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CONTENTS

Notes on Authors and Articles	(ii)
THE WEST AND SOUTH AFRICA	
Hedley Bull	1
THE RHODESIAN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE	
The Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole	15
OUTLOOK FOR RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE	
Bishop A.T. Muzorewa	28
A TRILATERAL WORLD APPROACH:	
A report of the Trilateral Commission on the Management of Interdependence	34
LETTERS	
<i>André du Pisani considers conflicting perceptual maps</i>	42
BOOK REVIEWS	
<i>The Government and Politics of South Africa</i> by Anthony de Crespigny and Robert Schrire	47
<i>Suid-Afrika se Buitelandse Beleid</i> by G.C. Olivier	49
<i>Mission and Colonialism in Namibia</i> by Lukas de Vries	51
<i>Black South Africans</i> by Dee Shirley Deane	52
Other Books Received	52
INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS	53

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NOTES ON AUTHORS AND ARTICLES

Professor Hedley Bull, author of the article on *The West and South Africa*, is Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford University. He is one of the world's foremost scholars in international relations and the author of numerous works in this field. He visited South Africa in July of this year to participate in a conference jointly organized by the Institute and the World Peace Foundation of Boston, U.S.A., and he also addressed a meeting of the Institute at Jan Smuts House. (The latter meeting was a private one, and Professor Bull's address was not published at the time. This article is, however, based on that address.)

In June *the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole*, one of the four members of the Executive Council of the Rhodesian Transitional Government, visited South Africa to address a meeting of the Cape Town Press Club. He also accepted an invitation to address a meeting of the Institute at Jan Smuts House in Johannesburg. In July, *Bishop Abel Muzorewa*, also a member of the Executive Council of the Rhodesian Transitional Government, visited Johannesburg and Grahamstown to address, respectively, the Institute at Jan Smuts House and the conference on "The Road Ahead" organised by the 1820 Settlers Monument Foundation. Together with the addresses by Mr Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa a few of their answers to questions put to them at the Jan Smuts House meetings (as transcribed from tape-recordings) are included.

In view of the wide interest in the influence of the Trilateral Commission, an abbreviated version of a report prepared for the Commission by three experts is included as the fourth article. One of these experts, *Professor Karl Kaiser* (Director of the Forschungsinstitut der Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Bonn, West Germany) visited South Africa in July, when he participated in "The Road Ahead" Conference and also addressed the Institute at Jan Smuts House on German foreign policy.

Attention is drawn on the final page to the Institute's publications, and members are reminded that Occasional Papers are available to them *on request* at no charge (within a reasonable time of their publication). These Occasional Papers are not automatically sent out to all members, but they are available to members interested in the particular subjects dealt with.

THE WEST AND SOUTH AFRICA

Hedley Bull

I wish I were more qualified than I am to talk about the West and South Africa. The fact is that I am on my first visit to this country. I have to confess that I have not made any particular study of South Africa, or even of Western policy towards South Africa. All I can say is that, like everyone else in the West who thinks about foreign policy matters, I am being forced to do some thinking about South Africa, because it is becoming a prominent item on the agenda of any general discussion of international politics at the present time.

My starting point is that the relationship between the Western powers and South Africa is a more tense and unfriendly one than it has ever been before. Anyone who has even the most superficial impression of South Africa at the present time quickly becomes aware that the West is now perceived as having become increasingly hostile to South Africa, and that this is deeply resented in this country by all shades of opinion, at least within the white community, from the right to the left, even though the degree of resentment may vary. There is resentment of Western policies in Rhodesia and South West Africa — and especially at the moment at the West's policies in relation to Walvis Bay — at the UN strategic arms embargo for which the Western powers in the Security Council voted last year; at the discussion in the Western world of what is called 'disinvestment' in relation to South Africa, and of economic sanctions. One encounters the feeling that Western man in his judgement of South Africa is ignorant of conditions in this country; that he is self-serving and unwilling to take account of the interests of white South Africans; that he is sometimes malicious — projecting his own feelings of guilt about colonialism on to white South Africans; that he applies double standards — being unwilling to condemn the racism of black African governments with the same exuberance with which he condemns racism in South Africa. There is a feeling also that the West's demands on South Africa are such that they can never be satisfied, that as is *shown by the West's unwillingness to endorse the 'internal settlement' in Rhodesia*, not even the most radical changes within South Africa would really meet the requirements laid down by Western policy.

It is true that this resentment of Western policy is tempered by the recognition that most other countries in the world are even more hostile to South Africa. It is true also that one sometimes encounters the view that Western pressure on the South African Government can be a constructive influence — that most of the

changes that have taken place in the South African Government's separate development policy — (the example of the steps taken to remove *apartheid* in sport is often cited) — do seem to have been reactions to Western pressure. Moreover, outside the white community in South Africa one finds some very different attitudes towards Western policy. I have encountered the view that only pressure great enough to create instability in South Africa would be really likely to bring about fundamental change, and that what is wrong with Western policy is that it is not sufficiently hostile to South Africa.

It is not my purpose to defend Western policy, but I do want to inquire into it by posing three questions. First, why is it that the Western countries are so hostile to South Africa? What are the factors which brought this attitude about? Secondly, is the West right to be so hostile to South Africa? Is the present policy founded on a true view of Western interests and of Western responsibilities? Thirdly, is there anything that South Africa can do or should do to make the West less hostile?

First, then, why has the West become so unfriendly to this country? It is necessary to begin by making a distinction between the economic and strategic interests that have in the past bound the Western countries to white South Africa, and the political and ideological interests that lead Western countries to want to distance themselves from it. Throughout the period since the Nationalists came to power in 1948 it has been held in the United States and Britain and in other Western countries that they have had strong economic interests and strategic interests in preserving links with white South Africa. The economic interests — most important for Britain, but in the 1960s and 1970s important for the United States also — are provided by investments, by markets, by the access that South Africa provides to gold and vital industrial raw materials, and by the important place that the South African economy occupies in the global free enterprise or capitalist system they wish to preserve. The strategic interests are those they sense in the continued existence in Southern Africa of a militarily and economically powerful state which, whatever reservations one may have about it, is intensely hostile to international communism and to the Soviet Union. The perception of these economic and strategic interests in the survival of the white-dominated South African state has been the most continuous and the dominant theme in the United States and British policy towards this country, and is still a powerful one.

Of course, throughout the period of Nationalist Party rule the West has made ritual disapproving noises about the policy of separate development. These noises became louder after Sharpe-

ville in 1960. The Kennedy Administration in the United States gave a higher priority to the expression of disapproval of South Africa, and in 1963 the United States imposed an arms embargo. The Macmillan Government in Britain judged that the expression of disapproval was important enough to acquiesce in the virtual expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth, and later the first Wilson Labour Government judged it necessary to terminate Britain's surviving defence links with South Africa. But throughout the last thirty years, and even today, the Western powers have been unwilling to do anything actually to challenge the structure of white power in South Africa, and while the reluctance has been rationalised as a preference for persuasion of South Africa over coercion and for gradual constitutional change over revolution, what it chiefly reflects is the perception that the *status quo* in South Africa has suited Western economic and strategic interests well enough.

The other interests to which I referred, the political and ideological interests, require the West to distance itself from South Africa, to look not to the present white leadership but to South Africa as a whole, and to commit itself to change in South African society. It appears to me that these interests are becoming more powerful than the traditional economic and strategic interests that have so much shaped Western attitudes to South Africa in the past. The Carter Administration, which has gone further than any previous United States Administration in distancing itself from South Africa, dramatises this change. It would be erroneous, however, to believe that the change has been brought about by a particular person or party. My view is that Western policy will more and more reflect the primacy of the political and ideological interests the West has in distancing itself from South Africa over the economic and strategic interests in supporting it, that this is not the consequence of the fact that America and Britain have Governments of the particular political complexion they have at the moment, but is a permanent change.

Now, why has this change come about? One of the factors is that the belief that Western economic interests are served by the present social and political structure in South Africa is in decline. An informal process of 'disinvestment' is already under way, as those who take decisions about investment calculate that South Africa is headed for political and hence for economic instability, and that quite apart from the pressures on them to withdraw funds for political reasons, South Africa is too much of a business risk. Nigeria, since the discovery of oil there, has come to loom as large or larger than South Africa in the external trade figures of some Western countries. There is no reason in principle why

Western interests in trade and access to raw materials cannot be satisfied by doing business with black Azania rather than white South Africa.

As regards the traditional strategic calculations, it is more and more apparent that association with white South Africa does not provide the Western countries with an effective means of resisting the Soviet Union or the spread of communist influence in its various forms. What chiefly facilitates the extension of Soviet and Soviet-satellite activity in Southern Africa is the perception on the part of black Africans — the correct perception, I should say — that in the struggle against white supremacism the Soviet Union is a powerful ally. The argument has, I think, become increasingly persuasive that if the West seeks to minimise Soviet 'penetration' of the subcontinent, what this requires the West to do above all is to dissociate itself from white supremacism in South Africa and to seek to eradicate it. As events showed in the Angolan Civil War, association with South Africa is a liability rather than an asset in any struggle with the forces backed by the Soviet Union.

Not only is it the case that the traditional economic and strategic interests are felt not to be served any longer by association with South Africa as it is now, there is also an increasing feeling that the political and ideological interests that the West has in promoting change in South Africa are more important than the traditional economic and strategic interests, and that even if some economic loss or some strategic risk were involved in dissociating ourselves from South Africa, this is the course that we should pursue.

The reason why this kind of view is becoming important in the West is to do with a major historical change that is taking place in the international political system, and has been taking place for a long time. This is that the Western powers, who at the beginning of this century dominated the international system, are increasingly feeling themselves to be in the minority. The majority of states in the world are African and Asian and the majority of the people in the world represented by these states are African and Asian. The Western powers are less dominant than they have been historically and if they look forward into the future they recognise that they are going to be less dominant still. They perceive a need founded not on ideological sympathy for the aspirations of non-Western peoples — although this affects them too — but on their own interests in preserving an international order in which all the major elements in world society feel they have a stake — to adjust themselves to this new situation.

In one way or another all the Western countries for quite some time have been involved in making this adjustment. Decolonisation was part of it. The changes in race relations policies within

Western countries have been part of it, above all the civil rights movement in the United States, the triumph of which is a development of truly world-historical significance, affecting the perceptions of people in all parts of the world about the possibilities of racial justice and racial harmony.

In Australia the changes that have been brought about in immigration policies and in aboriginal policy and in Australia's policy towards the Third World are part of this process of adjustment. In Australia as elsewhere these changes have not been founded primarily on the outlook or ideology of particular leaders or parties. It is interesting that when the Whitlam government was in power the Labour Government then embraced the policy of ridding Australia of what it called its "South African image", the danger that it would get into the kind of situation of isolation and pariah status that South Africa with such tragic consequences for itself has been for so long in. Much of the Whitlam's Government's policy in this respect, and especially the policy of seeking a more acceptable relationship with the Third World, was attacked at the time by the Conservative opposition. It is notable, however, that the Conservative Government of Mr Malcolm Fraser, that is now in power in Australia, has in effect embraced the Whitlam Government's policies towards the Third World, and indeed has taken them further and in some respects is pursuing them more efficiently. This bears out my point — that in Australia as in other Western countries these policies of adjustment to a changed international environment are founded not upon labour or socialist ideology or on sympathy with Third World aspirations (although this has played its part) but on a realistic assessment of what the position of the Western countries in the international system as it is now has to be.

The need the Western countries feel to distance themselves from South Africa derives not only from changes in the international environment, but also from changes in their own internal character. The United States, Britain, France, Germany, Holland — even Australia and New Zealand — are *multiracial countries*, although with white majorities. The *political awakening of non-white peoples* has included the awakening of their non-white minorities. All of them are embarked, with differing degrees of success, upon policies of racial integration. This means that the attitudes the Western countries adopt towards events in South Africa directly affects their own domestic peace and harmony. Support for white dominance in South Africa would be a betrayal of policies to which they are committed at home. Race violence in South Africa would be at once reflected in race tensions within their own societies. The United States, whose black population has

a strong sense of involvement in African affairs, is especially sensitive to these considerations. Underlying the concern of Western countries to promote change in South Africa there is a deep fear that violent conflict among the races in this country will come, and that when it does come, it will engulf them.

I do not think that Western policy is one simply of appeasement of the Third World or of black Africa. Certainly, I do not think it should be and I do not think, on the whole, that it is. When the Western countries contemplate black Africa they are conscious not merely of a need to take account of what black African demands are and satisfy them, but also of a need for the Western countries to make their own impress on the ultimate result; to uphold Western interests and also to defend Western values. The revolt of the so-called Third World — more generally the revolt of Asian, African and Latin American peoples against Western dominance in one or another of its forms, has been carried out largely in the name of Western values — the human rights of individuals and of peoples proclaimed by the Western countries themselves, as today so notably by President Carter. The revolt has not been against Western values, but against Western power and privilege, and the West's failure to apply its own principles to non-Western peoples. More recently there are signs in the Third World of a revolt against Western values also. In the face of this latter revolt the need of the West is not for flexibility or the graceful acceptance of change, but rather for firmness in the defence of principles in which it really believes.

