International Affairs BULLETIN

VOL 1 NO 2 1977

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

(founded/gestig: 1934)

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BULLETIN

Published by the South African Institute of International Affairs and supplied free of charge to members. Three issues per year. Subscription rate for non-members R5,00 per annum (surface mail); R7,00 per annum (overseas airmail). Price per copy R1,50 plus postage.

Uitgegee deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede en gratis aan lede verskaf. Drie uitgawes per jaar. Intekengeld vir nie-lede R5,00 per jaar (landpos); R7,00 per jaar (buitelandse lugpos). Prys per eksemplaar R1,50 plus posgeld.

EDITOR/REDAKTEUR
Denis Venter
(Assistant Director/Assistent-Direkteur)

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT/REDAKSIONELE ASSISTENT
Sonja Begg
(Research Assistant/Navorsingsassistent)

Review copies of books, monographs and pamphlets, as well as all correspondence on editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, *International Affairs Bulletin*, South African Institute of International Affairs, Jan Smuts House, P.O. Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Resensie-eksemplare van boeke, monografieë en pamflette, sowel as alle korrespondensie oor redaksionele sake moet gerig word aan die Redakteur, *International Affairs Bulletin*, Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede, Jan Smuts-Huis, Posbus 31596, Braamfontein 2017, Johannesburg, Suid-Afrika.

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

International Affairs Bulletin

Vol. 1, No. 2, 1977

CONTENTS/INHOUD

US PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
Donald Baker 55

PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN INITIATIVE VERSUS INTERNAL SETTLEMENT
Ariston Chambati 75

THE REPUBLIC OF TRANSKEI AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Tsepo Letlaka 79

THE ATTITUDE OF THE AFRICAN STATES TOWARDS THE UN AND THE OAU
Richard Bissell 84

LATIN AMERICA'S *ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS*: A NEW AWAKENING?
Carlos Barbieri 90

Notes on the Libreville Summit of the OAU 99

Book Review 102

Printed and Typeset by Midas Printers (Pty) Ltd., Selby, Johannesburg.

U S PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Donald Baker

United States policy towards Southern Africa is in the process of major transformations, and these changes will have a decided impact on that area. Although these policies are not yet fully formulated, the outlines are clear and their consequences are already evident. In three areas, in particular, these US policy changes can be detected:

- the Namibian and Rhodesian settlement issues;
- US attitudes and policies towards development problems in Third World, and particularly, African countries; and
- US attitudes towards and pressures upon South Africa for changes in its racial policies.

The series of recent meetings between high-level American and South African government officials reflect the pressures that are being brought to bear on the South African government.

The changes that have occurred or will occur in terms of US policy, can be best illustrated through a comparison of the Kissinger and Carter policies towards Southern Africa, for the basic premises and goals of each account for their different approaches towards resolving the conflicts and problems of Southern Africa.

Kissinger Policy towards Southern Africa

Until the Angolan Civil War, the United States paid scant attention to African affairs. It displayed a brief interest during the 1960's, but the Vietnam War increasingly diverted American attention from Africa. However, the Angolan conflict, along with Portugal's withdrawal from Africa and persistent Soviet inroads into that continent, prompted a US policy reassessment.

Prior to Portugal's demise, and even for a period thereafter, US Southern African policy was based on a series of assumptions, some of which were articulated in National Security Council Memorandum 39. These assumptions included:

- that whites — in the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa — would retain power for a considerable period of time;
- that although guerrilla war in Mozambique and Angola might lead ultimately to a Portuguese withdrawl, factionalism among

Professor Baker is a member of the Department of Political Science and Sociology at the Southampton College of Long Island University, New York in the United States. He is a Consultant to the US Government and various groups engaged in research focusing on the problems of development in Southern Africa. This is the text, with minor editorial changes, of talks given to several branches of the South African Institute of International Affairs during August 1977.

the Rhodesian nationalist groups would prevent them from successfully combining and contesting against white power there;

- that South Africa, given its military power, could relatively easily curtail internal or external African opposition to its rule;
- that with increasing industrialisation, the condition of black workers in South Africa might improve, thereby leading to greater internal stability; and
- that South Africa would ultimately grant "independence" to various homelands — e.g. Transkei and others — as well as Namibia; doing so, however, in such a manner that they remained client states to South Africa.

Although economic and political sanctions had been imposed against Rhodesia, the United States — under the Byrd Amendment — imported Rhodesian chrome and other minerals that it classified as essential to its national security. Moreover, subsidiaries of US multinational corporations (Mobil, Union Carbide and others) were allowed to trade with or operate in Rhodesia — usually through their subsidiary South African firms — the US government putting little or no pressure on US parent firms to terminate these activities. Even though it had introduced, during the 1960's, the UN resolution declaring South Africa's control over Namibia (South West Africa) forfeited, the US government gave little support thereafter to UN efforts and activities aimed at dislodging South Africa from that territory. Basically, US policy adhered to the premise of NSCM 38 that whites would continue to hold control and that the US could only hope that an industrialised South Africa might lead to improved conditions for its blacks.

The Angolan Civil War and Soviet/Cuban involvement, however,precipitated a change in US policy towards Southern Africa. Rebuffed by Congress in his covert efforts to provide military assistance to the FNLA and Unita, Kissinger thereafter moved in other directions to thwart what he saw as increasing Soviet inroads in Africa. These steps included Kissinger's April 1976 fact-finding tour of Africa; his speeches in Lusaka and Nairobi, the latter at the UN Conference on Trade and Development where he called for new development programmes and assistance to Africa; and his pressures on South Africa to bring about settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia. His June and September talks with Prime Minister Vorster, along with the pressures exerted on South Africa, Rhodesia and the British government resulted in the Geneva talks. The talks, however, proved abortive, but had Ford won the presidency, in all likelihood Kissinger would have pushed the efforts to reach an accord.

Kissinger's approach to the above issues was based on a number of assumptions that differ sharply from those that guide Carter policies towards Southern Africa. Kissinger's basic assumption was that development was impossible without stability and order. He viewed the post-war world as comparable to the period following the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, when Metternich fashioned a series of alliances among nations that brought nearly a century of peace — with a few exceptions — to Europe prior to World War I. Kissinger set out to do likewise, moving to de-escalate the cold war and achieve some form of rapprochement between the US, USSR and China; all of whom were locked in an international rivalry that could escalate into a nuclear holocaust. From Kissinger's perspective there were five major powers — the US, USSR, Europe, Japan and China — and if they could achieve détente and not contest for control over the Third World, which could trigger a nuclear war, then peace and stability might be assured. From this perspective, then, the Third World was of secondary importance; its only real importance was if it became a staging ground where major powers contested for influence or control, precipitating major power involvement and a possible world war.

Kissinger recognised that, in terms of development, Third World countries would undoubtedly undergo decades of political and economic instability. However, if the major powers could keep from being enmeshed — or from being lured into such situations by Third World countries playing off one major power against another — then peace could possibly be maintained among the major powers. Racial, ethnic, economic and political conflicts would undoubtedly persist in the Third World, but major powers should not intervene. If anything, they should serve as intermediaries rather than participants, offering to mediate problems if necessary. In other situations they should remain aloof, letting the country itself or others resolve the problems. One such example — one that is alluded to later — is that of Cyprus. There, the historical animosities of Greeks and Turks living on the island created chaos. Finally, Turkey intervened and partitioned the island as the only feasible means of resolving group hostilities. In this action the US acquiesced, and the Turkish imposed "solution" was thereby accepted as perhaps the only way of preventing group conflict.

The Angolan war, and particularly the Soviet/Cuban involvement, forced Kissinger to address himself to that part of the world and its problems — the purpose of his efforts that of forestalling further Soviet intrusions in Africa. To do this, solutions had to be found to the Rhodesian and Namibian disputes, and South Africa was seen as the "key" to their solution. Hence, pressures were

exerted on South Africa. What was envisioned was the establishment of black governments, both continuing essentially along the paths of development they had been pursuing — that in Rhodesia following closely the Kenya model. Thus blacks would replace whites in government, greater numbers of blacks would be incorporated within economic structures, but whites would remain and play a vital role in development. The leverage, particularly in terms of Rhodesia, for assuring these policies would be twofold:

- first, the offering of development funds to the new black government, if it would guarantee or assure the place of whites in the society — minority guarantees — and,
- second, guarantees — a "safety net" — to whites that should they be forced to leave because of chaotic conditions they would receive compensation, retained in a trust fund held outside the country, for their losses.

For Kissinger, though, Southern Africa remained of secondary concern: the primary issue was that of thwarting further Soviet encroachments in Africa. To achieve his goals Kissinger relied on Prime Ministers Vorster and Smith, and the frontline presidents of Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola and Botswana. There was little or no consultation with Rhodesian or Namibian nationalist leaders. It was this latter fact, along with widespread African distrust of the intent of his policies, that prompted opposition to Kissinger's efforts and led to the rejection of his settlement proposals by the Rhodesian nationalists and, ultimately, to the failure of the Geneva talks.

South Africa was the key link in bringing about a resolution to the Rhodesian and Namibian problems; it controlled the rail links to Rhodesia and, if it cut off oil and military assistance, Rhodesia could not survive. Moreover, South Africa controlled Namibia and could grant that area independence if it so wished. Consequently, the US applied diverse pressures, including "carrot and stick" tactics, for getting South Africa's support . For one thing, the US protested against South African racial policies, but that was a muted criticism in return for the Republic's assistance. For another, it convinced other IMF countries that they should sell part of their gold reserves to establish a fund for assisting developing nations, but the immediate consequence of that act was a devastating drop in the price of gold — a step that virtually crippled the South African economy because of its reliance on the sale of its gold for obtaining vitally needed foreign currency. Besides these pressures, inducements were also quietly and indirectly suggested, such as US support for softer monetary policies for South Africa in the IMF and World Bank, the possible extension of loans, a possible lifting of the arms embargo, and even possibly the recognition of Transkei at some future date. All of these tactics

were, along with others, employed for inducing South Africa into helping bring about a settlement in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Although Kissinger spoke of the need to avoid a racial conflict in Southern Africa, it was his desire to limit Soviet influence in Africa that was the key to his policies. Africa itself was only of secondary importance — except in terms of that power balance factor. Could the situation be stabilised, with black governments — preferably of the Kenya model — established in Rhodesia and Namibia, then the conflicts there would not lead to Soviet-US intervention of a type that might escalate into a direct US-USSR confrontation. Could there be a resolution, there was then the possibility that capitalist-orientated governments would emerge in both Zimbabwe and Namibia, and they would retain links with the Western industrial world and supply it with vital mineral resources, controlled and developed especially by the multinational corporations.

Carter Policy towards Southern Africa

US policy under President Carter is based on a different set of premises than those of Kissinger, and this is already reflected in policy. These policies derive from Carter's own beliefs, the ideas of Zbigniew Brzezinski, his National Security Adviser, and of Andrew Young, the American Ambassador to the United Nations. Carter's own populist ideas and his pragmatic approach to problems are significant, but equally influential are the ideas of Brzezinski. The differences between the Carter and Kissinger approaches derives from divergent assumptions in three areas:

- differing perceptions of the contempory world, and the implications of these differences for international relations;
- the issue of human rights; and
- the issues and problems of development.

In terms of the first of these, Kissinger perceived the contemporary post-war world as comparable to that of the Metternich era. Consequently, he moved — as Metternich — to establish stability and harmony among the major powers; hence, the Third World and its problems were only of secondary importance. The ideas of Brzezinski are significantly different, and they are reflected in Carter's University of Notre Dame speech in May. Brzezinski argues that there is no comparison between the present and the Metternich era. Rather, during the post-war 1945-1950 period a new world order was established, with the Marshall Plan, NATO, other alliances, and a polarisation of Western and communist blocs; but this order, based primarily on the five major powers, is now in the process of disintegration. Unlike Kissinger, Brzezinski views the five major powers as playing an increasingly

less significant role in the emergent new world order. He contends that in this new world order, the Third World instead of being of periphery importance will play a more significant role. This will lead to a reordering of the international system, including new alliances of nations.

This view of a changed international system of alliances was reflected in both Carter's Notre Dame speech and his earlier meetings with European leaders in London. Greater attention, Carter suggested, should be given to Third World countries and their problems. The industrialised world should be of assistance where possible and particularly should industrial nations help developing nations that are concerned with problems of development, social justice and human rights. These issues, Carter argued, are of major concern to the United States, and the likelihood is that the future will witness increasing US contacts and alliances with developing countries — even though in some instances these new alignments might put the US at odds with its traditional allies.

Linked closely with this notion of a new international order are the Carter emphases on social justice and human rights. It is what Carter sees as the social injustices against blacks in South Africa, as well as in Rhodesia and Namibia, that motivates his criticisms of this country. The use of racially ascriptive criteria for determining opportunities is anathema to the principle of human rights. The notions of human rights and social justice are closely linked with the principle of democracy in Carter's view; but there are distinctions that must be made. As Andrew Young noted before a conference of Latin American delegates in Guatemala in April, there are two levels of human rights. Both are fundamental, but the one — namely, an individual's right to food, shelter, clothing and an opportunity for employment to sustain himself and his family — is even more basic than the second level, that of civil and political rights. People are entitled to both, but concerted efforts must be directed especially towards assuring the first, for unless these rights are fulfilled the latter have only limited meaning. Thus, what is especially important for Third World countries is that their development efforts be directed towards fulfilment of this fundamental level of human rights — of food, shelter, clothing and employment. Efforts should also be directed towards assuring political and civil rights — as basic human rights — but that first level of human rights is so basic that demands for their fulfilment must take priority.

