

International Affairs BULLETIN

Smuts House Notes

Symposium

- **Changing Patterns in US — SA Relations**
W.B. Vosloo
- **The United States and South Africa: A Dialogue of the Deaf?**
Deon Geldenhuys
- **Foreign Pressures on South Africa: The Thumb-Screw as Conceptual Frame**
Newell M. Stultz

Lome II: The European Community and The North-South Dialogue
Klaus Baron von der Ropp

Book Reviews

VOL 4 NO 1 1980



**DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
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SMUTS HOUSE NOTES

FROM THE EDITOR

This edition of the *Bulletin* marks a change in the editorship of the publication, and regular readers will notice a few changes in style and format. The first of these is the inclusion of these Smuts House Notes which will aim to provide a regular forum for brief expressions of opinion on topical aspects of contemporary international life. It is hoped to canvas opinions from a wide-ranging group of people, including Institute members, academics, journalists and policy-makers. In their personal capacities, such people will, through the medium of Smuts House Notes, be able to contribute brief commentaries on the times in which we live.

A second innovation is the introduction of a debate on "South Africa and the International Community in the Eighties" which begins in this issue with a symposium of three views on the relations between the Republic and the United States. One of the features of political life in South Africa is the lack of serious attention to foreign policy issues, and it is hoped that this debate — which may, depending on the response, run for two volumes — will help to promote new thinking on foreign policy issues as the country faces up to the changes in both Southern Africa and the comity of states in the new decade.

Readers are reminded that the Editor welcomes contributions on all issues within the Institute's ambit of interest, which can be considered for publication. In normal circumstances, such contributions should not exceed 2 000 words, and a style sheet can be obtained by writing to the Editor.

Peter C.J. Vale

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE NEW ZIMBABWE

Before 1974 South Africa's policy towards Rhodesia was more or less a case of "business as usual". After the Portuguese collapse in that year, new more realistic perceptions at first dictated the policy of Prime Minister Vorster, as he tried to persuade Mr Smith to negotiate with the nationalist leaders who had been in prison for a decade and worked to find a solution which would be acceptable to other neighbour states. But gradually, as the conflict worsened and the perceived "communist" threat to South Africa grew, the temptation arose to try to select and support the black leaders who were seen as less "extreme", more amenable to South African viewpoints and in general less likely to disrupt existing structures. Thus the internal settlement of 1978/79 was strongly supported and, when new elections were

required by the Lancaster House Agreement, considerable South African support was marshalled for Bishop Muzorewa, on whom the hopes and confident expectations of the South African Government rested.

Robert Mugabe's overwhelming victory in the February elections came, therefore, not only as a disappointment to the South African Government, but as a great surprise. The unexpected emergence of this new Zimbabwe, under a militant government with socialist aims, has been a traumatic development for South Africa and the rest of the region — even if the level of trauma for white South Africans has been reduced for the time being by the conciliatory statements and actions of Mr Mugabe — and the future consequences for the region will no doubt be profound.

While it is too early to analyse effectively the possible consequences, it is worth listing here some of the lessons for South Africa to be drawn from this recent experience. Firstly, it is clear that the information received by the Government before the elections was not accurate, particularly regarding the degree of support for the various black leaders and their parties. The South African Government was, of course, not alone in being misinformed, and it seems that its sources of intelligence were not very different from those which also misled Rhodesian institutions, e.g. the Army, and even the British. Nevertheless, this experience demonstrates the importance of accurate and objective information, on which planning and policies can be reliably based, and the need to resist the human tendency to filter out the bad news and only listen to the good. Secondly, there is the more serious need to correct perceptions which distort even the most reliable information. Here again, the South African Government was not alone in allowing its perceptions of individuals, parties and the situation generally to take precedence over objective analysis. But, for South Africa especially in the years immediately ahead, failure to learn this lesson could have disastrous consequences in its Namibian and domestic policies.

Another lesson relates to the question of interference in the domestic politics of a neighbour. It would be unrealistic to expect South Africa to stand back, disinterested, from developments in Zimbabwe, and in past years the Government has justifiably received credit for its efforts to influence Mr Smith in the direction of majority rule. But open (in the sense that it could not be disguised) support for one party in an election was a rather blatant and risky contravention of the frequently declared South African policy of non-interference in domestic affairs — especially as it was based on inaccurate information and perceptions. Given South Africa's weak international poli-

tical position, this conclusion is valid even if there was encouragement from the British, and even if other governments and organisations were supporting other parties in the elections.

There are no doubt a host of other lessons, international and domestic, to be learned from a thorough reading of recent developments in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. These concern *inter alia* the implications of guerrilla/terrorist wars, the involvement of outside powers, the operations of black political parties and the response of the mass of blacks towards them, the dangers of using white criteria to label some leaders as "moderate" and others as "extreme", the real meaning of "liberation" to blacks living in a white-dominated system, the problem of rising, but unfulfilled, expectations and aspirations, the effect on whites and blacks of a change-over to majority rule, etc. While the situations in Namibia and South Africa itself are very different, there are enough parallels with Zimbabwe to make many of the lessons learnt there in recent years, during the agonising transition to recognised independence, highly relevant to the future course of events in those parts of the region still controlled by the South African Government.

John Barratt

Symposium

CHANGING PATTERNS IN US — SA RELATIONS

W.B. Vosloo

Relations between the United States and South Africa have traditionally been regarded as peripheral to the "vital interests" of both countries. Through most of South Africa's history its external relations — politically, economically, culturally and militarily — have been directed towards Europe (particularly the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and France) and its immediate African neighbouring territories. The United States for its part, has long been oblivious to developments on the African continent. Africa arguably did not exist as an independent concern of official policy and Southern Africa, at most, only featured as an adjunct to US relations with Europe.

Since World War II, the situation has gradually changed, for three reasons. Firstly, the emergence of the United States as a super-power and its role as the leader of the free world. Secondly, the emergence of black nationalism as Africa's new states crowded onto the stage of world politics since post - 1960 with the result that today the African continent accounts for more than

a third of the total membership of the United Nations. Thirdly, the rise of black consciousness in the United States and its impact on US electoral politics.

The trend of world events since World War II has prompted a re-evaluation of US — SA relations in the field of bilateral interaction by policy-makers on both sides of the divide. Whilst United States policies have changed from benign neglect to active and affirmative engagement, South African policies have moved from a posture of limited interest to one of serious concern.

This article seeks to outline the structure and scope of interaction between the United States and South Africa and to explore the chief determinants of past, present and possible future policy trends.

THE STRUCTURE OF INTERACTION

Although transnational interaction is often simplistically depicted as a relationship between two territorial nation-states, US — SA relations do not fit the neat image of one monolithic polity interacting with another monolithic polity. Both societies are multi-vocal actors on the international scene, speaking with *many, often conflicting, voices*. Both societies are highly fragmented or pluralistic, comprising a multitude of ethnic, racial, linguistic, religious and functional interest groups — each playing important roles in the field of transnational interaction. In addition, the two polities interact directly and indirectly on several levels simultaneously — governmental and non-governmental — with two-way lines of contact often criss-crossing rather than overlapping.

The main direct and indirect participants in this complex web of interaction are the governments, the political opposition groups, the ethnic-cultural-racial groups, the special interest groups, the foreign-policy-promoting groups and the general public.

(i) The Governments

In the case of both countries this category refers to peculiar power configurations between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. As far as the United States is concerned, it refers to the White House, the Pentagon, the C.I.A., the Department of State (particularly the African Bureau under an Assistant Secretary), the National Security Council, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate (particularly the Subcommittee on African Affairs). On

the South African Government side, the chief participants are the Cabinet, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the National Security Council, the Department of National Security, the Study group on Foreign Affairs in the National Party Caucus and formerly also the Department of Defence.

(ii) The Political Opposition Groups

In both countries this category of participants includes political parties, factions within political parties, and other open or clandestine political and ideological action groups. In the case of the US, it includes the Democrats, The Republicans and the Congressional Black Caucus.

