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# Smuts House Notes

## The Nationalities Issue: A Comparative Note on the Soviet Union and South Africa

Travelling uncharted roads of political transformation, the Soviet Union and South Africa are obliged to reckon with the legacies of policies grounded in unworkable, intolerant ideologies. Each must cope with fundamental communal challenges — but challenges shaped by political systems that took opposite approaches to the issue of nationalities. The Soviet state attempted to impose an emulsifying nationalism. The South African state tried to impose a disaggregating separatism.

Soviet policy asserted that the revolution of 1917 and the political oven of “international proletarianism” created or melded a fully Soviet society. Within the centralizing force of Marxism-Leninism, racial, ethnic, religious and other communal differences assertedly gave way to a transcendent Soviet identity, purpose and loyalty. As recently as 1988, Soviet publicists and researchers were dismissing all western scholarship that questioned the reality let alone the finality of Soviet claims to having resolved all nationalities issues within a common society.

*In the CPSU's Nationalities Policy: Truth and Lies* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988), Eduard Bagramov, a researcher at the Communist Party's Institute of Marxism-Leninism, wrote that “anti-scientific” “bourgeois literature” which asserted that the people of the Soviet Union had been subjected to a forced union were patently false. As a result of “radical social reforms” the “complex nationalities question” had been “successfully solved”. Bagramov confidently opined: “Antagonisms between nations that were inspired by the exploiter classes, as well as the centuries-old discord among peoples, now belong to the past. The common effort for a new, just world has given rise to the just fraternity of working people — an inexhaustible source of creative endeavours of the masses.”

A year later, in 1989, the same Researcher Bagramov stated that “all” Soviet scholars “knew that problems were piling up, that Lenin's nationalities policy had been deformed for decades, that sooner or later problems [such as those of the Baltics and Caucasus] would come to a head”. There were signs of “nationalism, chauvinism, local nationalism and insults to ethnic dignity” for all to see. Bagramov and his associates submitted “analytical memos” to “official bodies” suggesting ways of dealing with such problems. “We were invited over, shaken hands with and thanked [but] things remained static and our proposals were virtually ignored.” (See *Inter Ethnic Relations: Problems and Prospects* [Moscow: Novosti, 1989]).

Not only did diverse national sentiment persist within the Soviet state, because union had indeed been forced, but political liberalization (perestroika) promptly resulted in accelerating oppositional demand for self-determination on the part of constituent republics and some of their sub-units.

South Africa's own long delayed political liberalization is predictably characterized by an inverse thrust on the nationalities issue. Because apartheid doctrine led the state to engineer and impose formal separation of racial and ethnic communities, opposition galvanized around the positive assertion of a common South African identity. Despite racial oppression, most of the black African leadership opted for the goal of a common "unitary" state.

With a flexibility similar to that of Researcher Bagramov, analysts of South Africa's ruling National Party have now accepted that old myths and formulas, e.g. irreversible independence for the TBVC countries and a tricameral parliament that excluded Africans were never tenable. In a period of reform, "reintegration" of the Transkei has quickly become a question of timing and bargaining, no longer one of principle.

While political liberalization, however incomplete, presses the Soviet Union and South Africa in opposite directions on the nationalities issue, economic and political realities may serve as a long term force for convergence. In today's world, the linkage between economic well-being, democratic process and inter-state integration is dramatically and enticingly evident. The achievements of the European Community serve as a model for success and a warning against the excesses of either authoritarian centralism or parochial segmentalism.

Membership within an expanded complex of European integration and association represents a holy grail for Eastern Europeans emerging from Soviet domination. The reform leadership in South Africa, perhaps in some measure as the result of international sanctions, seems to have become similarly aware of the linkage between democratic tolerance of religious, linguistic, ideological, ethnic and cultural differences, on the one hand, and economic prosperity and Southern African regional collaboration on the other. To those who will negotiate the political contract establishing a "new South Africa", the need to accommodate communal diversity will be as important as the willingness to accept a social commonality. From opposite starting points, the Soviet Union and South Africa must each seek a freely bargained balance between the communal values and forces of universalism and particularism.

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André du Pisani and Koos J. van Wyk in collaboration with  
John Barratt

## **Restricted Palette: Reflections on the State of International Relations in South Africa**

This exploratory paper concerns itself with the implantation of international studies into South Africa, analyses its institutional context, and examines the theoretical and substantive concerns of the discipline. The paper concludes with some observations on broadening the restricted palette of international studies teaching and research in South Africa, which may enhance national and transnational community-building. It was originally prepared for the Third World Assembly of International Studies, Williamsburg, Virginia, 25-27 August, 1988 and has been recently revised and updated.

### **Introduction**

This report was originally prepared at the request of the ISA for presentation at the Third World Assembly in August 1988, and the research on which it is based was sponsored by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). The project was directed by John Barratt (Director-General of the SAIIA), and he and the authors of this report formed the national team on the project. They also received the assistance of a wider group of scholars who attended a workshop organised by the SAIIA in December 1987. Its purpose was to discuss the questions raised by the ISA insofar as they related to international studies in South Africa, and the authors benefitted greatly from insights gained at the workshop. The group and other scholars throughout South Africa subsequently responded to a detailed questionnaire (described further below), and their contributions have proved invaluable in providing material for this report. In its present

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form, the research was updated to reflect developments and advances in the discipline since 1988.

At the workshop in December 1987, Peter Vale (then Director of the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University) presented for discussion the draft of a chapter entitled "'Whose World is it anyway?': International Relations in South Africa", which subsequently appeared in Hugh C. Dyer and Leon Mangasarian (eds), *International Relations: The State of the Art*, published by Macmillan for Millennium. The team is greatly indebted to Professor Vale for his contribution to the project, and many of the ideas and assessments in this report are drawn from his chapter. The authors, however, take full responsibility for all conclusions.

In undertaking this task, we reminded ourselves of what Philip Windsor expressed so eloquently, that the importance of international studies 'lies in the fact that it literally considers the fate of the world — and in this sense it might be said to supersede the earlier preoccupations of History or Political Philosophy.'<sup>1</sup>

Although the report does not claim to give an exhaustive survey of the present state of international studies in South Africa, it is the most comprehensive survey of its kind ever to be undertaken in this country.<sup>2</sup> Painfully aware as we became of the difficulties in undertaking the survey, nevertheless, we wish to express our gratitude to the International Studies Association, the SAIIA and the small but lively fraternity of local scholars for making it possible.

### **Research Methodology**

The paper is based on material gathered from a comprehensive survey of work published by local scholars in both local and overseas journals,<sup>3</sup> unpublished work such as conference papers and dissertations, a careful perusal of university curricula and core readings, and from a questionnaire completed by a representative sample of local researchers and academics.

The questionnaire was compiled not only to enable us to obtain material relevant to the ISA study but also to determine whether the conclusions we reached after surveying the relevant literature were well-founded or not. Significantly, the questionnaire confirmed all our major findings and provided us with information on aspects not covered in the survey of published literature. An initial seventy-one questionnaires were sent out in March 1988, with a follow-up questionnaire sent in April. Altogether fifty-nine were returned, giving a response rate of 75,6%.

### **Implantation of the Discipline — The Prevalence of Eurocentric Values**

South and southern Africa were subjected to the imperial designs of Western Europe fairly late, at the end of the 18th century. Dutch commercial

interests preceded British political control by more than a century. Both these foreign implants were to shape the development of international studies for decades after their control formally came to an end.

The Dutch influence, which was especially pervasive until the Second World War, consisted mainly of a preoccupation with international law, diplomacy and the search for order. This is not surprising if one considers that Roman-Dutch law remains central to South Africa's legal system to this day. The work of Grotius (and others of his ilk) strongly influenced the somewhat arid and mechanical approach so prevalent in much of the scholarly and official understanding of international studies in this period. International law, however, was never fully integrated with international studies, nor was the disciplinary relationship between the two understood. An important illustration of this is the traditional editorial policy followed for the *South African Yearbook of International Law*, published annually by the Verloren van Themaat Centre for International Law in the University of South Africa.

In the period before the Second World War, most of the ideas about the international system were, in the words of Pettman (1975:2), 'neatly filed away under the box of international law, or diplomatic history, or the parent discipline of political thought itself'. Understandably, South African scholarship displayed similar features.

The brutality of the Great War of 1914-18 encouraged a somewhat utopian belief in the capacity of international law and international organisations such as the League of Nations to secure peace and order. E.H. Carr's seminal work, *The Twenty Years Crisis*, was one of the forerunners of the anti-utopian tide. Widely read in South Africa, it ushered in a new phase — that of *realpolitik*. 'Power' and 'national interest' became keywords in the lexicon of every respectable local scholar. Predictably, Hans J. Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations*, subtitled 'the struggle for power and peace', has been required reading ever since. The realist school still carries much weight in local international studies scholarship. After the Second World War, the politics of the Cold War, the advent of nuclear weapons, and growing regional and domestic conflict, have all predisposed South Africa towards a power-centred understanding of the world.

Under the influence of the power approach during the period 1957-1969, a typical course in international studies would have comprised some of the following aspects:

- a) The origins and development of the contemporary state system — still found in some curricula.
- b) International law, diplomacy, and international organisations.
- c) Power politics — the elements of state power — economic, military and cultural.



d) *The foreign policies of the major West European powers (capita selecta).*

Since the Second World War, international law has lost its predominant position, especially as South Africa's own international position deteriorated, largely as a consequence of racial domestic policies. While the realist school was dominant, developments within international law, such as the growing importance of human rights and the gradual erosion of the idea of state sovereignty, detracted from its popularity. Increasingly, the precepts of international law were used by some to justify the peculiarities of the apartheid state. This defence was also extended to hot-pursuit operations by the South African Defence Force (SADF) into neighbouring states, and to the issue of Namibia.<sup>4</sup>

The British contribution, with its emphasis on national interest and the power capabilities of the nation-state, found fertile ground in South Africa and continues to influence both research and teaching. For a variety of reasons, such as South Africa's role in the formation of the United Nations, the cultural and economic links between Britain and South Africa, the teaching and research ethos of English-speaking universities in South Africa, and the formation of the South African Institute of International Affairs in 1934, all ensured that local international studies scholarship became distinctively British in outlook. In particular, the role played by General J. C. Smuts in the formation of the League of Nations and his notion of 'commonwealth', exerted a major influence on local scholars. Smuts drafted the Preamble of the Covenant of the United Nations and initiated the idea of mandate.

The impact of the 'behavioural revolution' was felt in the mid-sixties. Attempts to formulate a scientific approach to international studies were encouraged by the return to South Africa of scholars such as the late Mike Louw, Ben Vosloo, and Denis Worrall, who completed their studies in the United States at the height of rampant behaviouralism. Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, behavioural approaches to international studies predominated in South Africa. The works of Knorr,<sup>5</sup> Rosenau,<sup>6</sup> and Dahl<sup>7</sup> were widely used as prescribed and recommended reading. Knorr and Rosenau's *Contending Approaches to International Relations*, published in 1969, and Rosenau's *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (1971), set the tone for a new-found confidence in the use of the 'scientific' method in international studies. It was only with the publication of Hedley Bull's famous classical attack on the misguided behavioural approach in 1966,<sup>8</sup> and his *Anarchical Society* in 1977, that international studies was rescued from rampant behaviouralism.

### **The Institutional Context**

A course in international studies can be found at all nineteen South African universities. In the majority of cases, these courses are offered as component

parts of the curricula in the various departments of Political Studies (or Political Science — the preferred term in South Africa). At three universities — the University of Pretoria, the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, and the country's biggest university (correspondence), the University of South Africa (UNISA) — sub-departments of International Relations exist. UNISA also houses a sub-department of Strategic Studies, headed by a Professor. One of its preoccupations appears to be the servicing of some of the postgraduate requirements of the SADF.

The University of the Witwatersrand is the only one with a separate department of International Relations. South Africa's first Chair — the Jan Smuts Chair of International Relations — was established here in 1962, as a result of an initiative by the SAIIA, intended to complement the Institute with teaching and research functions.

Recently, an International Studies Unit (ISU) was established at Rhodes University in Grahamstown. Headed by a Director, this Unit concerns itself with educating black students in the discipline of international studies. A Centre for Southern African Studies (CSAS) was established in the University of the Western Cape in 1989. CSAS has a strong regional focus in its work and its publications strengthen local area studies.

Cast in the mould of Chatham House and other sister institutes, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has given direction to the practice of international studies in South Africa for more than five decades. Imbued with an essentially British ethos, over the years the SAIIA has had to apply international studies with a somewhat restricted palette because the founding fathers never intended it to develop a research capability. Showing a flair for more descriptive work, as illustrated by James Barber and John Barratt's recent offering on South Africa's foreign policy<sup>9</sup>, the SAIIA has not been able to engage regularly in work with more theoretical rigour.

Since the 1960s a different kind of organisation entered the field, that of the professional lobbyist. The South Africa Foundation, founded in the early 1960s, is intended to 'present South Africa's case at home and overseas'. This organisation has offices in Washington, Paris, Bonn, and London, and serves as a lobby for South African business interests. The Foundation has a limited research capability and does not contribute much to local scholarship, although its journal, *South Africa International*, does publish useful papers from time to time.

The early 1980s saw the creation of 'think-tanks' that regularly make crusading efforts on behalf of the government. Notable in this category are the Institute for American Studies at the Rand Afrikaans University in Johannesburg, and the University of Pretoria's Institute for Strategic Studies. In the context of escalating sanctions, growing militarisation in South Africa and the region, and further international ostracism, these two institutes concern themselves primarily with strategic issues, superpower

relations and policies, and how these affect South Africa. Both institutes use international studies in a partisan way, and some of the postgraduate work undertaken under their auspices has been placed under a total embargo for 'security reasons'.<sup>10</sup>

Two other institutes deserve a mention — the Africa Institute of South Africa, established in the early 1960s, and the Institute for Soviet Studies (ISS), founded in 1980 at the University of Stellenbosch — now housed in the Department of Political Science. The Africa Institute concerns itself with the analysis of African questions and South African domestic issues. Until very recently, the study of Soviet foreign policy was undertaken by scholars without any contact with that country and without being able to read, write or speak Russian. The ISS has given credibility to the study of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy, especially as it impinges on the Southern African region.

### Composition of the Scholarly Community

The small local international studies scholarly community is chiefly in university employ. Of the fifty-nine respondents to our questionnaire, the breakdown in terms of employment is as follows:

Afrikaans universities	42,3%
English universities	42,3%
Ethnic universities <sup>11</sup>	15,4%
Research institutes	8,5%

The total international studies scholarly community numbers some seventy-one. Demographically, it is almost exclusively male and white — a mere 3,9% female to 96,1% male. It is also a relatively young community, as the table shows:

Under 30	15,1%
31-40	39,6%
41-50	24,6%
51-60	17,08%
Over 60	3,8%

The following picture concerning academic qualifications emerges:

DEGREE	BA	BA Hons	MA/MSc	PhD
Institution				
Afrikaans	31	29	25	16*
English	14	14	4	4
Ethnic	2	2	0	0
Foreign	2	6	15	12

\* Recently a fair number of Afrikaans-speakers completed PhDs in the fields of Political Studies and International Relations

The small size of the local international studies community and its demographic profile influence analytical and theoretical concerns, as well as local and transnational community-building, as will be shown

## **Theoretical and Research Concerns: Balance-of Power and State Interests above all else**

Given the prevalence of the Eurocentric tradition, it is perhaps predictable that only a small number of local scholars show any sensitivity for theoretical and philosophical concerns. Preference is shown in both teaching and research for the realist or neo-realist schools, with the work of Gilpin, Morgenthau,<sup>12</sup> Hoffman,<sup>13</sup> Reynolds,<sup>14</sup> Wright,<sup>15</sup> and Waltz<sup>16</sup> featuring prominently in most curricula.

Balance-of-power and the nation-state provide the intellectual focus for most introductory courses in international studies. This narrow theoretical preoccupation sparks related interests — superpower rivalry and the study of the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union. Special emphasis is often given to the 'global' dimensions of Soviet power and influence, which in turn are often seen as a consequence of a coherent ideological worldview: Marxism.<sup>17</sup> Departures from this realist understanding of the world, such as transnationalism<sup>18</sup> and conflict/peace research<sup>19</sup> are to be found only in the English-speaking universities — Cape Town, Rhodes, Natal and the Witwatersrand. With one or two important exceptions,<sup>20</sup> theoretical and philosophical issues have not concerned local scholars. Attempts to engage in theoretical debate have been made by the SAIIA, the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Rhodes University, and the Political Science Association of South Africa.

