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**CONTENTS**

<b>NOTES ON AUTHORS AND ARTICLES</b>	(ii)
<b>THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOUTHERN AFRICA</b> H.F. Oppenheimer	1
<b>THE INTERNAL AGREEMENT IN RHODESIA AND THE OUTLOOK FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT</b> John Barratt	10
<b>POLITICAL GROUPINGS IN NAMIBIA — THEIR ROLE AND CHANCES</b> G.K.H. Töttemeyer	23
<b>SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD: WHICH WAY NOW?</b> Robert Schrire	31
<b>LETTERS</b> <i>Mr Ken Owen lauds the "Sixth World".</i>	41
<b>BOOK REVIEWS</b> <i>The Diplomacy of Détente</i> by Coral Bell <i>The Communist Challenge to Africa</i> by Ian Greig <i>National Security: a Modern Approach</i> by M.H.H. Louw Other Books Received	44 46 47 49
<b>INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS</b>	50

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## NOTES ON AUTHORS AND ARTICLES

The first article in this issue is by *Mr H.F. Oppenheimer*, Chairman of the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, and it is based on an address by him to a meeting of the Institute of Directors in London in February 1978.

The articles on Rhodesia and SWA/Namibia are based on the two main papers presented at a symposium at Stellenbosch in April 1978, sponsored by the Stellenbosch Branch of the SAIIA. The authors of the two articles are well-known in South Africa and abroad for the work they have done in the field of international affairs:

*Mr John Barratt* is Director of the SAIIA, and was earlier an officer of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs. He served in New York as a member of the South African Mission to the United Nations for seven years.

*Dr Gerhard Tötemeyer* is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Stellenbosch. SWA/Namibia has been a special interest of his for many years, and he has published numerous works on this subject.

The fourth article in this issue, by *Dr Robert Schrire*, is based on the conclusions of a symposium in Cape Town in May 1978, organised by the Cape Town Branch of the SAIIA, and on a paper by Dr Schrire on American policies towards South Africa, presented at a symposium in Port Elizabeth in April, organised jointly by the Eastern Province Branch of the SAIIA and CIVITAS (a University of Port Elizabeth student society). The themes of these two symposia were, respectively, "South African Foreign Policy : Which Way Now?" and "The West, the Communist Powers and Southern Africa".

Dr Robert Schrire is senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Cape Town. He obtained his Ph.D. from the University of California at Santa Barbara, and he has also spent two years as a lecturer in the United States.

## THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

H.F. Oppenheimer

Everywhere, and Southern Africa is no exception, the power of the State to control the life of the individual is increasing, and indeed in Africa the individual seems to me to be more helpless than in Europe or North America. I suggest that that is because, in Africa, the growing power of the State arises from different reasons. In Europe the causes are economic and social; in Africa it is largely the consequence of the need for newly emerged States to establish their authority and assert their independence, and so the growth of State power often enjoys popular support based on sentiments of nationalism and patriotism. Consequently, while concern for individual freedom is certainly associated with the Western democracies and the free enterprise system, this does not mean that support for an all powerful State is to be equated with support for the Communist powers or even with any strong belief in the virtue of centralised planning and control.

Where, then, in the great world political and economic groupings, does Southern Africa properly belong? To the West or to the East? Or, as the new African countries hope and believe, to that "Third World" which is seeking, but has so far failed to find, a true individuality of its own? In fact, the concept of this so-called "Third World" is a result of the cold war — its result and also its victim. In colonial times it was widely held that people ought not to be free until they were fit to use their freedom wisely; and that on this basis the African countries were not ready for independence. To this Mr Harold MacMillan, whose part in fanning the "wind of change" in Africa was certainly not negligible, wisely retorted that this maximum was worthy of the fool who was resolved not to go into the water until he had learned to swim. Nevertheless, there certainly is one important respect in which most of the African countries were not ready for freedom. I am thinking of the acute shortage, in some cases complete lack, of technical skills and capital resources. The result was that the only real freedom available to them was the freedom to decide on which group of foreigners to depend. The full exercise of this rather limited freedom obviously called for a non-aligned stance as between East and West; and since the ownership and management of almost all major enterprises were in the hands of expatriate companies, and since liquid capital resources in local private hands were either non-existent or completely inadequate, it was natural that these new countries should feel they could not exercise a meaningful independence unless the control of their major industrial enter-

prises was taken over by the State. Strong protagonists though we may be of the private enterprise system, we must surely have some understanding of the motives behind this policy. Nevertheless, the resulting concentration of power in the hands of the State has created grave problems.

Southern Africa comprises a number of countries whose circumstances differ widely. Perhaps they can best be thought of in four groups; the White-dominated countries of South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia; the ex-British protectorates of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; the ex-Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola; and in the north Zambia and Malawi. I include Zambia and Malawi, though some of you may feel that their proper affiliations are to the east and the north, with Tanzania and Kenya. The fact is, however, that not only historically but politically and economically they look south, and President Kaunda's brave attempt to insulate himself from his white-dominated neighbours has involved severe economic loss and a measure of political instability in his country.

Zambia seems to me of special interest in relation to our theme. It is the only country in the area I am discussing which has been able to maintain more or less consistently the non-aligned stance which, in theory anyhow, is the ideal of the OAU States. As the basis of the Zambian social and economic system President Kaunda has devised a doctrine which he calls "humanism", conceived as an independent alternative to the rival ideologies of the West and the East. No-one who is privileged to know President Kaunda will doubt that his political faith is inspired by idealism and respect for the dignity of man. It must be admitted, however, that the theoretical basis and the practical implications of "humanism" are far from clear. Does it tend to promote individual freedom or the growth of an all powerful State? Let us see how matters have worked out in practice in Zambia.

The greater part of the Zambian population is desperately poor and occupied with subsistence agriculture. Superimposed on this is a highly sophisticated and, until fairly recently, very profitable copper mining industry in which the level of wages is vastly higher than the average of the country. Copper mining used to account for much the greater part of the revenue of the State and of the national exports. On this industry the economic growth potential of the whole country rested, so that Government felt that the country could not be truly independent or effectively non-aligned, unless it were State controlled — and if this involved some degree of inefficiency it was felt that the mines were profitable enough to be able to afford it. Accordingly the Government first acquired 51% of the capital of the companies and after a time

also assumed responsibility for their management. The same policy has also been applied to most of the other large industries in the country. Final decisions throughout almost all industry are therefore taken by the Government, and the organisation of labour and the rôle of the Trades Unions have become a political rather than an industrial matter. The changeover was smooth and, with the private shareholders' co-operation in technical matters, all went reasonably well, so long as the price of copper held up. Now it is quite a different story. Low copper prices would, in any case, have been very serious for the country, but the ill effects have been increased on account of central Government control. This made it extremely difficult for political reasons to effect in good time a necessary rationalisation of production by concentrating on the richer mines and ceasing production at those that had become unpayable. Further, it is now virtually impossible to attract equity capital from abroad, with the consequence that the mining companies, which had embarked on huge capital programmes, have been forced to rely to an excessive extent on short-term borrowing. The pressure on the balance of payments is severe and the Government with the best will in the world has not been able to avoid strict control over imports, and all remittances of funds abroad. This completed the process of cutting Zambia off from the capital markets of the world.

Socially and politically, tribal forces are strong and unrestricted party politics might have brought dangerous pressures to bear on the structure of the State. As in most African countries, therefore, a one party system has been established, though within the system differences of opinion, so long as they do not go too far, may be fairly freely expressed. The Press is strictly controlled. Foreign policy is directed, not to advancing Zambia's own interests in any narrow sense, but to the waging of a "holy war" against the "racist" regimes in the South. This has entailed sacrifices for all Zambians. The normal export and import routes are closed and essential supplies from abroad must be brought in at excessively high prices. At the same time the sense of living in a time of crisis has been held to justify the ever tightening control by the Government over the lives of private citizens.

I have no doubt that the policy of "humanism" was thought of as a guarantee of individual freedom, and yet Zambia is not, anyhow in the British sense, a free country. Individual freedom has been subordinated to the ideal of national independence, and the situation has been aggravated by the crusade against the Rhodesian and South African regimes. The underlying problem, however, goes deeper. With the possible exception of Nigeria, black Africa's independent stance is really an illusion. There is no such thing as

an independent African power bloc. What there is, is a power vacuum, maintained by equal and opposite pressures from East and West. When the pressure from one side or the other becomes predominant, the vacuum begins to break down, and in Africa, like everywhere else, centralised control of the economy, even though minority private interests may be tolerated or even welcomed, limits the freedom for the individual. To be non-aligned economically, as between private enterprise and centralised control as the main force of economic organisation, is, to my mind, not possible. So what "humanism" seems in practice to come down to, is a centralised political and economic system operated with humanity and a proper regard for the dignity of man. President Kaunda's exceptional personality is the only guarantee that the system will, in fact, be operated in that way.

Malawi is ruled by an idealist of a very different sort. President Banda has devoted himself with considerable success to the welfare of his own people and has certainly not been prepared to sacrifice this objective to any attempt to liberate other countries. Under his rule Malawi is far from being a democratic country, but the fact is that no country whose economy depends to the extent of Malawi's on subsistence agriculture can provide much freedom of choice for the individual. President Banda's attitude is not as cynical as it may sound. He is a practical man and knows very well that the process of being "liberated" is always uncomfortable and uncertain in its ultimate effects. Whether his policy or that of President Kaunda will in the long run achieve most for the black peoples of Southern Africa, is a question I find difficult to answer.

The Communist dominated Governments in Mozambique and Angola can neither of them make any serious claim to have majority support. They differ in that Frelimo in Mozambique is firmly in the saddle with no serious armed opposition, while in Angola the MPLA Government needs the continued support of Russian arms and Cuban troops to maintain itself against the competing movements. In the circumstances, to discuss the relationship of the State to the individual in these countries would be academic. At first sight it seems strange that in these two territories which had comparatively large European populations, white influence should have counted for so little once the Portuguese army withdrew. The answer, of course, is that the Portuguese, while not racialists, were colonialists in the old sense. Their attempt to look on these countries as part of Metropolitan Portugal and their refusal to grant local self-government produced a situation entirely different from that in Rhodesia and Namibia, let alone in South Africa, and the refusal of the United Nations to understand and accept this fact has added substantially to the



difficulties being experienced in finding peaceful solutions.

The former British protectorates, Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana, differ widely from one another. Swaziland is a feudal monarchy where individual freedom is certainly severely restricted. Nevertheless the atmosphere is more relaxed than in most new African countries. The principal reasons are probably that there are no tribal differences and that power has remained in the hands of the traditional tribal leaders. This contrasts with many of the new countries where national independence was preceded or accompanied by a social and political revolution which transferred power from the accepted chiefs to new men, who generally had affiliations with left-wing elements abroad.

Lesotho, the poorest of these countries and the one with the largest population, is ruled by a tough and intelligent chief, Leabua Jonathan, who would appear to regard freedom as something that should be enjoyed only by his political supporters. The King, a man of distinction, education and charming manners, reigns but does not rule. However, he enjoys the popularity and prestige which come to him as the direct descendent of the hero founder of the nation. On account of its poverty, its large population and its geographical situation, Lesotho is economically dependent on South Africa and this fact, in spite of brave words and gestures, inevitably limits its real independence.

The President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, is a remarkable man, able and humane, and Botswana is the only State in Southern Africa which can reasonably be called a democracy. Even here, however, the effort to assert national independence has brought about a great measure of Government control. The private enterprise system exists, but only in a limited form. Government takes an important part in the *control and management* of all large enterprises and is directly concerned with the regulation of wages and conditions of employment. Criticism of the Government is tolerated, but not exactly encouraged, and most people and all foreigners in the country would, I am sure, think it wise to keep it within careful limits. All this is understandable and to be expected. Nevertheless, even Botswana cannot be regarded as an exception to the general rule that in none of the black States of Southern Africa does the individual enjoy that degree of freedom to speak his mind and shape his life, which is regarded as normal in Britain, even under a Socialist Government.