Civil and political rights are also fundamental, and where the Carter Administration is critical of earlier Kissinger policies is in his tendency to neglect the issue of human rights; e.g., Kissinger's ignoring of the human rights issue in Chile, and his apparent willingness to withhold criticism of the South African denial of

human rights for blacks in return for the Republic's support in resolving the Rhodesian and Namibian problems. The distinction by Young, though, between the different levels of human rights, could be of significance in the future — particularly in terms of US criticisms of human rights policies in South Africa.

Development, in the Kissinger lexicon, was interpreted primarily in terms of economic growth, but his Nairobi speech indicated a movement somewhat away from that narrow interpretation. "Development", as a concept, is interpreted more broadly in the Carter Administration. This is evident among policy-makers and their advisers and staffs, be it within Brzezinski's National Security Group, the State Department and AID, or the UN Ambassador's staff. Many of these people are more pragmatic in their views, more receptive to criticisms of traditional development theories, and more open-minded concerning the limitations of capitalist strategies for development. Indeed, some take a broader view of development, recognising the fundamental need for changes within political and social sectors, as well as the economic sector, if development is to occur. They do not discount the role that capitalist development can play in some instances, but they are less sanguine about the capitalist notions that rapid industrialisation will resolve the problems of unemployment and poverty which beset most developing nations. Thus, while both Carter and Young have suggested that capitalism can play a role in development (Young, most recently, to industrialists and businessmen in South Africa), both acknowledge that the conditions of any given country must determine the development strategies it should follow.

This recognition by policy-makers, that prior development strategies have not worked in most instances, accounts for evolving shifts in US policy towards Third World countries. Prior economic growth/development models held that, in order to attain growth, developing countries must quickly industrialise — that being the major vehicle for eliminating unemployment — and that foreign exchange should be obtained through the export of primary products to the industrialised world, the foreign currency then being used for development purposes. However, little if any growth occurred in most cases, particularly when measured in terms of per capita income. Rather, industrialisation tended to be capital- rather than labour-intensive, and unemployment not only persisted but grew worse as the population increased. Moreover, the economies of most primary producing countries were virtually devastated when prices for their primary exports, such as copper, plummeted. The result was an increase in their foreign debts and in their rate of inflation. Where industrialisation is in the hands of multinational corporations, such

companies usually rely upon expatriates who are highly skilled and trained. The result is that few indigenous people are trained to replace them; even when some are, industrialisation still tends to result in the emergence of a small, highly trained elite with high incomes and a vast, largely impoverished population that seldom shares in the benefits of that type of development.

Thus little development has actually occurred in most Third World countries. Critics have opposed the emphasis on economic growth and on capital-intensive industrialisation. They propose, instead, that:

- the problems of poverty and unemployment be dealt with through the development of labour-intensive industries;
- rural development be emphasised, including land reform and training in husbandry for improvement in agriculture; and
- there be the rapid development of a rural infrastructure, including new economic zones, as a way of keeping rural people in those areas and away from the cities, where there are no jobs and where they put impossible burdens on social services.

The critics of prevailing economic growth theories also note that where developing nations have relied on the export of primary products and/or the export of cheaply manufactured finished products, they are at the mercy of the industrial world which can at any time reduce its demand for primary resources or enact tariff barriers against products from the Third World.

Hence, the new development theories tend to emphasise the need for increased self-sufficiency; the development of labour-intensive industries locally controlled; a decreased reliance upon, if not rejection of multinational corporations; and a greater attempt at curtailing economic links with the industrial world, with the concomitant attempt to increase economic ties with other developing nations. The emphasis of this is fairly clear: less reliance upon capitalist development; the possibility of nationalisation of at least some of the major industries; and a greater effort to retain local control over the economic sector.

New development theories recognise the imperative need for changes within political and social, as well as economic sectors. There is the need to develop new structures, including political structures, for incorporating and involving people in the development process. This will generally necessitate emphasis on new forms of education and on human resource development and training so that people can become self-sufficient to the degree possible. The basic need, then, is to assure the fulfilment of these basic human rights for all people — of food, shelter, clothing and employment. Beyond that, the means must be found for involving people through new political and social structures, within which and through which they can express their views and criticisms of

development processes and policies.

Recognising these changing perspectives on development, President Carter has emphasised the need for the US to work with developing countries in resolving their problems. There is, however, also an emphasis on the role of human rights. The thrust, then, of this new US policy is towards a rapprochement with Third World countries. The first stage in this has been to intercede especially in two problem areas: the Middle East and Southern Africa. Carter's emphasis is on finding solutions to the Arab-Israeli and Southern African conflicts, thereby hopefully bringing about closer links between the US and Third World nations. The appointment of Young to the position of UN Ambassador was part of this strategy — previously the UN had been only of peripheral importance in US policy; now it is seen as playing a crucial role in renewing US credibility with the developing world.

Even before Carter took office, Young was sent to Southern Africa to participate in a Lesotho conference with African leaders; and shortly after his UN appointment he was sent on a series of missions to Africa, the purpose of which was to contact African leaders, listen to their views on African problems, and emphasise American interest in being of assistance. Closer contacts were established especially with Nigeria, which is seen as one of the major and influential powers in African affairs. Moreover, rather than intervene in Zaire — as Kissinger had in Angola — when Shaba province was invaded, the US proposed that the major powers desist and allow African states to settle the question. Thereafter, in an effort to broaden US contacts and credibility with other Third World states, Young attended the Guatemala conference and met with Latin American leaders to express US concerns with the problems of development and human rights in that part of the world.

In terms of Southern Africa, the Carter Administration soon recognised the need for quick resolutions to the Rhodesian and Namibian problems. They, like Kissinger, directed pressures against South Africa to assist in bringing about changes in these two countries. However, unlike Kissinger, the Carter Administration rejected the notion of playing down its criticism of social injustices in South Africa. Rather, it has pressured for changes there as well, and it is these pressures that account for the present confrontation between the US and South Africa. Unlike Kissinger, whose primary intent in resolving Southern African issues was to prevent a further intrusion of the Soviet Union in that area of the world, the Carter Administration's motivation is basically that of seeing a termination of the racial injustices that characterise the situation in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.

Southern Africa and US Policy

Development, in terms of US policy, must be viewed in broader systemic terms, including the linkages of political, economic and social sectors, because American policy — besides focusing on these broader aspects — is now also committed to the principle of human rights. All these factors motivate contemporary US policy towards Southern Africa. However, the most immediate concerns of US policy-makers are the Namibian and Rhodesian situations, the racial policies of South Africa, and the development problems of Southern Africa. The US has not yet fully spelled out its policies, and even were it to do so its policies would undoubtedly be modified somewhat with changes in conditions and circumstances. However, it is possible to draw inferences from the above analysis of Carter assumptions and sketch briefly the major characteristics of emergent US policy.

Both the Kissinger and Carter efforts have been directed towards a quick resolution of the Namibian and Rhodesian problems. Pressures have been, or will be exerted on South Africa to assist in reaching settlements, for South Africa holds the power to make these determinations. It holds control over Namibia; and, given the Rhodesian reliance on South African transport systems, oil and military assistance, Smith must yield to South African pressures. Nowhere was this more evident than in September 1976 when, under South African pressures, Smith yielded and accepted the principle of majority rule for Rhodesia.

Where the Kissinger goal was clearly the establishment of a Kenya-type society in Zimbabwe, the Carter Administration holds that in both Zimbabwe and Namibia the new governments must determine for themselves the shape of their political economy. Even given some form of socialist system in either or both countries, the US intent will be that of helping them achieve their development goals — if requested to do so. The major criteria for that assistance will be whether or not these governments move to assure human rights and to implement their professed goal of basing their government on the support and involvement of the people. Congress, too, may intervene — as it has in rejecting aid for Mozambique — and thereby support or reject Carter policy. Providing there is some type of amicable settlement, the probability is that Congress will support the President's proposals for development assistance to Namibia and Zimbabwe, should those states request it.

That second principle — of popular participation — has created one of the major snags in present settlement negotiations. If people are to be given a voice in determining who they want to represent them in constitutional discussions and thereafter in

elections to government, then elections themselves become significant steps along the path to settlement. However, not all the nationalist groups, be they in Namibia or Rhodesia, accept that principle — at least not the principle of elections for selecting delegates to a conference to establish the constitutional framework for the new government. For example, SWAPO and the Patriotic Front demand that power be turned over to them in a new independent government and that only at some point thereafter should elections be held. This idea is rejected by other nationalists in both countries who demand that elections be held as the first step, these elections to determine the representation of delegates to a body that will establish the new constitutional framework of government.

Given the Carter emphasis on human rights, US efforts have been directed towards getting SWAPO and other Namibian nationalist groups to accept the principle of an election as a basis for determining the composition of the group that will shape the constitutional framework of Namibia. Should that effort prove successful, the probability is that the Anglo-American efforts at resolving the Rhodesian situation will follow somewhat comparable lines. Thus efforts will be directed towards the frontline, as well as other African states to persuade the Patriotic Front to accept a similar formula for Rhodesia. Anglo-American efforts are also being directed towards getting the Rhodesian government's acceptance, and in this instance exertions are also directed towards South Africa to pressure Rhodesia (as in the Kissinger talks) to acquiesce. If a settlement proposal is worked out, it will in all likelihood include a form of ultimatum: namely, that Rhodesia accept the settlement terms or the British and Americans will withdraw their services and the guarantees of the settlement proposal, letting the war take its course.

Part of the present settlement proposals include, as in the earlier Kissinger plan, proposals for white guarantees — i.e., a financial "safety net" for whites remaining in the country who, should conditions necessitate, may later seek to leave — and proposals for providing assisted passage for whites leaving — especially those who, if they remained, would prevent the incorporation into jobs of Africans who are qualified for positions whites now hold; jobs which blacks have been denied because of discriminatory legislation or practice. One of the major pressures that a new government will face will be the demand for Africanisation of jobs — especially from those Africans, whether presently resident in Rhodesia or those returning from abroad, who are qualified but have previously been denied access to such positions. Unless these demands are met, racial animosities could intensify and make virtually impossible any possibility of whites and blacks

living in harmony.

In the case of Namibia, South Africa has shown a willingness to accept the proposals for a UN supervised election as worked out by a delegation of Western nations in consultation with South African officials. The Geneva conference on Rhodesia was a failure, in part, because of Kissinger's neglect in consulting in advance with Rhodesian nationalist groups. Now, Anglo-American negotiators have included these groups, the frontline presidents and also the leaders of other African states in their consultations as they search for a feasible resolution to the Rhodesian problem. Where the Kissinger proposals included a substantial financial "safety net" for whites, the indications are that that safety net has been considerably reduced in the new proposals. Moreover, the longer the Rhodesian government appears to drag its feet in moving towards a settlement, the greater becomes the reluctance of the American Congress — who must approve the US contribution, which provides the major share — to support such a fund. However, were a settlement negotiated in the near future, Congress would, despite some reluctance, probably accept the President's recommendations for funds.

Carter Administration policy-makers recognise that both Namibia and Zimbabwe will chart their own future development course, and they also recognise that this will in all likelihood entail some form of socialism. For Namibia, the probability is for an exodus of many whites; the enactment of massive land reform measures; programmes for the nationalisation of multinational corporations; and moves to decrease that country's dependence on South Africa and on its export of primary resources. Given the level of economic develoment in Rhodesia, the probability — as apparently envisaged by the Carter Administration — is for some form of mixed economy; for either close control over or some form of nationalisation of major sectors of the economy; for land reform; and for concerted efforts at rural development. Should the US be called upon for development assistance, there is a major likelihood that the US, given its belief that Zimbabwe could play a major role in a regional development programme, would assist.

Thus, should these countries seek assistance from the US, aid would be forthcoming, especially for rural development programmes, improvements in agricultural production, and improvements in health care for the people. For, what the US Agency for International Development (AID) is increasingly emphasising in its assistance programmes for developing countries is the establishment of ventures that assist in helping people become economically self-sufficient. These concerns were already spelled out by AID in 1975, and the new leadership of AID has reaffirmed the position as set out in the 1975 statement:

"AID's development assistance strategy is cast in different form today than it was several years ago. The key elements are, we believe, consistent with the main themes of the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act.

— By concentrating our aid in three key sectors of food and nutrition, population and health, and education and human resources development, we seek to help developing nations increase their capacity to meet the basic needs of their people."[1]

The AID statement, now being implemented, notes that development assistance should be "directed towards reaching the poor majority within the populations of these nations" and that, equally important, AID programmes should "involve the poor as active participants in the development process itself, avoiding any suggestion of a handout".

Hence, AID programmes are moving in new directions. Recognising the systemic character of development problems, AID programmes are now aimed at breaking the chains of underdevelopment. The outlines for AID programmes, including its willingness to support new development approaches and strategies, is set out in the following terms: "...AID support must be part of a development approach conducive to broad-based systemic changes...".

