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OBITUARY

It is with a deep sense of regret that the Institute has to report the untimely death on the 12th May of Professor Dirk Kunert, the Jan Smuts Professor of International Relations in the University of the Witwatersrand.

A warm man of firmly held personal convictions, he left a strong imprint on his department and the discipline. He will be long missed by the Institute for his contribution both in his official and personal capacities.

Smuts House Notes

South Africa in Africa?

South Africans at all levels appear to be aspiring to identify with the continent of Africa as never before. Motives vary from the need to overcome diplomatic isolation, to enhancing business prospects, to a desire to be part of the culture and tradition of this black continent.

There is no doubt that the long years of isolation have left their mark in denied contact, in lack of knowledge of the experience of others, and in a frustrated curiosity. And this applies to both sides of the divide, to South Africans as well as to nationals of what is generally called Sub Saharan Africa, or paradoxically to 'black Africa' as though South Africa is a 'white' part of Africa.

Sensibilities in Africa are at an alltime high about the future role of South Africa in Africa. There are anxieties about a dominant economy exerting an unwanted hegemony over weaker countries. Others fear the political intrusion of a people with a suspect race-centred psychology. Yet others see the diversion of efforts to overcome dependency relations by a new nexus with a country which is heavily 'Western' in style and performance.

Yet contact is desired, to satisfy curiosity and, let us admit, in the hope of satisfying urgent economic necessity.

So on what positive basis might South Africa be united with Africa so that neither undue fears and expectations are excited and a rewarding experience results? I want to suggest that the single common and promising thread that unites the continent at present is the urge for democratisation of society.

Just as South Africa is tense with expectations about the restructuring of the social fabric, so Africa to the north is experiencing a spasm and even turbulence such as has not been seen since colonial times. Demands for multipartyism are the rage; protests and even rioting in pursuit of democracy extend across the continent, and few heads of state sleep in tranquility.

Paradoxically, it is the same heads of state, who, in their formal organisational relationships like the Organisation of African Unity, the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and even the African Development Bank are urging a new democratic dispensation for the continent. The argument is that there can be no development without democracy and popular participation, and since conditions have never been worse, this is what must be done.

Now sceptics say that these organisations are not serious in their pronouncements and that they are forgotten as soon as the proclamations are made. Partly true, no doubt. But it is also the case that Africa's leaders, at state and non-state levels, are acutely aware that the continent has been marginalised, that trade and aid has fallen off drastically, that they are left to their own resources, their own plans, and capacities.

This is why the current session of the OAU is dedicated to plans for an African Common Market leading to an African Community. It is understood that this will take a long time and that success will depend on major efforts to enhance regional integration and cooperation. There is also an entirely new commitment in the OAU to abandon former positions about respecting the sovereignty of countries in favour of intervention on human rights issues such as those in Liberia. The OAU seems to be intent on creating an armed force, thereby harking back to the Pan Africanism of Nkrumah.

But the main emphasis is on better economic performance. The word has gone out that development requires democracy, self reliance, social transformation and social organisation. To this end the OAU is about to set up country associations which will propagate the new developmentalism of these organisations. It will also encourage the formation of a myriad of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) whose rights will be respected and who will be consulted regularly.

The recent African Leadership Forum held in Kampala on 19-23 May was indeed symptomatic of the new tendency. Attended by five heads of state, three ex-presidents, leaders of trade unions, churches, NGOs and the rest, it gave a platform to devastating criticism of Africa's governments and elites as well as the failure of implementation of the best laid plans. Julius Nyerere caught the spirit of the meeting in saying that the mistake of the OAU was that at its formation it was a union of states and not of peoples. He urged that this be now remedied by taking the debate to the people themselves.

These are but early stirrings on the continent and we have yet to see whether sufficient momentum will grow to change the structures of society. But these events do hold the possibility of a new dispensation with which a stirring South Africa might identify. Of course, old prejudices and practices will have to be discarded and we know how stubborn is the heritage of apartheid and segregation. But the rewards will be substantial and one hopes that there is enough goodwill to make the effort required.

Ben Turok
Director of The Institute for African Alternatives

Heribert Weiland

Democratic Spring in Africa? The Demise of the One-Party State?

> If there were a people of gods, they would rule themselves democratically. So perfect a form of government is not for men.
>
> Jean-Jacques Rousseau

For decades it was thought impossible, and yet it has happened: surprising socio-political changes, glasnost and perestroika have reached Africa, as it were. The first hesitant democratic rebellion in Africa attracted little outside attention — the world was engrossed in breath-taking events: Germany and Eastern Europe, then the Gulf. In the meantime, it is difficult to ignore African demands for democracy, concrete demands for freedom of expression and freedom of the press, for multi-party politics, free elections and respect for basic human rights.

1. THE PEOPLE'S VOICE: MORE DEMOCRACY!

When pupils and students took to the streets in Benin, Gabon and Zaire, teachers and other civil servants joined them. After decades of popularity, apparently unassailable heads of state in the Ivory Coast, Somalia and Zambia were reviled and openly pressed to retire. Everywhere handbills circulated attacking corruption, nepotism and despotism. Pastoral letters accusing rulers of totalitarian tendencies and cronyism were read from Catholic pulpits in Zaire and Kenya.[1]

Criticized heads of state initially reacted as they always had: schools and universities were closed, demonstrations banned, police and army deployed, gatherings dispersed and leaders arrested, crowds even fired upon. But this time the people would not be gagged. The resistance proved stronger than the bayonets. Each crackdown generated another round of protest and strikes.

There was also a new domestic element to the confrontation. In some states Churches had long been critical of the authorities; now they openly

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sided with the populace. Finally, having averted their eyes for so long, foreigners started paying attention. Not only are the international media, above all the press, reporting, but western governments and development aid institutions have interceded, most strikingly in response to the massacre of demonstrating students in Lubumbashi. At first, the Zairese government denied all reports. But the Belgian government has turned the killings into an international incident by suspending diplomatic relations until it receives a satisfactory explanation.

The opposition's persistence has started to produce results. The ruling powers have given way. After governing for decades without democratic scruples, the autocratic presidents of the Ivory Coast, Gabon and Zaire, Houphouet-Boigny, Bongo and Mobutu, have allowed opposition parties, announced or already held elections and withdrawn from active government. Their new conciliatory attitude is largely due to the so-called Ceaucescu factor. The consequences of the upheavals in eastern Europe, symbolized by the execution of Ceaucescu, a close friend of many African rulers, have shocked them.

Once they realized they had lost control they transferred executive powers to politically untainted technocrats, usually bankers and functionaries drawn from top positions in international financial institutions. In this way they hoped to save what they could. 'National committees' to draw up proposals for a new economic and political order were formed in Burundi, Benin and Somalia. In Benin, a National Conference under the chairmanship of the Catholic bishop deprived President Kerekou of power in a civilian *coup d'etat*, leaving him only ceremonial functions. A liberal constitution that entrenches a multi-party system came into force in late 1990; presidential elections have taken place (Kerekou lost) and parliamentary elections are to follow.

Benin is an exception; other African states give grounds for scepticism. In most cases opposition groups are not tolerated, but that is about all. It is still unclear if and when multi-party systems will be introduced. Nigeria and Ghana have been talking of doing so for some time. Yet, in both countries the military keep a firm hold on political life and are experimenting with 'democracy from above'. So far, the governments of Angola, Kenya and Zimbabwe have had greatest success in warding off change. Yet even they are no longer able to completely suppress critical opinions and demonstrations. In a number of states, as so often in the past, force has a greater appeal to crucial groups than democracy. This applies to Sudan, where the military that took power in mid-1990 is vigorously trying to crush opposition in the South; this applies to the civil war in Liberia, where, since the overthrow of the government, three liberation movements are fighting for power. It applies to the Tutsi invasion of Rwanda, in the last analysis an attempt to avenge the genocide perpetrated by the Hutus in the early 1960s; it applies to the Libyan-sponsored rebellion in Chad. And this also applies to the bloody ousting of the military junta in Somalia.

Southern Africa is going its own way. Since March 1990 Namibia has been an independent state with one of the most liberal constitutions in Africa: regular elections, freedom of expression and assembly, no preventive detention and no death penalty. In South Africa, with the recognition of the African National Congress the dam has started to leak. Most of the legislation underpinning apartheid has been repealed. At present there are 'talks about talks' about how to establish a new political order that would transform quasi-democracy for a minority into pluralist democracy for all — very much a game of poker with all the attendant uncertainties.

The general trend towards democracy in Africa is not completely without precedent. For one thing, at the time of independence most African states did have multi-party systems. But there are also four functioning, though fragile democracies: Botswana, Senegal, Gambia and Mauritius. In the former three the opposition parties have never won elections. Mauritius is unique: peaceful, democratic changes of government took place in 1982 and 1983[2] — the only instances of such in Africa.

2. THE TIME WAS RIPE: REASONS FOR PROTEST AND REBELLION

2.1. Economic decline: clutching at political straws.

Although political protest differs greatly in potency and form from country to country, the desire to criticize and change appears to have gripped the entire continent. The slightest domestic or foreign provocation is capable of triggering off a wave of protest. The underlying causes are many and varied. One of the most important factors is the general economic decline of the continent.

All of Black Africa has been in a crisis for the past decade. In most states per capita gross national product is lower than under colonial rule and, as recent detailed analyses by the UN and the World Bank confirm, population is growing faster than the economy. Between 1979 and 1989 per capita income fell from US$854 to US$565.[3] Infant mortality in Africa is higher and the average life expectancy, of fifty-one years, lower than elsewhere. The prices of nearly all African export commodities have dropped sharply, and the continent's foreign debt has soared to almost US$143 000 000 000, a figure greater than Black Africa's annual gross domestic product. Relative to its economy, Black Africa is more deeply in debt than any other region in the world. The economic and financial crisis in many states is so serious, it would be sensible for them to declare themselves bankrupt and their reserve banks insolvent. So far, only Benin has taken this step. For, a ruling group unable to pay its own clientele — civil servants and soldiers — will sacrifice whatever legitimacy it still possesses within its own ranks. Nor does it matter whether the system is ostensibly socialist or free-market; in fact, most are mixed economies anyway. In Africa, one-party systems and authoritarian governance are independent of ideological persuasion. Corrupt elites, civilian or military, in Zaire, the Ivory Coast and Kenya, Ethiopia, Benin and Tanzania have treated the state as a self-service shop and enriched themselves at the expense of the rest. It became too much for even the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. For decades their reports argued only economically, going to extremes to avoid overt political comment. This changed in 1989, when they also reviewed general political conditions in Africa.[4] Their conclusion in a nutshell: no development without democracy.[5]

To find a way out of the crisis, former beliefs were discarded. This is particularly true of the socialist models with their unrealistic development plans. Salvation is now thought to lie in free-market economics. Finding themselves in an economic cul-de-sac, many countries are clutching at the concepts of free enterprise and democracy, though none seem to appreciate the difficulties involved in systemic restructuring. It is gradually dawning on a few countries that the consequences of moving from a state-controlled to an individual-oriented economy are not necessarily desirable. On the one hand, there is the 'black' or unofficial market. It is spreading like a bush-fire, and in some places has led to such huge price rises that barter is again on the increase, especially in rural areas. On the other hand, the transition to a free-market economy can be very disruptive, especially if part of a 'structural adjustment programme' devised and supervised by outsiders. This almost inevitably includes hefty devaluation, economic austerity and deregulation as well as privatization of run-down state enterprises. Some states, like Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania, have already achieved their goals of stability and renewal, at the expense of lowering the living standards of the urban middle and lower classes. In several countries, most recently in Zambia, freeing prices for basic foodstuffs has been the last straw for the long-suffering populace and precipitated food riots. Violent protest against hardship induced by reforms has convinced various governments, if only in the interests of their own survival, to rescind or amend decrees liberalizing the economy. The formerly omnipotent institution 'the state' has been so weakened in some places that it alternates between liberalization and repression with growing frequency. Hence, the reforms are often stuck halfway. This is not helping to resolve crisis, only postponing it.

2.2. Growing international pressure: political conditions.

Another reason for the revival of political protest and growing demands for democracy is change abroad. The political upheavals in eastern Europe and the ideological bankruptcy of communism have shaken the political foundations of many African regimes. Most black African governments professed some form of African socialism, an ideology combining elements of scientific socialism and African communal traditions. In practice, the profession of African socialism and close relations with the socialist states of the Second World always went hand in hand. Since the collapse of the ideological house in eastern Europe, the celebrated bonds of international solidarity have been strained. Most important, former socialist donors, themselves in a crisis, have slashed financial support.[6] In other words, most African states, even those that previously had ideological reservations about western capitalist models of development, have no choice but to turn to the West. Sovereign, i.e., independent decisions are no longer possible.

During the Cold War the West's attitude towards Africa had been one of rivalry with the Soviet Union. Africa's value lay in geostrategic advantage. Consequently, even corrupt dictatorships were supported to this end. For reasons of opportunism, questions of democracy and human rights were never raised. This, too, has changed; various political strings are being attached to aid. Since the IMF, World Bank and western development agencies have, at least implicitly, started admitting that much aid in the past was wasted, they have been attaching harsh conditions to new aid programmes. Some of these are economic, the so-called structural adjustment programmes, intended to force the liberalization of African economies. Others are part of the so-called 'political conditionality', which makes the realization of 'democratic values and respect for human rights' a prerequisite for development aid. These conditions are based on the conviction that economic development and democracy are closely interrelated and mutually reinforce each other. The intention of the industrialized countries and international donor agencies is unmistakable. Many African countries cannot survive without aid; tying aid to political pluralism and democracy is supposed to help to create a 'positive perspective of development in Africa'.[7] There is general agreement that a changed framework, political controls and more accountability are preconditions for sensible co-operation on development. Africans, by contrast, fear that these demands take inadequate account of Africa's specific socio-cultural peculiarities and specific historical conditions.[8]

2.3. The new consensus between government and opposition in Africa: More democracy is necessary.

Understandably, official government representatives in Africa vehemently object to a policy of 'political conditionality' in development aid, seeing in it an interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. In the past, the ruling elites inevitably succeeded in putting most of the blame for the appalling economic situation on outsiders — the colonial heritage, falling commodity prices and underdevelopment. It is not so easy now. The target of the current wave of protest is not so much foreign powers as local powers — those held responsible for internal political failure, i.e., for the self-inflicted crisis. It has not escaped Africans, like eastern Europeans, that for decades their elites mismanaged the economy, while enriching themselves. Accordingly, they now demand an end to corruption, nepotism, overbearing and authoritarian government and pervasive rent-seeking. Before the outbreak of widespread unrest, government critics were chiefly intellectuals and academics at African universities — mainly left-wing, but including liberals. In the second half of the 1980s a series of publications appeared on democracy, the state and domination in Africa, though they made little mark on the political or even intellectual public.[9] Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, editor of the reader, Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa (1987), summarizes the conclusions of these analyses: 'There is a definite correlation between the lack of democratic practices in African politics and the deteriorating socio-economic conditions.'

In the face of mounting criticism, most governments have finally accepted that they are facing a serious crisis of legitimacy. The heart-searching was apparent at the 26th summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in July 1990. For the first time ever, this gathering broached the topic of democratization. The Nigerian president, Ibrahim Babangida, among others, publicly admitted the political failings of the ruling elites. Even before the summit, a meeting in Arusha had identified the lack of popular involvement as a major cause of the crisis in Africa, and adopted an 'African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation'.

All in all, economic decline, political change abroad and the crisis of domestic political legitimacy have made 'democracy in Africa' the rallying cry of the day. The following sections consider the chances of democracy in Africa, and whether party pluralism is a feasible means of tackling the crisis.

3. CHANCES OF A NEW DEMOCRATIC START IN AFRICA

3.1. Parliamentary democracy and 'palaver' democracy: different concepts.

Before discussing the chances and perspectives of democracy in Africa, a few words are necessary on the differences in the concepts of democracy and in the historical political situations that have formed democracies. As a simplification, there are two fundamental positions on democracy in Africa. The one is the European liberal view. Applied to Africa, it runs as follows: to function, democracy requires certain democratic forms, organizations and attitudes. In Africa these either have never existed or, if introduced at the end of the colonial period, were later scrapped. Consequently, most African countries lacked the basics for democratic institutions: for institutionalized opposition, for a multi-party system and for a division of powers. Over and above this, the African mentality is not democratic, but traditionally hierarchically oriented, pithily expressed by the African saying: 'There is only one bull in the kraal'. The current protests and demands are a first step in the right direction, i.e., towards democracy.

The other view is shared by the majority of African politicians and thinkers, who believe Africa does have a democratic tradition; what it lacks is a model of government that fits African realities. They strongly emphasize the very different historical and political developments of Africa and Europe, and the colonial foundations of the existing states in Africa. The abuses and excesses of individual governments are not reason to deny Africa a development that in its own eyes is democratic and already practised in many states. To exaggerate: for specific reasons European parliamentary democracy has no future in Africa. On the other hand, the Ujamaa type of society needs and has a place for appropriate forms of democratic debate or 'palaver democracy'.

