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RHODESIA — THE APRIL ELECTIONS AND AFTER

Nicholas Ashford

Whatever may be said about the fairness (or unfairness) of the April general election in Zimbabwe Rhodesia — the first in which all Africans over the age of 18 had been entitled to vote — the important point about that election is that it has broken the political deadlock which had existed between the internal and external Rhodesian groups since the abortive Geneva conference at the end of 1976.

There is now, as the Americans would say, a new ball game in process, although the players are more or less the same as before. The political initiative has swung in favour of the new “government of national unity” headed by Prime Minister Bishop Abel Muzorewa. The change of government in Britain and the growing mood of conservatism in the US Senate and House, notwithstanding President Carter’s recent decision not to lift sanctions at this stage, means that there is now a real chance that the new administration in Salisbury may get some sort of Western support (if not actual recognition) before the end of this year. By contrast the Patriotic Front, which failed either to disrupt the election or to dissuade blacks from voting, has been unconvincingly shrill in its denunciations of the latest developments inside Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Renewed attempts to unite Mr Robert Mugabe’s and Mr Joshua Nkomo’s wings of the guerrilla organisation give the impression that the two men, together with their “front line” backers, realise the need for constructive action on their part to limit the damage already done to their cause.

‘New Reality’

As Lord Carrington, the new British Foreign Secretary, stated shortly after his appointment, the election in Zimbabwe Rhodesia had “fundamentally changed the situation in that country” — a point also conceded by Mr Cyrus Vance, the US Secretary of State who conceded that “we must recognise there is a new reality.” A black President and Prime Minister have been installed in Salisbury and a new government appointed in which 12 out of 17 members are African. These are political realities which cannot be ignored and which are not negated by the fact that whites will continue to wield an influence in the administration of the country which is far out of proportion to their numbers.

From the point of view of the internal black and white Zimbabwe Rhodesian leaders, the election (which took place between

April 17 and 21) was a considerable success. A total of 1.8 million out of an estimated electorate of 2.9 million cast their votes for one of the five black parties taking part, giving an overall turnout of 64 per cent. This is a quite respectable poll by Western democratic standards and exceptional given the circumstances prevailing in the country at the time.

The size of the turnout was important because the election was designed not just to test the relative strengths of the parties, but was also designed to be a sort of referendum among blacks on the country's new majority rule constitution. An important criticism of the procedure laid down by the former transitional government (headed by Mr Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Ndabalingi Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau) for a transfer of power from the white minority to the black majority was that only whites had been consulted about the acceptability of the new constitution. However as all the parties involved in the election were in favour of the new constitution the high turnout was interpreted by the government as showing that it had satisfied the last of the "six principles" laid down by Britain as pre-conditions for a lifting of sanctions — namely, that any settlement should be seen to have the acceptance of the majority of the people.

Electoral Irregularities

The actual outcome of the election had been widely anticipated. Bishop Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) won an easy victory, taking 51 of the 72 black common roll seats being contested. A total of 1.2 million people (about 40 per cent of the electorate) voted for the UANC. In the three heavily populated Mashonaland provinces the UANC won a clean sweep of all the seats. It also gained a majority of seats in the Manicaland, Fort Victoria and Midlands provinces. Only in Matabeleland was it driven into second place by Chief Kayisa Ndiweni's United National Federal Party (UNFP), the dark horse of the election which surprisingly won nine seats largely because it was seen as a surrogate for Mr Nkomo's ZAPU organisation which draws most of its strength from Matabeleland.

Rev. Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) won only 12 seats, a result which was a bitter disappointment to the party's headstrong leader who immediately denounced what he claimed to have been "gross irregularities" during the election. ZANU has subsequently boycotted both the new parliament and the government of national unity, a move which has done some harm to the credibility of the new government but far more damage to the reputation of Rev. Sithole's party.

There was some truth in Rev. Sithole's charge, although his own party was probably as guilty of electoral irregularities (particularly the use of "private armies" or "auxiliaries" to goad people into voting for a particular party) as the UANC. A number of more generalised criticisms have been made about the organisation and conduct of the elections, mainly by opponents of the internal Rhodesian leaders.

The election has been denounced as being neither free nor fair because of the existence of martial law in 90 per cent of the country, the general mobilisation of all able-bodied men to protect voters and polling booths from Patriotic Front attack, and the virtual exclusion of any form of organised opposition (to the extent that numbers of ZAPU supporters were detained a few days before polling started). There were allegations of wide-spread coercion not only by "auxiliaries", who number about 8 000, but also by white employers in cities and on farms who ensured a high turnout by their workers. The half million people who live in "protected villages" were said to be virtual captives of the police and white officials who run their camps. There were also criticisms of the fact that the election was run on a party list system which meant there was no registration of voters or delimitation of constituencies.

Lord Chitnis, an independent observer representing Britain's *all-party parliamentary group on human rights*, denounced the election as a "gigantic confidence trick", arguing that extensive intimidation had been used to produce a high turnout. However the overwhelming impression gained by the 70 or so observers (many of whom were admittedly openly pro-Rhodesian) and the 200 journalists present during the election was much more favourable.

The report drawn up by the independent American Freedom House organisation and submitted to the US House sub-committee on Africa in May conceded that there had been pressures to vote but added that these activities "did not affect the final returns sufficiently to discredit the general results of the election." The organisation recommended that the US government should begin talks with Bishop Muzorewa on the possibility of lifting sanctions and formal recognition, but that US action on these matters should be conditional on continued progress for blacks in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. This is a course of action that President Carter, whose Africa policy is in danger of collapse, may decide to follow.

A British Conservative party team headed by Lord Boyd of Merton found not only that the election had been fair by British standards and as free as could be expected in the circumstances of

a guerrilla war but, more importantly, it also found the result as tantamount to being a satisfactory kind of referendum on the new constitution.

Western Policy towards Zimbabwe Rhodesia

The conclusions reached by Lord Boyd are extremely important because his report will be used by the new Conservative Government as a basis for formulating its policy towards Zimbabwe Rhodesia. The British Government has already embarked on a new diplomatic initiative, dispatching senior emissaries to Salisbury and black Africa as well as undertaking a review of the joint British-American policy that has been followed during the past year and a half. Although Britain is not expected to take any steps that could jeopardise the Commonwealth conference in Lusaka in August, the government nevertheless seems determined to restore Zimbabwe Rhodesia to what it calls "legality" and to lift sanctions. The US Government, which has been working in tandem with the British, is under considerable domestic pressure to do likewise.

However British and American response towards Zimbabwe Rhodesia will to a large extent be determined by the performance of the Muzorewa government during the next few months. In order to gain their approval Bishop Muzorewa must be able to demonstrate himself to be a genuinely black leader and not just a lackey of the whites in government and those who will continue to control the civil service, army, police and judiciary. He must also try to satisfy the aspirations of his black followers by providing them with more jobs, higher pay, better schools and health facilities, more land and a real say in the running of the country without at the same time alienating the 200 000 whites on whom he will have to depend to continue fighting the war and to spearhead the economic recovery which he has promised.

Finally, and most important of all, he must try to bring the war, which is now taking about 30 lives a day, to a speedy conclusion. For the large election turn-out was above all else an overwhelming vote for peace. If peace is not achieved then black Zimbabweans will look elsewhere for ways of stopping the fighting, and inevitably they will turn to the men who are conducting that war — Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo.

Whether Bishop Muzorewa is the man to perform such a Herculean task is open to question. His past performance, particularly since he entered the talks with Mr Smith which led to the establishment of the bi-racial transitional government in March last year, does not inspire confidence. He has shown himself to be

indecisive, politically inept and often vacillating in the face of white pressure. However there are those who know him well who believe he will rise to the occasion just as he did when he rallied the population against the Smith/Home settlement proposals in 1972. There has already been a marked improvement in his public performances, the result of confidence inspired by his election victory.

His handling of the challenge posed to his leadership by Mr James Chikerema, the UANC's first vice-president, as well as his allocation of black portfolios in the cabinet, would seem to indicate that he has appreciated the need for his administration to embrace all the main sections of the population and not to be dominated by one tribal group. The Bishop resisted pressure from UANC loyalists to have Mr Chikerema expelled from the party, a move which would have cost him the support of much of the powerful Shona-speaking Sezuru group and could have led to the resignation of at least 12 UANC MPs. Although Mr Chikerema was left out of the government, Sezuru support has been retained by the inclusion of one of Mr Chikerema's associates, Mr George Nyandoro, an old-time black nationalist who has become minister of lands, natural resources and rural development.

Of the 12 black ministers in the government, three (including Bishop Muzorewa himself) come from the Manyica group, three are Sezurus, two are Karangas (the tribe that not only provides the backbone of the Zimbabwe Rhodesian army but also of Mr Mugabe's ZANLA guerrillas) and four are Ndebeleles, including two members from the UNFP. The new president, Mr Josiah Gumede, is also an Ndebele, a move which is clearly designed to assuage Ndebele fears of domination by the country's Shona-speaking majority.

The cabinet also includes five whites, as laid down in the new constitution which initially provides for cabinet posts to be allocated in proportion to the number of parliamentary seats held. Three of them — Mr Ian Smith, Mr William Irvine and Mr Pieter van der Byl — are prominent right-wingers whose names are synonymous with white supremacy. Their inclusion in the government, while expected, will nevertheless undermine Bishop Muzorewa's credibility as a black leader, and the removal from the cabinet at least of Mr Smith is likely to be demanded by Britain before any move is taken to lift sanctions.

Mr Smith is expected to use his position as minister without portfolio to assist Bishop Muzorewa who, in addition to being Prime Minister, has taken over the portfolios of Combined Operations and Defence. Mr Irvine's appointment to the Agri-

culture portfolio is clearly designed to maintain the confidence of the white farming community while the most likely explanation for the inclusion of Mr van der Byl in the government is the fact that he has good contacts overseas, particularly in defence circles.

Constitutional Bias

Apart from the presence of a powerful white minority in the cabinet, Bishop Muzorewa's scope for introducing far-reaching reforms will be restricted by the safeguards for whites which are built into the constitution. The whole bias of the constitution is towards maintaining the status quo. Of its 170 clauses no less than 123 (covering such vital spheres as agriculture, education and health) are entrenched and can only be amended if 78 of the 100 members of the assembly agree.

This means that at least 6 whites must vote with the 72 black MPs for such amendments to be passed, thus effectively giving the 28 Rhodesian Front MPs a permanent veto over any changes in the constitution for the next 10 years. Additionally, whites will also dominate the commissions set up to control the civil service, army, police and judiciary for the next decade. The appointment at the end of May of a prominent right-wing former minister, Mr Hilary Squires, as a high court judge would seem to indicate that whites intend to make full use of the powers they retain.

Nevertheless there are signs that whites are increasingly realising the need to build up Bishop Muzorewa's domestic and international stature as a black leader and will try to avoid blatant displays of white strength. However if Bishop Muzorewa is to carry out his election pledges he will run the risk of confrontation with white capitalism and white skills. He could therefore be faced with an early conflict between the desire of whites to retain most of their privileges and demands by blacks for a larger slice of the national cake. Unless there is an early lifting of sanctions and a massive injection of foreign capital he will not be able to enlarge the cake sufficiently to satisfy both blacks and whites. Herein lies the real significance of President Carter's decision. For if sanctions continue Bishop Muzorewa's domestic base may be eroded to such an extent that Western recognition may ultimately be too late.

Bishop Muzorewa has thus to perform a balancing act that would daunt a more experienced and capable leader. If he fails to maintain this balance then the political initiative which he achieved with his election victory will quickly evaporate and the pendulum will swing back in the direction of the Patriotic Front. The war will get worse and yet another chance of finding a peaceful solution for Zimbabwe Rhodesia will have been lost.

SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE TO EXTERNAL PRESSURE

John Seiler

This article has one premise: the best guide to a government's response to external stimuli, both pressures and incentives, lies in a close examination of the official decision-making system. Such research has been non-existent vis-a-vis the South African Government, except for a single paper by Dr Robert Schrire of the University of Cape Town. Schrire interviewed over one hundred politicians and officials, but he failed to convey either details or nuances in his first published analysis. Both sociologists and historians write frequently about South African response — especially Heribert Adam, Donald Baker, Lawrence Schlemmer, Jeffrey Butler, and Herman Giliomee — but they give very little attention to official decision-making. Instead they tend to assume that Afrikaner attitudes can be translated into group behavior which often implicitly they equate with governmental action.

This research required the selection of five areas of policy-making for detailed examination: SWA/Namibian negotiations; defense; international information; urban blacks; black labor. For each policy area, interviews were completed with Cabinet members, department secretaries and other senior officials, members of the National Party parliamentary caucus, representatives of effective interest groups, media observers, and academicians. *While the interviews were open-ended, they focused on two basic points: first, what perspectives did respondents hold about external pressure generally and about pressures brought to bear on their own policy area and second, how was policy made and its implementation insured.* To supplement interviews, a variety of primary and some secondary sources are now being analyzed.