In pressing ahead with new legislation, AID assistance is:

- "*concentrating on countries* whose development policies we can support and that can utilize our assistance effectively;
- *concentrating on key sectors* (food and nutrition, population and health, and education) affecting the basic well-being of the poor;
- *providing key components* (frequently in concert with other bilateral and international donors) of development packages designed to involve and affect broad segments of the poor majority, thus multiplying the impact of our assistance;
- *supporting selected pilot programmes* and testing new approaches with potential for affecting many people, thus encouraging the experimentation needed to advance the art of development. Above all, we must be prepared to assume risks."[2]

Thus, in terms of US policy, there is evidence within AID and the Carter Administration of a willingness to move in new directions in helping Third World countries break out of their dependency position. It is these Carter commitments that will, as he suggested in his Notre Dame speech, lead to new alignments of the US with Third World nations.

This new approach has implications far beyond the borders of

1. Agency for International Development, *Implementation of "New Directions" in Development Assistance*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1975, p.3.
2. *Ibid.*, p.7.

Zimbabwe and Namibia. For example, there is recognition among American policy-makers of the need for African and other Third World countries to break their dependency relationship with the industrial world. That dependency is based on their selling of primary resources and/or cheap finished products to the industrial world, and they thereby remain vulnerable to the fluctuating demands of industrial nations. One means for breaking this dependency relationship is by curtailing Third World links with the industrial world and creating new trade ties and relationships with nearby developing countries — establishing in effect a regional economic union. These regional linkages are virtually impossible now because of the limited transport/distribution infrastructures between and among the developing nations. This is evident even in the Central/Southern African region. However, were that infrastructure developed, the Central/Southern African states could establish an economic grid which, in terms of new trade patterns would leave them less dependent on the industrial world. A prime example of this is Rhodesia/Zimbabwe which, with its industrial base and transport/distribution infrastructure linking it to its neighbours, could play a crucial role in an economic union. Such economic unions are not easily established or maintained: witness the failure of attempts in the Caribbean, East Africa and elsewhere. However, if technical and other assistance were forthcoming from the industrial world, African states could move towards the development of closer regional economic ties as they evolved their own version of the European Common Market.

Current US policy towards South Africa represents a sharp shift from Kissinger policies. The Kissinger tendency was to play down human rights issues and mute the criticism of South African racial policies in return for that country's assistance in the resolution of the Namibian and Rhodesian problems. The Carter Administration, however, has moved forward on both fronts: that of criticising South African racial policies and that of pressuring South Africa to assist in resolving the Namibian and Rhodesian issues.

The American position was spelled out in the Vienna talks between Vice-President Mondale and Prime Minister Vorster. Developments in South Africa, Mondale asserted, would have to include major steps towards bettering economic opportunities and conditions for blacks, as well as providing for some form of African political incorporation. The latter point was subsequently translated into a "one man, one vote" issue which immediately brought a sharp reaction from South Africa and prompted the South African Foreign Minister's journey to Washington to seek clarification of the US position. As both he and Vorster

emphasised, such a step would lead to "the suicide" of whites in South Africa, and this they would never accept. Consequently, the position of the two countries was quickly polarised, and the United States, for the moment at least, has modified its position somewhat.

One possible way out of that polarisation and one that the US will in all likelihood take, is to draw the distinction between the two levels of human rights that Ambassador Young earlier articulated: namely, that first level of human rights which deals with an individual's right to food, shelter, clothing, an equitable wage and employment opportunities; and the second level, which includes civil and political rights. Thus the immediate US concern would be that South Africa move rapidly, through legislation and other means, to improve the economic and living conditions of its blacks. This does not mean that the civil/political rights issue would be ignored, but US demands would be that South Africa find some structural means for politically incorporating Africans, Asians and Coloureds, thereby giving these groups a larger voice in the determination of policies that affect their lives. As the US has stated, South Africa must determine for itself the structural means by which it will politically incorporate non-whites and provide for their representation. US pressures will persist, though, for political changes; and, if there are no changes the American government will resort to innumerable techniques for pressuring the South African government into modifying its stand.

The need for political restructuring brings into question the existing homelands policy of South Africa. The South African government's policy of granting independence to the homelands — as, for example, Transkei — has been a strategic device for "removing" blacks from the "white homeland" of South Africa. The homelands policy envisages the establishment of nine or ten reasonably consolidated homelands for the different African groups, but little has been done over the years to implement these goals. Thus, at present the African groups are scattered over one hundred widely separated enclaves.[3] To consolidate these pieces with additional lands into reasonably integrated homelands would require moving both Africans and whites from some areas in which they presently live; and in the case of whites this would necessitate the government purchasing properties from whites that would cost the South African government billions of rands. The costs are therefore prohibitive, and so the government has done little in this direction. Moreover, the envisaged transformation would still leave Africans, who constitute nearly 85 percent

3. The present scheme for the consolidation of the homelands will reduce the original 110 blocks of land to 32 (Transkei is naturally excluded from this analysis, having attained its independence on 26 October, 1976) — *Editorial Note.*

of the population, with little more than 15 percent of the land area of South Africa. Most of that land is of limited worth agriculturally or otherwise, and the consequence is that Africans would be forced to work as migrant labourers in the so-called white South Africa. The result of this policy, then, would be to turn the African into a migrant; and, as such he would have no right to a vote in the white South African state. Rather, he would have to vote in his "independent" homeland or state.[4]

What is, however, increasingly evident is that the homelands notion is neither a viable approach nor one acceptable to Africans. Moreover, were there the establishment of consolidated homelands with the concomitant movement of whites and blacks to their respective areas, one estimate predicts that this would mean resettlement of more than 7 million people. Even were this accomplished, the probability of its being accepted by South African blacks and the outside world is minimal, for whites would retain nearly all the country's land and resources. The other alternative, that of incorporating Africans within the South African political system on a basis of equality with whites — i.e., one man, one vote — whether now or in the future, is not acceptable to whites, as Mr. Vorster warned; and any attempt to force such a system on South Africa would undoubtedly lead to civil war.

The search, then, for some other political resolution continues. One such proposal is that of a "reverse trek", with South Africa being divided, not along the homelands lines as presently conceived but in terms of two separate states — one white, one black, the latter incorporating Transvaal, Natal and parts of the Orange Free State, the other the remainder of the country.[5] Thus the black and white state would each have nearly fifty percent of the present territory, but a good share of the resources and development would be in the black state. The result would be a type of Cyprus solution, where the final recourse to prevent massive conflict would be a partitioning of the country.

Despite the objections that can be raised against such a proposal, the idea of a partitioning of the country is not that far removed from the original homelands notion,[6] and it does represent an effort by individuals to find a peaceful solution to a political impasse that could otherwise result in racial conflict. In the meantime, though, the Carter Administration will continue to pressure South Africa to move forward rapidly in bettering

4. It should be noted, however, that the eastern and northern homelands are situated in some of the highest rainfall areas of South Africa where agriculture and aforestation have great potentialities, whereas the western homelands have a large mining potential due to very promising mineral deposits — *Editorial Note.*

5. Jürgen Blenck and Klaus von der Ropp, "Republic of South Africa: Partition a Solution?" *Aussen Politik*, 27 (1976), pp. 310-327.

6. Partition, which is a purely geographical notion, departs radically from the homelands idea, which is based on ethnicity and on the areas regarded as historically inhabited by the various black peoples of South Africa — *Editorial Note.*

conditions for its blacks. As the conditions of blacks improve, and as the political mobilisation of blacks continues — e.g., protests, demonstrations — South Africa will find itself under increasing pressure, both internally and externally, to bring about political change. Among the major external pressures will be those being exerted by the United States.

As noted previously, both carrot and stick tactics were utilised by Kissinger to prod South Africa into pressuring Rhodesia into accepting the settlement proposals, including majority rule. South Africa has the power over Rhodesia, for virtually all of Rhodesia's imports and exports must go through South Africa. Moreover, South Africa provides the oil and war materials without which Rhodesia could not continue its defence against the guerrilla forces. Given its control over Namibia, South Africa can determine whether or not it will grant that country its independence — and under what conditions. Within its own country, the South African government, given its weak political opposition, can move — within limitations — as it pleases in resolving its racial problems. Hence, external pressures, especially by the United States or in conjunction with other European countries, can have a decided impact on South African policies in all three of these areas.

The tactics used by Kissinger for pressuring South Africa were of a limited nature. They included, among others, the selling of gold by IMF countries on the open market, the result of which was to drive down the price of South African gold, as well as such "carrots" for South Africa as proposals that its co-operation might lead to development assistance, armaments and possibly recognition of Transkei at some future date. Even Andrew Young, then a Congressman, reflected these views, as can be seen in his 17 May, 1976 *Washington Post* article in which he suggested similar "positive" inducements: "South Africa may be saved from massive turmoil and bloodshed if it does three things: force Smith to step down; set a time-table for Namibian self-rule; and abolish the cruder realities of internal apartheid. What is not said, of course, is what else South Africa then perhaps could count on from the United States: a lifting of the arms embargo; softer monetary policies in World Bank and IMF decision-making; extension of direct loans from the Eximbank; possible recognition of (the) Transkei, South Africa's first Bantustan, for instance."

But these earlier attitudes have changed, in part the result of South Africa's slowness in bringing about internal change, in part because of Carter's commitments to human rights and US efforts, as previously indicated, to forge a new link with Third World and especially African countries. Hence, the US is listening more closely to the warnings of African states that resolutions must be

found quickly to the various Southern African problems or a racial holocaust could ensue. Despite Young's more adamant position, his position remains that — and for this he has been severely criticised by some Black African states and some blacks in the United States — of a gradualist. Nowhere is this more apparent than in his talk in Johannesburg with South African businessmen, industrialists and blacks. Rather than accept the inevitability of conflict, Young pleaded with white businessmen and industrialists that they improve working conditions of their black workers; and he advised South African blacks that they use their economic power (e.g., boycotts) and peaceful means (demonstations, strikes) to force changes in the system. Young advocated what can be termed the "Atlanta plan" for improving the conditions for blacks; an approach that Young helped devise for ending discriminatory racial policies in Atlanta, Georgia. He has been criticised for comparing South Africa with the American South, but his purpose is that of keeping conflict within relative peaceful boundaries; otherwise, he warns, conflict can result in deepening racial animosities and cleavages which could result in racial warfare.

The US government, given the Carter commitments, has changed its views of what needs to be done to support blacks in Southern Africa. The result is that increasing pressures will be put on South Africa to change its racial policies, grant independence to Namibia and assist in a settlement in Rhodesia. Vice-President Mondale's opening salvo and blunt statements concerning US attitudes towards South Africa were simply that: the opening salvo. Numerous steps and tactics have been or are being considered for pressuring South Africa. Some are of an economic nature, involving US corporations active in the South African economy; others are measures aimed at depriving South Africa of benefits it presently or in the future would receive from the US; and still others involve US measures taken in conjunction with other nations against South Africa.

Following is a brief listing of some of the tactics that have been or are being considered, some of which may also be in the process of being quietly implemented:

- Continued US criticisms of South African racial policies, with additional steps possibly to be taken through the UN that could lead to economic sanctions — a step that the US has previously opposed;
- New selling of gold by IMF countries, in an attempt to constrict further the South African economy;
- Restrictions on Eximbank services for South Africa;
- Redefining the present US arms embargo on South Africa to include aircraft, transport equipment and nuclear fuel;

- Curtailments in supplying South Africa with enriched uranium for its nuclear plants; and
- Trade restrictions, including pressures and restrictions on US multinationals (e.g., Mobil, Union Carbide, Ford, etc.) in their dealings with South Africa; and the exclusion of South African imports to the US through a reinterpretation of the Tariff Act of 1930, broadening its concept of "forced labour" — and prohibitions against trade with countries using forced labour — to include South Africa because its African workers have no real alternatives in terms of employment.

Moreover, to curtail the activities of US corporations in South Africa, the following steps have also been proposed or considered:

- The curtailment of US government contracts and export-import licenses to US corporations doing business in or with South Africa;
- The denial of US tax credits to US corporations directly or indirectly doing business with South Africa — and, directly or indirectly, with Namibia and/or Rhodesia — who are deducting from US taxes the South African taxes they are paying;
- Rescinding specific economic quota and trade preferences of US corporations doing business in South Africa, unless they take steps to improve the conditions of their African labour force; and
- Divulging to the US public, and thereby using public pressure, the names and activities of US corporations doing business in South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia.

That these latter steps could be significant is evident in the fact that approximately 350 US corporations, with corporate assets of over US $1,6 billion in South Africa, are engaged in economic activities there. Their withdrawal could have a serious impact on the South African economy. The argument is sometimes offered that these economic consequences would have their most devastating impact on Africans in the work force. This is, however, only partly true, for the longer-term consequences are that such pressures have the capability of pressuring South Africa into a fuller incorporation of blacks in the economy, and their position would thereby be immeasurably enhanced.

That the US pressures are not insignificant is illustrated by the unscheduled visit of South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha to the US recently to seek clarification of the US position concerning the issue of "one man, one vote". Botha argued that the US should evaluate South Africa in the African context — i.e., the economic condition of blacks in South Africa compared to their position in other African states; that it should recognise South Africa's role in the development of Southern Africa; that it should refrain from threatening US corporations active in the South African

economy; and that it should refrain from embargoing equipment needed by South Africa to protect the sea lanes around the Cape. Moreover, he said, the US should recognise the efforts of South Africa in bringing about change and not question its sincerity — noting that South Africa's problems are more complex than those found in the American South. However, Botha warned that South Africa could not accept the "one man, one vote" principle — a position reaffirmed by Vorster — for that threatened the very existence of the minority white government. Hence, it is clear that South Africa is concerned by the policies that the US government may pursue in the future.

