International Affairs Bulletin

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Smuts House Notes

'History', Herbert Marcuse reminds us, 'is the realm of chance in the realm of necessity'.[1] Even if we were to reject the determinism implicit in the 'grand cycles' central to the work of Spengler, Toynbee or Kennedy, as I feel one should, does this free us entirely from the grip of the past? To what extent are we victims of an inexorable historical process — even in South Africa? How much of world politics is 'given' at any one time — that is: to what extent is the course of events less susceptible to change than is at first apparent? One answer to these and other philosophical questions, lies in what Robert Heilbroner terms 'inertia', that is, the 'viscosity which is imparted in history because people tend to repeat and continue their ways of life as long as it is possible for them to do so',[2] nourishing and perpetuating that which they hope will function almost indefinitely. While 'inertia' fails to explain discontinuity, it seems to act as an almost universal brake on social restructuring. We do not have to look beyond our own borders to find some support for this proposition.

What about 'necessity'? Arguably, 'necessity' implies that there are material and intellectual limits or constraints that either favour or undermine the feasibility of some form of social engineering or policy. Look at *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the Soviet Union, at *kaifeng*, the Chinese version of glasnost, or the recasting of apartheid in South Africa. The Marcusean notion of 'necessity' has a clear ring of truth about it.

The dictum that change is the only constant in the universe is certainly true, however subterranean the process. The different contributions in this edition of the Bulletin touch on both the continuities and the changes in world politics. The first, a useful exposition of the Bush Administration's Foreign Policy and its revelance to America's Future, by Charles Kegley, identifies four sources of continuity — globalism, containment, anti-communism and a proclivity towards intervention.

Roger Gravil's comparative exploration of relations between South Africa and the Southern Cone, offers some useful insights and is crisp and economic in style. This is followed by two quite different theoretical articles with a bearing on contemporary conflict research — the one being the very readable and solidly-researched article by a regular visitor to Jan Smuts House, Paul Rich, from the University of Bristol, which offers useful theoretical insights into the labyrinth of Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Comtemporary Africa.

The contribution by Stan Schoeman from the Africa Institute, reflects the basic needs approach currently in vogue in conflict studies. His 'Human Rights, Values and Conflict' takes an inter-disciplinary view of value incompatibility and its relevance to conflict resolution.

It is one of the occasional pleasures as Editor to offer these Smuts Notes,

inspired in this instance by stimulating and readable contributions from both local and foreign scholars. Rodney Davenport's erudite review of the collection of essays commemorating the quite unjustly neglected W. M. MacMillan does this edition of the Bulletin proud, illuminating as it does some of the darker corners of South Africa's history.

André du Pisani
EDITOR

Notes
1. H. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*. London: Sphere, 1968, p.10.
2. R. Heilbroner, *The Future as History*. New York: Grove Press, 1961, p. 193.

Charles W. Kegley, Jr

Toward the Year 2000: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy and America's Future

As the most powerful democracy, the largest economy, the wealthiest society with the greatest concentration of scientific talent, we are going to substantially affect the course of human events whether we do so consciously or not. We can be a force for freedom and peaceful change unlike any other in this world. But if we fail to do so, we will not be able to run or to hide from the consequences.
Secretary of State James A. Baker III, 21 February 1989

The second half of the twentieth century has witnessed accelerating change, yet during this turbulent period, American foreign policy has displayed a remarkable degree of continuity. The world has changed dramatically, but the American approach to it has resisted change. Only modest and incremental adjustments in outlook and purpose have been evident, despite the fact that today, more so than at any time since the Truman Doctrine set the course for postwar American foreign policy, the assumptions underlying that world view are being challenged.

Has the time arrived for the United States to rethink the foreign policy axioms of the last half century and frame a fresh approach? In the twilight of the twentieth century, George Bush's repeated statements about the need to look over the horizon and prepare for the year 2000 have raised expectations of policy revision. As Bush put it in March 1989: "The essential question today is, what are we doing to prepare for the new world that begins eleven short years from now? That is what my agenda is all about."

Such pronouncements imply recognition that past policies may no longer be appropriate, that possibly what "was once a reasoned policy [had] become a conditioned reflex" (Ball, 1976), and that construction of a new vision was now an imperative. Such declarations structure expectations of policy change but do not resolve the issues of whether the established policy is inadequate and, if it is, whether the Bush administration can create an adequate new policy for the new century.

It is this essay's thesis — based on a reading of the performance of Bush's

Charles W. Kegley, Jr, is Director of the Barnes International Center and Pearce Professor of International Studies at the University of South Carolina.

predecessors over the past forty-five years and his own timid beginnings — that new departures are improbable. The grand strategy of the Bush administration — if, indeed, there is one — remains obscure, and talk of new principles to replace old goals is not the same as institutionalising practices that stray from past precedents. George Bush is not the first postwar president to call for a new foreign policy, and it is likely that he will learn a lesson each of his predecessors have had to learn — that limits to policy revision exist, that inherited policy precepts have a life of their own, and that a president is not the master of the country's conduct abroad.

Even if emergent circumstances seem to cry for policy revision, why are only superficial, remedial modifications of the postwar vision likely? Is Bush's path to some extent predetermined — with options foreclosed, changes inhibited, and new approaches discouraged? If so, does the conditioning force of the sources of foreign policy analysed in this text impose stringent limits on what any administration can hope to change, even if conventional policy assumptions, however treasured, have become obsolete? Or might future administrations find that, instead of imposing limits, there emanate from these pressures sources for policy innovation?

The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy: Pragmatism or Procrastination?

In his campaign for office, and as President, George Bush has often described himself as a pragmatically-oriented decision-maker. The image of the President as a methodical problem solver is consistent with Americans' historic ability to live comfortably with pragmatic diplomacy (Crabb, 1989). To convey an impression of professional competence, experienced policymakers skilled in management were appointed to Washington's key policy-making positions. The Reagan presidency's ideological pontification was replaced by a declared commitment to detached policy *planning*. The Bush administration thus projected an image of itself as an able group inspired more by the desire to forge effective policies rationally than by the desire to crusade for ideological causes. A deliberate, businesslike approach was embraced, which sought to elevate prudence and a focus on the long haul to principles of policymaking.

How this talk will translate into actual policy conduct is unclear. Pronouncements are not policies, and a posture is not a programme. A coherent, comprehensive plan was not presented, and hard decisions have been postponed. The lines between flexibility and vacillation, deliberation and delay, and caution and aimlessness are blurred, and it is difficult to discern whether or not Bush's avowed preference for pragmatism masked an inability to frame positions and avoid procrastination. Whatever the true roots of his reluctance to put long-term policies into place, upon assuming power

> President Bush obviously decided to proceed at a deliberate speed. This was probably a wise move, even though it [evoked] the ghost of indecisiveness. His Administration's main theme [was] not ideology but pragmatism: prudent approaches carried out by skilled practitioners, without polemics or militancy, and —critics would add — without vision. (Hyland, 1989).

This goal represented an abrupt rupture with the ideologically-inspired style of the Reagan administration (see Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987a). But Bush — a man who claims to value loyalty above all else (Dowd, 1989) — could not vocally distance himself from the President he had submissively served and at whose elbow he had sat in silence for eight years (Stockman, 1987). Even though he proclaimed his intention to place practicality over preference, Bush's sentimental predilections were exhibited in the tolerance he displayed for criticism of the policy orientation he had inherited and had once willingly defended. Although he kept his own counsel, he kept his loyalty to Reagan's policies.

Nonetheless, a capacity to make necessary arrangements was shown subsequently by alterations made to several aspects of the Reagan policy legacy, with respect to, for example, defence spending, troop reductions overseas, and Third World debt. The changes, however, were more symbolic than of real substance. As shall be argued, the inherited platform was largely presented and the modifications made were moderate: the "changes didn't add up to any fundamental shift of course for the nation" (Seib, 1989). George Bush represents an extension of the Reagan era, and the approach of his administration derives much of its character from it.

Bush asked Americans to judge him by the adequacy of his preparations for the year 2000, even though he was reluctant to announce decisions about the kind of world he wanted and his plans to create it. The pressures for a changed agenda were clearly not welcomed. They required that most difficult of psychological tasks — questioning a customary and comfortable way of thinking about world politics that hitherto could be accepted without benefit of re-evaluation. The extraordinary opportunities for policy innovation that had opened were not eagerly seized. As the review that follows will illustrate, the administration returned to conceptualisations that had been formulated decades earlier. The tune was a mere variation on a tried and tired melody sung often before, after many rehearsals.

The grip of old beliefs on the definition of the available options appeared to propel American foreign policy under Bush along a narrow and very conventional path: to carry out the goals of globalism, anti-communism, containment, military might and interventionism in ways that only tinkered with moderate adjustments at the margins.

Indeed, the diplomatic record of the Bush regime suggests that procrastination prevailed over pragmatism, as policymakers fumbled with profound uncertainties as to how to proceed. The drift and deferment of

judgement disclosed the absence of consensus about the long-term corrective action required to position the country on the threshold of the next century. It illuminated as well the ways multiple influences make it difficult to modify policymaking traditions.

Let us examine the policy responses that were made and how they conformed more than they diverged from the established pattern.

Globalism

From the beginning, the Bush administration repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to a global role for the country. Priority was given to projecting American power abroad and to demonstrating the nation's resolve to protect its interests everywhere. Unlike Jimmy Carter and many others who had preached that the nation's ability to manage developments in an interdependent world had eroded, Bush maintained that global disengagement was not acceptable. Pre-eminence was to be preserved.

The administration's advocacy of global diplomacy was captured in Bush's attack in August 1988 on the positions of his rival for office, Michael Dukakis, which he called "a rejection of America's role as a world leader and a repudiation of the Truman Doctrine and the vision of John Kennedy". It was later symbolised in May 1989 by his effort to intimidate into resignation a dictator who had grossly violated democratic electoral process in Panama, and by his order of Marines to that country to demonstrate the sincerity of his threat. By implication, the missionary role of the country abroad, which projected the United States' special responsibility for the preservation of freedom throughout the world (but which had fallen into disrepute in the wake of the Vietnam war), was restored; the United States once again represented itself as an agent morally responsible for directing global affairs. As Bush noted, "I think we're facing a real opportunity for world peace, . . . and it's a question as to whether the United States will continue to lead. You see, I don't believe any other country can pick up the mantle".

Although Bush's congenial and civil style differed markedly from Reagan's passionate proselytising and punitive bullying on the world stage, it is clear that both shared similar globalist assumptions. Both were tutored on *realpolitik*, and for those schooled in this philosophy, assertive American leadership was a given. Accordingly, both endorsed former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's (1970) belief that the American "commitment to international affairs on a global scale [had] been decided by history [and could] not be undone, and the only remaining relevant question is what its form and goals [would] be". For them, isolationism and sacrifice of superpower status were not options; the symbols of stature and power were to be highlighted in order to communicate the nation's intention to direct the course of history.

The Bush administration's activist foreign policy represented an implicit

attack on the view that the panoply of American splendour was mortal (Mead, 1987). During the 1970s and the 1980s, a neo-isolationist mood has arisen, punctuated by talk of suspending the US commitment to allies to protect their security and of "decoupling" Europe, as well as by a vigorous, vocal attack on multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and UNESCO. Under President Reagan, the "internationalist ethos" supporting international law and organisations were no longer "significant outlets for political idealism in the United States [and instead had become] the objects of derision and contempt" (Hughes, 1985-86). The mood was fed by American frustration with its loss of influence; America's go-it-alone policy (Kegley and Raymond, 1989) represented in part a reaction to the strain that an unrestrained globalist foreign policy had placed on the Republic's resources and to the resistance the country's effort to exercise leverage encountered. A contraction of the scope of America's global involvements appeared to some to be inevitable, and the challenge became how to accommodate the nation to the reality of this deteriorating circumstance without jeopardising US security. Lost was any hope of recovering the omnipotent power that the country had possessed at the end of World War II.

Like the Reagan administration in which he had served, Bush refused to accept this alleged decline of American power. He rejected the view that the United States was "overcommitted" (Nuechterlain, 1985) or that its global reach suffered from "overstretch" (Kennedy, 1987), and he denied the need for disengagement that such a disparity between ambitions and resources implied. The Nixon Doctrine, which had acknowledged the diminished capacity of the United States either to control global developments everywhere or to assume responsibility for them, was repudiated.

The Bush administration quietly differed from the excesses of the Reagan administration's rhetorical stress on unilateral approaches to multilateral problems, and instead, again treated international institutions as available if troublesome tools for the promotion of American national interests. Accordingly, in order to influence global policymaking, US participation in multilateral institutions under Bush became more active, even while faith in their efficacy remained suspended and resentment about the loss of American control of them did not recede. Still, their necessity was recognised and efforts were made to exploit opportunities in them.

Bush also altered slightly another attribute of the form of Reagan's practice of globalism — by turning down the volume control by means of which American pre-eminence was announced to the world and the virtues of the American way of life were extolled for others to emulate. To be sure, preaching continued, but example was emphasised rather than coercion, and the perceived need to sell American institutions aggressively as a model declined as the number of totalitarian and authoritarian states moving

toward democracy increased dramatically in the late 1980s.

