

International Affairs BULLETIN



**DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

VOL 2 NO 3 1978

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
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(founded/gestig 1934)

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BULLETIN

Published by the South African Institute of International Affairs and supplied free of charge to members. Three issues per year. Subscription rate for non-members R5,00 per annum (surface mail), R7,00 per annum (overseas airmail). Price per copy R1,50 plus postage.

Utgegee deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede en gratis aan lede verskaf. Drie uitgawes per jaar. Intekengeld vir nie-lede R5,00 per jaar (landpos), R7,00 per jaar (buitelandse lugpos). Prys per eksemplaar R1,50 plus posgeld.

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Review copies of books, monographs and pamphlets, as well as all correspondence on editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, *International Affairs Bulletin*, South African Institute of International Affairs, Jan Smuts House, P O Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Resensie-eksemplare van boeke, monografieë en pamflette, sowel as alle korrespondensie oor redaksionele sake moet gerig word aan die Redakteur, *Internasionale Aangeleenthede*, Suid-Afrikaanse Instituut van Internasionale Aangeleenthede, Jan Smuts-Huis, Posbus 31596, Braamfontein 2017, Johannesburg, Suid-Afrika.



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Vol. 2, No. 3, 1978

CONTENTS

Notes on Authors and Articles	i
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY	
Karl Kaiser	1
SALT II AND WESTERN SECURITY	
Edward Kennedy	13
THE COMMUNIST POWERS AND AFRICA	
F.McA. Clifford-Vaughan	16
CUBA, ANGOLA AND THE WEST	
David Willers	24
SHORT TERM SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES	
Seamus Cleary	34
IMPLICATIONS OF HOT PURSUIT OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA	
M. Hough	48
LETTERS	
<i>Deon Fourie on the Problem of Achieving a Rhodesian Cease-fire</i>	55
BOOK REVIEWS	
<i>The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution</i> by Douglas Porch	58
<i>Business in the International Environment</i> by Yair Aharoni and Clifford Baden	59
INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS	62

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NOTES ON AUTHORS AND ARTICLES

Professor Karl Kaiser, Director of the Forschungsinstituut der Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, in Bonn, is widely regarded as one of the leading experts in his field. In July this year Professor Kaiser visited South Africa where he addressed the Institute at Jan Smuts House and participated in the conference on "The Road Ahead", organized by the 1820 Settlers Monument Foundation. His address to the Institute, on *German Foreign Policy*, has not previously been published.

Senator Edward Kennedy, author of *SALT II and Western Security*, is United States Senator for Massachusetts. This article has been included with the kind permission of Senator Kennedy, in view of the wider debate on the implications of the Strategic Arms Limitations Agreement currently being negotiated between the Soviet Union and the United States, which has reached a decisive stage.

Mr F. McA. Clifford-Vaughan, author of *The Communist Powers and Africa* is head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Natal. Mr Clifford-Vaughan, who has long had a deep interest in the activities of the Soviet Union and China in Africa, recently edited a collection of essays on "International Pressures and Political change in South Africa", published by the Oxford University Press (Cape Town, 1978).

Mr David Willers, is assistant director of the SAIIA. In 1975 he was South African vice-consul in Angola. *Cuba, Angola and the West* attempts to distil some of the current thinking on the subject.

Mr Seamus Cleary, author of *Short Term South African Foreign Policy Alternatives* is a visiting lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Natal.

Dr Mike Hough, author of *Hot Pursuit Operations in Southern Africa* is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pretoria. Dr Hough has a special interest in strategic matters.

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

Karl Kaiser

In considering firstly the general condition of West German foreign policy, one has to bear in mind that the Federal Republic of Germany is in a state of transition on the path to assuming — one can say more or less against her own will — certain regional and selected global responsibilities.

When Germany first began to pursue a foreign policy in the mid 50s it was a policy of rehabilitation, of trying to re-enter the community of nations, a policy of co-operation and reconciliation, which necessitated maintaining a relatively low profile. In the meanwhile the German economy grew. Germany increasingly became a world trading nation and the Germans were content to view the global scene as an area to make money, but not to conduct policy.

An awakening occurred, however, when the international economy became increasingly politicised. While there had been a saying that Germany was an economic giant but a political dwarf, it suddenly became apparent that the Germans could not simply continue to use the outside world merely as an area in which to conduct business. They would have to make a contribution, to make decisions concerning the reform of the international monetary system, the world trading system, development policy, world boom, world business cycle policy, the policy of non-proliferation. So the German posture became different. It had to assume a political nature and had to go beyond the economic realm. This is an important point also in connection with another area to which I will refer later, namely the policy *vis à vis* Southern Africa where the separation of economics from politics becomes increasingly difficult.

Germany did not particularly seek participation in certain selective global roles, which rather grew upon the country — because, after all, the past of the Hitler period has had the effect of dampening any desire to play an important role again. However, Germany's contribution will be focused on again at the coming economic summit in Bonn. Furthermore, it is important to understand that the Federal Republic was not really very well prepared for this kind of role. This may be seen in the infrastructure which is basically still inadequate in a number of areas, in the sense that, given certain tasks to be fulfilled, certain infrastructures are required at home and in the bureaucracy. Secondly, it was a new experience for the Federal Republic, for German dip-

This article is not based on a prepared written text but contains an edited version of the transcript from the tape-recording of an address to the SAIIA Witwatersrand Branch on 10 July 1978.

lomats, in German politics, to encounter conflict in the outside world. For, when one conducts a policy of low profile, basically communicating with friends and allies, and on the whole (in the 50s and 60s), letting them speak for one — then, on conducting matters unaided, one encounters opposition and conflict. That new experience was not always easy.

Regional Role

When it comes to the regional role, I think one should mention too — and this is the product of the development of three decades — that West Germany is now a partner of the United States in the NATO alliance, and there are many reasons that support the contention that West Germany is today America's most important partner in Europe. Looking at the map one sees that the Germans cannot escape their geostrategic position and the requirements deriving from it; namely, Germany being the country on the frontline, divided where East and West meet, with the highest concentration of military force in the world. Germany today is a major partner and pillar of the NATO alliance, which has problems in a number of other areas, and she has the most important force in the conventional field in Western Europe. It has been very much up to the Germans to make it a prime goal of their foreign policy that they continue to be of major importance, to ensure that the American/European connection is preserved and continues to function, because if that does not function well Europe's security cannot be guaranteed and maintained. This is so because of the strategic function of Germany within the overall European context. It has therefore been a traditional goal of German diplomacy to keep the channels to the United States open, even if that sometimes makes relations with the other partners in Europe, notably with France, difficult. All this stressed a more European necessity, leading to a more independent stance. This role continues to be of major importance and it will remain a factor for a long time to come, and I think it is important in trying to understand German policy for the coming years.

The second element of the regional role is the West European role. Here, West Germany — and again it grew upon her — has become a major pillar of the European Community. She is today the largest economy in Western Europe. More than half of her trade is conducted with the European Community. The fate of the German economy, and thereby of German democracy, is intricately and inextricably linked to that of her partners. If that link were to suffer; if for example the European Community were to be destroyed or dismantled, that would be a major blow to

the prosperity of West Germany, and thereby to domestic stability. Today then, the Germans have discovered that they have grown into a new role, namely that of having a very strong self-interest in preserving the Community. They have accumulated large reserves, and the Germans have discovered that those reserves are no good if one's partners sink. Therefore one had better use them to help the others to keep afloat. This is borne out by the numerous incidences of bilateral aid to other partners. Therefore German policy, by its very nature and self-interest, must be a West European policy, integrating itself increasingly into the framework that the Community provides. These factors are important to South Africans looking at Germany because they have a bearing on policy towards South Africa. This will be discussed later.

Now, having mentioned briefly these general conditions that must be kept in mind, let me turn to some major changes that have affected West German foreign policy and which are likely to have a long term impact.

New Approach to the German Problem

West German policy has come a long way from the time when the major goal was to re-unite the two separated parts by arguing that the re-unification of Germany was the pre-condition for any progress in the field of détente and relations between Eastern and Western Europe. Today the policy is still aimed at the re-constitution of some form of unity, although it is quite uncertain what form that will be. It is the main goal of German foreign policy today to argue and to strive for détente as a means to make a contribution to the solution of the German problem. In other words, progress between East and West is the pre-condition for progress on the German problem. It has taken a long time to evolve to this stage and there were many reasons (in the 1950s) for supporting the old policy, but as a result of the extraordinary developments that have occurred since then, this is today's policy, as a result of which the two German states have entered into some form of *de facto* recognition. Although it is not a formal recognition as in the case of a foreign country, they conduct business with each other. They have concluded a basic treaty with each other with the result that the border has been opened and a degree of normalisation has set in. The parallel has to be drawn between the policy *vis à vis* East Germany and policy *vis à vis* Eastern Europe.

In both areas, major bones of contention were removed, which in the case of Eastern Europe meant the border issue. Through a recognition of the Oder/Neisse border a major problem was removed between West Germany and Eastern Europe. The possi-

bility of depicting West Germany as the bogeyman of *Revanchism* was eliminated and thereby the basis for normalisation was created. As a result of this policy six million West Germans, for example, could visit East Germany, (which has a population of only sixteen million) last year. This is equivalent to eighty million Westerners visiting the Soviet Union. This indicates the potential political implication of such concrete measures. With regard to the other East European states, it must be said that the fate of the small East European countries is a matter of concern to the Germans. It matters to them whether Poland, for example, or Hungary, or Czechoslovakia, manage to gain some small freedom of manoeuvre in certain delimited areas.

Eastern Policy

The whole stance of this policy aimed at normalisation and détente is in this sense slightly different from the American conception — and here was the problem of a difference in conception of Eastern policy between the United States and Germany. The Americans' détente policy is primarily a policy of conducting arms control and to some extent dealing with the human rights issue. It's all of that for the Germans, too, although they are not called upon to negotiate the strategic weapons agreement, but to them East/West relations have a much more concrete element. It is they who have immediate experience of what contact entails, and they are very much interested in pragmatically changing things, as opposed to stating big principles and then not achieving very much, as has been to some extent the problem of President Carter's human rights policy.

The second consequence of this policy has been that West German diplomacy has freed itself from certain constraints that existed in the past. It can now conduct an active policy, not only in the West as it did in the past, in NATO, in the European Community, but also *vis à vis* the East, — and could free important resources. The obsession of watching East Germany — whether or not it was recognised — which absorbed a good deal of the activities of the German diplomatic service, is over. They still observe the GDR, but not with the sole purpose of gearing all of Germany's diplomacy towards the prevention of recognition. As a result they can use their resources for a more constructive involvement in regional affairs and on certain issues in international affairs.

A third consequence of this policy has been — and to us it is very important — to further involve the United States (and we have to add Canada) in the security of Europe. Because, tied in to all these developments that occurred in the 1970s, the Berlin agreement was negotiated, which means that we have an Ameri-

can signature and a Russian signature under an agreement maintaining and securing the *status quo* in Europe at its most vulnerable spot — the enclave of Berlin. And secondly, in connection with that policy of normalisation and détente, we have the involvement, and again the signature of both super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union; and, in a way, the acceptance of the latter that the presence and the active participation of America in European security, is good for East/West stability. That was not the case in the 1950s and 60s when it was one of the prime goals of Soviet policy to disengage the United States from Europe. Today the American role in Europe is accepted, and that is one of the important changes of global significance that has occurred during the last ten years. It also means that the presence of the American superpower on European soil, which for ten or fifteen years was regarded as artificial — a leftover from World War II which should be done away with — no longer is an artificial product of that period but is a pre-requisite for a stable state of affairs in this part of the world, and thereby an element of stability generally in the world.

European Security

A second area in which I see major change is the whole area of security policy. Here I would argue that the concept of stability has undergone quite an extraordinary extension of scope. In the 1950s and 60s one tended, in Europe, to understand by security primarily military defence. The Alliance was formed under those premises. In the mid 50s and late 60s it became increasingly obvious that a policy dealing only with the symptoms in an age of nuclear weapons and a continuing arms race, might not help in the long run. As a result of a process of internal consultation the NATO Alliance has added to its list of goals not only the dealing with symptoms by being prepared against aggression, but also the aim of going to the root of the conflict and trying to alleviate the conflict itself, or at least to dampen it through a policy of détente, accommodation, arms control. And the result has been that since then — (and this is totally endorsed by German foreign policy) — security to us means both defence policy and détente policy.

Now that's easily said, but implemented only with great difficulty, because those are basically contradictory policies: that one deals with a country that is both one's adversary, against which one has to defend oneself, and yet one's partner with whom one co-operates. That exercise, on that grand scale, has been and still is difficult. Politicians, going back through history, have never been well prepared for such a way of looking at the world, but there is no other way, because the alternative is only a defence

policy, and that just means continuing the arms race with probable disastrous consequences at some point in the future.

So we have this expansion of the concept of security in Europe — and it's not just a German concept, it is generally endorsed by the partners in the Alliance. The Germans have an obvious particular interest, because they, as a divided country, naturally care more than the other European countries about what this process entails for people, since certain sections of the German population live under such a regime. They have a strong vested interest in achieving progress, and are reasonably sure that that will be a constant line regardless of the particular political colour of the German Government, although there will be differences in emphasis and style. But there's not the slightest question that any Government will have to do its best to alleviate the fate of the East Germans, to improve it and to make sure that no military conflict starts in Europe, on German soil, which would result (even if it is conventional) in tremendous damage to, if not the destruction of, German society.

But the expansion of security also has another meaning. Today, when we ask ourselves, "Where are the real problems in Europe, where is the danger of conflict the greatest?" — most people will say, "It's not so much in the military realm, where deterrence works reasonably well, but it's in the economic and social realm." Today the notion of economic security has become increasingly important to us, that is to say, a state of affairs where outsiders cannot disrupt the functioning of our society. And here again, as in the case of détente, that's an extremely difficult business. Because, in order to secure oneself economically, one has to co-operate with countries that do not share one's foreign policy outlook or one's regime — one has to deal with Opec countries, with raw material producers who in other ways may be quite opposed to one. This today is a particularly important task which we have to subsume under the concept of national security. That is to say, the threat from within, the threat of disruption as a result of economic and social turmoil.

If one looks at Europe one sees that there are several countries that have very serious domestic problems, such as Italy or Portugal. And if there is a threat to Western democracy, in terms of probability we would, as West Europeans, head the list with the threat from internal de-stabilisation, and it is not NATO soldiers or military hardware that would be useful in combating it. But reformers are needed, sound economic policy, sound social policy, mutual assistance, and in that sense the European Community has become an indispensable and absolutely essential complementary element to NATO to maintain European

security, to preserve democratic systems. And in that sense our perspective has changed. NATO continues to be as important as in the past, but it cannot do the job alone, we need other instruments, and we find them in the field of economic and political cooperation. In Western Europe it happens to be the European Community.

American/European Relations

As a third area of major change I would mention American/European relations. We have to start from the assumption — and I have alluded to some elements — that there are fundamental identities of interest which remain and will continue to shape policy on both sides, particularly the identity of interest in the common security; defence against potential aggression from Eastern Europe and from the Soviet Union to be more precise. There is also great identity of interest with regard to other areas, e.g. human rights, prosperity, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is great agreement on the goals, but, and this is new, there is divergence on the methods of achieving them. This has to be seen against the background of an important development, namely that the primacy of Europe in American conceptions of foreign policy has vanished. Europe has been relegated to one area, although a very important if not the most important one in a global conception of an American role, and the days of the 50s are gone, when Europe had absolute priority and attracted all the attention of the American policy makers.

The result is that today American/European relations are no longer the more or less happy and harmonious exercise of policies where one agrees, but the increasingly difficult management of divergences of interest which have to co-exist with identities of interest. That is new and I presume that is going to remain.