On the South African side it includes the Progressive Federal Party (P.F.P.), the New Republic Party (N.R.P.), the Labour Party (of the Coloured Representative Council), the Committee of Ten (Soweto), the Black Alliance, the African National Congress (A.N.C. expatriate), and the Pan African Congress (P.A.C. expatriate).

(iii) Ethnic-Racial-Cultural Groups

Groups in this category could be described as either "categorical" (*i.e.* aggregates of individuals sharing one or more common characteristics) such as whites, blacks, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPS), Afro-Americans, coloureds, Afrikaners, Zulus, Indians, etc., or "associational" (*i.e.* aggregates of individuals who are organized so as to promote interest arising from their shared ethnic, racial or cultural characteristics) such as the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (N.A.A.C.P.), Congress of Racial Equality, (C.O.R.E.), the black Muslims, the Broederbond, Inkatha, etc. Although the groups included in this category do not necessarily act as direct participants, they are often perceived by direct participants to be potentially or latently important and therefore serve as reference groups for policy-makers.

(iv) Special Interest Groups

This category includes groups representing labour, business, agriculture, the professions, religion, sports and the arts which have organizational links with related groups abroad. Examples here are the various multinational corporations (Exxon, Ford, General Electric, General Motors, etc.) the A.F.L. — C.I.O., the various professional associations and the news agencies. South African examples include public corporations such as ISCOR, ESCOM, and SASOL, Anglo-American Corporation,

Rembrandt Corporation, the Trade Union Council of South Africa, etc.

(v) Foreign Policy-Promoting Groups

This category includes the mass media, foundations, activist segments of the academic and student communities, columnists and privately organized groups devoted to promote particular policies. American examples include the TV-networks, major newspapers such as the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the American Committee on Africa, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, the Committee of Concerned Blacks, the Africa Research Group, the Southern Africa Committee, the Africa Information Service and Liberation Support Movement. South African examples include the South African Broadcasting Corporation (S.A.B.C.), the South African Institute of International Affairs, the South African Institute for Race Relations, South African Student's Organisation (S.A.S.O.), National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), the *Sunday Times*, the South Africa Foundation, etc.

(vi) The Mass Public

Although the general public can be considered a very amorphous actor in transnational relations on account of widespread ignorance and apathy, it can be mobilized politically when aroused and activated by the media, promotional groups and activists.

A final dimension that needs to be borne in mind in any consideration of the structure of US — SA relations, is the asymmetrical element. This dimension manifests itself in the vast differences in area, natural resources, population size, economic strength, military power, self-sufficiency, strategic vulnerability and international status. The United States is by all standards a "superpower", occupying the role of leader in the Western world. South Africa, on the other hand, is a relatively small power, currently branded by many as the *odium generis humanis* of the world and heavily burdened with a wide range of punitive measures imposed by the international community.

SCOPE OF INTERACTION

a. Diplomatic Relations

Diplomatic relations with the United States date back to the period before the unification of South Africa in 1910. As early

as 1799 an American Consulate was opened in Cape Town and, following the discovery of the rich gold deposits on the Witwatersrand, an American Consulate was opened in Johannesburg in 1891 and in Durban, the port city of Natal, in 1906.

The process of upgrading the diplomatic ties between the two countries paralleled South Africa's progress towards full statehood within the British Empire. Following the formal establishment of the South African Department of External Affairs in 1927, a South African Legation was opened in Washington in 1929. In the same period, the status of the American Consulate in Pretoria was raised to Consulate-General and in 1949 the American mission was upgraded to the status of an Embassy. At present, South Africa is represented in the United States of America by an Embassy in Washington, Consulates-General in New York, New Orleans and San Francisco, as well as Consulates in Houston, Los Angeles, Mobile and Portland. The United States is represented in South Africa by an Embassy in Pretoria and Consulates-General in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban.

The most important form of diplomatic relations, however, takes place through exchanges between high-level, policy-makers. Practical manifestations on the American side are the policy statements *vis-à-vis* South Africa which are made by the President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Adviser, the Ambassador to the United Nations, Chairmen and members of Congressional Committees and the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. On the South African side, the most important counterparts are the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. In recent years there has also been a growing tendency towards increased personal contact between high-echelon office-bearers, as exemplified by the visits to Pretoria by Dr Kissinger, Mr Cyrus Vance, Ambassadors Andrew Young and Don McHenry, Senator Dick Clark and Congressman Steven Solarz, as well as the frequent visits to Washington by Foreign Minister R.F. Botha and the meeting between Prime Minister Vorster and Vice-President Mondale in Vienna.

b. Military Relations

The history of US — SA relations in the military field reveals a trend of gradual deterioration. During the First and Second World Wars, South Africa participated in the arena of world conflict as an ally of the United States. In 1949 South Africa was one of the first nations to send an air crew for the massive Berlin airlift. Similarly, in 1950, after the North Korean attack on

South Korea, South Africa decided to send No. 2 Squadron of the S.A.A.F. to assist the UN forces, and this was attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing of the United States Air Force. Although military co-operation fell short of a formal alliance, the South African Government repeatedly approached the US and NATO in the 1950's to discuss such a possibility and pressed particularly for a so-called "Southern NATO" and tried to persuade the NATO countries to establish NATO bases in South Africa. During this period US naval vessels made regular use of South African ports and in 1959 the two countries even participated in combined naval exercises.

As pressure for international action against South Africa mounted from the beginning of the 1960's the Kennedy Administration, pursuant of a UN resolution calling for a ban on all arms sales to South Africa, decided unilaterally to end arms sales to South Africa after the end of 1963. In 1964, the Johnson Administration extended the scope of its arms embargo to include the sale to South Africa of materials to manufacture arms. In the following years the embargo was extended to certain types of aircraft as well as aircraft manufactured in other countries which were equipped with US -manufactured engines. In 1967, US — SA relations deteriorated further as a result of the "Roosevelt" — incident, when shore leave to members of the crew was cancelled by US naval authorities when the U.S.S. Franklin D. Roosevelt was refuelling at Cape Town *en route* to Viet Nam.

However, military co-operation improved during the Nixon Administration, particularly after the N.S.S.M. 39 study which recommended a more flexible interpretation of the US arms embargo against South Africa. This cautious *rapprochement* was further enhanced by the growing instability in the territories of Mozambique and Angola. It ultimately led to the "tacit" approval by certain American officials of the 1975 strike by South African armed forces into Angola in order to aid the UNITA and FNLA factions in their struggle against the Russian and Cuban-supported MPLA. However, on 19 December 1975 the US Senate, by a vote of 54 to 22, imposed a ban on all further American assistance, overt or covert, to the anti-communist forces in Angola. Unwilling to continue its military presence in Angola without American support, the South African Government withdrew its troops. On 31 March 1976, the UN Security Council denounced South Africa as an "aggressor" in Angola and the US did not veto this resolution, thus joining in the condemnation of South Africa and conveniently ignoring its own complicity.²

When the Carter Administration took over at the beginning of 1977, it was clear that the *rapprochement* period in US — SA military co-operation was quickly coming to an end. Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 25 1977, Andrew Young, the new US Ambassador to the United Nations, urged a hard line on South Africa and backed a global arms embargo against Pretoria. In a report to Congress on 11 July 1977, the policies of the Carter Administration were outlined in further detail. In subsequent statements by spokesmen of the new Administration during Congressional hearings and other public appearances, it became clear that actions were planned further to tighten the clamps on exports to South Africa of "dual use" equipment, such as that used in crime control and detection as well as "grey area" items not controlled before, (e.g. non-military gas masks, bullet-proof vests, helmets and shields, documentation authentication equipment, shotguns and aircraft which could be used for troop transport).