Certain elements of this discussion on democracy have a direct bearing on future co-operation between the industrialized states and Africa. Is there an African tradition of democracy? To what extent do the urgent socio-economic requirements of African states, i.e. economic advancement and national unity, determine and legitimize the various forms of government? And does ethnic fragmentation provoke social cleavages that can only be obviated by one-party systems?

Admittedly, there are pitfalls in generalizing for fifty states with very widely differing economic resources, as well as historical, social and political traditions and experience. On the other hand, structural similarities in the recent history of most of these states justify an attempt at a general survey.

3.2. The predominance of the authoritarian tradition.

The degree of democracy in pre-colonial and colonial Africa is hotly debated among historians and ethnologists.[10] This is partly explained by academic specialization — each region has its own history and traditions — and partly by the ideological bias that, perhaps inevitably, colours interpretations of traditional African societies. Scholars do agree that, as a rule, absolute or autocratic chiefs and monarchs, supported by dominant clans or families, exercised power in much of pre-colonial Africa — in particular the West, Central and Southern African empires. At the same time there were segmented, i.e., non-hierarchical societies that practised collective forms of government, at least in times of peace. These usually took the form of a council of elders, whose decisions were consensual. Then, as now, the village assembly served as a forum for open discussion of important questions affecting the whole community. The predominantly male body of elders took the actual decisions and, if necessary, sat as a court. This tradition of limited co-determination (palaver democracy) and transparent decision-making may be regarded as quasi-democratic. But it should not be overlooked that the 'elders' were always a small, privileged group, and as able to act in their own interests as in the interests of their people.

Colonial rule never pretended to be democratic. Colonization was, in effect, military occupation. The prime object was commercial exploitation of the colony. A functional infrastructure, state enterprises, trade monopolies and concessions for private mining and manufacturing all served this end. Local competition in any form was either prohibited or driven out of business. The local population was recruited as cheap labour and trained as economic necessity required. Criticism or resistance was tantamount to disobedience and punished accordingly. Only in the colonial twilight, when a small minority of urban Africans had received sufficient European education to become culturally assimilated, were the first institutions of local government established and demands for greater equality and freedom heeded. The westernized African elites successfully used liberal, democratic values and concepts as means to an end, decolonization.[11] The anti-colonial mood among members of parliament in Paris, London and Brussels was at least as important a factor for independence as street mobs in Abidjan, Accra and Leopoldville.[12]

Soon after independence most of these states degenerated into sham democracies. A democratic gloss barely disguised a thoroughly hierarchical governmental and administrative apparatus inherited from the colonial authorities. The most senior public representatives changed: an elected president replaced an appointed governor-general. The new elite slipped into the shoes of the former colonial officials, attitudes towards the populace remained as authoritarian, contradiction and insubordination were punished severely. The great promises of a golden future after independence were soon forgotten. The elite was far more intent on living from than for the state. They ensured the support of well-organized urban interest groups and well-paid police and military. The broad, mainly rural masses were largely neglected. In short, the new rulers were black, not white;[13] otherwise there was little change.

The new state elevated classes soon became wise to the ideological potential of eastern European models as a means of consolidating and entrenching their newly acquired positions of power: the one-party system. Charismatic politicians, such as Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah and Tom Mboya, used their powerful eloquence to justify one-party systems. All of them exaggerated the democratic character of traditional African societies; the appeal of their message lay in a romantic myth. Apart from this, they used two pragmatic arguments. On the one hand, by embracing all social forces, a single, united party would avoid the waste of energy and ability inherent in pluralism. On the other hand, allowing opposition parties would promote tribalism and, thus, weaken the national unity that had been forged at the end of the colonial period. Even where these arguments were used honestly and taken seriously, in practice the concentration of energies has not accelerated development. On the contrary, the result has been an uncontrolled concentration of powers and scandalous self-enrichment, irrespective of whether in the name of African socialism, nationalism or pan-Africanism.

Yet, the triumph of one-party ideology did not completely stunt the development of democratic processes in Africa. Even if elections were not really free, one-party systems often took their claim to mass participation seriously and held elections. Moreover, private property was never entirely abolished. Subsistence agriculture producing for local markets survived everywhere. Nor were the rural middle classes — traders, artisans, middling and large farmers, rural clerks and civil servants, transport owners, etc. — ever seriously oppressed. Virtually nowhere was there any meddling in the lower levels of trade and commerce. Finally, the long arm of the central government rarely reached as far as informal organizations such as cooperatives, self-help groups, savings and credit associations or even Church groups.

Admittedly, the existence of cooperatives and self-help groups did not noticeably influence political processes in the system as a whole or in the government. Elections in one-party systems hardly affect the political system. They are not intended as a means whereby voters control government actions, but as a means of giving local and regional interests representation at the national level. As a rule, these representatives are drawn from the rural middle classes and not interested in supporting local groups. In other words, democracy and politics in the name of the people disguises a system of patriarchal clientele politics. These politics serve to maintain the political domination and economic privileges of the intermediate stratum of traders and transport owners. Nor is the introduction of a multi-party system likely to change this overnight. The lack of information alone means that it will be a long time before the bulk of subsistence farmers benefit from any change.

The majority of the farming population has never enjoyed the advantages of democracy, regardless of the label. Even international development projects with the proclaimed intention of encouraging farmers' 'participative self-determination' treat farmers as people to be developed, never as people who can develop.[14] The farming population has always been kept in tutelage. Various empirical studies confirm that they have, quite rationally, resigned themselves to the existing hierarchies in one-party systems.[15]

The democratic rebellion spreading through Africa is not an uprising of the masses, but a protest by educated and privileged city-dwellers who no longer accept the authoritarian, absolutist tradition, and for this reason condemn the abuse of power and political repression. Current events may be expressions of an inchoate political culture, but it has a long road ahead of it before it is able to replace the dominant culture of hierarchies and consensual thinking.[16]

3.3. Economic growth and democracy: epiphenomena?

Can democracies function in the conditions of economic collapse described in 2.1., or do democratic structures require a minimum of prosperity to take root? In developing countries there is a correlation between the degree of indebtedness and the lack of functioning democratic institutions.[17]

The disastrous economic situation has exacerbated the struggle for social and political advantage. Now that it is there, pressure on governments can only increase so long as living conditions do not improve. So far, the protests for democracy have been peaceful. Given the strong position of the military in Africa, it is doubtful if they will remain so. Political periods of grace generally run out before economic reforms bear fruit. In view of the long tradition of coups in Africa, a widespread return to overt authoritarian rule cannot be ruled out.

It is a widely held view that authoritarian regimes are better able to concentrate energies and therefore more likely to surmount economic and political crises than democracies.[18] Many politicians and businessmen, too, favour a 'dictatorship for development'. By contrast, modernisation theories postulate a high correlation between economic development and democracy. In recent decades many studies have examined precisely this point. The results confirm the correlation – all highly developed industrialized countries are democracies – but have not established causal relationships.

There is no convincing evidence for the contention that poverty and underdevelopment hinder or preclude the introduction and growth of democracy. The possibility cannot be excluded that authoritarian systems run economies better than democratic ones, but there is no unequivocal statistical evidence for the superiority of dictatorships for development. As far as our topic is concerned, there is ample evidence that military dictatorships and authoritarian one-party states have dragged Africa into an economic quagmire, but little evidence that they are equal to the task of dragging it out again. This, in turn, provides general guidelines for industrialized states that wish to use development aid to consolidate democracy in Africa. Stepping up foreign aid and writing off foreign debt in stages could help stabilize democratic structures; a consistent policy of attaching conditions to development aid could brake the merry-go-round of military revolts.

3.4. Democracy in multi-ethnic societies: is consensus possible?

The weightiest argument against multi-party democracy in Africa is the extreme degree of ethnic cleavage. Ethnic tension and ethnic loyalties persist in all countries on the continent, and often intersect with social, religious and political cleavages. The democratic concepts of homogeneous states with their changing majorities can hardly be applied to Africa. The problem is essentially a conflict between ethnic group loyalties and the claims of modern territorial states to national assimilation and nation-building. To achieve this, the modern secular state qualifies the importance and the collective obligations of religion; a growing, ever more pervasive, centralized bureaucracy places increasingly stricter limits on existing social and political traditions, and the enforcement of a new, usually foreign official language (English, French, Portuguese) devalues the languages and cultures of individual ethnic groups. In other words, the centralized nation-state restricts the scope and the identities of ethnic groups. At some point conflict arises between primordial ethnic loyalties and new national orientations.

Ruling national elites or military juntas worsen these conflicts by discriminating against ethnic minorities or reinforcing the ability of the majority to perpetuate their own rule. Where ethnic groups have, by an accident of colonial borders, been divided between two or more states, resultant minority status may mean they have little say in any of them. New hierarchies of power, income or prestige have overlain and suppressed ethnic influences and claims to power. Regardless of constitutional form, certain groups try to hijack the state, to gain access to the state's coffers and redistribute whatever they can to the advantage of their own group. Depending on the ethnic structure in the state, the result may be ruling majorities (Kenya, Rwanda, Zimbabwe), ruling minorities (Burundi, Somalia) or any one of a variety of mixed forms. Because of the monopoly on distribution, all of them produce conflict, though the patterns of conflict may differ.

In dividing Africa into modern territorial states, the colonial powers underestimated — if they thought about it at all — the intensity and importance of ethnic loyalties. Later, they assumed that western liberal democratic institutions would deal with the problem. But European parliamentary models were unasked for, and have since caused enormous damage in Africa's multi-ethnic societies and promoted the introduction of one-party systems. The one-party system is the least happy solution, as it is incapable of overcoming or adapting to ethnic structures — even worse, through its monopoly of power it may well cement these divisions.

Transposing a multi-party system as practised in a simple majority democracy founded on individual rather than group rights is not a solution for the majority of African states. The experiences of very different societies — from South Africa, through Indonesia and Canada, to Switzerland — have demonstrated the need, at least as an interim measure, for constitutional provisions that take account of the social realities of plural societies. Such provisions include proportional representation, consociational or federal solutions, minority rights, cartels of elites and specific right of veto.[21] The examples of South Africa, Sri Lanka, Israel, Nigeria and the Lebanon show how difficult it is to introduce such models against the determined opposition of dominant groups. On the other hand, examples such as Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, Malaysia and Indonesia show that constitutional provisions of this nature can function successfully, and that under such conditions conflict can be expressed peacefully and democratically. In other words, Africa's journey to democracy will reach its destination only if democratic institutions are buttressed by group-oriented constitutional provisions.

4. LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL?

In terms of its political history, Africa is a young continent. Since independence, most states have had a turbulent history. Many have come the full circle, from the multi-party system imposed by the departing colonial power to attempts at reintroducing some form of pluralism. As discussed above, the prospects for lasting democratization are not good. The lack of democratic traditions, the appalling economic situation and ethnic loyalties all militate against democratic rivalry within a framework of multi-party systems.

None the less: the fresh start has a vehemence and intensity that should not be ignored. If the demonstrations and demands for democracy are to be more than a flash in the pan, or survive military attempts to crush them, they need the political and economic support of the international community. The pressure on African governments to respect human rights and introduce democratic reforms does have an effect and should be kept up. In practical terms, political dialogue and political conditionality should continue. However, foreign influence should not be Eurocentric; the attempt to simply transplant western democratic institutions has already failed once. Assistance should be tailored to African conditions. For only democratic institutions that are acceptable both to the majority of the population as a whole and to the individual minorities offer any hope of establishing democracy in Africa and putting an end once and for all to undemocratic ethno-hierarchies and absolutist military dictatorships.

Endnotes

1 The annexe provides a chronology of democratic protest by country

2 The socialist opposition 'Mouvement Militant Mauricien' (MMM) and 'Parti Socialist Mauricien' (PSM) defeated the conservative government of the Mauritian Indian middle classes The new coalition collapsed after nine months, and was back on the Opposition benches by late 1983

3 Cf *The World Bank Sub-Saharan Africa From Crisis to Sustainable Growth,* Washington, D C , 1989, *The World Bank and the UNDP, Africa's Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s,* Washington D C , 1989

4 Cf fn 3 and World Bank, *World Development Report* 1990, New York, 1990

5 Cf Gerald Braun, The Poverty of Conventional Development Concepts, in *Economics,* 42 (1990), pp 54–66

6 Cf Winrich Kuhne, Afrika nach dem Ende des Ost-West Konflikts Die Notwendigkeit eines 'neuen Realismus', *SWP-AP 2656,* Ebenhausen, May 1990

7 Cf *World Bank Sub-Saharan Africa From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, op cit*

8 Cf Rolf Hofmeier, Politische Konditionierung von Entwicklungshilfe in Afrika Neue Form der Einmischung oder legitime Unterstützung von Demokratiebestrebungen?, in *Afrika Spectrum,* 24 (1990) 2, pp 169f

9 Two interesting publications are Peter Meyns and Dani Wadaba Nabudere (eds), *Democracy and the One-Party State in Africa,* Hamburg 1989, which includes articles by K K Prah, J K Bavu, O Sichone, M Sithole, S Sesay, D Mabirizi and L A Darga among others, and the special number of the Review of African Political Economy, '*Democracy and Development*', 45-46 (1989) as well as *idem,* 49 (1990)

10 Cf Dietrich Kappeler, Mehr Demokratie für Afrika?, in *Neue Zurcher Zeitung,* 9/10 September 1990

11 Theodor Hanf *et al* , Education — An Obstacle to Development? Reflections on the Political Functions of Education in Asia and Africa, in *Comparative Education Review,* 19 (1975) 1, pp 80–83

12 Franz Ansprenger, *Politik im schwarzen Afrika Die modernen politischen Bewegungen im Afrika franzosischer Prägung* Cologne 1961

13 The term 'state class' is often used to denote the ruling group, cf Rainer Tetzlaff, The Social Basis of Political Rule in Africa Problems of Legitimacy and Prospects for Democracy, in Peter Meyns and Dani Wadada Nabudere, *op cit* , p 25–42

14 Cf Gero Erdmann, Demokratisierung in Afrika Aussichten und Bedingungen, in *Blatter für deutsche und internationale Politik,* 1 (1991), pp 51-59

15 Cf Heribert Weiland, Namibia auf dem Weg zur Unabhangigkeit, in *Europa Archiv,* 44 (1989) 23, p 714

16 Winrich Kuhne, *Afrika nach dem Ende des Ost-West Konfliktes, op cit* , p 26

17 Cf Rainer Tetzlaff, *op cit*

18 Cf Andreski, Parasitism and Subversion The case of Latin America, New York 1969, and R Lowenthal, Staatsfunktion and Staatsform in Entwicklungslandern, in R Lowenthal, *Die Demokratie im Wandel der Gesellschaft,* Berlin 1963

19 Cf Jürgen H Wolff, Demokratie Armut und Entwicklung Ein uberblick in *Aussenpolitik* 4 (1991), and W Weede, The Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth Some Evidence from Cross-National analysis, in *Kyklos,* 36 (1983)

20 Cf on this point various publications of the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, in particular Theodor Hanf, The Prospects of Accommodation in Communal Conflicts comparative study, in Peter A Dring *et al* (eds), *Bildung in sozio-okonomischer Sicht,* Cologne and Vienna 1989, pp 209-244, and Jakob Rosel, Ethnische Konflikte in den Staaten der Dritten Welt, in *Verfassung und Recht im Ubersee,* 22 (1989) 3, pp 285-312

21 Cf Theodor Hanf, Heribert Weiland, Gerda Vierdag, South Africa *The prospects of peaceful change,* London and Cape Town 1981

ANNEXE:

Chronology of strikes and protests for democracy and the reactions of governments (1989-1991)

ANGOLA:

Late 1988	First reconciliation talks between the government and UNITA
1989 Jun	Attempt at 'national reconciliation' — integration of former UNITA leaders; Gbadolite meeting
Aug	Agreement of Gbadolite collapses
Late 1989	Renewed fighting between government forces and UNITA
Mid-1990	MPLA announces 'development of a multi-party system'
1990 Dec	First MPLA Congress on peace plan and multi-party system
Early 1991	Second MPLA Congress, ideological reorientation
May	Peace treaty concluded between MPLA and UNITA under the auspices of the USA and the USSR

BENIN:

1989 Jan	Teachers, pupils and students strike; civil service strikes
Apr	Teachers strike for several weeks; universities closed
Dec	Teachers strike; public unrest; national conference on a new constitution announced
1990 Dec	Referendum on the new constitution — large majority in favour; end of the one-party state
1991 Mar	Presidential elections; run-off later in month

BURUNDI:

1988 Aug	Unrest in a number of provinces; army intervenes; Hutu against Tutsi; international pressure on government; institutional reforms and minor Hutu role in government
1990 May	'Military Committee for National Salvation' disbanded
1991 Feb	Referendum on new constitution announced

CAMEROON:

1990	President Paul Biya promised a 'greater level of democracy'; countrywide demonstrations
Apr	General strike
Early 1991	Formation of a National Committee for Human Rights; draft legislation for a multi-party system

CHAD:

1988 Feb	National reconciliation
1989 Apr	Attempted *coup d'état*
Jun	Draft constitution

Dec	Voting on constitution; one-party presidential system
1990 Apr	Merger of two opposition groups ('Struggle for Multi-party Democracy')
Jul	First elections since 1962; Habre wins
Nov	Deby's *coup d'état*, civil war, Habre flees to Cameroon

