheets often contain simply the specific charge in terms of a particular Act — such as treason, terrorism, unlawful

possession of weapons, public violence, sedition and subversion or a combination thereof.

At this point, it would be appropriate to inject a note of caution. While the events described above as well as those which follow indicate that the PAC is indeed in the process of its most significant revival since the early 1960s, both the scale and intensity of the revival remain relatively low. The novelty value of renewed PAC activity has tended to portray the revival of the organisation as far more spectacular than it actually is.

While the number of APLA insurgents and 'sympathisers' killed or captured during 1986 was — at thirty-eight — significantly higher than previous years, it is given some perspective by the comparative figures — 660 — for the ANC's *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK).<sup>62</sup> In 1987, eighty-five APLA insurgents or 'sympathisers' were killed or captured by security forces as against a corresponding figure of 446 MK insurgents or supporters killed or arrested.<sup>63</sup> So while the number of APLA insurgents 'neutralised' by the security forces during 1987 accounted for just under 16% of the total for the year, two factors detracted from the overall significance of the increase. The first was that APLA insurgency continued to function at a relatively low rate of success and the second was that an overall decline in ANC (MK) activity during 1987 served to inflate the percentage.<sup>64</sup> It thus becomes important to take note of the significance of renewed PAC activity within South Africa, while at the same time keeping it in perspective.

### **Diplomatic Developments**

The significance of the revival in PAC insurgency activity over the past three years was matched, if not exceeded, by developments on the diplomatic front. While the PAC remained committed to the armed struggle as the principal strategy for liberation in South Africa,<sup>65</sup> its leadership under Mlambo had apparently recognised the value of diplomatic pressure — especially if that pressure came from South Africa's major western allies. The PAC had for years, in this sphere in particular, lived in the shadow of the ANC which, via its twin-pronged strategy of armed struggle on the one hand and political organisation and diplomatic pressure on the other, had emerged in the eyes of many foreign governments as the only 'alternative' in South Africa.

The PAC enjoyed few of the benefits bestowed on its ideological rival. While it shared recognition as an official liberation movement by organisations such as the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the UN, it received few material benefits from these relationships. The PAC received diplomatic and logistical support from a number of nations prior to 1985 but most, if not all, were either Third World nations or aligned to the Eastern Bloc. Communist China was the PAC's main backer during its early years in exile.

A noticeable change came in 1986 after the appointment of Ahmed Gora Ebrahim as Secretary for Foreign Affairs on the PAC's Central Committee, and the appointment of Sam Makhanda as PAC representative to the UN. As early as January 1986, Mlambo had complained of western media bias against the PAC<sup>66</sup> — a situation that probably accurately reflected the attitude of most western governments.

The PAC apparently believed that the root of the problem lay in western government perceptions of the organisation as extremely radical and anti-white — a view still widely held even within South Africa. In response, the PAC leadership began what were the first in-depth explanations of its attitude towards whites in South Africa since Sobukwe attempted to deal with the problem over twenty years earlier. Mlambo said in a general comment on PAC policy that whites were part of the future in Africa and that any white South African who accepted the establishment of an Africanist, socialist, democratic society would be 'welcome in a free Azania'.<sup>67</sup> Ebrahim expanded on that policy by stating that the PAC would accept whites as individuals in the organisation but remained firm on the issue of joint action with white groups to bring about an end to white rule.<sup>68</sup>

As far as the PAC was concerned, the role of whites in the liberation struggle remained confined to their own communities. That did not imply, however, that they would be unwelcome in a post-apartheid Africanist society. The precise role of the PAC's 'information campaign' as outlined in the organisation's policies on white South Africans in the developments that followed is not yet clear. What is clear is that from about mid-1986 onward, the PAC made unprecedented progress in bringing its case to the attention of the international community.

With Ebrahim, Mlambo and Makhanda working furiously behind the scenes, the PAC established *official* diplomatic contact with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, the Caribbean Island nations, the Soviet Union and a series of African countries which had been previously committed only to the ANC — this in less than fourteen months.

In November 1986, Ebrahim addressed the UN General Assembly.<sup>69</sup> The address was followed by the first official contacts with senior officials in the United States State Department a few days after,<sup>70</sup> with a second meeting twelve months later.<sup>71</sup> The development was significant because for the first time the United States formalised its relationship with the PAC. The ANC had enjoyed a similar status for almost ten years. Squeezed between the two meetings with the United States government was the first official contact between the organisation and the British government in March 1987.<sup>72</sup>

At about the same time, the PAC was instrumental in securing additional Australian government support for the Southern Africa Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC).<sup>73</sup> It could be argued that the sudden

international interest in the PAC was the result of developments inside South Africa at the time (widespread unrest and a state of emergency), rather than a reflection of any improvement in the PAC's international standing.

The argument has two flaws, however. First, the perception of 'ungovernability' in South Africa was at a peak in late 1984 and early 1985. By 1986, and certainly by 1987, there was little doubt that the South African government was in control of the situation. Secondly, the ANC was widely perceived — incorrectly — to be in control of events in South Africa's black townships between September 1984 and the start of the second state of emergency in June 1986. The PAC received barely a mention.

Towards the end of the 1970s, the PAC's international contacts were largely confined to Africa, a few Middle Eastern countries and some international organisations. By the first months of 1988, however, the situation had undergone a remarkable transformation and the PAC boasted *official* diplomatic contact on a regular basis with the following: the United States; the United Kingdom; France; the Soviet Union; mainland China\*; Australia; Yugoslavia; Zimbabwe; Zambia\*; Botswana\*; Lesotho\*; Egypt\*; Nigeria\*; Cuba; Iran\*; Libya\*; Pakistan; Czechoslovakia; Argentina; Algeria\*; Syria\*; the Caribbean nations; Lebanon\*; Tanzania\*; Ethiopia\*; Burkina Faso; Ghana\*; Guinea Bissau and North Korea\* (\* denotes *official* contact prior to 1980). The list is not comprehensive and includes only those countries with which the PAC seems to have had regular contact during the past thirty months. The list now includes all five permanent members of the UN Security Council (as opposed to only one prior to 1980) and its international contacts have taken on a global appearance.

The PAC maintains its full observer status at the UN, the OAU, the NAM and SADCC, as well as various other regional and international organisations. Its status in all of these is quite secure, as opposed to the situation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when its position was in some jeopardy.

European countries such as the Netherlands, as well as the Scandinavian countries, would seem the next logical targets for PAC diplomatic penetration. The relatively low success of PAC efforts in these countries to date could be ascribed to the long history of support these nations have for the rival ANC.

The PAC's main backers, as far as logistical (training bases) and financial support are concerned, are (in no specific order): Libya\*; Yugoslavia; Czechoslovakia; mainland China\*; Syria\*; Lebanon\*, Iran; the OAU's Liberation Committee\*; the World Council of Churches\*; and Tanzania\* (\* denotes support predating 1980).

