

# International Affairs BULLETIN

**Botswana: Democracy under Pressure**  
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**Mozambique: Problems of Reconstruction**  
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**"Transnationalism": The Rediscovery of Pressure Groups**  
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**South African Policy and US Responses**  
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**Book Reviews**

**Storm over the Multinationals: The Real Issue**  
by R. Vernon

**South Africa and Sanctions: Genesis and Prospects**  
D. Willers and S. Begg (eds.)

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## International Affairs Bulletin

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## NOTES ON AUTHORS AND ARTICLES

*Mr Quentin Peel* is the Southern African correspondent for the London *Financial Times*. Prior to his posting to Johannesburg he was based in London. His article on Botswana, a country he has visited frequently, was especially written for the Bulletin in view of Botswana's vulnerability to political developments in contiguous countries.

*Mr Tom Lodge*, author of the article on reconstruction problems in Mozambique, is a lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand. Previously he was a Research Fellow at the Centre for Southern African Studies at the University of York. Mr Lodge's article is particularly pertinent and topical in the light of the recent heavy Rhodesian raids into Mozambique. The fragility of the economy is also underscored by recently reported attempts by the Mozambican government to persuade the South African Chamber of Mines to recruit more Mozambican workers.

*Dr Geoff Berridge* is a lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Leicester. Previously he also researched the economy of Anglo-South African relations at Durham University. His doctoral thesis entitled "Economic powers in Anglo-South African diplomacy: Simonstown, Sharpeville and after," is shortly to be published by Macmillan. Transnational pressure groups are a special interest of his.

*Professor Donald Baker*, author of the article on South African policy and US responses, is Professor of Political Science and Sociology at Southampton College of Long Island University, New York. He knows Southern Africa well and in 1975-76 was a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Inter-Racial Studies at the University of Rhodesia.

*The Rt Hon. Dr David Owen M.P.* was the former British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs until the change of the British government earlier this year. Currently opposition spokesman on energy matters, his interests still lie very much in the field of international affairs. Dr Owen feels strongly that negotiated settlements would be in South Africa's best interests.

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
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## **BOTSWANA: DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE**

**Quentin Peel**

In the geo-politics of Southern Africa, the sparsely-populated and semi-desert expanse of Botswana occupies a pivotal position. Surrounded, but for one tiny stretch of the Zambezi, by the last bastions of minority white rule in Africa, it has become a sanctuary for thousands of refugees from the growing conflicts of the region. By the same token, it presents a natural launching pad for insurgents seeking to overthrow those governments. A member of the group of black front-line states in the region, it is effectively behind the lines of white rule, seeking to maintain the uneasy position of political hostility towards, and economic dependence on, its neighbours. It also provides embattled Zimbabwe Rhodesia with one of its two remaining rail outlets to South Africa, relying on Rhodesian manpower to run it.

### **Record of Democracy**

Given the sensitivity of its position, Botswana has achieved a remarkable record of stability, democracy and economic growth, not to mention very largely good race relations. President Sir Seretse Khama has now called the country's third general election since independence, for October 20, and there is no doubt that his Botswana Democratic Party will be returned with an overwhelming majority, in spite of the vociferous opposition of more radical parties. Thanks to the rapid development of the mining industry, the economy grew by leaps and bounds in the first ten years after independence in 1966, falling back in 1976/77, but returning to a real increase in GDP of an estimated five per cent last year.

Botswana makes no secret of its formula for political and economic survival: "Sometimes South Africans call us hypocrites, because we condemn apartheid and then buy their mealie meal", according to one of Sir Seretse's closest aides. "We say; right, we are hypocrites. Fine. We survive." The political criticism is sometimes tempered by the government's official policy of not allowing the country to be used as a "springboard" for guerrilla attacks on its neighbours. On the other hand Botswana is seeking to reduce the economic dependence on its white neighbours.

Such pragmatism and moderation in the escalating confrontation in Southern Africa is under growing strain, from forces both within, but above all outside Botswana. The demands for the country to take sides — either to join South Africa's anti-Marxist

This report was written especially for the *Bulletin*.

constellation of states, or to grant the nationalist guerrilla movements bases from which to wage their liberation struggle — are becoming increasingly strident. So far Botswana has resisted. “We are prepared to die a little to help our brothers,” Mr Archie Mogwe, the Foreign Minister, once said, “but we are not prepared to cut our throats.”

### Refugee Strain

The most immediate strain, both social and economic, comes from the influx of refugees. There are now some 21 000 in the country, their numbers swollen by a further 600 to 700 a month — albeit a reduction on the rush of more than 1 000 a month earlier in the year. The great majority are fleeing the war in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Where once Botswana simply provided onward transport for them to join the refugee camps in Zambia — and for the able-bodied young men to join the guerrilla forces of Mr Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU movement — that is no longer possible. The road route to Zambia has been cut since Rhodesia bombed the Kazungula ferry at Easter. And even if Botswana were able to find an airline willing to carry them, senior officials in Gaborone say Zambia is unwilling to accept any more.

The refugee agencies, headed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, fear that any deterioration in the war could push numbers to 70 000 next year — almost ten per cent of Botswana's total population. Apart from the strain on the fragile infrastructure, their presence causes real social problems. Often the aid given to refugees actually makes them better off than the rural Batswana, who resent them. In the urban areas, the problem is also acute. There, an estimated 850 refugees include 200 each from Rhodesia, South Africa, Angola and Lesotho, mostly articulate and radical urbanites. Botswana officials fear they could radicalise their own young people, and disturb the hitherto good race relations in the country. Now the government is building a refugee farm settlement on the edge of the Kalahari to house South Africans. Although it is seen as more of a threat to the exile community to behave, the camp is also intended to house the next wave of South African refugees, which the authorities are certain will come.

Related to the refugee influx, as well as to periodic cross-border raids by Rhodesian soldiers, has been the decision to establish the Botswana Defence Force, in a country which previously had nothing more fearsome than a small contingent of para-military police. In the two years since it was created, the BDF has been rapidly built up to a force of 2 000 men, and now boasts six aircraft. Total cost in the present year was budgeted at Pula 10 m;

money which would otherwise have been devoted to development projects. The government is concerned both at its inability to prevent Rhodesian incursions, (not only in pursuit of guerrillas, but also apparently to frighten border villagers from helping them), and at the possibility of future raids on the three refugee camps, at Francistown, Selebi Pikwe, and most recently a more permanent settlement camp at Dukwe, north-west of Francistown. But the BDF can never be much more than a token force, and is equally unable entirely to prevent guerrillas using Botswana territory to attack South Africa or Rhodesia.

Another diversion of much needed revenue to guard against contingencies stemming from the war has been to prepare to take over the railway line, hitherto run by Rhodesia Railways. While the government is committed, in principle, to taking over the railway when it is ready to do so, it has also drawn up plans for a takeover if the Rhodesians were suddenly to abandon the line, because of the war or a shortage of railwaymen. Eighteen drivers are currently under training in Kenya and Malawi, and eight have finished their courses. Three times that number will eventually be needed. The future Botswana Railways will need 500 wagons, and has so far acquired 47 at a cost of some Pl. 3m. Cost of the takeover is estimated at P46m in 1978 prices, excluding any compensation that may be demanded by Rhodesia Railways, and could well rise to P60m.

Although the last public statement by Mr James Haskins, the Minister of Works and Communications, put the takeover date at 1982, some officials are more cautious, reckoning on another five years, unless they are forced to take it over early. But the World Bank has nevertheless declined to back the scheme, arguing that its justification is political, not economic. So Botswana is now looking for packages of aid from different donors, particularly for locomotives.

A fourth area of pressure directly caused by the Rhodesian war affects the cattle industry, still the country's most important source of employment. The collapse of veterinary services in western Rhodesia has allowed foot and mouth disease to reach epidemic proportions, and forced Botswana to build a cordon fence along most of its border. Any prolonged outbreak, coming on top of a drought year, could cripple the beef industry, which relies on the EEC (rigid in its health controls) as its major export market.

The possibility of oil sanctions being imposed on South Africa, whether as a result of its oil supplies to Rhodesia, or its policies in Namibia, has forced Botswana to build fuel storage tanks at Gaborone and Francistown. To date, however, South Africa has



refused to provide the once-and-for-all extra supplies of petrol and diesel needed to fill the tanks. Botswana is trying to negotiate a direct supply contract with an OPEC country.

#### **Economy Uneven — Serious Unemployment Outlook**

Botswana's popularity with aid donors, and its buoyant government revenues from the diamond mines at Orapa and Letlhakane, have helped the country to weather some of the strains it faces so far. Diamond exports were up from P47m to P76m between 1977 and 1978. This year the expansion at Orapa from 2,4m to 4,1m carats, and at Letlhakane from 330 500 to 400 000 carats will come into effect, which will mean diamond exports could almost double again, in spite of the more stable price.

The Bank of Botswana is actually flush with cash — reserves rose from P82,8m to P124,5m last year — and the commercial banks are awash with liquidity. But that is also a reflection of a structural problem; how to distribute Botswana's new-found wealth widely enough through the population, and find suitable job-creating investments to do so. The shortage of skills puts a very real limitation on the number of infrastructure projects which can be undertaken, if they are to be properly serviced. In the private sector, local entrepreneurs number only a handful. Foreign investment, meanwhile — other than in mining — is deterred by the instability of the region, (rather than specifically Botswana itself), and in any event prefers to go to South Africa, where the infrastructure and general facilities are so much better developed.

The employment problem is already being seriously aggravated by the cutback in migrant employment in South Africa. Employment of Botswana on the mines dropped from 25 000 in 1977 to 20 000 in 1978, but more significantly, recruitment dropped from more than 38 000 in 1977 to less than 23 200 in 1978. Officials believe the run-down of employment in South Africa is likely to be a continuing trend, as Pretoria seeks to encourage employers to concentrate on giving jobs to existing urban Blacks first, and Blacks from the homelands second. Development of Botswana's new diamond find at Jwaneng is providing jobs, (some 2 000 workers are now on site), but the country cannot rely on finding new mines every few years.

Top priority for the economic planners is therefore to develop arable agriculture. Cattle ranching is itself concentrated in the hands of a wealthy few, and tilling the soil therefore is still the only way of involving the great mass of the population. But the process of changing traditional tribal practices, including persuading people to quit the huge tribal villages to live on their land,

is likely to be long and laborious.

### **Seretse's Counter-Constellation**

The fact that post-independence prosperity has failed to percolate through to the bulk of the rural population to a significant extent has not yet surfaced in any real political opposition. That is more likely to come from the urban population radicalised by a combination of affluence, refugee politics and the rhetoric of Southern Africa's racial divisions. The Botswana National Front, led by Moscow-educated Dr Kenneth Koma, is expected to emerge as the principal opposition party after the coming election, although it may still not win more than two or three seats.

Radicalisation may be too strong a word for the placid politics of Botswana, but there is little doubt that Sir Seretse does feel increasing pressure for him to reduce his economic dependence on his white neighbours. Ironically, Mr P.W. Botha's proposal to form a constellation of states, which the Botswana Government sees as no more than "an extension of the bantustan policy", may have accelerated that aim. The Botswana President was the prime mover behind the July conference in Arusha of the five front-line states, designed to lay the groundwork for a Southern African community which would seek to reduce, not increase, all the states' dependence on the white south. Such a community, Sir Seretse said, would enable (black) Southern Africa to wage a successful struggle for economic liberation and a common future. The Arusha meeting, although still at a largely theoretical level, did attract representatives of the World Bank, the EEC, and the UN Development Programme, all giving their tacit blessing to the underlying thinking.

Reducing its dependence on South Africa has always been Botswana Government policy. "We have always said we want to lessen our dependence on South Africa. We are not saying we want to disengage," is the view of a senior official. Ironically, the next move may be one to increase that dependence, for Botswana has formally approached South Africa's Electricity Supply Commission (Escom) to inquire about the possibility of linking in to the South African power grid, in order to provide electricity for the new Jwaneng mine. But apart from diversifying sources of supply — some 85 per cent of Botswana's imports come from South Africa — lessening dependence means capital intensive projects like the railway takeover, and building an international airport, whose prime motivation is political, not economic. Another project motivated at least in part by the desire for alternative lines of communication is the mooted Trans-Kalahari railway to Namibia, whose cost has been variously estimated at P1bn to

P3bn. That is currently the subject of a Commonwealth-financed feasibility study, but it could never prove economic without the guarantee of bulk minerals to transport.

Expatriate advisers in Gaborone are worried at the trend towards political rather than practical projects. Nevertheless, they discount more extreme reports of radicalisation appearing in the South African press. "There is probably less tension than three years ago," according to one leading South African businessman based in Gaborone. "That is partly because senior Batswana have gained in confidence, and are more confident in their ability to run their country. That means they are less sensitive to foreign companies." The furore over the killing of two South Africans and a young Briton by a BDF patrol — which led one South African newspaper to describe the country as "suspicious, authoritarian and dangerous" — has largely subsided. Many Batswana are still rather resentful, however, at the attention that tragedy received, compared with the fleeting coverage of the killing of fifteen BDF soldiers by a Rhodesian patrol two weeks earlier.

In the coming election, Sir Seretse may well win even more than the 27 seats he currently holds of the 32 contested seats in Parliament. His primary concern seems to be to ensure a big turnout compared to the embarrassing 32 per cent poll in 1974. As long as he is in control, there is little chance of any sudden or drastic departure from existing policy of co-existence with the South. If there is no solution in Rhodesia and Namibia, however, the tensions within Botswana are certain to grow, and Sir Seretse's successor, whoever that may be, will be hard put to contain them.

## **MOZAMBIQUE: PROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTION**

**Tom Lodge**

This article proposes to outline the structural problems arising out of Mozambique's colonial economy and the decolonisation process; problems which impose stringent limits on the nature and pace of economic and social development which Frelimo, the new government, can initiate. Frelimo's approach to these problems is also intended to be examined, i.e. the economic, social and political structures that are being formed — the type of society Frelimo is attempting to create.

