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SMUTS HOUSE NOTES

THE SINGLE ISSUE AGENDA OPENS A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

It has been argued that the world can manage only one or possibly two crises at a time. What this really means is that the dominant powers would prefer to concentrate their efforts rather than deal with regional hot spots in a scatter-shot fashion. Certainly during the Cold War era this had been the case. The closer the crisis was to Europe, the more pre-occupied the superpowers were with east-west concerns.

For that reason, among others, African issues tended to be relegated to the global backburner. Yet George Bush has announced the arrival of a 'new world order'. If we are talking about a redistribution of military and economic power, or the emergence of revitalized international institutions, things indeed have changed. But, in fact, the old criteria for getting on the international political agenda still prevail.

The media in the United States still tends to feature one crisis at a time. That, in turn, focuses the attentive public on that issue and the cumulative weight of popular opinion and political effort force politicians at least to pretend to be addressing that 'crucial' pressing issue. The narrowing span of attention among concerned citizens in the U.S. and, I, suspect, elsewhere has been noted. 'The USA Today syndrome' one might call it, after the success of that national daily newspaper, which features short, punchy news items. 'The USA Today' format is itself modelled after the show-bizz approach of television news, with plenty of 'headlines', graphics, photos and visuals. It doesn't make for sustained attention and deep analysis. Unfortunately we are still inclined toward essentially a single issue format for the international political agenda. Other items may appear from time to time, but they find it difficult to get full coverage and full attention from the governments that are called upon to address these issues.

So it is with the present impasse in South Africa. South Africa's time at the top of the global agenda has come and passed. In the late 1980s, before the February 1990 release of Nelson Mandela, outsiders were keen to follow South African affairs and were willing to take steps to help resolve differences.

Today, however, Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union occupy that commanding position. When these issues subside, the conflict between Israel and its Middle Eastern neighbours as well as other Middle East issues are quick to fill in those quiet spells. The 'new world order' is hardly orderly these days, and South Africans will be hard pressed to convince the global power brokers that their problems are earth shaking.

It is with some surprise that both the ANC and the South African government allowed the CODESA talks to reach a blockage. Some commentators even maintained that given the stakes in the negotiations, CODESA's failure was inevitable. 'Inevitability' is a powerful word in political analysis — not to be used lightly. Yet, many columnists were drawn to it, as though the mass action confrontation was unavoidable given the conflicting interests of those two parties.

One reason for the stalemate, it has been suggested, is that both the ANC and the National Party government were convinced that by standing firm on their negotiating positions, they would be able to enlist the international community (*what ever that truly means*) in support of their stance. In other words, each wanted to widen the arena of negotiation in order to strengthen its bargaining situation. One of them must be wrong.

What we find, however, is that despite the prompt addition of the South African impasse to the agenda of the United Nations Security Council, the world community is still not prepared to move South Africa to the front of the crisis queue. It is as if the Security Council sought to fob off the question by setting up yet another fact-finding mission, a delay tactic of sorts, in the hope that South Africans would find a way of addressing the vital contentious issues themselves. On the current question, the world community seems determined not to take sides.

On balance, it looks as if the South African government got the better of the deal, although there is enough in Cyrus Vance's visit to South Africa to enable the ANC to say that they too are pleased with the outcome of the Security Council's meeting. The choice of Cyrus Vance as an intermediary is a positive one. He is a man of patience, tact and firmness. But the success of his mission depends on how Pretoria responds to his recommendations.

So, does the world have time for more than one or two crises at a time? Yes and no. In the first place, it is not altogether clear that South Africa's *current stalemate* is an *international issue*, as opposed to a domestic issue that could escalate and thereby become a genuine threat to regional peace. No question that South Africans are dying daily for their political beliefs and associations. No question, as well, that the United Nations can interpret liberally Chapters V-VII of its Charter regarding threats to the peace and particularly with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 33). But in this case, although they have technically taken up the issue, one senses that their hearts as opposed to their mouths are not in it.

In a fashion, the world's lack of intense interest in the current South African impasse, in fact, presents South African politicians with an opportunity that may be a blessing in disguise. They can be grateful that other governments would prefer not to get too deeply involved. After all, their involvement would reflect their perceptions of their own interests and

these may or they may not coincide with those of the various South African parties to the dispute. A window of opportunity has been left ajar. Will statesmanlike South Africans emerge to push it wider?

It would be far better if the outside world were prepared to act in a supportive capacity, rather than as actors prepared to shape (some would say dictate) a resolution to South Africa's problems. But since support so often is taken to mean financial assistance, it would appear that South Africa, indeed all of Africa, is the black sheep in the new world order. In so far as financial aid and investment is concerned, the heavy hitters would seek first to address central Europe's malaise. That is little solace for those convinced that South Africa needs to generate far more vigorous economic activity. But if that is the way the rest of the western world feels, it would be wise to work to assure that they are unable to impose their preconceived political formulae upon this country.

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The International Community in South Africa's Transition to non-racial Democracy*

For many long-time observers of South Africa the events of the last two years have been as dramatic and surprising as the simultaneous collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc. Before President F.W. de Klerk's February 1990 speech, few foresaw the imminent collapse of social apartheid and the commencement of negotiations toward a political settlement. The ensuing months have brought considerable progress as well as notable setbacks. Despite the recent collapse of the talks at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), they proved that a negotiated settlement is now possible, though certainly not inevitable. Serious political issues still separate the parties at CODESA, but as the politicians negotiate — both in and out of CODESA — thousands of South Africans are dying in politically-related violence, more than 1400 have perished in the last six months alone.

As South Africa advances toward its historic transition from apartheid to non-racial democracy it seems logical to expect it to draw heavily on the vast resources and expertise of the international community (*henceforth IC*) to better ensure its success. For the purpose of this article the transition period is demarcated at its beginning by the opening of CODESA in December 1991 and will close with the formation of the first South African government based on a non-racial constitution.

It is a propitious time for South Africa to seek the assistance of the IC. The end of the Cold War has dissolved the deadlock which previously prevented international involvement in the peaceful resolution of many international, regional and domestic conflicts. The results are unprecedented. The last few years have brought internationally-assisted settlements in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Namibia and Nicaragua. Even more pertinent to this study, the United Nations (UN) has provided a record number of election monitoring groups and peace-keeping forces. In the first six months of 1992 the number of UN peacekeepers has increased more than four times, to a

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total of 50,000.¹ Since 1948 the UN has conducted only 24 peacekeeping operations, eleven of these are still active today. New missions are being discussed for the Azeri-Armenian conflict and the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Why then is the role of the IC so controversial for the parties at CODESA?

The paradox which for more than four decades typified South Africa's relations with the IC provides a partial explanation. On one hand, because of apartheid the IC has enforced a wide-array of military, economic and cultural sanctions against South Africa, resulting in unparalleled involuntary isolation. For decades, South Africa regularly maintained diplomatic relations with only a handful of states and even among them it was a pariah. On the other hand, rarely, if ever, has the IC been so united and persistent in an effort to alter a state's domestic order. Although apartheid first received notable inter national attention shortly after its official birth in 1948, the sanctions movement failed to gain wide-spread support until much later. Between March 1960 and April 1988 the UN Security Council passed 30 resolutions condemning or sanctioning South Africa.² In total, hundreds of sanctions have been enacted by international organizations, nations and even local governments.

One negative legacy of South Africa's prolonged international isolation is that the very organizations most capable of playing a constructive role in South Africa's transition (the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity and the British Commonwealth) are distrusted by at least one major party at CODESA. Unfortunately, the problem is not limited to the South African Government's well-publicized mistrust of its past critics. Even amongst black organizations, there is a considerable divergence of opinion as to the roles the IC should play in South Africa's transition and which organizations should play these roles.

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this article is to determine which roles, if any, the IC can play in South Africa's transition to a non-racial democracy. The authors began the study with their own assumptions of the most likely roles for the IC. These were placed into five categories: (1) the repatriation of refugees; (2) peacekeeping; (3) election support and monitoring; (4) the application of sanctions and incentives; and (5) mediation and arbitration. Because the repatriation of refugees has already been turned over to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) the study focuses primarily on the feasibility of the latter four roles. Feasibility was analyzed on two levels. First, it was necessary to assess the IC's willingness and ability to play each role. This was done largely through a review of the secondary literature of cases in which the IC played similar roles in the resolution of other conflicts or other political transitions. In the belief that the end of the Cold War has

changed markedly the international environment, a major determinant of the feasibility of various IC roles, special attention was given to cases originating after 1988.

Secondly, it was necessary to give considerable attention to the specific features of the South African context. What roles do South Africans want the IC to play? To determine this, we began by focusing on the policies of the 19 political parties, organizations and governments at CODESA. Representative, or not, if CODESA succeeds it will shape both South Africa's future and determine the dynamics of the transition period. Two methods were used to determine organisational perspectives. The usual review of party sources and press statements was conducted. To this end, a number of parties and governments provided copies of their submissions to CODESA. In addition, an open-ended questionnaire (see Appendix 1) was sent to the delegates and advisors on Working Group 1 of CODESA, that CODESA asked this group 'To investigate, consider and report upon all proposals and make recommendations with regard to the role that the international community and/or organizations could be asked to play in the formal or informal processes involved in the period leading up to the introduction of a new constitution for South Africa'.³ The target was to conduct an interview with at least one representative from each of the 19 delegations. Although this was not possible, interviews were conducted with representatives from a majority of the delegations, including all of the more influential ones (see Appendix 2). In addition, based on the same questionnaire interviews were conducted with important individuals and parties not represented at CODESA. Respondents were asked to assess from their party's perspective the desirability of each potential role for the IC. It can be said in advance that the views of the parties frequently divide between two major alliances. The first, a South African Government-led alliance, includes the National Party, the governments of Bophuthatswana and the Ciskei, the Ximoko Progressive Party (Gazankulu), the Diwankwetla Party (QwaQwa), Solidarity and the National People's Party. This is opposed by the African National Congress (ANC)-led Patriotic Front alliance including: the South African Communist Party (SACP), the Natal Indian Congress, the Transvaal Indian Congress, the Transkei and Venda Governments, the Intando Yesizwe Party (KwaNdebele), the Inyanda National Movement (KaNgwane), the Labour Party, and the United People's Front (Lebowa).⁴ Other parties interviewed — such as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the Pan-African Congress (PAC) and the Democratic Party (DP) — often functioned independently of either alliance.

PEACEKEEPING

Undoubtedly, the most controversial role for the IC in South Africa's transition is that of peacekeeping. The term itself is often misconstrued to

mean only the provision of blue-helmeted UN forces to separate two sides in an international conflict. While such an event is certainly a peacekeeping operation, the term itself is much broader. The International Peace Academy defines it as:

...the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.⁵

Peacekeeping may entail a wide variety of operations conducted by international police, civilians, or soldiers and is not limited to UN personnel.

Based on the comments of delegates to Working Group 1, five alternative, but overlapping, peacekeeping missions are discussed herein. The five missions, listed in approximate order of the level of IC involvement, are designed to minimize the level of political violence during the transition period.

- (1) An international peacekeeping force — including soldiers, police and civilian administrators could be deployed in the areas of greatest conflict to physically separate the combatants. For example, peacekeeping soldiers could be used to separate IFP and ANC villages in Natal while international police could be placed in the troubled townships throughout the Transvaal. International experts could also help administer existing forces, such as the South African Defence Force (SADF), the South African Police (SAP), and other security forces. The IC's responsibilities could also include judicial and investigative tasks related to controlling political violence.
- (2) A variation is to create a domestic peacekeeping force under international control. Along these lines Bishop Stanley Mogoba (the Vice Chairman of the National Peace Committee) proposes, the construction of a peacekeeping force drawn relatively equally from the SADF, the ANC's armed-wing (Umkhonto We Sizwe), the IFP, the PAC, and any other force capable of contributing a sizable number of troops. This force would then be trained by UN or other international experts, and would serve directly under a designated international committee or representative. After the transition, this force could be turned over to the new government as the core of a new national non-partisan police force.
- (3) In another scheme, the security forces are left intact, but control over them is transferred to an international committee or representative. The IC could then provide the necessary expertise and training to transform the security forces into effective, non-partisan peacekeeping forces. The

IC's control of the security forces would also ensure their non-partisanship during the elections for a constituent assembly.

- (4) Another possibility is to allow the government in power to administer the security forces on a day-to-day basis, but invite the IC to monitor them. Representatives of the IC could sit on their governing and policy-making bodies. With complete access to all necessary information they would report any human rights violations, participation in the violence or evidence of political violence to the government, the National Peace Committee (NPC) and/or the IC. According to the decisions reached by Working Group 1, in the initial phase of the transition the National Party Government would still control both the SADF and SAP but would be subject to oversight of the so-called Transitional Executive Council (TEC) and the appropriate sub-councils.⁶ During this period, the IC representatives would report their findings to the TEC appropriate sub-councils, the National Party Government and/or the NPC. After elections for a Constitutional Assembly are held, a new interim government will be formed and the IC monitors could then report directly to it and the NPC.
- (5) Representatives from the IC could be invited to observe the violence and make public, but unofficial, reports and recommendations. With this alternative, the interim government in place could avail itself of IC advice and recommendations, but would be under no obligation to act on them.

Before examining the feasibility of these alternatives, it is instructive to analyze the tentative agreement reached by Working Group 1. As with alternative 5, they:

.. welcomed the initiative of the international community concerning the developments in South Africa. In this regard they considered it helpful that members of the international community acquaint themselves with the circumstances surrounding the violence in our country through fact finding missions with a view to making independent, objective assessments of the facts and realities surrounding the violence.⁷

It was further agreed that CODESA itself would invite an international fact-finding mission. The National Party Government previously accepted independent fact-finding missions, from the OAU and the International Commission of Jurists and will accept others as long as they do not entail 'any form of foreign control over our security forces.'⁸

On the violence problem, Working Group 1 called for a resuscitation of the National Peace Accords, signed on September 14, 1991. The central features of the National Peace Accords are a commitment from all major parties to help end the violence through the creation of regional and local dispute resolution commissions. Unfortunately, these commissions are presently either ineffective, or more commonly, inactive. Working Group 1

assigned the IC two minor roles in this process. First, it recommended that 'The assistance of professional dispute resolution agencies be used in training and development of ... local/regional monitoring commissions.' Secondly, it called on the IC 'to provide financial and other assistance to facilitate the successful implementation of the National Peace Accords.'⁹

1. AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE

The debate over an international peacekeeping force for South Africa clusters around three issues: whether such a force would violate South Africa's sovereignty, the ability and willingness of the IC to provide such a force; and the particular type of civil violence prevalent in South Africa. The sovereignty issue is raised by the IFP, the National Party, the South African Government and its allies. The core of the argument is that South Africa, despite its past status as a pariah state, is autonomous and completely sovereign. Accepting an international peacekeeping force would entail an unacceptable violation of this sovereignty.¹⁰ For the Government this debate appears to be part of the much larger issue of its own legitimacy and that of the National Party.

Noting the growing IC involvement in Eastern Europe, Cambodia and in unpopular regimes throughout Africa, the ANC alliance rejects this argument.¹¹ From their perspective, by invalidating the 1984 South African constitution, the IC has already ruled against the legitimacy of the South African Government. Its domestic affairs are already a regular target of international actions.

Instances of IC peacekeeping missions in essentially domestic conflicts are rare, but they do exist. UN forces in Cyprus have been used to separate Turkish and Greek Cypriots since 1964. In 1983, in the wake of Israel's withdrawal from Beirut, the United States, France and Italy sent peacekeeping forces into the midst of the Lebanese Civil War. Currently, an OAU force in Liberia and a UN force in Cambodia, are both attempting to resolve domestic disputes. The Cambodian case is most remarkable in that national sovereignty was enshrined in an interim unity government, the Supreme National Council, but at the signing of the comprehensive agreement on Cambodia the Council delegated '... to the UN all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of the comprehensive agreement, including those relating to the conduct of free and fair elections and the relevant aspects of the administration.'¹² The UN will effectively serve as Cambodia's government.