## **Research Priorities**

An extensive survey of published work in local and overseas journals and analysis of the questionnaire confirmed our suspicions about the concern with regional/domestic issues and strategic questions. Respondents' research priorities are categorised as follows:

**Table 1: Research Priorities**

Topic	Frequency
Southern Africa	25
SA foreign & regional relations	21
'Independent' homelands	11
Africa	9
Strategic Studies	8
East-West relations	7
Liberation movements	7
Other	5
Philosophy	5
Foreign policy (excl. South Africa)	5
International political economy	5

Perceptions/attitudes/public opinion	5
International law	5
Regionalism (excl. South Africa)	4
International organisations	3
Non-state actors	3
Philosophy of Science	2
Interdisciplinary studies	2
Nuclear issues	2
The Antarctic	2
Model building	1
Peace/conflict research	1
Research methodology	0

These priorities clearly indicate an overwhelming concern for regional questions with some focus on strategic and superpower issues. The dominance of realist and neo-realist understandings of the world, coupled with the level of conflict within South Africa and the region, are largely responsible for this. The ISU in Rhodes University has engaged in an extensive events analysis of South Africa's foreign policy behaviour. The SAIIA has compiled a chronology of South Africa's international relations during the period 1960-1990.

### Constraints on Research

Interestingly, factors relating to the workplace were seen to be much more significant constraints on scholarship than socio-political issues. This is an important finding and underscores the concern of the majority of local scholars with working conditions and the precarious financial position of universities in the country. Listed in order of importance, the constraints are:

**Table 2:** Constraints on Research

Level	Constraint	Median
High (7-5)	Time spent on teaching and administration	5,22
	Lack of research funds	5,02
Medium (<5-3)	Manpower constraints	4,29
	Inadequate library holdings	3,96
	Censorship	3,78
	State of Emergency	3,66
	Dissertation work	3,61
Low (<3-0)	Lack of encouragement by colleagues	2,70
	Inadequate co-operation with fellow academics	2,60
	Recent state action against universities	2,56
	No personal motivation	1,51

These responses confirm that many local scholars have limited time available for research work, mainly because of teaching commitments and administrative load, with the result that only a small number of local scholars regularly undertake research. Directly related to the lack of research is the 'medium' to 'low' rating given to state actions against universities, perhaps reflecting a certain lack of awareness. Logically, the more research-oriented academics show greater concern for political and ideological constraints on research. Perhaps the relatively limited state sponsorship of research also accounts for academic perceptions of constraints. Nevertheless, the overall pattern is that financial and manpower issues take primacy over socio-political ones, probably because most local universities are primarily teaching and not research institutions. Since 1988, the deepening of the fiscal crisis of the State and its implications for university funding pose additional constraints on teaching and research. On the other hand, political liberalisation within South Africa improved access to certain kinds of research material.

### **Structure of University Curricula**

Given the composition of the local international studies community, its historical roots, and institutional and societal constraints, it is not surprising that most university curricula show a concern for the more traditional aspects of the discipline. Invariably, the following aspects form part of most undergraduate courses in South Africa:

- a) Introduction to the study of international relations — a discussion of key concepts such as the state, power, influence, interests, sovereignty.
- b) South Africa's foreign relations, normally with specific reference to Africa and Western Europe.
- c) Interstate relations in Africa — with concern for civil/ military relations, political economy, strategic issues, and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).
- d) Balance-of-power.
- e) Non-alignment, often with reference to Africa.
- f) Diplomacy — history and practice.
- g) Geopolitics.
- h) The politics of alliances.
- i) Foreign policy analysis — the instruments and formulation of foreign policy.
- j) *Capita selecta* of important global problems, such as peace, overpopulation, food shortages and malnutrition, alternative energy resources, and nuclear proliferation.
- k) Strategy — theories, indirect and direct strategy, guerrilla warfare, disarmament and arms control.

- 1) An introduction to some theoretical issues, notably the 'merits and demerits of the 'Scientific' study of International Relations as opposed to 'Traditional' or 'Classical' approaches'.<sup>21</sup>

Approaches to international studies, although part of most undergraduate courses, are often only dealt with in necessary depth at postgraduate level. These are invariably classified under the rubrics of 'historical/traditional', 'realist', 'empirical', 'normative', and 'eclectic'. This categorisation comes from the curricula of four universities — UNISA, Fort Hare, Pretoria, and Orange Free State.

Epistemology and methodology are normally offered as options at postgraduate level. The same applies to advanced theoretical and philosophical discourse, and then only in the bigger departments. Closer analysis reveals that local scholars hardly concern themselves with human rights issues. These are usually left to legal scholars.<sup>22</sup> The growth in the importance of structuralist analysis, especially in international economic relations, has gone largely unnoticed. International political economy is taught at third-year level in the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, as well as at Rhodes and the Rand Afrikaans University (RAU). Local scholars have not, however, contributed much to the theoretical debate. The most readable work comes from outside the discipline.<sup>23</sup> For most local scholars, the nation-state remains the most important actor in the international system, despite some attention given to transnational actors.

The narrow theoretical base of much of local scholarship has meant that attempts at quantification are few.<sup>24</sup> Despite this theoretical limitation, some useful work has been done on the region. The theoretical debate about regional politics, however, has been largely stimulated by scholars outside the international studies field.<sup>25</sup>

## **Substantive Scholarship**

### **Regional Analyses**

As far as regional analyses are concerned, some good work has been done. Vale (1987: 176-194) provides a useful categorisation of work done on the region. He distinguishes the following 'schools':

the 'episodic' which concerns itself with 'chronicled events or episodes in southern Africa without giving attention to the development of a strong framework';

the 'revisionist', on the other hand, has 'used a strong revisionist paradigm'; and<sup>26</sup>

the 'technical', which concerns itself with functional and technical issues, especially of an economic and infrastructural nature.<sup>27</sup>

The CSAS in the University of the Western Cape contributes greatly towards strengthening work on southern Africa.

Exile scholarship has also contributed materially toward responsible regional analyses.<sup>28</sup>

### **The World of the Powerful**

Given the prevalence of realist and neo-realist understandings of international studies, it is not surprising that matters of 'high politics' receive a great deal of scholarly attention. Most of the local journals such as *Politikon*, the *International Affairs Bulletin*, and the *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* (since discontinued), reveal this interest.

Our analysis went back to June 1974, with the publication of the first edition of *Politikon*, the official journal of the Political Science Association of South Africa. Since then, articles on Soviet foreign policy (often written from an outmoded Cold War perspective<sup>29</sup>) have appeared regularly in this and other local journals. strong interest has also developed in aspects of the United States' foreign relations, with articles covering topics such as 'The Reagan Doctrine of Containment', 'United States/South African Relations', and the Africa policy of the United States.

Little research has been done in the area of arms control and global strategic issues.<sup>30</sup> Security concerns are reflected in a growing body of literature on guerrilla insurgency and the theory of guerrilla warfare. The Institute of Strategic Studies (ISSUP) at the University of Pretoria, in particular, concerns itself with these questions.<sup>31</sup> A similar concern is shown by the newly-established Institute for National Strategy (NS), headed by a former military intelligence chief.<sup>32</sup> The INS is not a serious research body.

The small number of researchers and academics working in this field invariably concern themselves with questions of the 'geo-strategic importance' of countries in the Southern African region (a firm favourite with ISSUP),<sup>33</sup> insurgency<sup>34</sup> (often in textbook fashion), and aspects of maritime, land and air strategy.<sup>35</sup> In short, the study of war is central to what most scholars do in this field. Work of theoretical rigour, especially on civil-military relations in South Africa, has come from scholars outside the field.<sup>36</sup> On reflection, it seems that Strategic Studies is informed by a narrow theoretical base. This applies especially to its understanding of revolution, its preoccupation with war, and the entire field of civil/military relations.<sup>37</sup>

### **South Africa as a Pariah**

South Africa's position as an international pariah has stimulated some



important work in the dynamics of international isolation and the foreign policy behaviour characteristic of such states. One scholar in particular has interested himself in this question, and has made a useful contribution to local scholarship.<sup>38</sup>

### **International Political Economy**

A study of both local and foreign journals and of unpublished dissertations over the past eighteen years revealed that hardly any work has been done in the all-important area of international trade régimes and economic relations. The limited number of published articles on this and related topics comes mostly from scholars outside the discipline.<sup>39</sup> This important omission in both teaching and research is also reflected in work on the economic relations of the states in the Southern Africa region.

North-South issues, despite the oft-cited official assertion that South Africa is a 'microcosm' of the world, have been almost entirely neglected,<sup>40</sup> although some groundwork has been done on the Lomé régimes.<sup>41</sup>

### **Policy Analysis**

Notwithstanding the problem of access to decision-makers, some important work has been done in the area of policy studies. Local scholars have done some original work on aspects of the decision-making process, initially in foreign affairs,<sup>42</sup> and more recently within the security establishment.<sup>43</sup> This work bears the hallmark of originality and augurs well for further research in this crucial area.

### **Bibliographical Series**

Outstanding work has been and continues to be done in the *Bibliographical Series* published by the SAIIA.<sup>44</sup> To date, twenty two volumes have been published, and two more are currently in preparation. The extensive data base on sanctions and disinvestment/divestment against South Africa, housed at the SAIIA, is an invaluable research tool for local and visiting scholars alike.

### **Exile Scholarship**

Elsewhere in this paper we have alluded to the South African exiles who have contributed considerably toward local scholarship. While the reasons for their departure from South Africa cannot be dealt with here, no survey of international studies would be complete without mentioning their special contribution. Scholars such as Charles Manning, Jack Spence and Sam Nolutshungu have given international credibility to local scholarship. Their work has been influential in teaching and has provided a source of inspiration, particularly to younger scholars.<sup>45</sup>

## **Analytical and Theoretical Weaknesses and Omission**

The role and growing importance of islands, small- and micro-states in the international system remain largely unexplored. Hardly any work has been done on recent developments in international law, especially how these relate to environmental questions and the law of the sea.<sup>46</sup> The issue of Antarctica has been touched on by only a few scholars and a non-South African geophysicist resident in the country.<sup>47</sup>

Virtually all the work done in the field of peace and conflict research is being done under the auspices of the Centre for Intergroup Studies at the University of Cape Town, headed by Hendrik van der Merwe, a sociologist, which has a resource centre on peace and conflict studies and publishes a regular newsletter, *Intergroup*, on its activities in this field. Important work is also being done by the Association for Sociology in Southern Africa (ASSA), which has recently established a working group on militarisation. Most recently a centre for Conflict Analysis and Resolution has been established in the University of Port Elizabeth.

As a consequence of the Eurocentric bias of much of local scholarship, scarcely any work has been undertaken in the area of black opinions and attitudes on foreign policy questions.<sup>48</sup> Despite the pioneering work of the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at Rhodes University, more research is desperately needed in this area. As far as sanctions and disinvestment are concerned (a growing reality for millions of South Africans), some responsible work has been done by the SALLA,<sup>49</sup> but black opinions on the matter have been examined by scholars outside the field of international studies.<sup>50</sup>

On a more philosophical level, it is a matter of some concern that only two scholars have published in this area.<sup>51</sup> Methodological issues have been examined only recently.<sup>52</sup> The thorny question of mineral rights in a post-apartheid South Africa has been critically examined by only two scholars — the one a foreigner resident in South Africa.<sup>53</sup> The study of cross-national and longitudinal studies of foreign policy is still in its infancy, with work being done by one scholar, Deon Geldenhuys, who recently published a voluminous comparative study of isolated states. Clearly, a challenge presents itself to local scholars to enter the vast field of comparative foreign policy behaviour. A further area of considerable importance is the integration of international law with international relations, to the benefit of both disciplines. As far as Africa itself is concerned, work needs to be done in the areas of regionalism, political economy and the foreign policy behaviour of new states.

## **Sponsors and Consumers of Research**

Our survey results show that universities are still seen as the most

important sponsors and consumers of research. In order of importance, respondents listed the other main sponsors as the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), organisations such as the Urban Foundation and the Centre for Policy Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, as well as business, the state, and political parties.

The consumers are chiefly universities, followed by the media, the state, business, other organisations and political parties.

The discrepancy that exists between the state as sponsor and consumer of research is noteworthy. We ascribe this to three main reasons. First, the possibility exists that some of our respondents did not disclose their sources of funding for specific research projects. Secondly, recent severe financial cuts in state funding to local universities have affected all areas of academic research. Finally, our definition of the 'state' was narrow, as we separated universities and the HSRC from it — both are to a significant degree state-funded, which has an inevitable impact on the direction and type of research.

### **Community-Building**

Respondents outlined their perceptions of national and international community-building. The results of domestic community-building are summed up in Tables 3.1 to 3.6.

In terms of the *Extension of University Education Amendment Act of 1959*, South African residential universities had been separated along ethnic and racial lines into 'ethnic' and 'white' universities. For the white population, a further division between Afrikaans- and English-speakers is made. The 'ethnic' universities originally created for the black community include Western Cape for 'coloureds'; Durban-Westville for Indians; and Fort Hare, the North, Zululand, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Vista for blacks of different language groups. Although some mixing has occurred, some South African universities maintain separate identities in terms of ideology and race/ethnicity, as was intended by the 1959 legislation.

As the figures in the Tables show, one can hardly speak of an International Relations community in South Africa, as most interaction takes place between like-minded universities (intra-relations), but there are some encouraging signs of increasing inter-relations, particularly in substantial contact (teaching exchanges, letters, joint research, telephone calls) and in improved attendance at academic conferences. A contributing factor has been the changing character of the Political Science Association, which now includes not only Afrikaans- but also English-speakers, as well as some black members. Unfortunately, some International Relations departments and scholars have, for their own reasons, been reluctant to participate in such community affairs.

**Table 3.1:** Teaching at

University	Frequent	Occasional	Seldom	No Contact
<b>A. English Universities</b>				
Afrikaans	0,0	5,3	31,6	63,2
English	0,0	6,7	20,0	73,3
Ethnic	0,0	20,0	0,0	80,0
Total	0,0	7,7	23,1	69,2
<b>B. Ethnic Universities</b>				
Afrikaans	0,0	10,5	21,1	68,4
English	0,0	12,5	6,3	81,3
Ethnic	0,0	20,0	0,0	80,0
Total	0,0	12,5	12,5	75,0
<b>C. Afrikaans Universities</b>				
Afrikaans	10,5	0,0	31,6	57,9
English	0,0	0,0	20,0	80,0
Ethnic	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0
Total	5,1	0,0	23,1	71,8

**Table 3.2:** Joint research with academics at

University	Frequent	Occasional	Seldom	No Contact
<b>A. English Universities</b>				
Afrikaans	0,0	10,5	21,1	68,4
English	18,7	25,0	6,3	50,0
Ethnic	33,3	33,3	0,0	33,3
Total	12,2	19,5	12,2	56,1
<b>B. Ethnic Universities</b>				
Afrikaans	0,0	5,3	5,3	89,5
English	0,0	0,0	0,0	100,0
Ethnic	16,7	16,7	16,7	50,0
Total	2,4	4,9	4,9	87,8
<b>C. Afrikaans Universities</b>				
Afrikaans	0,0	20,0	20,0	60,0
English	0,0	6,3	18,7	75,0
Ethnic	16,7	0,0	0,0	83,3
Total	2,4	11,9	16,7	69,0

**Table 3.3: Substantial contact with academics at**

University	Frequent	Occasional	Seldom	No Contact
<b>A. English Universities</b>				
Afrikaans	22,2	38,9	22,2	16,7
English	62,5	6,3	6,3	25,0
Ethnic	66,7	16,7	0,0	16,7
Total	45,0	22,5	12,5	20,0
<b>B. Ethnic Universities</b>				
Afrikaans	11,8	41,2	23,5	23,5
English	13,3	20,0	20,0	46,7
Ethnic	50,0	16,7	16,7	16,7
Total	18,4	28,9	21,1	31,6
<b>C. Afrikaans Universities</b>				
Afrikaans	50,0	35,0	5,0	10,0
English	23,5	35,3	17,6	23,5
Ethnic	20,0	0,0	20,0	60,0
Total	35,7	31,0	11,9	21,4

**Table 3.4: Supervise dissertations at**

University	Frequent	Occasional	Seldom	No Contact
<b>A. English Universities</b>				
Afrikaans	16,7	11,1	16,7	55,6
English	23,5	23,5	0,0	52,9
Ethnic	33,3	0,0	0,0	66,7
Total	22,0	14,6	7,3	56,1
<b>B. Ethnic Universities</b>				
Afrikaans	22,2	0,0	11,1	66,7
English	0,0	12,5	0,0	87,5
Ethnic	16,7	0,0	0,0	83,3
Total	12,5	5,0	5,0	77,5
<b>C. Afrikaans Universities</b>				
Afrikaans	35,0	25,0	10,0	30,0
English	0,0	12,5	0,0	87,5
Ethnic	16,7	0,0	0,0	83,3
Total	19,0	16,7	4,8	59,5

**Table 3.5: Attend conferences**

University	Frequent	Occasional	Seldom	No Contact
Afrikaans	55,0	35,0	10,0	0,0
English	22,2	44,4	22,2	11,1
Ethnic	20,0	20,0	0,0	60,0
Total	37,2	37,2	14,0	11,6

**Table 3.6: Serve on board of journal**

University	Frequent	Occasional	Seldom	No Contact
Afrikaans	36,8	10,5	10,5	42,1
English	17,6	17,6	0,0	64,7
Ethnic	0,0	16,7	0,0	83,3
Total	23,8	14,3	4,8	57,1

Respondents were asked to comment on factors that, in their opinion, inhibit community-building. Table 4 below illustrates that inadequate financial resources, the effects of apartheid on university education, and lack of political influence because of the small size of the academic community are regarded as the major constraints.