Two hypotheses were raised in preliminary discussions of this research: official perspectives might be found to be less overtly ideological and more calculating in nature — i.e., less dogmatic and more pragmatic; official decision-making might be increasingly co-ordinated and therefore more effective in coping with external pressures in terms of South African priorities and interests.

This article was originally prepared for submission to a US Department of State Seminar on 1 May 1979 and is published for the first time in the Bulletin. Dr Seiler's research was funded by the Ford Foundation and he also availed himself of the research facilities of the SAHIA while in South Africa.

South African Government Perspectives

Official views of the external world and of the pressures coming to bear on the Republic are strikingly regular in both content and the nature of expression. Since the aborted South African Defense Force intervention into Angola in 1975, with resultant South African Government bitterness about what it construed as broken pledges of support by the United States Government, the South African Government has decided that it stands alone in the international context. While this theme was expressed before 1975, it is no longer accompanied by the earlier ambivalence and wistfulness about South African affinity with the West. While the South African Government believes it cannot depend on the West, its interests require that it keep and even expand specific Western ties, but in doing so sentiment will play no role. *Vis-a-vis* Black Africa, the often-expressed yearning for a regional grouping of moderate states with open economies has recently re-emerged for the first time as an alternative to deeper ties with the West. Occasional mentions of possible ties with Communist states reflect disgruntlement with the West much more than any rational consideration of their feasibility.

The language used to discuss international problems is remarkably free of the emotional, quasi-religious rhetoric characteristic of South African Government pronouncements during most of the 1960s. While the nature of the interview process contributed to this directness, a preliminary examination of recent Hansards suggests that public statements by government leaders are also more direct, more focused, and more calculated.

This is not meant to suggest the end of ideology in South African Government attitude formation. Ideology is still central in discussion of domestic policies, although its form has been affected somewhat by a new pragmatism among officials. Even in discussion of international issues, the classic Afrikaner Nationalist perception of Communism as an all-encompassing challenge is often asserted, but now this challenge is recognized as more diversified in nature and manifestation. For instance, a clear distinction is now made between the interests of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Russia (which was not evident as recently as 1974 or 1975) and there is a recognition (somewhat oversimplified) of the finite economic and political resources available to the Soviet Union in the pursuit of regional interests.

Several analytical implications come to mind. First, these perspectives only convey an indication of South African Government response when examined together with changing South African Government decision-making structures. Second, it cannot be

proven whether these present perspectives are reversible. Finally, the *verligte-verkramp*te polarity is altogether useless in a discussion of these perspectives because of the uniformity involved. More productive might be a two-part typology in which perspective and action are considered separately. Thus, an individual might be categorized as dogmatic or pragmatic but distinctly for each step. Andries Treurnicht, whom I interviewed, might be classified as pragmatic in perspective and dogmatic in action — a significant distinction hidden by his *verkramp*te label.

South African Government Decision-Making Structures and Processes

Both formal and informal structures must be included in any analysis of South African Government decision-making. This means an examination of three basic overlapping foci — the government itself, the National Party, and the broader Afrikaner community.

Although the South African press gives considerable coverage to National Party politics, most of it is either personalized or analyzed in terms of a stereotyped *verligte-verkramp*te conflict. The accession to office of a Cape Prime Minister has revived the discussion of regional differences, to which a new and equally superficial element is the discussion of distinct Free State and Natal Nationalist “personalities”. Less has been reported of Afrikaner business interests as a distinct and growing factor in NP politics, at least until the recent abortive white miners strike, in which the South African Government tacitly accepted the views of this community over those of the miners.

Nonetheless, while the precise mingling of these factors in NP politics remains murky, the continued centrality of formal party processes must be appreciated. The annual provincial congresses are the focal points for making policy, constraining Cabinet change of policy, and in channeling if not altogether resolving intra-party conflict. The recent Crossroads agreement was delayed by almost two months by the constraints of Cape Province formal party policy which reiterated that the Western Cape was a Coloured preferential employment area. The Mulder conflict was resolved within the context of formal Transvaal party processes, coincidentally forcing Treurnicht to axe another conservative leader, to the immediate advantage of moderate opponents within the NP and probably to his own long-term advantage. Party processes provide the basic justification for loyalty to party. As long as these processes work effectively, disparate elements within the NP can be asked to give support to the incumbent government and will almost always do so. In addition, the

genuine commitment to these processes helps to explain why the present government gives little weight to attitude surveys of Afrikaners showing that it could act more quickly in changing domestic policies — if it were willing to ignore the time-consuming demands of party consultation.

Within the broader Afrikaner community, the mechanisms of constraint are usually informal and tacit in nature. Sustained public criticism of government policy is still reflected in social and professional ostracism, carried out not by the government but by the university, church, or newspaper employing the critic — witness the cases of Beyers Naudé, Gerhard Töttemeyer, Johan van der Vyver, Willem Kleynhans — although admittedly there are signs that the boundaries of acceptable public criticism have been enlarged in the past half-dozen years.

At the same time, a time-honored device to draw in influential Afrikaner Nationalists — the extensive network of government advisory bodies — is now being used to accommodate a wider circle of non-Afrikaners, including Blacks. Both technical and political advice is solicited, the former more explicitly than the latter, with the result of reducing potential reaction to government policy and increasing overall support for both specific policies and the government. This extensive practice results in widespread access of economic and educational interest groups to government. While their influence is channeled within the narrow domain of their immediate interests, and most often does not decisively shape government policy, the increasing access makes it decreasingly plausible that Cabinet members and senior officials desirous of changing policy need depend on an endorsement from the Broederbond, whatever the interests of the Broederbond in shaping policy-making.

Within the government itself, for the first time overall coordination of policy-making and implementation are now a central concern. The South African Defense Force deserves credit for the practical origins of this commitment, growing partly out of its “civic action” programs in the SWA operational zone and partly from its involvement in systems analysis and planning. The SADF must also be given credit for the thematic underpinnings of this venture in coordination: “winning the hearts and minds” of South African Blacks; and waging a “total response to a total threat”. Both themes predate the Angolan intervention in SADF rhetoric, but it is only since 1975 that they have become central to SADF operations. SWA operations are still the central demonstration area, but, at the same time, an extended intellectualization now takes place at the Defense College in Voortrekkerhoogte. There the course offered to general staff and colonels,

and equivalent ranking officials from civilian agencies, focuses on the practical implications of these two central themes for overall governmental planning and implementation of both foreign and domestic policies. Lecturers are drawn from throughout the government and from a wide range of civilian occupations — business, universities, newspapers. Participants come now from a number of agencies, including the South African Police, DONS, Plural Relations, and Finance, although the bulk are SADF men.

Partly because of SADF enthusiasm and partly because of P.W. Botha's own interest, coordination has begun at both the Cabinet and inter-departmental levels of government. At the Cabinet level, this has meant the invigoration of three existent, but only occasionally functional bodies — a National Security Council composed of selected Cabinet members, a Secretaries Committee drawn from the same departments to facilitate NSC operation, and the Department of the Prime Minister, which holds the statutory responsibility for coordination of executive government and for liaison with the House of Assembly. At the inter-departmental level, with the Prime Minister's encouragement, SADF representatives now take part in all inter-departmental meetings, regardless of their subjects or whether direct SADF interests in SWA or elsewhere are involved.

Significant Developments In Specific Policy Areas

International Information. The continuing Information scandal obscures the important initiatives in response to external pressure by Dr Eschel Rhoodie, Dr Connie Mulder, and General Hendrik van den Bergh. The period of intensive Information Department international activities which began with the 1972 appointment of Rhoodie as Secretary for Information served as a foretaste of the current South African Government effort to more precisely analyze the impact of international pressures, to take advantage of marginal differences among international critics and opponents, and generally to avoid an erratic pattern of ad hoc reaction to external pressures. The flamboyance and personal corruption of the Rhoodie era are unacceptable to the present government and to most Afrikaners, but the underlying acceptance of the Rhoodie emphasis on taking charge of overall response lies in Pik Botha's continuation of sixty of the 140 secret projects begun by Rhoodie.

Labor. The South African Government determination to control policy and pressures is most evident in this policy area. Mr Fanie

Botha's appointments of Professor Nic Wiehahn as his adviser and then of Mr Jaap Cilliers as Secretary for Labor involved marked departures from tradition. Wiehahn is the only adviser with such marked powers, although Dr Gerhard de Kock is beginning to assume a similar role with the Minister of Finance. Wiehahn was instrumental in the appointment of Cilliers and together they have strengthened Fanie Botha's ability to make effective policy, Wiehahn industriously cultivating business, union, and academic circles, while Cilliers more cautiously tries to reform the bureaucracy. As chairman of the Wiehahn Commission, Wiehahn has defined his role to encompass the building of an optimal constituency for the Commission's recommendations by the informal and private involvement of interested parties at preliminary stages of Commission considerations without giving away the nature of Commission inclinations.

Urban Blacks. The same conscious effort at controlling the direction of policy can be found in the Plural Relations Department, but here Dr Koornhof builds in his own fashion on the preliminary efforts of his immediate predecessor, Dr Connie Mulder, who put forth his own plans for change in somewhat formal five-year programs. Koornhof has appointed his own choice as Secretary for Plural Relations, Mr Jan Raath. Although Koornhof as of yet has no "Wiehahn" to help him build a larger public constituency for his policies, there are rumors that an Afrikaner Nationalist academician will soon be given this appointment. Despite these constraints, with combined pressure and support from the Urban Foundation, Koornhof has eked out requisite support in Cabinet and NP caucus for his Crossroads solution and for implementation of the 99-year leasehold plan. In addition, a bold overall development plan for Soweto, initiated by the Soweto Council and devised by a business consortium acting independently of the Urban Foundation, is under South African Government review. It holds several attractions for the South African Government. It would contribute to the stabilization of the most important urban black community in South Africa, while at the same time strengthening the Soweto Council, hopefully serving as a channel for massive loans from US and other Western banks, and constraining the growing impact of the Urban Foundation by making clear that the South African Government can turn elsewhere in the business community for ideas and initiatives.

SWA/Namibia Negotiations. Here the impulse to control policy is first shown in Mr Pik Botha's installation about him of a "Washington Mafia" of younger men who served in the Washington embassy while he was ambassador. For the first time, the Secretary

for Foreign Affairs, Mr Brand Fourie, and the senior officials, do not monopolize the diplomatic process, although Pik Botha has shown no inclination to eliminate them altogether from it. The South African Government negotiating team is small but very competent. Their actions have been generally rational and predictable. Increasingly, they see the United States Government as inclined to use the negotiations in a manipulative way to force the South African Government into concessions favoring SWAPO. Their shock, although naive, seems genuine, with the apparent reversal in late January of UN acceptance of an SADF plan for security transition perhaps the crucial trauma. While it is true that Pik Botha must be alert to his conservative colleagues in the NP caucus, most of whom felt when this session of the House of Assembly started that South African Government policy had been too compliant, his genuine disgruntlement and suspicion of United States Government motives and behavior should not be discounted as symptomatic of "paranoiac" behavior.

Implications for US Policy

What is the likely development of the patterns in perspective and structure sketched out in this paper?

The perspective shift is not irreversible, but any softening of attitude toward the United States Government and the West generally seems likely to come only after some substantial positive step or series of steps from those governments. Symbolic steps are unlikely to shift the South African Government perspective, given the emphasis on calculated national interests rather than sentiment. A further hardening of perspective is possible leading finally to a commitment to regional self-reliance.

The shift in structure to extensive governmental coordination does appear irreversible, because it meets not only SADF interests, difficult for any potential Prime Minister to ignore, but also those of moderate Cabinet members and most business leaders.

Thus, the United States Government will continue to find the South African Government reluctant to accept United States Government preferences and professions, except when they also meet South African Government calculated priorities. As the formal coordinative mechanisms take hold, increasing coherence in South African Government response to pressure is probable and increased ability to take advantage of gaps among Western governments about appropriate policy toward South Africa. The policy products of greater coordination rest partly on the values of the principal participants in the decision-making processes. While ad hoc, uncoordinated initiatives will be less likely, it is

impossible to predict at this early stage whether a vigorous, even aggressive overall policy — especially in terms of regional and domestic security — is more or less likely.

In conclusion, the five assumptions which seem to underpin South African Government perceptions and decisions need explicit statement. Whether they prove correct or incorrect will go far to determine the success or failure of South African Government policy in the immediate future and the prospects for peaceful resolution of regional conflict:

1. The United States Government is increasingly ineffective in its overall foreign policy and specifically in its Southern African policy. Because the United States Government will not commit sufficient resources to meet the Communist challenge, the South African Government must do so. Because the United States Government will not commit itself to comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa, the South African Government is free to work out its own regional and domestic future.
2. The Soviet Union's ability to influence regional events is increasingly hampered by its limited economic resources and the imminent struggle for succession. This ability will drop sharply after 1983.
3. The Cubans were defeated militarily by the SADF in Angola. Unless the Soviet Union puts its own troops into the region, any Cuban adventure in Rhodesia or SWA will be soundly defeated.
4. The experience of Mozambique proves most clearly that the regional Black states are amenable to arguments couched in pragmatic economic terms for a modus vivendi with the South African Government.
5. South African Blacks are also responsive to socio-economic inducements and will therefore generally accept the present South African Government plans for political development, with their emphasis on community councils, homelands, and the vague prospect of some linkage at the national level with the White, Coloured, and Indian political systems.