Following the domestic security crackdown in South Africa in October 1977, President Carter announced a further extension of the embargo on military-related equipment. This announcement was followed by active US efforts at the United Nations to organize a mandatory and total arms ban on South Africa under Chapter Seven of the Charter. This objective was achieved by means of Resolution 418 which was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 4 November 1977. Subsequently all forms of US — SA co-operation in the military field have ended.

c. Technological Co-operation

Technological co-operation between the United States and South Africa in the formal sense was essentially limited to the fields of nuclear and space research. The commencement of a formal programme of nuclear co-operation dates back to July 1957 when the two countries signed a ten-year agreement on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This agreement authorised the US Atomic Energy Commission to make available to the South African Atomic Energy Board (A.E.B.) certain quantities of enriched uranium — U-233 and U-235 and plutonium. From 1960 on senior staff members of the South African A.E.B. participated in training programmes in advanced nuclear technology in the US and several American scientists contributed to the development of the SAFARI-I reactor at Pelindaba near Pretoria. In 1967, the first agreement was renewed for another ten years and in 1973 a further ten-year agreement was made to supply enriched nuclear fuel for a planned nuclear power station at Koeberg, near Cape Town. The construction of the power station

was subsequently awarded to a French consortium and it is still uncertain whether the Carter Administration is prepared to honour the supply contracts signed in 1973. The Carter Government's policy towards South Africa regarding further nuclear co-operation, (including the supply of fuel for the power reactors presently under construction), is based on the condition that South Africa becomes a signatory to the 1968 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (N.P.T.), which would require South Africa to put all its facilities under international safeguards and inspection. This requirement was explicitly stated by Dr Z. Brzezinski, the President's National Security Adviser, in a memorandum dated 30 March 1978, submitted to the US Congressional Black Caucus.

Space co-operation between South Africa and the United States started in 1957 and led to the establishment in South Africa of three facilities for the US National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA): a minitrack radio tracking station, a camera optical tracking station and a deep space probe radio tracking station, all located at Hartebeesthoek, near Johannesburg. These facilities were operated by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (C.S.I.R.) on behalf of NASA. Although considerable importance was attached to these installations, the American space tracking operations in South Africa ended in 1975, and some of the facilities were taken over by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.

d. Economic Relations

Economic interaction can be regarded as the strongest link between the two countries and it is primarily manifested in the fields of trade and investment.

Trade. The overall trend in the US — SA trade pattern can be described as a steady increase in the volume of trade, with the US maintaining and increasing the trade balance in its favour.

The United States export profile reveals that South Africa occupies the eighteenth position in America's list of foreign clients and ranks first as a market for American goods on the African continent. In 1976, US exports to South Africa reached a peak of \$1.3-billion, representing about one-third of America's exports to Africa, (almost as much as the combined total of the next four trading partners — Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco), and this produces a favourable balance of \$423-million. In terms of American global exports, South Africa represents about one percent of the foreign market for American goods.

Viewed from the South African side, the volume of trade with the US takes on different proportions: in 1976 the United

States took the fourth position as importer of South African goods, (following the United Kingdom, Japan and West Germany) and took the first place as supplier of South African imports (21.4 percent of South African imports compared to the 18.1 percent supplied by West Germany, 17.8 percent supplied by the United Kingdom and 10.3 percent supplied by Japan).

Investment. Even more important than the volume of US trade with South Africa, is the growing value of US investments in South Africa, partly in the form of indirect investment (e.g. loans and equity investment), and partly in the form of direct investment (ownership).

Foreign investment was first attracted to South Africa with the discovery of gold and diamonds in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and foreign capital and markets have been essential ingredients in the substantial growth and evolution of the South African economy since that time. Since the early 1960's foreign investment has accounted for approximately 8 percent of South Africa's gross domestic investment, with domestic savings, providing the remainder. In 1976, South Africa held a minimum of \$9 billion in outstanding international credits representing an estimated 37 to 49 percent of total foreign investment at the end of 1976.³

The major national source of foreign investment capital has been and remains British, although there has been a trend towards greater US investment, particularly during the 1970's. In 1969, approximately 60 percent of South Africa's foreign liabilities were owed to Britain, approximately 20 percent to other European countries and approximately 14 percent to the United States. By the end of 1976, the U.S. percentage of foreign liabilities had climbed to 30 percent. The primary borrowers of international credit in South Africa are the public corporations such as ISCOR, ESCOM, the South African Railways and Harbours, the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, the S.A.B.C. and the South African Treasury. The primary US creditors include many of the largest international financial institutions: Chase Manhattan Bank, Citibank, Irving Trust Company, Bank of America, Centra National, Bank of Cleveland, Chemical Bank, Morgan Guarantee, Bank of Boston, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Wells Fargo Bank, etc.

The book value of American corporate investment in South Africa by 1976 was \$1 665-billion, or 37.3 percent of total American investment in Africa. Some three hundred and forty South African firms were American owned, wholly or in significant part, and the American companies involved represented a cross section of the biggest in American business. Out of the ten

largest American corporations, nine were included, as were one hundred and thirty six of the *Fortune* top five hundred. Amongst those are General Motors, Mobil Oil, Exxon, Ford Motor Company, General Electric, Firestone, Goodyear, 3-M, Caltex, Caterpillar, Coca-Cola, I.B.M., N.C.R., Otis Elevator, Union Carbide, Esso, Cyanamid, John Deere, International Harvester.

The Investors Responsibility Research Corporation (I.R.R.C.) estimates that US firms employ some one hundred thousand workers in South Africa, 70 percent of whom are blacks. American interests are concentrated in oil, motor vehicle and computer technology; comprising 43 percent of the petroleum market, 23 percent of the auto sales and 70 percent of the computer business in South Africa.

Ferguson and Cotter, pleading the case for economic pressure on South Africa, argue that US investment in South Africa amounts to barely more than one percent of total private investment overseas and yields about the same percentage of foreign earning. The implication here is that US divestment from South Africa would do little harm to the American economy. Foltz argues along the same lines, namely that "South Africa is important, but far from crucial, for these great corporations".⁴

e. Social and Cultural Relations

The scope and intensity of socio-cultural relations between the U.S. and South Africa is largely a function of interactions on the individual and collective levels between their citizens; by way of tourism, exchanges between scholars and professionals (through conferences, as well as study and research projects), general leadership exchange programmes, exchanges between performing artists, exchanges between religious organizations, literature, motion pictures, and last but not least, the news media (particularly newspapers and television).

In all of the above-mentioned fields, interaction is considerable and appears to be rapidly expanding. Despite the long distance separating the two countries, the gradual expansion of socio-cultural interaction is probably enhanced partly by the mutual use of the English language and arguably by the fact that both societies are struggling with the problem of race relations.

POLICY TRENDS

a. US Policy Trends

US policies towards South Africa in the years following World War II were marked by caution, compromise and muddle, by inconsistency between rhetoric and action and by a

low profile; ⁵ this was particularly true of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. South Africa was considered to be part of the British sphere of influence and in the United Nations, the US abstained from voting on resolutions concerning South Africa's domestic policies.

The years around 1960 mark a turning point in the trend of US — SA official policies as a result of a series of crucially significant events:

- (i) Black Africa leaped dramatically onto the world stage and forced upon the rest of the world a new awareness of the existence of the African continent.
- (ii) The black American Civil Rights Movement increasingly took a race-orientated turn with its "Black Consciousness" and "Black Power" rhetoric which stimulated the black thrust into electoral politics and resulted in a more active and aggressive role on the part of Afro-Americans in the shaping of American policy — particularly in respect of international issues in Southern Africa which involve colour conflict.
- (iii) The Sharpeville incident in March 1960, when more than sixty blacks were killed in confrontation with the South African police, gave a clear signal of the rising level of political, economic and social awareness on the part of the black South African urban masses and revealed the explosive nature of the black-white conflict in Southern Africa.

The changing face of the African map brought in its wake the creation of the Bureau of African Affairs in the Department of State in 1958, and in the same year, the US voted for a UN resolution which expressed regret and concern over South Africa's racial policies. The gradual hardening of official US attitudes was displayed by official reaction to the 1960 Sharpeville incident; in the form of a sharp State Department condemnation and US support for a condemnatory UN Security Council resolution.