GABON:

1989 Apr	Civil servants protest
1990 Mar	Multi-party system announced; over 20 parties
Sept/Oct	Election; governing party wins

GHANA:

1988 Jun/Jul	Student unrest
1990	Opposition party formed
1991 Jan	Gradual introduction of democracy announced

IVORY COAST:

1990 Apr	Countrywide unrest
	New parties formed, demands for multi-party system
Oct	Election campaign
Nov	Elections, Houphouet-Boigny wins

KENYA:

1988 Sep	Pupil and student unrest
1989 Nov	Student unrest
1990 Apr	President publicly rejects multi-party system
1990 May	Open criticism of president, especially by Catholic Church
Jul	Countrywide unrest
Nov	Formation of opposition party announced
Dec	KANU Congress: Kenya remains a one-party state

LIBERIA:

1988 Mar	*Coup d'état*
Aug	University boycott
1989 Dec	Armed insurrection
Late 1990	Provisional end to civil war

MALI:

1991 Mar	*Coup d'état* against Moussa Traoré's regime. New leaders promise a multi-party system and free elections in 1992

MOZAMBIQUE:

1988	Amnesty for RENAMO members announced (often renewed)
1989 Jul	Fifth FRELIMO Congress — Economic liberalization

	— Change to a socialist-oriented mass party
	— Decentralization of administration
Early 1990	Draft constitution published; internal peace talks
Aug	FRELIMO Central Committee decides to introduce multi-party system
Nov	Parliament accepts new constitution; multi-party democracy
Dec	Two new parties formed
Early 1991	Cease-fire negotiations begin in Rome between the government and RENAMO
1991	Elections planned for the end of the year

NIGERIA:

1988 Apr	Unrest in Jos; strikes against subsidy cuts
1989 May	Trade-union protest
May/Jun	Student unrest; universities closed; new constitution in 1992 announced
Jul	13 political parties apply for registration
1989 Oct	Decree disbanding parties
1990 Mar	Registration of 2 parties formed by the government
Apr	Attempted *coup d'état*; transition to civilian government in 1992 confirmed

SOMALIA:

1989 Mar	Student unrest
Jul	Unrest, mass arrests
Oct	Opposition party formed
Nov	Somalia Democratic Alliance formed
1990 Aug	Multi-party elections set for Feb. 1991
Oct	Multi-party referendum
Dec	Opposition parties legalized
1991	Civil war ends in overthrow of Barré; groups fighting for control of country

ZAIRE:

1988 Apr	Draft proposal for a parliamentary system
1990 Mar	UNIP Congress, discussion on multi-party systems
Jul	Referendum on multi-party democracy postponed for 10 months
Dec	First opposition party in 17 years formed

ZIMBABWE:

1988 Sep	Student demonstrations against corruption
1989 Jun	University boycott
Jul	Student unrest
Oct	University closed

1990 Mar	Elections; Mugabe wins
1990 Dec	Mugabe welcomes party pluralism in African states
	Constitutional changes (changes to the catalogue of basic rights, possibility of nationalizing 'white' farms) provoke constitutional crisis
1991 Jan	Mugabe again welcomes party pluralism in Africa

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Dissident Sub-Nationalism and the State in Africa: Comparative Study of Southern Sudan and Eritrea

The common ascription of many of Africa's present woes to the fateful events in Berlin more than a century ago, and the Balkanization of the continent which ensued, is rooted in the belief that European disregard for the dictates of ethnic homogeneity within the political entities created during the colonial period has been the source of contemporary problems. It is argued, for example, that the weakness of the African state in its bureaucratic/administrative sense is a result of it having been transformed into an arena wherein the representatives of competing ethnic groups vie for the control of the levers of the distributive process. Soon after independence the state, handicapped by the relatively swift transfer of power which did not allow it time to consolidate its position and build for itself a necessary degree of supra-ethnic autonomy, found itself pressured by the conflicting claims of elites anxious to build ethnic constituencies and ensure preferential treatment for their followers in the distribution of governmental largesse. Politics based on ethno/regional considerations, in conjunction with the state's need to preempt the possibility of violent contestations of the legitimacy of the post-colonial arrangement, led in many cases to the sacrificing of 'rational' national economic planning in favour of shorter term political considerations aimed at appeasing the demands of ethnic groups for scarce resources.

Over time, the situation developed along a number of paths. In rare cases, such as Swaziland and Lesotho, the population was ethnically homogeneous, the potential for ethnic conflict was absent and they were able to develop into cohesive nation-states. In other instances such as Tanzania, the state was fortunate enough to find itself confronted by a population divided into a large number of tribal groups, none of them strong enough to single-handedly make a bid to capture state power. In such situations, the state was able to rise above ethnic divisions and develop a non-tribal character. In other cases, such as Kenya under Kenyatta, a

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particular group gained a privileged position within the state apparatus after independence, and while using this position to maximize its interests, nevertheless had the foresight to co-opt elements from other ethnic groups into the ruling elite in order to pre-empt claims for autonomy.

More commonly however, this *modus vivendi* proved extremely difficult or impossible to attain. In some societies the post-colonial state came to be dominated by one ethnic group, which unashamedly used its position of power to monopolize economic wealth and the political process and ensure the subordination of other groups. An extreme example of this is the dynamics of Tutsi-Hutu relations in Rwanda, where the former group's control of the state apparatus led to a process of rigid social stratification, with the Hutu as definite underlings, that bears strong resemblances to a caste system. In other situations the problem of ethnic competition escalated to the point where fears of domination by another group led to demands for self-determination rather than, as was more commonly the case, being restricted to demands for more equal access to the material fruits of independence. Where these claims were denied by central government, the result was civil strife. The two foremost examples from the early post-independence period, namely the attempts at secession in Nigeria and Zaire, have already been extensively studied both in terms of their domestic and international impact.

The author believes, however, that certain aspects of the problem of ethnically-based political dissidence in Africa have been neglected, particularly in regard to the most extreme form this dissidence can take, namely when it comes to be framed in terms of demands for complete political sovereignty. Questions which deserve more detailed treatment include the manner in which the dissident elites forge a constituency out of previously disparate elements, who at first sight suffer from cleavages as serious as those dividing them from the group which controls the political centre. In addition, the demand for separate statehood is at the extreme end of a whole gamut of alternative formulae for national self-determination such as federalism and confederalism, and so the reasons why in certain circumstances secession is seen as the only viable solution to an intractable problem of ethnic competition, and the manner in which demands escalate to this point, require further attention.

For instance at the level of perceptions, how does the idea of the 'dominant other' arise and what role does the differentiated impact of colonialism have on the development of feelings of separateness on the part of different ethnic groups within a country? Furthermore, in what way do state policies exacerbate these differences and how do the positions of the contending parties become polarized to the point that the issue comes to be framed in zero-sum terms?

Two contemporary instances of secessionism in Africa provide useful material with which to address these questions, namely the conflicts in Southern Sudan and Eritrea. In both cases the attempts at secession have a particularly long history, thus providing a rich source of information as to how feelings of ethnic dissidence evolve over time, and more specifically the various phases involved in the breakdown of an existing political consensus and the increasing resort to violence on the part of the protagonists.

An Overview of the Conflicts

The war in the Sudan, which has been raging on and off since 1963, is fed by the immutable reality of deep cleavages of a religious, geographical, cultural and linguistic nature which separate the country's two distinct racial groups. As one scholar stated, 'The particular configuration and history of cultural relations in the Sudan opposed two geographical regions in which two generically different sets of world-views prevailed.'[1] It could be argued, however, that the North/South, Arab/African, Muslim/Christian-Animist dichotomy may be a necessary component but not, in itself, a sufficient explanation for the outbreak of communal conflict. There is no reason why, *ceteris paribus*, Sudan's post-independence leaderships should not have been able to overcome these divisions and the historical legacy of mistrust, and preserved the unity of the country. That they were not able to do so is attributable to the fact that the Arab North continued to monopolize the political process after independence in 1956, insisted on the necessity of the Islamic proselytization in the South and practised a policy towards the South that has often been described as one of 'internal colonialism'. Khartoum's discriminatory economic policies towards the South and preferential treatment of the North compounded the unequal development of the regions which had developed during the colonial period. This, together with the serious under-representation of Southerners in the national government, meant that the early years of independence were fraught with ethnic tensions and led to increasing Southern distrust of the Arab-controlled state.

In November 1958, a *coup d'état* of Northern officers, led by Ibrahim Abboud, brought parliamentary democracy to an end, and moved to crush Southern demands for autonomy within a federal structure, as voiced by Southern M.Ps. in the Khartoum parliament. The military regime speeded up the process of Arabization and Islamicization of the South, justifying it in terms of a desire to establish and secure national unity. Christian missions operating in Southern provinces were closed down, mosques and Islamic schools were established, the curriculum in state schools in the South was changed in order to reflect Arab-Islamic concerns, and Northerners were sent to administer Southern provinces and secure the implementation of Khartoum's policies. All development projects during the Abboud regime were concentrated in the North and those in the South were starved of resources and eventually closed down. The armed forces, previously dominated by Arabs but with a not insignificant Southern element, now became an almost exclusively Northern body, and the presence of soldiers in the Southern provinces took on the appearance of an army of occupation.

Southern reaction took time to germinate, and it was only in 1960 that a political body was established with the specific objective of defending the rights of the Southern peoples against these encroachments from the North. SANU (Sudan African National Union), founded by Southern M.Ps. who had broken with the Khartoum government, attempted to put forward the South's case in international bodies such as the UN and OAU and gradually began to argue the necessity of a military struggle. In 1963, a group of soldiers from the South founded the Anya-Nya, a guerrilla movement which proceeded to launch attacks on the Arab army in the South. The government responded by intensifying the repression, but this only served to increase Southern resistance. The scale of the war grew and became a serious drain on the country's meagre resources.

In October 1964, largely as a result of popular disillusionment in the North with the Abboud regime's failure to defeat the insurgency, the latter was deposed and civilian rule was restored. The new government, hoping to find a solution to the Southern question within the context of a united Sudan, convened a Round Table Conference in 1965. Southern representatives put forward their grievances, though they were by no means united in terms of their demands, with some calling for the outright secession of the South while others were prepared to discuss the possibility of a federal set-up. While Northern politicians were more amenable to the latter formula, there were disagreements as to the degree of devolution involved, with the Southerners advocating the creation of two regions, each with its own parliament and control of economic matters, internal security, foreign affairs and armed forces, while the Northerners were only prepared to contemplate granting the Southern parliament the right to legislate on matters such as education and health at regional levels. Khartoum would have thus maintained control over all other fields.

After a year-long period of deliberation, the committee appointed to examine ways of reconciling the two parties was over-ruled by Prime Minister Mahgoub, who was at most prepared to consider the possibility of creating a number of regional governments in the South with their own parliaments, (thus in effect balkanizing the South). These were furthermore to be restricted to deciding on purely local matters, thus leaving Khartoum in control of the real levers of power (the budget, national defence, foreign relations). Not surprisingly the proposals were rejected by the Southerners, and the war escalated.

In May 1969 the army once again put an end to civilian rule, invoking as reasons the corruption of Northern politicians and the deteriorating economic and security situation. By June, Nimeiry, the head of the Revolutionary Council, had announced his proposals for ending the war. While clearly more sincere than his civilian predecessors in his desire to find an equitable solution to the problem, and recognising the validity of Southern grievances, Nimeiry's initial policy suffered from a lack of clarity, never going beyond a vague commitment to 'regional autonomy' for the South within a united Sudan. His ill-defined position is understandable however in view of the pressures he was facing from Muslim fundamentalist groups who were demanding the adoption of an Islamic constitution and calling for the forced conversion of the South. Southern political groups were split on whether to take Nimeiry's pronouncements at face value or not. Some notables were willing to co-operate with the government, (e.g. Joseph Garang, a member of the Sudan Communist Party, whom Nimeiry appointed as Minister for Southern Affairs), while the Anya-Nya and its political wing, the SSLM (the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement), which under the leadership of Joseph Lagu had come to dominate Southern politics and continued to demand outright independence, was more wary of Khartoum's intentions.

In 1972 however, after many complex preliminary negotiations, the Khartoum government and the SSLM held talks in Addis Ababa, with both sides abandoning their inflexible positions and an agreement was reached. According to the Addis Ababa Agreement on the Problem of Southern Sudan, the Southern region became a self-governing unit through the creation of a People's Regional Assembly elected by Southerners. Legislative authority in the South was to rest with this body, which would concern itself not only with such social and cultural matters as previous Northern formulae had been prepared to concede, but also with economic development, (the South was given a great deal of fiscal autonomy), and internal security (police). The immediate effect of this was to rapidly curtail Arab hegemony in the South which had developed since independence. It was made clear in the agreement, however, that regional legislation should conform with directives emanating from the central government in Khartoum, which would retain control over national defence, foreign affairs, currency, customs and trade, and that the President retained the power of veto over any regional legislation.

The peace brought about by the Agreement lasted for over ten years, despite the pressures put upon it by Northern politicians and creeping Southern disillusionment with the arrangement. In 1983 however, under pressure from Islamic fundamentalist groups, Nimeiry decreed the introduction of Islamic law throughout the country. Predictably, the South rose up in revolt once again. This time however, the movement which led the revolt, the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), had as its declared objective not the secession of the South, but an end to military rule and the establishment of a unified, democratic Sudan, and went out of its way to attract Northerners. Under the leadership of Joseph Garang, the war waged by the SPLM was largely responsible for the overthrow of Nimeiry and the restoration of democracy. It is clear however, that secessionist undercurrents were still present in the South, given the establishment of an Anya Nya II in 1986, and surfaced again when the political centre was unable to respond to Southern demands. Once again the conflict led to the overthrow of Sadiq el-Mahdi's civilian government in 1989.

Like the war in the Sudan, the conflict in Eritrea has proved extremely intractable to either political or military solutions. Eritrea's separate status from Ethiopia dates back to 1890, when it became an Italian colony and thus a distinct territorial entity. The population is composed of two main groups divided along geographical, linguistic and confessional lines; broadly speaking the coastal areas are inhabited by Tigrai and Arabic-speaking Muslim clans while the highlands in the hinterland are populated by Tigrinya-speaking Coptic Christians. This community has close ties historically with the inhabitants of Tigray province in northern Ethiopia, but are distinct from the Amhara who since the 19th century have constituted the dominant group in Ethiopia.

In 1941, following the shattering of Mussolini's dream of an Empire in Africa, the colony passed into the hands of the British. At the end of the war, Ethiopia began to press its claims on the territory, arguing that Eritrea had been an integral part of the ancient kingdom of Abbysinia before the disruption of Western colonialism, and that the commonalities of culture were evidence of this. In addition, Haile Selassie also proclaimed Ethiopia's right to an outlet to the sea, and argued that his country's security required the annexation of Eritrea, since for centuries invaders had used the latter as a springboard, the most recent example having been Italy.

Britain continued to administer Eritrea until 1952, under the auspices of the UN which was to decide on the eventual fate of the territory. In 1950, largely as a result of American diplomatic manoeuverings (Washington was interested in securing Ethiopia as an ally and base for a projected world-wide military surveillance network), the UN voted in favour of Eritrea's federation with Ethiopia. A constitution was drawn up to underpin the federal compromise, ratified by both the Ethiopian government and an elected Eritrean assembly, which granted Eritrea the right to manage its own budget, to maintain its own educational system and police and to establish its own regional development policy, while the federal government in Addis Ababa would decide on foreign affairs, defence and trade issues.

It was not long however before the arrangement began to fall apart, largely due to Haile Selassi's centralizing tendencies. As one scholar put it,

> ...Ethiopia found a number of the provisions of the constitution anathema; a full-blown parliamentary democracy in Eritrea, when political parties were forbidden in Ethiopia, was constraining. The lack of direct police and taxing powers was frustrating. Tigrinya and Arabic as official languages ran counter to nation-building concepts then in vogue in the capital, which saw Amharic as the linguistic instrument of unification and integration of Ethiopian peoples.[2]

Between 1952-62, Addis Ababa gradually encroached on Eritrean rights, suspending the constitution, imposing Amharic as the language of government, education and business, outlawing political parties, and ensuring that a new and compliant Eritrean assembly was elected. In 1962 this legislative body voted for the dissolution of the federal act, and Eritrea became a simple province of Ethiopia.

Initial Eritrean resistance was largely based on the Muslim population, who feared domination by Christian Ethiopia. The first nationalist organisations were founded during the period of British administration which had allowed Eritreans a margin of political freedom. In 1958, a number of exiled Muslim notables established the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) in Cairo, advocating the use of peaceful methods of protest against Ethiopian policies. This was supplanted in 1961 by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which with the aid of a number of Arab countries, launched a guerrilla war. By 1965, 50% of the Ethiopian army was tied down in Eritrea.