A MID-TERM ASSESSMENT OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES IN AFRICA

Chester A. Crocker

This article attempts a personal perspective on a most ambitious topic: an assessment of President Carter's African policies two years after he entered office. The place to start is with a word of background about American involvement in Africa. While some of this will be familiar, I believe it is important to place my remarks in this broader context.

The American Background

Traditionally, we Americans have considered Africa to be our lowest foreign policy priority, a region not sufficiently important to warrant much public debate. Quite often, in fact, African policy has been made rather quietly in Washington, if not clandestinely. Accordingly, the US has devoted very minimal resources to support its interests in Africa, less than 5% of total economic and military aid resources. But I want to add that I am using the term "resources" in a broader sense: to include money for aid programs but also such things as military power, technology, and above all political will — the will to take a stand on an issue and stick with it in the face of difficulties. In all these senses of the term, the US has traditionally devoted minimal resources to Africa. Similarly, we have seen American rhetoric fluctuate quite dramatically on African issues from one Administration to another, but the level of our substantive interest and effort has remained low. At the time of the Portuguese revolution, in fact, I think it could be argued that Washington was reducing its interest and presence in Africa even further, and we were certainly seeking to distance ourselves from impending difficulties in such places as the Horn of Africa. It was, of course, events in Portugal which changed all this.

Now, into this general background entered one Henry Kissinger — a latecomer to the African scene, a statesman who was pre-occupied elsewhere and had worked to keep Africa off his agenda, but a quick learner for all that. In 1975-76, he rather suddenly discovered that there were important issues emerging on this continent which was no longer buffered from larger issues of global politics. In this brief period, Kissinger embarked on some personal and national innovations. He travelled to Africa

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and invested his personal time and energy in grappling with the complexities of Southern Africa. Whatever one may think of his efforts in Angola and Rhodesia, they represented a level of American concern and involvement in African problems not seen since the Congo (Zaire) crises of the 1960s. Second, he began a new pattern of dealing with South Africa in public, after decades of "backburner" or clandestine policy-making vis-a-vis the Republic. In the earlier period (including his first six years in Washington), the US had a tendency to deal with South Africa on two levels, with the public rhetoric diverging from practice. In another sense, of course, we had in the past seen little reason to take Southern African problems seriously, preferring to live off the status quo and the European colonial legacy. This changed with Kissinger, and his willingness to meet South African leaders in public underlined American concern. A parallel shift was Washington's new willingness to recognize in public that the whites of Southern Africa are a legitimate subject of US policy concern, as well as the African majorities about which so much rhetoric had been spoken in the past. The term "minority rights" was uttered in public, something which, ironically, would not have occurred in the pre-1975-76 period when our policy was very much one of conducting "business as usual" in Southern Africa.

Despite Kissinger's travels and personal diplomacy in both black and white Africa, it soon became apparent that Washington did not have a strong position from which to deal in Africa. There was only the most minimal diplomatic basis for an activist American diplomacy, particularly in black Africa, after many years of, shall we call it, benign neglect. Our relationships with many African states were cool or worse, making it extremely difficult for any American leader suddenly to swing into action in order to rescue a deteriorating situation, as in Angola. Diplomacy was as underdeveloped as our other policy instruments. And there were lingering questions also about resources, remembering the special sense in which I am using that term: would it be possible for the US government and political system suddenly to generate significant resources for African purposes?

The African Context

I would like now to put these remarks into the context of what had been occurring in Africa during the years immediately before and after Carter entered office, because it is my profound conviction that the recent American discovery of Africa is out of phase with African developments, speaking of the African con-

continent as a whole. Up until the mid-1970s, Africa gave the impression of relative stability, for a variety of reasons: a continuing European role on the continent, some degree of balance in US-Soviet interests and involvement in the region, and a rather restrained military balance among African states, some degree of outside economic support for development, and an international structure of OAU and UN norms and principles which — however fragile — nonetheless did provide general principles on which to build a system of regional order. In fact, however, these forces for stability turned out to be far more vulnerable and superficial than many people realized. Events of the past five years have underscored the fragility of the pre-1975 regional system.

In the first place, the European powers have not maintained a constant level of interest in Africa, but have been withdrawing their commitment and their readiness to devote resources to the continent. By 1975 it could be argued that only France among the Europeans was prepared to act as anything more than a glorified commercial power in Africa. The British had certainly limited themselves to such a role, consciously and deliberately. And even France was beginning to reduce its exposure in such places as Djibouti, the Comores, and Chad while also reducing aid in real terms.

The second factor which has changed, and changed rapidly, is the militarization of Africa. In military terms, Africa entered the modern period from a very low base: the smallest armies in the world, the lowest levels of arms imports, a relatively low level of external involvement in local security issues. But Africa is also a region in which small amounts of military force make an enormous difference, and this began to be noticed. The British and French, of course, were long familiar with these circumstances, but were less and less interested in playing the game. Once outside powers (including, again, France as well as Cuba, the Soviets and their East European allies, the UK and the US) began responding in a serious way to African arms requests, a new era of conflict and militarization was under way. Today, there are eight or nine wars (depending on how you count them) on the African continent — more wars than are taking place in any other region, small ones to be sure, but nonetheless important in African terms. The primary explanation for this state of affairs is, I think, fairly obvious. There has been a basic asymmetry in the behavior of the US and the Soviets in Africa in recent years. Moscow is now providing about 75% of Africa's arms imports; the French rank a distant second and the US a very distant third. While Africa accounts for around 50% of Soviet arms exports to the Third World, only

some 2-3% of US arms supplies to Third World countries go to Africa. This very asymmetry is helping to further militarize a continent in which small increments of force make a big difference and feed existing insecurities.

Other factors must also be cited which account for some of the turmoil and problems in Africa generally. The vast increase in oil prices since 1973-74 has hit some African economies hard, not because they are large oil importers or highly developed but because these economies are fragile and do not always have the flexibility needed to absorb the sudden increase in imported energy costs. I would broaden this point to argue that African institutions — political, economic, legal, and military — are fragile. With few exceptions, African institutions are superficially based on imported models but do not have strong indigenous roots and may not reflect the real balance of social and political forces within the state. Rather, they reflect an uneasy transition between the immediate post-colonial order and some new order as yet undefined. Weak institutions account in some measure for the internal difficulties which have faced such disparate nations as Ethiopia, Chad, Mauritania, and Zaïre. Zaïre's experience during 1977-78 epitomizes African conditions. If you look at a map, it is apparent why Zaïre should be one of Africa's least governable societies: it is enormous, underdeveloped, and lacking in essential infrastructure to assure growth and national unity. What does not show up on the map is probably more important. The administrative and political competence necessary to run the country is minimal. Corruption and demoralization are commonplace in governmental institutions. But if the Western powers and African states decide to write off the government of General Mobutu because of corruption and other factors, where will this process stop? This brings me to another troubling trend of the past few years which is a more selective attitude toward OAU principles on the part of some African leaders. Originally, after all, the OAU was established as an essentially conservative "club of governments", a self-protection society for governments which felt threatened and vulnerable. Now, apparently, some governments are seen to be more legitimate than others. President Nyerere of Tanzania has based his policies on such arguments, criticizing Western support of Mobutu on grounds of his questioned legitimacy. Nyerere's current venture into Uganda is based on the same premises. I am not here to defend the government of Idi Amin, but it does occur to me that selective interpretations of the OAU Charter have profoundly destabilizing consequences for Africa.

The picture I am sketching is of an Africa in which security and

military issues have become increasingly salient. The public commitment of African leaders to development, social justice and human rights has to be looked at in light of the growth of military threats to states and governments. Nothing could be more obvious than the way this applies in Southern Africa where you have a series of governments increasingly concerned about being able to control their own national territory. The recent shooting down of Zambian air force planes by Nkomo's guerrillas is only the latest case in point. The whole region from Zaire to Cape Town is under challenge — not, I would argue, primarily a challenge to white rule in South Africa, although this may be the ultimate objective of many, but rather an immediate threat to the existing bases of stability and security in the region.

Carter and Africa

Into this African setting which I have outlined and oversimplified, President Carter and his Administration entered with principles and commitments that reflect both continuity and change in US policy. But I would argue that many of the principles enunciated and applied by the Carter Administration in its first months in office ran directly counter to the realities of development in Africa. The contrast between African realities and American principles has been at times brutal.

Let us look, for example, at the principle of "Africa for the Africans". What does this really mean in an environment in which Africans are fighting each other in growing numbers? What does it mean when arms rather than diplomacy are shaping the outcomes of many African conflicts? To cite another example, Washington has frequently stated that Africa cannot become "an arena of East-West competition". This, however, is a statement of US preferences and hopes, not of African reality. Africa *is* an arena of East-West competition, and no amount of rhetoric from the US or any place else is going to change that. Therefore, the basic question is, What kind of competition will it be and will we take part?

Another commitment of the new Administration was to broaden our diplomatic base in Africa and stop defining our friends in "Cold War terms". In theory, no one would argue with the need for the US, back in 1976-77 to break out of the diplomatic isolation in Africa which bedevilled Kissinger's efforts. In practice, however, the new doctrine meant that we would distance ourselves from earlier friends and allies such as Liberia, Senegal, Morocco, Kenya, and Zaire and seek closer ties with new friends such as Tanzania, Nigeria, and Somalia. The problem with this

realignment is that it produced great confusion and insecurity, especially since neither our new friends nor our old ones had a clear picture of the blessings of US friendship.

In Southern Africa, the principle of increasingly harsh verbal pressure and criticism directed towards white minority rule was enunciated. Timetables for change were shortened, and Washington made an effort to dissociate itself more visibly from the structure of white power in South Africa. The intended message here was that when the time comes, as it surely will, the US will not be fighting on your side. Again, we see a very generalized principle which few Americans would object to; but it does not constitute a coherent foreign policy.

I would like now to offer an assessment of the implementation of President Carter's principles and policies over the past two years in reference to the economic, diplomatic and military dimensions of US involvement and then to US-South African relations.

In economic terms, Washington under President Carter has spoken of the growing importance we attach to the Third World and specifically to Africa. Nigeria is often cited for its role in US oil imports. There is more recognition of US interest in African minerals. In fact, however, American aid commitments to Africa over the past two years have been steady or declining in real terms, depending on which categories of aid one considers. There is a big gap here between rhetoric and performance, particularly in the important field of direct, bilateral assistance. If we are trying to build better relationships with African governments, as we say, this requires that we be able to deliver something. We must be able to talk in terms of tangible resources and to do so flexibly when opportunities for access and influence arise. Yet, one notes that we are putting more and more of our funding into international institutions such as the UNDP and the World Bank and so forth, rather than into bilateral programs. Our criteria for economic assistance have also undergone a change which limits, rather than expands, the scope for policy impact. Washington talks increasingly of principles which satisfy the lowest common denominator required in domestic American debates — programs to increase food production, to help refugees, to prevent the spread of the desert in the Sahel, to provide drought relief. Now, who can object to those goals? Obviously such programs have few enemies at home and are needed in Africa. but we have been less willing to provide resources to governments which really need help, flexible budget support for purposes which African leaders, not Americans, will identify. One thinks, again, of Zaire, but there are other important instances: Senegal and

Zambia. Other new US criteria include emphasis on the human rights performance of African governments. Leaving aside the baffling complexities of trying to establish clearcut human rights guidelines and rank ordering US priorities, it is obvious that our overall diplomacy is hampered in its flexibility and responsiveness if bureaucrats in Washington must first make sensitive judgments about African governments in this area. The government of Guinea, to cite an illustration from recent history, has indicated that it is seeking a way out of the morass of state economic mismanagement and over-reliance on the Soviets that had developed in the past fifteen years. Guinea would like to open up to the West and to broaden its relationships, but this is now made difficult because Guinea's human rights record is about as enlightened as that of most Stalinist dictatorships, in Africa or elsewhere.

Another economic principle that I find troublesome in the past two years is the doctrine that the American economy and technological strength offer us magical sources of influence with African states. To hear some official US spokesmen, one might conclude that all we have to do is possess our economic and technological strength and we will win friends in Africa — a form of economic determinism from the world's leading capitalist state which suggests that we already possess a form of "off-the-shelf" diplomacy. Since we believe in the inherent superiority of our economy and technology, we assume that the political and security aspects can take care of themselves. I don't share that view of world history or of current power relationships.