Still, a distinct air of defiance and chauvinistic indifference to the idealist face of the American diplomatic tradition (Kegley, 1989b), characteristic of the Reagan administration, was evident in the Bush administration's *realpolitik* practice of globalism. "I will never apologize for the United States of America, I don't care what the facts are", Bush stated in 1988 after the accidental US destruction of an Iranian civilian airliner, and this pronouncement may be interpreted as "a sign of national insecurity, not national self-confidence" (Kingsley, 1988: 86). Whether his policies spring from fear or from self-assurance, we can expect Bush to promote a globalist role for the United States, and to practice what he preaches.

Anti-Communism

Anti-communism has been a persistent theme of American foreign policy throughout the postwar period. During much of that time, discussions of American national interests were couched in the language of ideology — of opposition to communism's presumably evangelical global impulses. Indeed, diplomatic pronouncements by American statesmen throughout this period indicate that communism had become, as President Carter once described it, "an inordinate fear" and an "obsession". American foreign policy has riveted on the communist threat to the exclusion of other important issues that have no direct bearing on the competition between capitalism and communism.

The hold of anti-communist thinking was hardly even stronger than during Reagan's occupation of the White House (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987b). His administration chose to view nearly every international development through the prism of anti-communist ideology; all events disrupting the global status quo were traced to the revolutionary activities of a supposedly coordinated communist front. Whether an uprising by the left against their oppressors or terrorism by nationalists pursuing the cause of self-determination, the interpretation was the same: communism was responsible (see Crenshaw, 1990, and Bell, 1990).

Crusading ideologies often bred their antithesis. Behind the US fear and ideological opposition to communist beliefs was a Manichean world view that perceived the battle for people's hearts and minds as a zero-sum fight between the forces of good and bad (Glad, 1983). Communism — the proclaimed "focus of evil in the modern world" — was seen as an ideological scourge which, in Reagan's view, it was America's duty not just to contain but to eliminate from the face of the earth. Confronting that evil seemed to animate American foreign policy under most of the Reagan presidency; only in the last phase did a more pragmatic approach gain acceptance.

Bush's foreign policy conduct diverged from the hysterical extremes of

Reagan's ideological interpretation of the threat, without placing before the American public the question: "How the Cold War Might End" (Gaddis, 1987a). To be sure, anti-communism remained a concern even if no longer a preoccupation in an era when many people in the communist world were aggressively experimenting with economic and political reforms, openly encouraging free enterprise, introducing "profit motives" into their vocabulary and policies, and voting in elections to repudiate Communist party candidates. In addition, the feared appeal of communism had faded from sight; the communist model for development had lost its influence everywhere. In this atmosphere, opposition to an ideology that was undergoing rapid mutation, deviation from its core principles, and loss of influence seemed irrelevant, and therefore receded from American diplomatic discourse.

The attack had become less vocal and vehement, but that did not mean that anti-communism was forgotten. To declare, as did Assistant Secretary of State Richard Schifter, that "communism has proved to be a false god" did not mean that anti-communist thinking had disappeared. The "inordinate fear" may have become dormant, but clearly a Cold War orientation continues to colour the US interpretation of unrest in the Third World — and to reinforce the penchant to view global issues in those terms. The probability that the fear was dormant rather than dead was conveyed by Bush's acknowledgement (21 May 1989) that whereas an "ideological earthquake is shaking asunder the very communist foundation, it is clear that Soviet 'new thinking' has not yet totally overcome the old".

Containment

Since the conclusion of the Second World War the primary mission of American diplomacy has been the control of the Soviet Union's power. The abiding relevance of that focus has been challenged by the USSR's failure to compete in the modern world, the looming bankruptcy of the Soviet economy, the withdrawal of the Soviet presence from outside its borders and concentration on *perestroika* at home, and by the rise of important new global issues which either do not involve the Soviet Union directly or require cooperation with it. Arms control, multiple North-South issues, energy and food security, drug trafficking, balance-of-trade and payments deficits, foreign debt and investment, protectionism, economic competitiveness, pollution, immigration, resurgent Third World nationalism, and other global problems have all demanded attention and, in the view of some, have rendered anachronistic the Russo-centric focus of American foreign policy.

The Bush administration did not dismiss these challenges and new issues, and sought to bring some of them (for example, environmental degradation) into the national spotlight. But the fact that it chose to expand

the foreign policy agenda should not obscure its continued emphasis on the Soviet threat. Although President Bush readily recognised that collaboration with the Soviet Union was possible and could pay dividends at home and abroad, he consistently made clear his view that the relationship of the United States with the Soviet Union remained inherently competitive. "The Cold War is not over", he declared in 1988, and maintained that, whereas the United States "must be bold enough to seize the opportunity of change", it must at the same time be prepared for "protracted conflict" (Broder, 1988). Containment remained the cornerstone of his policy.

In 1989, the Bush administration dismissed as premature what appeared to most observers to be unprecedented opportunities to collaborate in areas where American and Soviet interests intersected, and responded negatively to many pacific initiatives offered by an assertive Mikhail Gorbachev (and for which the USSR scored great public relations victories). Secretary of State of State Baker (14 April 1989), captured the administration's deep mistrust and hand-wringing caution when he counselled: "I think it is too soon to conclude that the Soviet Policies most troubling to the West are in fact, gone forever". Underlying the administration's hesitation was dismissal of the view that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was less threatening than it was at the height of the Cold War — a precept publicly expressed by Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney, who predicted in March 1989 that Gorbachev and the reforms he was masterminding would not succeed. This comment raised doubts as to whether the administration truly wanted Gorbechev to succeed —suspicions which Bush belatedly sought to dispel (24 May 1989) when he announced that "our goal [is] integrating the Soviet Union into the community of nations".

If the goal of containing the Soviet Union was unoriginal, the means selected to accomplish the task were likewise not innovative. Two tactics were outlined. First, the administration tacitly revived Henry Kissinger's neglected linkage strategy that sought to tie US behaviour toward the Soviet Union to Washington's assessment of Moscow's activities elsewhere in the world (Hyland, 1987); cooperation on arms control, trade expansion, technology transfer, and the like would be contingent on the Soviet Union's adherence to Washington's code of conduct. The administration asserted that it would distrust words and respect only Soviet deeds, and laid down "tests" to be passed before the Kremlin can "earn" a better relationship" (Schlesinger, 1989). Secondly, it proposed to contain Soviet influence by confronting the adversary with preponderant military strength, and committed itself to preserving a favourable strategic advantage in the military balance.

Linkage was resurrected in spirit because the new dialogue that had opened between the superpowers made reciprocated concessions on linked

issues a critical part of the bargaining process. Bush conveyed his acceptance of the strategy in his pledge on 12 May 1989 that "we will match their steps with steps of our own". But from the start, the strategy was inconsistently applied, and at that, only in reluctant response to the upstaging concessions Mr Gorbachev daringly announced. Gorbachev's peace offensive was perceived to be offensive, and Bush's pledge at the annual meeting of NATO in May 1989 to "move beyond the era of containment" was motivated by the need to assuage the fears of America's allies that the United States alone clung to the perception that the military threat from the East was as dangerous as ever.

In part to counter Gorbachev's popularity and in part to comply with what public opinion worldwide strongly endorsed, negotiations eventually did proceed on reducing intermediate and strategic nuclear forces and troop strength in Europe. To prevent further procrastination, boundaries defining linkages were expediently blurred, as illustrated by Bush's decisions in May 1989 to subsidise the export of massive quantities of wheat to the Soviets at cut-rate prices without insisting, in return, on reciprocated policy changes, and to waive for one year the Jackson-Vanek amendment (refusal to grant most-favoured nation status to the Soviet Union at that time). In addition, negotiations were explored linking US restraint in Eastern Europe to a Soviet agreement to cease meddling in Central America.

Besides linkage, the second strategy for containing the Soviets was to confront them with the military capacity to inflict massive destruction. At the root of this orthodox deterrence strategy was distrust of Soviet motives and mistrust of their willingness to adhere to agreements (see Barnet, 1988). The approach rested on the same kinds of "worst case" analyses on which previous Cold War confrontational policies had been based in the past. Paul A. Nitze (1989:5), for a brief period Bush's Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, prescribed the basis for inherent bad faith: "we must always remember to base our security policies on Soviet capabilities and behaviour rather than on hopes or expressed intentions".

Bush's emphasis on rhetoric toward the containment of Soviet influence followed a worn script, his words couched in a familiar vocabulary. Practice, however, suggested a selectivity in the application of the conventional approach, talking tough while quietly seeking opportunities for cooperation. Faced with the necessity of making choices, the administration chose to steer a middle course. The consequence was resistance to inexorable change, punctuated by scepticism and a preference for the status quo. The administration's time-consuming review of Soviet policy during the first four months in office set the posture and pace: "We have the initial results from the study", Brent Snowcroft, President Bush's national security advisor, commented, "and it's probably not suprising that

the future looks a lot like the present in a straight line projection" (*New York Times*, 10 April 1989:A6).

A vision of a world without the Soviet Union as a threatening enemy was not evident; possibly, to the administration it was inconceivable, nor did there exist evidence that the administration sought to replace confrontation with an agenda that did not centre on East-West competition. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr (1989:A18) reflected, "One has the impression that [George Bush], a man of unimpeachable good will, is the prisoner of a bunch of foreign policy hacks whose idea is to greet every new problem with old cliches".

In fact, Bush did not rely on political hacks; he "assembled a foreign policy brain trust composed of Reagan holdovers, experienced hands from the period dominated by Henry A. Kissinger", brains which can be expected to preserve containment because "they see the world as Washington has seen it for four decades, through the prism of the familiar East-West power game" (Sciolino, 1989:A1). Hence, the opportunities to escape the confines of the Cold War may be missed. As Schlesinger (1989) observed, "this confronts us with what for governments is the most painful of necessities — fresh thought and new policies. So naturally we downgrade the significance of the Gorbachev revolution and fall back into the comfortable platitudes of the old Cold War".

Military Might and Interventionist Means

As the foregoing suggests, like its predecessors, the Bush administration relied primarily on military power to contain Soviet influence. A familiar tactic was tacitly accepted: substitute defence policy for foreign policy.

Bush echoed the orthodox faith in military prowess at the Republican National Convention (18 August 1988) when he asserted that Reagan and he "acted on the ancient knowledge that strength and clarity lead to peace — weakness and ambivalence lead to war... I will not allow this country to be made weak again". Thereafter, he often repeated his promise to "continue our policy of strength" (*New York Times*, 2 January 1989, p.18).

Alternative paths to peace were eschewed, including the approach advocated by the father of the containment doctrine, George F. Kennan, who had recommended vigilance and firm *political* pressure in order to facilitate the fragmentation of the Soviet Union *from within*, and counselled against *military* intimidation, which, he predicted, would inadvertently promote what it sought to prevent — Soviet belligerence and militarism. But, like nearly all postwar presidents, Bush rejected this approach to containment.

The contours of Bush's military conception of foreign policy were defined by the extravagant commitment made to defence spending in an era

of declining resources, staggering deficits and debts, and Soviet retrenchment in its own military presence and profile. For fiscal year 1990, the President requested $$309 billion for defence or approximately twenty-eight percent of the federal budget, and even higher levels for the following years. The steep increases institutionalised in the "buy everything" Reagan era were not challenged, even though it was questionable whether enough money was now available to pay for what had been ordered.

The criteria governing how this defence allocation was to be distributed evolved very slowly. The administration first placed primary emphasis on its desire to upgrade the land-based missile leg of the nation's strategic triad. Development of both the rail-mobile MX and the Midgetman missiles were supported, while choices about funding levels for the systems were deferred. Support also continued to be voiced for the costly and technologically unproven "Star Wars" Strategic Defence Initiative. Furthermore, Bush announced in June 1989 that he planned to go ahead with the Stealth bomber programme — potentially the most expensive in the Pentagon history, with a price tag for 132 bombers at $$70 billion — even though Secretary of Defence Cheney had expressed reservations about the programme's cost and quality, and despite the resumption at the same time of negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce the number of nuclear warheads, bombers and missiles in each nation's arsenal. In addition, Bush opposed a test ban on nuclear weapons, while at the same time he confessed (8 May 1989) that: "The fact of the matter is we have a massive survivable nuclear deterrent right now". "The question for Mr Bush", noted one commentator (Seib, 1988:1), "is whether he ever met [a weapons system] he didn't like." Unwilling to sacrifice any strategic programmes, Bush also pledged in 1988 to strengthen conventional capabilities: "What we don't have is the kind of strong conventional defence capability we must have, and that is going to be my top priority as president". Without question, military preparedness as a component of American foreign policy was to be continued.

Nor did the administration look with disfavour on the postwar propensity to engage in military intervention (Schraeder, 1989). Mr Bush pledged to continue supporting anti-communist rebels (Seib and Walcott, 1988), thereby reaffirming his faith in the Reagan Doctrine. As one careful student of presidential character (Barber, 1989) predicted on the day of Bush's inauguration: "Turning to a military cause, even beyond the dimension of the Grenada invasion that Mr Bush helped to orchestrate, is . . . going to be a temptation for this President".