Between 1966-70, the ELF was beset with problems, the most serious of which was the fact that, being dominated by Muslims who chose to portray the Eritrean struggle in Islamic terms in order to secure the assistance of the Arab world, it had antagonized the Christian population of the highlands. A rival organisation was established in 1970, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which apart from a more radical political programme, heavily infused with Marxism-Leninism, also differed from the ELF in that it consciously attempted to break down national divisions and include both Muslims and Christians. One can safely also assume that generational dynamics were a factor, with the new generation of Eritrean nationalists outbidding their seniors, upping the stakes while accusing the ELF of a whole range of shortcomings in their attempts to supplant them.

Between 1971-74 a fratricidal civil war between the two organisations consumed most of their energies but a new situation arose as a result of the revolution in Ethiopia. The coming to power of a revolutionary military government raised the possibility that Addis Ababa would be willing to make concessions on the Eritrean issue, particularly in view of the fact that discontent amongst the rank and file of the army in regard to the conduct of the war has been a powerful contributing factor in the upheavals that led to the demise of the *ancien regime*. These hopes appeared to be justified when in April and May 1976, the Dergue (the governing military committee) announced its policy on the nationalities question, specifically talking of the right to 'national self-determination'.

The Eritreans, who had called a truce to their own conflict, were soon disappointed however when the Dergue clarified its position. Drawing on East European studies on the nationalities question in Africa, and Soviet rationalisations for Moscow's particular approach to its own minorities, the Dergue argued that the revolution had removed the justification for the secession of Ethiopia's minorities, since feudal oppression, which had been the primary cause for discontent amongst the country's various groups, had now been destroyed. It became clear that the most Addis Ababa was prepared to grant was some ill-defined form of regional autonomy. When the Eritrean movements rejected the Ethiopian offers, Addis Ababa once again opted for the military solution, mounting a major offensive against the rebels in June 1976 which ended in a major defeat for the Ethiopian army, weakening the Ethiopian hold on Eritrea even further. Faced with conflict throughout 1976-77, the multinational Ethiopian empire appeared to be disintegrating, and the Eritreans had established *de facto* control of their territory.

The situation was only restored with the injection of considerable Soviet military aid in 1978. Since then, the conflict has escalated, resulting in what became a massive confrontation between the Ethiopian state and the Eritrean people.

The Importance of the European Colonial Interregnum in the Development of Secessionism

Both case-studies are particularly useful in elucidating the manner in which the colonial interregnum in Africa reinforced an existing sense of separateness amongst ethnic groups that were subsequently forced to inhabit the same political space, thus creating the necessary conditions for secessionism to take root.

In the case of the Sudan, the feelings of resentment amongst Southerners towards the Arabs of the North predate the period of British administration, and were a result of a long history of Arab exploitation of the African peoples of the South during the period of Egyptian rule in the 19th century. Northern slavers and ivory hunters had roamed the region and wreaked havoc amongst the tribal communities, leaving behind a reservoir of mistrust and fear.

However, it was during the years of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1898-1956), that the differences between North and South were formalised in administrative terms, with the British dividing the country into two and treating them separately in order to protect Southerners from what were seen as predatory Northerners. The use of Arabic was prohibited in the South, Christian missionaries were given permission to proselytise in the

South while Muslim preachers were banned, and in 1940 a pass system was introduced restricting the movement of Arabs in the South. Ethnic cleavages between Northern Arabs and African Southerners thus came to be reinforced by cleavages along confessional lines. The British administration also encouraged the use of indigenous languages in schools in the South as well as English as the region's *lingua franca*. Through these various means therefore, British policy consciously strove to separate the South from the North.

In the early post-war period, this policy was reversed. Ignoring the reservations expressed by the British governors of the Southern provinces, who feared the consequences of giving the Arabs a free hand in the South, London decided to work towards a decolonization process based upon a united Sudan. By then however, the seeds of future troubles had already been sown, and though Southern representatives in the parliament in Khartoum eventually agreed to the country's declaration of independence in 1956 on the basis of a Northern promise that the possibility of a federal solution would be examined in due course, there were already Southern voices advocating separation as the only solution for the Southern Sudanese.

As in the case of the Southern Sudan, the colonial interregnum also played a formative role in creating a sense of a separate identity amongst the Eritreans. As already mentioned, the Italians were responsible for the creation of Eritrea as a territorial entity, subjecting a number of disparate ethno/linguistic/religious groups to common colonial rule. Early on the Italians discovered that the colony was lacking in any important natural resources, and therefore Italian economic interest was restricted to supporting colonists to establish themselves as plantation-owners producing cotton and coffee for the metropolitan market, an escape valve for Italy's surplus population.

However, while the impact of Italian rule on Eritrean society of metropolitan economic interests was limited, the military aspects of the Italian presence, in conjunction with the attempts on the part of successive colonial governors to take on responsibilities for a 'mission civilisatrice' and consolidate the Italian hold on the territory, were to have profound and long-term effects, serving to set Eritrea apart from the powerful neighbour to the South. Rome's territorial ambitions in regard to Ethiopia led to the construction of roads, railways, ports and airports which served to unite Eritrea, as did the introduction of a postal, telegraph and radio network. Accompanying the Italian military and administrative presence, there was a rapid increase in levels of urbanization, drawing into the cities Eritreans of all backgrounds in search of work. Some even managed to obtain minor administrative positions in the colonial bureaucracy, becoming a petty bourgeois elite which was to play an important role in the subsequent nationalist movement. Health and educational facilities were expanded, and were for many communities the first intrusions of modernity into their lives. A further unifying factor was the use of Italian as the language of administration and education, helping to break down some of the barriers between the colony's linguistic groups. Artificial as the Italian creation may have been, by the end of this first stage of the colonial period Eritrea's inhabitants had begun to see their territory as something distinct from Ethiopia.

This perception was reinforced during the years of the British Military Administration. While Ethiopia stagnated under the absolutism of its Solomonic emperors, an ancient kingdom frozen in time and closed off from outside influences, Eritreans underwent an intense process of politicization. The British allowed the Eritreans to organise themselves into political parties and permitted the development of a free press and trade-unions. Splitting along confessional lines, the Christians were in favour of union with their Ethiopian co-religionists while the Muslims wanted a separately independent Eritrea, these sentiments finding institutional expression in the Unionist Party and Muslim League respectively. As one scholar has argued,

> While Eritrean society was undergoing intensive politicization; neighbouring Ethiopia was experiencing the opposite; rapid centralisation of power and the depoliticisation of society ... Modern political concepts and institutions adopted in neighbouring countries, including Eritrea, were rejected. Unlike Eritrea, Ethiopia had no political parties and no free press, nor was there any institutionalised representation of popular interests.[4]

In addition to these political developments, the territory also underwent a minor economic boom as a result of the British military presence and the needs thus generated. The process of urbanization continued and a not insignificant light industrial base was established, with a concomitant growth in the Eritrean working-class. The British authorities also promoted the 'Eritreanisation' of administrative structures in order to replace the Italians, leading to the further expansion of an indigenous, urbanised, and educated petty bourgeoisie. As a result of these developments, by the time the British Administration ended, Eritrea had become a significantly more developed region than Ethiopia, which was still dominated by pre-capitalist relations of production.[5]

Federation in 1952 thus saw the coming together of two radically different entities, and this incongruity manifested itself early on in the relationship, as Haile Selassie set about subverting the arrangement in order to eliminate this extraneous entity in the body politic of his centralised multinational empire.

The Rise of the 'Dominant Other' and Mono-Ethnic Control of the State

The conflicts in both Sudan and Eritrea indicate that secessionism arises in part from fears of domination by a threatening and alien mono-ethnically controlled state which seeks the acculturation and absorption of subordinate groups. This in turn triggers off a defensive reaction amongst the targeted groups who then establish an alternative set of points of reference around which they may unite. Over time, assuming deteriorating relations between the dominant and subordinate population, the necessity of group preservation will take root amongst the latter and in turn lead to the development of dissident sub-nationalism.

In line with the rest of Africa, the Arabs and Amhara were engaged in a process of nation-building based on their dominant ideologies. Their control of the state enabled them to translate their own particular ethnic nationalism into the official state nationalism and to pursue integrative policies on this basis. As one scholar observed in relation to Sudan, from 1958-64, the military regime in Khartoum aimed at the absorption of the South into the dominant North through the use of the twin tools of language and religion, namely Arabic and Islam.[6] If necessary, as was often the case, the process was carried out by the use of force.

Whether under military or civilian rule, Khartoum's basic position in regard to the South did not change. As the civilian Prime-Minister, Sadiq el-Mahdi, stated in 1966, 'the dominant feature of our nation is an Islamic one and its overpowering expression is Arab, and this nation will not have its entity identified and its prestige and pride preserved except under an Islamic revival.'[7]

In the case of Ethiopia, the state which made its claims on Eritrea, invoking historical rights over the territory, had itself been an Amhara-dominated entity since the last quarter of the nineteenth-century. Following the European scramble for Africa, Emperor Menelik had jumped onto the bandwagon, and through military conquest had subjugated a number of outlying regions to the West and South of the Amhara heartland, populated by Muslim Somalis and Animist Oromos respectively.

The idea of the Ethiopian empire as an Amharic-speaking kingdom was actively promoted, an understandable measure given that the Amhara were in fact a linguistic/religious minority. Amharization — in particular the adoption of Christianity — became a pre-condition for social advancement. Efforts were made to co-opt the elites of the conquered peoples, while cultural manifestations other than that of the dominant group were suppressed.

Not surprisingly, when this threatening and alien entity began to undermine the federation with Eritrea, it was the Muslim section of the population, which had the least in common with the Amhara in either linguistic or religious terms, that first engaged in ethno-political activity, invoked the principle of national self-determination and took up arms against the regime in Addis Ababa.

The Forging of Dissident Sub-Nationalism and the Secessionist Option

While it is clear in the case of both Eritrea and the Southern Sudan, that conditions for the rise of secessionism were present (perceptions of subjugation, discrimination and control by an alien state), further factors need to be operating in order to politicise and channel the feelings of resentment to specific ends.

It should be borne in mind that the exercising of the exit option by a group of people in order to establish a new state that more closely reflects their values, is a measure of the last resort, the end product of an escalating process of ethnic conflict. While ethnic competition is endemic in African political systems — largely the product of the resilience of ethnic consciousness and the willingness of elites to manipulate these for political purposes — the number of times this has spilled over into demands for outright secession, as opposed to some form of regional autonomy, are surprisingly limited. Incompatibilities between ethnic groups, inequalities in the distribution of the benefits of development, and perceptions of discrimination are common to most African countries, and therefore other factors besides hostile contacts between ethnic groups must be present in order to create a secessionist situation.

On the basis of the case-studies, one such factor would seem to be the unwillingness of a mono-ethnically controlled state to allow for cultural diversity, and to undertake the process of nation-building without due regard to the particularisms of other groups. In the case of both Sudan and Eritrea, it was the attempts on the part of the Arabs and Amharas to foist their value-systems onto subordinate groups, and where necessary to use force in order to ensure compliance, that fuelled the feelings of resentment and fear on the part of Eritreans and Southern Sudanese. Unlike many African states, where the dominant ethnic group has peacefully co-opted representatives of other groups into the government and state apparatus, or where a political leadership has attempted to give a supra-ethnic character to the state, or attempted to buy off discontent on the part of minorities through material inducements, the regimes in Addis Ababa and Khartoum set out to eliminate any diversity within their domains.

A second pre-condition for secessionism, related to the first, appears to be that channels for ethnically-based political dissent are completely closed, and therefore the political system becomes incapable of dealing with these demands. The disgruntled groups are therefore left with no choice but to resort to extra-political methods in order to have their grievances heard. In the case of the Southern Sudanese, they came to see the parliament in Khartoum as being dominated by Arabs, an institution set up and maintained by Northerners, to which they had little access and which was in any case unsympathetic to their demands. During periods of military rule, even the semblance of Southern political representation was removed, and the image of the state as a distant, alien and threatening entity was strengthened. Likewise in Eritrea, Haile Selassie's moves to depoliticise Eritrean society and bring it into conformity with the rest of his kingdom, his abolishing of the Eritrean assembly, banning of political parties and trade unions and centralisation of power in the throne, had similar effects.

Finally, the belief must develop amongst the subjugated groups that their physical existence is threatened under the existing arrangements. It could be argued of course that such beliefs are nurtured by the leadership of secessionist movements in order to galvanise their respective constituencies, often taking the form of the cultivation of common perceptions and ethnically-based interpretations of historical events.

Nevertheless, it is also the case that such 'scare-mongering' would be ignored if it did not strike a chord amongst the people and on the basis of past experiences become credible. That they may also become self-fulfilling prophecies is not disputed. As the dissident ethnic groups resort to armed struggle in order to secure their objectives, government retribution inevitably ensues, many a time against the civilian population, and as the violence escalates it becomes increasingly plausible to portray governmental actions as genocidal. For example, atrocities committed by governmental groups led many Southern Sudanese to flee across the border into Uganda in the belief that Khartoum was bent on their extermination. Addis Ababa's denial to aid organisations of the right to transport emergency relief to the contested zones during the 1985 famine likewise raised the spectre of genocide, and further hardened Eritrean determination to secede.

In order to maximise the chances of success, the leadership of both secessionist projects have found it both desirable and necessary to weld their various tribal, religious, and linguistic groups into some sort of collective ethnic entity. As one scholar has noted, ethno-nationalist elites assist in the development of 'a perceived need for collective action by the group to both defend itself and preserve its identity ... [these] individuals believe that group loyalty and political action directed towards group preservation take precedence over all potential or real competing loyalties such as social class, which may cut across group boundaries.'[8] In essence, what this involves is a search for commonalities. In the case of the Southern Sudanese and Eritreans, this has taken the form of the affirmation of a sense of territorial separateness inherited from the colonial period, and the negative identification of a common enemy, the creation of an 'us' and 'them' consciousness. In both cases, the process has been arduous and at times bloody. Anya-Nya for example fractured many times along tribal lines amidst accusations of Dinka domination of the movement. However, the strength of the collective fear of persecution by the Arabs, the minor importance of religious differences between the tribes, the clear racial differences between the black Southerners and the Arabs, and maybe even the common experiences of many Southern leaders who had largely all been mission-educated and spoke English, helped to attenuate the threat of inter-tribal violence, and enabled the political leadership to establish a dissident nationalist movement out of the various tribes with relative ease.

The Eritrean experience was by contrast much more difficult. Linguistic, cultural and religious differences between the two main ethnic groups were much more marked than in Southern Sudan. In addition, as already mentioned, the Tigrinya-speaking Christians had much in common with both their kin in Northern Ethiopia and the Amhara further South, helping to explain why this section of the population were initially in favour of union with Ethiopia. It also throws light on the fact that resistance to Ethiopian ambitions first arose amongst the Muslims, and that the first avowedly secessionist armed movement, the ELF, was overwhelmingly Muslim.

By the 1960s, however, Ethiopian military repression and the policy of enforced Amharization, which indiscriminately affected both Christians and Muslims, had served to radicalise the Tigrinya-speaking youth, who then attempted to enter the ranks of the ELF. The Muslims in the latter, however, were reluctant to absorb these elements, anxious as they were to preserve the image of their struggle as one of Islam against Christianity in order to ensure the support of the Arab world, as mentioned earlier. Criticising the ethnic exclusivity of the ELF, the Tigrinya then went on to establish the EPLF, which though predominantly Christian, made a special effort to also attract Muslims and to give their organisation a pan-Eritrean character. The growth of the EPLF since its creation, and its military ascendancy over the ELF, bear witness to its success in projecting an image of itself as the repository of, at the very least, a proto-Eritrean nationalism.

Conclusions

The intractable nature of the conflicts in Southern Sudan and Eritrea was borne out yet again by recent events. Negotiations between the Ethiopian government and the EPLF, held in Washington in February this year, proved fruitless, (Addis Ababa predictably being prepared to concede at most some form of regional autonomy while the EPLF demanded recognition of Eritrea's independence), as well as the Sudanese government's recent unveiling of yet another plan to solve the Southern Sudanese question through the establishment of a federal system based on the division of the country into nine provinces, each with some degree of autonomy on provincial affairs. The very fact that the Sudanese government made it known that financial resources to the administrations of the Southern provinces under the new federal arrangement would be contingent on their assistance in the prosecution of the war, indicates that Khartoum knew beforehand that the initiative would in no way satisfy the opposition in the South.

Both developments took place against the backdrop, yet again, of imminent famines in the region. The immeasurable suffering inflicted on the peoples of both these countries as a result of the longevity of these, the two oldest conflicts on the continent, leads one to the conclusion that Western doctrines of sovereign statehood find few more enthusiastic adherents than in Africa. It may even perversely be the case that it is precisely in countries such as Ethiopia and Sudan, where the state has largely failed to deliver on the most basic responsibilities of government such as education and health, as well as having been unsuccessful in its attempts at nation-building, that governing elites will cling most tenaciously to the remaining imperative of territorial integrity as their last *raison d'etre*.

Postscript

Events in Ethiopia continued to gather pace following the collapse of the Washington talks. The EPLF stepped up its military operations and succeeded in capturing the key city of Asmara, the last stronghold of the government's forces in Eritrea. At the same time the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of various anti-Mengistu groupings, advanced from their bases in the north towards Addis Ababa, and in May the city fell to the rebels. Mengistu fled the country and an interim government has now been established in the capital.