### **Frelimo's Inheritance**

Frelimo inherited from the Portuguese administration an in-

This article was written especially for the *Bulletin*.

herently fragile economy characterised by a degree of external dependence extreme even in an African context. The gross national product was dominated by a 65 per cent contribution from migrant labour earnings, port fees accruing from South African and Rhodesian transit traffic and tourism.<sup>1</sup> Colonial economic policy had been to develop a few export agricultural commodities — (cashew nuts, tea, sisal, sugar and cotton) — at the expense of the territory being self-sufficient in food production: for a long time Mozambique had imported basic foodstuffs from her neighbours. Dependency was not limited to the spheres of employment, markets and food supplies. In addition there was the high degree of foreign investment and ownership in plantation agriculture and the tiny industrial sector, (developed since 1965). Finally, Portuguese settlers, many quite recently arrived in the territory, had a virtual monopoly of skills in almost every sphere of administration, management, industry and social services.

It should be emphasised that on its accession to power in June 1975 Frelimo found the economy in a state of crisis — a crisis in which it could do little to alleviate the main causes. Let us look at four factors in this crisis, which has been a continuing one.

### **Migrant Labour**

Foremost have been the problems posed by migrant labour. In 1975 Mozambique had 130 000 of her nationals working in the Witwatersrand gold mines.<sup>2</sup> The origins of this flow of migrant labour go back well into the nineteenth century to a time when the pre-capitalist economy of Southern Mozambique was placed under considerable strain partly as the result of the displacement of Nguni groups during the Mfecane period, but also by the northward spread of stock disease. Later the penetration of merchant capital and the imposition of taxation by the Portuguese authorities created additional pressures inducing men to enter wage labour. In the long term, migrancy has negative consequences for a region's economy. These are well known enough not to require much elaboration *viz.*, the removal of the most potentially innovative and strongest section of the rural work-force; the displacement of reproduction costs of the industrial work-force onto increasingly impoverished rural areas; neglect of cash crops; perpetuation of rural conservatism, etc. However, as far as the Portuguese administration was concerned, the flow of migrants to South Africa brought a considerable advantage. Only 40 per cent of a migrant's wages was paid to him at the workplace. The rest was remitted in gold to the Mozambique authorities who would pay the balance of wages in local Portuguese escudos. The gold

was then sold on the world market and was thus an invaluable source of foreign currency for the government. Frelimo was committed to eventually ending the migrant labour system, but this was envisaged as a gradual process achieved by creating further employment in Mozambique. As things turned out the initiative to reduce the flow was taken by South Africa.

South African gold mining has been becoming increasingly capital intensive, the mid-seventies was a period of low gold prices, and long term policy is to increase the proportion of the mining work-force that is domestically recruited. Initially the South Africans were willing to co-operate with the new government to the extent of continuing to sell its gold for it on the world market. The large influx of labour from a potentially hostile state was viewed as an obvious strategic risk, however, and this, together with the above economic factors, probably persuaded South Africa to take a less accommodating stance. First, the basis for the gold payment was changed: gold was paid at world rather than the lower official prices formerly used, thus reducing the amount received by Mozambique. Then in 1976 it was announced that the following year's labour requirements would be sharply reduced: from an official figure of 130 000 for 1976, only 30 000 Mozambican miners would be needed the following year. <sup>3</sup> This reduction has been reflected in the rapidly shrinking gold payment; from \$150 m in 1976 to \$30 m in 1978. <sup>4</sup> At the same time over 100 000 men have been thrown onto the labour market in Mozambique. When one bears in mind that these people come from a fairly densely settled area where a large proportion of the population exists at a subsistence or a below-subsistence level, then the huge dimensions of the problem become clear.

### **Settler Outflow**

The second main problem arose out of the outflow of settlers that accompanied the transitional period when Frelimo, in collaboration with the Portuguese authorities, administered the territory in the period 1974 - 1975. Notwithstanding Frelimo's avowed non-racialism — (Whites still participate in Mozambican government right up to cabinet level) — it seems that there was some intimidation of Whites at a local level. Settlers were also thrown into a panic by early nationalisation measures affecting rented accommodation. But the basic causes of the settler exodus cannot be fairly blamed on Frelimo. In a racist society which had effectively denied any position of responsibility to Blacks, (at least until the early seventies), it was hardly likely that settlers would relish the prospect of a largely black administration — let alone a

self-proclaimed Marxist one. Between the years 1975 - 1976, 200 000 Portuguese settlers departed leaving Mozambique without administrative personnel, managerial staff, technicians, skilled industrial workers, mechanics, agronomists, medical staff, etc. In a country with an appallingly low literacy rate this was especially serious; very few Mozambicans had been employed in even junior positions of responsibility in the bureaucracy and the modern economy. As if this deprivation was not enough, many emigrants took with them any movable capital they could lay their hands on — (e.g. 25 000 vehicles left the country in this period) — and destroyed much of what they left behind.<sup>5</sup>

### **Decline of Agriculture**

A third set of problems are a consequence of the nature of agriculture as it was shaped in the colonial economy. The export sector of Mozambican agriculture (which accounted for 50 per cent of the cultivated land) was, with the exception of cashews (the bulk of which were foraged), dominated by ex-patriate concerns. Much of the external agricultural interest was British. Notorious, for example, were the Sena Sugar Estates which even by local standards paid atrociously low wages. After invisible exports agriculture was Mozambique's main foreign exchange earner. Mozambique's ability to generate income from this sector had depended historically on ruthless exploitation of the local labour force as well as ex-patriate expertise and capital. Scarcely surprisingly, when the owners withdrew, (often burning crops and smashing equipment), workers' committees that took over the plantations were not going to maintain the same rate of exploitation. Furthermore, they lacked the skills needed to run large-scale capital-intensive agriculture. Consequently the first year of independence witnessed a major decline in the production of export crops — 50 per cent in the period 1975 to 1976. Meanwhile the African peasant sector had also been experiencing problems. Though a black surplus-producing peasantry, together with poorer Portuguese farmers, had established the basis for a relatively prosperous agriculture, producing for the local market on 25 per cent of the cultivable land. The vast majority of Mozambique's rural population — 1 250 000 families — lived on 25 per cent of the cultivable land — (the poorest in quality) — at a very bare level of subsistence indeed.<sup>6</sup> When one remembers that the post-1974 period has been characterised by a chain of natural disasters — in particular flooding — occurring at a time when the territory's foreign currency earnings (and hence its ability to import food) have plummeted, it is not surprising that there have been reports of starvation.

### **The Rhodesian War**

One should also take into account the effects of the Rhodesian war. Though it has been argued that the impact of the Rhodesian war in the southern and central regions of Mozambique has provided the social experience that revolutionary violence gave in the northern liberated zones,<sup>7</sup> it is possible that the social and economic costs outweigh ideologically conceived benefits. 90 000 Zimbabwean refugees and over 200 raids by the Rhodesian armed forces must have had serious effects on the cycle of rural production.<sup>8</sup> Unless ZANU cadres are better disciplined than their ZAPU compatriots in Zambia their presence in Mozambique may go some way to explaining the persistent rumours of conflict and resistance to central authority in rural areas.

With the above points in mind, the picture depicted so often by South African politicians and media of an economic crisis created almost entirely by economic mismanagement and fanatical Marxist dogmatism becomes increasingly untenable. The entire way Mozambique has developed within the framework of the international capitalist economy has placed the country in an impossible position. A good example is to be found in the problem of industrial employment. Mozambique's industrial workforce is employed largely in import-substituting and processing light industry. Much of the import substitution activity — tyre production for example — depends on raw material imports which cut into Mozambique's meagre reserves of foreign currency. Many of the processing plants, given the difficulties of commercial agriculture, have to operate at below profitable capacity. Frelimo authorities are faced with the choice: close the plant and save resources, but at the cost of swelling the numbers of unemployed, or keep the plant running. On the whole, Frelimo has preferred to incur the economic rather than the social costs; the factories have remained in production. This is one example drawn from many. In general Mozambique's economic problems are inter-linked and structural. They are the product of the colonial experience and have little to do with Frelimo's degree of competence in economic management.

### **Examination of Frelimo Economic and Social Strategies**

Because Frelimo's policies have been influenced to an extent by the experience of a revolutionary war, it is necessary at this point to refer briefly to some of the facets of that experience. First of all Frelimo was by 1974 not only a formidable military force; it had also, through the administration of the liberated zones, created structures that had become integral parts of the social and economic life of the rural population. In the province of Cabo

Delgado initially, and later in Niassa and Tete, having effectively limited the Portuguese administrative presence to urban areas, Frelimo had to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of colonial authority. In other words, people had to be supplied with rudimentary social and educational services as well as a trading system, and organised to produce an agricultural surplus so that guerilla units could be supported locally. In terms of providing social services what Frelimo could do was fairly limited; nevertheless there is a good case for arguing that its vaccination programmes, simple clinics and primary schools had a significant impact in an area neglected by the colonial administration. In the agricultural sphere Frelimo extended the cultivated area by establishing its own food farms which were worked by guerillas and local auxiliaries. These served as models of collective production as well as fulfilling their supply function. The movement encouraged, but did not force, people to enter co-operative production in their own plots; some co-operative experience had been gained locally by a cotton producers' marketing co-operative active in Cabo Delgado until its suppression in the late 1950s. Farmers were supplied with tools and advice on how to increase productivity. Frelimo set up trading stores so that peasants could exchange surplus for manufactured items from Tanzania. Politically, Frelimo was also innovative: traditional structures were attacked, chiefs were replaced by village committees, and women were recruited alongside men in the guerilla forces. Frelimo's objective was "the participation of the people as a whole and the breakdown of barriers between a guerilla force supplied from outside and a passive peasantry".<sup>9</sup> The military offensive was accompanied by a degree of social transformation that involved not merely the erosion of traditional relationships, but also the curbing of a rural petty bourgeoisie; the late sixties saw a leadership struggle which Frelimo depicts in class terms. On the one hand there was a rural leadership, men who had led the early co-operatives and were now exploiting their control over the disposal of peasant surplus. The opposed faction (drawn largely from Southern Mozambique) consisted of people with a working class or urban white-collar background, arguably less élitist, probably more politically radical and certainly with very little sympathy for traditional forms of rural social organisation. This faction triumphed with the Kavandame expulsion of 1969.<sup>10</sup> From this time Frelimo began to identify itself as a Marxist party<sup>11</sup> though it still operated as an open organisation, with a largely peasant base; the population was engaged in political action.<sup>12</sup> The emphasis during the revolutionary phase was on mass mobilisation, voluntarism, initiative from below and self criticism; features which led



many observers to believe that Frelimo drew guidance from Chinese Marxism.

While the movement was attempting to transform society, the movement itself was changing in character. During the war there developed the structures of one-party democracy. In the liberated zones, village party cells elected representatives to district councils which in turn sent delegates to provincial councils which elected members of a congress. Congress selected from among its numbers a central committee. Congress, in theory, was to be held every 4 years; the second congress was held in Niassa province in 1968. But while the movement took on a formally democratic organisation there are grounds for contending that the leadership by the 1970s had become less representative of the following. The splits and expulsions of 1968, while they can be satisfactorily analysed in class terms, nevertheless had the effect of making the Central Committee less rurally and peasant orientated. While the movement was expanding its rural base and complexity of organisation it was tending to become more sharply class orientated. Frelimo, which had originated as a front, a coalition of different groups and parties, was becoming a party.

The final point to make about the war is that while it has been persuasively suggested that Frelimo's degree of military success was an important factor in the demoralisation of the Portuguese army and the subsequent coup, nevertheless in 1974 Frelimo's victory was incomplete. Though by 1974 Frelimo operations were at their most intensive in the Zambesia district and its control extended to the environs of Beira,<sup>13</sup> the degree of penetration of urban areas and relatively densely populated southern Mozambique was nevertheless, superficial. Moreover, it is worth noting that even in the liberated zones there were difficulties. Frelimo complained towards the end of the war of the "insufficient mobilisation" of the peasants. The problem seems to have arisen out of peasant resistance to the appropriation of their surplus by Frelimo forces.

To summarise: June 1975 witnessed the accession to power of a movement which had depended on the mass mobilisation of the peasantry; which was orientated to collective forms of economic production; which had attempted to diminish the importance of traditional social practices and political authorities, and which had tried to eradicate an embryonic rural bourgeoisie. Frelimo had also evolved a highly centralised political structure which, though it featured mass involvement in the political process at the level of the village, nevertheless concentrated power in the hands of a small group of fairly well educated men drawn from white-collar, intellectual and working class backgrounds. The wartime

period saw not only the accumulation of a socialist experience unparalleled in African history, in it can also be detected the seeds of contemporary political practice in Mozambique; the operation of a political vanguard.

This point is important to grasp. The increasingly authoritarian nature of Frelimo's leadership, the emphasis on discipline as opposed to the earlier reliance and faith in mass initiative, are sometimes related merely to the crisis of production, the exigencies of the economic situation. Some commentators distinguish between a "pragmatic" and an "ideological" trend in Frelimo policy.<sup>14</sup> Certainly the current economic difficulties have helped to shape Frelimo's development but contemporary political strategies are also the outcome of tendencies that were already developing in the liberated zones. But before looking at the post-colonial nature of the party itself, a consideration of Frelimo's response to socio-economic issues is helpful. Let us begin with agriculture.

#### **Peasant Food Production**

In September 1975 a Frelimo agricultural seminar proposed the re-organisation of peasant life along a system of communal villages. The proposals were adopted by the Central Committee in 1976. The system involved the regrouping of often dispersed settlements in concentrated units so that all members of the community could benefit from irrigation projects, literacy, health schemes and so forth. Social control and political education were also facilitated. In its ideal form, the process would involve initial encouragement of the peasants to produce part of their output together, the proportion being gradually increased until it became obviously advantageous for the producers to live together. At this point land resources would be divided into two parts: one to be worked collectively and one for individual family use. In some cases villagers would devote three days to private production and then join forces on the fourth day. Limits would be placed on the size of family plots as well as on stock ownership and no individual tenure would be permitted. 15 per cent of the sale proceeds of the collective produce was to be banked, ensuring development funds, and the rest distributed amongst villagers. Villagers were to be allowed some discretion in such matters as house design, village layout and the division of labour.<sup>15</sup> As originally envisaged the scheme involves a voluntary principle and a series of stages of implementation dependent on local initiatives in their implementation. However, since the scheme's implementation there have been reports of considerable opposition to

it. At the same time the process of creating villages seems to have been considerably speeded up; while in January 1977 there existed 75 communal villages ranging in size from 50 to 11 000 families,<sup>16</sup> by early 1978, 3 000 000 people lived in 1 500 communal villages.<sup>17</sup>

The nature of the opposition to, and factors affecting the success of, the scheme deserve attention for these suggest some of the difficulties of adhering to a voluntary scheme. Given the figures cited above it seems likely that Frelimo's original conception of this as a gradual and long term process has changed. First of all, unrest can be explained by the degree of rural social stratification in any one area. The 1975 agricultural seminar reported the existence of 390 000 family farming units occupying areas of between two and twenty hectares producing a considerable surplus<sup>18</sup>. Naturally this group would not welcome the restrictions on the size of individual plots (one to two hectares depending on quality). This rich peasant sector was mainly located in Zambezia, an area of fertile land<sup>19</sup>. Agricultural productivity decline has been especially serious in this area<sup>20</sup> and producer resistance may have been a factor affecting this. Another area of rural disaffection has been Cabo Delgado where an opposition insurgent movement is active. Though this is led by the "bourgeois" element expelled in 1969 its popular impact requires some explanation<sup>21</sup>. Cabo Delgado has the highest concentration of communal villages, and as the initial area of Frelimo operations, the longest experience of co-operative and collective economic organisation. It is possible that the employment of Portuguese "aldeamentos" (protected villages) as the basis for many of the new settlements contributed to their unpopularity. It is also possible that the Makonde have been alienated by the increasing urban orientation of the party leadership. The Makonde traditionally lived in highly dispersed settlements and were relatively little influenced by colonial culture, consequently Frelimo hostility to "feudal" beliefs and the movement's re-settlement programme would have an especial impact here.

