International Affairs Bulletin

International Affairs Bulletin

International Affairs Bulletin

Contents/Inhoud

The South African Institute of International Affairs is precluded by its Constitution from expressing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs. It is not, therefore, responsible for any views reflected in this publication.

Die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede word deur sy Konstitusie daarvan weerhou om 'n mening oor enigeaspek van internasionale aangeleenthede uit te spreek. Dit is daarom nie verantwoordelik vir enige sienswyse wat in hierdie publikasie weergegeewordnie.

SMUTS HOUSE NOTES

The 1980s have been characterized as the lost development decade for Africa. Grinding poverty, de-industrialization and ecological degradation across the continent are so deep and extensive that the major international organizations are predicting even more hard times for the continent. The 1990 UNDP *Human Development Report* confirms that over the past decade, many countries in Africa witnessed either stagnation or a reversal of the gains of the 1960s and 1970s. The countries of southern Africa, including South Africa, were no exceptions.

If this dark picture prevails at the end of a decade of stagnation, the last two years have also signalled positive changes in a region where peace and stability have been elusive goals. The independence of Namibia, the cessation of hostilities in Angola, the emergence of democratic movements throughout the sub-region, have been positive developments. The apartheid system has begun to unravel as the possibilities of a democratic transition looms over the horizon. The era of'President for Life' will soon come to a close. The pressure on African governments to implement market-oriented economic reforms and democratize their societies will intensify. While there is good reason to be optimistic about the future, there are still important challenges facing the governments in the region to solve some of the old problems of development and economic progress. The New World order may have grave consequences for southern Africa and the continent as a whole.

With the end of the cold war, the old military blocs are being replaced by trading blocs, with negative consequences for Africa and the Third World as a whole. Only the United States has the power and economic leverage to retaliate against this new 'collective protectionist' blocs. The recent U.S.-Canada free trade agreement and the soon to be signed U.S-Mexico free trade agreement is an attempt to create the largest trading bloc in response to the threat posed by the European Economic Community and an incipient East Asian trading bloc under the leadership of Japan. Africa will find itself becoming ever more vulnerable and isolated if it chooses (or is obliged) to remain a collection of fifty, small, competing exporters, dependent on these regional giants to purchase its output and to supply its needs. There is a compelling need to reverse this state of vulnerability, and to strengthen regional markets, and to rationalize existing resoures by establishing viable sub-regional economic integration schemes.

Unfortunately, the debate on the future economic role of South Africa in the region is cast in a rather simplistic formulation, failing to understand domestic political and economic problems confronting the governments in the region.

Similarly, sub-Saharan African governments are expressing high hopes on

a democratic South Africa to pull them out from their current economic crisis. In reality, both South Africa and the SADCC/PTA governments know very little about each other's potential and constraints. Yet, all of them are proceeding to plan their respective roles in the region without adequate facts. This is bound to lead to serious disappointments for both sides.

Since the start of political liberalization *on* February 2, 1990, the South African government and the SADCC/PTA governments have been propagating the view that the end of apartheid and the transition to democratic rule will open the door for increased economic cooperation in the region. Such a move, both sides argue, is the only way to resolve the backlog of economic and social problems confronting their respective countries and to overcome the difficulty of market penetration to the three world trading blocs. The SADCC states believe that a democratic South Africa could become the locomotive of economic growth in southern Africa and beyond, by providing the neighbouring countries with capital, investment, technology, and access to markets.

The South African government, and the business community in particular, also believe that little real economic expansion in sub-Saharan Africa is feasible without simultaneous growth in the South African economy and that South Africa is uniquely placed to promote economic cooperation in the continent.

This optimism is reinforced by the new political mood in Pretoria, which has led to the independence of Namibia and the resumption of constitutional talks on a future non-racial democratic South Africa. Increased business interaction with the governments in Africa, and the opening up of trade missions in Kenya, Togo, Mali, Mozambique has given rise to the hope that a new and positive era is at hand in the region.

This new optimism, however, is not based on a realistic assessment and identification of potential areas of economic cooperation between South Africa, its neighbours and the African continent as a whole. At the present moment, intra-regional trade and industrial cooperation in southern Africa face a number of serious obstacles on both sides of the border. In fact, South Africa and its neighbours face very similar political and economic challenges of structural reform and adjustment, under deteriorating international and economic conditions. Addressing these economic and political problems is a precondition for expanded regional trade and development. If one goes by the experience of Sub-Saharan Africa over the last decade, fundamental restructuring to create an enabling economic and political environment will prove to be difficult, time consuming, and politically risky in that immediate payoffs are unlikely in the short and medium-term despite the sub-region's economic and resource potential.

South Africans need to know the painful reality that the majority of sub-

Saharan African governments are completely broke. All governments in the region have been hard hit by falling terms of trade and a rising international debt burden which is now estimated to be over $260 billion. While some countries have improved their short-term trade positions, few have gained in any of the indicators that measure real, sustainable development. Rather, most have slid backwards into growing inequality, environmental degradation, de-industrialization and poverty.

By most conventional economic indicators, such as the ratio of debt to GNP, sub-Saharan Africa's debt burden was equivalent to 97% of its GNP compared to 45,8% for Latin America. In terms of ratio of debt to exports, the figures are striking: 312% for sub-Sahara Africa as compared to 288% for Latin America. For the sub-continent as a whole, debt per capita in 1989 was $437 as compared to GNP per capita of $449. The debt crisis has reduced the amount of foreign exchange available to purchase imports, leading to a very severe import strangulation; holding back new investments and even the maintenance of the existing capital stock. Debt servicing and the adjustment policies pushed to free up foreign exchange to repay the debt have also worsened social welfare in the areas of health, education and poverty alleviation. These countries are unlikely to overcome the 'foreign exchange famine' in the foreseeable future.

In addition, Africa will be marginalized further as the major capitalist powers are losing interest in the continent as they move to greener pastures in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Long before the end of the cold war, western governments were already showing signs of aid fatigue as corrupt governments failed to improve the living standards of the poor majority. Increasingly, the provision of aid is being made conditional on democratization and government accountability. There is also widespread fear that increasing flows of foreign aid will be diverted to Eastern Europe as these countries have a better infrastructure and human capital for expanded investment cooperation with the West. With declining aid and protected markets, the potential for trade with the West will become even less.

Looking at the policy dimension, the majority of African governments are far from creating an enabling policy environment conducive to greater intra-regional trade and investment. There are simply too many unnecessary and bureaucratic barriers to trade. Import controls and licencing, export licencing, customs holdups and price controls are some of the factors that hinder expansion of intra-regional trade. Policy makers in South Africa, despite their over-exaggerated optimism, should take note of these problems before jumping on policies that will have very little return in the long-term.

African governments must also understand South Africa's structural, social and economic realities. The injustices inflicted by apartheid have left the majority of South Africans with poor living standards and insufficient

opportunities for employment and only limited access to adequate education, health care and housing. As apartheid ends, high expectations will demand more social expenditure on education, health, and housing. The black community expects the conquest of apartheid to bring more than just votes. Activists want jobs in the new bureaucracy. Peasants want white farmland. Trade unions want a minimum wage and worker control of some enterprises.

A new democratic government will pay more attention to domestic issues and less to regional concerns. It is difficult to see how the domestic economy, which has been in crisis since the early 1980s, can mobilize the investment funds needed to redress the damage done by apartheid and restore the economy to reasonable growth. While there will be a post-apartheid dividend, this will be inadequate for the task ahead. South Africa will require a significant injection of capital from outside. The economy is unlikely to generate any significant surplus to contribute to the development and growth of the rest of Africa. The exclusive 'white economy' will have to be redirected first toward the rehabilitation of the underdeveloped section of the black majority. After all, charity begins at home.

Professor Fantu Cheru
School of International Service
The American University
Washington, D.C.

Graham Evans

OPERATION DESERT STORM, THE JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER-

SECTION i

INTRODUCTION
I chose the theme 'the Gulf War', the Just War Tradition and the New World Order' for two basic reasons. First, ever since Saddam Hussein's invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 the problem of the proper response of the international community has been a constant concern, not just of Western decision-makers and opinion formers, but also (not unnaturally) of the academic community of International Relations specialists itself. This after all is the discipline most closely associated with the events that took place as well as the concepts, ideas and institutions informing and surrounding them. Indeed, over the past eighteen months it has been impossible to open a journal or serious newspaper in Britain or the United States without coming across a discussion of the pros and cons of Western involvement and/or intervention in what subsequently came to be called the Second Gulf War. * So for this reason alone, an overview of the events and controversies of the Persian Gulf crisis seems appropriate. Especially so, since this is now the first anniversary of that conflict which not only witnessed the leading First World states deliberately bombarding a Third World state back into the pre-industrial Dark Ages, but which also effectively posted a notice that Third World [2] deviation from established norms and values, especially where this impinged on vital First World interests, would henceforth be a very risky business indeed.

Second, I chose this particular theme because although there have been innumerable discussions of the political, diplomatic, ideological, strategic and economic aspects of the war, of the resurgence of the United Nations as a major actor in world politics, of the mind-boggling technology associated with modern warfare, of the laying to rest of the 'Vietnam syndrome' in the American national psyche — although all these aspects have been covered at length — the question that lay at the heart of the matter, that is, the morality

Graham Evans is a visiting lecturer from the University of Wales, Swansea. This paper is based on an address to the South African Institute of International Affairs, Durban Branch, February 1992.

and legality of violent Western intervention and the consequences this may have for the future conduct of international affairs especially along the North-South axis, was given comparatively little critical attention.

In fact it was widely assumed by most people in the North (with the exception of die-hard radicals, Marxists and Islamic fundamentalists) that not only was the American inspired intervention 'just', but that it also represented both the *occasion* and the *first test* of President Bush's much vaunted 'New World Order' that supposedly came into play in the aftermath of the bipolar confrontationism that characterised the Cold War period. The fact that the unlikely coalition of states carefully assembled by the Americans held together for so long despite differences in orientation and interest can be traced to an almost universal acceptance by decision makers and their attentive publics that President Bush's three-track linkage between Operation Desert Storm[3], the Just War tradition and the New World Order was indeed the moral and legal framework within which the action was to be viewed.

And of course, President Bush and his advisory team in Washington were mindful at every critical stage to repeat and underline this linkage. I will cite two examples, although there are many others.

In an address to Congress in September 1990 Bush specifically linked the crisis with his concept of a new world order, he said, 'We stand today at an extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Gulf offers a rare opportunity to move towards an historic period of co-operation. Out of these troubled times a New World Order can emerge. A new era freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace'. Again in a speech to the American Religious Broadcasting Convention in February 1991 he said: 'The war in the Gulf is not a Christian War or a Muslim War. It's *zjust* war'.

Bush made an important distinction here, to which I will return later, but what is abundantly clear is that from the outset the Americans were convinced, in that moralistic legalistic way of theirs, that Operation Desert Storm was a classic example of the application of Just War principles to effect conflict resolution and that as a consequence the Allies held the moral high ground throughout.

So it is clear, at least in the minds of the formal office-holders, that the war in the Gulf was a Just War *and* that it heralded a new period of international relations. And this brand of triumphalism, both in the ethical sense and in popular perceptions of the military campaign, found echoes in virtually every British newspaper and government statement — the like of which we decline-conscious British had not witnessed since the heady days of Margaret Thatcher's splendid little away win over President Galtieri in the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982. Although the popular press did not quite reach the frenzy of the infamous 'Gotcha!' headlines that followed the highly

questionable sinking of the 'Belgrano', the public mood of confidence in the moral probity of our involvement was captured in banner headlines warning the 'Bastard' or 'Butcher of Baghdad' that the Brits were coming to get him!

In sum, the war generated a sense of euphoria and an overwhelming belief that justice was on the Allied side. There was no moral problem with this engagement: the West was in the very luxurious position of having not just 'might' but also 'right' on its side. And few people disputed it.

Given this undercurrent of near-unanimity on the Tightness of the cause, the questions I want to examine in this paper are the following:

(1) To what extent did Operation Desert Storm really conform to the principles of the Just War tradition? and
(2) In what sense, if any, can this kind of collective Great Power interventionism be seen as a model for the future conduct of international relations?

In other words, was President Bush correct in making this three-track linkage, or is this yet another piece of American moralism skillfully employed to disguise what was in essence a war in the pursuit of the national interest in the classic mode and one which furthermore was designed to re-establish American hegemony in international affairs generally — and in particular in the military/strategic arena — where the American stock had been perceived to be in decline since the debacle in Vietnam in the early 1970s?

SECTION II

THE JUST WAR TRADITION

The attempt to justify war in one set of circumstances but not in another has its origins in early Christian thought. Pacifism was at the centre of the Christian doctrine and the early Christians did not bear arms, but once Christianity became the state religion of the Roman empire, canon law moved steadily in the direction of a belief in the *right* and indeed in the *duty* of Christians to fight for what was perceived to be a just cause.

The central concepts of this tradition were formulated in the Fourth century AD by St. Augustine who sought to reconcile Christian commitments to 'love thy neighbour as thyself' with the soldier's duty to fight. This is not the place to unravel the complex arguments contained in his celebrated *City of God,* but fundamental to it are two principles which have been transformed out of all recognition during their sixteen hundred year journey into the American conception of the doctrine in the Twentieth century. These principles are: (a) Just wars are designed to protect the *innocent* and (b) 'Justice' rather than 'order' or 'peace' is the highest value.

Regarding the latter, St. Augustine had argued that to fight a war to

establish peace may in fact be unjust. Peace may be an unjust order in the sense that, for him, Pax Romana (peace established by Rome) clearly was.[4]

St. Augustine's theories were given greater precision by St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century when ideas of knightly chivalry dominated thinking about war and conflict. But, as with so many other key concepts in International Relations, it was in the seventeenth century that the doctrine began to take on its modern forms and indeed begins to divide into two distinct branches. These *arc Jus ad bellum* (justice in the resort to war) and *Jus in hello* (justice in waging war). So one branch relates to the purpose of waging war and the other relates to conduct in warfare, since it was widely held that a just war should not be prosecuted by unjust means.

This important distinction within the tradition was established by Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch theologians and lawyers who were concerned above all to *limit* rather than to justify the wars that occurred between the emerging nation-states of Europe. It was really the Dutchman, Hugo Grotius who effected the breakthrough from Augustine and Aquinas, when, in his *Laws of War and Peace* he put on a secular or pragmatic basis what had earlier been a matter of strict theological interpretation. (He argued for example, that the Just War thesis would still hold even if we could demonstrate that God does not exist).

Grotius is often referred to as the 'father of modern international law[1] (though paternity suits can be laid back at least as far as the Romans or Greeks), and it's not difficult to see why. Because it was this remarkable employee of the Dutch East India Company who in effect codified and transposed the Just War principles into law between states, thereby creating a legal regime covering the proper use of force in an anarchic international order. These rules governing purpose and conduct were subsequently enshrined in the various Hague and Geneva Conferences on the conditions of war and peace at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. This process culminated in the two great experiments in international organisation in the twentieth century — the League of Nations and the United Nations — at the heart of which lay the ideal of Collective Security, the essence of which is the Just War doctrine.

In the course of incorporating these notions into modern international law, it is the second branch —jus in bello — that became the dominant one, for obvious reasons. Since this is the branch that most easily translates into operational guidelines and because the secularization of international relations and its domination by real politik notions in the 'national interest defined in terms of power', meant in effect that *both* parties to a conflict could make a reasonable claim to just cause.

This second, secular branch of the tradition has as its central thesis the notion that its purpose is the maintenance of peace, order and stability between states rather than the original Augustinian idea of the promotion of

'justice' per se. In this sense most modern scholars prefer to speak of the 'doctrine of justifiability' rather than the 'doctrine of the Just War' which has clear religious, theological and moral overtones.