Having stressed the negative side, it must be pointed out that there are also positive aspects in the economic field. We have begun to put resources into the African Development Bank, a promising institution which for many years under the previous Administration got absolutely no support from Washington. We have, as I mentioned, begun to direct significant levels of aid in order to address humanitarian crises. In addition, we have made an effort to show up the Soviets at their weakest, namely in their appallingly poor record of delivering development assistance to African states. The message on this issue is beginning to get across, I believe, as evidenced at a recent conference in Nairobi where African states put considerable public pressure on Moscow to increase its economic programs. Thus, the picture so far is a mixed one.

Turning to the military field, the US started out in early 1977 enunciating a desire to avoid military competition in Africa. Yet by mid-1977, it appeared that Washington had reversed course and was prepared to offer military assistance to the governments of Chad, Sudan and Somalia. Then, as soon as Chad and Somalia

began asking hard questions and showed an interest in taking up the apparent offer, we backed down again, having realized that both governments could get us involved in things we wished to avoid. In effect, sloppy US policies triggered the first phase of the Somali-Ethiopia war in 1977. More recently, however, I think there is a more realistic and steady approach to the issue of military supplies for Africa. After a long delay, we have provided significant levels of arms sales to the government of Kenya. Our approach to Zaire in 1978 was somewhat more responsive than in 1977. Most interestingly, as some of you will have read in the South African papers, we have recently decided to open up a modest military supply relationship with Botswana, a deeply troubled state which badly needs whatever kind of Western help it can get to meet the threat of uncontrollable borders and refugee camps.

Our overall stance on US-Soviet military competition in Africa has also become more realistic. In 1977 we tried to argue that there was no competition, but now we are in that competition. Official spokesmen have begun to defend their policies in terms of this competitive relationship. We have not yet found adequate answers to the Soviet/Cuban thrust in Africa, in my view, but we are at least experimenting and groping toward a more effective stance. One promising avenue, perhaps, is the beginning of conventional arms transfer limitation talks with the Soviets aimed at reducing the flow of arms into Africa, or at least making clearer who is primarily responsible for Africa's militarization. No results are yet evident, but this approach seems to be worth pursuing.

I am not trying to argue that it is the American role to pacify Africa, nor that we need a Pax Americana here. That would be out of the question for domestic American reasons as well as historical African ones. We do not need massive amounts of US arms in Africa or military bases and US Marines. What we *do* need is an image and reputation for reliability, a performance which African states find credible, a sense that when they get into difficulties their Western friends might, at least, rally around.

I will turn briefly now to some diplomatic contrasts in Africa during the Carter era. This Administration has developed an energetic and activist diplomacy. Never in our history have so many senior Americans logged so many miles of air travel in Africa, sought to take on so many African problems and to bring about peaceful change or accommodation in so many African conflicts. This diplomacy has been characterized by a commitment to general principles which Africans, in the main, probably support. It depends, of course, whom you talk with in Africa, but I have the impression that Africans favor expanded US involve-

ment on the continent. The question, however, is one of performance. Are we effective? Wishing to be successful is very different from actually succeeding.

Consider some concrete cases. In the Horn of Africa, the Western Sahara, and Rhodesia, I think that one could argue that US diplomacy has so far produced a large zero. There is nothing in our Africa policy with which I disagree more strongly than our handling of the Rhodesian problem. We have approached it as though we were lawyerly mediators seeking an out-of-court settlement of a civil suit among gentlemen of goodwill. That's not what African politics, or any other politics internationally, are all about. Because of our insistence on seeking ideal solutions in a most imperfect world, our net impact has been negligible if not positively destructive. But there are contrasts. In the South West Africa case I think it is fair to say that Washington has accomplished quite a lot so far, even if our efforts have made some people unhappy — in South Africa, in black Africa, and in Europe. Perhaps the lesson here is that effective diplomacy is likely to make most people unhappy some of the time. In South West Africa/Namibia, we have succeeded in moving the conflict to the point where an international settlement seems to be within reach, although the effort remains extremely delicate and could go off the rails.

Similar observations could be made about Washington's diplomacy between Zaire and Angola, carried on quietly and skillfully over the past six months in hopes of keeping those troubled societies from tearing each other apart. Neither of them, I should add, is capable of governing itself without significant outside support. So I come back to my point that in diplomacy it is not the intellectual sophistication or elegance of the formulae, but the results, which count. American actions over the past two years do not yet present a clear enough picture to justify a final verdict.

US/South African Policy

The record of US policy toward South Africa during the past two years is similarly mixed. In my view, American tactics during 1977 were largely counterproductive — the tactics, not the espousal of overall goals. We obviously generated a substantial white backlash in this country. Some South Africans find it convenient to whip this up continually as a way of rallying support around current policies. But the fact of the matter is that our initial stance towards South Africa was offensive, condescending, and moralistic. It was a stance born of a desire to prove to the world that Americans have certain sentiments and believe in certain princi-

ples. Now, I share those principles and consider it essential that they be enunciated, unambiguously. But we stated our principles and the basic goal of progress toward majority rule as though that were in itself a policy, and in the process conveyed that impression that we had little understanding of South Africa's problems and considered white South Africans to be somehow morally inferior. In addition, our ringing declarations must cause some black South Africans to wonder if we mean what we say. They are partly correct to raise questions, because most Americans have not begun to realize the implications of our stated objectives. The overwhelming issue is not whether or not we are committed to democratic ideals and majority rule, but rather how to reach those ends.

Another problem with the way the US handled its public statements about South Africa in 1977 is that we created the impression that the issue for Americans is to decide whether we are pro-white or pro-black. In my judgment, we should be pro-American, but that idea has gotten buried. Basically, we have two choices vis-a-vis South Africa: we can either help black and white reach accommodation or we can walk away from the problem and let you stew in your own juice. Those are the only kinds of roles we have to play. But instead, there is a profound tactical confusion. We are not sure if we want South Africans to find their own solutions, we are uncertain whether we are prepared to accept the responsibility of interjecting our own ideas and preferences, and we seem doubtful whether South Africa's travail should become internationalized or not.

These are rather negative judgments, but I've mentioned some positive aspects already. It is vitally important that Washington make clear that it will not defend white South Africans against black South Africans, and it has done so.

In economic relations, despite utterances I frequently hear in this country, America has not reduced its economic involvement in South Africa; there has been only symbolic interference at the margins in an effort to signal that we wish not to strengthen the official state apparatus here. Washington has for the most part left American business alone to make its own decisions about whether it wishes to stay in South Africa, and American businesses are deciding overwhelmingly to stay. So far. This brings me to the observation that South Africans frequently misinterpret the current American leadership. Ambassador Young, President Carter and Secretary Vance are not people who believe in the economic isolation of South Africa as a preferable course of action. They are people who believe in gradual, but increasingly rapid, change and in the role of economic betterment and a

growing economy in making this possible. In fact, to listen to some of their statements, one would think that the multinational corporation is capable of miracles, as I mentioned earlier. In this connection, I would suggest that talk of disinvestment and sanctions should be interpreted in a tactical context, with specific reference to Namibia and labor relations issues, not as a commitment by a bunch of ideologues in Washington determined to destroy the South African economy.

We have seen some other tactical changes during the past year. The visit to South Africa in October of this past year by the Western Five, I think, shows a real improvement in diplomatic tactics: there is apparently a willingness to talk and deal on the assumption that white South Africans, as well as black South Africans, are human beings. Our role is not to defend them, but to treat them with the dignity that all people are entitled to.

The Complexities of the US

Let me comment, finally, on an aspect of American society which South Africans must begin to understand. We are a complex democracy, vastly more complex, I would argue, than the white democracy in South Africa — to say nothing of the multi-racial population and society here. We are also very different from you. In a bloodbath, we cannot take sides. The US is a country in which institutional authority of all kinds is rapidly declining, where the deference to leaders and to age simply doesn't exist as it does here. The average age of the White House staff, President Carter's advisers, is younger than I am, and I consider myself young. We live in a society in which secrecy has become virtually impossible. Secret deals and bargains that will not stand the light of public scrutiny are useless to other countries, as South Africa learned the hard way in Angola.

In the US today, there is simply no solid domestic base for the conduct of what I would term a durable and moderate policy toward Africa. As a result, and I think this is very evident, our policy lines switch from time to time, quite rapidly. On occasion it may take no more than one or two hostile editorials in our leading newspapers to change the Administration's position on things. The reason for that is simple. The only strong opinions in the US on African matters are at the emotional poles, the extremes, and the mass of moderate viewpoints is seldom articulated. When it is, the government listens; when it is not, the government attempts to patch together fragile coalitions for its own viewpoint.

Opinion polls have been conducted in the US to determine where public sentiment lies on African issues, and the results are

staggeringly complex. Americans *are* unhappy about Soviet adventurism in Africa, but they know little about Africa's complexity and do not realize that it may cost something to counter the Soviets effectively. As a result, they tend to oppose any form of military involvement. Americans sense that there are important US economic interests in Southern Africa, but they are not prepared to back those interests by supporting the current white authorities and have no idea what other options exist. We are, in effect, a confused society.

It should also be recognized that some of the key assets for conducting an effective policy in Africa do not lie within the control of the US Government at all, *but in the private sector*. And I mean not only the business community, but many other people — consultants, academics, foundation officials, special interest groups and lobbyists, and various kinds of opinion-shapers. We have a system in which people outside the government have a substantial influence over what goes on in government.

Ultimately, however, the US must decide whether it wishes to play the African game, even if it cannot dictate the rules. We face a fundamental choice over whether we are interested mainly in appearances, in pleasing domestic constituencies, the UN or the OAU; or whether we are interested in results in Africa. Africa is in a transitional era, moving toward an unfamiliar future, and *that future depends very much on who participates in shaping it*. If we talk only of abstract goals, we will miss the point: it's the process of change that matters above all. I regret that I will have to leave you with a question: Does the US intend to participate in that process?

THE CONSEQUENCES OF HELSINKI: SOVIET STRATEGY SINCE THE HELSINKI DECLARATION

Philip E. Uren

"Power in the world, the prizes of the world, must go to those who value them, and think them worth the effort to secure".

*W. MacNeile Dixon,
The Human Situation*

Cold warriors are scoffed at these days and are often warned not to exaggerate the Russian threat. Of course we should not, but this admonition, like President Carter's reference to "Our inordinate fear of communism", begs the question — and leaves us only to wonder what is exaggeration and what is "inordinate fear".

There are many arguments which seek to keep us in that state to which Saul Bellow once referred when he felt himself "forced to consider whether Western Europe and the United States may not be under the influence of some great evil. Whether we do not go about slightly chloroformed". It may be, as he points out, that we are less in need of political theorists than mythologists and demonologists to explain the distemper of the times and the lethargy of the Western states about their peril.

There is first the familiar blind bear theory, which has the great blind Russian Bear stumbling around Africa and the world without purpose and in confusion — so clumsy and untutored that he will eventually annoy everyone and be obliged to withdraw to his northern lair of his own accord, if we only have patience and exercise care not to make him mad.

There is also the economic weakling theory which suggests Mr Brezhnev will, in the words of an old English Parliamentarian, "mend exceedingly if we put him behind the counter a little". If we set him up in business, he will change his disposition. Some distinguished economists see the economic weakness of the Great Russians leading them to more emphasis on economic interdependence and modernisation and so, in the words of John Hardt, "to a qualitative shift, making Moscow's long-term slogan of peaceful co-existence more meaningful". In this connection, Russian power has been called "inorganic" by Dr Sonnenfeldt; meaning that it is almost exclusively military and thereby, to some minds in some strange way, less frightening.

There are those, too, who make much of dissidence and discontent within the Great Russian Empire, but others who think

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we should not seek to exploit this. Dr Simes of the Georgetown Centre wrote recently as follows in an article on human rights and detente:

“The United States should avoid giving the impression of launching a human rights crusade against the Kremlin in order either to undermine its rule or to embarrass it internationally. It should be made clear from the outset that the United States is seeking a dialogue, not a confrontation, with the Soviet elite. The purpose is not to encourage a siege mentality within the Soviet establishment. On the contrary, it is in the American interest to persuade it that although the United States does not approve of, or sympathize with, the Soviet regime, this country is not in the business of trying to overthrow it. It should be made clear that by articulating differences in Soviet and American values, the United States does not seek to impose its attitudes on Soviet society but means to establish better conditions both for mutual understanding and trust.”

This reflects a gentleness and restraint not always accorded to other states.

Then there is the crumbling Empire notion — the idea that the many peoples of the Great Russian Empire are growing restive and will soon throw off their chains. It is hard to think of Iran or Afghanistan as daggers pointed at the soft Turkic underbelly of the Russian Empire, but some writers hold to this view. A newspaper columnist recently stated, “the combined problem of ethnic demands and increasing ethnic populations will hit the Kremlin in full force in the eighties. And there is every indication that the problem will get out of hand before the Kremlin emerges with a solution . . .” In 1975 Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, who is now President Carter’s Security Adviser, wrote “. . . The national question could prove itself to be the fatal contradiction of Soviet political evolution”.

Mr Morse, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in Washington, is reported to have recently said that we should not worry too much about the Russians and Cubans in Africa. In due course, the Africans will ask them to go home and they will go quietly. This is the Little Bo-Peep theory — leave them alone and they’ll go home.