During the Cold War, there was little doubt as to the IC's ability to provide peacekeeping forces. There were relatively few missions. The cost of these was significant, but manageable. The crux of the problem was the lack of a consensus in the UN Security Council for any given peacekeeping

mission.¹³ Today, however, the situation is reversed. There is wide-spread consensus on the need for peacekeeping operations, both within and outside of the Security Council. The resulting eleven active UN peacekeeping missions are placing strains on the IC's capacity and willingness to undertake new missions.

By 1989 almost one half of the UN's budget was going to peacekeeping efforts.¹⁴ More ominously, the annual costs of the Yugoslav and Cambodian missions will push yearly costs to more than \$3 billion.¹⁵ Compounding the problem is the nearly \$2 billion now owed to the UN, which will increase by another \$857 million with the missions in Yugoslavia, Cambodia and the Western Sahara.¹⁶

A final fiscal problem is that peacekeeping operations are not part of the regular UN budget. They require either a special authorization from the Assembly, or must depend on voluntary contributions. Still, as recently as 1988, a specialist could reassure that finances never stopped a UN operation.¹⁷ However, funding is playing an increasing role in peacekeeping decisions. In 1988, against the wishes of many of the signatories of the Namibian Accords, the Security Council decreased the size of the Namibian mission to lower costs.¹⁸ Allegedly, financial considerations were a major cause of the United States' rejection of a peacekeeping effort in Somalia.¹⁹ With regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, UN General Secretary Boutros Ghali warned, 'It would not be productive for the United Nations to undertake such an operation without the means to do so.'²⁰

Additional barriers to the emplacement of an international peacekeeping force result from the special nature of the South African violence. As explained by Dr. John Hall — the Chairman of the National Peace Accord — the violence in South Africa is of a varied nature. In the Natal midlands, much of the violence is between IFP and ANC supporters.²¹ Often entire Zulu villages are demarcated as IFP or ANC territory. In another major locus of violence, the townships of the eastern Transvaal, the situation is much more complex. Here the participants in any given conflict might include, among others, IFP-aligned hostel-dwellers, ANC supporters, PAC supporters, the security forces, renegade groups from various parties, youthful hooligans, or a locally-based mafia. Violence that begins as simple poverty-inspired crime may take on political dimensions. Local criminals and hooligans often exploit ongoing political feuds. Nor are the combatants clearly separated. A PAC supporter may live next door to an ANC leader and across the street from a Zulu hostel.

On a comparative basis, the situation in Natal is relatively amenable to peacekeeping. The area is largely rural and thus, IFP and ANC territories can be demarcated. The situation in the townships of the Transvaal presents more serious problems. It is not clear which parties the peacekeepers would

be separating, where the lines of demarcation would be, or where the peacekeeping forces should be located. Physically, an urban setting is also far more challenging for peacekeeping.

The most vital differences between and civil and international conflicts involve: (1) the number of organizations participating in the violence and; (2) the level of military discipline amongst the combatants. In a typical international conflict there are a limited number of participants, frequently only two, who can guarantee the compliance of their forces with any ceasefire they sign. Conversely in South Africa, and other civil disputes, there are too many parties involved in the violence to find cease-fire terms acceptable to all combatants. Relatively minor organizations, on either the left or the right, can sabotage a peacekeeping effort by targeting the peacekeepers. In most cases, international peacekeepers are unwilling to accept many casualties before the mission is abandoned. Finally, there is substantial evidence that neither the Government, the ANC, nor the IFP can completely control their forces.

Undoubtedly, peacekeeping in civil wars is far riskier and succeeds less often than in international ones. This is borne out by recent history. The 1983 multinational force in Lebanon was eventually withdrawn without accomplishing its tasks and after a considerable loss of lives. The Cambodian experiment, the single largest attempt at resolving a civil dispute in this manner, is in danger of collapsing. While the Cyprus force has limited further violence, after almost thirty years it has not led to a settlement. Given its high costs, its poor prospects for success, and the opposition of a number of South African parties, an international peacekeeping force for South Africa is not presently viable.

2. A DOMESTICALLY-DRAWN PEACEKEEPING FORCE

The call for a domestically-drawn peacekeeping force, articulately championed by Bishop Stanley Mogoba, resolves many of the problems posed by an international force. With this plan, a peacekeeping force would be drawn relatively equally from the armed wing of the ANC, the IFP, the SADF and any other groups capable of providing a sufficiently large number of troops. In this plan, the role of the IC would be twofold. First, it would retrain the troops provided into an unbiased, unified peacekeeping force. Secondly, throughout the transition period, international experts would command these forces.

An obvious advantage of this plan is its relative cost. An international force, comparable to the one planned for Cambodia, would cost minimally \$2 billion. Forces drawn domestically are already funded domestically and would only require additional funds for retraining. Funding could be provided from the national budget, or by proportional contributions from all organizations providing forces. A trust could then be set up under the

control of the National Peace Committee and administered by the international commander of the force. The IC could be called on to pay for the international experts, and/or a portion of the total costs, without straining its resources to the same extent as an international force.

A domestically-drawn peacekeeping force would also be less of an affront to South Africa's sovereignty. Although it would empower international experts to command South African forces, it would not place foreign troops on South African soil.

In South Africa, this plan draws diverse, but not universal, support. It holds some attraction for both ANC and IFP delegates.²² The logic behind this concurrence is simple. Both groups are currently locked out of any real police role, a situation that would be remedied by a unified domestic peacekeeping force.

The most serious objections to a domestically-drawn peacekeeping force are practical ones. A Government official claimed that the standard of training and discipline between the SADF and Umkhonto are so different that no one in the latter organization would be prepared to move into a command position in a unified force.²³ While this claim may exaggerate the difference, it does allude to the vast incompatibilities in language, ideological beliefs and training among the potential members of a domestic peacekeeping force. ANC and PAC forces are trained largely in guerrilla warfare, and thus acquire few of the skills needed for peacekeeping operations. A lack of proper training and discipline is already a problem for many of the security forces used as police. Removing the carefully schooled political bias of all potential peacekeepers is also a daunting task. Thus, while a domestically-drawn peacekeeping force may be comparatively cheaper, the costs are far greater than it would initially appear. More importantly, can it be created in time? These practical problems led most parties to reject a domestically-drawn force, despite their attraction to the idea itself.

3. INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF THE SAP AND SADF

One of the more interesting alternatives, using unbiased international commanders for the existing security forces, has received little attention in South Africa.²⁴ What is to be gained by simply changing the command structure of the security forces? The answer is trust. Recent months have brought a steady stream of revelations pertaining to the SAP and SADF role in the violence. While the Government has sought to portray the violence as a struggle between the ANC and its main black rivals, there is growing evidence of SAP and SADF participation in so-called black-on-black violence. Assessments of the level of the security forces' involvement vary dramatically. The Government has been forced to admit that individual SADF and SAP officers have participated in the violence, but views these as exceptional and isolated incidents. On the other extreme, the ANC holds

the security forces as directly responsible for a large portion of the violence, including the massacre of more than 40 people at Boipatong in June 1992. Irrespective of the accuracy of either assessment, there is evidence of SAP and SADF involvement in the violence and the wide-spread perception, particularly among blacks, is that the role of the security forces is far more extensive than recent investigations have revealed. This perception alone diminishes the security forces' ability to serve as peacekeepers. The question then becomes who can be trusted to reform the security forces, to weed out those who participate in the violence? Given the low level of trust among the South African parties, a logical choice would be experts drawn from the IC, especially the police experts at the UN.

This alternative is clearly more feasible than the previous two. From the perspective of the international community, the costs would be minimal. Retraining the existing security forces and purging them of rogue elements would be far cheaper than creating a new domestic or international force. From a domestic perspective, this alternative would also be far less disruptive. The participants at CODESA could continue negotiating a permanent merging of police and military forces, without concern for the day to day functioning of the SADF and SAP.

A major drawback of this alternative, is that it involves a meaningful abrogation of South African sovereignty. And, as an ANC member of Parliament pointed out, the Government 'is likely to reject any plan that even smells like a challenge to its sovereignty.'²⁵ In fact, such a step is without direct international precedent. In a number of transitions from colonial status to independence the UN and/or other international organizations have assumed responsibility for administration of the local security forces. Most recently, in Namibia a civilian police unit was brought in by the UN to assist the local security forces during the transition period. In countries that have already attained independence the closest precedents are neighboring Angola, which will bring in UN police observers to help administer the police, and Cambodia, which will allow UN supervision of its police. These examples suggest that while precedents are few, it is feasible to transfer temporarily some, or all, responsibility for local security forces to international organizations.

4. OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF THE SAP AND SADF

The most widely-discussed alternative is to bring in an international team to monitor the violence. As with the third alternative, representatives of the IC would be given complete access to all information and policy making forums for the SAP and SADF. They would investigate allegations of involvement in the violence by the security forces and monitor their behaviour for any signs of bias, especially during the preparations for

elections. However, if violations are discovered, the international team would have no control over the security forces and could not force the necessary reforms. Instead, they would report their findings to the acting government, the NPC and/or the IC. The acting government would then be obligated to take the necessary steps to punish those in the security forces responsible for the violations and undertake the reforms needed to prevent future violations.

This alternative differs from the present situation (the fifth alternative) in that the international monitors would be a formal part of the transition process and the interim government would be obliged legally to act on the monitors' findings. In the present situation the Government has no such obligation and may openly reject international findings.

From both the perspective of the IC and many South African parties, there is little doubt as to the feasibility of this alternative. The UN in particular has provided monitoring teams on numerous occasions. The expertise is readily available and the size and cost of a monitoring team would be much less than actual UN troops.

Support for formal IC monitoring of the violence inside South Africa is surprisingly wide-spread. Calls for such a force have come from business organizations, a church leaders' summit and respected academics, among others.²⁶ In April 1992 the National Peace Secretariat, and representatives drawn from nineteen political organizations, called for three steps to end the violence including 'an international mechanism to monitor the violence.'²⁷ Probably the first (since 1990), and most consistent, supporter for international monitoring is the PAC.²⁸ Among the delegations to CODESA, the strongest support came from the ANC and its allies.²⁹ After the escalation of the violence in the fall of 1992, ANC statements began to stress the creation of an international monitoring force as a matter of considerable urgency.³⁰ Calls also came from the IFP, the Ximoko Progressive Party, the Ciskeian Government, and the Democratic Party.³¹ After the Boipatong massacre, the ANC made the creation of such a force a *pre-condition* for a resumption of negotiations.

The only unequivocal opposition to an official international monitoring team comes from delegates from the National Party and the Government.³² Their main objection is the perceived violation of South African sovereignty. The critical question then is whether the Government will reevaluate its position. Even before the Boipatong massacre and the ANC's withdrawal from negotiations there was speculation that the Government would reconsider.³³ If the Government is reticent, but ultimately willing to accept international monitoring, one can speculate that it is waiting for further improvement in its international ties before granting the IC a formal role in the transition. It may even seek to gain access to World Bank and IMF loans and/or OAU membership in return for its willingness to accept

international monitoring. If the Government is willing, the ANC withdrawal may be enough to force this concession. Some signs of change can already be seen in President De Klerk's first press conference following the ANC withdrawal, in which two concessions were announced. First he suggested that Justice Richard Goldstone should commence an investigation of the Boipatong massacre and at his discretion Justice Goldstone could 'arrange for a suitably qualified person of international repute' to join his commission as an assessor. Moreover, the SAP also requested that the judge be asked 'to invite one or more experts of international standing to evaluate police investigations of the Boipatong tragedy.'³⁴ Although neither of these concessions entails monitoring of the violence on a continuing basis, they both include a formal role for IC representatives that is indicative of some flexibility in the Government's position. Finally, if Cyrus Vance — the UN special envoy for South Africa — recommends an official international monitoring force, the Government will be unable to reject one without the loss of considerable international credibility.

5. INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL FACT FINDING MISSIONS

The acceptance of international fact finding missions to come to South Africa and report their findings publicly is already accepted by the Government and its allies and there is no doubt as to its feasibility. As the number of fatalities continues at a rate of more than 300 per month, there is little likelihood of going back. Thus far independent fact finding missions from the OAU, and the International Commission of Jurists have visited South Africa and if the agreements from Working Group 1 are eventually ratified, it will entail the creation of a task group for the invitation of other groups to monitor the violence. Vance's initial UN visit is also little more than a well-publicised fact-finding mission. The Government's main attraction of this approach is that it entails no perceived threat to its sovereignty. As stated by one Government delegate, while the Government will take seriously all findings, 'South Africa is a sovereign community and does not have to submit to any recommendations from outside observers.'

6. AUTHORS' ASSESSMENTS

Beginning with the extremes, while non-official fact finding missions are certainly feasible, they have done little to restore confidence in the security forces. Moreover, they have not stopped the violence. Further steps must be taken by the international community, as well as by domestic actors, in order to bring the violence down to levels acceptable for the continuation of negotiations. For a variety of reasons an actual armed UN peacekeeping force does not appear feasible. Despite its advantages, the creation of united domestically-drawn peacekeeping forces faces serious practical problems. This leaves a choice between international 'monitoring' and international

'control' of the security forces. The choice rests on a trade-off between maintaining South African sovereignty and a needed increase in the IC role. A possible compromise is to implement the alternatives chronologically. An international monitoring team could be brought into South Africa, with the explicit proviso that if the violence was not significantly diminished within months after its arrival, the IC would be given clearly specified powers in the administration of the security forces. This would increase the chances of stopping the violence, or at least guaranteeing the non-partisanship of the security forces, while providing for only the minimal international role necessary. It would also give the Government a final opportunity to reform the security forces before placing them under international control. One caveat which should be kept in mind is that the situation in South Africa remains extremely fluid. Developments which were previously seen as only remote possibilities are now increasingly likely. More specifically, all sides seem to agree that truly free and fair elections cannot be held with the present level of violence.³⁵ Therefore, if subsequent domestic efforts to end the violence fail, new and more drastic measures must be considered, including a greater role for the IC.

A final question to be addressed in this section is which representatives of the IC would be best qualified to play a peacekeeping role. Among the candidates mentioned by the participants at CODESA were: the Commonwealth, the European Community (EC), the Non-Aligned Movement, the OAU and the UN. Unfortunately, there was little consensus on which was best suited. At least one respondent raised some objection to every organization. To varying degrees, all of them imposed sanctions against South Africa and, are thus seen as partisan. Spokespersons for the Government and its allies did not directly reject any of these organizations, but generally preferred the British Commonwealth and the European Community, the members of which had maintained relatively better relations with it than other nations. They were most distrustful of the Non-Aligned Movement. Conversely, the PAC has raised some objections to both the OAU and the Commonwealth.³⁶ The IFP suggests that observers should be drawn only from Western nations that understand the workings of democracy. In the end, however, no South African party completely rejected the participation of any international organization and the majority saw the UN as the most capable and politically acceptable organization. During its special session devoted to the South African problem, the UN Security Council clearly demonstrated an unbiased approach, particularly from the Government's perspective.

As to international feasibility, the qualifications of the organizations vary with the alternative selected. While all of the above organizations are capable of providing competent fact finding missions, only the UN regularly has provided peacekeeping forces. However, the OAU is now active in

Liberia and with UN support is now creating its own peacekeeping force.³⁷ The Commonwealth and the UN have both assisted domestic police forces during transitions (in Zimbabwe and Namibia respectively); both the OAU and the UN have provided teams to help monitor violence. Ultimately, the best way to satisfy all South Africans may be to allow the UN to play the central role but include representatives from a variety of other organizations.

ELECTION MONITORING AND SUPPORT

Until recently, elections were considered a purely domestic function and any international role in a state's elections was considered a clear violation of sovereignty. In the last decade, however, both practice and perception have changed dramatically. Today, states ending civil wars (e.g. Cambodia and Nicaragua) regularly invite international observers to witness their elections and publicly attest to their fairness. This is also common practice for newly-independent countries (eg., Namibia, Western Sahara and Zimbabwe). A greater break with the past is the invitation of international observers in undeniably sovereign states in which a regime has lost legitimacy. In the formerly communist states of Central and Eastern Europe international observers were invited to the first multi-party elections. In Africa, international observers were present in the most recent elections in both Zambia and the Seychelles. In the 1990 Copenhagen Declaration the 39 members of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe pledged to encourage international observers as well as domestic monitors in all subsequent elections in member countries.³⁸ In sum, international observers are becoming a regular feature of multi-party democracy in the 1990s, especially where the legitimacy of the established regime is in question.