**Table 4: Factors Inhibiting Community-Building**

Issue	Frequency
Inadequate research funding & library holdings	21
Domestic cleavages (race, language, ideology)	20
Small local community of scholars & limited access to decision-makers	15
International isolation	8
Limited role of Blacks in local IR community	5
Limitations imposed by the state on scholarship	3

### **Perceptions of Global and Regional Issues**

We also surveyed some of the salient factors that, in the opinion of our respondents, would shape global and regional politics in the next five years. These responses were especially revealing, for they reflect not only research concerns, but also domestic political concerns.

**Table 5: Global Issues**

Priority	Issue	Median
High	Superpower relations	5,38
	World financial instability	5,04
Medium	Interdependence	4,82
	International conflict & war	4,53
	Nuclear issues	4,37
	North-South relations	4,25
	Human needs	4,10
	Ideological factors	3,88
	Wars of national liberation	3,80
	Scarcity of energy resources	3,57
Low	Ecological issues	2,92
	Non-alignment	2,53
	Restructuring the UN	2,39

In line with earlier findings, the issues that are seen to matter most relate to the 'world of the powerful', international security questions, and growing interdependence. Human needs, energy and ecological concerns were well down the list. This is consistent with our argument that it is the 'blood and guts', high politics issues that preoccupy most local scholars. This is predictable, given the security concerns of a pariah state and the seemingly intractable conflict within South Africa and the region.

This observation is particularly germane when regional issues are examined. Again, political and security issues predominate.

These findings (see Table 6) confirm that, in the opinion of the majority of local scholars, political and security concerns are central to the regional equation, borne out also by many opinion surveys on white attitudes and perceptions on regional and international issues, and also confirms a high level of insecurity among Whites. Again, it would seem that the isolation of South Africa from the international community, as well as lack of contact with the region, stimulates a high level of threat perception.<sup>55</sup> For a great many Whites, the outside world is indeed a dangerous place — and it is often presented as such by those in power. Once again, realist concerns supersede interdependence, trans-nationalism and global issues.

Sadly, until quite recently, only a few black students have had the opportunity to study International Relations. The International Studies Unit at Rhodes University was established with the specific aim to educate black

students at post-graduate level in this discipline. By and large, however, international studies remains the exclusive domain of Whites.

Our survey confirmed the peculiarly insular nature of the local international studies community, which has occasional and infrequent contact with overseas scholars. In fact, not a single respondent indicated frequent contact with foreign scholars. What contact there is consists primarily of correspondence, attending a few conferences overseas, visits from a limited number of foreign scholars to South Africa, and a limited number of joint research projects. Joint media appearances, teaching at foreign universities, and involvement in the supervision of theses are rare occurrences. Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the transformation in East/Central Europe however a growing number of scholars from there visit South Africa.

Scholars have identified certain factors that inhibit contact, as the following table shows:

Factor	Median
Lack of funds for travel	5,88
Geographic isolation	5,04
Apartheid-related issues	5,00

Language and cultural factors were also cited as inhibiting transnational community-building.

The geographic spread of existing contacts confirmed the dominance of North America, followed by the United Kingdom and Western Europe. Academic contact with other regions of the world — other pariah states, the states of Southern Africa, the rest of Africa, Australasia, Latin America, East/Central Europe, and the Middle East, is extremely limited and infrequent.

The overall pattern of academic contact with foreign scholars confirms the Eurocentric bias of local scholarship. It also displays two particular vulnerabilities. First, the concentrated nature of contact with a limited number of scholars in a few countries, and secondly — as a consequence of the first — the potentially detrimental effects that a coordinated academic boycott would have on local scholarship.

In terms of scholars visiting from abroad, the SAIIA's Bradlow Fellowship provides local scholars and students with a rare opportunity to interact with their foreign counterparts. The Bradlow Series has contributed to the quality of local scholarship,<sup>54</sup> important in view of the theoretical and other limitations outlined previously.

Lately constructive scholarly interaction has been greatly assisted by the programmes of the ISU based in Rhodes University. For example, in 1989



the ISU organised a conference on 'New Frameworks for the Analysis of Foreign Policy'. This conference was attended by foreign as well as local scholars. The proceedings of this conference were published by the SAIIA.

**Table 6: Regional Issues**

Priority	Issue	Median
High	Apartheid	6,36
	SA military intervention	5,67
	Incompatible value systems	5,41
	Sanctions	5,38
Medium	Surrogate focus	4,92
	War	4,71
	Human rights	4,69
	Economic assistance	4,62
	Superpower interests	4,54
	Human needs	4,54
	Namibia	4,50
	External support for liberation movements	4,48
	Growing interdependence	4,40

### **Challenges: Present and Future**

We also addressed the question of the major challenges, both past and future, to practitioners in the field of international studies, which respondents identified as follows:

**Table 7: Challenges**

Challenge	Listing
Improve standard of teaching & research	18
Strengthen international contact & counter isolation	14
Domestic community-building	8
Access to & influencing decision-makers & public	5
Counter government policies & propaganda	5
Maintain a politically non-partisan stance	3
Overcome financial constraints	2
Professionalise teaching (make it more market-related)	1

These challenges underline the theoretical weaknesses previously mentioned but do indicate a willingness to address the more pertinent ones.

By and large, the local international studies community is professional in its approach to the discipline. Perhaps even more encouraging is that scholars are eager and willing to strengthen and broaden domestic and transnational contacts.

### **Conclusion: Towards Bolder Brushstrokes**

This paper has shown that international studies scholarship in South Africa was formed by specific historical processes, in which Eurocentric values have predominated. While some of these values have been diluted over time, others have remained remarkably resilient. This is especially true insofar as realist and neo-realist understandings of the world are concerned. The nation-state is still widely seen as the most important actor in the international system, while work dating from the height of the realist school has remained remarkably influential.

Universities and research institutes provide the institutional context of much of local scholarship, both as far as sponsorship and the consumption of research are concerned. The unique composition of the local international studies fraternity — almost exclusively male, White and young — makes for particular research and theoretical concerns, and impacts on national and transnational community-building.

Specific theoretical and research strengths were emphasised, notably regional analyses (Southern Africa); South Africa's foreign relations; policy analyses; a bibliographical series; and exile scholarship. Major areas of analytical and theoretical weaknesses include, among others, the international political economy; peace and conflict research; black opinions and perceptions of foreign policy questions; philosophical and methodological studies; and Africa.

The somewhat narrow theoretical base of much of local scholarship was also reflected in the responses on global and regional issues. As far as global issues were concerned, superpower relations, financial instability of the international system, global interdependence, conflict and war, and nuclear issues were seen as the most important. Regional issues were seen to be shaped by apartheid, military intervention by South Africa into neighbouring states, incompatible value systems, and sanctions. Again, an essentially *realpolitik* understanding of the region was shown.

National community-building is severely constrained by domestic socio-political cleavages such as race and ideology, and by inadequate library holdings and research funding. Transnational community-building, on the other hand, is inhibited by financial constraints, the geographic isolation of South Africa, and by apartheid-related issues.

The lack of financial resources has been identified as a major impediment to international studies research and community-building, both locally and internationally. Universities, which are largely dependent on state

sponsorship, have suffered because funding has been severely cut over the past two fiscal years, due to a variety of reasons. The South African economy has been plagued with high inflation, budget deficits due to the high cost of maintaining apartheid, foreign debt, and sanctions. The short-term economic outlook is not favourable, and it is therefore to be expected that the financial problems facing universities will continue and, in some cases, even worsen.

The respective challenges for the discipline as listed by our respondents, augur well for the future, and for national and transnational community-building. The lively local fraternity of international studies scholars displays doctrinal diversity and a commitment to improve the standard of teaching and research. Perhaps the greatest challenge is at home — to prepare all South Africans, irrespective of race, colour or creed, for a post-apartheid society. This would be possible only if the discipline itself became more representative of our diverse society and if we rose to the theoretical and substantive challenges outlined in this paper. Most recently, some admirable exploratory work on the foreign and regional policy of post-apartheid South Africa is being done. The Centre for Southern African Studies (CSAS), as well as some individual researchers are probing this new area of research.<sup>55</sup>

Finally, there have been some advances in local scholarship, notably in the introduction of new curricula, in relatively more exchanges with the international relations fraternity and in exploratory work on post-apartheid South Africa and its relations with international society and the region. There still seems, however, to be a case to argue for a more policy-oriented dialogue with fellow scholars on the African continent.

#### Endnotes

1. Philip Windsor, 'An Introduction to the Special Issue', *Millennium*, Vol.16, No.2, (Summer 1987), London School of Economics, pp.185-187
2. For earlier surveys, see 'Political Science in South Africa', in *New Nation*, Vol.5, No.9 (April 1972); A. van Nieuwkerk, 'Kritiese Oorsig van Staatsleer in Politikon' (Critical Overview of Political Science in Politikon), in *Politikon*, Vol.11, No.1, (June 1984), pp.3-19; A.M. Faure, 'Die Moderne Politieke Teorie' (Modern Political Theory), in A.M. Faure & D.J. Kriek (eds), *Die Moderne Politieke Teorie* (Modern Political Theory), Durban: Macmillan, 1984; and André du Pisani, *First Directory of South African Political Scientists*, Johannesburg: SAILA, September 1987.
3. For instance, we surveyed every edition of the South African Human Sciences Research Bulletin from 1972 up to the first quarter of 1988.
4. See, for example, Jan C. Heunis, *The Coventry Four*, Johannesburg: Perskor, 1985; and *United Nations vs South Africa: a legal assessment of UN and UN-related activities in respect of South Africa*, Johannesburg: Lex Patria, 1986.
5. K. Knorr & J. Rosenau (eds), *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969.
6. James Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, New York: The Free Press, 1971.
7. Robert Dahl, 'The Behavioural Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a

- Movement to a successful Protest', in *American Political Science Review*, Vol 55, No 4, (December 1961), pp 763-772
- 8 Hedley Bull, 'International Theory the Case for a Classical Approach', in *World Politics*, Vol 18, No 3 (April 1966), pp 361-377
  - 9 James Barber & John Barratt, *South Africa's Foreign Policy — The search for status and security 1945-1988*, Johannesburg Southern 1990 (also Cambridge University Press)
  10. Two recent examples include J C K van der Merwe, 'n *Onderzoek na Aspekte van die ontstaan en verloop van die insurgensie in Ovamboland tot 1983* (An inquiry into aspects of the origins and course of the insurgency in Ovamboland until 1983), unpublished MA thesis, UNISA, 1986, and J K Cilliers, *An Analysis of Problems related to Combating Urban Insurgency, with special reference to the South African Defence Force, 1975-1985*, unpublished DLitt et Phil dissertation, UNISA, 1987
  - 11 Certain universities were designated as 'ethnic' by the 1959 Extension of University Education Amendment Act, in terms of which the country's universities were segregated along racial lines
  - 12 Hans J Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations the Struggle for Power and Influence*, 5th ed New York Knopf, 1978
  - 13 Stanley Hoffman, *Janus and Minerva essays in the theory and practice of international politics*, Boulder, Co Westview Press, 1987
  - 14 Reynolds, *An Introduction to International Relations*, London Macmillan, 1974
  - 15 Martin Quincey Wright, *A Study of War*, 2 vols, Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1942
  - 16 K N Waltz, *Man, the State and War Theoretical Analysis*, New York Columbia University Press, 1979
  - 17 Of the many examples, the following articles and unpublished works illustrate this point Dirk T Kunert, 'Windows of Peril Africa, the World and the 1980s' in *South Africa International*, Vol 11, No 1, (1980), pp 1-20, Kunert, *Africa Soviet Strategy and Western Counterstrategy*, Johannesburg Southern Africa Forum, Occasional Paper, 1981, Kunert & Colin Vale, 'The Chimera of the "Zimbabwe Solution"', in *Strategic Review*, Vol 12, No 3, (1984), pp 23-36, G S Labuschagne, *Moscow, Havana and the MPLA takeover of Angola*, Pretoria Foreign Affairs Association, Study Report No 3, 1976, Colin Vale, 'Communist intrusion in the region', in *South Africa International*, Vol 13, No 3, (1983), pp 172-188, and H A Wessels, *Die Stryd van die RSA teen die kommunistiese imperialisme — 'n staatsfilosofiese studie* (The struggle of the RSA against Communist Imperialism — a political philosophical study), unpublished DPhil thesis, University of the Orange Free State, 1973
  - 18 See Peter Vale, 'South Africa and the Changing International Community interpreting the future in the light of the past', in Robert Schrire (ed), *South Africa Public Policy Perspectives*, Cape Town Juta, 1981, pp 340-367
  - 19 André du Pisani's PhD thesis entitled *Critical Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Techniques From Workshops to Theory*, University of Cape Town, 1988 (unpublished), is a rare example
  - 20 Mervyn Frost, *Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1986, and Roger Spegele, 'Alarums and Excursions The State of the Discipline of International Relations', in *Politikon*, Vol 10, No 2, (1983), pp 51-72
  - 21 The quote is from a term paper in an undergraduate course on International Relations in one of the largest departments at an English-speaking university It is fairly typical of other universities in the country
  - 22 See, for example, John Dugard, *Human Rights and the South African Legal Order*, Princeton Princeton University Press, 1978
  - 23 See, for example, Alf Stadler, *The Political Economy of Modern South Africa*, London Croom Helm, 1987
  - 24 A recent exception has been Koos van Wyk, *Elite Opinions on South African Foreign Policy, Research Project on South African Foreign Relations*, Occasional Paper No 1,

- Johannesburg: Rand Afrikaans University, 1984; and the same author's 'Elite Perceptions of South Africa's International Options', in *International Affairs Bulletin*, Vol.11, No.3, (1987), pp.51-76; as well as his recently completed DPhil thesis entitled *Elitemenings rakende enkele aspekte van Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse Beleid* (Elite Opinions on selected aspects of South Africa's Foreign Policy), unpublished, University of Pretoria, 1987. The five opinion surveys conducted by the SAIIA on white opinions on foreign policy issues also fall into this category.
25. Most notable in this regard is the work of the following scholars: Deon Geldenhuys, 'Recrossing the Matola threshold: the "terrorist factor" in South Africa's regional relations', in *South Africa International*, Vol.13, No.3, (1983), pp.52-171; John Barratt, 'Foreign Policy 1983-1985 — the regional context', in D.J. van Vuuren (ed), *South Africa: a plural society in transition*, Durban: Butterworth, 1985, pp.414-478; Annette Seegers, 'The Development of the Armed Forces in Mozambique', in *Studies in Marxism*, No.3, (November 1984), pp.23-57; Peter Vale, 'Regional Policy: The Compulsion to Incorporate', in Desmond Blumenfeld (ed), *South Africa in Crisis*, London: Croom Helm, 1987, pp.176-194; and André du Pisani, *SWA/Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change*, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1986.
  26. Exponents of the 'revisionist' school include, among others, Robert Davies & Dan O'Meara, 'Total Strategy in Southern Africa: an analysis of South African regional policy since 1978', in *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.11, No.2, (1985), p.183-211; Robert Davies, *South African Strategy towards Mozambique in the post-Nkomati period: a critical analysis of effects and implications*, Research Report No.73, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1984; and Renfrew Christie, *Electricity, Industry and Class in South Africa*, London: Macmillan, 1984. See also Gavin Maasdorp, *Current Political and Economic Factors in Transportation in Southern Africa*, Occasional Paper, Johannesburg: SAIIA, February 1988.
  27. The following is an incomplete list of some of these studies: Gavin Maasdorp, *Transport Policies and Economic Development in Southern Africa: a comparative study in eight countries*, Durban: Economic Research Unit, University of Natal, 1984; Maasdorp, SADCC: *Post-Nkomati Evaluation*, Special Study, Johannesburg: SAIIA, August 1984; Alan Whiteside, *The Business Climate in the SADCC States*, Occasional Paper, Johannesburg: SAIIA, 1987; and Jacqueline Matthews, 'South Africa's Trade Relations: Foreign and Regional Interdependence', in *International Affairs Bulletin*, Vol.4, No.2, (1980), pp.3-17.
  28. Especially important in this regard has been the work of Sam Nolutshungu, *South Africa in Africa: a Study in Ideology and Foreign Policy*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975.
  29. See, for example, Colin Vale, 'Boer War III: The Soviet Imperial Factor in South Africa', in *South Africa International*, Vol.13, No.3, (January 1983), pp.172-188; Dirk T. Kunert, 'Windows of Peril: Africa, the World and the 1980s', in *South Africa International*, Vol.XI, No.1, (July 1980), pp.1-20.
  30. A rare exception is the work of Peter Vale and Wally Kopp, *Layman's Guide to Arms Control and Nuclear Arms*, Special Studies Series, Johannesburg: SAIIA, 1982.
  31. The ISSUP *Strategic Review* regularly carries articles on these questions. See, for example, M. Hough, 'Revolutionary warfare in the RSA'. *ISSUP Strategic Review/Strategies Oorsig*, May 1986, pp.1-19.
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  33. See, for example, B.J. Olivier, *Die strategiese belang van Angola* (The strategic importance of Angola), unpublished MA thesis, University of Pretoria, 1983; and J.C. Kruger, *Die strategiese belang van Botswana* (The strategic importance of Botswana), unpublished MA thesis, University of Pretoria, 1986.
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## **Equitable distribution and efficient use of mineral rights: the case for a South African minerals corporation**

### **Introduction**

Analysing the conditions for democracy and stability in a future South Africa, Stadler (1990) concludes:

'.... that egalitarian strategies which do not threaten growth are likely in the long run to enhance these prospects..... They require the development of a manifold of institutions of political participation, representative, popular and corporatist.'