The situation in the white-ruled countries is much more complicated. South Africa, with its associated territory of South West Africa/Namibia, and Rhodesia do not have to depend on foreign advisers and foreign technicians, and in that respect they have a

real independence the others do not. Naturally, to say a country is independent is very different from saying that it is free; and in these countries the technical skills are, generally speaking — and there are fortunately increasing numbers of exceptions — confined to the whites. This situation arose from historical circumstances, but it has been maintained and in South Africa codified as part of the policy of separate development or apartheid. The Governments of these countries are in theory anyhow, strongly committed to the private enterprise system, and so are virtually all of the White, Coloured and Indian populations and also, I believe, a very large majority of the Black population, particularly of that most important part of it which lives in the urban areas. Unfortunately, however, the private enterprise system is treated by the authorities as though it were a commodity labelled “for Whites only”. Then the Blacks are expected to stand together with the Whites to defend free enterprise and individual freedom against Communism, while they are excluded by official policy from most of the benefits which free enterprise brings.

This contradiction goes to the root of the South African problem. The White South African Government and electorate see themselves as an integral part of the democratic private enterprise West and, indeed, as standing in the frontline and making disproportionate sacrifices in the defence of the West against Communist aggression. And the curious fact, I believe, is that the Western democracies really see matters in much the same way. That is why White South Africa's refusal to associate the Blacks with the system they purport to be defending, is such a stumbling block and embarrassment. If White South Africa were not really part of the Western system, the Western powers would not care in the least how the South African Government behaved, any more than they really care how members of other authoritarian minority African Governments behave. What is felt to be intolerable is the refusal of White South Africa, for reasons of racial prejudice, to accept and enlist Black South Africans on merit as their allies in the defence of freedom.

There are interesting parallels between the situation in Rhodesia and that in Namibia. In each case the Government and the White population are now willing to accept independence on the basis of majority rule. And in each case the United Nations has seen fit to give support to militant factions armed and supported by Communists who, while they have so far given no proof that they enjoy majority support, have given the plainest indications that, if they came to power, they would destroy the private enterprise system with all that that implies for the freedom of the individual. No doubt the UN recognition of SWAPO, prior to any elec-

tions, as the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people, was due to the fact that they could not foresee that South Africa would at any time be prepared peacefully to abandon control. Indeed, a tremendous policy change was involved. Personally, I am very much encouraged to see such flexibility on the part of our normally rigid Government, and the change of heart by the Whites in Namibia, who used to be regarded as among the most racially prejudiced people of Southern Africa, is even more remarkable.

The problems of Rhodesia and Namibia are the most urgent, but in the long run they are peripheral to those of South Africa. We have become accustomed to think of the South African question in terms of the relationship between the various races who make up the population. We would do well to think more about the relationship of individual South Africans, Black and White, to the State. Majority rule, in the sense of all power being left unconditionally in the hands of a political majority, is no guarantee of individual freedom anywhere. In African conditions, where tribalism, Black and White, is strong, it creates a high probability that the right to organise political opposition — and indeed parliamentary government itself in any meaningful sense of the term — will rapidly be brought to an end. Reform in South Africa is vital and long overdue, but the necessary changes would be brought about more quickly and more peacefully if, at this stage, we concentrated less on who should govern the country and more on how the country should be governed.

South Africa, as I have said, is a country which, in theory anyhow, is strongly committed to private enterprise, and this applies just as much to the Government and the Afrikaans-speaking section of the Whites who keep it in power, as to the Opposition which is probably supported by the greater part of the business community. Yet this private enterprise Government interferes directly and indirectly with private business as much as many socialist governments elsewhere. The fact is that, while the Government believes in the principle of a free enterprise economy, it is heavily committed to intervention in society in other areas, and it is simply not possible to insulate the economy from the effects of this intervention. Most important, of course, is Government policy in relation to the Black and Brown populations, but the Government's desire to reduce, or at least limit, that part of the economy which is controlled by English-speaking whites who are not sympathetic to its policy, is also of significance.

State interference in business has come under attack by no less a person than Dr A D Wassenaar, a most distinguished and able leader of the Afrikaans-speaking business community and a poli-

tical supporter of the Government. He argues that socialistic measures are bad, whatever the motive that prompted them, and recently he has pertinently observed that the National Party may come to regret having conferred such extensive powers on Government, when the time comes that they cease to be in power. Of course this Government, which has been in office for thirty years and has just won an election with a record majority, is inclined to believe that it will be in power forever. They should consider the situation of Mr Smith in Rhodesia. He, too, has won a record victory at the polls, but how long is he likely to be in power? The changes that are imminent in Rhodesia and Namibia cannot leave South Africa untouched. Great changes are inevitable in South Africa also; what is far from certain is whether they will be for the better or for the worse.

It is central to the political faith of the Government that the sharing of power between different ethnic groups within one State is not practical. For this reason the Government is committed to the development of separate political institutions for each of the ethnic groups which it has defined in our population, and it is trying to induce the Black groups, each of which can be said to have some tribal territorial base, to follow the example of Transkei and Bophuthatswana in accepting full independence as sovereign States. A great deal can be said for developing these tribal territories as autonomous areas, though their viability as sovereign states remains open to question. What to my mind is indefensible is the Government's plan to deprive Black people who do not live, and in most cases never have lived, in these tribal areas, of their South African citizenship, and to force on them a tribal citizenship which, in most cases, they will not willingly accept and strongly resent. The primary objective of this "Bantustan" or "Homeland" policy is to create a legal basis for treating the Black urban population as foreigners in a country which belongs to them just as much as to the Whites. But a legal fiction like this cannot alter the real facts of the case; nor is legality a satisfactory substitute for morality.

The Government's policy of separate development, or apartheid, is calculated to set up centrifugal forces in society. People are required to live in separate areas, to use different and separate facilities and, of course, to exercise political rights separately. But all the while improved communications, the spread of education — largely through the medium of the English language — and, above all, the development of the economy by Black and White working together, are all making the people the Government is trying to separate increasingly dependent on one another. The Government's policy, therefore, can only be made effective by dis-

crimnatory legislation. Hence the industrial colour bar, the refusal to recognise Black trades unions, the pass laws, the ban on the acquisition by Black people of property outside the tribal area, the obstacles in the way of adequate technical training for Blacks and the refusal in most cases to allow Blacks to share facilities with Whites. Moreover, since freedom is indivisible, these restrictions on the freedom of Blacks also restrict the freedom of Whites, not least the freedom of businessmen and industrialists whose work makes them think not in terms of a separatist ideology, but of the real unity of the economy.

South Africa has sadly become a highly unpopular country internationally, and the external pressures on us for change are continually mounting. Our Government has represented this pressure as a demand for immediate majority rule based on "one man one vote". I do not believe that this is a true interpretation. Certainly I hope it is not, for it would be difficult to conceive of a surer recipe for disaster. A much more hopeful approach would be to think of South Africa's problems in terms of the need to protect individual rights against the power of the State. This need is important everywhere, but it takes on a special nature and urgency in a multi-racial, multi-tribal industrialised country such as South Africa is. The sharing of power between the different races must come, but there is a sense in which the sharing of political power is not exactly a part of individual freedom but a means by which the individual can protect his freedom. The way to peaceful change in South Africa is to remove the restraints on the individual freedom of the Blacks before, not after, a proper share of political power is transferred to them. I believe there is still time for that, though there is not much time to spare.

I hope that the time will come when racial and tribal loyalties and prejudices will become secondary to a broad South Africanism, but unhappily that time is not yet. It is easy in Britain or in America to call for drastic changes in Southern Africa for which, if things go wrong, others will have to pay the price. But, if it is peaceful change we aim at in South Africa, not just change on any terms, we must accept the hard truth that most White South Africans, while knowing that the Blacks have been and still are being unfairly discriminated against, do not regard this as any reason why they should accept unconditional rule by a Black majority who might be inclined to treat them as they have treated Blacks in the past. Our problem is not only that of doing justice as between the races, but of finding a way in which this can be done while guaranteeing the security and the freedom of individual South Africans, Black and White.

## THE INTERNAL AGREEMENT IN RHODESIA AND THE OUT-LOOK FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT

John Barratt

### Background

Before the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in 1974, the efforts to resolve the Rhodesian dispute were restricted mainly to negotiations between the British and Rhodesian Governments. The dispute was in the past treated simply as a constitutional one between those two governments, and there was no meaningful consultation with African nationalists within Rhodesia. Thus, the Smith/Home agreement in 1971 (which very nearly achieved a constitutional settlement) was rejected in 1972, when the Pearce Commission undertook its assessment of the opinion of the people of Rhodesia, mainly because the Africans argued that they had not been involved in the negotiation of the agreement.

The ending of Portuguese rule in Mozambique and Angola dramatically changed the situation in Southern Africa, and it especially affected Rhodesia. The nationalist movements, in particular the liberation movements based outside Rhodesia, were significantly strengthened. They had over the years gradually been gaining greater credibility and legitimacy on the international scene — not only in Africa and the United Nations, but in many world capitals as well — and now they gained the vital support of Frelimo-controlled Mozambique, with its long border with Rhodesia. They also gained political and psychological encouragement from the fact that other liberation movements had come to power in the ex-Portuguese territories. This meant, too, that the concept of the “armed struggle” as the means of achieving power, rather than negotiations, gained greater credibility.

The danger of escalating confrontation in the region, as a result of the change in Mozambique and the unresolved Rhodesian dispute, was quickly perceived by other powers in the region — not only by South Africa, but also significantly by Zambia. There then followed the period of negotiations between Mr Vorster and President Kaunda, which became known as the *détente* period, in which the chief focus was on the Rhodesian question. These negotiations, which brought about a *temporary relaxation of tension*, were based mainly on a degree of coincidence of interests between South Africa and Zambia, concerning the need for a Rhodesian settlement, and for the avoidance of disintegration in Mozambique. It will be recalled that Mr Vorster said in December, 1974,

that the consequences of failure in these efforts would be "too ghastly to contemplate".

It was notable that outside, non-regional powers were not directly involved in these negotiations — not even the United Kingdom — and the negotiations constituted a determined effort to settle differences within the region directly between the parties concerned. It was during this period of negotiation, which led *inter alia* to the release of detained nationalist leaders in Rhodesia, that the black nationalists were brought effectively into the negotiations about the future of that country for the first time. The highlight and climax of the détente negotiations was the meeting on the Victoria Falls bridge in August 1975, attended by Mr Vorster, President Kaunda, Mr Smith and the nationalist leaders. This meeting unfortunately did not product the results that had been hoped for from contacts between Mr Smith and the nationalist leaders, and then the Angolan war intervened to disrupt and eventually destroy the regional détente process.

The intervention of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola served to bring the United States actively into Southern African affairs for the first time, in the person of Dr Henry Kissinger who in 1976 undertook his dramatic diplomatic initiatives, concentrating primarily on Rhodesia. His policy speech in Lusaka on 27 April, 1976, marked a decided shift in American policy towards this region, notably in that it committed the United States to active involvement. Thus began the new period of negotiations over the future of Rhodesia, which is still continuing and in which the United States has played a leading role, in conjunction with the United Kingdom.

This new period has also been marked by the increasing influence of the five front-line states (Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Botswana) acting as a group in the negotiations. Furthermore, there emerged during this period (towards the end of 1976) the armed Patriotic Front alliance between the two externally-based liberation movements (Mr Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU, and ZANU under the political leadership of Mr Robert Mugabe), which served to bring the other leading nationalists (notably Bishop Muzorewa, Mr Chikerema and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole) back into Rhodesia and eventually into the recent alliance with Mr Smith in the internal settlement agreement.

So, in the past two years, since the beginning of Dr Kissinger's initiatives, the Rhodesian situation has become vastly more complicated than it was during the détente period in 1974/75, when the reluctance of Mr Smith's Government to make meaningful concessions appeared to be the main problem. The external inter-

vention — especially the growing support from Communist powers for the militant nationalist movements — has been one major complicating factor, but bitter divisions between the nationalists have also served seriously to complicate the issue. Most serious has been the growing trend towards violence i.e. the armed struggle, as the means of resolving the conflict, rather than negotiations which have so often failed to produce meaningful results.