Developments Within the European Community

The final point in connection with the major changes that have occurred is the evolution of the European Community. Here, as I said before, West Germany is irrevocably on a European course. Europe represents an alternative to the former nation-state. In the minds of many Germans the old nation-state died with the wars between the West European countries. But today Europe has an essential role to play in world politics, to preserve functioning democracies and functioning economies. The external view of the European Community is on the whole rather sceptical, because the difficulties are all too obvious and one easily holds them against the ambitious goals of the founding fathers of the

community of the United States of Europe, which we don't have. Moreover, many conclude that the Community really has not achieved much. I think this is a mistaken conception despite all the difficulties the European Community has. After all, we are dealing with a construction that has to overcome age-old differences. The Community is moving ahead, the economic integration is slowly continuing, new elements have been added. The European Community acts in unity in a number of areas in world politics, as for example in the European conference on security and co-operation, the biggest East/West conference in history, trying to agree on certain basic principles on how to conduct relations for the future and how to define the limits of change. No individual states appeared; no Federal Republic of Germany, or France, but only the Community. When there were points of view, they were first argued out in the Community and then presented to the others.

And there is increasingly a joint diplomacy, or at least a co-ordinated diplomacy. The ambassadors of the Community try to harmonise what they do in the capitals where they work. The Community has its caucus with international organisations. The Community is far from being a world actor, or able to act in a credible way as one country, but it is on its way. This is important because it has certain indications for the Community's African policy.

Finally, the direct elections scheduled for June 1979 will add an additional political element of legitimacy to the Parliament, which is going to be a Parliament of politicians who will try to control the Community. They will articulate European opinions and thereby add a new element to this whole construction, the consequences of which are not yet quite clear. But the general momentum is towards strengthening the whole undertaking and giving it more permanency and more political meaning.

German Policy Towards Southern Africa

Now, having said this and pointed to the areas of change, let me turn to some problem areas beginning with German policy towards Southern Africa. Basically there is no specific German policy, there is a European policy towards Southern Africa of which German policy is an important part. There have been and I am afraid will continue to be, moments when particular members will opt out of a common cause, as has happened even recently, but the general purpose and the general orientation goes in this direction, and I am saying this because I think one has to see the future realistically. I'm not saying this in order to excuse German policy hiding behind the European partners, I just want to point

to a general evolutionary trend which is not going to change.

Further, I would argue that the instruments of the European Community, the classical instruments that the Community has, will become increasingly important in shaping policy toward Southern Africa. If one looks at the policy of the Community since roughly 1974 — (before 1974 we had a collection of national policies, since then we have the beginnings of a joint policy) — one finds an increasing number of joint decisions on specific problems. For example, the Community has rejected the concept of the Bantustan, the homeland concept of South Africa, jointly without an exception, and has refused as a result to bestow diplomatic recognition in that context. (But they also pursue their policy by arguing in terms of the different models of emancipation.) The European Companies Code of Conduct is another element.

The whole policy of the Community *vis à vis* the Third World is an important instrument and will increasingly become so. The Association of the African, Pacific, and Caribbean countries, as was laid down in the Lomé Convention, is now an instrument of the Community's policy towards Southern Africa. To give an example; Rhodesia and South West Africa, once they have become the independent states of Zimbabwe and Namibia, respectively, have been offered association within the Lomé Convention. But the policy towards this part of the world doesn't stop there, it is extended to practically all other states in the region. If Mozambique and Angola want to apply for association, which they have not done, they are free to do so and they will get it. The Community conducts an active development policy which is more than just an economic development policy, towards all the southern states in Africa. And if one looks at the content of the projects one will see that some of them have quite important political implications. For example, projects that stress the interaction — communication systems, transportation systems, — between them.

There's a third factor, namely that the separation of the political and the economic realms will be increasingly difficult. In other words, the tendency will grow to look at economic relations of the Community in political terms, which is another way of saying that the past separation has become anachronistic for the policy of individual states like Germany, as well. This was re-stated by Chancellor Schmidt recently when he was in Africa; the separation of the two, of the political realm (the opposition to apartheid) and the economic realm (the continuation of economic relations). It seems to me that in the long run they will not be maintained in the same way, although at the moment they are still separated.

With this is connected another factor, namely that internal pressure within the European Community countries to put more leverage on South Africa to implement internal change, is likely to grow. More involvement of public opinion, from the younger generation in particular, works on policy-makers to put pressure on South Africa to abolish apartheid, and to come to some more adequate sharing of power. Moreover, such pressure may increase dramatically and swiftly if there are more violent incidents, such as the Soweto unrest or the death of Biko. The insistence on using relations to put some pressure on South Africa will come not only from the domestic scene, but also from the outside world. Within the Community there are activist and less-activist states, and the activists will of course try to use the procedures within the Community to put pressure on the less activist countries. Therefore the insistence on change operates on two levels, and through various channels; inter-governmental, public opinion, relations between parties. We are, in Europe, in the phase of the formation of European parties. In other words, the political groupings are pulling together to form European groupings, and they have close communication. That also applies to other groups, such as trade unions. So it goes across horizontally within the Community.

A further factor concerns relations with the rest of the world, because the pressure of others on the Community to use its own relations with Africa to force change, will also grow. The African states increasingly point out that the Community cannot expect to have advantageous relations in the economic realm with the black African countries while continuing with a policy of (as they would put it) supporting the South African regime. A country like Nigeria will point out — and has done so to the Federal Republic — that German trade with Nigeria is now as important as trade with South Africa, and similar points are made to other members of the Community. Pressure from black Africa is likely to grow, supported needless to say by the alignment of forces within the UN advocating this kind of change.

Moreover, it seems that the general evolution of thought within European politics will continue to be that internal change in South Africa will increasingly be a prerequisite of acceptance as an ally of Western democracy — change not in a symbolic way, but some real change, even if not all details of the final outcome are delineated in a blueprint fashion. An evolutionary change that indicates such substantial transformation would be sufficient. There is some understanding in Germany and Western Europe that, given the situation in South Africa, a transformation cannot be abrupt, but without a modicum of significant reform South

Africa is likely to lose Western support. In turn, the West must consider how a policy of positive incentives can help the South African whites to accept and promote change.

Arms Control

Arms control and Western economic co-operation are two other areas which merit some discussion. Concerning arms control; if one looks at the world today there's no doubt that perhaps the most important priority of rational policy must be to contain the arms race. All efforts in the past to do anything in this field have basically had very little impact. Arms spending has increased, it has reached gigantic proportions in the industrial world, and it has reached very high proportions in the underdeveloped world, deviating precious resources from productive purposes. But that's not the only problem concerning arms control. The other problem is that the world is entering a new phase of the arms race, a new qualitative jump, and nobody who looks at the future with some degree of knowledge can be sure that the next phase will not produce de-stabilising elements. If one looks at the weapons revolution of the last years; the precision-guided weapons, cruise missiles, neutron bomb, laser technique, to name but a few, one has to ask oneself whether a system within which these weapons are deployed and are further developed, where quality is enormously enhanced, is a stable system; whether deterrence which has worked so far will continue to work. That could mean that arms control of a new kind will be necessary.

The question is, have we done the right thing in the past because we have basically failed? This is extremely important to Europeans, since they are at the centre of the confrontation, and the question raises many new issues. The arms race has moved into a qualitative stage and all procedures and techniques to date were essentially quantitative. One can engage in the process of stabilising and mutual negotiation, but one does not know what is inside those weapons, and as long as there is no provision for on-site inspection, there is no way of knowing how to contain this arms race.

That's the general challenge, to which we have to add a second one — the economic dimensions of a continuation of the arms race are so enormous that it must be questioned whether both sides can really sustain it in the same way that they have sustained jumps in the arms race in the past. Imagine the deployment on a grand scale of the new weapons systems. Whether one considers these very advanced warning systems which cost billions, or whether one takes modern advanced fighter planes which cost many millions apiece, or the cruise missile on a grand scale, one

enters into financial proportions of staggering amounts, and all of that at a time when the increase of costs for personnel are enormous. If for example, East and West do not succeed in containing the next stage of both sides moving into cruise missiles in the northern hemisphere, the economic sacrifice for us, the Western society, is significant — but we can probably manage because we are literally a wealthy society. The Soviet Union already spends, an estimated eleven to eighteen percent of its GNP for defence, unlike we who spend about three to five percent for that purpose. If they have to add to that a defence system against the cruise missile which, (given the Soviet border which is enormous) must be extremely expensive, it means a further deviation of resources away from the civilian sector in a society that has to deal with rising expectations where the civilian sector is weak anyway. Such a further raise in armaments and expenditure is likely to be bought only at the cost of further repression.

The question therefore is: is that in our interest? These are questions that the Europeans have to discuss along with the Americans and the East Europeans. Besides these long term questions there are medium term and short term questions that we have to deal with. The strategic arms limitation talks (SALT 2) are now moving into their final stage, but one thing is sure, when they are over, the next round will be very difficult and very different; difficult for the reasons I mentioned, because we are entering the qualitative arms race where our past procedures of arms control are totally inadequate. We have to invent new ones; and whether the Soviets, for example, are going to co-operate is totally open, because it must be questioned whether we can do without on-site inspection, and that has always been a point on which the socialist states have been absolutely adamant in their refusal. There is, too, this question of a qualitative jump, and the other problem of having increasing difficulties in separating strategic from tactical weapons — weapons that are relevant to the two superpowers from weapons that are relevant to Europe. And this is the question we are really having to consider now. We have solved it so far through a process of relatively close consultations with the Americans, but in the next round we have to deal with weapons systems where Americans and Soviets can no longer do it alone. The Americans have to find some way to organise it jointly with us, and this is going to be extremely difficult. On consideration of the on-going negotiations in Vienna, the Soviets have just accepted proposals. Although the question of whether or not 10 000 soldiers here and 10 000 soldiers there are to be removed, is militarily unimportant, politically it is of symbolic importance; and that's why we are very glad on the whole

that we have made a small step ahead, with the Eastern side's acceptance of the Western proposals. What matters, however, is whether there is a situation of stability, in other words whether there is a capacity for surprise attack. That means one has to think in terms of over-all systems, in terms of political confidence, and the next round will be one that will shift its emphasis to a more encompassing view.

SALT II AND WESTERN SECURITY

Edward Kennedy

President Jimmy Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance recently concluded an important and encouraging round of negotiations with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT). Only (two months) ago Secretary Vance went to Moscow, and perhaps we can look forward to negotiation of SALT II before the end of the year. No agreement could be more important for the security of our two countries and the world.

When I met President Brezhnev (recently), we discussed the need to conclude a strong and effective SALT II agreement in the near future. It was interesting that 10 dissidents with whom I met in Moscow — including Andrei Sakharov and the mother and brother of Anatoly Scharansky — also stressed the importance of SALT. Not only do future generations have a right to live, they said, but also SALT II would improve US-Soviet relations and actually facilitate progress in the field of human rights.

One of the lessons we have learned in the nuclear age is that arms control can enhance our security. SALT II promises to do this in several ways:

- SALT will limit both sides to equal overall ceilings on strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems, as well as on major subcategories of multiple-warhead (MIRVed) systems. It will require the Soviets to dismantle and destroy almost 300 strategic systems. Thus the SALT II ceiling will limit the Soviets to about 900 fewer strategic launchers than the number the Department of Defence estimates the USSR will reach in the absence of such an agreement.

- SALT II would protect and enhance our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces through our intelligence capabilities. It would prohibit interference with the United States' means of verifying whether or not the Soviets are complying with the terms of the agreement. It also forbids the Soviets to alter current

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nuclear testing practices. Without these and related provisions in SALT II, such intelligence gathering could be considerably more difficult.

- Under the proposed SALT agreement, America's balanced deterrent triad — land-based missiles, missile-carrying submarines and heavy bombers — would be preserved. The agreement would permit the United States to modernise and strengthen its bomber force with powerful cruise missiles, and the planned Trident submarine programme will proceed unhindered by SALT.
- SALT II will permit America to maintain technological superiority. None of the US research and development programme would be restrained by this agreement.

While SALT is an integral part of America's national security policy, there are many security problems with which SALT does not deal and which it cannot completely cure. Serious issues continue to divide the United States and the Soviet Union, and in Moscow I expressed to Soviet leaders our view of the need for political and military restraint. But SALT has, in the United States, been saddled with a heavy burden in the political debate. Many of those who would "link" Salt II to Soviet actions in Africa or in the courtrooms of Moscow would also "link" it to defence problems that, in fact, have very little to do with the merging agreement.

The "vulnerability" of America's Minuteman missiles — as presented by many defence theorists outside the government — is a case in point. By the mid-1980s, they say, Soviet MIRVing and missile accuracy improvement programmes will give the USSR the ability to destroy as much as 90 per cent of the US land-based missile force, using only a fraction of Soviet MIRVed forces. Is this, the argument continues, a proper environment for arms control?

While one can theoretically compute such a "vulnerability," these calculations mean more in the panelled seminar rooms of the war games players than in the real world of military decisions. Soviet — and American — leaders would have to take into account far more critical factors in deciding whether or not to launch a first strike.

Both sides have tested MIRVed missiles individually and have sent a few dummy warheads to a handful of targets. But neither side has tested anything resembling a true counterforce attack, which would require hundreds of missiles with thousands of live warheads to be launched against hundreds or thousands of targets on the other side of the globe. Precision timing would be required to prevent some exploding warheads from destroying

others before they can reach their targets. The effects on guidance and accuracy of the untested over-the-pole trajectories required for a real world strike are uncertain and potentially critical.

Further, the simple mathematical formula of Minuteman "vulnerability" assumes that the President of the United States, with up to 30 minutes of advance warning, will sit still in his command post and wait to see if the Soviet strike is 90 per cent or 9 percent effective. It assumes that the President will sit still even though a strike against the US Minuteman force would immediately result in as many as 20 million American casualties.

Whatever the United States declared policy, the realistic Soviet strategist must ask whether the President would launch US ICBMS under attack, sending them to devastate Soviet cities and industry, and leaving only empty silos for the Soviet warheads to destroy. Indeed, during our discussions in Moscow, President Brezhnev told me that he believed even one nuclear bomb dropped by one side on the other would lead to global nuclear war.

This simple scenario ignores America's surviving bomber force and virtually invulnerable submarines at sea, to say nothing of the thousands of nuclear weapons targeted on the Soviet Union from bases in Europe. On a day-to-day basis, almost one-third of the US 316 operational B-52S are kept on high-readiness alert, and almost half of its 41 nuclear-armed submarines are at sea. One of America's new Trident submarines will have enough warheads—each with two to three times the destructive power of the Hiroshima bomb—to strike every Soviet city with a population of over 200,000. As Secretary of Defence Harold Brown says, "It really doesn't help the Soviets very much to knock out the Minuteman if the consequence is that they are devastated by other things."

Some critics argue that American bombers don't count, because it would take several hours for them to reach their targets. They should tell that to the people of Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Russians in Moscow, Leningrad or Kiev would hardly enjoy the few extra hours it would take for B52S with their gravity bombs, short-range attack missiles and highly accurate cruise missiles to unleash their horrible destruction.

In any event, SALT did not create this theoretical Minuteman vulnerability. Nuclear strategists realised long ago that land-based missiles might be more vulnerable than bombers or submarines, and so the United States has divided its strategic forces evenly among these three components. The strength of this balanced triad is that no future attack could eliminate America's ability to retaliate.

Had America not wanted to keep the MIRV option alive for it-

self at the time of SALT I, both sides might have been kept from developing this new technology. But the United States didn't want to deny it to itself, so it couldn't deny it to the Soviets. The result — so loudly decried by many of those who earlier refused to limit MIRVs — is a Soviet MIRVed ICBM capability which forms the basis for this theoretical potential to destroy America's ICBM force.

One solution to the theoretical problem has been the proposed "multiple aim point" system (MAP) for deploying ICBMs — a shell game in which the US Minuteman force would be deployed in only a small proportion (say 10 percent) of greatly increased numbers of missile sites. This cure could be worse than the imagined disease. It would invite a nuclear strike against all possible sites, including the empty ones, risking American casualties in many tens of millions. It could lead the Soviets to deploy a similar system of their own — sharply reducing the effectiveness of a US retaliatory strike. In terms of SALT, this system raises formidable verification problems and threatens to violate the counting rules elaborately negotiated to date.