This view has also been expressed by some in the business community (van Niekerk, 1990). It follows that a strong and stable democratic South Africa can only be achieved if the wealth created by economic growth, especially that contributed by minerals, is equitably distributed. This includes the provision of education, jobs and health care which enhance human potential. These provide a context around which the issues surrounding economic growth and the redistribution of resources are discussed in this paper.

The mining industry is and in the foreseeable future will continue as a major provider of jobs, training, foreign exchange and foreign investment. New industrial development will also largely depend on the raw materials made available by this sector of the economy. In any negotiations on a new constitution and an equitable socio-economic framework for a new South Africa, it will be necessary that the parties are fully informed about the minerals industry here and abroad, so that they can focus fully on the question: 'How should we reorganise the exploitation of our mineral wealth for the benefit of all South Africans?' Faced with this, what can an earth

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scientist do? One of the roles of earth scientists in South Africa at this time is to inform the negotiators about these resources and how they are discovered, exploited; and how such exploration and exploitation can be better optimised scientifically (Kruger & de Wit, 1988), and hence economically.

This is not a trivial problem. For example, South Africa is facing a serious reduction in viable gold mines, in part due to other viable discoveries elsewhere in the world, *mostly in the small mining sector* where a gold rush atmosphere exists (see e.g. Liu, 1988). Furthermore, there are major technical problems that are contributing to the decline in the profitability of the South African gold industry. Existing mines need to be exploited with greater technological efficiency, and new mines need to be found. The latter problem is analysed by Gleason & von Christerson (1988) who point to the need for more gold (mineral) discoveries to replace existing mines. These authors calculated that if we wish to retain our present level of income from gold exploitation, we need to discover and bring into full production the equivalent of more than two Orange Free State gold fields in the next 30 years (in all kinds of mineral deposits, large and small). This requires enormous, risky investment in exploration by companies with entrepreneurial attitudes using highly skilled and motivated personnel as well as a significant and growing involvement by small operators. The state cannot do this work: it can neither afford such investment, nor provide the necessary expertise.

With increasing scientific knowledge and political stabilization elsewhere (Eastern Europe, Australia, China, Brazil, Argentina, India and even perhaps Antarctica where a new mineral code is being formulated by the Antarctic Treaty nations (Antarctic Treaty, 1988)) there is likely to be an increase in the rate of discovery and development of mineral resources worldwide. Consequently, greater competition and even a switch from South Africa by mineral investors and markets seems likely; indeed, there are definite signs that this is already happening. This competition, unless countered, may yet plunge South Africa into third-world status as has happened in states where poorly considered 'status' programmes were embarked on (Turok, 1990). It is therefore vital that a timely enquiry into our total mineral wealth is made.

Coupled to this need to find and develop new resources, is the obligation to create new employment for the skilled miners who are retrenched, *inter alia*, due to the falling gold price. Between 1987 and 1990, seventy two thousand miners have lost jobs on South African gold mines, and if present conditions prevail, another two hundred thousand could join them. This would be a severe blow for an industry that employs seven hundred and thirty thousand workers. South Africa has a well trained corps of miners which constitutes an enormous education and training investment made by

the mining industry; this should be utilized. Re-training (possibly for a 'fashionable' Japanese style electronics industry) may not be a viable alternative at this stage, given the neglected state of our secondary and tertiary education and training facilities, compared to the training facilities for miners.

However, a vibrant small mining sector could absorb many of these workers, as 'self-help' and co-operative entrepreneurs if the mineral rights laws were modified to accommodate them; moreover, South Africa could become a training springboard for the latent mining industry in the rest of Africa. South Africa is a forefront mining country and because our mineral wealth is also the most diverse in the world, appropriate educational investment could stimulate a high technology materials industry based on this mineral endowment. Other countries cannot easily compete with South Africa in this sector: we should build on it and not starve it of status and expertise as we are doing at present. South Africans derive approximately R1000 per capita annually from our mineral endowment, but public expenditure on the research & development necessary to sustain the mineral industry in the long term is only approximately R2-00 per capita annually (i.e. 0.2%: Table 1A). Compare this with the R18-00 per capita spent on nuclear energy research, which in South African terms is a 'status' project (Table 1A).

To address these issues, we believe that negotiation for a viable system of mineral rights ownership is the key question. The current system is inequitable and inefficient and *must* be changed. Our objective in this contribution is to address this need for change more explicitly. Here we design a mineral policy that would equitably optimize the exhaustible resource utilisation for the present and future generations, as well as provide economic upliftment and growth in the New South Africa. We therefore view redistribution of mineral wealth in the context of the fight against poverty. Hence, in our proposals for a *South African Minerals Corporation (SAMC)*, we assume at the outset that it is in the country's interest to have a mineral code that encourages mining and exploration initiatives and foreign participation. We also take the view that the mineral wealth is the common heritage of all the inhabitants of South Africa and should be developed to their common benefit *and* with intergenerational equity.

### **Exploration and the Future of the World Minerals Industry**

There are two extreme philosophies with respect to mineral ownership in different countries of the world, depending on their guiding political system. These are:

- (1) total state ownership of both the mineral rights and the right to mine on the one hand; and

(2) total private ownership of both on the other.

In many mineral-rich and successful mining countries (e.g. Australia, Botswana, Canada, U.S.A., Zimbabwe) there is a tendency toward *state ownership* of mineral rights, but *private* exploration and exploitation. This may even become the case in the USSR as joint projects with the 'west' are implemented (including one with the diamond exploration arm of De Beers of South Africa). In these countries, the rights to explore for minerals are not held in perpetuity: they are freely available for prospecting by anybody. Nevertheless, several countries in the world are also re-examining their mineral codes<sup>1</sup> so as to make their mining industry more competitive and more environment conscious. In countries with rapidly developing mineral economies, the small mining sector is very important and is usually based on frontier type gold and precious stone mining (diamond, ruby and emerald). For a description of such conditions on the Witwatersrand in the 1880s, see Lee (1990). These operations are often social and environmental disasters, for example the Brazilian Garimpeiros (Mining Survey, 1990) and Pacific Rim mines (Liu, 1988), but are placing well established operations such as the South African mines under increasing pressure.

Recently, Stear (1990) has advocated the development in South Africa of small labour intensive operations in gold, dimension stone, mica & feldspar, talc, chromite and diamonds to address this competition. We believe that to attain this objective, as well as to enable larger mines to operate efficiently, the challenge for a changing South Africa is to create a model code in which there is easier access to mineral rights and a diversity of mining initiatives are encouraged. These must be environmentally and socially benign and yet remain competitive. Below, we examine if this is possible given the *status quo* regarding mineral rights in South Africa, and suggest an alternative. Before doing so, however, scientific, technological and economic developments that have a bearing on the world mineral industry have to be considered. It is therefore pertinent to highlight some scientific thoughts concerning the future of non-renewable mineral resources in general.

The future of primary commodity production in the world has recently been examined by Skinner (1990) who concludes that over the next century we will have to exploit less attractive and more expensive ores in the face of rising energy costs; and that environmental costs are going to have to be paid. He further states:

'Prospecting for new deposits is most active in countries that have histories of political stability. A certain amount of favourable land remains to be prospected in these favoured areas, but in both favoured and unfavoured areas, the hunt will eventually be for blind deposits that are buried between thick blankets of surface rocks. The search will become intense over the next century..... We have every reason to

believe that prospecting will be possible to depths of many kilometres, if the needed background work has been done. Exploration geologists of the future will tend to work in the countries that have made the long term investment needed to measure and map the Earth's crust to depths of 15–20 km.'

In essence, Skinner believes that despite the fact that simple exploration is still able to find large undiscovered resources in relatively unexplored areas of the world, the future emphasis will be on much more scientifically risky exploration strategies in those areas of the world that are socio-politically stable and economically attractive. The recent find of the giant Roxby Downs deposits in Australia more than a kilometre below surface gives great credence to Skinner's view.

### **An Overview of the Status Quo in South Africa and Its Historical Development**

The current mineral rights legislation in South Africa is economically inefficient for a number of reasons. This has been recognised for a long time (White Paper, 1986) and presently the government is attempting to enact legislation to deal with some of these shortcomings (Minerals Bill, 1990). In this section we first list and examine negative aspects of the current legislation.

There are three first order factors which lead to sterilisation<sup>2</sup> and fragmentation of mineral rights and thereby militate against efficient and equitable use of South African mineral resources namely:

- (1) there are different laws for different commodities, some of which occur in the same mine or mineral deposit;
- (2) the relevant legislation differs throughout South Africa and
- (3) the definition of the boundaries of mineral rights is based on cadastral data and has no scientific basis.

A simple example of the complexities created for the explorationist by the above is the proclamation of Sir John Cradock in 1813 that vested the rights to gold, silver and precious stones in the state but no other minerals. This only applies to the Cape Province, so that in that part of South Africa only the specific minerals mentioned are consolidated under state control, whereas all other rights to the same land may be endlessly subdivided. For these reasons, amongst others, Kruger & de Wit (1987) conclude that the present laws do not encourage optimal exploration and exploitation because the minerals industry is operating in a semi-closed market-place, dominated by anachronistic historical and legal inequities. Many of the current laws were initially formulated by legal precedent or arbitrary actions such as those of Sir John Cradock, in an era when scientific method and knowledge

were minimal, and are now outdated. The *scientific* principles that should govern exploration effort are in many cases inhibited by current legislation.

It must be emphasised that despite the above restrictions, the South African mining industry is and has been extremely successful; the benefits for South Africa are there for all to see. It is therefore clear that there are several advantageous aspects of the *status quo* to which Kruger & de Wit (1987) partly attribute the highly successful minerals industry (see also Beukes, 1986). Since mineral exploration is a high risk and long term investment, political stability and security of tenure of a discovered deposit were identified as the main advantageous factors which should be retained in any new system if the minerals industry is to prosper. However, they recommend that security of tenure should be conferred on discovered and exploitable reserves only, so as to discourage sterilisation of the remaining mineral rights.

### **The Gordian Knot: Three Case Histories**

Besides the proclamation of Sir John Cradock, which exacerbated the problem by reserving only part rather than all the minerals to the state in the Cape Province, there are numerous other cases where severe fragmentation has occurred. We illustrate this by way of three case histories. These are not unusual, and show the severe problems that can arise on privately held mineral rights and underline the adage that 'In South Africa, mineral exploration starts in the Deeds Office, proceeds to the attorney's office and often ends in the Supreme Court!'

The first, rather simple case, is that of the farm Abjaterskop on which Willem Prinsloo made peach brandy and had a party attended by Oom Schalk Lourens in the story 'Willem Prinsloo's peach brandy' in Herman Charles Bosman's classic 'Mafeking Road' (Bosman, 1947). The case is not trivial, as farms in the immediate vicinity and on the same geological units have lead, copper, iron and manganese deposits. Adjoining Abjaterskop to the south is the farm Droogedal on which Jurie Steyn's Post Office was situated. This has a small iron deposit similar to those of the Thabazimbi district which are the deposits on which ISCOR was built.

The mineral rights situation on Abjaterskop 107 KP is set out in Fig. 1. From Deeds Office studies it appears that acquisition of mineral rights by the various individuals took place as a result of owning the freehold (surface rights) at one stage. Acquisition of the share of mineral rights was done by reserving them in the Deed of Transfer. Prior to passing of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937, a person so reserving the mineral rights was not required to take out a Certificate of Rights to minerals. Acquisition was thus obtained without the registration of rights, which makes the tracing of the owner or his heirs extremely difficult.

Both these farms are now part of Bophuthatswana, the surface rights

having been expropriated and transferred. The mineral rights, however, were not expropriated but are still held by the original holders or their heirs, except for that held by the expropriated surface right owner, which were probably also transferred to the national state. further exacerbating factor is that the cadastral boundaries are now been taken off the the topocadastral and geological maps produced by the Geological and Trigonometrical Surveys, presumably on the basis that the homelands are now communal land, even though these are vital for locating mineral rights on the ground. Mineral rights are now being ignored even by the South African Geological Survey!

The second case is that of the *Transvaal Consolidated Lands and Exploration Company (TCL)* which illustrates how and why mineral rights were acquired about 100 years ago. In Johannesburg in 1886 the firm of H. Eckstein formed a syndicate to buy huge tracts of land for the purposes of systematic exploration for minerals and the pre-emption of mineral rights. These farms also could be put to use as labour pools. Africans were settled as tenants and squatters on these farms and could then be coerced into spells of labour on the mines to pay for their tenancy (Webb, 1981).

Eckstein's also acquired shares in a number of other syndicates for this purpose viz. Sammy Marks, Abe Bailey, Alois Nellmapius, the Marais family, T.M. Bourke and T.W. Beckett all owned or were members of syndicates that owned farms in the Rustenburg, Waterberg, Middelburg and Lydenburg districts (Cartwright, 1965; 1968). These syndicates agreed in 1892 to pool their holdings and form a company to carry out scientifically organised prospecting. Thus was formed the Transvaal Consolidated Lands and Exploration Company Ltd., which is now part of the Barlow-Rand Group. The farms which ultimately came under the control of this company covered a total of 1.871 million hectares in the Transvaal (TCL, 1980; 1988).

At present most of the TCL-held mineral rights are in effect sterilised to any except Rand Mines, as any negotiation with TCL for prospecting rights is usually protracted, frustrating and futile, and TCL itself does not have the staff to prospect this vast holding efficiently.

The third example concerns *The Vergenoeg Fluorite Mine*. The farms *Kromdraai 209 JR* and *Naauwpoort 208 JR* are the location of a major acid-grade fluorite producer (with associated iron) which ranks as one of the world's largest single deposits. The Vergenoeg fluorite mine is located on portion RE (remaining extent) of Kromdraai (Fig. 2) approximately 65 km. northeast of Pretoria and 6 km. south of Rust der Winter (see Crocker *et al.*, 1988 for a detailed description of this and other fluorite deposits). Wagner (1929) was the first to scientifically report these iron deposits which were worked in ancient times as a source of red pigment. The occurrence was re-investigated by Glatthaar (1955) who was instrumental in outlining various payable fluorite and iron ore bodies. This in turn led to the mining of the

fluorite by Chrome Chemicals which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bayer AG Germany at present.

The mineral rights situation on Kromdraai is exceedingly complex, and the following description is highly simplified. A detailed ownership chart similar to that shown in Fig. 1 for Abjaterskop, would cover very many pages. For more details, the reader is referred to the 1977 Transvaal Supreme Court case No M2249/77. The mineral rights of the whole farm together with the freehold were originally held by Lourens Jacobus Erasmus (who died in 1903) and his spouse Helletjie Maria Erasmus under Deed of Transfer T 611/1876, in the Pretoria Deeds Office. In 1914 the mineral rights to iron were severed from the freehold and other mineral rights in respect of the whole farm by the cession of mineral rights to iron under Notarial Deed of Cession no. 165/1914 S and registered in the name of Lewis & Marks (the S shows that this was a servitude). This was ceded to Dunswart Iron & Steel Works Ltd by Notarial Deed of Cession no. 344/1966 RM (RM shows that this was now a mineral right, rather than a servitude; a consequence of Act 47 of 1937).

The remaining mineral rights (which include the fluorspar which is intimately associated with the iron) in respect of the various portions of the farm Kromdraai (dashed lines on Fig. 2), have devolved to the heirs of the five children of Lourens and Helletjie Erasmus, and to the heirs of these five heirs *ad infinitum*. Of this multitude of heirs, some have taken out Certificates of Mineral Rights and their share of the mineral rights are thus reflected in the Deeds Office records with a RM notation. Others inherited a share of the mineral rights without inheriting a share in the freehold of the various portions. These rights do not appear in the Deeds Office records, but nevertheless remain rights that have to be considered.