There is the idea that Marxism-Leninism is a dead and barren doctrine, that Eurocommunism is a bigger headache for the Russians than for NATO, and there is even the thought that Cuba is a millstone around Russia’s neck. Without pursuing this theme further it seems clear that the Western intellectual effort to persuade us not to worry is substantial. One is reminded of the rather

sad words so often used by Russian defectors, "you do not understand with whom you are dealing".

Russian Expansionism

Before looking at the Russians' activities since 1975 it will be useful to look briefly at Great Russian history. Between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the Grand Duchy of Moscow, which at first cringed in a small part of the northern forests away from Mongol power, extended its dominion over the Ukraine, southwards to the Transcaucasus and the Turkish border; then eastwards to the Great Ocean, taking Chinese territories on the way to Alaska and northern California; and finally in the nineteenth century it extended to the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, until it bumped into Rudyard Kipling. In this process, it subjugated many non-Russian peoples and came to rule one sixth of the land-surface of the globe. Like all European Empires, this one came close to disintegration and decay in the twentieth century — from this it was saved by Lenin.

Stalin devoted himself to making the narrowly rescued Empire secure and to laying some of the groundwork for its future expansion.

As a result of the Second World War, the Great Russians established control over eight countries — Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania — as well as receiving territory from Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Japan. They further attempted to expand into Iran and Greece. Though this Great Russian expansion was not successful everywhere and receded in places, generally speaking it maintained its position, partly by dint of two military invasions — Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

In spite of this phenomenal success, the great Russians remained uncomfortable about their hegemony over Eastern Europe. The idea of "liberating" this area was mentioned more than once in the West and the ghost of Imre Nagy and others haunted the Kremlin. The Brezhnev Doctrine partly met the case but the Russians longed for an international seal of approval on the new political geography which their armies had created in Eurasia. After a long struggle and some three years of negotiations, they were to get this approval at Helsinki in 1975.

In 1951 Walter Lippman had written in the New York Herald Tribune, "unless ideology can be translated into geography, the conflict cannot be dealt with by diplomats and military strategists . . . if they mean to deal with the conflict, not merely to agitate it and

talk about it, then they must come down to geography. Every treaty or agreement which settles or purports to settle a mortal conflict is essentially a map . . . The rivalry of kings, or churches, of nations and of empires has continued. But insofar as the rivalry could be regulated by diplomats, the issue that had to be decided was the control of territory. What could not be settled by the conquest or the defence of territory, or by treaties fixing the boundaries of power and sovereignty over territory, was beyond the diplomats and the strategists . . .”

Geographic Implications of Helsinki

There is a profound truth in these remarks to which the Helsinki Declaration bears witness. While the Declaration was not a treaty, what we might call the “hard parts” of it had to do with the recognition of boundaries, specifically the East-European boundaries. Insofar as the Declaration had any substance at all it had broad geographical implications and, it is perhaps not too harsh to say, that the rest was “sound and fury signifying nothing”.

The main aim of the West at Helsinki was to get the Russians to permit a much freer movement of people and ideas across their boundaries and to pay more attention to cherished Western “human rights” within them. The main aim of Russia was to make the East European part of its empire respectable.

The relevant parts of the Declaration read as follows. Under Basket Three the Russians undertook:

- To deal in a positive and humanitarian way with persons who wished to be united with members of their families.
- To examine favourable exit or entry permits of persons wishing to marry the citizens of other states.
- To facilitate wider travel by their citizens for personal or professional reasons.
- To further (encourage) contacts among young people.
- To expand sports and other contacts.
- To improve the circulation of, access to and exchange of information.

Under Basket One, the participating states, thirty-five of them, accepted the notion that they would regard as inviolable one another’s frontiers, and further that they would all refrain from any form of armed intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating state, regardless of their mutual relations; they would refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating state . . . they would refrain from direct or indirect assis-

tance to Terrorist activities, or subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating state.

The Economist called this basket “a victory on points for the Russians”. They added that:

“ . . . The wood that lies behind the trees is the West’s explicit acceptance of the new frontiers the Russians drew all over Eastern Europe in 1940 and 1945, and its implicit acceptance of the post-1945 ideological division of Europe”.

Belgrade Meeting

In late 1977, the thirty-five nations met in Belgrade to review their progress in implementing the Helsinki Declaration. In speaking of the meeting, Secretary Vance reminded his listeners that it had taken three years to negotiate the Declaration. “Undertakings of such gravity”, he said, “cannot subsequently be relaxed or overlooked.”

At Belgrade the Russians argued that any discussion of the implementation deficiencies of another state was banned by the sixth principle of Basket One, e.g. that of “non-intervention in internal affairs”. The State Department report of the meeting read in part as follows:

“While Western states recognized even before Belgrade began that not all Western proposals were likely to be acceptable to the East, it was hoped that at least some initiatives would be incorporated in a substantive and balanced concluding document. The level of Eastern resistance to serious consideration of most Western and neutral/nonaligned proposals, however, soon indicated that there was little likelihood of obtaining such a text . . . the Soviet Union and its allies rejected all substantive language pertaining to the human rights and humanitarian provisions of the Final Act.”

This rather diplomatic language obscures the Russian record of non-compliance, high-lighted by the Orlov trial, but by no means restricted to it. Some people were allowed to marry, some to emigrate, some to travel and the United States gave back the crown of St Stephen to Hungary — but in general the prospect was dismal.

The body of the report suggested the general atmosphere:

“ . . . The deterioration in working conditions for journalists which has been evident in several Eastern countries since early 1977 appears to be a deliberate effort to discourage journalists from reporting negative news, particularly in relation to human rights matters, and to discourage Eastern citizens from

associating with Western correspondents. Eastern concern regarding unfavorable press stories was demonstrated in April when Soviet officials refused to allow Western correspondents to transmit photographs of a woman who had chained herself to the American Embassy in protest against repeated Soviet exit-visa refusals. The United States protested this interference with journalistic activity as a violation of CSCE provisions. In addition, Soviet efforts to discourage citizens from associating with American correspondents were evident in a Soviet television film during the reporting period. The film accused five former US correspondents in Moscow of CIA connections, although all five had clearly denied such charges."

In short, the Russians showed little interest in the "Spirit of Helsinki". Their minds were not in Europe, but were busy elsewhere.

American and Russian Moves Since Helsinki

In the period since 1975, the United States has:

- Withdrawn from Vietnam
- Announced the proposed reduction of its forces in South Korea.
- Foregone the opportunity to intervene in Southern Africa.
- Resisted the temptation to develop an important new weapons technology (the neutron bomb).
- Made available large economic credits to the Great Russians.
- The Chief Executive of the United States has stated in a major speech (in 1977), that the great recent success of democracy in the world justifies the shedding of our inordinate fear of communism. He reasserted his faith in détente and the hope that he could persuade the Russians that one country cannot impose its system of society upon another. At the same time he hoped to engage the Russians in a common effort in the Developing World.

Of course, a great deal more could be said but these seem to me to be the salient points. In any case, it is evident that the United States, as a representative of the West, has tried to live up to the spirit of Helsinki, not only in Europe but in the world at large. However misguided some may consider its efforts in that regard, few will call them insincere.

Now, let us look briefly at the record of the Great Russians and then it may be possible to suggest what conclusions reasonable men might draw from it:

- They have moved quickly to fill the vacuum in Vietnam and have supported that country militarily in the invasion and con-

quest of its neighbour Cambodia.

- They have intervened in Angola, with their allies, in order to establish a regime favourable to themselves and to obtain special privileges.
- They have intervened in the Horn of Africa with major military forces for similar purposes.
- They have become suppliers of military equipment to Terrorist organisations operating across international borders.
- They have moved with military assistance to establish themselves in Afghanistan.
- They have sought to exacerbate the internal problems of Iran.
- They have continued to expand their conventional armed forces, including their navy, at rates which seem incompatible with a sense of insecurity or a defensive strategy.
- Finally, the public statements of their leaders make it clear that they have an interpretation of détente which is very different from our own. Brezhnev puts it bluntly, "The world views and class goals of socialism and capitalism are opposite and irreconcilable". He would like to shift this historically inevitable struggle into a channel that does not threaten war, by which he means nuclear war. He does not however exclude revolutionary wars of liberation. Indeed, Soviet officials have congratulated the United States publicly on observing the spirit of détente and staying out of Angola.

The Russians in Africa

And what of Africa? Ambassador Solodovnikov, ex-Head of the Africa Institute in Moscow and a senior officer in the KGB is well ensconced in Lusaka. The general nature of the operations which he co-ordinates are well known. The Russian fact in Southern Africa was brought home to me forcibly, albeit symbolically, when I was in the South African military headquarters in Windhoek. There I was shown a full Russian uniform which had been captured five kilometers from the SWA/Namibian border. I had last seen one in Leningrad. To what purpose was this lad so far from the banks of the Neva? Senator Moynihan put it rather well, if harshly when he said, "In nation after nation, at conference after conference, what the Soviets seek is failure, breakdown, bitterness, distrust. They judge that they thrive on this and history certainly does not prove them wrong". He went on to say, "There is one Soviet policy in the Third World: the worse the better".

It is commonly said that the three sources of Russian action are a sense of insecurity, an imperial spirit and an ideological conviction.

tion. I know of no way to judge this except by their words and actions. There is little doubt that there is a deep sense of insecurity in the Russian soul which is not surprising in view of Russia's bloody history. We do well not to pooh-pooh their fears. Voznesensky makes the point in a recent poem.

"I scent Kuchum . . .
dust rises above the horde in a mushroom-shaped
sand storm . . ."

Increasing the Russian sense of insecurity at home does not necessarily help to counter Russian aggression abroad. But the imperial spirit is also part of that psyche as Voznesensky suggests.

"Are we to carry the world on our backs once more?
Pray to Russia for her incredible destiny . . .
Russia the Saviour."

Nor is there any doubt about the ideological thrust. The title of a new London publication of Russian statements is apposite, *They mean what they say*.

These are the elements most widely exploited or emphasised: "Resentment and impatience, the depravity of the rich and the virtue of the poor, the guilt of Europe and the innocence of Asia and Africa, salvation through violence, the coming of universal love". (Bellow)

So much for some of their words: what can we derive about Russian objectives from their actions? They seem to be aimed at disruption (as in South West Africa/Namibia or Rhodesia), Denial, (with respect to strategic minerals particularly), and eventually to increased Russian presence, influence and control.

On the basis of the record, these objectives are likely to be pursued through the co-ordinated use of all the instruments of power at the disposal of the state — (military, political, economic, cultural, covert and clandestine). They will also be pursued with persistence, as the historical record also suggests, with a high degree of organisation, and with flexibility.

Of course, our fear must not be inordinate or our perceptions of our peril exaggerated. The longer, however, that we delay in making the rules of the game clear to the Russians, the greater will be the danger of an uncontrollable clash when we are finally obliged to do so.

International Approval for Russian Policy

In conclusion, I am conscious that I have oversimplified a very complicated subject. To quote MacNeile Dixon, "We cannot be sure at any time, or in any cause, that we are right and our opponents are wrong, or that the good for which we strive will be un-

mixed with evil. If you wait for such a certainty, you will sit in your armchair forever. We can only hold to our principles and take this side or that". In an age of totalitarian advance, we must decide where to stand, and the events since Helsinki should make that decision easier. As a result of that strange diplomatic adventure and the détente associated with it, the Great Russians received an international stamp of approval on the latest great extension of their Empire. They have received a massive injection of Western technical assistance and they have been given a free hand to pursue their global ambitions. It is a situation which must be changed.

We might make it clear that what goes on inside the present boundaries of the Soviet Union is a matter of some indifference to us. We should make it equally clear that the Great Russians cannot expect to use their military power, either directly or by proxy, outside of those boundaries with impunity; nor can they otherwise interfere in regions where non-communist countries have legitimate interests, without accepting serious risks. In the words of Eugene Rostow, "The only prudent assumption . . . today is that the Soviet Union will take advantage of every opportunity for expansion unless confronted by unacceptable risks". We might borrow a phrase from Khrushchev, who understood power, "Keep your pig's snout out of our garden".

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Note: The complete text of the final act of the Helsinki Conference may be found in the *United States Department of State Bulletin.* Vol. LXXIII, No. 1888. September 1, 1975.

IS TERRITORIAL PARTITION A STRATEGY FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA?

Klaus Baron von der Ropp

For close on 30 years the South African policy of apartheid has been annually the subject of long debates in the UN General Assembly and UN Special Organisations. After 1957 when Ghana became the first Black African country to achieve independence the tone of debate became ever sharper. Following the independence of Angola and Mozambique and the victory in both countries of Marxist regimes emerging from liberation movements, world political interest in Southern African developments has increased rapidly. The unrest which lasted over a year in the black townships of South Africa, the constantly growing polarisation which this caused between the population groupings of the country and the increasing conflicts between the moderate "internal" transitional governments and the socialist-oriented liberation movements in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South West Africa/Namibia have conjured up in the eyes of the world visions of an imminent, almost compulsorily escalating conflict leading to major warfare in Southern Africa. The centre of such a conflict would be the Republic of South Africa, a state with a uniquely heterogeneous population. In the middle of 1976 some 18.6 million black Africans (70% of the total population) were living there, some 4.3 million white Africans (17% of the population), 2.4 million Africans of mixed race (descendants of the *Khoisan* with strong Euro-Malay strains/10% of the population) and 0.75 million Africans of Indian ethnic origin (3%).