What appears possible is that US policy will be determined by what changes occur in the immediate future within South Africa. A major concern will be whether or not steps are taken to improve the working and living conditions of Africans — i.e., that more attention is given to their basic human rights. Botha's points will not be ignored, but South Africa will be expected to move rapidly in improving economic conditions for Blacks, as well as Coloureds and Asians. But the US will not rest there, for it also believes that South Africa must find some means for politically incorporating the non-white groups, Africans, Asians and Coloureds, in more than token fashion.

Thus, US policy has sharply changed under the Carter Administration, and its pressures on South Africa will certainly continue. Whether or not the above pressures will be applied, and to what extent, depends on the steps South Africa takes to change its racial policies. South Africa cannot hope that public opinion in the US will come to its support. There are pro-South African sentiments present, but the opposition — liberals, blacks, churches and others opposed to South Africa's racial policies — have a larger following. Even US corporations recognise the need for change in South Africa, and while they do exert pressures intermittently on the Carter Administration to relent in its pressures on South Africa, they too come under pressures from liberal, black and religious groups that oppose their participation in the South African economy. There is some opposition in Congress to Carter's policies, but Carter's own public support is substantial, more so than that of Congress. Were Carter to ask for support on specific measures aimed at bringing change in Southern Africa, the probability is that he would receive Congressional support. Moreover, in his executive capacity he has vast discretionary powers and need not get support from Congress for implementing many of the above noted measures for putting pressure on South Africa. Thus, given Carter's views — and those of his Administration — it can be anticipated that pressures for change in Southern Africa will persist and, indeed, intensify in the future.

PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN INITIATIVE VERSUS INTERNAL SETTLEMENT

Ariston Chambati

Any discussion on the Rhodesian settlement issue is a rather precarious exercise. A Rhodesian settlement has been an extremely elusive enterprise for a long time and therefore any attempt to predict the possible outcome of the present initiatives could prove to be a futile indulgence. This article is an attempt to assess the possibility of a settlement within the Anglo-American initiative and to point out the difficulties inherent in a so-called "internal settlement". Somebody who understands the Rhodesian situation fully cannot believe that an internal settlement is still possible in the year 1977. However, there are certainly possibilites of achieving a negotiated settlement within the framework of the Anglo-American initiative, because it would appear that the British and Americans have become aware of the realities and the serious implications of the Rhodesian situation.

In order to discuss the idea of an internal settlement, it is necessary to define what is meant by it. Basically it seems to aim at an agreement between the Rhodesian Front regime and some groups of "moderate" Africans within Rhodesia. One of the immediate problems, however, is to identify who these moderate Africans are, because they seem to change from time to time. Not long ago the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole was considered to be the most militant and dangerous African nationalist leader, but today he has suddenly become the most moderate African — perhaps even more moderate than Chief Jeremiah Chirau. It would appear that all that an African has to do is to say what the whites want to hear, no matter how unrealistic it may be — then he becomes a moderate and responsible leader fit to be groomed for participation in government.

The idea of an internal settlement is based on a number of assumptions on the part of Mr. Ian Smith, and some of these assumptions — which are not new — have become mythologies. These assumptions are:

- that the Patriotic Front and the frontline states are either communists or agents of communists;
- that an agreement between the Rhodesian regime and the African parties inside Rhodesia opposed to the Patriotic Front, would eventually be acceptable to the West and to the rest of the

The author is a member of the Political Science Department at the University of Rhodesia in Salisbury. He has attended the Geneva Conference as an adviser to Mr. Joshua Nkomo and is now Acting Secretary-General of the ANC Zimbabwe, led by Mr. Nkomo. This article is the text, with some editorial changes, of an address given to the Witwatersrand Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs on 23 August, 1977.

world;

- that once an "internal settlement" is reached, the war would come to an end;
- that the guerrillas are nothing but tools of the communists;
- that the OAU is badly divided and therefore some of the so-called "moderate" states would welcome the idea of an internal settlement;
- that the "moderates" will unite and that these will have a preponderance over the "militants"; and
- that the African population is tired of the war and therefore would welcome any settlement.

It is on the basis of these assumptions that Mr. Smith seems to be preparing for the rejection of the Anglo-American initiative.

It is, moreover, quite obvious that all these assumptions are incorrect and therefore any solution based on this kind of thinking is bound to fail. Mr. Smith is now trying to promote moderate groups with whom to negotiate, and these are led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the Rev. Sithole and Chief Chirau. The only factor these groups have in common, however, is their desire to keep the Patriotic Front out of power. Bishop Muzorewa's party is facing difficulties and the possibility of the Rev. Sithole gaining support among the African people is remote. Chief Chirau's party, ZUPO, is generally regarded as the black section of the Rhodesian Front. But now Bishop Muzorewa has changed his mind about an internal settlement. Since his recent visit to London, he has made it very clear that he would not be interested in an internal settlement, and indicated that the Anglo-American initiative appeared to have a reasonable chance of succeeding.

It is thus cardinally important to have a clear understanding of what is meant by a settlement. The ANC Zimbabwe's understanding of a settlement in the Rhodesian context is that it must achieve the following:

- the ending of the war raging in that country;
- the removal of economic sanctions by the international community, so that Rhodesia can begin to have normal trade relations with other countries throughout the world;
- the granting of legal independence by the United Kingdom followed by international recognition of the State of Zimbabwe; and
- the reconciliation of the different racial groups, particularly the Africans and the whites.

The ANC Zimbabwe is concerned about the present situation in which there is continuing loss of life. But, to bring about a new order, it is necessary to come to grips with the realities of the Rhodesian situation and to take into account all the factors operating in that situation. The first priority is obviously to seek to

end the war, and in order to do so it is necessary to analyse how and why the war came about. Practical experience elsewhere has demonstrated that a war can only end when its cause has been removed, and in this connection it means the removal of the present political system which caused it. It is unrealistic to talk of creating a new society before the war is brought to an end. The prerequisite for the creation of a free, non-racial and democratic Zimbabwe is the ending of the war.

In the view of the ANC Zimbabwe, free and democratic elections are not possible while the war is raging. Once the war is brought to an end by removing its cause, then and only then can a caretaker government be established whose main task would be to create democratic conditions under which elections should be held. The Rhodesian Front government is mistaken in its belief that it can still negotiate with African leaders of its own choice; time for private agreement, otherwise known as "internal settlement", is past. The Rhodesian situation has long been internationalised and any settlement that does not take the international dimension into account is doomed to failure, because it would not achieve the ending of the war, removal of sanctions and international recognition. It is not for the Rhodesian Front to choose leaders for the African people; that is the prerogative of the people of Zimbabwe, at free and democratic elections. Internal settlement is merely a euphemism for delaying tactics; it has been heard too many times before.

Some clarification is needed regarding the ANC Zimbabwe's position on a number of issues which are of concern to certain sections of the Rhodesian community. The following thoughts reflect the ANCZ's intentions for a future Zimbabwe under majority rule.

- The position of the ANCZ regarding the present negotiations is that it accepts and believes in:
  - a justiceable Bill of Rights;
  - an independent judiciary;
  - free and democratic elections; and
  - franchise based on adult suffrage.
- With reference to the terms for a settlement, the ANCZ believes that the details of a settlement are a matter for negotiation and therefore these are merely guidelines and principles which constitute a framework within which the settlement terms can be accomplished.
- The ANCZ further believes that the settlement problem has to be tackled in two stages:
  - negotiations, in order to end the war; and
  - negotiations for an independence constitution in conditions of peace, followed by democratic general elections.

- Finally, the ANCZ believes that the ending of the war and the creation of peaceful conditions must be followed by a conscious effort on the part of all the peoples of Rhodesia to work towards reconciliation, not only between the different races but also among the various political parties which have been at daggers drawn for a considerable length of time. Whatever the ethnic, cultural, racial, political and ideological differences, it must be recognised that all belong to the same country and will necessarily have to live together.

In conclusion, it would appear that the Anglo-American initiative provides a realistic framework for a negotiated settlement. The details of this initiative are not yet known, but it seems obvious that Britain and the US would like to see a settlement that would result in a stable future Zimbabwe. Mr. Smith's internal settlement cannot provide such a future; as a matter of fact, it is a prescription for continuing struggle in the form of a bloody civil war.

THE REPUBLIC OF TRANSKEI AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Tsepo Letlaka

The question of the relationship between the Republic of Transkei and the international community is a subject which simultaneously embarrasses and frightens the free community of nations. In 1975, even before the birth of Transkei as an independent sovereign state, the nations of the world gathered in New York and recognised the impending sovereignty of the state to be by banding together to conspire against the freedom of the people of Transkei. Like all conspirators, they did not await nor require invitation by the subjects of their conspiracy to consider or deliberate on the matter. In fact, at the very moment members of the United Nations were making solemn declarations justifying continued enslavement of the people of Transkei, the entire Transkeian nation was locked in battle with their erstwhile oppressors, their leaders involved in difficult and ticklish negotiations with the Pretoria regime.

Thus, at midnight on 26 October, 1976, when the new Republic of Transkei was born, paradoxically a pathetic drama was being artificially and gingerly enacted in New York at the UN headquarters, where representatives of states — whose Charter committed them to the attainment of freedom for the oppressed peoples of the world and the maintenance of peace — were making vows that Transkeians would never be allowed to disentangle themselves from the humiliating oppression of apartheid in South Africa. Some of those states were having secret and not so secret relations with South Africa, whose policies they claimed to abhor; others were openly fraternising with South Africa, having — and being proud to maintain — diplomatic and commercial relations with that country. Some African states have been stubbornly refusing to cut economic ties with South Africa on the "reasonable" grounds that they were not so stupid as to succumb to the temptation of cutting their noses for the dubious pleasure of spiting their faces. Big industrial countries like the US say they would not cut their economic ties with South Africa because they want to preserve the means of influencing South Africa, while Britain, West Germany and others supposedly preserve those ties out of sheer pity for the poor oppressed blacks, as such a step would hurt them most. They all, however, in varying degrees reap handsome profits to their material benefit from relations with South Africa, either from customs duties, various tax arrange-

The Hon. Mr. Letlaka is Minister of Finance of the Republic of Transkei. *This is an edited version of a talk* given to the Witwatersrand Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs on 28 September, 1977.

ments and certain forms of direct assistance in respect of the former, or from a good market and accruing business profits — mostly augmented by the poor wages they pay to thousands of black workers in South Africa — in the case of the latter. It would appear that the common bond of unity between the two groups, who normally have a love-hate relationship between themselves, is their inflexible desire to have Transkei manacled to apartheid, racial domination and exploitation by South Africa.

The history of Transkei is simple and well-known to all those who have taken the trouble to read it. Up to the middle of the last century, the people of Transkei lived in independent kingdoms and chiefdoms — each with their own language, customs and social organisation, and effective administration — in the area between the Umzimkulu River bordering Natal in the north and the Kei River in the south, and between Lesotho in the west and the Indian Ocean in the east. It was only in 1854 that Sir George Grey, Governor of the Cape Colony and British High Commissioner for South Africa, suggested that the whole area across the Kei River should be brought under British control. This was done by a process of annexation which covered the period 1879 to 1894 and was a typical example of the scramble for colonial territory by the British Imperial Government, using its colonial administration at the Cape. During this period a scramble for land by European countries was taking place throughout the whole continent of Africa. In Southern Africa, other territories were likewise annexed: Basutoland (Lesotho) and Bechuanaland (Botswana) were annexed by the Cape Colony while Swaziland was briefly annexed by the Transvaal Boer Republic. These three territories later became British Protectorates while Transkei was dragged, as part of the Cape Colony, into the Union of South Africa in 1910 — without the consent of its people or any prior consultation with them in any form whatsoever. Furthermore, the people of Transkei were not given the opportunity to participate, in any meaningful way, as part of the body politic of South Africa. On the contrary, like all other black people in South Africa they became unwilling victims of discriminatory laws passed by the all-white Parliament in Cape Town.

Of significance is the fact that the Act of Union (1910) stated the intention to re-annex or incorporate the three aforementioned British Protectorates into South Africa, and the then British government conceded that the matter merited consideration at some future date when the peoples of these territories would be consulted. Later, when that consultation took place, the African people of these High Commission Territories rejected re-annexation or incorporation and opted for self-determination and sovereignty. Hence the emergence of the two independent

Kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland, and the Republic of Botswana. It is of interest that nobody has ever suggested that they were not entitled to freedom and independence — although two of them are much smaller than Transkei — and no one questioned their right to sovereignty — although all of them were poorer and less viable than Transkei at the time of its independence. In addition, the people of Transkei never abandoned the desire of regaining their self-determination and independence, and continually struggled for it: they never regarded the Act of Union as a holy covenant, because they believed it was designed for the prolongation of white hegemony, it robbed them of their nationhood and it denied them fundamental rights and human dignity.

There seems to be no magic formula for the solution of political problems, nor is political wisdom — in the art of attaining freedom — reserved for a special brand of "wise men". Dr. K.D. Matanzima reflected quite maturely on the question of the methods by which freedom should be obtained, when he stated that "where suffering and violence have been inescapable for gaining freedom, then let it be so; but freedom gained peacefully and by negotiation cannot be less meritorious". Furthermore, it is an historical fact that the preponderant majority of African states obtained their freedom through negotiation and by peaceful means.