Despite the considerable advances of recent years, the PAC — as was the case with its revived insurgency campaign — remains very much in the diplomatic shadow of the ANC and, more importantly, trails behind the



latter as far as financial support is concerned. The significance of the PAC effort as detailed above is twofold. First, it is a reflection of the quality of leadership currently present in the organisation and, secondly, it may herald the first real attempt by the PAC to integrate at least some political action into its programme which, until now, has relied exclusively on the armed struggle.

The ability of the PAC leadership to maintain the stability and unity of the organisation over the next few years will be crucial if the organisation wishes to obtain a greater share of the resources the international community makes available to the liberation struggle in South Africa.

### **Internal Developments**

Elements of Africanist philosophy have existed in various black political organisations since it first found a new prominence in the South African political environment in the 1940s. But from the early 1960s until the beginning of the 1980s, Africanism in South Africa became the near-exclusive domain of the PAC. The black consciousness ideology that began to develop in South Africa in the late 1960s was quite distinct from Africanism. Africanism and black consciousness do share a deep distrust of white liberalism and hold similar positions on a number of issues but they differ quite considerably on other aspects — most notably, ideological differences and the question of tactics.

Practical considerations have also played a role in the past: for example, while their own ideology is significantly closer to Africanism than to the multiracial Charterism of the ANC, there is evidence to suggest that the majority of black consciousness adherents who fled South Africa during the 1976/1977 uprisings joined the ANC in exile.<sup>74</sup> The black consciousness exiles were most likely drawn to the ANC because it was the larger and better organised of the two exiled liberation movements — this despite the fact that they had previously shunned its political stance.<sup>75</sup> But while the black consciousness exiles may have taken the only *practical* course open to them in 1976/1977, the theory of black consciousness remains much closer to the PAC than to the ANC.<sup>76</sup>

It is not merely coincidental that both the PAC and black consciousness groups<sup>77</sup> drew extensively for their respective leaderships on the South African Students' Organisation (SASO). SASO was created in 1968 in direct response to black opposition to white liberal leadership. In addition, black consciousness rejected the historical role of white liberals, using almost identical arguments to those put forward by the PAC in the 1958/1959 breakaway.<sup>78</sup>

Africanism and black consciousness share similar views on suffrage and both differ from the ANC in this regard.<sup>79</sup> Other similar positions included a mutual stand against negotiation with the South African government<sup>80</sup> and a

shared view that any guarantees of 'minority rights' implied an unacceptable race bias in a society where *all* who lived in a post-apartheid South Africa would be equal.<sup>81</sup>

The *Azanian Manifesto*, adopted in 1983 by most of the black consciousness organisations, reflected the major principles of Africanism.<sup>82</sup> The similarities in Africanism and black consciousness thought would thus seem to place them in the same camp and in opposition to the ANC and its allies.

Bantu Steven Biko, probably the most influential black consciousness leader in the history of the movement, implicitly praised the Africanists who challenged the Freedom Charter and broke away from the ANC.<sup>83</sup>

While it remains important to view black consciousness and the Africanism of the PAC as essentially different philosophies or ideologies, it is equally important to keep sight of the fact that they are united in one key respect — they both oppose the multiracial Charterism of the ANC from similar platforms. Black consciousness was able to provide the only outlet for those Africanists who became disillusioned with the PAC's performance in the late 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, however, Africanism began a period of renewed growth in which the formation of the National Forum in 1983 was to play a key role.

The National Forum was formed to oppose the new constitution and the creation of the tricameral parliament constitution, and to mobilise support against participation in the 1984 elections in the Indian and coloured communities. The National Forum contained elements of both black consciousness and Africanism and played a significant role in bringing the two movements closer together under one umbrella, but Africanism began to expand its influence outside of the black consciousness groupings — expansion which occurred independently of the PAC. It was not long before this growth manifested itself in the creation of new organisations which were essentially supportive of the PAC but which had no links with the exiled movement.

The most important of these organisations was the Azanian National Youth Unity (AZANYU), formed in 1983 to promote the unity — under an Africanist banner — of those forces opposing white rule. Less than a year later, AZANYU claimed a membership of 16 000.<sup>84</sup> While the claim was greeted with some scepticism, by January 1988 little doubt remained that AZANYU was among the fastest growing township movements in South Africa. During that month, an AZANYU national congress in Soweto attracted 2 000 delegates from branches all over the country.<sup>85</sup> Equally important was the fact that officials from five western embassies attended the proceedings, as did a delegation from Zimbabwe.<sup>86</sup>

Another purely Africanist movement to emerge from the revival was the All African Student Action Committee (AASAC), launched in early 1988.

The AASAC was supposed to co-ordinate 'Sobukwe Year' celebrations but the organisation was restricted and its leaders detained just weeks after it came into being.<sup>87</sup>

Africanism also began to gain a strong foothold in the labour movement, with the revival of the South African Black Municipal Workers Union and received a further boost in 1986 when the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) was formed — a federation of black consciousness/Africanist trade unions. NACTU claimed (and still does) to hold a strictly neutral position in the broad ANC/PAC debate. Members of NACTU met officials of both exiled movements<sup>88</sup> for discussions on the South African situation, but the raising of the PAC flag at NACTU's launch has left a lasting impression.<sup>89</sup> The NACTU federation claimed a membership of twenty-three unions which look after the interests of 240 000 workers.<sup>90</sup> While sceptics pointed out that not all twenty-three unions in the NACTU federation were active, some — such as the South African Chemical Workers Union and the Media Workers Association of South Africa — had long histories of *effective action*. Recent developments within NACTU suggest that a power struggle within the federation between the adherents of black consciousness and the Africanists has shifted decisively in favour of the latter.<sup>91</sup> That has very important implications for the growth of Africanism in the labour movement, even if most of that growth is initially at the expense of black consciousness.

The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 had a spin-off in South Africa and contributed to the growth of the black consciousness/Africanist movement in the Western Cape. The successful overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran was seen by many South African Muslims as a vindication of the widely held belief that Islam represented a viable alternative for oppressed nations.<sup>92</sup> The result was the re-formation of an Islamic fundamentalist movement known as Qiblah (sometimes spelled without the H). Elements of Qiblah had first made an appearance in the Western Cape some twenty years earlier but at that time had established no formalised structures for their organisation; however, its strong anti-imperialist, anti-communist and pan-Africanist stance made it a natural ally of the PAC and, during the 1960s, Qiblah drew extensively on the PAC's organisational structures. Following the wide state crackdown on Poqo and the PAC, however, it apparently faded from the scene, but following the revolution in Iran, Qiblah re-emerged with formalised organisational structures in the early 1980s.