During this period South Africa has continued to play a role both as the main support of Mr Smith's Government and, at the same time, probably the strongest influence in persuading him to come to terms with the increasingly critical situation.

### **The Recent Settlement Proposals**

Dr Kissinger's initiatives, including his diplomatic shuttle in Africa, led to his meeting in Pretoria with Mr Smith in September 1976, at which a settlement plan was presented to the Rhodesian Government. While Dr Kissinger was able, with Mr Vorster's assistance, to ensure that Mr Smith's Government accepted this plan — even though there were elements in it which Mr Smith did not like — Dr Kissinger was not able to ensure that the plan would also be accepted by the nationalists and their protectors, the five front-line states. With Dr Kissinger coming to the end of his term of office and with his power fast declining after the American election and the defeat of President Ford in November of that year, it was not possible for the Kissinger settlement plan to be effectively pursued. When Mr Jimmy Carter took over the Presidency at the beginning of 1977, American policy towards Southern Africa, including Rhodesia, was re-assessed, and negotiations were then restarted between the United States and Britain, on the one hand, and the various parties to the Rhodesian conflict on the other, including South Africa and the five front-line states. Although the Kissinger plan was not completely thrown out, significant changes were made in the Anglo-American proposals which eventually emerged in detailed form in September 1977. While they have not been accepted *in toto* by any of the parties, these proposals still form the basis of the British and American efforts to achieve a settlement.

When Mr Smith concluded that the Anglo-American proposals were unacceptable, even as the basis for further serious negotiations, he proceeded with his plan for a so-called internal settlement, and his negotiations with Bishop Muzorewa and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, together with Chief Jeremiah Chirau, led to the agreement signed on 3 March, 1978. This agreement thus



became the third settlement plan to be evolved in a period of 18 months.

### **Comparison of Internal Agreement with Kissinger Proposals**

This internal constitutional agreement is said to be based in the first place on the settlement proposals of Dr Henry Kissinger, and it is true that in his important and moving address to the nation of 24 September, 1976, Mr Smith accepted publicly for the first time the principle of majority rule, meaning "black" majority rule. Furthermore, the broad structure of the Kissinger proposals is repeated in the present agreement. But there are in fact also significant differences. In some respects Mr Smith has gone further now; he has conceded more to the internal black leaders than he did in September 1976. But at the same time he has retained some safeguards, such as the continued existence of the present parliament during the transition period, which were not in the Kissinger plan. A very important aspect missing from the present agreement is that of external guarantees for the lifting of sanctions, ending of the war and international acceptance, with economic aid. But it is presumably hoped that, as the present plan for a majority rule government appears to follow fairly closely the plan proposed, with British approval, by Dr Kissinger in 1976, international acceptance, the lifting of sanctions, etc., will in due course follow.

In order to clarify present developments within Rhodesia, it may be useful to compare more closely the main elements of the Kissinger plan of September, 1976, with those of the present internally-agreed plan — without going into all the constitutional details. Then it will be possible to compare the internal agreement with the current Anglo-American proposals which were presented formally in September, 1977 (one year after those of Dr Kissinger), but which have not yet been accepted by any of the main parties to the Rhodesian conflict — although they appear to have support among the front-line states.

*In the first place*, both the Kissinger proposals and the internal agreement are based on the acceptance by Mr Smith's government of black majority rule. However, this acceptance is now more clearly spelt out than it was in September 1976, in order to satisfy the nationalist leaders. The agreement of 3 March states that the Constitution "will provide for majority rule on the basis of universal adult suffrage" (which in effect means "one man, one vote"). This was not spelt out in Mr Smith's acceptance of the Kissinger proposals, so that there was presumably still the possibility of negotiating a constitution based on a qualified franchise.

*Secondly*, the Kissinger proposals provided for a period of two years for the implementation of the settlement, whereas the present agreement provides for only ten months, and it even lays down the date for Independence Day, namely 31 December, 1978.

*Thirdly*, both plans provide for a form of transitional government, and it is here that the similarities are very striking, as far as the overall structure is concerned. (The present agreement, however, contains a much more detailed listing of responsibilities and functions than there was in the Kissinger proposals which frankly left a lot of important matters of detail to be settled, before the plan could have been implemented.) The transitional government in both cases is based on a two-tier system, with a fairly small Executive Council (called a "Council of State" in the Kissinger proposals) and a larger Ministerial Council. However — and this is a significant difference — the present agreement provides in effect for a third tier, namely the Rhodesian Parliament, continuing as presently constituted, while the Kissinger plan gave no role for Parliament — except perhaps to legislate itself out of existence. (This difference will be dealt with further below.)

The Executive Council in the present Transitional Government consists of Mr Smith and the three black leaders with whom he negotiated the agreement. The chairmanship rotates, and decisions are by consensus. Under the Kissinger plan the membership of the Council would have been half black and half white, with a white chairman (without a casting vote). While it was also intended that decisions would be by consensus, provision was made for decisions by two-thirds majority, if necessary.

The present Council is charged under the agreement with the responsibility for the expeditious carrying out of all functions and duties spelt out for the Transitional Government as a while, and it is especially concerned with the drafting of the new Constitution. The Kissinger Council, in addition to the major responsibility for a new constitution, would also have had legislative power, which is now retained by the existing Rhodesian Parliament.

With regard to the next tier of the Transitional Government, i.e. the Ministerial Council, the present agreement provides for equal black and white membership, with the chairmanship alternating between black and white ministers, while the Kissinger plan would have given a majority in the Council of Ministers to the Africans, with an African First Minister. To satisfy Mr Smith's concern about security, Dr Kissinger agreed that the Ministers of Defence and of Law and Order should

remain in white hands. This aspect has not yet become a serious issue between Mr Smith and the black leaders in the present case, because the agreement provides that each portfolio will be shared by a black and a white minister. But it has caused a problem for the three black leaders among themselves, as each of them would have liked to appoint his supporters to the security portfolios.

The Ministerial Council operates as a cabinet, with responsibility for initiating legislation, as well as for preparing legislation on the direction of the Executive Council. It can also make recommendations to the Executive Council. Its decisions are by majority vote, and they are subject to review by the Executive Council. Kissinger's Council of Ministers would have had similar executive authority, but it would also have had legislative authority delegated to it by the Council of State. Its decisions would have been by a two-thirds majority.

The most important difference, therefore, in the structure of the Transitional Government, when compared with that proposed in the Kissinger plan, is the continued existence of the Rhodesian Parliament which remains in the full control of Mr Smith and the Rhodesian Front. All legislation, including the new Constitution itself, must pass through Parliament. This provides Mr Smith with a very important fall-back position, if things should go wrong in the transition process during the next few months. Although the power of Mr Smith and his party is now severely limited at the executive level, as there is no way of proposing legislation to Parliament without the agreement of the Executive Council, it would presumably be possible, if a fundamental and unresolvable disagreement occurs, simply to replace the executive part of the Transitional Government (i.e. the Executive and Ministerial Councils) with the previous Cabinet system. In other words, the essential structure of government has not yet been dismantled, and it will not be, until the new Constitution comes into force. In contrast, under the Kissinger plan the interim government would have been a completely new authority, to which power would have been transferred and which, moreover, would have been brought into being by enabling legislation of the United Kingdom. That would have restored international legality, even before a new constitution was implemented, and it would have been impossible to go back to the previous situation — except, of course, by another UDI.

*In the fourth place*, when comparing the present agreement with the Kissinger plan, one must note that the most serious differences relate to the absence of any international involvement in the

present agreement. The two factors mainly responsible for bringing Rhodesia to its present critical situation — and which in fact forced Mr Smith's Government to accept the principle of majority rule — are the deteriorating economy and the war. If the Kissinger plan had been implemented, sanctions would have been lifted when the interim government was established, and a ceasefire would have been arranged. These were two essential elements in the Kissinger "package deal", as Mr Smith called it, and Mr Smith in fact maintained then that his acceptance of the proposals as a whole was conditional upon the implementation of both these undertakings. Nevertheless, Mr Smith has signed the present agreement committing the whites to the same fundamental political change as he did in September, 1976, but without any similar guarantees. The agreement is based only on a hope that it will lead eventually to international acceptance and a lifting of sanctions, and that the internal black leaders have sufficient authority over the guerillas — or a large enough number of them — to be able to bring about at least a significant de-escalation of the fighting. In other words, Mr Smith has accepted the terms of this agreement, without any party to it being able to give him guarantees about sanctions or the war.

*Fifthly*, another related element missing from the present agreement is the undertaking of substantial economic support from the international community and especially the establishment of the international Trust Fund promised in the Kissinger plan. This Fund would have provided development assistance to rebuild the economy and would also have provided guarantees for Rhodesians in respect of pensions and other existing economic rights.

*Sixthly*, an underlying difference in Mr Smith's approach to the two plans is that he regarded the Kissinger plan as having been imposed on him — even though he acknowledged some advantages in it — whereas the present plan has been, in his view, drawn up within Rhodesia, by Rhodesians. In his address of 24 September, 1976, accepting the Kissinger plan, he made it clear that he did not feel the settlement proposals represented the best solution for Rhodesia's problems. However, he said, the American and British Governments had decided what kind of solution they wished to see in Rhodesia, and they were determined to bring this about. He continued: "The alternative to acceptance of the proposals was explained to us in the clearest of terms, which left no room for misunderstanding." However, even though the present agreement was arrived at internally between black and white leaders, without the element of obvious external imposition, it could be argued that it is nevertheless the circumstances of the

situation — which include external pressures — that have forced Mr Smith into this agreement which provides for the transfer of power to a black majority government.

### **Comparison with Anglo-American Proposals**

One can now turn to a brief examination of the Anglo-American proposals, negotiated during 1977, after the Carter Administration came into office, and published in September. Whereas the Kissinger proposals were accepted by Mr Smith, but not by the nationalist leaders, the present Anglo-American proposals have not been accepted by either Mr Smith or the Patriotic Front leaders or the internally-based nationalist leaders. They do, however, have wide international support in the West and from the African front-line states (which presumably means also a large number of other African states).

The Anglo-American proposals are much more detailed than either the Kissinger plan or the present settlement agreement, and they include a full outline of a proposed constitution. It is intended that the principles of this constitution should be accepted beforehand and not be worked out (except in regard to the details of drafting) by the Transitional Government. In this respect, the present internal agreement comes closer to the Anglo-American proposals, than did the Kissinger plan, in that it also sets out the main provisions (although in less detail) to be included in an independence constitution to be drafted by the Executive Council. All three constitutional plans start from the same basis, namely the acceptance of majority rule, although the Anglo-American proposals are the most explicit when they say that this will be "on the basis of one man, one vote and one woman, one vote". Moreover, they do not allow for any seats to be reserved for whites, which is the case in the internal agreement where provision is made for 28 white seats out of 100.

The Anglo-American proposals provide that the constitution will include a justiciable Bill of Rights, and these rights are listed. The internal agreement provides for the inclusion of a "Declaration" of Rights, which will also be justiciable, but the details are not spelt out.

The Anglo-American proposals provide for a transitional administration, which would exercise power for a period of not more than six months, but the structure and role of this administration would be very different from the Kissinger and internal plans. Briefly, the *transitional administration* would be organised as follows:

A Resident Commissioner would be appointed by the British

Government, and his role would be to administer the country, organise elections and take command of the armed forces. The Resident Commissioner would thus be the centre of power in the transition period, and he would be responsible only to the British Government.

A Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General would be appointed to work with the Resident Commissioner and observe his administration, as well as the organization and conduct of elections.

In addition, a UN Zimbabwe Force would be established, and its role would be to supervise the cease-fire, support the Resident Commissioner and liaise with both the Rhodesian forces and the liberation armies. This central role of the United Nations in the Anglo-American proposals would be based on the authority of the Security Council which would be required to approve the whole plan, and this UN element is, of course, not present in the other settlement plans.