The President's pronouncements made clear the martial thrust of the policy. The capacity to wage extended conventional war worldwide was defined as important; a renewed concern was voiced for developing enhanced counterinsurgency and counterterrorist capabilities; the Carter

Doctrine, which pledged the use of military force if necessary to maintain a free flow of oil from the Persion Gulf region, was reaffirmed; signals were sent to communicate the impression that the CIA was licensed to test many restraints that Congress had earlier placed on its covert activities abroad. In addition, an increasing proportion of the economic aid package was targeted to the Third World in the form of security-supporting assistance, and arms sales abroad were again perceived as an acceptable policy instrument. In all of these ways, the Bush team sought to dispel doubt that the United States had become averse to the military exercise of influence. No one had to read Mr Bush's lips to infer his faith in military might.

If we put aside the restraint displayed in the Bush administration's actual diplomatic practice, its posture can be classified as an unambiguous reaffirmation of a cluster of enshrined beliefs: strength produces peace; the capacity to destroy is the capacity to control; weapon superiority can both deter and compel; the price of military preparedness is never too high; only negotiate arms reductions from a position of relative strength (so, increase arsenals before reducing them); and political problems are susceptible to military solutions. A centrist George Bush showed little inclination to depart from the centre of a beaten path.

But the potential for a surprise departure from the middle-of-the-road is also in Bush's character (Barber, 1989). The more radical and less reasonable face of George Bush's faith in the utility of force was displayed "during the 1980 Presidential campaign, [when] he said he believed there could in fact be a winner in a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union" (Warnke, 1988:A38).

The Sources of Continuity in American Foreign Policy

What forces reinforced so strongly the Bush presidency's embrace of the same tenets on which his predecessors relied in the postwar era? Are these forces so potent as to preclude the possibility of reorienting American foreign policy in a world undergoing profound transformation? Or, from those same forces, can there develop conditions sufficiently ripe for fundamental reorientations in American foreign policy?

The balance sheet on forces now at work at home and abroad yields no sure conclusions. Nonetheless, a reading of prevailing trends and constraining factors suggests that the assumptions on which the postwar policy pattern is based are unlikely to be seriously questioned. Any excesses contemplated by the Bush administration are likely to be restrained by these forces, and departures from the past policy pattern are likely to be infrequent, modest, and transient.

Why should confidence be placed in this prediction? The constraints on foreign policy change are powerful, and these inhibiting influences may be categorised and subsumed by reference to five sources: the individual, role,

societal, governmental, and external variables that condition foreign policy decisions. Let us conclude by examining their likely impact on George Bush's conduct of foreign policy and on that of his successors.

Any administration's foreign policy will reflect the character of the man sitting in the innermost sanctuary of power, the Oval Office. A future president's individual or idiosyncratic qualities are likely to influence the style of future policy. But this impact is also likely to be reduced by numerous constraints. All recent presidents have found it necessary to bend to the force of competing political pressures and to apply most of their energies to rallying support for their policies. Successful presidential performance requires not only strong convictions but also a willingness to appease political constituents. For this reason, historians typically have portrayed most presidents as compromising chameleons whose capacity to lead was itself compromised by the very compromises they felt it necessary to make.

The Bush presidential experience illustrates the power of these pressures and the policy inertia they create. George Bush is a president whose personality disposes him strongly to seek public approval, to back away from domestic confrontation, and to seek compromises among the contestants. He is also has a history of adherence to precedents and inclination to make decisions piecemeal. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, who, through long-time association with Bush, is very familiar with him, describes his decision-making as shaped "out of a lifetime of dealing with problems on a one-on-one basis" (Seib, 1988:A16). Throughout his long career as a public servant, Bush's instinctive compulsion has been to take the middle road, to wait for events to hit his desk, and to let the course of events set his agenda. Far more reactive than proactive, as a matter of principle, Bush has preferred to delay important decisions until time-consuming reviews have been completed. Paralysis by analysis has been symptomatic. Bush's overwhelming desire to keep options open, moreover, has reinforced "the tendency to postpone hard choices on issues that may cry out for action" (Broder, 1989).

The President himself seemed to be aware of the potential problem of missed opportunities for lasting superpower harmony and mindful of the danger of protracted delay when he observed in January 1989, in the context of his snail-pace reaction to Mikhail Gorbachev's overtures: "What I don't want is to have it look like foot dragging, or sulky refusal to go forward . . . [But] I would be imprudent if I didn't have our team take a hard look at everything". Subsequently, on 21 May 1989 at Boston University, Bush reiterated the basis for his slow, passive response: "I believe in a deliberate, step-by-step approach to East-West relations, because recurring signs show that while change in the Soviet Union is dramatic, it is not yet complete . . . in an era of extraordinary change, we have an obligation to

temper optimism ... with prudence". "I know", he added, "that some are restless with the pace I have set ... but I think it is the proper pace. We have time."

This style of decision–making makes it extremely tempting to yield to pressures and to avoid disruptive corrections that might allow creative adaptations to be fashioned. "Because he believes he has little control over events", observes Margaret G. Hermann (1989), "President Bush allows situations to dictate to him rather than the reverse. This type of behaviour leads to more reactive and slow policy making ... [and his genuine respect for considerate, friendly, loyal behaviour] and a great personal need for support and affiliation [leads him to a high] concern with the morale ... of the groups with which he works."

Likeability is a poor substitute for leadership, and loyalty is a poor substitute for judgement. Capitulation can be corrosive. The consequence of this decisional style is that George Bush is not likely to be a force for change, and under him only marginal policy adjustments and *ad hoc* reactions to surfacing problems are likely to be witnessed. The status quo has an ally in the beliefs dominant in the White House. As Reagan speechwriter Larry Speakes put it: "The bottom line is [that Bush is] the perfect team player, the perfect yes man ... With Bush, the popular image may be accurate: That he does have a strong philosophical base, that he is not decisive, that he is not willing to take stands on the big issues" (*US News and World Report*, 23 May 1988, p.22).

A president is not the personification of the state, and Bush's capacity to move in new directions is also restricted by the prior commitments and policies of his predecessors, the actions and preferences of the individuals appointed to implement policy, and his conception of how he is expected to perform the role of president.

The backgrounds of those appointed to fill foreign policymaking *roles* invariably govern the kinds of decisions that are made. In this respect, it is important to note that Bush's advisors are almost entirely veterans of previous Republican administrations. Lawrence Eagleburger, Brent Snowcroft, James Baker, Richard Cheney, Nicholas Brady, Ronald Lehman, and Bush himself are products of the habits of mind developed in the formative stage of their careers and strenghtened by the similar coaching they received as understudies from their mentors (among whom Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger were highly influential). They carry with them well-worn conceptual baggage. Members of the eastern "establishment" which has guided American foreign and defence policy for nearly a half century, these foreign policy managers who have been insiders before, agree on the fundamental policy questions. Their consensus ensures that they will respond to many decisions from a common perspective shaped by Cold War precepts.

As an experienced policymaker, Bush was well aware of the propensity of bureaucrats to challenge presidential directives that threaten their agencies' interests. To overcome potential bureaucratic resistance and intransigance, Bush selected key personnel on the basis of their ability to be loyal team players. But loyalty to the President's formulations of the national agenda did not prevent the inevitable struggle for power among ambitious men and women. True to role theory, the president's players found themselves in partial disagreement about the positions that they believed should be taken toward key issues. The differences between Secretary of Defence Cheney and National Security Advisor Scowcroft in 1989 on choices regarding the MX and Minuteman missiles, were illustrative (although the friction paled in comparison with that which ignited between Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski in the Carter administration and between George Schultz and Casper Weinberger under Reagan). Nonetheless, as in the past these differences compromised the day-to-day effectiveness and coherence of the country's foreign policy. Even a homogeneous, team-oriented administration is prone to turn the policymaking process into a battleground. In a climate of diminishing resources, struggles over their distribution are to be expected, and undoubtedly will be intense. Policy innovation is not a characteristic product of such conflict-ridden processes, compromise and delay are. As before, bureaucratic struggles are likely to restrain policy innovation.

Implementation of new policy initiatives also will be circumscribed by the *governmental* structure Bush was elected to run. For this task, Bush sought to create a coalition presidency. But the elaborate, overlapping organisational machinery of the foreign affairs government is resistant to streamlining, management and coordination, and coalitions tend to be fragile. To a considerable extent, the governmental machinery is beyond presidential control:

> presidents operate on the brink of failure and in ignorance of when, where, and how failure will come. They do not and cannot possibly know about even a small proportion of government activity that bears on their failure. They can only put out fires and smile above the ashes. They do not know what is going on — yet they are responsible for it. And they feed that responsibility every time they take credit for good news not of their own making (Lowi, 1985:190).

A system of checks and balances inhibits change and promotes policy momentum.

Add to this an independently-minded (and, under Bush, a Democrat-controlled) Congress with a propensity to act as a brake on proposed policy changes, and the prospects for policy initiatives from the legislative branch are at best remote. Bush's stress on bipartisanship was medicinal, but the polarising forces within Congress are likely, in the long run, to destroy even his best efforts to win and preserve good will on Capitol Hill. The fact that

he was the first newly-elected President to have a Cabinet choice (John Tower, nominated as Secretary of Defence) rejected by the Senate, attested to the strength of these obstacles.

Ultimately, a new president's ability to work his will in Congress will be influenced by the support his policies enjoy among the American people. Indeed, the potential influence of societal forces in a globally interdependent world is especially potent, for under such circumstances, foreign policy is often little more than an extension of domestic policy. Many groups within American society have great incentives to influence foreign policy, and presidents are tempted to take foreign policy positions primarily for their public impact, for in a highly politicised domestic environment, presidents are inclined to resist everything but temptation. Politics does not stop at the water's edge.

Bush's 1988 election is illustrative. It was a personal victory without a mandate. Opinion polls revealed that many Americans who voted for the president did not understand the specifics of his philosophy, particularly in a vicious campaign which emphasised personal attacks on his opponent and neglected to spell out positions. George Bush does not benefit from a programme backed by the American electorate; this makes engineering policy changes difficult. Moreover, although efforts were made to curtail their clout, single-issue special interest groups and political action committees will continue to press their causes. And public opinion, always potentially fickle, may be expected to turn sharply against a president when costly budgetary commitments threaten the welfare of organised interests. The status quo, accordingly, is preserved by the cross-pressures exerted on contending groups in a pluralistic American society. The paradox exists that, whereas the American public clearly desires and rewards presidential leadership, the fragmented American political system thwarts its exercise.

The public "mood", moreover, is prone to cyclical oscillations between internationalism and isolationism, and between idealism and realpolitik. Together, these discordant rhythms, both evident in the 1980s, point toward potentially divergent future paths, as the relative costs and benefits of options are weighed. Some will find the interventionist thrust that the Reagan administration advocated (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1982-1983) palatable; others will recoil from it. Regardless of the direction in which public opinion swings in the 1990s, however, it is unlikely that the opinion will mobilise permanently around a conception of US national interest sufficiently radical to pull American foreign policy outside the boundaries within which it has fluctuated since the end of the Second World War.

The American public's definition of national priorities is also likely to be driven by parochial concerns about the economic foundations of national prosperity. The potential impact of these concerns was nowhere more apparent than in the domestic debate that arose over the basic question that

Bush was forced to confront: whether guns and butter, military spending and economic prosperity, are incompatible in the long run (and whether one could be obtained without sacrifice of the other).

The Reagan administration's efforts to increase military spending without incurring deficits, and its utter failure in that endeavour speaks to the inherent tension between the goals. Reagan was forced to compromise on one of the most important tenets of his conservative philosophy: the belief that US influence around the world could be promoted by military spending. Reagan succeeded in making America stand tall — by standing on a mountain of debt. Bush cannot continue that approach.

Instructively, the Bush administration exhibited confusion and indecision about the best way to deal with this dilemma. The inertia and ambivalence displayed may signal deficiencies in the ability of the United States to frame a foreign policy to address deteriorating circumstances, and uncertainty about the commitments that would best serve American national interests.

How peace and prosperity are best protected and promoted is, of course, a matter of opinion. Some nations in the *external* environment of the United States do not share its global vision, and their growing clout may serve as a catalyst to its revision.

Today, few global developments (whether a consequence of American behaviour or of trends independent of American influence) fit neatly into the orthodox American world view, and even America's closest allies have questioned recent American administrations' picture of global priorities. At a time when interdependence among nations was growing rapidly and when Japan and a uniting Europe had become viable economic competitors to the United States, the administration seemed indifferent to and unaccepting of other countries' professed definitions of the global agenda. Instead, ignoring these vulnerabilities, Bush followed the path blazed by the author of Reagan Doctrine.

This defiant posture has been taken at a point in history when the relative decline of American power is readily apparent. It is, nonetheless, a reality that has been denied. Rather, the Bush administration ostensibly has accepted the Reagan administration's belief that "a strong reassertive America could make the world adjust to Washington" (Gelb and Lake, 1985).

The United States does maintain unmatched military strength and doubtless continues to exercise disproportionate influence over international affairs (Russett, 1985). In this sense, one can easily agree with Henry Brandon that "The presumed retreat of America never happened". But that conclusion ignores the decline of the resource base of the United States relative to others, however measured. The erosion of its economic output, productivity, and competitiveness has made it increasingly difficult for the United States to exercise political leverage. Former Secretary of State

Alexander Haig underscored the predicament (18 February 1985) when he observed that: "The idea that the United States, acting alone in an interdependent world, can somehow renew the mythical golden era of the immediate postwar years when [the United States] seemed invulnerable to the international political or economic developments is a dangerous illusion".