However, the Americans have persisted in using the term to embrace both *purpose* of and *conduct* in war. It seems to me that American decision makers have either misunderstood the subtleties of the distinctions within the doctrine or else have deliberately collapsed the two branches in their quest to give moral substance to US foreign policy. The statements by President Bush, referred to earlier and Ronald Reagan's famous tirade against 'the evil empire of communism' testify at the very least to an American disinclination to abandon the 'jus ad bellum' tradition where one side exclusively lays claim to the moral high ground. This tendency of cause has been a persistent feature of US foreign policy and its presence can be deduced from George Washington's Farewell Address, to the Monroe Doctrine, through Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, to Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, ending up most clearly in the Reagan doctrine of the 1980s. (In fact, the Bush doctrine, in so far as it exists, is just a repeat of the Reagan doctrine, but with the volume turned down!).

In other words, the language of the Just War doctrine, spoken in an American accent, refers *both* to a war to preserve peace, order and stability *and* it is also a Holy War in the sense that its ultimate purpose is to Defend the Faith or to promote a particular moral or religious ideal — in this case liberal democracy allied to, and perhaps growing out of, free market economics.

This American tendency to run the two branches together is an extremely handy piece of confusion since it enables them to equate 'peace' with 'justice'. On this reading the Grotian concern for order and stability does not clash with Augustine's idea of protection of the innocent and the promotion of justice.

In fact of course, as Augustine himself was at pains to point out, 'peace' and 'justice' are only rarely co-terminous and may in fact represent opposing sets of values. Peace may be an unjust order.[5] From a 'satisfied'[6] First World perspective they may conceivably amount to the same thing. But from a Third World perspective — as shown for example by the demand for a New International Economic Order — they are literally poles apart.

If this confusion of 'peace' and 'justice' really does lie at the heart of the American conception of the New World Order — and reading Bush's statements it is difficult to escape from this conclusion — then I think we are at least entitled to ask, 'what's new?, which world? and whose orders?'

It is important to realize that the Grotian conception of the Just War tradition, where 'order' is the primary value, is essentially a statement about *states'* rights: it is ominously silent about *human* rights. In international law, and in the American reading of it, protection of the 'innocent' clearly refers

to innocent states (like Kuwait) rather than innocent peoples or groups such as the Kurds or the Shiites, or indeed the beleaguered Iraqi people themselves.

If the Just War doctrine really does underpin the American conception of the New World Order then what this really amounts to is the formal legitimisation of an already extant *Pax Americana,* i.e. more of the same. Used in this way, it is a conservative doctrine which always leans heavily in favour of preservation of the status quo. It consequently has little to say about human rights or humanitarian intervention, except obliquely referring to their protection through the democratic ideal within an overall capitalist/free market international system. In any case, these human rights are basically *civil* rights (freedom from...) rather than *economic* or subsistence rights (freedom to...) which are, or ought to be, the most pressing issue that any new world order ought to address.

SECTION III

THE GULF WAR AND THE JUST WAR TRADITION

Let us turn now to an analysis of the Second Gulf War in relation to the criteria associated with the Just War tradition. Broadly put, the question is this: What are the circumstances in which it is permissible to go to war and how has the international community defined the limits to which this may be taken?

At the risk of oversimplifying a very complex set of arguments, I think we can identify seven conditions which must be satisfied: none of which are sufficient in themselves but all of which are necessary in some degree or other if the war warrants the adjective 'just'. They are as follows:

1. The war must be waged by a 'lawful authority'.
2. There must be 'just cause'.
3. Every effort must have been made prior to the use of force to settle the matter by peaceful means.
4. There must be a 'reasonable' prospect of success or victory.
5. The intention must be to promote justice not to promote private gain.
6. There must at all times be a conscious effort to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants.
7. There must be 'proportionality' between means and ends. In other words, the punishment must fit the crime and the overall costs must not be greater than the original offence. (Sometimes referred to as the 'proportionality principle' or the idea of 'war as the lesser evil'.)

Clearly all of these conditions involve complex and highly subjective calculations. At each stage facts, assessments and evaluations have to be read into them. The United States and its allies believed from the outset that all

these conditions had, or were in the process of being satisfied and that therefore the Second Gulf War was indeed a just War in the classic mode.

It could be maintained though that not nearly enough of these criteria were satisfied and that in effect the USA hijacked the authority of the United Nations (as it had done with the Korean War of 1950-1953) and cynically used the Just War doctrine to disguise and also to promote its own regional and global ambitions. In other words, that the quest to reassert global hegemony combined with the need to secure control of vital and relatively cheap sources of energy rendered the Gulf War an Oil War rather than a just one in the usual meaning of the term.

If we look down this crude checklist, I think we can see where the difficulties and disagreements lie and perhaps understand why some analysts have expressed grave disquiet at the way the crisis was managed, the way the war was prosecuted and of course its overall net result.

1. Lawful Authority

In its original Catholic form this is sometimes referred to as 'competent' authority and it asserts that the right to use force is enjoyed by those, be they Popes, monarchs or nation-states, with responsibility for public order and the promotion of the common good. Today it refers primarily to the United Nations and in particular the Security Council which is charged with maintaining the principles of collective security (See Chapter VII of the Charter).

In relation to the Gulf War, not only did the United States' Congress explicitly endorse the use of force, but the Security Council itself passed no less than twelve resolutions condemning Iraq's aggression, one of which, UNSC Resolution 678 gave what appeared to be the go-ahead ('the use of all necessary means') for the use of force to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait and to restore the legitimate government.

On the face of it then, the Americans and their allies appeared to have fulfilled this basic requirement: Operation Desert Storm was underwritten by the lawful authority granted by Resolution 678. This seems fairly unambiguous.

However, on closer observation things are not at all as clear cut as this might suggest. Apart from questions relating to the very expensive interpretation of 'all necessary means', the Second Gulf War was neither prosecuted nor controlled by the United Nations. It was fought by national forces under national authorities who submitted to the overall leadership of the United States. It did not comply fully with Article 47 of the Charter which states that the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations 'shall be responsible for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council'. The forces did not fight under the U.N. flag nor did they wear U. N. insignia, and the chain of command throughout

the Operation led straight to the Oval Office in Washington *not* to the U.N. Headquarters in New York. It was in effect a 38 flag effort led unambiguously by the only state left in world politics with a sufficiently broad portfolio of power resources to be able to form such an unlikely coalition of states and to direct the military effort with such devastating effect.

Furthermore, it was the United States not the United Nations that declared the ceasefire and administers the surrender. So in relation to criterion number 1, the allies did, by virtue of Resolution 678 have 'lawful authority', but it is by no means certain that the intrinsic terms of this condition were fully complied with. The Americans may have followed the letter of the law in this respect, but they certainly did not take cognizance of its spirit. In fact, after securing Resolution 678, the United States in effect marginalized the influence of the U.N. on the course of events and all but completely by-passed the Military Staff Committee provisions of the Charter.

2. Just Cause

Traditionally this revolved around notions of self-defence (individual and collective), punishing wrong-doing and recovering what was illegally taken — the underlying purpose being the protection of the innocent.

In relation to the Gulf this appears to be the easiest to evaluate. Almost everyone outside Iraq believed that Kuwait was the innocent victim of aggression and therefore on the principle of collective self-defence there was just cause for external intervention. Furthermore, just cause would remain in place even if Kuwait's principle export was carrots or bananas rather than oil. There was a clear violation of Kuwait's territorial integrity thus challenging the basic norm of post Westphalian international society. Therefore there can be little room for doubt about this criterion being satisfied.

We may in fact doubt very much that the Americans would have been so resolute in defence of Kuwait if indeed carrots were its principle export. But then one could also argue that in this case Saddam Hussein might not have been tempted to invade in the first place!

There is however, some substance to the allegation that in an unusual display of Machiavellian guile, the United States iured' Iraq into the invasion. The argument is that the USA, for reasons both domestic and external, needed a resounding foreign policy success in a region which had hitherto been marked by inconspicuous and inglorious failure. A 'splendid little war', à la Theodore Roosevelt, in the Persian Gulf would do no damage at all to President Bush's personal standing and would underline the unipolar character of the Post-Cold War era as well as demonstrate the global reach of the only remaining Great Power in world politics.

It is all but impossible to prove or disprove these allegations but the fact remains that in the run up to the crisis, American diplomacy emitted signals which could be interpreted as giving Saddam the green light to deal with the Kuwaitis as he pleased. On July 25 1990, a week before the invasion, Ms. April Glaspie, the American ambassador in Baghdad, had a meeting with Saddam Hussein, during which the Iraqi leader outlined the dire economic plight of Iraq and his perception of the consequences of Kuwait's 'economic war' against him. In addition to reassuring Saddam that the US would not impose economic sanctions on Iraq, Ms. Glaspie added these crucial words: 'The United States....had no opinion on inter-Arab disputes such as your border dispute with Kuwait'.[7] This apparent assurance of US neutrality or indifference to the dispute may well have been reinforced by President Bush's statement three days later, July 28, when he indicated that the US had a 'keen interest' in improving relations with Baghdad.[8] Whether this amounts to Kissinger-like cunning on the part of the State Department or whether it stems from the sheer incompetence that so often results from the complicated bureaucratic decision-making structures that characterises the American foreign policy making process, is difficult to assess. And so until the US comes to the aid of a state where it has no vital interests to protect (Yugoslavia?) we must give it the benefit of the doubt and assume that the 'just cause' provision was satisfied.

3. War as a last resort

The question at issue here is: were all peaceful alternatives to war exhausted? Were economic sanctions and other non-violent instruments of pressure (eg. diplomatic isolation) given enough time to work? The United States has relied on sanctions and diplomatic isolation against South Africa for decades as its principle coercive weapon in the fight against a 'crime against humanity', why then did it resort to war with Iraq only five months after they had been put in place?[9]

Given that Iraq's economy is almost entirely oil-based, it seemed to many observers that in spite of its generally poor track record in world politics, the determined application of the sanctions/isolation instruments in this particular case had a better than average chance of succeeding.

On the face of it, this appears to be a serious weakness in the American case that this war was indeed a just one. For reasons of politics and/or military prudence, it seems that the Americans resorted to war far too soon. It is now an open secret that the US military advisors as well as commanders in the field, had pressed for a winter war — a war in January and February — since this would deny any possible strategic advantage that might accrue to the Iraqis, experienced as they had to be in fighting during the Desert heat of the summer months. So in this regard, it may well be that the Americans could not afford to regard war as the last resort and that therefore its

timetable was dictated by the seasons and to by the judicious application of known rules established by the just War doctrine.

4. Reasonable prospect of success

No one doubted that the allied coalition forces would prevail: the question was, at what cost? At the time, Iraq had the fourth largest army in the world, possessed chemical and biological weapons and was rumoured to be close to having a deliverable nuclear capability. In addition, its armed forces had considerable recent combat experience and would fight on the more favourable strategic defensive.

However, as it turned out the allied victory was easy and the number of casualties on its side was relatively small. While not exactly a 'turkey shoot' it soon became evident that First World fire power, especially from the air, could quickly wreak havoc with this fragile developmental infrastructure of what was, and now remains, a Third World state. As the bombing campaign got under way doubts about the cost of victory receded and the original confidence of the coalition governments was seen to be well founded. However, whether the 'victory' eventually turned out to be a hollow one is another matter.

5. Peaceful intention

This is extremely difficult to assess since it involves probing the motives of the Americans and their coalition partners. Did the United States fight to defend vital oil resources in the Middle East — which of course are essential to the well-being of the North — or was the purpose the promotion of international law and the reversal of an injustice? The fact that two of the world's three economic superpowers — Germany and Japan — were non-combatants but nevertheless largely bankrolled the American effort, leads one to suspect that oil was indeed the primary motivating factor. But again the coincidence of 'realist' demands to defend vital interests with 'idealist' aspirations to right an obvious wrong render judgement on this criterion inconclusive.

The Americans initially resisted the Scud missile-induced linkage between the Kuwait affair and the running sores of the Arab/Israeli dispute and the Lebanon, but to their credit in the post-war period, they have made determined efforts to broker a general Middle East settlement. To the extent that President Bush has publicly rebuked his long term regional ally, Israel, for resisting the Land for Peace proposal which to many students of conflict resolution is a reasonable alternative to the zero-sum position adopted by hard-liners since 1948. With regard to 'peaceful intentions' then, their post-war sensitivity to issues which threaten regional security and order, might well dispel remaining doubts. On this one then, I think we can conclude that the Americans pass muster.

6.   Discrimination between combatants and non-combatants

This criterion calls into question the whole rationale of using the Just War doctrine as a validating principle of modern warfare. Clearly, distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants is not nearly as straightforward now as it was in the seventeenth century when the modern conception of this was formulated. The question at issue here is can modern warfare and the totally destructive material it has at its disposal even approximate to meeting this condition?

This principle of'discrimination' is in fact the very antithesis of modern nuclear strategy wherein the very rationale of the concept of Deterrrence rests on the credible threat of deliberate mass slaughter of the innocent. Thus genocide, or more accurately, *omnicide,* lies at the very heart of the MAD[10] doctrine for so long the mainstay of Cold War 'survivalist' strategies.

Since the early 1960s strategists have attempted to meet this condition by drawing on scenarios of'Limited' nuclear weapons but in the final analysis no one can doubt that nuclear weapons are intrinsically indifferent to quaint distinctions we might want to make between belligerents and non-belligerents — a distinction inherited from earlier, more civilized periods of international relations. And it is this indifference that renders the idea of the Just War a dangerous one to employ in the conditions of modern warfare (Indeed, the ambiguity of the moral status of Nuclear Weapons is reflected in international law which holds that *possession* may be legal but their actual Hseisnot).

The Gulf War did not involve the use of nuclear weapons, but it was fought in the context of possession, at least on one side. No one could confidently rule out their employment since President Bush stated on more than one occasion that he was not going to fight this war 'with one hand tied behind his back'. It is difficult not to interpret this as an indirect reference to American perceptions that their defeat in Vietnam was a direct function of their reluctance to use all the means at their disposal.

As it was, American field staff officers constantly boasted about the precision and accuracy of modern Western weapons technology, and indeed its 'deliverability' was demonstrated to devastating effect. But only the least imaginative amongst us could be lulled into believing that 'Collateral Damage' means anything other than indiscriminate civilian casualties.

The very fact that the Americans have invented and employ such coldly clinical terms as 'collateral damage', 'smart bombs', 'surgical strike', 'target-rich environment' or (more ominously for British troops), 'friendly fire' — indicates a desire to distance oneself from the moral and humanitarian consequences of one's actions. As Ken Booth put it recently in connection with the failure of International Relations specialists to come to terms with the post-1989 world: 'Our business is words, but the words don't work any more'.[11] In this context the notion of the 'just' war, like that of'friendly' fire

becomes dangerously nonsensical to all, except perhaps militarists nurtured on Alice in Disneyland conceptions of language and meaning.

7. The Principle of Proportionality

As noted earlier, this condition involves a tricky cost-benefit analysis in a social realm within which, as Clausewitz noted, unpredictability is often the dominant variable. The question here is, how can policy makers ensure that the punishment fits the crime and that the overall costs do not outshadow the original offence? The short answer must be that they cannot.