If we approach SALT fairly on its merits, we will not accuse it of causing problems that predate it. We will not ask it to solve all of our defence problems. We will not rush into "solutions" to theoretical problems which will further diminish the security of both sides. And we will not hold SALT hostage to issues of less consequence to every American and Soviet man, woman and child. We are now at the threshold of a responsible SALT II agreement that will enhance our national security by preserving America's military deterrent and by reducing the risk of a nuclear holocaust.

THE COMMUNIST POWERS AND AFRICA

F. McA. Clifford-Vaughan

It seems that for South Africa the Cold War is definitely 'on' because South Africa represents all that is anathema to 'good socialists', and being labelled both 'capitalist' and 'racist', it also represents a source of anachronistic irritation in the international field. Furthermore, it affronts the socialist conscience by apparently being a stable entity in an unstable continent. All this in spite of — or perhaps because of — governmental fragmentation policy and capitalism modified by governmental control.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, Brezhnev has sought to consolidate the communist hard-line/soft-line type of policy and to see Africa, as a whole, as a factor in East-West relations, in which South Africa is not particularly singled out from other

This article, written especially for this issue of the *Bulletin*, is based on ideas first advanced by Mr Clifford-Vaughan at a SAIIA/Civitas symposium held in Port Elizabeth in April 1978

African countries except, of course, as a candidate for 'liberation' from the twin evils of 'capitalist exploitation and racist domination'.

The so-called common interest of socialism is very clearly enunciated in speeches and statements of both Brezhnev and other Eastern bloc leaders.¹ The marxist regime in Chile has been ousted — a failure in the Soviet book. In Angola the sympathetic MPLA Government has taken power — therefore a success. One does not need to ask whether it is in the Soviet interest to allow Angola to, as it were, change direction.

Does Soviet policy conform to observable patterns? In my view it does, even where no pattern is immediately obvious there is the ever present underlying 'revolutionary purpose'. The so-called 'conspiracy theory', so often decried by Western liberals, is a fact of life as far as the USSR and China are concerned. The communists have demonstrated that they can operate successfully in Africa, without interference from the United States, and the legitimacy of the armed struggle against South Africa is almost accepted. The inevitability of such an armed struggle is, in fact, an act of faith which is evident in many opinions expressed on the future of the Republic, from the most diverse sources.

Ethiopia is a new and developing sphere of Soviet influence and Libya presents itself as a source of supply for world revolution. The Mediterranean is Russia's *mare nostrum*² and Russian military advisers proliferate on the African continent, together with their proxies, the Cubans. In fact, there is the possibility that Soviet prestige is, or at least has been, enhanced in the Third World by her support for African liberation movements, which has been accomplished to some extent at the expense of the Chinese.

Although South Africa and the United States have opposed foreign intervention in Angola — the former actively, the latter passively — the force of this opposition has been attenuated by the balancing of Cuban power with South African, or perhaps the reverse. In any event, it has led to a new definition of détente as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. Brutally explained, the notion is that things should not be left as they are, (perhaps a view also held by some Western states) but should rather be pushed to the point where maximum advantage may be obtained with minimum response from the West or the Chinese.

Economic and Technical Aid as Foreign Policy

One can discern some common ground between the foreign policy patterns of the Soviet Union and of the People's Republic of China. Firstly, there is the assumption that economic aid to African countries is desirable. This may take the form of long-term, no-interest loans or grants, and the buying up of complete

national harvests of crops or products at special non-world market prices. The fact that these economic grants usually appear to have no strings attached may be construed as illusory. There *are* strings, one of which ensures that military aid is linked to the package as a political vehicle towards gaining influence. An example of this is the 1955 Czechoslovak pact with Egypt for \$250 million, which had the effect of upsetting the then existing western orientated Baghdad Pact. Although the linkages are not necessarily visible, they are always there.

Another connecting point for such forms of aid is the opportunity to exploit existing friction on the continent. The main point of friction as far as we are concerned is the 'apartheid' system in South Africa, which can always lend a 'human rights' aspect to accusations made by even those states most blatantly lacking such rights.

Technical assistance forms another type of aid, as exemplified for instance by the Chinese help with the TanZam Railway, and the Russian aid for the High Dam at Asswan. Young people are also encouraged to travel to the Soviet Union and China as students in various disciplines and to return home after they have been directed in the 'correct way'.

Chinese Initiatives

China plays a trump card in that it stresses the race aspect of its aid policy, putting forward the notion of the 'non-white' nature of its agents in Africa in a more or less successful attempt to score over the 'white' Russians. The Chinese have insisted upon this factor ever since their initial interest, in modern times, in Africa, initiated by the visit of the then Foreign Minister, Chou en Lai, in the 1960's, when he visited ten African countries, including Ethiopia and Somalia.

Cultural and liberation organisations also play a part in the Chinese diplomatic offensive and their desire to win friends.³ In 1958, the All-China Afro-Asia Solidarity Committee was formed, which in spite of its cumbersome title had just such objectives in mind. All these bodies are under the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the governmental organ charged with Foreign Affairs. In 1964, fifteen nations enjoyed diplomatic relations with China, today the number is twenty-four, including new countries such as Cape Verde and Liberia, which entered into diplomatic relations in 1977. South Africa has no official relations with mainland China, recognising instead Taiwan, or the Republic of China, as an ally at least in the economic sphere.⁴

It may not be easy to discern the exact form of such relationships but it is clear that the 'revolutionary purpose' is always at the bottom of the stated purpose for which relations, dictated by

pragmatic considerations of the day, are conducted. The difference between what the communists say and what they do also needs to be taken into account. The vision they have of the world, linked with their capability at any given time, and of the priorities as dictated by party policy must be borne in mind and must also be balanced by the competition for influence in Africa between the two main communist powers, China and the USSR.

China's Africa Policy

As far as China is concerned, however, the main priority at the moment seems to be to govern herself, while foreign policy with regard to Africa seems to be, in simple terms, to counter Russian influence where possible and not to commit itself without foreseeable returns. The Chinese disengagement in Angola after the visible victory of the Cuban/Soviet-backed MPLA is a case in point. This will probably remain their policy for some time to come. However the previous Chinese plan for the unification of the *whole* of Africa should still, perhaps, be held in mind, and will be discussed later. China is really looking for allies to counter-balance the 'revisionist' influence of Russia and, of course, the 'imperialist aggression' of the United States.

That this doctrine of the sixties has not really changed is perhaps borne out by recent communist bloc activity in Africa. Africa is seen now, as then, as one of the main centres of the liberation struggle, one of the 'storm centres of revolution'. In February 1964, Chou en Lai, then Foreign Minister of the People's Republic, made a speech in Mogadishu during his 'African safari', in which he said that there were excellent revolutionary prospects in Africa. He meant this in terms of 'revolutionary national liberation', rather than in terms of a social revolution of the sort labelled 'communist take-over'. As P. Seale of the London *Observer* remarked, Chou had to wear the diplomat's top hat and the guerrilla's beret at the same time. Whether Africans were convinced by this sartorial anomaly is, with the benefit of hindsight, rather doubtful.

Difficulties also arise as to what China's attitude to foreign policy *vis á vis* Africa should be. On the one hand there is the view that 'socialism in one country' should be the sole aim, whilst on the other there is the notion that world revolution should play a large part in policy making. It is rather the same sort of problem that the USSR had in the inter-war period. A flexible policy seems to have emerged of, on the one hand, a 'minimum' programme to deny Africa's resources to the West and, on the other hand, a 'maximum' programme of liberation and unification of the whole of Africa, by a Southern Expedition similar to the Communist-Nationalist Northern Expedition to unite China in 1927. Fuller

exploitation of mineral and agricultural resources also seems to be the objective.

In some measure, China can be seen as being played off by the African states against the United States, Russia and Western Europe. But at the present moment China does not have the means which would make it worthwhile for these states to sever all former links and throw in their lot with the Chinese. Nevertheless, China's willingness to supply money, to train guerillas and to embark on transport schemes such as the TanZam Railway, has the effect of attracting — or forcing — others into taking an interest in Africa, as happened with the Russians in Somalia, for example, before their expulsion by President Barre and prior to the latest series of events in the Horn of Africa.

Perhaps the best example of China's former policy towards Africa can be obtained from Chou en Lai's statement of the sixties on 'common ground' for relations with Africa:

1. China supports the African peoples in the fight against imperialism and old and new colonialism, and in winning and safeguarding national independence;
2. it supports the governments of African countries in their pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment;
3. it supports the African peoples in their desire to realise solidarity and unity in the form they choose;
4. it supports the African peoples in their efforts to settle their differences through peaceful consultation;
5. it maintains that the sovereignty of the African countries must be respected by all other countries and that all encroachment and interference from whatever quarter should be opposed.

As should be fairly obvious, all these generalisations could express, with some slight change of wording, the stated aims of the USSR and the USA in Africa. The notion that America would not really object to receiving radical black governments back into her fold when they become disenchanted with the Soviet Union after an initial spell of dependence, is perhaps not such a fantastic idea, although it does remind one of the Chinese story of the invention of roast pork by burning down the pigsty.

The Chinese view that the 'will of the masses' will be served by revolution, if not at present then at some time in the future, allows for plenty of leeway in policy making. This, coupled with the idea that "their minority view really represents the will of the people, including those whose consciousness has not yet been aroused", as stated in the *Peoples Daily* — Red Flag Editorial of 2 February 1964, adds more scope to any effort that is made by them in

Africa. Actually, this idea of retrospective justification by a future majority was denounced by Lenin. It may be one of the basic differences between China and Russia on the perceived role of the Communist Party in its 'world revolutionary purpose'. It is clear that Chinese efforts to gain world-wide influence have provoked hostility from the Soviet Union, especially their efforts in the emerging countries of Africa. The two have come to the point of actually working against each other.⁵

The Soviet motive for attempting to exploit the 'Bandung spirit' of peaceful coexistence, neutralism, and so on, was to build up industrialisation and living standards and to continue the trade expansion of the socialist economic systems, whilst at the same time weakening the capitalist economic system.⁶ Oil plays a part in this because China, in 1964, was dependent upon Soviet supplies — hence their interest in seeking alternative sources and, of course, developing their own possibilities.

The Chinese identify themselves in theory with the peasants and in practice with opportunistic individuals and extremist or tribal groups. (Cameroun and Angola are examples of this.) They have propagated the line: 'the peasantry, which comprises eighty per cent of the African population, is the backbone of the present-day independence movement in Africa. Supported and influenced by the world revolutionary movements . . . the people of the African colonies have been launching . . . one offensive after another.' If one transposes this talk of independence to 'liberation', one may very well update the underlying factor of both communist powers' policies towards Africa.

However, there are some signs of open disillusionment with communism on the part of African leaders. Barre is one such. The Soviets display irritation with the line of African socialism adopted by some other countries and there are also signs of 'colour consciousness' and stories of Russian chauvinism brought back by students returning from the Soviet Union. The Chinese have made some moves to prevent the formation of a black middle class or a 'national bourgeoisie'.

The instruments of Chinese foreign policy in Africa are of two main kinds. Firstly, there are agreements which fall into four general categories:

1. Traditional alliance type, consisting of friendship treaties based on the Bandung Five Principles and solidarity between the consenting parties, whilst containing the provision 'to develop economic and cultural relations in the spirit of equality, mutual benefit and friendly co-operation'. These treaties are usually arranged to run for ten years. In 1969, China had such treaties with Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana (then under Nkrumah), Guinea and Tanzania, that is to say the

- formerly 'socialist-revolutionary' states.
2. Cultural pacts, which involve the exchange of students, teachers, newspaper reports, theatre groups and so on.
 3. Commercial relations, which grant one another *favoured nation* treatment, commodity exports (which are usually defined and detailed as to type and quantity), and exhibitions of goods produced in each other's countries. The first agreement of this type was reached with an African country, the United Arab Republic (UAR), in 1955. By 1967, there were twenty-nine such agreements with sixteen African countries.⁷ And in 1968, according to IMF Direction of Trade figures, trade was carried on with at least thirty countries, including Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and the former United Arab Republic.
 4. Economic aid and technical assistance, funds and technical know-how, to achieve development towards political and economic independence. Between 1956 and 1965, US\$353.9m in aid, mainly in the form of interest-free loans, were granted by China. This is, of course, a mere sop compared to the US grants of aid to the Third World countries.⁸

The second kind of foreign policy instrument is the covert aid or agreement to aid. These are, of course, by their very nature, difficult to measure and the secrecy surrounding such operations often attributes Chinese influence where there may be none or very little. There are proven cases of arms and instructors in guerrilla warfare in Angola and Mozambique. Revolution as an instrument of foreign policy, plus the overt 'non-radical', 'normal' means of policy operation, thus provide a large area of coverage in Africa.

Russia's Role In Africa

The Soviet Union, as an example of a backward rural economy, hurriedly industrialised and now a super power, has had traditionally a great attraction for African intellectuals. Moreover, the Russians have encouraged African exuberance and have foreborne to give advice. Hence, Nkrumah and Sekou Touré, founders as it were of the radical view of African independence, found themselves more in tune with the Soviet bloc than with the 'generous but tiresome West'.

'The Soviet Union's main objective in Africa has not been the establishment of communist regimes in this or that nation, but a deepening estrangement of African politicians and intelligentsia from the West and the prevention of any orderly pattern of political development, so as to keep this vast continent a source of division, conflict and danger to the West.'⁹

The same writer goes on to describe the efforts of the Russians

to indoctrinate African students by inviting them to the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. He describes the problems encountered by those people there, and concludes that it would have been more efficient as an instrument of persuasion to play the part indirectly and allow Western radicals to indoctrinate Africans at Western universities, thus avoiding racial and other incidents which occur when Russians come face to face with black people.

Sino-Russian competition for influence

Although Chinese play the part of 'fellow coloured' people with some success whilst in Africa, there have been racial incidents of a disharmonious kind between blacks and Chinese in China itself.

It is true that the Chinese have now, perhaps, other more important priorities than Africa. Their main task at the present time might be seen as the need to consolidate the governing of China after the death of Mao and the trauma of the cultural revolution. But, nevertheless, the Chinese are not willing to allow the Soviet Union to have untrammelled access to influence on the continent. The economic interchange alone would give this the lie. In 1976, for example, the People's Republic gave something in the region of US\$2,2m in credit and grants to African countries. In this, they almost match the aid given by the Soviet Union over the same period: a sign perhaps of their determination not to be surpassed in generosity? China is firmly committed to Africa as an area of its influence, and the effects of all this competition might very well form the subject matter of another paper.

What emerges, I think, is the picture of two communist powers vying for influence and willing to invest money and prestige to gain it. It seems that all this competition is at the expense of the West and ultimately, one if forced to believe, to the distinct disadvantage of the Republic of South Africa, whose inhabitants, particularly the white minority, might become more aware of the dangers of being Africans in an Africa being 'liberated'.

1. Cf. Conquest, Robert. "The Rules of the Game", in *Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1977-78, p. 342. Conquest cites many examples of Soviet leaders' policy statements in this regard.
2. The literature on the growth of the Soviet navy is now extensive; see for example, MacGuire, M. and McDonnell, J eds *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions*, Praeger, New York, 1977. Also; Palmer, N. *Soviet Naval Power*, New York, 1974.
3. Cf. eg Schatten, F. "Peking's Influence in Africa", in *Military Review* (U.S.), Vol. XLI, No. 8, August 1961, p. 51.
4. For details of Taiwan's economic possibilities and problems, see eg Esterhu, J H "The Crisis of the Republic of China", in *Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1977-78, p. 374. Also; Brandt, K "Economic development: Lessons of Statecraft in Taiwan", in *Orbis*, Vol. XI, No. 4, Winter 1968.
5. Cf. Ade, W.A.C. "China, Russia and the Third World", in *China Quarterly*.
6. Cf. Albright, D E. "Soviet Policy", in *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXVII, Jan-Feb 1978, p. 20.
7. Cf. Yu, G.T. "China's Impact", in *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXVII, Jan-Feb 1978, p. 40.
8. Cf. Yu, G.T. *China in Africa* Yearbook of World Affairs (London) 1970.
9. Cf. Ulam, A B. *Expansion and Co-existence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67* (London) 1968

CUBA, ANGOLA AND THE WEST

David Willers

Any discussion of present day Angola must take cognisance of the role played by Cuba, the changing attitude of the West towards Angola and the mutating nature of the revolution in Angola itself. There is a dynamic interaction between these three elements which has a great potential for resolving conflict in the immediate region.