The rump of the EPRDF is composed of followers of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), an organisation which has been fighting the Military Marxist regime in Addis Ababa since 1976. It is worthwhile noting that the victory of the EPRDF, and therefore by implication the TPLF, represents a reversal of one hundred years of Ethiopian history. Prior to the rise of Emperor Menelik and his Amhara followers in the last quarter of the 19th century, the northern province of Tigray had been the epicentre of Abyssinian life, home to the ancient kingdom of Axiun, while Tigreans had been the dominant ethnic group. Menelik had usurped this role, deliberately moving the capital of his multinational empire southwards to present-day Addis Ababa, thus ensuring Amhara dominance of the Ethiopian state.

Given the fall of the Mengistu regime, the prospects for Eritrean independence are better now than at any time in the past. During its struggle the TPLF benefited greatly from a long-standing alliance with the EPLF, their forces often fighting side by side. This symbolic relationship was helped in no small measure by the fact that Tigrinya-speaking Christians straddle the border between Eritrea and Tigray province, and provide the main source of support for both movements.

Interestingly enough, and in contrast to the EPLF, the TPLF has never demanded complete independence for Tigray, being prepared instead to settle for some form of regional autonomy within an otherwise unitary Ethiopian state.

Now that through the EPRDF the Tigreans are once again in control of the political centre, it remains to be seen whether they will deliver on any promises they may have made to the EPLF.

Footnotes

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2. Young, Crawford, 'Comparative Claims to Political Sovereignty' in Rothschild and Olorunsola, *op.cit.*, p.215.
3. See Beshir, M.O., *Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict* (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1968), p.51.
4. Erlich, H., *The Struggle Over Eritrea: 1962-1978* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), pp.6-7.
5. On the economic, social and political effects of British rule, see Shearman, R , *Eritrea — the Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), pp.16-20.
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Alan Whiteside

Aid to South Africa

This article looks at the current aid flows to South Africa (including both the size and type) and the likely future trends, and will assess how South Africans may benefit from aid to the region. It represents a first attempt to evaluate a hitherto neglected area.

INTRODUCTION

Foreign aid to developing countries is a controversial subject. It has been much debated in academic circles and a considerable literature has developed.[1] Key questions are: is enough aid given? What effect does it have on the recipient countries? Is the aid of the right sort? Should aid be given at all?

An aid industry has evolved with three groups of protagonists: the donors, the recipients and the facilitators. The first group includes the governments of the developed world operating through their own agencies; multilateral agencies such as the World Bank; non-governmental organisations such as the Red Cross; and charities, for example, Oxfam and World Vision. The recipients, the second group, are the poorer nations of the world and their citizens. They are known variously as less developed countries (LDCs), developing countries (DCs), and the Third World. Assistance may be given to the governments; to individuals; or to organisations within a country. The final group, the facilitators comprise the firms and individuals that assist in the provision of aid. These include consultants, construction firms, auditors and a myriad of other activities.

Until recently, South Africa and South Africans were unable to benefit from aid flows, and thus to debate the relevance of aid seemed pointless. The reason for South Africa's exclusion from access to aid can be blamed on the apartheid system. This had four direct consequences with regard to aid:

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(i) South Africa was excluded from membership of certain multilateral agencies, and even when its continued membership was permitted, it was not allowed to benefit;

(ii) bilateral donors would not give assistance to the South African central government, local government, the homelands or any institutions connected with these bodies. As most aid is provided on a government to government basis, this severely restricted the range of recipients;

(iii) charities were extremely wary of providing any assistance that could be construed as supporting the apartheid regime;

(iv) South Africans and South African firms and suppliers were expressly prevented from bidding on any contracts and tenders by certain donors, most notably the African . Development Bank and Scandinavians.

Despite the restrictions detailed above, the late 1980s saw a rapid increase in aid to South Africa. Accurate figures are hard to obtain but some informed guesses can be made. It appears that the reform process and return to international acceptability may lead to a further increase in the aid flow, although its nature will change. Finally, South Africans will soon be able to participate in bidding for aid contracts in Africa without let or hindrance, and this could create lucrative business opportunities.

CURRENT AID FLOWS TO SOUTH AFRICA

Aid reaches South Africa via a number of routes. Firstly, there is bilateral aid: this is given by governments to organisations and individuals within South Africa. Most of this flows through aid organisations of the local embassy. In addition to money brought in and disbursed in South Africa, there are funds spent on South Africans outside the country which also count as aid to South Africa. Most of this is money given to scholarships which are often to institutions in the donor country. The channels, amounts and directions of the bilateral aid are shown in Table 1.

The second major source of aid to South Africa is the European Community (EC). This is a multilateral body made up of 12 countries. The provision of aid through the European Development Fund (EDF) is one of the functions of this body. The aid is administered from Brussels and totalled R42 000 000 in 1990.

The third group of donors are the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and charities. These include international organisations such as the Red Cross. South African trade unions have received considerable support from the international trade union organisations as well as national unions in the west. The churches have also been recipients of large sums of money. Generally, a denomination will provide support to their sister organisations

Table 1: *Bilateral Aid 1989/90*

Country	How Administered[1]	Amount[2]	Date Aid started	Main Programme Sectors[3]
Australia	Embassy in Pretoria	3 000 000	NA	Education, trade unions, human rights
Austria	Embassy in Pretoria	> 500 000	NA	Human rights, informal business
Canada	CIDA at Embassy	17 500 000	NA	Education, dialogue, development project
Denmark	DANIDA	NA	NA	NA
France	Embassy in Pretoria	3 500 000	NA	Alternate education, health, social affairs
Germany	Embassy in Pretoria	10 000 000	1981	Education/teacher/trade unions/vocational training/church
Greece	Embassy in Pretoria	> 500 000	NA	Bursaries, financial aid
Italy	Embassy in Pretoria	4 500 000	NA	Education, health
Israel	Embassy in Pretoria	500 000	1987	Agriculture, community, development, cooperational labour
Japan	Consulate in Pretoria	3 800 000	1987	Bursaries and Kellogg trust
Norway	NORDD in Oslo	32 200 000	NA	Humanitarian aid
Netherlands	Embassy in Pretoria	19 500 000	NA	Formal/informal education, trade unions, human rights
Spain	Embassy in Pretoria	500 000	1988	Education/management skills, public policy and planning
Sweden[4]	SIDA in Stockholm	NA	NA	NA
Switzerland	Embassy in Pretoria	11 000 000	1986	Dialogue, human rights, training of journalists
Taiwan	Embassy in Pretoria	NA	NA	NA
UK	Embassy in Pretoria	42 000 000	NA	
USA	USAID office in Pretoria	80 000 000	1986/1987	Education, human rights, black private enterprise development

1. The source of this is the document *Project Funding by Foreign Embassies within South Africa*
2. Amounts are rounded. This information was derived from a confidential source.
3. In the document in (1) above, the main areas of aid are indicated. We have linked the first three.
4. All Swedish aid was provided to the ANC outside South Africa.

in South Africa although individual congregations may support specific projects.

Finally, a range of charities operate in South Africa and include such organisations as Save the Children Fund, World Vision, SOS Villages, Cheshire Homes and so on. Their funds come mainly from donations from individuals and companies but often they receive topping up from governments. Aid will be given to specific projects or groups and may be administered from a local office or by the head office.

Estimating the Amount

It is surprisingly difficult to estimate accurately how much foreign aid is received by South Africa. Government was hostile to much of the aid, which it saw as propping up the opposition forces. This meant that there was no central co-ordination of aid to the country nor even a central registry. Nonetheless, aid flows can be estimated in a number of ways.

(i) *Data from Donors*: Most donors publish figures on how much aid they give — they want people to be aware of this as a public relations exercise. Data collected for this article show that bilateral donors gave approximately R229 million in 1990.[2] In addition, the only multilateral agency active in South Africa, the EDF, gave R42 million in 1990. Thus, the total aid recorded from major donor sources is R271 million. This excludes aid from Sweden and Denmark, bilateral donors known to be operating in South Africa.

Data on funding from the wide range of smaller donors detailed above are not readily available. A considerable amount of money flows from these various organisations, but to locate sources and identify the amounts and destinations would require substantial research. Ideally, a donor data base should be established.[3]

(ii) *South African Government Data*: All money flowing into the country is expected to come through the banking system. Foreign currency must be declared, and data are collected and published by the South African Reserve Bank (in *Table S-68 Services and Transfers* in the Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletins). The data on transfer receipts are reproduced in Table 2: Transfer Receipts[4] (see appendix).

These data do not give an accurate picture of the total amount of aid accruing to South Africans since they exclude money spent outside the country on bursaries and scholarships or goods and services.

(iii) *Anecdotal Evidence:* The third source of information on size of aid flow is the guesstimates made by various bodies. Two sources gave estimates to the author: the first — a Pretoria-based diplomat — suggested that aid received in 1990 totalled approximately US$250

Table 2: Transfer receipts (R million)

	Private Sector		Central Govt.		Total	
	Total	of which Aid	Total	of which Aid	Total	of which Aid
1985	349	314,1	373	37,3	722	351,4
1986	356	320,4	426	42,6	782	363,0
1987	358	322,2	431	43,1	789	365,3
1988	363	326,7	400	46,0	763	466,0
1989	460	414,0	455	45,5	915	459,5

These data do not give an accurate picture of the total amount of aid accruing to South Africans since they exclude money spent outside the country on bursaries and scholarships or goods and services.

million (R625 million), while the second source — linked to the ANC — stated that their information was that at least R600 million per annum was reaching South Africa.[5]

Finally, it must be mentioned that these estimates do not take into account funding given to the ANC, SACP and PAC. Up to 1990 these organisations were illegal in South Africa and so could not operate in the country. They received considerable support from foreign governments and organisations for their activities in exile. The Swedish government gave R142 million to the ANC and SWAPO in 1989. They probably gave similar amounts to the ANC in 1990 and will continue to provide support of this magnitude for several years. The Liberation movements have now been unbanned and can operate in South Africa. They will have to bring aid money in to fund their establishment and running costs.

How Aid is Allocated and Administered

One of the fundamental features of the aid being given to South Africa is that almost all is intended to either help combat apartheid or assist its victims. The donor governments make no secret of this. Some examples from the paper 'Project Funding by Foreign Embassies Within South Africa' illustrate the reasons for giving aid:[6]

(i) *The USAID*: 'The focus of the USAID programme in South Africa is primarily political. Its objectives are to dismantle apartheid and help legally disadvantaged South Africans prepare for leadership in a post-apartheid South Africa.'

(ii) *Australia*: 'The purpose of the programme is to give substance to

Australia's condemnation of apartheid, to help prepare black South Africans for the post-apartheid era, and to help meet current humanitarian needs caused by apartheid'.

(iii) *Britain*: 'The British government's objective is to promote fundamental change leading to the creation of a just, democratic and non-racial society in South Africa'.

(iv) *Canada*: 'Supports a number of positive measures in South Africa intended to promote peaceful change and to prepare legally disadvantaged South Africans for a rightful and meaningful role in a post-apartheid society'.

(v) *Germany*: 'The Special programme on Southern Africa established in 1981 by the German Bundestag, is directed specifically towards relieving the plight of the black community suffering under the apartheid system and towards supporting non-racial groups engaged in activities to overcome that system and pave the way into a post-apartheid society'.

The *EDF* has similar goals to the bilateral donors and similar quotes on the purposes of bilateral aid could to be provided for every donor. They all seek to support the victims of apartheid and promote change as central tenets of the policy. Aid to South Africa is political rather than developmental. This raises the question as to what will happen to aid flows when apartheid ends.

Aid to South Africa is therefore very different to that given to most of the developing world.[7] Generally in LDCs, some 65% of bilateral and 85% of multilateral aid is channeled as project aid. The aim of this project aid is to strengthen the economic and social infrastructure in the recipient country. It is usually provided as finance for capital projects in social infrastructure, transport and energy and in productive sectors such as agriculture and industry. The recent increase in non-project aid then arises from the difficulty in identifying suitable projects particularly in Africa. This includes assistance with import finance, general budgeting support and emergency aid.

In South Africa the traditional project aid tends to be given by the NGOs, churches and foundations. They receive the type of request for support that allows them to provide this aid. There is very little non-project aid given by bilateral donors; the British have helped the Mozambican refugees, but emergency aid is provided by the churches and NGOs.

The mechanism whereby the aid is allocated in South Africa also differs from that in the rest of the world. Generally donors (especially bilateral and multilateral), operate in conjunction with the recipient government. The projects will usually be designed to support the government's national development priorities. Most projects will be subjected to some form of evaluation to ensure that they will be both successful and cost-effective. Management of the projects may be carried out by the government and/or donor, and there is usually an evaluation at the end of the project.

The attitude towards the South African government and the government's own hostility towards donors has meant that aid allocation in South Africa has operated rather differently. Firstly, much aid has been given despite rather than because of the government. Secondly, the government and, indeed most public organisations, have been excluded from the identification of projects and the allocation and expenditure of funds.

Usually the mechanism whereby aid is allocated is for the recipient organisation to make application to the donor. The application will then be evaluated in accordance with whatever criteria the donor uses and money may be granted. The two exceptions to this are money for external bursaries (here the donor will usually set up and administer the programme) and for emergency aid, which is given without recourse to lengthy procedures.

Allocating aid in this manner has a number of serious disadvantages. The organisation that can write the most convincing motivation rather than the most deserving one may receive funding. There is no co-ordination of aid among donors or recipients which may lead to expensive and unnecessary duplication of efforts. Finally, aid will probably not be used in the most effective way; indeed there has been a growth in the number of small single-project organisations, and while it is comparatively easy to set such organisations up, it is very hard to close them down at the end of the project.

The administration of aid in South Africa also differs from that in most other developing countries. Usually the donor organisation or country will have an office in the recipient country to handle both requests for aid and disbursement of money. Generally, aid to South Africa is managed by the head office in the case of charities. Bilateral aid has tended to be administered from consulates or embassies in South Africa. The exceptions to this are the USA, which established a USAID office in Pretoria in the late 1980s, and the EC, which opened its office early in 1991.

LIKELY TRENDS IN AID

There can be no doubt that once apartheid ends and a new representative government is in place, the aid flows will change. A number of donors will cease to support activities in South Africa while new ones will enter the field. The recipients and the type of aid given will also alter.

To understand why this will happen, it is necessary to appreciate the philosophy behind the giving of aid to developing countries. At the simplest level, aid is assumed to have a positive effect and help the poor by assisting in development and growth. Indeed, aid is generally known as official development assistance (ODA).

South Africa will be at a distinct disadvantage as far as receiving aid goes. The reason is quite simply (and this is clearly illustrated in Table 3) that

South Africa is (by African standards) a wealthy country. It has the second highest per capita income in continental sub-Saharan Africa, only oil-rich Gabon's is higher. The income is not equally distributed, an estimated 44% of South African citizens live in poverty. In general, donors do not look at income distribution as this is regarded as the responsibility of the government, and it seems that South Africa has more than ample resources to improve the lot of the poorest people.

South Africa's comparative wealth means that, post-apartheid, it will not qualify for aid from some of the bilateral donors and non-governmental organisations currently involved. These bodies are presently giving aid to groups that they feel the government is ignoring. These donors would assume (one hopes, correctly) that a new government will set about righting the social injustices and helping the poorest groups. Again, the donors would argue that South Africa has sufficient wealth to to this.

There are also a number of discernible global trends in the direction of and type of aid being given. Some may work to South Africa's benefit. The first

Table 3: Comparative wealth in Sub-Saharan Africa

Country	Population 1988 (Million)	GNP 1988 ($ Million)	GNP Per Head ($)
Angola	9,4	8,000	850
Benin	4,4	1,530	340
Botswana	1,1	1,150	1,000
Burkina	8,5	1.960	230
Burundi	5,1	1,200	230
Cameroon	11,2	11,270	1,010
Central African Republic	2,7	1,080	390
Comoros	0,4	200	440
Congo	2,1	1,950	930
Equatorial Guinea	0,3	140	350
Ethiopia	46,1	5,760	120
Gabon	1,0	3,200	2,970
Gambia	0,8	180	220
Ghana	14,0	5,610	400
Guinea	6,6	2,300	350
Guinea-Bissau	0,9	150	160
Ivory Coast	11,5	8,590	740
Kenya	23,0	8,310	360
Lesotho	1,6	690	410
Liberia	2,4	1,060	420
Madagascar	11,2	2,080	180

Table 3: (Continued)

Country	Population 1988 (Million)	GNP 1988 ($ Million)	GNP Per Head ($)
Malawi	8,1	1,320	160
Mali	7,9	1,800	230
Mauritania	1,9	910	480
Mauritius	1,0	1,890	1,810
Mozambique	14,9	1,550	100
Namibia	1,2	—	—
Niger	6,9	2,190	310
Nigeria	110,1	31,770	290
Rwanda	6,6	2,064	310
Sao Tomé	0,1	35	280
Senegal	7,1	4,520	630
Seychelles	0,06	260	3,800
Sierre Leone	3,9	930	240
Somalia	5,8	970	170
Sudan	23,7	8,070	340
Swaziland	0,7	580	790
Tanzania	24,7	3,780	160
Togo	3,3	1,240	370
Uganda	16,1	4,480	280
Zaire	33,6	5,740	170
Zambia	7,4	2,160	290
Zimbabwe	9,2	6,070	660
South Africa	33,9	77,720	2,290

Source: Rethinking Corporate Strategy for Africa: Opportunities and Risks in a Fast Changing Government. Business International, London 1990.

is that there is growing donor fatigue with Africa. After three decades of self-government and development assistance, many African countries seem no better off than they were at independence. Of the 44 sub-Saharan countries, 27 experienced declines in per capita income in the 1980s while only four had an average annual income growth of more than 2%.[8] Increasingly, donors want to put their money in projects and countries where self-sustained growth will occur.