Glib and vociferous allegations have been made in certain circles that by taking independence Transkeians have left their fellow-oppressed in the lurch, and that Transkei's independence will not help to solve the problems of Southern Africa. On the other hand, even the most ardent advocates of continued voluntary submission of Transkeians to oppression have failed to demonstrate how that would help solve the problems of Southern Africa. Certainly it is not the continued oppression of Transkeians, but rather their freedom that will contribute substantially to the diffusion of racial discrimination and exploitation of Africans in South Africa, and lead the way to complete freedom for everyone in that country.

The contention that Transkei's independence is wrong because it violates the territorial integrity of present-day South Africa, does not hold water in the light of the experience of liberation movements both in Africa and elsewhere in the world. As recently as September 1975, Lesotho's representative at the United Nations spoke of territorial claims his country was making against South Africa. If these claims were to succeed — as Lesotho obviously fondly desires — that would mean the excision of parts of South Africa and inclusion thereof in Lesotho. Yet, there was not a single voice that objected to the claims, despite their threat to

the territorial integrity of South Africa. Indeed "territorial integrity" is not generally held as a bar to any people gaining freedom and independence, where circumstances permit. Zambia and Malawi were part of the white dominated Central African Federation, but they broke away and established their own sovereign states. In 1920 the people of Southern Ireland attained their independence from the United Kingdom: the Republic of Eire was recognised as an independent sovereign state, while Northern Ireland continued its struggle for freedom from the British. Recently Bangladesh did likewise, and there was no international outcry.

It must be abundantly clear by now that the policy of seperate development of the present government of South Africa is fundamentally irrelevant to the question of freedom and liberation for the people of Transkei. Whether their freedom was obtained earlier than or simultaneously with the rest of the oppressed people of South Africa would be a neutral incident of history, and similar to whether Zambians or Malawians obtained their freedom earlier than or simultaneously with the people of Zimbabwe. Moreover, the policy of apartheid or racial discrimination is that of the present government of South Africa: Transkei was never consulted when that policy was formulated and has no truck with it. Furthermore, Transkei's total rejection of apartheid is clearly expressed in its declared policy of non-racialism. The people of Transkei, therefore, share no responsibility for the policy of apartheid.

Having re-stated the position of Transkei, one may assert that — except in those cases where ideological prejudices intrude* — there are internationally accepted criteria a state has to comply with if it wants to be recognised as a member of the international community. These criteria are that the state should have:

- defined borders;
- a permanent and settled population;
- a stable government that either has the support of the majority of the population or is in effective control of the country; and
- effective control of its foreign policy, or that it should be capable of exerting it.

The Republic of Transkei satisfies all these legal and constitutional criteria and many objective observers have readily admitted that it does. There is, therefore, no justifiable reason in international and constitutional law for its non-recognition. It thus seems that it is simply ideological motivation that stands in the way of international recognition for Transkei by the international com-

*The People's Republic of China was ostracised by the UN for almost 25 years; the USSR was not recognised by the US during the period 1917 to 1930; and the Republic of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), dubbed a British imperialist stooge, was not recognised for two years until Communist Albania broke the stranglehold of non-recognition.

munity.

The argument commonly used is that such recognition would constitute endorsement of seperate development. This fallacious stand flies in the face of the facts and the history as outlined above. In any event, if Transkei had conceded to the policy of seperate development, instead of one Transkei there would have been eleven ethnic states. Was it Mao Tse-tung who said? "To be sure that you are right and not tricked, you must oppose everything that your adversary supports." It is on this assumption that the international community expects Transkeians to oppose and reject their own freedom.

It is not the intention to deal here with the host of spurious, self-deceptive and patently hypocritical arguments which one often hears from the lower orders and more frivolous traducers of Transkei's independence — namely, that Transkei is a "mini-state"; sparsely populated; poor; not productive enough; not viable; an enclave of South Africa, etc. Having had the opportunity of visiting no less than twelve North American and Western European countries before Transkei's independence and spoken to leaders in many walks of life, and having visited four European countries after independence — and the Foreign Minister of Transkei having recently made a visit to several European countries — one has a pretty good idea of what is going on in the minds of many people in the world about Transkei. In Umtata, too, there is no lack of international visitors who come and see the country for themselves.

Now that Transkeians have gained their freedom, re-established their dignity as human beings, and joined the arduous road of self-determination, they feel even more committed to the cause of human freedom — and with the rest of all other free people in the world they share high aspirations of equality of all men, and the need of man's humanity to man.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE AFRICAN STATES TOWARDS THE UN AND THE OAU

Richard Bissell

The first fifteen years of the United Nations can be characterised by the virtual non-existence and therefore non-participation of Black African states. Concern with South Africa's racial policies was mainly limited to the question of South African citizens of Indo-Pakistani origin, and even this had by 1955 become pretty much of a non-issue. It remained on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations, but India was no longer pressing the issue primarily because it faced sufficient problems elsewhere — notably with Pakistan and China.

The year 1960 is often regarded as a turning point in the treatment of South Africa's racial policies at the United Nations. There are two facts which are usually cited to substantiate this: the Sharpeville disturbance, and the emergence of a large number of independent Black African states with membership in the United Nations. With the advantage of hindsight, it strikes one that there are two aspects of this theory which, in fact, suggest it may not be as important as had once been thought.

- The first aspect is that Sharpeville, according to the critics of South Africa, demonstrated the evil character of South Africa's racial policies to the world. One is justified in taking exception to this view, because it seems that it also showed the ability of South African society and that which holds the South African nation together, to survive a very violent disturbance; after all, in our changing world it seems that the test of a nation comes in the middle of a storm, rather than during times of normalcy which are fairly easy to navigate.
- The second aspect concerns the appearance of Black African states in the United Nations and the fact that these states were, for several years after 1960, not an united bloc. If one looks at the voting records, one sees that they tended to split widely on all issues, including the issue of South African racial policies. Strangely, one finds it difficult to discern motives behind these voting patterns, until one looks at the governmental structures of the early independent African governments, where many of the decisions were made by expatriates — e.g. in the former French colonial territories by the *conseillers*, appointed by the French government, rather than by African administrators themselves.

Dr. Bissell is a Research Associate at the Foreign Policy Research Institute of Philadelphia in the United States, and Managing Editor of *ORBIS*, a journal on world affairs, published by the Institute. This is an edited version of a talk given to the Witwatersrand Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs on 18 January, 1977.

The key period — the key watershed — could therefore be delayed from 1960 to about 1962 or possibly 1963. At this point in time there were two important developments. One was the appearance of an African bloc at the United Nations and the second was the formation of the Organisation of African Unity. It does not really matter which came first, but it can be maintained that each was impossible without the other. In other words, the unity of the African group in the United Nations depended upon the existence of the Organisation of African Unity, and likewise the OAU depended to a large degree upon the Africans having some force and power in the UN.

To explain the nature of this OAU-UN symbiosis, there are two terms that have a great deal of meaning: one is authority and the other is legitimacy. Authority simply raises the question of whether an organisation can enforce the decisions that it takes. In other words — should the members meeting in a group decide that they want something to be done, will the organisation actually be able to do it? This can apply to a national government or to an international organisation; even to the involvement of trivial tasks. For instance, if the United Nations instructs its Committee on Apartheid to undertake a study of South African racial policies and it obeys, that demonstrates some authority. If the OAU members instruct its Liberation Committee to "liberate" Southern Africa and the committee cannot find the authority to do so, it is a pretty ineffective organisation.

The second side of the coin, legitimacy, is simply the question of whether or not an organisation, such as the OAU, commands sufficient respect from its members. After all, an organisation is made up of its members, so that it is only able to do what its members are willing to countenance. Here one has only to refer to the sad saga of numerous resolutions passed by the OAU in recent years. These include, for instance, instructions to refuse to trade with South Africa — whereupon members would go home and do exactly the opposite. This is one of the facts of history, which simply indicates the real lack of respect individual members have for international organisations — mainly because they do not have any binding force. It is thus important to keep these two concepts, authority and legitimacy, in mind when one analyses the relationship between the OAU and the UN.

From the inception of the OAU in May 1963, it was faced by crises in both these areas. Take, for instance, the question of secretariat services. When the OAU was first formed, the secretariat services were provided by the Foreign Ministry of Ethiopia — a relatively efficient outfit. However, after about a year and a half it was decided to establish an independent OAU Secretariat. This being done, the quality of service immediately fell off: it was

difficult to obtain verbatim transcripts of meetings, and confidential documents were sent through the regular mail. The OAU, therefore, decided to turn to the United Nations Secretary-General to obtain training for its permanent personnel and also to enlist seconded UN personnel to undertake, for example, translation at important meetings. At the same time the OAU formed various specialised commissions such as those in the fields of health and economic development, which were identical to similar UN committees already in existence: the Africa Region of the World Health Organisation, and the Economic Commission for Africa. Within a very short time nearly all the work that was produced under the name of the OAU specialised commissions, was in fact done by the UN committees jointly with the OAU commissions, and issued under the OAU imprint. In other words, they had not really found their function and therefore had to turn to the UN to obtain services required in their areas of operation. In a sense one could say this was good, because it avoided duplication of work; but it also indicated a certain bankruptcy in the sense that they could not find a seperate mission for the commissions of the OAU to perform.

The question of legitimacy raises similar problems. The OAU felt for a number of years that resolutions were not obeyed by members, and the solution they chose was a rhetorical one. Resolutions in the UN expressed support for the OAU, and the OAU reciprocated. Thus, in the campaigns against South Africa's racial policies, the Committee on Apartheid in the General Assembly of the UN became so closely identified with the Africans — in fact, was run by the African group at the UN — that many non-Africans simply refused to serve on that committee.

The reasons for this interdependence were several:

- The issue of South African racial policies was, along with the anti-colonial and anti-Portuguese campaigns, the cement that kept the OAU-UN relationship together. In other words, it was the issue on which the two organisations, through consensus or majority vote, could agree.
- The second factor is that where universal agreement existed on a particular problem — and it is fair to state that there was virtually universal opposition to the South African racial policies — the OAU-UN relationship resulted in an infusion of radicalism into the UN, which increasingly alienated those in favour of moderate change in South Africa. Even more significant, the quest for mutual legitimacy tended to drive the tone of the anti-South African resolutions into a realm beyond any hope of real implementation. In other words, when resolutions moved into a realm where members would consider them illegitimate — and accordingly they would not cease trad-

ing with South Africa — both organisations really lost any chance of gaining what was supposed to be their goal.

What is described here is certainly a simplification of what was occurring chronologically, because there were more complex interactions at work. However, the same dynamic process as described above, was occurring in each of the Specialised Agencies. Some of this did not gain much publicity, but during 1962-1965 — which can be regarded as a watershed period — one saw an extraordinary development and understanding of what legitimacy means when one reads through the transcripts of OAU meetings. One African Foreign Minister would appear after a WHO meeting in Geneva and would talk of penalties levied against South Africa. Then another Foreign Minister would come from an ILO meeting and would boast that he did one better — he helped to expel South Africa from the organisation. After they congratulated one another they would make plans for action at the Fall meeting of the UN, where they could incorporate all that they learned from the other organisations and apply it to the South Africans there. In other words, this was a process where examples simply tended to multiply.

In sum, the tension that was generated through these efforts in everyone of the Specialised Agencies right down to the Universal Postal Union, were focussed back into the UN — as South Africa remained a member of the United Nations. The United Nations, after all, is the centre of the wheel from which all the spokes emanate — all the Specialised Agencies and other programmes of the UN system. So, as long as South Africa remained in that centre, the tension kept moving back into the UN General Assembly and Security Council — into that hub of the wheel.

This picture, however, needs to be balanced. South Africa, after all, will not lightly be removed from all international organisations; in fact, it remains a member of what are probably the two most important — the World Bank group and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The ironic fact is that from the second fifteen years of the United Nations' existence — i.e., 1961 to 1976 — these two organisations have emerged as the most important in functional terms. In addition, the economic and security developments of the last five years have brought repeated crises to the Third World: from economic disorder to the burgeoning nuclear capability of several middle powers around the world. The theme for the next fifteen years — if one can see the period of repeated economic crises of the last three years as a watershed — is being set right now. It does not revolve around the issues that were subjected to so much rhetoric in the period since 1962, and it is important that the character of the relationship between the African states and the United Nations does not lend

itself to meeting the economic and security threats which are currently reaching the top of the agenda as far as the less-developed countries (LDC's) are concerned.

The irrelevance of the OAU to these new important issues has left the African states in a remarkably perilous diplomatic situation. It is a situation in which, in contrast to the last fifteen years, South Africa has unique opportunities to participate more fully in international life, given a change in the nature of the UN agenda. Participation by South Africa is related to finding a middle ground with its Black African opponents, whereby they would accommodate to an active South African presence in the new emerging international system in exchange for serious moves by the South African leadership to implement continuing changes to its racial policies.

