

International Affairs BULLETIN



**DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

VOL 1 NO 1

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
(founded/gestig: 1934)

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BULLETIN

Published by the South African Institute of International Affairs and supplied free of charge to members. Three issues per year. Subscription rate for non-members R5,00 per annum (surface mail); R7,00 per annum (overseas airmail). Price per copy R1,50 plus postage.

Uitgeegee deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede en gratis aan lede verskaf. Drie uitgawes per jaar. Intekengeld vir nie-lede R5,00 per jaar (landpos); R7,00 per jaar (buitelandse lugpos). Prys per eksemplaar R1,50 plus posgeld.

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(Research Assistant/Navorsingsassistent)

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Resensie-eksemplare van boeke, monografieë en pamflette, sowel as alle korrespondensie oor redaksionele sake moet gerig word aan die Redakteur, *International Affairs Bulletin*, Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede, Jan Smuts-Huis, Posbus 31596, Braamfontein 2017, Johannesburg, Suid-Afrika.



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Vol. 1, No. 1, 1977

CONTENTS/INHOUD

SOVIET AND CHINESE POLICIES IN AFRICA James Mayall	1
RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE: THE POSITION OF THE UNITED AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL Gordon Chavunduka	14
THE INDIAN OCEAN IN INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY T.B. Millar	22
WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE UNITED NATIONS? Leon Gordenker	33
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY J.D. Matthews	43

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SOVIET AND CHINESE POLICIES IN AFRICA

James Mayall

The development of Soviet and Chinese policies towards Southern Africa must be seen against the background, not merely of the struggle which so recently ended – if indeed it has ended – in Mozambique and Angola and which is currently being acted out in Rhodesia and SWA/Namibia, but also in the wider context of their overall foreign policies. While concentrating on Southern Africa, Soviet and Chinese policies in the sub-continent should be related to those they have pursued elsewhere in Africa. This is because of two reasons. First, although Africa has been an area of interest to both communist powers since the middle 1950's, and although both powers have certainly tried to capitalise on the withdrawal of Western imperial power, the idea of a vacuum which the Chinese and Russians could fill at will is mistaken. However much African leaders have valued Russian and Chinese support, their primary loyalty has generally been to securing their own independence from any permanent external allegiance. The second reason for asserting the central position of the African states is perhaps even more important: since 1963 it has been the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which has provided the essential support of legitimacy for the African policies – and particularly the Southern African policies – of both communist powers.

It was in May 1963 that the African states finally agreed, after three years of internecine quarrelling, to create a continental organisation and to submit themselves to a common Charter. It is no secret that this document reflected a compromise between different groups of states, which were rather mistakenly labelled radical and moderate at the time. Under this compromise the African leaders bound themselves to create a diplomatic system for relations amongst themselves and with non-African states, which was a direct descendant of the system which emerged from the debris of the Thirty Years War in Europe in 1648: in other words, the emphasis was placed emphatically and deliberately on the minimal institutions for international order; on the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of states; and, of course, also on what this implied – the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. But, the wars of religion which had preceded the creation of the European state system also had their echo in the OAU compromise, for all OAU members bound themselves – as a matter of fundamental principle – to the eradica-

The author is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United Kingdom. He is the author of *Africa – The Cold War and After*. This article is an edited version of a talk given to several Branches of the South African Institute of International Affairs in February 1977.

tion of colonialism and minority rule throughout the continent. To the extent that there has been an African foreign policy since 1963 – and many will dispute its existence – it has been provided by these dual commitments: to order and to revolutionary change.

Both these commitments had quite far-reaching consequences for the Soviet Union and China. When the OAU was set up, one of the main spurs to intra-African reconciliation was the fear that many African leaders then had of externally-assisted subversion against their regimes. Much of this fear focused on Kwame Nkrumah, who was widely believed to be aiding dissidents in Ghana's neighbour states and even further afield in an attempt to bring to power regimes sympathetic to his own particular brand of Pan-Africanism. Since in the early 1960's Ghana had developed close relations with both Peking and Moscow, some of this suspicion rubbed off on the communist powers. There were also other reasons why the majority of African states wished to distance themselves from the Soviet Union and China: China had continued to support – and train in guerrilla warfare – the UPC of Cameroun and the Sawaba Party of Niger after the independence of these two countries, as well as the Lumumbists under Antoine Gizenga after their elimination from power in the Congo; and Guinea's relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated despite the Russian rescue operation after De Gaulle expelled Guinea from the French Community, when Sékou Touré accused the Soviet ambassador of interfering in his country's internal affairs. Finally, and above all, by 1963 African leaders were generally dismayed and resentful at the ferocity with which both communist powers projected their ideological quarrel onto Africa with very little regard for African concerns or sensitivities. It was in this context that Julius Nyerere warned his fellow leaders about the dangers of "a second scramble for Africa".

So, on this score the lesson for the Soviet Union and China was clear: the African states would welcome normal diplomatic relations with all states – theirs is after all the only international organisation in which membership is conditional on being formally non-aligned – but they would not condone foreign intervention in their internal conflicts; these were to be their own exclusive preserve. They also committed themselves, perhaps with more hope than true conviction, to the peaceful settlement of intra-African disputes. By and large the Soviet Union adapted its policy fairly closely to the OAU line, and by the middle of the decade had established relations – admittedly of varying degrees of warmth – with most African states, regardless of the nature of their regimes. Chinese policy followed a rather more erratic course, partly because – until the Cultural Revolution – the con-

flict with the Soviet Union over the meaning and implications of peaceful coexistence required Peking to demonstrate Chinese militancy in the anti-imperialist revolution. For example, the agreement with Ghana to train freedom fighters within that country dates back to 1964, but after the Cultural Revolution there was a change of tack and since 1971 it has been the Chinese who have been the more careful of the two powers to align their policy with that of the OAU.

In co-operating with the efforts of the independent African states to create their own diplomatic system, the communist powers were doing nothing more than the industrial states of the capitalist West. But, whereas in the West their economic, political and cultural ties with the white regimes in Southern Africa produced a highly ambiguous response to that part of the OAU Charter which committed African states to radical change in Southern Africa – if necessary by violent means – neither the Soviet Union nor China faced any such inhibitions. Historically, for reasons which overlapped but were also different in each case, the anti-colonial liberation struggle had always been considered in principle as part of the socialist world revolution. In any event, since 1963 the OAU commitment to the eradication of colonialism and minority rule had had the full – and on the rhetorical level at least, enthusiastic – endorsement of the Soviet Union and China. But, while for independent Africa this is an un-negotiable commitment – and it should be emphasised that it does not refer to timing, or to the means by which the goal should be achieved, or to the kind of day-to-day *modus vivendi* which all the OAU members near the Republic engage in, but to the principle – for both the Soviet Union and China it is a diplomatic commitment, which they have voluntarily entered into and which they will honour only in so far and to the extent that it is consistent with their other interests and preoccupations. In the past there have been many twists and turns in the policies of both powers towards national liberation movements, and there is no reason to believe that this will not continue to be the case in the future. To understand their Southern African policies, therefore, it is necessary to set these in the wider context of Soviet and Chinese policy generally. How then does Southern Africa figure in the overall policy of the two communist states?

The Soviet Union and Southern Africa

As has been said, the Soviet Union has little difficulty in aligning its policies with those of the OAU. This is true but not, of course, the whole truth. Although there has always been a tension in Soviet policy between the need to develop relations with regimes which were ideologically sympathetic to Moscow and the need to

exploit opportunities wherever these arose, Russian support for the OAU was in the early years ensured: it was a policy advocated by all the so-called "radical" regimes and particularly by Ghana, Guinea and Mali with whom the Soviet Union had developed close relations after 1960. But later, Russia's Africa policy became increasingly pragmatic and relations were developed wherever opportunities occurred. So, for example, Moscow developed close relations with Somalia after the Western powers had failed to agree on a military aid programme which the Somali regime had requested, and relations with Nigeria improved rapidly when the Soviet Union agreed to supply offensive weapons for the war against Biafra.

Apart from the fact that it was in line with the OAU, there were two reasons for this increasingly pragmatic Soviet policy. Within Africa the main reason was the series of reverses which the Soviet leaders encountered in their efforts to sort out the sheep from the goats and to establish reliable ideological allies. The rash of military coups, in West Africa particularly, was not confined – as Soviet theorists had imagined it would be – to "reactionary" regimes: Nkrumah in Ghana and Mobido Keita in Mali were overthrown by their allegedly "progressive" armies, and neither did relations with Guinea prove as easy as the Soviet leaders had no doubt hoped. But overriding the constraints the Russians faced in Africa were those they faced in their relations with the West. The Congo crisis had in effect demonstrated that there were limits to what they could do in supporting particular nationalist movements – in this case the Lumumbists in Stanleyville – as long as the West enjoyed the support of the majority of African states, however grudging and critical, in the United Nations. But probably even more important than this experience was the need which the Soviet Union felt after the Cuban missile crisis to reach some kind of accommodation with the Western powers. This could only be done if they avoided policies which might lead to an open confrontation with the United States, and even perhaps confined themselves to playing an active role only where there was a tacit community of interest between the two super-powers – as, for example, in the settlement of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war.

The middle 1960's then were a period of restraint for the Soviet Union, when Moscow concentrated on establishing "correct" relations with legitimate governments in Africa as elsewhere in the developing world. Restraint of this kind, of course, never applied where there was no risk; nor could it, because the Soviet government had to think not only about the reaction of the Western powers, but also about the new challenge from Peking which was aimed with particular vehemence at Soviet positions in Asia and Africa. In these circumstances Southern Africa had

obvious attractions for Moscow: it was the last remaining area of the world under colonial rule; the African states, quite independently of any pressure from the Soviet Union, were committed to change; and the Russians had gained considerable prestige at the UN by calling for the immediate liquidation of colonialism – the initiative which led finally to the almost unanimous adoption of an Afro-Asian resolution on this subject. In the OAU, the African states had underlined the fact that their commitment to change in Southern Africa included the use of force by setting up their own Liberation Committee to co-ordinate support for the nationalist movements. So, although the Soviet decision to back the leading liberation movements in the area – FRELIMO, MPLA, SWAPO, PAIGC, ZAPU – created some problems for the OAU, on the fundamental question of confrontation Moscow was doing no more than following the official OAU line. In view of the Soviet claim to be the first socialist state, to have done less might well have forfeited African support, since for many African leaders the attraction of the Soviet Union was precisely that it was powerful and anti-Western at the same time. In any case – and this is the real point – inactivity would have left the field open to the Chinese.

Support for African liberation was also attractive at that time, because the risks were not very large. For their own reasons the Western powers have never been willing to arm or train the liberation movements – so there was no risk of an open competition for influence – while even in the early 1970's the structure of white power still looked pretty solid. In any event, although the communist powers were always the major source of arms for the movements – SIPRI estimated that they provided up to 40 percent of all supplies – the Soviet Union never intervened directly until 1975; nor is there any evidence that such intervention would have been welcomed by the movements themselves. The weapons supplied – and they were mostly small arms – were never on a scale which would have been regarded as dangerously provocative by the West. Neither the United States nor Britain – which in 1963 was designated by the Kennedy administration as principal guardian of the Western interest in Africa – had an effective Southern Africa policy: so the Soviet Union was able, at very little cost to itself, both to support OAU policy and at least to contain Chinese influence amongst the movements.

China and Southern Africa

Where the Soviet Union led, China was bound to follow. However, while some of its reasons for doing so echoed those of the Soviet Union, others constituted polar opposites. Like the Soviet Union, China was committed to the anti-imperialist cause from the start and so, by definition, was ranged on the side of the libera-

tion movements in Southern Africa. Like the Soviet Union also – although this similarity was not immediately apparent – China was to face difficulties in Africa as a result of the two levels on which its foreign policy was pursued: that is, on the level of promoting revolutionary activity, or at least of seeking special relations with regimes who were regarded as sympathetic to the revolutionary cause; and on the level of correct diplomatic relations with regimes of all ideological complexions. So, by simply endorsing OAU policy on Southern Africa, China – like the Soviet Union – was able, up to a point, to have its cake and eat it.