Like the Western countries, white South Africa is faced by a need to adjust. We have to recognise, however, that South Africa's problem of adjusting to change is very much more difficult than the problem faced by other Western countries. Australia, for example, happens to be an island in which the white population is a majority, and for that country to open its immigration policy to non-whites, to accord full dignity to its aboriginal population, to conceive of itself as a multiracial society, to change, accordingly, its view of its own identity, has been difficult, but is nothing like as serious as the problem faced by the white minority in South Africa. Equally, white South Africa's problem of adjustment is immensely more difficult than that faced by the whites in the American South, who were in a majority locally, were part of a majority community in an even more preponderant position in the United States as a whole, and who in cultural terms — in language and religion and social organisation — had much more in common with their black co-citizens than do the white minority in South Africa.

It is, I think, helpful to compare the position of the white

minority in South Africa with the position occupied by the Western peoples in the world as a whole. Just as the whites are a privileged but vulnerable minority within the borders of South Africa, so the Western countries — (among whom for some purposes one can include the Soviet Union because culturally Russia — if ambiguously — is part of the West, and marxism is in origins a Western doctrine) — are in the same sort of minority position in the world as a whole.

The Western countries, when they contemplate their position in the world as a whole, would not accept for themselves many of the things that they want the white minority within South Africa to accept in their situation. It is the Western policy, for example, to call upon white South Africans to accept full political rights for non-whites, which would lead to majority rule. But majority rule within the world as a whole would mean the domination of the world community by the peoples of Asia, and that is something which the Western Europeans and North Americans would not accept, nor indeed would the Africans or Latin Americans. One-man-one-vote in a unitary political system of the world as a whole would make the Western privileged minorities vulnerable in the same way in which white minorities in South Africa would be vulnerable. I do not mean by this to imply that full political participation by non-whites is not desirable in South Africa; I think it is. My point is simply that the white minority in this country are in a more tragic situation than are the Western countries, when they face up to their own problems of adjustment in the political system of the world as a whole.

The second question I posed is: should the West be so hostile to white South Africa? Should it, perhaps, be more hostile? Where do I stand on this issue? This is a question I have been asking myself for the last couple of weeks. I believe that one needs to begin by questioning some of the conventional Western liberal attitudes about South Africa, and by trying to achieve a greater compassion for white South Africans and a greater understanding of their predicament. Even if one feels that the policies pursued by South African Governments over the last thirty years have exacerbated their problems, one needs at least to begin by recognising that they do have problems, and this is not always the impression with which one is left from reading British newspapers or the speeches of American Congressmen.

There is a need to recognise that the predicament of white South Africa is a unique one and that the solutions that have been readily available to other Western countries, such as the United States or Britain or Australia, are not readily transferable to the South African case. There is a need to recognise that white South

Africans too, wicked and foolish as their policies appear to be judged by the standards of the Western world, are after all at least people, and have rights like other people; and any prescriptions made for this country, designed to realise human rights, ought to take account of the rights of the whites just as it needs to take account of the rights of the various non-white groups. Moreover, the human rights of white South Africans include not only their rights as individuals but their rights as a group. One of the elements in the South African situation is the desire of the Afrikaner people, and more generally of the white South African group, to preserve something of their way of life. If the West is asking these peoples voluntarily to extinguish themselves as a collective identity, or to risk the development of a situation in which they will be deprived of their collective identity, then they should recognise that this is not the sort of thing that groups of people normally do, nor is it something that any Western people is thinking of doing itself. Even if, on reflection, Westerners conclude that this is what they must ask white South Africa to do, they should at least recognise that what they are asking for is a greater sacrifice than is contemplated by Western peoples themselves. Even if Westerners feel that the way of life that white South Africans want to preserve consists partly of privileges to which they are not entitled and which they cannot expect to preserve in the modern world, they should recognise that this way of life also consists partly of traditions of parliamentary government and the rule of law, observed at least within the white community, which the West itself regards as valuable.

One may also say — here again I am trying to make out a case for a sympathetic view of the white South African's situation — that the dire expectations that white South Africans have of a future in which they have relinquished control and in which black majority groups will assume power are not necessarily unfounded. It is, I believe, quite false to imply, as the liberal critique of South Africa often does, that the fears that white South Africans have about the consequences for their way of life under black majority rule are simply the product of racist phobias or the ignorance of backwoodsmen. The fears of many white South Africans that if they relinquish control this may lead not to a liberal, multiracial political system but to some form of black authoritarianism or to a prolonged condition of anarchy, are surely founded not on blind prejudice but on rational apprehensions. If it is the case that more liberal policies introduced by the whites a generation ago might have brought about a different situation in which these fears of today would be baseless, this today is neither here nor there. When Western liberals fail to recognise that South African whites have

anxieties about their future — not merely about their privileges but about their institutions and elementary rights — they do not treat the issue seriously. Even if it is the case, as Western intellectuals are wont to say, sometimes scornfully, that white South African attitudes are peculiarly doctrinaire and bigoted, and that the Afrikaner people, in particular, are a people with a peculiar history of isolation from the main currents of thought in the modern world, containing within itself attitudes that are unsuited to it — even if this is true, that also is something that requires understanding and sympathy. And if the attitudes of some people in this country are those that others of us in the West shed long ago, then this too is something that makes it more difficult for them than for us to make the adjustments to the circumstances of life in the twentieth century that we all have to make.

But when all this has been said, one still has to preserve a sense of proportion. The white South African faces an uncertain and possibly dangerous future. But what about the black, the coloured and the Asian South African? The future of non-white South Africans is uncertain and possibly dangerous, too, but unlike the majority of whites, they are in the position of being subject to an unjust system here and now.

Certainly we should cultivate sympathy and understanding for the tragic position of the white South African. But we should also cultivate sympathy and understanding for the position of the non-white majority. The oppressions they suffer are not possible future ones, but actual present ones. It may be that history is on their side, and that they can look forward to liberation sooner or later, but meanwhile they live under a system of discrimination which according to our own deepest principles is morally wrong. It is easier for a visiting Westerner to put himself in the position of a white South African than in the position of a black man living in Soweto or an Indian worker in Natal or a member of the coloured community at the Cape. But it is to the plight of the latter that he should first try to respond.

I am reminded today of many conversations I had with a distinguished South African, Professor C.A.W. Manning, who for many years occupied the Chair of International Relations at the London School of Economics and whose portrait hangs here in Jan Smuts House. In his retirement Manning devoted himself to cultivating in the Western world an attitude of greater understanding of the position of the white South African. He strove to show, and very convincing he was too, that the white South African's group identity was under threat, and that the policy of separate development, whether or not it was the right one, at least sought to preserve this identity. What I used to say to Professor

Manning was: Yes, whites are in this difficult position, they have rights to group identity and must be expected to try to preserve it — but what about the rights of non-whites, what about their individual human rights, their group identity? If I were to weep tears for South Africa I am not sure that my tears would be primarily for the whites; they would rather be more for the majority of the South African people, the non-whites now. Their problems are not those of rich and privileged people who are concerned about the security of what they have and about how long they can go on enjoying their privileges. The plight of the non-white majority in this country is something immediate and inescapable. From the point of view of the black South African in the urban areas the policies of the Western powers for many years have been policies of, in effect, protecting white South Africans, policies which have combined hypocritical moralism about South African race policies with actual measures that preserve the situation as it is. If I were a black in Soweto contemplating the world and asking myself the question: Who outside South Africa is doing anything to help change my situation, I should conclude that the black African countries were doing all they could but that they were not strong enough to have much impact on the situation; that the Soviet Union and its allies, however suspect their ultimate intentions, were doing the most to help me, because of their consistent opposition to colonialism and white supremacism; but that the Western powers, who are more able to affect events in South Africa than any other outside states, are in fact the main props of the present system, and have done next to nothing for me except make speeches.

The inherited Anglo-American policies towards South Africa treated obligations to the white community as primary, and obligations to the non-white communities as secondary. The origins of these policies lie in the period when Britain and the United States were themselves colonialist and white supremacist states, and it was natural for them to treat non-white South Africans as a secondary obligation because this was also their attitude to non-white peoples under their own jurisdiction. Today, I think, the Western powers must regard their primary obligations as being not to the white minority in South Africa but to the people of the country as a whole. The practice we have pursued in the past of tacitly assuming that when we say the word 'South Africa' we mean the white community in South Africa, is one which today is a betrayal of the greater responsibility we have to the non-white majority in this country.

In this change of attitude there is an element of self-interest: the interest the Western powers have, and that I described earlier, in

adjusting to the changed circumstances of their international environment and the changed nature of their domestic political systems. But there is also a moral element in our change of attitude. We reject today the distinction between primary obligations to whites and secondary obligations to non-whites because we have experienced a widening of our moral sympathies. In the course of this century people in Western countries have experienced an extension of their moral sympathies to non-white peoples as they have done to poor peoples among the whites and to foreign white peoples. They now find it easier to put themselves in the position of non-white under-privileged peoples than they did a generation or even a decade ago. It is my impression that predominant public attitudes in South Africa are less affected by this extension of moral sympathies than are public attitudes in Britain and even more in the United States, where in the last generation a great change in moral consciousness has taken place.

Granted that the West's primary obligations are not to the white community but to all South Africans and to the rights of the oppressed majority, there are perhaps three broad lines of policy that the West can pursue in relation to South Africa. It can seek to influence the white South African establishment to initiate change. It can seek — in common with the Third World and socialist states — to subvert the present system in South Africa, or at all events to remove the obstacles that its present links with South Africa place in the way of a radical challenge to the system from within. Or it can seek simply to disengage from South Africa, to wash its hands of all connections and seek to minimise the repercussions on itself of subsequent events.

The policy of complete disengagement would imply the severance of surviving diplomatic and economic links, and it would lead to the total isolation of South Africa, except for such links as it might still have with other so-called 'pariah states'. It is a policy very remote from the present thinking of Western Governments, and it would indeed at present be an irresponsible and unduly defeatist one. In the event, however, of protracted and large scale violence in South Africa Western Governments would, I believe, feel an impulse towards a policy of disengagement, because their own societies would be divided in their attitudes to the conflict, and the best prospect of preserving domestic peace and harmony might lie in a policy of attempting to keep out.

The policy of what I have called subverting South Africa is favoured by minority elements in Western countries. This would also imply the withdrawal of diplomatic and economic links, but together with this it would imply the extension of support to the domestic opponents of the present system. Those who argue for

this position would say that although intervention in another country's internal affairs is, in general, wrong, the West is already intervening in the struggle by recognising the South African Government as a legitimate one, by co-operating with it in the economic domain and by interpreting the strategic embargo in such a way that South Africa is still able to maintain itself as a formidable military power. This policy also is remote from the present thinking of Western Governments, although it is possible that they will inch their way towards 'disinvestment' and some form of economic sanctions. It does presuppose that the West has lost all faith in the policy of influencing or pressuring the white South African Government to make concessions. It represents the abandonment of peaceful and constitutional change in favour of revolutionary change. And it implies resignation to the prospect that the black successor state that results from this upheaval will be one whose political and economic principles will be anathema to the West.

The present policies of the Western countries are, of course, policies of seeking, by pressure and persuasion, to influence the South African Government towards change, while refraining from undermining it or disengaging from it. This enables the West to demonstrate its political and ideological distance from South Africa, while at the same time preserving intact its economic and strategic interests in the present system. The debate in the West is between those who think that merely rhetorical pressure and persuasion is enough, and those who think it is necessary to make things uncomfortable for the South African Government. There are, I think, grounds for scepticism about this policy. Is there any reason to believe that the attempt to influence or pressure the South African Government to embark upon a wholly different course is likely to work? Do Western leaders themselves really believe that a policy of persuasion and pressure will lead to reform in South Africa, or is the policy not intended chiefly to demonstrate that Western Governments are active in combating *apartheid*? Is there not an element of unreality in Western warnings that unless timely concessions are made, violence is to be expected, when violence is perhaps to be expected in any case?

I have asked many people in South Africa for their views about 'disinvestment', and as a result I have heard a great many arguments against it. It is said that 'disinvestment' would hurt blacks more than it would hurt the whites; that it would be counter-productive because it is the further development of the South African economy that is most likely to integrate South African society and to lay the basis for a liberal and multi-racial polity; and that the best policy for the Western countries is to keep their

investments in this country, but to use the influence they thus acquire through EEC codes and other codes to try to bring about change in the social and economic sectors.