The danger of an escalation in conflict in Southern Africa lies primarily in the fusing of several areas of struggle. The argument between the demands of militant black Africans and the white Africans in South Africa who are essentially out to preserve the status quo carries within itself elements of racial conflict, the North/South confrontation and now even East-West rivalry apart from the problems of ethnic domination. It is simultaneously a race, class — and something which is only too often overlooked — a nationality struggle, which is comparable with the former Dual Monarchy (of Austria-Hungary).

After Angola

Most recently, after the South Africans' Angola debacle in 1976 and the Cuban/Soviet offensive, Southern Africa has featured even more strongly for the Great Powers in the sphere of foreign policy activities and internal policy arguments. The unanimously agreed mandatory weapons embargo passed by the UN Security Council in November 1977 should in this connection be regarded as only the tip of the iceberg of international compulsory measures against the government in Pretoria; the intensive consultations of the five Western Powers for the settlement of the South West Africa/Namibia conflict should be seen as the most important indication of Western constructive involvement so far.

Publications on political, economic and social change in Southern Africa reflect the increased danger of conflict escalation and the recognition of how different problem complexes overlap. Despite this the debate reveals a certain one-sidedness: the main emphasis of all critical documents and analyses is still always directed at the injustice and untenable nature of the present system of ethnic discrimination and the necessity of replacing this system through increased pressure from within or without. In contrast, the questions of how, or by which other order, the system of white African domination can be replaced and the political and economic tensions brought about by this process of change overcome, receive relatively little attention in this literature.

However, despite this, in the South African debate in the last two or three years some indications as to a strategy for peaceful change have crystallised, one of which — territorial partition — is presented for discussion in this contribution. I am concerned less with presenting this idea as an optimal "solution" for the practical problems of the present, but rather more to work out the premises for a practical realisable solution through critical discussion of the various considerations which are posed for or against such an idea.

The South African Crisis Scenario

The future of South Africa will ultimately be formed through two factors: the nationalism of white South Africans and the nationalism of black South Africans. The overwhelming majority of the white Africans see themselves as an African nation which has been permanently settled in Africa for over three hundred years. South African history of the past 70 years in which the struggle of the Afrikaners against often overwhelming opponents exercised an important influence on the self-understand-

ing of white South Africans, shows how strongly this grouping is permeated by the numerically superior and thus politically dominant Afrikaners. White nationalism of the Afrikaner stamp has historical, cultural and finally also marked religious foundations which hardly permit political compromise or a yielding up of a position of supremacy vis-a-vis black nationalism. There is a basic fear of physical annihilation! The absence of a means for retreat is an important contribution to the absence of readiness to compromise, which is often simplified by foreign observers as obstinacy or interpreted as absolute conservatism.

Although the Government policy of ethnically separate development and the fact that all over Africa ethnic consciousness causes to a certain extent divisiveness and weakening in black nationalism, one should not underestimate the solid strength of a black nationalism aimed at the ending of white domination in South Africa. If, as is to be feared, the conflict between blacks and whites escalates further, the black Africans, at least in a transitional period, will disregard their own ethnically based conflicts of interest and stand together in the struggle against the whites.

The role of racially mixed Africans (or Coloureds) and that of the Africans of Indian origin remains at the moment ambivalent within black nationalism. In the long term both will have to choose that leading group which is most likely to meet their economic and social demands. Up to now it has always appeared as if this would be the whites rather than the blacks.

A black dominated South Africa would at first be a developing country with an acute shortage of dynamic forces for development. Economic and political principles which almost inevitably stem from a one party state of socialist leaning are to be expected; tendencies in this direction are to be found as much in old publications of the Black Opposition as in the statements of today's leading black personalities. Those who have been aware for decades of the continuing close co-operation of the ANC with the South African Communist Party will not reject out of hand the possibility that such a new South Africa will follow a course even closer to the USSR than that followed with some reservation today by the former Portuguese colonies in Africa.

Furthermore, the behaviour of the white and black leadership of South Africa is not inconsiderably influenced by the existing or expected pressure from outside and the ideas of foreign parties involved for a possible solution to the conflict. International discussion, however, is still constantly dominated by the conception of a political, social and economic integration of all groups and regions of South Africa on the basis of a black majority government. Although the concrete ideas of individual politicians in the

West do deviate considerably from this view, which threatens the existence of the Africans of Coloured, Indian and European origin and numerous observers recognise the need for a political solution "sui generis", this attitude has still not by any means been suppressed in resolutions of international organisations and in the world press.

Foreign Attitudes towards South Africa

Summary judgments in attitudes outside South Africa — for example, over the ethnically based aims of the White South African regime, the alleged inevitable process towards decolonisation and the relevance of Angola and Mozambique as models for liberation in the future development of Southern Africa, not to mention tactical considerations in the context of East/West and North/South disputes — play an important part. The sharp criticism of South Africa in UN circles, together with the threat of escalating pressure tactics and relatively passive conduct of the Western Powers — while there is at the same time more active support for liberation movements from Communist countries as well as a large proportion of the Third World — contribute in the end to a further polarisation of the parties to conflict inside South Africa.

If one considers these forces of growing polarisation and absence of compromise in their overall context, one is then not far from the conclusion that the conflicts in interest between black and white Africans can only be resolved through a *comprehensive* territorial solution, that is, an opposite solution to that of immediate or step by step integration of all groups.

Proposals for Territorial Partition in South Africa

Long before the coming to power of the National Party in 1948 a comprehensive system of formal and unconventional racial separation had already existed. Under the covering conceptions of "Apartheid", "Separate Development", "Parallel Development" and "Multi-national Development" the principle of separation was developed as far as the achievement of "independence" of the totally unviable Transkei and Bophutatswana (with three or four more "independent" homelands in prospect). The principle of separation always remains in practice subjected to the political and economic supremacy of the Whites, which is also an important reason for the widespread rejection of this policy inside and outside South Africa.

Parallel to the execution of this policy of separation the ques-

tion of a consistent territorial division of South Africa has been repeatedly taken up in the last few decades, with a general basis that only in this way would it be possible to resolve the irreconcilably opposing views and conflict of interests of white and black South Africans. Leading Afrikaner politicians such as General Hertzog and D.F. Malan portrayed such a solution as an ideal, the implementation of which was virtually impossible.¹ Liberal politicians and experts such as the South Africans R.F. Alfred Hoernle and Colin Legum, the Americans Edward A. Tiryakian and Gwen Carter have seriously considered the possibility for a consistent and equitable division of South Africa into two or more successor states.²

With the publication of the treatise "Republik Südafrika: Teilung als Ausweg?" ("Republic of South Africa: Is Partition a Solution?") in the German periodical "*Aussenpolitik*" an attempt was made in 1976 to establish in concrete form the very vague pointers in the direction of a partition strategy.³ The following proposals were aired for discussion in this article:

- A consistent territorial partition of South Africa into two states: a northern state with an exclusively Black population and southern state with an exclusively White and Brown population. The border line proposal was that of a line through Oranjemund, Kimberley, Bloemfontein and Port Elizabeth with these listed places forming the north and east boundary of the White/Brown state.
- Full integration of "Coloureds" and "Asians" into the white/brown state.
- The drawing of boundaries taking into consideration historical factors and a detailed established fairness of partition (for example the black state would dispose of 50% of the country with some 70% of the total population and approaching 75% of GNP). In addition to this the drawing of boundaries would have regard for a certain equity of development potential using raw materials and infrastructure as a measure for this (for example, both states were to have three large ports each).
- Population movement in a very considerable measure would be permitted, in which contrary to separation policy until now, White and Asian Africans would be most affected. In all, some 4.6 million people were to be resettled.
- The white/brown state would be incorporated into the Western Alliance in order to preserve its existence.

From the reactions⁴ to these proposals some important conclusions for further discussion of strategies for solution of conflict may be drawn. Although hardly a commentator accepted the

partition proposal outright, at first sight the intensity and breadth of reaction both inside and outside South Africa were worthy of note. As far as South Africa's future was concerned, it reinforced the generally perceived necessity to go down new and (possibly in the eyes of the world) away from ordinary paths. Secondly, the discussion confirmed that any "solution" of the many sided conflict in South Africa required strategies which were more extensive and dramatic in their effect and could not be conceived of as naked abolition of measures for discrimination or other gradual adaptations. I should briefly draw together here some further conclusions from the discussion:

- The political, social and economic contrasts between Blacks and non-Blacks should be born in mind. Integration for its own sake at the present juncture is not a realistic strategy for solution.
- A territorial settlement with simultaneous guarantees for political sovereignty of the new areas could be the foundation for a real and new partition of political and economic power.
- A comprehensive territorial partition would possibly be more easily accepted internationally than a step by step separation policy on the basis of the existing homelands policy.
- In contrast to the South African Government's policy to date, in which the Whites had hardly any sacrifice to make, an acceptable solution for both black Africans and the international body would necessitate *prima facie* material sacrifice by the Whites.

Doubts about Partition

If one analyses the reactions to this concrete proposal more closely, considerable doubts about such an initiative become apparent however. They are in the first place based on a strong pessimism concerning the readiness of white as well as black South Africans to agree in the present situation to a radical partition respectively to carry it through effectively. As far as the Whites are concerned, their agreement to consolidation of the homelands is already a difficult matter and their resistance to a cession of the Witwatersrand and Durban industrial complexes could be entirely uncompromising. With regard to dynamic developments and the latent ethnic conflict between black Africans, the moderate Blacks are interested in the Whites remaining, while "progressive" black leadership has been on record as not prepared up to now to divide "their country". The bare attempt at partition could by itself solidify the polarisation between the races especially if such a policy were initiated onesidedly by the Whites.

In the light of these and other considerations, almost all those writers who take part in this discussion come to the conclusion that such a strategy is only relevant in the case of a breakdown of all other alternatives. Should the attempts at reform on the part of the South African Government not go ahead quickly enough and not be pressed systematically in the direction of effective political and economic power partition — as is quite possible — or if the Western Powers and — with which we must also reckon — the OAU and in its train the UN, regard this inner process of change as insufficient, the South Africa conflict will become ever sharper. In that context an economic boycott would certainly play an important part. Then a total partition in the sense of establishing a refuge for brown and white Africans may be the single remaining way out. But it should be mentioned in this context that G.M.E. Leistner has proposed a far-reaching consolidation of the homelands and the founding of a southern state dominated by the Whites;⁵ the industrial district of Witwatersrand would, according to Leistner, become a condominium commonly administered by all racial groups.

Alternatives to Total Partition

In addition to critical consideration of present government policy and the alternative of total territorial partition there are also at the present time some other strategies under discussion. At the same time it is particularly noteworthy that the alternative most regularly posed at a distance in international discussion — majority rule in a single state on the “one man one vote” system under the leadership of the ANC and/or PAC — has still hardly been examined as far as its political, security and economic consequences are concerned. I do not want to go into these points here, but there are two others, in some respects tied to one another, which have already been developed further in mainly South African and German publications and which are already strongly in the forefront of public discussion both inside South Africa and in some expert and political circles outside.

The model which is based on the teachings of G. Lehmbruch on “Democratic Concordance” and the work of A. Lijphart and K. McRae on “Consociational Democracy”, presents one of the most important and most closely followed proposals in South African publications as well as in internal South African political discussion. Theodor Hanf and Heribert Weiland of the Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institute in Freiburg, Germany have played an outstanding part in the further development of this till now still largely unpublished conception of a federation *sui generis*, or a federation with pronounced confederal traits⁶ It may be that a

model of this sort of state order is viable, even though the white/brown South African population groups on the one hand and the black South Africans on the other lack a common denominator above all in the political, social and cultural fields — normally a 'Conditio sine qua non' of common statehood. Decisive in the viability of such a state will however be that the power instruments of state, not least the police and military, should be divided out constitutionally in such a way among the different population groups that both main contending parties are able to force the other at any given time, through the application of state measures of compulsion to respect the constitutional order.

The second proposal worked out — among others — by Wolfgang H. Thomas of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen, Germany stems from an evolutionary development of the policies existing up till now of separate development.⁷ The most important elements of this strategy are the following:

- The reserves, with the exception of the Transkei, are to be regarded after achievement of "independence" not as fully sovereign states separated from South Africa, but as largely autonomous parts of a kind of South African confederation.
- The population groups settled outside the homelands receive in the context of constitutional changes (restricted at first to Whites, Coloureds, and Indians, but including also before long the Blacks living outside the reserves) separate parliamentary organs of self-government, which function at the same time as a means for the election of representatives sent to the Upper House. All central legislative functions would lie with this Upper House. The Cabinet would be the executive organ to which representatives of all important population groups of the country would belong according to an entrenched clause of the constitution.
- In the longer term the possibility exists so to alter the relationship of the reserves towards the rest of South Africa (governed in the model by its different racial groups together) that a genuine confederation of states with equal constitutional rights comes into being.
- A far-reaching economic and geographical consolidation of the reserves would facilitate the carrying out of this strategy. This would not necessarily entail however a resettlement of people.