From 1960 onwards Chinese policy in Africa was marked not by these underlying similarities with Soviet policy, but by the striking contrasts. For a start the Chinese did not accept that the nuclear capability of the United States constituted a good reason for caution – at least as the Soviet leaders interpreted that concept. On the contrary, until the Cultural Revolution when the Chinese political class turned in on itself and seemed primarily concerned with defending the purity of the Chinese revolution at home – and to a limited extent abroad also – the official Chinese line was that the balance of world forces had tilted in favour of the socialist states and that revolutionary internationalism demanded a show of solidarity wherever wars of national liberation were being waged. In Africa they had given earlier and more consistent military and political support than the Soviet Union to the FLN and they regarded the Algerian revolution as the prototype for other African territories. Although they entered into diplomatic relations with a number of states whose leaders were sympathetic to Peking – and it is also worth recalling that in the mid 1950's they had been quicker than the Soviet Union to recognise the diplomatic potential of the Afro-Asian world – and although they adopted from the start an extremely pragmatic attitude towards trading with states with whom they did not have diplomatic relations, in the Chinese revolutionary tradition the correct way to achieve independence – the only way to avoid neo-colonial control – was seen to be through self-liberation by waging a protracted guerrilla insurgency. In this effort all patriotic elements would be united, but ideally they should be organised and led by the Communist Party.

Leaving aside the fact that there were very few communist parties in Africa and that those that did exist were all pro-Moscow, the Chinese revolutionary programme created both problems and opportunities. The problems arose because several African leaders were suspicious of Chinese revolutionary activity in support of their own dissidents. Unlike the Soviet Union after Stalin's death, the Chinese leadership was not favourably disposed towards non-alignment, the official foreign policy stance of the

OAU, until the early 1970's. On the basis of their non-aligned policy the African states had all implicitly backed China against India in the 1962 border war, in that none of them were prepared to answer Jawaharlal Nehru's call for a condemnation of Chinese aggression. But they applied the same strict neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, which the Africans regarded as weakening anti-imperialist solidarity; and this time African non-alignment worked against the Chinese interest. Whether because the Chinese took the initiative in projecting the dispute into Africa, or for some other reason, the experience of being used by the Chinese for extraneous purposes was widely resented by African leaders, as was the precipitate haste with which Peking recognised Houari Boumedienne after he had ousted Ahmed Ben Bella from power in Algeria in 1965. In the mid 1960's, the Chinese found themselves expelled from several states with which they previously had good relations – from the Central African Republic (now the Central African Empire), Dahomey (now Benin) and Ghana – and in increasing disfavour in others, such as Kenya.

But if the revolutionary commitment always posed problems, the Chinese doctrine also created opportunities in Southern Africa. All the liberation movements opted for the strategy of protracted guerrilla warfare. Until the Angolan civil war, all of them also endorsed the doctrine of self-liberation and self-reliance which forms an essential ingredient of the Chinese model – even to the extent of turning down military support from friendly African states; as, for example, the Nigerian offer to support the PAIGC in former Portuguese Guinea. Finally, although the Soviet Union outflanked them in West Africa, in Mozambique and Rhodesia both FRELIMO and ZANU were willing to accept financial and political support from Peking, as well as training by Chinese instructors in China itself and in the neighbouring sanctuary states of Tanzania and Zambia.

It was in Tanzania, as a result of the very close relationship China was able to build up with the Tanzanian government in connection with the building of the Tazara Railway and other projects, but extending also to the training and supply of the Tanzanian armed forces, that the Chinese put themselves in a good position to contain Soviet influence – or so it seemed until 1975. Emphasis falls on the idea of containment for two reasons. The first is that there is evidence that the Chinese were against any early escalation of the conflict, particularly in Rhodesia, precisely because this would threaten to transform it from guerrilla to conventional war, thus risking the intervention of external forces. Not only might such intervention threaten the independence of the sanctuary states by opening them up to reprisal raids, but it would also – in the Chinese view – distort the revolution and open

the nationalist movements to neo-colonial exploitation. The second reason is that only by containing the Soviet presence could the Chinese hope to maintain the balance between the appeal of their own strategic and political doctrines and superior Soviet material assistance.

One of the consequences of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the early 1960's had been a competition for patronage amongst the rival liberation movements. It was this competition, and what they rightly regarded as its divisive consequences, that led the OAU to set up its own Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam. However, this Committee was never able to enforce its authority because of internal difficulties and a perennial shortage of funds. The liberation movements, therefore, looked elsewhere and were armed directly, although never exclusively, by the communist powers. With the important exception of FRELIMO, which succeeded in keeping its lines open to both Moscow and Peking, China did not do well in this competition. The Soviet Union had well-established relations with the MPLA and PAIGC – and also with SWAPO. Thus Peking found itself backing the generally less effective splinter groups. Since it was not in a position to compete effectively with the Soviet Union as a military backer, the close and mutually beneficial relations with Tanzania – and through Tanzania with FRELIMO – constituted a major diplomatic gain for the Chinese. From the Chinese point of view the trouble was that as a result of an historical legacy going back to the Congo crisis, they were not able until 1973 to repeat the same policy with Zaire and so gain access to the FNLA. Perhaps it would have made no difference in any event, but with hindsight one can at least say that by the time this link was forged it proved to be too late.

The emergence of the Soviet Union as a "global" power: The Portuguese collapse and Sino-Soviet rivalry

Until the end of the 1960's the commitment to aid the liberation movements in Southern Africa was useful to the Soviet Union in that it did not involve them in an open confrontation with the West and so endanger their policy of East-West détente, while it actually supported the development of normal relations with legitimate African governments and countered the Chinese ideological challenge. A constant theme in Soviet propaganda in recent years has been that by preaching self-reliance the Chinese were ensuring that the African countries would remain in a state of subservience to the industrialised West, the hewers of wood and drawers of water for the multinational corporations. Until the end of the decade, however, the view from Peking was not impeded by any visions of détente. The principle objective of the Chinese government appears to have been – as it remains today – to under-

cut the extension of Soviet influence which, as time passed, the Chinese have come to see not just in revisionist ideological terms but as a form of social imperialism and neo-colonialism – more dangerous, because it is more insidious, than that of the West.

However, this hardening of Peking's attitude to the Russians also involved a change of perspective: what was seen in the early 1960's primarily as an ideological quarrel about methods, was regarded in the 1970's as a direct threat to the security and interests of the Chinese state. This shift has brought about, if not exactly a reversal of alliances in Southern Africa, at least a coincidence of Chinese and Western views on some aspects of Soviet policy. In the mid 1960's China was actively promoting the idea of insurgency, while Soviet policy was constrained by the need to reach accommodations with the West on nuclear and other issues. By 1975 the Soviet Union felt free to intervene actively and decisively in Angola, while the Chinese leadership was clearly disappointed that the Western powers did not put up a more effective resistance to the Russian/Cuban intervention which they unequivocally condemned.

Finally, two questions – which have been lurking behind the aforementioned remarks – must be asked. What is the nature of the change in the international environment which has led to this change of tack by both communist powers; and what are the implications for the various conflicts in Southern Africa?

The answer to the first question is relatively straightforward in the sense that it was the Portuguese coup of April 1974 which created the conditions for the rapid transfer of power in the former Portuguese colonies and also created the opportunities for the Soviet Union to reap the rewards for its consistent – although not trouble-free – support for the now ruling parties in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. It also faced the Soviet leadership with the problems of what to do about Angola, where the MPLA – which had the monopoly of Soviet support – was only one of three major contestants for power. It is known now how they eventually decided to handle this problem. But the decision to intervene not only ran counter to their previous policy in that there was at least notionally a risk of confrontation with the West, but also directly contradicted official OAU policy which was for an African solution to the conflict. Thus, it was not self-evidently an obvious decision for the Soviet Union to take.

Why then did they do it? In one sense the answer is easy. Beyond saying that they must have calculated correctly that they could get away with it, more is not yet known. Two more general points can, however, safely be made. The first concerns the emergence of the Soviet Union over the past few years not only as a nuclear super-power, but with a global conventional military

capability as well. This is a capability which the United States has had since 1945 but which the Soviet Union is only now acquiring. The second point again concerns the dynamic of Sino-Soviet rivalry in Africa.

One of the uncontested facts about the Soviet Union is the steady expansion of the Soviet navy, both in size and deployment, since the Cuban missile crisis. That episode must have demonstrated to the Russians, amongst other things, the importance of naval power in the competition for influence between nuclear powers, whose use of their ultimate weapon has so far been mercifully confined to threat. The Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean has almost certainly been exaggerated by both the Chinese, who see it as part of the Soviet policy of encircling China, and for obvious reasons by the South African government and its friends within NATO; exaggerated, because the Soviet navy is still not the largest navy deployed in the Indian Ocean – an honour that belongs to France about whose activities very little is heard. Still, as Admiral Gorshkov's writings make clear, the aim is for the Soviet navy to have a global capacity for intervention, and it is this relatively new self-confidence about its global role on behalf of "all peace-loving peoples" that has led to the view that the Soviet Union is only now entering into its truly "imperial" phase as a world power.

While this kind of evidence may point to the growing military self-confidence of the Soviet Union – and it seems to have none of the difficulties experienced by the Western powers in keeping up the level of defence expenditure – it is hardly enough to establish the thesis of the Soviet Union as a new and recklessly expansionist power. After all, it did not have to intervene in Mozambique to establish friendly relations with Maputo, and in recent years the Russians have suffered some fairly humiliating reverses in the Middle East and elsewhere, despite their growing military power. Reckless the Russians have never been, and had the Americans made it clear that they would match any Soviet intervention in Angola, the Russians could always have got out of their commitment to the MPLA by invoking the 1973 agreement on super-power consultation. So, what the Chinese call the Soviet Union's hegemonic ambitions may have been a necessary condition for the Angolan decision, but it was clearly not a sufficient one.

Once it became clear that the United States would be inhibited from acting for a host of familiar reasons – the experience of Vietnam, Watergate, the ambiguities surrounding American policy in Southern Africa, and the lack of an acceptable proxy through which to project American power into the conflict – it was the historical commitment to the MPLA, a commitment contracted by the Soviet Union during an earlier phase of the Sino-Soviet conflict, that finally persuaded Moscow to go for broke. It has

already been suggested that it was the intensity of this quarrel and the inadequacy of funds available to the Liberation Committee of the OAU, which had persuaded the communist powers that they could ignore OAU policy in this respect. To begin with: although China was as guilty as the Soviet Union, after 1971 it fell in line with OAU policy. This may have done something for Peking's standing with African governments, whose independence it was now a Chinese objective to secure against Soviet encroachments; but it made no impact at all on Soviet practice. The truth is that the battle lines had been drawn several years earlier, when the Soviet Union effectively expelled the Chinese from AAPSO – the front organisation through which they subsequently consolidated their relations with all the main liberation movements in the region. To have backed off at a time when their own involvement with the MPLA has already contributed to the internationalisation of the conflict, would obviously have been difficult for any Soviet leadership.

Thus, for the Russians there remained only the irritating problem of having to oppose OAU policy, which was strongly in favour of a government of national unity. This they did by a combination of bullying and the oldest tactic in the game: changing the rules by simply ignoring them. No doubt, in this their calculation was – and one must admit that it was fully vindicated – that success would bring its own reward, and that the OAU – as in all previous crises in its history – would in the end accept a *fait accompli*. The moral of this might be that the OAU will accept any *fait accompli*, but without the evidence it would be over-hasty to draw this conclusion. Although it is fairly clear that the Soviet intervention was not a reactive response to that of South Africa, there is very little doubt that nothing did so much to legitimise the Soviet support for the MPLA as the South African intervention on the other side.