The existing police forces, under a Police Commissioner appointed by the Resident Commissioner, would continue to maintain law and order, but a new Zimbabwe National Army would be established during the transitional period, to replace all existing armed forces. The indication that the new army would be based on the liberation movements, with acceptable parts of the Rhodesian army included, was one of the main reasons for rejection of these proposals by the Rhodesian Government. The present internal agreement, however, also mentions this question (as it is one of the concerns of the internal nationalist leaders), but in vaguer terms. The agreement states that the Transitional Government will deal with the "composition of the future military forces, including those members of the nationalist forces who wish to take up a military career, and the rehabilitation of others". (This matter was apparently not dealt with in the Kissinger plan, at least as it was announced by Mr Smith in September, 1976).

As with the Kissinger plan, the lifting of sanctions and the cease-fire would come into effect as soon as power was transferred to the transitional administration. Provision is also made for a Zimbabwe Development Fund which appears to be very similar to the one projected in the Kissinger plan. (These elements are entirely missing from the internal agreement, as already mentioned above.)

Finally, the Anglo-American proposals provide (as did the Kissinger plan) for the enactment of the Constitution and all other legislation to be undertaken by the British Parliament. There is no reference to the Rhodesian Parliament, which

would presumably disappear, or to any legislation by it. (In this regard even the wording of the Anglo-American proposals is presumably more offensive to the Rhodesian Government, because reference is made several times to "the illegal regime" and "the surrender of power" by that regime.)

### **International Outlook for Zimbabwe**

The above attempt to analyse the internal agreement — mainly insofar as it relates to the process for the transfer of power — by comparing it with the Western-backed plans, has perhaps served to indicate some of the problems which the Transitional Government will face in implementing the agreement. In particular, there is the obvious absence of external support, especially from the West, which would enable sanctions to be lifted and capital to be infused to rebuild the economy and create growth. Related to this gap in the agreement is the absence of any assurance that it will bring about an end to the war, because of the opposition of the Patriotic Front leaders who are backed by the front-line African states. The internal leaders — Bishop Muzorewa and Mr Sithole — claim that they will be able to effect a ceasefire. But their influence and authority over the guerillas still has to be proven, and much will depend on their ability to fulfil their claims. For, if there is no ceasefire, or at least a very marked de-escalation of the fighting, it will be impossible to stage a fair and credible election which would stand a chance of being recognised as such inside or outside.

The fact is that the Rhodesian issue is an international one, and an internal agreement, no matter what its merits as such — and there certainly are great merits in what has been achieved so far — is only part of what is required to resolve the issue. The international interest and involvement, whether it be from Britain, from all the neighbouring states, from the Communist powers, from the United Nations or from wherever, cannot simply be wished away, because this all has a very real effect on the prospects for the future independent Zimbabwe.

On the other hand, it needs to be recognised that no externally designed settlement, no matter how much international support it has, can be imposed on the country, with any hope of success, if it is not acceptable to the people themselves within the country.

Because of the general international acceptance (including by South Africa) of a continued British legal responsibility, until there is international recognition of independence, much will depend on the British approach, closely linked as it is to that of the United States. While still advocating the acceptance of the Anglo-American proposals, the British Government has so far been

somewhat ambiguous in its reaction to the internal agreement. The agreement was not fully accepted, of course, but neither was it rejected, and shortly after it was signed, Dr David Owen commented on the position of the Patriotic Front, as follows: "The test of sincerity, as far as the PF is concerned, is whether they will return to Salisbury if a fair offer is made . . . If they are fighting for power without the ballot box, they will get no support from me."

The initial American reaction was similar. President Carter said, for instance, on 9 March: "I would doubt that we could have a permanent settlement without including the right for all the nationalist leaders to participate. . . . We've not rejected the individual component parts of the so-called internal settlement plan. To the extent that they are consistent with the overall Anglo-American plan provisions, they are a step in the right direction. But I think that it must be that any permanent settlement would include the right of all the interested nationalist leaders to seek the leadership of Rhodesia."

More recently, however, some divergence has appeared, and the Americans seem to be taking a stronger line against the internal agreement. This emerged from reported statements by President Carter in Nigeria, and from statements by Ambassador Andrew Young. For instance, Ambassador Young is reported to have stated in a letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, referring to the Patriotic Front guerillas: "They know that history is on their side and that it's not a question of whether they ultimately win, but how long it will take." He added that "any settlement which does not include the forces that are doing the fighting simply paves the way for a repeat of the Angola experience". This is not in fact contrary to the British position in essentials, but it is expressed in stronger terms and leans more towards the Patriotic Front.

Perhaps the Americans are disinclined to risk a split among the African front-line states and even in the Patriotic Front, whereas Britain might be willing to accept a settlement which includes Mr Nkomo but not Mr Mugabe and the militants of his army. It must be said here, by the way, that in any case it will be difficult to implement the internal agreement successfully without Mr Nkomo or at least a leader from the ZAPU section, who has influence among the Matabele.

A compromise has been suggested in the form of a conference in which it is hoped all parties will be represented. However, the chances of such a conference taking place cannot be very great, and, even if it meets, can one entertain any high hopes of an agreement being reached between the internal leaders and the Patriotic Front?



The present Rhodesian situation, with opposing positions being taken, within and outside the country, on both the internal agreement and the Anglo-American proposals, constitutes a real dilemma for the West (particularly the United Kingdom and the United States), because of the implications for them of increased conflict in Southern Africa. If they gave support to the internal agreement, as being the best available option for a settlement, there is a strong chance that the fighting would continue, with increased assistance from the Soviet Union and Cuba. The Western countries would thus find themselves "on the wrong side", in their view, with the front-line states on the other side. The British Foreign Minister, Dr Owen, has implied that this would amount to espousing "the lost cause of white minority rule" which would be "the easiest way to lose the battle of ideology (with the Russians) which continues in spite of détente".

On the other hand, the Western countries cannot deny the merits, even if inadequate, of the internal agreement, and they cannot fully back the Patriotic Front and its armed struggle. There is no way, for instance, that the British and the Americans could compete with the Soviet Union by lending military support to the Patriotic Front, any more than they could do this for the internal leaders.

The Soviet Union is making the most of this difficult position, and Moscow Radio has even suggested that the internal settlement, creating "a serious threat to the peace", could be made an excuse for the introduction of Cuban forces and greater Soviet military support. Moscow Radio has said: "The leaders of the Patriotic Front have stated that they will step up their armed struggle against the illegal Smith regime and its puppets, and will struggle to a victorious conclusion." If the Patriotic Front's military activities increase, as predicted by Moscow, then there is a likelihood of further Rhodesian strikes on guerilla bases in Zambia and Mozambique. This will in turn increase the likelihood of the Patriotic Front asking for more Cuban and Russian support, which both these countries seem prepared to give. And so the military escalation will continue, with the West's hands more or less tied and all the advantages going to the Soviet Union and Cuba locally and in the wider international context.

The Western states also have domestic problems which constrain them from taking a clear-cut position. Influential opinion is clearly divided, especially in Britain, but also in the United States, on the merits of the internal agreement, and the respective governments have limited political room in which to manoeuvre. This is highly unfortunate, to put it mildly, because while the West is unable to act decisively — in its own interests or those of the

people in the region itself — the Communist powers have no such constraints, and they can continue to gain advantage from the opportunities afforded them by conflict and potential chaos. One can understand, therefore, the importance for the West of a negotiated settlement which has not only a real chance of working effectively within Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, but also of gaining the external support which will remove the opportunity for further exploitation by the Communist powers. But, in spite of all their efforts, they do not seem to know how to achieve this.

However, the outlook is not necessarily as bleak as would appear from this brief look at the dilemma for the West, because the prospects of an internationally accepted settlement do not depend only on the present attitudes of Britain and the United States. In spite of their indecisiveness now, and the apparent opposition of the front-line states, there are indications of positive interest in the internal agreement among other African states and elsewhere. There are some grounds for believing, as the internal leaders apparently do, that support and even recognition will be forthcoming from within Africa, not immediately, but in due course — *provided that* the agreement is implemented speedily, effectively and fairly within Zimbabwe. Bishop Muzorewa and Mr Sithole, with long records as nationalist leaders, have many friends in Africa and cannot simply be written off as puppets. But they must, of course, be seen now to be effectively exercising power and achieving meaningful results.

This will require obviously the early removal of all remaining discriminatory measures; it will require other clear evidence that power is really being transferred; and it will require evidence that guerillas are heeding the call to return.

If the agreement thus achieves credibility internally, and if wide domestic support is demonstrated, international acceptance will follow, perhaps first within Africa itself, rather than in the West. If this happens, it will be a major breakthrough for the cause of negotiating the settlement of conflicts, on the basis of realistic compromise. It will serve to counter the trend in Southern Africa towards seeking solutions by force and violence, a trend encouraged for too long both by those who wish to maintain the existing order and by those who seek to overthrow it. Success for the settlement in Zimbabwe will thus raise hopes also for the resolution of other conflicts in the region.

## **POLITICAL GROUPINGS IN NAMIBIA — THEIR ROLE AND CHANCES**

**G.K.H. Tötemeyer**

The impression prevails that the South African Government is considering an internal solution for Namibia, with all the dangers and problems inherent in such a plan. Such a move might be supported by some political parties and groupings in Namibia. While South Africa would, in terms of this scenario, hope and perhaps rely on the West not deploring an internal solution although not approving it.

Any observer concerned with the socio-political and socio-economic development process in Namibia is well aware of the dangers inherent of such an internal solution without international support and without the participation of Swapo. Increased international pressure on South Africa, the possibility of mandatory economic sanctions, increased South African military commitments on the northern border and internal tension in the Territory could probably result from such an action. South Africa is thus facing an extremely difficult decision.

At the same time South Africa has a compelling interest in solving the Namibian issue as soon as possible. The acceptance of the latest proposals of the five Western powers has given ample proof of South Africa's honest desire to find an amicable settlement. The Western proposals clearly reflect an effort to comply, as far as possible, with the demands of both Swapo and South Africa, as well as with the other interested political and social forces in Namibia. I think, in all honesty, that the bona fides of the Western powers and South Africa is above doubt.

What then are the remaining obstacles? According to Swapo there are three remaining issues: Walvis Bay, the position and status of the UNO representative during the transition period, and the withdrawal of the South African military forces.

It is obvious that in the latest Western proposals the issue of the Walvis Bay enclave has not been mentioned. One reason could be that Resolution 385 of the Security Council which formed the basis of the negotiations between South Africa, the Western powers and Namibian political and social forces, does not mention Walvis Bay. This resolution refers to the termination of South Africa's occupation of the Territory, free elections under United Nations' supervision and control, the release of political prisoners and that South Africa must not use the Territory as a military base for attacks on neighbouring states.

The position of Walvis Bay was mentioned as an additional issue

by Swapo at a later stage. Although Walvis Bay was not part of Resolution 385, it remains a problem and a matter for further consideration. South Africa has not closed the door for further negotiations but has indicated that these should not take place before independence. I am of the opinion that the Walvis Bay problem will sort itself out after independence and does not deserve the importance given to it by Swapo, except in so far as Swapo has given certain undertakings to those powers who supply Swapo with logistic, material and military aid.

One can accept that the real issue at stake is the withdrawal of the South African military forces from Namibia, or at least from the northern borders. It appears that this issue, in all probability, is the one least likely to be resolved to the satisfaction of all concerned. Swapo's demand that these forces should be reduced to 1 500 and confirmed to barracks at Karasburg, prior to the election is unacceptable to South Africa and many political groupings in Namibia.

If South Africa would agree to this proposal, it would lead to a large exodus of Whites and in all probability to a situation of total instability in the country. It can also be accepted that such a step will have consequences for the South African Government and especially the ruling National Party within South Africa.

The proposal to move a limited number of troops (1 500) to a base at Karasburg in the far southern part of Namibia in effect means that South Africa will no longer have military supervision over the Territory. For all strategical purposes, Karasburg is far outside the present Operational Area. Swapo's strategy seems to be to create a vacuum between Karasburg and the northern borders to be in a position to deploy its own military forces without any competition. In that case one must ask the question whether Swapo intends to use its military forces solely to secure its own political power and not those of others too.