There have been successful instances of the communal village programme, those of Gaza are sometimes cited in publications sympathetic to Frelimo<sup>22</sup>. After flooding in 1976, 50 new villages were established, inhabited by a quarter of the provincial population. Here, however, the establishment of the villages preceded communal production; coming as a relief operation, the implementation of the scheme was considerably easier.

#### **The Commercial Agricultural Sector**

There have also been problems in the commercial agricultural

sector and again there has been a similar transition from a period of popular mobilisation to one of more stringent control and guidance from above. Most of the plantations are in the central and southern parts of the country — areas unaffected directly by wartime operations. With the exodus of European managers many of these concerns were taken over by self appointed workers' committees. On the tea plantations, the committees awarded a 200 per cent increase in wages. At the same time productivity per labourer fell from 45 kg to 15 kg of leaves picked a day. There was also a reported decline in quality; bushes were neither being pruned nor fertilised. At the end of 1976 the government intervened and took away ultimate control from the workers' committees and placed it in the hands of the state tea corporation<sup>23</sup>

In the past cashew nuts provided an important source of income for peasant producers. They do not depend on cultivation, the bulk of Mozambican output being collected from the forests, and farmers used to exchange them for basic necessities at trading stores. Though traders in the more remote areas were in a situation of virtual monopoly and could therefore impose highly unequal rates of exchange, Frelimo's replacement of the trading network with government-controlled buying co-operatives does not seem to have increased the attraction of foraging cashews. By the end of 1977, Mozambique, normally one of the major exporters of cashews, was having to import them to keep processing plants in operation. The recent attempt to remedy the situation by the introduction of incentives for cashew pickers is an indication of the seriousness of the situation<sup>24</sup>

Frelimo's approach to agriculture should be linked with its long term political objectives as will be shown later, but the nature of its intervention in the commercial sector and the emphasis on collective production (which Frelimo planners deem to be more efficient) should also be considered in the light of the strains imposed on agriculture. In the four years since independence there have been a series of floods in the most productive regions of the country, the redundancy of over 100 000 migrant workers, and the disruption caused by the outflow of European owners and managers. The Third Congress recognised the degree of crisis the economy was in when it formulated immediate economic priorities, namely:

- to guarantee the supply of main agricultural products and to give special attention to the supply of basic necessities to urban centres.
- to ensure the supply of basic materials for industry.
- to increase production and attain the pre-1974 volume of

exports by 1980<sup>25</sup>

Such objectives are not easy to reconcile with immediate improvements in the rural standard of living. Declining government revenues — (expenditure was cut by 25 per cent in 1975 - 1976)<sup>26</sup> — and the fall in industrial production meant that there were not the resources available to offer agricultural producers substantial improvements in the terms of exchange being offered for their surplus. If the pre-independence volume of exports is to be regained swiftly it is difficult to see how conditions for plantation workers in the nationalised and private sectors can be dramatically improved. The reorganisation of African peasants into communal villages has been accompanied by tight restrictions on population movement. The urban unemployed are in the process of being moved out of towns and resettled in the villages<sup>27</sup> This is obviously necessary as the urban economy cannot be expected to absorb a vast unemployed workforce, but it means that resettlement inevitably has to be accompanied by an intensification of coercive measures. Authoritarian measures have in any case been necessary to prevent the emergence of a rural elite and to increase productivity. But though the turning away from voluntary principles may have been conditioned partly by disillusion with the 'mass line' in the light of economic realities<sup>28</sup> it also had an ideological dimension. As Machel put it at the Third Congress:

Collective production is the only way to allow the Mozambican peasant to pass on to more advanced methods of work and to the introduction of mechanized production and the first forms of rural industrialisation<sup>29</sup>.

Proletarianisation of the peasantry is bound to involve social conflict: with the experience of rural class struggle Frelimo inherited from the pre-independence liberated zones its leadership must have realised this from early on. The rural revolution would have to be imposed.

#### **Industry and the Transformation of Frelimo**

Though Frelimo views agriculture as the basis of development, its leaders in their speeches give precedence to heavy industry as the dynamic sector of the economy, a decisive factor in their independence. In the period 1977 - 1980 Frelimo hopes for a complete recovery of industrial production and special attention is to be paid to the supply of basic necessities to urban centres<sup>30</sup>.

Plans for the development of heavy industry are vague: the party is committed to producing a plan by 1980 which will probably be based on the processing of mineral resources. Alongside this ideological emphasis on industrial development there has

been a formal transformation of the movement itself. At the Third Congress Frelimo proclaimed its development from a front of different and sometimes conflicting interests, to a "Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party". The implication is that the small Mozambican working class would assume the leadership of society as the "dynamic leading vanguard section". Priority was to be given to the creation of local party organisations in workplaces with the greatest concentration of workers, as well as in the military and paramilitary organisations. Criteria for party membership were to become more rigorous: one year's candidature would be required before a prospective party member could be accepted, though this would not apply to those who joined the party before 1974.

The focus on tighter party organisation in the urban industrial centres, while reflecting ideological preoccupations referred to above, should also be attributed to increasing discontent among the workforce. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Portuguese authority there was a period of working class action *independent of Frelimo initiatives or control*. Between the coup d'état of 25 April 1974 and the establishment of a transitional government of Portuguese and Frelimo appointees, while Frelimo battled for control in the countryside, there was a wave of strikes in Beira and Lourenco Marques. These strikes were intended to win wage increases, rather than being in direct support of Frelimo.

One of the first actions of the transitional government was to move against strikers, and Frelimo supported this. Machel said on 20 September 1974; "At this stage in the life of our country there is no room for strikes". This attitude has persisted: both last year and in 1977 strikers have been arrested at Maputo docks. However in 1974 - 1975, while Frelimo was willing to support actions curbing industrial unrest it was prepared to conflict with Portuguese members of the transitional administration over the question of nationalisation. Despite administrative resistance, Frelimo encouraged workers to assume control of abandoned industrial installations. Worker take-over had affected 50 factories in Maputo by independence. Workers' control presented problems; the exodus of Portuguese skills and the freer working atmosphere contributed to a fall in production, and workers were also highly politicised by this stage. With the cessation of hostilities, Frelimo had encouraged the formation of "Grupos Dinamizadores" in the workplaces, residential areas and villages of these areas which had not been affected by the war. These groups were often formed fairly spontaneously without much external direction or control, their purpose being to extend the support base of Frelimo beyond the former liberated areas.

Frelimo's response to this situation has been to replace the independent workers' committees with a formal institutional framework. First, in the case of the abandoned factories the state has appointed managers and an administrative structure. In at least one important factory this caused some dissatisfaction: the workers' representative at the CIFEL metal rolling works complained that workers had lost their share in decision-making. Orders were handed down from a remote bureaucracy compelling workers to conform to "unalterable and bourgeois" working methods<sup>31</sup>.

### **Production Councils**

The second Frelimo action was the creation of a disciplinary apparatus in November 1976. These are the Production Councils which have been established in most state-owned and private factories. The councils are selected by the Grupos Dinamizadores and their members can be accepted or rejected by the workforce at an open meeting. The councils act as an internal disciplinary body; for example, they check on timekeeping and absenteeism; they discuss production targets with management and then consult the workforce on how these can be met. The nature of such consultation can perhaps be judged by the fact that the workers' estimation of the time needed for the job normally coincided with that of the technicians. If they did not coincide, it was because workers asked for less time than was allowed for<sup>32</sup>.

Though Frelimo claimed that the councils were accepted by workers with enthusiasm, it was also admitted that some regarded the council members as "factory gendarmes". However workers view their function, it does seem that the councils have assisted in the industrial recovery reported in 1978: one factory apparently saw a 100 per cent increase in output per capita<sup>33</sup>. This is all the more remarkable in the light of Machel's denunciation of productivity-linked pay rises as "ideological diarrhoea"<sup>34</sup>.

Most recently there has been a move to replace the Grupos Dinamizadores in the workplaces with proper party cells composed of working people with an understanding of the class struggle. Grupos members would have to apply for party membership like everybody else and be subjected to the same screening procedures<sup>35</sup>.

The last four years can be divided into two phases: first there was a period of autonomous working class action, and with the takeover of concerns by independent workers' committees, a very real form of workers' control; this phase was accompanied by a fall in output. Frelimo's reaction has been to intensify industrial

discipline and increase the rate of exploitation by the creation of the Productivity Councils as well as the extension of centralised control over workers' political groups. This process is legitimised by a formal adherence to the principle of popular participation in the system, but as the examples of this participation that are cited by Frelimo supporters are ones that favour the efficient operation of the system, it is justifiable to be rather sceptical of its democratic content, i.e. the degree to which workers can challenge decisions made by authority without penalisation.

Frelimo's economic strategy has to be geared to a massive increase in production to make up for previous dependence on a now rapidly shrinking tertiary sector. The government sees rapid industrialisation as the one way in which Mozambique can lessen its dependence on foreign capital, on the fluctuations of the South African economy and on foreign aid, (this now playing an alarmingly major role in sustaining economic life in the country). It is a strategy which requires a high degree of agricultural production for the export sector, considerable austerity and tight industrial discipline.

So far we have been looking at the way government policy has been affecting certain social groups; what now needs to be examined is the question of which class forces Frelimo itself represents. Here one should distinguish between two levels of policy. First, a short term strategy aimed at getting the country over its immediate economic difficulties. Second, policies intended to introduce structural change in Mozambique's political economy.

In the short term, Frelimo has been confronted with the problems of compensating for the fall in migrant labour employment and the outflow of skills and capital that accompanied the Portuguese exodus. It has become clear that this cannot be done merely by an infusion of disinterested foreign aid; initial expectations of the extent of Soviet and Eastern bloc economic assistance have been disappointed. For the time being, the agricultural export sector has to be maintained and worker-orientated socialisation of factories and plantations regulated. Mozambique hopes to continue to attract foreign capitalist investment, albeit, (in the words of the 1975 constitution), "within the framework of the state's economic policy". Nationalisation measures have proceeded fairly slowly. The first wave affected those concerns abandoned by Portuguese settlers in 1975; at the same time, land and rented property was also placed under the state ownership. More recently electricity, insurance and banking have been nationalised, with the important exception of a British-owned banking subsidiary. In the sphere of commercial agriculture, one of the most impor-



tant concerns, Sena Sugar, was only taken over in August 1978, by which time the company was in a situation of near bankruptcy as a result of a huge investment of borrowed capital on a new mill which, on completion, could not be put into operation<sup>36</sup>. Government caution in this sphere is understandable: Western-derived aid has helped to avert national bankruptcy, though at a cost of deploying developmental funds for day to day expenditure<sup>37</sup>. At the Third Congress it was emphasized that foreign capital had a part to play in reconstruction. The institution of Production Councils has helped to limit autonomous worker decision-making and their inception was greeted favourably by private employers, (though the councils have more recently shown themselves willing to criticise ex-patriate managerial staff). In April 1977, foreign companies were given permission to repatriate a generous proportion of profits.

However, there have been measures implemented which obviously go beyond the level of short term expediency. Frelimo's determination to prevent the consolidation of a rich (i.e. labour employing) peasantry, by the limits placed on the size of family plots and the trend towards collectivisation, reflect a development strategy that is geared to the sharing of rural prosperity among members of the whole community rather than those most advantageously placed economically. The communal village scheme, though it may not be universally popular, does have as one of its main justifications the necessity to organise settlement in such a way that all can benefit from whatever social and technical facilities are made available. Within the urban context, the nationalisation of housing has also involved a redistribution of benefits as smart apartment blocks in Maputo, vacated by their Portuguese owners, are filled with the former inhabitants of shanty towns, often together with their livestock. So it can be argued that there are clear instances in which the state is acting in what it conceives to be the interests of the underprivileged, and endeavouring to prevent the development of a local property-owning and labour employing class.

However, there is the obvious danger of the party itself functioning as a self serving bureaucracy: reports in 1977 of special low-price imports shops open only to army and Frelimo members and the recent series of central committee purges of individuals charged with corruption, individualism and elitism<sup>38</sup> serve to emphasize the point. One way to ensure that party and state — (despite Frelimo insistence to the contrary the distinction between the two seems more formal than real) — are responsive to wider interests, is through some form of democratic mechanism. There is no reason why in a one party state political decision-

making should be limited to the highest echelon. During the guerilla phase, the whole logic of Frelimo's strategy demanded the mobilisation and support of the community. The movement was in no position to intimidate; its legitimacy had to be accepted voluntarily. The atmosphere of wartime conditions carried over for a period into the post-independence years: the initial encouragement of assertion of working class initiatives; the early emphasis on voluntarism in the communal village scheme. However, while the liberated zones were themselves not free from internal social tensions, conflicts of interest in the post-colonial state are considerably more fundamental.

In particular there is the problem posed by the peasantry. Both in the context of the immediate requirements of the economy requiring the diversion of rural surplus to urban centres, and in the long term with the demands inherent in Frelimo's vision of building an industrial economy, rural producers stand to lose economically. Frelimo's re-orientation as a party has the implication of the industrial working class being assigned the prime political role: in terms of political decision-making one would expect elements in the rural population to have the least say, and this appears to be borne out in the recent series of elections. The peasant component of the membership of each representative body diminishes with each level of the political hierarchy. While the peasant proportion of the District Assembly membership is nearly 38 per cent, peasants only make up 29 per cent of the National Assembly<sup>39</sup>.