What are the current implications of the Angolan episode for the remaining conflicts in Southern Africa? Five points, which certainly do not exhaust the subject but may help to focus thought on these problems, are:

- At least temporarily the MPLA victory has obviously raised the stock of the Russians and depreciated that of the Chinese throughout the region. Although the Chinese have maintained their contacts by endorsing OAU policy – and therefore the stand being taken by the front-line presidents – they have been effectively excluded from influence in Angola, and are currently reported to have much less influence than the Russians in Mozambique.
- At least temporarily the MPLA victory has raised the prestige in African nationalist movements for the military rather than the

constitutional approach towards the remaining Southern African struggles. If – and this seems a very big if indeed – the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia was to win a battlefield victory without major assistance from outside, this could turn out to be a kind of Pyrrhic victory for the Chinese view of true independence by self-liberation. A much more likely outcome, however, is the escalation of guerrilla warfare with increasing external intervention.

- Russian gains have also clearly increased the pressure on South Africa itself. Although, since this forms part of the OAU Charter and since the OAU has always accepted the Ben Bella strategy under which South Africa was the last target, very likely this was going to happen anyway. What the Angola episode does seem to have demonstrated is the extreme difficulty that South Africa is going to have in establishing its legitimacy amongst any group of African states which is politically significant in continental or even regional politics. South Africa's credentials may be accepted – although one wonders for how long – in a limited context, such as the Rhodesia negotiations, but that is at least partly because the front-line presidents have the backing of the OAU. An attempt to go over their heads and appeal to other African leaders, e.g. in West Africa, is as unlikely to succeed now as during the attempted dialogue between 1969–71.
- However, while there could in theory – and possibly in practice – be a replay of the Angolan crisis in Rhodesia, this is certainly not even now inevitable. The US no longer has a lame duck administration and even if the recent diplomatic initiative cannot be revived, it is likely to leave some uncertainty in the minds of the Russians as to what the Western reaction would be. Nor does it seem altogether likely that at a time when they want things from the new administration – arms control agreements, trade deals and credits, etc. – they will be anxious to force a showdown just yet. On the other hand, they certainly understand all about negotiating from strength, as their current efforts to counter American diplomacy within OPEC seem to suggest.
- Finally, even in those African countries where the Russians have established their influence, this should not be mistaken for control. Despite the patronage rivalries with Peking, the three liberation movements managed to maintain relations with one another. Also, whether the Soviet Union could undertake the kind of massive underwriting of the Angolan and Mozambique economies that occurred in Cuba – even if their governments were prepared to allow this to happen – remains doubtful, particularly at a time when the Russians themselves have a large

trade deficit with the West. The history of Soviet-African relations prior to 1975 shows that the African states have generally proved more independent than the pessimists predicted. To the extent that the Soviet Union is intent, as the Chinese maintain, on its own brand of neo-colonialism, there seems no reason why the Russians – any more than the Americans, British or French – should be proof against the law of colonial ingratitude.

RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE: THE POSITION OF THE UNITED AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL

Gordon Chavunduka

On 24 September, 1976, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia announced to the people of that country and to the world that he and his government now accepted majority rule. They agreed that Rhodesia should have majority rule within two years. This pronouncement meant that those members of Rhodesian society who for years and years had bitterly fought against majority rule, now accepted this new political horizon, and today the vast majority of white and black citizens recognise that majority rule will come. In fact, the question many people are asking in Rhodesia and abroad is: since the country has accepted majority rule, why is it still bedevilled by political uncertainty?

There are two main reasons for the present political uncertainty in Rhodesia. The first is the unwillingness or inability of those who hold power at present to bring about rapid changes in the society, and there are whites who still fear change. As a result they expostulate that the Africans are not ready for government; that they lack expertise; that change must be gradual; that the economy will collapse, etc. None of these is a valid reason; they are all excuses to delay the transfer of power to the majority.

The second reason for the delay and the abovementioned uncertainty is the quarrelling and political manoeuvring among the African leaders, each claiming to represent the majority of Rhodesians. Linked with this is the confusion being caused by Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania and to some extent Britain, whose leaders argue that the Patriotic Front of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe should be accepted as the sole representative of Rhodesia's nationalists; an argument based on the mistaken belief that the Patriotic Front controls the entire guerrilla movement in Rhodesia. The argument put forward by the leaders of Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania is also weakened by the fact that the Patriotic Front enjoys very little support among the African nationalists of Rhodesia generally.

What does the delay, resulting from the above factors, produce? It produces a horrible war in many parts of the country – a war in which hundreds of people are being killed, or injured for life. It produces a running-down of the economy of the country, with people losing their jobs and companies going bankrupt, with no signs of recovery. It produces inflation and poverty, with ever

Dr Chavunduka is a member of the Sociology Department at the University of Rhodesia in Salisbury. This article is based on an address to the Witwatersrand Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs on 15 March, 1977, at which time he was Secretary-General of the United African National Council.

vaster sums of money and resources being devoted to the war machine and the killing of people. No reasonable person wants this situation to continue, and all now long for peace and prosperity.

The first cause of the delay and present uncertainty can be remedied by members of the white community. Delay and procrastination is the policy of the present government, therefore, it is up to the members of the white community to act decisively and to tell the government that they want majority rule now. Otherwise there will be a prolonged period of uncertainty, with all the problems of the last few years becoming aggravated.

Members of the African community will deal with the second cause of the problem. To this end the author's Party – the United African National Council (UANC) – suggested in November 1976 that the only way to move forward was to hold a referendum or election before an interim government was established in Rhodesia. There are a number of reasons why this proposal was made:

- Firstly, the UANC was opposed, and still is opposed to the idea of creating a government by nomination – a method which was favoured by other political parties at the conference in Geneva. The people of Zimbabwe must be given the opportunity to exercise their fundamental democratic right of establishing a government of their own choice.
- Secondly, the UANC maintained, and still maintains that a referendum should be held because it is difficult, if not impossible for the four African political parties to agree on who should be the Chief Minister in the interim government. Even if these parties agree on this point there is still the question of the distribution of ministries, some of which are more important than others. Because of this, months would be spent arguing over which party should take this or that ministry. In fact, agreement on this issue might never be reached at a conference table.
- The third disadvantage of establishing a government by nomination is that such a government would be unstable, because the Chief Minister nominated outside the country might be unpopular at home. Furthermore, some persons given certain ministries might be unpopular within Zimbabwe. Such a government would not be able to govern, even during a transitional period, with time being wasted by ministers quarrelling with those from other political parties. Such an interim government would be expected to govern the country; it would be expected to end the war and maintain law and order, stabilise the economic system, provide employment and housing, build more schools and hospitals, etc. A nominated government

would not be able to perform these essential services; in fact, it would probably bring about a civil war in which thousands would lose their lives.

- On the other hand, if a referendum were held, it would become relatively easy to establish an interim government, with the major political party being given a greater say in the establishment of the new government. It is not suggested here that other parties with significant support should be excluded from an interim government; they would play a role in accordance with the amount of their support within Zimbabwe. Holding a referendum at this stage of the country's political development admittedly has its own problems, particularly the security aspect of the exercise. But there will be greater dangers in the months that lie ahead, if a firm political foundation is not laid before moving into the next phase.

The success of a referendum will depend on two important conditions: it must be a fair test of opinion, and it must be acceptable internationally. The UANC has suggested a number of measures designed to satisfy these two conditions:

- All the political leaders who are abroad must be invited to return to Rhodesia, if they so wish, and be present when the referendum is held.
- If one or two party leaders are unable, or unwilling to return to Rhodesia at the present time, then all party leaders must be asked to be out of the country during the time of the referendum.
- Normal political activities must be permitted during the time of the referendum, as was done at the time of the Pearce Commission.
- The following countries and organisations must be invited to send observers to be present during the referendum – the Commonwealth, Britain, South Africa, the OAU, the United States and the UN (plus other possible interested governments and organisations).
- The guerrillas in Mozambique and Zambia must be allowed to vote in their camps under the supervision of the OAU Liberation Committee.

The UANC is convinced, and its experts agree that a referendum could be held within two to three weeks. No electoral roll is required as there are other methods of identification which are immediately available. Whites, Asians, Coloureds and some Africans are already on the existing voters rolls. Most adult African males possess identification certificates, and adult African women possess identification documents of various kinds, such as marriage certificates, certificates of employment, education

certificates, etc. All these forms of identification could be used. To safeguard against double voting each voter could be required to dip his thumb into indelible ink, and each identification document produced could be marked with an appropriate stamp. The whole of Rhodesia is already divided into district commissioner areas, and many reserves or tribal trust lands have district councils. In each district area polling booths could be installed at schools, churches, dipping tank centres, or any other convenient locations. There is, therefore, already an established administrative machinery for carrying out an election or referendum which could be put into immediate effect.

People in Rhodesia know, of course, that the United African National Council is the largest movement in the country; it is supported by about 90 percent of the population. But most people have never taken part in a national election before and it is only fair that they should be given an opportunity to exercise their democratic right of saying which of the existing political parties should play the major role in the next government of Rhodesia. Zambia and Mozambique must not be allowed to impose a minority government on Rhodesia, because the people do not want the minority government of Mr Ian Smith to be replaced with a black minority government. A minority government is unacceptable, whether it is white or black.

Once an election or a referendum has been held, the road forward will become clearer and easier to negotiate. If at that time there is a general demand for another conference in Geneva or elsewhere, the task before the conference will be much easier. The major political party will be given a greater say in the establishment of the new government. The quarrelling and political manoeuvring among the African leaders at the conference will have been made obsolete by the referendum. On the other hand, if after the referendum there is a general demand that the conference be held at home, again the elected party will be in a stronger moral position to arrange for the transfer of power to the majority in consultation with the present Rhodesian government. Whichever path is followed, it is the end result which is important to the people of Rhodesia. What they would like to have is an interim government which is stable and which will bring about majority rule within the shortest possible time.

A government established in the manner described will be able to govern the country – it will be able to restore peace; to stabilise the economic situation; to provide employment and housing; to build more schools and hospitals; to build new roads, etc. – and there will be no danger of a civil war developing during the transitional period. Moreover, it will be in the interest of Mozambique

and Zambia to assist the new popular government, and in this way solve many of their own economic problems.

The question is often asked whether the UANC could stop the war if it came to power. The answer is yes, and there are a number of reasons for this:

- The guerrilla movement in Rhodesia is not a united movement in matters of politics and ideology – some guerrillas support the leadership of Joshua Nkomo, some that of Robert Mugabe, others that of Ndabaningi Sithole, and some that of James Chikerema. But by far the largest group support the political leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa. The average age among the guerrillas today is about 15 years; this means that most of them have been in the guerrilla movement for only three or four years. Most of these boys and girls were members of the UANC before they left the country, or at least this was the only political party they knew. They were too young during the time of ZANU and ZAPU and have, therefore, no emotional attachment to Sithole, Nkomo or Mugabe. Thus when guerrillas are given a chance to express their political preferences, many choose the UANC.
- Nearly all the villagers and others in the operational areas are members of the UANC. The guerrilla leaders know very well that they cannot fight without the support of local Rhodesian villagers. Once this support is withdrawn, the war would come to an end in a matter of months.
- There is also an ideological difference, or at least a difference in approach, between guerrilla leaders and leaders of the Patriotic Front of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. The latter believe that they are leading a revolution which will remove the present political system and immediately replace it with a Marxist system. On the other hand, most guerrilla leaders believe that the aim at this stage of the revolution is merely to overthrow the present regime. They argue that debate over the re-structuring of society will take place in the second stage – hence their willingness in the first stage to work with all people, socialists, capitalists, even some imperialists, in order to attain their first objective: the removal of the present regime. In accordance with this approach, they argue that the next government must be one that is supported by the masses at home. They have stated openly that they will support whatever political party is supported by the majority of their own people within Rhodesia.

As far as the future is concerned, the UANC looks to the day when every Rhodesian of every colour, creed and religion, can be trained for decent employment, can find it, and can support their

families in an enriching and rewarding environment. The aim is to broaden the base of abundance in society, i.e. to give more people the chance to produce and consume. By doing this, it will also be helping to create new industry, higher production, increased earnings and better incomes for all the people of Zimbabwe. The aim is also to build faith between man and man, and faith between race and race. There must be faith in each other and faith in the promise of this beautiful country.