Swapo's demands for the complete withdrawal of South African military forces is backed by the resolution of the UN General Assembly of 3 May. This resolution, adopted by 119 votes to nil with 21 members abstaining, called for South Africa's unconditional withdrawal from Namibia and recommended economic sanctions to back up that demand. No mention at all was made of the Western proposals for a settlement in Namibia. The probability of an internationally acceptable and peaceful solution on the lines of the Western proposals has therefore been weakened.

What are the chances for a peaceful future in Namibia? To evaluate this question one has to identify the present political forces active in Namibia and their respective policies.

Currently there are four distinct political groups, from right to

left, in Namibia. There is the right wing *reactionary* group consisting mainly of Aktur, composed by the National Party of the Territory and the Action Group of Percy Niehaus, who brought a group of supporters from the old United Party, probably most of them "Bloedsappe". The reactionary group also embraces the Herstigte Nasionale Party under the leadership of Mr Sarel Becker. The general attitude of these groups is characterised by opposition to the new status quo. They oppose radical changes in the existing social, economic and political structure. They advocate a return to a status quo ante. This group further proposes a strong decentralised ethnic orientated governmental system which leaves ample opportunity for the protection of white political rights in a so called white area. Each ethnic group must get the opportunity to administrate and govern itself within its own geographical area as stipulated by the Odendaal Commission in 1964. The so called white area must be kept intact which means that about half the country remains in the possession of ten percent of the population. Only matters of real common concern like defence and foreign affairs should be dealt with in an overarching central government. An election on the basis of one man one vote for the whole country and therefore a common voters role is opposed. Instead, ethnic elections within the homelands are proposed. The stance of this group on the Western initiative has always been very critical. Swapo and its programme is rejected in toto and the closest co-operation possible with South Africa is demanded.

It is difficult to judge the actual support of Aktur and the HNP. If Swapo would decide to take part in the forthcoming elections, which is unlikely, this reactionary group could attract as much as five to eight percent of the vote. Without Swapo's participation the percentage could be as high as ten percent, which would consist mainly of white support. It can be safely stated that this group enjoys the majority support of the whites.

The second group I will refer to as the *conservative* group which comprises mainly the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, consisting of ethnic orientated political parties such as the South West African Peoples Democratic United Front, a Damara Party under the leadership of E.H.L. Christy, the Rehoboth Bastervereniging with Dr Ben Africa as its leader, an Herero Organisation, the National Unity Democratic Organisation, whose leader Chief Clemens Kapuuo, has recently been murdered, the National Democratic Party with Rev. L. Ndjoba as its chairman — thus an Ovambo organisation —, the white Republican Party of Dirk Mudge, the Labour Party of the Coloureds under the leadership of A.J.F. Kloppers, and the Democratic Turnhalle Party, most

recently formed by the Nama spokesman D. Luipert, while Kavangos, Tswanas, Caprivians and the Bushmen are represented in the DTA by individual spokesmen.

This group also objects to radical changes in the social, economic and political structure, but is not opposed to changes *per se* as long as the changes occur gradually and do not affect the basic principles such as the protection and maintenance of ethnicity, the latter need not necessarily be on a homeland basis. Point 2(c) in its programme says clearly: "The Alliance strives for a political system which makes it possible for the various individuals, language and population groups to maintain themselves in the cultural and material spheres and which eliminates domination by any group".

The DTA believes in a free capitalistic system with equal opportunities for all. Economic interdependence with South Africa should prevail. The DTA has proposed a three tier system with much emphasis on the second, the ethnic tier, although it is flexible in its approach on the transfer of certain functions such as economic affairs from the second to the first, the central, tier. The DTA is attacked by its opponents for perpetuating the apartheid system in a camouflaged way and for proposing a political and administrative system which is not acceptable for the majority of the blacks. If Swapo participates in an election the tentative support for the DTA could be anything between twenty to thirty percent. It will be as much as forty percent if Swapo refuses to take part in an election.

The third group can be identified as a *liberal* group which consists mainly of the Namibia National Front, with components such as the South West African National Union under the leadership of Gerson Vei, the National Independence Party with Charly Hartung as its leader, the Federal Party with Brian O'Linn as chairman, the Damara Tribal Council with Justus Garoëb as its leader and the Mbanderu tribe. This group is in favour of progressive but evolutionary changes. It strongly emphasises the promotion of the free development of the individual, the Namibian, and not of ethnicity. This group opposes the favouring of any social, political or economic group. The NNF deplors the continued control of Namibia by South Africa and rejects in toto the regionalisation of the Territory into tribal homelands in whatever form it may occur. The NNF foresees a Namibian State with its *national unity and territorial integrity secured on the basis of a Charter of Fundamental Human Rights*. It will relentlessly fight for the establishment and maintenance of a sovereign, independent, democratic state of Namibia, and for the retention of Walvis Bay as part and parcel of Namibia. The NNF proposes a unicameral parliament, provincial councils and non-racial municipal

councils.

In its economic principles the NNF views the country as a whole, favours the free exercise of private economic initiative subject to measures against unhealthy monopolistic conditions and other forms of abuse which would militate against the national good and public interest. According to its programme there shall be publicly as well as privately owned industries. Public income from all natural resources will be equally allocated for the benefit of all the people of Namibia and farmers should be given the opportunity to form co-operatives. Expropriation is possible but not without reasonable compensation and only when in public interest. The NNF proposes a Namibian Development Bank and stresses the importance of a centralisation process with the state as the foremost entrepreneur.

On the whole the NNF is far more interested in the ends of production than the means employed. On this point especially and on the role of the individual in the political, social and economic dispensation it differs fundamentally from the stand taken by Swapo. The NNF, however, agrees with Swapo that a totally new order should come about and not only cosmetic changes. The programme of the NNF can in its contents and intentions be characterised as a form of social liberalism. It subscribes only partly to the principle of *laissez faire* and is open to certain tenets of socialism.

It is very difficult to forecast the percentage support for the NNF in the forthcoming elections. If Swapo participates the NNF could attract as much as twenty percent support but without Swapo's participation it could be as much as forty percent plus.

This brings us to the last group, the *social revolutionary* group in which Swapo is mainly represented. Swapo considers itself as a movement in protest against the existing economic, social and political order in Namibia which is seen as a replica of the South African order. This must be totally discarded with and substituted by a new order. Swapo makes the imputation that there is exploitation of the Black mass by a privileged White group. The social, economic and political order which permits such exploitation is therefore totally rejected.

Swapo described the proposals made by the DTA and AKTUR as neo-colonialistic and not guaranteeing a fair social order which, *inter alia*, will bring about a more balanced redistribution of wealth and also a non-racial and classless society.

Swapo rejects a capitalistic free market economy in favour of state control and planned collectivism, that is to say, the public or collective possession and control of all means of production on a co-operative basis. These aims must be achieved in conjunction

with the masses, which must be educated or re-educated and be prepared to associate themselves with the propagated objectives (subjective consciousness), and to tie this to the current situation (objective experience) and then, together with the leadership, to consummate the process of transformation, if necessary, on a revolutionary basis.

Swapo's political programme identified the tasks before Swapo at present and in the immediate future as follows:

- (a) "The liberation and winning of independence for the people of Namibia, by all possible means, and the establishment of a democratic people's Government and
- (b) the realisation of a genuine and total independence of Namibia in the spheres of politics, economy, defence, social and cultural affairs.

To these ends, Swapo has resolved:

- (a) to persistently mobilise and organise the broad masses of the Namibian people so that they can actively participate in the national liberation struggle.
- (b) To mould and heighten, in the thick of the national liberation struggle, the bond of national and political consciousness amongst the Namibian people.
- (c) To combat all manifestations and tendencies of tribalism, regionalism, ethnic orientation and racial discrimination.
- (d) To unite all Namibian people, particularly the working class, the peasantry and progressive intellectuals into a vanguard party capable of safe-guarding national independence and of building a classless, non-exploitative society based on the ideals and principles of scientific socialism".

According to the programme "Swapo holds high the banner of international anti-imperialist solidarity . . . Swapo holds the conviction that armed resistance to the South African occupation in Namibia, is the only viable and effective means left to achieve genuine liberation in the Territory . . . to transform the armed struggle in Namibia into a truly people's war".

In its economic proposals Swapo associates itself with the following thoughts:

1. To wage the struggle towards the abolition of all forms of exploitation of man by man and the destructive spirit of individualism and aggrandisement of wealth and power by individuals, groups or classes.
2. To ensure that all the major means of production and



exchange of the country are ownership of the people.

3. To strive for the creation of an integrated, national economy in which there is a proper balance between agricultural and industrial development along the following lines:
  - (a) the establishment of processing industry;
  - (b) a comprehensive agrarian reform aimed at giving land to the tillers;
  - (c) the establishment of peasants' or farmers' co-operatives or collectives;
  - (d) the establishment of state-owned ranching and crop farms, aimed at making Namibia an agriculturally self-sufficient nation, and
  - (e) the cultivation of a spirit of self-reliance among our people."

On several issues one can notice a congruity between the programme of the NNF and Swapo but there are also fundamental differences. While Swapo stresses the importance of collectivism and the classless society, and at the same time emphasises the means for fulfilling its ideals, the NNF accentuates the importance of individualism, is not against the existence of classes in a society as long as these are not based on race or colour. The NNF, in contrast, puts rather more emphasis on the ends than the means while striving for its ideals. The NNF has associated itself with peaceful development and disagrees with Swapo's revolutionary strategy.

Again I must admit that it is very difficult to determine the exact support of any of the political parties and groupings. My guess is that Swapo can presently command a support of anything between 42 and 52 percent.

Why then, one is often asked, is Swapo not prepared to take part in an election? There are several reasons. To mention a few: The Swapo leadership is not altogether sure whether more than fifty percent of the voters will actually vote for Swapo in an election. Secondly, Swapo would like to take over the political regime in Namibia as the undisputed and sole representative political organisation as did Machel in Mozambique and Neto in Angola. Thirdly, if Swapo would be prepared to take part in a democratically fought election as one among many other political parties and groupings, this could harm its image and claim of being the only and authentic political representative of the Namibian people. Swapo is recognised as such by the UNO and the OAU. In other words, for Swapo its participation in a free and democratic election could mean a loss of face and stature in international politics, while at the same time it runs the risk of not being voted in as the governing party. Swapo's programme clearly spells out

what kind of struggle it has decided on. I quote: "Swapo holds the conviction that armed resistance to the South African occupation in our country is the only viable and effective means left for us to achieve genuine liberation in Namibia . . . We see war for what it really is — an extension of politics by other means. It is the continuation of political relations in the form of violence . . . We consider our own armed struggle as just and, therefore, deserving support from all the justice and peace loving peoples".

In its revolutionary approach with its Marxist contents, Swapo is not backed by the very influential black churches in Namibia. This could in the end have tremendous influence on the overall support for Swapo. One has to bear in mind that the most important of all the black churches in Namibia, the United Evangelical Lutheran Churches of Namibia, is supported by 66 percent of the total black population. The majority of Swapo members in and outside the country belong to this church.

Most recently, the leaders of this church, in a letter to this congregations, warned against the atheistic contents and anti-Christian attitude of Marxism because it clashes with the Christian Gospel in the same way as apartheid. According to the church spokesmen separate development can be considered as the matrix of Marxism. To quote Dr L. de Vries and Bishop L. Auala: "If Marxism and capitalism were rejected as mock religions, apartheid was rejected in the same breath as a sin against the humanity being an act of God".

By taking a stand against Marxism, the church leaders emphasised, it should not be inferred that a confrontation with the liberation movements must be unleashed. What the Lutheran churches are asking for is a new road based on the Bible, creating the possibility of finding a peaceful solution. Consequently South Africa, Swapo and all other political groups are asked to lay down their arms and to end bloodshed. The church leaders concluded that if it were possible to achieve the liberation of Namibia in a peaceful manner, they would be the first to encourage their members to accept it. It therefore came as no surprise when the church leaders, this time with the support of the Anglicans and the Roman Catholics, urged Namibians to accept the latest proposals of the five Western powers. In a joint statement the three churches described the proposals as a basis upon which can be founded the long-awaited united and free country of Namibia.