### **Democratic Centralism**

Apart from the extent to which government is socially representative, there are difficulties in the system of Democratic Centralism formally adopted at the Third Congress. The system involves a hierarchy of authorities each voting for the one above it; decisions taken by a local body can be overruled from above. Though the system does involve a degree of local political participation, and through the chain of authorities a link between ruler and ruled, crucial to its democratic functioning is the existence of free discussion and criticism. While Frelimo's directives emphasize the need for discussion within party structures, it also qualifies its attitude by distinguishing between constructive criticism, which makes it strong and more resolute and destructive criticism, which divides and weakens. The party also guarantees the freedom of criticism and will discipline anyone who represses and distorts it. The party says it will never permit anyone to exploit this freedom to undermine its unity or to attack its discipline<sup>40</sup>.

Given the tremendous social and economic problems confronting Frelimo on its accession to power, it is easy to sympathise with and understand the urgency with which it has tried to implement social change, its insistence on discipline, its increasingly hierarchical and authoritarian nature as a political movement and government. However, the extent to which political debate retains a vitality in Mozambique will be a considerably more important factor in promoting progressive social change than the individual motives of Mozambique's ruling group.

1. *Quarterly Economic Review of Angola and Mozambique* (QER), Economist Intelligence Unit, Annual Survey, 1977.
2. Hodges, T. 'Mozambique: the politics of liberation' in Carter, G.M. and O'Meara, P. (Eds), *Southern Africa in Crisis*, Indiana University Press, 1977, p. 64.
3. QER, 2/1977.
4. QER, 3/1978.
5. A current tendency for Mozambican politicians to blame all economic failure on 'the external enemy and its agents in our midst' should not lead to underestimation of the serious dimensions of sabotage in 1975, widely recognised at the time by foreign observers.
6. *Peoples Power*, Mozambique, Guinea and Angola Information Centre (MAGIC), London, no. 5, November 1976, p. 26.
7. See: Henriksen, T.H. 'Marxism and Mozambique' in *African Affairs*, 1978, p. 444.
8. QER, 1/1979.
9. Chilcote, R.H. 'Mozambique: the African nationalist response to Portuguese Imperialism' in Potholm and Dale (Eds) *Southern Africa in Transition*, New York, 1972, p. 193. This conflict is described in Munsloe, B. 'Leadership in Frelimo' in Hill, C.R. and Warwick, P. *Collected Papers*, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, Vols. I & II, 1975 & 1977, and also Saul, J.S. 'Frelimo and the Mozambique Revolution' in Saul, J.S. and Arrighi, G. *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa*, New York, 1973.
11. See: Henriksen, T.H. *op cit*, p. 442.
12. Mondlane, E. *The Struggle for Mozambique*, Harmondsworth, 1969, p. 165.
13. Hasungs, A. 'Some reflections upon the war in Mozambique' in *African Affairs*, 1974, p. 267.
14. See for example QER 3/1978 where there is a suggestion of a growing influence of 'technocrats' as evidenced in a major reshuffle of Central Committee posts. See also: QER 3/1977.
15. 'Communal Villages' in *Peoples Power*, no. 5, November 1976, pp. 23-35, and Segall, M. 'The Communal villages of Gaza' in *Peoples Power*, January 1978.
16. Isaacman, A. 'Transferring Mozambique's rural economy' in *Issue*, African Studies Association, Spring, 1978, p. 20.
17. QER, 3/1978.
18. *Peoples Power*, no. 5, November, 1976, p. 26.
19. Dongen, I.S. 'Agricultural and other primary production in Abshire, D.M. and Samuels, M.A. *Portuguese Africa: a handbook*, London, 1969.
20. QER, Annual Survey 1977.
21. Some South African press reports suggest that today Frelimo is in the position the Portuguese found themselves in in Cabo Delgado during the 1960s: confined to the towns and with little effective control in rural areas. These are probably exaggerated: Kavandame's opposition owes some of its vitality as much to Rhodesian interest as internal support.
22. See for examples articles by Segall, M. and Isaacman, A. in *Peoples Power* and *Issue* cited above.
23. QER, 4/1977.
24. QER, 1/1979.
25. *Peoples Power*, nos. 7-8, June 1977, p. 20.
26. Hodges, T. 'Machel wants production not ideology' in *African Development*, December, 1976.
27. A permit system has been established in which all urban employees must register every two years as well as showing their work permits to the authorities every three months. Those without the required documentation are subject to deportation from the cities.
28. As is argued by Henriksen, T. *op cit*, p. 447.
29. Fauvet, P. 'Frelimo, now a party charts the way ahead' in *African Development*, April 1977.
30. *Peoples Power*, nos. 7-8, June 1977, p. 21.
31. Hodges, T. *op cit*. It is worth mentioning that QER 1/1979 reports a recovery of production levels at the CIFEL plant.

32. 'Workers control in Mozambique' in *Peoples Power*, no. 10, October 1977 — quite a long quote.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Hodges, T. *op cit.*
35. *Peoples Power*, no. 12, Autumn-Winter, 1978.
36. For contrasting interpretations of the Sena Sugar affair see 'How the enemy acts: a case of economic sabotage' in *Peoples Power*, no. 12 Autumn-Winter, 1978, and 'Sena Sugar estates taken over' in *QER*, 4/1978, pp. 17-19.
37. See *QER*, 4/1978.
38. There have now been five major purges the most recent involving four central committee members reported in *Rand Daily Mail*, 9.7.1979, p. 3.
39. *Peoples Power*, no. 11, January - March, 1978.
40. *Peoples Power*, nos. 7-8, June 1977, p. 35.

## 'TRANSNATIONALISM': THE RE-DISCOVERY OF PRESSURE GROUPS

Geoff Berridge

There is a fashionable view that international politics since the Second World War has been a stage on which many 'new actors' have appeared; private ones such as multinational corporations and public ones such as the EEC and the UN.<sup>1</sup> Names that I associate with this view are Cosgrove and Twitchett, Nye and Keohane and Morse, but there are, of course, many others.<sup>2</sup> The multiplication of these 'transnational organizations', as they are alternatively called, is supposed to have led to the necessity for rejecting the old-fashioned 'state-centric paradigm' in which the state was the scholar's central and, indeed, exclusive focus of attention, and made advisable the adoption instead of a 'world politics paradigm' in which the focus of attention is wider, embracing not only inter-state relations but international relations between the 'new actors' as well. In words which are less offensive to the proper use of English, we might say, after Hedley Bull, that the transnationalists are enjoining us to concede the death or imminent demise of the 'states-system' and contemplate its replacement by a 'new mediaevalism'.<sup>3</sup>

It will be my purpose here to argue, first, that the case for the demise of the state or at least its weakening<sup>4</sup> in the face of rivalry from these 'new actors' is empirically dubious — to say the least — and in any case logically misconceived and, second, that insofar as the transnationalists have any contribution to make to knowledge at all, it is in the fields of Government and Diplomatic History and not International Relations. I am conscious that my argument is short on originality, owing much to Goodwin, Bull, Gilpin and Huntington in particular.<sup>5</sup> I hope, however, that I will be able to make one or two fresh points and to give the argument something of a Southern African flavour.

This article was written especially for the *Bulletin*. It is based on ideas first advanced by Dr Berridge to a meeting of the Witwatersrand Branch of the SALLA on 8 August 1979.

### **Political Impotence of the Multi-National Corporation**

Amongst transnational organizations which I have chosen to classify as private, multinational corporations have, of course, received most attention at the hands of the new mediaevalists. The size of their assets, the range of their activities — (functional as well as geographical) — and their close connections with governments all go to make multi-nationals obvious candidates for the role of puppeteer in world politics. But the most signal fact about these organizations for the contemporary historian is not contained in this list: this, as Gilpin has pointed out, is the fact that the great majority of them are American as, indeed, the great majority of them were British in the 18th and 19th Centuries. This is hardly accidental! On the contrary, it seems clear that American — as earlier, British — companies have expanded their activities and admittedly had a substantial hand in the affairs of some small states because of the protection afforded them by their imperialistic home state and not in spite of it. In Europe, for example, the expansion of the activities of US so-called 'multi-nationals' was clearly smoothed by post-war aid from the United States Government and by military occupation. The moral is clear: multinational corporations are more dependent upon state power than vice versa; their activities are not evidence that the state has withered away.

If we want detailed evidence of the political impotence of the multinational corporation, (though I do not mean to suggest that it is always without political weight), we need look no further than Southern Africa. Big business opposed UDI in Rhodesia and yet UDI was declared; the big corporations in South Africa have always opposed the National Party's policy of apartheid and yet only after three decades is this even hinting at the possibility of collapse; whilst the case of BP and sanctions-busting in Rhodesia is the exception which proves the rule. On the face of it, that is to say, this might seem a first-class instance of a multinational corporation *consciously thwarting the political will of a large state*, even its home state, Britain. But, of course, everyone now knows that the British Government tolerated this because attempting to stop it would have antagonised the South African Government, to which the British Government looked for assistance in bringing the rebellion to an end and in whose gift were many important economic favours. What next, then, of the UN and the EEC, 'new actors' in the public sphere to which so much attention has been directed?

### **UN and EEC are 'Standing Diplomatic Conferences'**

The utter inconsequentiality of the UN hardly needs docu-

menting in front of a South African audience, even though I suspect that the National Party Government has over the years attempted for electoral reasons to create a fear of the UN's potential amongst the white South African public. In its political aspect the UN is a standing diplomatic conference, nothing more — as Connor Cruise O'Brien found to his cost when he was Hammar-skjold's special representative in Katanga in the early 1960s — and something less, since its parliamentary form and virtually universalistic composition render it an inappropriate body for serious negotiation. Indeed, a moment's reflection is sufficient to confirm that most of the important diplomacy in the post-war world has completely by-passed the UN — in recent years, the negotiations which ended the Vietnam War, arms control negotiations between the Soviet Union and the USA and the Camp David negotiations on the Middle East, for example. The Great Powers have not taken the UN seriously for a long time now and to the extent that 'it' appears to be 'acting' in an important area as, for instance, in the recent Security Council imposition of a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa, what is really happening is that the Great Powers are acting through the agency of the UN. The UN is not a whole which is greater than the sum of its parts. If it did not exist it would not need to be invented: the Great Powers would meet somewhere else to decide the fate of the world.

The EEC, it is true, is something more than a standing diplomatic conference of European states: it is, of course, a customs union as well. But this side of its character is the product of an interstate agreement and it remains at the whim of the states which concluded the treaties. All power in the EEC lies in the Council of Ministers and each of the ministerial members of this Council is answerable to a National Assembly. The Commission is nothing more than a pressure group of pro-Europe idealists and the European Parliament is little more than a talking shop where failed politicians are put out to grass at considerable expense to the tax-payer. It is not a parliament: it does not legislate, it does not create a government and its control function is rendered largely irrelevant by the prior role in this respect which is accorded to the national assemblies which hold their own representatives on the Council of Ministers accountable. The EEC remains, therefore, in its political aspect, just a very important standing diplomatic conference of Western European states.

If it can be accepted, then, on the basis of this admittedly cursory survey of the evidence, that it is, at the very least, hardly self-evident that the state is currently in eclipse, what are the reasons to which we must turn in order to explain this circumstance?

### **Nations Still a Focus of Loyalty and Force**

In the first place, states substantially retain their monopoly of force: ITT may have a private army but I have not heard of it. In the second place, the internal growth of the state in the 20th Century has meant that many activities formerly in private hands are there no longer and this includes those which extend beyond the state's boundaries. This is especially obvious in the state trading which characterizes the command economies of the Soviet and Chinese systems but is by no means confined to them of course. In the third place, as Huntington points out, the activities of multinational corporations have naturally increased the power of the state by increasing their patronage. The state, that is to say, stands to the multinational as 'gate-keeper' and landlord too. Whilst the multinational brings advantages to the state which give the former political leverage, the multinational cannot make a profit without the compliance of the state. And finally, the nation is probably still the most important focus of loyalty in the contemporary world, which is another way of saying that nationalism is probably still the most powerful of all contemporary ideologies. And the ambitions of the nationalist are only realized when the nation and the state are co-terminous: nationalists cannot do without states.

On this evidence and for these reasons, therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the contention that we no longer live in a 'state-centred' world is premature, to say the least. But I said at the outset that the argument of the transnationalists is also logically flawed. What do I mean by this? What I mean is that to pose the question: to what degree have 'transnational organizations' come to rival the state? is to pose a false question because like is not being compared with like. Transnational organizations either do not aspire to fulfil the functions of the state (as in the case of multinational corporations) or, if they do (as in the case of certain 'transnational' political parties or the European Parliament), simply become the core of new states to the extent that they succeed. If I interpret him correctly, it is a similar point which Huntington makes.

### **Argument for Academic Euthenasia**

What we are left with, therefore, is nothing more than the consideration that transnational organizations *influence* states. Their study thus becomes the study of pressure groups active in the area of foreign policy formulation and is appropriate only to the student of Government, Contemporary Political History and Diplomatic History. Their activities are of no interest whatever to the student of International Relations, whose proper concern is the

institutional history and political theory of the contemporary states-system, as Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, amongst others, have made so clear. All that the 'transnationalists' have done is to have re-discovered pressure groups: it must be recorded that this is a singularly unmomentous achievement. It is lamentably the case that the fashion for 'transnationalism' has fallen out of the same cradle of absurdity that has given birth to 'systems analysis', 'game theory' and all the similar nonsense which has now thoroughly confused a generation of 'IR' students. There is here a strong argument for academic euthenasia.

## NOTES

1. I am aware that this is a very crude classification and that those who consider these things important have devised far more elaborate schemes.
2. The classic statement is probably J.S. Nye and R.O. Keohane (eds.), *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Harvard UP, 1972), though some of the articles in this collection are openly critical of the 'transnationalist' position.
3. *The Anarchical Society* (London: Macmillan, 1977), especially Ch. 11.
4. There are strong and weak positions in the 'transnationalist' camp. Nye and Keohane themselves hold to the latter. See Bull on this point, *op. cit.*
5. G.L. Goodwin, 'The Erosion of External Sovereignty' in G. Ionescu (ed.), *Between Sovereignty and Integration* (London: Croom Helm, 1974); H. Bull, *op. cit.*; R. Gilpin, 'The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations' in Nye and Keohane, *op. cit.*; and S.P. Huntington, 'Transnational Organizations in World Politics', *World Politics*, Apr. 1973.

## SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY AND US RESPONSES

**Donald G. Baker**

A subtle though significant change has occurred in US policy toward South Africa. The fundamental basis of that policy, President Carter's emphasis on human rights, remains; but the change, primarily in terms of how the United States approaches the issue, could have far-reaching consequences for South Africa. The change is reflected particularly at two levels: first, in a move away from declamatory pronouncements (such as Vice President Mondale's "one man, one vote" statement) toward quieter forms of pressure; and, second, in the transition from an activist or initiatory approach to one that is more reactive to South African policies.

These changes do not mean that the US is less concerned about South African racial policies. Human rights remains a fundamental American foreign policy concern, and that concern will persist regardless of who is President after 1980. Because it is the last country where racial factors determine human rights and opportunities (and therefore an individual's life

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chances), South Africa will remain the center of world attention until that policy is discarded. Only when concrete steps are taken that lead toward power sharing, full political participation and equal educational and employment opportunities for all people will there be a relaxation of world pressures on South Africa.

The purpose of this change in American foreign policy is two-fold: first, it seeks to avoid situations where South African politicians can distort statements such as Mondale's to manipulate the South African electorate's fears for political ends, as occurred in November 1977; and second, it seeks to prod South African authorities into opening new channels for communication and dialogue with its subordinate African, Coloured and Asian groups. Unless subordinate groups, represented by leaders of their own choosing, participate in the restructuring necessary for meaningful change, there is every likelihood that they will reject such changes because they have been imposed by arbitrary and unilateral government action.

The brief activist period of US policy toward South (and Southern) Africa was initiated by US Secretary of State Kissinger's 1976 efforts to resolve the Rhodesia and Namibia problems. His major goal was that of curtailing Russian influence in Southern Africa, a concern prompted by Cuban participation (as a proxy of Russia) in the Angolan and, later, Ethiopian civil wars. Unless solutions were found for Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa's racial problems, Kissinger concluded, black resentment would escalate and Russian influence (if not, indeed, proxy Cuban participation) would increase. These actions would threaten Southern and, ultimately, all of Africa. Hence Kissinger's African concerns were part of a broader geopolitical strategy aimed primarily at the containment of Soviet power.

Carter's policies toward Southern Africa derived from two sources: his human rights concerns and the geopolitical views of his major adviser, Zbigniew Brezinski. Like Kissinger, Brezinski is wary of Russian influence in Africa, but his basic premises and long-range outlook differ somewhat from Kissinger's. The Carter-Brezinski views coalesced in an activist strategy, one that, in contradistinction to Kissinger's, emphasized public pronouncements (such as Mondale's), partly concealed threats or warnings of possible US retaliatory policies unless South Africa changed its racial policies, and, in the case of Rhodesia, assertive US-British proposals for a negotiated settlement between the warring groups. The tactic followed for Namibia was somewhat different, for there the US and other Western powers, under UN auspices, sought more quietly to induce South Africa and opposition groups to accept independence and elections under

UN supervision.

Numerous factors contributed to changes in the US policy approach. Two in particular should be noted: Prime Minister Vorster's manipulation of the Mondale statement for electoral purposes and the impasse in efforts to resolve the Rhodesia problem. The approach taken in each case proved to be counter-productive, and the 1979 British elections proved to be somewhat fortuitous. Given the Conservative Government's resolve to settle the Zimbabwe Rhodesia situation, the United States quietly deferred, leaving Britain to take the lead. That, along with other indicators (for example, deference toward its European partners in resolving the Namibia problem; a quiet acquiescence toward France's increasingly interventionist role particularly, though not solely, in French-speaking African states; and support for new British initiatives and policies toward South Africa and Namibia) suggests that the US is pursuing a less activist or interventionist role in African affairs. That does not mean America is withdrawing from African affairs. Rather, it appears that the US is playing a backstage or intermediary role, directing its efforts particularly through its African contacts in the United Nations. Nor does this mean that the US is less interested in South African affairs. Instead, it suggests that American policy will tend to *respond* to (i.e., react to rather than initiate) situations in South Africa. Consequently, the US will respond to South African policies for resolving its racial problems rather than, as typified by the Mondale approach, propose policies that South Africa should follow. The United States will not forego the use of pressure, but such pressures will be exerted in response to South African actions. This means that South Africa must itself take the lead in solving its problems rather than asking outsiders, including the United States, what it should do. This forces South Africa to deal more directly with its own subordinate groups.

Given these changes in US policy, South Africa may wish to assess its own policies in terms of four points: (1) factors that influence and shape US policy toward South Africa; (2) the alternative strategies open to South Africa in terms of its internal and external relations; (3) what the US views as critical sectors of change within South Africa; and (4) possible US and world responses to South African policies.

#### **1. Factors shaping US policy toward South Africa**

Taken out of context, Mondale's "one man, one vote" statement was shrewdly manipulated by Vorster to frighten the white South African electorate of an imminent black takeover of

power. The resultant National Party victory, swelled by increased support from the English electorate, enabled Vorster to rebuff external pressures for change. Thus Mondale's statement proved to be counterproductive to basic US policy interests, leading to South African support for "internal solutions" in Namibia and Rhodesia. The basic US policy position is that of full political and economic participation for all people and the protection of individual and group rights, but there are various political structures — not simply a unitary one — by which these goals can be accomplished. But it is up to the people of the country, not the US Government or other nations, to determine what political structures best suit their needs and problems. However, the US position is that all individuals and groups should be involved in these determinations, and any basing of power or opportunities on racially ascriptive categories is opposed by the US.

This distortion of the American position contributed to the reassessment of US strategies and approaches for pressuring change in South Africa. One thing has remained clear, however: unless pressure is continued, the South African Government, as is evident from its past policies, will do little of its own volition in changing the system. It reacts or responds solely to pressure. The issue, then, is what form that pressure should take, for it is now clear that the wrong form of pressure can be counterproductive.

Other factors have contributed to the US policy reappraisal. Difficulties encountered in resolving the Rhodesia and Namibia situations illustrated how intractable are these racial and power-transition problems. Clearly, if these problems are difficult to resolve, those of South Africa are even more so. Given white fear for their group survival and their military and police power, South Africans are even less likely to accept change if it is perceived as threatening that group's survival. At still another level, the problems of power and development within other African states have contributed to this American reappraisal. The development problems of African (and other Third World) countries, virtually insoluble, have exacerbated political instability, prompted countless military coups, and in some instances resulted in the emergence of governments that ignore the welfare of the people and are characterized by corruption, despotism and the widespread suppression of human rights. Even the Organization of African Unity found it necessary to recognize this problem at its 1979 conference. Given these conditions, the American public and policymakers (President and Congress) have grown increasingly sceptical about human rights and

development problems in Africa, be it the black states or South Africa.

These factors affect US perceptions. There is a recognition that unless orderly processes are found that lead toward power sharing or the transfer of power, instability, chaos and the emergence of dictatorships is likely to occur. But it is also realized that unless meaningful changes occur in South Africa that lead toward full political participation by all groups, conflict will almost certainly ensue. Thus the conflicts in Zimbabwe Rhodesia and Namibia are seen as scaled-down versions of what could happen in South Africa if there is no move toward power sharing and the termination of racial policies. The Rhodesian scenario particularly influences US perceptions concerning South Africa's future. Frustrated by years of useless negotiations with the Smith regime, Zimbabwean nationalists reluctantly opted for war. That split the nationalist movement, exacerbated group and ethnic rivalries and created internal animosities which, even were a settlement reached, could lead to civil war. The war did, though, increasingly narrow the options available to the white regime. Where years ago it rejected even moderate proposals for change, its stubbornness in negotiations created conditions which now threaten the future of any Whites in that country.

Despite economic sanctions, the Rhodesian Government survived after its unilateral declaration of independence — (1965) — because the world exerted little pressure on Rhodesia to change its policies. Indeed, by using South Africa as its intermediary, Rhodesia was able to circumvent sanctions and continue its racial policies. One lesson has been learned from this by the outside world: unless pressures are applied, a country (Rhodesia or South Africa) will simply ignore world opinion. The most that the country may do is introduce cosmetic changes which, while superficially appearing to be concessions to subordinate groups, in substance preserve the white racial system. Thus, it can be anticipated that South Africa will not make substantive changes unless considerable pressure is exerted by the outside world.

To understand US policy responses toward South Africa it is necessary to focus particularly on policymakers (including the President and Congress) and various public groups. US policymakers are pressured or influenced by these groups and the public under specific circumstances or at particular moments. Some groups, such as students and religious organizations, often exert a pressure disproportionate to their numbers — if not on the government at least against businesses and corporations that have investments or other interests in South Africa. Their actions, as well as those of policymakers and others, are based on their per-

ceptions of and reactions to South African Government policies. Thus it is the latter's racial policies that prompt particular responses of the American Government and various groups.

In general, South and Southern African problems hold low priority (and limited public attention) for the United States. Specific situations, though, will increase that interest or concern; and it is possible for anti-South African groups to mobilize support from other groups or even a generally indifferent public when particular South African racial policies — (Soweto, the death of Steve Biko, etc.) — receive widespread media publicity. In general, though, and most observers of the American scene would concur, possibly half or more of the US public and policymakers are usually indifferent toward South Africa. But various situations — (besides those noted above, the demolition of squatter camps, increased Russian involvement in Southern Africa, etc.) — may heighten the awareness of part of this group, leaving them receptive to suasion or mobilization by others, be it in support of, or opposition to, South Africa. The other half of that public and policymakers, more involved and aware, can perhaps be divided into five fairly distinct groups, all of nearly equal strength: (1) those adamantly pro-South Africa under virtually all circumstances; (2) those, primarily in commercial and industrial sectors, who are mildly pro-South Africa, their inclinations however influenced by their perceptions of South Africa's investment climate; (3) those concerned about South Africa's racial problems who are normally neutral or objective, basing their judgments on the character of changes in South Africa's racial policies; (4) those moderately opposed to South Africa because of its racial policies, their view basically sceptical that South Africa will implement meaningful racial change; and (5) those, including some (though not all) Blacks, students, academics, religious groups and others, whether motivated by their opposition to South Africa's racial policies or its capitalist system, who have "written off" South Africa and believe that the changes needed are impossible under the existing government and system.

Except for the last group there is *normally* a willingness among the others to reserve judgment on racial changes in South Africa, but that judgment is then based on how those changes are perceived — as simply cosmetic and thereby maintaining white power, or as more substantive and leading toward power sharing or the elimination of other forms of racial discrimination. These latter groups are in the vast majority. They, however, receive little media attention, while the smaller, highly articulate anti-South Africa group receives disproportionate attention. The latter's support is in most instances limited, but they can mobilize some of

the others against South Africa under the conditions noted above. But even that support is fluid, and groups that momentarily support anti-South Africa measures (because of South African policies) may subsequently, revert to their former neutral stance, their future behavior determined by their perceptions of later South African racial policies. This fluidity in views holds for many of these groups as well as for policymakers. Thus it is South Africa's racial policies and strategies, including its internal policies and its external relations, that serve as the basis for US perceptions of and policy responses toward South Africa. These, then, should be looked at briefly.

## **2. South African policies: alternative strategies**

There are numerous alternatives that South Africa can pursue in its internal and external relations. Though simplified here for the purpose of analysis, the alternatives in terms of the country's internal relations can be designated as: (1) preservation of the racial status quo, (2) the modernization of racial domination, or (3) power sharing.

Preservation of the status quo, including the continued implementation of apartheid, is one option, and this position is apparently supported by a substantial segment of the National Party as well as, though in more extreme form, the Herstigte Nasionale Party. Those holding this position resist racial change, particularly measures that could lead toward power sharing. Moreover, such individuals reject policies that are seen as undermining racial separation, be it in sport, social amenities, living situations or social relations. Any racial liberalization is seen as threatening the Afrikaner group, particularly its volk identity. Although minor modifications — ("cosmetic changes") — might reluctantly be accepted to mute external criticism of, and internal opposition to, apartheid, some proponents of this view support a "fortress South Africa" posture whereby the country would isolate itself from the outside world in order to preserve apartheid. But even cosmetic changes would be rejected were it thought that these endangered the volk identity or power.

A second possible strategy is that of "modernizing racial domination", the title of Heribert Adam's earlier study, in which he argued that a "pragmatic oligarchy" rules South Africa. This group, he contended, recognizes that apartheid policies have precipitated external and internal opposition, and they have shrewdly pursued a flexible strategy and policies which, while seemingly modifying apartheid and providing greater opportunities for a few subordinate group members, nevertheless preserves the white racial dominance system in disguised form. Hence racial

domination has been modernized, even though that has meant the token incorporation and co-optation of a small black minority by the white power structure. Some concessions are thereby possible, be it in interracial sport, the termination of petty apartheid, removal of restrictions on some social amenities, the broadening of educational and employment opportunities for a few Blacks, and political modifications which, while providing some Africans, Coloureds and Indians with a modicum of political power, nevertheless retains real power in white hands. The basic purpose of these changes is the co-optation of subordinate group leaders, this tactic aimed at muting their opposition and turning them because of the benefits they receive into supporters of the system. These changes, then, are more ephemeral than real, for they simply modernize the system of racial domination.

The most sophisticated version of this modernized racial dominance system evolved in Rhodesia during 1962 - 1979 under the Rhodesia Front. The RF modernized racial dominance by incorporating a few Blacks within the political system, providing them and others with a few social and economic opportunities, and heralding the system as based on merit and achievement. However, economic, political and social systems were so structured that few Blacks could fulfil the merit criteria, and Africans within the political system had no real power. So effective were these white manipulations that for an extended period most black nationalist leaders deluded themselves into believing that meaningful change could occur, and only after they resorted to guerrilla war was the government forced by that and other factors to concede power.

The third possible strategy for internal relations is that of fundamental power sharing, leading toward full and, on equal terms, political, economic and social sharing. For such a system to evolve, all groups must participate in the restructuring process. While the new structures assure equal access and opportunity to all groups, they also are structured to protect groups and individuals from abuses of power by others, be it society or government. This restructuring process cannot occur overnight, but a timetable for the transformation, including transitional institutional arrangements necessary for bringing it about, can be specified and implemented. It is then possible to monitor these steps, and such monitoring provides the substantive evidence for determining whether or not the transition is in fact occurring.