Since achieving independence in November 1975, the Government of Agostino Neto has relied heavily on Cubans to buttress his regime and protect it from within and without. The Cuban role has concentrated considerable international attention on Angola. It has evoked anxieties of all kinds, particularly in South Africa and amongst sections of Western opinion, and the fear has been repeatedly expressed that the Cuban presence in Africa is a visible expression of Soviet imperialist ambitions. In the United States it brought the disagreement between the "global strategists" and the "area specialists" into sharp focus, according to some observers. This disagreement — between those who hold that the United States should get involved in regions as an automatic reaction to Soviet participation on the one hand, and those who argue that local causes of the conflict are more important and should be settled locally — has not yet been settled¹. It appears however that the views of the "area specialists" are on the ascendancy and Mr Cyrus Vance, US Secretary of State, is said to support this approach. There seems to be a growing view that America should not become entangled in the Third World disputes, even if the Soviets are involved, so long as the major issues at stake are local in nature, and not fundamental to basic US interests.

In the case of Angola, part of the argument between the "area specialists" and the "globalists", is whether Cuba has a foreign policy of its own. One view is that the Cubans are simply puppets of the Soviet Union and for this reason the West should back "the other side" in countries where they are active. Another view is that Cuba has succeeded in cutting itself loose from Mother Russia and is in fact pursuing an independent and "non-aligned" foreign policy — and that Cuban activities abroad therefore pose no fundamental threat to Western interests. The truth of the matter probably lies somewhere in between.

This article is based on an address by Mr Willers to the SWA/Namibia branch of the SAIIA on 27 November 1978

Castro and Cuba's Second "Prague Spring"

The central concern of Cuba is survival of the Revolutionary Government. All other objectives, domestic and foreign, are subordinate to this primary objective. Some writers consider that it was the practical imperative of survival, rather than any ideological affinity, that is responsible for the strong Soviet connection².

The early revolutionary Government needed foreign support to survive — the Soviet Union provided it, and from the outset of the revolutionary relationship to the present day, Cuban foreign policy operates under the Soviet hegemonic umbrella. However, the degree of Cuban dependence and independence from Russia, has also dictated the permissible boundaries of Cuban foreign policy and, as we shall see, has led in many ways to a second Cuban "Prague Spring" as a result of Fidel Castro's Angola policy.

Cuba's first "Prague Spring", when Castro displayed an independence that was eventually to prove too much for Soviet tolerance, occurred during the middle sixties. The reasons were twofold; firstly, and mainly because of the American economic embargo, Cuba was forced to seek wider trade support than that which the Soviet Union alone could provide. Secondly, and as a result of this expanded focus, Cuba began to display a pragmatism that was sometimes at odds with its ideological posture. This led to the creation of a "new left" that relied more for its ideological formulations on the pragmatic speeches of Fidel Castro than it did on the orthodoxy of Karl Marx.

Because the American Government eventually managed to involve virtually the whole of the Organisation of American States (OAS) in an economic boycott against Cuba, Fidel Castro felt justified in exporting revolution to the OAS, which was in keeping with Cuba's "internationalist" objectives. But it would nevertheless be a mistake to assume that Cuba, in the days of Che Guevara's ill-fated attempts to "revolutionise" Bolivia, was prepared to forego the practical relations it had forged with some non-communist states for a unified revolutionary stance under Russian leadership — which is what the Soviet Union traditionally insisted its satellites adopt.

On the contrary, where Cuban interests were involved, Cuban tactics were deployed, even if they ran counter to Soviet interests. For instance the Cubans criticized and ultimately helped split the Soviet-orientated Venezuelan Communist Party. The Bolivian Communist Party was also divided between the pro-Guevarists and the pro-Soviets, and the same thing happened in Guatemala.

Castro became bolder still, and openly criticized Soviet trade with the Military Government of Brazil and pre-Allende Chile —

countries which both followed the American “no trade” policy with Cuba.

Cuba refused to take sides during the Sino-Soviet split, and when the 1963 sugar price rose, and Castro felt less dependent on Soviet financial support, trade with socialist countries was ditched in favour of trade with capitalist countries. Spain became a major trading partner, and more important in economic terms than East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

But the crisis in Cuban/Soviet relations really came to a head in 1968 when Russia, deeply concerned with Castro’s “outward” policies, established secret links with an orthodox marxist wing of the Cuban Communist Party (CCP) opposed to Castro’s liberalism. Castro discovered the “plot” and destroyed the “microfaction” by expelling some of its members from the CCP and imprisoning others.

The Soviet Union reacted by imposing an immediate and highly successful oil embargo on Cuba. Fidel Castro sought in vain for support. The revolutions in Bolivia and elsewhere in South America had collapsed; relations with China had deteriorated sharply (see footnote), and America was still unwilling to trade with Castro. Cuba, faced with the prospect of triple sanctions — from the USSR, America and China, chose the primary objective of survival of the revolution over all else. In August 1968 Castro signalled his capitulation by endorsing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and once again became a surrogate instrument in the hands of Soviet foreign policy makers.

The Soviet Union moved swiftly to put the Cuban economy back on its feet after the collapse of 1968 - 1971. In time Cuba recovered and began to exhibit a renewed interest in foreign affairs. Now the emphasis was rather different, however, and while the policy became as global as before, Cuba’s discretionary choices within the boundaries set by the Soviet Union appeared to have become more limited than during the sixties. The foreign successes, though, because of Soviet support, have been greater.

The principle objective of Cuba in the seventies has been to gain acceptance in the “non-aligned club” by achieving diplomatic gains in the Third World . . . “what was in the early years a rather desperate reaching for support to counter US pressures has evolved over the years into a centrepiece of Cuban foreign policy. In addition to its support for the economic demands of the non-aligned group, Cuba has been vocal in supporting the themes of continued revolution, ending all vestiges of colonialism and white domination and combating “neo-colonialism”.³

The Chinese had earlier tried to influence the Cuban military in the same way the Russians attempted to influence the CCP — when that plot was also discovered and Chinese advisers were expelled from Havana. China imposed an economic boycott on Cuba.

This attitude accords with the objectives circumscribing Cuban foreign policy which are (in descending order): ● Survival of the revolutionary Government, ● Economic development ● Influence over the left and ● Support of revolution.⁴

The Angola adventure offered Castro the possibility of harmonising several of these objectives at one fell swoop as well as creating a Soviet debt to Cuba for the first time in nearly a decade. Castro must have seen in Angola the same opportunities which Bolivia offered in the early sixties; the difference in Angola was that the Russians backed what was originally really a Che Guevara sponsored adventure — something which must have amused many of the old timers in Cuba, who probably recalled that Guevara had a profound distate for Soviet orthodoxy.

The first contacts with the MPLA were made by Guevara, as Castro's emissary, in 1963. In the same year Cuban troops saw action in Africa for the first time in Algeria in its fight against Morocco. In 1965 Cuba began its long association with the Congo (Brazzaville) and in 1966 started training MPLA guerrillas seriously.

The MPLA provided an attractive opportunity for Cuba to cooperate with the Soviet Union in a revolutionary endeavour, something which it was not able to do in South America. However, it was only in 1974, when the prospects for independence increased dramatically after the Portuguese Revolution, that the scale of Cuban assistance was substantially stepped up. For the first time Castro, with a professionally trained reservist army at his disposal and with the Cuban economy in fair shape, was in a position to extend his "foreign aid" programme substantially.

It should be noted here that the chief characteristic of all Cuban foreign aid programmes involves sending personnel rather than money or materials to recipient countries⁵. In the case of Angola, therefore, Cuba decided to extend its foreign aid programme by dispatching troops to Africa. The Soviet Union supplied the arms and the global security umbrella. A cartoon of the day summed up the relationship very aptly by showing a beaming Brezhnev and a glum looking Castro examining a map of Angola. Brezhnev is saying: "We'll supply the cannon and you supply the fodder".

However, as the war progressed, Castro was soon looking less glum as it rapidly became apparent that, because of the Cuban successes in Angola, the Soviet Union was getting into hock with Castro and not the other way round. Cuba had demonstrated that it could be a good ally to Mother Russia if need be, and could do much to further Soviet interests. The Cuban army had proved itself, and Castro's slate was clean. At the same time Castro was winning non-aligned friends and influencing non-aligned

leaders through his support for the MPLA and was in sight of achieving his major goal of being accepted as a fully fledged member of the non-aligned community. This was clearly not in the Soviet Union's best interests and it was perhaps inevitable that something of a crisis in the relationship should arise sooner or later. That crisis proved to be the attempted Luanda "Putsch".

The Revolt Against Neto

The origins of the attack on President Neto's leadership on 27 May 1977 by the "fractionalists" in the MPLA led by the former minister of the Interior, Mr Neto Alves, go back to May 1974, when the Soviet Union withdrew its support from Neto. The MPLA was divided into factions (one led by Neto Alves) and Russia preferred to hedge its bets until a clear leader arose⁶. Soviet support for Neto was resumed after 1974, but the structural and ideological problems in the Movement surfaced again after independence. The reasons were apparently straightforward — Neto was accused of pursuing policies that were too moderate, pro-bourgeois, non-racial, non-aligned and insufficiently socialistic. His detractors followed a more orthodox marxist line with a racial emphasis on greater black involvement in the revolution⁷.

The MPLA central committee had set up a commission of inquiry into the activities of the "fractionalists" at the beginning of 1977. Over the week-end of 20 - 21 May the central committee met to discuss the recommendations of the commission and decided to expel Neto Alves and his ally Jose van Duren from its ranks.

On the morning of 27 May, Neto Alves and his supporters made their bid for power. They released prisoners at the Sao Paulo prison and seized the radio station from whence they broadcast claims that the Neto Government was either 'Maoist' (which meant somewhere beneath the scum of the earth) or 'social democratic' which was considerably more revealing, as were the accusations that the Luanda Government was "completely Bourgeois".

In no time at all the MPLA military wing, assisted by the more important Cuban units had put down the Putsch when popular support from the Luanda 'bairros' that Neto Alves had expected failed to materialise.

But it was the debris of the aftermath of the storm which really indicated which side Cuba had backed. Evidence collected by the MPLA showed that the "fractionalists" were in fact ultra-leftists who enjoyed active organisational support from pro-Moscow Portuguese Communist Party members who had fled to Angola in 1975 in order to escape reprisal in Lisbon for the role they

played in the Portuguese Communist take-over bid⁸. There was little doubt in Neto's mind that these Portuguese Communists were in turn supported by the Soviet Union, and in the summer of 1976 for instance Soviet backing for the "fractionalists" had become so obvious that Angola expelled a Soviet diplomat⁹. Alves had been made "redundant" and lost his position as Minister of the Interior weeks earlier (in August), when the Ministry was abolished altogether.

Cuban support for Neto in this incident proved to the Angolan leader that Castro was not simply a fair weather friend, as the Soviets had been in 1974 and again in 1976/77. Cuban support for Neto had not wavered in the twelve years they had supported him, which is a testimony to Che Guevara's perspicacity in backing an individual who would later prove to be a political "stayer".

The crisis- and Castro's handling of it — showed two other things: firstly that Cuba, less dependent on the Soviet Union than at any time since 1965, again felt sufficiently emboldened to oppose a pro-Soviet faction in a socialist movement — in this case within the MPLA. Thus history was repeated, and the South American experiences re-lived. The only difference was that on this occasion Castro had won a small victory — there was no oil embargo forthcoming from the Soviet Union, and in a sense Cuba's second "Prague spring" had arrived. (Although it must be said that one swallow does not necessarily make a summer.)

The second thing the crisis showed, linked to the first, was that Cuba was well on its way to becoming accepted as a non-aligned nation. Support for Neto during the attempted "Putsch" won Castro many friends. It is true that he was criticised sharply at the Belgrade meeting of the non-aligned States in 1978 for keeping troops in Africa once colonial control had been ended. Nevertheless, this did not prevent the conference from accepting Havana as the venue for the next non-aligned conference in 1979. It was thought that Cuba would be obliged to moderate its policies in the medium term if it genuinely sought membership of the non-aligned club and that the Soviet connection would grow weaker as a consequence. Cuban willingness to assist *affirmatively* in causes backed by the Soviet Union would thus be substantially affected¹⁰.

The nature of the "Putsch" and the charges levelled against the Neto leadership raised interesting questions about the direction the revolution in Angola has taken since November 1975. There is no longer any doubt that the MPLA has moved moderately out of the orbit of Soviet influence (whether it has moved out of the Cuban orbit is another question entirely), although Neto went to great pains to assure the Soviet Union shortly before the attempted "Putsch" that he had nothing against Russia. He was reported

as saying that “some comrades” had said he was against the Soviet Union and that the MPLA was anti-Soviet. That, he said, was a complete lie, but equally it was a complete lie to assert that Angola was under Soviet domination. On the contrary, and in the same breath he claimed: “As long as the political leadership of the MPLA is directing the country, we will always defend our independence and our non-alignment”. Mention was significantly made of the support which “Cuban comrades” had given him.

On the domestic front, meanwhile, the MPLA was taking certain steps to constitute itself into a “vanguard party”. The MPLA is not yet a “party” in the sense of the word, but rather a “movement” and Neto felt, particularly after the “second war of liberation” (against the South African, FNLA, UNITA forces, etc.) that the MPLA needed to be more formally structured. The steps the central committee took in this regard, and the recommendations they made, proved extremely upsetting to the hard-line pro-Soviet MPLA faction.

Firstly, it was proposed that the MPLA would not become a party immediately e.g. there would be no Angola Communist Party, but rather a formal “vanguard” organisation¹¹. Secondly, it was recognised that thousands of MPLA supporters had not had much contact with historical materialism and dialectical materialism — “their adherence to scientific socialism is empirical and relies much on the trust they place in the MPLA and in the guidance of comrade President Aghostino Neto”¹². The trend which demanded that anyone who was admitted to the MPLA Party (when constituted) should already be a committed Marxist-Leninist was rejected. To be a convinced Marxist-Leninist one had to know a minimum about the scientific theory of the proletariat, it was decided, and the MPLA could not be so demanding of its members. It was certainly the duty of members to study Marxism-Leninism, however, but this was not a primary consideration.

Instead the central committee felt that a more important criterion for membership to the MPLA should be the attitude to productive work — “(the candidate) should be an exemplary worker in carrying out work schedules and helping to solve problems at his work place”. This decision amounted to a classic victory of the pragmatists over the ideologues, and a parallel with present day China is not inappropriate.

Thus we see a revolutionary party emerging with all options open — ideologically speaking — and with less immediate emphasis on the attainments of marxist insight for its members than might have been supposed.

All this indicates that the MPLA is pursuing a policy of severe

realism, that they recognise an absolute need for a unity of theory and practice, and that only policies which arise from the "living reality" of Angola will really work. Again there are indications, in this approach, of considerable pragmatism within a socialist framework as is evidenced in the economic field by continued capitalist practices, private ownership of many businesses and the on-going operations of large multi-national corporations, such as Gulf Oil (whose installations are reported as being guarded by Cubans), the Angolan Diamond Corporation (Diamang) — a subsidiary of de Beers, the 90 percent British owned (and partly Angolan operated) Benguella Railway and the Miniera de Benguella with West German interests. These developments in Angola and the changing perceptions of the Cuban role in Africa, and particularly Angola, have caused the West to look with new eyes at President Neto.

The Western Suitor

The Western interest comprises two converging interests — those of the United States on the one hand and Western Europe on the other. The United States focus is more of a strategic and economic one while that of the Europeans is more intimately bound up with their broader relations with black Africa within the context of the Lomé Convention and their historical links with former colonies.

Both parties also have a deep interest in resolving the Namibian and Rhodesian conflicts and the current wooing of Angola must be seen in this context as well.