I must say that I do not find these arguments convincing. If 'disinvestment' would hurt blacks most — which I expect is true — this is because the economic structure of South Africa is such that the blacks are most vulnerable; to accept this argument is to accept the legitimacy of this structure. The South African economy undoubtedly sets up pressures in favour of social and political integration, but the evidence so far is that the pressures deriving from South African politics and society against integration are more than sufficient to resist them. Is there not an element of wishful thinking in this economic determinist doctrine so widely held in the business community, and is it not a comfortable rationalisation of the existing system? I admit, however, that 'disinvestment' appears to be a very blunt and uncertain instrument. Its utility as a means of bringing the South African economy to the point of collapse, and so provoking a revolutionary situation — or as part of a policy of disengagement from South Africa — is easier to perceive than its value as a lever to pressure the South African Government.

Thirdly and finally, what, if anything, can South Africa do to cause the Western countries to be more friendly, to bring the Western countries to 'call off the dogs'? Some people in this country would say that what the West does is not of crucial importance for South Africa, and that the restoration of a satisfactory relationship with the West, or prevention of the further deterioration of that relationship, is not a major priority. President Kruger's last message to his people after the failure of his attempts, when in exile in Europe in his last days, to persuade the French and German and other European governments to give support to the Boer guerillas, was to the effect that the Afrikaner people should not put their trust in help from foreigners. Perhaps it is this line of thought that leads some South Africans to the view that South Africa should move towards acquisition of nuclear weapons, or at least towards acquisition of an option to acquire nuclear weapons, as the highest expression of the policy of self-reliance and independence of any allies. I do not propose to discuss this issue except to say that this would be a dangerous course for South Africa to follow, because I believe that the great powers, in the last analysis, will not tolerate the acquisition of nuclear weapons by pariah states. This is, I think, one of the few matters in which the United States and the Soviet Union can be expected to act together in relation to South Africa.

Others would say that while the restoration of a closer relation-

ship with the West is desirable, it is not attainable; that concessions by white South Africa to the demands laid down by the West do not lead to the abatement of these demands, but only to more exacting demands.

I do not myself consider that there is any great likelihood that the Western countries and the present South African state will move closer together. As I have been saying the factors inclining the Western powers to distance themselves are growing stronger, not weaker. The relationship could be repaired only if South Africa began not merely a token, but a fundamental reversal of the separate development policy, and of this there is no sign whatever.

Nevertheless, it is worth drawing attention to the following points. First, South Africa, even as it is now, still has certain selling points in the West, still has a certain credit in Western countries. It is still known and appreciated in the West that South Africa is a country that, at least among its white population, has a constitutional Government, and is a country that in some sense politically and constitutionally still belongs to the Western world and is part of the Western political tradition, however much it and the democracies of North America and Western Europe have diverged. There is in this country still a history of conformity to certain Western values; if South Africa is a 'pariah state' now, it has not always been one, but on the contrary, was at one time a particularly honourable and respectable member of the Commonwealth and of the League of Nations and founder member of the United Nations. It is not possible for Western nations to eliminate this from their consciousness entirely or to forget that in some sense South Africa with all its sins is still part of the West. It is also, of course, a dynamic free enterprise economy and it is widely held to be an important Western interest to preserve such economies where they exist in different parts of the world.

Secondly, however much the West may disapprove of South Africa it still has to be compared, even as it is now, with likely alternatives. In Southern Africa the political issue is not just one of how white rule can be made to give place to black majority rule but also a question of what kind of black majority rule will emerge. And Western policy does still take account of the difference between governments established by constitutional means and governments established by force. When South Africans draw attention to their present virtues by comparison with certain black African states, this is a point that registers in the Western world even though present policies in Rhodesia and South West Africa may lead one to think the contrary.

Thirdly, even if it now seems unlikely, it is still in principle

possible that South Africa might reform itself, or begin to reform itself in such a way as to become the kind of polity with which the West would once again wish to identify. Secretary of State Vance has put forward a formula that what the United States wants South Africa to do is to make 'genuine progress towards an end to racial discrimination and towards full political participation of all South African citizens'. The crucial part of the phrase is 'full political participation'. The fundamental objection to the separate development policy is that it is a policy imposed by the white minority. The West does not seek to prescribe what the prevailing political forms in South Africa should be, but it does demand that they should be generated by debate among all sections of the South African people, and not simply by debate within the white community. Secretary Vance's formula does not necessarily imply a system of 'one man, one vote, one value' in a unitary state, but could in principle be satisfied in a variety of other ways. And some of these other ways seem to include systems of weighted voting, or federal solutions, or conceivably forms of partition.

I must say that nothing I have seen or heard in South Africa leads me to be at all optimistic that the present authorities are likely to move in this direction. I am not confident that an American ultimatum of this sort, or statement that indicates what South Africa has got to do, is productive rather than counter-productive of the effect it is intended to produce. But if South Africa were once again to be regarded in the West as a state that is in the full sense a legitimate one, the changes it would have to make in its domestic arrangements could be no less fundamental than this.

THE RHODESIAN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

The Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole

I would like to tell you as frankly and as honestly as I can what is in my heart, and what is in the hearts of the people back home in Rhodesia or Zimbabwe. Whatever our differences may be with South Africa, whatever points of view we may hold which are at variance with one another, the fact remains that geographically, culturally, historically, economically this country is bound up with South Africa and South Africa with Zimbabwe or Rhodesia. So we are people who find themselves hanging together as it were, for very practical reasons, and therefore it is extremely necessary that

This article is an edited transcript of the tape recording of an address to the Institute at Jan Smuts House on 9 June 1978, plus several questions and answers.

from time to time we should exchange our ideas, our fears, our concerns with one another, so that together we may be able to solve the problems that face this region of Southern Africa. We cannot afford to live in isolation from one another.

Tonight I am supposed to address you on a subject which has been given to me by the Institute and the subject is, *the political situation in Rhodesia*. Now this is a very wide subject and yet in spite of that it is important that we try all means to look at the situation in Rhodesia as objectively as we can so that we may be able to interpret more correctly what is going on in that part of the world. Many of you know very well the history of Rhodesia especially the history after UDI was taken in 1965. You all know that we have held internal talks which have resulted in an agreement, but this agreement has run into difficulties, not because it is not accepted internally but because it is doubted externally. It is doubted by some countries in Europe, in the Eastern bloc, as well as in the independent African states. It is doubted by some of our critics. Now, so far as we are able to study the criticisms that have been levelled against the agreement, we find we have no objective criticisms that can be accepted as valid, but we ask ourselves again and again this question, how is it that some countries do not seem to believe that the agreement in which we believe, will work, how is it that an agreement which was based on a negotiated settlement is not accepted by so many people, especially people outside Rhodesia. We find of course that there are historical factors that tended to contribute to this belief.

History of the Negotiations

Firstly, if one looks at the history of the negotiations to break the deadlock in Rhodesia or Zimbabwe, one finds certain factors which have contributed to this belief. For instance, in 1965 Sir Harold Wilson and Mr Smith met in Salisbury and tried by all means to resolve the threat of UDI but they failed. Then in 1966, on *HMS Tiger* the two gentlemen met and tried to resolve the problem as well as they could, but they failed. And again in 1968 the two gentlemen tried on *HMS Fearless* to resolve the problem, but they failed. Then in 1971 Sir Alec Douglas Home and Mr Smith tried to resolve the problem, but again they failed. Then in 1974 Bishop Muzorewa and Mr Smith met from time to time in Salisbury with the whole idea of resolving the problem, but the results were the same, they were negative. Then in 1975 I well remember, myself and other African nationalist delegates going to the Milton Building, meeting with Mr Smith and his colleagues and trying very hard to resolve the problem, but we all failed. Then at the beginning of 1975 Mr Nkomo and Mr Smith met in

the Milton Building and tried to resolve the problem but they failed. Then at the end of 1976 we met in Geneva, all the African delegations, or rather all the African political parties, were represented there. We tried to resolve the problem but we failed. And so, an impression was gained over the years that the Rhodesian problem was insoluble.

But we continued to seek ways to find a solution to the problem that was facing our country. We again met at the end of last year, precisely in December, and on 3 March we were able to come to an agreement and because we came to this agreement many people did not believe that this agreement would work. They told us that Mr Smith was still the same person, uncommitted to the principle of majority rule on the basis of "one man one vote" and this belief is held by many of the people who are critical of the agreement. But other critics did not understand one point; that from 1965 to 1967 Mr Smith never went into these talks committed to the principle of majority rule based on "one man one vote". He went into those talks fighting that principle but after he publicly said he now accepted the principle of majority rule on the basis of "one man one vote" in the internal talks of this year, he was fully committed to that principle which he had repudiated for almost twelve or thirteen years.

That is the difference which many of our critics have completely failed to understand. They are still dealing with Mr Smith, before he was committed to the principle of "one man one vote", whereas we inside the country are dealing with Mr Smith committed to the principle of majority rule on the basis of "one man one vote". Even the British Foreign Office is still dealing with Mr Smith uncommitted to that principle whereas we inside the country are dealing with a second Mr Smith committed to that principle and hence the difference between our approach and the approach of those who live outside our borders. When the talks began in December 1977 many people were quick to point out to us that we were being deceived — that no positive results could be achieved. We said whatever the case may be, Mr Smith has committed himself publicly to the principle of majority rule on the basis of "one man one vote" and therefore it is only fair that he is tested against what he himself has openly said he accepted. And so, with much criticism by people inside Rhodesia and people in Africa and by people beyond the continent of Africa, we entered the talks, we wanted to demonstrate one way or another that Mr Smith was either sincere or insincere.

This we thought it our duty to do and so we entered into these talks. The talks went on for three months; it was hard bargaining; people were quite frank with one another; the Africans were

frank, Mr Smith and his colleagues were frank; we met on the basis of equality, each delegation expressed exactly what it felt about the entire situation. There was a lot of give and take with the result that after three months we were able to come to an agreement. This to us was very historic. For the last eighty-seven years no such agreement had been reached between blacks and whites in our country, this was the first time, it was historic, it was unique and we support this agreement because it is a voluntary agreement by both blacks and whites, who have accepted to live with one another on a footing of equality.

Majority Rule

Now the agreement is the only correct formula. As far as we are concerned it concedes the principle of majority rule on the basis of "one man one vote" and more than that it also states the date when Rhodesia or Zimbabwe would become independent. If it was an agreement without a date, one probably would have certain reservations with regard to it. But it is an agreement which concedes the fundamental principle of majority rule. We recall many people in our country have been fighting, many people have been suffering, many people have been dying, not because it was a racial war but it is what we have called the franchise war. The majority of the people demanded majority rule on the basis of "one man one vote", and therefore we are quite satisfied that as far as the political battle goes, this has been won, this has been settled whatever the outside world may say, that is their business but our business is to accept the fundamental principle for which so many people have died. The fundamental principle which has been the cause of a bitter armed struggle in Zimbabwe or Rhodesia, has been resolved, has been accepted and this is why we are very happy about the agreement. And beyond that the agreement does state very clearly that Zimbabwe will become independent on 31 December 1978. We believe the agreement is a genuine one, it is a sincere one, but still we get the outside world saying, "No. Mr Smith is taking us for a ride." They are quick to point out because they have had personal experience with the man and with the others. We say to them, "We were with Mr Smith for three months negotiating very hard where he was literally presiding over his own political liquidation. How many people who hold power would preside over their own political liquidation?"

Then after the proceedings we were to sign the agreement. There was every reason why the leader of ZAPU, Chief Chirau, signed the agreement. Bishop Muzorewa also signed the agreement. I also signed the agreement. The three of us signed the agreement because we are literally signing ourselves into power.

But, as far as Mr Smith went, he was literally signing himself out of power. To us this was a sincere demonstration of his own good intention but the world has not yet accepted that. Now I am merely talking objectively about what has taken place in Zimbabwe. We believe that the agreement is a genuine one, we believe that it is going to be implemented and it is going to bring about what the majority of the people in our country would like to have. So, as far as the sincerity of Mr Smith goes, that's a problem for the outside world, but that is not our problem. Recently in Cape Town Mr Smith announced publicly that he was going to retire from politics. This again is more evidence that Mr Smith is quite sincere in what he has said to us and also to the world. But beyond that, after the agreement we formed the transitional government; now I would like this point to be quite clear, that the transitional government is not an end in itself but rather a means to an end.

It is not the thing itself but rather a means of bringing the thing that we would like to come to our country, so that when people look at the present transitional government they must never think that it is the thing that we have been fighting for, that it is the thing that we have been demanding. We have not been fighting for a transitional government, we have not been looking for a transitional government but we have been fighting for independence. The transitional government is merely an instrument to bring about the independence of Zimbabwe.