The presence of international observers at South Africa's election for a constituent assembly is not, itself, a topic of great controversy. Representatives of the UN, the OAU, the Commonwealth, the EC, the NAM and the International Red Cross, as well as various embassies and diplomatic missions to South Africa were present at both CODESA 1 and 2. In our interviews none of the respondents rejected the simple presence of international observers during the elections. This was reflected in the agreement in Working Group 1 '...that a task group be set up in relation to the process of elections to invite a neutral independent international body.'³⁹ The task group was to decide the terms of the invitation, the scope of responsibility; and 'all other matters concerning such and undertaking.'

There are two reasons for not ending this section with the agreement in Working Group 1. First, the agreement was never ratified at CODESA 2. Secondly, the awkward grammatical construction of the agreement is indicative of a controversy left unresolved by Working Group 1. Delegates

for the Government and its allies objected to the verbs 'monitor' and 'observe' in that they implied an official role for the IC. Although they would welcome IC representatives to watch the election process, they refused to be placed in a position of having to submit to any recommendations of foreign observers, or in which the observers would be required to 'certify' or 'verify' the results of the election (e.g., Namibia, Haiti and those planned in Angola, Cambodia and the Western Sahara). This places too much power in the hands of the IC, which they privately feel is biased in favour of the ANC, their main competitor. But as a growing number of Government scandals come to light, public trust in the Government's commitment to free and fair elections is dissipating. Concern is also pervasive regarding the elections in the TBVC states where the results of past elections have been heatedly debated and numerous scandals have been uncovered. Already, the ANC and most of its allies insist that such international oversight is the only way to guarantee a fair result. More surprising is that the DP, and some of the Government's own allies, support formal international certification. Thus, while the Government currently rejects formal international certification of election results, this is an issue where international and domestic pressures appear quite strong. Ultimately, it may be the *only way in which the Government can guarantee the fairness of the election to its own population, let alone the IC*. A final point is if the elections are generally free and fair, there is little to be lost by consenting to international verification.

There is no doubt as to the IC's ability to provide an adequate monitoring team for the South African elections. In the past a large number of international organizations including: the UN, the OAU, the Commonwealth, the NAM, and the EC have all provided election observers elsewhere. There are also independent organizations, such as the Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute that can provide specially trained observers.

A more drastic solution to the legitimacy problem is to ask the IC to itself 'conduct' the elections. In the elections 'planned' by the UN for the Western Sahara the UN is to establish the electoral procedures, identify and register voters, monitor the elections and announce the results.⁴⁰ In the past this has been done regularly in transitions to independence (most recently Namibia) and in a few cases where the ruling regime has completely lost legitimacy and is seen as incapable of conducting free and fair elections (e.g. Zimbabwe and Cambodia). For obvious reasons the Government and its allies reject any contention that the current South African situation falls into the latter category. While the ANC cites the Government's lack of legitimacy as necessitating international monitoring, they have not, as of yet, called for international control of the election process.

Asking the IC to actually conduct the elections would also be very costly.

Given the present level of violence, the IC could not conduct elections without a *large and expensive peacekeeping force*. It thus appears *unfeasible*, and the most likely alternative remains domestically run elections with international monitors formally certifying the election process and results.

Aside from monitoring, there are other forms of assistance that the IC could provide: (1) assistance to the parties participating in the elections and, (2) assistance in the preparation for elections, such as in the registration of voters or in educating them as to the principles of democracy.

In this survey, every respondent agreed that international assistance to political parties during the elections was desirable. A point made repeatedly is that a large number of the parties expected to participate in the elections have never before run a campaign and others, such as the homeland parties, have never campaigned nationally. In addition, many of these parties draw much of the support from the poorest portion of the population and would likely be out-spent by more experienced, wealthier parties. They will also need expertise and assistance on campaigning, registering voters, using the media, and general strategies for the conduct of democratic elections.

At CODESA:

it was agreed that the provisions of the Prohibition of Foreign Funding of Political Parties Act, 51 of 1968, with regard to the receipt of foreign funds by political parties be suspended until a date six months from the date of the general election in terms of the the (sic.) provisions of a negotiated new constitution for South Africa.⁴¹

In June 1992, the necessary legislation was passed.

While all parties feel international assistance is needed they disagree on the disbursement of this assistance. A basic problem is that most feel that international assistance should be distributed on the basis of the size of the party's support base. However, only the elections will provide a realistic estimate of popular support. Thus, nearly every party feels disadvantaged by the current disbursement. For example, smaller parties complained that the bulk of past aid has gone disproportionately to larger parties such as the ANC and the IFP.⁴² The US Congress, for example, approved funding for only the ANC and the IFP. The IFP complains that the US programme gives considerably more aid to the ANC, which is also rumoured to have received over \$100 million from the World Council of Churches.⁴³ A PAC spokesperson contends that the US Congressional decision to aid only those parties no longer involved in the armed struggle (the ANC and IFP) places political strings on aid. In his view, this was particularly unfair as the ANC and IFP were both heavily involved in the domestic violence, while the PAC was not.⁴⁴ In addition, the ANC and other national liberation movements have received millions of dollars in bilateral aid and UN funds in their capacity as liberation movements. A Government advisor thus suggests that

these UN funds should now be distributed to all South African parties in need of financial help to prepare for elections.⁴⁵ A Democratic Party delegate suggests that his party has more supporters than the IFP, possibly even in the black community.⁴⁶ Finally, the ANC points out that because its supporters are generally poor and unenfranchised it is at a comparative disadvantage relative to all existing, white-based parties.

Given the wide variety of views on how international assistance to political parties should be disbursed, an agreement on the subject is unlikely. In lieu of an agreement, international donors are likely to give to those parties that both need the assistance and are thought to have large bases of potential support. Parties perceived to have little chance of doing well in the elections will receive little support. The end result may roughly approximate the one desired, in that under-funded, popular parties receive the vast majority of international assistance.

Although not formalized at CODESA 2, there appears to be a basic consensus among the participants on the issue of IC support in the conduct of the elections themselves. All agree that South Africans should, as much as possible, conduct the elections. Two issues, however, continue to generate controversy. One is the contention by the governments of the TBVC states that they should conduct their own elections and have the expertise to do so, but are increasingly inadequately financed. Most of their funding still comes from Pretoria and is gradually diminishing. Another issue is voter registration. The Government feels it is completely capable of carrying out this task and any international role would be an unnecessary violation of its sovereignty.⁴⁷ Conversely, many opposition leaders do not trust the Government enough to control the critical process of registration and want international observers to monitor, but not conduct, the process.⁴⁸ In response to such concerns, a Government delegate suggests that the Government can pattern its own preparations on the procedures used by the UN team in Namibia.⁴⁹ He suggests that South Africa could call on the individual UN administrators for advice. Ironically, the highly-praised preparations for the Namibian elections were conducted by the South African Government, which then controlled Namibia, under the supervision of the UN. The query then becomes, if this formula was acceptable and successful in Namibia why not in South Africa itself?

SANCTIONS AND INCENTIVES

In recent years sanctions have become an increasingly utilized tool of diplomacy. Just since 1988 sanctions have been enacted against Burma, China, Cuba, Haiti, Iraq, Libya and Yugoslavia, to name only a few. Recently many of the sanctions against South Africa, the world's most heavily-sanctioned nation, have been removed. The irony is that while the

sanctions are widely-lauded as having helped bring about the negotiations, they have not yet brought about their original goal, the abolition of apartheid.

There is little empirical evidence to demonstrate whether or not sanctions have been a major cause of the recent changes in South Africa. Thus, it is of little surprise that the maintenance of the remaining sanctions against South Africa continues as a source of considerable controversy amongst the participants at CODESA.

The sanctions debate has grown increasingly complex. Now intertwined with the sanctions debate is the provision of incentives to South Africa, such as access to new loans and aid packages. In general, those parties which opposed sanctions — the National Party, the Conservative Party, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Ximoko Progressive Party and the governments of both Bophuthatswana and Ciskei — still oppose them and believe that all remaining sanctions should be removed immediately. The centrepiece of their argument almost invariably is that sanctions are most hurtful for the poorest part of the population (mainly blacks). South Africa needs economic growth to ensure the peacefulness of its transition. When queried, they also opposed the reimposition of sanctions as a response to any major impasse or breakdown in the negotiation process.

The ANC, the PAC, and AZAPO all thought that the lifting of sanctions by the IC was premature and oppose the further lifting of sanctions at this time.⁵⁰ The arguments of those who support sanctions, of necessity, have evolved with changing circumstances. The most sophisticated response comes from the ANC. Initially the ANC argued simply that sanctions could only be removed when the process of change was 'irreversible.' This seemed to refer to the acceptance of a new non-racial government. By August 1991 the ANC position had evolved to a three-stage approach.⁵¹ The first wave of sanctions could be rescinded when the regime removed all obstacles to negotiations and took effective measures to end the violence. A second wave would be ended with the installation of an interim government and finally, all remaining sanctions would be removed with the adoption of a democratic constitution and the election of a permanent non-racial government. In a more recent statement ANC Secretary General Nelson Mandela said that once an interim government is in place 'the ANC would call for the immediate lifting of all sanctions, save for the oil and arms embargo.'⁵²

This would also be 'a benchmark for South Africa to rejoin the international community via the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity.'

Despite the resistance of the ANC and its allies, as well as the PAC and AZAPO, many sanctions have already been removed including many national ones imposed by the United States, Japan, Israel and a variety of

other countries. Most of the international cultural and sports sanctions have also been lifted. At the same time an impressive array of sanctions remain. As the ANC suggests, in all likelihood the lifting of these will be tied to further progress in South Africa's transition. For example, New York Mayor, David Dinkins, reports that New York's bans will not be lifted until 'the prospects of an interim government in South Africa appear to be very good.'⁵³

Presumably many of the 26 American states and 88 municipalities that also maintain sanctions will adopt a similar position. The Secretary General of the British Commonwealth also links the remaining sanctions to progress toward an interim government.⁵⁴

Closely tied to the issue of sanctions, but logically distinct, is the provision of economic incentives to South Africa. Because of sanctions, a prolonged drought and the world-wide recession South Africa is already facing serious economic problems. Thus, '...the new South Africa will be launched in the face of disaster, unless extensive and prolonged [economic] assistance from the international community is forthcoming.'⁵⁵ While many parties agree with this assessment, they disagree on whether economic assistance should be provided before the transition is complete. The Government and its allies contend that anything which can be done to improve South Africa's economy will make for a smoother and more peaceful transition. Conversely, the ANC and its allies worry that the improvement of South Africa's economic ties removes a major motivation for the Government to negotiate in good faith.

In the light of the continuing disagreement inside South Africa, potential international donors appear to have taken a middle position. The World Bank, for example, is reportedly planning to make South Africa its biggest African aid recipient as soon as an interim government is formed.⁵⁶ The Danish Foreign Minister has also announced major development programs to be set up concurrent with an interim government.⁵⁷

A new development in the area is the call coming from supporters of the National Party and its allies for the IC to pressure all parties, including the ANC, to keep talking without advocating any prescribed outcome.⁵⁸ A South African Government adviser to Working Group 1 specifically targeted the PAC. He argued that because the PAC had participated in the UN General Assembly Special Session on South Africa, which advocated a negotiated settlement, it had in essence committed itself to negotiations.⁵⁹ Thus the IC, and especially the UN would be right to push the PAC to join CODESA.

In fact, the PAC is under mounting pressure to join CODESA. According press reports the PAC's support among its close allies, Nigeria and the front line states, is drying up and the PAC may be in danger of losing its key bases in Tanzania.⁶⁰ The PAC denies any loss of support.

The ANC is now facing international pressure on an altogether different issue, its support for nationalization. The ANC has responded to this international pressure by reassuring international business leaders that it will rethink its policy on nationalization and promising that there will be no nationalization without compensation.⁶¹

In sum, the original sanctions, designed to force the South African government to abandon apartheid and begin negotiations have largely succeeded and; are rapidly dissipating despite the ANC's and the PAC's objections. Unfortunately, 'most states seemed to have little plan as to their role in South Africa after sanctions.'⁶² This does not mean their influence has disappeared. As one journalist argued, foreign government and businesses are not active participants in CODESA, but 'they may wield as much, or more, influence than the visible players.'⁶³ What has changed is that, beyond the death of apartheid, the IC does not present a coherent or united vision for the new South Africa. While the lifting of sanctions may prove premature, if CODESA cannot be resuscitated, it leaves South Africans the necessary freedom to design much of their own future.

When asked whether sanctions should be reimposed if the negotiations reached a major impasse or collapsed, those groups originally opposed to sanctions rejected a return to them. As of May 1992, the ANC and its alliance did not foresee a major impasse, but if one occurred they would reopen the sanctions debate. After Boipatong, the ANC considered a quick return to sanctions, especially sports and other cultural measures, but apparently rejected the option. Sanctions are a slow-acting and unrefined tool. Their impact is felt only gradually and is hard to tie to specific issues. A return to the pervasive sanctions of pre-1990 could only evolve gradually and thus, the ANC's leaders are only likely to opt for it when the possibilities for a return to CODESA are truly exhausted. However, UN Security Council Resolution 765 does call for the maintenance of all remaining sanctions.

MEDIATION

When research on this paper was begun in February 1992, international mediation of the South African conflict seemed a remote possibility. The talks at CODESA were going well and the only organization calling for international mediation, the PAC, had refused to participate in CODESA. Delegates to Working Group 1 were asked, 'If there is a major impasse in the negotiation process, or if the process collapses, should the international community play a more active role in trying to mediate/arbitrate, such as the role played in Cambodia, Zimbabwe or Namibia?' Surprisingly, none of the delegates suggested an impasse was likely and many specifically argued it was unlikely.

Today the talks have collapsed. International leaders including OAU

Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim, Commonwealth Secretary-General Emeka Anyaoku and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali are meeting independently with the representatives of various South African parties in an attempt to restart the talks. After holding a special session on South Africa in July 1992, the UN Security Council has appointed a special representative, Mr. Cyrus Vance, whose mandate includes making recommendations for restarting negotiations. While the IC is not formally mediating, international officials are facilitating a settlement and a return to the negotiating table. Can these international representatives play a greater role in mediating the conflict?

There is little doubt as to the ability of the IC to provide capable mediators to serve in South Africa. The UN, the OAU and the Commonwealth all have successfully mediated past conflicts including civil ones. The UN is most experienced in this area as the Secretary General routinely appoints special representatives to convene and mediate talks. With the support of the UN, the OAU is also now considering creating new political structures for mediation in Africa.⁶⁴ The OAU, the UN and the Commonwealth all sent observers to CODESA 1 and CODESA 2 and are well-informed on the major issues involved.

The more challenging question is whether South Africans themselves will accept international mediation. Even before CODESA the PAC's platform included negotiations at a neutral venue with an OAU or UN Chairperson presiding.⁶⁵ Although not a precondition for negotiations, at least one ANC delegate suggested the UN should appoint a special representative 'to participate in talks as an observer' and 'submit mediating proposals to overcome deadlocks.'⁶⁶ Recent statements by South African Government spokespersons suggest that they view an international mediator as a last resort. Therefore, an international mediator probably will be brought in only at the insistence of the ANC and its allies. Thus far, the ANC has demanded neither a neutral local mediator nor an international mediator. Another possibility is that the UN itself might suggest mediation. If the negotiations are not restarted soon, representatives of the IC, particularly the UN special representative, are likely to gradually play a greater role in facilitating a dialogue in South Africa, thus acting as unofficial mediators.