In order to achieve this kind of society, many changes will be introduced and there will be a general overhaul of the social, economic and political system. Space does not allow for a detailed spelling-out of all the changes that the UANC would like to see in a future non-racial society, but some areas for change can be mentioned:

- The first proposed change relates to land. The Land Tenure Act will be abolished, and most of the land will be opened to all the people. Any citizen must be able to live where he chooses to live; farm where he wishes to farm; trade where he chooses to trade; and be buried where his kinsmen want him to be buried. The tribal trust lands will be protected for some time, because it is the duty of every government to protect the poor members of society.
- In the economic field generally, measures that will have to be taken immediately include the following: raising of wage incomes; expansion of wage employment; narrowing the gap between urban and rural incomes; and making urban life more secure for most of the urban dwellers. It will be relatively easy to implement these measures; for example, wages can be increased considerably without reducing the viability of a large number of the present business institutions. This is because there is presently a gap between productivity and wage rankings which has in fact widened over the last decade. In dealing with the expansion of wage employment and the gap between urban and rural incomes, the most important factor will be the level of investment sustained in the new situation – that is, direct investment capital, and also domestic savings and investment. This investment capital, together with the widening of markets when sanctions have been removed, will give rise to a corresponding increase in the rate of growth.

The main objectives of these economic policies are:

- the maintenance of productivity, so that the economy remains viable, and
- an equitable distribution of wealth and opportunity.

With reference to the land problem, these objectives mean that gainfully-used land will not be interfered with, because this would

lead to a lowering of productivity – but, on the other hand, un-utilised land will be redistributed to those who will utilise it. With reference to commerce and industry, as the so-called free enterprise system is not inconsistent with the policy already stated, there is no reason why it should not be allowed to continue.

In carrying out the economic reforms suggested, a number of problems could arise and these will be monitored. The first is that higher wages may be accompanied by a decrease in employment in sectors such as domestic services and agriculture. But, in general, in the industrial and commercial sector, the claim that employment would slump dramatically if wages rose, is grossly exaggerated. There are a number of reasons for saying this, the first being that since the time of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, there has been a process of labour saving in all firms in which surplus workers have been declared redundant. There are few firms in Rhodesia today that have not trimmed their labour forces to the minimum needed to service a particular production and distribution line. This means that most workers are presently directly functional. If services are to be provided on the existing scale, it requires the current labour force to operate it. The second reason is that labourers can only be replaced if machines are available to replace them; but in Rhodesia many business enterprises are already using the most capital-intensive techniques available and would not be able to mechanise further, even if wages rose.

The problem of inflation has also been mentioned, but this is by no means clear-cut. If higher wages are accompanied by an improvement in efficiency, including the efficient use of labour, the effect on costs will be reduced. Moreover, the increase in monetary demand that will flow from an increase in wages, is more likely to stimulate further production than to push up prices. These factors – and there may be others – lead to the conclusion that employment levels in Rhodesia, particularly in commerce and industry, would not fall significantly under a situation of rising wages.

Unlike many African states, Rhodesia is fortunate in that many whites who play an important role in the economic field today are Rhodesians, and they will continue to live and work in the country. As far as the author knows, no responsible African leader has ever suggested that whites should leave the country when majority rule comes. They cannot do so because:

- Most whites are citizens and not expatriates, and they therefore have as much right as anyone else to continue to live in the country which is their home.
- African leaders also appreciate the important role that whites

have played, and will continue to play in many fields, particularly in the economic sphere.

Today the whole economy of Rhodesia is regulated by decree; there is constant government *interference and direction*; control of manpower, wages, prices; and control of imports and foreign currency. This is an unbearable situation which cannot be expected to continue for much longer.

It is sincerely hoped that all Rhodesians will join in the exciting task that lies ahead – the task of re-building a stable, prosperous and united nation.

THE INDIAN OCEAN IN INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY

T.B. Millar

Some years ago, the author was telephoned one afternoon by the *Age* in Melbourne. They said that the British Prime Minister, Mr Harold Wilson, had just announced that all British naval and military forces were to be withdrawn, over a period of a few years, from east of Suez. They asked the author to write a piece for the next day's issue of the paper which was printed under the headline: "This lake (i.e. the Indian Ocean) up for auction".

It was a catchy title, but was it true? Was the Indian Ocean "up for auction", or is it now the case? The phrase is just too simple and the ocean too big. The author spent a year at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in 1968-69, and it seemed then that at least a Soviet pattern of interest had developed which could be disturbing and might be alarming to the countries of the region, including South Africa and Australia. What the author wrote at the time was something of an over-reaction, but not excessively so. In the intervening period there had been an increase in the Soviet presence especially in a few places, and strategists in South Africa have been watching this with some concern.

Strategy tends very much to be a matter of perspective. Western Europe is understandably preoccupied with the strategic balance or imbalance in Europe and the North Atlantic. In Australia, the concern is rather more focused on the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and who controls or may control the junction between them at the Malay Archipelago. South Africa again is concerned about its continental neighbourhood, and the seas that surround it on three sides.

In Europe, people look at the strength of the Soviet forces in Europe and the North Atlantic and compare them with Soviet strength in the Indian Ocean. Of course, the latter is insignificant in size by comparison, and so is considered insignificant in importance. In discussions on this issue in London over recent months, the author has tried to make three points:

- that Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean can be reinforced fairly quickly, especially while the Suez Canal is open;
- that the most relevant comparison is not between two sets of Soviet forces, but between Soviet forces and *the opposition to them where they are*; and

Dr Millar is a former Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, and is one of Australia's most authoritative writers in the field of foreign affairs and defence. He is the author of *The Indian and Pacific Oceans: Some Strategic Considerations*. This article is an edited version of a talk given to a meeting of the Witwatersrand Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs on 31 March, 1977.

- that Europe and the Indian Ocean are divided by what is probably the most strategically and vitally significant part of the world – the Middle East oil-producing area – and that it is not enough for the West to consider only the northern approaches to this area, as they are customarily preoccupied in doing: they must also look at the southern approaches. It is not absence of mind, or the personal whim of an energetic admiral that has placed a Soviet naval intelligence vessel in the Strait of Hormuz monitoring all shipping into and out of the Persian Gulf.

After studying and discussing the Indian Ocean in Australia, the United States, Britain, and various parts of Asia – including Iran – one aspect that causes some difficulty is to ascertain the facts and what they mean. Some years ago, at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Professor Charles Manning asked for comments after a lecture, whereupon an incautious student arose and said: “Well obviously, Professor Manning . . .”. Manning threw his hands up in the air. “I cannot have a discussion”, he said, “with someone who begins by saying ‘obviously’.” Well, some things are obvious. It is obvious that the British have withdrawn their forces from the Indian Ocean region, but not quite so obvious that they will never, even in a modest way, return. It is obvious that the Suez Canal can be blocked in ten minutes. It is not so obvious who would do that, or under what circumstances, or whom it would affect most. It is obvious that India has a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, with a section dealing with security. It is less obvious what this means in terms of Soviet use of Indian defence facilities, or Soviet help to India against, say, China.

There have been many changes in the strategic situation in the Indian Ocean in recent years, especially as regards some of the littoral states.

- Although no littoral state can dominate – on its own – even its own region, Iran has become the most powerful state in the Gulf, with a growing but still fledgling navy and air force; with a massive US military assistance programme – as there is in Saudi Arabia; and with an interest far beyond the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz – described by the Shah as Iran’s “jugular vein”. One must not forget Iran’s long border with the Soviet Union; its considerable investment in the export of gas, through the Soviet Union, to Eastern and Central Europe; its not inexhaustible supplies of oil; its deal with Iraq over the Kurds and over Baluchistan, which may turn out to be less stable than it looks; and the nearness of Iraq, and of the Soviet-

built facility at Umm Qasr, to the great refineries at Abadan and the oil-route down the Shatt-al-Arab.

- Then there is Pakistan, dismembered by the 1971 war; its navy decisively defeated by India, although partially restored; no longer a major threat, real or imagined, to the sub-continent; and a friend of China but a protégé of Iran.
- India is demonstrably the world's largest democratic state, where the people have just overthrown a dynasty. Who can say where this will lead India's foreign policy? – it may make little difference in fact, although there may be less deference to the Russians. Indira Gandhi did not turn to the Soviet Union for help because she was a communist, but because only they could and would provide reassurance against China, and military aid on an acceptable financial basis. Mr Morarji Desai has said that India will continue to be non-aligned, and one assumes he has a more literal interpretation of the word than did his predecessor.
- Thailand struggles with considerable insurgency problems; and with the American forces withdrawn, there had been no obvious leaning by either the previous civilian or the present military/civil government towards communism.
- Indonesia seems to be preoccupied by its own immense problems; with most of its modern navy and air force, provided by the Soviet Union, now rusting away; and a government patently anti-communist, and most unlikely to be a host to either Soviet or Chinese power. Both Indonesia and Malaysia have aired the notion that the Strait of Malacca are territorial waters, but this brought immediate protests from the major maritime states.

Before turning to Africa, the position of some of the external powers in the Indian Ocean must be considered.

- Britain has virtually completely withdrawn, but is prepared to conduct military exercises in the region from time to time. As from about 1980, Britain will cease to be dependent on Middle East oil, but from the best projections that could be found in London – even allowing for new discoveries in the North Sea – by about 1990 Britain will again be importing oil and by the year 2000 it will be importing about as much as it did before the North Sea wells began to flow. It is believed that Britain will not again deploy large forces east of Suez, but it cannot be ruled out altogether that it will take part in a combined operation to safeguard a vital Western interest.
- France has often provided, in numbers of ships, the largest naval force in the Indian Ocean, presumably to safeguard its

colonial territories and also to "show the flag" along the oil-routes. France's decision to give independence to the territory of the Afars and Issas, including the port of Djibouti, will limit its capacity to deploy naval power in the north-west corner of the ocean, and with the Comoros – other than Mayotte – independent and the base at Diego Suarez evacuated, there will probably be a substantial reduction in French power and interest in the whole region.

- China has shown an interest in various African states, but in none does that influence seem to predominate. Although the Chinese navy is steadily growing, China does not deploy naval power in the region although unconfirmed Indian reports occasionally suggest it may.
- Japan has developing commercial interests throughout the whole area, but it has neither the capacity nor the intention to protect these by force. Japanese dredges keep open the Strait of Malacca, although it is too shallow for the super-tankers which must use one of the Indonesian straits.

The other external powers using the ocean, apart from those well-known merchant maritime forces Liberia and Panama – now joined by the Seychelles – are of course the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States is the largest trader in the Indian Ocean and it has three naval ships on permanent station in the Persian Gulf. Since the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, it has periodically deployed a carrier task force in the region. It has strengthened the facility at Diego Garcia, and under present financial approval it will develop a carrier anchorage there, lengthen – and presumably strengthen – the runway to take heavy bombers and transports, and build extra barracks. The naval communications station has probably taken over much of the traffic from the one almost run-down at Asmara in Ethiopia. The Australian government has given American nuclear-powered vessels access to Cockburn Sound, and has slightly altered the terms but not the character of the US communications station at North West Cape. Nowhere, except at Diego Garcia, does the United States have a base of its own. It has been using Bahrain, but is on daily notice to quit, and it has used Masirah. Its presence in Iran and Saudi Arabia, the size of its arms sales and of the concomitant military assistance programmes are such that, if they were Russians instead of Americans, one would be immensely alarmed. Perhaps the Russians are alarmed at what they see.

Many people have wondered what President Carter meant recently when he spoke of "demilitarising" the Indian Ocean. A fairly senior member of the US administration recently said that Mr Carter was stating an objective for the Indian Ocean, not a

unilateral policy; that what he was in effect saying to the Russians was: "Let us get together and see if we can put a ceiling on our arms in the Indian Ocean, and maybe even drop the level below where it now is." If that seems a more rational interpretation than Mr Carter actually intended, perhaps one should give the new President the benefit of the doubt until he gives grounds for believing otherwise.