The considerable growth of Islam in South Africa since the 1960s allowed Qiblah to re-emerge with considerably greater influence on the political scene. Qiblah supported the black consciousness view that history was the product of social forces, not individuals, and was highly critical of the Charterist movement, which it accused of undermining the working class

and allowing petty intellectuals to subvert the revolution.<sup>93</sup> This view inevitably brought the organisation into conflict with the Charterist-aligned Call of Islam and the feud reflected the broad ideological divisions in South African society between the Charterists and the black consciousness/Africanist movement. The Call of Islam held its first public rally in Cape Town on 17 July 1983 in a move which Qiblah saw as seriously undermining its position in the Muslim community.<sup>94</sup>

While the extent of Qiblah influence in the Western Cape has been questioned following the organisation's failure to muster strong public protest over the killing of Iranian pilgrims in Mecca in 1987,<sup>95</sup> it did play a key role in revitalising the black consciousness/Africanist movement and is by no means a spent force.

### **Necessary Conditions for Further Growth of the PAC**

The level of PAC-inspired insurgency outlined in the preceding section hardly qualifies as spectacular, but its significance lies in the fact that it represents the most concerted PAC effort to date.

The Poqo uprisings in the early 1960s do not qualify as externally motivated insurgency. Although some link to the PAC certainly existed, there was enough evidence to suggest that the role of the exiled movement's leadership was limited.<sup>96</sup>

Prior to 1985, and apart from isolated incidents during the 1970s (specifically the halfhearted attempt to infiltrate mainland China-trained insurgents in 1978), the last known serious attempt by the PAC to infiltrate insurgents into South Africa occurred in 1968 and even that effort ended in dismal failure before the group reached the South African border.<sup>97</sup> The 1980s, especially since 1985, however, have seen the PAC extend its diplomatic influence and increase its support base inside South Africa. The PAC is thus clearly in the midst of a revival.

What needs to be assessed now is the potential of that revival and the following would seem to be essential in this regard:

1. High quality leadership.
2. The growth of Africanism in South Africa.
3. Increased international support.
4. An increase in insurgency and insurrection.
5. A reasonably high level of state repression.
6. Increased radicalisation of (especially) the black youth.
7. A perception that the ANC cannot end white minority rule.
8. Increased radicalisation in white reactionary politics.
9. The failure or perception of failure of negotiation politics.

The list is a formidable one but a close examination would reveal that all nine conditions already exist to a greater or lesser degree.

High quality leadership is necessary to inspire confidence in the organisation and to give clear direction to the strategies of the PAC. It would also suggest to the international community that the PAC should be taken seriously. Organisational skills of a high standard would be necessary in order to plan and execute insurgency campaigns; organise fund raising programmes; secure additional logistical support; and to mobilise and direct internal programmes. The days of 'spontaneous mass action' ended with Poqo.

The growth of Africanism within South Africa and an increase in (mainly) financial support from the international community would be required before the PAC could realistically expect to maintain, let alone increase, its current rate of growth. One of the key conditions the PAC must meet involves demonstrating — as visibly as possible — both the willingness and the ability to oppose the South African government. The PAC would have to improve not only the quantity but the quality of its insurgency, as well as demonstrate an ability to organise and maintain acts of local insurrection with a far greater level of control than was evident in the case of Poqo. The Poqo insurrections were not, as is often portrayed, merely acts of mindless violence<sup>98</sup> but the lack of direction resulted in many missed opportunities. The PAC cannot afford to repeat the error.

The organisation has elevated the strategy of armed struggle to a principal position in its overall plan and its ability to maintain this effectively would have a direct bearing on the support it is able to attract. A condition which lies largely beyond the control of the PAC is that related to the level of repression present in the country. The higher the level of repression, the more radical the townships (especially the youth) are likely to become and the PAC has always held a special appeal for the more radical elements.<sup>99</sup>

There is little doubt that the cycles of repression and radicalisation feed off each other and the faster the wheels turn the greater the PAC is likely to benefit — especially if the ANC proved unwilling or unable to absorb the new levels of radicalisation. Directly related to this aspect is the success — or lack thereof — of ANC efforts to bring white minority rule closer to an end. The ANC holds the political high ground in black politics in South Africa today — ground that the PAC has to erode from under the former. One of the most important means of achieving this end would be to exploit the apparent failure of the ANC to consolidate its position or make any significant impact on the South African government during the widespread insurrections between 1984 and 1986.

Another key element in the PAC's growth potential calls for a continuing shift in white politics to the right of the political spectrum. Based on South African government reactions to similar shifts in the past, this would bring both a slowing down in the government's 'reform' measures and increased repression. Both reactions would further radicalise black opinion. In

addition, a continuing shift to the right in white opinion would first shrink and then isolate what remains of white liberalism. Such a development would erode the basis of the ANC's multiracial Charterist approach and underscore the Africanist/black consciousness contention that white liberalism was an unreliable ally.

The final condition necessary for further growth of the PAC is the failure — or perceived failure — of the politics of negotiation. The PAC (and the black consciousness groupings) have historically rejected negotiation with the South African government, while the ANC, despite propaganda to the contrary, continues to place considerable emphasis on the strategy. If the strategy continues to fail in producing concrete results then black opinion will inevitably harden against it in favour of armed resistance. There would be no point in attempting to talk when no-one was willing to listen.

The conditions outlined and discussed above are, in fact, all interlinked and were separated merely to facilitate an explanation. The division of the conditions should be seen as artificial.

### **The Current Situation**

The list of conditions necessary for the continuing growth and development of the PAC comes with two assumptions of its own. The first is that the broad ideological divisions in black South African politics will remain roughly where they are for some time to come and that no alternative 'third force' will emerge. Secondly, it is assumed that the major exiled organisations will remain intact. While a split in either the PAC or ANC (or both) is always possible, the likelihood of such splits in the short to medium term appear remote. Following on this is the assumption that a loss of support for the multiracial Charterist approach will benefit the Africanist/black consciousness bloc.

Present conditions in the black townships and black areas, the high level of repression, the lack of constitutional development towards a more equitable deal for the black population, and a general slowing down of the limited South African government reform measures make it unlikely at present that the exiled movements will lose support to the black political middle-ground. It now remains to assess the extent to which the current situation meets the necessary conditions for further PAC growth.

The PAC's insurgency campaign, the extent of its domestic and international support, and the quality of its leadership have been dealt with in preceding sections and need not be repeated here. These aspects can be summarised as follows:

1. That the PAC has made significant strides in all four areas but that the organisation still trails behind the ANC.

2. That a potential for PAC expansion exists.
3. That the quality of its leadership has improved considerably and will be a decisive factor in its growth potential.

### PERCEPTIONS OF ANC FAILURE

There is no evidence to suggest that the ANC played any major role in sparking the insurrection in the Vaal Triangle during the Spring of 1984. As the insurrection spread, however, the ANC's role increased, as the spate of treason, terrorism, and related Internal Security Act trials during 1985 and 1986 shows clearly.