In about 1957 the Vergenoeg Mining Company negotiated for a mining lease in respect of portion RE shown in Fig. 2. In 1958 the heirs to the mineral rights on that portion formed a family committee 'Die Beheer Komitee van Minerale Erfgename Kromdraai' to represent the majority of persons entitled to the mineral rights on this portion as well as the other eleven portions (there is considerable overlapping ownership). This committee is still in existence and collects and distributes the royalties payable by Bayer to the heirs in the proportion to which they are entitled. This committee represents 288 individuals with shares which range between 3.5 and 0.00005 percent of the original portions of Kromdraai (personal communication, Mr. Maarten Venter, Committee Secretary, 1990).

The Surveyor General's diagram of the whole farm Kromdraai 209 JR (on which Fig. 2 is based) shows that this farm now comprises portions RE, RE2, 3, 4, 5 and 11; and portions RE1, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are now consolidated with Rust der Winter 180 JR. These latter portions have in turn been resurveyed into numerous agricultural holdings that in turn redefine

cadastral boundaries (dotted lines in Fig. 2) which in turn complicate the choice of possible future exploration targets for fluorite and other minerals except iron. Note that the situation on Kromdraai with respect to iron, is similar to the situation created for the whole of the Cape Province for precious stones, gold and silver.

The procedure for acquiring the mineral rights on a farm such as Kromdraai, given that no minerals have yet been discovered would involve working back from the current cadastral units i.e. initially the agricultural holdings on what is now Rust der Winter, then the portions of Kromdraai. The mineral right owners of each of the portions would then have to be traced and this is a very difficult task as many are unregistered. Note that before exploration can commence the mineral rights or options to the rights have to be secured.

The position on the farm *Naauwpoort 208 JR* is simplified in that both freehold and mineral rights are vested in Montrose Exploration Pty. Ltd who in turn ceded the mineral rights to Transvaal Mining and Finance Company Ltd. Both these companies are subsidiaries of Genmin, and as in the case of TCL negotiations for the prospecting rights would probably be futile. Numerous other mineral rights case histories exist, some of which are presently unresolved (e.g. *Vyfhoeck 428 IQ* in the Potchefstroom gap gold area), but cannot be examined here for want of space.

From the above analysis it is clear that mineral rights holdings can be extremely complex, the complexities being hidden until they are discovered during deed searches. Unless a mineral deposit is known to exist *a priori*, due to the activities of earlier researchers (as was the case at Kromdraai), it would be considered an unreasonable enterprise to try and secure the rights for mineral exploration; and thus sterilisation from further exploration occurs.

The root of the problem is that there is a link, albeit frayed, between the freehold and the mineral rights. It is this link which forms the basis of South Africa's mineral rights, and now most severely hampers its mineral development.

### **The New (1990) Minerals Bill**

The new Minerals Bill (1990) of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA) is designed to, we quote:

'regulate the prospecting for and the optimal exploitation, processing and utilisation of minerals; to provide for the safety and health of persons concerned in mines and works; to regulate the orderly utilisation and rehabilitation of the surface of land during and after prospecting and mining operations; and to provide for matters concerned therewith.'



The basic philosophy affecting mineral rights is stated in the Memorandum on the Objects of the Minerals Bill, 1990, section 2(c). We quote:

'To ensure that Government policy in respect of privatisation and deregulation is applied in the minerals industry, which entails –

- (i) the removal of regulating measures which have the effect that the holder of a mineral right, which is a real right, cannot dispose of his right, but that the right is put out to lease by the State as happens at present in the case of precious metals and precious stones on proclaimed land;
- (ii) the prospect of gradual privatisation of mineral rights which at present are registered in the name of the State, for example where alienated State land is involved, thus bringing about reduction of Government involvement in the economy;
- (iii) the recognition of the free enterprise system where demand and supply regulate the market, so that the holder of a mineral right may mine and market his mineral where he finds the best market, and if at any given time there is no suitable market, he may even leave the mineral *in situ* until such market exists.'

The Minerals Bill is therefore an inefficient hybrid that deals with the question of mineral rights and exploration, and also with the operational and safety aspects of mining now dealt with under the Mines and Works Act. In the new act, all mineral rights are retained as they are now, but the mineral rights on State and Alienated State Land (now held by the state and controlled by the Mining Commissioner and claims inspectorate) will eventually be sold to the private sector. Other provisions deal with the surface right holders, rehabilitation of land and administration of the act. Unlike the current situation, control will be by bureaucratic regulation, rather than legislated provision.

At the present time, the proportion of State and Alienated State land is unclear but, excluding the National Parks, it is less than 10% in the Transvaal (personal communication, Office of the Mining Commissioner, 1990). Similar proportions may hold in the other provinces, and it is higher in the 'national states'. The case of the Cape Province is particularly difficult due to the proclamation by Sir John Cradock which reserves gold, silver and precious stones to the state, which still holds in that province.

The DMEA believes that their new Minerals Bill is a major step towards 'privatisation' and 'deregulation' which is the current government policy. This is because it proposes that all rights eventually be transferred to private ownership and reduces the plethora of legislation to a single act; except for diamonds which again 'have managed to escape' being included.

However, as argued below, we believe this to be a naive view: the stated intention to privatise the mineral rights on State and Alienated State Land will only exacerbate the current problem. These mineral rights may end up sterilised as well, which will seriously hamper the development of a small mining sector as small entrepreneurs (having only a skill in mining and not deed searching) will be excluded. In short, the new Bill does not address:

- (i) the fragmentation and sterilisation which *inhibit* a free market in mineral rights;
- (ii) the situation with respect to offshore rights, game parks and currently communally held land (homelands), and
- (iii) the rights to gold, silver and precious stones in the Cape Province.

The root of the problem, remains the *basis* of our mineral rights holding and its historical development which has left the mineral rights partially coupled to the freehold and defined by cadastral data. Until this link is properly severed and the basis of ownership changed, the problems will remain and get worse, as each generation further subdivides the mineral rights. The *status quo*, which hampers exploration and development of our minerals industry will be perpetuated, extended and entrenched. Therefore, in our opinion the basic philosophy behind the bill reflects flawed thinking about the nature of mineral rights and exploration in the context of free enterprise in a free society.

### **A basis for mineral rights ownership and the South African minerals corporation concept**

In this section we outline a basis for public ownership of mineral rights and our concept for a South African Minerals Corporation (SAMC), which we believe will lead to a rational, equitable and dynamic restructuring of the minerals industry to the benefit of all South Africans. This concept is based on the idea of free trade in, and equitable access to, our mineral rights by all who wish to develop them; the efficient use of scientific methods, the expansion of the scientific data base; and the strengthening our competitive position in world mineral production and beneficiation. At the outset we reiterate and expand on the principles outlined by us (Kruger & de Wit, 1987 & 1988 and in Henning, 1990a & b):

- a) All mineral rights to be vested in the SAMC in return for shares based on their holdings and the land area and continental shelf of South Africa. The continental shelf is included as it has proven diamonds (West Coast), oil and gas (Mosgas), phosphates (West Coast) and titanium (East and West Coasts). With new technology other mining may be possible.
- b) The right to prospect an area should be granted to companies and

individuals, at a price per unit area which would confer the right to exploit or trade any discoveries subject to environmental and other reasonable conditions. All conditions to be spelt out *a priori*.

- c) Registration of a mining lease should guarantee security of tenure. Discoveries that are not viable for the discoverer should revert to the SAMC, unless the discoverer would want to hold them in reserve at some realistic rent, or trade them to another entrepreneur. If the SAMC is anxious that a mine be established for some technical or social reason, provision could be made by way of incentives (e.g. Royalty reduction) for the discoverer to open a mine. For example, if a set of small deposits is discovered, a type of cooperative could be set up with SAMC aid (including central cooperative mills and plants such as those operative in Western Australia). The Rand Refinery which processes South Africa's gold is a local example. Note that the SAMC could act as a type of clearing house where discovered deposits could be offered for sale by explorationists to miners.
- d) Prospecting areas should be defined using the National Survey Grid and scientific parameters such as geological contacts, and not cadastral boundaries. If minerals are discovered, the mining lease areas should also be defined using geological parameters.
- e) There should be a mechanism to eliminate sterilisation of prospecting rights. One suggestion is the annual escalation of prospecting fees proposed by Kruger & de Wit (1987), but other schemes are possible and may be better. For example, a proportion (say 25%) of the prospecting grant area could be dropped annually. This type of mechanism operates well in Botswana and Queensland in Australia.
- f) There should be a mechanism to encourage nation-wide use of up to date scientific methods in the mineral exploration industry. In this connection, all data gathered by the prospector must be deposited in the national data bank within a specific time-frame, so that it is available to all interested parties including other prospectors, as well as technicons and universities for research purposes. See also Cumming (1990).
- g) An equitable system for marketing the production of small business ventures should be instituted. This should not affect the contractual or other arrangements of the larger mines. There is a precedent for this in that the Reserve Bank sells the entire South African gold production. If this marketing system is equitable, it may dramatically improve the lot of the small miner and prevent a socially and environmentally debilitating situation developing as has occurred in some parts of Latin America and East Asia (e.g. the uncontrollable behaviour of the Brazilian Garimpeiros).
- h) There should be a mechanism to fund both research and training of mineral scientists, technicians, economists and ecologists from the

whole population. This should be on a steady basis to avoid the 'boom-and-bust' character of the geological profession which is often out of phase with demand. This research and teaching investment is vital and would be one of the most important functions of the SAMC. Current expenditure is not adequate to sustain our mineral industry (see Table 1A), and is one of the fundamental reasons for falling production.

- i) The nation's surface, water and environmental rights must be rigorously protected and extended. In order to conserve the environment, the rehabilitation operations needed today in the industrialized nations of the northern hemisphere are almost incalculable and would have been cheaper to prevent than they are now to cure. Such costs would be included in the lease agreements of companies with the SAMC, and thus would be taken into account (i.e. 'polluter pays'). This is in contrast to many leading economic models of intergenerational equity and the allocation of natural resources which still have not incorporated the cost of pollution (i.e. Solow, 1978 & 1986; Hartwick, 1977, 1978a & b; Dasgupta & Mitra, 1983), and is only presently being addressed in earnest elsewhere (Hartwick, 1990a & b; Hartwick & Oleweiler, 1986). Innovative legislation in the new South Africa must incorporate these enormous 'hidden' costs and prevent environmental degradation.

Kruger & de Wit (1987) made the following proposals for achieving the above aims, namely:

'As people should not be discriminated against by historical and geological accident, all privately held mineral rights should be purchased by the state at a flat rate per hectare and paid to the holders. Private holders could, for example, be given equity on the basis of their holdings in a state minerals corporation which could be tradeable on the stock exchange; in such a case the average value of the mineral rights of South Africa would be determined by the market. If one unit of stock was equivalent to one hectare of the surface area of the country including the territorial waters, the state would be the major stockholder, but the populace would also have a significant private share. The initial price per unit area could be a function of the total estimated value of minerals over the entire country.'

This suggestion has been criticised by a number of people, (e.g. Economic Focus, 1988 & 1990a) but their position is, we believe, based largely on ignorance as to the nature of mineral occurrences and the economics of mineral exploration and development. On the other hand, this position has

been supported by others (e.g. von Below, 1990). It is therefore worth reiterating and briefly exploring this again here.

The value of mineral rights in an area is strongly *knowledge-and-time* dependent. Hence, presently held ideas about the mineral value of a given area are not incontrovertible. Areas now considered of marginal value may in fact contain undiscovered minerals which could be viable in the future as geological knowledge of the area improves or different commodities become important. For example, with new technologies and changing socio-economic perceptions the value of commodities change. Therefore, mineral potential of an area is not intrinsic, but is dependent on demand for commodities and current knowledge about the area. Kruger & de Wit (1987) illustrate this by way of specific South African examples. It is for these reasons that research into our geology is vital for the sustained health of the minerals industry.

Alternatively, exploration and development can prove specific mineral rights to be barren and the value may therefore decline. This is because minerals are concentrated in a small volume of rock to form an ore deposit of economic or socio-economic value. The position of the deposit cannot be determined without exploration of the geology hosting the deposit, and final location of the deposit may render the immediately surrounding mineral rights worthless. Often mining companies do not explore specific rights as the chances are that their investment may be rendered worthless by their quest to find minerals. Therefore, the value of mineral rights is not self evident as in the case of farm land, but currently our mineral rights are held and traded as if they were.

It is for these reasons that Kruger & de Wit (1987) state that mineral rights on a specific area are often (not always) of capricious and unknown value. They cannot be simply traded in a rational way because most holders of mineral rights do not have the scientific knowledge to make an assessment of their value. Furthermore, a person wishing to dispose of mineral rights cannot easily offer them for sale to a mining company or small entrepreneur in the way that freehold is offered for sale. Often the owner is not aware of his ownership or the ownership may be severely fragmented and cannot be sold without lengthy legal proceedings as outlined above. Mineral rights are in a buyers' market where the buyer seeks out the potential seller in the deeds office. Furthermore, the buyer usually has scientific reasons for acquisition of mineral rights, whereas the seller is usually at a disadvantage for want of knowledge and information. There is in fact no free market in mineral rights.

We propose, therefore, that the *basis* of mineral rights ownership be changed, in that current mineral rights where ever they are situated, be made a *share* of the total, and not be defined in terms of a specific geographical

location. This would in effect create a large new industry in these shares, in which the state would have a major interest. The management of these shares would be vested in the SAMC in which all parties in the South African economy, including the State, would have a share holding based on their current ownership of mineral rights. This share block would be the total area of South Africa including the 'homelands' or National States and the continental shelf, a total of approximately 150 million hectares. For argument, this could be sub-divided on the basis of 1 ha = 1 share.

Current holders of mineral rights would lose nothing, but gain directorships and easily tradeable assets in a new corporation. The share price would be set by supply and demand on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). These would be valuable assets as the royalties derived from a healthy minerals industry would be large and would be distributed equitably to both the state and private shareholders on the basis of their current holdings. This is analysed further below.

The state (a major shareholder) could then privatise to realise capital for whatever purpose by selling shares, or nationalise to realise royalty income by buying shares in the SAMC. Our proposals are based on sound scientific principles, considerations of efficiency and accountability to shareholders and the population at large, and is an attempt to create a neutral entity that is not 'capitalist', 'communist' or 'socialist'; but has the efficiency and accountability of free enterprise as well as social and environmental responsibility. We also believe that such a restructuring would lead to new foreign investment of risk capital in our most important economic sector.

### **Royalty Income, Expenditure and Value of the SAMC: First Order Calculations**

In this section we present two 'back of the envelope' calculations based on the contribution of minerals to the fiscus and the GDP, and on the expenditure of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs. Naturally, our calculations have to be more thoroughly assessed by professional mineral economists for more accurate predictions. In our calculations we do not include the 'national states' in terms of income or the contribution of minerals to the GDP. However we do include these territories of South Africa in terms of the total area, and therefore the figures expressed per hectare are a minimum value.

- (i) Determination of royalties: royalties on minerals could be levied in two ways: (1) on production or (2) on pre-tax profits. Furthermore, the proportions can be at a flat rate or on the basis of a formula related to production and revenue as is currently done for the precious metal mines in South Africa. This is a matter for debate and is itself an influencing factor on the viability of a particular project. The system must also

automatically prevent or minimise 'high-grading' (picking out the eyes or rich bits of ore for a quick profit) or other deleterious or anti-social short term practices such as gold extraction using mercury. In this connection note that very high royalties are counterproductive as they may encourage high-grading, pilfering, smuggling (as is the case for gold and precious stones in South America and East Asia), and discourage large scale or capital intensive mineral development (i.e. of low-grade deposits and base metals generally such as copper, lead, zinc etc.). Therefore, it must be emphasised that the royalty must be set dynamically by statute; and be an essential ingredient of any potential mining lease agreement with the SAMC. For an overview of the problems associated with development of a mine the reader is referred to Gleason & von Christerson (1988). Mining and exploration are long term and risky investments and arbitrary action cannot be tolerated.

Currently in South Africa, royalty-type lease agreements only apply to precious metals and stones and are dependent on the original agreements reached when a specific mine was started. This is called the 'State Share of Profits' and is determined using the formula  $y = a - (ab/x)$  where  $y$  is the State Share of Profits payment,  $x$  is the ratio of profit over revenue expressed as a percentage, and  $a$  &  $b$  are factors that are specific to each mine and were determined when the mine was started. The same type of formula with different  $a$  and  $b$  factors is applied to calculate the income tax of gold mines, whereas all other mines (diamond, platinum, chromite, coal etc.) pay tax at the normal company rate of 50%. Such lease agreements could easily be transferred to the SAMC and could form the basis of all lease agreements with the SAMC.