The implementation of specific steps and goals can provide a positive incentive for bringing groups together to work towards a common goal. Group suspicions and, indeed, conflict, will persist for a period, sometimes exacerbated by transition problems, but

the continued implementation of specific steps and goals based on racial justice will curtail support for extremist groups. Thus, if subordinate groups and foreign observers perceive and believe that these steps are leading toward meaningful change and power sharing rather than the modernization of racial domination, they will be supportive of these efforts.

In terms of South Africa's external relations, three options appear feasible: (1) a "go it alone" or "fortress South Africa" strategy, (2) a Southern Africa strategy, or (3) an international strategy. Should it adopt a racial status quo policy, South Africa might be compelled to pursue a go it alone policy. That decision could be of its own choice, but such a policy would most likely be forced upon it by the outside world that opposed either a racial status quo or the modernization of racial domination strategy, particularly if that world imposed effective economic sanctions against South Africa.

Given the country's resources, technology, productive capacities and military power, a fortress South Africa policy is not unthinkable. South Africa could undoubtedly survive for an extended period, as R.W. Johnson concluded in *How Long Will South Africa Survive?* (1977). Either a status quo or modernization of racial domination strategy would increase external as well as internal opposition on the government, and the consequences could include international economic sanctions, support of guerilla movements by frontline states, and the escalation of internal black opposition. Under these circumstances the possibility of peaceful change would be severely jeopardized and circumscribed; and South African options would increasingly be narrowed. A repeat of the Rhodesian scenario is entirely feasible with the likelihood that the racial conflict would be even more intense and violent.

Were it to pursue a southern African strategy, South Africa could curtail its links with the Western world, assume a more neutral posture in international affairs, identify and project itself more fully as an African state — (particularly though not wholly in economic affairs) — and strengthen its ties with other African countries. Given its industrial position, technology and expertise, South Africa could emerge at the centre of a core-periphery "Greater Southern Africa Co-Prosperity Sphere", playing in Southern and Central Africa a role comparable to that which is evolving for Nigeria in Northern black Africa. That sphere could include, besides South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Namibia; also Zambia and Zaire. Even the inclusion of Mozambique and Angola should not be discounted. Quiet economic links already exist between South Africa and



many of the black states. However, if South Africa opted for the racial status quo position or the modernization of racial domination, most African states would rebuff open or more expanded economic and political links. Some African states might reject links with South Africa even if it moved toward power sharing, but others, especially if they perceived such changes as leading toward an equitable sharing of power with blacks and others, might accept closer ties with South Africa.

The third external strategy, based on a broadening and intensification of South Africa's links with the world, is virtually impossible unless South Africa pursues either a modernizing racial domination or a power sharing strategy. If the former is followed, some countries will opt for closer contacts with South Africa, but extensive world ties and support for it will only occur if South Africa embraces policies that lead toward power sharing. Thus South Africa's internal and external strategies are closely linked.

South Africa has the potential for economic self-sufficiency should it choose or be forced to pursue a go it alone policy. But it must be recognized that even the United States would be forced to react — and rather strongly — if South Africa pursued a racial status quo policy, that reaction including support for UN economic sanctions. Were sanctions vigorously enforced — (and that could be anticipated, the Rhodesian example not being comparable since it had South Africa as an outlet) — it could mean the termination of South African exports, (including gold), and imports. South Africa might be able to circumvent these sanctions somewhat, particularly the clandestine export of gold, but with enforced sanctions the country would undergo momentary though serious economic dislocations. Those could, in turn, have serious political and social consequences, though South Africa would survive. However, its policies are at present directed toward international trade. Indeed, by 1979 South Africa had achieved a favorable balance of trade — even without taking into consideration the foreign currency obtained from the sale of gold. These earnings derived from the export of mineral resources as well as agricultural and manufactured products. By 1979 South Africa's investment climate had improved to the point where in international surveys it had moved ahead of France, Brazil and Israel as a favored place for investment. But that position would be altered radically if South Africa's racial policies precipitated external opposition and internal unrest, for foreign concerns would quickly move to terminate existing or new investments. Were that to occur, economic dislocations would exacerbate economic problems particularly for Blacks, and the possibility of extensive black unrest would greatly increase.

A policy aimed at modernizing racial domination would increase external opposition to South Africa. A few Blacks, (as well as Indians and Coloureds), might benefit from such a policy, as occurred in Rhodesia, but such a policy might generate black lower class hostility. The policy could also splinter the black groups, polarizing black "haves" from "have nots". That would provide Whites with a momentary respite from organized black opposition, but the long-term consequences could parallel those in Zimbabwe: namely, the fragmentation of black groups into warring factions, the polarization making any racial settlement that much more difficult. What should also be recalled is that some of those co-opted black leaders, finally rejecting Rhodesian Front tactics for modernizing racial domination, became the most radicalized leaders of the guerrilla movements.

As in Rhodesia, South Africa's options for the future are narrowing. South Africa may attempt, as Rhodesia tried for years, to arrest the black nationalist movement. But even momentary successes, (i.e., the postponing of power sharing) achieved through the modernization of racial domination strategy proved ephemeral. For those delaying tactics simply increased the opposition, both external and internal, and further radicalized the nationalist position. Formerly moderate nationalists, rebuffed at every turn, either became more radicalized or were replaced by extremists who rejected power sharing and demanded total power. Were South Africa to pursue that middle strategy of modernizing racial domination, it could anticipate a possible repeat of the Rhodesian experience.

Were South Africa to move toward genuine power sharing, pursuing simultaneously a combined Southern Africa and international strategy, it would in all probability mute world criticism and, indeed, gain foreign support for its efforts. South Africa's development problems, once that racial factor is isolated, are acutely similar to those of other African states. Outside of that white enclave South Africa is a Third World country. But given its extensive resources and potential, human and physical, South Africa, with external support, could move rapidly to overcome its development problems. The economy's rapid expansion, for instance, would open new employment opportunities and facilitate the rapid incorporation of previously subordinate group members, quieting, too, the fears of Whites who might otherwise fear for their job security.

Foreign reactions to South African policies are based on how they, be it governments or groups, perceive and assess changes in critical areas within political, economic and social sectors. South Africa's policies serve as indicators from which can be drawn in-

ferences concerning that government's motivations, i.e., whether its intent is that of preserving the status quo (through cosmetic changes), modernizing racial domination, or moving toward real power sharing. If changes are interpreted as cosmetic or the modernization of racial domination, foreign opposition will increase. Policies that are interpreted as limited but clearly aimed at power sharing will receive external support or praise. What is most significant, then, is that programs directed toward power sharing or the termination of racial discrimination should be stated precisely, with timetables for their implementation, for as steps are implemented the credibility of the South African Government will increase in foreign eyes. Non-fulfilment of these objectives, however, will lead to increased opposition and pressure. Consequently, the types of changes are crucial, and what is proposed here is that changes in three areas provide major indicators of whether or not progress is being made toward power sharing and the abolition of racial discrimination. These areas are significant indicators for the United States, and its assessment and responses toward South Africa are in good measure determined by changes in these sectors.

### **3. Critical sectors of change in South Africa**

There are three crucial policy areas, homelands, employment and power sharing, changes in which would serve as major indicators of the South African Government's determination to eliminate its racial system. Changes, and the character of changes within these areas, will shape the perceptions and responses to South Africa of foreign governments and observers. Changes in other areas are also important, but the degree of structural transformation and the South African Government's credibility in the eyes of others can be most readily assessed by what occurs in these three sectors.

Government policy towards the homelands is the clearest indicator of whether it wishes to maintain the status quo, modernize racial domination or move towards power sharing. Government efforts to force "independence" on the black homelands is viewed by outsiders as a ruse, a device whereby blacks lose their citizenship rights in South Africa and become citizens of one of the homelands. Already South Africa has shed itself of Bophuthatswana, the Transkei and, shortly, Venda; and were it to succeed in imposing independence on the other homelands, South Africa would have forced all of its Blacks into less than fifteen percent of the land while retaining the remainder for the minority white population. Few if any of the homelands are economically viable as states, and their potential for viability is lessened because they

are composed of widely scattered, non-continuous pieces of land. Overpopulated, their soil depleted by overgrazing and over-use, the homelands cannot sustain their people. As a result they are forced to work as migrants within "white" South Africa. Foreign observers, as a consequence, see the homelands as cynical devices by which white South Africa exploits impoverished black labor. From this perspective "independence" for the homelands is seen as *an even more callous way of denying Blacks their political and other rights in South Africa*, turning them into migrants with no rights whatsoever in the land in which they were born.

This perception of South Africa's homelands policy will persist unless a series of steps are taken, including, among others: (1) termination of government pressures to force independence on the homelands; (2) recognition and acknowledgement that the homelands are an integral part of South Africa; (3) massive efforts by the government to develop the homeland areas, including infrastructural, agriculture and rural development programs; (4) termination of existing land tenure restrictions that reserves the major land areas for Whites; (5) enactment of massive rural development programs, focusing on housing, the development of village commerce, industry, education, medical and health facilities; and (6) within the mining, white agricultural and urban areas, establishment of similar education, housing and other social service programs for migrant workers and their families.

The homelands cannot sustain their present (or future) population, and this necessitates massive land reform and rural development programs. These programs can make rural areas — (but not simply as homelands) — economically more viable. The expansion of employment opportunities in rural areas will slow the exodus of people to urban centers where, besides becoming part of the vast body of unemployed, they impose heavy social burdens and costs on the society. Unemployment becomes the crucial problem, and to correct this governments must institute programs and incentives for the development of labor-intensive industries and activities in both rural and urban areas. Were South Africa to move rapidly toward eradication of its racial structures, the starkness of its rural and other development problems would quickly emerge, problems that differ little in substance from those of other African states. This being the case, South Africa, too, might well be eligible for international assistance in coping with its development problems. This, however, means that it must at present seek solutions to its rural, (including homelands), problems, for the steps it takes in this direction will provide the outside world with evidence that South Africa is

moving toward the elimination of its racial policies.

The second area where change can readily be evaluated is that of employment. Some steps have been taken to eliminate job reservation and discrimination, but the pervasiveness of apartheid has left Africans, Coloureds and Asians in a disadvantaged position, one that the simple elimination of discriminatory legislation will not in itself correct. Not only have subordinate groups suffered from job restrictions, but they have as a consequence of poorer health care, education and vocational opportunities also been severely limited in obtaining other than unskilled employment. The abolition of discrimination in employment is a necessary first step, but compensatory programs, public as well as private, in education, vocational and other training programs are fundamental if subordinate groups are to be structurally incorporated at other than the low-level, unskilled positions in the economy. Government initiatives, including timetables for the establishment, implementation and monitoring of such programs are essential to assure that subordinate group members receive equal chances in hiring and advancement policies. Moreover, timetables and their monitoring would provide outsiders with the data that shows whether or not programs for eliminating discrimination in fact are being implemented.

It is the government that must take the lead on these numerous fronts, be it in program initiation, the monitoring activities or providing inducements and incentives within public and private sectors for assuring the full structural incorporation of subordinate groups. The experiences of two quite different societies, the United States and Rhodesia, confirm that unless the government itself mandates and enforces these changes, the private sector will not of its own volition implement such programs. Government action is thereby crucial; and, by designating specific programs and timetables for their implementation, (be it educational, vocational or other training programs; the opening of jobs; steps leading to the advancement of subordinate group members, etc.), the monitoring of these steps is possible, and the results again provide clear indicators of the extent and degree to which transformation in the system is occurring.

If the rapid structural incorporation of subordinate groups is to occur, a rapid expansion of the economy is necessary in both urban and rural, (including homeland), areas. For this to happen it may be necessary to provide inducements to local, national, multinational and parastatal firms, particularly those of a labor-intensive nature. Government incentives, in the form of tax or other concessions, must go hand-in-hand with the programs noted above, thereby assuring that subordinate group members

have opportunities to move rapidly into skilled, management and professional positions. This "forced feeding" policy will, by leading to the emergence of middle and upper class members, provide a new source for the emergence of new political leaders who, in conjunction with existing subordinate group leadership, will more fully reflect the total spectrum of political views within African, Coloured and Asian communities. The emergence of this expanded leadership is vital for the intergroup dialogue out of which new political structures can evolve that assure the full political participation of all groups.

The establishment of new structures for power sharing is hardly a simple task, and it is particularly difficult where one group has historically held monopoly power. Even where race has not been a factor the adamant refusal of élites to share power has precipitated conflict and revolution; France and Russia providing the two major examples. Even in the United States, which was founded on the principle of equal rights, not even a civil war that terminated slavery assured Blacks their political rights. The black struggle for equal rights and chances was rebuffed and circumvented for a century, and only after Blacks organized and mobilized during the 1960s, demonstrating and demanding full political participation, the termination of discrimination and the establishment of programs that assured them equal educational, employment and other opportunities, did that occur. Many of these rights were implemented during the civil rights struggle, though pockets of white resistance persisted. White society conceded those rights only after Blacks mobilized and confronted the system, a point that should not be overlooked. But equally significant is another fact: even in a country that professed a belief in equal rights for all and in which Blacks constituted a small minority (less than ten percent of the population), Whites found it difficult to accept the principle of equal rights and full political participation to the black minority.

What these examples indicate is that solutions will be even more difficult to reach in South Africa, where Whites are in a decided minority but hold power. But what the American and Rhodesian experiences also indicate is the imperative need for the accelerated training and rapid incorporation of Blacks. Otherwise, subordinate group frustrations and antagonisms increase, leading to the polarization of views and the increased possibility of racial conflict or, as in the case of Rhodesia, guerrilla war.

There are two major weaknesses to most of the proposals, whether they are by the government or others, for the political restructuring of South Africa: first, most do not substantively reduce the power of Whites; and second, most derive from Whites

with little or no input from South Africa's subordinate groups. That being the case, many of those groups have rejected the proposals, deeming them inadequate or simply disguised forms for the modernization of racial domination. Unless they participate, and as equal members in such deliberations, most subordinate groups will continue to suspect any such changes. Similar perceptions are held by foreign observers, for the impression is that unless subordinate groups themselves are significantly involved in this restructuring process, changes will be little more than cosmetic, aimed primarily at protecting white power and privilege.