Shortly before his election President Jimmy Carter said he thought that the United States' position in Angola should be one which admitted that the opportunity had been missed to be a positive and creative force for good in Angola during the years the US supported Portuguese colonization. The United States should also realise, he said, that the Russian and Cuban presence in Angola, while regrettable and counter-productive of peace, need not constitute a threat to United States' interests and nor did that presence necessarily mean the existence of a communist satellite on the continent¹³

This approach seems to have been pursued and it appears from various remarks made by Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance subsequently that, to return to the observations at the beginning of this paper, the "area specialists" are those now shaping US policy towards Angola. Vance has pointed out that the most effective policies towards Africa are "affirmative policies". This has been interpreted as that a negative reactive American policy that sought only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in Africa would be futile and the best course would be to help resolve the

problems which created opportunities for external intervention.

United States policy towards Africa is complicated by its rather ambiguous approach to the Cubans, and the fact that the United States has little leverage over Cuba. In the view of Dominguez¹⁴ this is the result of retaining obsolete policies after they have outlived their usefulness. The United States, he says, "failed to offer Cuba credible alternatives to full dependence on the Soviet Union in the late 1960's and early 1970's.

He argues that because of the static nature of US/Cuban relations, part of the US response to Cuban foreign policy will have to be aimed at other targets, will require a workable African policy and will require negotiation with the Soviet Union.

Top level American visits to Angola in recent months (underscored by the visits of Mr Richard Moose (US Under Secretary for State) and Senator George McGovern, would appear to indicate that this strategy is being considered. Western policies are increasingly being characterised as those of reconciliation rather than division, inducement rather than coercion. The principal American objective in Angola now can probably be summarised as follows: The United States would like to stabilise the region as part of wider efforts to seek peace in southern Africa generally. The Cuban presence is no longer seen to be the destabilising element that it was once thought to be, although a primary American concern, particularly at the Congressional level, is still to create conditions that would encourage the Cubans to get out of Angola and elsewhere in Africa. The American position is that a settlement in SWA/Namibia and the reconciliation between Zaire and Angola would remove the immediate perceived foreign threat to President Neto from across his borders. The hope is that the Angolans would then recognize that they no longer needed the Cubans for security purposes and would send them home.

But as the Luanda "putsch" showed, Neto also has to worry about challenges within his country, and even though the "foreign" threat may be neutralised he is likely to lean on the Cubans as long as there is an "internal" threat to his regime. The Cubans too, so long as they continue to operate a foreign aid programme in Angola — which, as mentioned earlier, involved sending men and not materials to the country — will remain. There is no sign that Castro intends stopping this "aid" and he has already made it clear to the United States that the Cuban presence in Angola is not negotiable as a pre-condition for improved relations with the West.

The changing American and European attitude to the Cubans in Africa may also in part be a response to criticism by African leaders like Paolo Jorge, the Angolan Foreign Minister, who is on record as saying: "How does the United States distinguish be-

tween the type of foreign aid Cuba is providing Angola and that provided by the United States to other Third World countries? You have more military instructors in Saudi Arabia and Iran than we have Cubans and Soviets combined".¹⁵

It particularly riles the Angolans that the United States has yet to establish formal diplomatic relations with a country whose co-operative attitude has to some extent facilitated the Namibia discussion. (It is noteworthy that France established full diplomatic relations with Luanda at the beginning of December 1978)¹⁶ However, the other side of the story, (which is possibly one reason that the US has hesitated in recognizing the Luanda Government), is that despite signs of moderation the MPLA still appears to have a militant intention to see that decolonisation along socialist lines continues throughout the length and breadth of Africa. The diplomatic initiatives of the MPLA should not necessarily therefore be read as a softening of the MPLA's position on national and international objectives.

Angola's internationalist objectives are also to some extent aligned with Cuba's foreign policy objectives, in the sense that the socialist themes of anti-colonialism, anti-racism, continued revolution, etc. are ever-present. It is as much for this reason, as for its desire to curry favour with the black African states generally, that the MPLA supports Swapo. Continued Angolan pressure on Swapo to accept the Western settlement proposals therefore must always be seen as conditional upon the Western strategy being in Angolan (and ultimately Cuban) interests.

Yet, Angola is nevertheless being seduced by the West. The most striking illustrations of this are the tentative feelers that President Neto is waving in the direction of Lomé. Angola and Moçambique are virtually alone among the independent countries of Africa in not having acceded to the Convention. This is no fault of their's, of course, (since the Convention only came into force in 1975), but it is currently being re-negotiated and interest in Maputo and Luanda runs high. In September this year the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr Henri Simonet, visited Luanda to, (among other things), discuss the benefits Lomé can offer developing countries.

If Angola does accede to Lomé, President Neto will have put his country solidly in the Western trading camp. The implications of such a step for MPLA policy could be enormous and would be interpreted as a serious set-back for Soviet ambitions in Southern Africa. The effect on Cuba would also be worth watching.

- 1 For a wider discussion of this see Bender, 'Angola the Cubans and American Anxieties' in *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1978
- 2 For a discussion of Cuban revolutionary objectives see Jorge I. Domínguez 'Cuban Foreign Policy' in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1978 pp 84 - 108 The description of the early years of Cuba's foreign policy (particularly the South American experience) is largely a summation of Domínguez' historical overview
- 3 Domínguez, *op cit* pp 92 - 94

4. Dominguez, *op. cit.* p. 88
5. Dominguez, *op. cit.* p. 95
6. Another leader was Daniel Chipenda, said to have enjoyed the backing of Moscow. He later joined up with the FNLA. See "The South African Intervention in Angola" by Robin Hallett; *African Affairs* vol. 77, no. 308, July 1978.
7. A discussion of the racial belief systems of nationalist movements (Angola and South Africa) and the problems of disunity is contained in a phd. dissertation of the same title by S. Y. Abdu of the University of Denver, 1975. pp. 81 - 82.
8. For analyses of the events of 1975 see Porch, D. "The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution". *Crdomhelm* 1977; pp. 222 - 237.
9. Bender, *Op. Cit.* p. 25
10. Dominguez, *Op. Cit.* p. 13, see also Chester Crocker, "Making Africa safe for the Cubans" in: *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1978, p. 32, for criticism of this assumption
11. MPLA Congress documents 1977.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Interview with *Africa Magazine*.
14. Dominguez *op. cit.* p. 105
15. Bender, *op. cit.* p. 29
16. *The Star*, Johannesburg, 4 December 1978

SHORT TERM SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Seamus Cleary

The recent statement by the South African Minister of Defence, Mr P.W. Botha, that South Africa would not tolerate a marxist (Swapo) Government in neighbouring South West Africa/Namibia and the announcement on 20 September, 1978, that South Africa intends to hold elections in the Territory in the following November, suggests that South African foreign policy is in the process of being changed. Similarly the resignation of Mr B.J. Vorster, Prime Minister of South Africa for the past twelve years, suggests a change in tone, if not in actual policy aims. The question remains, however, whether apart from the brief Angolan military exercise, South African foreign policy has changed in the past or will change in the future.

Admittedly South African policy-makers have pressured the Smith regime to reach some sort of accommodation with, at least, some of the African leaders of Zimbabwe, and economic pressures have, in all probability, been brought to bear on the BLS countries¹ to refrain from actions which are perceived as detrimental to South African interests. But South Africa has, nevertheless, by and large adhered to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other independent states. Whether this policy will continue to be applied in the future depends largely on whether the broad aim of the South African Government, i.e. the establishment of stable, preferably pro-South African, but at least neutral, black governments in neighbouring states and a type of regional economic unit,² remains the same. Arguing on the presumption that this will be the case, one would infer that there will be little change in South African policy, both internal and external.

This article was written especially for this issue of the *Bulletin*

Certain assumptions will be made in this proposition; namely, that in the short term the international economic climate will not undergo any drastic change nor will there be any dramatic increase of pressure on South Africa³. The argument then, may be divided into four parts: (i) the policy aims of the South African Government; (ii) the policy choices open to it; (iii) the constraints operating on these policy alternatives; and (iv) the policies which will probably be adopted. The discussion will necessarily be brief but it is believed that the main influences on South African policy-makers will be covered.

The South African Government's Policy Aims

Broadly speaking the policy aims of all states are similar and may be subdivided, again, into four parts. According to James Barber these are: the survival of the state, the preservation and promotion of particular values, the maximisation of wealth, and the ability to influence other states⁴.

In the South African situation the achievement of these aims is affected by both internal and external factors. This is amply illustrated by the change of the South African Government's tactics after the Portuguese coup d'état in 1974. For the South African perception of these broad aims to be understood, attention must be paid to South Africa's internal policy of 'apartheid' or, as it is officially known, separate development. This is necessary because this policy not only influences the South African concept of the state, but it also helps to explain white South African values and the difficulties facing South African policy-makers in their attempts to influence other states, as well as the country's chances of maximising its wealth.

South African policy-makers perceive the country as being a type of empire. Apartheid provides for the 'decolonisation' of this 'empire' through the creation of separate 'independent' black homelands which are to be granted 'independence' as quickly as possible⁵.

Because of this concept of the state, the South African Government maintains that the whites are in the actual majority in South Africa — they allegedly represent one nation amongst many other nations which will all gain 'independence' at some stage in the future. This perception has enabled policy-makers to argue that black South Africans are temporary sojourners in the Republic of South Africa, who exercise their political rights in their own states. The commitment to white political supremacy within the South African state on the part of policy-makers has caused problems in the formulation of South African foreign policy. The South African Government has attempted to divorce the opera-

tion of its internal policies, from the operation of its foreign policy, mainly through its insistence on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of independent states — a well established principle in international law.

Policy-makers, however, have been forced to make adjustments to their internal policies in order to improve the prospects of foreign successes. Perhaps one of the best examples of this was the creation of diplomatic suburbs in the country's capitals, Pretoria and Cape Town, to enable black representatives of states, such as Malawi, to live in South Africa and the granting to certain hotels of 'international status', so as to enable them to admit black foreign guests. Another excellent example of the flexibility of foreign policy-makers in their attempts to achieve the broad aims of the country's foreign policy was the change in perception manifested by the South African Government after the Portuguese coup as to how these aims would best be achieved. Whereas previously South Africa had perceived that her aims would best be achieved by low-key support of the white Rhodesian regime⁶, the changed situation brought about by the Portuguese coup and the impending independence of Portugal's African colonies, necessitated a policy revision and the adoption of a new approach if the same goals were to be achieved.

The Republic of South Africa desired, and continues to desire, politically stable neighbours⁷ and while it might have been preferable to the policy-makers that these neighbouring states were ruled by whites, the realities of the post-coup situation required the South African Government to face the fact that this was not possible without large scale South African involvement⁸, which the Government was not prepared to risk. This resulted in the formulation of the détente initiative and the increase of South African pressure on the Smith regime in an attempt to encourage white Rhodesians to reach an accommodation with the black Rhodesian population. There were obviously other reasons behind the adoption of this new tactic, among them being the expected good will which would accrue from Central African states through South African assistance in the search for a solution to the Rhodesian dispute, and the expected economic benefits which would result from closer relations with independent African states by means of increased trade and investment opportunities.

The country's international position has, if anything, worsened since this period. South Africa is presently subjected to a United Nations-sponsored arms embargo under Chapter VII of the organization's Charter, (this makes it a mandatory measure). Furthermore, there is still a possibility of economic sanctions

being imposed on the country due to its action with respect to Namibia⁹, and relations between South Africa and black African states are far worse than they were in the mid-1970's. It is highly unlikely that South African policy-makers will do more than change their tactics once again in order to attempt to achieve the broad aims of foreign policy. Any change in the aims themselves would represent a negation of probably the second most important aim — that of the preservation of particular South African values — the maintenance of white political supremacy in the country.

South Africa's Policy Alternatives

The Republic's policy-makers have three basic policy choices if they wish to achieve the broad aims of South African foreign policy. These may be briefly summarised as: (a) a retreat into isolationism; (b) some adaptation of the internal political policy of the country, while maintaining the official policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of independent states; and (c) the establishment of client governments in neighbouring Namibia and Zimbabwe, and possibly Angola and Mozambique. All three options have been used in the past, to a greater or lesser degree, and it is, therefore, likely that they will be considered again.

A retreat into isolation by the South African Government would entail a reduction in the perceived importance of external actors by policy-formulators. The country underwent a similar sort of retreat during the immediate post-Sharpeville period and during this, emphasis was placed on building up South African economic and military strength¹⁰. Any retreat into isolationism during the present period would probably be for the same reason. The attempt would be made to strengthen the country's economy in order to reduce the effectiveness of any possible economic sanctions adopted by the international community, to restore the confidence of the white electorate in the country's future¹¹, and to strengthen the country's military potential. The policy would also entail a tacit withdrawal from involvement in regional affairs and a greater emphasis on internal affairs. External contacts would be maintained but at a far lower level than at present. While it is not envisaged that South Africa would resign from the United Nations, for example, it is likely that the importance given to the international body would be downgraded.

Alternatively South Africa could become more aggressively involved in the affairs of the sub-continent. This would entail engagement in military operations in Zimbabwe and Namibia, at least, and possibly in Angola and Mozambique. There is little background for such a policy. South Africa was militarily in-

volved in both Rhodesia and Mozambique (while it was a Portuguese colony), and in Angola (in the pre-independence power struggle), but withdrew rapidly when its interests required this. The adoption of this policy would require a major commitment of South African military personnel and equipment as well as economic aid, if the regimes established in terms of this policy were to have a chance of survival in the short term. It would also require solid support inside South Africa and a quiescent black population. In addition, South Africa would have to be assured of support from groups inside the countries concerned, from which to form the client regimes.

Finally, South African policy-makers could continue their present course of attempting to find internationally acceptable solutions to the region's problems while, at the same time, attempting to make the country more internationally acceptable by making cosmetic changes to its internal policies¹². These cosmetic changes would include adaptations such as the removal of social discrimination in respect of the black population and arriving at some form of political compromise with the coloured and Asian groups in the country. The adoption of this alternative would entail a continuation, or an increase, of the level of the country's involvement in the international community. This means that South African Government officials would continue to perceive institutions such as the United Nations as having intrinsic value and would, therefore, not downgrade their importance¹³. Similarly, policy-makers would not slacken their attempts to open, reopen and maintain the country's contacts with the international community. The country's perceived strategic importance would continue to be stressed¹⁴, as would the economic potential of the Republic¹⁵. The continuation of this policy, however, does not mean that South African policy-designers will necessarily agree to proposals put to them by international bodies or other national agencies. Essentially all they will do is to avoid rejecting negotiations on the sub-continent's problems¹⁶.

Finally it is also possible that some form of adaption of two, or even all three, of the above could be adopted as the country's foreign policy. For example it is possible that South Africa could decide to adopt a policy which saw the establishment of a client government in Namibia only while still offering co-operation in the search for a solution of the Zimbabwean dispute and, at the same time, reducing foreign contacts. Such a solution would be faced with similar constraints operating on it as would a decision to adopt any one of the three alternatives outlined above.

Constraints on South African Policy Alternatives

South African policy-makers are faced with various constraints operating on their choice of policy, which can be broadly divided into domestic and external constraints. The following discussion covers the main constraints and is not intended to be all-inclusive.

Chief amongst the domestic constraints facing them is the concern for the *white electorate's opinion*. This concern has been displayed in the past. For example, soon after the declaration of independence by Ian Smith's regime, South African policy-makers were concerned not to appear to be betraying the 'white man's cause' in Rhodesia. The Opposition political parties in South Africa, (with the exception of the Progressive Party), attempted to make electoral propaganda out of the event. They called for a clearer definition of South African-Rhodesian relations and South Africa's immediate recognition of Rhodesia as an independent country. This concern for the reaction of the white electorate to particular policies on the part of policy-formulators is an important factor in the choice of a particular policy, and is likely to remain so. The prospect of white Rhodesians fleeing Rhodesia in the manner of white Belgians fleeing the Congo, or the Portuguese leaving Angola, haunts the South African Government, as this would significantly affect the opinion of the white electorate, thereby limiting the options open to South African policy-designers. As well as limiting the policy-maker's options, it is possible that such an event would have a serious effect on the possibility of re-election for a Nationalist Government in South Africa; an important consideration for any policy-maker. Because of this the South African Government is unlikely to do anything which would significantly reduce its support amongst the electorate. This indicates that there is little chance that South Africans would adopt policies which could be perceived as leading to the betrayal of the 'white man's cause'.