The recent changes in Eastern Europe mean that it is being seen as a more 'worthy cause'. In addition, the media attention is switching from Africa with its poverty and famines to the Middle East, the environmental crisis and AIDS. This might work in South Africa's favour as it may be perceived as a country with the infrastructure and political will to succeed.

A second trend is that, as Business International notes:

> Political change internationally means that in the 1990s, Africa will be less of an economic and political preserve for any single country or economic bloc. It will increasingly command the attention of multilateral agencies, especially the World Bank, the UN and an enlarged EC. Bilateral aid will decline in importance as donors channel their funds through the multilaterals.
>
> Both bilateral and multilateral donors will channel more assistance to non-government recipients — e.g. private-sector enterprises, NGOs, church groups, women's associations — in an attempt to improve aid efficiency and ensure that their assistance trickles down to grass-roots levels rather than being distributed by politicians driven by political, vote-winning considerations. (p.34)

South Africa could again benefit from this. It has a highly developed NGO network and the private sector is well established. This will mean that its organisations will be able to motivate for and absorb aid more easily than most other African countries.

The evidence suggests, though, that in general South Africa will get less aid from bilateral and non-governmental donors. Some, however have indicated that their level of support will be consistent and may even increase. Others will probably open offices in South Africa and respond to needs. The next South African government may hold a donor's conference, (as seems to be fashionable) and could result in large sums being pledged by bilateral donors as one-off gifts. Nonetheless, the bilateral aid flows will decline.

By contrast, multilateral donors are beginning to operate in South Africa. Currently, the EC is the only organisation operating. The World Bank (the biggest multilateral donor) has begun looking at South Africa and teams have visited to assess needs and how the Bank can operate.[10]

Other multilateral agencies that can be expected to get involved are the African Development Bank (based in Abidjan) and the United Nations family. The latter include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), UNESCO, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), UNICEF and UNHCR, as well as a host of less important bodies. The UNHCR may well be the first of the UN family to become involved as it has been asked to assist in returning the ANC exiles.

The likely trend in aid is illustrated in Table 4 (see appendix), although it must be stressed that actual figures are speculative. This shows that the multilateral agencies will replace the bilateral donors as the main funding organisations in South Africa. One reason for this is that most multilaterals have hard and soft loan arms. The soft loans are given over 20-25 years at very low interest rates (2-4%) and are intended for the poorest countries. Hard loans are generally given at rates around the LIBOR (London Interbank Offer Rate) over the same periods. South Africa with its low levels of debt, would be a good risk for loans.

Table 4: Possible trends in Aid flows in South Africa (Real terms)



All these projections of the trends in aid do, however, presuppose that there will be a stable government in South Africa. The type of government is not of major significance — what is most important is that it be stable and able to absorb the inflow of money. It is, however, quite likely that all the lending agencies will increasingly emphasise pre-conditions attached to their loans, in particular control of public enterprise, accountability and democracy.

THE OPPORTUNITIES

Aid to South Africa will create opportunities for local business. There will be a demand for feasibility studies, project evaluation, construction, and supply of goods and services to projects. There will be an opportunity for an aid industry to develop and it is expected that this will be very much more formalised than it has been up to now. South African firms, with their greater level of sophistication, should be well placed to undertake work currently done in European- or American-based consultancies.

One of the main opportunities which will arise from the ending of South Africa's pariah status will be the chance for South African firms to obtain work in the region. A vast amount of aid flows into Southern Africa. Most of it is supplied to the individual countries, but a certain amount is channelled through regional organisations such as SADCC. It was estimated that in 1987 Sub-Saharan Africa received nearly $14,000m. in aid. As Table 5 (see appendix) shows, a significant amount of this was received by the Southern African continent.

In addition to this money, SADCC reported a cumulative commitment of $2,7 billion up to mid-1988[11], although it is not clear how much of this

Table 5: AID — Flows to Southern Africa 1985 and 1987
(Million current US$)

Country	1985	1987
Angola	102	168
Botswana	99	158
Lesotho	92	105
Malawi	113	281
Mozambique	359	708
Swaziland	25	45
Tanzania	503	888
Zaire	325	623
Zambia	326	429
Zimbabwe	250	296
TOTAL	2 194	3 701

money was also included in individual country budgets. This double counting is very difficult to eliminate. For example, money might be committed to improving navigational aids at the national airport of a country. This could be counted both as a SADCC regional communications project and as a national project. Nonetheless, it is evident that a considerable amount of money flows to the region. If South African firms can obtain part of the work, this could be very profitable.

CONCLUSION

The flow of aid to South Africa is much greater than is generally realised. This has not been appreciated to date as few people outside the donor community have attempted to assess how large and how effective the aid is. In addition, aid given to South Africa is very different from OD given to most countries. It has had political rather than developmental goals. The past hostility of the government to aid has meant that it is difficult to quantify the flows or identify the recipients.

The change in government in South Africa will mean a change in the source, size and type of aid. Donors currently supporting anti-apartheid movements can be expected to withdraw or reduce their commitments. One of the big changes will be the establishment of the multi-lateral agencies most notably the World Bank. Aid to South Africa will have developmental goals and there will be an increase in project aid and loans.

International acceptability will also mean that South African firms will be able to bid on all contracts in the region. As these firms can often do work cheaper and better than their European counterparts, this could lead to an increase in their activities and profitability.

This article represents a first attempt to evaluate the size of the aid flows to South Africa as well as the likely trends. As such it presages a further growth industry related to aid flows — research into and writing about them.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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Endnotes

1. See for example, Roger C. Riddell, *Foreign Aid Reconsidered,* James Currey Ltd. London 1987.
2. This information was collected through a series of interviews with major donors.
3. Two examples illustrate this. Operation Hunger featured in a corporate survey in the *Financial Mail* on 7.10.1988. According to this, the organisation had an income of R14.6 million in the 1987/1988 financial year. Money from overseas donors totalled 42% of total income in 1988 and was received from the West German

Government, the BNL Bank in Italy, *USAID*, the Presbyterian Hunger programme and the UK government. When preparing this article a number of questionnaires were sent out and although very few responses were received, the University of the Witwatersrand indicated that they had received R7,054,094 in 1990 from US foundations. These two examples illustrate the magnitude of the aid flows.

4. According to the Reserve Bank footnote to the table these transfer receipts are 'migrants funds, legacies, grants, etc.'. Professor Jack van der Spuy Heyns of the Rand Afrikaans University was asked to advise on what percentage of these amounts represent aid. He suggested that 90% of private sector receipts and 10% of government receipts could be regarded as foreign aid.
5. These sources must remain confidential, but accurately reflect the present situation.
6. These examples are all taken from the introductory statements made by the embassies in South Africa in the document by Ann McKinstrey Micon, *Project Funding by Foreign Embassies within South Africa, South African Information Exchange Working Paper, No. 13*, Institute of International Education, New York, June 1990.
7. This was reported in *Business Day*, 28 2.1991. It was reported that 16,3 million live below the minimum urban living standards; 2,3 million are in dire need.
8. Business International, Rethinking Corporate Strategy for African Opportunities and Risks, London 1990.
9. The British and Americans have indicated they will maintain their support. The British, Germans and Canadians will probably open aid offices, the French and Italians may look to moving to more commercial operations while the Scandinavians' position is unclear.
10. It was recently reported that the World Bank was sending a major team to South Africa and their initial area of interest is urbanisation. *Finance Week*, 28.2.1990.
11. Joseph Hanlon, SADCC in the 1990s: Development on the Frontline. *Economist Intelligence Unit*, London 1989.

Peter Vale

Using Every Available Weapon?: International Pressure and Change in South Africa[1]

Since 1946 international pressure has been a continuous feature of South African politics. This paper is naturally concerned with identifying both the forms this has taken and which have yielded the most significant results. At another level, however, the paper is more engaged in the reciprocal dimension of international pressure: why, with all the pressure on South Africa, did it take so long to effect political change?

At a primary and conscious level the isolation of the impact of external forces on South African developments is, at once both very easy and devilishly difficult. It is easy to enumerate the kinds of attitudes which the international community has taken against South Africa and then, as it were, close one's case. A recently published volume does this as follows:

> *The West* (especially the United Kingdom and the United States): publicly to endorse opposition to apartheid, privately to engage in constructive efforts to encourage verligtes and to preserve economic investments, always mindful of the strategic importance of the Cape and South Africa's mineral wealth. The American policy of Constructive Engagement is designed to preserve regional stability, to encourage reform and to maintain Western influence.
> *The East* (especially the Soviet Union and China): to encourage national liberation movements, to destabilise the region, to play upon the ambiguities of Western policies so as to embarrass the West, and eventually to dislodge and replace its influence in the region.
> *The Black Neighbours or Frontline States* (primarily Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia, Angola, Tanzania): to complete the anti-colonial, anti-white revolution, while not sacrificing domestic development and growth. South Africa is the economic giant of the region and all its Black neighbours are economically dependent on it. Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana have near-total dependence, while

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Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia have varying but significant degrees of dependence.

The Commonwealth: although South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth when the Republic was inaugurated on 31 May, 1961, it has always been prominent in the world campaign against apartheid. In 1985, at their summit at Nassau in the Bahamas, it appointed the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons to investigate conditions inside South Africa and to seek ways of establishing there a genuine non-racial democracy. Their report of 1986 recommended among other initiatives that South Africa's major trading partners should apply economic pressures on a continuing and incremental basis in order to bring about reform. Thus far, the intransigence of the UK government has seriously damaged the collective impact of the Commonwealth's recommendations.[2]

This roll-call approach, however, falls far short of offering any understanding of the linkage between international pressure and domestic change, or — in South Africa's case — lack of change.

So, how are we to explain process, interaction and resulting transformation?

International pressure to end apartheid and instal a government in South Africa which is representative of the interests of the country's majority has taken many forms — multilateral, bilateral, unilateral, individual.

Take the United Nations, for example. Scarcely a session of the General Assembly has passed without not only a major debate on South Africa, but a vote of some kind or another. In the main, the central thrust of these focused on apartheid but it is worth remembering that two other issues — the occupation of Namibia and South Africa's support for the rebel regime in Rhodesia — highlighted both South Africa's regional preponderance and her determination to preserve the status quo.

Early pressure from the United Nations was easy to deflect. In the immediate post-War years, South Africa was a respected member of the international community: she had, after all, fought on the victorious Allied side and was a valued member of a Commonwealth which was itself chiefly white. The rub, of course lies in the qualification — chiefly white. The underlying nature of the international community was undergoing profound changes: of these, far and away the most important was the rise of states governed by people of colour. To them, apartheid with its inherent racial bias was simply not acceptable — this was/is the essence of the conflict between South Africa and the international community.

In the early days, however, the campaign against South Africa operated on the symbolic level, such as the 1946 decision by India to impose a trade boycott against South Africa. A recent study points out that at that time, 'South Africa was not yet diplomatically isolated but she was becoming an embarrassing friend.'[3]

But why did it take so long to bring about change?

The answer lies in two complementary issues: the prevailing nature of the international system and the resulting inadequacy of the instruments available to effect change.

The paralysis of the Cold War

As with other international efforts to change circumstances, periodic deepening of Cold War tensions drew attention away from South Africa's own problems. So, with the exception of the voluntary Arms Embargo of 1963,

> South Africa's Western trading partners refused to heed the resolutions demanding diplomatic and economic sanctions, which the General Assembly began passing with monotonous regularity from November 1962 onwards.[4]

It is impossible to over-estimate the effect which the Cold War was to have on delaying the process of change in South Africa. The contests for both majority rule in what are now the Frontline States, and to end apartheid, were portrayed in starkly Cold War terms. The language both of the status quo and of resistance were powerfully imbued with East-West images: the forces which opposed change were western and pro-capitalist; those who pressed for change, eastern and pro-socialist. On both sides of the great international divide, it was an article of faith as to how, if at all, the Superpowers lined up over South Africa.

In order to protect its global interests the United States proclaimed two separate strategic canons which spanned two decades. The first was the Nixon Doctrine (known alternatively, of course, as the Kissinger Doctrine), the second the Reagan Doctrine. Both were to reinforce the notion that the apartheid issue was an integral part of the Cold War.

The former promised that in non-nuclear types of aggression, the United States would

> provide military and economic assistance with the important proviso that 'we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its own defence'.[5]

In practice this was also to provide considerable grace for South Africa both at home and in the region. NSSM 39 — the Nixon Doctrine's southern African dimension — with its 'tilt' towards the white regimes of the region, was a considerable fillip at a time when South Africa's conventional military arsenals were in need of considerable revitalisation.

South Africa was considerably buoyed by the implications of the Kissinger era. Of distinctive importance was its commitment to the war in

Angola where, in essence, it fought as an American proxy. This intervention proved a turning point in the history of the sub-continent, because the introduction of Cuban forces stripped away for the first time South Africa's ability to control the course of events throughout the region. This, in turn, set the stage for the intensification of Cold War-type issues in South and southern Africa which would, ultimately, delay the search for a democratic solution to the region's problems.

For the sake of analysis we should pause to consider the implications of this. What, of course, the Cubans represented was an intrusive force, which could match South Africa's power in the sub-continent; but there was more to it than this. They came to symbolise something far deeper for the majority of southern Africa's people. This was the understanding that their own liberation was close at hand; a force from a country which has freed itself was to inspire more than a generation of activists.

There seems little doubt that the Soweto uprising of 1976 drew hope from these events, particularly the setback suffered by the SADF, in Angola. But Mozambique, too, inspired a generation of young; in the latter case, many South Africans were imprisoned for organising pro-Frelimo rallies. Both boosted the democratic movement in South Africa, as Nelson Mandela suggests in these lines:

> [Of Angola] ... there are strong ties between the MPLA and the ANC, between the people of Angola and the people of South Africa. Those good relations were developed in the course of a bitter struggle which you, the people of Angola, and the people of South Africa are even at this moment fighting for ... The progress we have made in our armed struggle is owed largely to Angola...
> [Of Cuba] ... In size, the People's Republic of Cuba is a small country. It's not as wealthy as the old industrialised countries of the world. But there is one thing where that country stands head and shoulders above most of the countries of the world: it is the love of human rights and freedom. Inspired by these basic needs, it rallied around Angola where she was attacked by hostile forces from South Africa and from other parts of the world.[6]

These tributes indicate an opinion of the Cubans which, itself, underscores an antipathy for American policy made five years earlier:

> The American view of Namibia concerning the linkage of the Cubans to independence is totally unacceptable to us. We very much welcome their presence. They are defending the kind of societal change we want to see. There is a Xhosa song thanking the Soviets and the Cuban people for all they have done. It has become clear that no social and economic problems can be solved through Parliament here. Armed struggle, strikes, boycotts have become necessary to bring about change. The state of emergency is crushing democratic organisation. So our people turn elsewhere. The parties which will help us are the Cubans, Russians, East Germans, Angolans, etc. America is making a fundamental mistake by not forcing the South African Government to lift the state of emergency. So we have no choice but to turn East. We get no support from Governments like Britain and the US...So we welcome the Cubans.[7]

The advent of the Reagan Administration both halted and reversed the nascent struggle for democracy represented by developments in Mozambique and Angola. Reagan's views on international issues fitted neatly with the ascending power of the military in South Africa's decision-making circles as this assessment suggests:

> ...South Africa's dominant strategic position in the post war period has been the Cold War...Magnus Malan was at Fort Bragg in the Fifties...(where the) .. dominant ideological thinking was...quite crude anti-communism...This doctrine has had a huge influence in South African strategic thinking, especially in regional affairs.[8]

For South Africa, the Reagan Doctrine opened new political opportunities with its

> creation of a new international order where legitimacy of governments is linked to conformity with the democratic process. This means that the United States has a 'moral responsibility' to support anti-communist insurgencies wherever they appeared...for the specific purpose of checking, and if possible reversing, the growth of Soviet and communist influence in the Third World.[9]

Sharing *common strategic goals with the* United States *and confronted with* self-styled Marxist-Leninist states on their immediate borders, South Africa's strategic planners — in the name of anti-Communism — not only wreaked havoc on the country's neighbouring states, but turned on their own people even more viciously.