The hardening of official American attitudes towards South Africa was well under way when the Kennedy Administration took office in 1961 and with the appointment of G. Mennen (Soapy) Williams as US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. The strength of verbal condemnations by the State Department increased and, during the Johnson Administration, the US imposed the aforementioned unilateral arms embargo on South Africa and also took an active part in the formulation of a UN Security Council resolution to create a committee of experts to study the feasibility and implications of imposing sanctions against South Africa. Then in 1966, the United States supported a UN resolution asking the Security Council to take all effective

measures to oust South Africa from South West Africa.

As recorded official American pressure on South Africa diminished slightly when the Nixon Administration came to power after the 1968 election. The foundations of the Nixon Administration's policy towards Southern Africa were laid down by the National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) of 1969 which in option II, advocated a "tilt" toward the white regimes in Southern Africa. During this period a key role was played by Dr Henry Kissinger, first as National Security Adviser and later as Secretary of State. Dr Kissinger attempted to introduce a measure of consistency in US policies towards Southern Africa in terms of goals such as the avoidance of a race war, preventing foreign intervention, preventing radicalization and promoting peaceful co-operation of the communities in Southern Africa. Regarding South Africa specifically, Dr Kissinger appeared to favour and follow a "carrot and stick" approach. In practical terms, this meant muting US protests against South Africa's domestic policies on the international forum in exchange for South Africa's assistance in solving problems in other areas of Southern Africa, specifically Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and South West Africa/Namibia. In the tradition of his "shuttle diplomacy" technique, Dr Kissinger was the first American Secretary of State to visit Pretoria, which he did in 1976.

The advent of the Carter Administration after the November 1976 election, brought about major changes in the official US policy towards South Africa as we have seen. The Administration's policy involves both serious public confrontation with South Africa and the threat of effective pressure. The Carter Administration has been most explicit about the linkage of Southern African issues with American Civil Rights issues and the Administration's commitment to Human Rights as a fundamental tenet of US foreign policy. Strongly worded denunciations of South African domestic policies have been included in several public policy statements by the various spokesmen of the Carter Administration, e.g. by the President, by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Security Adviser Dr Brzezinski, Vice-President Mondale, and UN Ambassadors Young and McHenry.

The Carter Administration's general policy approach towards Southern Africa appears to be predicated on the following assumptions:

- (i) That the central and northern parts of Africa (e.g. Nigeria) are likely to replace South Africa as significant trading partners for the United States.
- (ii) That far from being allies against communism, the white regime is considered a liability because it invites external

- intervention.
- (iii) That authentic black nationalists within South Africa are to be seen as America's natural allies in the long run.
 - (iv) That the United States, acting for the West, must be seen as a primary agent in the transformation of South West Africa, Rhodesia and South Africa to black majority rule.
 - (v) That serious public confrontation and the threat of effective pressure is necessary to guarantee the United States' credentials with both the O.A.U. and the so-called front-line states in order to establish a basis for long term co-operation, to facilitate the acceptance of compromise solutions in Zimbabwe and South West Africa/Namibia and to prepare the way for long term serious change within South Africa itself.
 - (vi) That the domestic situation in South Africa is not yet ripe for major structural changes in the balance of power between the races, but that such changes are likely to be brought about by better organized black leadership within the next decade.
 - (vii) That the United States should be able to establish good relations with South African blacks, and to influence future black leadership, through direct contacts made by black Americans and American black power theorists.
 - (viii) That the US should be prepared to risk alienating present white leadership on the grounds that it is going to have to change in the long run and that it has nowhere else to turn for support.

b. South African Policy Trends

Undoubtedly, official South African policy towards the United States has shifted from a position of marginal or limited interest to one of serious concern, but this shift in policy interest is more reactive than pro-active in nature. South Africa has been forced to take cognizance of the emergence of the US as a super-power, as leader of the West, of its growing involvement in Africa and (specifically in Southern Africa), as well as the considerations of the US domestic political forum.

The main tenets of South Africa's policy towards the United States can be summarised as follows:

- (i) Maximum feasible co-operation in the military and technological fields.
- (ii) Maximum feasible promotion of economic relations in the form of trade and capital investment.
- (iii) Maximum feasible dialogue and the widest possible dissemination of information on South Africa's domestic poli-

cies in order to promote a better understanding of the peculiar nature of South Africa's problems in the field of inter-group relations and the objectives of its policy of Separate Development.

- (iv) Maximum feasible co-operation with the United States and other Western powers towards reaching a peaceful settlement of other Southern African problems without creating a power vacuum in the regions which would, in her opinion, open the door for direct or indirect intrusion by communist forces.

CONCLUSION

Certain realities in the international, African as well as the domestic South African and American situations, can be expected to exert an important influence on the future course of US — SA relations and these may be summarized as follows:

- (i) *The decline in the relative importance to the United States of Southern Africa as compared to black Africa.*

This trend is clearly illustrated by changes in the relative roles of Nigeria and South Africa. Although South Africa's mineral resources remain important for the American economy, their political leverage is countered by the 38 percent of America's petroleum imports supplied by black Africa. Increasingly, multinational corporations which have some South African involvement are also getting involved in Nigerian operations. Economic relations with South Africa can therefore be expected to diminish as a constraint on American policy towards South Africa.⁶

- (ii) *The growth of black Africa's effective power in the arena of world politics.*

Because of their number and block voting practices, black African states are likely to wield growing power in multi-lateral institutions such as the United Nations. Both the United States and South Africa will have to pay more attention to their demands in order to bring about an internationally recognized settlement of the political conflicts in Southern Africa.

- (iii) *The increase in military intervention by communist forces.*

Although Western military forces have intervened in Africa since the 1880's, the Soviet-inspired intervention by means of Cuban and East German "proxy"-forces has placed external military intervention onto an unprecedented scale, particularly in Angola and Mozambique, and such intervention is not likely to diminish. On the contrary, it appears to provide a useful launching-pad for further

incursions into Southern Africa. The United States and other Western countries are not likely to mount a military response to deal with the eventuality of a large-scale Soviet-inspired military confrontation with South African forces. Only a direct and overt military campaign by the Soviet Union itself is likely to provoke a direct military response by the United States.

(iv) *Changes in American domestic politics*

Because of the black American thrust into electoral politics and the development of explicit linkages between black Americans and Southern African issues, Afro-Americans can be expected to take a more active and aggressive role in the shaping of America's foreign policy in future. To most black Americans, the issues in Southern Africa are those of race and not those of class or political ideology. Black Americans, the most westernized blacks in the world, are not interested in the ethnic dimensions of the conflict situation in Southern Africa, but are more likely to become increasingly involved with issues that are black and white in their dimensions; black/white dichotomics are more in line with the black American's sense of social urgency.⁷ In consequence, there is in the United States a racially conscious cadre of black politicians and activists who are actively concerned with American policy towards Southern Africa and who are likely to press radical demands — irrespective of their relevance to conditions in Southern Africa.