Clearly, therefore, the most likely policy to be adopted by South Africa is one which assists in the search for a solution to the Zimbabwean dispute, while not overtly prejudicing the position of the white inhabitants of Zimbabwe.

While it is true that Professor Schlemmer and others have detected a movement towards "pragmatic conservatism" amongst the white electorate in South Africa¹⁷, I do not believe that a massive white exodus from Zimbabwe fleeing 'murderous black hordes', would re-inforce this movement. It is far more likely that the white electorate would react strongly against pragmatic adjustments to South Africa's internal policies in this event. This expected white backlash affects the options open to South African policy-designers and forces them to move cautiously when

formulating policy on Zimbabwe. In any event, it is the perceived situation and not the actual situation which is what really matters, and there can be little doubt that policy-makers believe that a white backlash would occur if the South African Government was perceived as being one of the major causes of a white Rhodesian exodus.

Economic considerations impose a constraint of almost equal importance. It is highly probable that the South African Government would be reluctant to adopt any policy which would be harmful to the country's economy¹⁸. This can be taken to mean that South African policy-makers are unlikely to adopt policies which would significantly harm, for example, Mozambique-South African relations, since Maputo is an important port for the continued well-being of the South African economy. Reportedly 66 percent of the Witwatersrand's — (the major industrial area of South Africa) — exports and imports are directed through Mozambique's capital, Maputo. It is equally, if not more, unlikely that the South African Government will adopt policies which will significantly harm its relations with the Western world, given the Western bloc's pre-eminence in South Africa's trade relations. In this context it can also be expected that South African policy-designers will take into account the danger of economic sanctions when formulating a foreign policy. While it appears unlikely that such measures will be adopted by the international community in the short term¹⁹, the possibility of such a move must influence the choice of policy.

Military considerations are a further influence on the choice open to the South African Government. While the country is almost totally self-supporting in relation to the supply of small arms, the lessons of the Angolan military exercise will not be lost on South Africa. The shortage of 9mm ammunition experienced in South Africa during the Angolan adventure²⁰, when allied to the mandatory arms embargo imposed on South Africa by the United Nations Security Council, which effectively prevents the re-supply of arms which cannot be manufactured locally, will tend to discourage the adoption of a policy necessitating major military involvement outside the country's borders. In addition, South African policy-makers are aware that such involvement would heighten the danger of major external — (Cuban and, possibly, Soviet) — involvement in the region²¹. Further, South Africa will probably attempt to discourage its neighbours from total co-operation with the guerilla forces operating against her²². The South African Government will probably attempt to maintain such co-operation at the present low level — (more accurately, at a level perceived to be containable by South African policy-

makers) — while not jeopardising the country's basic interest.

Finally, if the South African Government is to keep internal dissatisfaction at an acceptable level, economic growth will have to be stimulated. Greater growth will tend to limit the effectiveness of both right and left wing opponents of the Government, provided it can be sustained. But this requires a higher level of foreign investment than is current in the South African economy. South Africa has already experienced the difference between public and private foreign investment²³ and while it would probably prefer private foreign investment, this is unlikely to flow into the country in any significant amounts while the possibility of internal instability exists to any significant degree²⁴. Clearly, therefore, despite the rise in the gold price, large scale public foreign investment is needed if the South African Government is to achieve sufficient economic growth with which to limit internal unrest. Because of this South Africa is open to pressures and further limits on its foreign policy choices. It will be reluctant to adopt a policy which will limit the possibility of foreign investment in the country.

Probable Policies to be Adopted

It is possible, therefore, that a policy will be adopted which will not clash with any of the constraints discussed above. It will have to be acceptable to both wings of the National Party and have the possibility of gaining at least the acquiescence of the majority of the South African population. Similarly, it will have to enhance the chances of increased external investment in the country, while not seriously damaging existing relations with neighbouring states, such as Mozambique.

Finally the policy adopted will probably entail a low risk of increasing the country's military commitments outside its borders.

A continuation of the present policy applied by the South African Government would best fulfil these conditions. Current South African foreign policy entails some cosmetic adjustment of internal policies, while offering support, in some degree, to international efforts to find a peaceful solution to regional disputes. A prerequisite for such a solution is that it is internationally acceptable, especially to the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations. This means that a black majority government in Zimbabwe and Namibia has to come into being and there will have to be some corresponding advancement in the socio-political position of blacks in South Africa.

There is little in the logic of Nationalist policy to prevent this from coming about. National Party policy would, arguably and logically, lead to the creation of 'independent' black states, and

therefore, citizens of 'independent' black states who, in the future, will presumably be treated in a similar manner to citizens of other independent states. Clearly the removal of legalised social apartheid, and the declared desirability of such a course of action by some Government ministers²⁵, would improve the prospects of South Africa's acceptability to African states and, therefore, to the international community as a whole. Neither would this conflict with National Party dogma to any great extent. Internationally reprehensible laws, such as the Mixed Marriages Act and the miscegenation provisions of the Immorality Act, could be removed from the South African Statute Book without significantly affecting the ruling party's ideology²⁶.

There have been some indications that these cosmetic changes are being considered for implementation by the South African Government. Leasehold schemes, allowing urban blacks some degree of permanence in the urban areas of 'white' South Africa, have been mooted, and approved by Government²⁷. In some areas racial discrimination has been lifted, notably in those of sport and culture. The method adopted by the Government to achieve this relaxation of ideology has been to make administrative changes without abolishing such discrimination legally. There are probably two reasons for this. Firstly, the Nationalist Government is reluctant to acknowledge publicly that its policy is a failure.²⁸ Secondly, by removing discrimination in some areas by permit, the Government controls both the carrot and the stick. Any moves away from discrimination which it regards as being too radical are easily stopped by the removal of the required permit.²⁹

Another indication that some changes are planned in the country's internal policy can be seen in the proposed new constitution which envisages some degree of power-sharing with the coloured and Asian population of the country. Although the degree of power-sharing envisaged is small, and the control of the decision-making process would still remain in the hands of white South Africans, the change of attitude represented by the proposed constitution is significant. It is particularly so when one remembers the concern of earlier Nationalist Governments to remove the coloured voters from the common roll³⁰, and the later exclusion of the African and coloured people's special representatives from the South African Parliament.

At a regional level South African policy-makers are likely to consider policies in terms of a costs-benefits equation. Provided that the costs are not perceived as being too high, it is probable that policy-makers will continue to support moves towards finding a solution to the region's problems. This would entail main-

taining, or possibly limiting, South African support of the white regime in Rhodesia, while not ruling out further negotiations with the Western bloc and the United Nations in respect of Namibia. Clearly the South African Government would also attempt to establish much the same relationship with the new Namibian Government as was established with the Frelimo Government in Mozambique. This would entail refraining from offering support to the opponents of the Namibian Government and from commenting publicly on events within the country. In addition, aid and assistance would be offered and given, if accepted, as in the case of Mozambique.

On a wider level, the South African Government will probably attempt to make use of the good will hopefully generated by its co-operation and assistance in the search for solutions, in order to increase its trade relations with Africa, and its influence with the Western bloc. Some form of trade-off is likely; for example, South Africa might try to use its assistance to gain increased foreign public investment, the use of a Western veto on any sanctions proposals, or a lessening of Western diplomatic pressure on the country³¹.

A further advantage of continuing the present policy would be the limited military risks involved. At the most, the country's military would have to face a limited guerilla war. Patriotic Front leader, Joshua Nkomo, has said that a Patriotic Front Government in Zimbabwe would offer only tacit support to guerrillas operating against South Africa³², and the experience of South African-Mozambican relations tends to support this. Mozambique's Government would appear to have actively discouraged South African guerillas from attacking the country³³, and it is probable that an independent Zimbabwean Government would do the same, given Zimbabwe's dependent position in the Southern African trade system. It is also probable that a Swapo Government in Namibia would equally discourage guerrilla attacks on South Africa from bases in Namibia, while also offering transit rights to returning South African guerrillas.

Conclusion

It is, therefore, probable from the foregoing that South African policy-makers will opt for a continuation of the present policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of independent states, while continuing to make some cosmetic changes to their own internal policy. While the risks involved in such a policy may be perceived as being high, the rewards are correspondingly worthwhile. Equally, if the risks involved in the continuation of the present policy are high, they are not as high as those involved in the adoption of the alternate policies discussed.

Military involvement at a higher level runs the risk of greater foreign involvement, the possibility of the country's forces becoming bogged down in a Vietnam-type situation;³⁴ and also raises the chance of developing large scale white opposition to such involvement at some stage in the future. Besides the latter possibility, military involvement at a high level would significantly reduce the prospect of economic growth, beset as the country is by a lack of foreign investment, and would provoke international opposition — (probably to the extent of imposing economic sanctions). The concentration of national expenditure on armaments must also be taken into account.³⁵

A stagnating economy increases the danger of large scale internal opposition within the country, an event which South African policy-formulators would like to prevent if possible. Isolation, too, raises similar possibilities. If the country is to resume economic growth at the level required to meet the revolution of rising expectations, large scale foreign investment is necessary but a retreat into isolationism would harm the prospects for such investment.

In the light of the foregoing, it is now possible to attempt to explain Prime Minister P.W. Botha's statement that South Africa will not tolerate a Swapo Government in Namibia, and the subsequent announcement that elections will be held in Namibia between 20 - 24 November, 1978³⁶. His statement can be seen as stemming from his position on defence matters and from his desire to win support for his successful bid for the Premiership. The white electorate expects Cabinet Ministers to make 'kragdadige' statements from time to time, and Botha's known 'hawkishness' on defence matters made Namibia a suitable field for the pronouncement of such a statement. The explanation of the South African Government's decision to hold elections is more problematical and largely supposition³⁷. South African policy-makers are concerned not to appear to be betraying the 'white man's cause' in the region, and this may be the possible explanation for the decision to hold elections.³⁸

Nevertheless, policy-makers are equally concerned not to harm the country's prospects for economic growth and acceptance by the international community, provided that this can be done without damaging the country's basic interest — the survival of the state and of white political supremacy. An explanation taking these factors into account must, therefore, be made. South African policy, in recent years, with respect to Namibia has centred on the statement that the peoples of Namibia must themselves decide on the future of the country. It is possible that the South African Government decided to hold elections in Namibia to elect

an interim assembly which would then accept the United Nations sponsored plan for the Territory. This acceptance would then be divorced from the South African Government because it would be a decision made by the elected representatives of Namibia. The South African Government could then not be accused by its opponents on the right, inside and outside the Party, of betraying the 'white man's cause', or of dealing with 'terrorists'.

Doubtless, if this is the reason for the South African decision, pressure will be brought to bear on the interim assembly to accept the United Nations plan, but this pressure will not be visible to the general South African electorate and could, in any event, be explained away as being in the South African interest. Pressure on a white regime to make accommodations with the country's black population has already, and successfully, been explained away in this fashion without too great an impact on the electorate. In any event, it is probable that such pressure will not be necessary. The example of Rhodesia, or Zimbabwe, is there for the Namibians elected to the interim assembly, and given the expressed hostility of the international community to any Namibian UDI, it would influence any decision on the outcome.

Despite the presence of the Zimbabwean example, South African policy-makers can be said to be actively encouraging Namibians, at least, to consider seriously the acceptance of the Waldheim proposals. The emphasis placed on the possibility of such acceptance both at the press conference held by the then Prime Minister, B.J. Vorster, and in later interviews with the South African Administrator-General for the Territory, Judge M.T. Steyn, would appear to indicate that the above explanation of the South African decision, may possibly be correct.

In any event, policy-makers in South Africa would not adopt a policy which would harm the country's interests, and the South African decision at first glance appeared to be detrimental to those interests. The explanation given above, while having little factual basis other than the subsequent acceptance of the South African-Western compromise, does postulate some benefits for South Africa. After 9 December, 1978, South African policy-designers will be able to stop making visible decisions for Namibia, while pressuring the interim body, elected in terms of the elections, to make decisions which are favourable to South African interests — in this instance the acceptance of the United Nations proposals. Namibia would have been successfully placed in a position similar to that of Zimbabwe in relation to South Africa, and the South African Government could then proceed to win international credit for its assistance and co-operation in the search for a peaceful solution to the region's problems, while not seriously threatening its electoral position inside the country.

1. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. For example the Swazi Government was reportedly pressured not to allow a factory producing television sets in competition with South African producers, to be opened in the country
2. Address by previous Foreign Minister, Dr Hilgard Muller in *Southern Africa Record*, no 7, December 1976, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, outlines these as the broad aim of South African foreign policy
3. An increase of pressure on South Africa would mean the imposition of coercive measures such as economic sanctions on the country, or diplomatic measures such as the withdrawal of the Western bloc's ambassadors. cf. eg. F. Mc A. Clifford-Vaughan (ed). *International Pressures and Political Change in South Africa*. Oxford University Press, 1978
4. J. Barber *South Africa's Foreign Policy; 1945 - 1970*. Oxford University Press, 1973
5. 'Independence' for the black homelands is forced through by South African officials regardless of the economic feasibility of such independence. Regardless of the objections of the 'homeland government', South African officials, having obtained agreement to the principle of 'independence', tend simply to push ahead with plans for 'independence'. See unpublished paper by H. Gihomee (of Stellenbosch University): *The Evolution of a National Movement; 1934 - 1978*
6. South Africa delivered limited economic and military aid to Rhodesia, e.g. by paying the lion's share of the Rhodesian military budget and seconding South African police for service in Rhodesia
7. Prime Minister P.W. Botha re-iterated this point in an interview with S.A.T.V. on 25 October, 1978.
8. i.e. It would have required a high level military involvement.
9. Sanctions appeared to have been almost totally staved off after the compromise reached in Pretoria between the South African Government and the representatives of the major Western powers on 20 October, 1978. Latest reports, however, seem to indicate that the African bloc is not satisfied with the compromise and will press for sanctions to be applied. e.g. Report in *Natal Mercury*, 26 October, 1978.
10. See e.g. J. Barber: *op. cit.* and R.W. Johnson: *How Long Will South Africa Survive?* Macmillan (SA) Ltd, 1977.
11. There have been numerous reports of South African professional men and women leaving the country. The area most affected would appear to be the medical profession. For example, there have been reports of 'Little Johannesburg' in Houston, Texas. In addition immigration figures are down and this probably causes concern in Government circles, given the need of the South African economy for skilled personnel. The training of blacks for skilled and semi-skilled work reflects this concern.
12. These changes would not affect the political position of blacks vs. whites in South Africa
13. Minister of Foreign Affairs, R.F. Botha's, interview on S.A.T.V. on 20 October, 1978, gives credence to this. He implied a continuation of the level of importance attached to the UN. This is also supported by South Africa's reluctance to withdraw from the UN
14. See for example D. Gekkenhuyts: "South Africa's Search for Security Since the Second World War", The South African Institute of International Affairs, *Occasional Paper*, September, 1978
15. See for example Extracts From Speeches by Dr Hilgard Muller to the South African/British Trade Association, Johannesburg, 4 August, 1976. *Southern Africa Record*, no. 8, March 1977. The South African Institute of International Affairs. Another example of this was given in the interview with James Soustelle, leader of the French Economic and Trade Mission (unofficial) in the *Durban Daily News*, 24 October, 1978
16. See for example, Mr R.F. Botha's statement to Parliament, 14 June, 1977, in: *Southern Africa Record* no 11, January 1978 — Johannesburg, South African Institute of International Affairs. Other examples are: Prime Minister B. J. Vorster's statement on Namibia on 20 September, 1978, and Mr Botha's interview on S.A.T.V. on 20 October, 1978.
17. See unpublished paper by Raphael de Kadt (Natal University): *Does social democracy constitute a realisable political alternative in South Africa?* 1978
18. Foreign Minister, R.F. Botha, has said that the possibilities of economic sanctions have not been significantly increased by the South African Government's decision to go ahead with elections in Namibia; arguing that if sanctions are imposed because of this, they would have been imposed in any event. *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, 20 September, 1978. The South African agreement to a compromise solution with the Western bloc's negotiators on 19 October, 1978, was perhaps also influenced by the possibility of the imposition of economic sanctions. This agreement has further reduced the chances of such sanctions being imposed by the Security Council.
19. There are two factors which lead one to this judgment. Firstly the current economic recession has shown no real signs of making rapid improvement. States will, therefore, be reluctant to sever trade relations with a potential and existing market. South Africa, a major supplier of gold, also supplies the Western world with other strategic raw materials and this will be taken into account before any decision on economic sanctions is taken by the major powers — Britain, France and the USA. Secondly, only the USA has shown any real move out of the economic recession. Europe and Britain are still struggling economically. Britain is still a major purchaser of South African produce and a major supplier of South African requirements, at a profitable level.
20. There were numerous reports of this shortage in the South African press at the time.
21. It is not envisaged that the Soviet Union would actually become militarily involved beyond the level of involvement reached in Angola. This entailed the supply of Cuban ground troops and Soviet military equipment. While the quantities of equipment and the number of men would probably be increased in the event of an aggressive South African expansionist policy, it is not likely that Soviet involvement would go further than this.
22. The current South African-Swaziland situation is relevant to this point. ANC guerrillas reportedly enter South Africa through Swaziland and as the Swazi Government is unable to prevent this, South Africa accepts the situation.