CONCLUSIONS

While the above sections provide their own conclusions, there are more general findings which merit repetition. First, a key issue in many areas is the trade-off between a greater role for the IC and the associated abrogation of South African sovereignty. There is a growing perception in South Africa that the IC can aid South Africa's transition in a variety of ways. But in the minds of many political leaders, especially those participating in the Government alliance, this entails an unacceptable loss of sovereignty. The

sovereignty question is a serious one, even for the Democratic Party, the ANC and its allies. Thus, the role of the IC will only be expanded when necessary and with great reluctance.

Secondly, the role of the IC is growing in inverse proportion to the success of the domestic negotiations. When talks are going well, the participants are willing to forego greater assistance from the IC. Conversely, when an impasse is reached or there is a marked escalation in the violence, many participants seek an expanded IC role. Given the further violence and that more impasses are likely, the role of the IC is also likely to expand beyond its present levels.

The authors' assessment is that there are a number of substantial roles the IC could assume to expedite and ease South Africa's transition to a non-racial democracy. *The most important of these pertains to the spiralling violence.* While our study rules out the creation of either an international or a domestically-drawn peacekeeping force, it finds an international monitoring group both feasible and desirable. This monitoring group would work with existing structures such as the National Peace Secretariat and the Goldstone Commission. It would be called on to monitor the violence and apportion responsibility for infractions of the peace accord. If the greater stature of the international monitoring force is not to stem the violence, South Africans must consider yielding some of the control of their security forces to international representatives. The violence in South Africa has escalated out of control, and until there is meaningful improvement a successful return to negotiations is unlikely. On the issue of violence, and the others considered above, those who have resisted until now an expanded role for the IC based on the legitimate concern for preserving South Africa's sovereignty will soon face a hard choice: either accept a greater international role and make some concessions on sovereignty, or increase the risks of degeneration into domestic turmoil. This is not to suggest that the IC can solve South Africa's problems. It cannot: it is up to South Africans to find their own settlement. However, the IC can be used by South Africans as a powerful tool during their difficult and dangerous transition to a non-racial democracy.

APPENDIX 1

QUESTIONS FOR DELEGATES AND ADVISORS ON CODESA WORKING GROUP 1

1. Given the continued violence and potential for further violence in various parts of South Africa do you think it would be desirable/necessary to have the international community play a peace-keeping role in these areas in the period immediately preceding and during the non-racial South African elections? Why or why not?

- 1a. Should the international community serve largely to oversee local police and military forces, or are actual peace-keeping forces viable?
- 1b. If international peace-keeping forces do become necessary who, in your opinion, is best suited to play this role: forces from the UN, the OAU or consignments from individual countries?
- 1c. In your opinion, what is the likelihood of international peace-keeping forces being used in South Africa?
2. Given the past practices of apartheid many political parties that will participate in the future South African elections have never before participated in elections. Recently the US and other countries have provided money for parties such as Inkatha and the ANC to prepare for elections. Do you think additional support is desirable/needed?
 - 2a. Has past support been fairly distributed?
 - 2b. Aside from financial support, should such parties be provided training in the financing, advertising and general conduct of democratic elections such as is being done for parties in Eastern and Central Europe? Who should provide such support?
 - 2c. Do you think South Africa in general will need international help for tasks such as registering voters and designing and constructing new polling places? Who should provide such assistance?
3. During the elections themselves, would you like to see international observers monitor the elections for any potential violations of election procedures, irregularities in vote counting or any use of fraud, force and intimidation by any parties?
 - 3a. Who could legitimately play this role in South Africa?
- 3b. If referenda are held in the TBVC states to consider their re-incorporation into South Africa, should international observers monitor these elections for any potential violations of election procedures, irregularities in vote counting or any use of fraud, force and intimidation by any parties?
- 3c. Who could legitimately play this role in the TBVC states?
4. Do you think the further removal of sanctions and the provision of economic incentives for South Africa should be tied to the progress in the negotiation progress in South Africa?
 - 4a. If so, at what point do you think all sanctions should be removed?
- 4b. If there is a major impasse or excessive delays in the negotiation process, or even a collapse of the process, should sanctions be reimposed? If so, which sanctions?
5. If there is a major impasse in the negotiating process, or if the process collapses, should the international community play a more active role in trying to mediate/arbitrate, such as the role they played in Cambodia, Zimbabwe or Namibia?

6. Is there any other way in which you believe the international community should assist in South Africa's transition to non-racial democracy?

APPENDIX 2

INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED

Telephone interview with Essop Pahad, South African Communist Party delegate, June 3, 1992 (by Lebona Mosia).

Written interview with S. M. Govender, National People's Party of South Africa adviser, May 15, 1992.

Telephone interview with Mr. J. Shearar, Deputy Director General, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, May 21, 1992 (by Daniel R. Kempton).

Telephone interview with B. M. Tlakula, Ximoko Progressive Party delegate, May 13, 1992 (by Daniel R. Kempton).

Telephone interview with M. B. Webb, adviser to the Ciskei Government, May 29, 1992 (by Daniel R. Kempton).

Telephone interview with Bishop Stanley Mogoba, Vice-Chairman of the National Peace Committee, May 13, 1992 (by Daniel R. Kempton).

Interview with Jacob Zuma, ANC delegate, April 1992, Johannesburg, (by Lebona Mosia).

Telephone interview with N. E. Mulaudzi, Venda Government adviser, May 12, 1992 (by Daniel R. Kempton).

Written interview with Dr. Ed Bernard, IFP delegate, May 19, 1992.

Telephone interview with Dr. Ed Bernard, IFP delegate, May 20, 1992 (by Daniel R. Kempton).

Telephone interview with Advocate G. Myburgh, National Party delegate, May 12, 1992 (by Daniel R. Kempton).

Interview with Gora Ebrahim, PAC Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Johannesburg, April 1992 (by Lebona Mosia).

Telephone interview with Dr. John Hall, Chairman of the National Peace Committee, June 8, 1992 (by Daniel R. Kempton).

Interview with Dave Dalling, ANC MP, Cape Town, June 18, 1992 (by Daniel R. Kempton).

Telephone interview with Hennie Bester, Democratic Party delegate, May 12, 1992 (Daniel R. Kempton).

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ENDNOTES

- * The authors would like to thank the International Studies Unit (Rhodes University), the Institute for Social and Economic Research (Rhodes University)

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THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: FOCUS ON LESOTHO

A. 1.0 INTRODUCTION

Labour migration constitutes one of the perennial problems of the political economy of southern Africa. That is why in academic discourse the region is commonly referred to as 'Africa of the Labour Reserves'.¹ This paper deals with possible solutions to this problem, focusing primarily on the prospects for the transformation of the regional economy from a labour reservoir to a more productive, growing and labour-absorbing economy.

In order to achieve this task we start off with a sketchy chronology of labour migration in the region,² viz. the pre-mineral revolution phase; the mineral revolution phase (1889-1906); 1906-39 state capital pressures to provide cheap African labour for the South African mines; increased migration phase (1940-74) and the 1975-92 era of a steady decline of migration from independent southern African states to the South African mines. The first four phases are covered in Section One (1.1) of the paper. Section Two (1.2) deals with the fifth phase at some length, given its paramount importance for the future of international labour migration in southern Africa.

Section Three (1.3) introduces a debate on future scenarios of migration in southern Africa and the possible options for the labour supply states to disentangle themselves from the migrant labour system. The second part (2.0 to 2.2) of the paper deals with Lesotho as a case study. The impact of migration on Lesotho's economy, particularly agriculture, is given a fair share of the discussion. We then venture into the options available to Lesotho in order to lessen its dependence on the migrant labour system. Our conclusion is that Lesotho has to rethink and redefine its own rural development strategy in order to open up more domestic jobs within the rural economy. To this end, we argue that the government public works strategy needs to be advanced and the National Union of Mineworkers' (NUM) cooperative strategy needs to be strengthened and expanded. The

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paper primarily focuses on labour migration to the South African mining industry, since this is the sector which continues to absorb a huge proportion of foreign African labour. We therefore concentrate more on male migration than female migration. After the 1960s' border restrictions, official female migration from Lesotho to South Africa virtually stopped.

B. 1.1 OVERVIEW OF PAST TRENDS OF MIGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

International labour migration in southern Africa has a fairly long history which can be conveniently divided into four broad phases. The first phase is the pre-mineral revolution period (i.e. the period before the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa). During this period international labour migration was largely a function of the 1820s *Lifaquane* wars and the colonial conquest.³ Thus the pre-mineral revolution migration was primarily a factor of political exigencies rather than socio-economic imperatives, as is the case in the present phase. Furthermore, during this period the white farms, particularly sugar plantations in the Cape and Natal used to attract seasonal migrant labour from African societies.⁴

The second phase is the mineral revolution era (1889-1906) when the burgeoning mining industry in South Africa became firmly established. Innes argues that as the South African mining industry emerged, three major factors of production became necessary in order to ensure profit maximisation and cost minimisation. These were sufficient capital to finance production, sufficient supply of low-cost labour power and the maintenance of a low-cost wage structure for a predominantly migratory and semi-peasant workforce. To achieve the last two objectives, the mining houses established various institutional frameworks to facilitate inflow of sufficient cheap labour to the mining enclaves.

In 1889 the Chamber of Mines (COM)⁵ was formed with the express objective of co-ordinating, regulating, controlling and standardising cheap labour supply to the affiliated mines.⁶ Ruth First argues that the formation of the COM was to guarantee a large and constant flow of African labour at a controlled cost. Attempts in the early 1890s by the COM to co-ordinate recruiting, impose a maximum average wage and prevent one mine poaching the labour of another, repeatedly broke down. If low-grade mines were to be developed then it became imperative that the COM guarantee ways of bringing down the cost of reproducing the labour force.⁷

The COM, therefore, established recruiting agencies in different parts of the southern African region to fulfil its mandate. In 1902 the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA) was formed to recruit migrant labour from Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC) was formed in 1912 to recruit cheap labour in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. In the mid-1970s, the

COM decided to consolidate WENELA and NRC into The Employment Bureau of Africa Limited (TEBA), which is presently the main agency responsible for the supply of migrant labour to the COM-affiliated mines from the region.⁸

Prior to the establishment of these recruiting institutions, mining companies tried to fulfil their labour demands by engaging local convict labour and importing indentured Chinese labour. The COM set up the labour importation agency to control imported Chinese labour. Between 1904 and 1906 when importation of Chinese labour was terminated, about 63 296 Chinese men were contracted and shipped to South Africa.⁹ Mining companies were compelled to use local convict labour and indentured Chinese labour because during this period African peasant migration to the mines was more discretionary (i.e. voluntary) than necessary (i.e. compulsory).¹⁰

It was in the third phase (1906-39) that mining capital, in close alliance with the South African state, set out to apply vigorous economic and extra-economic pressures on the African peasantry to extort cheap migratory labour for the mining industry. Thus migration became more and more common among the African peasantry in South Africa and the neighbouring territories. Firstly, the South African state enforced discriminatory trade and pricing policies on agricultural produce, which favoured Afrikaner farmers at the expense of African peasants.¹¹ Secondly, heavy taxation was imposed on African peasant producers. Thirdly, substantial tracts of fertile land were usurped from African peasants through the notorious 1913 Land Act and 1936 Natives Land and Trust Act. Fourthly, the Pass Laws and other influx control laws were enforced on Africans in order to restrict their freedom of movement and channel cheap labour where it was needed.

The Pass Laws were also meant to confine and barricade surplus population (i.e. the unemployed) in the rural slums of the unproductive tribal reserves.¹² Finally, the South African government entered into covert and tacit agreements with the colonial regimes in the neighbouring countries on the constant supply of cheap migrant labour to the mines. A clear-cut example is the 1909 Mozambican Convention signed between the Transvaal Republic and Portugal, which provided for a stable annual exportation of 100 000 Mozambicans to the Transvaal gold mines.¹³ This agreement remained in force until the mid-1970s when Frelimo took power in Mozambique. This agreement was a vivid indication of the South African state-capital collusion with colonial regimes in Southern Africa in extracting cheap oscillatory labour from the colonies and thereby undermining peasant subsistence economies.

The fourth phase (1940-74) was a period of increased migration from the neighbouring states to the South African mines, particularly gold mines. Table 1 shows that during this period foreign migrant labour as a proportion

Table 1: Africans Employed on the Gold Mines: Selected years between 1906 and 1984

Year	Number Employed (thousands)	% Foreign
1906	81	77
1911	190	60
1916	204	56
1921	173	61
1926	182	62
1931	210	50
1936	297	48
1941	368	52
1946	305	59
1951	299	64
1956	336	65
1961	399	64
1966	370	66
1970	370	72
1971	371	77
1972	362	78
1973	379	79
1974	350	78
1975	322	68
1976	343	58
1977	374	49
1978	389	47
1979	399	46
1980	416	44
1981	422	43
1982	418	43
1983	428	43
1984	437	42

Sources: Santho and Pule 1989 from Wilson (1972); Wenela Teba Annual Report various years; COM Annual Reports various years.

of total African labour on the gold mines rose from 52% to 78%. The higher wages in the South African manufacturing industry during this phase attracted more domestic African labour, which came to despise mine jobs.

It was, therefore, during this phase that Southern African states' dependence on the migrant labour system was deepened. The profundity of this dependence is clearly reflected in the fact that the attainment of political independence by these states during this period had no significant effect in reversing this unhealthy economic environment. The editorial of *Moeletsi oa*

Basotho (1990) bemoaned the failure of political independence in Lesotho to translate into economic independence as follows:

Political independence has not redressed Lesotho's massive labour drainage to South Africa. This economic dependence on South Africa gravely undermines Lesotho's international stature as a sovereign state. The country's socio-economic stability is largely contingent upon external factors. Once international aid is not forthcoming Basotho become more desperate. Thus we are not Masters of our own destiny (Translated by author).

The above catalogue of southern African states' dependence on the migrant labour system strengthens the apt depiction of the region as a labour reserve economy.¹⁴

B. 1.2 THE DECLINING PATTERN OF MIGRATION 1975-1992

During the fifth phase (1975-90) inflows of foreign labour to the South African mines declined steadily. Table 1 clearly shows that between 1975 and 1984 the proportion of foreign African labour of the total African labour on the gold mines dropped from 68% to 42%. Both regional developments and developments inside South Africa played a contributory role in this decline during this phase. In 1966 Zambia withdrew its workers from South Africa. In 1974 Malawi withheld its mine labour force from South Africa following a plane crash in which about 74 miners were killed. After lengthy negotiations with the COM, Malawi agreed once again to send its labour to South Africa in 1977. By this time the COM had established a severely restricted quota for Malawi.

With the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in southern Africa, the COM regarded the future labour supply from Mozambique as politically uncertain. The COM therefore reduced the number of Mozambican recruits in 1974, and unilaterally phased out the 1909 Mozambique Convention. From the high of 118 000 in 1975 the number of Mozambican recruits was reduced to a low of 42 000 in 1978.¹⁵ Currently, Mozambique supplies about 50 000 miners to South Africa (see Table 2). Thus, Mozambique remains one of the crucial labour suppliers to the South African mines, second to Lesotho which currently supplies about 93 000 miners to the TEBA member mines. In 1981, the decision by the Zimbabwean government not to renew the recruiting licences of TEBA led to the repatriation of Zimbabwean miners at the end of their contracts.¹⁶

These regional political developments led the COM to reduce its dependence on foreign African labour. On the contrary the migrant labour quotas from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland stabilised, and in some cases increased, during this phase (although recruitment of novice labour from these countries has been systematically declining).

Among the domestic factors in South Africa which precipitated a decline

Table 2: Labour complement on Teba Member Mines, February 1992

Origin	Number	%
Lesotho	93 011	23,44
Botswana	14 012	3,53
Swaziland	16 712	4,21
Mozambique	50 149	12,64
Transkei	87 230	21,98
Bophuthatswana	36 178	9,25
KwaZulu	25 106	6,32
Ciskei	7 356	1,85
Other (RSA)	66 440	16,74
Total	396 737	100,00
Local	222 853	56,17
Foreign	173 884	43,83

Source: Teba – Lesotho, April 1992.

in foreign African labour intake on the South African mines after 1975, the following loomed large: Miners' wages increased during this period as a result of both workers' struggles and the rise of the gold price on the international market. This increase provided the necessary economic incentive for domestic African labour to take up mine jobs in large numbers. Secondly, the COM's inward-looking labour recruiting strategy was also a function of the pressing need for the state and capital to address the chronic structural unemployment crisis in South Africa.