Clearly, many of the challenges of the 1990s do not fit well with a foreign policy designed for the circumstances of the late 1940s. A post-World War II vision is not very suitable to a post-Cold War system.

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson once noted that "there are fashions in everything, even in horrors ... and just as there are fashions in fears, there are fashions in remedies". To the extent that this telling aphorism is true, global trends can be expected eventually to distance American foreign policy from the approach it has relentlessly pursued for nearly five decades, and move it toward a more complex conception of national security. But there is unmistakable resistance to acceptance of new fashions. Acheson's tongue-in-cheek policy advice seemed to characterise the Bush administration's to change: "Don't just do something — stand there". "With the passing of time", observed *The New Yorker* (29 May 1989), "what at first appeared to be professional detachment is looking more and more like a tenuous grasp of reality." Will the Bush administration live up to the lofty standard it has set for itself, and pragmatically adjust its policy approach to the world taking shape in 2000?

The Problematic Future

Harper's Magazine characterised the setting for American foreign policy thus:

> It is a gloomy moment in the history of our country. Not in the lifetime of most men has there been so much grave and deep apprehension; never has the future seemed so incalculable as at this time. The domestic economic situation is in chaos ... Prices are so high as to be utterly impossible. The political cauldron seethes and bubbles with uncertainty. Russia hangs, as usual, like a cloud, dark and silent, upon the horizon. It is a solemn moment. Of our trouble no man can see the end.

That statement, written not in the 1990s but in *1847*, is disconcerting. It depicts circumstances both today and over 150 years ago which convey the impression that a mere trend equates with destiny, that yesterday's problems are likely to remain tomorrow's, and that, therefore, the capacity of American foreign policy to create a promising future is questionable. By implication, the statement also persistently suggests that *new* global challenges may be beyond the nation's ability to manage and that, in conjunction with the durability of *old* troubles, the United States is somehow doomed by new perils and fading promise. It appears to have reached a watershed in its history.

America's future is not predetermined by invisible but potent forces. Trend is *not* destiny. The nature of the world that will be inherited will be influenced by how today's American foreign policy makers set priorities. The adequacy of their response will rest on the accuracy of their assumptions about global realities and on their capacity to act decisively and wisely.

As before, at issue today is whether the conventional assumptions that have guided American foreign policymaking since World War II are warranted. Although reaffirmed and elevated to be worshipped as sacred truths during the Reagan years, their appropriateness, given the number of unconventional economic and environmental threats that urgently need to be addressed, is certain to be questioned. Today's environment necessitates many hard choices.

Their ostensible inability to achieve consensus and react to various global situations with a coherent and comprehensive policy response has led many observers — beginning with Alexis de Tocqueville in the nineteenth century — to question whether democratic government is suited to the conduct of a global foreign policy. The verdict depends, in part, on the capacity of democracy to recruit into office farsighted, courageous leaders able to offer a positive vision of the future and a programme for reaching it. That capacity is being tested again today.

The consequences that surface at the advent of the millennium will determine future generations' judgement of Bush's decisional style and his worship of the elusive (Kegley, 1989a) principle of pragmatism. Whether his practical diplomacy combined with plodding deliberation works or fails will be tested by time. Bush himself in April 1989 asked that history might evaluate the wisdom or folly of his method: "the proof will come when we look back from the year 2000".

The method of choice, of course, is only one determining element in the outcome. The factors that collectively drive the policymaking process will give direction to the eventual policy that emerges. Indeed, the process — more so than the individuals involved in it — will parent the policy. For the process will not only stimulate efforts to cope with external challenges but also constrain a president's ability to implement the design chosen. "All of [the nations past presidents], from the most venturesome to the most reticent, have shared one disconcerting experience: the discovery of the limits and restraints — decreed by law, by history, and by circumstance — that sometimes can blur their clearest designs or dull their sharpest purposes", noted Emmet John Hughes (1972). "I have not controlled events, events have controlled me", was a telling lament that President Lincoln expressed.

It is unlikely that prevailing circumstancees will permit America's forty-first president, George Bush, to be an exception. The job is seemingly intractable, the obstacles enormous, the number of problems devoid of

simple solutions staggering. The inclination to look to the future with a vision inspired by the past, and to postpone the awesome task of developing a comprehensive policy response to the profound changes that have recently transpired, will be compelling. It will prove difficult to depart from the prevailing pattern that has consistently defined American foreign policy for almost fifty years.

"The really suprising thing about [the United States]", noted Henry Brandon in 1983, "has been the basic stability of American foreign policy. There has been a continuity that, in fact, nobody could have predicted." Now, however, if past *is* truly prologue, we *can* predict somewhat confidently that policy continuity will persist. The assumptions made by American policy makers in the immediate aftermath of World War II have proven to be remarkably resilient ever since, even in the face of turbulent global changes. Our changing times may certainly call for an American foreign policy different from the strategy formed almost five decades ago for a different set of challenges. But past policy has the force of momentum behind it, and that force is awesome. The outlines of American foreign policy are therefore unlikely to be redrawn. Dramatic policy changes after George Bush are not to be anticipated.

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Roger Gravil
The Southern Cone and South Africa

Points on the compass can suggest associations both real and imaginary, both significant and vacuous. The expression, "the West", conveys a solid enough geo-political entity with an unmistakable economic mode. "Out East" conjures up oriental exoticism of a type not encountered elsewhere. "North" may run the gamut from brisk efficiency to spiritual introspection. But with the fourth station, "South", we enter a more nebulous zone, speculative rather than charted, tentative instead of formalised. Put crudely, the South remains ill-defined and conceptually diffuse in spite of a profusion of journals and magazines aimed at fostering a sense of identity. This ambiguous setting raises the question of the possibility of a pan-austral community of nations. If so, could this be either parallel with, or in opposition to, the more organised "North"? Short of close formal arrangements, could there be, at least, some type of southern concert resembling that of pre-1848 Europe? The prime issue in approaching the whole subject is: "does it exist"? Is the Southern Cone more than a geographical term and, if so, what are the possible implications for South Africa?[1]

While the republics of Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru and Chile are all in land-linked proximity, the shortest possible journey between South America and South Africa is across 4 500 miles of ocean.[2] For the latter, Western Europe and the U.S.A. are just as geographically accessible and historically more congenial, as they are also for the Latin countries. There is no inevitable, automatic or natural tie-up between the two regions beyond the geological fact that they were once joined. Even the very crude trade figures available (see Table 1) make the point more eloquently than mere words.

The South American state with the closest African ties is Brazil, which is not, however, part of the Southern Cone. Broad historical associations of the sort described by José Honorio Rodrigues were intensified practically

Roger Gravil is Professor of Economic History in the University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg) and also an authority on Latin America.

overnight by the OPEC crisis of 1973 and the 1974 regime collapse in Lisbon. Portugal was as incapable of a neo-colonial comeback in late 20th century Africa as it was in early 19th century Brazil. The fall of the Portuguese dictatorship thus presented the Brazilians with a windfall opportunity to pose as champions of African liberation while simultaneously easing their fuel crisis. As early as July 1974, Rio de Janeiro recognised the PAIGC in Guinea and eighteen months later did the same for the MPLA in Angola. This diplomatic recognition by Brazil preceded that of all western countries and even most African states. It was followed up smartly by oil agreements with President Agostinho Neto and well-wishers, Nigeria and Gabon.[3]

The Brazilian military's headlong solidarity with African Marxists did not, however, inhibit trade with their implacable foes, the South Africans, currently reputed to be worth $$300 million a year. The geo-political ambitions of Brazil, particularly the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1975 and their *mare nostrum* attitude to the Atlantic Ocean, stirred considerable anxieties among adjacent states. At times, the notion of the Southern Cone has even seemed to be directed more against Brazil than any other likely aggressor.[4] This thrust intensified after South Africa made a treaty offer, which was appreciated by the Argentine Junta but rejected by the independent-minded strategists of Brazil.

Such rivalries raise the burning issue of the geo-political purpose of a putative South Atlantic Treaty Organisation.[5] The standard and swiftly-delivered answer is that it would form a common front against Soviet penetration of the southern oceans, which enjoys the boon of Marxist regimes on both African coasts. As NATO is a defensive alliance against Russian expansion, so SATO would police the southern hemisphere. In short, (and self-evidently?) it would constitute the South's dutiful contribution to the defence of the Free World.[6] The analogy with NATO, however, must appear far-fetched to anyone who has actually studied the naval strength of the countries concerned. Recent assessments show that South Africa's blue water operations are diminishing every year and the Republic's navy is adopting a coastal defence posture quite incompatible with grand decisions against the Russians. Some of the South American fleets are stronger, but the general maritime weakness of the entire zone is clearly signalled by the fact that, in practice, NATO has never observed any southern limit. A proposed SATO force would never be entrusted with the Herculean task of standing up to the Soviet Union.

It was not, therefore, a superfluous question when the Nigerian soldier-diplomat, Brigadier Joseph Garba, asked in 1977: "Against whom is the South Atlantic being defended?" Mindful of previous western duplicity, some Africans suspect that the undisclosed purpose of SATO would be to guarantee the security of South Africa in the event of a revolution.[7] For black

people, these are understandable suspicions; for those white South Africans who have abandoned harsh reality, they are pipe dreams. But for academics, with the time and duty to think things through, the prospect of a transnational South American fleet, steaming across the high seas in some very rough re-enactment of the Relief of Mafeking, seems fanciful.

This leaves the possibility of a measure of solidarity between the Southern Cone and South Africa based upon ideological sympathy. Could something have been worked through the kinship and affinity generated among pariah states? Twenty-five years ago, the Alliance for Progress collapsed into the proliferation of dictatorships across Latin America. The same era saw South Africa's departure from the British Commonwealth. Did anti-democratic trends in both regions merge into a shared impatience with an uncomprehending world? Did the Southern Cone countries resolve to cooperate and sustain each other until the day dawned when conservative realism would finally win universal appreciation?

Certainly, South Africa became a haven for Argentine officers, who had served their turn in the repressive campaign following the military coup of March 1976.[8] Their rewards for arduous service were sinecures in an environment which, for affluent Whites, resembles the life style of, for instance, California. Particularly during the ambassadorship to Pretoria of Alfredo Oliva Day, hordes of Argentine tourists, mobilised by favourable exchange rates, were joined by less innocuous figures directed to South Africa by global organiser, Jorge Eduardo Acosta, whose duties involved "the subsequent appointment of ex-Escula officers to diplomatic postings around the world".[9] The late Alan Paton's "beloved country" was earmarked as a rest and recuperation centre for exhausted "dirty warriors". Ruben Chamorro assumed duties as armed forces attaché in Pretoria on 14 June 1979; Jorge Perren followed three days later; Alfredo Astiz turned up in South Africa after another three days interval. It will come as no surprise that there is no known case of refugees from *El Processo* seeking asylum in South Africa. No doubt they wisely concluded that, in such company, it would be among the last places to find safety.

It has been asked to what extent the South African authorities were aware of this influx of pseudo-diplomats from the River Plate? The Pretoria administration denied that it was ever given details about the mastermind, Captain Acosta, and even the date of his arrival was unknown to immigration officials. While engaged in their operations in Argentina, these servicemen went under a plurality of nicknames, ranging from "Angel" to "Tiger", from "Page Boy" to "Crow", while their torture centre, EMSA, was known in a cruel inversion as "El Dorado". Yet in South Africa they openly used their real names. Of course, outside hispanic society and 5 000 miles from home, it would in most cases have meant nothing. But even the internationally notorious Alfredo Astiz did not use an alias, appearing on

South Africa's list of accredited diplomats under his own name.

The Swedish congressman, Mat Hellstrohm, who took up the Dagmar Hagelin case, prompted a Stockholm newspaper to carry the headline: "How long is South Africa going to protect him?".

Durban's *Sunday Tribune* commented: "The matter is a major diplomatic embarrassment for both the Argentine and South African governments". Whatever the degree of collusion of the government in Pretoria with the Argentine Junta, the whole episode at least demonstrated that a potent opposition still exists in South Africa. The Progressive Federal Party's Helen Suzman declared: "Because of our own clouded human rights record, we should be especially careful of the people we accept under diplomatic privilege".[10] The same party's Colin Eglin pressed that the government must not remain inactive in the matter. The noted journalist, William Saunderson Meyer, organised a press campaign which resulted eventually in the offenders being told to leave the country. The outcry in South Africa was as effective as, for instance, that stirred up by Granada Television regarding the presence of Jorge Gildoza and Alberto Menotti on the staff of Argentina's embassy in London.

The question that thus arises is whether any special significance can be seen in the location of Junta personalities in South Africa? In the first place, postings were arranged to countries as politically diverse as Spain, Bolivia and Britain, as well as to the citadel of apartheid. Secondly, in view of the decades of local experience in repressing political dissent, it is unlikely that the Argentines were operating a training mission for the South African security forces. Thirdly, there was a stronger possibility that this concentration of senior figures in South Africa reflected political manoeuvres at home in Argentina. The ex-chief of GT 333/2, George Eduardo Acosta, was an intimate confidant of Emilio Massera, whose presidential ambitions were hardly concealed. In turn, Acosta brought in his bosom friend, Captain Jorge Perren, and a chain was thus established. In short, this gathering of the clans in South Africa may have formed a highly novel location from which to plot the hoped-for future government of Argentine.