A further major change on the American domestic scene is the emergence of an intellectual climate characterised by a messianic sense of universal humanism. Its philosophical roots can be traced partly to the "New Left" movement which accompanied the campus revolt of the 1960's and partly to the moralistic zeal of the American people. This intellectual climate manifests itself *inter alia* in the widespread familiarity with, and acquiescence to, neo-Marxist thought among college students and also among many college graduates who are now entering the lower and middle-management ranks in the public and private sectors. Within the framework of this intellectual climate, Americans are less likely to be aroused by the threat of communist expansion or to be drawn into strategies designed to contain communist subversion. The spread of neo-Marxism in Third World countries is not considered to be incongruent with US national interests — even if those countries maintain their distance from the West and introduce socialist patterns of development. The new generation of foreign

policy-makers is likely to replace the more traditional "power-realist approach" with the "planetary-humanist approach".⁸

An upshot of these changes on the American domestic scene is an avalanche of anti-South African pressure groups; amongst which are church, college protesters, black organisations and individual activists. This mass-media orientated, anti-South African campaign is becoming increasingly bent on punishing white South Africa and less dedicated to winning a better life for South African blacks and coloured people. The radical movements enjoy unusual access to policy-makers and top executive circles and they are pressing hard for more extreme measures against South Africa. Amongst these measures are the following:

- to downgrade the US diplomatic mission in South Africa;
- to eliminate US Commercial, Defence and Agricultural Attaches to South Africa;
- to deny tax credits to US companies which invest in South Africa;
- to withdraw facilities of the US Government which promote the flow of capital or credit to South Africa;
- to end the US — SA co-operative agreement on nuclear technology and research as well as export licenses for export of nuclear materials to South Africa;
- to initiate UN Security Council action against South Africa;
- to support Congressional action to pass legislation placing economic and diplomatic sanctions on South Africa;
- to place a moratorium on all US — SA exchange programmes, and
- to strongly affirm a US policy calling for black rule in South Africa in terms of one or other blueprint and timetable.

Despite the growing demands on the US Government to impose extreme measures, disengagement does not seem to be a real option open to the United States. Punitive action against what is considered "white" South Africa may be intensified, but in the long run the US would still be confronted with the realities of the domestic South African situation and its impact on African and world politics. Given its own diverse, multi-racial society and moral concerns, the United States will continue to have a special interest in Southern Africa.

(v) *Changes in South African domestic politics*

The proper understanding of South African domestic politics requires due consideration of the basic forces that have given shape to the current situation. These may be summarized as follows:

- (a) The exceptional heterogeneity in the South African population encompassing deep cleavages (e.g. in terms of race, language, religion, culture, socio-economic class and ethnicity) which provide a fertile seedbed for polarized and hostile cumulative conflict.
- (b) The high degree of economic interdependence between the various population groups brought about by a process of rapid industrialization and urbanization during the past four decades.
- (c) The concentration of most forms of institutionalized political and economic power in the hands of the dominant white minority which is strongly pre-occupied with its own survival in the face of the danger of being swamped by the numerically preponderant blacks.
- (d) The growing power aspirations on the part of the black, coloured and Indian population groups who are demanding a share in, if not a preponderant control of, the exercise of governmental power.

The most important change is the rapidly rising level of political, economic and social awareness on the part of all the black population groups. This change calls for a very substantial transformation of existing social economic and political structures that is bound to go much further than anything contemplated by the present leadership — black and white. Some changes will eliminate the causes of humiliations, grievances and discontent on the level of specific problems relating to the everyday lives of many South African blacks, such as differential salary and wage structures, inequalities in the provision of public services (education, training, housing, entertainment and recreation etc), injudicious application of influx control, injuries to personal dignity in situations of inter-personal contact (the ban on mixed marriages and inter-racial sexual intercourse), restraints on home ownership and the general exercise of individual freedoms. Other changes of a more fundamental nature will affect the overall pattern of constitutional development such as the territorial or geopolitical dimension, systems of representation, inter-governmental relations and the institutionalization of power-sharing.

Because the continuation of a white-dominated political

and economic power structure in South Africa is regarded by US policy-makers as a net political liability, any change in South African domestic politics which does not produce black rule, is not likely to be considered as congruent with American ideals and interests. But an immediate and complete transformation of this nature does not seem possible or likely — unless it is brought about by the employment of large-scale external armed intervention or by means of an internal violent revolution, or both methods simultaneously. Large-scale violence, however, is not an eventuality that either a South African Government or a United States Government can allow to materialize.

South Africa is not going to escape the great pressures resulting from a rapid pace of change — pressures which could easily result in political paralysis and a considerable amount of violence. Therefore the key to a peaceful transformation towards a more equitable dispensation lies essentially in the proper timing of the pace of change.

It is also clear that South Africa's future will have to be worked out in an "age of discontinuities". It is a future that will not be determined by the momentum of a few straight line trends, but by many forces working in several directions. The internal rivals for political power will continue to transmit conflicting signals to the outside world and short-term alliances and polarities are going to complicate the task of foreign-policy analysts who would be trying to make reasoned assessments of local conditions.

One thing is certain, however, and that is that for years to come the American and South African societies are going to be stuck with each other — for better or worse.

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- 3 *Report of the Subcommittee on African Affairs to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate* Washington, United States Government Printing Office 1978 pp 21-49
- 4 W J Foltz 'United States Policy Toward Southern Africa, Economic and Strategic Constraints', *Political Science Quarterly* vol 92, no 1, 1977 p 50
- 5 A. Lake, *Caution and concern — the Making of American Policy Toward South Africa* Princeton University, 1974 p 69
- 6 W J Foltz, "United States Policy Toward Southern Africa Economic and Strategic Constraints", pp 47-54
- 7 J K. Obatala, "Black Consciousness and American Policy in Africa", Said and Summons, *Ethnicity in an International Context* New Jersey, Transaction Books, pp 64-65
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Symposium

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA : A DIALOGUE OF THE DEAF?

Deon Geldenhuys

The rediscovery of South Africa

There has of late been a remarkable resurgence in American interest in South Africa, judging by the rising tide of American politicians, officials, academics, businessmen, journalists and others traversing our shores. South Africans naturally wonder about the reasons behind the growing American presence. Is it perhaps some kind of *coincidental spill-over* from their interest in the Rhodesian situation? Or is it a deliberate result of that interest? If so, is the assumption that the domino principle is operative : *come Zimbabwe so follow inevitably Namibia and then Azania?* Related is the possibility that Americans are keen to demonstrate their solidarity with the heirs to Azania well in time, so as to try and ensure that a successor regime would look favourably upon the United States. Or does their interest flow from a perfectly reasonable concern about the possibility of escalating Soviet interference in the affairs of the subcontinent and a corresponding decline in American influence?

A different consideration might be that South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha's new domestic initiatives have produced renewed interest in South Africa and perhaps even managed to shake some of the long-nourished American preconceptions about the inability of the South African political system to reform through its own internal dynamics. Other Americans are perhaps simply caught up in the momentum of the growing interest in South Africa : this country's domestic situation has long been something of an *American growth industry* and has recently gained considerable momentum. In this respect, domestic American factors have certainly played a role; such as the *increasing black American involvement* with South African issues and the Carter Administration's vacillating policy towards the Republic. Nonetheless, the bandwagon is rolling and seats are at a premium.

Obviously, there could also be several other explanations for current American interest in South Africa. For example, it could simply be a *legitimate academic interest*, albeit related to the "school of thought" (if any) that the particular visitor adheres to on Southern African issues — radical, liberal or conservative. But however many reasons there are and however sincerely they are held by Americans, the chances are that South Africans will find different explanations to those Americans would offer, because of different and often conflicting perceptions of

motives. It can safely be assumed that South Africans — white or black — would find it hard to believe that American visitors are influenced by purely humanitarian and altruistic considerations, that they are overflowing with the milk of human kindness. Instead, South Africans will tend to seek explanations in various less noble motives.

The difficulty of dialogue : the American make-up

The South African tendency to question American motives is, in turn, the product of the long process of estrangement between South Africans and Americans. The cumulative effect of this is that it makes a meaningful dialogue with American visitors that much more difficult. This, however, is only the beginning of the problems in an American-South African dialogue.

The second problem is so old and has been so tenaciously seized upon by local defenders of the *status quo* that the mere mention of it could be considered old-fashioned or stereotype, if not offensive. Nonetheless, the degree of knowledge Americans have of South Africa remains a very real problem. At issue is not a superficial knowledge of the South African political ABC; rather, it is the frame of reference for analysing the South African scene. It may be safely assumed that for the overwhelming majority of American visitors, the situation is examined in terms of a simple white-black confrontation and this is the all-pervasive issue. While it would be futile to deny that white-black relations are indeed South Africa's primary domestic political issue, the question is whether the white ruling/oppressive minority versus black subordinate/suppressed majority dichotomy provides an adequate frame of reference for the purposes of a thorough analysis of South African society. (Assuming, of course, that this is the real objective of American visitors).