As shown in Table 1B, in the tax year ending in March 1990, gold mines made state share-of-profits payments of R327 million, diamond mines R29 million and the others (mainly platinum mines) R185 million giving a total of R541 million. The formula tax of the gold mines was R1016 million and the rest contributed a total of R1258 million company tax to the exchequer. This gives a grand total of R2815 million. These figures do *not* include the taxes and other payments levied by the 'independent national states' who have extensive mineral deposits (and which may add a further billion rand in revenue) or by those engaged in quarrying and other activities related to our solid earth mineral endowment. For a further analysis of the tax system applicable to the minerals industry, the reader is referred to Economic Focus (1990b)

- (ii) An estimation of SAMC income and expenditure: If the income of the SAMC is set equal to the total determined above, i.e. R2815 million, and 15% (R422 million) is deducted to finance management and

R&D<sup>3</sup>, this leaves a nett income of R2393 million of which company tax of 50% leaves R1197 million for distribution to the approximately 150 million shares previously calculated. This gives a dividend of approximately R8 per share. At an after tax price to earnings ratio of 10:1, each 1 ha share would be worth approximately R80. These would be exceedingly valuable shares, and the SAMC would have a potential market capitalisation of approximately R24 billion (150 million shares at R160 each using the before tax figures).

It is also of interest that the budget of the DMEA is dominated by 'secret' programmes viz. Nuclear Energy (R713 million) and SOEKOR (R195 million) out of a total budget of R1.1 billion (see Table 1A). These vast expenditures have produced the least visible benefits for South Africa and its people, and illustrate the inefficiency brought about by secrecy and the associated lack of publication of research results and public accountability. It is in such programmes that the cost of simple objects such as a nut or bolt rise to astronomical levels as shown by the American military procurement scandals. Also note that despite this 'squandering', income from the mineral industry accruing to the state exceeds the budget of the DMEA by R1.7 billion.

An alternative calculation would use the contribution of the mineral industry to the economy, and then assigning a portion of that income to the SAMC as a royalty. The mineral wealth of South Africa contributed approximately R37 billion to the GDP in 1989 (Minerals Bureau, 1990). If approximately 7.6% of this were royalties, this would result in an income and expenditure similar to that determined above.

Note that the state would receive a large proportion of the dividends and thus the income from mining would not differ markedly from those currently derived by the state from lease payments and tax. Since the SAMC would also pay tax at the company rate, as well as the state portion of the dividends, the state would derive a significant benefit from the efficiency and profitability of the SAMC and our minerals industry. The state would therefore want an efficient operation free of corruption and patronage of incompetents.

### **Transitional Arrangements**

South Africa's mineral rights system developed over many years and cannot be instantly changed. Some projects near fruition were instituted under those rights and may have involved a significant capital outlay in obtaining the rights. The capital investment in buying rights from the original owners (often after laborious deed searching and negotiations as explained above) cannot be recovered. A sudden imposition of a royalty



may jeopardise a new mine. In the SAMC system this investment would not have to be made, but a royalty would be paid instead.

Therefore transitional arrangements must be negotiated in which the current rights holders and explorationists are not disadvantaged by the changes. This may imply an approximate 10 year transitional period in which some rights would be retained in private hands, and others vested in the SAMC. This is a thorny issue to be negotiated between the current owner, SAMC and the exploration professionals.

All South African freehold properties except undeveloped mineral rights are subject to a form of taxation. Since the income of the SAMC would be subject to Company Tax, we believe that to encourage individuals to vest their rights in the SAMC, undeveloped rights could be taxed just as other property is taxed. This tax would be at the same rate as that imposed on the SAMC profits.

### **The SAMC Concept: Criticisms, Weaknesses and Strengths**

There are potentially strong arguments which could be levelled against any proposals for the nationalisation of mineral rights in South Africa. Such criticism has been articulated in an anonymous report (*Economic Focus*, 1990a). However, von Below (1990) argues otherwise; he believes that nationalisation of mineral rights would be much more economically efficient and more equitable than nationalisation of the mines *per se*. At the outset we reiterate that the SAMC concept does not represent a simple nationalisation of mineral rights: indeed the idea of a State or National minerals corporation was presented as an alternative to nationalisation by confiscation or expropriation. The SAMC is designed to manage the shares created by a change in the *basis* by which we own mineral rights. It is a mechanism to create a free trade in mineral rights, eliminate sterilisation and encourage development.

The SAMC model is clearly in conflict with the new Minerals Bill currently before Parliament. However, in this we are not alone; and we believe we are in good company, both from a political and more important: from an economic viewpoint. Many people are opposed to the new minerals bill; e.g. the major South African mining houses represented in the Chamber of Mines (Cumming, 1989) and The National Union for the Mineworkers (Smith, 1990). Why might this be so? First, we believe this bill does not address the fundamental problems of our mineral rights. Secondly, the current government is committed to negotiating a new dispensation in which minerals are to play a part. The bill pre-empted this negotiating process and as such may well be overturned by a new Parliament. Thirdly, we believe that the Minerals Bill might lead to a proliferation of rights holders, but that it is more likely to lead to further concentration in the hands of large

companies, with attendant further sterilisation, a perception of racism and monopoly practice and hence a greater temptation for some future government to nationalise. We must therefore be in conflict with this bill to have a valid point of view.

*One might legitimately ask whether nationalisation of mineral rights would be complicated by difficulties in ascertaining the value of mineral rights acquired from private owners?* Such a critical analysis would be largely based on the belief that the SAMC concept represents nationalisation by expropriation, which of course it is not. As outlined above, we believe that all mineral rights should have the same value per unit area for the purposes of establishing the new SAMC; this includes the current mines and the mined out areas. This will not affect security of tenure in any way and operating mines would remain as they are. We believe this is the only equitable solution because the value of rights to a specific area are knowledge-and-time dependent. We believe that we were wrong in our initial model (Kruger & de Wit, 1987) to advocate the outright purchase of the mineral rights; we now believe that the basis of ownership should be changed to a share system. The value of existing mines and proven prospects will remain unaffected. Unprospected mineral rights clearly have no definite value and attempts to define value by geological proximity to known deposits may have no scientific basis and discriminate against potentially lucrative rights in currently unfashionable areas. The calculations in the model of price per unit area are based on sound geoscientific principles.

‘What about private business confidence; Could it be perceived that the state would acquire lucrative mineral rights from the mining houses? Would mining companies be expected to explore mining prospects with no guarantee that they could negotiate successful agreements on mineral rights with the state to enable them to exploit any viable deposits which they discover? With mineral rights in the hands of the state, private mining firms may fear that the rights will be taken away from them if mining operations are not started within certain time periods; this could *inter alia* discourage exploration in the mining sector. These fears could indeed prove to be a strong disincentive to the development of the entire mining industry. There is also the danger that mineral rights could be granted for political rather than economic reasons and that the distribution of mineral rights could reflect patronage (Economic Focus, 1990a).

The mining houses, private individuals and the State would all hold shares and appoint the directors of the model SAMC, who would then be accountable to the shareholders. Arbitrary and political actions of the type feared would not be tolerated by any reasonable directorship accountable to

such a diverse shareholding. Furthermore, the SAMC would be a statutory holding company for mineral rights only. It would not prospect or mine them in competition with its shareholders or companies registering mining leases with it. The state could only grant its own shares in the SAMC (a possibility examined below), not those of private or corporate shareholders. Royalty agreements would be fixed *a priori* and discovery would secure security of tenure.

Such systems work well in other overseas countries (viz. Australia & Canada) and in Southern Africa (Botswana, Zimbabwe & Namibia) where South African companies operate. Many of these countries also have a high exploration expenditure, which implies that the exploration companies have great faith in their mineral codes.

The SAMC proposal does not involve total nationalisation, and the large corporations would retain their current holdings in a different form, namely shares in the SAMC based on the area of their current holdings. At the same time, a small mining sector would be encouraged that the larger companies could contribute to by selling any small deposit they discover (and would not find profitable to exploit) to individuals or small cooperatives. Small entrepreneurs would be encouraged to the benefit of the entire South African economy. The SAMC should therefore eliminate sterilisation by large mining companies as well as private individuals, intestate and obscure estates, fragmented and other legally sterilised or complicated holdings as outlined in the consideration of the *status quo*. The onus to prove a mineral right and thereby claim a share of the SAMC would fall on the rights holder, and not the explorer as is currently the case. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a situation in which mineral rights still largely reside in the hands of mining houses because of their desire to remain dominant mining operators and because of their skills in prospecting and developing deposits, would arise. Buying out all the mineral shares in the SAMC would require a very large capital outlay, funds better spent on prospecting the now freely available land. The SAMC would hold all mineral rights in trust and is designed to encourage foreign participation. The fact that the state would own a large share in the SAMC does not change this fact.

In reality, mineral rights as shares would reside in the hands of those with confidence in our mineral development, which would include our large companies but would not be dominated by them since the state would have a large share. Foreign investors would be encouraged as they could easily start exploration programmes and their security of tenure would be guaranteed. We believe that SAMC shares would be sought after by both foreign and local investors in the JSE.

The SAMC would create the conditions needed to increase the rate of minerals discovery in future years in order to avoid losing ground to other large minerals producers simply by eliminating sterilisation and

encouraging a small mining sector. This would surely lead to more production and employment of our well trained miners in the population. In this connection, note that our miners are in fact skilled in many highly demanding tasks, despite illiteracy and language difficulties — *they are not simply unskilled labourers*. As stated by von Below (1990):

'The constant battle with Nature in conditions approaching the limit of human and technological tolerance (virgin rock temperatures of more than 60°C and extreme rock pressures at depths exceeding 4000 m) allows no carelessness or ignorance.'

We believe that our model will encourage more competitive exploration in South Africa — and Africa as a whole — should similar models be adopted elsewhere. Such developments should lead to more finds and cheaper commodities, which after all are the cornerstones of creating greater wealth, since it will encourage other projects such as greater mineral beneficiation and other value added industries. Clearly emphasis should be placed on beneficiation and the SAMC has a role to play here in funding Mintek and research into metallurgy and materials sciences. To become a major supplier of high tech materials based on our minerals production (special steels, alloys, possible superconductors, ceramics etc.) requires a major educational effort in our technikons and universities that the SAMC would support.

The SAMC system proposed here will allow a much more transparent and fair tax system to be implemented than the current somewhat arbitrary system. Poor government and arbitrary taxes cannot be prevented by the current system of mineral rights ownership, or by the SAMC system. This can only be achieved by accountability of government to a informed electorate.

*Can the SAMC concept help in the coming political negotiations?* We believe it can. Before the New South Africa can prosper, simple justice demands that many debts be paid (Terreblanche, 1990). In the case of minerals, many South Africans were denied access to minerals rights since there was, and still is, a historical link to the surface rights. In fact expropriation of farms did not always include the mineral rights. Ownership often remained with the (unknown) rights holder, but jurisdiction was transferred to the 'national state'. This problem, and the problem of the mineral rights of people removed from freehold property under apartheid's laws is not resolved. Those dispossessed of their land (and the mineral rights) must have their rights restored, or some form of compensation must be negotiated.

We require a kind of Jubilee (Leviticus, 25, 13-28) so that equity is restored. How can this be done without severely disrupting our minerals based economy? The debt is a communal one accumulated due to historical factors, and should not be borne by scapegoats. The people who are now

returning to their confiscated land may demand back their mineral rights as well. However, these may since have been acquired in good faith, and may be productive. We believe that the SAMC model allows these dilemmas to be resolved. For example, a community claiming back mineral rights, productive or unproductive, could be given equivalent shares which would provide a good income. According to our calculations an approximate 1000 ha farm would provide approximately R8000 annually to the community, or, if they sell their shares, they would receive approximately R80,000 capital for the community. In this way, no specific person suffers a loss, but the debt is repaid by the entire nation. In fact the large State share of mineral rights could be devolved on to the dispossessed communities as a source of capital or income — a socially based privatisation or 'communitisation' — to coin a word.

*Can the SAMC concept help government privatise?* We believe it can, and in so doing create a unique mutually beneficial working relationship between the State and the minerals industry. Should the SAMC concept be adopted, the Geological Survey, Minerals Bureau, Mintek, Chamber of Mines Research Organisation (COMRO) and that part of the Government Mining Engineers office could be included. This would amount to a partial privatisation of the DMEA, which would then be funded in a much more directed and rational way by those it serves. These departments and organisations would become much more efficient, and thus serve the interests of the country better. Squandering of public and private funds (on unproductive projects such as the Nuclear Energy programme) would not be allowed by responsible directors of the SAMC.

*Finally, can the SAMC concept encourage investment in our minerals industry?* Again, we believe it can. For example, to encourage investment, it could be a requirement that shares equal to the proposed prospecting area be acquired. This would encourage a buoyant and brisk trade in SAMC shares on the JSE. In this connection, note that the Vancouver Stock Exchange in Canada is almost entirely based on venture capital for mineral exploration and development. Furthermore, South African mining companies who now hold substantial mineral rights in South Africa would not disinvest as they would receive the right to explore on holdings equivalent to their current holdings, but would have to move their prospecting operations on a continuous basis. They would gain great flexibility, and save large capital amounts now required for securing mineral rights.

## **Conclusion**

We present the SAMC concept for debate and critical examination by all who wish to be involved in the development and utilisation of mineral wealth in the New South Africa. The current system of rights ownership perpetuates an inequitable system and will militate against a democratic,

prosperous and stable New South Africa. It has to be replaced by a negotiated dispensation based on rational principles. We feel that our best interests would be served by a minerals industry rooted in the new South African democracy, where both the private and the public sector have a stake in the common good.

On the world stage we are going to face stiffer competition from countries with similar problems to our own, and if we fail to make the human investment in high level manpower, we will fail to compete — to our detriment. Our Universities and Technikons must be encouraged to maintain high standards and increase their output of earth — and materials — scientists and technicians. Clearly, the pursuit of excellence, imaginative thinking, and a high professional standard at these institutions is vital. This can only be sustained if these workers and our miners are restored to the 'heroic' status enjoyed when our mineral industry was developing (Gleason & von Christierson, 1988).

**Table 1:** Relevant data pertaining to the Minerals Industry

**(A) Budget of the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs**

For the year ending March 1991 (DMEA figures R1000s)

Administration	11,908	Nuclear Energy	712,700
Assistance to Mines	63,173	SOEKOR	194,129
Mintek	50,177	Other Energy Related	37,432
Geological Survey	21,822	Nuclear Safety	6,653
Gvt Mining Engineer	16,409	Pensions etc.	5,627
Mining Commissioner	4,032	Coal Research	5,600
Minerals Bureau	3,076	Training etc.	,872
<hr/>			
Total: R1,133,610 (March, 1990 Rands)			

**(B) State income for year ending March 1990 (Dept. of Finance)**

State share of profits (Royalty)		Income and formula tax (Tax)	
Gold	327,000,000	Gold	1016,000,000
Diamonds	29,000,000	Diamonds	11,000,000
Others	185,000,000	Others	1247,000,000
Total	<u>R541,000,000</u>		<u>R2274,000,000</u>
Grand Total R2815,000,000			

**(C) Contribution of Minerals to the Economy in 1989 Rands**

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Total GDP	211,000 million	(Reserve Bank, 1989)
Total exports	51,000 million	(Mintek, 1989)
Total mineral sales	37,126 million	(Minerals Bureau, 1990)
Mineral Exports	29,365 million	(Minerals Bureau, 1990)
Wages & Salaries	9,544 million	(Minerals Bureau, 1990)

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**Figure 1** Abjaterskop 107 KP showing the subdivisions and mineral rights holdings


**ABJATERSKOP 107 Kp district: Marico**

AREA OF ORIGINAL GRANT 3823-8530 ha

O.S 342 fol 15

NOW IN BOPUTHATSWANA

**FIG 1**




CON	AREA HA	DEED OF TRANSFER	SURFACE RIGHTS OWNER
RE	801-8603	T 3741/72	Jacoba Johanna VENTER (7/11/06) Dorm LIEBENBERG WIDOW Johanna SOPHIA NORDIN (28/8/33) Dorm VENTER married in N. RHODESIA FRANKINA Hendrina Bernadina de WAAL (14/8/35) Dorm VENTER married I.C.O.P.
1	753-7462	T 4425/78	PHILLIPS Jacob WELFMAN (16/10/87)
RE2	353-0154	T 31447/64	Charles-Johannes NIEHAUS (2/11/20) Jacobus Johanna NIEHAUS (5/7/20)
3	753-7462	T 25084/61	as for RE 2 ABOVE
4	752-7462	T 19853/37	Jacoba Johanna VENTER (7/11/06)
6	400-7328	T 32080/77	Izak Bernard NIEHAUS (24/12/23)
<b>MINERAL RIGHTS</b>			
RE	FLB (3)	CHTH (1/2)	KFW (1/2) SA (1/2)
1	FLB (3)	CHTH (1/2)	KFW (1/2) SA (1/2)
RE2	FLB (3)		SA ESTATE (1/2)
3	FLB (3)		SA (1/2)
4	FLB (3)	CHTH (1/2)	KFW (1/2) SA (1/2)
6	FLB (3)		SA (1/2)
<b>NOTES - APPLICABLE TO ALL MINERALS</b>			
FLB FRANCIS ROUS BIGGARO		SR SURFACE OWNER	
CHTH CARL HARMAN THEODOR HOEVENER			
KFW HART FRIEDRICH WOLFF			
<b>ESTATE NEL Stefanus Johannes NEL #574/63</b>			
<b>MR 320/64 EXECUTORS (Kant Campbell &amp; Maltz - Pretoria)</b>			
(1) Lucas Cornelius NEL (25/11/23)			
(2) Jacomina Hendrina Christina MARSHALL bn NEL (27/4/25)			
(3) Stephanus Johannes NEL (31/10/28)			
(4) Lambertus Rudolph NEL (30/5/38)			
(5) Cornelius Casparus Sutherland NEL (24/2/27)			



**Figure 2** Kromdraai 209JR showing the complex subdivision.

Each subdivision can have multiple mineral rights ownership. Black areas are iron deposits, and Vergenoeg mine is a fluorite deposit.