As a concrete expression of the above influences and concerns, the COM embarked on three main strategies aimed at reducing the foreign African labour on the mines. These are (a) internalisation of labour supply policy (b) stabilisation of labour force policy and (c) mechanisation of production.¹⁷ It needs to be emphasised, though, that this three-pronged strategy of reducing foreign labour has been (at least before the De Klerk era) tied to South Africa's regional strategy of exerting pressure against neighbours who have been sympathetic to the liberation struggle in that country while rewarding those supportive of the apartheid regime.¹⁸ Another factor that explains reduction of foreign African labour on South African mines is the declining price of gold on world markets, hence the closure of unprofitable marginal mines.¹⁹

It was in response to this changing pattern of labour demand and supply for the South African mining industry that the Southern African Labour Commission (SALC)²⁰ was formed in 1980. Its primary mandate since its inception has been to coordinate and stabilise migrant labour supply to South Africa, through collective bargaining with the South African state and

mining capital on labour agreements in order to establish mutually acceptable quotas of mine labour from member states. The SALC is further charged with the responsibility of striving towards gradual withdrawal of member states from the migrant labour system. To this end the SALC is further mandated to facilitate members' contingency plans for absorbing returning migrants in case of either gradual or sudden repatriation of foreign migrants by South Africa.

In the early 1980s the apartheid regime threatened to repatriate all foreign migrants in the event of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions. How real this threat was is a moot point. It is very likely that it was being used as a deterrent to imposition of sanctions. Whatever the case, the SALC took this threat, and many others which followed, quite seriously. In 1984 South Africa threatened, yet again, to repatriate about 140 000 Basotho migrants and replace them with Mozambican migrants unless Lesotho considered signing an Nkomati-type non-aggression pact with South Africa.²¹

As Lesotho adamantly refused to enter into a non-aggression pact with South Africa, the latter imposed a devastating economic blockade on the former in 1985. This economic stranglehold precipitated the military coup of 20 February 1986 and the demise of the Basotho National Party (BNP) government. It is not clear whether the military government signed a non-aggression pact with South Africa, but what is obvious is that relations between the two countries became very cordial and Lesotho's migrant labour quota to TEBA member mines increased from about 101, 000 in 1985 to about 109,000 in 1987 (see Table 3).

In 1986, after the collapse of the Nkomati Accord, South Africa further threatened to repatriate about 60 000 Mozambican migrants upon termination of their contracts in retaliation for a landmine blast attributed to the then proscribed African National Congress (ANC) whose activists were purportedly being harboured by Mozambique.²² Mainly because of the persistent threat of migrant repatriation, the task of the SALC has become much more burdensome. Paradoxically, however, the SALC has not as yet initiated well-coordinated contingency programmes for the reabsorption of returning migrants even in the face of all these threats. In this context then,

Table 3: Lesotho Labour Complement on Teba Member Mines: 1960–1991.

1960	—	45 698	1987	—	108 895
1970	—	62 576	1988	—	105 116
1980	—	100 458	1989	—	105 000
1985	—	101 120	1990	—	103 040
1986	—	106 379	1991	—	93 319

Source: Teba—Lesotho April 1992.

the vexed question is the future of the migrant labour system. To what extent can the southern African states continue to rely on this system? What are the likely future scenarios and options for the SALC member states?

1.3 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION AND FUTURE SCENARIOS

It is quite evident from the above account that since the mid-1970s there has been a systematic and deliberate reduction of foreign migrants working on the South African mines through four main strategies employed by state and capital. These have been identified as internalisation, stabilisation, mechanisation and South Africa's regional strategy of sustaining and perpetuating its sub-imperialist politico-economic domination in Southern Africa. Given the soaring structural unemployment, particularly among blacks, in South Africa, we can justifiably project that the decline of foreign labour intake for the mining industry will continue even in the 1990s.

The reconstitution of South Africa and the establishment of a democratic and non-racial state is not likely to reverse this trend. The SALC member states will have to reckon with the high employment expectations of black South Africans under a democratic state once transition has been completed. The ANC, which is likely to form part of the new government, is clearly aware of the enormous employment challenge that will confront the post-colonial state in South Africa.²³ Furthermore, the SALC has to take cognisance of the employment pressure that the return of approximately 30 000 exiles will pose for a post-apartheid state in South Africa.

Clearly, the democratic state in the post-apartheid South Africa will be saddled with the daunting tasks of (i) fair redistribution of economic wealth, opportunities and income (ii) resettlement of returnees and their engagement in gainful economic activity and (iii) reversal of the upward spiral of the unemployment rate currently estimated in the region of 30%.²⁴

Given the uncertainties of labour migration and South Africa's own employment problems, various options ranging from the SALC withdrawal of its migrant labour from South Africa to surviving within the *status quo*, have been advanced.

Stahl and Bohning²⁵ argue that the SALC member states should take concrete steps towards a phased withdrawal of their migrants over a 15-year period. Such a withdrawal should be undertaken collectively by these states to ensure co-ordination and avoid a situation whereby SALC states could be played against one another by the South African state and mining capital. In order to cushion the adverse effects of such a move on SALC economies, it is argued, the United Nations should be approached to establish a special fund in line with the resolution on accelerated economic development and international action adopted by the 1978 Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Conference on migratory labour in Southern Africa.

This proposal for withdrawal further notes that the process of creating alternative employment within SALC economies is of utmost importance and the highest priority in the process of withdrawal. It is estimated that the job-creation process may cost the SALC states some US\$2,500 million over a 24-year period. It is argued that this money could be raised by charging a levy on South African employers for each migrant worker employed during the phased withdrawal. The suggested levy is R1 500 per man-year for the COM and R100 for other mining houses. A threat of sudden *en masse* withdrawal would be used if South Africa were to default.

The withdrawal option suggested by Stahl and Bohning however, has its own shortcomings. Firstly, given the SALC states' extreme economic dependence and political linkages to South Africa, it would be adventuristic for them to withdraw migrant workers without a meaningful reformulation of their economic strategies in order to absorb that labour. Secondly, the question of levying South African mining capital some US\$2 500 million from is impracticable because presently the COM does not need foreign African labour as desperately as they did a couple of decades ago.

Thus, if the SALC states were to withdraw their workers, mining capital would still extract cheap migrant and commuter labour from the South African Bantustans and townships. Thirdly, the suggestion that the SALC use the sudden and *en masse* withdrawal of labour if South Africa defaulted on the levy is completely unrealistic. It is incontrovertible that South Africa has much more political and economic capacity to repatriate foreign migrants than the SALC has to withdraw, let alone absorb, their migrants.

The second option is that of the SALC states attempting to stabilise the migrant labour system in order to survive within it despite its socio-economic consequences. This particular school of thought views the Southern African states as almost helpless politico-economic hostages of South Africa with limited powers, if any at all, to extricate themselves. The SALC activities since 1980 bear testimony to the organisation's conviction that this option is optimally viable. SALC member states have concentrated on negotiating labour agreements with South Africa and improving conditions of migrant workers in South Africa (SALC 1990) rather than restructuring their domestic economies to absorb their growing labour force.

Our assessment of the past decade is that instead of the SALC initiating new economic strategies, policies and programmes geared towards extracting its members from the migrant labour system, it is South Africa which has in fact embarked upon migrant repatriation and retrenchment. This is the major weakness of the SALC. It continues to react to South African pressure rather than create domestic job opportunities. Instead of the SALC governments creating alternative income-generating projects for

the repatriated/retrrenched migrants, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) seems to have effectively seized this initiative, particularly since the 1987 mineworkers strike. It has to be borne in mind that the central policy of the NUM is to dismantle the migrant labour system. As part of its strategy towards this end, the NUM has established mineworkers' labour cooperatives in Lesotho, Transkei and Swaziland. The main objectives of these cooperatives are to identify and initiate labour-intensive income-generating projects and engage repatriated/retrrenched migrants in gainful economic production.

B. 2.0 FOCUS ON LESOTHO

Lesotho's dependence on labour migration to the South African mining industry is much more pronounced than is the case with other SALC member states. It may be argued that Lesotho as a landlocked mountainous country with paltry resources stands to gain from migrant labour system through the following spin offs:

- (i) Deferred payment, which has increased quite phenomenally in the last decade. In 1980 deferred payment to Lesotho was about M24 million. In 1989 this figure shot up to M242 million — a net increase of 908% over a nine-year period.²⁶ Deferred pay is the 60% of migrants' wages which is transferred to Lesotho by mining companies. It contributes a substantial amount to government revenue and finances a large slice of the country's trade deficit. It is presently estimated that the 93,000 Basotho miners in the COM mines alone earn Lesotho the sum of M1.1 billion per annum.²⁷
- (ii) Migrant remittances which accrue to the migrants' families and are used largely to finance household consumption and production needs. Presently migrant remittances account for about 80% of most rural households' gross income. This proportion underlines the serious decline of agriculture as an income earner in Lesotho's rural economy. Migrant remittances accruing to Lesotho rose from M18 million per annum in 1980 to M166 million in 1989 — a net increase of 822%.²⁸
- (iii) Finally it may also be argued that the migrant labour system is a socio economic blessing for the resource-poor economy of Lesotho. In other words, it relieves the economy of a large proportion of the domestic labour force which could not be absorbed by the domestic economy. Table 4 provides a succinct synopsis of the labour force participation and unemployment rates in Lesotho. It is estimated that the labour force participation rate was about 56% while the unemployment rate was about 23% in 1985/86. Thus labour migration from Lesotho could be seen as a 'safety-valve' for the domestic employment crisis. This is one of the factors that explains the government's inertia in creating

Table 4: Labour Force Participation and Unemployment Rates by Age and Sex: Preliminary report of the 1985/86 Labour Force Survey

Age Group	Participation Rate %			Unemployment Rates %		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
12-19	40,7	17,5	28,5	28,9	37,1	31,6
20-19	90,8	47,1	68,8	22,1	29,4	24,6
35-54	94,7	49,5	71,0	16,1	19,6	17,3
55 and over	77,5	31,9	51,6	25,9	17,1	22,8
Not stated	27,9	2,8	10,9	0,0	0,0	0,0
Total	76,3	37,1	55,8	21,8	25,4	23,0

Source: GOL 1987 Socio-economic indicators of Lesotho.

productive employment opportunities, not only for the returning migrants but also for the unemployed Basotho who can no longer be absorbed by the mining industry in South Africa.

The above-mentioned spin offs are not real socio-economic benefits for Lesotho in the long run. A closer scrutiny of the migrant labour system will reveal that these spin-offs tend to be ephemeral. They are therefore devoid of any long-term development dynamic and social stability. Consequently these apparent benefits translate into a high socio-economic cost for the country. Elkan captures this point cogently in relation to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

While one can argue that labour migration provides benefits in the form of income-earning opportunities that would not otherwise exist, the degree of dependence on this source of income, especially in the case of Botswana and Lesotho, must also be regarded as a cost. Whatever may be true of the long run, there is no question but that in the short run if South Africa were to close her frontiers to prospective migrants all the three countries would be worse off, and in Lesotho there would be severe distress. Such a degree of dependence on a particular source of income must be counted as a cost.²⁹

As reflected in the above quotation, migrant labour may be regarded as both a benefit and a cost for the labour supply states like Lesotho. As dependence on labour migration becomes deeply entrenched, economic, particularly agricultural, decline becomes much more intense.

We are in no way trying to construct a mechanistic correlation between the migrant labour system and agricultural decline in Lesotho. The uni-dimensional linkage between migration, labour shortage, low agricultural productivity and low incomes in rural Lesotho is somewhat tenuous. In another formulation, migration and shortage of labour *per se* do not sufficiently explain Lesotho's agricultural crisis.³⁰ There are many other endogenous and exogenous variables to Lesotho's agricultural decline besides labour migration. These variables, however, are not the subject of this study.

Our emphasis, therefore, is on the extent to which migration has become a disincentive to agricultural pursuits in Lesotho.

The fourth Five Year Development Plan (1986/87-1990/91) confirms this observation by arguing that:

Dependence on mine wage income has grown since 1978 from 35,5% of GNP to over 50%. The GNP more than doubled but agriculture's share declined from 17 per cent in 1978 to 7.1 per cent in 1984.....As a result of rural residents dependence on off-farm income, total farming effort has declined.³¹

Table 5 clearly shows that even during the 1970s when mine wages substantially increased, agriculture's contribution to GNP continued to decline. In 1970/71 mine wage income contributed 32% to GNP while agriculture contributed only 22%. In 1979/80 mine wage income and agriculture's contribution to GNP were 41% and 14% respectively. This may mean that mine remittances are rarely invested in agricultural productivity. Even in cases where remittances are invested in agriculture, smallholder farmers are confronted with a myriad of problems which inhibit increased productivity. These include labour shortage; lack of institutional backup and instruments of production; precarious climatic conditions; the nature of state rural development policy, which has an explicit bias in favour of progressive farmers at the exclusion of small farmers; soil erosion; landlessness; overpopulation and overstocking.

Not surprisingly, therefore, farming in Lesotho has virtually become a part-time, very marginal, occupation for most rural households.³² Many

Table 5: Sector Distribution of Gross National Development Product of Lesotho: Selected Years

Sector	Year/Percentage				
	1970/71	1974/75	1975/76	1977/78	1979/80
Mine wages	32,0	38,2	47,3	44,1	41,1
Agriculture	22,4	20,1	14,7	16,5	14,5
Mining	0,8	0,6	0,2	0,4	2,9
Manufacturing	2,8	3,1	2,7	2,1	2,2
Trade	13,9	8,3	7,6	5,8	5,3
Construction	1,9	3,1	2,8	6,7	4,4
Private	16,4	14,7	14,6	13,1	13,5
Government	5,8	3,3	3,7	3,7	4,6
Other	4,0	8,6	7,6	7,6	11,5
Total GNP (in million Maloti)					
	74,772	158,125	211,990	331,406	444,994

Source: Plath *et al* as extracted from IMTF (1983)

studies³³ have shown that a considerable portion of migrant remittances is earmarked for the purchase of livestock and other household items rather than direct investment in profitable agricultural assets.

This explains precisely why the 1970s mine wage increases resulted in a massive rise in the number of goods imported from South Africa rather than the real and sustainable development of the domestic economy. Besides the fact that the migrant labour system has not contributed to real economic development in Lesotho, it has subjected Lesotho to an extreme external dependence whose vicissitudes are beyond the control of the government.

At least since the 1930s economic crisis in Lesotho, it has been very clear that the demand and supply of cheap Basotho migrant labour would be controlled solely by the COM and not the Lesotho government. The 1970s measures adopted by the COM's to reduce foreign black labour through internalisation, stabilisation and mechanisation are a clear testimony of the COM absolute control over migrant labour. Though the 1970s changes did not affect Lesotho drastically, the COM has gradually tightened its employment screws on mine novices from Lesotho.

In 1981, 5% of TEBA's Basotho recruits were novices. This figure plummeted to 3% in 1982 and 1% in 1983.³⁴ For the gold mines alone the figures for Basotho mine novices as a proportion of total TEBA recruits from Lesotho dropped from 17% in 1975 to 5% in 1985.³⁵ This reduction of mine novice recruitment effectively translates into a two-pronged socio-economic disadvantage for Lesotho.

Firstly, since the 1980s a conspicuous trend of internal rural-urban migration in Lesotho has been exacerbated. This migration comprises largely female migrants who, since the 1960s border restrictions, have been barred from seeking employment in South Africa. This trend is being further aggravated by the retrenchment of some experienced Basotho miners from South Africa. Secondly, the reduction of mine novice recruitment further deepens the employment crises in Lesotho. This means that the country's annual domestic labour market entrants, estimated at 20 000 in 1988, are being increased. The World Bank projects that by the year 2000 Lesotho's annual labour market entrants will shoot up to 26 000. Presently Lesotho's unemployment rate ranges above 35% with a population growth rate of about 3%.