Whatever broader strategic expectations the Junta held of South Africa, they were disappointed in the South Atlantic conflict from April to June 1982. It is well known that the North Americans forgot General Galtieri's "majestic personality" in his hour of need. It is also well known that the Chileans facilitated British attacks against their Southern Cone neighbour. Similarly, there were strong rumours that the Simonstown–Silvermine facilities were opened to the British for the first time since 1976. The Argentines certainly thought so and, consequently, were furious with South Africa.[11]

The commercial effect, if any, of pariah status is difficult to measure, not

least because of the cagey attitude of the South African authorities towards releasing statistics of trade with foreign countries. Only a broad outline can be drawn from the opaque publications of the Central Statistical Office in Pretoria. Any detailed breakdown is frankly described by officialdom as classified information. Compilations by international bodies such as the United Nations are limited by the data supplied to them by the South African state. It has therefore been impossible to amass and make comparable the official statistics from the six governments of the Southern Cone.

Such data do not allow analysts very much scope. But some points, nevertheless, emerge from Table 2: between 1974 and 1984 not even Argentina surpassed South African exports in any year, while the latter's imports were usually more than double those of Argentina. No other Southern Cone state remotely approached South Africa in imports or exports. These results were obtained despite international sanctions and boycotts against South Africa not applied against the Southern Cone countries. Throughout, commerce with the Southern Cone, or indeed with Latin America as a whole, remained a minute fraction of South Africa's total trading efforts.

It seems clear that even in the days when the Southern Cone was entirely under military rule, regional relations were unpredictable when not actively hostile. Over the same period, South African overtures towards the region displayed a number of features militating against the establishment of genuine solidarity with the Southern Cone. First, the motivation was so obviously negative, amounting to prize consolation in the light of the rising tide of criticism of apartheid in Western Europe and the USA; secondly, Spanish Americans had good cause to ponder their own racial standing in the estimation of some South Africans; thirdly, mutual trust among pariah states is about as dependable as "honour among thieves" - philosophically, it seems probable that people are drawn together more closely by decency than disgrace; fourthly, in view of the similar climates and seasons, economic complementarity is low, while flourishing traffic in counter-insurgency hardware was obviously contingent on the survival of repressive regimes. Thus, even when ubiquitous misgovernment formed the common ground, the alliance between the Southern Cone and South Africa was always precarious and unreliable.

Clearly, the recent resurgence of democracy[12] in the Southern Cone has made it more difficult for the Republic of South Africa, as presently constituted, to strengthen relations with those countries. With a few exceptions, they have ceased to be pariah states at the very time when world hostility towards South Africa has reached fever pitch. These reborn democracies have to assert their credentials and beware of tarnish. While euphoria would be misplaced, the moral recovery of South America, led

above all by Argentina, merits international applause. By contrast, South Africa has not elicited such a response from the world community since the days of General Jan Smuts and has never before experienced the unpopularity which the country faces today.

The democratic surge in the world in general has been hailed by, for instance, John Kenneth Galbraith, on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the Philadelphia Convention. Alan Riding championed its didactic message south of the border in an influential newspaper article coining the "Latin Spring". Such journalistic coverage[13] has been followed up by more cautious academic assessment pointing out both glaring contrasts and significant nuances among the currently prevailing regimes in Latin America.[14]

Dictatorships of different sorts still persist in Chile, Paraguay and Cuba. The Central American republics of El Salvador and Guatemala operate "death squad" democracies under which failure to vote may bring capital punishment. Nevertheless, when Nicaragua produced a high poll and clear results without terror, it received not congratulations but Contras.[15] Venezuela, Columbia and Costa Rica never established bureaucratic authoritarianism so that they fall outside redemocratisation. Regime breakdowns, catastrophic in Argentina, corrosive in Brazil, brought elections and new presidents, both of whom roundly denounced Ronald Reagan for claiming the credit. Clearly, Latin American politics are not uniform and the sole common feature to all regimes is the handover of power from military to civilian government. It is emphatically not a swing from right to left.

While that is a disappointment in some quarters, it must nevertheless be conceded that the transition has brought acceptable regimes to much of the Southern Cone. Alfonsin's Argentina, Sanguinetti's Uruguay, Paz's Bolivia, and Garcia's Peru can all no doubt be construed as expressions of bourgeois moderation in regional circumstances demanding radical measures. They can equally well be seen as historical improvements and staging posts. The point is fortified by recalling that the 35–years–old dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay fell in February 1989, leaving progress towards Chile's regime change as sporadic rather than majestic. In the Southern Cone, there is now a glaring cleavage between reconstructed democracies and pariah regimes.

South Africa is generally classed with the latter, though unjustly, according to Pretoria's defenders.[16] They urge that the country is not and never has been a dictatorship; rather, like the USA, it has practised constitutional government while tackling intractable racial problems. Secondly, reforms introduced in recent years show that South African politics are responding to democratic trends in the world at large. Thirdly, while it is admitted that the Nationalist Party is now in its fortieth year of

continuous office, that closely resembles the situation in Mexico where, however, the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* has long been vaunted as a paragon.

Such pleadings have not, in practice, mitigated foreign or opposition perceptions of South Africa as a pariah state, and the countries of the Southern Cone have either adopted individually distinct policies towards the South African situation or have ignored it as remote from their interests.[17]

South Africa's sternest critic among the Southern Cone republics is definitely Argentina and the reasons merit examination. In contrast to the USA, Argentina's present day black population is infinitesimal and few of this handful wield votes, as they tend to be foreign immigrants, particularly from Uruguay. Argentina's own black citizens apparently vote Peronist and would not be converted to the Radical Party by a mere gesture. Evidently, it is not an issue of domestic politics, but could be a concern with Blacks overseas, resembling that of the Australian and New Zealand governments. Raul Alfonsin's authentic concern with human rights at home might have an overseas dimension. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that Argentina is the only country of the Southern Cone to break off diplomatic relations with South Africa (in May 1986). Two years later, in the midst of celebrations marking Brazil's (very late) abolition of slavery in 1888, Congress voted to continue recognition of the Pretoria regime, in the face of internationally reported black demonstrations in Brazil.

Argentina's decision to withdraw its ambassador from Pretoria was taken at a time when exports were buoyant, thanks to their ability to relieve the Southern African drought, as Table 3 shows. There were excellent prospects for future growth and these may have been permanently jeopardised, especially as the trade's social utility is so easy to demonstrate.

The precise reasons for the break in diplomatic relations between Argentina and South Africa still remain a matter of speculation for historians.[18] First, General Videla' government has maintained close ties with Pretoria, probably offending the Radical Party with its principled traditions. Secondly, Raul Alfonsin may have aspired to head the Non-Aligned Movement and was courting black support. Thirdly, the Argentine government could certainly use black support in international bodies, particularly over the Malvinas question. Fourthly, the actual occasion of the breach was the South African forces' infringement of Zimbabwe's sovereignty, so the Argentine aim may have been to pay them back by helping President Mugabe into the chairmanship of the Organisation of African Unity. Lastly, South African diplomatic assessment is that Foreign Minister Dante Caputo insisted on the breach as career insurance, envisaging an international post if the Radical Party were to lose in the 1989 elections. The best analysis seems that which links the break to the Malvinas issue. In a BBC talk on 14 May 1988, Enoch Powell reminisced that when he

was born, Britain was strong enough in the South Atlantic to defeat the German fleet off the Falkland Islands. Latin Americans have not been slow to point out the degree to which 'Fortress Falklands' has strenghtened NATO's southern flank. Who needs SATO now? The Argentines feel that this has been achieved at their expense and leave no avenues unexplored in the search for redress.

Uruguay continues full diplomatic relations with Pretoria, though in reality it is rare to find an ambassador in residence. Bolivia maintains a consulate, while Paraguay's Asuncion has been made a twin city with Pretoria. Survey teams have investigated both Bolivia and Paraguay for the resettlement of South Africans. Preparation of a South American escape hatch was also tried out by the Rhodesians a decade ago, without success. The long-settled Boer community in Comorado Rivadavia discourages new immigration.

Peru is worth mentioning as the antithesis of South Africa on debt policy, Alan Garcia's truculence contrasting with Pretoria's punctilious repayment.[19] The Botha government's public explanation that South Africa is not a "banana republic"[20] indicates the true extent to which fellow-feeling has really extended to the Southern Cone. Chile,[21] with its studied silence and arms exhibitions, remains in good standing.

What was said at the beginning bears repeating at the end: South Africa's strongest general link with Latin America falls outside the Southern Cone in Brazil, and the same holds good for all major African states.

Table 1: South Africa's Regional Trade with the Americas (R M)

Year	South Africa's Imports from			South Africa's Exports to		
	U S A	Brazil	Rest of Latin America	U S A	Brazil	Rest of Latin America
1980	1 949,2	77,4	43,3	1 032,0	129,5	129,6
1981	2 654,7	116,0	86,3	1 187,4	161,1	179,1
1982	2 679,0	121,7	76,4	1 061,2	84,8	162,2
1983	2 465,6	168,0	247,9	1 290,6	18,1	103,6
1984	3 402,9	201,6	244,3	2 104,4	61,8	103,0

Figures extracted from R S A Central Statistical Service, *South African Statistics* (Pretoria Government Printer, 1986)
In the source 'Rest of Latin America' appears as 'Other South America', though it must include Mexico and Central America as they are not shown anywhere else

Table 2: The participation in World Trade of South Africa and the six Southern Cone Republics (U S $M)

Year	South Africa		Argentina		Bolivia		Chile		Paraguay		Peru		Uruguay	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
1974	7 856	4 433	3 635	3 931	366	583	2 413	2 153	171	170	1 909	1 503	487	382
1975	7 564	5 490	3 947	2 961	575	478	1 338	1 552	179	177	2 327	1 330	556	384
1976	6 738	5 212	3 034	3 916	594	573	1 684	2 083	180	181	2 016	1 341	587	546
1977	5 886	6 743	4 165	5 655	391	630	2 518	2 190	255	279	2 148	1 726	730	608
1978	7 191	8 433	3 834	6 399	769	635	3 002	2 478	318	257	1 668	1 972	774	686
1979	11 766	10 475	6 711	7 813	894	857	4 218	3 894	438	305	1 954	3 916	1 206	788
1980	18 553	12 548	10 541	8 020	665	1 037	5 124	4 671	517	310	3 090	3 916	1 680	1 059
1981	21 077	11 076	9 430	9 143	917	984	6 364	3 906	506	296	3 803	3 249	1 641	1 215
1982	16 971	9 635	5 321	7 726	554	899	3 529	3 710	581	330	3 080	3 227	1 110	1 023
1983	14 528	9 672	4 501	7 835	532	818	2 754	3 836	506	284	2 147	3 027	788	1 045
1984	14 956	9 334	4 583	8 107	631	773	3 191	3 657	563	386	1 870	3 131	776	925

Figures extracted from *Statistical Yearbook 1983–4* (New York United Nations, 1986) South Africa's data were the adjusted foreign trade of the customs area comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa, though their intra-regional trade is excluded and both imports and exports are F O B values For the South American countries imports are C I F but exports are F O B

Table 3:	Argentina's Trade with South Africa (U S $M)	
Year	Argentina's Exports to South Africa	Argentina's Imports from South Africa
1976	4,6	8,9
1977	5,6	14,7
1978	11,2	17,4
1979	11,4	29,9
1980	15,6	53,7
1981	18,0	32,6
1982	19,1	30,9
1983	172,0	23,5
1984	53,9	7,8

Figures extracted from Alan Campbell 'Trade Relations between Argentina and South Africa', *Latin American Report* (Pretoria UNISA Centre for Latin American Studies) Vol 1, No 2, 1986, pp 37–40

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Paul B. Rich

Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Contemporary Africa

The study of ethnic movements in African politics has undergone a pronounced change in the post-colonial era. Both before and after the period of political independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, social analysts were preoccupied with issues of "nation building". Ethnicity appeared to be a hangover from the past in this endeavour and to conflict with the demands of modernity, which was conceived in mainly western terms of passing from a condition of ascriptive to achievement-orientated social goals. Critics charged that the formulation of "nation building" was too concerned with the idea of the nation in an idealistic sense and failed to relate it to real political and social action.[1] The idea of modernisation, however, became virtually synonymous with the processes of "nation building" and little attention was paid to the significance of sub-national cleavages mobilised under ethnic group identities.