Swapo cannot afford to ignore the standpoints taken by the black churches and is very much aware of this.

Finally, can a peaceful Namibia still come into being? It can, but it is going to be a difficult task. It involves a delicate process of accommodating different ideologies and the sharing of power.

Any objective observer of the Namibian situation knows that an internal solution without the participation of all political forces in Namibia, including Swapo, will be an awesome task. On one objective the majority of Namibians, however, agree *viz.* that it must be a new, non-racial Namibia.

To accomplish peace in Namibia will not depend on the willingness of the Blacks only but to a large extent also of the Whites to share in a common future and in a new, binding nationalism, one which cannot be based on racial prejudices and the safeguarding of economic and political privileges of one group only. A new order has to come about which will differ fundamentally from the old one — a new order in which the total population is given its rightful opportunity and responsibility to share in the social, economic and political development process and future of Namibia on an equal basis. Only then can a peaceful future be realised in Namibia. This possibility still prevails but once again time has become a deciding factor.

## **SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD : WHICH WAY NOW?**

**Robert Schrire**

### **The International Environment**

South Africa is today at the crossroads and the time for making critical choices has arrived. International relations have become of increasing importance and the future of the country will be determined by the interplay between domestic and international factors. The aim of this article is to explore the nature of South Africa's international environment, so as to highlight the choices facing the country.

The world has changed dramatically during the last two decades and an important characteristic of the contemporary international system is the interdependence of states. It is no longer a realistic option for states to attempt to disengage themselves from international relations and all states, to a greater or lesser degree, are influenced by events that take place outside their boundaries. Great inequality in power between states has forced the minor states to depend upon the support, whether overt or a by-product of the linkage of issues, of the major powers for their survival. The security of the lesser pro-Western states is not secured by reliance upon Soviet goodwill or restraint, but by either explicit United States commitments to their security and survival or the Soviet fear of United States counter-measures.

Interdependence is also a reality in the economic sphere and very few states today are economically self-sufficient. The Western industrial states are dependent upon other states for a wide variety of basic commodities including petroleum, chrome and uranium. South Africa, although more favourably placed is nonetheless dependent on important products such as petroleum for its continued prosperity and growth.

Also of importance in the contemporary world are the trade flows in manufacturing products, and capital movements. Many states are dependent upon imported manufactured goods for their domestic consumption. The advanced states, while capable of producing a wide range of consumer and capital goods, benefit greatly from international trade which permits economic specialization and increases the standard of living by permitting the operation of the principle of comparative advantage. Capital flows benefit both the provider and the recipient. The former benefit from returns that are higher than could be obtained domestically, while the latter benefit from the increased investment, higher economic growth and the resultant technological transfers that accompany capital flows.

This growing importance of economics has contributed towards the politicization of economic relations that were formerly not of political importance. International trade and foreign investment are today politicized and are being influenced to an increasing extent not by profitability or expectations of profitability, the traditional criteria, but by their political implications.

What are the implications of the new international relations for South Africa? Firstly, it is clear that international relations have assumed vital importance in a wide range of economic and political areas. This means that in practice, no state or very few states can attempt to go it alone, and an accommodation that at a minimum produces normal economic relations is of the greatest importance. In the case of South Africa, it is clearly the Western states that should be accommodated to the extent possible. In practice this means that there is an urgent need to bring about the domestic reforms that are required if even minimum Western support is to be forthcoming. It is simply not realistic to adopt legalistic attitudes and demand a return to the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. For better or worse, the world has changed and South Africa must accept these changes and adapt.

Sound policy-making requires an accurate perception of the environment and it is therefore important for South Africa to understand the nature of the international political system and what the outside world wants. The first factor to keep in mind is that there is no unified outside world making demands upon

South Africa. There are certain states or groupings of states that are unalterably opposed both to the political and economic foundations of South Africa. These states include the Marxist bloc, as well as many of the more radical members of the so-called Third World. It must be accepted that there is nothing that white South African policy makers can do that would placate this group. While Marxist efforts to destabilize the Southern African situation should not be minimized, they should not be exaggerated. It is counter-productive to perceive the Russian leadership as a superbly organized and omniscient team. The Soviets can and have made important foreign policy errors and perspective is therefore needed in evaluating their goals and tactics.

The second group of states is more important because it is amongst them that South Africa has found its traditional allies and economic partners. These predominantly Western states would like to support South Africa but cannot do so openly as long as South Africa's domestic order is based upon race. It is important to note that the Western states do not have a coherent and well worked out blueprint for change in South Africa, and it is simply untrue to claim that they are demanding one-man-one-vote in a unified political structure. The understanding of sophisticated European and American policy-makers towards South Africa is far more sophisticated and flexible than their public rhetoric would indicate. What they are demanding from us is an indication of change and new policy initiatives that could lead to a more just society. Indeed they would accept a wide range of different political and institutional structures, and this should be borne in mind by South African policy-makers and members of the interested public. This flexibility of Western views and perceptions can be illustrated by a brief analysis of United States policy and perceptions. It is important to understand the United States position, because the United States is the leader of the Western alliance and many European states follow American initiatives. In addition, the United States has more leverage over South Africa than many European states because it is less interdependent with South Africa than for example, Great Britain.

### **American Perceptions of South Africa**

Policy-makers in foreign as well as domestic affairs behave on the basis of their perceptions of the situation rather than upon the reality itself and it is therefore important to understand American perceptions of South African affairs. American policy-makers do not share a common perceptual framework, and it may be useful to distinguish between two different and partly com-

peting paradigms, which we will label model one and model two.

Model one is based upon the assumption that United States/Soviet relations are no longer the dominant issue in international politics, but are only one of a large number of high priority issues which include international development, problems of interdependence, and ecological and resource problems. If the Soviet Union has failed to recognize the importance of these changes and stubbornly continues to play the old and partly dated game of cold war politics, the United States should not be forced into responding to every misguided Soviet initiative. In the East/West conflict, both the United States and the Soviet Union have certain advantages. The major Soviet advantage is essentially related to its flexibility in the use of military power, and this flexibility is largely the result of the non-democratic political structure of the Soviet policy, which results in a leadership that is not accountable to an electorate and therefore has considerable leeway of action. In terms of African policy the Soviets have the additional advantage of being able to use Cuban forces to intervene directly in African affairs and thereby avoid the stigma that would result from direct Soviet intervention.

The United States cannot match these advantages, but it has its own strong points which in the longer run may be of more decisive importance. First of all there is the vitality of America's political ideals and values, and it is within this context that the human rights policy should be seen. It is in essence an attempt to sell America's strongest ideological point, which is her basic values, to the outside world. Of perhaps greater importance is the tremendous economic and technological advantage enjoyed by the United States. The United States economy, which is capital intensive and becoming more dependent upon trade, is an irreplaceable market for African products and an unrivalled source of capital and investment. The Soviets cannot duplicate this economic importance, and therefore in a situation of normal relations this American advantage would soon become apparent as African states oriented first their economies and then their political structures towards the United States. United States policy should therefore aim at transferring political competition away from the military area, where the United States has important disadvantages, to the economic and technological, where the United States has a decisive advantage. In general those policymakers who perceive the situation in this way tend to be cautiously optimistic about the course of great power competition.

Many of these policy-makers view South Africa as a fundamentally unjust society whose political system will be replaced by black rule. Although white domination is at present secure, these

changes may take place within five to fifteen years. The existence of white rule has a negative effect, because it provides the Soviets with an opportunity to intervene in Africa. Indeed white rule in South Africa is the best thing the Soviets have going for them.

The policy implications that flow from model one are as follows:

- (1) The United States should attempt to steer the inevitable process of change in Southern Africa in a direction that is favourable to United States interests, and
- (2) The United States must prevent the Soviets from gaining from this inevitable change. Under no circumstances should the United States either overtly or clandestinely be seen to back losers, and the United States should not react automatically to every Soviet move.

Proponents of a competing perspective, which we will label *model two*, tend to take a more traditional view of international politics. They regard the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union as the pre-eminent problem in international politics. The fundamental task of the United States is therefore to counteract Soviet initiatives and attempts to exploit new opportunities for expansion.

Accordingly, Soviet intervention in Africa must be viewed in a very serious light because the Soviets are gaining important advantages by increasing their influence in a large number of states. This influence produces not only additional votes at the United Nations and other international forums, but also enables the Soviets to make important strategic gains in the Horn of Africa and perhaps later in Southern Africa. Finally, the Soviet success undermines United States' credibility and contributes to the decline in American prestige. This could contribute to the unwillingness of many states to identify with United States political and economic aspirations. In other words Soviet success in Africa has implications not only in Africa but throughout the world.

A comparison between model one and model two brings out several important differences. Those who believe in model one are likely to place a higher emphasis on South Africa and Southern Africa as an issue of importance in its own right, than those who believe in model two. The latter would tend to see South Africa as of lesser concern to the United States except in terms of its cold war implications. In addition, whereas model one tends to view Soviet policy in Africa as either a fundamental error or else merely as producing short run victories that will have limited longer term policy benefits for the Soviets, advocates of model two argue that Soviet intervention in Africa must be viewed in a more serious light. They reason that, while it may be true that the

Soviets are incurring large financial and military costs in areas where they have no legitimate interests, the short-term is of great importance and one cannot rely upon the hope that they will overcommit themselves and will ultimately be thrown out of Africa. Policy must be based upon shorter term considerations, rather than upon any speculative future.

From the perspective of South Africa an important difference between advocates of model one and model two is that the former tend to support a more aggressive American policy toward South Africa irrespective of its consequences for the larger international position, whereas the latter argue that any action against South Africa must be viewed very carefully in terms of its international implications.

Finally, those who believe in model one, believe that there is no inconsistency or incompatibility between the safeguarding of American interests and the extension of human rights and liberal values throughout the globe. Model two advocates believe that there is in fact no necessary relationship between the two and that human rights may frequently be counter-productive in terms of the preservation of America's traditional interests.

At present there is an important debate taking place within the Carter Administration between competing advocates of model one and model two. Until recently, those who believed in model one were the dominant influence on the formulation of American foreign policy. It would appear, however, that the pendulum is swinging in the direction of model two. This will have important implications for South Africa, because it means that the United States will begin to oppose Soviet initiatives with greater vigour. In addition, South Africa may now have more breathing space in which to formulate an effective response to what appears to be long term and fundamental changes in international politics. So it is important for South Africa to focus not only upon United States' weaknesses and errors, but also upon the likely changes and trends in American foreign policy.

It is obviously too early at this stage to attempt an objective evaluation of United States African policy, but it is perhaps indisputable that despite good intentions, American policy makers have made several important errors. President Carter's own personal predispositions and values have had several unfortunate consequences for his foreign policy. First of all, his unique emphasis on human rights and exaggeration of the importance of Africa, have meant that many of America's more important national priorities have tended to be neglected. As a result far too many Africanists have obtained high positions in the United States Administration, and this has reinforced this emphasis on African



affairs. Tony Lake of policy planning, for example, is an Africanist with an interest in Rhodesia, and this has meant that policy planning has perhaps been biased towards African problems. Mr Young and the United Nations office have, of course, also contributed to this over-emphasis on African affairs. A second important weakness of American policy has not been the result of Mr Carter's own policies, but has reflected the legacy which he inherited. The two recent tragedies for United States foreign policy — Vietnam and Watergate — have perhaps done more damage to the coherence of US foreign policy than anything Mr Carter has done or failed to do. In essence what these two events have done is to destroy or at least erode much of the legitimacy and status of the presidency.

Since the end of the second world war, one of the major reasons why America was able to follow a coherent foreign policy was the domestic consensus on foreign policy issues and the tremendous prestige and status of the presidency. This enabled the executive branch to dominate foreign policy and to undertake initiatives which were not strictly authorized by the constitution. In other words, the division of authority in the area of foreign policy between Congress and the executive branch has not been spelt out clearly, and the executive, by virtue of need and its prestige and status, was able to fill this vacuum and to undertake an aggressive foreign policy with wide congressional and public support.