As argued earlier, drastic cuts in Basotho migrant labour to South Africa are likely to be made even in the 1990s. This process may include more repatriation of Basotho miners in favour of the local African labour from the South African townships and Bantustans. Cobbe³⁶ and Wellings³⁷ have, however, argued that as long as the gold mining industry does not collapse, some 100 000 Basotho will be assured of employment in South Africa.³⁸ This likelihood notwithstanding, the on going processes of internalisation, stabilisation mechanisation in the South Africa mining industry as well as

the declining price of gold on the World Market warrants a fundamental re-thinking and redefinition of Lesotho's development strategy.

B. 2.1 ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY GEARED TOWARDS DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT CREATION

As far back as 1979, the ILO/JASPA Report³⁹ observed that with regard to the quantitative outflow of Lesotho's labour force, with its attendant socio-economic disadvantages and political uncertainties, the government is faced with four policy options:

- (1) a policy of *laissez-faire*, the outcome of which might mean more or fewer migrants;
- (2) a policy of local job creation and rural development, creating domestic income-generating opportunities at a rate that is hopefully equal to the natural population and labour force growth, while exporting surplus labour to South Africa;
- (3) a policy of deliberately cutting down the growth in migration and perhaps eventually the absolute numbers of migrants while re absorbing as many of the returned migrants as possible in domestic productive employment;
- (4) a radical policy of banning all migration to South Africa as was done in Tanzania (1961), Zambia (1963) and Malawi (1974), combined with an appeal to the United Nations to finance adjustment costs.

A closer examination of these options leads to our conclusion that option (2) above is the most practicable if Lesotho is to gradually lessen its dependence on the migrant labour system. Thus Lesotho's redefined and reformulated development strategy needs to be conceptualised within the confines of this option.

The Lesotho government should work out a comprehensive agricultural and rural development strategy that will provide gainful employment for the rural population. This alternative development strategy should be worked out as a matter of urgency given the present political developments, which are likely to bring about a democratic and non-racial state in South Africa. In this eventuality we project three scenarios in terms of Lesotho's participation in the migrant labour system in a post-apartheid South Africa.

Firstly, migrant repatriation accompanied by training of the local labour to fill up vacant positions formerly held by Basotho will continue. This is highly likely particularly if nationalisation of the mining industry becomes part of the new regime's agenda. Secondly, Lesotho also has a choice of applying to become part of a larger confederal system in a future democratic South Africa. In this manner Lesotho constitutionally becomes part of South Africa and her migrant labourers on the mines are likely not to be repatriated, since they would not be regarded as foreign labour. This is the

most intricate and indeed, politically sensitive scenario. As such it is highly dependent on the nature of political relations of Lesotho and South Africa after Apartheid has been dismantled. Thirdly, assuming that nationalisation of the mining industry does not become part of the economic policy package for a new regime in South Africa, then the COM will still exercise its absolute discretion and monopoly on labour demand and supply sources. In this case, the assumption by Cobbe and Wellings, that at least some 100 000 Basotho will be ensured of mine employment as long as the gold mines do not collapse, may not necessarily hold. The present trend already shows that COM Mines alone may cut Lesotho's labour to about 83,000 by the end of 1992.⁴⁰

Scenarios (2) and (3) above may prove favourable to Lesotho. The possibility of scenario (1) should, however, not be disregarded. It is precisely because of the possibility of scenario (1) that Lesotho needs to open its own domestic employment opportunities particularly in the rural areas. Such a venture would not only stem international migration in the long run, but would also off-set internal rural-urban migration inside the country.

Since 1978, Lesotho's government has embarked upon public works projects through the Labour-Intensive Construction Unit (LCU) in order to redress both rural-urban and international migration. This public works strategy falls short of opening up viable employment avenues in the rural areas for the retrenched and prospective mine migrants in two fundamental ways. Firstly it has not been able to absorb retrenched migrants, particularly after the 1987 mineworkers' strike which culminated in the expulsion of about 9,000 Basotho miners. Secondly, it has not been able to transcend mere road construction and maintenance into agricultural productivity and other rural income-generating projects which could attract labour away from migration.

In order to be viable, a labour-intensive public works strategy should have a dual role: It should be able to make a strong contribution to the policy of local job creation and rural development and it should be the principal means to provide a large number of standby jobs through a readily available 'shelf' of projects, if a sudden emergency occurs. As mentioned earlier, after the 1987 mineworkers' strike, the NUM initiated income-generating and rural development schemes to provide employment for retrenched Basotho miners in their home country.

The NUM, therefore, established the Basotho Mine Labour Cooperative (BMLC) in 1988. The BMLC has already initiated income-generating schemes for the retrenched Basotho miners. These schemes include (a) a taxi operation in Maseru with prospects and plans for expansion to other areas (b) brick-making projects which have thus far engaged about 100 ex-miners and (c) a variety of income-generating projects for migrants' wives through their own women's cooperatives involving about 100 women in the Butha-

Buthe district. With a strong infrastructural base and financial support these embryonic NUM rural development projects stand more chance of succeeding.

B. 2.2 CONCLUSIONS

The evidence provided in this paper points to the grave uncertainty and precariousness of Lesotho's continued participation in the migrant labour system. Two main processes loom large in reinforcing this uncertainty. These are the ongoing reduction of foreign labour on the South African mines by the COM through internalisation, stabilisation and mechanisation. The second process is the current political transformation in South Africa which is likely to lead to the establishment of a democratic and non-racial state. Such a state will certainly have to grapple with the increasing structural unemployment in South Africa itself.

Consequently Lesotho needs to create more viable employment alternatives at home to absorb retrenched and prospective migrants. This strategy, we have argued, needs to be sharply focused on agricultural and rural development. Both the government and the NUM have made a start in this direction. We argue, however, that the government's public works strategy has serious shortcomings as a contingency plan for re absorbing returning Basotho migrants. The public works strategy, therefore, needs to be broadened, diversified and expanded in order to provide employment in the rural economy. *Embryonic as it is, the NUM labour co operative strategy seems to augur well for a reformulated rural development strategy in Lesotho. What makes the NUM co operative strategy even more ideal is the fact that it is solely an initiative of migrants themselves. Put differently, it is a 'bottom-up' rural development strategy which needs support from government itself.*

The government is not totally oblivious of the dire need for a reformulated rural development strategy in Lesotho. For instance, in a representation to the 1990 Donor Round-table Conference, the government notes that despite the fact that 80% of Lesotho's population lives in rural areas, these regions are characterised by low and stagnant agricultural yields, poor off-farm income-earning opportunities and lack of government services. The main income source of rural people, migrant incomes from South Africa, has probably peaked and its future is uncertain. The government, then in effect, commits itself to a strategy of increased income-generation and employment opportunities in the rural economy. While a mere commitment is very easy to make, implementation is something else.

ENDNOTES

1. Amin, S., 'Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa —origins and contemporary forms' in Cohen D. and Daniel J. (eds) *The Political Economy of Africa*, Longman, London, 1981.

2. For a closely comparable periodisation of International Labour Migration in Southern Africa see Malan, 1985, Santho and Pule, 1989.
3. Due to a series of Basotho-Boer wars during this phase the Afrikaners usurped much of Lesotho's fertile land. Basotho were ultimately forced to eke out a living on an unproductive and largely mountainous piece of land. This is the origin of the present colonial boundaries, which were fixed through the 1869 Treaty of Aliwal North. This forcible dispossession of Basotho's fertile land, in part, explicates the present shortage of agricultural and residential land as well as the gross overcrowding of the population in Lesotho (see Murray, 1987). As a result of this loss of large tracts of agricultural, grazing and residential land and following the inevitable over-population and environmental degradation, Lesotho has been drifting irreversibly into poverty, particularly since the 1930s. Consequently, Basotho peasants' booming commodity production was undermined and migrant labour to the South African mines became a norm for supplementation of the plummeting rural income and for paying colonial taxes (also see Innes, 1984).
4. Innes, D., *Anglo-American and the Rise of Modern South Africa*, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1984.
5. The COM was primarily intended to monopolise recruitment of mine labour, reduce competition for labour among affiliated mining houses and fix a standard labour cost. In 1897, through the WENELA and NRC, the COM slashed African mine wages from R78 per month (as of 1889) to R58 per month. The wage level was held at this rate in real terms until the early 1970s. Migrant labour was therefore the key to the cheap labour policies of the mining industry which in turn ensured profit maximisation and cost-minimisation. The COM conveniently presumed that African mineworkers still had access to land in the rural areas and that on completion of their contracts they would return to these plots of land. Their families would be housed and fed in the rural areas through production of this land and not out of the wages of the migrant worker. Thus wages could justifiably be kept low (see Davies, *et al.*, 1988). Besides an absolute control over the price of African labour, the COM also aimed at controlling cheap labour flows to the mines. In 1890 the COM appealed to the Kruger government for support in securing control over the supply of labour to the mines. The COM appeal read as follows:

Private enterprise has repeatedly failed in attempting to organise and maintain an adequate supply of kaffirs. The task must be undertaken by the public authorities and the chamber trusts that the government will lend it their indispensable assistance (Innes, 1984:58).

6. See Clark D., 'The South African Chamber of Mines: Policy and Strategy with reference to foreign labour supply', DSRG working paper, No.2, University of Natal, 1977. See also Santho S., and Pule N.O., 'ILO Research and Evaluation', National University of Lesotho, 1989.
7. First R., *Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletariat and Peasant*, the Harvester Press, Sussex, U.K., 1983.
8. See Callincos, *op.cit.*, See also Malan T., 'Migrant Labour in Southern Africa', *Africa Insight*, Vol.15, No.2, 1985.
9. Innes, *op.cit.*
10. For profound treatises on this observation see Arrighi, 1973, Palmer and Parsons, 1977, Murray, 1981; Kimble, 1985. In Lesotho, for instance, prior to the 1879-1881 Gun War, the major incentive for Basotho migration to the South African mines was a desire to acquire firearms, horses, ploughs and manufactured goods. Thus their participation in migration was largely voluntary. In the case of Zimbabwe, Arrighi (1973) noted that early African participation in the capitalist money economy through sale of their labour was more 'discretionary' than 'necessary'. Arrighi observes two tendencies whereby sale of labour time became necessary for Africans: (a) the transformation of discretionary cash requirements into necessary requirements (eg. taxation) and (b) an upward tendency in the effort-price of

- African participation in commodity production resulting from a growing disequilibrium between means of production (mainly land) and population in the peasant sector and the weakening of the peasant's competitive position on the produce market.
11. See Palmer R. and Parsons N., *The Roots of Rural Poverty*, Heinemann, London, 1979; Murray C., *Families Divided: The Impact of Migrant Labour in Lesotho*, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1981; Matlosa K., 'Labour Migration and Constraints on Development in Lesotho', unpublished M.A. Dissertation, University of Leeds, U.K., 1987.
 12. Davies, R., et. al , *The Struggle for South Africa*, Zed Books, London, 1988.
 13. See Cohen R., (ed) *Forced Labour in Colonial Africa*, Zed Books, London, 1979; Magubane B., *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa*. Monthly Review Press, London, 1979; Stahl C., 'Recent Changes in the Demand for Foreign African Labour in South Africa and Future Prospects' in De Vletter (ed) *Labour Migration and Agricultural Development in Southern Africa*, FAO, Rome, 1982; First R., *op.cit.*
 14. See Amin S., *op.cit* ; Amin S., et al, (eds) *SADCC: Prospects for Disengagement and Development in southern Africa*, Zed Books, London, 1987.
The major thrust of Samir Amin's argument is that unlike in other parts of Africa, particularly West Africa (which he terms Africa of the colonial trade economy) and Central Africa (which he terms Africa of the concession-owning companies) the intervention of the capitalist mode of production in southern Africa ushered in a specific form of colonisation in the region — that of a regional economy of labour reserves. This colonisation went hand in glove with dispossession of African land and forcing of the African peasantry into unproductive reserves deliberately planned to be inadequate so as to ensure the failure of subsistence production in earlier traditional forms. The African peasantry would as a result re-emerge as a semi-proletarianised labour force for mining capital (Amin, *et al*, 1987). Cliff (1978) corroborates this thesis by observing that most of the African people in southern Africa have been integrated into the world capitalist economy through labour migration rather than direct production of commodities.
 15. Leisner G., 'The future of Labour Migration to South Africa', *Africa Insight*, Vol.14, No.1, 1984.
 16. De Vletter F., 'Labour Migration to South Africa: Recent Trends and Prospects', ILO, Lusaka, 1984.
 17. Internalisation of labour supply refers to the COM policy of replacing foreign migrants with domestic workers, thereby reducing the dependence of the mining industry on external and precarious sources of labour supply. The disruptions of the early 1970s had evidently exposed the COM's vulnerability to the political vicissitudes of external labour supplies. The South African state also exerted a lot of pressure on the COM to employ domestic labour so as to reduce internal structural unemployment. It is estimated that the ratio of domestic to foreign labour on the mines is at most 60:40. Stabilisation policy is aimed at creating a professional and disciplined mine labour force. Hence the contract period for migrants has increased substantially. As a result of this policy valid re-engagement guarantee of 'bonus' certificates have been introduced. Tough measures are taken against migrants who contravene contract obligations. Mechanisation of production refers to the transformation of the mining industry from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive enterprise. This process is at an advanced stage in the coal mines (see Santho and Pule, 1989). The obvious effects of these three processes have been the retrenchment of foreign labour and a substantial reduction of novice labour supply from the SALC member states.
 18. See De Vletter 1984, *ibid*; Matlosa K., 'International Labour Migration in Lesotho: Current Dimensions and Context' paper presented to the Canadian Association for African Studies Annual Conference, Carleton University, Canada, 1989; Matlosa K., 'The Changing Labour Demand in South Africa and Prospects for Re-absorption of Returning Basotho Migrants in Lesotho's Economy' in Santho S.

- and Sejanamane M , (eds) *Southern Africa after Apartheid*, SAPES Books, Harare, 1990
- 19 See *Business Day*, May 11, 1992 The recent case in a series of closure of marginal mines and retrenchment of massive numbers of foreign African labour is that of the Harmony gold mine The likely closure of this mine will lead to a sudden retrenchment and repatriation of about 8,000 workers (see *Business Day*, May 11, 1992) The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) has proposed a retraining programme for the miners to ameliorate adverse effects of retrenchment Such programme, according to NUM, should be state-financed
 - 20 The SALC is basically a consultative body composed of ministers concerned with labour matters in the Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of Malawi, the People's Republic of Mozambique, the Kingdom of Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Zambia and the Republic of Zimbabwe The People's Republic of Angola holds observer status in SALC Independent Namibia has not affiliated Two other components of the SALC besides governments are worker organisations and employer associations The Lusaka-based ECA and ILO form the Secretariat of the SALC The Commission holds annual conferences to consider and assess, among other things, members' labour agreements with South Africa, domestic job creation plans to absorb repatriated migrants and migrant working conditions in South Africa
 - 21 De Vletter (1984), *op cit*
 - 22 De Vletter F , 'Foreign Labour on the South African Gold Mines New Insight on an Old Problem', *International Labour Review*, Vol 126, No 2, 1987
 - 23 *New Nation*, 5-11 October 1990, *Sechaba*, Vol 24, No 10, October 1990
 - 24 *African Communist*, No 123, Fourth Quarter, 1990
 - 25 Stahl C & Bohning W , 'Reducing Dependence on Migration in Southern Africa', ILO/SATEP, 1983
 - 26 Central Bank Quarterly Review, Lesotho, 1989
 - 27 Information received from TEBA, Lesotho Branch, 1992 April
 - 28 Central Bank Quarterly Review, *ibid*
 - 29 Elkan W , 'Labour Migration from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol 28, No 3, 1980
 - 30 ILO/JASPA, *Options for a Dependent Economy Development Employment and Equity Problems in Lesotho*, ILO, Ethiopia, 1979
 - 31 Government of Lesotho Fourth Five Year National Development Plan
 - 32 Inter-ministerial Task Force Progress in Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, Maseru, 1983, Plath J et al, 'International Labour Migration and Agricultural Development in Lesotho', Farming Systems Research Project, Ministry of Agriculture, 1984
 - 33 Plath et al, *ibid* , Eckert J & Wykstra R , *The Future of Basotho Migration to the Republic of South Africa*, Research Report No 4, Lesotho Agricultural Sector Analysis Project, Ministry of Agriculture, 1979
 - 34 World Bank, Lesotho Country Economic Memorandum, Washington, 1987
 - 35 World Bank, *ibid*
 - 36 Cobbe J , 'Emigration and Development in Southern Africa with special reference to Lesotho', *The International Migration Review*, Vol 16, No 4 , 1982
 - 37 Wellings, *op cit*
 - 38 Cobbe and Wellings argue that the COM may retain a stabilised quota of about 100,000 Basotho miners even at the height of the internalisation, stabilisation and mechanisation processes so long as the gold mines continue to operate The rationale for this policy would be to (a) preserve the diversity of labour sources, (b) hold on to more skilled and experienced Basotho miners, and (c) sustain the political grip that South Africa has on Lesotho via the nexus of the migrant labour system
 - 39 ILO/JASPA, *op cit*
 - 40 Interview with TEBA — Lesotho Branch

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2. Cliffe L., 'Labour Migration and Peasant Differentiation: Zambian Experience', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.5, No.3, 1978.
3. Kimble J., 'Migrant Labour and Colonial Rule in Southern Africa: The Case of Colonial Basutoland 1890-1930', Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Sussex, U.K., 1985.