Release of Detainees

Outsiders often criticize the transitional government as though it were the end of the battle, the end of what we have been fighting for. When in fact the transitional government is a tool to implement the provisions of the agreement that we signed on 3 March this year. Now because the transitional government is a tool it has a problem of bringing about the independence that we expect to come to our country on 31 December. As soon as the transitional government was formed many detainees were released, for instance. More than 800 detainees were released. Less than 200 of them are still to be released. The ban on the prescribed parties was lifted. The whole idea behind it was to effect reconciliation among the people of that country. But we must all begin with a clean slate and learn to think that we are one people moving together, facing the new future, the new social order together as one people deriving the subsistence from the same soil and from the same country. The Executive Council also went further, they are trying by now to dismantle their protected villages which have been very unpopular with the African people, they have declared a general amnesty so that all those who are outside the country, who

couldn't come back for political reasons, who would have been arrested if they returned, now those who have been outside the country are coming back and we can feel that we are moving towards a new era where blacks and whites, coloureds and Asians may live together in peace, and make a success of what is to come to Rhodesia or Zimbabwe. At present the transitional government is drawing up a new constitution for the country, a constitution which is based on majority rule on the basis of "one man one vote", a constitution which is based on non-racialism, a constitution which regards human beings as human beings and not as this or that race. We are working together to bring about a new social era so that we may resolve the problems, the many problems that face us. Already the Ministerial Council is examining many of the laws that are racially discriminatory, so that when Zimbabwe becomes free we will not start trying to fight racialism. We would like the independent Zimbabwe to inherit from Rhodesia non-racialism, so that we may secure a higher measure of racial harmony and racial co-operation and racial peace. And I am glad to say that now the question of racialism is no longer the preoccupation of only the blacks but it has also become the preoccupation of the whites, because we can see that this big experiment will fail unless we the blacks, the whites, the Asians and the coloureds who live in Rhodesia do something now so that when we become independent we become independent as one people, not as two separate peoples, but as one people deriving their very existence from the same country, from the same roots of nationalism.

Some people make the mistake that probably the transitional government will not succeed, but I would like to assure you that anyone who comes to Rhodesia and observes the work of the Executive Council of the Ministerial Council will not fail to be impressed that things in our country are moving towards a definite end and the definite end is independence on 31 December this year. Already we are in the process of registering almost three million voters, we are in the process of having our constitution completed, everything is now moving to a definite time-table, so that we may realize our independence on 31 December and thereby resolve the problem that has faced our country for the last thirteen years. Some people have doubted the irreversibility of our agreement but this doubt is largely due to the fact that they are not aware of the seriousness with which we are tackling the problem. I attended an army conference at Victoria Falls, and a conference of industrialists. Practically all of them criticized the Executive Council for not moving fast enough and removing racial discrimination so that people may once more feel that they belong together, so that that part which has caused so much

trouble may be done away with. And at the ACOR Congress which was held in the same town, the leaders there again and again called upon the Executive Council to move fast enough and make sure that the land tenure act which is based on racialism was removed, so that people might learn to regard one another as people, to regard one another as human beings and not as this or that race.

Important Experiment

So that the experiment we are carrying out in Rhodesia or Zimbabwe is important for Southern Africa, which is inhabited by both blacks and whites. If we succeed, and I have no reason to doubt that it is going to succeed because it is supported by men and women of all races. They want the experiment to succeed and we have no alternative but to succeed. The agreement as far as we are concerned has come to stay. There has been a call for an all party conference. They want the externally based leaders in the transitional government to come together at an all party conference, but naturally because of this agreement we have stated quite clearly that as far as we are concerned the issues are closed. After all what would be the main item on the agenda of an all party conference? We don't see that main item. The main item for the agenda of the African liberation movement has only been majority rule on the basis of "one man one vote". That item has been settled and we do not see why we should re-open the issue, what else would we demand other than majority rule on the basis of "one man one vote"? We feel that the whole idea of an all party conference is really to wreck the agreement and we are not interested in wrecking such a wonderful agreement. Our main preoccupation now is to implement the agreement for the good of our people. In Rhodesia our problem is not one of getting people to accept the agreement or getting the guerillas to accept the agreement, but it is merely one of implementing the agreement and one of assuring the guerillas that nothing will be done to them, but what is required is that we come together to discuss our military problems and settle them. That the military leaders, those who have borne the brunt of the war shall come together, shall confront one another just as white politicians and black politicians have had to consult one another in order to settle the problem. In talking with some of our guerilla commanders one is impressed by the big fear that they have for themselves. I have tried and others have also tried to assure them, but fear is very real, in other words the problem really that we face, with regard to the agreement, with regard to the transitional government, is one of trust, not one of acceptance whatsoever. What is going on now is getting the guerilla leaders and the leaders of the Rhodesian security forces to

come together to discuss the problems that have faced them over the years, so that in doing that they may be able to understand better one another's feelings.

Because we are meeting a certain measure of success and a realistic success for that matter, we are not in any way interested in United Nations forces coming to supervise the peace of Zimbabwe or of Rhodesia. We feel if we can't get the guerillas, and if we can't get the Rhodesian security forces to come together to accept one another to settle their own problem, no other external forces can do that. And even our own guerillas, our own Rhodesian forces, have expressed the same view that it is imperative that the various "in-factions" shall come together and settle the problem that has bedevilled our country for the last thirteen years and this is already going on in various parts of the country and we are quite confident that ceasefire will come, the end of the war will come, provided no outsiders interfere in our affairs too much. We understand one another's emotions much better than any other outsider can do.

Now this is what is going on in Rhodesia or Zimbabwe and we feel that what we have embarked upon is something we understand, is something for the good of, not only Rhodesia and Zimbabwe, but also South Africa and the whole of Southern Africa. Today our cry more than ever before is that people, regardless of the colour of their skins, shall be regarded as people. Now, speaking as the leader of my own party, and I am sure this is shared by the entire Executive Council, by the entire transitional government, we believe that non-racialism is good not only for Rhodesia and Zimbabwe, but for the whole region of Southern Africa.

Position of Whites

Some people often ask us the question, what will happen to the white men after Zimbabwe becomes free, will the leaders of Zimbabwe drive white people out of that country? I am not talking here as a matter of political gimmick. This is our very outlook on life. Our basic principle is one of non-racialism. We believe that we have enough room in Zimbabwe for blacks and whites, for Asians and coloureds, we have enough room for everyone. The white people are not only required to live there because of their technical skills. If that was so, this would be a very immoral proposition. If we say the white people should remain in our country for economic reasons or for the reasons of technical skills, this would be an immoral proposition. Indeed, they are needed for their technical skills, indeed they are needed for their many other gifts but with or without skills it is only morally right that they have a

home in the country in which they have worked and lived for so many years. The white man is free to work there, he is free to live there just as the black man is free to do all these things. So that it should be left in no doubt to all of you that our basic policy is that all races who subscribe to the demands of the constitution of our country are welcome. We are not an anti-race set of people, we are not looking for independence in order to carry out some dangerous schemes against any race, we believe that Zimbabwe and Rhodesia is better off when it has all the races that have built it up to the stage at which it is at present.

I will not keep you much longer, but I would like again to state to you that what we desire in Zimbabwe or in Rhodesia is that the agreement shall work, and we would appeal to all of you to make sure that you help us in the selling of this agreement. The agreement is again a genuine one, it is a voluntary one, it is an agreement between blacks and whites, it is something that comes from the people of Zimbabwe. It is not something that has been superimposed, it is something that is based on democratic principles and sometimes one wonders why democratic countries are so hesitant in accepting that which the people of that land have accepted for themselves. The United Nations, the OAU, Britain and the front-line states have expressed their reservations, they have talked about free elections, fair elections, and yet our agreement guarantees those very things about which they are talking. This is where we are at variance with many of our critics, but we believe that as long as we in that country stick to that agreement, as long as we press forward, it will work and I am glad to say that it is already working.

DISCUSSION

Question:

Is it not possible that the Patriotic Front may aspire to domination, rather than participation, in a democratic process?

Answer:

There can be no doubt that behind the call for an all party conference is the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front, of course, as you are all well aware, is favoured by some of the front-line states. There was one time for instance when one of these front-line states said all power should be transferred to the Patriotic Front and the Soviet Union also repeated the same thing. They even repudiated the whole idea of having elections before independence. Now, according to our own political philosophy inside the country, we say no power should be handed to any political leader however brilliant he may be. No power should be handed over to any political party, but all power must be handed to the people and

then the people will use this power to elect the leaders they like. Those are two fundamental differences between ourselves and the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front would like to have everything their way; we say no, power belongs to the people who after all are immortal in the true sense of the word. Individuals come and go but the people will always be there. I was born myself in 1920, I found the people there. My father was born before 1920 and he found the people there. My grandfather was born before then and he found the people there. I shall die and leave the people there, and all of you one by one will die but you will leave the people there. They are the correct, the right, fundamental depository of all power.

This question concerns the economic future of Rhodesia after a new government has come into power. Mr Smith is potentially abdicating power by having signed this agreement, and he is placing a great deal of trust in the position that the whites will have after a majority government has taken power. This will depend largely on the economic policy and intentions of such a majority government, what are those intentions?

I think in the course of my talk tonight I did indicate to you that we would like to do away with racialism now during the interim period, so that when Zimbabwe becomes free and independent we will not start racial agitation against the whites, this is because we would like the whites to be as happy as we are. We want them to have real confidence in the country which after all, is as much theirs as it is ours. And now, there can be no doubt, that mutual trust means that when Zimbabwe becomes independent the white people without being placed in a precarious position will continue to live there as happily as they can. Our trust is mutual, we have, for instance, in an assembly of 100 representatives, 72 Africans and 28 whites. That was done in order to assure the whites in our country that they have a place in a free and independent Zimbabwe. We have a fairly sophisticated economy in our country and this economy was built as a co-operation between blacks and whites and we are quite sure that a free and independent Zimbabwe will continue for a very, very long time to come to need this co-operation.

Now there is the question of property — the economic policy that we are going to adopt. We have stated quite clearly from time to time inside our country, in the United States, in the United Kingdom, in France and elsewhere that our economic policy is one of mixed economy. Some people have a tendency of saying that capitalism was introduced to Zimbabwe by the whites who came there in 1890, and others have the tendency of saying that socialism was introduced in that part of the world by the contact of the African people with the Eastern world, both analyses I am afraid

are quite wrong. I am talking strictly from the conflicts of Zimbabwe or Rhodesia. If you look at the ownership of cattle, goats, poultry, fields, huts and other things that people work for or acquire by their own effort, you will find that this ownership of property is based on the principle of individual ownership not collective ownership. And after all what is free enterprise, what is capitalism? It is basically individual ownership of this or that according to one's neighbours, so that capitalism is not something which has been introduced to us by whites.

Now when we come to socialism it is exactly the same thing. All the gifts of nature for instance, the trees, the rivers, the woods, the stones, the land, locusts, birds and animals, these may be used collectively or communally or owned collectively. We distinguish very clearly between what we work for and what is the gift of nature to us. These concepts were not taught to us by foreigners from the West or from the East, they are as native to the country as we are, hence our insistence that our economy has got to be a mixed one, so that we cater for what is already inherent in our own people.

Then there is the question of farms. The African population in Zimbabwe increases at the rate of 3.6 percent every year. This means we shall continue to need more and more food, therefore we shall continue to need more and more systematic farming. Some of us have had the opportunity of visiting other independent countries inside Africa as well as outside Africa. In Zimbabwe hunger is not so much our problem and we would like to keep hunger away from our country, and the only way of doing that is to see that there is a very strong farming community. In our submission for the elimination of the land tenure act, and in our endeavour to get away from the racial concept of the land, we have made it quite clear that what we would like to see now in this country is that land is classified into three categories namely, general land, which shall consist of all land on freehold titles and then communal land which shall be owned and used communally, and also wild park land, or unalienated land, which shall be used according to our own purpose. Now the idea is that at no time do we envisage a situation in an independent Zimbabwe when every person shall have so many acres of land.

But we envisage a rising incidence of African industrialization, of African urbanization, of African professionalization, so that more and more food will be required by those who are in urban areas. Those who are in industries, those who are in professions, do not have to grow their own food. And in order that we may have more and more food we naturally will need as many white farmers, as many black farmers, as we can have. There is also the question of unemployment. Systematic farming does provide a

good deal of employment, apart from making it possible to have quite a sizeable foreign trade. Now anyone who thinks that after independence all the black people will go on the rampage, just seizing the property of other people, is quite mistaken. We have deep respect for the property of other people. As we say in Shona, everyone must eat his own sweat not another man's sweat. This is very basic in our own thinking.

You can imagine what will happen in any country, where you say, "Alright, black people, we have now got our independence, you can go anywhere and get whatever you like from these people." You would be introducing a society that has no moral scruples whatsoever, a society that will be a real danger to itself. The point of individual property will be restricted, probably I should state also, doubts are cast on part of our economic thinking by three questions. How much should the state own so that it does not become a threat to the freedom of the people? For instance, what would happen in a situation where the state owned practically everything? The people will become the creatures of the state instead of the creators or the masters of the state. So even the state itself has to be controlled in its ownership of things. Then the next question that guides us in our thinking is, how much should individual communities own, so that they are strong enough to resist the dictatorship, or the tyranny, or the abuse of the government that may take place from time to time? They must own something, they must control something, they must have something, so that they are strong enough to stand against governmental tyranny. The third question is, how much should an individual have, or own, or control so that he is not a mere cog in the enormous structure of the state or of the community, so that he is strong enough to reassert his own spirit against whatever tyranny there may be around him, so that he can defend his own freedom?