Watergate destroyed the presidential myth and also contributed to the breakdown of a domestic consensus which had been severely damaged by the trauma of Vietnam. Any American president today would be challenged by a critical public and a resurgent Congress determined to exercise an independent influence on foreign policy. The ineptitude of Mr Carter in his dealings with Congress has exacerbated the situation and it has become very difficult to predict what the United States will do. This has made it very difficult for the president to implement policy and may well, as in Angola, have encouraged the Soviet Union to take actions which five or ten years ago it would not even have considered.

A related problem has been the misreading of the lessons of Vietnam and the consequent inordinate fear of repeating that disaster. The falacious assumption has been made, and has indeed almost become part of the new orthodoxy, that once forces are committed to an area it is impossible to prevent escalation. Therefore any kind of commitment to an Angola or Somalia is viewed as a recipe for another Vietnam. The reality would appear to be that, contrary to these fears, while there are strong forces that frequently pull or push in the direction of escalation, there are no reasons to believe that escalation is uncontrollable, and that policy

decisions once made cannot be reversed.

More generally, United States policy towards Southern Africa has been marred by other serious errors of analysis. In 1969 when the study of American options in Southern Africa was undertaken, there was a gross exaggeration of the strength and durability of white regimes in Southern Africa. The authors of the national security study ignored the weaknesses of both Rhodesia and Portugal and therefore assumed that, with these buffer states impregnable, white South African rule would endure unchallenged. With the fall of the Portuguese empire, many United States analysts have had a complete change of view and now argue that white South Africa is doomed in the short run. I think it is accurate to conclude that both the assumption of the permanence of white rule and the assumption of South Africa's imminent demise as a white-ruled state, are grossly exaggerated. In other words, United States policy-makers have fluctuated widely from excessive optimism to excessive pessimism about the prospects for the continuation of white rule.

Finally, turning more specifically to United States policy towards South Africa, there has been a gross exaggeration of United States leverage over South African policy-makers. For example, Mr Carter drastically misread the situation when he maintained that the United States had more influence over South Africa than South Africa had with Rhodesia. The reality is that economic leverage is subtle and is frequently long term in its effects. In any case, economic factors in the absence of armed force are not usually an effective mechanism for dramatically influencing other states. Related to this has been the United States' inability accurately to gauge white South African and especially white leadership attitudes in South Africa itself. Essentially the United States has set itself goals which it lacked the means to carry out successfully. The United States must accept, and is beginning to accept, that South Africa will not change and the Soviet Union will not desist from its African adventures, unless the United States is prepared to commit more resources to the task than it has to this point.

The weakness of contemporary American policy is clearly seen when its methods are examined. First of all, there is reliance upon diplomatic activity; secondly, multilateral diplomacy; thirdly, support for African initiatives; fourthly, the minimization of United States military involvement; fifthly, underplaying the East-West factor in African problems; and, finally, permitting market forces to continue to operate. It is very clear that these means are inadequate to stem Soviet aggression or bring about change in South Africa. It is therefore necessary for the United

States to develop realistic and sensible goals and attempt the difficult task of devising a package of means that would realise these goals.

There are important implications for South Africa that flow from this analysis. There is no doubt that the United States has begun to learn the lesson from the errors that have been noted above. What South Africa must do is to recognize that United States pressure on South Africa is not temporary and will not vanish with the end of the Carter administration. Rather, the form of American pressure, as well as American goals, may change, but South Africa is now permanently on the United States political agenda. In addition, South Africans must accept the impossibility of selling South Africa to the United States. For various reasons, Americans are not convinced by South Africa's argument about the importance of its minerals, the danger of communism, or its strategic importance. What is significant is that the changes outlined above may mean a reduction in crude American pressure which will give South Africa more time in which to make the necessary changes.

### **Other Factors Affecting South African Policy**

South Africa's future will be determined by the interplay of a wide range of factors. Some of these factors are outside South Africa's control, but many others can be modified by purposeful South African policy. In other words, there are many things that we can do that will change our situation. Domestically the state of our economy is going to be of critical importance. The political and social programmes that can be successfully undertaken domestically, will be decisively influenced by the state of the economy. With an expanding economy we can embark upon programmes of income redistribution and of development. Internationally our greatest guarantee, perhaps our only guarantee of security, is what we are worth to the rest of the world, and this will be related to the strength and diversity of our economy. Some of the policy implications may well be that we can no longer afford to use our resources and manpower in an inefficient manner by, for example, locating industries where their efficiency is not optimum.

The second important domestic factor is our internal political stability. It must be conceded that, whereas in the past our political stability was largely the result of coercion and the absence of articulated black demands, any future political stability will require a consensus about the nature of our political structure and hence a moral authority which must be based upon fair modes of participation for all of South Africa's population groups.

The discussion above provides the framework within which important domestic and foreign choices must be made. It would not be appropriate here to outline the kind of specific changes that should be made. A few general points that must be taken into account should, however, be noted. First of all, one should not confuse political reality with political rhetoric. The mode of political discourse tends to be rhetorical, and it is critically important for both policy-makers and members of the public to discern the underlying intentions and policies beneath the political rhetoric. In addition, one should not exaggerate the importance of politics and politicians. There is a whole range of transactions, both domestic and foreign, that are important and significant and are not merely responsive to political factors. Finally, we should recognize that the West is far more flexible than we sometimes perceive and that their attitudes and policies will be shaped in an important way by our response to pressures and our domestic situation. For the sake of South Africa's political destiny and the welfare of all her people, the observer can only hope that the important Western states will adopt realistic policies towards South Africa.

It is clear that certain pressures can be counter-productive, if their form is crude and the demands are unreasonable. Equally, pressures can be productive, under certain circumstances. If we examine the changes that have taken place in South Africa in the last few years, one must conclude that in the absence of pressures we would have seen far less progress than we have had. But equally one must admit that pressures are a very sensitive instrument and that in certain areas progress has perhaps been less forthcoming as the result of these pressures. It is possible, however, that our political leaders should view pressures as a challenge and an opportunity to make changes which they would otherwise not make, because of the fear of the reactions of their supporters.

South Africa also requires a more rational approach to foreign policy-making. There is an urgent need for a more comprehensive analysis of alternatives and greater planning for the future. The limits of adhoc reactive foreign policy are already apparent.

Yet of greater significance for our future foreign relations will be the state of our domestic policy, and no political arrangement that is based upon race will further South Africa's interests at home or abroad. South Africa must therefore mobilize its resources and use the opportunities that are available domestically and internationally to bring her own house in order as soon as possible. The fundamental choice is either to accept this challenge, or to resign ourselves to the lonely life of an international outcast, with all of the domestic and foreign implications that this would involve.

## LETTERS

*Mr Ken Owen, Assistant to the Editor of the Sunday Times, writes in response to an article by Mr Peter Vale on the concept of South Africa as a 'Pariah State', published in an earlier Bulletin, vol. 1, no. 3, 1977.*

Sir

Since I was probably the original author of the notion that South Africa might exploit its membership of a constellation of outlaw states, I trust you will permit me a comment on the views expressed on the subject in a recent issue of the Bulletin. (Volume 1 No 3).

The origin of the idea was a conversation with Frank Crump, then on the South African desk at the State Department, about the decline of American hegemony throughout the world. In the course of discussing the co-operation between South Africa, Israel and Iran, which was then topical, Crump remarked wryly that it was "a nightmare thought" that this constellation of states ("call it a Sixth World" he said laughingly) might escape entirely from the orbit of American control and influence, especially in regard to nuclear weaponry.

I subsequently developed his remark into a longer article, retaining the whimsical phrase "Sixth World" in order to signal to intelligent readers that the idea should not be taken too literally.

Nevertheless, the notion was picked up from The Star's international edition by a professor and presented at a congressional hearing as a "new South African strategy". American news media seized upon the idea, and somewhere along the line an over-earnest academic counted the recognised worlds, found only four, and renamed Frank Crump's world. Hence the notion of a Fifth World.

Since then it has been a frighteningly serious matter, often debated, seldom understood. Lamentably, it has been taken in South Africa as an argument for a strategy of defiance and has acquired some idiotic ramifications (such as the suggestion of an alliance with the People's Republic of China). Serious students of foreign affairs rightly dismiss the idea of a Sixth World, thus defined, as silly.

Yet I believe there is some usefulness in the original notion. Modern technology is giving to nations, as it does to individuals, a greater range of options. It is calling into question the very possibility of hegemony. American hegemony in half the world has collapsed and in the other half it is increasingly challenged (even by West Germany!). And it seems very likely that Soviet hegemony, backed by more primitive technology than the

American, will fare no better — as the Soviet relationship with China, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and even Roumania would suggest.

If this is a true assessment of the trend of international affairs, then regional autonomy — or multipolarity, as Kissinger called it — seems likely to play an increasingly important part in determining international affairs. Regional powers like South Africa, Brazil, Iran, Israel, Australia and many others will find themselves progressively less dependent for their security, and therefore possessed of greater freedom of action than they have enjoyed in the past. Among other things, they may be able to enter into relationships outside the context of Great Power alignments.

For example, South Africa may not find it wise, or even possible, to develop a nuclear weapons capacity from its enrichment technology; but it might well find it profitable to “sell the threat” to a third power (say Brazil or South Korea) by providing enriched uranium. Essentially, South Africa would then threaten American control over nuclear developments in smaller nations by ending the American monopoly on the supply of enriched uranium. It takes very little imagination to see the bargaining possibilities inherent in this development — vis-a-vis both the United States (which might be prepared to buy our good behaviour) and Brazil (which might be prepared to outbid the US for the sake of its own independence).

Of course, it takes very little education to perceive the risks in such a course of action relating to nuclear weaponry, and I personally would oppose it. But the nuclear example does demonstrate other possibilities which are less stark but which seem to me worth exploration. For example, it should be possible to sell steel-making capacity to potential buyers of South African ferrochrome in order to reduce dependence on (increasingly protectionist) Western users.

It is up to the technicians to develop the idea. But it would be a pity if, in the course of dismissing a silly version of the Fifth World option, our policy-makers were also to dismiss the possibilities inherent in the emerging multipolar world. There is no need for an alliance with Iran, and no profit in it. But, for a country under such pressure from its traditional partners as South Africa, there is every reason to explore the possibilities of more limited co-operation with Iran, especially in fields where the major powers use their leverage to limit the Shah's actions.

Similarly, South Korea, some Latin States, Israel, France (for some purposes), and other nations which live restively under American hegemony, are prospects for specific, limited co-operation agreements or contracts. Most obviously, South African armaments production runs might be extended to the point of

economic viability by a policy of supplying weapons in cases (such as Somalia recently) where the major powers of both camps have refused to do so.

And so forth. The point is that the chains which bind us are often those in our own minds. We really have no need to be an American vassal state and this need will decrease as advancing technology further undermines American hegemony. (That technology will throw up other problems in our own region is beyond denial, but also for the purposes of this argument beyond the point.)

*Arise, the Sixth World!*

Yours sincerely

(Signed)

KEN OWEN

*All letters should be addressed to the Bulletin Editor, P.O. Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017. It should be noted that correspondence will be subject to editing.*

## BOOK REVIEWS

### THE DIPLOMACY OF DETENTE: THE KISSINGER ERA

*Coral Bell*

*Martin Robertson & Co. Limited. London, 1977. 278 pp.*

This is (presumably) one of the earliest books about the remarkable Dr Kissinger which will appear in the coming years. Alas, until the memoirs of the former Secretary of State are published, all such books will be grounded in uncertainty and speculation. (It may be that even the Kissinger memoirs will not totally resolve the vicissitudes of the man and the operator. Possibly only the passage of history itself will point out how he saw the overall thrust of "A World Restored" operating in the nuclear age.) Professor Coral Bell recognises the limitations of writing a book such as this at the outset, and, as a result, has written a book which sheds light not so much on the man Kissinger, but rather on the process he adopted in implementing his world view, the notion of "détente". It is thus a book on Kissinger the operator.