In the Gulf, the Americans reached their stated objective. The Iraquis were expelled from Kuwait and its government was restored to office. But consider the costs:

a) Environmental damage: apart from the destruction of Iraq's social and economic infrastructure, the torching of over 700 oil wells in Kuwait is at this moment causing environmental and ecological pollution in the Persian Gulf region which concerned observers, like Greenpeace, allege will take generations to recover.

b) Battlefield costs: Although Allied costs were relatively small and coalition burden-sharing was high, the number of Iraqi deaths has been estimated as follows: between 70,000 and 150,000 military killed during the air war, 100000-120000 civilians dead after the cease fire, but directly related to the war effort.[12] There are no reliable estimates of the non -human costs of the war, but most analysts regard these as astronomical.

c) Humanitarian costs: Again the mass exodus of Kurdish and Shiite refugees fleeing the wrath of the Iraqi army into Turkey, Iran and Kuwait is an abiding memory of the aftermath of the war. Allied strategy has been to encourage internal revolt against Saddam Hussein, but when it was forthcoming the Kurds and Shiites were given no material backing. They were in fact victims of the limitations imposed on the Allies by their adherence to the Just War principle. So which is the lesser evil? Iraq's occupation of Kuwait or the genocide or partial genocide of regional ethnic groups? The Allies only belatedly offered 'safe havens' after it was known that thousands had been executed and perhaps millions had become 'displaced persons'. The Just War tradition —- especially in its modern guise — is silent on the plight of victims or innocents once the formal peace or ceasefire has been established. This is its most serious indictment.

In sum, this principle of proportionality, even if intentions are pure, is virtually impossible to satisfy. It involves very fine judgements for which there is no simple formula or clear guidance.

SECTION IV

CONCLUSION

There are many other issues that could be raised in connection with these seven criteria, but it is clear that where one stands in relation to the moral status of the war depends on one's own subjective evaluation and the nature of the cost-benefit analysis that is made. Indeed the spectre of auto-interpretation runs right through the language of the Just War tradition, especially when broken down into its component units. I realize that these artificially constructed neat categories are more appropriate to lecture hall ethics than they are to the operational milieu of the decision-makers themselves who are operating in the heat of the battle. However, President Bush *did* assert that this was a Just War and that it heralded the beginning of a New World Order. We are therefore obliged to examine these claims, even if we do so from hindsight. So what are we to make of it all?

My own view is that of these seven criteria, only two or three could be said to have been complied with — Just Cause, Reasonable Prospect of Victory and Peaceful Intent — and even these are not without ambiguity. All the others are hedged about with imperfect information, contradictions and plausible alternative explanations.

possible two or three out of seven does not, to my mind, entitle the war to be called Just in terms of the received tradition. We might wish to call it a Limited or a Necessary war, but I think it is an abuse of language to call it a Just War, as the Americans clearly did. That is the first general conclusion: The Gulf War may have been necessary, but it was *not* necessarily just (Hobbesian or Machiavellian realists would of course argue that 'that war which is necessary is also that war which is just' — which is one way of saying that ethics play no part in warfare. All is fair in love and war to the realist).

The second general conclusion is that the Gulf War was a product of a unique set of circumstances that temporarily restored the Just War doctrine to pre-eminence but in reality, its criteria are no longer appropriate guides for a workable or equitable collective security system.

If the Just War doctrine really is to be the basis for the New World Order, then *either* this order is fraudulent in the sense that it is merely about preserving the status quo or Pax Americana, *or* else the origins of the Just War tradition must be rediscovered and Augustine's humanitarian interpretation of Protection of the Innocent, referring primarily to human beings or groups, must be its central thesis.

In other words, until the basis for collective interventions in world politics is a humanitarian one — in the sense that it is about the relief of suffering rather than the preservation of stability — the whole concept of a New World Order is a sham.

On the American reading 'innocents' clearly refers to states, particularly states where they perceive themselves to have vital interests. Until we can rediscover norms for intervention that are not hidebound by Westphalian notions of sovereignty or terminal integrity then this American version will continue to punish peoples rather than governments and will continue to unleash forces which are at the very best indifferent to environmental and ecological issues.

If President Bush's assertion that the Second Gulf War was a just one is something of an exaggeration, then his assertion that this can be regarded as a template for the New World Order is, to paraphrase Saddam Hussein, — the 'Mother of all exaggerations'. A.J.P. Taylor, that eminent English lover of paradoxes got it right when he said of twentieth century crusading idealism:

> 'Bismarck fought necessary wars and killed thousands. Liberal idealists fight Just Wars and kill millions'.

ENDNOTES

*   I would like to express my thanks to the following for helpful discussions during the period spent preparing this paper: John Barratt, Andre" du Pisani, Peter Vale, Chris Schoeman and Anthoni van Nieuwkerk.

1. The Iraq-Iran war of 1980-88 is usually referred to as the First Gulf War.
2. I am aware of course, that with the collapse of communism and hence the disappearance of the *Second* World, that the term *'Third'* World is now something of a misnomer.
3. The Second Gulf War was composed of both 'Operation Desert Shield' and 'Operation Desert Storm'. I use the latter as a convenient term for the entire field of operations.
4. For a masterly discussion of St. Augustine's views see Paul Ramsey 'The Just War According to St. Augustine' in *Just War Theory* (eds. J.B. Elshtain, Blackwell), Oxford, 1992, pp.8-23.
5. See Chapter XIX of the *City of God* for Augustine's disquiet over *Pax Romatia.*
6. The term 'satisfied' and 'dissatisfied' states was used with devastating effect to analyse world politics in the inter-war years by E.H. Carr in his celebrated *Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939,* Macmillan, London, 1939.
7. This comes from an Iraqi released transcript of the meeting, which significantly has not been denied by the State Department in Washington. See 'Why did Saddam Hussein invade Kuwait?'. Efraim Karsh in *Gulf Crisis, Political-Military Implications,* London Defence Studies, 1990-91, Brasseys, London, 1990. pp.35-54.
8. *ibid.,p.5\.*
9. 'War' was not officially declared by the US or its allies, but in terms of international law it was not required to be so described. The 1963 Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Convention states that a 'state of armed conflict' is all that is needed for a 'War' to exist and consequently for the conventions on the laws of warfare (jus in bello) to become operable.
10. Mutually Assured Destruction.
11. See his article in *International Affairs,* Vol.67, No.3, July 1991 'Security in anarchy: Utopian realism in theory and practice', pp. 527-547.
12. These figures are from *Newsweek,* January 20, 1992, p.12. US and Allied deaths were as follows: 146 US troops killed in action; 159 US troops dead outside combat; 244 Allied troops killed in action.

R.D. McKinlay & Greg Mills
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AT THE CROSSED ROADS

INTRODUCTION

While evaluative reviews of the performance and achievements of the European Community (EC) vary considerably, reflecting different sets of preferences or values from which the evaluations are made, rather more descriptive reviews of the history of the EC yield several largely uncontentious points.[1] First, the EC has endured over four decades, a singular achievement given the stagnation or collapse of most post-war attempts at macro regional integration. Secondly — in a number of critical respects — the EC has gone onward and upwards. For example, the list of member states has increased with yet more states queueing in the wings; and again, the range of common policies has expanded. Thirdly, while the development of the EC has clearly not been without its hiatuses, these interruptions have not detracted from the overall onward and upward movement.[2]

This largely uncontentious case of a community progressing over an extended period in time albeit with temporary halts or reversals, lends itself not surprisingly to a number of movement analogies. Thus, the development of the EC has been represented, albeit with a certain degree of licence, to a vector, i.e., something with magnitude and direction. Less prosaically, it has also been likened to a ship weathering storms or to a train gathering speed. The analogy that provides the point of departure for this paper is of a vehicle travelling down a road successfully negotiating cross-roads. These cross-roads provide critical decision points at which previous development or momentum can be halted, can be diverted (by a turn to the left or right), or can be enhanced by successfully crossing the obstacle of the junction. The cross-roads analogy accepts that developments can be slowed or even temporarily halted but nonetheless in aggregate sees cumulative development that has a clear direction.

R.D. McKinlay is Professor of International Studies, Lancaster University, England and Visiting Lecturer at the University of the Western Cape. Greg Mills is Lecturer, Department of Political Studies at the University of the Western Cape and Chairman of the Cape Branch of the SAIIA.

The principal thesis of this paper argues that this analogy is seriously misleading, not in implying accumulation or even interrupted accumulation but in implying a clear and unwavering direction. The contention of this paper is that EC integration has developed in response to a series of cross pressures, many of which are decidedly, if not completely, at odds, which have pulled or pushed EC integration along an erratic path. As such the EC does not now stand (nor ever has) at the cross-roads but rather has travelled rather more erratically down a maze *of crossed* roads.

It may be objected that substituting 'crossed roads' for 'cross-roads' is an exercise in rather futile academic word play. Though there is admittedly an element of word play in the substitution, what is at issue is most certainly not just a word play but rather an understanding of the nature and driving forces of EC integration. While the *cross-roads* analogy implies linear aggregation pushed by constant influences on integration, the *crossed roads* analogy implies a set of cross-cutting and variable pressures which though cumulative have pulled and pushed EC integration rather more erratically and haphazardly in a variety of different directions. Whether the development of the EC is a case of a linear unfolding driven by constant influences or a case of a multi-directional lurching driven by variable and contradictory influences is not a matter of futile academic word play.

In trying to substantiate the crossed roads thesis the first step will be a descriptive documentation, followed by a second step which seeks to explain this descriptive profile.

DESCRIPTIVE ELABORATION

If the crossed-roads analogy is an appropriate representation of the development of the EC, it is argued that this development should display substantial incongruities in a number of major areas. This is premised on the idea that incongruities imply inconsistent or multidirectional rather than linear unidirectional development. This section will therefore try to indicate a number of important incongruities in historical development, policy output, institutional arrangements and policy implementation. While no pretence is made for anything like an incongruity index, it is suggested that the examples of incongruities provided under these headings are sufficiently important and numerous (the examples could furthermore easily be multiplied) to substantiate the case for a high level of incongruity).

Historical Incongruities

What has subsequently evolved into the EC, easily the world's most highly developed intergovernmental organisation, had a relatively inauspicious origin in the 1950 Schuman Plan for the common management of the French and German coal and steel industries. That there should have been some commitment to integration within Europe or that the EC should

have had a relatively inauspicious birth is not at all surprising. What is rather more incongruous is that this initiative should have taken so long; that it was so modest (being initially directed by the French government purely at Germany); that while some of the moving forces (particularly Schuman and Monnet) had decidedly more ambitious future goals in mind the dominant motivation of the French government was simply to harness German recovery (essentially a national security aim); that the EC should have developed from a rather idiosyncratic French initiative on coal and steel rather from any of the already existing organisations, which were more comprehensive and had more ambitious objectives, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Organisation of European Economic Cooperation, or the Council of Europe.

From this extremely inauspicious beginning the next stepping stone was the negotiation for the establishment of a European Defence Community (EDC) and a European Political Community (EPC). What is rather startling here is that these plans were massively ambitious; the EDC design though taken up by France, was basically stimulated by a response to factors quite extraneous to European integration, namely: US plans for the rearmament of Germany against the backdrop of the outbreak of the Korean War; the ambitious plans for an EDC came within a hair's breadth of being accepted and equally curiously were defeated in the very state (France) that had initiated them.

From this failure there quickly followed a sudden lurch from defence and political union to energy and economic issues, culminating in the Treaties of Rome, which established in 1957 the European Economic Community (EEC) and EURATOM. Rather curiously the initiative for these moves came from the smaller members of the six; an energy community omitted any consideration of oil or gas; the commitment in the EEC to a common market, essentially a liberal economic objective, bore no resemblance to the commitment to develop a number of common policy areas (such as agriculture) in a distinctly illiberal form.

Having refused to join the new communities, the British government then, to some extent consistently, moved to a more aggressive position by trying to undermine the EEC with a design for a European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Having succeeded in establishing EFTA (1960), the British government, without waiting to see whether its counter-policy would succeed promptly made its first application (1961) for membership of the EEC (along incidentally with three other of the remaining six EFTA members).

Since major efforts had been made by the Six to recruit Britain and since British application of 1961 would clearly seem to register a defeat for an EFTA future in favour of an EEC future, it might well have been expected that the British application would have been welcomed. It was instead

vetoed (1963) by de Gaulle on grounds which are much more easily interpreted in terms of old fashioned national power politics than any emergent Europeanism. Certainly any attempt to explain the French veto in terms of an effort to preserve the integrity of the EEC against suspected perversion by the British makes no sense as the French government proceeded in December 1964 to threaten to withdraw from the EEC (over grain prices) and to move in 1965 to institute the so-called 'empty chair policy', effectively paralysing totally the Community.

Following the Luxembourg Compromise (actually a French victory), the British again (1967) reapplied for membership, an application which this time was simply put on hold rather than rejected. Following the fall of de Gaulle (1969), the first serious discussions on extending membership began and culminated in 1973 with the recruitment of Britain, Ireland and Denmark to the original Six. The Irish government which in a number of important areas was at loggerheads with the British government had faithfully shadowed British applications; the Danish government managed to drive a wedge into the Nordic Union; the British accession triggered a major debate as to whether Britain should have applied for membership at all, resulting in the renegotiation of entry terms in 1975.

The Hague Summit of 1969 undoubtedly represented one of the major decision points in the history of the EC. One of the critical decisions of this Summit was to pursue monetary union, for which the major design materialised from the Werner Committee in October 1970. Though monetary union certainly has a continuity with the establishment of a common market, it nonetheless represents a truly major qualitative change. Somewhat out of the blue the European Monetary Union (EMU) was launched in June 1971 with a staggeringly ambitious completion date set for 1980. Thanks to substantial international monetary turbulence (the collapse of the Bretton Woods system), very little preparation and an extremely low level of co-ordination, the EMU was to all intents and purposes abandoned by 1974. In looking at this episode it is frankly not easy to avoid the conclusion that a number of key decision-makers had no idea what was being undertaken.

The issue of monetary union was taken up again in 1977 at the instigation of the President of the Commission, On this occasion progress was made, partly because the design was more realistic but also because it was backed by a strong coalition of Jenkins as head of the Commission and the so-called 'Paris-Bonn' axis of the right of centre French President d'Estaing and the left of centre German Chancellor Schmidt.

While substantial and quite radical change was taking place in the European Monetary System (EMS) area, an extremely costly row in terms of time, level of conflict and general embarrassment, broke out over the issue of British budgetary contributions. The budgetary row displayed

national interest calculations and conflicts at their worst. Furthermore, its resolution was effected only through an extreme dose of inconsistent and incoherent fudges. It is frankly rather hard to believe that the strife generated by the conflict simultaneously with progress on the EMS originated in the same organisation.

Policy Incongruities

For much of the history of the EC the jewel in the crown, as fax as common policy making is concerned, has been the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It is decidedly anomalous in some respects that the cement for a group of so-called post-industrial states has been a policy area dealing with what is a small and declining area of national production.

The CAP is unquestionably highly protectionist and has its roots in neo-mercantilist thinking. On the other hand the latest single most important area of policy initiative is the Single European Act (1987), which is unequivocally strongly liberal in its orientation, body that produces the CAP and the SE is one which defies the laws of physics by moving in opposite directions at the same time.

By the end of 1990 one of the major factors that led to the suspension of the GATT Uruguay Round was intransigence on the part of the EC over reform of the CAP. In this context the EC has been willing to jeopardise the outcome of a set of negotiations which are massively more important to it in the long run than the CAP.

An extremely important indicator of the capabilities of any intergovernmental organisation (IGO) is the nature of its budget. Other things being equal, the relative importance and relative independence of an IGO can be assessed in the size and 'own control' of its budget. Compared with other major IGO's the budget of the EC puts it in a class of its own. Here again a number of incongruities appear. Thus, the 'own resources' of the EC are largely a chimera; the revenue and expenditure profiles bear no resemblance to national budgets; the size of the budget relative to national ones (it is currently around 1.2% of EC GNP) is very small; the dominant allocation rule has in effect become the so-called 'juste retour', which means that as either a fiscal or reallocation mechanism (the principal roles of domestic budgets) the EC budget is close to being pointless.