There appears in most discussions or proposals concerning constitutional change in South Africa an avoidance of what is the fundamental issue: namely, the problem of power. It is generally implicit but it is an issue that needs to be addressed openly, for it rests at the core of South Africa's problems. It is an avoidance of this issue that also leads foreign observers (as well as South Africa's subordinate groups) to believe (perhaps mistakenly) that Whites are circumventing the issue and simply trying to preserve the existing racial dominance system. But Whites could face the issue directly, thereby clearing the air and providing a basis for dialogue. This could be accomplished by Whites and the government were they to make the following statements or points as a basis for exploring power sharing and the restructuring of South African society:

1. The basic issue is power, and Whites are afraid to discuss this openly or directly, let alone share it, though the issue of power is fundamental if South Africa is to avoid the kind of conflict that could destroy us all;
2. What troubles Whites (or most of them) is that they don't want to be incorporated into a black state, just as the English in Northern Ireland don't want to be incorporated into Ireland — and Whites will fight to preserve that fundamental principle;
3. Whites have used power to protect their own group and identity;
4. However, like others with power throughout history, Whites have also used power arbitrarily against other groups and as a means for gaining privilege for themselves;
5. The issue, then, is how can all groups, working together, devise a power sharing system whereby
  - (a) Whites, as well as others, can protect their own group identity but not have power and privilege over other groups;

- (b) No group have arbitrary power over another;
- (c) No one (or group) have privileges, but rather, that all groups have equal chances, with advancement in society based on merit and achievement; and
- (d) The structures devised protect all people (in terms of individual rights and group identity) from arbitrary power exercised by anyone or group, the system itself including various systems of checks and balances which, to the extent humanly possible, protect individual and minority group rights.

The fundamental problem of power is its abuse and misuse, and history is replete with people's efforts to check its abuse by government and tyrannical leaders. The problem of power is not simply an African one. Africa may have had its Amins and Bokasas, but Europe has had its Hitlers. Even the United States, which prides itself on its extensive system of checks and balances, could not prevent a President Nixon from misusing power. Hence the fear of arbitrary power is a universal concern, of black, brown and white alike, and the problem of restructuring power in South Africa should thereby start with the above issues or problems, proceeding then to the following:

1. Can we, as different groups, often suspicious of and threatened by, or hostile to each other, live together, or is the only logical solution that we live apart. Thus:
  - (a) If we decide we can, must, or want to, live together, what systems and structures can we devise for that purpose which will promote harmony, provide equal access, chance and opportunity for all, and prevent the abuse of power by anyone, or
  - (b) If we conclude we cannot live together, or some of us cannot, how can we establish structures whereby we remain separate, or where those who can live together in *harmony* and so wish are enabled to do so while others remove themselves to separate areas and structures where they can protect their own group identity or whatever it is they feel needs protection, the structures, however, assuring that all people still retain equal chances and opportunities;
2. What are the costs and consequences of the different structures proposed above; are such structures feasible; and what are the problems to be encountered in developing these structures, either where we live together or separate; and



3. What structures are needed to promote development in the country, thereby assuring equal access and opportunity to all people, with advancement based on merit and achievement rather than ascriptive factors.

It would appear that an open discussion of these issues is imperative among all groups, Europeans, Africans, Coloureds and Asians. But it is here that South Africa's Achille's heel appears most obvious: the paucity of representative leaders, particularly within the black community, a virtual vacuum created by an apartheid system that has stifled the emergence of an extensive black middle, managerial and professional class. There do exist a few black leaders, and they do reflect views of part of that community, but they are few in number. Moreover, some of those black leaders are seen within their own community as puppets or pawns of the government, hence their leadership is suspect. There are few black leaders with the stature of a Buthelezi, Qboza, Tutu, or Motlana; and, given the possibility of government banning or arrest, there appears to be a conspiracy of silence within the black community, a fear of allowing other leaders to emerge so long as there is the possibility of government reprisals. This, too, limits the possibility of needed dialogue between group leaders and government. Thus there is that shortage of black leadership.

What is evident from other societies is that where economic and social advancement is possible there emerge within groups new leaders who, by joining with existing leaders, provide the group with representative leadership. When, however, a system restricts or prevents their emergence, where government imposed "leaders", and where there emerge only a few leaders considered representative by the group who are then banned or their demands rejected by the government, there will then emerge a new radical leadership that quickly gains support within the subordinate group. Radicals and revolutionists are seldom spawned by marxist literature; they spring forth and are nurtured by a repressive and inequitable society. Likewise, the middle position, that of moderation, negotiation and compromise is not destroyed by radicals but by the system that refuses to negotiate or bring about needed change. When a group concludes that it has little stake or opportunity within a system, and when it sees its moderate leaders rebuffed in their demands for change, the group grows more receptive to extremists. Under these circumstances moderate leaders themselves become more radicalized. When the radicalization or polarization occurs, amicable solutions are less possible, and the escalation of conflicts results in situations such as those evident in Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Rhodesia.

Consequently, unless steps are taken toward power sharing, steps which necessitate the establishment of new if even transitional structures and institutions through which dialogue and negotiation can occur, group cleavages and animosities will widen and the room for negotiation and settlement will narrow. This, for instance, occurred for the dominant white group in Rhodesia. Its stubbornness in accepting power sharing resulted in the country's present conflict, a situation that has many parallel features to conditions in South Africa. Were South Africa to move toward power sharing, external opposition and criticism would certainly be muted, and others might be more willing to explore means of helping South Africa resolve its problems.

#### **4. US (and world) responses to South African policies**

There is within the United States (and elsewhere) considerable goodwill toward, and concern for, South Africa and its problems. But there is also a scepticism concerning South Africa's willingness to shed its racial system. There is a recognition that group security and minority rights, (be it for Whites or other groups, including Blacks whose rights are often denied), must be protected, but what the US sees at present in South Africa is a racial minority, exercising virtually monopoly power, using that power to deny equal rights to other groups. That is the fundamental issue. Many Americans recognize that South Africa's problems are virtually intractable in terms of solution, but that is not seen or accepted as an excuse for not moving resolutely to resolve them. Indeed, if American opinion and policymakers saw South Africa as attempting to preserve the racial status quo system through cosmetic changes, the US would respond decisively, itself pushing for UN economic sanctions and other measures aimed at forcing change in South Africa.

A crucial factor, then, is how the US perceives South African actions. If, as indicated, changes are perceived as simply cosmetic, the above US response can be anticipated. If South African actions are perceived as changes aimed at modernizing racial domination, a somewhat more mixed response can be anticipated. The anti-South African groups would move to mobilize other publics and policymakers to respond as they would if South Africa pursued a status quo policy. However, other groups, particularly if South Africa's attempt to modernize racial domination includes the structural incorporation and co-optation of a black middle class, would possibly defer a decision, hopeful that an emergent black middle class would eventually pressure the government into changes which could lead toward the dismantling of the racial system — even though that was not the government's origi-

nal intent. But that policy position is now more difficult for American groups to hold, particularly given the example of Rhodesia. For it was that policy of attempting to modernize racial domination that created the present problems in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Therefore, should South Africa follow that strategy, various American groups and policymakers who might have earlier supported such a position would no longer do so, the Rhodesia experience now shaping their images of possible future outcomes in South Africa. But if South Africa opted for the modernization of racial domination, a few Americans might support it, holding to the assumptions previously noted.

If, however, the actions of South Africa are perceived as motivated by a willingness to share power, to work toward equal rights and opportunities, and to move toward the resolution of its development problems, then South Africa could anticipate both sympathy and support. What is fundamental if that support is to be gained, though, is that South Africa initiate positive measures in the sectors noted earlier, for in those areas it can establish programs and timetables whereby change can be monitored and evaluated by the external world. The implementation of these timetables would re-establish the credibility of the South African Government and buy for it not only time but also external support as it seeks to resolve its problems. Moreover, these moves would clearly bring internal support from presently subordinate groups, for there would be tangible evidence of fundamental — and not simply cosmetic — change.

What should be recognized by South Africa in terms of US policy responses is that a diverse array of opinions and attitudes exist within the American public and among policymakers. The recent statement of one South African industrialist concerning American critics — “When will the dogs be called off?” — misses the fundamental point. Those critics will continue. They do not believe change in South Africa is possible. They are a small, highly articulate group, but they are less significant than the *other* groups who, when they perceive South Africa as doing little to improve its racial situation or share power, become more receptive to the admonishments of that small, anti-South Africa group. Thus it is that larger group with whom South Africa should be concerned. And that group’s attitudes are determined by South Africa’s policies. Consequently, what is important is what *actions* South Africa takes, for the US, be it groups or policymakers, will *respond* to those actions. South Africa is itself responsible for how that outside world, including the United States, responds to it.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

**David Owen**

My firm belief, from which I have never wavered for over two years, is that negotiated settlements in Namibia and Zimbabwe are in South Africa's own national interest. While a South African Government cannot clinch a settlement, it has the power to block a settlement, and the Government's power of decision in Namibia and of influence in Zimbabwe should be used constructively and responsibly. Success in these negotiations, besides giving hope for the future development of Southern Africa, would also provide the three Western permanent Security Council nations — France, Britain and the United States — with the political authority to hold off demands for immediate economic sanctions affecting South Africa, if the Government is genuinely embarking on the dismantling of apartheid and the ending of minority rule.

Both sets of negotiations which started in the Spring of 1977 are once again at a critical stage. The all-party Conference started on Monday (10 September) in London. It is taking place after two years of escalating guerilla fighting and of intensive international diplomatic effort, following the collapse of the Geneva Conference. It is in all our interests that that Conference succeeds. Once it became clear that the internal settlement would not be recognised by the new British Government, its convening was inevitable. I wish it every possible success. I can see no major problems over agreeing on a Constitution. A detailed draft in legislative form has existed in the Foreign Office for over a year. The crucial differences of view will come on the arrangements for the transitional period. In Namibia it has been agreed that a Constitution would follow elections for a Constituent Assembly which would itself draw up the Constitution.

### **The Problems of Transition**

In Namibia, as over Zimbabwe, it is the transitional arrangements which have proved so difficult to negotiate. I will not attempt to chronicle the detailed history of the various attempts over the last two years in Namibia and in Zimbabwe to reach agreement over the transitional period. The situation on the ground in the two countries is very different, as is their legal status, but there have been certain key common features dominating both negotiations.

Firstly, the need for a neutral transitional administration to

This is the text of an address by the Rt Hon. Dr David Owen M.P. to the Witwatersrand Branch of the SALLA on September 13, 1979.

exist during the election period. In Namibia that has meant the existing office of a South African Administrator General being off set by the introduction of a Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General. In Zimbabwe proposals for a neutral administrative authority have centred on introducing an agreed figure as Resident Commissioner or Governor, either to act alone or with an advisory or executive council drawn from all the parties expected to participate in the election. The arrangements in both countries have focused on the necessary checks and balances to ensure that the authority is neutral in terms of the physical arrangements for the election and the fair conduct of the campaign. Each of the parties have attempted, not unnaturally, to tilt the balance of the transitional administration in their favour.

The second common feature has been the need to ensure that the forces of law and order operating during the transition are neutral as between the parties, and that no one side is capable of interfering with the election by intimidation or of threatening to overthrow the election result by force in the immediate aftermath of the election. In Namibia this has centred on the introduction of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group and of UN civilian observers. In Rhodesia the proposal for a UN force and UN observers has been developed in detail and Lord Carver's proposals published. It could however easily be a Commonwealth force and Commonwealth observers. What has been so far excluded by all British Governments has been a solely British military presence. But the last Government was prepared to commit our forces to a UN presence. In both countries what to do during transition with the *existing* armed forces — South African or Rhodesian — and their guerilla opponents — Swapo and the Patriotic Front — has been one of the most difficult issues. This has been harder to resolve in Zimbabwe, because the armed struggle is far more advanced and there are many thousands of guerillas permanently in the country.

It is inevitable that these two features will continue to lie at the heart of both settlements. It would be absurd to try and pretend that these issues can be ignored. I hope the present Conference in London can initially concentrate on the Constitution. This was tried previously in May 1977, but we were forced to grapple with the transition in parallel when discussing the Constitution, and in logic it is very hard to separate them out.

We have now seen internal elections taking place in both countries without these two issues being resolved — in December 1978 in Namibia and in April 1979 in Rhodesia. In neither country has the election been accepted as being a free and fair expression of opinion by the international community, and in

neither country has the level of violence abated. In both we have, however, seen as a consequence of all the pressures the start of a process of recognition by the white minority, of the need for majority rule. To this extent there has been real progress. But in both countries the white minorities have been tempted to believe that even when the final moment for majority rule approaches they can manipulate events, people, the constitution and the election to ensure that the party they feel will best protect their interest comes out on top. Sadly the South African Government has given the beleaguered white minorities in both countries the impression that they could continue to rely on South African economic and military support in a last attempt to act in defiance of international opinion. Simply stated, if a settlement in either Namibia or Rhodesia is to be internationally recognised, the white minorities and the South African Government have to accept that you cannot predetermine the election result. You have to be committed to an electoral process which may produce a Government which is unsympathetic and even hostile. It is natural to attempt to do the best for the party you support; that's politics and that's reality. I do not expect those intending to vote for DTA or the UANC to pretend that it is immaterial and of no consequence if Swapo or the Patriotic Front win an electoral victory, no more than I expect the South African Government to pretend that it is uncommitted or unconcerned. South Africa is not neutral. I do not expect it to be. Nor are the Governments of the Front Line States neutral or uncommitted about the outcome of the election.

#### **Western Arbiters**

The Western Five in Namibia and Britain and the US in Rhodesia are in a quite different position. Having undertaken the difficult task of acting as intermediaries and as independent arbiters of the electoral process we must be neutral, impartial and uncommitted about the outcome. Our concern has to be to ensure a free and fair test of opinion by means of an internationally accepted election. It has not helped the development of a fair and balanced public understanding in South Africa of the Western Governments' role that the Government has tended to present the inevitable conflict of view between their interests and our task as the result of a hostile, partial, anti-South African bias. We are not to be viewed as acting against your interests or your Government, as indeed we should not be viewed as acting against the interests of other countries and people who are committed to Swapo or the Patriotic Front. The Western countries' inability to identify with your Government's interests is no more

than the logical outcome of our role. We cannot similarly identify with the interests of either Swapo or of other Governments.