These are the things we have in mind. There was a time when people were thinking that when the government owned everything and told everybody else what to do and what not to do, everything would be fine, but experience has shown that it doesn't work out that way. It is only if the government owns something or the state owns something, the community owns something and the individuals own something, that you can get the right balance for any society. After all, competition is very essential in any society that is to be prosperous or progressive. Once you take away the element of competition, the society becomes stagnant. Once you take away individual initiative, again it is the society that suffers. In our own society, in a new independent Zimbabwe, we will make sure that competition and individual initiative are allowed to go on. It is only by allowing these to go on that our country can continue to be progressive.

Are the 28 white parliamentary seats consistent with Mr Sithole's views that the new government should be free of racialism?

That question was asked of me by the British Foreign Office. I do not know if the questioner comes from the British Foreign Office. It is a question that has been posed to us by various people and I am glad that even here they are aware of it. Being practical men, being pragmatic, we saw that there are big fears among the whites, and we wanted to assure them that we were thinking of their interests, that they should be allowed a period of adjustment, because we recognized that radical changes were coming to our country. You know any change is very fearful. People are afraid of change — just change alone without knowing exactly what it has in store for them. So we felt that in spite of our fundamental principle of non-racialism, the whites need a period of adjustment to the new situation. So we decided that we would violate the letter of the principle to serve its spirit. Some said, we shall liberally violate our own principle for the sake of our fellow whites here for five years. Others felt it was a little too short a period. We should give it ten years so that they can adjust themselves better, so we have agreed to that period of adjustment after which we all return to non-racialism. I recognize that in principle we are wrong, but in practice and in point of human need we are right.

I would like to ask the Honourable Minister how soon he expects to hold the free elections given the fact that the death toll in the guerilla war is now higher than it has ever been since the war started; and secondly, given the fact that his own repeated attempts to persuade his followers to lay down their arms and back the settlement has so far been a conspicuous failure, how soon can the elections be held?

I am not so sure that we have failed, if we look at what is happening in the country. There are people dying there, there can be no doubt about it, I will not deny that. There are people dying, but you know that we have outside enemies who would like to make sure that the agreement fails. But that does not mean to say that we are not in control of the situation. However, that is beside the point. What we are doing points to one thing, and that is that we are going to have free and fair elections by the end of this year, most probably in November. I would like to assure the questioner that so far as we are concerned, we see a decrease in the number of people who are dying — in the number of incidents. You may get certain areas that are very difficult, but in general terms you could say the situation was improving in spite of the fact that in certain areas the situation has got worse.

Mr Minister you are contradicting the statistics put out by the government of which you are a member, which would say the death toll is increasing.

In certain areas, not throughout the country.

Overall, Mr Minister, overall it has been increasing. If it continues at the present rate, 60 percent as many people will die this year as have died in the whole of the guerilla war in the past five years. Those were the statistics put out by your Government's Ministry of Information.

It is not my intention here to say one way or another, but from the reports that we get, for instance the report that we got this morning from various places shows quite clearly that the elements which have been sent into the country to disrupt whatever we are doing, are being taken care of. You should also bear in mind that there is a determined effort to disrupt the agreement in the transitional government. But on the other hand we are trying our very best to get the situation under control.

OUTLOOK FOR RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE

Bishop A.T. Muzorewa

A visitor to my house said to me the other day, "Bishop, you will lead our people from Rhodesia into Zimbabwe in the same way that Moses led the children of Israel from Egypt to Canaan. But", he warned, "you will not surmount barriers of water as Moses had to. Your barriers will be barriers of fire."

The difficulties inherent in the outlook for Rhodesia and for the transition to Zimbabwe and indeed for Zimbabwe itself are considerable. It would be self deception to pretend otherwise. We shall pass through barriers of fire as my visitor graphically put it. Yet, the real significance in the outlook for Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is that, since March 3, 1978, we can now see our way through to a Canaan, this land of milk and honey which is the logical objective of our struggle. Before March 3, 1978, the prospect was misty and clouded. We were then blundering our way to possible chaos. We were slowly but surely edging towards the alternative which is "too ghastly to contemplate", as Mr Vorster warned. We have now taken the turn towards the option of a Zimbabwe of peace, progress and prosperity.

I have referred to a Zimbabwe of milk and honey. I have referred to a Zimbabwe of peace, progress and prosperity. It is well justifiable to demand a more definitive picture and vision of this objective. Let me state that I am, in this respect, an idealist and as such am guided to the future by a vision born of conviction. The

Zimbabwe which is the objective of my efforts must literally flow with milk and honey. The constant and continuous availability of food to all citizens, regardless of economic and social status and in contrast and deliberate negation to Africa's chronic food shortages, must be the fundamental concern of the state. The absolute freedom from hunger must be equated with all the other democratic freedoms in promotion of peace, harmony, political stability, and the citizen's ability to exploit his full potential. In pursuit of the same, there must be an equitable distribution of national wealth and equally important, there must be induced an increase in national prosperity through the encouragement of private investment and private enterprise, side by side with the operations of state enterprises.

A Non-Racial Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwe of my visions and my plans must needs be a non-racial Zimbabwe, a non-racialism encompassing all aspects and spheres of national life. We have learnt this bitter lesson in Rhodesia that racialism breeds war and conflict and a corrosive instability apart from the objective and philosophical fact that racialism is a negation of basic human rights. Zimbabwe must be inhabited by citizens and residents who are first and foremost human beings and whose status thereafter is determined by their own merit and achievement in their respective fields of endeavour.

My condemnation of racialism and my advocacy of non-racialism must needs be extended to the complementary condemnation of tribalism and the advocacy of non-tribalism. The rationale is the same. Like racialism, tribalism causes division and instability. It causes conflict and war and bloodshed. It is a negation of human and individual rights. It matters not to me that over 80 percent of the people of Rhodesia are Shona while the other 10 to 15 percent are Ndebele. I am deliberately and philosophically blind to the fact that there are linguistic and regional differences amongst the Shona people. These distinctions, to me, are the preserve of anthropologists and similar academicians. They have no practical and indeed pragmatic relevance to the Zimbabwean political outlook.

The land of milk and honey presupposes that the land respects basic individual rights buttressed by the constitution, an independence of the judiciary and a justiciable Bill of Rights. Basic human rights must not be mere protective devices for minorities. They are an indispensable guarantee against bad government and human frailties.

The question is often posed to me regarding the nature and

depth of relationships between an independent Zimbabwe and the Republic of South Africa, our giant southern neighbour. The response must be an inclusive one, embracing relations with all our neighbours. Fate and geography have decreed that Zimbabwe shall be a land-locked country while the accident of historical development had established bonds of economic interdependence between Zimbabwe and all her neighbours. To ignore these facts and these bonds would spell jeopardy for Zimbabwe and her well-being as a state and consequently the well-being of her people. It becomes a matter not only of statesmanship but of sheer necessity for Zimbabwe to seek good neighbourly relations with all her neighbours. This is the honest, the realistic, and the pragmatic approach.

Another question often posed to me is whether Zimbabwe shall identify itself with the capitalist camp or with the communist camp, the two major economic ideologies identified with the West and East respectively. I do not believe that Zimbabwe must make a categorical choice between the two. Our relations with our neighbours, I have already said shall be governed by pragmatism and the self interest of Zimbabwe, regardless of the hue of state politics followed by those neighbours. In like manner, Zimbabwe shall adopt the same pragmatic and non-aligned view with regard to East and West. Where capitalist systems or socialist systems shall be most suitable for the development of Zimbabwe, they shall be employed. The choice must be ours to reject the exploitation of man by man and the yawning gap between rich and poor as inherent in the capitalist system and also the subjugation of the individual and his rights or the state capitalism inherent in socialist and communist systems. The primary objective of Zimbabwe must be the generation of wealth, the accelerated exploitation of our natural resources, and the equitable distribution of national wealth amongst all our people.

The basic choice for Zimbabwe is whether we shall have the capability to sustain democracy or not. In my view, we must sustain the democratic ideal. In my view, we can only attain this goal as long as we remain economically viable. In my view, food shortages, massive unemployment, individual poverty and related economic ills serve as the major corrosive agents on democratic ideals.

Progress towards a Ceasefire

The question arises whether Rhodesia as of now is headed towards the objective I have outlined. Put differently, the question arises whether the Rhodesia created on March 3, 1978, and the Zimbabwe outlined under the agreement of that date has strong

enough prospects to survive the intense and unmistakeable pressures now bearing upon our country. These are specific and pertinent questions to be answered. Is enough progress being made towards an effective ceasefire? Will the agreement gain international recognition? Is the transitional government making enough progress in order to nurture the agreement and make it indisputably credible? Or might the ultimate answer not lie with the much mooted all-party conference? I shall climb down from the realm of visions and ideals and briefly attend to these more mundane issues.

There is no doubt that the achievement of an effective ceasefire is the central challenge facing the transitional government. It would indeed be foolish to minimise the complexity of the whole ceasefire question. We have on our hands a conflict whose roots lie embedded in all of 87 years of minority rule. We have a war fanned by deep racial hatreds, fears, suspicions and frustrations. We have a society whose norms and very culture are dominated by violence. Then, on the peripheries of our already volatile situation, there are external forces ready to reap gains from sustained conflict. That is the context in which we seek an effective and urgent ceasefire.

I find it remarkable that we have made as much progress as we have, given these complexities. I am personally flattered that my meetings in the operational areas have immediately resulted in a tangible reduction of war activities in those areas. I am already on record as saying that there are now areas where government forces and guerillas live side by side and in peace. I believe that these successes will escalate because while war breeds more war, peace breeds more peace. I am indeed now more confident than ever before that we shall achieve the necessary level of de-escalation of hostilities for the holding of free and fair general elections before the end of the year.

Key to International Recognition

Success at holding free and fair elections shall, we fully expect, end the current prevarications and ambivalence of the British Government with regard to recognition. But I do not believe that the key to international recognition lies with Whitehall or the White House of Capitol Hill or the Kremlin, Lusaka, Dar-es-Salaam or Addis Abbaba. I believe the key lies in Salisbury with the transitional government. It is possible that we have overdone the begging bowl approach and not enough of generating reforms and changes in our own society as the surest way to international recognition. Purely in a spirit of self criticism, we have not moved fast enough to remove all racial discrimination, to dismantle the

principle of protected villages, to translate the spirit and letter of the Salisbury Agreement into irreversible fact.

There is many a time when I have wished the transitional government were a UANC government, responsive to the wishes and aspirations of the masses of Zimbabwe. Then we would have a homogeneous government and a streamlined decision-making unitary authority.

Be it as it may, the transitional government is holding together and will continue to hold together. Barring the slow progress, some solid preparatory work has been achieved behind the scenes. Various committees of government have drawn up detailed plans ranging from the mechanics of general elections to principles of national service under majority rule. The provisions of the Salisbury Agreement remain inviolate to all of us and we all of us have the fullest intention to carry them out to their logical conclusion. I do not believe that there is a viable alternative to the Salisbury Agreement, given my stated vision of a democratic, stable, peaceful and progressive Zimbabwe.

I am aware that a panacea for all our problems is being promoted in certain quarters. It has been put to me that an all-party conference involving the participation of the so-called Patriotic Front would be such a panacea. I am immediately reminded of that other all-party conference in Geneva back in 1976. That conference solved nothing and only served to enhance differences and bring us closer to the Cold War arena. I do not for one moment believe that the so-called Patriotic Front have either the capability or the capacity to improve on the Salisbury Agreement or indeed to improve on our progress towards an effective cease-fire. I believe it would be wrong in principle to go to the conference with an intention of determining how much power should be accorded to one particular black leader or set of black leaders. That would be an unacceptable usurpation of the sovereign right of the people. If, on the other hand, a conference of the type suggested has no other purpose than to save the political faces of some leaders or of the British Government, then the promoters must come out in the open and say so. In that case I would choose to save the nation rather than save selfish power-hungry faces.

I am not averse to attending a conference whose objective is to promote positively identified interests of Zimbabwe and all her peoples. My colleagues in the Executive Council and I are agreed that the positive interests to be discussed at any further conference on Rhodesia must be spelt out and then we shall look at them.

Finally, I must stress that the outlook for Rhodesia/Zimbabwe can only be examined in the light of two alternatives. On the one hand, there is the Salisbury Agreement, an established and con-

crete existence in the middle of the very conflict it has been designed to resolve. On the other hand, there is the conflict itself and the prospect of its perpetuation until chaos reigns. If there is a choice, and I do not believe there is one, then the Salisbury Agreement presents the only viable alternative leading to stability, peace, progress and independence for our dear and beautiful country, Rhodesia now and Zimbabwe after December 31, 1978.

DISCUSSION

Question:

This question is on the economic aspect, the sort-of bread-and-butter politics. It refers to the fact that part of the Anglo-American plan would involve a massive injection of capital, which of course would not be available if that plan was not accepted. The Questioner would like to know how the Bishop thinks that they could manage without that capital.