Institutional Incongruities

Two of the most central institutions in the EC, the Council of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the European Council, developed initially entirely outside the Treaties of Rome. Though both of these bodies have now been formally incorporated, their initial development was entirely unanticipated and 'extra legal'.

While national governments have often been intent on stymieing any

supranational developments (for example the Council of Ministers and the European Council are often used as veto groups against the Commission or attempts have been made to sustain unanimity as a voting principle in the Council of Ministers), national governments have blithely endowed the .European Court of Justice with supranational powers. Within the parameters of the treaty obligations this Court has unquestioned supremacy, making it by far the most impressive international court. Furthermore, the supremacy of the Court has never been a serious bone of contention.

Of the major EC institutions there is a general consensus that the European Parliament is the most feeble. Though it would be an exaggeration to suggest that its influence on the working and development of the EC is so slight that it can be ignored, the range of powers of the European Parliament is such that the Parliament's influence on the EC is close to negligible. On the other hand, the European Parliament displays one of the most impressive manifestations of European integration in that political parties within the Parliament have completely eschewed any national identity to form groupings defined by ideological and policy affinities.

Policy Implementation Incongruities
Polls have consistently shown that one country, Italy, near the top of the league in enthusiasm for integration is near the bottom of the league when it comes to implementing EC directives. The converse is true for Britain.

Although 'juste retour' plays a strong role in governing each member state's expectation of its budgetary receipt, 'juste retour' does not dictate the actual allocation. Since the single strongest influence on revenue and expenditure is influenced by agriculture, then rather incongruous outcomes can appear. Thus, Denmark, having among the highest per capita income levels in the EC, also has among the highest per capita benefits from the EC budget.

Though the EC has developed its own multilateral aid programme, this programme pales into relative insignificance next to the bilateral programmes retained under national control.

The examples provided above are undeniably in some respects anecdotal or idiosyncratic and as such simply cannot be aggregated into some form of incongruity index. Nonetheless, it is argued that these examples (which could easily be multiplied) being drawn from important dimensions of the EC, do add up to a substantial degree of incongruity in the structure, development and performance of that body. These incongruities, it is suggested, do therefore collectively present a picture of EC development rather more consonant with the more erratic or multidimensional analogy of the crossed roads than the linear or unidirectional analogy of the cross-roads.

EXPLANATORY ELABORATION

If the path of development of the EC does indeed conform to the multidirectional analogy of the crossed roads, then it is argued that this analogy would become more persuasive if a number of cross pressures, which could explain why the development of the EC has been pulled and pushed in different directions, can be identified. There is no dearth of such cross pressures, which can in large part be collected and ordered in two main categories: competing agendas and factors outside Community control.

Competing Agendas

In popular terms the issue of European integration appears relatively straightforward, with most people being willing to subscribe to a pro- or anti-Market position. That the crucial question on integration should be whether or not one favours integration makes sense particularly if academic definitions of integration are consulted. Thus a perfectly acceptable academic definition of integration is 'that process whereby units move toward collective action based upon consensual values for the achievement of common goals'. An increase in the degree of integration, synonymous with increasing collective action, is often then represented as a movement along a continuum from harmonization to co-ordination to supranationalism.

This presentation of integration, as a progressive movement through increasing collective action towards enhanced common policy, though perfectly correct, is also extremely superficial. Though it is true that a decision as to whether a commitment to more collective action has to be made, this decision cannot be satisfactorily made in isolation. It requires in fact simultaneous decisions on a number of related issues, critical among which are questions of the level of integration, with whom it should be pursued, and what form integration should take. (By 'what form' we refer to the substantive content of common policies). Thus, it is argued that it is impossible, in any coherent or sensible manner, to make a simple response (i.e., yes or no) to the question of 'do we favour greater integration', coherent and sensible response can only be made to the question of 'do you favour this level of integration with these particular parties taking this particular form'. The point being made here, a perfectly simple but often overlooked one, is that the issue of integration is massively more complicated than the question of being for or against increased collective action. Thus, it is quite possible, and entirely coherent and logical, for one party to be strongly committed to one line of integration (a particular combination of level, set of parties, and form) and strongly opposed to another.

Though the subtlety and complexity of integration debates are largely lost in popular debate, they are not lost on key decision makers. We do not find

among these people a debate of the for or against variety on a single integration agenda. Rather there is a debate across competing agendas, constructed in terms of variations in levels, with whom integration should be pursued, and variations in the substantive content of the common policies that should be developed.

In the EC setting, as indeed in others, this variation is and always has been very substantial. European integration has never been dominated by a single agenda — rather we have seen conflict, sometimes acute, over competing agendas. On the other hand, integration, in its simple form of increased collective action, has been taking place. What has been happening is that integration has not been pushed by a single victorious agenda but by partial victories/and or compromises across competing and sometimes very difFerent agendas. It is the presence and partial success of a variety of agendas which explains why integration, though in some respects cumulative, has also been multidirectional — in other words of the more erratic and less coherent form presented in the crossed roads analogy.

It is certainly beyond the scope of this paper to construct the different agendas of competing actors, and indeed to do so in any systematic manner would be a truly formidable research task. We do not, however, need to go nearly so far. Rather it is sufficient to establish that there are major lines of tension over level, with whom and in what form. Without any pretence of comprehensive coverage, some of the principal divisions, which are both significant and clear, can be noted.

Confederation and Federation: *One* principal issue that must be *faced* by any set of actors contemplating integration is the nature of the institutional design. At the level of state integration this debate centres on whether the governmental structure should be unitary, confederal or federal. Though there have been suggestions of a unitary system, this option has never really been a serious contender. Both the confederal and federal positions recognise the difficulties involved in pursuing common action across a multinational setting and as such reject the unitary design as being insufficiently flexible to accommodate the diversity and competition inherent in Western Europe. Though the widespread rejection of the unitary option does unquestionably simplify the debate (and as such reduces the number of different directions in which the EC could move), nonetheless confederal and federal options still point in different directions. The situation is made even more complicated in that confederation and federation must be represented in terms of a continuum having two main dimensions: the relative balance of power between the centre and the principal constituent units, and the number of policy areas which fall under central direction. A multiplicity of positions can appear across these two dimensions (which to make matters even more complicated are interactive),

meaning that there is not simply a conflict between confederation and federation but between a whole variety of different shades or permutations of these.[3]

Widening and Deepening: Any set of actors contemplating integration must face critical and complex questions of which parties should be included in the integration drive (commonly referred to as widening) and of how highly developed should the common policies be (commonly referred to as deepening). In fact three important and complex debates appear. As far as widening is concerned, substantial controversy has developed over such matters as the rate of widening, the conditions of admission for new members, and the desired target size for total membership. As far as deepening is concerned, there has been controversy over the rate, the areas which should be pursued, the prioritisation across these areas, and the substantive form that common policies should take. Explicit recognition of the severity of the issue of deepening is manifested in the so-called two-tier debate (which refers to whether one set of states, or tier, should commit itself to faster integration while agreeing that a second tier should go for slower integration). These complex and unavoidable debates on widening and deepening are made yet more troublesome in that there is recognition that each option has its own opportunity cost (i.e., a commitment to substantial widening must detract from the degree of commitment to deepening). We find therefore not just isolated debates on widening and deepening but also on the relative priority that should be attached to each.[4]

Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism: Another extremely important area of choice (and therefore of controversy) concerns who or what should be directing the integration drives. The intergovernmental position posits that national governments should retain control of policy initiatives and policy implementation. The appropriate forum for key decision making is among representatives of national governments negotiating and bargaining on the basis of what they take to be national interests. The supranational position envisages and extols a situation in which critical decision-making increasingly passes to individuals and bodies which produce policies held to reflect the interests of the integrative community as a whole, rather than the lowest common denominators produced by a brokerage process between national representatives.[5] The EC contains both elements — with the cluster of institutions of the European Council, the Council of Ministers and COREPER reflecting intergovernmentalism — and the cluster of the Commission, the Parliament and the Court broadly speaking reflecting supranationalism. Since each of these clusters is well established then the EC has contained within it an institutionalised line of cleavage. Furthermore, since critical decision-

makers within each of these bodies are well aware *of* the different orientations, much time and effort is devoted to trying to protect the capabilities of one body and to constrain the development of capabilities of rival bodies. The outcome of these power-plays pulls and pushes *EC* integration in different directions.

Governmental and Market Management: It is impossible to express a coherent view on integration without knowing the substantive content of the common policy through which integration is to be pursued. Since there is no consensus on the substantive content of policies, it follows that this lack of consensus produces another important debate which can lead to very different agendas.[6] At a macro level perhaps the single most important divide on substantive content concerns the role of government versus market management. All the EC states are mixed market economies and as such the stark choice between socialism and liberalism as guiding principles for the substantive content of policy is not relevant. (This of course reduces the latitude within which integration can be pulled or pushed). Nonetheless, there is some variation both across and more particularly within states as to whether emphasis should fall toward the government or the market end of the spectrum. This variation in the relative salience of governmental management has important repercussions for many policy areas. For example, those inclined towards the socialist end of the spectrum will support integration when the particular vehicles for common policy making involve such items as an enhanced budget that will play a significant reallocative role or an expanded regional development fund or a social charter. Equally, those leaning towards the liberal end of the spectrum will oppose integration precisely when it entails such common policies. On the other hand, liberals will support integration when the vehicles of common policy entail the type of legislation of the Single European Act, which aims to remove. many of the obstacles to the free flow of goods, services and persons, or stimulation of competition. In this context a common misnomer is to try to ascribe relative commitment to integration between different states. It is not of course states that have commitments but governments — and governments have substantive policy preferences. As such the commitment of any one state (or more precisely the commitment of the government of that state) will not be constant but will vary in terms of the degree of latitude between the substantive content of its own policy preferences and the substantive content of the integration initiative.

Universalism and Regionalism: An important 'theoretical[1] debate in the integration literature, which at first sight seems to have little relevance to EC conflicts, concerns regionalism and universalism. Briefly, regionalism, at the extreme, posits that integration initiatives should be confined *to*

countries having similar levels of development, similar forms of government, and similar macro policies (which in effect translates into regional initiatives). Universalism begins from an argument that the major source of international conflict lies in the competition of individual states each pursuing its own national interest. For universalists the solution to this problem is to create international interdependence, for which universal IGO's are crucial, which produces cross-cutting cleavages across national boundaries. Like regionalists, universalists are in favour of integration but are adamantly opposed to the type of integration favoured by regionalists because they see the outcome of regional integration as simply larger states. To complicate matters more, some universalists will support regional integration but only if such integration is seen as an explicit stepping stone to universal integration. Certainly at first sight this debate may not seem very relevant in that it colours very substantially the view on the position that the EC should adopt to the outside world. It is currently manifested in the so-called 'fortress Europe' debate (though the 'fortress' analogy is rather overdrawn and overdramatic). Those straining more toward the regionalist position relish the prospect of the EC developing into a superstate that could rival or exceed, in both military and economic capabilities, the United States. These people will generally favour neo-mercantilist policies, such as the CAP, and security policies that would lead to a distinctive EC military capability. Those straining towards the universalist end may well tolerate some degree of regional integration but only if it does not negate or undermine EC interdependence with the rest of the world. For such people obligations to bodies such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, or the GATT take priority over European initiatives. Whether the EC should develop as a superpower or commit itself to revitalising universal IGOs has a profound impact on a whole range of international economic, security and immigration issues.[7]

Though not exhaustive, this list does indicate five extremely important and central debates. These debates entail hard choices which frequently verge on the incompatible. Furthermore, there is no homogeneity or consensus among critical decision-makers — these debates are in other words very real debates. Moves towards integration are not made from a coherent and consensual programme that stipulates a direction of or integration (in terms of agreed level/with whom/what form) and a clear rationale for that direction. Rather initiatives for integration come from different groups, existing in a highly pluralistic setting, trying to form winning coalitions across competing agendas. It is the absence of a single winning agenda and the existence of competing agendas, entailing at the extreme paralysis or compromise, that explains in part why EC integration is pulled and pushed rather erratically in the different directions implied in the crossed roads analogy.

Factors Outside EC Control

The pull and push of EC integration is not contingent purely on the different values and priorities that underpin the competing agendas of principal decision-makers. The nature of EC integration is influenced also by factors that lie to some extent outside the control of principal decision-makers and which consequently are independent of the competing agendas. As such these factors constitute an additional influence. In profiling these factors, again with no pretence to an exhaustive list, a distinction or ordering may be made in terms of own momentum and extra-community influences.

Own Momentum

Any complex organisation, quite simply by engaging itself in decision-making, essential at the minimum for survival, develops a certain momentum, which can influence the course of its development. Three facets of this momentum influence may be noted.

The first derives from a large body of research on bureaucratic models of decision-making, which calls attention to the important influence of the internal dynamics of decision-making within an organisation on the policy making of that organisation. It is argued, for example, that bureaucrats have an interest in protecting their budgets or the range of tasks of their agencies partly because this is part of their jobs and partly because success in so doing provides job tenure or improved career prospects. Pushed to their extreme, arguments drawing on the bureaucratic model suggest that it is pressures within complex organisations that explain policy directives. A good illustration of this extreme position is that US-USSR security policies were driven by the organisational phenomena of such things as inter-service rivalry or the military-industrial complex (as opposed for example to power rivalries or competing ideologies).

It is generally accepted that to explain all policy making in terms of bureaucratic pressures is oversimplified. Nonetheless the bureaucratic model research has much less contentiously established two more modest conclusions. The first is that if the livelihoods and career prospects of large numbers of people are tied up with the continued survival of the organisation, then such persons will consequently devote their working lives to executing duties and searching for new tasks that justify and sustain the organisation of which they are a part. The second conclusion is the argument that different branches of a complex organisation will compete against each other for scarce resources and in so struggling against each other will, depending on the outcome of these struggles, pull and push the organisation in different directions. Both of these conclusions are very relevant to the EC. Thus, there are large numbers of persons whose careers and livelihoods depend on the continuance of the EC to which they therefore become committed irrespective of differing ideological

preferences. Furthermore, these persons exist in relatively distinctive bureaucracies which to some extent compete against each other and trigger thereby power plays which manipulate the direction of development of the EC.[8]

The more modest arguments developed from the bureaucratic model research explain quite well both conflict within a complex organisation and strains to survival of that organisation. They do not explain nearly so well expansion of the organisation. Two further influences still consonant with the thrust of the general idea of own momentum contribute to the explanation of expansion.

The first of these comes from neo-functionalist theories of integration, which were actually developed in the context of attempts to explain European integration. The most important idea from neo-functionalist theorising is that of the so-called logic of integration. The argument here is that a policy initiative in one area will either require simultaneous action in other areas or will create dislocations in other areas. Either way any one initiative will require others and this produces a self sustaining momentum of the spill-over effect of the expansive logic of integration. Although both the automaticity and exclusivity of this influence are in serious doubt, there are equally without doubt numerous illustrations of policy initiatives which are not autonomous actions taken from a clear policy agenda but which are incremental adjustments to some anticipated difficulties or dislocations caused by some previous initiative.[9]

A second and rather different ramification of the general idea of own momentum, which bears on the expansion of integration, concerns increasing membership. Drawing in particular from the literature on alliances, it can be argued that the security of any organisation will depend in part (other things being equal) on the size of the membership, as size will predict as to capabilities. Equally non-members may feel increasingly threatened as the size and capabilities of an organisation expand. This factor has played a crucial role in the evolution of the EC.