This period of social science optimism was quite short-lived. The breakdown of a number of post-colonial regimes and the onset of military governments in the course of the 1960s and 1970s led to a new focus upon institutions requisite for the maintenance of political order, together with a renewed interest in issues of ethnic and communal cohesion.[2] In one sense, this was a tardy acknowledgement by social scientists of the saliency of ethnicity for, as Frank Furedi has pointed out, this was of direct and immediate interest to the British Colonial Office and colonial administrations in Africa in the period after World War II.[3]

For a number of social theorists, however, the issues presented by the resurgence of ethnic alignments were significant for challenging some of the dominant assumptions concerning the growth of mass political participation in the post-colonial era. Nelson Kasfir, for example, pointed out that "modernisation" in its original form was initially assumed to mean the expansion of structures of mass political participation in African states accompanying the emergence of the nationalist ideology. The continuing importance of ethnicity, however, meant that this could no longer be

Dr. Paul Rich is lecturer in Politics at the University of Bristol, U.K.

assumed to be a hangover of "tribalism", which was generally acknowledged by anthropologists to be a redundant term confined only to the historical period before the advent of European colonial contact.[4] Ethnicity was a product of modernisation and, to a considerable degree, subject to contrivance and political manipulation. It was unlikely to disappear from the landscape of African politics at an early date, despite the continuing hopes of many African nationalists. Some political observers, such as Colin Legum, predicted the continuing domination of ethnic politics in Africa until at least the end of the century.[5]

This shift of focus indicates a need for a reassessment of ethnicity in African politics in relationship to the structures of the post-colonial state. Ethnic political alignments can no longer be conceived of as solely "primordial" and a hangover from past historical divisions that might stretch back to the period before the advent of colonial rule.[6] The political symbolism that has been associated with ethnic political mobilisation has become a powerful input into African politics, although it is possible to overstretch this by conceiving of ethnic identities as being entirely "invented" as a consequence of European "divide and rule" policies, as some social analysts have suggested.[7] Clearly, ethnic identities can be subject to a considerable degree of change in the urban slum. The protean quality of modern ethnic identity is thus an obvious potential base for political mobilisation and the symbolism attached to it is one that can be manipulated by skillful political entrepreneurs.

The Role of the State

The saliency of ethnicity in African politics therefore needs to be seen within the context of struggles for power at the political centre around the post-colonial state. As Crawford Young has pointed out, the growth of the state in Africa was accompanied by a body of political doctrine that was substantially European in orientation. The establishment of state systems in Africa was seen as an enterprise that was dependent upon the fulfillment of certain basic criteria in order to be accepted for inclusion into the anarchical society of sovereign nation states. These criteria were *territoriality, internal sovereignty, external sovereignty, institutionalisation* and *nationhood* and, taken together, can be considered to "demarcate the contemporary nation-state as ideological charter".[8] In the African context, however, these attributes of the nation-state were perceived as an essentially alien imposition through the system of European colonial domination. The impact of the colonial state was diverse; it ranged from the model of indirect rule, where the actual infrastructure of the colonial state often failed to penetrate in any wide-ranging manner into the institutional life and culture of the colonial society at the local level, to that of the white settler states in southern and eastern Africa, which had a considerable impact in terms of population resettlement

and the catalysing of proletarianisation to service the needs of mining and agriculture.

In its varied forms, the European colonial state did much to emphasise the ethnic compartmentalisation of African society and to integrate this into the infrastructure of colonial administration. This could lead to the perpetuation of ostensibly "traditional" ethnic communities run through tribal political structures in accordance with the doctrine of "indirect rule". In practice, however, this often amounted to a "pseudo-traditionalism", since it provided space for political gatekeepers to define an artificial terrain for the "traditional" separate from that of the "political". Martin Staniland has shown, in the case of the Dagomba in Northern Ghana, that the legacy of indirect rule provided a set of rules concerning the operation of the "traditional" rule of the king, the Ya-Na, together with a judicial council of elders and a state council. This was based on the premise that Dogomba affairs could be conducted in isolation from external influences, despite a continuous tradition of outside interference. This indirect rule tradition survived under the Convention People's Party government of Kwame Nkrumah, which in 1958 appointed a commission on the rules of succession of the Ya-Na. The commission attempted to depoliticise the succession issue, although political events over the following decade indicated how far local and national policies in Ghana had become intertwined. In 1969, the two rival parties in the elections of that year — Dr Busia's Progress Party and the National Alliance of Liberals — became linked through the rival parties to a succession dispute over the Ya-Na in Dagomba, the Abudu Gate and the Adani Gate respectively. Both parties sought to employ "tradition" in support of their respective claims.[9] The example shows the continuing importance of "traditional" and ethnic power bases in post-colonial African politics.

The ruling classes that gained political power at the time of independence were not rooted in a hegemonic bourgeoisie which had control over an independent economic base. Class power in African politics has thus been dependent on the capture of state power and using it to gain or generate wealth. The "soft state" that has arisen in most post-colonial societies in Africa has in many cases pursued a strategy of departicipation in order to consolidate its authority around a dominant faction under the control of a charismatic personal ruler such as Jomo Kenyatta, Hastings Banda or Kenneth Kaunda.[10] Furthermore, what can be perceived as an "economy of affection" rooted in local clan-based political alignments has in many cases overtaken state structures in the post-independence period and undermined efforts at economic development and a structural break with the colonial past. This has been the case in, for instance, both Angola and Mozambique, where a myriad of micro-economic and political networks has undermined the attempts at developing a wider strategy of socialist transformation of the

economy and society. In some instances, however, these networks have been buttressed by external support from South Africa as part of its attempt to destabilise the regimes.[11]

Ethnic politics in the post-colonial setting has in many instances moved away from the model of pluralist party politics and become dominated by a pattern of patron client relations. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg have argued that "clientism" along with corruption and purges have now become integral elements of the African political system, which cannot be understood solely through the lens of the Weberian ideal type of legal rational authority.[12] In some cases, however, the power of personal rulers such as Hastings Banda reaches the point where factional politics are effectively pre-empted through strong authoritarian leadership. But even here it is doubtful if the state can be seen as a completely autonomous entity. Conspiratorial and "great man" politics are still dependent upon a series of local power bases and here ethnicity has proved the salient dimension in contemporary African politics.

The hijacking of the state by an ethnic group or ethnic political alliance was largely the product of a longer term failure of mass nationalism to develop in Africa. Though many of the slogans and ideas of western and European nationalism were imported into African politics in the years after World War II, for the most part, independence was not conceded by the European colonial powers as a result of mass resistance to their authority. Decolonisation generally became a process that was orchestrated from above in response to a wider pattern of global forces. Though France tried to make a stand in Algeria between 1954–62 in defence of 1 million *piéds noirs*, for the most part, it was recognised by the late 1950s by most European colonial powers (a notable exception being Portugal) that colonies were politically obsolete in the era of mounting superpower rivalry and failed anyway to pay for their own upkeep.[13] This did not mean that nationalism was especially liked by European colonial administrations and, as Furedi has pointed out, positive observations on colonial nationalism were often belied by the activities of administrations in real life crises, such as that of Mau Mau in Kenya.[14]

The general non-revolutionary transfer of power to moderate African political elites in most parts of Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s ensured that African nationalism failed to develop the mass political base comparable to, for instance, the highpoint of Congress rule in India under Nehru between 1948-1962. The petit bourgeois colonial leaderships in Africa were confronted with the basic dilemma of trying to invent or contrive a sense of nationhood with the artificial boundaries bequeathed by the former colonisers. All African member states of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), however, remained committed to the sanctity of the territorial boundaries inherited at the time of independence and there was

never any significant diplomatic support for the attempted secession of Biafra from Nigeria or of Eritrea from Ethiopia, while that of Moise Tshombe's Katanga from the Congo was widely perceived as instigated by the copper company, *Union Minière*. These attempts at secession were also hidebound by the fact that the seceding fragments such as "Biafra" and "Katanga" were just as much artificially contrived entities as the states from which they were attempting to defect.[15]

The generally unsuccessful efforts at secession in Africa has illustrated the power of the legal and normative definition of sovereignty in the contemporary international system. To some critical analysts such as Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, this has represented the triumph of juridical over empirical statehood in the case of many African states. It has been the international community in the form of the United Nations (UN), which has replaced the colonial powers as the essential moral, legal and material support for the post-colonial political order in Africa. As a consequence, the sovereignty of African states need not be thought of as in jeopardy, since it is "not contingent on their credibility as authoritative and capable political structures" but more through the operation of juridical statehood, which has been a phenomenon that has escaped serious analysis by political scientists, as a result of the divorce between legal and sociological theory and an undue focus upon the latter. A renewal of interest in the study of institutions might end this theoretical cleavage and lead to a serious effort at analysing juridical norms in terms of their actual working through the institutions of political and state power.[16]

This criticism of Jackson and Rosberg can certainly be seen as representing an important challenge to political research in the African context. Their thesis represents a major charge against the manner in which statecraft has been pursued in many contemporary African states, since they implicitly assume that the buttress of the international community effectively nullifies or blunts any serious effort at state building on lines familiar to western political theorists:

> Tropical African governments need not feel compelled to establish systems of national authority throughout their territories for fear that not to do so would endanger their sovereignty. They are not driven by competitive international pressures to integrate their political jurisdictions, or to acknowledge the independence of uncontrollable peripheries and build up what they control. Current collaborative norms of international legitimacy free them from these pressures, and also from the imperatives and disciplines that statebuilding entails.[17]

This argument derives from the realist tradition of International Relations thinking, which assumes a competitive model of force and the threat to employ it behind the establishment of the contemporary international system of sovereign nation states. The performance of state institutions is thus judged from the standpoint that "power is the basic arbiter, states are

substantial entities, and international law and morality are secondary factors at least".[18] The theory nevertheless ignores the more recent neo-realist critique of classical realism, that it is a generally static definition of power which cannot explain change in the international system and also ignores the dimension of political economy which makes the contemporary post-colonial African states in the international system different in kind to that of their eighteenth and nineteenth century European forbears.[19]

Any theory of the state, furthermore, implies a link with a wider body of theory concerning human capacities and potentialities. Jackson and Rosberg's argument assumes a Hobbesian theory of the state in the Africa context in which a link is made between political disorder and ethnic sub-nationalism and the failure of strong state systems to emerge capable of legitimising their authority and asserting political order and effective developmental goals. Such an assumption fails to establish what the criteria are for the supposed state of nature which necessitates the need for a strong Hobbesian Leviathan state in the first place. Hedley Bull argued that this Hobbesian analogy did not work especially well in terms of the functioning of the international system, for there is not a state of permanent warfare between states, which cannot "kill" each other like individuals in the state of nature.[20] The OAU and the UN have collectively opposed the territorial annexation of territory from other states and attempts at territorial expansion on the continent have been generally unsuccessful, such as Libya's abortive effort to merge with Chad. But this enforcement of territorial sovereignty is no different to efforts elsewhere in the international system, and there is no special reason within Jackson and Rosberg's argument why Africa should be considered as different to the rest of the post-colonial world.

The argument of Jackson and Rosberg was symptomatic of a wider Hobbesian style of thinking in United States' African policy in the early 1980s. During this period, an effort was made at "constructive engagement" with South Africa, which was viewed by the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, as an example of an effective and strong state, even if its apartheid goals were ones to which the US government remained strongly opposed.[21] The effect of such a policy, however, was in many ways the reverse of what the Hobbesians imagined, in that it encouraged a more confrontational stance by the South African government in the early 1980s and attempts at destabilising surrounding states. Despite efforts at mediation through the Nkomati and Lusaka Accords in 1984, subversion was continued through South African backing of the RENAMO movement in Mozambique and of UNITA in Angola. One longer term fruit of Crocker's policy has been a peace settlement in Namibia based on a phased withdrawal of 50 000 Cuban troops from Angola.[22] What Joseph Hanlon has termed "destructive engagement" by the

South African Defence Force can be seen as weakening the efforts made by the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), established in 1980, to increase regional economic cooperation between South Africa's neighbouring states in Southern Africa.[23] Contrary to Jackson and Rosberg's argument, a number of African states, including those attempting centralised command economies, such as Mozambique and Angola, have been forced to turn to the West for aid and investment and have adopted more pragmatic policies of economic decentralisation. These changes were induced through poor planning mechanisms and an absence of trained managerial personnel, as well as a series of disastrous harvests in the early 1980s due to drought and external destabilisation instituted by South Africa. This pragmatism may be of a short-term tactical nature or may indicate more profound longer term adjustment of ideological goals, but it does indicate a political realism in African statecraft which belies the thesis that there is no real attempt at modernising the state infrastructure.[24]

The model of state-building suggested by Jackson and Rosberg is further flawed by its failure to understand the problems confronting the process of "nation building" in Africa. The post-colonial state in Africa cannot simply be likened to that of a business firm, for its mobilisation of public power depends upon a more intangible series of mythic supports in order for it to gain popular political legitimacy. This is a problem all states have to confront in varying forms and the role of myth has been equally important in the mobilisation of public power in the western political systems.[25] In the case of post-independence African states, the issue has been especially important, given the comparative failure of mass-based nationalism to develop in the continent on lines hoped for by the first generation of Pan Africanists in the 1950s.

The Symbols of Ethnic Nationalism

The early study of the rise of African nationalism was in many cases burdened by a whiggish optimism concerning its supposed inevitable extension throughout most of the continent. The focus upon the first generation of African political leaders, such as Nkrumah, Nyerere and Kaunda and the political parties by which they came into power, ignored the process through which the nationalist symbols were implanted within African colonial societies. Robert Rotberg, for example, perceived the development of nationalism in Africa as a three-stage process of awakening, incipient action and triumph, and there was little consideration of what such a "triumph" meant in comparative terms, since the rhetoric of nationalists themselves was taken to a considerable degree at face value.[26]

A more sceptical approach has emerged in recent scholarship, and even the violent pattern of national liberation in Zimbabwe and Mozambique has failed to encourage political analysts in thinking that the pattern of political

mobilisation in the post-independence situation would be substantially different to other African states in the region.[27] A pattern of political departicipation has developed even in these states, indicating that basic problems of building a coherent national identity still remain.