From January 1986 to February 1987, 104 people were charged in terms of Section 29 (1) of the Internal Security Act, which includes offences such as treason, terrorism, subversion, sedition, terrorist activities, as well as murder and arson.<sup>100</sup> A further 399 people faced charges under the Internal Security Act but relating to less serious offences such as public violence, intimidation, furthering the aims of banned organisations, and possession of banned literature.<sup>101</sup> The ANC was specifically mentioned in evidence during many of these trials.<sup>102</sup>

Even more important than the facts of the ANC's role in the widespread insurrections of September 1984 to mid-1986 was the perception, both domestically and internationally, that the ANC was leading the revolt. Thus when the insurrections failed, the ANC was left to accept most of the blame.

The ANC's strategy during 1984 to 1986 failed mainly because it underestimated the strength of Pretoria's security force network.<sup>103</sup> In addition, the ANC did not have internal organisational mechanisms of sufficient strength or skill to guide the insurrections effectively.<sup>104</sup> These shortcomings did not go unnoticed, especially after the State crackdown which followed the June 1986 state of emergency effectively ended the revolt. It brought those who had believed the government was about to crumble back to reality with a jolt and left them nursing bruised expectations. In such a climate, it was perhaps inevitable that the ANC would be blamed — at least in part — for the failure. The ANC acknowledged this failure to take full advantage of the favourable conditions and has since set about plugging the gaps exposed by the insurrections.<sup>105</sup>

The two major problem areas identified by the ANC were the organisation's inability to deploy sufficient forces in support of the insurrection and a difficulty in basing *Umkhonto* insurgents among the local populace.<sup>106</sup> A possible explanation for the latter problem is the extent of the security force informer network which operates in most townships.

The ANC has clearly to reorganise the internal dimension of its armed struggle and integrate *Umkhonto* units into local township cell structures. This is precisely the task the PAC set itself early this year. There is no

evidence to suggest that the ANC's 'failure to deliver' has as yet resulted in widespread disillusionment with the organisation, but the seed has been sown and there is no guarantee that it will not bloom at some future date.

While the ANC maintains its dominant position in black politics in South Africa, the failure of the insurrections may have made that support more brittle.<sup>107</sup> The ANC has experienced similar problems in its seventy-six year history but the events of the past four years have shown unprecedented levels of frustration, anger, and radicalisation among a vast section of the black population. The ANC thus cannot afford to 'fail' indefinitely without losing at least some of its support and the organisation may soon find its claim to a seventy-six year history a problem rather than a rallying point.

### REPRESSION AND RADICALISATION

Even a cursory glance at the history of black politics in South Africa since the banning of the ANC and PAC in 1960 will reveal a close historical relationship between repression and radicalisation. The one always follows the other, even if it takes some time, with the ultimate result that both the radicalisation of black opinion and actions and the level of state repression continue to reach new heights.

The relationship between the two concepts has continued to follow the pattern throughout the current crisis which, for the sake of a cut-off point, will be deemed to have begun on 3 September 1984. A breakdown of insurgency activity shows that there were forty-four reported incidents of insurgency during 1984.<sup>108</sup> Following the insurrections of 1984 and 1985 and the first state of emergency proclaimed in 1985, incidents of insurgency increased by over 100% to stand at ninety-six for the twelve month period ending December 1985.<sup>109</sup>

The continuing insurrections and the new peak in insurgency levels resulted in further repressive measures contained in the 12 June 1986 proclamation of a new state of emergency. By the end of that year, the state of emergency provisions and a massive state crackdown had all but ended the insurrections, but the level of insurgency doubled again, with a total of 203 incidents recorded by the end of 1986.<sup>110</sup> There was a slight decline during 1987 but 1988 saw the emergence of a far more radical insurgency campaign with a series of high profile attacks on so-called 'soft' or civilian targets.<sup>111</sup> The current year has also seen a significant rise in the level of State repression with a spate of restrictions on black extra-parliamentary political organisations and trade unions, as well as the detention or silencing of the organisations' leaderships.

By September 1988, detention monitoring groups were reporting an increase in the number of political detainees and added that over 1 000 activists and trade union leaders were known to be in detention.<sup>112</sup> The last few months have also witnessed an increase in insurrectionary activity



(although its extent is unknown due to restrictions on the reporting of such activity by the media). There is no doubt, however, that there is a dramatic increase in insurgency activity and incidents are now being reported on an almost daily basis.

During September, twenty-four incidents of insurgency were reported, the majority involving the use of limpet mines. The figure represented the highest monthly total of insurgency actions in South Africa's post-war history,<sup>113</sup> but in October, the total increased to thirty-three known incidents of insurgency.<sup>114</sup> The contention that the increased levels of insurgency, insurrection and repression are more closely related to the October 1988 municipal elections than to each other is of academic importance only. First, the increased level of insurgency will bring greater repression and thus feed the cycle anyway, and secondly, the elections themselves are widely regarded as perpetuating a repressive system. Whatever the underlying reasons, the ultimate result will be the same — to push the repression radicalisation cycle another notch up the scale. And the higher up the scale the cycle moves, the greater the likely benefit to the PAC. Some evidence supports the contention that the post-1984 levels of black radicalisation are causing tensions in the ANC. Unless the ANC is able to absorb the new levels of radicalisation — and the new phase in its insurgency campaign is evidence of its attempt to do so — it faces the very real danger of losing touch with its constituency and creating a gap the PAC may be able to fill.

As early as 1986 the first signs of strain in the ANC began to show as the organisation attempted to absorb the new influx of increasingly radical recruits.<sup>115</sup> Brutalised by events in South Africa's townships, the young radicals began to demand increased military action against their white oppressors on an ever-widening front. During May, June and July this year (1988), *Umkhonto* units began a series of attacks on specific 'soft' or purely civilian targets such as sports facilities, shopping centres and cinemas.

The shift to 'soft' targets was widely interpreted as a change in tactics on the part of the ANC and was attributed to the increasing influence of *Umkhonto's* dynamic and skilled young Chief of Staff, Chris Hani. Highly regarded and well-respected by *Umkhonto* insurgents in the field and supported by young hardliners, Hani has articulated and put into action the increasing demands for more radical action by the ANC. But on 17 August 1988, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC issued a statement in Lusaka expressing its concern at the 'spate' of attacks on civilian targets and accepting responsibility for 'some of these'.<sup>116</sup>

The ANC statement blamed 'agents of Pretoria' for some of the attacks but warned its cadres that attacks against civilians 'played into the hands of the enemy'.<sup>117</sup> The statement said that it was 'contrary to our policy to select targets whose sole objective is to strike at civilians'.<sup>118</sup> The NEC (of which

Hani is a member) response to the civilian attacks amounted to a public reprimand of *Umkhonto* and demonstrated that the ANC had no intention of sacrificing political and diplomatic influence to satisfy demands for more radical action.