One must not forget that the United States has been ejected from its bases in Thailand; that its presence in Bahrain is extremely precarious; that it is committed to the defence of Israel, and in effect also to Saudi Arabia and Iran; that it is vitally interested in the flow of oil; and above all, one must remember that during the combination of the Yom Kippur War and the Arab oil embargo, the United States was only able to reinforce Israel by grace and favour of Portugal and the Azores, the valour of the other NATO powers being heavily tempered by discretion. In any future Arab-Israeli war that might erupt, the US could not be sure it could rely on Iran or Saudi Arabia, or on Portugal. Diego Garcia thus offers a staging post on the west-about route to Israel; a base for reconnaissance aircraft; a facility for use by a carrier task force; and a communications station for surface or submerged vessels.

It is uncertain whether there are US ballistic missile submarines in the Indian Ocean, but it would be reasonable to assume that there may be some there from time to time. It seems unlikely that such a possibility was the main reason why the Soviet navy began deploying in the area – i.e. in order to keep track of US nuclear submarines. Given the present and foreseeable state of the art, this would be like searching for a moving needle not in a haystack but under the surface of a hundred-acre field. The technology of the Trident SLBM system will obviate the need for using the Indian Ocean at all in order to reach any part of the Soviet Union with a submerged second strike capability. This does not necessarily mean that Trident, or Poseidon, or Polaris submarines would not use the ocean; or that Soviet submarines may not do so, deployed against targets in China or in Australia.

It is the Soviet presence that sets all the alarm bells ringing, and creates all the strategic problems. But what is one really troubled about? Firstly, what is disturbing is the permanent Soviet naval presence in the ocean, where only a few years ago there was none. From the beginning it has been a fairly modest force – currently eight or ten combat ships and slightly more support ships. It is not necessarily significant that this figure may go up or down by 20 or 30 percent. The force tends to be concentrated in the north-west corner, but it uses Indian, Somali, PDRY and Mauritian facilities and by some accounts also Singapore. There are mooring buoys

in the Mozambique channel, off Socotra, in the Chagos Archipelago, and elsewhere. It is not a big force, but it is a great deal bigger than most navies in the region, and it has behind it – “over the horizon” – a very formidable naval power. Thus it has gained a psychological impact out of all proportion to its size.

Secondly, one is troubled about Somalia and the Soviet base – it is a base – there. According to American reports, the Russians have at Berbera a floating dry-dock capable of taking ships up to 8 000 tons, a major airfield, storage capacity for missiles and barracks. There are Soviet instructors in the Somali armed forces, which use Soviet weapons' systems, and the security services are allegedly pervaded and controlled by the KGB. Aircraft based at Berbera could use Aden, and between them cover by surveillance the whole north-west ocean. Somalia thus gives the Soviet Union's armed forces a base from which to operate – not a big base, not big forces, but a home away from home. When one thinks that the nearest Soviet bases to the Indian Ocean are in the Black Sea and Vladivostok, Berbera becomes very important indeed, both in straight military terms and in psychological terms.

It may be a little early to determine the significance and durability of the Soviet presence in Angola, but Somalia seems *sui generis*. No base on foreign soil is ever quite as secure as a base on home ground. The Soviet Union is not immune to other forms of nationalism: it burnt its fingers very badly in Egypt, as it did in Indonesia, sustaining enormous losses. But, from all the available evidence, Somalia is much more under Soviet domination than Egypt ever was. It is a much smaller power, much more vulnerable and controllable, and the Russians seem to have established something close to the old-style British protectorate, except that they are not actually enunciating the foreign policy. There had been reports that Saudi Arabia – without or with American encouragement – has been trying to wean Somalia away from the Soviet Union; and Saudi Arabia has the advantage of being a fellow Muslim state. One cannot forecast into what this competition will develop. The Russians are on the spot, but they are Russians, which is not necessarily an advantage. One cannot see them fostering Somali irridentism against any of its neighbours. With more optimism than the situation warrants, the Soviet Union has also declared Ethiopia a “state of socialist orientation”. Its policy towards the Afars and Issas will almost certainly be to uphold the territory's right to independence and non-viable sovereignty, and to offer generous aid in order to establish a Soviet presence there rather like that in Somalia, but making use of the French naval base at Djibouti and sitting astride the railway to Addis Ababa. That has, however, not happened yet.

The Soviet Union has a treaty with Somalia, one with Iraq, and

one with India. As far as is known, there is no Soviet-controlled base in either Iraq or India, although the Russians have helped develop bases in both places. Of the two, Iraq is the more vulnerable but also the more volatile. The Russians have developed good relations with many other countries in the region, through military and economic aid. The ones which would most seem to warrant attention are the two Yemens, Mauritius, Uganda, and of course Mozambique. Yemen offers a possible route into Saudi Arabia; the PDRY has the former British air base and maritime refuelling station. Yet it is interesting that in both places the Russians have had some friction with the government – they have some influence, but no demonstrable power. The full extent to which the Russians make use of Mauritius is not known, but it is strategically located, has a vulnerable economy, a potentially unstable political situation, and there can be no doubt that a lot more than exchanging of crews and refuelling of fishing vessels goes on there. In Uganda, held by fear under the temporary sway of a maniac, the Soviet provision of arms does not seem to offer any present or future assurance of political influence. Mozambique seems the southern Black African state most likely to provide a host to Soviet ideas, influence, and even power. President Nikolai Podgorny has now signed a friendship treaty with President Samora Machel, in words milder than one might have expected. It is too early to be sure of the nature of President Machel's variant of Marxism, of his relations with Moscow, and of the Soviet presence in Mozambique. *The South African Financial Gazette* carried a report in October 1976 that President Machel had granted the Soviet Union "facilities to build air and naval installations at Indian Ocean bases". This report has not been confirmed and if it were to happen, one should be troubled.

Soviet or other East European arms are undoubtedly important to the black liberation movements, although it is understood that many of the arms are of American manufacture. President Podgorny's visit to Tanzania and Zambia seems most relevant in terms of the liberation forces, and less in terms of obtaining a dominant Soviet political influence on either state. In this respect, the front-line states and the black Rhodesian forces may be glad of arms, but it is believed they would resist direct Soviet or Cuban intervention in any strength. The presence of Cuban forces and/or advisers in Angola, Mozambique, Uganda, the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea has provided a bizarre, exotic and uncertain element to the situation. Are they merely Soviet surrogates, or does President Fidel Castro have an African policy of his own? Did President Castro come to Africa ahead of President Podgorny to blaze a trail, to be a "stalking horse", or to try to demonstrate that Cuba is an in-

dependent agent albeit with common objectives? Whatever his purpose, and however much his own man he claims to be, there cannot be many people he met who would not appreciate that President Castro flew in on a Soviet plane; that the forces he has provided have been equipped, trained, transported and in effect paid for by the Soviet Union, which now subsidises the Cuban economy to the extent of about US \$2,5 to 3 million per day. This still does not make the Cubans any less significant while they are there, although their numbers are small in most places.

Before looking at the reasons for, and the implications of the changed Soviet position in and around the Indian Ocean, consideration must be given – briefly and very superficially – to the objectives and methods of Soviet foreign and defence policies, and some of the restraints upon them. It is well to remember that foreign policy is made, or formulated, not in the Foreign Office but in the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – it is thus heavily ideological, as well as nationalistic. In simple terms, one could formulate the objectives of Soviet foreign policy as: the preservation and promotion of the Soviet Union and its national interests; and the furtherance of the world revolutionary process, in the hope or intention that eventually the socialist commonwealth will be universal. This second objective is utopian, or at least remote, and intermediate objectives are to encourage the replacement of capitalist by socialist (i.e. communist) systems wherever possible; to ensure the unity, and Soviet leadership of the international communist movement; and to encourage national liberation movements in states with pro-Western, neutral or unstable governments.

Yet, while acknowledging the way in which the Soviet Union took advantage of World War II and its aftermath to extend its imperial or quasi-imperial control over adjacent territories, a case can be made for saying that Soviet foreign policy-strategy tends to be cautious and conservative, even though tactics may at times be adventurous. It is concerned to work within the terms of treaties; to respect the territorial integrity of states (e.g. Nigeria, Ethiopia); to work with existing governments where possible; to preserve the strategic balance with the US; and to be a respected as well as a feared member of the international community. Soviet aid programmes are on the whole modest, selective, and not very effective. Angola is an exception to this, as were Indonesia and Egypt, and one cannot yet be sure that Angola will not go the way of Indonesia and Egypt. The Soviet Union has no formula for translating aid into influence, or for ensuring the success of communist coups, or for owning the total allegiance of communist governments (Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam) or foreign communist parties (Italy, France, Spain). The non-aligned world

on the whole tends to be as suspicious of Soviet intentions as of American or Chinese. Where the Soviet Union has strings it can pull it has the deplorable if understandable temptation to pull them, and this is resented.

The principles being suggested as applying to foreign political policy also seem to apply broadly to foreign economic policy. The Russians are tough negotiators, especially with small states, but so are the Americans and the Japanese, and one often hears that the Russians are more likely to abide by an agreement than certain Western trading powers. They may shoot their way into shipping conferences by introducing cut rates, but once *in* they tend to conform. The Soviet merchant fleet (*Morflot*) has expanded rapidly, but still only accounts for around 5 percent of total merchant shipping tonnage. It is an arm of government as much as the navy is, but it has to justify itself in terms of hard currency earned or saved.

One aspect of Soviet capacity that affects the Indian Ocean is the size, rate of expansion, and doctrine of the Soviet navy – and especially its submarine strength. This is one of the most alarming aspects of Soviet naval policy today, giving the Russians a wide-ranging capacity for sea-denial, as well as strategic deterrence. In the Soviet *Okean* fleet exercise of 1975, the navy rehearsed tactics for cutting open-ocean sea lanes. With the launching of the *Kiev*, the new STOL/VTOL aircraft carrier, the Russians are beginning to be able to protect the projection of power ashore, and to cover Soviet fleet units when they are operationally outside the range of land-based air forces. The Soviet Union has, through its navy, become a global super-power – as Admiral Gorschkov has pointed out – demonstrating its war-time capacity to defend and attack; its peace-time capacity to deter; and to extend economic and political influence far beyond its own borders.

Many strategists have given a lot of thought, since the first Soviet fleet units appeared in the Indian Ocean in early 1968, as to the reasons for the developing Russian presence in the ocean and the littoral states. It is impossible to weight the different factors, but they would seem to include the following:

- To offer some protection to the shipping between the eastern and western seaboard of the Soviet Union.
- To develop a capacity to track down and counter American naval vessels, including nuclear-armed submarines.
- To project Soviet political and economic power in the interests of the Soviet Union, and to deny the West – especially the United States – and the People's Republic of China influence and access to resources.
- To be in a position to exert some pressure on the major oil-routes, and possibly on the oil-producing states. However, it

must not be forgotten that the interdiction of shipping is an act of war.

- To engage in space research.
- To survey the ocean's seabed resources, and to obtain relevant hydrographic and oceanographic information for shipping, including submarines.
- To catch fish.

Leo Mates, Director of the Yugoslav Institute for Political and Economic Affairs, once said: "You (the author) want to know why the Soviet navy is in the Indian Ocean? I will tell you. There are two reasons: there is a Soviet navy, and there is an Indian Ocean."

So what, then, should one be worried about?: the Soviet naval presence itself? – yes, but it is still modest, and given sufficient notice the United States can deploy considerably more naval power in the region. Soviet facilities at Berbera? – yes, but it is a bit precarious. Interdiction of shipping? – perhaps, but it is a risky business. A new Soviet empire? – the evidence is not yet there, even though the Chinese keep referring to the "new Tsars". Denial of resources to the West? – yes, particularly some important but rare minerals such as chrome, but there is a long way to go before the West is noticeably affected. Soviet control of sea passages? – well, Suez is easily blockable, and that would add six to seven thousand miles to the Black Sea-Indian Ocean route. The Soviet Union, Japan, Britain and the US all have a strong interest in keeping the Malaysian/Indonesian straits open. South of Australia and south of the Cape of Good Hope there are not passages but open sea.