Whether or not the United States turned a blind eye to what South Africa was doing is a moot point. What is important is that immediate US concerns and a lack of interest in domestic change gave South Africa a free hand. Horace Campbell recalls this period thus:

> [d]uring the period 1976-1980 the South Africans were on the defensive militarily and diplomatically. This position was to change at the end of 1980 when the Republican administration came to power in Washington. Under the Reagan/Crocker position of Constructive Engagement with apartheid, Angola (and elsewhere in the region) was seen in the cold war context and this message was conveyed to the South Africans in a series of confidence building measures between the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs in the Reagan administration and the Defence and Foreign Ministers of the Republic of South Africa.[10]

Constructive Engagement itself proved no more than a resurrection of NSSM 39's 'tilt' towards minority regimes: the striking difference being that, by this time, there was only one — South Africa — left. But in point of fact, the central occupation of Constructive Engagement was not towards the South African issue but rather towards linking the Namibian issue with withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. It seems clear, therefore, that the central pre-occupation of Constructive Engagement was the Cold War issues — particularly on the Angolan-Cuban-Namibian question.

There was no evidence for suggesting, to make an hypothetical point, that had the Cubans withdrawal unilaterally from Angola, P.W. Botha would have withdrawn from Namibia and set the country on the road to independence. Nor, indeed, was there any indication that, in these self-same circumstances, South Africa would have moved any further to ending apartheid than the already inadequate Tricameral system. And yet, by the day he left office Chester Crocker was able to pronounce the success of Constructive Engagement.[12] Why?

The answer lies less in the inherent efficacy of the policy and Crocker's diplomatic skills, than it lay in a war over which he had no control. This was the struggle for Cuito Cuanavale[13], the strategic hamlet in south-east Angola which lasted for the eight months between October 1987 and June 1988. By the time the battle was over, South Africa's formal capacity to buy time for itself through military action in the name of the Cold War cause was all but spent. In the resulting peace accords, Crocker was able simply to cobble together increasingly converging diplomatic positions.

As important in bringing the South Africans to heel in Angola, was the deepening series of understandings between Washington and Moscow on settling regional conflicts by Superpower dialogue. By December 1988, South Africa and its adversaries had reached a far-reaching series of understandings and Namibia — for so long a deeply contested issue — was well on its way to independence.

Unable — either politically or financially — to sustain their war effort, the South Africans abandoned their once grandiose hopes of Namibia as a fifth province and watched the Secretary-General of the United Nations read the oath of presidential office to Sam Nujoma, the leader of an organisation which successive South African governments had vilified. It was, of course, sheer irony. Years earlier, a South African scholar described the strongly Cold War views which South African authorities held of SWAPO.

> For South Africa, keeping the communists out of Namibia is synonymous with keeping SWAPO out of power. South Africa is convinced that SWAPO is a Marxist organisation, subservient to Moscow. Should it come to power, it would not merely offer the communists a foothold (sic), but would embark on wholesale nationalisation and also ferment unrest and civil war in Namibia...[14]

Of course for Pretoria, the ANC and its ally the South African Communist Party, were no better than SWAPO: Communists intent on perpetrating evil, violence and destruction; resolved to replace the peace and harmony of free enterprise and separateness with the disorder and chaos of socialism. But even before Namibia became independent, the ANC and the SACP had been unbanned. What had changed? returning exile presciently caught the slip-stream of the times with this observation:

> How much, for instance, do ordinary South Africans, black and white, understand the immensity of what is happening to them? Are they at all able to situate the dynamism transforming their own individual political and economic lives in the context of that

> global revolution, inaugurated by a little man in the Kremlin with a map-like birthmark on his bald pate — a revolution which has ended the 'cold war' and the mythologies of 'deterrence', 'balances of terror', 'total onslaughts' and 'total strategies' to defeat them?'[15]

Of course, international pressure on South Africa has not only consisted of sticks: carrots, too, have played their part. It is obvious that few of these were directed towards the apartheid government and more have been directed towards those who traditionally have opposed it, including civil rights groups and the liberation movements. In many ways, however, supporting these groups seemed to further strengthen the Cold War dimension of the problem.

Take, for example, the avowed support which the Soviet Union offered to the ANC: this was literally a red rag to a bull. The long-term effect was that it became very difficult for the ANC, at a crucial moment in the country's history, to shed the image that it was no more than a stalking horse for Soviet interests. This certainly retarded the ANC's capacity to blunt British and American opposition to it during the Reagan and Thatcher years; the South African government was certainly able to use this to further entrench its own position.

Boycotts and Sanctions: Tyranny or Myth

Any deliberation or international pressure against South Africa is incomplete without a discussion of the sanctions issue which has — certainly formally — been at the core of debates over change in South Africa.

Setting aside the requisite international action which apartheid invited against South Africa's ruling minority, the sanctions debate was itself caught in a complex ideological web. Western-oriented states — along with leading South African industrialists — argued that only economic growth could erode apartheid and ensure a more just society. In many ways, the basic setting of this 'growth-and-erosion' thesis remains undisturbed after nearly three decades: it is still used by those who wish to bring an immediate end to sanctions.

The majority were, it goes without saying, seldom asked about their attitude towards sanctions. Indeed, their role in the setting and practice of South Africa's foreign relations was hardly a factor at all. Still it is clear that, for the majority, sanctions were always an attractive weapon. For example, in 1963 Albert Luthuli recognised the damage which would be done by sanctions but reached a somewhat different conclusion than those who were so vehemently opposed to them.

> I shall not argue that economic ostracism of South Africa is desirable from every point of view. But I have no doubt that it represents our only chance of a relatively peaceful transition from the present unacceptable type of rule to a system of government which gives us all our rightful voice.[16]

In many ways, however, the boycott/sanctions issue may have been less intended for the impact it was to have on South Africa (to which we will return presently) than for deepening support for the exiled movements, especially the ANC, abroad. Here, as in so many South African cases, an internal issue — the Sharpeville massacre — sparked the transformation of the so-called Boycott Movement into the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), which spearheaded the drive for isolating the white State.

Equally quickly a range of pro-South African movements sprung into life with, amongst others, the aim of opposing sanctions. These included the American-South African Council, the United Kingdom-South African Trade Association and the South African Foundation.[17] The contest between them was all too often cast in Cold War terms, incidently.

We need to pause here to consider two separate things: first, whether sanctions were always intended only to be symbolic; and second, the growth of the strong international representation of the exiled movements, particularly the ANC.

The latter is relatively expeditiously dealt with. There is no doubt that the ANC began conducting a

> separate...foreign policy...[which aimed]...to isolate white South African...[This resulted in]...alternative foreign relations...[which]...came to represent the international preferences of the disenfranchised. [These]...circumstances forced the liberation movements to conduct foreign policy by proxy for the country's majority.[18]

This 'alternative foreign policy' must have troubled mainstream South African policy-makers, especially when less ideologically driven — in Cold War terms, this is — states like Australia, Nordic countries and Japan, began to recognise ANC foreign representatives. This reciprocal pressure became a vital form of, to use a mathematical image, 'crowding out' South Africa's formal diplomatic space.

Were sanctions against South Africa only meant to be symbolic? The answer is a conditional one: yes and no. One reason for this was that, as Ronald Segal put it,

> [t]hose who want sanctions dismiss all arguments against them as trivial or irrelevant, or those who opposed such action denounced it as illegal, impractical and economically calamitous. It was a dialogue of pulpits with the phrases of revelation.[19]

However, the extent of the economic links of some western states — most noticeably Britain — could not bring them to disengage. A good indicator of the extent of British fears over disengagement from South Africa appeared in a document issued by the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association in 1978,

> [on] the employment front alone, the loss of South African trade would add anything

> from 70 000 to 250 000 to the unemployment list...alternative markets are simply not available.[20]

For some countries, disengagement from South Africa was far easier. The best known example was the joint action by Nordic countries in response to the Soweto uprising of 1976. A recent doctoral thesis describes the development of this position.

> Norwegian initiative led the Nordic foreign ministers to decide, in September 1977, to appoint a working group to develop a joint policy of economic sanctions. During a foreign ministers meeting in March 1978 a Nordic Programme of Action was established to discourage new investment, prevent cultural and [sporting] contacts with South Africa, and increase aid to the liberation movements. The Programme was revised and expanded in 1985, revised again in 1988 and is now entitled the Nordic Programme of Action Against Apartheid. The new Programme includes a trade boycott of South Africa and operates within the framework of the United Nations.[21]

Between these two positions, the international dilemma of sanctions against South Africa was an unalterable one for external states. All states, including South Africa's neighbours, were

> impelled to join the political ostracism of South Africa partly by internal pressures and partly by external ones...[but there was a necessity to draw]...a distinction between the economic and strategic interests...that have led them to support the South Africa state, and the political and ideological interests that impel them to distance themselves from it.[22]

This is another way of saying that states were driven by the established international principle of self-interest.

This is why, until the infamous 'Rubicon Speech' of August 1985, trade and other sanctions did not effect great changes in the status quo: indeed, quite the opposite. The arms embargo, for instance, had driven South Africa to acquire relatively advanced technology: she used it, on the one hand, to wreak havoc on her neighbours whilst, on the other, the same technology enabled her to offer peace and harmony to the region.

The real problem remained unaltered throughout: the least painful and most expeditious way to end apartheid. It was, however, the financial sanctions which followed upon the Rubicon Speech which really focused the minds of South Africa's policy-makers on change. Why?

A combination of a faltering economic policy and a deterioration in the country's political risk assessment led banks into

> what financial watchers call the 'herd instinct'... financial institutions would begin to compete, not to stay in, but to get out of the South African market.[23]

For the South Africans, this situation was compounded by the fact that

> the unusual political circumstances (there was still turmoil on the streets of the black

> townships), the banks were not prepared to sit down with South African negotiators to work out a mutually satisfactory arrangement.[24].

The impact of Rubicon and the response to it altered both the political discourse and the assessment of the impact of sanctions on the process of change. Let the following example, stand for numerous others. Dr. Chris van Wyk, a former Chief Executive of a South African banking group, suggested that sanctions had left the country R100-billion poorer. He concluded his comments, with a 'scathing attack on the proponents of sanctions' saying that:

> through impoverishing and radicalizing the nation, sanctions have raised the chances of political confrontation at the expense of political reconciliation in the 1990s.[25]

Drawing some lessons: Five paradoxes of pressure and change

This selective discussion enables us to offer some tentative conclusions on the impact of external forces for change. Most of these conclusions are marked by incongruity: there should be no apology for this. If, as the cliché says, change is painful, efforts to effect the processes of change where a loss of power and privilege are at stake are near impossible.

The paradox of isolation

Two contradictory thrusts fashion the quandary to which this paper directs its attention. First, the inescapable realisation that southern Africa's search for democracy has been accompanied by a drift towards isolation. Secondly, the inescapable recognition that the most effective means of fortifying democracy is by the cultivation of a democratic culture.

In international terms, the latter means reinforcing those forces which will enhance the goal while the former means sanctioning and boycotting those which are bent on thwarting the process. Between the two positions there is very little place for discussion and persuasion which, after all, is the regular currency of democracy.

In the Namibian case, a series of General Assembly Resolutions were passed against South Africa over the continued occupation of the disputed territory. Nevertheless, the United Nations — in various guises —continued dialogue with South Africa on Namibia's fate. This suggests that, in reality, isolation and communication are not mutually-exclusive. In Namibia's case both were crucial in effecting change. If, for example, South Africa could have procured the sophisticated aircraft denied her by the mandatory arms embargo, she might well have been able to sustain her effort and the outcome of Cuito Cuanavale might have been different. However, the continued dialogue with the United States may have impressed upon her the need for a reconsideration of her position in the light of the changing nature of East/West relations.

The paradox of apartheid ideology and foreign policy

South Africa's drift into international isolation was primarily, the result of the determination of successive National Party governments to press ahead with apartheid. Insensitive to the necessity of normal diplomatic practice and mesmerised by their own ideology, South Africa's foreign policy became an endless succession of reprimands by South African politicians of the international community for their short-sightedness. It was not foreign policy at all: international relations were no more than an effort by the government to reassure its supporters that under no circumstances would they bow to international pressure.

The transformation of apartheid from its racially-based ideological origins to a vulgar anti-communism was no solution; it could not resolve the paradox.

Although self-proclaimed Marxists, SWAPO proved less ideologically hide-bound than the South Africans: of course, the changes in the Soviet Union did help this along. Nevertheless, South Africa's notion of a total onslaught — in effect a cruder version of the Evil Empire notion so purposefully propagated by Ronald Reagan — was of course the factor which brought South African troops face to face with Cuban and Angolan troops. The outcome, as we have seen, was a reversal of the fortunes of the SADF which eventually helped to bring Namibia to independence and change in South Africa. The lesson is clear: although apartheid ideology strengthened in the short-run, it was ultimately a paralysing condition.

The paradox of geography

While political choices made South Africa's isolation inevitable, geography reinforced the residual power of the state. Put as a reciprocal question: why was it difficult to change the state-directed political discourse in South Africa?

A not too small part was South Africa's geographic isolation from competing centres of power. As a result, the sheer ability of the minority to sustain its position for a long period of time was directly proportional to South Africa's distance from an alternative political message. The point is strengthened when one considers how it was that apartheid's life was prolonged for fifteen years as a result of the diversion provided by the Smith regime in Rhodesia, as well as for over sixty years in the case of Namibia!

In both cases, the capacity to dislodge the power of the minority was complicated by the fact that the official message of politics was near impossible to counter. This general state of affairs was compounded by the introduction of television. Long-standing states of emergency in both countries also weakened the ability to feed an alternative message into the prevailing political process.

But the more the state controls the message, the weaker it gets. This paradox is a simple one: increasingly embattled and tightly-controlled communities tend to believe their own propaganda. This inability to understand the dynamic of one's own society is a form of paralysis from which it is difficult — if not impossible — to escape.

An interesting comparative perspective is offered by the East European experience. Here, the accessibility of alternative messages — in the form of television and radio — on public policy may have speeded-up the process of change far faster than in the South African case.

The paradox of the Cold War

As we have seen, the Cold War runs like a San Andreas Fault throughout the post-War efforts to dislodge minority rule in southern Africa.

> [It]...enabled minority rule (and its two colonial manifestations) to incorporate...(a series of)...cardinal arguments which were used singularly, or together, to resist the forces of change. These contentions had little or nothing to do with the centrality of the race question; they were, in essence, effective decoys which made it difficult to dislodge these objectionable political systems.[26]

By successfully portraying itself as an integral part of the West's opposition to Communism, South Africa not only procured for itself military hardware but necessary diplomatic support, both bilaterally and multilaterally. When it seemed that the sting was being taken out of the Cold War issue, South Africa used the pretext of the Reagan Doctrine both to reinforce its pro-Western credentials, and effectively to destroy hopes for prosperity in other southern African countries by destabilising them.

In point of fact the nexus between minority rule in southern Africa and the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States was absurd. Far removed from the central site of a potential conflict, the entire political process in southern Africa was used and abused as the Superpowers sought to protect residual elements of their own power in the region.

Nevertheless, this chimera increasingly became the reality of the region. This state of affairs might have continued had not the Cold War ended. Its demise — interestingly enough — was spawned by the self-same forces which were driving the Superpowers into deeper and deeper competition. The willingness of South Africa's ruling elite to re-direct the nature of their control over that society by opening-up the political process, was dramatically increased by the ending of the Cold War. It was, for example, the most compulsive tool in dislodging the military from their grip on public policy in South Africa.

The paradox of excessive power

Not only in South Africa but elsewhere, the paradox of power is always present. There seems little doubt that South Africa was/is militarily influential but the price paid for this has been daunting. An increasing proportion of the exchequer was required to sustain South Africa's arsenal; at the same time, it was nearly impossible for South Africa to catch-up in advanced areas of military hardware, like avionics. This hampered her capacity to sustain the war effort in Namibia which she seemed so intent on pursuing in the late-1980s.

As serious, was the view that South Africa's power was omnipotent because it cowed the states around it. As Horace Campbell convincingly puts it:

> during the 1980s, the South Africans had come to believe in their military invincibility as their troops made forays into Angola and their forces wrought destabilisation and destruction across the region. The fetishism of the weapons systems became bound up with the mystique of white supremacy as sales representatives of Armscor sold the idea that their G-5 and G-6 155mm long range artillery was 'the best gun in any army in the world'.[27]

While the enthusiasm of the sales team may have been excessive, South Africa's capacity to procure weapons in the arms bazaar was impressive. The problem was, however, one of generations of technology: as Cuito Cuanavale showed, South Africa's real problem lay in the air where the mandatory arms embargo had denied her free rein.

What changes the minds of men?

Because this question is as old as politics itself, there is not one but many conceivable answers. South Africa offers, however, an interesting opportunity to try to address the question, simply because the struggle to end apartheid has been so long-lasting and the means used to end it so diverse. This paper, in a cursory manner, has tried to evaluate these.