The message took some time to filter through to *Umkhonto* field units, but during September and October, insurgency attacks reverted to targeting government property, infrastructure and black local authority candidates and structures. While municipal election candidates may not seem to be 'hard' targets, the ANC believes their participation in government-created structures and institutions makes them legitimate targets for attack. There is as yet no clear evidence one way or the other whether *Umkhonto* will continue to toe the NEC line on the question of civilian attacks, but the NEC's statement on its position regarding such attacks may mean that any further violations of this policy would bring disciplinary action.

The ANC is rapidly approaching the point where it must decide once and for all how it will deal with the increasing demands to take the insurgency war into white areas. To date, the ANC has succeeded in absorbing the radicalisation, but only at some cost to its political and diplomatic programme. While this root cause of strain (and tension) within the ANC is likely to increase in the short to medium term, it is improbable that it will result in any dramatic alterations in the organisation's policies. In addition, the quality of the ANC leadership (including Mandela), the proven loyalty of the NEC members (including Hani and his major NEC ally, Steve Tshwete), as well as its long history, militate against a serious split in the ANC. That leaves only one possible result.

It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the ANC will choose to occupy the middle-ground in South African politics — there are many who would say that it already does — and in so doing sacrifice the support of the more radical elements, even at the cost that this might entail. By leaving the PAC to absorb this radical element, the ANC would be running the risk of altering the balance of power between the two liberation movements, but it seems to be a risk the organisation would be willing to take. Provided the PAC proved equal to the task, the development will strengthen the organisation at the expense of the ANC. The only real imponderable is to what degree.

## **NEGOTIATION AND WHITE POLITICS**

The current swing in white politics to the right of the political spectrum and the decreasing likelihood of direct negotiations between the South African government and the ANC are two further elements that add momentum to the growth of the PAC. The form of the relationship is an indirect one and derives from the premise that a shift to the right by whites

and the failure of negotiation politics will promote the further radicalisation of black opinion.

There is substantial evidence to support the proposition that white opinion has shifted to the right since the start of the latest insurrection in 1984. In the 1987 General Election, for example, the ruling National Party's share of the vote declined by 3,5%, while the rightwing share increased from 15% in 1981 to over 30% in 1987.<sup>119</sup> Detractors who claim that the size of the increase was distorted by the formation of the Conservative Party (CP) in 1982 are misguided. Comparing the support attracted by the Herstigste Nasionale Party in 1981 to that of the CP in 1987 is not comparing an orange with an apple; it is comparing a green apple to one that is just beginning to ripen.

Those who claim that the swing to the white right has been exaggerated have yet to offer a satisfactory explanation for how a 'liberal' official opposition came to be replaced by an ultra-conservative one. The election results are not the only evidence to support the proposition that the white electorate is drifting to the right.

A series of surveys conducted by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) over six years at two-year intervals show the shift quite clearly. (The surveys were confined to whites.) Consider the answers to the statement: 'Blacks should serve with whites, coloureds and Indians in the same Parliament'. In 1982 (the first year of the survey) 61% replied in the affirmative; in 1984 74% concurred; in 1986 68%; and by 1988 it was down to 60%.<sup>120</sup> The trend to the right was evident on issues such as the Group Areas Act: in 1988 some 60% wanted the Act retained.<sup>121</sup>

A recent survey conducted for the Afrikaans Sunday newspaper, *Rapport* (August 1988), showed a similar shift away from the white political centre towards the rightwing parties.<sup>122</sup> It was thus hardly surprising that the SAIIA surveys found a steadily declining level of support for direct South African government negotiations with the ANC down from 41% in 1986 to 36% two years later.<sup>123</sup>

This rightward trend was confirmed in the municipal elections held in October 1988. The rightwing Conservative Party again increased its share of the vote — even if by less than it had anticipated — and the National Party gained ground at the expense of the 'liberal' Progressive Federal Party. The election results in Johannesburg confirmed the overall shift to the right. The PFP's share of vote declined from 47% in 1982 to 33% in 1988.<sup>124</sup>

The below-expected performance of the Conservative Party in the elections could just as well be attributed to the near-total lack of political reform in the sixteen months since the 1987 General Election.

The South African government — its domestic power base under threat as never before in its forty-year history — seems unlikely to ignore the danger

signals from its white constituency about continuing with substantial reform measures and will be even less likely to take a bolder approach on the issue of negotiating with the ANC. The latter issue was clearly demonstrated by the government's bitter attack on South African rugby chief, Dr Danie Craven, for his attempts to negotiate with the ANC.

Both short-term prospects for political reform that will be widely acceptable to the black community and prospects for a negotiated settlement with the ANC appear bleak. Both will further undermine the ANC's position and lend increasing weight to the Africanist/black consciousness contention that the vested interests of whites prevented them from playing any meaningful role in the liberation struggle. The longer the shift to the right continues, the closer South Africa will move to a situation of almost total polarisation. The Orwellian slogan in *Animal Farm* which proclaimed: 'Four legs good, two legs bad', could soon find a local counterpart: 'Black good, white bad', with no attempt to distinguish any further. Under such conditions, the PAC will hold considerably more appeal to the radicalised youth than the ANC could provide.

#### **WHERE TO FROM HERE FOR THE PAC?**

The preceding sections have, one hopes, provided some insight into:

1. the ideal conditions under which the PAC would increase its influence and support both inside South Africa and externally; and
2. the extent to which prevailing conditions in the broad domestic political environment approximate to the ideal.

The leadership of the PAC is the core around which all else will revolve. Only an effective and united leadership would be able to take advantage of the opportunities that may present themselves in the near future. If events in South Africa continue along approximately the same path for the next few years as they have followed the previous four, then the ever-increasing levels of black radicalisation could result in a situation in which the ANC is regarded as too moderate by many in its present constituency. It would then be up to the PAC to take maximum advantage of the situation and improve its own position — once again the question of leadership becomes crucial.

Although the quality of the organisation's leadership has certainly improved in recent years, some problems continue to exist. The 1987 upheaval in the PAC's Central Committee which resulted in the dismissal of CC members Ike Mafole (Secretary for Education) and Mike Muendane (Secretary for Labour) and prompted the resignation of UK Representative Vusi Nomodolo, raised the old spectre of division and infighting.<sup>125</sup>

While the PAC seemed able — for the first time since the early 1960s — to deal with a disagreement at CC level without falling apart, it was precisely the kind of incident the organisation cannot afford to repeat too often.

Memories of the bitter divisions of the 1970s are still too fresh in too many minds. The leadership question is crucial because, despite the fact that the PAC may be moving into the most favourable period of its history since the early 1960s, it still faces many obstacles. Heading the list of obstacles is its old rival, the ANC, which has gained an impressive head-start. Even under the most favourable conditions, the PAC will be hard-pressed to close the gap enough to become a serious threat to the ANC's position. The established structures and organisational mechanisms of the ANC, its long history and the sheer size of its support base, place substantial restraints on the PAC's growth potential. Even though the PAC could gather a significant number of radicals under its wing, and assuming it can mobilise this support to maximum effect, it may not have enough time to develop to the point where it could mount a serious challenge to the ANC. Conditions may currently be shifting in its favour and are likely to remain so for the next two to three years, but the period beyond that is an imponderable.