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE FRONT LINE STATES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

Southern Africa has never been a high priority in United States strategic and political concerns. During the Cold War, most interest focussed upon the geo-strategic and economic importance of South Africa to western interests within a wider policy framework of containment of Soviet military and ideological influences.¹ More recently, the focus of policy-makers has shifted towards seeing political evolution in South Africa in the context of political and economic stability of the southern Africa region. The various departments and agencies of the US government involved in policy formulation have not always acted consistently or harmoniously towards the region and, on occasions, have even acted to undermine each other.

The growing regional focus of policy in the 1980s, nevertheless, forced the US to take increasing notice of the role of the Front Line States (FLS), (though the term itself may become anachronistic as South Africa emerges from its political and economic isolation and begins to play a role in southern Africa's regional affairs). The FLS as such first established themselves as a serious political entity at the time of the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979 on Zimbabwean independence. The FLS was loosely organised at this time with a minuscule secretariat and did not have a solidly united political front. A number of the FLS leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania still managed to perform a vital mediating role between the Rhodesian government and the exile Zimbabwean nationalist groups organised as the Patriotic Front.²

In July 1979 the members of the FLS also began establishing the *Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference* (SADCC) with the long-term aim of reducing economic dependence upon South Africa, which at the time was committed to its own regional policy of a 'Constellation of African States' (CONSANS). By 1980 SADCC consisted of nine member states of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi and Tanzania.

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The growth of US government interest in SADCC, however, proved to be slow. The Reagan administration's policy of 'constructive engagement' in the early 1980s marked, in some degree, a return to Cold War principles of containment of Soviet power in the region. The emphasis of policy became, for a period in the early 1980s, one of maintaining economic links with the white government of South Africa as a means of encouraging it to move towards progressive internal political reform. South Africa remained for the USA the hub of regional security and a bastion of anti-communism at a time when the USSR was perceived as a potentially expansionist power still interested in building on the increased influence it had secured with the Marxist-inclined governments of Mozambique and Angola in the latter half of the 1970s.

The Reagan administration eventually proved rather less ideological than at first thought. By 1982 it began moving towards arms control with the Soviet Union and pragmatic considerations began slowly to win out over ideology in US dealings with radical African governments.³ As far as southern Africa was concerned, US policy was not tied to any strongly-defined set of interests or any sizeable domestic political constituency. It was to a considerable degree free-floating and tended to be, in William J. Foltz's words, 'defined broadly (and somewhat irrelevantly) by the symbolic extension of domestic political ideology with the occasional interjection of considerations derived from concerns with the international balance of power'.⁴

International balance of power considerations began, rather sporadically, to decline as one of the major considerations behind US policy toward the region. The USSR appeared increasingly less willing in the course of the 1980s to underwrite the efforts by its clients in southern Africa, such as Mozambique and Angola, to establish socialist-type command economies. Reflecting this decline of Soviet interest, FRELIMO in Mozambique, at its Fourth Congress in 1983, decided to commit itself to increasing the role of the private sector and shifting the emphasis in its development programme from large-scale to medium and small-scale projects.

The signing of the 1984 Nkomati Accord also appeared to vindicate the policy of 'constructive engagement' as South Africa and Mozambique agreed to stop backing each other's rival 'resistance' movements of RENAMO and Umkhonto we Sizwe.⁵ These regional diplomatic efforts reflected the changing US-Soviet relationship at the international level. At the 1986 Reykjavik Summit between Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev, the two leaders underlined the growing determination of the two super-powers to keep the region as far as possible out of international power politics and seek to promote the peaceful resolution of conflict.

The US, however, continued to isolate Angola from this more pragmatic policy. This was a country burdened since the middle 1970s by a civil war

between the marxist-inclined MPLA government in Luanda and the western-backed UNITA forces led by Jonas Savimbi in the south of the country. A hard-line US policy continued to prevail towards the Luanda government with considerable support from Congress. The Reagan administration remained committed throughout the 1980s to the principle of 'linkage' between the withdrawal of Cuban troops, who were supporting the FAPLA forces of the Luanda government, and the acceptance by the South African government of a timetable for the independence of Namibia under UN resolution 435. Despite the fact that some US economic interests such as Gulf Oil in the Cabinda enclave were happy to accommodate the MPLA government in Luanda, the US continued to exert a significant political leverage in the region based on support for the rival UNITA movement led by Jonas Savimbi. In 1986 Savimbi was received by President Reagan in the White House and the US provided military assistance in an escalating military conflict in the southern part of the country adjacent to the Namibian border.

It was not, though, altogether clear whether Washington was really all that concerned to get the MPLA government removed from power. Some analysts saw US strategy as geared towards keeping a weak MPLA regime in power that was compliant to western interests. This path had the advantage of avoiding chaos whilst requiring a continued threat from Savimbi's UNITA.⁶ Once the Angola-Namibia Peace Accords were signed at the end of 1988, the MPLA's position began to look rather more precarious. The US chose to avoid direct mediation in domestic Angolan peace talks where more of the running was made by President Mobutu of Zaire.⁷

The high political profile of US diplomacy on the twin issues of Angola-Namibia contrasted with a growing resort to economic diplomacy in the case of the rest of the FLS. By the middle 1980s southern Africa had emerged into some political prominence in Washington as a result of the development of a domestic political constituency in the early 1980s campaigning for US divestment from South Africa.⁸ Media attention focussed on the wave of unrest in the South African townships during the period 1984-1986 as well as the economic destabilisation wrought by the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the neighbouring states which produced an economic crisis and the threat of starvation.

Congressional pressure tended to lead to a lack of overall clarity in US policy towards the southern African region. The Reagan administration made rather unsystematic forays towards establishing closer relations with the members of SADCC. It secured an \$8 million aid programme to Mozambique in 1984, rising to \$85 million in 1987 and \$100 million in 1989-1990. It excluded however, the MPLA government in Luanda from its African aid programme and continued to give aid and diplomatic support to

the rival UNITA movement of Jonas Savimbi. Relations with the Mugabe government of Zimbabwe were also rocky and a \$20 million US aid programme was discontinued in 1986 after an attack on US policy in the region by the Zimbabwe Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was resumed again two years later based on a \$17 million package.⁹

The issue of Mozambique particularly served as a battleground between the contrasting diplomatic styles of US policy. The State Department became keen to improve relations with the FRELIMO government of President Samora Machel after 1983 as the regime appeared to be moving away from the Soviet orbit. These efforts culminated in 1985 in President Reagan receiving Machel in the White House. However, other sections of government continued to view the FRELIMO regime with considerable ideological hostility and urged support for the rebel RENAMO movement. RENAMO had been established by the Rhodesians in 1976 but fell under South African control after the ZANU-PF victory in 1980. It waged an increasingly costly war of destabilisation in Mozambique in the early 1980s, though some hard-liners in Washington saw this as the price to pay for overthrowing a Soviet-backed Communist regime.

In the early 1980s the hard-liners were mainly focussed around the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under its militantly anti-communist director William Casey. The CIA was reassessing its covert operations at this time after the disaster in Iran in 1979. Casey was anxious to reduce CIA dependence on indigenous intelligence organisations which, as in the case of the Shah's SAVAK, had ultimately proved unreliable in their intelligence estimates of the Shah's ability to contain the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the country in the late 1970s. Casey tended to favour the employment of what were termed 'unilateral' human assets who were paid and controlled exclusively by the CIA and so less subject to local political pressures in the states in which they operated.¹⁰ Casey's main concern was to get intelligence mobilised as an active resource behind policy-making.¹¹ While he sympathised with RENAMO, he also saw it as part of a wider global network of activity. Money raised to support RENAMO was partially diverted to other parts of the world just as money for Iranian arms was used to support the Nicaraguan Contras.¹²

Until 1986 the CIA continued to work through the RENAMO office in Lisbon. Casey admired the South African intelligence network and maintained close ties with it, especially as the South Africans provided Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement in Angola with \$200 million of aid.¹³ However, the passage of the 1986 Comprehensive Anti Apartheid Act made such a close link with South Africa increasingly dangerous politically, especially as the earlier policy of 'constructive engagement' was effectively dead in Washington by this time. There was growing Congressional pressure to reduce all links with South Africa, including military and

security links and it became necessary to rethink the CIA's role in the region in order to avoid these political constraints. Relying upon the South Africans as the main supporters of RENAMO would risk boxing the CIA into the same corner it found itself in at the end of 1975 in Angola in the operation in support of UNITA's offensive against the MPLA in the capital of Luanda. Pressure from Congress led to the passage of the Clark Amendment in December 1975 ending any further funding for the CIA operation.¹⁴ Furthermore, other western leaders did not view RENAMO in a favourable light and distinguished its activities from those of UNITA. Margaret Thatcher of Britain particularly favoured supporting the existing FRELIMO government as a means of keeping it in a non-aligned position and was by no means a rigid Cold War ideologue as far as southern Africa was concerned.¹⁵

The CIA, nevertheless, began to respond to a groundswell of discontent on the far right in the US following the 1985 visit of Samora Machel to Washington. Following criticism of Reagan's apparently conciliatory policy, the CIA set up in 1986 a political front of its own that was no longer beholden to the MNR office in Lisbon. The front was called the *Mozambique Research Centre* and was headed by an American who had formerly worked for the Rhodesian government, Thomas Schaaf Jr. This body established a series of RENAMO representatives who were responsible to Washington rather than Pretoria, though this also led to some rivalry between the different RENAMO groups. In November 1987 two RENAMO representatives in Malawi with links to Schaaf, Joao Ataide and Mateus Lopes, were murdered — ostensibly on South African orders.¹⁶

The murders did not prevent a decline of South African influence over RENAMO in the years following 1986 and increasing US leverage over it. The CIA was assisted by fundamentalist missionary sects in the Shire Valley of Malawi who helped establish a new base for RENAMO operations. It has proved impossible though for the CIA completely to dislodge the main affiliation of the organisation to the SADF, given the latter's long-standing financial and logistical support of it under its intelligence chief, Major General C.J. Van Tonder.

The US pressure also did not come exclusively from the CIA, which became weakened by new controversies over the scope of its activities following the Iran-Contra scandal and the death of Casey in 1987. By 1988 the focus for the activities of the hard-liners in Washington shifted to the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) based in the Pentagon. This had formerly observed a demarcation of responsibilities with the CIA under its Director, Air Force Lieutenant General Eugene Tighe, and concentrated on gathering intelligence on the Soviet military machine while the CIA concentrated on political upheaval and revolutions.¹⁷ However, with the rapidly approaching demise of the Cold War, it began looking for other

roles for itself and was able to take advantage of the CIA's own internal crisis by expanding into the Mozambique theatre.

In 1988, the DIA began supporting its own lobby called *Freedom Research Foundation*, under the joint chairmanship of newsletter-writer Larry Abraham and Harry Schultz, described by one analyst as an 'unorthodox financier'.¹⁸ *Freedom* was a rather more conventional anti-Soviet organisation and fostered links with Colonel Oliver North. Schultz too worked on joint projects with General Daniel Graham, a former director of the DIA who had advised the South African government on psychological warfare. It appears to have been less concerned than the Mozambique Research Centre to undermine South African support for RENAMO and to try instead to give continued backing to the SADF's 'total strategy' against a monolithic communist 'onslaught' in southern Africa. This more amenable line of the DIA to South Africa probably reflected a common sense of decline in hard-line military influences on the foreign policies of both the US and South Africa by the late 1980s.

Freedom Inc began its work at an inopportune time politically for the wave of interest in RENAMO on the US right had already peaked following revelations of a massacre in Mozambique by some of its combatants in 1987. The US State Department also went on to the political offensive at this time following revelations that RENAMO had caused up to 100,000 deaths in Mozambique and begun comparing it to the *Khmer Rouge* in Cambodia.¹⁹ The decline of the Cold War atmosphere of the early 1980s made it increasingly difficult to excite political interest in the issue, especially as the Reagan administration was in its final year.

By the advent of the Bush administration, therefore, the covert activities of some sections of US government such as the CIA and the DIA in southern Africa had considerably diminished. The US moved towards supporting a negotiated settlement of the Mozambique civil war, though without the same degree of high-level diplomatic activity as occurred in the case of Chester Crocker's protracted mediation in the disputes in Angola and Namibia in the course of the 1980s, culminating in the New York Accords of December 1988. The issue was seen in Washington as one that should be settled through African mediation. Presidents Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Moi of Kenya took a lead by helping arrange preliminary talks by the two parties in August 1990 in Nairobi. These talks were partially stimulated by the Gbadolite Declaration of June the same year whereby President Mobutu of Zaire succeeded in bringing the MPLA government in Luanda face to face with Jonas Savimbi of UNITA to sign a cease-fire and an agreement to begin talks.²⁰

The US did make one peace proposal on 7 December 1990 when the talks threatened to go off the rails once it became clear that the Chissano government insisted that the RENAMO leaders could participate only as

individuals in forthcoming elections and not as a political movement. The RENAMO leader Alphonso Dhlakama, however, rejected point six of the seven point US plan which provided that all parties should recognise the 'legitimacy of the Republic of Mozambique and its constitution, institutions and the fundamental laws emanating from them'.²¹ The issue illustrated the degree to which policy on the issue had come back under the aegis of the State Department, though it is probable that the CIA continues to maintain some interest in the activities of RENAMO, which has recently been operating a political front in Britain in the form of a *Mozambique Institute* directed by David Hoile. The Bush administration continues to distance itself from any formal support for RENAMO, which has tried to present itself as a movement that is not committed to terrorism or food starvation and is simply committed to taking control of Mozambique as a non-aligned state committed to political pluralism and free enterprise.²²

THE SHIFT TOWARDS ECONOMIC LEVERAGE

The State Department's reassertion of control over southern African policy in the late 1980s was partly a result of the progressive winding down of military confrontation in the region following the Angolan-Namibia settlement in December 1988. The 1986 Anti Apartheid Act also necessitated a reassessment of policy towards the Front Line States and in the period since fiscal year 1987 the US Congress appropriated \$50 million a year towards the SADCC Programme of Action. This was in addition to a Development Fund for Africa account (DFA), though in 1990 the \$50 million was finally merged with the DFA.

It became increasingly clear in the second Reagan administration that Afro-Marxist regimes could no longer look to Soviet and Eastern Bloc support to sustain poorly-planned and administered command economies. By 1988, the assumptions behind Soviet foreign policy were undergoing serious reassessment and the First Deputy Foreign Minister, Anatoli Kovalev, urged at a closed conference in July that year Soviet diplomacy should have as its main priority the Asia Pacific region in order for the USSR to act as a bridge between Europe and Asia.²³ Africa had been seriously down-graded in Soviet political thinking and no longer appeared to represent a terrain for major geo-strategic initiatives as in the 1970s.