Normally Governments do not act as arbiters and there are strong arguments theoretically against nations doing so. It is better to leave to the international organisations the role of intermediary. But few would deny that, given the long history of UN deadlock in their direct negotiations with South Africa, a new initiative by the Western Five in 1977 was the only way of mobilising sufficient international diplomatic activity to make a negotiated settlement a possibility. Similarly in Rhodesia the failure of internal negotiations and the collapse of the Geneva talks made it necessary for a new initiative in 1977. The initial involvement of Dr Kissinger made it inevitable that it should have been the US and Britain. We worked in one of the closest diplomatic partnerships that has, I suspect, ever been established between the two countries, short of our alliance in the Second World War. US involvement made it natural to use the UN. We carefully considered in 1977 a Commonwealth peace-keeping force, but the prominent military role for Britain, probably inevitable within any Commonwealth force, was felt by the then British Government to put Britain in too exposed a posture, and this was reinforced when it became obvious that neither Nigeria nor Canada, two key military countries, were keen on contributing, and preferred action through UN peacekeeping. Following the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting at Lusaka, it may now be that the concept of a Commonwealth peacekeeping force can be looked at again. I would certainly support this. The role of African Commonwealth countries — Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana and Nigeria — will anyhow be crucial.

#### **Meaningful Negotiations Essential**

The Rhodesian and Namibian problems will only be solved by a meaningful negotiation between all the nationalist parties. But, given that some of these parties are liberation movements, fighting a guerilla war, having none of the civil service back up of a Government, the liberation movements tend to turn for advice to those countries, particularly the Frontline States, who support them economically and militarily. In a different way South Africa can influence the parties inside Namibia and Rhodesia, which it supports. The test of Western diplomacy has been to try *simultaneously* to produce a constructive influence from all the surrounding countries and to achieve a concerted effort to bring about a genuine negotiated settlement. It has been difficult, but we have achieved such progress as we have by eschewing, as all African countries want, any polarising of African issues around East/West confrontation.

Namibia could now be near to settlement. South Africa's main concerns about border security and Swapo bases inside Namibia can be resolved. The negotiating gap over Rhodesia is wider, predominantly because of the difficulty of achieving a ceasefire. Integrating the forces currently fighting each other is still an anathema to some, and even with goodwill poses immense practical difficulties. But the alternative is even more daunting. To hold the two forces apart on the ground inside Rhodesia during an election would be hard enough, but to prevent them from re-summing the fighting afterwards would be impossible, if the camps in nearby countries had not been dismantled. South African interests are not served by your Government's hesitancy hitherto in grappling constructively with these military issues and in influencing the Rhodesian Defence Force Commanders.

Over Namibia for months your Government argued for a smaller UNTAG than was eventually agreed. Why? The Five always understood your anxiety about composition. Composition of UNTAG was a wholly legitimate concern. On the size of the force, it always seemed to me that the threat of penetration across the Namibian border was a real problem. But a larger UN Group was more likely to be able to seal it, when your forces were reduced. The proposed demilitarised zone is an important additional protection and something you tried to negotiate directly yourself with the Angolans. Similarly I could never understand why it could ever be in your interest for unidentified Patriotic Front forces to stay in Rhodesia with arms cached during the election and in camps in the surrounding countries.

#### **Internal Settlements Feasible?**

It was these apparent inconsistencies in South Africa's negotiating position, which at times made it appear that you were really committed in both countries only to the so called internal settlement route. Internal settlements were, for South Africa, always a gamble, with no hard evidence to believe they could work. Now the evidence points decisively against their feasibility. The two internal elections have achieved no reduction in the actual level of fighting. For over a year we have been told that the "boys in the bush will give up". We have been promised that "thousands of liberation fighters will return". "The Frontline States are getting fed up and will throw the liberation movements out of their countries." For all these optimistic forecasts, the reality has been a steady escalation in the fighting. All the strength of your forces in Namibia and all their raids into Angola and Zambia have not been able to stop guerilla incidents. The same can be said for Rhodesia. Look back at the old press



cuttings, read what has been said, and then compare it with the turn of events. We were told that some OAU countries would recognise; the world was led to believe that the new British Government would recognise, the US Senate would lift sanctions. None of this has materialised. Why? Again, put simply, the realities demonstrate that the only way of preventing a long and violent struggle is a negotiated settlement.

It says much for the British Government's realism that they have now faced up to these facts. When will South Africa also face up to these facts? You cannot have certainty until you do. You must take an electoral gamble. If the DTA wins a UN supervised election in Namibia, you will be able to rely on that Government, and their acceptance by the world will mean that you can start on improving your relations with Angola and Zambia. If Swapo wins, they will have to face economic and political realities. The easy rallying cry of liberation will be over; they will seek an accommodation with you in much the same way as Mozambique has done — not compromising their principles, but recognising realities.

In Rhodesia the UANC may win. If they do, you will have a government more sympathetic to South African interests than the Patriotic Front. But say the Patriotic Front win? Again, they will have to face realities — how to restore the prosperity of the farms, how to build up key industries. Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique recognise the facts of rail links, economic and trading links with your country. Why will the Patriotic Front Government be any different? If, in addition, by then the South African Government is clearly making genuine reforms and dismantling apartheid, the chances of an accommodation being reached become very much higher. It really is absurd to believe that a Swapo Government in Namibia and a Patriotic Front Government in Zimbabwe will decide openly to engage in military hostilities with South Africa. The worst that South Africa can expect is that some people who you see as hostile to your interests will be given a home in their territories, and this could pose a threat in terms of guerilla penetration across your frontiers. But, given the present situation in Zimbabwe and to a lesser extent Namibia, it is already possible to approach the South African border across these countries. It is very unlikely that in the early stages of independence, with all the internal problems facing either or both of these two Governments, they would encourage or allow the establishment of actual military camps. In the longer term this may emerge, but it is unlikely that a Swapo or a Patriotic Front Government will pose any greater security problem to South Africa than is currently posed from Mozambique. Again, start dismantling apartheid, and the possibility of

the constellation of South African states, on which your Prime Minister often speaks, become a real possibility.

### **Hope for South Africa**

One cannot escape the judgement that, until South Africa is prepared to see genuine settlements in Namibia and Zimbabwe, it will be unable to face up to genuine reform inside South Africa. The strategy of the Western powers in insisting that progress be made first on these areas of negotiation is still, I believe, a correct reading of the priorities in the region and the political realities inside South Africa. Some people in South Africa have been always attracted by the buffer state theory; relying on Namibia and Rhodesia to fend off the rest of Africa — accepting that they would become increasingly ruled by Blacks, but hoping to establish a half way house, an accommodation between black and white, which would help establish the pattern for a similar, but less radical, accommodation in South Africa. This strategy might have succeeded as recently as 1972 in Rhodesia, but delay, the armed struggle and the internationalising of the issue have meant that nothing short of genuine majority rule has any hope of ending the fighting.

There is a major warning in the historical development of the armed struggle for majority rule in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and now Zimbabwe. It may be that your Prime Minister has taken the point, and that his personal decision to resume the Namibian initiative in October last year was the first demonstration of a new resolve. It may be that he has the toughness internally to fight his own backwoodsmen and the vision externally to make the negotiations succeed. If he has, then he and those who support him must recognise that time is their most precious commodity. Delay will defeat the whole strategy. Of course, any politician will want to decide the timing and the tactics of their moves. But no longer can South Africa operate within its own frontiers. The world is watching. Within that world audience, however, it is important to realise that there are realistic politicians, politicians who know the strength of racial prejudice in their own countries — politicians like President Carter and Andrew Young who have lived through, in their lifetime, the problems of changing deep seated attitudes in their own state and country.

As long as South Africa is clearly heading in the right direction of dismantling apartheid, then there will be a significant and powerful part of the world audience, who will be prepared to understand at least, even if not agreeing with all the arguments for moving at a steady but absorbable pace. At present

very few of us are yet convinced that South Africa is committed to changing direction. There are numerous changes in prospect, which could be taken as real change, but could also be merely delaying action. I am by nature an optimist. I remember how surprised I was that Prime Minister Vorster did agree in 1977 to embark on the Namibian negotiations with the Western Five. I remember the hours of negotiation and the cliff-hanger here in South Africa in October 1978, when it looked for a few hours as if there was no hope. I remember the hours of discussion on Rhodesia. There were large differences, and the South African Government was often keen to argue that it had no direct control of Rhodesia. But at least the discussions were able to concentrate on the detailed issues, while respecting each others' different viewpoint. Sensibly they have continued. Despite the fighting, the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire was always kept alive, and the South African Government — even while supporting the internal settlement — was realistic enough to recognise it might not work.

I believe the pattern of negotiation established in Namibia and Rhodesia offers hope for Southern Africa and could, if successful, be followed by internal negotiation within South Africa. It necessitates, however, that your Government drops any lingering hopes that internal settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia are in South Africa's interest. It means committing yourself to the UN proposals for Namibia. It means working for the success of the London Conference on Rhodesia. It means asserting nothing less than the real South African national interest, which is to bring peace to Southern Africa.



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## BOOK REVIEWS

### **STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS: THE REAL ISSUES**

*R. Vernon*

*Macmillan Press, London. 1977. 260 p.*

The Harvard Business School's project on the multinational enterprise has brought forth a number of publications the most notable of which is probably Vernon's *Sovereignty at Bay*. The value of these publications has been in the factual information reported. The present book by Vernon proposes to lay bare the "real issues" behind the "tensions" generated by the presence of the multinational in the host state, and to a lesser extent in the home state.

In approaching the matter, the author commences from the viewpoint that there has been a tremendous shrinkage in what he calls "international space". This trend has tended to homogenize consumer tastes throughout the world, thereby providing the multinational with the opportunity to operate abroad. At the same time, however, this process has increased the interdependence amongst nations, which has not always been to the liking of the nation state as it would ideally prefer to be independent. The multinational as a vehicle of interdependence consequently comes in for attack from the nation state pursuing an independent existence. Vernon suggests, however, that the tension so created may not only stem from the nature of the multinational's operations, but also from the ills derived from the inherent industrialization process, and proposes that in any investigation it is necessary to separate out the latter.

The author devotes roughly half the book to the multinational enterprise itself in order to distinguish between their two forces. He describes the multinational in terms of technology, the desire for stable earnings and the fight against entropy. He points out that what may seem dubious to the host state is, in fact, quite rational to the multinational and may not constitute underhand behaviour, but rather a logical means of responding to the international environment.

Having delineated the multinational and its organizational strategies, Vernon pursues the matter of tension in more depth. He contends that the host state, and in some cases the home state, are at odds with the multinational because the state, on the one hand, strives to maximize national benefits whereas the multinational strives to maximize global profits. At times the two objectives are compatible but there will always be instances of incompatibility. Vernon describes the nature of the tensions created by

conflicting objectives, and in doing so distinguishes between what he terms the "strain on national objectives" pertaining to first the industrialized countries and then the developing countries. The nature of the strain has generally been well documented and Vernon really has little to add in this respect. He goes on to point out that the "double identity" of the multinational has important implications for the international relations of the host and home state and whereas the home state is commonly accused of using the multinational as an instrument of foreign policy, it can also be shown that the host state may do likewise. He concludes that if the tensions generated by the multinational are to be avoided in the future it would be necessary to consider world wide rather than national political forms.

In conclusion, this book is valuable in that the data pertaining to the multinational is factual and that a total picture is gained of the multinational and its impact on the home and host states. Some would debate, however, as to whether Vernon has covered the "real issues" and whether he has done so in sufficient detail.

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#### **SOUTH AFRICA AND SANCTIONS: GENESIS AND PROSPECTS**

*D. Willers and S. Begg, eds.*

*SAIIA/SAIRR, Johannesburg 1979. 95 p.*

The subject of international pressures on South Africa is an important one, one which has an immediacy and an arresting topicality, reflecting a diplomatic situation some of whose major variables can change literally from day to day. There is a good case, then, for academics leaving it severely alone. But South African academics can scarcely ignore it and an increasing number of them are apparently willing to risk having their arguments confounded and left stranded before publication day by the tide of events. Such is not truly the case, however, with this collection, since it brings together papers and comments delivered at a symposium jointly organised by the South African Institute of Race Relations and the South African Institute of International Affairs, on 24 February, 1979. The speed of publication has been impressive, especially since the format is not unattractive, and is quite serviceable.

Overall, the papers provide a useful contribution to a growing

literature, a contribution which however far from definitive — by the nature of the exercise, the papers are interim, tentative, exploratory — helps to put in perspective some of the more ignorant and partisan assumptions which are frequently expressed on this subject. Prominent among these is the notion that because pressures on South Africa — (especially from the West) — have not brought apartheid to an end, they are not “effective” or “real”, or are intended only as cosmetic gestures towards “liberal opinion” at home and a presumably infinitely gullible Afro-Asian bloc abroad.

Recent South African experience suggests that even a modest amount of pressure can contribute to the erosion of a target state's legitimacy; can create domestic insecurity by emphasising survival and confrontation as the principal political questions and facilitating the definition of political processes in military terms; can provide openings and precedents for lobbyists intent on further, incremental pressures; and can narrow the future policy options of those states applying the pressure. It is only when arbitrary and apocalyptic criteria of “effectiveness” are raised that the seriousness of international pressures — (including Western ones) — on South Africa is in doubt. The papers cover the development of the idea of sanctions as a diplomatic instrument in the twentieth century (Mervyn Frost); the South African experience to date and the prospects for the future, (Dr Deon Geldenhuys); some comments on the prospects of economic sanctions and their effect on the South African economy (Andre Hamersma); and a review of sanctions other than economic ones (Dr J.J. van Tonder).

It is unfortunate that while this collection has gained in immediacy from the speed with which it has been published — and I would argue that with a publication of this kind, speed is very important — it has lost a lot to the well-known pitfalls of publishing symposium papers. This is, above all, a very uneven collection. While the other contributions are not negligible, it is quite clear that Dr Geldenhuys's paper greatly overshadows the rest in terms of length, scope, originality, and documentation. Not only does this mean that the book is unbalanced, but also, as John Seiler points out in his perceptive comments on Dr Geldenhuys's paper, the latter is too long, covers too many topics, and loses sharpness in focus. Some time might profitably have been allocated by the editors to allow the contributors to rewrite their papers; Dr. Geldenhuys to narrow and refine the focus of his considerable contribution, and the others to fill their's out a bit. In addition, several of the papers bear the marks of construction for verbal presentation rather than for reading. The editors could probably

have done a fair bit of tidying in this respect, and in spotting a number of minor errors, like that of referring to Raymond Aron's international relations masterwork as *War and Peace* instead of *Peace and War*, (page 29). Despite these shortcomings, this remains a useful and interesting collection.

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