The favourable circumstances the PAC finds itself in at the moment are based to a significant degree on two variables. First, the increasing radicalisation of the black political environment, and secondly, the failure of the ANC to take full advantage of the favourable conditions — especially between 1984 and 1986 — is causing increasing impatience among elements of its constituency. Both these variables could alter virtually overnight and pull the rug from under the PAC's feet. While such developments are unlikely, they cannot be ruled out, thus the PAC would be advised to concentrate its efforts on short-term objectives. The PAC may be tempted by the favourable conditions prevailing to make a serious bid to replace the ANC as the major liberation movement, yet it would be an ill-advised gamble that may demand more resources than the PAC could muster.

A less ambitious but more attainable objective would be for the PAC to concentrate its efforts and resources on improving its bargaining position and then push for unity with the ANC while the latter organisation was at its weakest and the PAC at its strongest. In this way, the PAC may be able to force some concessions from the ANC. Such a strategy would also take advantage of the pressure — notably from Nigeria and Zimbabwe — which currently exists within the OAU for the unification of the two liberation movements.<sup>126</sup>

The OAU could resort to arm-twisting if it were forced to do so and, in the not too distant future, the ANC — faced with a steady increase in PAC growth and African pressure for unity — may be forced to accept. Admittedly, unity between the two major liberation movements — if it occurs at all — is likely to involve a far more complex procedure than that briefly outlined above. It nevertheless seems to represent the most viable option open to the PAC at present. Although all indications are that Africanism in South Africa will emerge over the next few years with more

influence and support than at any previous time, it may not be enough to swing the balance of power between the liberation movements to the point where it favours the PAC.

There would seem to be little point in the PAC attempting an exhausting climb to the peak of a mountain only to find on reaching the summit that the ANC has been sitting there for twenty-five years. The logical course would be to attempt to force the ANC to meet them halfway.

#### Notes

1. See M. Motlhabi, *The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid — a Social-Ethical Analysis*, Johannesburg: Skotaville, 1984 (revised ed). For more details on this argument, see pp.79-80.
2. *Ibid*, p.77.
3. See, for example, Fabian Tract No.345, *The Coming Struggle for South Africa*, London: Fabian Society, 1963, pp.9-10.
4. T. Lodge, *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983. See especially Chapters 3 and 9.
5. 'African' as distinct from 'black' — the latter includes the Indian and so-called coloured population groups; the former does not.
6. PAC policy on this issue has been repeated on numerous occasions since 1959. See *The Sowetan* of 23 October 1987.
7. See R. Davies *et al* (eds), *The Struggle for South Africa — a Reference Guide to the Movements, Organisations and Institutions*, Vol.II, London: Zed Books, 1984. pp.300-301.
8. See *City Press* of 25 October 1987 for a restatement of PAC's position on this point.
9. See *The Sowetan* of 29 July 1986 for a restatement of PAC policy on this issue in an interview with PAC foreign secretary Ahmed Gora Ebrihim.
10. For a detailed analysis of Africanism and its dominant role in the ANC Youth League, see Lodge, *op cit* (1983), pp.20-22 and pp.80-84.
11. Motlhabi, *op cit* (1984), p.74. See also Davies, *op cit* (1984), p.298.
12. These were the Pan African Congresses in Paris (1919); New York (1927); and Manchester (1945).
13. G.-C.M. Mutiso and S.W. Rohio (eds), *Readings in African Political Thought*, London: Heinemann, 1975, p.202.
14. *Ibid*, p.321.
15. *Ibid*, p.321.
16. T. Karis and G.M. Carter (eds), *From Protest to Challenge — a documentary history of African Politics in South Africa 1882 to 1964*, Vol.3, *Challenge and Violence 1953-1964*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977, p.320.
17. *Ibid*, pp.320-321.
18. Part of the PAC Manifesto as quoted in *From Protest to Challenge*, Vol.3, p.322.
19. *Ibid*, p.320.
20. Motlhabi, *op cit* (1984), p.74.
21. Lodge, *op cit* (1983), p.22.
22. *Ibid*, pp.22-23.
23. *Ibid*, p.27.
24. *Ibid*, p.80.
25. *Ibid*, p.80.
26. *Ibid*, p.82. Lodge provides a detailed examination of this period of in-fighting. See pp.81-85.
27. *Ibid*, p.82.
28. The ANC was not merely reacting to a PAC-created situation; it had organised mass pass protest actions for the end of March 1960 well in advance of the PAC. The PAC pass protests organised for nine days earlier were in fact an attempt to pre-empt the ANC.

29. E. A. Brett, *African Attitudes — a Study of the Social, Racial and Political Attitudes of Some Middle-class Africans*, Fact Paper No.14, Johannesburg: SA Institute of Race Relations, 1963, pp.58-61.
30. *Ibid*, p.5.
31. *Ibid*, pp.58-61.
32. *Ibid*, pp.61-62.
33. *Ibid*, pp.61-63.
34. See Lodge, *op cit* (1983), Chapter 12, for a detailed account.
35. Potlake Leballo was chairman of the PAC's Central Committee and its Acting-President from 1962 until 1979.
36. Davies *et al*, *op cit* (1984), pp.300-301.
37. B. Leeman, *Lesotho and the Struggle for Azania*, Vol.3, (1966-1984), London: University of Azania, 1985, p.83.
38. *Ibid*, p.84.
39. *Ibid*, p.84.
40. T. Karis & G.H. Carter (eds), *From Protest to Challenge*, Vol.4, (Political Profiles), Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977, p.129.
41. *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol.22, 15 August 1985.
42. *The Weekly Mail*, 16 May 1986.
43. *The Sowetan*, 7 January 1986.
44. *The Herald*, 6 January 1986.
45. At the time of writing, nineteen men accused of treason and other charges in the so-called 'Delmas Treason Trial' are awaiting judgment. Three of the accused, 'Terror' Lekota, Popo Molefe and Moss Chikane, were senior UDF officials at the time of the Vaal uprisings in September 1984, to which the charges relate.
46. *The Citizen*, 12 April 1986.
47. *The Star*, 12 April 1986.
48. *The Botswana Gazette*, 20 January 1986.
49. *Africa News Summary*, Vol.27, No.6, September 1986.
50. *Race Relations Survey — Part 1 — 1986*, Cape Town: SAIRR/Blackshaws, 1987, p.167.
51. *Race Relations Survey — Part 2 — 1986*, Cape Town: SAIRR/Blackshaws, 1987, p.530.
52. Molope was the officer commanding a Bophuthatswana riot unit which opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators at Winterveld on 26 March 1986, killing 26 people.
53. *The Herald*, 16 September 1986.
54. *The Star*, 28 February 1987.
55. *The Star*, 28 February 1987.
56. *Business Day*, 22 April 1987.
57. *The Citizen*, 1 June 1988.
58. *The Citizen*, 1 June 1988.
59. *The Sowetan*, 9 February 1988.
60. *The Star*, 25 July 1988.
61. *Human Rights Update*, Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, April 1988, pp.30-34.
62. Figures released in Parliament by the Minister of Law and Order on 2 September 1987 and reported in *The Citizen* of 3 September 1987.
63. Figures quoted in Parliament by the Minister of Law and Order and reported in *The Citizen* of 1 June 1988.
64. See 'Select Indicators of Political Violence' in *Indicator SA*, Vol.5, No.2, pp.20-21.
65. *City Press*, 25 October 1987.
66. *The Herald*, 6 January 1986.
67. *The Botswana Gazette*, 20 January 1986.
68. *The Sowetan*, 29 July 1986.
69. *The Sowetan*, 14 November 1986.
70. *Ibid*.