It is, however, probably true to say that the seeds of apartheid's destruction seemed self-evident from the very beginning. Excluded from access to the very fundamentals of life's chances, the majority of the country's citizens felt little or no inclination to sustain the existing order. In these circumstances, the formal demise of a system which was so patently illegitimate was surely only a matter of time. But, in many ways, its corollary — the sheer economic and political costs of maintaining minority domination — will prove to have been the system's ultimate undoing.[28]

Endnotes

1. Some of the ideas in this paper can be found in Peter Vale, 'Pressure for change in South and southern Africa' in Gavin Maasdorp & Alan Whiteside (eds.), *South and southern Africa into the 21st Century*. London, Macmillan, (forthcoming), 15p.
2. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*. London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, pp.18-19.
3. James Barber & John Barratt, *South Africa's Foreign Policy: The search for status and security 1945-1986*. Johannesburg, Southern, 1990, p.25.
4. Deon Geldenhuys, *The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making*.

Johannesburg, Macmillan for The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1984, pp 11-12

5 Graham Evans & Jeffrey Newnham, *op cit* , p 275

6 Nelson Mandela *Speeches 1990 Intensify the struggle to abolish apartheid* New York, Pathfinder Press, 1990, p 54 & p 55

7 David Hirschmann, *Changing Attitudes of Black South Africans towards the United States* Lewiston The Edwin Mellen Press, African Series Volume 12, 1989, p 134

8 Peter Vale, *Southern African Strategic Considerations*, in Alternative National Service Occasional paper No 14 Cape Town, Centre for Inter-Group Studies, 1990, p 142

9 Evans & Newnham, *op cit* , pp 338-9

10 Horace Campbell, *The siege of Cuito Cuanavale* Uppsala The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies (Current African Issues 10) 1990, p 14

11 See, for example, Sanford J Ungar & Peter Vale, 'South Africa Why Constructive Engagement Failed?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 64, No 2, (1986), pp 234-258

12 See Chester Crocker, 'South Africa Eight Years later' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 68, No 4 (Fall, 1989), pp 144-164

13 For a comprehensive account see Campbell, *op cit* , pp 30

14 Deon Geldenhuys, *op cit* , p 227

15 'Everything is different — but still so much is the same', *Cape Times*, 1 October 1990, p 6

16 Quoted in *Sanctions against South Africa* Edited for CASE by Mark Orkin Cape Town David Philip 1989, p vi

17 Barber & Barratt, *op cit* , p 80

18 'Who does own foreign policy in South Africa', *Cape Times*, 28 January 1991

19 Cited in Barber & Barratt, *op cit* , p 80

20 'Britain's Link with South Africa worth R13 200m', *Rand Daily Mail*, 29 November 1978

21 Scott Thomas, *The Diplomacy of Liberation The International Relations of The African National Congress of South Africa, 1960-1985* Unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to the University of London October 1989, pp 473-4

22 Hedley Bull, 'Implications for the West', in R I Rotberg & J Barratt (eds), *Conflict and Compromise in South Africa* Cape Town, David Philip, 1980, pp 173-174

23 Keith Overden & Tony Cole, *Apartheid and International Finance programme for change* Sydney, Penguin, 1989, p 84

24 *ibid* , p 88

25 *The Star*, Johannesburg, November 3, 1989

26 Peter Vale, 'Pressure for change in South and southern Africa' in Gavin Maasdorp & Alan Whiteside (eds), *South and Southern Africa into the 21st Century* London, Macmillan, (1990), 15p

27 Campbell, *op cit* , p 3

28 See John Davies, Negotiations in South Africa the international dimension *New Zealand International Review*, Vol 25, No 6, (November/December 1990), p 16

Book Reviews

INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA ONE YEAR ON

David Simon, March 1991 Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (RISCT), London, ISSN 0069-8792, 26 pages (including bibliographic notes).

This monograph, by one of the best Namibian specialists, was published to mark the first anniversary of the independence of Africa's last colony.

Simon displays a gift of sensitive understanding and strong identification with the new state in its trek towards nationhood. An analyst of formidable versatility and polish, he writes economically — yet full of sparkle — of the uplifting background to independence, of SWAPO's complex transition from liberation politics to national government, and of the simultaneous restructuring of the apparatus of state.

This eminently readable monograph probes the implications of Namibia's nationhood for the Southern African region. It reviews the current political and economic situation and the possibilities of greater regional co-operation. David Simon concludes by examining some of the central issues which lie ahead for southern Africa with post-apartheid South Africa as inevitably the dominant power.

Reflecting on Namibia's transition and on its first year of independence, Simon concludes that there has been 'a remarkable degree of continuity in administration and economic production amid a genuine atmosphere of optimism and reconciliation'. While this is also the view of this reviewer, Simon tends to underestimate the potential contradictions and tensions for the ruling party that may emanate from the politics of reconciliation. Perhaps, his admiration for the new political elites and for their policies goes too far? What has been 'reconciled' to date, are the interests of the new political elites and nomenklatura with those of local and foreign capital and those of the predominantly white commercial farming sector. 'Racial reconciliation', yes. 'National reconciliation', perhaps.

Simon's brief overview of political and economic life in Namibia is crisp and instructive. One learns of the fluctuating fortunes of the official opposition — the DTA; of the melancholic provincialism that informs political thinking among some of the smaller ethnic groups, and of the attempts of trade unions to rebuild. He also offers a useful introduction to regional and local government, in his capacity as advisor to the country's First Delimitation Commission.

As is customary with monographs in this series, security issues feature prominently — both within and across the northern border with neighbouring Angola. Simon addresses such issues as the 'formation of new security forces'; 'border concerns' and 'illegal weaponry and possible insurrection'. Oddly enough, he hardly deals with the Namibian Police, and tends to dismiss the vital importance of basic social security and of job creation — arguably of considerable relevance in the security context of Namibia.

His survey of Namibia's economic inheritance and of prevailing conditions, is compulsive and stark. Labour too, gets more than just a mention. His writing is graphic and rich in perspective and analysis.

The last part of the monograph, dealing with the regional impact of Namibian independence, displays balance and bold brushwork. Although parts of it have been overtaken by events, the argument for closer regional integration survives.

David Simon has enriched our understanding of regional developments and fired our imagination with this composed and uplifting monograph.

André du Pisani
Jan Smuts House

REFLECTING APARTHEID. SOUTH AFRICAN SHORT STORIES IN ENGLISH WITH SOCIO-POLITICAL THEMES 1960-1987

Select and Annotated Bibliography by Catherine E. Dubbeld (Compiler). South African Institute of International Affairs Bibliographical Series No.21 Johannesburg, 1990. 337pp.

This handy and comprehensive bibliography, the first of its kind in South Africa, documents those short stories published in English in South Africa between 1960 and the renewal of the Emergency in June 1987 which deal specifically with socio-political experience under an apartheid regime.

There is much introductory material detailing the methodology followed, a few aspects of which I question. For example, only stories directly relating to apartheid were included while those whose setting could have suggested any violent society were excluded. This was a choice dictated by considerations of scope but has the effect of omitting allegorical pieces. How could one omit *Waiting for the Barbarians* from a similar catalogue of South African novels? Stories published in journals and magazines were also excluded, which is a great pity since it is here, especially in the little magazines of South Africa that proliferated after the 60s, that new trends are first apparent.

Apart from these exclusions, this is a most useful and important work. Stories are neatly catalogued, a short summary of the plot given as well as a list of topics referred to in the story. Only one holding library is referred to. Indexing by title, author and subject matter and cross-referencing are meticulous and uncumbersome, and the inclusion of a lucid and pertinent chronology of important literary and political events for the time period, almost a study in itself, is extremely helpful, although it must be remembered that stories, especially in anthologies, are invariably written several years before publication. This bibliography will be an invaluable research tool for any serious student of South African literature.

Marcia Leveson
University of the Witwatersrand

ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 1961–1989

A Select and Annotated Bibliography, compiled by Elna Schoeman, Bibliographical Series No.20, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1990, 377 pages (including index), ISBN 0-908371-79-9, R60.00

This is another in the SAIIA Bibliographical Series. It will be of inestimable value to researchers; it contains 1316 entries in alphabetical order according to name of author or subject, as well as an Author Index and Subject Index. Each of the entries is briefly summarised.

The bibliography is select and thus one should not expect it to give 100% coverage. Indeed, complete coverage would be impossible given the volume of writings in the field and the diversity of sources and languages. nevertheless, there are a number of unfortunate lacunae: the list of journals consulted excludes, for example, the Zimbabwe Journal of Economics, the South African Journal of Economic History, and South African Transport.

There are also some surprising omissions with regard to individual books and articles. Taking only one country — Swaziland — as an example, two books with definite interdependence themes: Alan Best's *The Swaziland Railway* (1966) and *Development in Swaziland* by Fair, Murdoch and Jones (1968) are not listed. And although the South African Journal of Economics is consulted, one notes the omission of Guma's article on the Southern African Customs Union. In the listings, mention is made in reference 138 to an article on the SACU by Ayee; surely this deserved a separate entry?

All in all, however, these minor points cannot detract from the importance of this work. It is recommended that any serious researcher on Southern Africa acquire a copy, and the compiler must be commended for undertaking yet another painstaking task for which researchers will be eternally grateful.

Gavin Maasdorp
Economic Research Unit
University of Natal
Durban

Letters to the Editor

Three responses to 'A Restricted Palette: Reflections on the State of International Relations in South Africa' in Bulletin No.1 of 1991, by Prof. Mike Hough, Director Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, Prof. Carl Nffke, Director, Institute for American Studies, Rand Afrikaans University and Prof. H. de V. du Toit (Lt. Gen. retired), Chairman of the Department of National Strategy, Rand Afrikaans University.

There is a matter we would like to raise in connection with an article in the *International Affairs Bulletin*, Vol. 15:1, 1991. In the article "Reflections on the State of International Relations in SA", reference is made on pp 8-9 to *inter alia* the Institute for Strategic Studies using international studies in a 'partisan way'.

No explanation for this sweeping statement is given, despite the fact that the Institute's publications are open to any articles (also those critical of Government policy), and indeed such articles have appeared in the past.

Furthermore, it is stated that "some of the post-graduate work undertaken under their auspices has been placed under a total embargo" (this includes a reference to the Institute for American Studies at RAU).

Reference no 10, which is cited as a source for this statement, however then promptly quotes two post-graduate studies completed at UNISA. The Institute for Strategic Studies does not have its own students at any rate.

We have no problem with academic criticism, but the statements referred to above, seem to fall into a different category.

Mike Hough (Prof)
Director: Institute for Strategic Studies

I would like to refer to some disturbing, erroneous and false charges pertaining to the Institute for American Studies which appear in the paper 'Restricted Palette: Reflections on the State of International Relations in South Africa' (*International Affairs Bulletin*: Vol.15, No.1, 1991).

I quote: "The early 1980's saw the creation of 'think tanks' that regularly make crusading efforts on behalf of the government. Notable in this category are the Institute for American Studies at the Rand Afrikaans University in Johannesburg, and the University of Pretoria's Institute for Strategic Studies. In the context of escalating sanctions, growing militarisation in South Africa and the region, and further international ostracism, these two institutes concern themselves primarily with strategic issues, superpower relations and policies, and how these affect South Africa. Both institutes use international studies in a partisan way, and some of the postgraduate work undertaken under their auspices has been placed under a total embargo for 'security reasons'".

Naturally, my remarks are aimed at the Institute for American Studies. It was established in 1978 (not in the early 1980s!) when it became apparent to many South Africans that it had become essential to establish an academic institution to "read the minds of Americans". Our focus point is the United States. We are primarily a research body which operates on an inter- and multi-disciplinary basis at the Rand Afrikaans University. In addition we consult regularly with some of the most outstanding academics and political experts in the United States and Canada. Our publications are widely known in South Africa and the United States and are available in 250 American universities. Our seminars, conferences and round table discussions are addressed by experts in their field — to which the South African business community, academics and the news media can testify.

Frankly, the three authors of the paper abusively distort the work and achievements of our Institute, which has never acted in a partisan manner or served the State as an unpaid spokesman. Our Institute is funded by private contributions. Our quarterly, *American Review*, is widely read and often quoted in both the United States and South Africa. The fact that Americans contribute approximately 50% of its contents is surely an indication of its international standing. Our monthly newsletter, *Confidential Memorandum*, and an ad hoc publication, *Immediate*, are subscribed to by corporate members, mostly members of the business community, who require factual information about USA-S relations.

The contents of our publications, which actually mirror all our activities, amply illustrate that the three co-authors presented a factual distortion and inaccurate account of our Institute.

What we find equally strange and sad is the comment that some of the "postgraduate work" undertaken under our auspices "has been placed under a total embargo for 'security reasons'." Fact of the situation is that our Institute has never offered graduate and postgraduate courses. The reference which the three academics supply to substantiate their point in this connection applies to an unpublished M thesis and an unpublished D.Litt en Phil. dissertation. However, the end note in question refers to the University of South Africa!

We demand an apology for action which has harmed the interests of the Institute for American Studies. Furthermore, if the information related to our Institute was included in the paper which was prepared for the Third World Assembly of International Studies in Williamsburg, Virginia (August

25-27 1988) we will also demand an apology, approved by us, to be mailed by you to all the participants.

Carl Nöffke
Director: IAS

1. In the latest issue of your Bulletin (Volume 15, No.1, 1991), you publish an article ' Restricted Palette: Reflections on the State of International Relations in South Africa', in which I find the following statements (p.14) ' similar concern (i.e. "guerrilla insurgency and the theory of guerrilla warfare") is shown by the newly-established Institute for National Strategy (INS) headed by a former military intelligence chief. The INS is not a serious research body'. To this is added a footnote (32) 'The Institute for National Strategy at the Rand Afrikaans University is headed by General Hein de V. du Toit, formerly Director of Military Intelligence.'

2. I would appreciate you publishing of the following corrections in your next issue:

   a) No 'Institute for National Strategy (INS)' has ever existed at the RAU and naturally such a non-existent Institute has never produced any research, serious or otherwise.

      After retiring from the Defence Force as Chief of Staff Intelligence (Not 'Director of Military Intelligence') I was in 1979 appointed as Professor of National Strategy in a Chair created for that purpose. The Chair was in 1983 upgraded to a Department of National Strategy of which I have since been Chairman. The purpose of the Chair and later the Department has been the teaching of post-graduate courses. Since 1983 82 post-graduate degrees in National Strategy have been awarded. The hundredth mark will probably be reached in September 1992. In South Africa only UNISA and the RAU specifically award such degrees.

   b) There is no special focus in the Department of National Strategy at RAU on 'questions of guerrilla insurgency and the theory of guerrilla warfare'. The syllabus for the Honours Degree in National Strategy prescribes 4 compulsory courses. The 5th is chosen by students from a further five optional courses of which Revolutionary Warfare (a perfectly valid course in Strategic Studies) is one. Since 1983, six students have opted for Revolutionary Warfare as part of their Honours degree. Of the 27 M and D degrees completed or in preparation, two have guerrilla insurgency as a theme.

3. No serious research by the authors of the article was necessary to obtain the above facts. A glance at the RAU Yearbook and a telephone call to my Department at the RAU would have obviated incorrect information being published not only in your Bulletin but also at an international overseas conference.

Heinrich de V. du Toit
Lt.-Gen (retired)

APOLOGY

As Editor of the *International Affairs Bulletin* and principal author of 'Restricted Palette: Reflections on the State of International Relations in South Africa' that appeared in Vol.15, No.1, 1991, I apologise to the *Institute for Strategic Studies* (ISS), the *Institute for American Studies* (IAS) and the Dept. of National Strategy as well as to their Directors and Staff for the use of phraseology in the paragraph under review which entirely unintentionally may have harmed their interests, as well as reflected negatively on their professional and scholarly reputations.

Reaction

I have read with keen interest, Prof. Carl Nöffke's comments on our article, 'Restricted Palette...', (*International Affairs Bulletin*, Vol.15(1), 1991). As noted, Prof. Nöffke is the Director of the Institute for American Studies (IAS) at RAU.

I welcome a debate about the role of the IAS in our scholarly community. First of all, my apologies regarding footnote 10. It did not apply to IAS and we accept full responsibility for this obvious error. Maybe one should be grateful that the IAS has not been involved in postgraduate teaching.

Our article was an investigation of the International Relations scholarly community in South Africa, and how it operated within the context of the constraints imposed by the apartheid regime. The readiness of academic institutions, like some Afrikaans Universities, to operate within the apartheid and total onslaught paradigm severely hampered academic freedom and challenged it's fiduciary responsibilities towards the South African public.

For example, during the decade I lectured at RAU, the IAS remained silent about the harmful effects of apartheid on South African-US relations.

To some degree Prof. Nöffke is correct that we are uninformed about IAS. It might be a useful exercise for a political scientist or an investigating journalist to analyze the documents and reading matter of the IAS in order to answer a number of pertinent questions: What were the political motivations for the establishment of the IAS? From which sources (persons, institutions, organizations), did the idea originate? What are the past and present financial sources of the IAS? What are the academic credentials of the 'outstanding academics and political experts' associated with the IAS? How objective are the publications of the IAS about topics like sanctions, the Democratic Party in the USA, South African foreign policy, etc.?

Maybe the time has arrived for an open debate in our political science community about state penetration of our universities during the apartheid years. Not only have institutes of ostensibly academic concern harmed our credibility, but in a post-apartheid South Africa this unfortunate phenomenon may revisit us. An open society requires a greater accountability of public institutions.

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