Answer:

Of course, there is a lot of truth in the fact that economically we are getting desperate. We wouldn't mind if you threw some of your spare money to our transitional government, because we need it very badly. We very much wanted to solve our problem on the basis of the Anglo-American proposals, but we found out that the other people were just playing politics. The Anglo-American advocates were just stringing along because they wanted to pacify, or appease, the Patriotic Front, because the Patriotic Front was supported by the OAU. The OAU in turn being supported by the frontline states, and they by Dr Kaunda, because of his friendship for Mr Nkomo and so on. We decided therefore to talk with the man who holds the power in Rhodesia. This was not the first time that we tried to do that, but it was the only time that it worked. So although we wanted very much to base our settlement agreement on the Anglo-American proposals, we were faced with tactics of appeasement and time was of the essence. The people were anxious for us to talk to Mr Smith, so we talked. We were forced by the gravity of the situation and we did not get the money. But I think one of these days there are going to be some people who will regain their moral senses and they will start recognizing us, and I think money will follow. I believe that.

The Bishop indicated that he would like to reach a solution by means of persuasion. However, the evidence, since 3 March, would indicate that persuasion is not succeeding. The country is running down, even in the country areas cattle cannot be dipped, etc. How are you going to organise a peaceful election in these circumstances?

I'm glad that this question has been put because I have to correct a false impression here. When I talked about persuasion I talked

about it in the context of ceasefire. In our agreement of 3 March we said that we would try to bring the forces together. We would try to integrate the security forces and the nationalise forces. That's what I was referring to, not beating these people. That's what I meant by persuasion. In other words, we are now supposed to go and explain to these people that there is an agreement. You may notice from casualty figures that the people who are being killed or massacred now are not military people — they are defenceless civilians. I don't believe that this is real confrontation between forces. The evidence before us, as we talk, is that there is a movement towards the right direction, but it is taking time. And I can promise you that this is not merely talking politics, I am being honest with you in saying that the trend is in the right direction, but progress is very slow. In certain areas forces and guerillas are now meeting without exchanging fire. This has not happened before. As far as elections are concerned, judging on what I know is taking place, I'm quite convinced that there will be elections.

A TRILATERAL WORLD APPROACH

A Report of the Trilateral Commission on the Management of Interdependence

A plan to guide the industrial nations in seeking solutions of their common problems and those of the Third World was outlined in a report produced by the Trilateral Commission — a foreign policy study group comprised of business, labour and government leaders from North America, Western Europe and Japan (to which US President Carter and his National Security Adviser, Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, once belonged). The report was prepared by Richard N. Cooper, US Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Karl Kaiser, Director of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs in Bonn; Masataka Kosaka, Professor of Law at Kyoto University. Dr Brzezinski, who was formerly a Columbia University professor, was a consultant. The following article is a condensation of a working draft of the report, which first appeared in The Christian Science Monitor, as reproduced in Horizons USA, No. 24, Availability List 4/78, No. 8.

The international system is undergoing fundamental changes which could enhance the likelihood of economic, political and ecological breakdown; but such an outcome is by no means a foregone conclusion.

Man remains the maker of his own history; by understanding the forces at work and by co-operative action, he can influence the ongoing transition to move it toward his social and political goals. Contemporary problems seem greater in magnitude than those of

the 1950s and 1960s, but there is no alternative to approaching them jointly with a will to influence the course of events. Focusing on the next decade or so, this report attempts to develop an appropriate strategy of action for the Trilateral countries.

The international system is characterized by increasing complexity and interdependence, but co-operative management of interdependence and complexity faces great difficulties. Among nations, political and ideological barriers undermine co-operative approaches to global problems.

Power shifts among states have been insufficiently accommodated in decision-making arrangements. Great disparities between richer and poorer countries turn interdependence into dependence for the poor, it is argued, and some call for disassociation from the industrial world.

Within all nations, the desire for autonomy and the traditional concept of sovereignty remain more or less strong. Domestic concerns still dominate national political processes. Interdependence creates mutual vulnerability and interference across national frontiers, at the same time that modern welfare states, created in response to the rising expectation of citizens, more actively seek to shape national conditions.

What principles should guide the Trilateral countries in their approach to managing our increasingly interdependent world?

With its numerous complexities and uncertainties, the temptation will be strong to adopt a completely pragmatic approach; in short, to "play it by ear." The Trilateral countries should surmount this limited view and have in mind a broad strategy for the management of interdependence. At the same time, however, large-scale detailed blueprints for action are too ambitious at the present time and likely to lead to no action. Many countries are not yet prepared or willing to act in close co-operation with others, and the sheer scale of protected international co-operation may overburden existing capacities.

What is required is a framework of action — a general strategy — which will provide a sense of direction or guidance for the handling of particular international problems.

The overall goals within this framework include keeping the peace, managing the world economy, contributing to economic development and the satisfaction of basic human needs and avoiding ecological breakdowns. Within these broad goals, countries should work out modes for international co-operation that are practicable and effective for each of the particular problems they face.

Elements

There are several key elements of a strategy for making

problems more manageable, for co-operation in the management of interdependence:

Piecemeal functionalism — We do not underestimate the difficulty of separating issues for the purposes of discussion and negotiation — what we call piecemeal functionalism. But experience shows that when separation of issues is feasible, progress in reaching agreements is likely to be faster and more durable. For many issues a considerable degree of separation is practicable.

Decentralized management — At the international level, the emphasis should be placed on rule making rather than management; wherever possible the function of management should be pushed down to lower levels.

Flexible participation — The appropriate international participation will vary from area to area. We support the participation of as many of those interested as is consistent with effective solution of the problem. Whatever form co-operation takes, it should include a built-in mechanism for review and adaptation.

Evolutionary change — A global strategy should allow for evolutionary change. We cannot freeze the present relationships among countries any more than we could 25 years ago. Changes in institutional relationships should be encouraged as circumstances change in order to sustain effective decision making and management.

There will, of course, be exceptions to these principles; where seemingly diverse issues cannot be effectively uncoupled, where effective management requires international management and not merely rule making and where effective solutions require universal participation.

Our basic argument is for flexibility in approach, as circumstances require. General adherence to the principles will make more tolerable the occasional exceptions. International management will be more readily accepted in a few distinctive areas; for instance, if it rests within a general approach that strongly supports and reinforces national autonomy within a framework of agreed rules.

Central Problem

The management of interdependence has become the central problem of world order for the coming years. Its origins lie in the expansion of interaction between modern states and societies.

In the psychological and social domain, the growth of communication, the flow of ideas and the movement of persons as a result of modern transport and mass tourism have resulted in greater

knowledge about other societies, in the mutual impact of ideas and in the formation of transnational links of interest and even action. There is not only growing knowledge but also greater concern about places remote from one's residence. To the rise of expectations in poor countries, partially fed by this interaction, corresponds a rising feeling of compassion and sometimes of guilt among a number of people in the rich countries with respect to the poor countries, especially among youth.

In the economic and political domains, interdependence has grown to an unprecedented scale. The rapid growth of international trade and finance has led to an intense degree of mutual dependence. The vast amount of internationally owned and managed production provides a particularly important transnational link, as does mutual dependence on vital imports such as oil, food and other raw materials.

While interdependence is a web that connects practically all states of the globe, it remains fragile. Nuclear proliferation and undesired ecological change are two increasingly important threats to these ties. Avoidance of nuclear war is rarely discussed as part of the problem of interdependence. It is, however, generally regarded as a condition for the solution of all other problems of world order, for nuclear war threatens the survival of mankind.

Proliferation concerns no longer focus on countries like Germany and Japan — since they have ceased to be a problem in this respect, if they ever really were — but on unstable or adventurous countries in the developing world, especially in areas of conflicts and violence, which could acquire a capacity to build nuclear weapons. In fact, unless the states of the world are capable of innovation in this field, a period of instability and violence could be opened compared with which the past quarter-century may appear as a *belle époque*.

Environment

The origins of the environmental problem lie in industrialization, the introduction of modern agricultural techniques and the expansion of population — though the perception of the wide-scale importance of the problem is recent. It is an international problem in that pollution in one country often affects the environment in others as well. In the case of ecological interdependence, the transmission of the effects of local or national action can be much less resisted by outsiders than in other types of interdependence where a limited option of withdrawal exists by cutting transnational links and interaction — though at considerable cost.

The present international system has not sufficiently solved the problem of accommodating shifts in power among nations and

their desires for new roles.

To the developing countries the disparities in economic and political power form the central shortcoming of interdependence, which becomes a system of dependence for the weaker members. What was once theory among intellectuals from or sympathetic toward developing countries is now the basis of much of the rhetoric, if not the political strategy, of the developing countries. The division of labour within the present world economy, so the argument runs, provides no benefits for the weaker countries. Moreover, the dependent states of the Third World have structured their entire economy and external trade according to priorities defined by stronger industrialized states and not by their own needs.

Some intellectuals, groups and governments in the Third World increasingly lean toward a strategy of disassociating North and South.

The Trilateral countries regard acceptance of pluralism as an essential characteristic of human organization. Being fully aware of the differences between themselves and others, they do not set out to remake the world in their own image but accept the existing variety.

But acceptance of the pluralistic nature of world politics cannot and must not imply acceptance of gross and arbitrary disparities in distribution of gains, violation of human rights and repression.

The Trilateral approach combines self-interest with concern for a more effective and humane world order. The Trilateral countries should be "outward looking" in their perspective on the rest of the world, generous and co-operative in spirit, attempting to internalize the interests of others, in particular by helping the less privileged countries. At the same time they should strongly resist developments that threaten their fundamental values.

Trilateral co-operation appears necessary to ensure that the tendencies toward disassociation at work within the developing world, as well as in the industrialized countries and the communist countries, do not undermine global co-operation. The idea of strengthening the self-reliance of the developing countries, which is, in fact, an indispensable goal of development policy, could degenerate into a rejection of an integrated world economy if present trends continue.

Similarly, the confrontation atmosphere in North-South relations has strengthened those strands of public opinion in advanced countries which advocate a policy of retreating into a bastion of co-operation among a closed and exclusive club of advanced countries, leaving the developing countries to their own fate. In addition, the precarious links of co-operation between the

communist world and the West would be threatened if a concept were to be implemented in world politics that subdivides the world into three encapsulated regions of advanced countries, developing countries and communist countries. We believe that effective, confidence-building co-operation is the best way to resist these tendencies.

We also believe that the Trilateral countries should aspire to go beyond merely *coping* with future events to *shaping* these events. They should have in mind a broad global strategy for the management of interdependence.

The major tasks of a global strategy involve keeping the peace, managing the world economy and satisfying basic needs.

Peace Keeping

A prime desideratum for any system of world order is keeping the peace. The utmost efforts must be made (1) to achieve limitations on and eventually reductions in the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons; (2) to reduce forces and de-escalate confrontation in conflict areas, such as Europe and Korea, where the use of nuclear weapons could threaten; and (3) to prevent other parts of the world, such as Africa or the Middle East, from becoming battlegrounds among big powers even when local conflicts erupt.

Beyond keeping the peace, we should strive for a world order that allows diversity of values and circumstances but also achieves the substantial gains to be derived from close international co-operation on a host of issues. We believe that the four key elements of a strategy for co-operation amid diversity are the following: (1) piecemeal functionalism; (2) international rule-making combined with national, regional or local management; (3) flexible and open-ended participation; and (4) allowance for evolutionary change.

The case for separation of issue areas — what we call piecemeal functionalism — is at least threefold. Strong gains to all participating countries can be made in numerous specific, functional areas. These gains are most likely to be achieved by focusing on the functional area in question rather than through diplomatic discussion and negotiation cutting across many areas. Finally, agreement is more likely to be achieved among specialists treating the issue as a relatively technical one than among political generalists for whom the issue is more likely to become symbolic of victory or defeat for particular national or regional political viewpoints.

The modern world is complex, requiring strong specialization among men. This specialization creates common bodies of knowledge and common intellectual frameworks among specialists from many nations; and in many functional areas coalitions of

specialists can be built across national boundaries, blunting the nationalism that might otherwise hinder international agreement.

Many linkages exist among seemingly diverse issues. We do not under-estimate the difficulty of separating issues for the purpose of discussion and negotiation. Nor do we mean that issues should always be divided as finely as conception allows. Experience does show, however, that when separation of issues is feasible, progress on solutions is likely to be faster and the solution is likely to be more durable. Some issues are technically linked, but for many issues a considerable degree of separation is practicable.

The separation of issues raises the question of how the gains from co-operation are to be distributed among the participants, of how to achieve what in tariff negotiations is called reciprocity.

In addition to keeping the peace and maintaining close co-operation among industrial countries on a wide range of issues of common interest, a global strategy for the Trilateral countries should involve efforts to foster economic development and alleviate poverty in the poorer countries of the world. Inevitably the major effort toward economic development must be made by the countries themselves; development cannot be imported. But the Trilateral countries can manage their affairs so as to encourage economic development elsewhere in the world.