71. *The Sowetan*, 12 November 1987.
72. *The Sowetan*, 9 March 1987.
73. *The Herald*, 20 February 1987.
74. See H. Attwell, *South Africa: Background to the Crisis*, London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1986, pp.134-135.
75. *Ibid*, p.135.
76. Motlhabi, *op cit* (1984), p.115.
77. The use of the terminology 'black consciousness groups' is designed to avoid the confusion which may arise if the terminology 'black consciousness movement' was used instead. The Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) is a specific organisation and operates from exile in Harare, Zimbabwe.
78. Motlhabi, *op cit* (1984), pp.139-140.
79. *Ibid*, p.116.
80. *Ibid*, p.137.
81. *Ibid*, p.120.
82. For example, *The Azanian Manifesto* lists as principles: non-racialism; non-collaboration; opposition to alliances with the ruling class (whites). Africanism adopted precisely the same principles some twenty-four years earlier. *The Azanian Manifesto* was banned by proclamation in the Government Gazette of 9 October 1987. Most of the major black consciousness organisations — i.e. the Azanian Peoples' Organisation (AZAPO), the Azanian Students' Movement (AZASM), had adopted *The Azanian Manifesto* prior to its banning.
83. *The Star*, 12 September 1987.
84. *The Sowetan*, 9 October 1986.
85. *The Sowetan*, 21 January 1988.
86. *Ibid*.
87. *The Sowetan*, 24 March 1988.
88. NACTU met the PAC in September 1987 (see *The Sowetan* 4 September 1987) and the ANC in May 1988 (see *The Herald* 5 May 1988).
89. See *Africa Confidential*, Vol.28, No.5, 4 March 1987.
90. *Ibid*.
91. *The New Nation*, 1 September 1988.
92. F. Esack, 'Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice', in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.10, No.2, April 1988. p.484.
93. *Ibid*, p.487.
94. *Ibid*, p.487.
95. *Ibid*, p.488.
96. Lodge, *op cit* (1983), pp.244-245.
97. *The Star*, 28 February 1987.
98. See the paper by Lodge entitled *The Paarl Insurrection*, presented at an African Studies Seminar, University of the Witwatersrand 1979, especially pp.17-18.
99. See Brett, *op cit* (1963), pp.61-62; Davies *et al*, *op cit* (1984), pp.299-300; and Motlhabi, *op cit* (1984), p.153, for further details of this aspect.
100. *Race Relations Survey 1986 Part 2*, p.878.
101. *Ibid*, pp.880-883.
102. *Ibid*, pp.878-883.
103. *Africa Confidential*, Vol.29, No.5, 4 March 1988.
104. *Africa Confidential*, Vol.27, No.25, 10 December 1986.
105. See R. Kasrils, 'The Revolutionary Army', in *Sechaba*, September 1988, p.4.
106. *Ibid*, p.4.
107. *Africa Confidential*, Vol.27, No.25, 10 December 1986.
108. See *Indicator SA*, Vol.5, No.2, (Summer 1988), p.21.
109. *Ibid*, p.21.
110. *Ibid*, p.21.
111. *The Sunday Star*, 21 August 1988.
112. *The Star*, 24 September 1988.
113. *The Citizen*, 29 September 1988.



114. Compiled from *SA Barometer*, Vol.2, Nos.20 & 21, and press reports.
115. *Africa Confidential*, Vol.27, No.25, 10 December 1986.
116. ANC statement issued on 17 August 1988.
117. *Ibid.*
118. *Ibid.*
119. See the article by H. Kotze & E. Lourens, entitled 'Considering the swing to the Right — some thoughts on the 1987 election result', in D.J. van Vuuren *et al* (eds), *South African Election 1987*, Pinetown: Owen Burgess Publishers, 1987, p.366.
120. A. du Pisani, *What do we Think? A survey of white opinion on foreign policy issues No.4, Occasional Paper*, Johannesburg: SA Institute of International Affairs, May 1988, p.30.
121. *Ibid*, p.34.
122. *Market and Opinion Surveys, Survey No. 1/88*, commissioned by *Rapport*, presented August 1988, pp.2-4.
123. Du Pisani, *op cit* (1988), p.31.
124. *The Star*, 28 October 1988.
125. *Work in Progress*, No. 47, April 1987.
126. *The Cape Times*, 23 May 1988. Nigeria and Zimbabwe are particularly significant. The former is the major financial contributor to the OAU Liberation Committee from which both the PAC and ANC draw considerable support and the latter currently holds the chairmanship of the OAU.

### Select Bibliography

- A. For developments leading up to the formation of the PAC, its early history, problems and decline, the following works proved useful:
  1. Lodge, T. *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983.
  2. Davis, R. *et al* (eds), *The struggle for South Africa — a Reference Guide to the Movements, Organisations, and Institutions*, Vol.II, London: Zed Books, 1984.
  3. Motlhabi, M. *The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid — a Social-Ethical Analysis*, Johannesburg: Skotaville, 1984.
- B. or additional information on the growth and development of black consciousness and its similarities/differences to Africanism, see:
  1. Fatton, R. *Black Consciousness in South Africa — the Dialectics of Ideological Resistance to White Supremacy*, New York: State University of New York, 1986.
  2. Motlhabi, *Black Resistance*.
- C. For readings on Africanism, African Nationalism and Pan Africanism, see:
  1. Mutiso, Gideon-Cyrus M. and S. W. Rohio, *Readings in African Political Thought*, London: Heinemann, 1975.
- D. For current developments in the PAC (and the ANC) the following were the most rewarding sources (in order of usefulness):
  1. SPECIALIST PUBLICATIONS:
    - Africa Confidential*
    - Africa Research Bulletin (Political Series)*
    - The South African Barometer*
    - Africa News*
    - Work in Progress*
    - Africa Notes*
    - Indicator SA (ANC only)*
    - Race Relations Surveys (SAIRR)*
  2. NEWSPAPERS
    - The Herald (Harare)*
    - The Soweran (Johannesburg)*

City Press (Johannesburg)  
The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg)  
The Citizen (Johannesburg)  
The New Nation (Johannesburg)  
Beeld (Johannesburg)  
The Star (Johannesburg)

### **Appendix**

The PAC's Central Committee and Foreign Representatives. (CC denotes Central Committee member).