The theoretical work on the development of nationalist ideology shows that it is a product of profound social and economic change, wrought by the impact of industrialisation and "modernisation".[28] In addition, a pivotal role is performed by an intelligentsia disseminating nationalist ideas to a wider political audience. Such nationalist ideas stress a strong historicist dimension of cultural continuity, even though the nationalist movement may itself represent a profound break with the immediate past. But the success of any nationalist movement hinges to a considerable degree on a element of struggle, for as Ernest Gellner has pointed out, one of the striking features of modern nationalist movements is not their straightforward success, but rather their relative failure, in that for every one that succeeds there are numerous other cases of failure, reflecting an inability of "national" entities to be mobilised into coherent national movements.[29]

Gellner's more recent emphasis on cultural struggle within modern nationalism is a reflection of what he sees as one of them most important forces behind its development: the expansion of education away from a caste of high priests in agrarian societies to universal mass literacy. Nationalist ideology draws on the folk roots of the former peasant culture but seeks to recreate a new high culture based on the fusion of culture with a polity; the binding agent in this regard is the political will created through the nationalist ideology itself, which is concerned with establishing the boundaries of the culture to be protected from the wider cosmopolitan arena.[30] The "nation" as such thus becomes contrived through the nationalist ideology, though here the African example becomes qualified, since there was no former high culture to fall back on, and the first generation of African nationalist intellectuals sought to establish nation states in Africa modelled on the European example set by their colonial overlords. They were assisted in this by the common collective experience of African nationalist intellectuals in the racial exclusions imposed through the system of colonial rule, especially in central and southern Africa. The binding agent in nationalist mobilisation long in opposition to the humiliations of racial segregation — the problem of forging a more positive national identity - was in many cases postponed to the period of political consolidation after the colonial withdrawal.

The problem confronting those anxious to forge a nationalism that could underpin juridical statehood in Africa was thus one relating to a suitable set of myths that could bind together the competing ethnic sub-nations into a wider political entity. National myth is vital for the fostering of political nationalism in that it unfolds a dramatic narrative that binds together past,

present and future and transforms what Benedict Anderson has termed an "imagined community" into a popular political consciousness.[31] This use of national myths in Africa, however, was complicated by the fact that it took as its yardstick the western nation state at precisely the time when many sub-national movements in Europe were starting to challenge its pre-eminence. As Anthony Smith has pointed out, the orthodox understanding of nationalism in the West was qualified by its failure to understand the continuing saliency of pre-industrial sources of ethnic sub-nationalism. The modern state was perceived in mainly instrumental terms as a mechanism for advancing modernisation, and the deeper sources of cultural and ethnic struggle which had gone into its makeup went substantially unnoticed.

Anthony Smith's study, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*, is a useful way of reinterpreting contemporary ethnic nationalism in Africa as a process for cultural and political struggle between ethnic segments for the wider definition of nationhood at the level of the juridical state. The evolution of the modern nation state needs to be seen within the context of key ethnic cores without which the central state would alone have been unable to impose a pattern of national homogeneity over its subject population. Such ethnic cores provide a yardstick by which the national project can be developed, as well as the basis for a romantic nationalism based upon folk myths and the creation of a sense of the historical past in heroic terms.[32] In the case of Africa, some ethnic groups have begun to form the basis for new national myths, such as the Kikuyu in Kenya linked to the Mau Mau struggle against the British in the 1950s, and the Shona-speaking group of peoples behind Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF regime in Zimbabwe with their heroic legends of the *Chimurenga* war.[33]

This ethnic symbolism can also serve as an important ideology of class mobilisation in the post-colonial African state. Classes need to be seen less in terms of their relationship to the means of production but rather through the agency of state power, which is significant for developing a new class structure by means of an infrastructure of publicly funded state economic projects.[34] The state bourgeoisie that was thus created as a tributary class had a vested interest in the preservation of the state infrastructure and, even if brought to power on the basis of a guerilla war as in Zimbabwe, appears unlikely to wish to pursue a full-scale socialist transformation of the economy. By the time the 1985 elections, there were, as Christopher Sylvester has argued, three dominant clusters of political myth in Zimbabwean politics: authoritarianism, inherited from the Rhodesian legacy; Marxism-Leninism, as part of the professed ideology of the ZANU-PF government; and a liberal nationalism that is allied to a broadly Fabian socialist strategy for reforming capitalism. In many cases, these three myths were ambiguously presented by politicians in Zimbabwe — even those of the ruling ZANU-PF — who often virtually ignored the Marxist-Leninist

tradition. Politics often became a process of shadow boxing, with the ZANU-PF taking on a protean quality in its efforts to dominate the high ground of being the main nationalist party and the repository of Zimbabwean national identity. This certainly succeeded, as the rival ZAPU was "unable to convey persuasively the urgency of moving away from an ideological tradition which combines weak forms of liberal nationalist reform with the basic structures of authoritarian continuity".[35] In the period since the elections, the two parties have merged, although the cohesion of the ruling party's ideology is still quite weak.

More controversial is the South African government's employment of ethnicity to serve the purposes of divide and rule against the black nationalist opposition to continuing white domination. This has been seen especially in the case of the *Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe* movement of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi in Natal. Originally formed in the late 1920s by the Zulu king, Solomon ka Dinuzulu, as a conservative royalist movement that bound together the chiefs with the educated intelligentsia, led by such figures as Pixley Seme and John Dube, and helped forge a class alliance with local sugar interests in Natal whose main political spokesman was the segregationalist George Heaton Nicholls.[36] Buthelezi revived the Inkatha movement in 1975 as a means of building up a power base during the political vacuum in black South African politics that followed the banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1960. It was modelled on Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party in Zambia, and developed a fairly widespread following within rural Natal, especially among women, while many members are alleged to have joined as a means of securing a job.[37]

Inkatha's manipulation of Zulu ethnicity can hardly be seen as part of a wider process of building up a wider South African national mythology as it works more by a strategy of *exclusive* rather than *inclusive* ethnicity, although since 1979, the constitution of the movement has been amended to allow non-Zulus to join. The main power base of the movement is really within the assembly and the administrative apparatus of the Kwazulu Homeland established by the South African government, and Buthelezi has been increasingly forced to turn to this during the 1980s, after failing to establish a successful dialogue with the exiled ANC following talks in London in 1979.[38] Furthermore, the emergence of the multiracial United Democratic Front (UDF) in Natal after 1983 forced Inkatha into an increasingly conservative political direction. It opposed the campaign for sanctions against South Africa by western states, and in 1986 established the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA)in opposition to the radical Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which was linked to the UDF. Buthelezi has threatened to sack all personnel in Kwazulu who belong to the UDF, and, in many cases, the movement has become

dependent upon local political bosses such as the leader of impis in Durban, Thomas Mandla Shabalala, who drove out UDF supporters from the 9,000 shanty-town shack settlement of Lindelani. In this campaign, allegations were made of covert police backing of the Inkatha vigilantes, although the movement has only slowly come to be seen as an ally by the government, which has so far rejected Buthelezi's calls for a local Natal *Indaba* in order to establish a multiracial structure for the province along consociational lines. Nevertheless, Inkatha has managed to establish quite a wide following, with an estimated 1,2 million people organised into 2 000 branches: thirty-eight percent of whom are claimed by its Secretary-General Oscar Dhlomo to belong to the Youth Brigade.[39] Buthelezi's appeal to an ethnically Zulu warrior heritage undoubtedly contradicts radical efforts to build up a class-based movement transcending ethnic divisions among the black South African working class. In this regard, the ethnic power base serves as an important check on the Congress movement and cannot be simply discounted in any future diplomatic efforts to resolve the South African political crisis.

Conclusion

Ethnicity has a complex series of relationships with state power in post-colonial Africa. In general, the state systems in Africa have been too weak to allow a fully developed national bourgeois political leadership to emerge and politics has been characterised more by factionalism and personal political leadership. In many cases, states have been confronted by a vacuum in national mythology which has been partially filled by an ethnic myth which may not as yet command universal political allegiance within the state. political and ideological struggle between competing ethnic definitions of African national identity characterises a lot of African politics and the "nation building" process. Modernisation cannot be assumed to reinforce this nation building project in the way that many analysts assumed in the 1950s and 1960s, for greater attention needs to be given to the continuing saliency of ethnic cleavages. State power as such in Africa is not underpinned as yet by the same public doctrine as in the West and this is a task that may take at least another generation to complete.

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Stan Schoeman
Human Rights, Values and Conflicts

Now that the Universal Declaration is thirty years old (wrote F.E. Dowrick in the introduction to a volume on human rights and associated problems,[1] of which he was the editor) the new generation may need to be reminded of the historical background. It was not the product of the brain of one man, nor was it the product of one tidal wave of world opinion in 1948 breaking into propositions in the UN General Assembly on 10 December . . .

Some Ideas on the Subject of Human Rights

Several "watersheds" in the development of thought on the question of human rights are mentioned in the compendium of texts Clearly, the problem of human rights has engaged the intellect since ancient times Plato, Socrates and Aristotle addressed these matters in their writings on political philosophy. Centuries later Rousseau, in his *Du Contrat Social* (1762), outlined the "rights of man" to "liberty, equality, and fraternity". In the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, as quoted by P J Rhodes in his contribution to Dowrick's volume, this affirmation is found

We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created equal, that they endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness [2]

To whatever extent these ideas may have applied to the more general problem of human rights, also interpreted in more recent times, it is reasonable to conclude that, at the time, they were directed to the socio-political problem of interpersonal relationships within particular communities those of ancient Greece in the times of Aristotle, Plato and Socrates, and later to those of France and America. If ideas on human rights, particularly as expressed in the passage quoted above, are to have universal application, it is necessary to consider in what respects "all men are created equal" and to define rather more clearly what is meant by "rights".

Only in the first half of the twentieth century did philosophers, political scientists, statesmen and others turn more specifically to the question of

Dr Stan Schoeman is a senior researcher with the Africa Institute in Pretoria

human rights as something affecting all mankind. It is perhaps significant that the two temporal landmarks in this period should have been two World Wars. One is tempted to assume that man, reviewing the destruction caused by the efforts of nations to impose upon each other the priorities arising out of their own ambitions, had given some thought to a higher order of human relations in which peace might come upon the world. This, if true, would imply a moral development long overdue in the turbulent history of mankind. The cynic might be forgiven when, considering the present state of world disorder, he feels obliged to conclude that no such ethical development has occurred.

The question of human rights must involve a relationship in which need, desires, interests and claims can be effectively communicated between individuals. From this point of view, it can be assumed that the matter of human rights is as old as humanity. In an article on the recent advances in research on the evolution of the hominids, Phillip Tobias[3] has shown that the neurological conditions for articulate speech already existed some two million years ago - partly in *Australopithecus* and almost completely in *Homo habilis*.

This important finding may at first seem irrelevant to the subject under discussion, but its significance will become plain as the argument proceeds. For the moment, it serves to indicate the long and close relationship between the history of human rights and the emergence of humanity. It is not suggested that "human rights" were consciously at issue in the pre-sapiens state some millions of years ago. It is possible, however, that an event far more significant than the "watersheds" mentioned earlier occurred as ecological changes and overpopulation overtook hominids in the primaeval forests of what is now known as Africa, when physically more vulnerable segments of the population were expelled. Faced with extinction, the latter were forced to pool their cooperative efforts in order to survive the savannah conditions outside the tropical forest regions. This evolutionary adjustment could have been achieved only after the first rudimentary steps towards a form of articulate speech which vastly improved interpersonal communication.

Examining the question of human rights, its history and the forces which inspired the present quest for their realisation, some authors have investigated the relationship between rights, obligations and morality.[4] Others have considered the effects of equalities and perceived inequalities leading to the articulation of human rights.[5] Another approach has been to analyse the *common rights* in which benefits are conferred upon the holder independently of his community.[6]

Many others assume a position of universal morality and from there attack various examples of offences against human rights without, however, analysing the conditions in which they occur, so that all of them appear to be

instances of the same evil. Rather more helpful have been those, like Barry Gower, who point to "substantial and difficult issues involved in deciding what, if anything, and to what extent, if any, it is necessary for a person to do or to have some thing". These are issues, Gower believes, that need to be resolved in "any comprehensive account of rights [based] upon some general theory about what it is to be a human being for whom certain things are necessary".[7]

This last point requires an examination of the relationship between rights and values, a question also addressed by Milne without, however, considering the important role of communication in establishing what P.J. Rhodes viewed as "conventions" from which rights are derived.

Values

I am indebted to A.R. Radcliffe-Brown[8] for my understanding of values, but I must take the responsibility for the way in which I define them. Essentially, human institutions are based on values derived from common interests surrounding the functional needs of man in his quest for survival. *Values* are thus the consensus-like results of interaction between individuals on issues of common interest, leading eventually to institutionalised activity in categories universal to human experience. These are *communication, social organisation, politics, economics, education, law, religion, technology, art* and *recreation*, thus giving to all value systems a ten-part structure.[9]

Value systems

The ten kinds of values listed above combine into systems upon which all functionally identifiable institutions (Rhodes's "conventions"?) are built. Ideally, these values should be evenly represented in all such systems and be reflected in a balanced series of institutions associated with all fields of human interest. Should this condition be met universally, the lifestyles of all communities might be much alike, with only minor adjustments relating to local ecological conditions and availability of resources. Human rights would then apply equally to all of humanity. A generally adopted morality, flowing from common ethics would embrace rights that would not vary essentially between communities. International instruments of law could protect these rights and the world would be at peace.