What are these emerging international issues? They could generally be grouped into three categories:

- First, there is the stabilisation of commodity prices. This is an effort to regularise import costs and export earnings, and whilst its importance has not been historically of the first magnitude all countries are beginning to recognise that it is of cardinal importance to find some degree of stability in the movement of goods which comprise an ever-increasing portion of international trade. In several major commodities, agreements are very unlikely to be accomplished without South African participation; or, to put it the other way round, it would be within South Africa's power to disrupt such agreements as might be made. For example, what would the South African attitude be towards the so-called uranium cartel — that is, the Uranium Institute in London — if its economic and political functions were regularised and regulated?
- Secondly, in the field of energy, South Africa is certainly occupying a major role as an emerging industrial power. The research and development of new technology, e.g. the production of fuel from coal, could be of great consequence for other nations which have large coal reserves. How will this technology be shared? South Africa is a country with diverse commitments in the energy field and like many similar countries, such as Brazil, Australia and others, its economic growth rate — which is currently effecting an energy growth rate of nearly ten percent per annum — will force a decision on the South African government as to whether it wishes to increase energy supplies in terms of exported finished goods, or to export basic commodities thus increasing the need for energy capacity abroad. In other words, South Africa will increasingly be in a position to affect international energy planning, particularly as a derivative of mineral resource production.

- The third problem is the limited capital resources available to meet the development demands of the less-developed countries (LDC'S), making it increasingly apparent that the LDC'S and middle powers, as well as the developed countries, will need to co-ordinate new technologies that are less capital intensive. Every meaningful international organisation dealing with current functional problems has been putting greater stress in this area, and the middle powers and their choice of technologies for research and development will greatly influence the two-thirds of mankind yet to move significantly above subsistence level. The technology-sharing agreement between Israel and South Africa is certainly an encouraging first step. Consideration should now also be given to the vastly increased opportunities to multilateralise these initiatives in other parts of the world.

The relationship between these three areas and the United Nations is presently very unclear, but the long-term trend would be for some organic links to be formed with the hub of international organisations in New York. What is clear, however, is that some honest-brokers, possibly international organisations, will have to serve as transmission belts between South Africa and those areas of the world that have developed such hostility towards it during the last fifteen years.

A new international order is emerging in which everybody needs to apply the best kind of imagination to influence developments, for a time of transition is the time when one can exert influence. The possibilities for change often seem very far off, largely because most national leaders are the last to recognise changed realities. The leaders of many countries in the OAU are only now coming around to a new general view of things, in order to deal better with the serious economic realities that shake the roots of their power. This could make the present international system, of which we are all part, ready for a more equitable set of rules.

LATIN AMERICA'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: A NEW AWAKENING?

Carlos Barbieri

The term Latin America, commonly denoting the geographical area of South America, is not really able to provide a true reflection of the historical, political and economic aspects of that continent. In fact, the millions of square kilometres bordered by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans along its entire length, and by the United States to the north, is by no means a homogeneous entity. One tentative proposal being put forward is to call this geographical area "Iberian America", in order to reflect a truer picture of the realities of Latin America and to highlight its historical origin. Brazil, for example, has historic roots in the old Kingdom of Portugal and differs greatly from the other Latin American nations, which have a history of Spanish colonisation. Such an historical label, however, will still not bridge the differences that have developed through the centuries — differences which have grown despite a common language, religion and origin. For instance, although Paraguay and Argentina are neighbouring countries with similar historical legacies, there are major differences between them. It is, therefore, very difficult to regard the continent as a homogeneous whole and to fit it into a global analysis.

Major political differences also exist in Latin America and this is manifested particularly in the contrast between Cuba and Chile. Furthermore, Spanish America has been divided into many nations and their size, compared to the large territory of Brazil, creates even greater difficulties in ensuring a power equilibrium on the continent. Thus, the only links that seem to unite the different political regimes in Latin America are a common foundation of political power based on Catholicism, the mass media, economic power and the Army. Cuba is excluded, for obvious reasons, from this analysis.

In the economic sphere — and, of course, economic conditions always influence power — one also finds a large measure of diversity in Latin America. There are the differing ideological positions, such as the dogmatic Marxist-Leninist approach adopted by Cuba, compared with the economic policies pursued by the other countries in the area. Then, too, there are differing stages of development : while Brazil is already in the fifth stage of Rostow[1] Bolivia remains in the first or second stage with a particu-

The author is a noted Brazilian economist, lawyer and industrialist, and is Director President of the Society for Political, Economic and Social Studies (SEPES). This is an edited version of a talk given to the Witwatersrand Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs on 28 July, 1977.

1. The five stages-of-growth (economic development) are: the traditional society based on pre-Newtonian

larly agrarian structure. Very serious difficulties are experienced today in ensuring progressive development of economies based on a free market system, because of the pro-socialist position of some governments in Latin America. The complete failure of socialism in some of these countries will probably lead to a search for systems more suited to the realities in each specific case. Apart from this, there are also diverse levels of economic development caused by the policy changes effected by different governments. The result is that there is no common standard of economic development policy in Latin America.

The great divergencies in South America are manifested by the very serious crisis which the Organisation of American States (OAS) currently faces. This is partly due to attempts by the United States to steer the organisation in a direction that will conform with American foreign policy. It is also due to the concept of liberal democracy which has very deep roots in some Latin American countries — and which still finds expression in countries like Colombia and Venezuela, where it is regarded as the ideal system for the preservation of liberty. Ironically, it is in these very countries where communism is strongest, apart from those countries which have already chosen socialism. With the exception of Nicaragua and Guatemala, where the present governments have turned their backs on the concept of liberal democracy, Central America is suffering as a result of the United States' policy of détente towards the Soviet Union. Countries like Jamaica and Panama, especially, are particularly defenceless against the Cuban brand of Marxism. In this situation the phenomenon of the military form of government has come to the fore. This should not necessarily be seen as an anti-communist phenomenon, but rather as the natural evolution of the concept of self-determination on the continent, and the direct result of a search for national pride and honour unaffected by both Marxism-Leninism and American influences.

This having been said, however, it must be accepted that the world is divided into two major power blocs, or spheres of influence: the communist bloc, mainly the Soviet Union and China, and the so-called "Free World". Inevitably, this division has had its bearing on the military regimes in Latin America. On the one hand, there is the strong military tendency in Peru which, although not directly subservient to the Soviet Union, receives so much economic aid and military assistance from Soviet Russia that there can hardly be any talk of absolute national autonomy. Similar tendencies are to be found in Panama and Ecuador. On

science and technology; the transitional phase, when the pre-conditions for economic take-off are developed; the take-off stage to economic progress, when growth becomes a normal condition; the drive to technological maturity, which only follows after a long interval of sustained if fluctuating growth; and the stage of high mass-consumption, where the leading sectors of the economy shift towards durable consumers' goods and services. See Rostow, W.W., *The Stages of Economic Growth*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1960, esp. pp. 4 – 11 — *Editorial Note.*

the other hand, the example of the Brazilian Revolution of 1964 demonstrated that there is an alternative to the "Chinese Revolution" for the upliftment of under-developed countries. This alternative is based on the principles of free enterprise, defence of national sovereignty, and the inspiration of a true nationalism. In a certain way this has lead to unity in the so-called South Cone[2] because the example of the Brazilian Revolution has been followed by Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile and finally Argentina. What is important is not the chronological order in which they adopted the alternative system in question, but the similar route that they have chosen to the realisation of national self-esteem. Why should this have occurred in the South Cone? The answer is that it was precisely in these countries that communism came closest to gaining power and where terrorist activity has been promoted most extensively. Communism and terrorism caused popular reaction and the armed forces intervened directly to counter the threat to the national sovereignty of these states.

It is important to note that through the years the armed forces in these countries have never defined what they regard as their specific mission. For many years they remained uninvolved in the concrete options open to the state, but rather passively served the government of the day. Eventually they were forced, as a result of subversion and political chaos, to intervene without in most cases being able first to create their own ideological platform — their intervention was spontaneous and in the interests of the people. They did try, as in the case of Brazil, to maintain certain democratic structures, and in the case of Argentina and recently Chile they consider themselves to be the transition preparing for a return to democracy in the future. Today it can be said that there is a common objective among the armed forces of South America, namely to eliminate Marxist subversion in the different national territories. It is accepted that not only is the Brazilian or any other way of life being threatened, but also Western civilisation itself. In the South American continent the subversive elements are so strong that the mere existence of political alternatives within a particular country no longer constitute an effective defence against invasions, whether of the military "hot war" type or of the ideological "cold war" type.

The Brazilian model, although it cannot be said to be characteristic of the military regimes throughout the South Cone, has been a source of confidence for some other countries which are very conscious of the Marxist threat, and feel that if they follow the military pattern of Brazil they can count on the support of the

2. The South Cone comprises the southern-most countries of South America, which one could describe as an ice-cream cone with the northern-most states forming, as it were, the ice-cream. The South Cone countries are Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia.

most powerful country on the continent. Although the Brazilian regime has given the appearance of continuity and stability, it has nevertheless adopted a system that caters for different ideological viewpoints in government institutions at both state and federal level. There is thus a large degree of flexibility. For example, the previous Brazilian government tended towards accepting a free enterprise system, whereas the present government — even though it advocates the free enterprise system — is in fact allowing exaggerated growth of State enterprises. Differences are also evident in foreign policy: for example, the previous Medici government based its African policy very strongly on support of the Portuguese colonies, whereas the present Geisel government has adopted a far more liberal outlook on African policy.

The African policy of the present Brazilian government is based on the following ten premises:

- That a presence should be established in individual countries in order to gain friendship before any definite diplomatic or other links are instituted.
- That the "liberation movements" do not have an ideological stance when they are first established, but lean towards Marxism at a later stage purely because of the support they receive from the Soviet Union or China.
- That African reality is based fundamentally on tribalism, not always restricted within national boundaries but evincing supra-national characteristics.
- That insofar as Angola is concerned, the two opposition movements — Unita and the FNLA — cannot be regarded as orthodox pro-Western movements as both receive significant support from Communist China, both have tribal bases, neither has an urban base and, in the specific case of the FNLA, the origin of the tribe that forms its major support is in Zaire rather than in Angola.
- That one can expect the influence of the Soviet Union in Africa to be diminished due to conflicts that will arise between African countries as a result of Russian support. It is thought that when the Soviet Union supports one country it will invariably have problems with neighbouring countries.
- That the status quo in Rhodesia cannot be maintained in present conditions.
- That from a pragmatic point of view alliances with losers are not feasible.
- That relationships with countries still under white control would make relationships with Black Africa extremely difficult.
- That the security of the South Atlantic area will be strengthened when countries under white control are taken over by non-Marxist black governments.

- That the ideological war has no particular significance in Africa.

This is the position as advocated by the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Antonio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira. One must realise that politically speaking there could still be further policy changes in Brazil, as the present government is seeking to achieve liberalisation of both its economic and foreign policies. Quite apart from this, however, the Brazilian armed forces are very conscious that Africa is Brazil's neighbour and is separated from it only by the Atlantic Ocean. Furthermore, there is a healthy awareness that the security of Brazil's ocean frontiers and of the South Atlantic can be greatly influenced by events in and around the African continent.

One problem in this regard has already been referred to, namely that the armed forces have taken over control because emergency situations developed, and have not introduced their own particular brand of ideology but are pursuing liberal democratic concepts. These emergency situations being instituted in South American countries can best be explained by looking at the different approaches being pursued and actions being taken by the adherents of the Marxist-Leninist ideology.

- The Chinese approach, which seeks power through armed struggle and more specifically through rural guerrilla warfare, was most successful in the 1960's following a split in the pro-Soviet communist parties. China was, however, eventually forced to support the approach pioneered by Cuba, after the success of the Cuban Revolution.
- The Cuban approach, inspired by the Soviet Union, which tries to establish armed pockets in Latin American countries — a technique now also being used in Africa. This does not reflect a deviation from Soviet strategy, but is rather a practical way of diminishing Chinese influence. The extent to which the Soviet Union has managed to use the Cuban regime becomes clear when one takes into consideration the way in which Kremlin strategists have forced Cuba to enter the military sphere of external operations in order to neutralise Maoist sympathisers. It is against this background that the *Organización Latino-americana de Solidaridad* (OLAS) and the *Organización de Solidaridad de los Pueblos de Africa, Asia Y America Latin* (OSPAAAL) must be viewed. The Cuban approach has, however, lost much of its effectiveness and can now be seen only in the support it gives governments which the Soviet Union has already subverted. Cuba's role is to influence the military and security forces, as in the case of Panama, Guyuana and Jamaica.
- The Trotskyist approach, which is restricted fundamentally to

intellectual circles, receives its ideological orientation from France. It supports armed struggles wherever they occur, but lacks any kind of territorial base. Its greatest strength has always been in Latin America, particularly in Argentina before the present military junta came to power. It was in Argentina that the group had the largest number of armed guerrillas and in 1975, for example, it worked on a budget of nearly 90 million dollars — larger than the military budget of some Latin American countries — which it financed from money it received from kidnapping operations and other criminal actions. On the thesis that action cannot be restricted to one country, it has formed the Revolutionary Co-ordinating Junta, which unites the guerrilla movements in the continent — such as the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario* (MIR) of Chile, the Tupamaros of Uruguay, the Montoneros of Argentina, and others. More recently, the Trotskyites, and specifically the *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* (ERP), have suffered severe losses in Argentina — especially after the death of Roberto Mario Santucho.

These three methods of attack, adopted by Marxist revolutionaries in South America, are the main reasons for the intervention of the people and the armed forces in order to preserve national pride and self-determination. Reaction to Marxist revolutionary activity was so severe that it even overruled the desire of the upper classes to preserve the standards of Western civilisation. In this analysis Chile, however, is an exception because Salvador Allende — having gained power through democratic means — did not need guerrilla warfare. But even in Chile the direct cause of intervention by the armed forces was the peoples' reaction to and rejection of Marxism. The armed forces also had evidence that the MIR was preparing for terrorist action with the support of the Allende government. In spite of all their revolutionary activity, terrorist groups have never gained power in South America, but the greatest threat to this continent undoubtedly remains the subversive approach adopted by the Soviet Union.