Certainly on a macro level the first community of the ECSC was scarcely a threat to anyone. The Treaties of Rome, however, induced a qualitative change to the status of the Six. This lesson was not lost in particular on Britain, which also happened to be experiencing a simultaneous decline in two communities to which it was allied, namely the 'special relationship' with the United States and in particular with the Commonwealth. It was this in part that triggered the counter offensive of the British initiative on EFTA and equally it was an appreciation that EFTA could not overwhelm the EC that led to the British application to join the EC. The British application, pulling very significantly several other states in its wake, was tantamount to recognition that the Six had developed an organisation with the best claim to an influence over the future development of Europe. The

expansion of 1973 combined with enhanced common policy initiatives made the EC even more formidable. There followed of course the Greek and then the Spanish and Portuguese applications. More recently Austria has lodged a formal application; Sweden seems to be on the verge of so doing (driven incidentally and very significantly in large measure by Swedish business interests fearful of exclusion). The remaining EFTA countries have negotiated a special arrangement in the so-called European Economic Space; meanwhile the fragmentation of Eastern Europe is producing more potential applicants, some of whom are already clearly waiting in the wings.

In sum, the successful moves by the Original Six have made the EC attractive to others who merely by dint of their application have added to the momentum. Equally new applicants automatically structure the agenda of existing members forcing difficult and contentious choices onto existing members as seen for instance in the widening and deepening controversy.

Extra-Community Influences

The basic argument of this section rests upon a fairly simple and uncontentious argument that the EC, like other international actors, is subject to a variety of influences which lie to some extent outside its control (but which unlike the own momentum factors are not rooted with the EC itself). It is the corollary of this simple argument which is of interest. This corollary suggests that these influences have varying effects on the EC and in so doing contribute yet again to the multidimensional pulling and pushing of the crossed roads analogy.[10]

What is of concern for the general thesis is not the list of external influences, which are far too numerous to elaborate, but rather the different consequences that such influences can have. Some factors cause a form of defensive response encouraging the EC to look 'inward'; a second set impact differently across the different constituent groups of the EC; a third set encourages the EC to look beyond its own rather more parochial concerns to a set of interests substantially more general than the issue of EC integration itself and as such cause the EC to look 'outward'. These three rather different effects may be illustrated.

An early and extremely important example of an 'inward-looking' effect was the Cold War. The EC has undoubtedly enjoyed some degree of latitude in how it has responded to Cold War tensions. What it has been unable to avoid is making some form of response, in which respect the EC has been moulded by a factor largely beyond its control. Though Cold War pressures have been far from uniform (a point to which we return below), one undoubted effect has been to encourage some key European actors to look inward in the sense of promoting EC integration as a form of defensive response. An immediate attraction of a grouping such as the EC was that it presented an opportunity for the Western European states to provide

something of a counter to the Soviet Union without compromising too much their independence vis-a-vis the United States. Successive US governments were in fact quick to appreciate this, which explains their attempts to persuade Britain tojoin the Community.

A further example of an *inward-looking* pressure has been the emergence of other regional groupings. Any expectation in the aftermath of World War II that universalism had vanquished regionalism was clearly not met. While numerous regional groups have decayed or become moribund, many others have clearly thrived. Indeed the EC is perhaps the arch example of this. As universalists rightfully argue, one of the effects of successful regional co-ordination can be to encourage other regional co-ordinations as a defensive response. One current and extremely important illustration of this process is the set of moves on EC monetary union to develop a currency unit and support system against prospective dollar and yen zones.

A second set of external influences, which may be termed 'cross pressures', varies in impact on the individual members. An early example of this arose in part out of the Cold War (indicating as mentioned above that Cold War pressures were not uniform) in the guise of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was established to monitor the administration of Marshall Plan aid. This grouping, which unquestionably played an important role in stimulating European co-operation, was not, however, coterminous with the EC, and became less so when in 1960 it became transformed in the Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development (OECD) to include, among others, such major states as the United States and Japan. The OECD continues of course as a major forum for discussion and negotiation by the developed countries and as such cuts across the EC.

An even more pronounced 'cross pressure' comes from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This organisation not only includes some non EC members but also excludes (unlike the OECD) some EC members. Thus Ireland remains a neutral state while France withdrew from the integrated military command. Though the failure to develop an EC security policy cannot be attributed solely to the existence of NATO, NATO has undoubtedly massively complicated and to some degree certainly thwarted EC initiatives in the security area.

Another similar example of an extremely important body which is not coterminous with the EC, in that it excludes some EC members and includes some non-EC members is the Group of Seven (G7) of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The summit meetings of the G7, which again completely overrides the EC, have arguably become the single most important locus in which key international issues, particularly economic ones, are discussed.

A third set of external influences causes the EC to look 'outward'. Such

pressures do not by any stretch of the imagination undermine the rationale for the existence of the EC. They do, however, undermine to some degree the significance and salience of the EC, to the extent that an input to policy making is not and cannot be confined to what are taken to be the common interests purely of the EC members themselves.

A good example of such influences comes from what is loosely termed the 'Bretton Woods system' of the IMF, the World Bank and GATT. This 'system', of which all EC states are members, provides a set of rules and an institutional forum for decision-making. Maximally these rules either take priority over EC decision-making or minimally provide important parameters within which EC decision-making can take place. Short of abrogating at immense cost these treaty commitments, EC policy must adjust to and incorporate these broader rules. Or again, the growth of foreign direct investment and of multinational corporations represents global economic developments which involve EC states in a set of interactions not predicated on EC membership. The more recent expansion of international banking has had much the same consequence. A very different development, which nonetheless has much the same 'outward looking' impact, is the recent collapse of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and possibly of the Soviet Union itself. Again we witness a development largely outside EC control which does however have important ramifications on the policy response (as yet unclear) of the EC.

In sum, there are important influences, whose origin lies outside the EC and which to all intents are not under EC control, that dictate to some degree the nature of EC development by dint of structuring agendas or requiring responses. What is more these influences are both variable and complex. Sometimes they impinge more or less equally on most EC actors, while at other times their impact is quite uneven. Furthermore, the response they elicit can be variable ranging from 'inward' to 'outward-looking' pressure. It is a major and all too common error, in our view, to try to understand and explain the machinations of EC integration purely in terms of the preferences and power plays of key EC decision-makers.

CONCLUSIONS
The principal descriptive thesis of this paper is that EC integration has not unravelled in the unidirectional manner envisaged in the *cross-roads* analogy. Rather the evolution of the EC has been decidedly more erratic and incoherent as envisaged in the *crossed roads* model. This explanatory thesis has been directed at trying to explain why there has been a more incoherent and multidirectional development. The essence of the argument has been that competing agendas and factors beyond Community control have pulled and pushed EC integration in different directions. Given the diversity of factors at work, what is perhaps more remarkable than the lack of clear and

continuous direction is that *EC* integration has taken place and has not been more erratic.

There is of course nothing in the argument that would preclude the EC moving at some future date to a *cross-roads* model. Although prediction is admittedly a dangerous art, it is possible to use the explanatory thesis to reduce these dangers. Other things being equal, EC integration could move to the *cross-roads* model if the competing agendas were to reduce to consensus and if the EC could insulate itself from external influences. Though the direction of development of each of these factors is arguably towards greater consensus and greater insulation, neither of these developments has progressed sufficiently far for EC integration to move in the near future to the *cross-roads* position. Though the agreements from the important Maastricht Summit of December 1991 clearly indicate a strong and ongoing strain toward enhanced common policy making, there is still sufficient compromise and variation in the interpretation of the nature and consequences of these agreements to indicate that the EC is still at the *crossed roads.*

ENDNOTES

1. Traditionary the *'left' has* been *more* critical *of moves towards European* integration. See, for example: J. Galtung, *The European Community,* London, Allen and Unwin, 1973 or S. Holland, *Uncommon Market,* New York, St. Martins Press, 1980. For a more 'within' critical evaluation by a former Commissioner, see: C. Tugendhat, *Making Sense of Europe,* Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1986.

2. General 'textbook-type' overviews of the structure and working of the EC are proliferating at a very rapid rate. For a selection, see: A.M. El-Agraa, ed., *Economics of the Eastern Community,* London, P. Allan, 3 ed., 1990; S. George, *Politics and Policy in the European Community,* Oxford, Clarendon, 1985; T. Hitiris, *The European Community Economics* Brighton, Harvester, 1991; J. Lodge, *The European Community and the Challenge of the Future,* London, Pinter, 1989; W. Nicholl and T.C. Salmon, *Understanding the European Communities,* London, P. Allan, 1990; N. Nugent, *The Government and Politics of the European Community,* London, Macmillan, 2 ed., 1991; R. Pryce, ed., *The Dynamics of European Union,* London, Routledge, 1987; D. Swann, *Economics of the Common Market,* Harmondsworth, Penguin, 6 ed., 1986; L. Tsoukalis, ed., *The European Community,* Oxford, Blackwell, 1983; H. Wallace, W. Wallace, C. Webb, eds., *Policy-Making in the European Community,* London, Wiley, 1983.

3. On the subject of confederation and federation, see for example: C. Brewin, 'The European Community: Union of States without Unity of Government', Journal *of Common Market Studies,* 26, 1988; l.D. Duchacek, *Comparative Federalism,* New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970; P. King, *Federalism and Federation,* London, Croom Helm, 1982; J. Lodge, ed., *Institutions and Policies of the European Community,* London, Pinter, 1983; N. Nugent, *op.cit;* P. Taylor, *The Limits of European Integration,* London, Croom Helm, 1982.

4. On widening and deepening, see for example: 'Survey of the European Community', *Economist, July* 7, 1990; J. Galtung, *Europe in the Making,* New York, Taylor and Francis, 1989; H. Wallace and A. Ridley, 'Europe: The Challenge of Diversity', *Chatham House Papers,* 29,1985.

5. On Intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, see for example: D.L. Lasok and J. Bridges, *Law and Institutions of the European Communities,* London, Butterworth, 1991; P. Taylor, 'Coordination in International Organization; in A.J.R. Groom

and P, Taylor, eds., *Framework for International Cooperation*, London, Pinter, 1990;
P. Taylor, 'Supranationalism', *ibid.;* H. Wallace et al. *Policy Making in the European Communities,* op. cit.

6. The literature on the government-market controversy is legion. For some recent interesting examples, see: A.S. Blinder, *Hard Heads Soft Hearts,* Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1987; P.F. Drucker, *The New Realities,* London, Heinemann, 1989; M.E. Porter, *The Competitive Advantage of Nations,* London, Macmillan, 1990; L.C. Thtirow, *The Zero-Sum Society,* New York, Basic Books, 1980. It is impossible to reference works on all policy areas but some examples may be cited from two areas: the CAP and regional policy. On CAP, see for example: F. Duchene et al.. *New Limits on European Agriculture,* Totowa, Rowman and Allanheld, 1985; R. Fennell, *The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community,* Oxford, BSP Professional Books, 1987; S. Harris et al., *The Food and Farm Policies of the European Community,* New York, Wiley, 1983; J.S. Marsh and P.J. Swanney, *Agriculture and the European Community,* London, Allen and Unwin, 1980. On regional policy, see for example: W. Armstrong, 'The Reform of the EC Regional Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 23 1985; M. Keating and B. Jones, eds., *Regions in the European Community,* Oxford, Clarendon, 1985; D.A. Pinder, *Regional Economic Development and Policy*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1983; D. Swann, *op.cit.*

1. For general discussions on regionalism and universalism, see for example: L.J. Cantori and S.L. Spiegel, eds., *The International Politics of Regions,* Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1970; M.M. Etzioni, *The Majority of One,* Beverly Hills, Sage, 1970; E. Frey-Wouters, 'The Prospects for Regionalism in World Affairs', in R.A. Falk and C.E. Black, eds., *The Future of the International Legal Order,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969.

8. On bureaucratic influences, see for example: D. Braybrooke and C.E. Lindblom, *Strategy of Decision,* New York, Free Press, 1963; M. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy,* Washington, Brookings, 1974; H. Michelmann, *Organisation Effectiveness in a Multinational Bureaucracy,* London, Saxon House, 1978; J.D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974.

9. On neofunctionalism, see: E.B. Haas, *Uniting of Europe,* Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958; R.J. Harrison, *Europe in Question,* London, Allen and Unwin, *1974; L.* Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration,* Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1963; L. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would Be Polity,* Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1970.

10. For some examples of a rather neglected area of study (European's interaction with the rest of the world), see: R. Bailey, *The European Community in the World,* London, Hutchinson, 1974; L. Fielding, *Europe as a Global Partner,* London, UACES, 1991; R.H. Ginsberg, *Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community,* Boulder, Rienner, 1989.

Maxi van Aardt

BUILDING A NEW SOUTH AFRICA: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

It is impossible to prescribe the ultimate solution to South Africa's political problems, but some reflections on the issue of foreign involvement in the country can nevertheless be offered. The focus of this paper is on one particular aspect of the new South Africa, namely the relationship between South Africa and the international community with special reference to socio-economic aspects of the transition to democracy. The economic problems facing South Africa, the reasons for foreign involvement in the area and the possible nature of such involvement are examined. It is concluded that without foreign involvement in the form of substantial aid and investment, it will not be possible to build a new South Africa.

INTRODUCTION[1]

In discussing the new South Africa one is reminded of what I prefer to call the Mills and Boon syndrome: South Africa in particular finds itself in the position of an avid romance-reader: boy meets girl, they overcome the trials and tribulations caused by the villain, they get married and, so one is led to believe due to a dearth of information, they live happily ever after. No Mills and Boon romance ever tells of the marriage itself, its problems and how to overcome them. South Africa, too, has generated thousands of publications mainly concerned with the need for overthrowing or killing the villain, apartheid. Now that the world is gathered round apartheid's deathbed, one suddenly realises that the happy-ever-after-marriage is about to begin, but that very little is known about it.

It is impossible to prescribe the ultimate solution to South Africa's (and by implication Africa's) political problems, but some reflections on the issue *of* foreign involvement in the country and its region might nevertheless be offered. These suggestions and ideas also pertain to the rest of Africa, the least developed and most marginalised continent, because they touch on the

Maxi van Aardt is a lecturer in Politics at R AU.

sensitive issue of the so-called North-South divide and the precarious interaction between African concerns and Western economic hegemony.

Whitehead (1986) examines the importance of international factors influencing attempts at democratization and stresses the fact that external support of democratic transitions is of secondary importance — the internal process is the most important in determining the success of such a transition. This does not mean that the role of the international community in building a new South Africa is negligible. On the contrary, it is argued that, despite its secondary status, such a role is important in the sense that the international community (including South Africa) can benefit from involvement in this process. Although the importance of internal political and economic factors and debates fully acknowledged, this discussion will focus on one particular aspect of the new South Africa, namely the relationship between South Africa and the international community, with special reference to socio-economic aspects of the transition to democracy. The economic problems facing South Africa, the reasons for foreign involvement in this area and the possible nature of this involvement will be discussed.

This discussion is divided into three sections. In the first, attention is paid to the scope of the socio-economic problems facing the country, the solution of which might be facilitated by international involvement. Areas in which involvement is needed and influence might be exerted are identified. The second section argues that there are certain reasons why this community should be involved in building the new South Africa. Thirdly, the nature of such a role will be examined. Some preliminary remarks on the concepts 'international community' and 'new South Africa' are, however, necessary.