Above all, the major industrial countries should manage the economies of their own countries to ensure a stable and vigorous demand for imports. Sharp ups and downs in economic activity in the Trilateral countries, which are the major source of foreign exchange earning for developing countries, do incalculable harm to economic progress in those countries.

Second, sound economic management can be supplemented by explicit schemes for stabilizing both export earnings of developing countries and prices of certain primary products of special interest to developing countries, either as importers or as exporters. We already have the compensatory financing arrangement of the International Monetary Fund to provide special loans to countries whose export earnings have fallen below certain historical norms; and this is supplemented for some less developed countries by the Lomé Agreement of the European Community, although the amounts potentially available under the latter scheme are quite small. If it seems necessary in the light of future demand management, these two facilities should be improved.

Although the situation has improved compared with the past, it remains true that the tariff structures of many industrial countries provide artificial inducements to the location of early-stage processing industries in the industrialized countries. Low or zero tariffs are charged on raw materials and higher tariffs on

materials that have gone through one or two stages of processing.

This processing could sometimes be more economically located in countries where the raw materials originate, where it would also serve to increase employment, help develop a modern industrial labour force and generate taxable profits. The industrial countries should remove these distorting effects of their tariff structures during the ongoing multilateral trade negotiations.

A more important commitment in the area of trade policy would be for the industrial countries to provide open markets for the growing volume of manufactured products that many developing countries are able to produce successfully. Exports of these manufactures to North America, Europe and Japan have grown rapidly. What is needed is assurance that success in exporting to these markets will not subject a developing country to the imposition of import barriers or to arm-twisting to introduce "voluntary" export restraint.

Poverty has been endemic throughout man's history. Over the last two centuries a remarkable thing has occurred: roughly one-third of mankind has been lifted from grinding poverty and is now able to enjoy many of the amenities of life that over the ages have been limited to only a tiny fraction of the world's population.

Psychological Interdependence

The same improvements in transportation and communication that have made the world more interdependent economically, and more productive, have also increased the flow of information about other societies and hence create psychological interdependence — enlarging aspirations in the poorer parts of the world, and engendering guilt feelings in the richer parts.

It is not possible to eliminate world poverty at a stroke. It has recently been suggested that the ratio of per capita income (after adjusting for differences in local purchasing power not adequately recorded in per capita gross national product) between the wealthiest 10 percent and the poorest 10 percent of the world's population should be reduced from the current 13-to-1 to a much more modest 3-to-1 by the year 2010. This target seems beyond the realm of practicality, however, for it implies that the poorest 10 percent — basically, India — should experience over the next 35 years a per capita rate of growth about 50 percent higher than Japan's extraordinary rate of growth (7.5 percent in real per capita GNP) during the 1950s and 1960s.

But it is possible for the richer countries to contribute toward the improvements in nutrition, health and education that are necessary before individuals can begin to take a longer view of self-improvement.

We believe that the Trilateral countries should substantially increase the flow of resources addressed to alleviating world poverty, with emphases on improving food production, providing simple health care delivery (including healthful water supplies, sanitation and help in family planning) and extending literacy.

These programmes should be available wherever there is poverty, with minimal political constraints. The grants can properly be subject to conditions to achieve their stated objectives and be closely monitored for their effectiveness in alleviating poverty. Recipient countries whose sense of national sovereignty is offended by such conditions can decline the foreign assistance.

In the current situation of complexity and uncertainty, there is a need for strong "poles of co-operation" which will attract and draw in others. The Trilateral region can serve as such a pole. Close Trilateral co-operation in keeping the peace, in managing the world economy and in fostering economic development and alleviating world poverty will improve the chances of a smooth and peaceful evolution of the global system.

LETTERS

André du Pisani argues that South Africa and the United States operate on two conflicting perceptual maps. His letter is in response to an article in the last Bulletin (Vol. 2 No. 1) on "South Africa and the world: which way now?" by Robert Schrire. Mr du Pisani lectures in political science at the University of South Africa.

Sir,

Reading Robert Schrire's article one is struck by the relative intractability of the international environment and the problem it poses for the foreign policy of nations in general and small nations (like South Africa) in particular. Changes in the contemporary international environment, like the growing interdependence among national actors in the system, have implications on both the theoretical and the operational levels of analysis. On the theoretical level it poses the problem of a viable analytical framework to study linkage politics between international and domestic systems. On both levels of analysis it has become meaningless to retain the classical distinction between international and domestic politics and the corollary distinction between external and internal dimensions of foreign policy. It may even be argued that in the case of penetrated systems, like South Africa, it is meaningless to distinguish between foreign policy and domestic policy. Furthermore, this 'cobweb model' of international politics as John Burton typifies it, implies the erosion of national sovereignty, changing

the nature of the nation-state itself. The point is that the international environment goes beyond the mere fact of an increasing interdependence among actors in the international system. Rather it is an example of a process in which the traditional boundaries separating the nation-state and the enviroing international system are becoming increasingly obscured.¹

Framework

Returning to our earlier point, namely the problem of a viable analytical framework to study linkage politics between international and domestic systems, Rosenau's proposed penetrated system may provide some answers. Rosenau maintains that a new kind of analytical system should be devised by foreign policy analysts, "to comprehend the fusion of national and international systems in certain kinds of issue-areas". Such systems he typifies as "penetrated", because they have become so penetrated by their external environment that they are no longer "the only source of legitimacy or even (of) the employment of coercive techniques". Consequently, "national political systems now permeate, as well as depend on, each other and . . . their functioning now embraces actors who are not formally members of the system".²

Although it falls outside the scope of Schrire's paper, Rosenau's framework may provide a tool with which "to explore the nature of South Africa's international environment, so as to highlight the choices facing the country". Rosenau's analytical framework has an additional advantage in that it provides a combination of both the opportunities and strictures presented by the nation's external, operational environment,³ and focuses on the internal, psychological environment⁴ prevailing in the national system. By taking both dimensions into account, a wider range of relevant data may be accumulated and a more comprehensive analysis becomes possible.

Schrire is aware of the fact that policy-makers in foreign as well as domestic affairs "behave on the basis of their perceptions of the situation rather than upon the reality itself". This constitutes the crux of South African/American relations, because these two actors operate on two conflicting perceptual maps. The famous

NOTES:

1. Hanrieder, Wolfram F. "The International System: Bipolar or Multibloc?", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 9 September 1965, pp 299-308. See, also Rosenau, James N. (ed). *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York Free Press, 1961), especially the Introduction and Part I.
2. Rosenau, James N. "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", p. 53.
3. The *operational environment* may be defined as those factors which an outside observer judges to be relevant and significant in explaining an event or state of affairs.
4. The *psychological environment* constitutes the actors' image of reality. This distinction between the operational and the psychological environments is based on Sprout, Harold and Margaret, *Foundations of International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: D. van Nostrand, 1962), pp. 46-47.

words by William Blake "If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything will appear to man as it is, infinite", comes to mind. The official perception in policy-making circles in the United States seems to be that South Africa is heading for a racial inferno unless certain fundamental changes are brought about in the society. For some observers the only issue is how it will happen and in what timespan. Such an eventuality is feared since the evolution of the crisis will force the United States into taking sides between 'white' South Africa and black Africa. In such a choice straight American self-interest is at stake — black Africa has one-third of the voting power at the United Nations; Nigeria is presently America's second biggest foreign supplier of oil, and its trade with the United States is bigger than that with South Africa. Furthermore, as Schrire rightly points out, economic relations have increasingly become politicised. American sensitivity towards Russian involvement in Africa is restricted by the fact that South Africa is a most unwelcome ally in the fight against communism. The present South African regime is an embarrassment both to the West and to moderate African States because its policies of institutionalised racism make it a pariah nation. South Africa is essentially resented because of this. The American Government works on the premise that if the Soviet Union pushes too hard in the sub-continent, America could be drawn into a theatre of super-power conflict, and no outside power could afford to be seen to be defending South Africa. In addition the racial problem in South Africa is perceived to be positively encouraging the expansion of communism in sub-Saharan Africa. Communist expansion in sub-Saharan Africa can only be countered effectively by internal changes of a fundamental but peaceful nature by the present white power elite. The United States and other major Western powers desperately desire some tangible evidence from South Africa's whites (since they have a monopoly on political and economic power) that they are making real progress so as to facilitate peaceful change. The present policy of geo-political partition, to the United States, simply does not offer this possibility, and is therefore dismissed.

Marxist Subversion

The perception of the South African Government towards the United States' foreign policy as it relates to South Africa, was reflected in a recent speech by Mr Vorster in Pretoria, (August 1977), when he concluded that the end result of American pressure on Southern Africa "would be exactly the same as if it were subverted by the Marxists". "In the one case", he continued, "it will come about as a result of brute force. In the other case, it

will be strangulation with finesse".⁵ In the face of mounting external and internal pressures, the South African Government fails to realise that as a penetrated system with limited diplomatic options, it has become impossible to retain the traditional distinction between international and domestic politics. The essential problem regarding these two conflicting perceptual maps, seems to be that both Vorster and Carter perceive their respective policies to be in the best interest of mankind, rooted in moral values, based on an historical vision of their country's respective roles, and as the only one to "an alternative too ghastly to contemplate".

One important question facing policy analysts concerns the implications of co-ordinated external pressures on South Africa. Given these two sets of perceptions, and accepting them as valid, it can be asked whether the South African regime will be pushed forward on the road to majority rule or will it instead frighten the whites into a stockade? George Ball, for instance maintains that South Africa cannot be equated with the American South of the 1860's, because "even the most rabid Northern Abolitionists did not threaten Southerners with the total transfer of political control to the Blacks". Ball argues that external pressure will force South African whites into the laager. Moreover, Western pressure will only encourage the pace of African violence. Other observers argue the opposite case. The argument goes that it is clear that white South Africa, if it decides to go it alone, will topple anyway — a more ghastly scenario than if it gives way now. The forces of change within and around it are now on the advance. The only question is whether the West, by joining these forces, can use its influence to mitigate the carnage that radical change inevitably produces?

In this context the experience of the American civil rights movement tends to be brought in. The civil rights movement taught America, particularly the South, a number of lessons. First, that political progress for blacks and economic progress for whites are not mutually exclusive goals.⁶ Second, that if change is catered for in the era of nonviolent pressure, the chance of democratic institutions being built that are viewed as legitimate by all the parties involved is improved. But if change is resisted — as it was in the Northern States — violence takes over. The situation rapidly polarizes and peaceful political solutions become more difficult. For South Africa, a violent option may entail, in the end, a black

5. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha, has warned that "we cannot negotiate our own destruction now or tomorrow" . . . The premise of the United States' foreign policy is that "the communists would in any case control Africa, as the best way for the West to win back the friendship of the black states would be to take sides against the whites". *Rand Daily Mail*, 18/08/1977, p. 1.

6. See Ambassador Andrew Young's address to industrialists in Johannesburg, May 1977.

marxist dictatorship. Third, that life does not become unbearable if blacks are in command.

Schrire's article is in many respects a welcome and novel approach to a complex problem with ramifications for the world at large. He argues convincingly about the changes that had taken place in the international environment and how these affect South Africa's policy options. The choice before South Africa is clear — change or the laager. Personally, I agree with Schrire that the latter is no option at all. In the words of Alan Paton, it is "the cage, the prison, the grave, an Edifice . . ."

A. du Pisani

All letters should be addressed to the Bulletin Editor, P.O. Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017. It should be noted that correspondence will be subject to editing.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF SOUTH AFRICA

Anthony de Crespigny and Robert Schrire
Juta & Co. Cape Town. 1978. 260 pp.

In the preface to this textbook we are warned that certain chapters are 'hardly orthodox' in their treatment of the political system. Their inclusion is justified because 'the moral issues thrown up by our politics are so critical, it is important to confront our students at the outset with them'. Therefore it might be fairly expected that this book would include some indications of the nature of the debate which has concerned social scientists and historians who have looked at the political process in South Africa. One would also expect that the 'moral issues' would be clearly spelt out. However, instead we are presented with a generally arid and often superficial analysis of the surface of South African politics ('the formal governmental structure') and essays of 'evaluation' which either avoid or duck the major issues which have concerned both liberal and marxist scholars over the past few years.

The assumptions underlying many of the contributions are immediately made clear in an introductory chapter on the context of South African politics. For example: South Africa has a 'dual economy' and the 'existence of migrant labour may be partly attributed to the duality', that is, the 'backward and predominantly subsistence-orientated economies of the homelands'. No indication that there is a school of thought which contends that, on the contrary, migrant labour is at least partly responsible for the 'backward' nature of the reserves, that there is a causal connection between the 'advanced' nature of the urban economy and the poverty of the Bantustans. It is also asserted that wage differentials reflect skill levels rather than being differentials for the performance of identical tasks; this without a hint that there is considerable debate over the point, that employers' willingness to erode job bars has not been accompanied by an attack on the disparities between wages paid to white and those paid to black workers. The whole tone of the chapter, with its implication that economic growth is synonymous with greater social justice, appears to be calculated to reinforce the complacency of South African students rather than arouse in them moral or any other variety of concern.