- The Soviet approach and Moscow's objectives in Latin America are easy to define namely reinforce Soviet influence wherever possible, defend Cuba, and weaken the still dominant position of the United States.
  - In trying to achieve these goals, the Soviet Union is prepared to co-operate with democrats, dictators and radicals alike — even if these are anti-communist. Moscow did not worry overmuch, insofar as the implementation of its strategy was concerned, when the communist parties in Brazil and Argentina were banned. In this regard it rather prefers an anti-comunist government with a friendly foreign policy to a

Marxist state which resists Soviet influence. For instance, a military dictatorship with non-communist principles, such as Peru, suits them far better than Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia.

- Moscow looks at the South American continent as a whole, but it divorces the Caribbean which it regards as having special characteristics. South America is considered as the most sensitive area of the United States' strategy and the only region where the US has intervened with military power recently. Also, South America is defined by Moscow as the world zone that maintains the closest political, military and economic ties with the United States.
- Under present Soviet strategy, local communist parties are being urged to assume a prominent role in leftist coalitions, in radical revolutionary governments and even in progressive military regimes. This strategy requires communist participation in all kinds of alliances, penetrating into the progressive segments of the national bourgeoisie and working towards the radicalisation of the masses. Where areas are entered into that are delicate because of East/West détente, revolutionary movements are given support in such a way that this will not endanger détente with the United States. This is particularly important to Moscow as it is felt that it is precisely in these areas that the Soviet Union has the best chance of ultimate victory over the United States.
- Nor has Moscow any illusions about the benefits of achieving power through peaceful means and Chile provided the best testing ground. For this reason the Soviet Union is concentrating its efforts on infiltrating existing structures and — via its new image of commitment to détente — using and exploiting these structures for its own ends. This applies to the economic sector, to the mass media, and even to the inner circles of the Catholic Church. In this regard it must be remembered that ninety percent of the continent are adherents to the Roman Catholic faith.

In the light of the aforementined — that the military regimes came to power as a reaction to terrorism, not because they themselves pursued a definite ideology; that these governments have still not been completely consolidated either politically or economically; and that strong pressures are being exerted on them by the major world powers — it could be stated that there is a strong political awakening in Latin America, especially in the South Cone countries. It is believed that all these factors are part of the necessary process that will lead to a common strategy on the part of all the countries in this region, and will eventually culminate in the successful implementation of the new trend towards national self-determination. This trend first appeared in

Paraguay with the assumption of power by General Alfredo Stroessner and since then it has gradually grown stronger. Today one no longer finds a Juan Torres in Bolivia, a Salvador Allende in Chile, a Juan Peron in Argentina, a Joao Goulart in Brazil or a Frente Amplio in Uruguay. The new Bermudez government of Peru is seeking alliances with other countries of the South Cone, and even in Ecuador there has been a movement towards adopting a policy more in line with those of the South Cone countries.

This new trend is characterised by a move towards independence in relationships with the United States, including rejection of American pressures, a strong spirit of anti-communism — although this has a pragmatic base derived from mature nationalism — and insistence on the individual national interest as being paramount and different from others. Ideologically, Paraguay — probably because it was first to assume a definite approach — is more consolidated as far as government support from the people is concerned, and the structure of government is more firmly established than elsewhere on the continent. In the other countries of the South Cone, however, there is a reluctance to depart from present governmental systems, which is probably due to the fact that they are rooted in deep liberal democratic principles.

The United States, which was once the principle partner of these states, is today significantly restricted in its economic relationships with South America. Brazil, for example, already has a greater volume of trade with the European Common Market than with the United States. Furthermore, relations with Asia and Africa are now also being strengthened.

The new position of the South Cone countries manifests itself most clearly in the military sphere. Until a few years ago, military personnel were sent to the United States for training. Today several countries have renounced American military aid in protest at the interference by the US in their internal affairs, such as through President Carter's so-called human rights policy. Furthermore, at one stage practically only American military equipment was being used in the South Cone countries, but today there is a strong tendency towards diversification, with Israel and some Western European countries playing an important role. The most significant factor in this regard is that some Latin American countries have started manufacturing their own military equipment. Argentina recently started to produce its own prototypes of tanks and combat vehicles. Brazil is not only manufacturing almost all its own military and naval equipment, but is also producing combat aircraft for military training as well as other types of weapons which are being exported to countries in

Latin America and to countries in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere.

Politically, this move towards independence from the US has been most expressive, not only in the United Nations but also in a refusal to submit to American pressures and to accept committees of investigation sent by international organisations. In this respect the nuclear agreement signed by Brazil and West Germany is of particular importance. In spite of several threatening statements by the American government, this agreement has not been modified by either party. Significant also is the fact that in spite of regional rivalries, such as between Brazil and Argentina, all the South Cone countries express their support for and solidarity with Brazil for its successful negotiation of this nuclear agreement.

In conclusion, it could be stated that in spite of all the difficulties the Latin American countries have to face, there is a tendency to search for new systems that will be representative of the national aspirations and realities of each particular country in the region. It is also noteworthy that this search is being conducted against the background of a world situation which is characterised by ideological and/or armed adventures by the major powers. The South Cone countries recognise that they must brace themselves for an intensified subversive attack by the communist bloc. They also realise that the United States cannot be relied upon to accept the leadership of the "Free World" in fending off this communist onslaught. On the contrary, the countries of the South Cone accept the position that the United States has in fact unwittingly assisted communist activities in the world by strengthening the Soviet economy via multinational companies based in the US. It has also done so by boycotting and putting pressures on countries which have sought to maintain their national self-determination through the adoption of what they regard as necessary measures to protect their sovereignty and independence. In the process the US has completely ignored the fact that the West faces a new type of war — a psycho-political war which the Soviets have exploited with considerable success.

Notes on the Libreville Summit of the OAU

The only really major decision of the 14th Organisation of African Unity Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government was the somewhat unexpected approval of moves led by President Kaunda of Zambia to channel all future aid for the Rhodesian liberation movements to the Patriotic Front, and to regard this movement as the "sole authentic representative of the peoples of Zimbabwe". It was clear that the OAU emerged from the Libreville summit bent on a new, strongly co-ordinated offensive against Rhodesia. Announcing the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee which would work as a "defence commission", OAU spokesman Peter Onu indicated that assistance being planned for the frontline states in the struggle against Rhodesia would be military and could possibly include the formation of an African expeditionary force. In effect, a plan that was proposed by Nigeria envisaged a combined military and diplomatic offensive which might, conceivably, put Nigerian troops into frontline positions along the Rhodesian border.

On the question of SWA/Namibia the political committee of the Council of Ministers decided that attempts by the contact group of five Western powers to find a peaceful solution should be encouraged. This has been interpreted as a setback for SWAPO — which is recognised by the OAU as the "sole authentic representative of the peoples of Namibia" — for UN bodies like the Council for Namibia, and for a number of radical African governments which have all indicated opposition to all or part of the West's proposals, claiming that they do not provide an acceptable solution to the dispute over the territory.

Other discussions relating to Southern Africa were the usual denunciation of apartheid and a call for tougher sanctions against the Republic. Member states were again called on not to recognise Transkei or any other so-called "bantustan" set up by the South African government.

Also emanating from the Libreville summit was a decision to endorse a Nigerian sponsored resolution calling for the setting up of a mediation commission to deal with inter-African disputes. The Nigerian leader, General Olusegun Obasanjo, told delegates to the summit that Africa was witnessing increasing tension between OAU members. Calling for drastic action to devise more effective machinery for settling inter-African conflicts, he recommended the creation of a standing committee "to help defuse and neutralise situations which could bring countries to the brink of armed conflict".

This rather sombre view of African developments, is borne out

by the fact that in spite of its praiseworthy ideals, the OAU has continuously had to struggle to contain bitter and occasional bloody disputes between its member states and to prevent them from splitting the organisation. Every year the crises facing the organisation are different, increasingly complex and more difficult to solve. Current issues are again challenging, as never before, the OAU's survival and its very *raison d'etre*. The organisation was established in 1963 primarily to assert the sovereignty, territorial integrity* and independence of African states, and to assist in the "liberation" of white-ruled Southern Africa. The OAU Charter indeed reflects some of the basic Pan-African principles such as socialism, anti-colonialism, racial equality, non-alignment and restricted federalism. More important, it also emphasises the desire of African states to speak with a concerted voice in international politics.

However, the promotion of "solidarity" among African states sometimes seems to be a futile exercise, thus to retain at least an outward show of unity, compromise steps were taken at Libreville on some of the following conflict issues, while others were not dealt with:

- In an effort to avert potential conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the disputes between Ethiopia and Sudan on the one hand, and between Ethiopia and Somalia — mainly centring around the Somali dream of a "Greater Somalia", which includes the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, as well as the north eastern districts of Kenya — on the other, were both referred to conciliation committees. In the latter case, the committee also has the additional brief to investigate mass killings in Ethiopia, resulting from the actions taken by the government in Addis Ababa to counter Sudanese and Somali-backed guerrilla operations.
- The territorial dispute between Libya and Chad over Tripoli's claim to a strip of territory near the Aozouan oasis in the Tibesti region of northern Chad — which has confirmed uranium deposits — was referred to another conciliation committee.
- The major problem of the phosphate-rich, former Spanish territory of Western Sahara, now divided between Morocco and Mauritania, with the armed internal opposition of the Algerian-backed Polisario Front, was shelved for the time being. In this case the issue was to be discussed by an extraordinary summit meeting of the OAU in Zambia during October.

*On the vexing problem of territorial disputes, see the resolution adopted at the 1964 Cairo Summit of the OAU as reproduced in Cervenka, Zdenek, *The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter*, C. Hurst and Company, London, 1969, p.94. This resolution basically validated territorial boundaries then existing — also that of colonial dependencies — because it was thought that by preserving and legitimising the *status quo*, external incitement for secession could be averted.

- Requests for increased aid from African countries to Mozambique to enable it to play a more active role as a frontline state against Rhodesia were referred to a special OAU commission.
- No resolution was passed on a proposed convention on mercenaries, the major purpose of which would have been to define precisely who were mercenaries.
- Zaire accused neighbouring Angola, as well as Cuba and the Soviet Union, of being behind the invasion mounted by former Katangese gendarmes into Shaba Province earlier this year, which had to be suppressed with the help of Moroccan troops and French logistical support.

Underlying at least some of these issues has been an apparent determined stand by the "moderate" OAU countries against growing communist encroachment into African affairs and its consequent threat to the independence of the continent. Significantly the summit carried a Senegalese resolution — formulated in close consultation with other states, such as Egypt, Morocco, the Ivory Coast, Sudan, Zaire and Togo — which simply condemns all foreign intervention in African affairs, but is in fact aimed at curbing the spread of communist interference in Africa. This reflected the growing concern of many member states at the spread of outside interference in Africa since the Cuban involvement in Angola.

Prior to the adoption of this resolution on non-interference in internal affairs and during the OAU Ministerial Council meetings, proposals put forward by Senegal and Algeria respectively, illustrated a profound split amongst member states. West African French-speaking countries especially, as well as some others, are resentful of the domination of the OAU by the progressive and militant nations, and regarded the Libreville conference — in the words of Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-Boigny — as "the opportunity for the voice of the silent majority to be heard". The emergence of such a moderate majority can be regarded as one of the most important features of the OAU summit.

Denis Venter

The author is Assistant Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs. These notes are an abridged version of a *Brief Report*, entitled "The 14th OAU Summit Conference at Libreville, Gabon: June/July 1977", and is based on short comments made at the Institute's monthly meeting on current international developments on 1 August, 1977.

Book Review

THE WAY THE WIND BLOWS: An Autobiography by Lord Home. Collins, London. 1976. 312 pp. R12,10.

Political autobiographies tend to fall either into one of two categories: the mediocre or the bad. Hence it is a welcome, though not surprising relief that the former British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, has written an autobiography which is interesting, informative and entertaining. Perhaps the most attractive feature of the book is the simplicity of the telling, a gentleness of touch and at times painful modesty. These characteristics are indeed rare in political autobiographies, so much so that the reader is probably inclined to be over-sympathetic to Lord Home and it may be that this reviewer was captivated by his charm!

Only two of twenty chapters are devoted to the two years Sir Alec lead the Tory Party before the 1964 electoral defeat. That was, for obvious reasons, not a happy time, though Lord Home is generous both to his predecessor, Harold Macmillan, and his successor, Ted Heath. Of the former he says: "The secret of his political success was his absolute mastery of every political occasion...(and he was) a supremely successful showman...". Of Mr. Heath, Lord Home makes a claim which, given the confrontation with the miners in 1973, is difficult to sustain — "No Prime Minister had ever taken such trouble to bring Trades Union leaders into discussion, nor spent so many patient hours on formulae which could achieve moderation and result in constructive partnership between capital and labour...". What was the three day week about then? Both the Labour Party and Harold Wilson are, expectedly, less generously dealt with.