The pressure for concentrating upon economic as opposed to military or political leverage in US policy was also strengthened by a new assertiveness in some of the aid organisations concerned with the region. In particular the World Bank started to go onto the ideological offensive by the middle 1980s against criticisms that aid programmes sponsored by it were responsible for the progressive under-development of many African economies. Montague Yudelman, who had headed the World Bank's Department of Agriculture and Rural Development from 1974-1984, pointed out in Congressional

testimony in 1986 that the World Bank had mistakenly assumed in the 1970s that Africa would follow the precedent of Asia in a forging of 'green revolution' based upon the infusion of aid funds and technological expertise. It was not recognised that this aid model was no longer appropriate to societies with a poor economic and political infrastructure and that smaller-scale projects, based particularly upon irrigation projects for peasant farmers, were necessary.²⁴

A new climate began to infuse policy-making by the late 1980s as a group of 'Africanists' in the State Department began to pressurize George Shultz into recognising that Afro-Marxist regimes were more manageable and more pragmatic than had been generally supposed. In part this was a result of the previous destabilisation strategy of South Africa which, 'in exposing the inherent weaknesses of the Frontline States...left them receptive to American overtures urging peaceful coexistence and peaceful change'.²⁵ It was also informed by a changing intellectual climate in which market models, privatisation and a lessening of state control were seen as essential for African economic development.

The US policy change can be seen as part of a wider shift in western policy as a whole towards developing states based upon a 'linkage strategy' of extending aid provisions in return for political reforms.²⁶ Since developing states have less bargaining power with the decline of Cold War rivalry between the super powers, there are no alternative bodies for them to turn to in search of aid and capital investment. US policy is in a strong position to exert some leverage over reforms in areas such as human rights after years of silence.

So far there is little evidence of any clearly focused policy on human rights linked to economic development as far as southern Africa is concerned. The last time a human rights policy was attempted was under the Carter administration and it was almost exclusively preoccupied with South Africa. This policy had in the end little credibility for it was closely linked to the demand for 'one man one vote' and failed to calculate the response from the whites, who refused to yield power without any safeguards.²⁷

Now that a negotiation process has commenced in South Africa on a transfer of power, the issue of human rights in the region can be pitched at a more general level. Signs of this have particularly emerged in the case of Angola. A number of Congressional democrats began demanding a halt in arms shipments to UNITA by late 1990 on the grounds that it was time to end America's 'last proxy war' and seek a peaceful resolution of it as in Cambodia and Afghanistan.²⁸ Most US efforts at promoting human rights in the region tend still to be concentrated upon South Africa, which has far greater media visibility than any of the other states and continues to be of major interest to the Congressional black caucus and the House and Senate Africa Sub-Committees.

RELATIONS WITH SADCC

The pre-occupation of US policy in the region with South Africa, however, has also meant that there has not been a comprehensive trade and investment policy for the region as whole. Aid and development policy has tended to evolve piecemeal and to be with specific countries. Programmes have not generally been geared towards promoting greater regional cooperation, although it was clear right from the time of SADCC's foundation that there was very little intra-regional trade between its member states. From the early Reagan years, all new interaction has tended to be conceived in terms of promoting security.²⁹ In 1981, for example, trade between SADCC members was only US\$290 million or some 5.1% of total exports and 3.9% total imports. By 1987 only 4.4% of SADCC's total trade was between its members.³⁰ In this context, US policy tends to follow a wider pattern of western development assistance to the southern African region, which throughout the 1980s has been mainly on a bilateral basis.

Table 1: US Official Development Assistance in southern Africa

	US \$ mills.		Bilateral %	
	1980	1987	1980	1987
Malawi	143	280	52	61
Tanzania	679	882	81	81
Zambia	318	429	81	80
Lesotho	94	108	64	64
Zimbabwe	164	295	71	90
Swaziland	50	45	64	64
Botswana	106	154	78	80

Source: World Bank.

The US has not been especially different in its aid programme to the region where the lion's share has gone to individual countries rather than SADCC.

Table 2: US Aid to southern Africa

	(US\$ mills.)				
	1981	1984	1986	1988	1990
Dollar Aid	103,3	101,9	101,2	77,0	93,4
Food Aid	56,5	56,0	50,0	52,8	37,4
SADCC	12,4	9,7	14,7	50,0	49,8
Total	172,2	167,6	165,9	179,8	180,6

Source: USAID

Critics of IMF and World Bank policy on aid to developing states have charged that this bilateralism reinforces the economic dependency of these states on trans-national corporations and financial institutions who are not interested in local development needs but exporting cheap raw materials or assembling a limited range of capital intensive manufactures. The political failure to challenge this in the US during the 1980s has thus been seen as reflecting the interests and pressures of multinational corporations.³¹ It is likely though that more immediate pressures on policy-makers in USAID were general political and security issues. The US has been mainly concerned not to see the collapse of political structures in the region necessitating a major western military incursion into the region in the event of a major war.

Some of the policy failure can also be put down to the growing intellectual influence of neo-conservative thinking about Africa in the 1980s. This produced a generally complacent outlook towards Africa combined with what Christopher Coker has termed an 'incurable tendency to oversimplify experience'. In the US, policy-makers tended to assume they had nothing to learn from the cultures of other societies and ignored the costs incurred by these societies in importing models from the West.³² This view has been replicated in the southern African region where white-controlled South Africa has been seen as the main centre through which economic transaction takes place with the other regional participants effectively colonial satellites of this major economic and political hub.³³ Policy attitudes have only recently begun slowly to change in this regard as the prospect emerges of a domestic transfer of power in South Africa to a majority controlled government. However, even a black South African government may well find itself forced to work structures bequeathed from the colonial past and find itself treated by western governments, including the US, as the neo-colonial overlord of regional economic and political stability.

The political windfall created by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of any serious Soviet interest in Africa may reinforce this political myopia. On the other hand, the decline of a security interest in the region may leave the Department of State in a relatively strong position to develop its own regional policy in a rather more creative manner than formerly, building on organisations like SADCC which seek regional economic cooperation rather than domination by a South African hegemon.

The US Agency for International Development in the Department of State, however, tends to follow in close tandem with the thinking in international agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank. The latter bodies have far more funds invested in the region, with World Bank debts to SADCC members totalling US\$1605.9 million in 1987 and the IMF debt totalling US\$1338 million for the same year. Total debts to SADCC

amounted to US\$4762 million.³⁴ In September 1989 the IMF and World Bank decided at their annual meetings in Washington not to accede to pressures on helping developing states with multi-lateral debt reduction, which accounts for 35.6% of the southern African region's debt. USAID policy for the region has also shifted from an earlier emphasis upon increase in the actual capacity in areas such as transportation towards cost effectiveness improvements. Thus while some \$185 million has been given overall for the ten year period starting in 1981 for improvement of transportation among SADCC members, the criteria for giving it have increasingly necessitated closer analysis and coordination of policies between USAID and the IMF and World Bank.³⁵

CONCLUSION

To this extent, it is unlikely that any major new US aid programme is likely to emerge from within USAID that would re-orientate US policy towards the region as a whole. The US simply does not have the funding leverage to initiate a new western aid and development policy for the region even if it wished to. US policy is likely to be far more significant regarding South Africa than the region as a whole if US aid to that country is significantly increased.

Southern Africa, though, is viewed as a relatively remote region in Washington and it is unlikely to have the same strategic importance it had during the Cold War.³⁶ The role the US plays in the region will to a considerable degree be derivative and highly dependent upon the role forged by the US in other strategically and politically more salient theatres such as the Middle East and South West Asia. If the US maintains its position as a global super-power into the next century its resulting confidence may induce it to play a creative diplomatic role in the southern African region, which is the one region that the State Department's Africanists see as having any really credible long-term economic potential on the continent.³⁷

However, another likely alternative is that US political and economic interest in the region will decline once a constitutional settlement with South Africa is achieved. This will mean that the longer-term economic future of the region, especially regarding policies concerning aid and investment, will be increasingly in the hands of international financial institutions and aid agencies like the IMF and the World Bank. It will be these bodies which will shield the governments of major western states from having to make long-term political decisions on credit and aid for the region, which as a whole faces a difficult task in bidding for aid and investment in competition with other regions capable of maintaining greater international attention such as the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

ENDNOTES

- 1 See for example Paul B Rich, 'US Containment Policy, South Africa and the Apartheid Dilemma' in Stephen Chan (ed), *Exporting Apartheid Foreign Policies in Southern Africa, 1978-1988*, London and Basingstoke, The Macmillan Press, 1990, pp 306-328
- 2 Robert Jaster, *A Regional Security Role for Africa's Front Line States Experience and Prospects*, London, I I S S , 1983, p 34
- 3 David A Dickson, *United States Foreign Policy Towards Sub Saharan Africa*, Lanham and London, University Press of America, 1985, p 137
- 4 William J Foltz, 'United States Policy Toward Southern Africa Economic and Strategic Constraints', *Political Science Quarterly*, 92, 1 (Spring 1977), p 63
- 5 Gillian Gunn, 'Post Nkomati Mozambique', *CSIS Africa Notes*, 38, January 1985, pp 1-8
- 6 'Angola Courting Washington', *Africa Confidential*, 3 February 1989
- 7 'Angola UNITA and Washington Scent Victory', *Africa Confidential*, 29 June 1990
- 8 Michael Maren, 'Building a Constituency Against Apartheid', *Africa Report*, May-June 1984, pp 55-59
- 9 Ben L Martin, 'American Policy Towards Southern Africa in the 1980s', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27, 1 (1989), p 33
- 10 Bob Woodward, *Veil The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1987, p 114
- 11 *Ibid*, p 111
- 12 'Mozambique Plausible Deniability', *Africa Confidential*, 2 December 1988, p 1
- 13 Woodward, *op cit*, p 269
- 14 John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, London, A Deutsch, 1978
- 15 Alex Vines, *Renamo Terrorism in Mozambique*, London, James Currey, 1991, p 51
- 16 'Mozambique Plausible Deniability', p 2, Ataide was supposed to be extending the CIA network by going to France as RENAMO representative See also Alex Vines, *op cit*, pp 43-44
- 17 Woodward, *op cit*, p 98
- 18 'Mozambique Plausible Deniability', p 1
- 19 'Mozambique marketing RENAMO', *Africa Confidential*, 9 September 1988, p 1
- 20 Vines, *op cit*, p 125
- 21 *Ibid*, 126
- 22 Sharon Behn, 'The Unknown Side Renamo in Mozambique', Mozambique Institute, London, n d
- 23 Bogdan Szajkowski, 'A Preliminary Assessment of 'Soviet New Thinking' Concerning the Marxist Regimes in Africa and New Policy Adaptations in Ethiopia', unpub paper presented to the Communist Politics Group of the PSA, University of Warwick, April 1989, p 6
- 24 CIS 87-H241 *Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs*, Montague Yudelman, June 25, 1986, p 5
- 25 Martin *op cit*, p 45
- 26 Ibrahim S R Msabaha, 'The Implications of International Changes for African States' in Francis M Deng and I William Zartman (eds), *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, Washington D C , the Brookings Institution, 1991, p 90
- 27 Christopher Coker, 'Retreat Into the Future The United States, South Africa and Human Rights, 1976-78', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 18, 3 (1980), p 524
- 28 *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 1 August 1990
- 29 Ed Brown, 'Foreign Aid to SADCC An Analysis of the Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy', *Issue*, X11, 3/4 Fall/Winter 1982, p 30
- 30 Archie Mafeje, 'Food and Security and Peace in the SADCC Region' in Emanuel Hansen (ed), *Africa Perspectives on Peace and Development*, London and New Jersey, Zed Books, 1987, p 185, Susanna Smith, *Front Line Africa The Right to a Future*, Oxford, Oxfam, 1990, p 173
- 31 Ann Seidman, 'Towards Ending IMF-ism in Southern Africa An Alternative

- Development Strategy', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27, 1 (1989), p 1
- 32 Christopher Coker, 'Neo Conservatism and Africa: Some Common American Fallacies', *Third World Quarterly*, 4, 2 (April 1983), pp 283-299
- 33 Brown, *op cit*, p 33
- 34 Smith, *op cit*, p 190
- 35 Kimberley Finan, Mimeo entitled 'Transport', USAID, 18 August 1990, interview with Kimberley A Finan, USAID, Washington D C, 31 October 1991
- 36 Though this theme is still argued by some neo conservatives. See L H Gann and Peter Duignan, *Hope for South Africa?*, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1991, pp 38-50
- 37 Interview with Peter Chave, Office of South African Affairs, Department of State, Washington D C, 29 October 1991

BOOK REVIEWS

ZEA E. ZIMMERMAN, *Zimbabwe's First Decade of Independence, 1980-1990: a select and annotated bibliography*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1991, ix+410pp., R75,00. ISBN 0 908371 93 4, paperback.

R. KENT RASMUSSEN and STEVEN C. RUBERT (editors), *Historical Dictionary of Zimbabwe* (second edition). Metuchen, NJ and London: Scarecrow Press, 1991, xxxviii+502pp., Pound Sterling 41.25. ISBN 0 8108 2337 3, hardback.

Zimmerman's 'select' bibliography has nearly 2,000 items, despite being restricted to the 1980s and social, economic and political aspects of Zimbabwe's first ten years. This is an admirable and remarkably comprehensive collection, marred only by the fact that a small proportion of entries, including some important items, are honestly admitted to be unseen. Otherwise, the annotations are short accurate summaries of the authors' arguments rather than evaluations. There are two excellent indexes, by author and subject, and ample cross-referencing. Oh, and of course, almost everything I have published has been picked up, which predisposes me in its favour.

The original edition of the *Historical Dictionary* was edited by Kent Rasmussen in the late 1970s, and, as Jon Woronoff, the series editor (there are 44 other countries covered), states in the foreword, '[I]t is the complex twists and turns of Zimbabwe's post-independence politics that make this revised and expanded edition of the dictionary indispensable.' This work has been carried out by the second editor. The dictionary may well be indispensable for social historians, but its uses will be severely limited for others, even for economic historians.

The bulk of the book (over 400 pages) is an alphabetical dictionary, clearly based on the first edition, with relevant entries updated, and a limited number of entries for the 1980s. It is certainly a useful source for basic information in its field, but a high proportion of the more economic or cultural topics that I looked for were absent.

There is also a useful chronology, which starts in prehistory and begins in earnest in the 19th century, and a highly selective and not very useful bibliography, running to barely a thousand items. Naturally, reviewers will be influenced by whether they find that their own name is given due coverage, and I have to confess that I didn't. The bibliography contains references to two or three minor papers by me (it's hard to be sure how many, because there are some 60 subject areas, but no overall index of any type), but misses several more important ones and all three books. But I am apparently not the victim of discrimination: my searches uncovered no

reference to Arthur Hazelwood, surely a key author in the federal period, hardly any to Roger Riddell, not even the famous 'Riddell Report', Ibbo Mandaza's key edited collection 'Zimbabwe: the Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986' is missing, although Schatzberg's less interesting 'Political Economy of Zimbabwe' is there, possibly because it derived from a conference in the USA. Other omissions are the influential UNCTAD report and its extensive working papers from the late 1970s, and Anthony Chennels is a name that ought not to have been missed in reference to the settler novel. The subsection on industry has only nine references, none of them after 1974, even though the industrial sector, at over a quarter of national income, is relatively the largest in Africa, and a bibliography since 1974 would consist of at least a hundred items of equal or greater interest than those included.

There are also a number of mistakes: a collection edited by Seidman, Seidman, Ndlela and Makamure implies that they are the authors, and Makamure is misspelt; and Terry Ranger's famous paper emerges as 'The hanging of the old guard'!

In short, although both these books will find a place on my shelf, Zimmerman's is the one I shall turn to first, and I think that even historians of the post-independence period would do so as well.

Colin Stoneman
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