The term international community refers in the broadest sense to actors in the international political economy, be they states, international governmental organisations and agencies, transnational corporations, or investors. This paper furthermore accepts the existence of a relatively liberal international economic order which will remain in place in the foreseeable future. As far as a new South Africa is concerned, a distinction is drawn to distinguish between post-apartheid South Africa and a new South Africa. The former refers to the interregnum between white-ruled South Africa and the implementation of a negotiated settlement, a period which might involve third party intervention in the form of mediation in order to facilitate such a settlement. A new South Africa, on the other hand, does not refer to a ready-made new society, eagerly awaiting its re-integration into the international political and economic system. Rather, it refers to a process by which South Africa will, over time, manage to evolve into a different society, with or without (but preferably with) assistance from the international community. The image of a new South Africa as the logical successor *to* apartheid-South Africa is a myth insofar as it suggests a sudden

and complete change. Only when one realises that the new South Africa needs to be built, which implies a time-consuming process, and that investment and aid are imperative for the success of this process, does it become realistic to use the term new South Africa.

I THE LEGACY OF APARTHEID: SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES

The process of building a new South Africa requires both political stability and the creation of a climate conducive to economic stability and growth. Both requirements are imperative and, to a large extent, indivisible. Economic empowerment is highly improbable if not accompanied, or even preceded, by political empowerment, as is clearly illustrated in the history of the Afrikaner (cf. Giliomee and Adam, 1981:108-227).[2] In this section, however, the main characteristics, demands and expectations of the South African economy are outlined, thereby placing the demands on the political system in perspective. It should be kept in mind that this separation between features, demands and expectations is largely artificial and is applied to facilitate discussion. A distinction is drawn between demands and expectations: the former refers to structural issues vis-a-vis the economy and the latter to (a) the objectives of economic policy, namely the maximisation of the welfare and prosperity of the total population in the short and long-term which implies maximum participation by the population in the processes of production and consumption; and (b) the aspirations of the population which they hope to realise by means of the economic policy followed by the state. The main features of the South African economy are as follows:

— The (almost clichéd) duaKstic nature of the economy relating to the existence of the highly developed mining, agricultural, manufacturing and tertiary sectors on the one hand, controlled by, and benefiting mainly the white population, and on the other the existence of a large, basically underdeveloped sector earning a livelihood in traditional agricultural and informal activities (SACOB, 1990:7). This feature mirrors to a certain extent the typical Third World phenomenon of the inequities of the distribution of wealth within these societies (Palmer, 1989:287). The exception is the fact that the prosperous minority in South Africa is white, thereby economic benefits are distributed in terms of race rather than class. At the same time the dualistic nature of the economy mirrors the world economic system with its complementary portions designated by the terms core and periphery (cf. Hopkins, 1982:11) which refer to the highly developed urban areas which contrast sharply with the underdevelopment of rural areas. On a more mundane level the existence of a large underdeveloped sector means abject poverty for a large percentage of South Africa's black

population (cf. Wilson and Ramphela, 1989:13-185 for a comprehensive discussion of the extent and scope of black poverty)

— The economy is characterised by its openness, with foreign trade contributing between 60 and 70% of the GDP. Related to this is South Africa's heavy reliance on the export of raw materials eg. coal, gold and other minerals, which subjects the country to external influence *and* market fluctuations. The openness of the economy has in the past created successful avenues for foreign intervention in order to influence South African politics by means of the implementation of comprehensive economic *sanctions.*

— Especially since the late 1970s South Africa has suffered a low and declining economic growth rate exacerbated by sanctions. From 1960-1974 the growth rate was 5,5% p.a., declining to 1,9% in the period 1974-1984 (Barber and Barratt, 1990:10) and is currently at 1,4% (SACOB, 1990:8-9). high growth rate did not, however, imply development of the economy's Third World component, i.e. economic growth did not lead to equal distribution of the wealth generated. This explains the internal, largely black demands for sanctions, despite warnings by government and anti-sanctions groups and individuals (mainly in the business sector) of the detrimental effects of sanctions on economic growth. Stadler (1987:31) cites the example of black mineworkers whose wages did not improve in the six decades between 1910 and 1970. By the time that the black population started sharing in the wealth of the country, albeit in a limited way, the economic growth rate was already deteriorating and the era of international intervention in the form of punitive sanctions was looming, which accelerated the downturn in the economy and hampered efforts towards socio-economic upliftment.

As far as demands on the South African economy are concerned a few of the most salient issues confronting the country can be summarised as:

— *High population growth versus low employment opportunities.* The population growth rate of 2,7% p.a. and a labour force growing at 2,6% p.a. place serious strains on the economy and create a potentially volatile social situation. In contrast to these figures, employment in the formal sector has increased at only 0,7% p.a. over the last decade resulting in almost 40% unemployment of the economically active population (SACOB, 1990;9-10). An added danger is the possibility that any improvement in this area might result in what Du Pisani (1990:17) refers to as 'the spectre of millions of migrants flocking to the relatively greener pastures of (the South African) economy', a subject returned to in section III.

— *The multi-faceted crisis in black education.* In the first instance black education in the form of Verwoerdian Bantu Education constitutes inferior education, which does not prepare black school children for the demands of a modern, industrialised economy (Christie and Collins, 1984:160-183; Christie, 1985:51-54). Black schools and teaching facilities are inadequate for the number of pupils; 93% of teachers in black schools are not fully qualified, at more than 600 schools double sessions are in operation due to a shortage of classrooms (Van Nieuwkerk, 1990:118-119); and the matriculation failure rate was almost 70% in 1990. The increase in the black school population will necessitate the building of an additional 9 000 schools and the training of 73 000 teachers (these figures imply only the maintenance of present standards and not upgrading black education to equal white standards). Compounding these problems is the fact that since 1976 thousands of black children have left school or have interrupted their studies to become part of the struggle for political rights and an estimated two million illiterates between the ages of thirteen and twenty five are roaming the streets of the townships and cities without any skills to secure employment or a decent living.

— *A housing shortage amounting to between 700 000 and 1,4 million units (Race Relations Survey, 1988:198).* The 1985 occupancy level was 12,8 persons per unit. US$8 billion would be needed to provide housing over the next decade. Should living standards be increased to lower the occupancy rate to 6 persons per unit (the white level is 3,4 persons per unit), the amount needed would be US$20 billion. The scrapping of the Group Areas Act might alleviate this problem, but only to the extent that middle-class blacks would be in a position to benefit — the actual shortage is more in terms of low-cost housing for the poor.

— *A lack of small business development and the inward orientation of the manufacturing industry.* The latter is partly ascribed to sanctions and boycotts (SACOB, 1990:8), but decades of protectionist policies and inadequate development strategies, which were further hampered by the dictates of apartheid, contributed to this problem (Innes and Gelb, 1987:560).

— *Limited natural resources.* The country does not have sufficient water resources for the demands of its growing population and industrial needs, and suffers from regular and extensive droughts. Pollution, deforestation and desertification add to the problems of limited resources. The extent of poverty, under-development and deprivation hampers conservation and inhibits the granting of sufficient finances and manpower to address these problems in a concerted and comprehensive way.

— *Coping with social and labour unrest.* Since 1976 South Africa has been

confronted with endemic violence, especially in the black townships (Du Toit, 1990:66) and in the rural areas of Natal (Aitchison, 1989:465), resulting in high losses of life and destruction of property. According to the then South African Minister of Police, Mr Adriaan Vlok, 771 people were killed in unrest-related incidents during the first four months of 1991 (SABCTV News, 6 May 1991). As far as industrial unrest is concerned, figures for 1988 record more than a thousand strikes and work stoppages and at least 1,5 million workdays were lost. Approximately 2,5 million workers participated in the November 1988 stayaway in protest against the Labour Relations Act amendments (Bennett, 1989:290-291). The cost of labour unrest to an economy already suffering from sustained recession, high inflation and the effects of sanctions is extremely high.

The abovementioned demands on the economy indicate, to a large extent, the population's expectations of a new South Africa. Broadly speaking, these expectations consist of adequate housing, relevant and quality education, 'living wages', employment, access to land, the improvement of social services (especially health care), the removal of all restrictions on social and economic mobility; in short: not only 'access to' (which implies only a potential), but affirmative action in order to raise the quality of blacks' lives *to* that of the white community. A major problem in this regard is the fact that these expectations are of an immediate nature in the sense that these benefits are expected to accrue immediately once a political settlement is reached, if not sooner. In this regard the ANC strongly criticised the Government's 1991/1992 budget as 'an uncaring budget favouring the rich and providing limited direct relief for the poor' *(Mayibuye,* April 1991, p40). It is suggested by the ANC that the Government should increase its share of the GDP and spend this additional income on poverty relief. Such actions would, however, prove almost impossible to sustain in the long run if no investment is forthcoming to assist in the creation of wealth-creating economic activities which in turn could broaden the revenue basis of the state, enabling it to allocate a larger portion of the budget to social expenditure. Taking into account the current crises of the South African economy and the lengthy time-span involved in creating the circumstances under which such developments could take place, it would seem that the new South Africa will be launched in the face of disaster, unless extensive and prolonged assistance from the international community is forthcoming.

II   REASONS FOR FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN NEW SOUTH AFRICA

Itemizing a litany of woes facing South Africa does not necessarily 'prove' that the international community is under obligation to assist in the arduous

task of building a new South Africa. There are, however, three interrelated reasons for a role for the international community in this regard: a moral-ethical reason, a utilitarian reason and a political economy reason.

The moral-ethical reason for foreign involvement

Attributing a moral-ethical role to the international community regarding its involvement in building a new South Africa, has two aspects: first, that some of its members implicitly collaborated over a long period of time in protecting the South African government, and thus apartheid. Secondly, that the international community, paradoxically enough, played an important role in the demise of apartheid.

With regard to support of the apartheid regime, reference may also be made to the fact that Western powers, in particular, such as Britain, the USA, (formerly) West Germany and Japan, obtained economic benefits, over a long period, from the continued existence of apartheid (International Peace Academy, 1988:xx,xxii; Legum, 1988:xix-xxiii) whilst denouncing it as morally repugnant, It can also be argued that South Africa's reliance, like so many other Third World economies, on the export of raw materials indirectly served to maintain apartheid: the prices of raw and semi-processed materials fluctuate widely and are largely dictated by foreign markets (Stadler, 1988:33), the controllers of which, for many decades never attempted to utilise their potential power in this regard in order to weaken or to apply pressure to the South African government. Apart from the economic advantages which the West, in particular, gained from apartheid, a strategic reason for its maintenance may also be referred to. According to Jonah (1988:122-123) and Campbell (1988:36) Western involvement in South Africa and the Southern African region often seemed preoccupied with countering Soviet strategic interests, even to the extent of turning a blind eye to apartheid. Alexander Haig of the United States, for instance, referred to that country's 'shared values' and 'shared concerns' with South Africa (quoted by Jaster, 1988:144) as far as security issues were concerned. South Africa's role in countering Communist influence in the sub-continent intensified its perception of a total onslaught and resulted in large-scale repressive measures which mainly affected the black population, especially during the reign of PW Botha.

It might be difficult to prove tacit Western support for the apartheid regime in the decades of its existence, but it is clear that a certain measure of protection was offered, especially in international forums such as the UN and by Britain in the Commonwealth. From, as early as the 1950s, Arab and Asian members, and later African members of the UN, exercised increasing influence in the General Assembly to exert pressure on South Africa to abandon apartheid. In the Security Council, however, Britain and the US regularly used their votes to modify or veto proposals for mandatory

international action against South Africa. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that between March 1960 and April 1988 the Council recorded 39 votes *on South* Africa, resulting in the passage of 30 condemnatory resolutions (Geldenhuys, 1990:267) of which only one (Resolution 418, November 1977 — the arms ban) constituted mandatory action against South Africa. Britain and the US used their vetoes to thwart a proposed Security Council resolution in 1970, and were joined by France in 1974, 1975 and 1976 and four times in 1981 (Geldenhuys, 1990:267). It must be admitted, though, that since 1970 the Council has censured South Africa in resolutions over a wide range of issues. The point, however, is that the structure of the Security Council provided the means for Western powers to regulate mandatory action against South Africa and that these means were regularly used to protect South Africa, lending credibility to accusations of support for the South African government from 'imperialist states' (Apartheid South Africa, dateunknown:7).

On the other hand, the international community did contribute to the demise of apartheid. It would be extremely difficult to quantify this contribution and the role of the international community would not readily be acknowledged by the South African government, given its record of rejection of 'foreign interference in domestic policies' (cf. Geldenhuys, 1985:68-69; Lauren, 1988:257-267). After World War II, the 'new[1] international morality which demanded human rights, freedom and independence for all nations, found in South Africa's racial policies a condensation symbol of immoral behaviour, often equated with Nazism and fascism. The international community internationalised this immorality and attempted to eradicate apartheid with increasing force and severity, from the first session of the UN in 1946 onwards (cf. Schoeman, 1986, for a comprehensive overview of international sanctions directed at South Africa during the period 1946-1988).

This objective is now being realised as South Africa moves into the post-apartheid era. 1991 will see the removal of the last vestiges of statutory apartheid with the scrapping of such key acts as the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act and the Land Acts. Attaining this stage does not, however, absolve the international community from a further role. The manifestations and consequences of apartheid are not eradicated by the scrapping of apartheid practices from the lawbooks of the country. Removing racial discrimination is only one aspect of the moral issue of apartheid: building a new society, in other words assistance towards the upliftment of the impoverished and otherwise deprived majority of the South African population, might prove a much more daunting task and one requiring the commitment of many more resources than the campaign to end apartheid. Too often in the past movements to end morally repugnant systems such as colonialism were not followed through fully. It is not

enough to put an end to an unacceptable situation — on a moral-ethical level involvement in the establishment of the new order is also necessary. This paper will return to the practical issues pertaining to such involvement in section **III.**

Consolidation of the outcome of transformation

Whereas the moral-ethical reason for foreign involvement in South Africa is largely focussed on the objective of transforming the country from authoritarian rule, based on racial discrimination, to an apartheid-free democratic society, the second reason for such involvement pertains to a utility argument. The process of eradicating apartheid involved the isolation of South Africa mainly through the calculated application of political, diplomatic, economic, socio-cultural and military sanctions (cf. Geldenhuys, 1990:1-27). Although sanctions contributed to the demise of apartheid, they severely and adversely affected South Africa in all the abovementioned areas. As is continually stressed in this discussion, ending apartheid is not enough. The very means through which this has been achieved should now be harnessed, almost in reverse, to ensure the normalisation of South African society.

Transition should be accompanied and followed by democratic consolidation, a process in which the international community has a practical role to play. The consolidation of political democracy, in the words of Schmitter (1988:11), involves 'the structuration of a particular type of regime.' This process might call for foreign involvement in the form of third party assistance in conflict resolution (mediation), a topic dealt with in considerable detail by Van Nieuwkerk (1990). For the purpose of this discussion however the term *democratic consolidation* is used in a broader sense to draw attention to the fact that building a new South Africa involves more than the structuration of a particular type of regime. It necessitates the consolidation of the transformation on the broad level of socio-economic issues. Without the assistance of investment, aid, technology and knowledge from the international community, regime structuration or democratic consolidation would be in vain. If there is a lesson to be learnt from Africa's post-independence experience, it is precisely that, no matter how fancy the constitutional footwork, without planning for, and addressing, the diverse expectations of the population, stability, growth, development, security and quality of life will decline. Reading the statements of leading black South Africans (the Mandelas, Boesak, Tutu, 1987:385-394) is sufficient to realise the extent to which political aspirations are indissolubly linked to socio-economic expectations as well as, furthermore, to realise the corollary: the impossibility of achieving these goals without international assistance.