Should one be worried about: Soviet assistance to national liberation movements? – yes, but except for Angola it is limited, there are strong African restraints on direct Soviet intervention, and there is no assurance that such aid will be translated into commensurate political influence. The Brezhnev proposal for a new, Soviet-backed "system of security" in Asia? – no-one has taken it seriously. The build-up of *Morflot*? – it may have selective effects favourable to Russia, but *Morflot* is too small to make these widespread or lasting. The size of the Soviet navy? – certainly, this is disturbing, but it is not easy to see the circumstances in which it would be allowed to take action, or what would be the consequences of its doing so. Another Angola? – one can make a case for saying that Angola was a special case, the conditions of which are unlikely to be duplicated, and are not duplicated in Rhodesia where the front-line states will not – one assumes and hopes – want Soviet aid given to one liberation movement to fight another. One can also make a case for the proposition that the Soviet Union will not let its client liberation movements be ex-

tinguished, and has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to deploy power at a distance, using the facilities of friendly African states.

In sum, what one is worried about is the change that has taken place over so short a time – the increasing Soviet presence; the British departure; the French reduction; the American reluctance to compete at the margins of détente; the general extension of Soviet spheres of influence often without a competing external alternative; and the Soviet realisation and enjoyment of the status that accompanies power. There are genuine and substantial grounds for concern, but not by any means – not yet – for alarm. It may be that the Soviet Union – which is anxious to grasp low-risk opportunities but wary lest the risk grow larger; an assertive power with inherent caution; and a revolutionary power with remarkable conservatism – will be corrupted by the opportunities provided to use power in or against small states around the region. A most recent, and still tentative conclusion is that this is very much unlikely – especially while a general détente is desirable; while 40 plus Soviet divisions are deployed on the Chinese border; and while, within the Soviet Union itself, national groups and other dissenters are raising objections to the totalitarian nature of the Soviet state.

WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE UNITED NATIONS?

Leon Gordenker

Talking about the United Nations in the Republic of South Africa and some other parts of Southern Africa gets reactions which cannot exactly be described as flattering, but this often arises from misinformation, simplistic analysis and self-serving ideological interpretations. Without preaching faith and hope, other interpretations are tenable and they need to be set out, because what happens outside Southern Africa has a bearing – perhaps eventually a determining bearing – on what happens inside the sub-continent. This article puts forward a view of the United Nations and the system of organisations around it (and for that matter international institutions in general) that differs from the *commonplaces* of South Africa. It will not take up utopias, heaven or salvation, but neither is it intended to take one on a flat-footed walk in a forest of ignorant nightmares. What then has happened to the UN?

I

A great deal has happened without either help or effective influence from the government of South Africa and its few friends outside the Republic. The United Nations system has in many respects excluded South Africa and for the rest has enjoyed little positive participation from it during the last two decades or more. Meanwhile, the membership in most of the organisations of the UN system has grown to more than 140 countries. Furthermore, the institutional complex around the UN has burgeoned both in scope of operations and demands made on it. It includes a dozen or so autonomous specialised agencies and associated bodies, e.g. the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Altogether the UN system constitutes an organisational network unique to and characteristic of our times. It serves the purposes of interdependence and economic and social development as well as some of the needs of international security. In fact, international security no longer constitutes the main work of the UN system, no matter what impression may be created from glancing attention to what goes on in the General Assembly. More than 80 percent of the financial resources of the system now go to economic development and co-operation for the general welfare; in some organisa-

Professor Gordenker, who specialises in international politics and international organisation, is a member of the Department of Government at Princeton University in the United States. During the second half of 1976, he was Visiting Smuts Professor of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. This article is an edited version of a talk given to the Transkei and Natal Branches of the South African Institute of International Affairs in November and December 1976, respectively.

tions, nearly 100 percent of the expenditure goes for these purposes. The UN system, however, still functions in international disputes. The Security Council meets, as it did to extend the mandate of the peace-keeping force on the Golan Heights; it meets on Namibia, the implications for security of South African social policies, Rhodesia and other questions. A whole set of committees and commissions follows and tries to shape developments in Southern Africa.

Yet most of life on our earth and most of what most governments do, either has little connection with international security, or else requires international co-operation rather than conflict, and examples of this are manifold and part of global life. Radiotelephone from Johannesburg to New York cannot work without having assigned frequencies, a task accomplished by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) on a co-operative basis; airlines fly by rules designed by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and navigational practices agreed at the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation make ocean-shipping safer and better; spread of plagues is prevented by the work of the World Health Organisation (WHO), which lays down quarantine regulations; and capital for economic development is assembled and redistributed in loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Endless examples of this sort could be mentioned.

Such institutions and their continuous work create organised international relations, in which governments and the people who are affected by what governments do, can have some solid expectations about what comes up tomorrow. More than 200 intergovernmental institutions and ten times as many active, non-profit transnational groups of unofficial character help produce organised international relations. Never before in world history have so many transactions among nationals and organisations been brought into an organised framework, and never before have governments agreed to regulate so much of their behaviour towards each other and even towards their own citizens. Despite such an unprecedented and still expanding network of organisation, any claim that a brilliant new era of peace and prosperity is dawning obviously deserves a sceptical response. What then can be expected from international institutions?

II

International organisations cannot be expected routinely to make binding, enforced decisions characteristic of governments in times of stress. International institutions were not organised primarily to exercise control over individual persons or their

activities, but it is rather governments acting in a co-operative way that constitute the subject matter for international organisations. None of these governments shows much inclination, no matter how weak it may be, to hand over authority over its nationals. International organisations generally do not dispose of physical or coercive means for executing policies, nor can they dispose of ready coercive means to stop governments from mistreating their own people.

All the same, governments have wanted international organisations to produce governing effects. Similar expectations have often been voiced in popular opinion, where governments allow them to be expressed. A creation of governments – and originally popular everywhere – the UN is supposed to protect world peace and to foster human rights for all people. The International Labour Organisation (ILO), created with the League of Nations, is charged with creating and protecting the rights of working people and with advancing trade unions. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) hopes, sometimes forlornly, to eradicate illiteracy – thus one sees that these duties and intentions resemble activities associated with governments. Governments keep law and order, provide education, set the conditions for trade unions and generally have responsibility, at a minimum, for a range of essential services. If the machine of government works at all, it runs because people willingly comply with its policies and only occasionally and in exceptional situations is active enforcement required. Policies of governments frequently do no more than suggest courses of action by individuals, such as anti-inflation programmes in the United States and in the Republic of South Africa which include such recommendations and with which many individuals co-operatively comply. Where anti-social behaviour must be controlled, as in the case of sale of addictive drugs, governments legislate standards of behaviour, and those few who fail to comply with the law can be dealt with as criminals. But if those who fail to do so are more than a few, no government can enforce the law unless it is willing to kill large numbers of its subjects. The machine of government requires co-operation and so too with the UN system and other international organisations. Either governments do what they undertake to do, or else the co-operative programmes are still-born.

In co-operating through international organisations, governments join in several ways to induce compliance to the organisational policies. The means employed usually succeed, for if they do not members leave the organisations; however, international organisation continues to grow.

A primary device for gaining compliance is the international

forum, a feature of all international bodies, of which the best known example is the UN General Assembly. Here, and in similar organs in other organisations, national policies are put on exhibit, criticised, praised and watched. Such a government as that of South Africa, with policies that are subjected to criticism, can defend itself in forums of this sort; it can also gauge just how unpopular its course may be. Speeches in the forum can be endless and trivial, yet the building blocks of co-operation often get baked hard in the hot air of the forum. All governments want their representatives to use it and they do, although some observers would say far beyond the boundaries of efficiency.

Conciliation is a second principal means of gaining compliance and is directly connected to such diplomatic practice. International organisations and the UN system in particular grew out of the efforts of practical, experienced statesmen, including General J.C. Smuts and President Franklin Roosevelt, who knew that quarrels and lesser frictions develop among governments. At times governments seek incompatible goals, as when, for example, Israel tries to extend its territory along the Jordan River over the violent objections of the neighbouring governments, which would prefer a world without their neighbour. Statesmen who deal with such politics, let alone large-scale war, know that merely providing dependable devices for settling disputes often helps to settle them. This is a commonplace notion in domestic life, for the existence of a court – which can give a decision on an argument over the execution of contract – helps the adversaries to reach settlements by their own persuasion in order to avoid the expense and embarrassment of litigation.

In the international sphere, any means of settlement is likely to be valued, because so little has been available. The UN system provides a wide range of conciliation mechanisms, which are never used sufficiently to satisfy many observers; but, nevertheless, the system is sometimes used. The UN forces in Cyprus, on the Golan Heights and on the border between Israel and Egypt, and even the early treatment of the Rhodesian question, testify to the utility of conciliatory devices and the persuasion used in them. Of course they do not always work to a permanent solution of problems, as in the case of the South West Africa/Namibia situation or Rhodesia, but even so they point to possible directions. A similar comment can be made about international concern with South African racial policies, in the case of which the initial approaches used conciliation machinery, including negotiating committees and missions by the Secretary-General. While the South African government neither acknowledged the correctness of criticism nor found many acceptable suggestions, deeper and stronger information emerged and the nature of the dispute

acquired sharper definition. Such conciliation can often be of considerable value; when it fails to be so probably no means of ending a quarrel short of more quarrelling really exists.

Along with this conciliatory and forum structure goes a network of world services, the most tangible form of which is the existence of a corps of international civil servants who number perhaps thirty to forty thousand throughout the world. Their first task, which now takes relatively little time, is to provide basic services to keep the machinery going. The international civil servants help conciliate, as Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim tried to do in SWA/Namibia under instructions of the Security Council; they help to design and revise programmes for acceptance by governments; they provide advice to governments and they produce vast amounts of paper, including indispensable statistics, analyses of these statistics and research papers. Together with national civil servants and ministers of every kind, they form an interlocking network of experts. For example, the officials in health ministries who deal with the problem of bilharzia keep in touch with each other and with international civil servants through meetings of specialist committees at the World Health Organisation. Further, because bilharzia interferes with plans to improve agricultural output, the FAO enters these discussions and the results are used in development projects supported by the UNDP. Such activities spill over into the private sector, because from them emerge specifications for products bought by governments and knowledge useful to private investors. Thus the provision of world services establishes an interlocking set of officials in specialised branches of governmental and private life who influence each other and their governments. This process goes on quietly and with some effectiveness, whatever happens on the ideological and political level.

Coercion and force rarely has any place in creating and fostering organised international relations, no matter what simple conclusions are drawn by publicists. If the world or any national society had to operate exclusively or mainly on the basis of coercion, most resources would have to go into policing. The proposition that coercion could only be used in exceptional circumstances was thoroughly understood in creating the UN system. The use of coercion was reserved only to the most clear and aggravated threats to, or breaches of the peace and the explicit norm of the UN Charter calls for peaceful international relations. Threats to, or breaches of the peace must be specifically identified and agreed upon by the permanent members of the Security Council – the veto-wielders – or the matter does not go farther. Yet force or coercion has been provided in Korea, the

Congo (now Zaire) and Rhodesia. In all these instances, its use fell into the category of ultimate steps reluctantly taken and is quite out of the ordinary in institutions that rely mainly on co-operation.

III

Despite the primarily co-operative character of the UN system and other international bodies, they become notorious forcing beds of political ideas. They insist on adopting resolutions that absurdly demand immediate solutions to such problems as poverty; strident rhetoric becomes nearly normal; and Southern Africa, distant and abstract for most UN members, has a central place in each meeting of the UN General Assembly. How can such developments be explained?