The terms of the white political debate in South Africa are inexorably moving towards strategies for political accommodation between white and black. To understand this requires an insight into the workings of white, and more specifically, Afrikaner Nationalist politics. It can legitimately be asked whether the army of American commentators/observers/analysts are familiar with the terms of the debate within the ranks of the Afrikaner Nationalist establishment. Furthermore, it can be asked whether the foreign visitors have a sufficient grasp of the divisions within the ranks of the National Party and in Afrikanerdom generally, which could act as continuous constraints on the Government. For all this, an elementary prerequisite is an understanding of the Afrikaans language. Or do the visitors simply glean their

“knowledge” of this vital component of the political scene from second and third-hand reports in local English or even American newspapers and, in so doing, ignore the growing library of Afrikaans books on political issues?

A much more arduous task facing American visitors is to try and comprehend the terms of the black political debate. This is a perplexing matter even for the best informed local observer, because of the relative absence of tested organs of political expression, particularly in the urban black areas. Yet, it is crucial to take cognizance of the undercurrents in black politics — something which is not encouraged by the adoption of a rigid white-black confrontation framework.

The third problem is somewhat related to the second, and deals with the value positions taken up by Americans analysing the South African situation. It would be naïve — and totally unreasonable — to expect any foreigner to adopt a “value free” approach to this country’s problems. This issue lies in the all too common tendency to adopt positions predicated upon American liberal values and to judge the local situation in terms of that perspective. Part of this tendency is to project the “American experience”, specifically the trials and tribulations of the Civil Rights Movement, onto the South African scene and to seek “solutions” in terms of this great “experience”. This equation of the local situation with America’s is itself often the product of an insufficient understanding of South African politics. A rider can be added to this third problem : it seems somewhat strange that at least some of the Americans who readily draw a parallel between their and South Africa’s racial problems, are also the ones who use the simplistic white-black confrontation approach. Is one then to conclude that they see the local (SA) “confrontation” as not all that serious after all? Or, alternatively, that the Civil Rights struggle was as daunting an experience as that of finding solutions for South Africa’s racial problems?

The fourth problem flows from the third, *viz.* the different, often conflicting, cognitive frameworks employed by Americans and South Africans for assessing change in the Republic. This, in turn, touches upon the different perceptions of the nature of the South African polity. The South African Government, articulating the views of the vast majority of whites, sees the country as composed of separate ethnic groups; political structures are then built on ethnic lines. “Progress”, in this context, is thus measured in terms of giving substance to the dictates of political (and also social and even to some extent economic) separatism. For the international community, by contrast, this constitutes regression-cum-repression; “progress” is measured in terms of

dismantling separatism. Nowadays, there would seem some measure of convergence between the two notions of "progress" in view of local moves towards liberalising separatism in the economic, social and ultimately also political spheres. Yet, as long as the ethnic basis of South Africa's political structure remains intact and the United States (like other Western countries) tends to equate this with racism, different cognitive maps will still be used, with all the attendant conflict.

The rejection of political dispensations predicated upon the pluralism of South African society leads to a fifth problem : a tendency to discount individuals and organisations "working within the system". This reveals a certain determinism in the approach to South Africa : the tide of black liberation, so the typical argument runs, will inevitably engulf South Africa and turn it into black-ruled Azania. Farsightedness, or mere common sense, it is then claimed, demands that American visitors (and no doubt also resident American officials) should make timely overtures to the black heirs of the country. These inheritors are members of the exiled "liberation movements" and local blacks who have risen to prominence through, on the one hand, their outspoken opposition to the Government, its structures created for blacks and blacks co-operating within them and, on the other, their identification with black consciousness and the "liberation movements". The fear that America may again be caught on the side of the losers (as in Iran) adds urgency to the need to come "on side" in South Africa well in time. In choosing these heirs, Americans of course indulge in a selective exercise, the more so when bearing in mind that the popular following of some of their earmarked successors has never been put to the test — (which, of course, is not to deny that these black leaders may enjoy a substantial following). Through their identification, or simply contact, with some elements in the black community and their exclusion of others, some Americans at least — officials and others — in effect act as kingmakers. This not only antagonises whites; it infuriates those blacks who are relegated to the periphery (or even further) by Americans. The feeling is understandable enough if one of the condemned organisations happens to be the largest formal black political movement yet seen in South Africa. To play down such an organisation is, moreover, demonstrating a bad sense of political realism : politics is, after all, about power and influence (however unpalatable or Machiavellian it may sound). By so doing, Americans may run the risk of achieving what they hope to avoid : backing the wrong horse in South Africa, too. A further consequence of the tendency to listen to, identify with or bolster select

black groups or individuals, is that it can further complicate the search for a compromise between white and black in the Republic itself. It is within the ranks of those "radical" (in strictly white South African terms) blacks for whom Americans show such a marked preference, that the willingness to compromise is smallest. It can of course be argued that the Americans, through their contacts with these groups, hope to engender some moderation in their views and influence them towards a compromise. It is, however, difficult to accept this against the background of the thought patterns identified above, such as the notion that a black-ruled Azania is an inevitability. It can also be questioned whether the Americans are really credible mediators between the various elements, both black and white. The nagging question, common to all local groups, is bound to be the following : can we really rely on the Americans to back us up once the going gets tough? Or will the Americans switch horses in mid-stream if they fear they have backed the wrong one(s)?

The sixth problem, which is a consequence of the fifth, is really a case of American double talk. On the one hand, Americans are usually quick to assure South Africans that America could not and should not, dictate a political solution to South Africa and that it is up to South Africans to work out a political formula acceptable to all its people(s) — America will thus not prescribe to South Africa. On the other hand (and in almost the same breath), Americans are keen to impose a series of provisos — black homelands are not acceptable; whites, coloureds and Indians ought not to be politically differentiated; homeland leaders are of little, if any, consequence and hardly worth involving in the constitutional debate, etc. This amounts to telling South Africans; "You are perfectly free to decide on any political dispensation you wish, provided we approve". White South Africans are, however, bound to wonder whether American approval or disapproval will in the final instance be shaped by black Africa's response — even if it does not meet with America's known commitment to democracy and human rights.

Finally, Americans often tend to approach their country's relations with South Africa as if it were simply a bilateral relationship between a superpower and a weak and recalcitrant small state and in which other countries play the role of impassive spectators. This kind of premise easily leads to the notion that the United States could pressurize South Africa into making the domestic changes Americans desire, if only the United States showed the will to do so. This is clearly a highly simplistic view to hold and reflects an illusion of power. The reality is that South Africa's external relations are a web of complex political and

economic relationships with numerous other states, both Western and non-Western. This necessarily limits the tangible impact on South Africa of unilateral punitive action on the part of the United States. In addition, South Africa's inherent economic strength and its role as an exporter of strategic minerals serve as further brakes on American pressure. On the political front, America also faces constraints, both domestic and from other Western powers. Of course, South Africa is far from invulnerable to external pressures, but any assumption that it would inevitably submit to American pressure is simply unrealistic./

The difficulty of dialogue : the South African make-up

Having identified a number of problem areas on the American side, one of course has to acknowledge that just as it takes two to tango, it requires a duo for dialogue. South Africans, too, contribute to the difficulties in ensuring a meaningful American-South African dialogue. (Since this essay is primarily concerned with the American approach to the Republic, the South African "make-up" will be considered only very briefly).

First, there is a wide lack of local understanding of the extraordinary complexity of the American foreign policy process, when compared with that of South Africa itself. It is particularly with regard to the variety of domestic American factors — both official and unofficial — impacting on foreign policy making, that South Africans find themselves insufficiently informed. The fact is easily overlooked that American policy towards South Africa is essentially a compromise — the outcome of weighing up a variety of often competing and conflicting pressures and influences.