For many, the chief focus of détente was in the European theatre with the overlapping complications of Ostpolitik, MBFR, CSC E and the ever present SALT negotiations. The intricacies of the trade-offs, setbacks and successes of this focal point of the détente exercise were, throughout the duration of the Kissinger period, adequately dealt with in the pages of major journals in the discipline, and it is a welcome departure that the author has not only confined herself to them. Instead we have an excellent interpretation of how the entire exercise affected less central cauldrons of Superpower conflict — notably Australia and Southern Africa.

Throughout his extraordinary Secretaryship, Kissinger remained both the theorist and the practitioner. More often than not, he appeared to be torn between the roles — the Harvard Don versus formulator of US foreign policy in a remarkable period of American political history. The essence of this conflict is dealt with in a thoroughly workmanlike manner in two chapters on the conflicting (though sometimes complimentary) roles of Kissinger the theorist and Kissinger the policy maker. To demonstrate the conflict of roles, Professor Bell has quarried Kissinger's early writing on the Soviet Union. So, 'his writings were flattering about neither the Soviet system nor its leaders . . .' and, 'his view on détente as an element in Soviet diplomacy might be called particularly mordant or disillusioned', etc. What was it that made Kissinger think that the Soviets, a decade or so later, would comply with the demands which détente put on that same system? The riddle is, of course, answered by the chemistry of the Kissinger-



Nixon partnership which put Kissinger the Don secondary to Kissinger the policy maker.

The chapter on Portugal and Southern Africa is of obvious interest to a South African readership. The very title of the chapter, 'Portugal and Southern Africa: Setback and Rebound', places two sets of concepts into perspective. Firstly, that it took a major political development in Europe — in this case the revolution in Lisbon — to fundamentally alter the political stakes in Southern Africa. (Indicative, one suspects, of the continuing colonial status of the sub-continent.) Secondly, because at the time of Kissinger's involvement in this part of the globe, his own status and prestige was waning, a process from which, as we now know, it never recovered. Little light is shed on the involvement of the CIA on the side of the FNLA-UNITA axis — though they were clearly involved, if we are to believe subsequent revelations. There is, therefore, no mention of Kissinger's 'come on' to the South Africans, as South African Government spokesmen have alleged. For Professor Bell, Kissinger's primary preoccupation "was not with which faction inherited power in Angola — (for) he said at one point that he had no objection to the MPLA or a Marxist government there — but with the conventions of détente diplomacy."

Both Kissinger and John Vorster saw the September 1976 meeting as an exercise in pure power politics along a familiar line — US pressure on South Africa (the price of gold, the possibility of sanctions over the Namibian issue and the alleged letter from the Shah threatening oil supplies); South African pressure on Rhodesia (arms, oil and economic access to the world); Smith's acceptance of the Kissinger package. Q.E.D. In it all, Kissinger seemed to be conscious of the fact that the NSSM 39 calculations had been seriously wrong, and what was now needed was a transfer of power to a moderate Black government by a rapid evolution rather than to a radical Black government.

Professor Bell is unashamedly sympathetic to the exercise of diplomacy by means of détente. ("I believe that history's verdict on détente, the central diplomatic strategy of that time, will redress any damage done to it during the 1976 US electoral debate.") This sympathy may possibly colour her final judgement on the success of Kissinger both as a practitioner and a theorist ("the intellectual stimulus of the policy"). For her, the "eight years of a strategy of détente saw change in every element in that situation, and in each case to the net advantage of the Western camp". In retrospect, we can understand her sympathy, though two unanswered issues remain: firstly, how does one maintain order in a world which was not fully restored, and, are there other ways than détente of

preventing what Churchill once described as "the giants from colliding"?

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#### **THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE TO AFRICA**

*Ian Greig*

*Southern African Freedom Foundation. Sandton. 1977. 384 pp.*

From the title of this book neither the publishers nor Mr Greig can be faulted for poor timing. The recent Shaba province incident and the emergence of the highly ambiguous western policy towards Africa are, arguably, a reaction to what many have come to see as 'the communist challenge to Africa'. It is, alas, at this early stage that Mr Greig loses the admiration of this reviewer.

The chief thesis of the book rests on the author's committed belief that the Soviets seek to ensure the eventual triumph of 'Socialism throughout the world' (P.49). This is nothing less than a crude restatement of the Dulles view which gained messianic status in the Cold War. For Greig the African continent is merely the scheme of a neo-Cold War which if not checked is potentially hazardous to the so-called soft underbelly of Europe. The complexities of the contemporary international life are not explored in any great depth nor are the seemingly endless contradictions in the Soviet approach to international politics. Thus, scant attention is paid to the Sino-Soviet nexus nor to the ideological confusion in Soviet foreign policy which facilitates, for example, support for a bourgeois regime like that of Nasser who appeared to have no qualms in suppressing local Communists.

If the general thrust of the thesis were not sufficient, the author is inept in his application of it to Africa. As a result Africa — in the author's mind, still a dark continent — has given the Soviets carte blanche to operate where they will and when they will. Scant attention is paid to the African dimension of the involvement. In the entire book, the OAU is mentioned a mere six times and always in passing. For example, that critically important OAU summit which debated Angola in January 1976 is not mentioned at all. Similarly, in discussing the complex bilateral relations between African states and the Soviets, no attention is given at all to the nature and scope of African perspectives on the relations.

As we have been reminded so often by African scholars, most recently by Oye Ogunbadejo in *Orbis* (Vol. 21, No. 4), bilateral relations with Communist states are seen by African leaders as a legitimate means of maximizing independence outside the control of the Western countries.

A large proportion of the book is devoted to the various 'liberation movements' on the Continent. For Greig these are all fronts for the Soviet Union, which, if successful, will set up satellite states responsive to instructions from Moscow. He appears unaware of the strong nationalist strain in these movements which renders such a development highly unlikely. Further, the rôle of the 'freedom fighters' as the spearhead of Africa in the struggle against racism, colonialism and apartheid in the South of the Continent is totally ignored.

African international politics are, in fact, too complicated to be accommodated in Mr Greig's crude Cold War model; and their dynamics are different from the dynamics of western international politics. The recent events in Africa, if properly examined, will show this to be correct, and lend no real support to Mr Greig's thesis.

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#### **NATIONAL SECURITY : A MODERN APPROACH**

*Michael H.H. Louw*  
*Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria. Pretoria. 1978.*  
*203 pp.*

This short book is the result of a series of papers presented at a Symposium held in Pretoria in March/April 1977. The articles by a mixture of academics, soldiers and civil servants, British, South African, German and American, aim at promoting an understanding of the complex factors involved in defence policy making at the national level. To this end, comparisons are made and *general* strategic notions, rather than purely South African references are drawn. Naturally, South African problems are the underlying motivations for this symposium. General Dutton's contribution gives as he himself says, "... a realistic approach in so far as evaluation is related to real situations, to present time and place, to the feasible rather than the desirable, and to success or

failure in terms of tangible results as opposed to rhetoric and semantic apologies". An approach, which although not strictly followed by all writers in this collection, adds to its value and appreciation by your reviewer.

As well as the practicalities of military assessments of the changing situation there are also papers on the political, economic and most interestingly, psychological aspects of military and strategic action . . . an aspect which, of course, is of primary interest in the multi-racial security position of the Republic. The 'hearts and minds' programmes which were the motivating factor behind many of the US actions in Vietnam and, one suspects, largely failure. Although perhaps less from ill-will or ineptitude on the part of the fighting soldiers themselves not entirely convinced of the real objective of their efforts, than from planning and intellectual input. In the Far East, of course, the Americans were dealing with foreigners with a totally different culture pattern (even the British, speaking more or less the same language, had difficulties with the first Americans to land in Europe as part of the allied war effort in WWII), and one feels that they never really came to the same conclusions as their opposite numbers in the Communist forces who had an already institutionalised politically orientated psychological weapon in the marxist-leninist-maoist training of their personnel, and the importance afforded to indoctrination on the part of Communists. Colonel P.P. Katz surveys these and other similar problems in his paper which should make it compulsory reading for all members of the SA Defence Force, who after all are likely to have to co-operate with their black but not foreign, compatriots in any future incursion or subversive exercise directed against this country.

The whole book will, it is suggested, be prescribed reading for *all* those who are interested in the realities of the defence and security situation in South Africa and the information and opinions expressed by the well qualified people who have produced this work should go some way to dispelling some of the euphoria surrounding much of the thinking on these matters. Certainly Professor Erickson's view that to assume that Soviet 'global strategy' is an "accomplished fact and an irreversible process may well be to talk ourselves into premature demise," is as important for South Africans as it is for western Europeans. Professor Louw, as editor, has done valuable service too, in drawing to our attention the need for realistic appraisals and pragmatic research into these security matters. The problem of the political pressures on the Republic of South Africa which he raises in the Preface, has been in fact the subject of the sort of research I think he has in mind and will soon be published as "South Africa: inter-

national pressures and political change" by Oxford University Press and edited by your reviewer. The specific problems raised by the book under review on National Security will be certainly taken up by readers of this Bulletin and may be the beginning of a fresh hard look at the problems of the Security of the Republic. Problems which it is suggested have perhaps not been taken too seriously by many people.

This small volume covers a wide field and although there are too many irritating misprints: the doyen of strategists, Liddel Hart appears as Liddet (sic) Hart, WWI is specified, when WWII is obviously meant etc; the overall picture is one of experts writing on their own subjects and being in command of the information at their disposal, something of a rarity. There is an excellent small selective bibliography appended as well as the bibliographical information given at the ends of chapters, although there is no index, which is a pity. The introduction and summary by the editor are also excellent and succinct. Altogether a necessary and interesting book and if the conclusion of the editor, Prof M Louw, that a National Security "think-tank" be formed is heeded, it will have served an even more worthwhile purpose.

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#### **OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED**

- Aharoni, Yair, *Business in the international environment: a casebook.* London, Macmillan, 1977. 245 pp. ± R23,20.
- Donovan, John C. (and others). *Democracy at the Crossroads: an introduction to American government.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978. 436 pp. ± R14,40.
- Freedman, Lawrence, *US intelligence and the Soviet strategic threat.* London: Macmillan, 1977. 235 pp. R23,20.
- Spanier, John, *Games nations play: analyzing international politics.* 3rd ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston/Praeger, 1978. 628 pp.

## INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS

A full list of publications may be obtained from the Administrative Secretary, SAIIA. P.O. Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017, Transvaal, South Africa. Listed below are some examples of recent available publications.

### BOOKS AND SPECIAL STUDIES

- *Strategy for Development*, Macmillan, London, 1976. Edited by John Barratt, David Collier, Kurt Glaser and Herman Mönnig. (Based on the proceedings of a conference at Jan Smuts House in December 1974. The third in a Series on population growth and development, published for the Institute by Macmillan). Price: R15,00 if ordered from the Institute.
- *South Africa in the World: Political and Strategic Realities*, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1976. Edited by Denis Venter. Price: R2,50.
- *Wars of National Liberation, the Super-Powers and the Afro-Asian Ocean Region*, by Dirk Kunert, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 1977. Price: R2,50.

### PERIODICALS (In addition to *International Affairs Bulletin*)

- *Southern Africa Record*, Issued on irregular basis, approximately four times a year, containing the texts of, or extracts from, official policy statements on international relations in Southern Africa. The latest issue, no. 12, includes material on diplomatic negotiations over Rhodesia and South West Africa. Price: R2,00 per copy.

### OCCASIONAL PAPERS

- *The United States and South Africa : Three South African Perspectives*. Percy Qoboza, John Barratt and Tom Vosloo.
- *Human Rights : Their Origin, Validity and Implementation*. A.C. Partridge

### BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND INDEX SERIES (Most recently issued)

- No. 3 *South West Africa/Namibia: an international issue 1920-1977: a select bibliography*. Compiled by Elna Schoeman. April 1978. Price R8,00.
- No. 4 *Bophuthatswana Politics and Economy: a select and annotated bibliography*. Compiled by Jacqueline A. Kalley. May 1978. Price: R2,00.

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