A first element in an explanation reflects the character of the membership of international bodies. Members are states; states have living form as governments and governments have to try to achieve goals in an atmosphere of uncertain knowledge, contending interests and incomplete consensus. They do so in part by urging their nationals, the people who permit them to retain control (even in the worst tyrannies), to behave in a desired manner – and exactly the same is done in the UN. They insist, for example, that majority rule must come to Rhodesia or that South Africa must abandon policies that keep all of its people from any approach to ideals of human rights; they urge each other to comply with a standard that includes freedom of assembly, the ability to participate in government, the right to choose places of residence and the right to equality in social life; and they almost all accept such a standard, even if it is unevenly and poorly applied.

Because the main lever available to get compliance to an international standard is persuasion, a determined government can simply push aside what it does not want to accept, whatever forum or conciliatory machinery is employed. The stronger or the richer the government, the less likely that it can be induced to move against its will if it does not yield to persuasion. Were such a government an individual person, his government might try to force him to comply. But how does one coerce a South Africa, a Chile or a Soviet Union? The great powers usually drag their feet when offered such ventures, because they will bear the main costs while the lesser countries begin to turn their frustration into organisation.

The lop-sided majorities and the hyperthyroid language of the UN emerges from organisation based on frustration. No matter what the majority, the votes themselves for the most part

adopt recommendations, but no government *need* accept these merely because they have been adopted. They do, however, display the temper and tendency of the governments of the world; they measure in a general way the world political environment; and they can be read seriously for their evidence of what governments may do. For example, Venezuela recently decided to stop trade with South Africa on the basis of many resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly. The decision therefore has a stamp of legitimacy, independent of the Venezuelan government, because it accords with widespread, explicit opinion expressed in an international forum. Furthermore, such majorities may contribute to the creation of international law – deliberately, by recommending binding legal texts to governments for their adherence; or implicitly, by forming doctrines and practices of such general validity that national and international courts honour them. Thus resolutions of international bodies take on real meaning in political life, especially when they suggest future policies to governments that are in the process of being persuaded for their own particular reasons.

IV

Repeated expressions of opinion and the adoption of connected resolutions create what can be termed a doctrine. Such a doctrine involves a deliberate approach to a defined problem, an obvious example of which can be found in the steady opposition to racial domination in Southern Africa. International organisations have increasingly produced doctrines on this and other issues. They have their importance as expressions of norms and goals to which governments can strive; at least in some countries nationals can insist on their governments behaving according to such norms. Not all governments follow or accept such doctrines, however, but enough conformity of behaviour may exist to give the doctrine produced by international organisations quite real importance, as in the cases of racial discrimination and redistribution of wealth in the world.

Thus abhorrence of racial discrimination produced an early doctrinal development in the UN system where the doctrine emerged naturally and popularly enough after the horrors of Nazi Germany. The belief that racial discrimination by a government is immoral, tied in with widespread attempts – both nationally and internationally – to make it illegal. Eventually the UN drew up a legally-binding convention, now in force in the fifty or so countries that ratified it, to make hitherto legal discrimination illegal. Such a convention can be applied by national courts.

Racial discrimination also marched hand in hand with colonialism and the two subjects linked together in the UN, where decolonisation – or self-determination – was strongly mirrored and given all encouragement. Former colonies – almost all now independent governments – perceived continued colonialism and its partner, legal racial discrimination, as a threat to the peace. They acted to support guerrilla groups and anti-colonial movements, too, making the threat to the peace something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The doctrine that colonialism and governmental denial of human rights – especially human equality – threatens the peace has been repeatedly pronounced by the General Assembly, which also pleads for action by the Security Council. The resolutions of the General Assembly also make it possible to claim that support of liberation movements has legitimacy. A large majority of governments in the world accepts this doctrine, despite its shrillness and sometimes extraneous provisions, and some are prepared to act on it and support those who do. In addition, members of political movements within the affected territories invariably press for the rights which have international legitimation. Such legitimation gives their appeals a special, universal quality and consistency.

Both racial domination and colonialism – or what is left of it – seem to be centred in Southern Africa. What South Africa calls separate development and what the rest of the governments in the world now call *apartheid*, falls directly under the doctrine that governmental denial of human rights is a threat to the peace. Indeed the doctrine grew up mainly around Rhodesian independence, South African racial policies and the adamant denial by the South African government that its social programmes were subject to any international concern without its consent. South Africa's continuing administration of SWA/Namibia also brought it into conflict with the other principle of the human rights-colonialism doctrine. The General Assembly increasingly challenged the South African stance on SWA/Namibia after the failure of conciliatory approaches. The clear result is that now the doctrinal spadework for the Security Council has been accomplished if the United States, the United Kingdom and France are moved to accept or abstain on a resolution treating South African social policies or administration of SWA/Namibia as a threat to the peace. They have already done so in the case of Rhodesia. Already all of Africa and the rest of the Third World does so with regard to South Africa and SWA/Namibia. Some of the Western European governments have joined them and also extend some support to the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and the Rhodesian liberation movements. Thus the doctrine has support, nearly extensive enough to permit the

Security Council to take coercive action, and is already in use to legitimate coercive pressure in Southern Africa.

A second major example of doctrine concerns the uneven distribution of wealth and economic benefit in the world. By far the great majority of the world's people live in or near the edge of poverty. The gap between rich and poor is nowhere more starkly etched than in the new, former colonial countries. Since 1950, the UN system has been used to mount pressure and programmes to remedy the evils of poverty and to reduce the contrast between poverty and wealth. Really substantial development programmes exist, but there is never enough aid being given. Thus the poverty gap remains unfilled and grows larger each year.

Two years ago, in the aftermath of the oil boycott, the UN General Assembly adopted a far-reaching declaration on a new economic order. As a document it has important defects; some of it is internally inconsistent; it contains extraneous material and emphasises unrestrained nationalistic behaviour, where co-operation would serve better. But the doctrine is there: the organisation of international life must be directed to a more even distribution of wealth. The doctrine has elicited some – naturally not complete – response from the wealthy countries, the most important of which perhaps came from the United States, which in effect rejected the first Declaration on a New International Economic Order. When the time came to give the declaration more specific effect, the United States exerted strong leadership among the developed countries, used former Secretary of State Kissinger to set the tone of negotiations in the General Assembly and contributed greatly to the creation of a position for future co-operation. Efforts will continue to achieve a more equitable redistribution of wealth and some of those can be expected to succeed. Above all, the framework of ideas for more organisation now exists, and the whole UN system has begun to apply that framework.

V

The UN system and other international organisational systems, e.g. the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), thus consist of more than flashy debates in the Security Council and an annual slanging match between embattled South African diplomats and their suspect opponents. What results and conclusions can be discerned?

- The co-operative links among specialists in governments, academia and in private sectors have never been broader or more pervasive. The network of associated national and international civil servants and their clients and associates continue

to grow and can be expected to do so, especially as efforts to produce development and the associated investment opportunities continue.

- In a quiet, sometimes even unnoticed way, these linked networks of the people who make the machinery work, adopt and carry out parts of international programmes. Some incorporate international doctrine in their thoughts and aims; statements on human rights by President Carter and former Secretary of State Kissinger provide excellent examples. As in national political affairs, government servants seek consensus among themselves across national borders. They also use their powers at home and in international co-operation to extend organised international life.
- From this line of argument comes the conclusion that, generally, interdependence among governments increases daily as the result of work by international organisations, including the UN system. It costs increasingly more to break out of the network, although it can still be done. First among these costs is diplomatic isolation. The deviant's voice neither influences doctrines and programmes, nor is it sought. Then explicit punishment may follow, perhaps not enough to bring objectionable behaviour to a halt but not necessarily inexpensive either. Participation in international welfare programmes, especially those for economic development, becomes impossible and furthermore, external pressure may be attuned to internal dissidence in the non-complying state; such dissidence may be encouraged and even directly supported.
- Despite the range of co-operation, not all problems are solved, near solution or necessarily on the way to solution. Far from it: people in most of the world live in hunger and have no defence against, for example, arbitrary arrest. If their governments try adventuring abroad, their own people can do little to stop them and other governments may not try.

This, then, is no picture of early paradise or undoubted progress towards it, but the UN system still can be taken as a serious fact of international life. It offers benefits and a sketch of the future. It suggests that organised international relations has reached new levels of richness, variety and opportunity for governments that wish to or must co-operate.

PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

J. D. Matthews

The partnership between African countries and the European Economic Community set out under the Lomé Convention of 1975, has inaugurated a new trend in international economic co-operation.

Although some African countries have been associated with the Community since the Treaty of Rome of 1957, which established the *European Economic Community (EEC)*, the latest agreement of Lomé introduced a number of new features into the relationship. The most striking of these was the expansion of the Association which now links 55 independent nations: 9 members of the European Community and 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific states, usually known as the ACP countries (see map on page 45). Among these, 39 are in Africa, and Transkei may in time become the 40th African associate of the European Community.

To become an associate of the EEC does not imply membership of the Community. The EEC is an economic union providing for free movement of goods, capital and labour as well as establishing common policies for all members in specific areas of economic life. An association agreement, on the other hand, is a treaty providing for reciprocal rights and obligations, mainly with regard to trade and aid. Some agreements lead to some form of economic integration whilst others are more accurately labelled as economic co-operation.

After a brief outline of the nature of economic integration, this article will examine the evolution of the EEC association system, the characteristics of the Lomé Convention and the benefits it would bring to Transkei.

Economic Integration

Economic integration is a process combining divided national economies into a single economy. The first stage involves the removal of discriminatory measures between countries, and the more advanced steps include the co-ordination of various national policies into common policies. Some countries limit themselves to the first stage, while others integrate more fully.

Dr. Matthews is Senior Lecturer in Business Administration at the University of Natal in Durban. She is the author of *Association System of the European Community*, Praeger, New York (forthcoming). This article contains the text of a paper presented to the Conference on *International Implications of the Independence of Transkei*, organised by the South African Institute of International Affairs in Umtata, Transkei from 24-27 November, 1976.

There are therefore different degrees and forms of economic integration.

A *free trade area* is the simplest form of integration. Countries eliminate tariff barriers on the movement of goods between themselves but retain their own tariffs against goods from outside the area. An example of this is the European Free Trade Association of which Britain was a member until it joined the European Community.

A *custom union* has two characteristics: elimination of tariff barriers on the movement of goods – as in a free trade area – and in addition, the establishment of a common external tariff on goods from outside the customs union. Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and the Republic of South Africa have been in a customs union for many years.

In a *common market* there is free movement of all factors of production; that is, not only goods, but also labour and capital. The European Community is often described as a common market, although it is more accurately an economic union, since it aims at common policies.

An *economic union* contains the characteristics of a common market but there is, moreover, a co-ordination of national economic policies which necessitates harmonisation of social, fiscal and monetary measures. The EEC has set up common agricultural policies in other areas, for instance, towards the developing world. The association system and the Lomé Convention are part of this policy.

The Association System

Although some agreements between the European Community and other countries establish free trade areas and customs unions, the Lomé Convention does not lead to economic integration; it forms a partnership between the ACP countries and the Community. To understand the complexity of the association network, it is important to differentiate between three types of agreements: full association; special or partial association; and trade agreements.

Since we are mainly concerned with the first group, the other two will be examined only briefly. Special or partial association is regulated by *sui generis* agreements, provided for by Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome. Several of these agreements are operating at present, either with a view to future membership of the European Community (as in the case of Greece and Turkey) or to establish a limited type of association (as with Morocco, Tunisia, and more recently Algeria). The Community has also entered into a number of trade agreements with certain


THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

BELGIUM
DENMARK
FRANCE
GERMANY
(Federal Rep.)
IRELAND
ITALY
LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS
UNITED KINGDOM

BAHAMAS
BARBADOS
BOTSWANA
BURUNDI
CAMEROON
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
CHAD
CONGO
DAHOMEY
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
ETHIOPIA
FIJI
GABON
GAMBIA
GHANA

THE ACP STATES (African, Caribbean and Pacific States)

GUINEA
GUINEA-BISSAU
GRENADA
GUYANA
IVORY COAST
JAMAICA
KENYA
LESOTHO
LIBERIA
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALI
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
NIGER
NIGERIA
RWANDA
SENEGAL
SIERRA LEONE
SOMALIA
SUDAN
SWAZILAND
TANZANIA
TOGO
TONGA
TRINIDAD and TOBAGO
UGANDA
UPPER VOLTA
WESTERN SAMOA
ZAIRE
ZAMBIA



Source: 'The Courier' Brussels.

countries, e.g. in the Mediterranean region, in Latin America, and with those members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which did not enter the EEC. Some of these agreements are preferential – and are therefore frowned upon by the GATT – whilst others extend to all other countries the tariff concessions granted under the agreement.