- 23 R W Johnson *op cit* p 102 *ibid*
- 24 Two explanations are needed in the light of the United States Congress's decision to refuse to allow South Africa credits from the Export-Import Bank and the decision of United States based companies to increase investment in South Africa in 1979. The refusal of credits could be reversed if the American President certifies that South Africa is moving away from discrimination. The measure is therefore avoidable. The decision to increase investment refers to a total sum of approximately R40 m. South Africa needs more foreign investment than this.
- 25 Such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr R F Botha and the Minister of Sport and Education Dr Piet Koornhof although they are probably in advance of some of their cabinet colleagues on this issue.
- 26 This presupposes that it is political and not racial supremacy which is the aim of the South African white population. Current political initiatives in South Africa logically demand that at some point in the future these laws will be removed. There is little point in creating independent states if one does not grant citizens of such states the same rights as citizens of other independent states. South Africans may marry white foreign nationals and may reside next to them and it is only logical that the insistence on the colour of an individual's skin being the same as his spouse's or neighbour's will fall away with time. If, as is envisaged, there comes a time when the only South African nationals are white (coloured or Asian) — (and these are engaged in a power sharing relationship) — there is little point in terms of Nationalist ideology in maintaining social barriers of the sort propagated by the Mixed Marriages Act, the Immorality Act and the Group Areas Act. South Africa's dependence on black labour will ensure that a solution such as that adopted at present with regard to nationals of other independent black states (e.g. Malawi and Mozambique) will not be adopted in this case. For further discussion on this point see W J De Klerk 'South Africa's Domestic Policies: Key Questions and Options' in *Politikon* vol 4 no 2 December 1977.
- 27 His approval has been won to such an extent that the Minister of Plural Relations Dr Connie Mulder has announced that banks and building societies are now permitted to make loans to blacks to buy homes in urban areas of white South Africa. *Daily News* Durban 26 October 1978.
- 28 This is partially a function of the almost Olympian stature that the late Prime Minister Dr Hendrik Verwoerd still commands in National Party circles. He was a believer in total apartheid — social as well as political.
- 29 This obviously does not stop the movement of ideas in favour of the removal of discrimination, but so long as permits continue to be issued, the hope that are in which discrimination still persists will soon come under this system remains, and this encourages compliance with the Government.
- 30 Nationalist Government efforts to remove the coloured votes from the common roll began when J G Strydom was elected Prime Minister. Attempts were made to ignore the South African constitution's entrenched requirement that a two-thirds majority of both Houses sitting together was needed to do this. When this failed after a test case in the South African Appeal Court, attempts were made to limit the power of the courts by passage of the *High Court of Parliament Act*. This in turn was defeated by the South African courts and the Nationalist Government then packed the Senate and the Appeal Court in order to pass the bill.
- 31 This is given some credence by the recent announcement that American based companies are to increase their investment in South Africa in 1979 and the possibility that Western members of the Security Council will veto any sanctions proposal against South Africa in the light of the compromise agreement reached in Pretoria.
- 32 *Rand Daily Mail* Johannesburg 9 September 1978.
- 33 Reportedly the Frelimo Government has not permitted South African guerrillas to establish bases in the southern part of Mozambique and there have been few if any guerrilla incursions into South Africa from Mozambique.
- 34 If South Africa were to set up client states in Southern Africa by military means, the country's military forces would have to support the existence of these regimes. It is unlikely that groups such as Swapo or the Patriotic Front would disappear because South Africa had become militarily involved at a higher level than at present. This would result in a continuing struggle in the client states — a no win situation for South Africa.
- 35 A greater military involvement in the region by South Africa would decrease the possibilities of greater foreign investment in the South African economy due to the widespread international opposition to such a move.
- 36 Now postponed to 4-9 December 1978.
- 37 The explanation is however tentatively supported by the South African agreement to the compromise reached at the Pretoria talks with the representatives of the five major Western nations.
- 38 It is hard to credit that the official statement that South Africa will not withdraw while violence continues in Namibia is the real reason for the South African decision. South Africa withdrew its forces from Rhodesia despite the continuing — (and after the withdrawal if increased) — violence in Rhodesia when it suited its interests to do so and when the white South African electorate had been prepared for the withdrawal.

IMPLICATIONS OF HOT PURSUIT OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

M. Hough

The right of hot pursuit has only been codified in the international law of the sea. This "right" may also, however, find expression on land as well as in the air. In the case of land it refers to *the uninterrupted immediate pursuit of an offender or group of offenders into the territory of another state*. The right of hot pursuit does not, however, permit the crossing of boundaries or of territorial waters or of the air space of another state unless an agreement permitting the exercise of this right between the states involved already exists¹.

Legally, hot pursuit should be distinguished from such actions as self-defence and reprisals. It is submitted by some writers that although self-defence may include measures which resemble hot pursuit, the distinction between the right of self-defence and the right of hot pursuit is founded primarily on different objectives. Self-defence aims at the repulse of aggression or armed attack and the protection of the territorial integrity or political independence of a state. The main objective of hot pursuit on the other hand, is the effective administration of justice of an injured state and the bringing before its courts and punishment of wrongdoers².

As to reprisals, there appears to be some uncertainty as far as their legality is concerned. Articles 2, 33 and 51 of the UN Charter, as well as a declaration adopted by the General Assembly in 1970, do not justify the use of force in acts of retaliation, and seemingly view the use of force as illegal. The term "punitive intervention" is also sometimes used with regard to retaliatory acts. This is defined as reprisal, short of war, for an injury suffered at the hands of another state.³

The 1970 General Assembly Declaration also proclaimed, however, that "No State shall organise, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the régime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State."⁴

In 1974, however, a resolution defining aggression was adopted by the General Assembly which stated (Article 7) that the definition in no way prejudiced the right to self determination, freedom and independence of peoples "forcibly deprived of that right" and particularly "peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination."⁵

This article was written especially for this issue of the *Bulletin*

The Objectives of Hot Pursuit on Land

The main objective of hot pursuit is obviously the arrest of escaping wrongdoers. The psychological effect of hot pursuit operations may also however be important, namely to deter or prevent future illegal activities, as well as serving other strategic ends.

The widespread use of techniques of revolutionary warfare such as guerilla war and terrorism in Southern Africa, has resulted in quite a number of attacks being launched by South Africa and Rhodesia in the territories of states harbouring guerilla bases. It is intended to interpret the meaning and implications of these actions, often explained and justified in terms of hot pursuit, through an analysis of the case-studies cited below.

Rhodesian Raids In Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana

In May 1977 an attack was launched on guerilla bases in Mozambique during which a number of camps were destroyed and several guerillas killed.

A question immediately raised, however, was why the Rhodesian troops tarried in Mozambique for such a long period during the raid, as hot pursuit generally entails swift intervention and withdrawal.⁶

In part, the answer may have been that it was in effect a pre-emptive strike designed "to prevent invading groups from bringing violence and brutality into Rhodesia". It was also stated by the Rhodesians that a pre-emptive strike required that the attacking states' position be consolidated and that as much enemy equipment as possible be brought back or destroyed. Although all the guerillas in the area may not have been killed, their war-making capacity was at least temporarily destroyed.⁷

The main effects of the raid were seen to: have given a tremendous boost to public morale; have been a demonstration to the outside world that the Rhodesians have not "given up" and to have been a demonstration of Rhodesia's war-making capacity. It was also seen as a demonstration of what could happen to other states harbouring guerillas intending to launch attacks against Rhodesia.⁸

During a raid carried out in August 1976, a number of problems arose. It was alleged that Rhodesia had attempted to provoke Frelimo into calling on the Soviet Union or Cuba for aid in order to bring Western nations into the war to aid Rhodesia. It was also suggested that the raid was aimed against Frelimo — (some Frelimo soldiers were also killed) — and not only against guerilla bases.⁹

These allegations were of course denied by the Rhodesians, but a more intricate problem did, however, arise. The Rhodesian

Government said initially only that the raid had been carried out. Four days after the raid, however, the Mozambique Government announced that the attack had been directed against a village harbouring "defenceless refugees", and this was taken up by the British press. It was only about three weeks after the raid that the Rhodesian Government published full details, clearly indicating the military nature of the camp that was attacked. It was, consequently, felt that full details of the raid should have been published immediately so as to offset any propaganda value it might have held for other states.¹⁰

In November 1976, a raid (termed "highly successful") was carried out against guerilla camps in Mozambique close to the Rhodesian border. A large amount of equipment was seized, as well as files and documents. Not much resistance was shown¹¹. After this raid it was stated that the intention had been to deter guerillas from siting their base camps close to the Rhodesian border. The object of the raid was to safeguard border towns inside Rhodesia, such as Umtali, as well as to make re-supply for guerillas inside Rhodesia difficult¹².

A further Rhodesian "hot pursuit" raid was also carried out in Botswana in May 1977, which reportedly nearly led to a clash between Rhodesian and Botswana forces. The Rhodesians made the raid a day after a Rhodesian farmer and his wife were murdered by guerillas. After the Botswana Government's police mobile unit took up defensive positions between the invading Rhodesians and the guerillas, the Rhodesian troops were ordered out in order to avoid a battle with the Botswana forces. Rhodesia was accused of unprovoked aggression by the Botswana Government, who claimed there were no guerillas in the area¹³.

After a Rhodesian Airways Viscount was shot down in September 1978, raids were carried out in Mozambique (following a warning by the Rhodesian Premier, Mr Ian Smith, that retaliatory steps would be taken as a result of the downing of the aircraft.) A communique was issued which stated that the objectives of the security forces were the destruction of guerilla bases, collection of intelligence, destruction of logistics and the elimination of guerillas. It was also stated that there were no civilians in the camps and that insurgents at the bases had already committed acts of terror. The raids were regarded as of crucial importance owing to the intention of many of the guerillas to infiltrate Rhodesia in the near future in order to sabotage the planned handover to black rule.¹⁴

A month later, a massive attack was launched on guerilla training camps deep inside Zambia. Bombers and helicopters were used in this attack during which many guerillas were killed and

bases destroyed. The Zambians were informed of the attack as it was launched and told not to interfere. During the same week, an attack was also launched on insurgent bases in Mozambique¹⁵.

Reaction to the attacks included Mr Nkomo's statement that an all-party conference was now unacceptable to the Patriotic Front; allegations were again made that not all of the bases were military establishments; and Zambia reacted by requesting military aid from Britain.¹⁶

South African Raids into Angola and Zambia

In May 1978, an attack was launched against Swapo camps in Angola. It was stated by the South African Defence Force that the action had been undertaken because of the escalation of Swapo activities which included border violations, intimidation and abductions. It was also claimed that the Angolan Government had repeatedly been asked not to make military bases available to Swapo¹⁷. Previously, in February 1978, it was reported that eighteen guerillas were killed in Angola by the South African Security Forces after a patrol unit had been attacked by Swapo forces. The governments in the north of SWA/Namibia had, it was reported, repeatedly requested that their territories be protected by means of hot pursuit operations.¹⁸

In August 1978, "follow-up" operations were carried out against Swapo bases in Zambia after the bombardment of Katimo Mulilo. It was reported that units of the Zambian Army had been involved in the bombardment.¹⁹

Swapo's reaction to the South African raids, and especially to the raid on Swapo camps carried out in May 1978, was to harden its attitude towards talks on the future of SWA/Namibia. The South African Minister of Defence, Mr P.W. Botha, declared after the attack on the bases in Angola, however, that South Africa would be compelled to hit back when attacked by guerillas using bases in neighbouring states. Regardless of the location of such bases, action would be necessary should these bases prove a military threat to South Africa.²⁰

The Political and Strategic Implications of Hot Pursuit

From the case-studies, it appears that very few of the "hot pursuit" operations carried out by Rhodesian and South African forces met even some of the requirements for a justification of hot pursuit as defined in international law. In none of the cases did any agreement giving consent to hot pursuit operations exist between any of the governments concerned; the conditions of uninterrupted and immediate pursuit were seldom met, and the operations often covered a long time-span. In certain cases, such as the "follow-up" operation after the Swapo attack on Katimo

Mulilo, it was obviously far removed from "hot pursuit", since the attack on the town was launched from the opposite side of the border.

Justifications used for the "hot pursuit" operation appear to have been based on a variety of factors, including those of a legal, political and strategic nature. The right of hot pursuit itself; the right of self-defence and retaliation; pre-emption and deterrence, were invoked.

Excluding the legal justifications on which the right of "hot pursuit" was based in these cases, considerations of a political and strategic nature obviously proved to be the real rationale behind the "hot pursuit" operations. In this regard, the following motives can be identified:

- *Pre-emption*

In strategic terms, pre-emption has the object of forestalling an imminent attack. Destruction or capture of weapons is therefore a prime object of any pre-emptive strike in order to, at least temporarily, delay or destroy an insurgent's military capability. Pre-emptive strikes are obviously aimed at the larger guerilla bases and cannot prevent smaller groups of guerillas from continuing to function. In fact the destruction of bases often has the result of fragmenting guerilla forces until such time as a regrouping has taken place.

- *Deterrence*

"Hot pursuit" operations could serve both as a warning to the government of the states harbouring guerillas as well as to the guerilla leaders, that future operations will be carried out if terrorism does not cease. Where deterrence in the original sense, that is defensive deterrence through the application of conventional tactics, can seldom serve to prevent terrorism, offensive deterrence, through threats coupled with action, is sometimes seen as an effective alternative. It does not, however, appear as though "hot pursuit" raids can be a completely effective deterrent either. None of the governments of the states harbouring guerillas have reacted after "hot pursuit" operations by withdrawing support facilities. In many instances these governments had even been warned or requested beforehand not to grant these facilities. It seems, however, that because these governments either feel that they themselves will not be attacked; (such contacts have been avoided by Rhodesia and South Africa during hot pursuit operations); or because they are often powerless to control the guerilla forces; or they are under pressure from other black states to grant these facilities; they will continue doing so.

The guerillas likewise do not appear to be deterred by "hot

pursuit raids". There seem to be sufficient recruits available, (either joining voluntarily or being kidnapped), and fresh supplies of weapons apparently pose no problem. While the Governments of South Africa and Rhodesia also have to deal with the problem of civilian morale, the guerillas only have the problem of their own morale with which to deal.

- *Other strategic and tactical considerations*

The seizure of guerilla equipment, especially in the case of Rhodesia (where equipment is in many respects a problem), as well as the prevention of abductions, gives an added incentive to "hot pursuit" operations. Obtaining the plans and documents of insurgents also provides information on future guerilla activities. Furthermore, attacking of bases located near the border makes re-supply for guerillas more difficult, and temporarily safeguards towns.