An Attempt to Assess the Various Strategies

If one puts the above proposals for a solution to the South Africa dilemma together — total partition, consociational democracy, and plural integration — one is able to draw a series of conclusions which could be important for further discussion on

South Africa. All three proposals attempt to recognise the efforts of individual population groups to keep their identity (including language, culture, political organisation and living style) through far-reaching decentralisation and political autonomy.

These strategies, excepting total partition, are in accordance with the principle, which is given so much importance in international discussion, of maintenance of national or territorial unity of South Africa. However, one should recognise that both variations of regional autonomy given here are not far short of formal independence. Current government policy seeks even now through an evolutionary process to achieve full "independence" for the reserves, although the withholding of international recognition of these states together with economic and security considerations do not permit a real separation from South Africa. In any case the above mentioned principle of South African territorial integrity would mean that the two successor states resulting from total partition — if at all — would then only be recognised diplomatically by third countries after a larger number of OAU countries as well as the West had been convinced, that no other solution was realisable.

In contrast to total partition, but also to the strategy of "concordance" or "consociational democracy", the proposal for plural integration has the advantage that development can be accomplished step by step. For it can be seen as being consistent with the present government policies. Through this it ought above all to be possible to ensure agreement of the white Africans which is so indispensable for peaceful change, that is to say for all practical purposes today the National Party. On the other hand there is just in that a great danger: the majority of black Africans and almost all critical foreign observers would regard such a strategy of evolution coming from the present apartheid structure as a sham solution which above all had the goal of safeguarding the interests of the Whites.

In this dilemma relating to an evolutionary development the central role of a National Convention in which all racial groups take part is clear. Even if the individual groups have already clear and prepared positions as to the desired middle and long-term outcome, it is absolutely necessary that all participating groups together seek after a compromise. Such a round of consultations is necessary as an instrument for consensus building, quite apart from the strategy accepted in the end. This assertion seems important in as much as the proposal of the Whites to convene a National Convention is too easily and too often equated with the enforcement of demands for majority rule without, or at any rate not with the full protection of the minority (*one-man one-vote in*

one country).

As far as the dynamic development of events is concerned, there is an important distinction between the three approaches: global partition is really only to be seen as the result of a massive pressure from outside or as the consequence of a longer war. To make all three strategies work, an all embracing division of power between black, white and brown Africans is necessary, and they are all only viable through the participation of all racial groups. They all have however in contrast to pure integration strategy, one advantage, that the range of power-sharing is determined constitutionally in advance and that the power basis of the Whites can not be completely eroded as far as the constitution is concerned. This guarantee is provided in the case of total partition, and also in the strategy of a concordance or consociational democracy, even if the numerically so superior black African population groups later do not behave constitutionally, that is to say a striving after a system of "one man one vote in one country".

A central problem of all strategy for change is the formation of economic development in a way which does justice to the aspirations of the individual ethnic groups and socio-economic classes but at the same time is realisable within the scope of South African resource potential. In the case of total partition this problem would be met in two stages: firstly, through the drawing of boundaries and mass shifting of population, through which both states would be provided with a certain resource potential. If one follows the plan developed in *Aussenpolitik*, the southern state would have a stronger advantage in the manpower field through its much better educated population, whereas the northern state would have the advantage in its industrial complexes and on this basis would also have to draw in foreign expertise. Once the full separation had been made, the development in both states would probably not be dissimilar to world-wide relations between Western countries and the Third World. In the northern black state the structural problems of the fields of education, community development, modernisation of the agricultural sector, urbanisation etc. would have to be dealt with step by step and with regard to the developing models in Africa and other developing countries. Given the numerically rather strong group of Coloured and Asians the southern state would also have to tackle typical problems of development, in which there would be a dearth of work capacity (labour). If the development dynamic of the southern rump state were to be distinctly stronger than that of the northern state, so it would highlight again the whole North/South issue. That could mean a considerable threat for stable political relations between the two countries which however, circumstances permitting, might be less than the tensions which flow

from the income and ownership disputes between ethnic groups inside an integrated South Africa.

As final points of comparison there are two important aspects (closely linked with one another), the possibility of international recognition, and the further development in the event of growing conflict escalation. The success of all three strategies depends on the recognition by at least the Western Powers and some OAU states. On the part of these countries there are in the short term considerable doubts about all strategies since they are seen in the first place as an attempt by the Whites to stabilise their relative position of power. Since all three strategies require a far-reaching dismantling of petty apartheid and an effective participation on the part of the Blacks in collective political, economic and social decisions in the areas that concern them so the main objections should disappear with time. Finally, there is the question as to how far these strategies are acceptable for the Blacks, which again depends on comparison with other strategies. Should the conflict in South Africa become more strongly enmeshed in the East/-West conflict, and a step by step evolution process (as seen in the plural integration model) become impossible as a result of growing guerilla activity and other military and economic pressure measures, then total partition could prove the only viable solution.

Final Remarks

With regard to the sharpening of the South Africa conflict it is evident that time is working against the possibility of a successful mediating role on the part of Western and other countries; time is working against compromises which are not the result of armed struggle. If the Western world falls back into the old fatal indifference about South Africa's domestic problems, then the country at the Cape of Good Hope will definitely set out on the march to tragedy. The Western states, that is above all the five initiators of the SWA/Namibia initiative must together with as large as possible a number of black African countries (such as Ivory Coast, Senegal, Kenya, Camerouns, Zambia), enter into a dialogue with the South Africans dedicated to a permanent solution of the domestic South African conflicts. This dialogue should of course be conducted with the White Government in Pretoria, but at the same time with the political heirs of Steve Biko, with Inkatha, with the ANC (rather less the PAC) and the OAU and in individual cases also with those with responsibility in the reserves.

Alternatives to the status quo elaborated in South Africa or abroad should be introduced as a basis for discussion into the Republic's publications and academic circles, in order to give impetus to an internal South African dialogue over the country's

future. It does not require any special world insight to see that both parties to the conflict will follow the role of the Western "contact group" with the greatest of suspicion. This mistrust will only be reduced to tolerable proportions, if the contact group make the following two points absolutely clear in an unambiguous statement of intent: the right of the (black) majority to self-determination and the right of the (white and brown) minorities in the Republic to permanent copper-bottomed guarantees of existence. Whoever, possibly for thoroughly comprehensible reasons, omits one of the points will fail as a mediator and with it also unwittingly contribute to the sparking off of a major conflict in and around South Africa.

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BOOK REVIEWS

OIL COMPANIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Louis Turner

The Royal Institute of International Affairs, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1978. 240 pp.

This Chatham House study seeks to explore the wide-range of images which have developed from the complex relationship between the national governments and the giant transnational oil companies. The author's underlying theme draws inspiration from the current fashionable perspectives — held more particularly by political scientists and contemporary historians — that the oil companies have throughout played a highly unethical exploitative role. While this particular approach is almost the wisdom logic of studies like this, it generally lacks multi-dimensionality through failure to dissect factors beyond “high” and “low” politics. Turner's awareness of the inadequacies inherent in earlier studies and thus the prerequisites for his own undertaking, are best realised through his quote from Stanley Hoffman:

“The competition between states takes place on several chessboards in addition to the traditional military and diplomatic ones; for instance, the chessboard of world trade, world finance, of aid and technical assistance, of space research and exploration, of military technology, and the chessboard of what has been called ‘informal penetration’.”

Unfortunately the clarity of Hoffman's message is not conveyed in Turner's book. He fails to properly execute the analysis on the simultaneous series of chessboards which Hoffman advocates. Perhaps because of his overwhelming drive to analyse the complex global patterns in toto, Turner, not unlike many of his colleagues, pays insufficient attention to the presentation of his obviously well-researched data. A large proportion of the book consists of mountains of facts, statistics, dates and quotations, which, while unquestionably valuable, are neither fully differentiated, nor properly integrated and hence lose their impact. As a result, the study appears quasi one-dimensional and the chief conclusion of the book — viz. that the oil majors, notwithstanding their exploitative role, have played a relatively minor role in international politics — emerges blurred.

The juxtaposition of the interesting data and Hoffman's notion of simultaneous chessboards is an ironic one, for had Turner visually presented the data in chronological order by displaying it in sequence in a cumulative scenario, using the principles of chess, (if not at least on a series of graphs and charts) he might well have

succeeded in presenting his conclusion with more convincing objectiveness.

The opening Chapters give in-depth accounts of the relationship between the oil companies and their home governments prior to 1939 (Chapter two); from 1939-1969 (Chapter three) and the relations with the host (oil rich) governments pre-1970 (Chapter four). This latter chapter deals with the controversial involvement of the oil companies in both coups and wars — the Chaco situation, Cuba, Nigeria, Bolivia and, closer to home, Angola. Chapter five deals with the home government — host government relationship prior to 1970. Chapter six examines the global impact of the majors as independent actors with seemingly only one objective: the business of extracting and marketing oil. Some of the socio-economic benefits which have accrued to the host countries from the continuous exploitation, are played off against the catalytic role of the oil companies in the sparking off of anti-Western (anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist) campaigns. The cushioning role which the majors have played in relations between producer and consumer countries are shown to have had a variety of effects. Predictably however, their independency waned with the approaching oil crisis when the commodity more openly revealed its strategic importance.

In almost a second part covered by the last three Chapters, the book deals with the genesis and growth of OPEC and the complex myriad of relations between home and host governments which the cartel spawned, especially in the buildup towards the events of October 1973. The embargo itself is discussed in Chapter nine which is, arguably, the most enjoyable in the book. It remains however a speculative one for the reasons which Turner himself gives: "It is difficult to show that the oil majors have played a political role of great importance."

Thus to reconcile oneself with Turner's conclusions may be selfeluding. In particular, Turner's suggestion that bribery on the part of the majors played but a relatively minor role, is not convincing: there is insufficient probing into the alleged clandestine intervention of oil companies in the domestic political circumstances of the host countries, into the economic benefits of their more subtle commodity marketing procedures and, indeed, into their involvement in sanctions busting which the recent Bingham Report so graphically demonstrates. These obvious shortcomings invoked for this reviewer a feeling of being back at square one.

In retrospect the book leaves two interesting and subtle areas of speculation which both political scientists and historiographers should explore:

(1) The unacknowledged role played by geoscientists in initiating political events associated with natural resources and the global impact thereof. While Turner recognises this, he fails to expand on the theme and leaves one hanging with quotations like the following:

“The U.S. Geological Survey made a number of statements suggesting that the country’s oil position was precarious The result was a diplomatic offensive aimed particularly at the restrictive practices of the British. The State Department sent instructions to all U.S. diplomatic and consular offices reminding them of their duty to help the crucial search for adequate supplies of oil to meet future American needs.”

As a rule, there are serious controversies associated with resource estimations, not only because of uncertainties inherent in the geological (technical) data, but also because of the very dynamic nature of reserves and resources. Since important political decisions have been based on speculative calculations, this non-recognition amongst politicians is patently inadequate and begs the attention of the political scientist.

(2) The future role of other mineral resources and the lesson which can be learnt by home governments from the oil saga. If Turner’s narrative which follows a well-trodden sequence from outright exploitation by the consumer countries through to the familiar refrain of nationalisation and expropriation of foreign assets in host countries is accepted, it surely applies in the case of other resources. The West’s need for natural resources has not declined, indeed for oil quite the opposite has occurred since the 1973 crisis. Consequently exploitation in the resource-endowed countries never ceased. The explosive events recently in Iran highlights the predicaments from a lack of sensitive awareness of the attitude of the populace of these countries towards this continuous exploitation. This alone provides a crystal clear message for the West and mineral rich South Africa.

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INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

F. McA. Clifford-Vaughan (ed.)

Oxford University Press, Cape Town. 1978. 109 pp.

This volume contains six short papers which were presented at a symposium at Natal University in August 1977. Unfortunately, nothing of substance — and very little in the way of guidance to what follows — is contributed by the addition of what is an over-long introduction by the editor. Nevertheless, Clifford-Vaughan has done his work better in ordering the papers, for there is a fairly clear progression from the emphasis of the earlier ones on the nature and inspiration of external pressures on South Africa's present regime through to the emphasis of the later ones on the current and future consequences of this pressure within South Africa itself — culminating appropriately enough in Moorcraft's 'Towards the Garrison State'. As a result, the reader is not subjected to an unbearable degree of repetition as is commonly the case with the more usually 'jerry-built' product of the symposium.