By far the most important part of the association system is the first group, the full association between the EEC and African countries, which began in 1957 and culminated in the Lomé Convention of 1975. This association passed through three phases: 1957-1963, 1963-1975, 1975 to the present.

During the first phase, it was regulated by Part IV of the Treaty of Rome, which dealt with the relationship between those EEC

members with overseas dependencies and members without such ties. The free trade area of the Community was extended to those dependencies to avoid setting up new tariff barriers.

With the advent of independence for many African countries during the Sixties, the arrangement fell away and a new association was offered and accepted by 18 African states under the 1963 Convention signed at Yaoundé (Cameroon). It was called the Association of African and Malagasy States (AAMS) and this second phase lasted until 1975. Under the Yaoundé Convention, 18 separate free trade areas were formed between the Community and each African state, except that these were allowed to levy customs duties in certain circumstances, such as for the protection of infant industries. Financial aid was to be provided for associates through the European Development Fund, and other measures established institutions for the implementation of the Convention and dealt with problems such as the establishment of foreign companies. The Convention was renewed in 1969 and became known as Yaoundé II. It was an open association, in the sense that Article 58 provided for the accession of states with an economic structure comparable to the associates. Invoking this article, Mauritius joined in 1972 – the first Commonwealth country to become a full associate of the EEC. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania entered into a partial association with the Community under the Arusha Convention of 1969. They have now joined the ACP countries under the Lomé Convention.

The enlargement of the European Community to include Britain, Ireland and Denmark in 1973, made it necessary to reconsider the relationship between Africa and the Community, since trade links between Britain and Commonwealth countries would be affected. If nothing was done, Commonwealth exports to Britain would be dutiable in the same way as exports from any other country outside the EEC; in other words, Community preference would replace Commonwealth preference. It was then decided to offer developing Commonwealth countries, as well as nations with a similar economic structure, some form of formal relationship with the Community. Those countries, most of which were in Africa, were given three choices: full association on the lines of the Yaoundé Convention; a more limited association; or a simple trade agreement.

At the same time, the expiry of Yaoundé II in 1975, demanded a reappraisal of the arrangements between the EEC and associates. It was considered appropriate to combine the two sets of negotiations, and for the enlarged Community to discuss a new agreement with both the Commonwealth countries and the Yaoundé associates, as well as with a few other African countries,

such as Ethiopia and the Sudan, who were interested in the scheme.

Negotiations took about three years. One of the many problems was the question of "reverse preferences", i.e. reciprocity in tariff concessions. This had been part of the Yaoundé Convention – as part of the requirements of a free trade area – but some countries regarded this reciprocity as no longer justified. The opposition of the United States to reverse preferences and the fact that the GATT does not expect reciprocity in the case of developing countries, were stressed by some negotiators. In the end, the EEC agreed *not to demand* free access in the markets of the ACP countries, but instead asked for a guarantee of non-discrimination between Community members and most-favoured-nation treatment for their products. Most-favoured-nation treatment has been a feature of commercial treaties for many decades. It means that EEC goods imported into ACP countries are not taxed more heavily than imports from any other country.

Preliminary discussions took place in 1972 and negotiations were formally opened in Brussels in July 1973, followed by a conference in October. Discussion continued at Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in February 1974 and at Kingston (Jamaica) in July. No agreement was yet in sight and the Yaoundé Convention was due to expire on 31 January, 1975. This accelerated the pace of the negotiations and final agreement was reached on the morning of 1 February, 1975 when nine Community and 46 ACP countries signed the Lomé Convention in the Togo capital. One of the salient features of the negotiations was the strong unity of ACP countries. In spite of the difficulties of co-ordinating so many different viewpoints, Francophone and Anglophone negotiators showed a remarkably cohesive front in their dealings with EEC spokesmen, and this was instrumental in achieving more favourable terms than under previous agreements.

The Lomé Convention

The Lomé Convention is divided into six parts: trade co-operation; export earnings from commodities; industrial co-operation; financial and technical co-operation; establishment, services, payments and capital movements; and institutions. In addition, the agreement includes several Protocols, covering specific aspects such as sugar, rum and bananas.

Trade co-operation. The EEC is giving free access to most exports from ACP countries and, in return, these will give EEC products most-favoured-nation treatment and they will not discriminate between Community members. Access to the

Community's markets will be free where customs duties are the only form of protection. It has been estimated that 94,2 percent of ACP agricultural exports will enter duty-free.¹ For 5,8 percent, however, there remain restrictions due to the common agricultural policy of the EEC, but those ACP exports will nevertheless receive preferential treatment. This affects products which compete with EEC agricultural goods, such as beef, veal, certain fruits and vegetables.

Although these restrictions apply only to a small percentage of ACP products as a whole, for specific countries it concerns a much larger part of their trade. In the case of Botswana, for instance, livestock amounts to about 80 percent of its exports. As this could nullify the advantages of the Lomé Convention for some countries, the ministers of foreign affairs of the Community agreed on 26 June, 1975 to suspend 90 percent of the import levy on beef imports from Botswana, Swaziland, Kenya and Madagascar. This was a temporary measure and it was hoped that the ACP countries would start exporting a different cut of beef, which would not compete with EEC goods and would therefore not be subject to the import levy.

Export earnings. This section institutes a new method of stabilising export earnings of ACP countries. The system is called STABEX and is applicable to 12 basic products.² It operates as follows: where an ACP country's earnings from the export of one of the specified products represents at least 7,5 percent (2,5 percent for the 34 least developed, landlocked or island ACP countries)³ of its total earnings, that state is entitled to a financial transfer if its annual earnings from the export of that product to the EEC fall to 7,5 percent (2,5 percent for the least developed, landlocked or island ACP countries) below the "reference level". This level is calculated on the basis of the average of the four previous years. In the case of Burundi, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda and Swaziland, the system will apply to exports of the products listed, irrespective of destination.

The Community will provide 375 million units-of-account⁴ to the STABEX fund, but provision is also made for a certain amount of self-help, because the ACP states which have received transfers are to contribute to the reconstitution of resources,

1. "Lomé Dossier", *The Courier*, Brussels, Commission of the European Communities (Special Issue), no. 31, March 1975, p. 38.

2. Groundnut, cotton, tea, coconut, fresh bananas, coffee, palm products, wood products, cocoa, iron ore, skins (raw hides) and leather products.

3. Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana*, Burundi*, Central African Republic*, Chad*, Dahomey*, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia*, Fiji, Gambia*, Grenada, Guinea*, Guinea-Bissau*, Jamaica, Lesotho*, Madagascar, Malawi*, Mali*, Mauritania*, Mauritius, Niger*, Rwanda*, Somalia*, Sudan*, Swaziland*, Tanzania*, Togo*, Tonga*, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda*, Upper Volta*, Western Samoa* and Zambia (*countries exempted from the obligation of contributing to the STABEX fund).

4. The unit-of-account of the European Community is made up of specified amounts of the member currencies. In March 1975 its value was approximately \$1.31.

when certain conditions have been met five years after receipt of aid. Twenty four countries are exempt from this obligation.⁵

Industrial co-operation. The Community will help to set up programmes and projects as regards infra-structures, industrial undertakings, training, technology and research, in order to promote the industrial development of the ACP states. A committee on industrial co-operation will gather and disseminate information and organise and facilitate contacts between commercial agents.

Financial and technical co-operation. This section deals with aid to ACP countries. The Community will contribute towards the European Development Fund (originally created under the Rome Treaty of 1957) for the economic and social development of associates. The fund will provide grants and loans to the ACP countries, and certain measures were taken to guarantee the optimum use of those funds; for example, the EEC Commission will be represented in each state by a delegate responsible for the correct implementation of projects financed from the fund. At present the fund consists of 3 000 million units-of-account distributed as follows: 2 100 grants; 430 soft loans (1 percent interest); 95 risk capital; and 375 STABEX.

In addition, the European Investment Bank will contribute 390 million units-of-account in the form of normal loans. It should be noted here that Community aid is separate from aid provided by individual EEC members.

Establishment, services, payments and capital movements. The purpose of these measures is to provide non-discriminatory treatment of EEC nationals or companies in ACP states and similarly, equal treatment of ACP nationals and companies in the Community. The signatories should also refrain from using any measures which would render impossible the fulfilment of obligations undertaken under the Convention.

Institutions. Three bodies are set up; the Council of Ministers, assisted by the Committee of Ambassadors, and the Consultative Assembly.

The Council of Ministers is composed of EEC Council members and EEC Commission members on the one hand, and a government member of each ACP state on the other hand. This Council will meet once a year, whenever the necessity arises. It may delegate certain powers to the Committee of Ambassadors, which is the body generally responsible for assisting it in the performance of its duties.

The Consultative Assembly is made up, on an equal basis, of members of the European Assembly representing the Commu-

5. For further details on association, see Jacqueline Matthews, *Association System of the European Community*, Praeger Special Studies, New York, 1977.

nity, and of representatives appointed by the ACP states. It expresses opinions in the form of resolutions on matters covered by the Convention. There is also an arbitration procedure for settling disputes regarding the interpretation or implementation of the agreement.

Protocols. Among the protocols attached to the Convention, the most important is the one dealing with trade in sugar. When Britain entered the EEC, it was agreed that its obligation to buy agreed quantities of sugar under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement would continue until 1974, when arrangements regarding sugar would be made within the framework of an association with the enlarged Community. Thus, the Protocol on sugar is meant to compensate Commonwealth producers for the loss of preference in the British market.

For an indefinite period, the Community undertakes to buy up to 1375 000 metric tons of sugar from the ACP states at guaranteed prices and the ACP sugar-exporting countries undertake to supply this amount. Prices will be fixed annually and will be within the range of prices operating for beet sugar produced in the Community. The Community will purchase only if the guaranteed prices cannot be reached on the free market. Other protocols deal with trade in rum and bananas.

General. The Lomé Convention allows ACP countries to form free trade areas, customs unions or economic unions with each other or with developing countries. Although South Africa is not a developing country, the customs union between Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and the Republic did not prevent the BLS countries from becoming signatories to the Lomé Convention, as evidenced by the Joint Declaration annexed to the Treaty, dealing with the problem of trade between the Community and those countries.

Article 90 of the Convention provides for the accession of any state with an economic structure comparable to that of the ACP states, as long as the original signatories give their consent. The Convention may be denounced by either side with six months' notice and will expire in 1980.

Transkei and Association

Transkei would benefit in becoming a signatory to the Lomé Convention. It produces tea and could expand the production of coffee and cotton: all three are included in the list of "basic products" of the STABEX arrangements. Development of infrastructure is, however, essential for the economic growth of Transkei and there is also a need for research and training programmes. These aspects are also covered by the Lomé

Convention. The section on industrial co-operation is specifically designed to promote industrial development in the ACP countries, and financial and technical aid is available with the assistance of the European Development Fund.

Transkei has an economic structure comparable to that of ACP countries and is therefore eligible for membership. If accepted, it would be included in the group of "least developed countries" in the same way as Swaziland and Lesotho, and receive additional benefits.

Membership of the South African Customs Union would not be an obstacle, as shown above. Participation in the Lomé Convention would, of course, need the consent of the original signatories, and although this may take some time, we look forward to the day when Transkei joins the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in a partnership with the European Community.

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- Statement on Rhodesia by the South African Prime Minister, the Hon. B.J. Vorster, in the House of Assembly (28 January, 1977)
- Statement on Rhodesia by US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, in Washington (31 January, 1977)

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