- *Political implications*

Boosting of public morale; creating conditions conducive to peaceful internal settlement and a possible stronger bargaining position during negotiations; are seen as important considerations by states carrying out "hot pursuit" operations. The limited freedom of action that South Africa and Rhodesia possess, however, creates a problem in this sense. Both the Patriotic Front and Swapo have hardened their attitudes towards negotiation; they have tried to use "hot pursuit" operations for propaganda by claiming, among other things, that the guerilla bases were refugee camps harbouring civilians. Consequently the outside world has often condemned the "hot pursuit" raids as "aggression", and has viewed them as ruining the prospects for peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian and SWA/Namibia disputes. The risk of contact with Frelimo or MPLA troops is also ever-present during "hot pursuit operations", and although such contact has been largely avoided, large-scale contact, should it occur, could have far-reaching political repercussions.

Conclusion

The problems connected with the idea of "hot pursuit" in southern Africa are only part of a larger problem, namely that of revolutionary warfare and support for "liberation movements". It may, strictly speaking, be legally more correct to invoke self-defence as justification for raids on guerilla bases although this concept is somewhat vague and often has an element of reprisal built into it.²¹ It is sometimes reasoned that justifying "hot pursuit" in this sense will make these actions internationally more acceptable. The concept of self-defence and especially preventive

self-defence, exercised through pre-emptive attacks, will, although possibly legally more correct in the situation under consideration, in all likelihood be equally condemned.

From a strategic point of view, certain advantages can obviously be gained — (even if these are only temporary) — by carrying out raids against guerilla camps. It was a lack of "safe sanctuaries" that facilitated the ending of the Malayan insurgency by the British. In the South African context, the political gains of raids on guerilla bases are less clear. As in any counter-insurgency campaign it is ultimately preventive political action and not so much military action, which is of greater importance. It is true to say that the best form of counter-insurgency is one which prevents an insurgency from getting under way in the first place.

1. Poulantzas, N.M. *The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law*, A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1969, pp. 1 - 11.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 16. The concept of "preventive self-defence" also exists, and states have invoked this right in practice although a measure of uncertainty exists as to what is admissible according to the right of self-defence. Necessity, proportionality and quick withdrawal are all elements of self-defence.
3. Starke, J.G. *An Introduction to International Law*, Eighth edition, Butterworths, London, 1977, pp. 117 and 551 - 552.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
5. *Yearbook of the United Nations*, Volume 28, 1974, p. 845.
6. *The Star*, 2 June 1977.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Rhodesia and World Report*, September 1976.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, November 1976.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *The Citizen*, 17 May 1977 and *The Star*, 18 May 1977.
14. *Pretoria News*, 25 September 1978 and *Beird*, 21 September 1978.
15. *Sunday Times*, 22 October 1978.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Citizen*, 6 May 1978.
18. *Beird*, 11 February 1978.
19. *Pretoria News*, 29 August 1978.
20. *Beird*, 5 June 1978.
21. The Israeli raid on Uganda during 1976 was however, according to some opinions, justified in terms of reprisal, as well as the raid on El Fatah bases in Jordan during 1968. In the last mentioned case, the doctrine of hot pursuit was also evoked. The Americans, in operations in Cambodia, evoked both hot pursuit and self-defence, and viewed these two terms as virtually interchangeable. See *US News and World Report*, 10 July 1976, and Poulantzas, N.M. *op. cit.*, p. 35.

LETTERS

Deon Fourie comments on the problem of achieving a ceasefire in Rhodesia. His letter is in response to talks given at Jan Smuts House by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, which were reproduced in Bulletin vol. 2 no. 2.

Mr Fourie is a senior lecturer in strategic studies and political science at the University of South Africa.

Sir,

It is significant that the speakers, in regarding the achievement of an effective ceasefire as the central challenge facing the Transitional Government, both point to the complexity of the problem of gaining the confidence of the insurgents, as the key to this.

Strangely, this apparently obvious factor — the fears the insurgents have of retribution should they fall into the hands of the Security Forces — is generally completely overlooked when the progress of the internal settlement is discussed in the press. One never sees reference to the fact that during the course of the war, terrorists taken under arms have been liable to capital punishment. At no time in the past has the Rhodesian Government resorted to persuading them to surrender, in order either to desist from further action or to operate against their erstwhile companions as counter-guerrillas so as to overcome the problem of forcible recruiting. The nearest Rhodesia came to this move, until March 1977, was in the amnesty that accompanied the negotiations initiated at the end of 1974, when military operations by the Security Forces were also suspended. But even then no attempt was made to secure mass surrenders, nor was there any attempt to put captured terrorists to use as counter-guerrillas. Instead, the Rhodesian Government preferred the rather legalistic, perhaps Anglo-Saxon approach, which treated the insurgents as common criminals, subject to the full weight of the law.

The use of surrendered enemy personnel on a large scale by the Portuguese, both in Angola and in Moçambique, was so widespread that they could be formed into uniformed companies known as *Flechas* (arrows), who operated very successfully against the various bands from which they had themselves come prior to capture or surrender. The Portuguese are believed to have pressed the Rhodesians to encourage desertion and surrender with a view to establishing counter-gangs. Apparently, however, the Rhodesian Government saw no merit in the system, presumably because they had a clear upper hand at the time.

Indeed the legalistic approach was used in Kenya and Malaya during the emergencies in those colonies until the value of encouraging surrender was perceived. Once this was understood, the

governments of both colonies took pains to encourage surrender and even used many surrendered terrorists against those who refused to surrender.

The results were slow in developing, even though neither of the insurgencies was benefitting from substantial assistance from a large power, nor from the total commitments of the countries bordering on the colonies; moreover, the surrender policies could be pursued at a time very favourable to the colonial governments. Also, the impetus to stop fighting was greater than would outwardly seem to be the case in Rhodesia today. Especially in Kenya, the fear of hanging assumed enough importance to ensure that the undertaking not to execute those who surrendered, became fundamental to the agreement which set the stage for the surrender campaign, namely Operation Wedgwood, following the capture of 'General China' in January 1954. Despite the undertaking, Wedgwood and a campaign in 1953 together failed to produce more than eight hundred and fifteen surrenders. Military operations continued, in fact, until February 1955 when negotiations began again on the same undertaking that those who surrendered would not be hanged, although those convicted of murder would be detained. By May 1955 it was clear that mass surrenders would not occur and that suspicions that these overtures constituted traps, dominated Mau Mau thinking. At the same time, the surrender talks had shown that there were large numbers who were thoroughly tired of the terrorist life. There were gradual surrenders and many of these joined the Special Forces, in turn hunting down and killing the leaders who still kept the forest gangs together. These were in fact the most effective final measures against Mau Mau.

The experiences of Malaya and Kenya, in which the situations were apparently more promising for the authorities than seems to be the case in Rhodesia — subjected to sanctions and surrounded by enemies as she is — are very relevant to an assessment of how long it is likely to take for the terrorists in Rhodesia to return in really significant numbers. There is very little in their past experience in Rhodesia to give the terrorists an indication that surrender would be wise. Not even the gratuitous intervention of the British Government has caused the Rhodesian authorities to alter the death sentence on terrorists. Subjected as they must be to indoctrination on the kind of treatment to be expected on capture, insurgents certainly cannot be expected to trust themselves to the authorities until a climate of confidence has been firmly established. Taking into account the expectation of victory that is obviously strongly propagated in the present atmosphere in Rhodesia, it must be even more difficult for them to muster the courage to walk in and surrender.

As the Reverend Sithole emphasises in his talk “. . . the fear is very real, in other words the problem really that we face, with regard to the agreement, with regard to the transitional government, is one of trust, not one of acceptance whatsoever.”

This admonition, appearing in different forms in both addresses, seems to be grossly neglected and yet forms the crux of the whole question of the progress of, and prospects for, the settlement. Probably not until after a black government is installed will it be certain that a mass response is possible. However it may be, no assessment that ignores the lessons of experience in Kenya and Malaya as they bear on the question of the fears of the terrorists, can be relevant.

Deon Fourie

All letters should be addressed to the Bulletin Editor, P.O. Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017. It should be noted that correspondence will be subject to editing.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE PORTUGUESE ARMED FORCES AND THE REVOLUTION

Douglas Porch

Croom Helm Ltd, London. 1977. 273 pp.

The Portuguese revolution of April 1974 focused world attention on this traditional backwater of Europe in a way nothing else has done since Wellington's troops marched out of Torres Vedras in 1808. It came as a considerable surprise to many people and as a shock to many governments who had failed to predict the event.

However, as the author says in the preface to this excellent book, the Portuguese *coup* loses much of its shock value if it is viewed in the context of Portuguese history and the experience of armies in other countries, particularly that of the French army in Algeria.

Mr Porch, who lectures in Modern European History at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, contends that it was the traditional independence of the Portuguese armed forces which led to strained relations setting in between the military high command and the Salazar-Caetano regime. He makes the point that since 1945, civil-military relations in Europe have had the greatest strain placed upon them by decolonisation. Portugal, like France but unlike Britain and Belgium, had to learn the hard way how to decolonize and divest itself of possessions in Africa and elsewhere.

The practice of sending politically troublesome officers to the colonies to keep them out of the way rebounded on the civilian authorities in Lisbon. Colonial service only reinforced the independence of the army and emphasized the growing military-civil rift. Far from curbing the ambitions of some officers, the colonies actually became springboards from whence they launched their bids for power with the intention of ending Portugal's colonial wars. For it was the colonial wars, says Porch, which eventually brought professional discontent to the boiling point, and led to open revolt.

The political development of the Portuguese armed forces is coherently traced from 1910 to 1974 when the military took power. Thereafter, Porch's account deals with the army in crisis and the strains placed on military organisation, the traditional career patterns and attitudes of soldiers and on army discipline by the military's attempts to influence the political life of the country.

Particularly interesting from a South African reader's point of view are the army's activities in Angola and Mozambique in the

post revolutionary period. A major problem in Angola was factional Portuguese military support for the MPLA which made it difficult to obtain a settlement between the MPLA and the other liberation movements. Consequently, there was a good deal of disorder during the transition period to independence, which affected the Portuguese white settlers (who were not in any event much loved by the Portuguese army). Nothing was done to protect Portuguese lives and property, leading one officer to remark in the book: "The whites in Angola were promised protection by the government. They did not get it. Had I known that the colonies would be abandoned like that, I would have said no to the revolution".

The Portuguese armed forces and the revolution is a valuable addition to the literature on the revolution of April 1974, and makes worthwhile reading.

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BUSINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: A CASEBOOK

Yair Ahroni with Clifford Baden

MacMillan Press Ltd, 1977. 245 pp.

The ability to scan the environment, to analyse and interpret events and to predict future trends is obviously one of the most important ingredients of effective management. Most business schools today provide courses in 'environmental analysis' which usually concentrate on the analysis of such traditional areas as the behaviour of competitors, technological developments, tax and legal issues and the economic environment. More recently emphasis has been given to the systematic monitoring of the broader social, economic and political issues that shape the company's environment. The authors see the role of the environmental scanner as being concerned with those aspects of the environment that are important to the firm, but which are not regularly investigated by "others in the organisation". The selection of cases for a course in international business at IMEDE, the Management Development Institute, in Lausanne, Switzerland reflects this area of interest.

Operating in foreign lands is now commonplace for many businesses, but because of cultural differences, prejudices or ignorance of differences in ways of doing things and varied national goals, the investment risks are often seen to be unduly great and the management problems often intractable.

The cases in this book promote the view that for the most part the environment functions independently of the manager's will. Demographic change, cultural norms and political movements are the result of profound — and often slow — changes in society over which the firm has no control. This does not imply fatalistic acceptance and that no action will be taken by the firm, but rather that whatever action is taken will or should be in response to an understanding of these external conditions.

The collection is strongest in the first selection of cases which deal with 'interest groups' and their influence on the firm's decision making. In the introductory comments the authors examine the nature of pressure groups, trends and tactics of such interest groups as environmentalists, minorities, religious groups etc. and suggest that while these groups traditionally have either brought their cases before government in an attempt to influence legislation or have taken their causes to the streets, however, there has, in recent years, been a shift in tactics. Recognising the immense power wielded by industry, interest groups have been directing campaigns at executives of individual firms — using these executives as levers of change in society. Rather than trying to influence the political/governmental establishment, these groups have chosen instead to bargain with those who hold economic power in a free market society.

The authors warn that in assessing the potential impact of interest groups in foreign lands, the manager should be wary of equating high visibility with power and low visibility with weakness. The cases under this section develop the student's skill in identifying relevant actors and assessing their strengths.

A second set of cases treat the issue of assessing political risks and opportunities in foreign environments. The reader is asked to go beyond mere generalised attitudes as to what constitutes a political risk. War, revolution and expropriation of the firm's assets are usually categorized as political risks.

But often, in attempting to classify nations into acceptable or unacceptable political risks, a first impulse is to group them merely by political form: democratic, marxist, socialist etc. which are oversimplifications when one considers that in the community of nations we have relatively socialistic democracies, such as Sweden and relatively capitalist democracies such as West Germany. Similarly, while economic ideology must be considered as important as political form, such terms as 'capitalism', 'socialism', 'welfare' and 'economic development' can have different meanings, even within the same country. But despite political risks, many firms do still invest in less-developed nations for frequently political risk is counterbalanced by a strong element of economic opportunity.

In the cases presented, we are asked to consider strategies for minimizing political risk when investing in developing countries, which the authors suggest involves, in part, appraising the strengths and motives of the interest groups in the countries and understanding the role that private enterprise is expected to play in the nation's development.

The third category of cases deal with the firm's role in the community or private responsibility for public welfare. The first case raises the question of whether a private enterprise should, of its own initiative, become involved in changing existing social relationships. The last three treat the question of social responsibility of business. How is that responsibility defined, and how is it exercised in different circumstances? One case considers the problem of a major multinational about to launch an exercise in measuring the corporation's impact on society, but it is far too sketchy to be useful.

An unsatisfactory collection of cases considers government decision making as it affects business and the question of public responsibility for private welfare. This section lacks depth and variety.

The well informed businessman operating in the international arena, is unlikely to find anything startling in this series of cases, but they may focus attention on areas of analysis which should be refined. To the student, newly entering this field, it is a sound and readable introduction to an important skill. Some of the companies are household words, such as Fiat, Citroen, Basf, Logo. Most of the problems are frequently encountered. There is a full teacher's manual also available for bona fide teachers.

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INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS

A full list of publications may be obtained from the Administrative Secretary, SAIIA, P.O. Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017, Transvaal, South Africa. Listed below are some examples of recent available publications.

BOOKS AND SPECIAL STUDIES

- *Namibia Old and New*, by Gerhard Töttemeyer. C. Hurst & Co., London, 1978. Published in co-operation with the Institute. Limited number of copies will be available from the Institute at a special reduced price of R15,00 for members.
- *Strategy for Development*, Macmillan, London, 1976. Edited by John Barratt, David Collier, Kurt Glaser and Herman Mönning. (Based on the proceedings of a conference at Jan Smuts House in December 1974. The third in a series on population growth and development, published for the Institute by Macmillan.) Price: R15,00 if ordered from the Institute.

PERIODICALS

- *International Affairs Bulletin*. Three issues per year. (For subscription details see inside front cover.)
- *Southern Africa Record*. Issued on an irregular basis, approximately four times a year, containing the texts of, or extracts from, official policy statements on international relations in Southern Africa. Price: R2,00 per copy.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

- *Political, Security and Economic Relations in the Eastern Bloc* Richard Szawlowsky. July 1978
- *South Africa's Search for Security since the Second World War* Deon Geldenhuys. September 1978
- *Nigerian Foreign Policy and The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): two essays*. Keith Campbell. September 1978
- *Islam in Africa*. J.A. Naudé. October 1978
- *South West Africa/Namibia: The South African Government's Response to the UN Secretary-General's Report on the Implementation of the Western Proposal. The Government's Statement of 20 September, 1978 and an analysis* by André du Pisani. September 1978
- *Whither South Africa?* S.P. du Toit Viljoen. November 1978
- *South Africa at the Crossroads*. A. Suzman. November 1978
- *Interdependence in Southern Africa*. Leif Egeland. December 1978

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