This argument for a role for the international community in building a

new South Africa can also be extended *to* the region as a whole. South Africa's neighbours also suffered the consequences of apartheid (cf. World Bank, 1989:23) and from the efforts to end apartheid, due to the region's broadly integrated economic system which is largely dependent on South Africa. Like the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Africa is characterised by 'weak agricultural growth, a decline in industrial output, poor export performance, climbing debt, and deteriorating social indicators, institutions and environment' (World Bank, 1989:34). Assistance to South Africa without due consideration of the region as a whole might lead to long term social dislocation and increasing poverty and instability. Thus, in order to ensure a democratic, developing, new South Africa, the role of the international community must be extended to the whole of Southern Africa.

The re-integration of South Africa into the international community

The third reason for a role for the international community in the process of creating a new South Africa is a political economy argument based on the concepts *dependence* and *interdependence*. Whereas the first two reasons are concerned mainly with the requirements and needs of South Africa (and the Southern African region), the re-integration of South Africa into the international system, and in particular into the international *economic* system, is also of importance to and in the interest of the international community.

Dependency is usually defined as an asymmetrical relationship based on a high level of economic interaction in which state is of great importance to state B and B is influenced by actors and events in A. In contrast, interdependence refers to a symmetrical relationship comprising a high level of mutual economic interaction and mutual sensitivity (Spero, 1985:16). It is suggested that dependence and interdependence should be viewed as two absolutes on a continuum, thereby allowing for degrees of dependence moving towards degrees of interdependence, according to specific issues. The openness of the South African economy, discussed in section I, attests to the fact that it is already largely integrated into the international economy and the extent to which it needs to be re-integrated is directly related to those areas in which economic sanctions have been applied. Considering the various sanctions programmes adopted by Western states and organizations (such as the EC) and an IGO such as the Commonwealth *(cf.* Legum, 1987:419-441), it would seem that bans on the imports of South African products were carefully considered so as to limit the negative results to the enforcers' economies. In other words, sanctions were apparently imposed after careful consideration of the potential damage to the economies of the states implementing such steps, and largely concerned those areas in which there was a minimum degree of dependence on their target. South Africa's resource base, in particular as far as the export of raw materials and 'vital'

minerals is concerned, is of highly functional value to the international system (cf. Van Wyk and Von Below, 1988). The structure of most sanctions programmes attest to this, confirming the assumption that in areas of high interdependence which spilled over into relations of dependence on South Africa, these relations were minimally disturbed. The fact that so many Western states in particular were willing to reconsider economic sanctions after President de Klerk's opening of Parliament speech on 2 February 1990 (interview with S.A. Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism, 1990:31) might be an indication of their interest in normalising trade relations with South Africa in order to benefit themselves.

The present inward orientation of the South African manufacturing industry is largely the result of sanctions and boycotts by the international community (SACOB, 1990:8). Only a reversal of these policies, accompanied by comprehensive foreign incentives, would aid the implementation of an export orientated industrial strategy geared to the demands of the international economy. Assisting South Africa, and the Southern African region, in such development initiatives does not imply a 'handout* or charitable gestures, but would benefit the international system and therefore also the actors involved. As the advanced industrialised countries move into a post-industrial services-orientated cycle, the international division of labour is also changing. 'Vacancies' in the industrial and manufacturing fields, especially in the field of beneficiation, must be filled. South Africa as a developing country endowed with raw materials, abundant labour and in possession of a highly developed infrastructure as far as transport, energy and telecommunications are concerned, is ideally suited to become a supplier of exported manufactured and semi-manufactured goods and consumer products provided it is allowed to, and actively assisted in, full re-integration into the international community. Limited re-integration, for example lifting the oil-embargo or allowing South Africa to be a legitimate trading-partner but only as far as the supply of minerals or other raw materials are concerned while policies of protectionism are still practised by the industrialised states (cf. the EC's Common Agricultural Policy or the United States' protectionist trade in services), might be detrimental to the international system in the long run: state intervention in order to close markets, avoid competition and protect declining local industries might eventually result in world-wide stagflation as a capitalist or market system requires outward expansion (Gilpin, 1987:400). There is also a moral hidden in this political economy argument for a role for the international community in the new South Africa: it is increasingly expected (and demanded) of Third World countries to democratise, to limit state interference in their economies, and to open up markets. These measures are being accepted as prerequisites for international aid and investment. But why should these conditions be met when the institutions demanding these

adjustments are controlled by states who do not practise what they preach?[3] The re-integration of South Africa into the world economy is, in the final instance, not only of the utmost importance for the successful political and socio-economic structuration of the new South Africa, but would also contribute to the stability and growth of the international economy.

Ill THE NATURE OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT

The above reasons for foreign involvement in building a new South Africa naturally brings one to the thorny issue of the actual role of the international community in this process. Although the international community is quite uniform in its demand for an end to apartheid, it is difficult to discover exactly what is to replace apartheid, apart from an apparent broad consensus that it should be a non-racial democracy. As far as an alternative political dispensation for South Africa is concerned, different states have different ideas (Geldenhuys, 1985:79-82). There no longer seems to be consensus on the extent and implications of sanctions. Various states are changing their sanctions policies towards South Africa in what seems to be an almost arbitrary way, indicating the lack of clearly defined long *term* objectives as to how a South Africa without apartheid should be constituted. It might be argued that the international community has no right to enforce a blueprint for a new South Africa, but assistance in the building of such a South Africa in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter does imply a set of goals to be formulated. In this regard it might be useful to examine a number of goals, modes, existing avenues, areas and criteria for involvement.

As far as the goals of the international community are concerned, possible objectives can be identified by formulating three questions under the heading: *What does the international community require?*

— Does it want a policy change, i.e. the elimination of apartheid? It seems that this goal will be realised in the course of 1991 with regard to apartheid as a policy adhered to by the National Party government. As was discussed in section II, the ending of apartheid does not necessarily mean an end to discrimination and therefore not an end to foreign involvement for moral-ethical reasons.

— Does it want a regime change in South Africa? This would imply not only a post-apartheid South Africa, but a new South Africa and involvement in the sense that mediation to resolve the conflict between different regime contenders might be called for. Whichever regime model is eventually negotiated and implemented, it would gain added legitimacy if supported by the international community. Du Toit (1990:63-101) discusses the two basic contending regime models which are identified as Technocratic Liberation (favoured by the incumbents)

and People's Power (primarily favoured by the ANC). If both contenders perceive the implementation of their favoured model as a zero-sum situation, the institution of a new regime model will be reduced to a struggle for hegemonic control over South Africa. The crux of the contention between these models can be found in opposing definitions of democracy and nationhood and different public policy priorities. These can be summed up (admittedly in a superficial way) by defining the Technocratic Liberation regime model as one which conceives of democracy as a system of power-sharing between different groups in a multiracial nation in which the priorities are political stability and economic growth. The People's Power model favours full political participation in a unitary non-racial state which caters for socio-economic equity largely arrived at through a policy of redistribution of wealth by means of state intervention in the economy.

— Does it want a South Africa and Southern Africa fully integrated into the international system? Achieving the demise of apartheid might fully integrate South Africa into the international political and diplomatic community with the added benefit of the restoration of sporting and other socio-cultural relations. Without full re-integration into the economic system however, South and Southern Africa might be relegated to increasing marginalisation and poverty, resulting in economic chaos and political and social instability from which the region might never recover. Any form of close cooperation between Southern African states would have to deal with rehabilitation of the region before real development can take place.

In order to protect its existing and potential interests in South Africa and to ensure regional and global stability, the international community would need to be involved in securing a negotiated settlement in South Africa, be it on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Du Pisani (1988:325-326) identifies two modes of foreign involvement in conflict resolution: firstly, instrumental intervention which is limited in scope and has limited impact on the general outcome of the conflict, and secondly, process intervention which he defines as 'aiming to be inclusive of all the major political and social formations in society.' Following the distinction between a post-apartheid and a new South Africa and that the latter should be conceived of as an ongoing process, it would seem that process intervention, especially in the area of the socio-economic challenges facing South Africa, would be the most valuable contribution the international community could make. Such involvement furthermore entails not only conflict resolution in the sense of mediation, but actual financial assistance to ensure long-term development and prosperity; in short: paying for a new South Africa.

The avenues through which process involvement in the building of a new

South Africa might be channelled already exist and were hitherto applied mainly for punitive measures. Geldenhuys (1988:21-38) identifies four approaches by means of which the international community deals with South Africa, namely penetration, intervention, isolation and mediation, while admitting to the difficulty of drawing distinct boundaries between these processes. These approaches do, however, indicate ways in which South Africa might be assisted in achieving socio-economic solutions to its problems, although utilising these avenues might create tension between the South African community and the international community (see below). Only the *first* three of these approaches are of direct interest to the current discussion, as mediation usually refers to attempts to settle political disputes peacefully.

South Africa is extensively penetrated by the outside world, not least insofar as socio-economic and the less tangible forms of ideas and philosophies are concerned. The existence of such comprehensive penetration in fact created the possibilities for intervention, isolation and mediation which have been used extensively by the international community to exercise influence in South Africa. These areas of existing penetration could be utilised towards constructive involvement in promoting the transfer of technology and knowledge, in education and training, in channelling funds for development and investment, and in exposing people to new ideas and values, geared to the demands of a new South Africa.

Whereas penetration has a largely neutral connotation and implies the possibility of different modes of involvement, intervention usually refers to various degrees of coercion with regard to the target's internal structures and external behaviour. Intervention in the case of South Africa also encompasses non-authority structures and groups outside government. Should a negotiated settlement be reached in South Africa, intervention by foreign actors might be necessary in order to ensure compliance with these terms. There are groupings both to the left and the right of the present main contenders for political power who might be inclined to disregard the agreements reached and who could conceivably wreck prospects for peaceful and active socio-economic development and progress.

Isolation, on the other hand, seems an obvious misnomer as far as a discussion on a new South Africa is concerned. It is, however, relevant to the extent that a complete reversal of all forms of isolation of South Africa should be instigated, not only to end the detrimental effects of sanctions, but also to concentrate active involvement in those same areas in which especially economic sanctions have had such an adverse effect. The correct timing for the lifting of sanctions *seems* currently *to* be a problem. Most sanctions programmes laid down specific requirements which South Africa had to meet before these sanctions would be lifted. These requirements were

largely concerned with the ending of apartheid policies and related issues such as the lifting of the state of emergency, the release of political prisoners, and the unbanning of organisations. Provisions for the way in which these sanctions would be lifted and the possibility of replacing them, either with new demands, or incentives to proceed with the establishment of a new dispensation were, however, not fully considered. One almost gets the impression that the international community either did not believe in the effectiveness of their actions, or did not consider involvement beyond ridding South Africa of apartheid and the world of 'one of the bitterest, most persistent, and least soluble problems confronting it' (Bennett, 1984:117). reversal of sanctions with the concomitant goal of long-term involvement in the process of building 'a new South Africa would require clear policy definition and intention as prerequisites to participation in the field of problem-solving (cf. Holland, 1988:147-148).

As was stated in the introduction, this discussion is mainly concerned with a role for the international community in South Africa in the socio-economic field, although it is accepted that the socio-economic and political fields clearly are closely interrelated. Involvement in one often implies or leads to involvement in the other, as is clearly illustrated by the use of economic sanctions. The specific areas in which socio-economic involvement is required, have largely been covered by the discussion of the socio-economic issues in section I, indicating the scope of meeting the requirements of growth with redistribution, in other words, economic growth with social impact. Total government spending for the 1990/1991 fiscal year amounted to US$30 billion (28% of GDP), indicating the impossibility of meeting the expectations and needs of South Africa's population without massive foreign investment and aid.

Given the hardship and poverty with which South Africa's black population is faced it is little wonder that so much is expected of a political settlement and that violence has become so widespread and seemingly ingrained. It has been argued earlier in this discussion that the international community also has a role to play in building the new South Africa with regard to protecting their economic interests and securing peace and stability. The very real and high convergence between socio-economic needs and security is of increasing importance not only in South Africa, but in the Southern African region as well (cf. Du Pisani, 1990:16). South Africa, with its limited resources and the high demands on these within the country, is in no position to provide fully for regional development which would be largely concerned with the relationship between urbanisation and rural development.

Large-scale foreign involvement in restructuring South Africa and the region would, however, demand certain criteria according to which such a role would be exercised. On the one hand, involvement will to a large extent

be determined by the regime model accepted for a new South Africa. One can, for instance, expect that a form of People's Power regime implementing socialist policies which comprise a high degree of state intervention in the economy, might result in low investments by transnational corporations. Countless similar scenarios could be sketched, but the important point is that, whatever the scope and intensity of involvement by the international community, it should, as was the case in implementing sanctions, lay down carefully considered criteria for such involvement in the form of codes of conduct pertaining both to the actions of international actors and those of the South African government and non-authority structures and groups.

What is meant by *carefully considered criteria* might be best explained in two ways, the first of which is basically anecdotal, yet (uncomfortably) informative: Israel implemented extensive aid and development programmes in Africa during the 1950s and 1960s of which it was very proud (cf. Meir, 1975:265), yet was reprimanded by one African commentator in the following way: 'Do not allow your press to remind us too often of the benefits we receive as a result of your aid, because we know it, because this is not the custom in Black Africa, and because it is embarrassing' (quoted in Van Aardt, 1990:252). Codes of conduct should be devoid of any hint of paternalism (cf. Holland, 1988:86), not only because paternal attitudes are resented, but also because foreign involvement implies benefits to these actors as well. Secondly, codes of conduct should take cognisance of the social cost of involvement in South Africa. In this regard the World Bank Report on Social Dimensions of Adjustment in Africa (1990) might provide useful guidelines to ensure that policies are in accordance with local culture, customs and needs (cf. Mazrui, 1990:195-205). Investment and aid to promote economic growth, for instance, do not necessarily imply socio-economic development but might even re-inforce existing inequalities (cf. discussion in section I), not only in South Africa, but also in the region as a whole.[4]

CONCLUSION

One way of defining a role for the international community in the building of a new South Africa is to call for a revised and adapted version of the Marshall Aid Plan. Yet such a concept is merely a superficial catch-phrase if not thoroughly designed, taking full cognisance of the scope and intensity of the South African conflict and of the benefits which might accrue to those involved. South Africa itself would have to create an environment conducive *to* active foreign process involvement, but this need, paradoxically, can only be fulfilled if the country receives encouragement and assistance from the international community. Building a new South Africa might present a costly venture, but much is at stake, both

on a moral-ethical level and on a practical level with regard to international peace, stability and prosperity.

ENDNOTES

1. The author would like to thank Dr. Andre du Pisani, Director of Research at the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg for his invaluable suggestions and Professor Deon Geldenhuys from the Department of Policical Studies, Rand Afrikaans University, Johannesburg, for his comments. They are in no way responsible for the final product. This article was originally presented as a paper at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Vancouver, BC, 20-23 March 1991. While much has changed since then the basic premises of the article remain essentially intact.

2. It should be kept in mind, though, that when the Afrikaners, through the National Party, gained power, both in 1924 and as the Herenigde (re-united) National Party in 1948, they inherited a strong and healthy economy, capable of being manipulated into providing economic upliftment and the necessary degree of a redistribution of wealth. The South African economic outlook for the 1990s is vastly different, however, and so is the political situation. The Afrikaners were not disenfranchised, for instance, but already a parliamentary opposition. As far as South Africa's black community is concerned, the political framework for its participation is still to be debated and negotiated before it can be implemented, which suggests a more time-consuming process than that of fighting and winning an election within an existing political structure. In the light of the present troubled economic environment, the call for continued economic sanctions and the persistent violence, it is possible that very little might eventually be left in a new South Africa, except the existence of what Ghana's Nkrumah once called the political kingdom, a realm which is usually easily withered away by socio-economic hardship.