On the whole, I found the papers interesting and — with the exception of Baker's — well documented. They are all tracts for the times and it is absorbing for an English reader to see how at least one section of the SA academic community views its government's relations with the outside world at what appears to be a critical juncture.

Duminy draws some useful morals from the Boer War for the likely response of SA Whites to external pressure for domestic change; Baker is good in parts on the inspiration of recent US policy towards southern Africa; Schrire presents a very sensible appraisal of the motives and opportunities which are possessed by 'the West' (but especially the USA) for applying pressure on South Africa; the sociologist, Schlemmer, provides some useful evidence of opinion research on the effects of external pressure on "street corner" attitudes (though his metaphor may be misinterpreted in Britain and the US), and Moorcraft considers the important practical question of whether ideological resolve or economic pragmatism is nearer to the hearts of SA Whites and the bearing of the answer to this question on the likely consequences of mounting external pressure. However, what I miss in most of these contributions is any real attempt to come to grips with the proposition on which the whole exercise is predicated, to wit, the nature and motivation of 'Western pressure' on South Africa.

One imagines that this is to be at least one of Johnston's tasks in the first paper but unfortunately this author is almost exclusively

concerned to put Western pressures on South Africa into the context of fashionable theorising about 'the international system'. The arguments for the demise of the 'state-centred' system are competently — if uncritically — rehearsed but it is not clear what bearing any of this has on Western pressures on South Africa. More seriously, Johnston's paper begs the question as to whether or not 'the West' has ever genuinely tried to apply pressure on South Africa for purposes of domestic change, rather than simply go through the motions in order to appease liberal sentiment at home and 'non-white' opinion abroad. Johnston (like Duminy in the subsequent paper) simply *assumes* that pressure has been seriously applied to this end — as evidenced, for example, by his reference to the case of British pressure on loyalist dominated N. Ireland. The only thing in common between Britain's relations with this province and its relations with South Africa in my view (apart from the problems presented by having had to deal in both cases with governments with more than their fair share of psychopathic bigots) has been the symbolic importance attached in each relationship to oranges!

Baker's is the strongest paper with regard to the nature and motivation of 'Western pressure', pointing out, however, that US pressure on South Africa (under Kissinger at any rate) was not in the least directed towards achieving change within the Republic itself but rather towards persuading Pretoria to lean on Smith and grant some form of independence to South-West Africa. What exercised Kissinger was not apartheid (he was prepared to recognize Transkei) but Soviet intrusion into Southern Africa. Baker claims, however, that US policy under President Carter has "changed sharply" in the sense that since his inauguration it has been directed towards achieving an end to apartheid itself. This, by the way, seems to be the basis of Johnston's and Duminy's positions. But what is the evidence for this contention? The evidence which Baker presents is Carter's position on Human Rights and Mondale's rhetoric. There was supposed to have been a major change in British policy of this kind towards South Africa after the Sharpeville shootings. What was the evidence? The evidence was Macmillan's rhetoric.

Schrire attempts to lend plausibility to the view that the US is keen to apply serious pressure for internal change on South Africa by recording that the US regards South Africa as relatively unimportant in economic and strategic terms and that it sees a white supremacist South Africa as a political liability in any case. But he produces no evidence for this and — in somewhat contradictory fashion — strongly hints that US pressure will drop since "Soviet involvement in southern Africa has stabilized". This is

surely right. Baker, moreover, gives the game away as far as the US is concerned, by noting that the Carter Administration has already covered itself by drawing a distinction between "two levels of Human Rights" — economic ones on the one hand, and civil and political rights on the other. For the point is that it is precisely in the area of 'economic rights' that the SA government has been able to achieve a modicum of public relations success with regard to the condition of its own blacks vis-a-vis that of those in the rest of the continent. Despite, therefore, an underlying and largely unexplored assumption that South Africa has been increasingly subjected to *serious* pressure for *domestic* (rather than foreign policy) change from 'the West', it is possible to find scattered around in these papers a discerning feeling which is at times uneasy (Baker) and at times rather complacent (Schrire) that the pressure has been neither.

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THE FIRST EUROPEAN ELECTIONS: A handbook and guide

*Chris Cook & Mary Francis
Macmillan, London, 1979. 193 pp.*

The intricate economic, social and political network of the European (Economic) Community (EC) tends to lose all but the most scholarly or committed. To the layman, the Nine members appear to be caught up in a hopeless tangle of often obscure acronyms — CAP, COREPER, (even NATO) — and the peremptory dictates of Eurocrats. Looked at from the outside, it also appears that the Nine have invited further confusion by superimposing upon the existing uncertainty, incomprehensible concepts like monetary 'snakes' (sometimes in a 'Tunnel'). Mark I and Mark II Lomé Conventions and an EC Unit of Account. Certainly university students coming to the EC in the course of their studies are at pains to understand exactly what is happening because the jargon tends to be so specialised. Although the central focus of Dr Cook's and Ms Francis' book is the first Direct Elections to the European Parliament (of which more later), this short book provides an easy guide through the maze of jargon about the current situation of the EC. This alone makes it a valuable reference book for the layman, student and teacher.

Although the book is primarily about Britain's role in Europe, in the first chapter the authors give a 19-page background and history to the European community movement — from the Hague Conference of May, 1948, to British confirmation of their membership by means of the 1975 Referendum. This section is not analytical, but historical. Readers coming to the subject cold, ought perhaps to read it in conjunction with Andrew Schonfield's 1972 BBC Reith Lectures*, whose analysis remains, in my opinion, the best, briefest and most readable of accounts of the centripetal forces operative in Europe during the past thirty years.

Chapter Two is little more than an index to the present life and times of the EC, and deals comprehensively with every aspect from the Treaty of Accession to operation of the Veto. Here entries on the most complex of issues are simple and commendably brief. My favourite, if only because economists and journalists so often obfuscate the issue, is the explanation given of The Snake (in a Tunnel):

“This picturesque phrase (sic) is a description of the graphic representation of the effects of decisions taken by certain member states about exchange rates between their currencies. In 1971 and 1972 they decided that the fluctuations in exchange rates between their currencies should be confined within a narrow band — ‘the Snake’. This narrow band would move within a wider band of maximum permitted fluctuations against the United States dollar — ‘the Tunnel’. The scheme had barely started in 1972 before Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom withdrew, under pressures from the mounting international monetary crisis. Continuing international crises and pressures from, for instance, differing rates of inflation in the various countries have meant that various attempts to solve exchange rate problems have had to be made since the early 1970s. (pp. 43-44)”

Questions on the myriad of issues relating to the European Parliament are the central concern of the book from this point on. The Third Chapter sets out to ask (and answer) ‘key questions which are sure to be at the heart of many arguments . . . during the coming (direct) election(s) . . . (to the European Parliament) . . .’ (p. 45). Here, in a not unattractive question and answer sequence, the writers go to the core of the issue. Again, they do not attempt to analyse the forces at work neither do they try to state the case against Direct Elections. The authors are committed Europeans and this commitment weakens the book. Moreover, shorn of the important theoretical debate, the chapter looks as if it might be designed to cater for aspirant European Parliamentarians.

rians as they respond to questions at public meetings. If this was the intention, then certainly dog-eared copies of the Cook/Francis volume will be part of the essential baggage of all future members of the European Parliament.

The Sixth and Seventh chapters of the book are interesting and valuable contributions to the current debate on direct elections. The former presents, in crisp style, the debate over Electoral systems and Representation, while the latter gives an invaluable guide to the supranational groupings in the European Parliament — the so-called European Parties — and their respective manifestos. Moreover, this chapter deals with the role and place of national parties in the broader European drive towards unity. These will, one suspects, be of interest only to the scholar, particularly the scholar with an interest in parliamentary democracy in Europe. Similarly, only the student of British politics, will be interested in the final chapter which deals with the likely fortunes of the British Political Parties in Europe.

A helpful chapter is the penultimate one which deals with the thorny question of 'Britain and Europe: Current Issues and Controversies'. Here we are given a somewhat biased view of why the British have emerged as such reluctant Europeans and the prospects for a resolution of the issues which have made, first, Dr David Owen and, now, Lord Carrington such surly members of the 'Club of Nine'. These issues remain, of course, centrally important to the future of the EC and are likely to be exacerbated by the recent admission of Greece and, later perhaps, Spain and Portugal.

South African readers might perhaps legitimately ask whether the politics of the EC are relevant to South Africa. The question may be answered briefly as follows: first, direct elections are likely to increase the power of the European Parliament and this "democratisation" will increase exposure of the South African nexus in that chamber. Secondly, South African coal exports to the EC, have made the community infinitely more important to SA. Thirdly, the positive achievements of the Europe of the Nine represent a model for the co-operation of diverse peoples in a single political unit — that needs no further explanation.

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* Published by Penguin Books, 1974, under the title *'Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination'*

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Anglo-Transvaal Consolidated Investment Company Limited
Argus Printing & Publishing Company Limited
Babcock & Wilcox of Africa (Pty) Limited
Barclays National Bank Limited
Barclays National Bank Limited
Barlow Rand Limited
Blue Circle Limited
Bowring, C T and Associates (SA) Limited
BP Southern Africa (Pty) Limited
Bradlow Stores Limited
British Steel Corporation of (SA) (Pty) Limited
Bruynzeel Plywoods Limited
Burrhoughs Machines Limited
Caltex Oil (SA) (Pty) Limited
Chase Manhattan Overseas Corporation
Chloride Oldham Limited
Citibank N.A. Limited
CNA Investments Limited
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Company of South Africa Limited
Combrink Construction (Pty) Limited
Commercial Union Assurance Company of South Africa Limited
Com Products Company South Africa (Pty) Limited
Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation of Africa Limited
De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited
Dorbyl Limited
Dunlop South Africa Limited
Edgars Stores Limited
Employment Bureau of Africa Limited, The
Federale Chemiese Beleggings Beperk
Federale Voedsel Beperk
Federale Volksbeleggings Beperk
Fisons Industries (Pty) Limited
Ford Motor Company of South Africa (Pty) Limited
Foschini Limited
French Bank of Southern Africa Limited
Garlick Limited
General Mining and Finance Corporation Limited
General Motors South Africa (Pty) Limited
General Tire & Rubber Company SA Limited, The
Gold Fields of South Africa Limited
Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Company (SA) (Pty) Limited, The
Grace, W.F. Africa (Pty) Limited
Grand Bazaars
Group Five Engineering Limited
Guardian Liberty Life Group, The
Gubb & Inggis Limited
Haggie Rand Limited
Hawker Siddeley Electric Africa (Pty) Limited
Hill Samuel Group (SA) Limited, The
Hulett's Corporation Limited
IBM South Africa (Pty) Limited
Industrial and Commercial Holdings Group (Investment Limited)
Industrial Development Corporation of SA Limited
Jaff and Company Limited
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company Limited
McCarthy Group Limited
Massey-Ferguson (South Africa) Limited
Messina (Transvaal) Development Company Limited, The
Metal Box South Africa Limited
Metboard Limited
Merkor Investments Limited
Midland Bank Group Representative Office (Pty) Limited
Mobil Oil Southern Africa (Pty) Limited
Murray & Stewart (Pty) Limited
Nasionale Pers Beperk
Natal Tanning Extract Company Limited, The
Natal Witness (Pty) Limited, The
National Trading Company Limited
NCR Corporation of SA (Pty) Limited
Nedbank & Syfrets-LIAL Holdings Ltd
Otis Elevator Company Limited
Overstone Investments Limited
Percy FitzPatrick Memorial Trust
Pitkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Limited
Pioneer Holdings and Finance Corporation Limited
Pretoria Portland Cement Company Limited
Price Waterhouse & Company
Protea Holdings Limited
Raphaely, Leo & Sons (Pty) Limited
Reef Lefebvra (Pty) Limited
Rembrandt Group Limited
Rennies Consolidated Holdings Limited
Reunert & Lenz Limited
Rio Tinto Management Services (Pty) Limited
Roberts Construction Company Limited, The
SANLAM
Schindler Lifts (SA) (Pty) Limited
Scotts Stores Limited
Sentracher
Shell South Africa (Pty) Limited
Siemens Limited
Smith, C.G. & Company Limited
Smith, C.G. Sugar Limited
South African Associated Newspapers Limited
South African Breweries Limited, The
South African Manganese AMCOR Limited
South African Marine Corporation Limited
South African Sugar Association
Southern African Music Rights Organisation Limited
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, The
Stewarts & Lloyds of SA Limited
Suid-Afrikaanse Steenkool-Olie- & Gaskorporasie Beperk (SASOL)
Suid-Afrikaanse Yster- & Staal-Industriële Korporasie Beperk (ISCOR)
Taeuber & Corssen (Pty) Limited
Tiger Oats & National Milling Company Limited
Total South Africa (Pty) Limited
Toyota South Africa Limited
Trust Bank van Afrika Beperk, Die
Truworths Limited
UDC Bank Limited
Union Corporation Limited
United Building Society
United Tobacco Company Limited
Volkswagen of SA (Pty) Limited
Wiggins Teape (Pty) Limited
Woolworths (Pty) Limited