Why has man not successfully aspired to these obviously desirable ideals? Perhaps because there is a persistent individuality unfortunately, about value systems in their association with particular societies, affecting the nature of their institutions and creating identities analogous to the "personalities" of individuals. This explains why functionally universal institutions such as marriage differ so markedly in form: polygyny, monogamy, polyandry, endogamy and exogamy being typical variations on this universal theme.

The distinctive quality of a value system derives from the creative role of

the individual. According to Cole and Scribner,[10] there is a sociological component in the psychological pattern of the human mind. It probably evolved in close association with articulate speech, thus permitting communication of mutual interests between members of a given community. It can be reasonably supposed that this sociological component in each individual assumed in time the same ten-part structural pattern found in all value systems. Individuals are by definition not identical and so are unlikely to entertain the same priorities of interest in each or any of these universal fields. Given the effective communication implied by articulate speech, these divergent priorities can be processed until general agreement is reached on those which individuals are willing to accept in return for the benefits of community membership.

Simple factorial arithmetic shows that the ten categories of human interest can be arranged in at least 3 600 000 different orders of priority. This is enough to accommodate all known institutional variations in human behaviour all over the world. Human propensity to such variation is the major origin of ethnicity which, being no more than an expression of free choice in the arrangement of universal human interests, implies neither inferiority nor superiority between "ethnic" groups. Yet it has been, and still remains, a prime factor in releasing the global conflict which statesmen and philosophers alike have been unable as yet to resolve.

Rights, Values and the Ethnic Factor

No "entity" is assumed under the term "ethnicity". It indicates, instead, a *process* in which individual members of a community interact while responding to different areas of communal and personal interest. Overriding all of this is the distinctive impetus of communal priorities within particular value systems. If, among the ten listed options, a combination of religious and social values is emphasised in a given community, other values will tend to be viewed in such a context and influenced accordingly. In such a society, for example, language — as the major institution of communication — will have a vocabulary appropriate to that emphasis. Interpretation and evaluation of rights will be similarly affected.

Social rather than economic relationships may be more highly valued in some societies than in others where, perhaps, the opposite situation may prevail. In many Third World countries, typically in sub-Saharan Africa, economic systems in the subsistence tradition strongly favour distribution, expressed in the North-South dialogue as an insistence on the "redistribution of wealth". In First World industrialised countries, on the other hand, the emphasis is on production, with a long economic history of increased specialisation. In extending development assistance, therefore, there is a steady insistence on increased productivity.

Article 23.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stresses free

market related values such as lucrative employment, favourable working conditions and protection against unemployment. Interpersonal relationships, by implication, would be contractual and the respective interests of employers and workers embodied accordingly. Elsewhere, these relationships may be specifically social, incorporated in a network of rights and privileges linked to particular duties and obligations. In such communities, the provisions of Article 23.1 of the Declaration, if imposed, would result in hardship and would not readily be viewed as a right. Article 26.1 of the Declaration concerns the right to education and prescribes it as a compulsory service at, minimally, the elementary level. In societies where social emphasis is expressed in obligations towards senior kin, compulsory education would be seen as a constraint and no longer regarded as a right. A "right", as Milne correctly observes, should include the option of waiving it.

Implications for Socio-Economic and Political Development

One problem suggested by such contradictory elements in the Universal Declaration seems to be the potential for value systems conflict in designing development programmes as well as setting up a code of human rights. Milne, in the article quoted, points out that the Declaration is clearly based on values in western and industrialised countries. This implies that communities which are to comply must first accept the priorities dictated by the Declaration. Hence, the problem becomes not so much a matter of establishing a code of human rights, but an attempt to induce a major ethnic shift of the kind implied in schemes for a world government.

Any serious consideration given to compiling and applying a code of universal human rights should address the problem of effective communication, which raises the question of selecting a world language. This does not in theory appear to present a major obstacle, but in practice — because of overriding national interests – it is likely to demonstrate forcefully the inadequate level of current human development when called upon to cooperate for the common good of mankind.

Referring to an earlier observation, it will have become plain that the current concern for an effective, universally applicable code of human rights has intensified since the two World Wars. I would argue that this concern is not so much a major advance in world ethics, but rather a response to problems deriving from serious imbalances in "western" culture, where the emphasis is undeniably on economics and associated technology. It is to this imbalance that Third World spokesmen generally refer when applying dependency theory to their insistence on a new international economic order.

Diagram 1 represents a typical primary value system, such as might be associated with any particular community. Because of intensified

transnational and transcultural conduct worldwide, each such system now forms part of what may be termed an emergent "secondary system". The Diagram employs an analogy drawn from Newtonian physics. It has the disadvantage of attempting to present in a two-dimensional sketch the perspective designed to represent a three-dimensional segment in the process associated, as I have argued, with ethnicity. In the Diagram, each globe (identifiable at the pole by means of a key) represents a functionally distinct body of universal human values. Each should be regarded as maintaining itself by centripetal motion against the oscillating forces of interaction with all the others. At any given moment, its surface is exposed to the effects of such interaction, shown in the Diagram by the segmented patina on each globe and shaded for identification according to the key. Logically, the communications sphere is the largest in all such systems, since it must conceptually encompass all the values represented by the others. The size of the segments on its surface therefore indicates the degree of emphasis accorded to the corresponding sets of values at any given time. All dimensions within the system presented in diagram form are infinitely variable and the system itself is in a state of permanent imbalance, thus setting up the internal force field that provides the energy to operate the system.

Greater or lesser degrees of incompatibility between value systems determine the nature and intensity of conflict which, given the recent advances in communications technology, arise from continuous contact between the nations of the world. This is a major cause, no matter how presented or illustrated, of the currently prevailing global unrest.

Diagram 2 illustrates the problem of value system diversity with the aid of a bar chart, using as an example randomly sampled data from a Zulu-English dictionary[11] to represent a primary value system profile based on a Bantu language (solid line). The broken line is a subjectively conceived profile drawn from my own impressions of English as typically "western" language, and superimposed for ease of comparison upon the other. Since language is the data base, the communicational system is not represented in the bar chart where it would otherwise have appeared as column 1.

One should not be misled by the incidence and diversity of conflict situations, and so to view them as pandemic of largely unrelated outbreaks. The connection between some of them is, of course, obvious, but too often one is deceived, perhaps because of the geographical distances involved, to regard many of them as localised versions of natural human belligerence. Diversity stems from the large numbers of variables implied by combinations and permutations arising from the ten major fields of universal human interest previously mentioned. Assuming that incompatibility of perceived value systems is the root cause of human unrest, Diagram 2 indicates that this apparent variety can be reduced to a dichotomy

conveniently expressed in terms of *conflicts* and *gaps*. This is shown by the graphs in Diagram 2 as they move up or down from left to right across the bar chart. *Conflicts* are indicated when they cross each other in opposite directions, while *gaps* are evident in accordance with their angles of deviation.

The major implications of value system diversity substantially affect prospects, not only for development, but also for an effective code of universal human rights. In both cases the relevant "gaps" and "conflicts" need to be dealt with by means of appropriate adjustment.

To the extent that western thought has contributed to a Declaration of Human Rights, the first problem is to rectify imbalances in the "western" profile by increasing the interest and activity in the field of ethics (as represented by religion) in which it has a low score. Only then could it be reasonably expected to serve as a model for modifying Third World profiles such as the Zulu example.

The second problem is to reduce the degree of value system incompatibility by narrowing the angles of deviation as shown in Diagram 2, for example, by strengthening the "social conscience" (column 2) in western society, particularly in its concentration on economic gain, and decreasing the social emphasis indicated in the Bantu-Zulu example, where it is so exaggerated that it dominates economic values, thus inhibiting the response of such value systems to the demands of a global market for goods and services. Adjustments of this kind are matters of educational reform as well as intensified negotiation in areas where "gaps" and "conflicts" occur.

Development towards an improved quality of life for the Third World countries and a more balanced level of ethics in industrialised society is a two-way process. It would not be a paternalistically benevolent gesture by wealthy, powerful nations in a North-South dialogue. By the same token, mutual understanding between the nations of the world, based on effective transcultural communication and an improved perspective regarding differences and similarities, is a fundamental prerequisite for a generally acceptable code of universal human rights.

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Book Review

This volume of essays arose from a symposium, held in October 1985 at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London, to commemorate the centenary of W.M. Macmillan's birth. The contributors are a group of historians, most of whom are well enough known to the profession, and they include Macmillan's widow and his son Hugh. Some could have profited from a brief identification such as is given (rather superfluously) to the editors (as "authors") on the jacket. All have contributed something worth reading. ·

Readers of this journal may find their attention drawn to the last three chapters of *Africa and Empire*, on account of their broader imperial focus, especially in view of John Flint's reference to Macmillan as a historian who actually had a direct influence on the making of history — a dream of many, which only a few, the Kissingers and Churchills of this world, are able to realise in practice.

Yet Macmillan seems to have had much less of an impact on the course of events than he would have liked to have. He did not found a school of history, and but for the resonant echo of his ideas through C.W. de Kiewiet, as Christopher Saunders points out, his reputation as an historian (which is at last being fully appreciated) was at one time in danger of falling into oblivion. He wrote about John Philip — too selectively, we are now told by Andrew Ross, because Philip is not placed by Macmillan sufficiently in the context of Scottish, evangelical, free trade thinking, to enable one to see how he related his background experiences to the situation which he found at the Cape. What was more, with the memories of a Stellenbosch childhood during which one of his brothers was killed in action against the Boers, Macmillan never developed a robust pro-Boer outlook even when he was looking into the problems of poor whiteism. Less still did he find virtue in the segregationist ideas of the anthropological school led by Radcliffe Brown and Malinowski, which were developed into a political doctrine in the days of Hertzog, and for a while even captured the imagination of the likes of Edgar Brookes.

To return to Flint's encouraging introduction, Macmillan made an impact on the history of the British Empire in spite of several misadventures, because of an inspired analysis of conditions in the West Indies which enabled him to warn of troubles ahead — troubles which subsequently took place because his warnings had not been heeded. As a result, he was able to use influence to turn British colonial policy away from the complacent

posture identifiable with the philosophy of indirect rule towards that of colonial development and welfare, with Malcolm Macdonald taking over the helm. This influence was effective even though it came soon after the abrupt termination of his teaching career at South African universities after an apparent confrontation with Pirow and other members of the segregationist establishment, despite the years in the academic wilderness which had followed, and despite the lack of acknowledgement from Lord Hailey for his direct contribution to Hailey's *African Survey* during the preparation of his own work on *Africa Emergent*. Nor was Macmillan's public image promoted by a somewhat disastrous safari in Bechuanaland in 1951, to advise over the handling of Tshekedi Khama in the light of Seretse Khama's problematic marriage to an Englishwoman.

There had to be something solid about Macmillan's intellectual performance to enable his reputation to survive all the blows. Perhaps this is best described as a capacity for fundamental thinking which enabled him, especially when he shrank from theorising, to maintain empirical judgement when offering explanations. He refused to fall for functionalist anthropology which ignored historical influences, and he thus escaped the snare of simplistic segregationism. He escaped from the easy assumption (which was to find its unfortunate justification in the civilised labour policy) that the real explanation of poor whiteism was unfair undercutting by unqualified blacks, because — like the Economic and Wage Commission of 1925 — he came to see at an early stage that to depress black opportunities in order to protect whites was to compound the problem of poverty and create a really vicious circle of growing impoverishment. This kind of thinking led him to the notion of underdevelopment long before the term itself came to be used in the 1960s. But he was also realistic enough not to be taken in by any simple idealisation of the traditional economy, and to see that unless the way of life in the African reserves were to be allowed to adapt to new challenges, there could be no solution to the problem of poverty, which he diagnosed as the root evil. Chiefs, he realised, knew how to exploit their people long before the French anthropologists found structural reasons for their doing so. Colonial authorities which allowed mining enterprises to develop, and wealth to be extracted and then exported, without making sure that a substantial part of the profits were diverted to the development of African agriculture, came in for Macmillan's criticism after he had seen how South African governments could protect white farmers even if they failed in their duty towards Blacks. Macmillan approached the problems of colonialism, against the background of a varied South African experience, without the dogmatism of a marxist (which he explicitly was not); without the doctrinaire idealism of a free trade liberal (which was fundamentally uncongenial to this disciple of Adam Smith, for whom — we are told — free trade was not so much a first principle as a pragmatic device for achieving

better distribution without inhibiting productivity); and with the practical awareness of an orthodox Fabian (which led him to seek solutions through those in authority as an alternative to undermining them).

It was essentially these qualities, it seems, which provided Will Beinart, in an excellent analytical essay, with the explanation he needed for the undoubted fact that, despite several appearances to the contrary, Macmillan's thinking of the 1920s and the 1930s, both about South Africa and the colonial world at large, managed to bridge the gap and provide a take-off for the "Cape-liberal-marxism" of the 1970s. Macmillan did not found a school. But he set in motion an idealogical debate which ensured the continuity of his own influence even if, at times, he seems to have been utterly disowned.

My thanks to the editors and contributors to this volume for having enabled this reader, at the price of not too much repetition of detail, to have taken away a very positive impression of "Pienkie" Macmillan as the Grand Old Man of South African social historians.

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T.R.H. Davenport
Rhodes University
Grahamstown

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