3. SADCC Executive Secretary, Dr Simba Makoni, referred to this problem in the following way: "When you begin to do things which tend to impinge on the welfare and interests of those that are assisting you, then you are beginning to approach the limit of the assistance line.... If you are asking for basic investment, so you can convert Zimbabwe's iron and steel into tractors and equipment in Zimbabwe, not in the north... that you will not get" (interviewed in *Africa South*, March/April 1991, p 13).

4. On the other hand, the implementation of SD (Structural Dimensions of Adjustment) projects which concentrates on reducing poverty while maintaining macroeconomic discipline and restoring the conditions for growth, implies the lifting of sanctions. South Africa has to be accepted by the international community — relations with the IMF should be normalised and the country should become a member of the African Development Bank, for instance, in order to get assistance in the process of structural reform.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aitchison, J, 1989, "The Civil War in Natal' in Moss, G and I Obery (eds), *South African Review* 5, Johannesburg: RavanPress.
Apartheid South Africa: Colonialism of a Special Type, date of publication unknown, ANC publication.
Barber, J and j Barratt, 1990, *South Africa's Foreign Policy — The Search for Status and Security 1945-1988,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bennett, leR, 1984, *International Organizations,* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Bennett, M, 1989, "Recent Trends in Industrial Action' in Moss, G and I Obery (eds), *South African Review 5,* Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
Bethlehem, R'W, 1988, *Economics in a Revolutionary Society: Sanctions and the Transformation of South Africa,* Johannesburg: Ad. Donker.

'Breakout: Interview with Minister Kent Durr' in *Leadership,* October 1990.

Campbell, H, 1988, 'Beyond Sanctions and Destabilization — Towards Popular Mobilization' in International Peace Academy, *Southern Africa in Crisis: Regional and International Responses,* Dordrecht: Martin us Nijhoff.

Christie, P and C Collins, *1984,* 'Bantu Education: Apartheid Ideology and Labour Reproduction' in Kallaway, P, *Apartheid and Education,* Braamfontein: Ravan Press.

Christie, P, 1987, *The Right to Learn,* Braamfontein: Ravan Press.

Du Pisani, A, 1988, *Critical Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Techniques: From Problem-Solving Workshops to Theory,* Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Cape Town: University of Cape Town.

Du Pisani, A, 1990, 'Post-Apartheid South Africa and the Region in the 1990s', Paper presented to BIS Annual Conference, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 17-19 December 1990.

Du Toit, P, 1990, 'The Contest for the Middle Ground' in Du Toit, P and W Esterhuyse (eds), *The Myth Makers — The elusive bargain for South Africa's Future,* Halfway House: Southern.

Geldenhuys, D, 1985, *Internasionale Isolasie: Suid-Afrika in vergelykende perspekiief,* Johannesburg: RAU.

Geldenhuys, D, 1988, 'The international community and South Africa: Penetration, Intervention and Isolation', *International Affairs Bulletin* 12(1).

Geldenhuys, D, 1990, *Isolated States — Comparative Analysis,* Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.

Giliomee, H and H Adam, 1981, *Afrikanermag Opkoms en Toekoms,* Stellenbosch: Universiteitsuitgewers.

Gilpin, R, 1987, *The Political Economy of International Relations,* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Holland, M, 1988, *The European Community and South Africa — European Political Co-operation Under Strain,* London: Pinter Publishers.

Hopkins, TK and I Wallerstein and Associates, 1982, *World Systems Analysis,* Beverly Hills: Sage Publishers.

Innes, D and S Gelb, 1987, 'Towards a democratic economy in South Africa', *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 9(2).

Jaster, RS, 1988, *The Defence of White Power— South African Foreign Policy under Pressure,* London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.

Jonah, JOC, 1988, 'Limits and Possibilities of Third Parties: The Role of Multilateral Organizations' in International Peace Academy, *Southern Africa in Crisis: Regional and International Responses,* Dordrecht: Martin us Nijhof Tf.

Lauren, PG, 1988, *Power and Prejudice — The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination,* Boulder: Westview Press.

Legum, C, 1988, *The Battlefronts of Southern Africa,* New York: Africana Publishing Co.

Mandelas, Boesak, Tutu, 1987, 'Vision of the future: an anthology of writings and speeches', *Third World Quarterly,* Vol.9(2).

Mayi'6wye, Joumal of the African National Congress, Vol.2(3), April 1991.

Mazrui, AA, 1990, *Cultural Forces in World Politics,* London: James Currey.

Meir, G, 1975, *My Life,* London: Futura Publications Limited.

Palmer, M, 1989, *Problems of Political Development,* Ithaca: F E Peacock.

South African Institute of Race Relations, 1988, *Race Relations Annual Survey,* Braamfontein: SAIRR.

SACOB, 1990, *Economic Options for South Africa — South African Chamber of Business View,* Johannesburg: SACOB.

Schoeman, E (compiler), 1988, *South African Sanctions Directory 1946-1988,* Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs.

Schmitter, PC, 1988, 'The Consolidation of Political Democracy in Southern Europe', Unpublished Paper.

Spero, JE, 1985, *The Politics of International Economic Relations,* New York: St Martin's Press.

Stadler, A, 1987, *The Political Economy of modem South Africa,* Cape Town: David Philip.

The Star, 8 April 1991, .13.

Van Aardt, M, 1990, *Ideological identification as explanation for relations betweeen South Africa and Israel* (Afrikaans), unpublished Master's thesis, Johannesburg: Rand Afrikaans University.

Van Nieuwkerk, A, 1990, 'Outsiders' Efforts' in Du Toil, P and W Esterhuyse (eds), *The Myth Makers — The elusive bargain for South Africa's future,* Halfway House: Southern.

Van Wyk, K and M von Below, 1988, 'The Debate on South Africa's Strategic Minerals Revisited', *Comparative Strategy,* Vol.7, pp. 159-182.

Wilson, F and M Ramphele, 1989, *Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge,* Cape Town: David Philip.

World Bank, 1989, *Sub-Sahara Africa — From Crisis to Sustainable Growth,* Washington: World Bank.

World Bank, 1990, *Social Dimensions of Adjustment in Africa,* Washington: World Bank.

CONFERENCE REVIEW

RECONCILIATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: REGIONAL
CONSULTATION ON WAYS FORWARD

This short article summarises the various expressed views and positions taken at the 'Reconciliation in Southern Africa' Conference held in Harare on 28 — 31 October 1991, with some editorial input by our contributor.

The debate on reconciliation is very much alive and of growing relevance in Southern Africa. This was the conclusion drawn by the conference on 'Reconciliation in Southern Africa' held in Harare, 28-31 October 1991, organised by the Zimbabwe Institute on Southern Africa and the African-European Institute. The conference brought together an interesting combination of politicians, church leaders, government and international agency representatives, and other participants from the academic and NGO communities, for an exchange of perspectives on regional peace and stability.

This is a time of vibrant political change in large parts of Southern Africa: negotiations in South Africa; peace in Angola; Mozambican peace talks; Namibia just two years old; a new regime in Zambia. From one side of the region to the other, there is a call for reconciling with the painful past as part of the formula for building a more solid future. Reconciliation is needed to prevent social unrest, and it is a prerequisite to any environment conducive to investment, development and indeed survival.

The conference examined the effectiveness of various policy instruments of national reconciliation in relation to justice, redistribution and nation-building. Although originally a theological and not a political concept, reconciliation in Southern Africa is accepted as an issue directly relevant to economic development processes in, for example, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Namibia. It can also be related to various bilateral and multi-lateral applications: between South Africa and the victims of destabilisation in the ten-member Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) region, for example; between independent states and the former colonial powers; and reconciliation in the more general North-South context.

Defining Reconciliation

There was general agreement on the need for reconciliation in Southern Africa. Racism and apartheid have been and remain at the centre of the

region's problems. South Africa's racial policies institutionalised white privilege and black deprivation: to the extent that much grassroots resentment has been generated by calls for reconciliation from voices never raised in solidarity with the victims of apartheid. The South African government also used its military advantage against the region in the 1980s in an undeclared and often covert war, which is still being hardest felt in Angola and Mozambique. Namibia more recently and Zimbabwe for a dozen years have been trying to balance the popular cry for restoration and redistribution with the economic imperative of production and growth.

Senior Minister Mutasa opened the conference by stating that the challenge of reconciliation on a national, regional and international level is also relevant to many other regions of the globe, and that Southern Africa was playing its part in the debate. In April 1980, on the eve of Zimbabwe's independence, President Robert Mugabe set the tone by declaring: 'If yesterday we fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself...The wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten'. This philosophy helped to create a context within which the wounds of the liberation struggle could heal, but which in itself was insufficient to address economic disparities and social injustices.

Reconciliation is not the same as justice. To some extent the two appear contradictory when reconciliation calls for forgiveness and justice calls for punishment and restitution. To some, justice is a partial prerequisite to reconciliation, especially for those who fear reconciliation is incompatible with gross social inequalities created by apartheid laws and practices. Minister Mutasa stated that many Zimbabweans incorrectly see reconciliation as an instrument to prevent justice, because it appears to favour the status quo rather than the redistribution of land and income. In Namibia reconciliation is working at a political level, butjias been called 'one-sided' at the socio-economic level because of what Prime Minister Geingob terms the 'convenient misunderstanding' by those who are privileged. The danger in selectively defining reconciliation is that the obligations or responsibilities of all sides may not be fully agreed upon, resulting in a reinforcement of the status quo.

Linda Zama, from the National Association of Democratic Lawyers (NADEL) in South Africa, listed many components of a comprehensive definition: reconciliation entails first a serious division or conflict; awareness of that condition by all parties involved; and ideally, a full owning up by the oppressor, appreciation of the deep hurt caused and a sincere intention to change from old ways. This aligns with the theological call for repentance, confession and forgiveness. What is not acceptable in terms of reconciliation is when the oppressor shows no remorse, offers no apology, makes no full disclosure, appears to count on very little material change, and yet insists

that reconciliation is something the oppressed should do or agree to.

Reconciliation is the prerogative *of the* victim, according to Dr. John Lamola of the South African Council of Churches (SACC): 'It is the victim who determines and decides whether to forgive or not. Genuine reconciliation is a process which empowers the victim'. Reconciliation in South Africa is therefore indivisible from success in addressing political power imbalances and black economic marginalisation.

Basic components of reconciliation policy in a specific national context can entail, for example, redistribution of land, income and opportunity. Without visible change in economic terms, success in political reconciliation can become doubtful. Nonetheless, political cooperation can strengthen national unity and contribute to the climate for reconciliation, especially when the active participation of the maximum possible population is achieved. An important element of reconciliation is that both (or the major) sides in a conflict accept the terms of its resolution. More directly, some material improvement on the ground is essential to easing the frustration, anger and fear at the heart of social divisions.

Critical Policy Questions

Southern Africa will need to identify innovative policy responses to a number of critical issue areas. Three themes covered during the conference on reconciliation were economic redistribution (e.g. land reform), national unity and international mediation and interaction. The land question in Zimbabwe offers a good example of how expectations can be frustrated. Land reform efforts since independence simply haven't worked, according to Dr. Sam Moyo of the Zimbabwe Institute for Development Studies, as a result of both Lancaster House constraints and market-based approaches. The government announced a radical new land policy in 1990, amending the constitution to remove the willing seller-willing buyer clause, and a new land acquisition act was being prepared. This may ease land pressure in rural areas and hopefully address the critical urban housing backlog. Other regional states with similar problems are watching to learn from the Zimbabwe experience.

Angola and Mozambique must cope with the extraordinary challenge of forging national unity in the wake of devastating externally-sponsored insurrection and war. The economic cost of destruction has been high in both countries, contributing to the vast human suffering. Church groups represented at the conference from both countries described the present needs and their programmes to prepare the people psychologically for peace. Without reconciliation and disarmament, the most intricate of peace accords could become meaningless. Popular participation in new multi-party political processes will be maximised if people are also made aware of their new constitutional rights and responsibilities. Such participation is a

key to democratisation.

The last theme of the conference, the role of the international community, pointed the way for new forms of interaction and support. The examples of UN-supervised elections in Namibia, UN-monitored peace accord and elections in Angola, and Commonwealth elections training in Mozambique, as well as other international peace-keeping efforts, serve as reference points for possible international involvement in South Africa. It is no surprise that nearly all eyes in the region seem to be cast on events in South Africa. When an internationally-accepted government is voted in, South Africa will become an official partner in planning the development future of the region, rather than its nemesis.

International involvement in national reconciliation should show a sensitivity to the history of past relations between countries and regions. For example, the South African government was responsible for a devastating campaign of war, terrorism and destabilisation in die SADCC region during the 1980s, of which the scars and destruction are still all too evident today. Jan Nico Scholten, President of AWEPA (European Parliamentarians for Africa) predicted that Mozambique's resettlement programme will emerge 'as one of the most monumental challenges this region has ever faced'. According to him, the international community has a clear responsibility to provide resources to rebuild Mozambican life and to help make reconciliation possible.

Must South African whites pay a price for reconciliation, and if so, what? Where does one draw the line? Should a democratic South Africa make reparations to the SADCC region? Should Germany make reparations for the policy that robbed countless Namibians of their lands and livelihoods, before South Africa began its apartheid policies there? Should the Portuguese or the British make reparations for the colonial past? And what about the trade and investment sustenance of South Africa, the sanctions-busting, the friendly relations with apartheid which most of the industrialised world maintained? For many questions a consensus answer is impossible.

The issue doesn't seem, to revolve around compensation for the past as much as participation for the future. Setting things right in Southern Africa, addressing in a true sense the long-term legacy of apartheid and destabilisation, will require a concerted national, regional and global effort. Former combatants in Angola and Mozambique must be peacefully reintegrated in local communities. Extremist and violent forces in South Africa will need to accept a new dispensation. The Southern African economic pie will need to grow as well as be sliced differently. May the dialogue toward these ends continue.

Dr. Jeffrey Balch
Programme Officer
African-European Institute
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Publications of The South African Institute of International Affairs

Occasional Papers/Geleentheidspublifcasies
Issued on an irregular basis, and containing the text of addresses at Institute meetings or original articles. Price per copy: R8,25.
Latest titles are:
G. Evans: *Continuity and Change in South Africa's Present and Future Foreign Policy*
S. Chan: *Prospects for the 1991 Elections in Zambia*
A. Reeve: *First Impressions of a changing South Africa.*
H. Schaefer: *On the Way to a new South Africa.*

International Affairs Bulletin
Three issues per year and supplied free of charge to members. 1992 subscription rate R27.50 per annum South Africa; R35 overseas (surface mail). R60 overseas (airmail). Price per copy R9.35

Jan Smuts Memorial Lecture Series
Margaret Thatcher: A *Time for Greatness.* R8.25

Bibliographical Series/Bibliograflesereeks
No. 21. *Reflecting Apartheid: South African Short Stories in English with Socio-Political Themes 1960-1987.* Compiled by Catherine E. Dubbeld R66.
No. 22. *Zimbabwe's First Decade of Independence 1980-1990. Select & Annotated Bibliography.* Compiled by ZeaE. Zimerman. R82.50.

Southern African Issues
André du Pisani: *Rumours of Rain — Namibia's Post-Independence Experience.* R27,50.

Special Studies
Change in Eastern/Central Europe - Some Implications for Southern Africa. Editors: A. Begg & A. du Pisani (The proceedings of the October 1990 Institute Conference). R27,50.
D. Geldenhuys: *The Politics of International Seclusion: A Study of Self-Isolated States.* 64pp. R27,50.
A. van Nieuwkerk & G van Staden (eds): *Southern Africa at the Crossroads —Prospectus for the Political Economy of the Region. 279pp. R38,S0.*

Prices do not include postage. Please enquire when ordering concerning latest postal charges.

VAT is applicable to all transactions within South Africa.