Of course, given Lord Home's long association with the Foreign Office, the book is a gem for any student of international politics. Sir Alec was with Chamberlain at Munich and from that period contributed substantially to both the form and content of British foreign policy. The early Commonwealth years are eagerly discussed, including Dr. Verwoerd's withdrawal of South Africa's application for continued membership in 1961. Lord Home says of the event, that the mood of the Conference was reconciliatory, that the Ministers attending wanted to give South Africa another chance, but that in the end "South Africa expelled themselves".

An entire chapter deals with British African policy and the rump of it is an analysis of the early years of the Rhodesian crisis. Reading it again makes the on-going saga of lost opportunities a painful experience — there were so many near misses. In a later chapter he returns to the question and deals rather fleetingly with

the Pearce Commission. One has the feeling that by that stage they all knew the exercise was fruitless. Discussing African politics in general, his over-emphasis on tribalism is offensive, primarily because this is not the prime motivating force in African politics. One senses a lack of appreciation for the complex problems of underdevelopment, although surprisingly, in national affairs, Lord Home does give recognition to the central place of economics.

Also worrying is the one-dimensional analysis of the Soviet Union's position in the world, their apparent omnipotent power and their seeming refusal seriously to contemplate the possiblities of peaceful coexistence, in the proper sense of the phrase. This, too, is a matter of personal interpretation and his reviewer and Lord Home part company early in the analysis. Still, the negotiations with Krushchev and Gromyko make as interesting reading as the meetings with Kennedy and Rusk.

If the reader finds himself at a loss to understand what sustained Lord Home in the 45 years of rigorous political life, most of it in the international arena, they should re-read both the final chapter and the declaration of faith, sense the obvious passion for cricket and look, perhaps like Lord Home, to "the way the wind blows".

Peter C.J. Vale

The reviewer is Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Select List of Recent Institute Publications
Keurlys van Onlangse Publikasies van die Instituut

BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS/BOEKE EN MONOGRAFIEË

- *Strategy for Development*, Macmillan, London, 1976. Edited by John Barratt, David Collier, Kurt Glaser and Herman Mönnig. (This volume is based on the proceedings of a Conference at Jan Smuts House in December 1974.) Price: R15,00 if ordered from the Institute.
- *South Africa in the World: Political and Strategic Realities*, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1976. Edited by Denis Venter. (Revised proceedings of a Symposium organised by the Pretoria Branch of the Institute in June 1975.) Price: R2,50.

REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION/NASLAANDOKUMENTASIE

- *Southern Africa Record.* (Contains the original texts of, or extracts from official policy statements on international relations in Southern Africa.) Price: R1,50 per copy for No.5 and subsequent issues; R1,00 per copy for Nos.1 to 4.

SPECIAL STUDIES/SPESIALE STUDIES

- *Wars of National Liberation, the Super-Powers and the Afro-Asian Ocean Region*, Dr. Dirk Kunert. Price: R2,50.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS/GELEENTHEIDSPUBLIKASIES

- *"Namibia and Human Rights": A Report on the Dakar Conference and its Implications for the South West Africa Issue and Détente*, Professor John Dugard.
- *The Angolan Conflict: Internal and International Aspects*, John Barratt.
- *The European Economic Community: A Guide to the Game of Marbles*, Peter Vale.
- *Détente in Southern Africa: Two Views*, Professor Ronald Ballinger and Professor Gerrit Olivier.
- *An Anatomy of Chinese-American Relations*, Professor James C. Thomson, Jr.
- *The Soviet Union and the Conventional Threat to South Africa: A Strategic Analysis*, Christopher McEwan.
- *The Rhodesian Constitutional Dispute: Black Majority Rule or Meritocracy?* Denis Venter.
- *Rhodesia, Settlement and Southern Africa*, Professor Donald G. Baker.
- *The Kremlin, the World Revolutionary Process and African "National Liberation Movements"*, Dr. Dirk Kunert.
- *The United States and South Africa: Three South African Perspectives*, Percy Qoboza, John Barratt and Ton Vosloo.
- *The Future of South West Africa/Namibia: A Symposium*, John

Barratt, Dr. Willie Breytenbach, Dr. Gerhard Tötemeyer and Dr. Lukas de Vries. (With a Statement by the South African Foreign Minister, the Hon. R.F. Botha, and the Text of UN Security Council Resolution 385.)

The price of all occasional papers is 50 cents per copy.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND INDEX SERIES/BIBLIOGRAFIESE EN INDEKSREEKSE

- *Transkeian Bibliography: 1945 to Independence 1976.* Compiled by Jacqueline A. Kalley. Price: R3,00.
- *Index to the Republic of South Africa Treaty Series 1961 — 1975.* Compiled by Jacqueline A. Kalley. Price: R2,00.

Southern Africa Record

(SELECTED ITEMS FROM AVAILABLE ISSUES — Nos. 1-10)

- The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa (April 1969)
- The Mogadishu Declaration (October 1971)
- Statement by the South African Prime Minister, the Hon. B.J. Vorster, in the Senate (23 October, 1974)
- Statement by Ambassador R.F. Botha, Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations, in the Security Council (24 October, 1974)
- Address by H.E. the President of Zambia, Dr. K.D. Kaunda, on the Occasion of the Conferment of the Degree of LL.D. (Honoris Causa), University of Zambia (26 October, 1974)
- Extracts from a Speech by the South African Prime Minister at Nigel (5 November, 1974)
- Statement by the South African Prime Minister on the Lusaka Talks (8 December, 1974)
- Statement by the President of SWAPO, Mr. Sam Nujoma (March 1975)
- Speech by Mr. Vernon Mwaanga, Foreign Minister of Zambia, at the 9th Extraordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers (8 April, 1975)
- The Dar es Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa (10 April, 1975)
- Statement to Parliament by the Rhodesian Prime Minister concerning the Victoria Falls Conference (26 August, 1975)
- Declaration of Dakar on Namibia and Human Rights (January 1976)
- Dakar Conference on "Namibia and Human Rights": Programme of Action (January 1976)
- Statement by the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations in the Security Council, on South West Africa and Angola (27 January, 1976)

- United Nations Security Council Resolution 385 on South West Africa/Namibia (30 January, 1976)
- Interview with the Prime Minister of South Africa, the Hon. B.J. Vorster, by Mr. George Evans of the Sunday Telegraph, London (14 March, 1976)
- Statement issued by the Rhodesian ANC (19 March, 1976)
- South Africa and Angola
  - A. Statement in Parliament by the South African Minister of Defence, the Hon. P.W. Botha, concerning Care for Refugees in and Withdrawal of South African Troops from Angola (25 March, 1976)
  - B. Letter from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the UN Secretary-General (28 March, 1976)
  - C. Letter from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the UN Security Council (31 March, 1976)
  - D. Resolution 387 (1976) adopted by the UN Security Council (31 March, 1976)
- Address by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. the Hon. Hilgard Muller, entitled "South West Africa: A Glance into the Future", at the University of Stellenbosch Autumn School (1 April, 1976)
- Address by the US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, in Lusaka, Zambia (27 April, 1976)
- Speech by H.E. Sir Seretse Khama, President of Botswana, at a Banquet in Peking (27 July, 1976)
- Address by US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to the Annual Conference of the National Urban League in Boston (2 August, 1976)
- Extracts from a Speech by the President of Zambia, H.E. Dr. K.D. Kaunda, at the 5th Non-Aligned Summit Conference, Colombo, Sri Lanka (11-19 August, 1976)
- Address by US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, in Philadelphia (31 August, 1976)
- Constitutional Conference of South West Africa (Turnhalle Conference)
  - A. Declaration of Intent (14 September, 1975)
  - B. Statement issued by the Constitution Committee of the Conference (18 August, 1976)
  - C. Statement issued by the Constitution Committee of the Conference (16 September, 1976)
- Address to the Nation by the Rhodesian Prime Minister, the Hon. Ian D. Smith (24 September, 1976)
- Statement issued by five African "front-line" Presidents in Lusaka (26 September, 1976)

- Extract on Rhodesia from a Speech by the British Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. James Callaghan, to the Labour Party Conference in Blackpool (28 September, 1976)
- Issue of Lesotho/Transkei Border
  - A. Letter to the UN Secretary-General from the Chairman of the African Group and Permanent Representative of Libya (12 November, 1976)
  - B. Letter to the UN Secretary-General from the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. the Hon. Hilgard Muller (16 November, 1976)
  - C. Resolution 402 (1976) adopted by the UN Security Council at its 1982nd Meeting (22 December, 1976)
- British Proposals for a Transitional Government in Rhodesia (January 1977)
- Address to the Nation by the Rhodesian Prime Minister, the Hon. Ian D. Smith (24 January, 1977)
- Statement on Rhodesia by the British Foreign Secretary, the Rt. Hon. Anthony Crosland, in the House of Commons (25 January, 1977)
- Statement on Rhodesia by the South African Prime Minister, the Hon. B.J. Vorster, in the House of Assembly (28 January, 1977)
- Statement on Rhodesia by US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, in Washington (31 January, 1977)
- Statements by President Carter of the United States concerning Repeal of the "Byrd Amendment" on the Importation of Chrome and other Minerals from Rhodesia, in Washington (18 March, 1977)
- Rhodesian Statement of Intent issued in Salisbury (29 March, 1977)
- Western Statements at UN Conferene on Southern Africa, Maputo, Mozambique
  - A. Statement on Zimbabwe and Namibia by the UK Minister of State, on behalf of the Nine Members of the EEC (17 May, 1977)
  - B. Extracts from a Statement by the UK Minister of State (17 May, 1977)
  - C. Statement made on behalf of the five Western Members of the UN Security Council by the US Delegation, at the Final Session of the Conference (21 May, 1977)
- Statement by the United States Vice-President, Walter Mondale, at a Press Conference in Vienna following discussions with the South African Prime Minister (20 May, 1977)
- Extracts from a Statement in Parliament by the South African Prime Minister, the Hon. B.J. Vorster, concerning his Meetings with the President of the Ivory Coast in Geneva, and with the

Vice-President of the United States in Vienna (27 May, 1977)

- Speech on Relations with Africa by the United States Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, to the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, in St. Louis, Missouri (1 July 1977)
- Interview with Mr. Peter Katjavivi, Information Secretary of SWAPO, in London (September 1977)

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

LYS VAN KORPORAATLEDE
LIST OF CORPORATE MEMBERS

Abbott Laboratories South Africa (Pty) Limited
African Cables Limited
AECI Limited
African Oxygen Limited
Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Limited
Anglo-Transvaal Consolidated Investment Company Limited
Argus Printing & Publishing Company Limited, The
Babcock & Wilcox of Africa (Pty) Limited
Barclays National Bank Limited
Barlow Rand Limited
BP Southern Africa (Pty) Limited
Caltex Oil (SA) (Pty) Limited
Cayzer, Irvine South Africa (Pty) Limited
Cementation Company (Africa) Limited, The
Chase Manhattan Overseas Corporation
CNA Investments Limited
Commercial Union Assurance Company of South Africa Limited
De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited
Dorman Long Vanderbijl Corporation Limited
Dunlop South Africa Limited
Edgars Stores Limited
Federale Volksbeleggings Beperk
Ford Motor Company of South African (Pty) Limited
Foschini Limited
French Bank of Southern Africa Limited
General Mining & Finance-Korporasie Beperk
General Motors South Africa (Pty) Limited
Gold Fields of South Africa Limited
Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Company (SA) (Pty) Limited, The
Guardian Liberty Life Group, The
Haggie Rand Limited
Hill Samuel Group (SA) Limited, The
Huletts Corporation Limited
IBM South Africa (Pty) Limited
Jaff & Company Limited
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company Limited
Legal & General Assurance of South Africa Limited
McCarthy Rodway Limited
Massey-Ferguson (South Africa) Limited
Messina (Transvaal) Development Company Limited, The
Metal Box South Africa Limited
Mine Labour Organisations (Wenela) Limited
Mobil Oil Southern Africa (Pty) Limited
Natal Tanning Extract Company Limited, The
National Trading Company Limited
Nedbank & Syfrets-UAL Holdings Limited
Nywerheidontwikkelingskorporasie van Suid-Afrika Beperk
Otis Elevator Company Limited
Philips South Africa (Pty) Limited
Plate Glass & Shatterprufe Industries Limited
Pretoria Portland Cement Company Limited
Price Waterhouse & Company
Reef Lefebvre (Pty) Limited
Rembrandt Groep Beperk
Rennies Consolidated Holdings Limited
Retco Limited
Reunert and Lenz Limited
Roberts Construction Company Limited, The
SA Associated Newspapers Limited
SA Manganese Amcor Limited
Sanlam
Schindler Lifts (SA) (Pty) Limited
Shell Southern Africa (Pty) Limited
Siemens (Pty) Limited
Smith, C.G. & Company Limited
Smith, C.G. Sugar Limited
South African Marine Corporation Limited
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, The
South African Breweries Limited, The
South African Sugar Association
Suid-Afrikaanse Steenkool- Olie- & Gas-korporasie Beperk (SASOL)
Suid-Afrikaanse Yster- & Staal-Industriële Korporasie Beperk (YSKOR)
Tiger Oats & National Milling Company Limited
Total South Africa (Pty) Limited
Toyota South Africa Limited
Truworths Limited
Trust Bank van Afrika Beperk, Die
UDC Bank Limited
Unilever South Africa (Proprietary) Limited
United Building Society
Union Corporation Limited
Volkswagen of SA (Pty) Limited
Woolworths (Pty) Limited