Zephania Mothopeng	PRESIDENT (CC)
Johnson Mlambo	CHAIRMAN (CC)
	COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF APLA
Ahmed Gora Ebrahim	SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (CC)
Leswane Samuel Makhanda	CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE — UN (CC)
Joe Mkhwanazi	ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY (CC)
Keke Nkula	DEPUTY ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY (CC)
Edwin Makoti	SECRETARY FOR INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY (CC)
Joe Moabi	SECRETARY FOR FINANCE (CC)
Mfanasekhaya Gqobose	SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (CC)
Nomvo Boyi	SECRETARY FOR SOCIAL WELFARE (CC)
Sabelo Victor Phama	SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE (CC)
Waters Thobothi	CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE — ZIMBABWE (CC)
Maxwell Nernadznhanani	CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE — SOUTH PACIFIC
Thobile Gola	CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE — TANZANIA (CC)
Hamilton Keke	CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE — MIDDLE EAST (CC)
Boyi Jordaan	CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE — NIGERIA
Ray Johnson	CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE — GHANA
Lawrence Mgweba	MEMBER CC
Morgan Mgidini	MEMBER CC
PAC HEADQUARTERS: TANZANIA.	

## Book Reviews

BIG BROTHER: THE SOVIET UNION AND SOVIET EUROPE

*Helène Carrère d'Encausse, trans. by George Holoch, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987, xii, 332pp.*

Originally written in French and published in 1983 as *Le Grand Frère*, the translated title of 'Big Brother' immediately conjures up the Orwellian image, and in my opinion, '*The Big Brother*' would have better conveyed the French meaning.

The author describes the Soviet Union as a big brother who dominates smaller states, and analyses their relationship by using the analogy of a *family* of Eastern European states — a much more benign image than that of Big Brother in George Orwell's *1984*, which leads one to doubt whether the author ever intended the latter image. Even though the Soviet Union dominates Eastern Europe, this study shows that Soviet leadership has not always been able to impose its will on these countries. On the occasions when it did, it was at considerable cost.

The author's intention is stated quite clearly in the introduction: to re-examine the history of Soviet involvement in post-war Europe from the Soviet perspective and to investigate Soviet plans and actions 'to forge a unified space running from the Baltic to the Adriatic'.

The book is divided into three parts: the first deals with the establishment of communist states in Eastern Europe after 1945; the second with the period following Stalin's death, examining the dynamics of successive crises in Eastern Europe which arose out of Soviet domination, from Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 to Soviet response and reaction to the rise of Solidarity in Poland in 1980; and the last illustrates the role of the Warsaw Pact and, to a lesser extent, the CMEA, play in integrating the countries of Eastern Europe into an empire. A postscript for the English edition examines the Gorbachev era.

Events are interpreted in the light of the age-old Russian imperial design to control Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic. Although this theme gives continuity to the seemingly inexplicable behaviour of the Soviet Union at different times and towards different countries, it is not entirely satisfactory. Accounting for Communist Party takeovers in Eastern Europe in these terms does not sufficiently explain why countries such as Finland and Austria have remained outside the Soviet empire, or for the differences in Soviet response to events in Poland in 1956 or to the invasion of Hungary in the same year. Other reasons could be found for Soviet behaviour: the effect of political in-fighting in the Kremlin, or the relative status of the Communist Party in the states concerned. Indeed, in analysing these events, the author herself highlights these very aspects.

Nonetheless, the book gives a valuable summary of developments in Eastern Europe in the post-war era. Students of Soviet-Eastern European relations as well as the general reader of Soviet affairs will find it an invaluable insight into Soviet behaviour in this part of the world.

Adèle Wildschut,  
Institute for Soviet Studies,  
University of Stellenbosch.

#### AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS

*Edited by Stephen Wright and Janice N. Brownfoot, London: Macmillan, 1987, 214pp.*

The editors of this book have assembled thirteen papers which were originally presented at a conference on 'Africa in World Politics', held at the Commonwealth Institute in London in May 1984. The papers have been updated and revised in the light of subsequent events concerning Africa. The presenters of the papers are highly qualified to write on Africa and include a number of well-known names such as Legum, Shaw and Spence.

Stephen Wright, in his 'Introduction: Africa in World Politics — Changing Perspectives', says that during the early 1960s, when the majority of the states in Africa gained independence, 'there was great optimism that the continent could effectively mobilise its vast resources in order to make an impact on the world stage', but in the 1980s these hopes have given way to disillusionment, 'as Africa has become increasingly marginal in global political and economic affairs'. Furthermore, the countries of Africa have been forced 'to pursue introspective policies' as they struggle with 'economic hardship and seemingly endemic political instability'. Wright ascribes the inability to influence world events to economic factors — lack of growth and development.

The chapters of the book have been grouped into four thematic areas: Africa and the international economic system; Africa's international organisations; development, change and diplomacy; and security and conflict. Within these areas, the editors acknowledge that 'there are some unavoidable omissions of content'. Little attention is given to, for example, West and East Africa. On the other hand, there is an interesting chapter on 'Women and Politics in Africa'. The links between this issue and 'Africa in World Politics' are somewhat tenuous, however.

A number of disturbing and often ignored conflicts are discussed, such as the long drawn-out civil war in Chad and the struggle by the Polisario Front for full independence in the western Sahara. The editors have included a useful map at the beginning of the book to help with the understanding of the latter conflict.

Much of the content of the contributions is historical in nature, with an occasional glimpse into the future. This is very much in keeping with much of the literature on Africa.

This volume is certainly a useful contribution to the literature on an enormous continent, which is at present in great economic difficulty. There is a definite need for thought and new ideas as to how Africa can overcome its current difficulties — and this is where future conferences on Africa might make their greatest contributions.

Clive J. Napier,  
Department of Development,  
Administration & Politics,  
Unisa.

### **Books Received For Review**

AFGHANISTAN. THE GREAT GAME REVISITED

Edited by Rosanne Klass. *Freedom House, New York, NY.*

SEA-BED THEORY AND MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, VOLS. I, II  
& III

E.D. Brown. *Graham & Trotman, London.*

WALDHEIM. THE MISSING YEARS

R.E. Herzstein. *Grafton Books/Collins Publishing Group, London.*

THE POLITICS OF THE SOUTH AFRICA RUN — EUROPEAN SHIPPING AND PRETORIA

G.R. Berridge. *Clarendon Press, Oxford.*

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## Forthcoming:

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No. 18. *SA Sanctions Directory, 1946-48.* Compiled by Elna Schoeman. R50,00 plus postage.

## Special Occasional Paper

*What Do We Think No. 4.* (Survey of white attitudes on foreign policy issues. Analysed by A. du Pisani). R15,00 plus postage.