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### ENDNOTES

1. For a review of different mineral codes, see Brown (1986), Drolet (1975) and Campbell (1980). Contrasting views of the situation in the western U.S.A. are provided by Burford (1990) and Hocker (1990) who argue for and against changes to accommodate new social forces, respectively. Changes to the Ontario minerals legislation have also provoked heated debate (e.g. Malouf, 1990).
2. *Sterilisation* is defined as the prevention of access to mineral rights for exploration purposes by whatever means.
3. In the budget of the DMEA (Table 1A), Administration, Geological Survey, Mintek, Minerals Bureau, Mining Commissioner, coal research, assistance to the mines and SOEKOR and the Government Mining Engineer are allocated a total of approximately R350 million. This leaves approximately R72 million of the original R422 million estimated, of which R30 million are earmarked for development of high level manpower in tertiary institutions in the fields of the geosciences, metallurgy and ecology. The rest should be used to increase the effectiveness of the departments listed here as well as to fund organisations such as the Chamber of Mines Research Organisation.

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## **SADCC: Part of whole or whole of a part?**

### **1. Introduction**

The framework for analysis in this paper is regime theory. Oran Young's regime definitions and typologies are used to explore the relationship existing between the SADCC states themselves, and between South Africa and seven of the SADCC states, who still maintain close economic ties. Regime theory uniquely describes the relations between actors in the region, where two regimes can be seen to be in operation. The first is SADCC, defined as a negotiated regime of the piecemeal variety, and the second may be defined broadly as an imposed regime, with South Africa as the hegemon and the SADCC countries as the subordinate actors. In this article regime theory provides the method of analysis by which the strength of convergent interests in the region may be ascertained, as well as highlighting the functioning of shared economic and other interests, which cause fixed patterns of behaviour. The fact that economic ties between SADCC states and South Africa are as strong, if not stronger than they were before the creation of SADCC, indicates that there are powerful binding interests, particularly on the economic level, between the SADCC states and South Africa.<sup>1</sup> Regime analysis emphasises why these links remain so strong, and the implications thereof for SADCC.

It is necessary to define Young's three regime typologies briefly before analysing the strength of the two regimes which may be seen to be in operation in southern Africa. His typologies also serve to explain the organisational relationship between SADCC states and between South Africa and SADCC.

### **2. Definition of Regimes and Regime Typologies**

Before explaining Young's regime typologies, it must be mentioned that

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the concept of a regime as a method of analysis has been criticized, because of the tendency to reify interaction, and because the regime concept had become something of a 'Jack of all Trades' (Strange:1982)(Haas:1982). However the regime framework concept is used here as a method of analysis to examine the SADCC organisation in much the same way that Keohane uses it to draw conclusions on the role of the U.S. in the energy, trade and monetary regimes which functioned internationally between 1967 and 1977. He states,

'Rather than an explanation of particular events, in which idiosyncratic and frequently random factors have played a role, the focus is on a pattern of events — not on particular bargaining outcomes but on what a pattern of bargaining outcomes reveals about implicit norms and rules in world politics. Fragments of political behaviour take on additional meaning when thought of in terms of regimes: they are part of a larger mosaic, a context within which they become intelligible' (Keohane:1980:134)

Oran Young uses regime typologies to narrow down the conceptualism of a regime (Young:1982). For the purposes of this analysis his typologies will be used to classify SADCC. Regime theorists agree (to varying degrees) on the broad definition of regimes as given by Young, that is, '...recognised patterns of behaviour or practise around which interests converge' (Young:1982:277). This definition will be used as a starting point in which to conceptualise regimes as frameworks within which participatory actors interact, and which form part of the international socio-economic totality.

Krasner's more detailed definition incorporates the idea of a rather more ordered pattern of behaviour in which '...implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures...' shape decision-making within the regime framework (Keeley:1990:81). However this definition does tend to reify the concept of a regime framework around a specific pattern of shared ethics and procedures. Young's three regime typologies on the other hand, show how patterns of behaviour may overlap, and that regimes themselves may overlap, leading to the sharing of different ethics and decision making procedures which may be both contradictory and complementary. Fluidity is therefore an important part of regime analysis. If this factor is emphasised the danger of treating regimes as reified state-centric structures can be avoided. Keeley, in his Foucauldian regime analysis, explains the fluidity of regime structures,

'If issues can be connected, then regimes may overlap, spread and compete along these connections and may merge with, absorb, or be absorbed by other regimes'<sup>2</sup> (Keeley:1990:95)

## **2.1. The Regime Typologies**

Young's typologies provide the theoretical dimension with which to analyse the SADCC organisation and its interaction in the southern African and international contexts. The fluidity of the typologies allows the

complexity of the southern African situation to be explained in terms of overlapping and often conflicting interests in the region.

Young cautions against the use of these typologies as absolute clear cut entities, stating that the three types of regimes, spontaneous, imposed and negotiated, are not mutually exclusive. Because regimes are dynamic '...any attempt to classify international regimes rigidly in terms of my three categories is apt to distort reality and produce confusion rather than increase understanding' (Young:1982:286). Thus his regime typologies are, as the regime concept itself, a means of perceiving a given aspect of reality in such a way that it can be understood in terms of convergent interests and corresponding patterns of behaviour. It may be postulated that every international regime is part of the totality of the international socio-economic setting.

SADCC fits loosely into Young's typology of a negotiated regime. This framework of interests is characterised by its conscious design, and the explicit consent on the part of the participants who make a formal expression of expected results. Although some negotiated orders may be comprehensive, that is: as a result of careful and orderly negotiation, conflict or the fear thereof may cause some orders to rely on piecemeal negotiation. In other words, problems are worked out empirically according to practise and precedent. This defining characteristic of the typology would seem to square with the organisation of SADCC. The organisational structure of SADCC, which is characterised by an absence of formal interactive institutions (other than the Secretariat) and piecemeal design (sector development<sup>3</sup>) allow it to be classified as a negotiated order of the piecemeal variety.

Young defines two other typologies. Spontaneous regimes, he states, are, as Hayek put it, ... the product of the actions of many men but...not the result of human design' (Young:1982:282). He states further,

'Such institutions are distinguished by the facts that they do not involve conscious co-ordination amongst participants, do not require explicit consent on the part of subjects or prospective subjects, and are highly resistant to efforts at social engineering' (Young:1982:282).

The third typology which Young outlines is that of an imposed regime. The dynamics of such orders are to be understood in terms of power. Coercion and incentives are used by the dominant power to obtain the co-operation of the other actors. However coercion, in successful imposed regimes, is not used on a continuous basis. This typology shares common ground with the structuralist hegemonic stability theory.<sup>4</sup>

In the southern African context the relationship between South Africa and SADCC displays many of the characteristics of an imposed regime, according to the above definitions, for example the use of coercion and

incentives. However, the imposed regime existing between South Africa and SADCC also has many of the characteristics of the spontaneous regime typology, in that many of the interactions on the economic and political level are not organised or comprehensive, nor do they have the explicit consent of the subordinate actors (SADCC states). The relations between South Africa and SADCC may thus also be seen in the context of a spontaneous order which is maintained because of convergent economic interests amalgamating around a pattern of behaviour. However, in keeping with the definition of a spontaneous regime, these interests have not been formally articulated.<sup>5</sup> At the same time South Africa has used both tangible and intangible resources to manipulate the subordinate SADCC states. Thus the relationship existing between SADCC and South Africa may be loosely defined as a spontaneous imposed order.

The definition of these two regimes in the southern African region, which overlap and contradict one another, places the SADCC regime and its goals into perspective. The conflicting interests around convergent expectations result in the two regimes working both in tandem and in conflict. The framework of interests around which the SADCC states have developed their economic and political relations are aimed specifically at reducing dependence on South Africa. However economic relations between all the SADCC states and South Africa, except Tanzania and Angola, continue. Thus the interests which give rise to each regime are essentially conflictual, although the two regimes continue to function, but within different frameworks of interests. However, which of the two regimes has the greater long term strength in terms of these convergent economic interests? Do the contradictions existing between the two regimes point to any major changes to either of the regime frameworks in the future?

### **3. The Negotiated Versus The Imposed Regime**

To examine the strength of the SADCC regime it is necessary to look briefly at the goals the regime has set out to achieve. These were ostensibly undertaken to promote independence, unity and 'equitable regional integration' in the region, but the exclusion of South Africa gave the organisation a profoundly political orientation. The goals are:

- 1) Economic independence, particularly but not only from South Africa.
- 2) Forging links to create genuine equitable regional integration.
- 3) Effective mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies.
- 4) Action to ensure international co-operation within the framework of SADCC's strategy to achieve economic liberation (Kongwa:1987:2).

It is impossible to discuss fully all of the above goals for reasons of space, so the first goal will be discussed with reference to the other three. The



strength of regime ties between the SADCC countries, and between SADCC and South Africa in terms of fixed patterns of behaviour around convergent interests, will be used to determine objectively which of the two frameworks holds the greater structural long term strength.

Economic co-operation, according to Venter and Geldenhuys, implies a cooperative but informal set of relations between states which rely on dialogue to resolve grievances. Economic integration on the other hand, implies specific action to abolish discriminatory measures, or an absence of discriminatory measures among national economies (Venter and Geldenhuys:1979:37). According to Venter and Geldenhuys, of the forms of integration between states, the lowest level of integration is a free trade area agreement, followed by a customs union agreement, entailing a higher level of integration, and finally a common market type of agreement which entails the highest level of economic and political integration.

Because of SADCC's loose organisational framework, where individual countries are given responsibility for the development of various sectors, and where the only formal organisational structure is the Secretariat, there is consequently a low level of integration. This precludes any formal relinquishing of national sovereignty. This means that 'economic independence' in the region is especially difficult to achieve, in terms of cutting or diminishing ties with South Africa and the West.

The question which arises from the above conclusion is what steps have been taken towards the goal of economic independence? Although some success has been achieved in improving the transport network in the region, these links tend to reinforce economic ties with the West. In terms of SADCC's fourth goal there has been a great deal of financial assistance from the West which has been used mainly to better the transport infrastructure and also for projects in the individual countries.<sup>6</sup> However with regard to the goals of 'economic independence' and 'equitable regional integration' South Africa's continued economic and political dominance shows the weakness of convergent economic interests in SADCC. The organisation's functioning in terms of the main 'economic independence' goal will be examined in order to substantiate this conclusion.

#### **4. Dependence Despite 'Independence' Rhetoric**

SADCC's economic interaction with South Africa is economically asymmetrical. Seven of the nine SADCC countries have a greater proportional reliance on South Africa in terms of transport, trade, energy and investment than with each other (Davids:1986:10).

The degree to which infrastructure is linked in the region emphasises the long term nature of the southern African region's economic links with South Africa. In terms of physical infrastructure, South African capital is tied to railway and hydroelectric plans and to railway construction: for

example the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric scheme in Mozambique and Cunene in Angola, as well as railway and construction schemes in Angola, Malawi and Swaziland (Chitala:1987). Chitala outlines some of the difficulties involved in trying to break from South Africa's railway and port network. Besides rebel group interference, the TANZAM railway route '...suffers from a low capacity of the harbour at Dar-es-Salaam and is also hampered by poor administration and maintenance' (Chitala:1987:22). The Maputo and Beira rail links in Mozambique also suffer from '...the problem of worn down tracks, manpower shortage, lack of locomotives and rolling stock, inefficiency and frequent sabotage attacks carried out by the MNR' (Chitala:1987:22). Although transport and communications links have improved through SADCC's projects (implemented through the Southern African Transport and Communications Conference [SATCC] which is based in and controlled by the Mozambican government) the obstacles facing the improvement of both rail and port facilities are hampered by structural obstacles. Thus although sector implementation continues, so too does the reliance on South Africa's rail and port links.<sup>7</sup>

Those SADCC countries linked to South Africa infrastructurally, and in terms of trade, maintain these ties because the pattern of relations within which the economic interests of the countries converge are economically compatible within a spontaneous imposed regime framework, as the subordinate actors still gain financially. These interests dominate the politically based alternatives offered by the SADCC framework. Political and economic coercion from South Africa contributes to the prevention of alternative patterns of behaviour arising. These conclusions are well substantiated by the SADCC states' domestic economic and political practices, the discussion of which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article.<sup>8</sup> However a brief discussion of trade relations in the region supports the above assertion. An analysis of the trade relations also puts paid to the idea that South Africa maintains economic hegemony in the region by force only. The convergence of economic interests perpetuates the spontaneous imposed regime in spite of SADCC's rhetoric.

#### **4.1. Trade Relations**

Although the level of dependence differs, Davids points out that dependence on trade with South Africa varies from about 12% of total Mozambican trade to 95% of total trade with Lesotho. South Africa plays, therefore, the role of leading trading partner with all of the SADCC countries, with the exception of Angola and Tanzania (see table). Political theorists differ on whether this trade is important to South Africa. Davids states '...it is likely that in the next few years the southern African markets will become even more crucial to South Africa as protectionism and sanctions in the western industrial economies take hold' (Davids:1986:13).

Kiljunen, however, states that trade with SADCC is, for South Africa, not very important. Less than 7% of South Africa's total exports and 4% of her imports take place with African countries. However the importance of the ties in terms of the method of analysis used in this article, points to the conclusion that the interests of the SADCC countries and South Africa have, through historical and geographical links, converged economically and become fixed even if not formally articulated. The analyses of the SADCC states' domestic economic situations substantiate this conclusion empirically. Thus the economic regime functions not only in terms of present interests but also because of the causal factors which gave rise to the spontaneous imposed regime. These factors function to perpetuate the regime in terms of a 'feedback mechanism' as elucidated by Keohane in his analysis of regime perpetuation (Keohane:1980). In the case of southern Africa, the trade ties developed during the colonial days have given rise to the economic regime which exists between South Africa and seven of the nine SADCC countries. The ties are developments from the colonial system in terms of economic links and infrastructure. These causal or 'feedback' mechanisms are significantly related to the extension of capitalism in the region.<sup>9</sup> As analyses of the domestic situations of the SADCC countries show, southern Africa fits into the world system of capitalism through its historic relations with South Africa and/or with the western market economy.

**Table: South African Trade with Africa, 1980-1985**

Country	Million US\$											
	Imports from South Africa						Exports to South Africa					
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Angola		206					33					
Botswana					530	447					61	44
Lesotho			508						16		17	
Malawi	163	116	106	120	109	104	9	14	14	18	23	22
Mauritius	83	53	41	38	38	45	3	6	4	3	3	1
Mozambique						76						8
Reunion	54	42	43									
Seychelles	10	10	9	8	7	4						
Swaziland					399					94		
Zaire	42	38	30									
Zambia	173		145		129		7		3		5	
Zimbabwe		362	331	238	221	170		283	190	176	214	111
<hr/>												
	Exports to Africa						Imports from Africa					
S. Africa	1412	1186	834	717	616	710	371	362	305	290	284	207
<hr/>												
Quoted in Leistner E: 1987: 168												

Within the context of the functional approach to regime interaction applied to the relationship between SADCC and South Africa, it may be said that on the economic level they interact because of individual self-interest. However the existence of military destabilisation and the moral stance that the SADCC states take against apartheid (as well as the reluctance to interact with South Africa because of her political policies) make these relations strained and economically dysfunctional. Economic interaction, although functional in the sense that it is in the interests of the SADCC countries in terms of their interaction with the world economy, is dysfunctional insofar as they remain recipients of the effects of South Africa's discriminatory form of government. This includes the very real economic and political costs of South African destabilisation, especially in the case of Mozambique and Angola. The cessation of hostilities between South Africa and SADCC; a possibility which has become more feasible since the coming to power of F.W. de Klerk and the subsequent political progress made in South Africa, could however indicate that these relations may eventually become more functionally orientated. The fact remains that, even when these relations were dysfunctional, the SADCC countries economic interests were such that they did not break these ties. South Africa's strength, politically and economically, also prevented SADCC from breaking or even diminishing links.

### **5. The Strength of the Spontaneous Imposed Economic Regime**

Leistner illustrates how South Africa's economy dominates the region. It has a GNP that accounts for 79% of the region's total. Furthermore, South Africa's income in 1985 was 13 times that of Mozambique, 4 times that of Zambia and almost 3 times that of Zimbabwe (Leistner:1986:149). According to Keohane, a specific relationship arises between the hegemon and the subordinate actors in a regime,

'Both hegemonic powers and the smaller states may have incentives to collaborate in maintaining a regime — the hegemonic power gains the ability to shape and dominate its environment, while providing a sufficient flow of benefits to small and middle powers to persuade them to acquiesce' (Keohane:1980:137).