Second, there is considerable local confusion about America's real stance on South Africa, caused by the (seeming) diversity of voices purporting to speak on behalf of the United States Government and, of course, also by apparent contradictions in American statements and actions regarding South Africa. All this was vividly illustrated in Prime Minister Vorster's lament; "If I only know what it (*i.e.* U.S. policy towards South Africa) was. Candidly we don't know what it is. However, the little we know about United States policy towards South Africa, we don't understand at all. We fail to understand why the State Department adopts this (read: hostile) attitude towards us".

The third major problem on the South African side is a strong tendency to underestimate, if not to discount, the present commitment of the United States to the promotion of human rights worldwide. This has led to the mistaken belief that South Africa could succeed in taking its cause to the American people over the heads of the Administration.

A fourth and related difficulty is that South Africans — both white and black, though for different reasons — tend to question America's determination and indeed sincerity in bringing about political change in the Republic. Although there may be good reason to be sceptical on both counts, it would be wrong to assume that the United States is either unable, or unwilling, to take action against South Africa. The viability of the ends and means of such action is, of course, an entirely different matter.

Fifth, President Carter's pre-Afghanistan view of the world — détente, Soviet intentions and America's role — coupled with America's Vietnam syndrome, was difficult for South Africans to comprehend, since they held a markedly different perception of Soviet motives and actions. Perhaps President Carter's rediscovery of Soviet imperialism could help to narrow this divide.

Finally, white South Africans in particular should spare a thought for the fact that the American visitors they are exposed to are very seldom of truly radical persuasion (in US terms). The thorough-going radicals are simply unlikely to be allowed to visit South Africa. A further sobering thought to bear in mind is that although South Africa may be of primary concern to the Americans visiting the country, it is presently by no means a primary foreign policy issue for either the US Government or the American people in general.

Conclusion

It has to be conceded, of course, that this examination has inevitably been based on generalisations regarding both American and South African attitudes. Needless to say, there are many and important exceptions to the rule on both sides. These, however, would not seem to detract substantively from the main thrust of the argument. The gist of it is that, generally speaking, American visitors and South Africans are both encumbered by a compound of preconceptions and faulty perceptions of each other. The problems deserve to be recognised and hopefully tackled, lest what should be a vital meeting of open, informed and critical minds degenerates into a dialogue of the deaf.

Symposium

FOREIGN PRESSURES ON SOUTH AFRICA : THE THUMB-SCREW AS CONCEPTUAL FRAME

Newell M. Stultz

To begin with a simple and indeed commonplace idea: all of us, when looking at a new and unfamiliar problem — whether it be fixing the home lawnmower, raising our children, or thinking through how to encourage change in South Africa — organize

our perception of that particular reality according to some explicit, or more likely implicit, conceptual frame. Standing apart from, and prior to the data itself, this frame will suggest what is important and what is not. It also ordinarily includes a sense of the dynamic of the subject under consideration — how its parts work together. When made explicit and formalized in general terms, this “understanding” becomes, in the case of the social world, social science theory. However, conceptual frames are not all equally valid: they may be silly or insightful, useful or dangerous. One can sense which, by seeing how well they work out in practice, but here the cost of failure may commend a less expensive form of evaluation. Alternately (and this is certainly the better preliminary step), one can seek to make conceptual frames explicit so as to expose for testing against both logic and experience their important assumptions, and propositional statements linking causes and presumed effects.

This paper aims at examining the conceptual frame that lies behind a particular set of pressures on South Africa which are now being advocated in the United States, particularly arguments and recommendations presented by Harvard law Professor (and former Ambassador) Clyde Ferguson and William R. Cotter (at the time President of the African-American Institute, and now President of Colby College in Maine) in their January 1978 article in *Foreign Affairs*,¹ entitled “South Africa: What is to be done.” Put briefly, Ferguson and Cotter recommend a policy of (in their own words) “tightening the screws” on South Africa, which is the basis for the choice of the metaphor of the “thumb-screw” to characterize the point of view they adopt.

The piece was of course, written as a *critique* of American policy towards South Africa and not as an expression or endorsement of it. Arguably, however, their thinking can be taken as an indication of the direction in which American policy is likely to move in the years ahead, indeed may already be moving. They themselves report that the graduated forty-one steps they suggest are (or at least were in 1978) “under active consideration by the Carter Administration”.

Their statement also has the practical advantage of being a very full and candid expression of its point of view, thus facilitating the analysis that follows. Its theoretical premises are for the most part understated, however, which is the justification for this present exercise; and this becomes very obvious when one compares the Ferguson and Cotter reasoning with that commonly contained in discussions of the “radical” policy option with which their proposal is, in a sense, in direct ideological competition.

Speaking in July 1978, Professor Hedley Bull described this “radical” option as follows: it would have the West seek “in common with the Third World and socialist states — to subvert the present system in South Africa, or at all events to remove the obstacles that its present links with South Africa place in the way of a radical challenge to the system from within”.² Reading various expressions of the position, one cannot fail to be impressed by the deliberate and explicit theoretical preoccupations of many of its proponents. This is also true of quite a different argument, the so-called O’Dowd thesis concerning the (presumed) inverse relationship between race discrimination and economic growth, and the Western foreign policy option (re South Africa) known as “constructive engagement” with which it is obviously linked.

In all these cases, the fact that the arguments are structured by explicit theory imposes upon those making them an intellectual accountability which can only be essential when the stakes of the dispute in human and material terms are so great. However, this kind of intellectual accountability appears to be lacking in much contemporary discussion in the United States concerning that country’s relations with the Republic, including to some extent the article here under review. Certainly it cannot be completely intellectually responsible to contemplate “meaningful” sanctions upon another society far away, with but only the most hazy conception of what the consequences of those sanctions are likely to be.

The metaphor of the thumb-screw suggests a number of important features of the Ferguson and Cotter conceptual frame and these will be briefly mentioned together before turning to a separate treatment of three of them at greater length.

One is dealing here with a simple, two-person, zero-sum “game”: one of the parties, Washington, seeks to impose its will in certain policy areas on the other, Pretoria; Pretoria resists because it is in its material self-interest to follow different policy options. However, asymmetric relations between the two parties, favouring Washington, give it leverage (the thumb-screw) over Pretoria. It is thus only necessary for Washington to apply its leverage, i.e. to “tighten the screws”, until the discomfiture this causes Pretoria, together with domestic pressures, just overcomes the value to Pretoria of pursuing its preferred course, i.e. the *status quo*. At this point Pretoria can be expected to accede to Washington’s will. As this decision is irreversible once it has been made and implemented, Washington can thereafter “loosen the screws” and the game ends.

1. Rationality

The model (a term taken here to be synonymous with theory) assumes that both actors are rational and rationality in this sense is akin to classical "economic rationality" and takes on a rather technical meaning. Quoting Anthony Downs, a rational man can be expected to act as follows: when faced with a range of alternatives, he ranks each of them in the order of his preference, and this preference ranking is transitive (capable of being set out on a one-dimensional scale). He then chooses from among the possible alternatives the one that ranks highest in his preference ordering.³ Rationality is thus a calculating intelligence.

Two implications of this are critical for our purposes. First, whatever the values that the current pattern of race relations in the Republic underpin for South African whites, these are negotiable. In the ongoing debate among social scientists in this country and elsewhere as to whether the source of race discrimination in South Africa lies foremostly in the ethnicity or class interests of the whites, Ferguson and Cotter opt for the latter. Here, of course, the well-worn view in social science that ethnic values are especially resistant to bargaining is being adopted, and that these commonly involve their adherents' conceptions of the sacred ends of society — ("consummatory values", to quote David Apter.) Readers of the Ferguson and Cotter article cannot fail to note that they return again and again to the issue of the "acceptability" or not of certain sorts of change to white South Africans. Clearly they believe that with sufficient pressure white South Africans will accept racial democracy by some reasonable definition of the term. In this they are in good company, academically speaking*, though obviously the neo-Marxists will be unimpressed by their belief that important social change can be realized without a thorough restructuring of South African capitalism. But the view that Afrikaners, in particular, will commit their future as a community once and for all to the decision-making of a non-Afrikaans majority, if only the price is right, is by no means universally accepted among responsible scholars, which is the point being made.