The chapters on governmental structure and political institutions on the whole do what they set out to do in a dully competent way. It is arguable that an exhaustive knowledge of South Africa's constitutional niceties provides much insight into the relationship

of the State to those it governs. No more than a study of the Soviet constitution would reveal to students of that country. Following on from this is the conviction, implicit throughout the book, but often explicitly expressed, that South Africa's 'problems' can be solved by adjusting the formula, 'the structural device', to meet the 'unique and pluralistic nature of the South African situation'. Of course, another solution might be to alter what is 'unique' or 'pluralistic' (whatever that means) about the South African situation. But to advocate that sort of solution would make studies of institutional and constitutional formalities totally irrelevant. The Government must be able to govern, we are told, then 'a movement towards democratic ideals will follow naturally'. In which case, it could be claimed that in South Africa, the overture has been going on for an awfully long time.

Moving to more specific issues it is surely questionable that the South African authorities 'do their utmost to avoid violence'. Nor is state violence adequately excused by the following apologia:

"Unfortunately, violence has during recent years become so much part of life of all Western societies that its use by the public authorities to maintain law, order and security of the State cannot be avoided."

Certainly it is true that most states employ a degree of coercion but few bourgeois democracies can match the totalitarian quality or the brutality of South Africa's repressive apparatus. A chapter on white political parties is singularly uninformative, even within the limits of the book's general preoccupations. The Progressive Federal Party has been long enough in existence to make its exclusion from a chapter purporting to deal with white politics strange, not to say bizarre. Whereas we are treated to a lengthy 'systems analysis of the extra-parliamentary political decision making processes' of the National and United Parties, we are told virtually nothing about their historical evolution and in particular about the social forces which over time they have reflected. It is not enough to repeat the old racist cliché that the vital distinction in white politics is an English/Afrikaner one: what was crucial to the Nationalist victory in 1948 was their garnering of working class support. But then, class is not really an important factor in understanding the politics of plural societies, is it? The chapter on black politics does have some historical depth, but even so, will do little to disturb the comforting mythology on which most of the book is based. In particular the concept of an urban-rural dichotomy (with 'vast differences in political culture' between the two) deserves to be challenged. The Mpondo Revolt of 1960 gives the lie to the claim that 'attempts by the ANC to extend its influence to

homelands have never been successful'. Similarly, Inkatha's membership provides evidence of the links between rural and urban political consciousness: Inkatha is not simply a 'homeland' party, a greater part of its membership lives around Johannesburg. And to write of 'communist dominance' of the African National Congress is a gross oversimplification.

The final section on political evaluation begins by pointing to distinctions that should be drawn between empirical and evaluative, descriptive and prescriptive, and instrumental and axiological judgements. With these distinctions in mind one can approach the next contribution which is on 'Deriving Policy for South Africa'. And, yes, if you include among your 'empirical assumptions' that 'blacks are finally interested only in the transference of power to themselves, not in sharing power with minority groups', and that the 'creation of wealth and the long run improvement of living standards are greatly assisted by the maintenance of a free enterprise economy', if you think that these statements are not really open to serious argument, then you too will end up with recommendations which would do little more than make trivial adjustments to the *status quo*.

In no way is this text suitable for an introductory course on South African politics: it would neither stimulate the student's interest in the political process, nor (and more importantly) provoke him to ask questions about it.

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University of the Witwatersrand.*

SUID-AFRIKA SE BUITELANDSE BELEID

G.C. Olivier

Academica. Pretoria & Cape Town. 1977. 236 pp.

This book is an excellent macro analysis of South Africa's foreign policy, from both an historical as well as a contemporary perspective. The methodology used by the author illustrates his ability to empirically analyse such a contentious subject as South Africa's foreign policy by means of a soundly formulated theoretical framework, despite the fact that South African politics can seldom be "fitted" into existing theories.

Professor Olivier provides a comprehensive analysis of South Africa's foreign policy, and this book should be viewed in terms of

general tendencies and developments rather than finer detail. The author succeeds admirably in remaining relevant throughout the analysis. A broad spectrum of approaches (traditional-descriptive, structural-functional, integration, power etc.) have been effectively combined in the analysis of the subject.

Chapter 1 focuses on the highlights of South Africa's diplomatic history, in which established patterns of South Africa's foreign policy are identified. Chapters 2 to 7 deal with national determinants of foreign policy (chapter 2); multilateral relations (chapter 3); bilateral relations (chapter 4); South Africa's Africa policy (chapter 5); the values and norms of the decision-making elite which guide South Africa's actions in the international system (chapter 6); and the structural and functional aspects of the foreign policy decision-making process necessary for external action. The author deals with this wide range of matters in an extensive and proper fashion. He illustrates clearly that the locus of decision-making power lies with the Executive rather than with Parliament and that a proper analysis of South Africa's foreign policy is inhibited by the secret nature of policy-making. (Unfortunately little attention is paid to South Africa's relations with states in Australasia, Latin-America or Europe in a regional context (E.E.C.). The author focuses on both the institutional as well as the functional aspects of South Africa's foreign policy, e.g. the impact of non-governmental relations on South Africa's position in the world is placed in its proper perspective.

The pro-Western nature of the Republic's foreign policy which stems from what the author calls a "family association" is emphasised. The author also provides penetrating comments and recommendations to improve the effectiveness of South Africa's foreign policy, (chapter 8). The main reasons for the decline of South Africa's position in world politics, a theme interwoven throughout the book, are outlined. The shortcomings of the structural-functional aspects of foreign policy-making in South Africa are sketched. The main objectives of South Africa's foreign policy are specified, as well as operational policies with regard to specific problems (e.g. Rhodesia) and specific states. The author evaluates the alternatives open for South African foreign policy in the future and emphasises the necessity for a "dynamic future oriented foreign policy for South Africa" and stresses the fact that: South Africa must identify as an African state; and that crucial adjustment to South Africa's internal affairs is necessary to create a viable national base for an effective foreign policy.

A comprehensive bibliography of theoretical and empirical studies is also provided, but unfortunately no subject index was included.

I have no doubts about recommending this analysis to both the serious student of South Africa's foreign policy and the layman interested in the subject.

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MISSION AND COLONIALISM IN NAMIBIA

Lukas de Vries

Ravan Press. 1978. 216 pp.

Dr de Vries has produced a most valuable book connecting the German colonisation of South West Africa with the present problems of that country and even of South Africa. It is all the more valuable because German policies in South West represent an extreme example both of the coloniser's dealings with conquered or "protected" peoples and of the attitude of missionaries and missionary societies to the colonising power.

The sorry story of protection followed by divide and rule, of the colonising of races regarded as inferior by superior European cultures, is told without a great deal of bias. The characters and deeds of Jonker Afrikaner, Hendrik Witbooi and of the Herero leaders, are dealt with at great length in order to show that these men were seen as working for the peace and stability of Namibia by their own people, and as banditti by the occupying power. The final brutal repression of the Hereros becomes the liquid conclusion of a total inability of either side to communicate, in which the responsibility must lie heavily upon those who claimed to be civilised and eminently capable of communication.

Dr de Vries writes as a theologian. I make no apology for this predominance of theology — it is the way the author has chosen. For him the attitude of the Rhenish Mission, head office at Barmen and missionaries in the field, is of paramount importance. They could have prepared for, and assisted in, communication. They appear to have suffered from many disadvantages. They were convinced of the superior value of European, Germanic, Christian culture. They felt they needed law and order provided by European law to proclaim the gospel in peace. They were restricted by what Dr de Vries calls wrong understanding of Luther's doctrine of the Two Kingdoms and found themselves always counselling submission to "the godly prince" who was

always the German governor and never the native chief. They could not see Witbooi's aims as at all Christian (though de Vries admits that Witbooi's faith makes virtually no mention of Jesus Christ or of the Holy Spirit!) They were unable to proclaim man saved by faith in Jesus Christ alone without at the same time promoting European humanitarian aims. It took the bloodshed of the suppression of the Hereros to convince them that something was wrong with their priorities.

Hence Dr de Vries sees the problem as a colonial problem and the racial problem as a failure of Christian mission (in this case the Rhenish Mission) to apply the gospel and lay any sort of foundation. A gospel inadequately presented, assuming conversion where it is not evident, and confusing externals with commitment, can never build up reconciliation of man to man upon such shaky foundations. His conclusions at the end of the book provide a really intelligent criticism of the work of Christian missions and a call back to the way of Christ in suffering. The problem lies in whether Christians in South West or in South Africa, the missionaries and the missionised, will be able to accept and find this way.

G.W.E.C. Ashby,
*Cathedral of St Michael and St George,
Grahamstown.*

BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS

Dee Shirley Deane
Oxford University Press. Cape Town. 1978. 210 pp.

An expanded "Who's Who"; in-depth profiles of fifty-seven of Natal's leading Blacks in many fields of endeavour, local and national, with a preface by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. (Hardcover and paperback).

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

- Laszlo, Ervin., ed. *Goals for mankind: a report to the Club of Rome.* London, Hutchinson, 1977. 434 pp.
Lee, J.M. *African armies and civil order.* London, Chatto and Windus for the IISS, 1969. 198 pp.
Thompson, Sir Robert, *Defeating communist insurgency.* London, Chatto and Windus, 1966. 171 pp.
Turner, Louis, *Oil companies in the international system.* London, George Allen and Unwin for the RIIA, 1978. 240 pp.

INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS

A full list of publications may be obtained from the Administrative Secretary, SAIIA, P.O. Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017, Transvaal, South Africa. Listed below are some examples of recent available publications.

BOOKS AND SPECIAL STUDIES

- *Namibia Old and New*, by Gerhard Tötemeyer. C. Hurst & Co., London, 1978. Published in co-operation with the Institute. Limited number of copies will be available from the Institute at a special reduced price of R15,00 for members.
- *Strategy for Development*, Macmillan, London, 1976. Edited by John Barratt, David Collier, Kurt Glaser and Herman Mönnig. (Based on the proceedings of a conference at Jan Smuts House in December 1974. The third in a series on population growth and development, published for the Institute by Macmillan.) Price: R15,00 if ordered from the Institute.

PERIODICALS

- *International Affairs Bulletin*. Three issues per year. (For subscription details see inside front cover.)
- *Southern Africa Record*. Issued on an irregular basis, approximately four times a year, containing the texts of, or extracts from, official policy statements on international relations in Southern Africa. Price: R2,00 per copy.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

- *Negotiations on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Helsinki to Belgrade*. D.H. McClure. March 1978.
- *The Rhodesian Constitutional Agreement; aspects and prospects*. Max Chigwida. May 1978.
- *Human Rights: their origin, validity and implementation*. A.C. Partridge. June 1978.
- *Political, Security and Economic Relations in the Eastern Bloc*. Richard Szawlowsky. July 1978
- *South Africa's Search for Security since the Second World War*. Deon Geldenhuys. September 1978
- *Nigerian Foreign Policy and The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): two essays*. Keith Campbell. September 1978.
- *Islam in Africa*. J.A. Naudé. October 1978
- *South West Africa/Namibia: The South African Government's Response to the UN Secretary-General's Report on the*

Implementation of the Western Proposal. *The Government's Statement of 20 September, 1978 and an analysis by André du Pisani. September 1978*

Occasional Papers are available gratis to Institute members on request; price to non-members is R1,00 per copy.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND INDEX SERIES

- No. 1 *Index to the Republic of South Africa Treaty Series, 1961—1975.* Compiled by Jacqueline A. Kalley. August 1976.
Price: R2,00
- No. 2 *Transkeian bibliography: 1945 to independence 1976.* Compiled by Jacqueline A. Kalley. November 1976.
Price: R3,00
- No. 3 *South West Africa/Namibia: an international issue 1920—1977: a select bibliography.* Compiled by Elna Schoeman. April 1978. Price R8,00
- No. 4 *Bophuthatswana Politics and the Economy: a select and annotated bibliography.* Compiled by Jacqueline A. Kalley. May 1978.
Price: R3,00
- No. 5 *Index to the Union of South Africa Treaty Series 1926—1960.* Compiled by Jacqueline A. Kalley. September 1978.
This comprises a chronological and subject index to over 300 treaties and international agreements. Price: R6,00.

International Pressures and Political Change in South Africa. F. McA. Clifford-Vaughan. Oxford University Press. Cape Town. 1978.

These essays were originally delivered as papers in a symposium — "International Pressures and Political Change" — held under the auspices of the South African Institute of International Affairs and the Department of History and Political Science of the University of Natal, in August 1977. The authors view pressure, as a diplomatic action, from various perspectives — historical, the evolution of new international relations, from the sociologists' viewpoint, the aspect of the United States and South Africa, and the increasing isolation of South Africa.

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