In the South African context, threats to the regime framework by the subordinate actors are dealt with by varying degrees of political and economic manipulation. However, the use of coercion and incentives is not inconsistent with this type of order. It does not require the explicit consent of the participants. For most of the SADCC states, interruptions to trade relations would negatively affect their economies, especially the BLS states. Furthermore, because of the region's isolation and South Africa's dominance in all economic sectors, it is difficult to envisage economic independence from South Africa. Mandaza states,

'Logically a liberated South Africa would become the economic, political and strategic base for a future SADCC, regardless of the organisation's attitude towards international capital' (Mandaza:1987:210).

Edgren explains the relationship which exists in imposed orders in a more structural sense. Vulnerability and sensitivity are two effects of asymmetrical interdependence. Sensitivity, arising from the tactics of development of individual states may not be affected by foreign aid and direct investment. However vulnerability, from long term structural factors, i.e. natural resource endowments and geographical location, may cause long standing and virtually indestructible effects with regard to asymmetrical interdependence (Edgren:1985:5). This is particularly relevant to SADCC and South Africa, because all the SADCC states are to varying degrees vulnerable to South Africa's dominant and diverse economy and geographical proximity. It is logical that the SADCC states need to reduce dependence by increasing economic diversity and trade ties, but that this goal is thwarted by the factors which give rise to the vulnerability in the first place.

South Africa also provides a link with western markets, and also serves as an outpost for these markets in terms of multinational corporations within South Africa. This fact substantiates the conclusion that the dominant economic regime in the region, between South Africa and SADCC, is reinforced by the dependency patterns which link the region to the Western capitalist system.

## **6. Inequitable Equality, or 'What is Possible'**

What has been done to promote the goal of 'equitable regional integration?' It is evident that to reduce dependence on South Africa, this goal, together with the first, is vital to the success of the organisation. Regional economic integration has been pursued with a deliberate emphasis on the retention of individual sovereignty. SADCC maintains that organisational structures need to be loose and informal, '...as facilitating and consequential rather than causative forces or ends in themselves.' (Anglin:1983:691). SADCC has insisted that it is a co-operative organisation only, and that the loose organisational structure and lean bureaucracy are results of lessons learned from the failure of economic organisations in Africa which attempted close integration, such as the East African Community (SADCC Conference papers:1987). Thus SADCC's unique character is said to be defined by its commitment to identifying projects of 'national interest'. However in terms of convergent interests within the regime framework it would appear that national and regional interests are not always compatible. Mandaza points out that,

'sovereignty expresses itself in the fear of domination by regional influentials, the problem of sovereignty cannot be divorced from uneven and unequal development which was sparked off by colonialism and relates to present relations of dependence' (Mandaza:1987:216).

Thus the interests of the SADCC countries converge rather amorphously around individual national development. There is a very low level of formalised economic interaction in terms of sector approach to regional economic development, as the sectors are made the responsibility of one state only, and the sectors' organisational structures are kept small. The sectors must reflect economic involvement in the goals of the regime. This is not always forthcoming, as it does not always feature as a priority which is in the immediate economic interests of the particular individual country (Anglin:1983). This is substantiated by the slow rate of progress in sector development. As the 1987 Gabarone Conference made clear, transport featured as top priority, with aid being channelled chiefly into this sector.<sup>10</sup> The only other sector to receive significant attention from both SADCC members and donors, was energy and food security, which had just concluded its planning stages (SADCC Conference Papers:1987).

Sectoral responsibility is further constrained by the fact that the SADCC countries wish to keep the organisation of sectors subordinate to the SADCC framework itself. This has constrained the development of sectors, for example, the attempt by Angola to organise an Energy Commission similar to SATCC. SATCC was established by Mozambique before SADCC, and is said to have a more organised Secretariat than SADCC itself (Anglin:1983). However Angola's attempt to do the same in the field of energy met with resistance. Anglin states '...SADCC is suspicious of the tendency to promote 'little empires' within sectors' (Anglin:1983:696).

## Conclusion

The support of the Frontline States for the South African liberation struggle and their political stance against Apartheid remains a constant dominant political feature of both of the economic regimes' interaction. However, the strength of the spontaneous imposed regime would seem to lie in the fact that the reasons for its existence are historically based, that is, as a result of long standing economic and infrastructural links. These ties of economic interdependence are perpetuated by the fact that they are rooted in the socio-economic totality of capitalism. Hence the spontaneous imposed regime structure which dominates is tied to the socio-economic reality of which all the southern African countries are part, even though political factors cause the regime to perform dysfunctionally.

The fact that the SADCC countries and South Africa remain economically intertwined has further implications for SADCC's future in the long term. Developments in South Africa since the coming to power of

F W. de Klerk have raised the possibility of political compromise between the recently unbanned ANC and the National Party government. As already mentioned, SADCC has a profoundly political disinclination to maintain any formal ties with South Africa because of Apartheid. Aid to SADCC has also been directed largely as an anti-apartheid gesture of support on the part of most western countries. The dismantling of Apartheid and a new political and economic dispensation in South Africa will remove the political motive for SADCC's first and most important goal and may also cause an ebb in the flow of aid from western countries. Changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union may contribute to the shift of support from the southern African region to those in Eastern Europe who have denounced communism.

The conclusion that the spontaneous imposed regime is stronger than SADCC, despite SADCC's opposition to South African ties, indicates that the development of formal ties with South Africa in the post-Apartheid era is virtually certain. This, however, is subject to the type of settlement reached and whether it receives significant support from the majority of the members of the Organisation of African Unity. The Deputy President of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, has, since his release, publicly stated that a new era of co-operation has begun in the region. The fact that interests between the SADCC countries converging around present goals will be largely irrelevant once South Africa's political policies have changed means that the SADCC regime is heading either towards regime disintegration, or to an inclusion of South Africa, which will necessitate a fundamental restructuring of goals and attitudes towards economic integration. The latter option, in the light of Kenneth Kaunda's speech at the 1990 SADCC conference, which postulated the inclusion of South Africa in SADCC, seems a strong possibility. However South Africa's historical role as the dominant economic actor in the region will shape the structure of political and economic co-operation regardless of what form of negotiated regime is eventually worked out.

#### ENDNOTES

- 1 The Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) idea of former South African President P W. Botha can be seen as the abortive formal move to place these economic and political relations on a more open and formally institutionalised foundation. This was however not the first of the initiatives made by South Africa towards closer collaboration. Since General Smuts first voiced the idea of a 'mini League of Nations', South Africa has entertained the ideal of formalising economic and political co-operation in southern Africa. The motivation behind this, from Smuts to Botha, has remained consistent, namely to secure political and economic stability for white-ruled South Africa.
- 2 Keeley's analysis specifically focuses on the power/knowledge concept as used by Foucault. The discourse referred to, according to Keeley's definition, is a form of knowledge embodying not only theory but at the same time being connected to social practice (Keeley 91 1990).

- 3 Sector development is based on co-operation between SADCC states within a given sphere of development, i.e. agriculture, mining and industry etc., co-operation between states on various projects within these spheres is worked out through practice and precedent. Projects must gain the support of members to reach implementation and completion.
- 4 Analyses such as Keohane's and Krasner's on the United States and the international economic order attempt to explain the relationship between the tangible (economic) and intangible (psychological) resources of the hegemon and the subordinate actors in the regime. While Keohane did not decisively conclude that tangible power resources are essential for the dominance of the regime, he showed that hegemonic actors use their tangible and intangible power resources to manipulate the other lesser endowed actors in the regime framework (Keohane 1980).
- 5 This statement refers to the SADCC states as a whole. The Southern African Customs Union, formally organised between South Africa and the BLS countries is an obvious exception.
- 6 The 1987 and 1988 SADCC Conference papers provide a detailed breakdown of project initiation, progress and financing.
- 7 For a comprehensive analysis of SADCC's infrastructural and transport situation see Kennedy T L, *Transport in Southern Africa*, SAIIA, 1988.
- 8 A country by country analysis of the SADCC states undertaken in 'SADCC part of a whole or a cover?' substantiates this conclusion (Rhodes University, 1989, unpublished).
- 9 For a thorough analysis of the links which have been perpetuated through multinational corporations, see Amin S, Chitala D and Mandaza I (eds), *SADCC Prospects for disengagement and development in Southern Africa*.
- 10 According to the 1990 SADCC Conference report made by Quett Masire (re-elected president of SADCC) the Beira and Maputo corridors have had a traffic increase of 16% and 21% respectively over the last two years (Cape Times 27 Aug 1990).

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## BOOK REVIEW

### THE WAR FOR AFRICA – TWELVE MONTHS THAT TRANSFORMED A CONTINENT

*Fred Bridgland, 1990 Ashanti Publishing Limited, Gibraltar, 403 pages (including Maps, Select Bibliography & Index), ISBN 1 874800 12 X, R59,95.*

Fred Bridgland is one of England's most gifted and experienced foreign correspondents. He is currently southern African correspondent for *The Sunday Telegraph*. Previously he was a *Reuter* correspondent based in New Delhi, Beirut and Lusaka. While based in the decaying Zambian capital of Lusaka he blew the cover of the 1975 US/South African engineered military invasion of Angola. Bridgland subsequently joined *The Scotsman*, Scotland's national newspaper, for which he reported principally on European affairs from Brussels before becoming diplomatic correspondent in the British capital.

*The War for Africa* is the author's fourth book. His first, *Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa*, published in 1986, won wide critical acclaim. His work has also appeared in a number of prestigious newspapers and news magazines, among these the *Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, *The Times*, *The Economist* and *Newsweek*. A documentary film he made on the Angolan civil war was screened by the BBC, CBS, West German Television, NHK TV of Japan and Swedish TV.

Part of a new fifteen part series entitled 'South Africans at War', *The War for Africa*, offers much in terms of dramatic description, pictorial impact and refreshing background to one of the most important potential turning points in the affairs of southern Africa.

Bridgland dissects how one of the biggest wars in recent African history sprang from profound disagreements between the ruling MPLA Party of Angola and its Cuban and Soviet patrons. Miscalculations and unnerving military and political crises on the part of South Africa and Cuba are uncovered. The reader learns more of the background to early South African military successes in the immense and nightmarish Angolan bush. This absorbing account of the Cuban-South African clash in Angola – especially in 1987–88 – almost amounts to an unofficial story of the war. Almost, because it lacks compositional balance, especially in its portrayal of the war as seen and experienced by the Cubans and the Angolans.

This absorbing and at times cavalier account of the civil (uncivil) war in Angola as well as of foreign intervention vindicates American historian Barbara Tuchman's evocative phrase – 'War is the unfolding of miscalculation'. Equally, one cannot escape recalling Tennessee Williams' words: 'Life is a terrifying experience, but oblivion is sadder'.

In a surrealistic prologue to the war, Bridgland recounts how he uncovered Washington and Pretoria's curiously hidden war in Angola in 1975. Intensely personal, the author's account of Angola's inexorable drift towards an even more internationalised conflict, offers much in the form of vignettes of key military personae – Soviet General Konstantin Shaganovitch and Cuban generals Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez and Rafael Del Pinto Diaz, for example.

Part 1 of the book (Chapters 1–4) deals with Soviet General Shaganovitch's offensive against UNITA and its South African backers in the general area of Mavinga, along the Lomba river in the south-east of Angola and around the Chaminga high ground near the town of Cuito Cuanavale. Focusing heavily on the SADF's counter-offensive, the author highlights the economic and politico/diplomatic constraints surrounding military and operational strategy in the Angolan theatre. The surrogate relationship with Jonas Savimbi's UNITA rebels is realistically drawn, so is the political and strategic costs that flowed from this relationship. A map complete with cigar-smoking Cubans and South African pipe-smoking forces wearing bush hats (not to mention menacing tanks and aircraft) adds an additional dimension to the powerful rendition. Although, for my liking, there is an element of theatricality about most of the maps – as if it was a case of war games...

Part 2 is devoted to 'The Defence' and gives a detailed account of South African, South West African [SWATF and 32 Battalion] and UNITA deployment and tactics. Somewhat mechanical in its rendition, one learns of the operations of the elusive recce teams, of confused UNITA intelligence and the personal anxieties of the men in battle.

Parts 4–9 sketch the inferno of war on the ground and in the air, analyse the military stalemate beyond the strategic Lomba river and graphically paint the cataclysmic events around Cuito Cuanavale and the town of Menongue. For those interested in the personal accounts of fighting men and their frustrations with slick politicians, this part of the book offers vivid descriptions of tactical battles and frustrated strategic initiatives.

With the onset of battle fatigue and post-traumatic stress on both sides, the mysterious rituals of diplomacy began to reassert themselves in the person of the unassuming Chester Crocker, US Permanent Under-Secretary for African Affairs. Skilfully applying his 'synthesis technique', based on a process developed by Roger Fisher and Herman Kelman, Crocker nudged the various parties to the conference table. Jaw-jaw began to supplant war-war. Vindicating the immortal words of the finest statesmen of the nineteenth century, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand: 'War is much too serious a thing to be left to military men'.

This sober account of the last twelve months of the Angolan campaign impresses in parts with its candour, vividness and debunking of the

invincibility of fighting men and their machines. Principally concerned with and dedicated to field commanders, it adds to our understanding of the 'year-long War for Africa'. But, it is also disturbing for it chronicles so vividly the seductiveness of war, the duplicity of politicians and the near-impenetrable mark that cloaked the politics of southern Africa over the last decade and a half. To launch a major series on 'South Africans at War' at a time in the history of this country still at war with itself, must surely raise more than an ethical issue....

André du Pisani  
Jan Smuts House

## Letter to the Editor

**A response to Prof. John Dugard's Smuts House Notes in Bulletin No.2 of 1990, by Donald Sole, a distinguished, retired career diplomat in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and among other appointments, former Ambassador to the United States.**

### **What's to be done with Walvis Bay?**

In his Smuts House Notes (International Affairs Bulletin, Vol.14. No.2, 1990) Prof. John Dugard claims that 'South Africa's own interests would be best served by a speedy re-integration of Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands into Namibia'.....'It would be unfortunate if the dispute... were permitted to obstruct South Africa's full acceptance by the international community.....Sound legal arguments rooted in international law of the colonial era cannot in the long run compete with United Nations-backed "new international law"'.

Since Prof. Dugard's comments were published, President Sam Nujoma of Namibia has reiterated his country's claims to Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands (claims which are embodied in Namibia's constitution), the occasion being an address to an international conference in Windhoek last month (January).

As someone who was involved off and on with the so-called South West Africa question throughout my diplomatic career (1938-1982) and in the belief that public discussion of such issues usually serves a useful purpose, may I add a few comments on my own.

The legalities of the dispute can be argued interminably. In my own mind I have no doubt that South Africa continued to be entitled to exercise sovereignty over Walvis Bay. The 'colonial enclave argument' to which Prof. Dugard refers has always been applied selectively. Prof. Dugard quotes the Spanish cession of Ifni to Morocco as an example of the application of this doctrine, but as I understand the position Spain does not accept its application to the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. The United Kingdom did not base its decision to cede sovereignty over Hong Kong Island to China in 1997 on the 'colonial enclave argument' but rather on its assessment of the politico-economic non-viability of Hong Kong Island when Britain's rights to the adjacent leased Territories expires in 1997. As for the estoppel argument that because Walvis Bay was administered for so many years from Windhoek, Namibia has thereby acquired a legal right to

the enclave, it is significant that those who espouse this argument carefully refrain from mentioning that the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, equally as a matter of logistical and geographical convenience, was administered for many years from Pretoria, not Windhoek.

What counts with me is what arrangement will best serve the interests of the *permanent* residents of Walvis Bay, the interests of Namibia and the interests of South Africa. It should not be beyond the ingenuity of statesmen, diplomats and economists to find a solution which broadly satisfies all three parties.

My own recommendation is predicated on the hypothesis that a well-run port such as Walvis Bay, with adequate infrastructure, regularly updated equipment, proper manning and imaginative direction is probably essential to the economic well-being of Namibia as well as to the prosperity of the citizens of Walvis. How can this best be guaranteed?

In my judgement, for the foreseeable future, only the South African Harbour Administration has the manpower, the expertise, the administrative and technological infrastructure and the financial resources to run the port of Walvis Bay as a politico-economically viable enterprise capable of meeting the demands likely to be made on it.

The concept of making Walvis Bay a free port has been researched in some detail and requires no elaboration here.

Accordingly my preference, in contrast to the recommendation of Prof. Dugard, would be for the establishment of a free port in Walvis Bay under a joint Namibian-South African Port Authority, with sovereignty remaining with South Africa and primary responsibility for running the harbour installations continuing to be vested where it is at present.

This is not the place to argue the pros and cons of such an arrangement but I do suggest that it would serve a public interest if the Institute could, in the course of 1991-92, devote one of its seminars to the subject of 'What's to be done with Walvis Bay?'

Donald Sole

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