There is another point concerning this issue of the negotiability of social values that can be briefly mentioned here. Johan Galtung noted in 1967 that what he calls the "naive" theory of economic warfare (the thumb-screw approach in this discussion) sees an essentially direct linear relationship between two variables of value-deprivation and political disintegration. That is, the more deprivation, the more disintegration. But, Galtung

* For example Herbert Adam, Herman Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer

says, this conception fails "to take into account the possibility that value-deprivation may initially lead to political *integration* and only later — perhaps much later, or even never — to political disintegration." The probability of such an outcome is increased, he says, when three conditions are found: (i) the attack from outside is perceived to be on the group as a whole; (ii) there is weak identification with the attacker; and (iii) no alternative value system is seen as better.⁴ Obviously, the relevance of these conditions to contemporary South Africa varies rather greatly depending upon whether one is calculating the reaction to external pressures of just the white population, or of the country as a whole. But if our concern is the impact of foreign pressures on the members of the regime directly (and this seems to be Ferguson and Cotter's concern), Galtung, at least, would have us believe that the short-term consequence of the Ferguson and Cotter programme may be to create social conditions under which more, rather than less, individual sacrifice is possible.

The second implication is of more important consequence for our model in a negative sense. It is that the decisions of both governmental actors can be taken as rational decisions. At issue here is whether government decision-making is rational. This is a generalizable problem that has received a good deal of attention in American political science over the past decade. Here the familiar scholarly name is Professor Graham Allison, now Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard.

In 1969 (at the height of the Viet Nam war, when many in the United States doubted that the American war policy was rational), Allison published an article dealing with alternative conceptual models for understanding the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.⁵ Allison's argument can be reduced to three linked propositions:

- i. First, in Allison's own words, is that "analysts think about problems of foreign and military policy in terms of largely implicit conceptual models that have significant consequences for the content of their thought". This is, of course, the premise of this article, for which, obviously, a considerable debt is owed to Allison.
- ii. Second, that "most analysts explain (and predict) the behavior of national governments in terms of various forms of one basic model", which Allison terms the "rational policy model". The essence of this approach is the conception of the nation, or the government as a unitary, rational decision-maker, or actor. This actor is taken to have (a) one set

of specified goals, (b) one set of perceived options, and (c) a single estimate of the consequences that would flow from each alternative, were it chosen. This is the implicit operating assumption of the Ferguson and Cotter proposals with respect to both Pretoria and Washington, *i.e.* that both are capable of acting rationally.

- iii. Third, that the rational policy model is a gross and dangerous simplification of reality, and that two other approaches provide "a base for improved explanation and prediction." One approach he terms the "organizational process model". Here the foreign policy actor is not a monolithic nation, or government, but rather a loosely allied organization on top of which sit the governmental leaders. The second approach Allison calls "bureaucratic politics". Here the actor is neither a unitary nation nor a conglomerate of organizations, but instead a number of individual players. In both cases — the organizational process model and the bureaucratic politics model, (a) conflicting goals are present, (b) there is no agreed-upon set of perceived options, and (c) relevant personalities differ on the consequences they believe would flow from alternative courses of action. In brief, decision-making is not at all rational according to the definition of rationality that was given at the outset of this article. This is not to say that it is irrational, or absurd, but that it results from compromise and bargaining and that the product of this process can be appreciably different from what a single, rational individual might decide.

It is fair to say that Allison's insights represent the new conventional wisdom. The issue is then not whether the decision-making under consideration departs from the rational policy model, but by how much it departs. Regarding the making of South African policy, a view that political pluralism is not much of a factor is underwritten by the country's unitary political structure and the political dominance of the National Party in recent decades, together with the reputation of leaders of that party for centralized (some would say autocratic) decision-making. One recalls Edwin Munger's 1965 suggestion that the three most important individuals in the formulation of South African foreign policy were all Dr Verwoerd.

On the other hand, it now appears that the central government in Pretoria is deliberately deferring to the judgments of local authorities for the elimination of many so-called petty apartheid regulations — theater segregation and the like. The result is a confusing patchwork of norms that does little to foster goodwill for the regime either at home or overseas. One is not

sure what to make of this delegation of responsibility, especially when the policy is contrasted with the forthright attitude of the government in the matter of recognizing African trade unions: does it reflect domestic political necessity, or is it (as some think) a device to evade pressures for unwanted changes?

Overall, one is sanguine about the capacity of the South African regime to react to pressures upon it with intelligence and dispatch, although there is an arena of Allison's bureaucratic politics here that is too easily ignored by foreign observers. It is certainly the case that foreign pressures on South Africa are not felt equally by all members of the country's political establishment, to say nothing of differences in short-term motives that are inevitably found from individual to individual.

There is, of course, an expression of this problem of Allison's bureaucratic politics on the other side of the Atlantic as well. Not all proponents of "turning the screws" on South Africa seek liberal reform in South Africa, let alone all the members of the UN or the OAU with whom Ferguson and Cotter recommend America co-ordinate its efforts. In the words of one group of American activist scholars:

Elimination of discriminatory laws, alone, will not restore the region's mines, farms and factories to the people. The liberation movements call, not simply for the right to vote, but for the people's right to shape their own forms of social control over the region's wealth.

This is the language of the radical challenge to South Africa mentioned by Hedley Bull in his words quoted earlier. Ferguson and Cotter expressly exclude from their proposals trade sanctions against South Africa and military support to liberation groups, and this sets them apart from much, if not all, of the anti-apartheid movement, most of whose members appear openly revolutionary in purpose. But these groups are generally united on the merits of the pressures Ferguson and Cotter do advocate. Thus it is that certain anti-apartheid groups differ with Ferguson and Cotter concerning the point at which a "loosening of the screws" should begin. Could these anti-apartheid forces block such a decision, as black African states blocked South Africa's re-admission to the Olympic Games in 1968 after the IOC had voted in favour of such a move? It cannot be known for sure, because although in the United States the anti-apartheid groups are still without significant political power — that power appears to be growing. However, if American decision-making in this matter is going to be "bureaucratic" rather than "rational", an appreciation of this should in all likelihood stiffen the resolve of white South Africa to resist American pres-

tures. For while, under certain circumstances, it may be rational for the South African regime to co-operate in its own reform, it can scarcely be expected to assist in its own overthrow without far greater pressures being placed upon it than those contemplated here.

2. Sequence

One of the most interesting features of the Ferguson and Cotter approach is that while the forty-one steps they discuss to increase pressure on South Africa are each very specific, and of limited scope, the change they repeatedly mention as the one they wish to see these pressures encourage is obviously central to the problem in South Africa and politically far-reaching. This is the object of multi-racial dialogue within South Africa concerning the country's future, *i.e.* a representative national "conference" leading to "power sharing".

There are at least three exceptions to this relationship of the specific and limited to the fundamental. Two recommendations (28 and 29) are directed at ensuring "fair employment" practices within American firms operating in the Republic, while another (15) seeks a more open South African visa-granting policy. However, most of these recommendations do not mention or imply a response in South Africa that would be at all proportionate to the weight of the external inducement. Instead it appears that Ferguson and Cotter expect the South African regime to agree to transform itself "fundamentally" in order to relieve a variety of pressures none of which taken individually is fundamental to its survival. Indeed, many of these pressures must be said to be relatively minor from the standpoint of the persistence capability of the regime, eg. the threat to suspend sporting contacts with the United States, reduce American tourism to the Republic, and end (or reduce) landing rights for South African Airways in New York, (recommendations 11, 33 and 39 respectively). Put this way, it is clear that Ferguson and Cotter do not envisage a process of slow and incremental change in the Republic, one step leading to the next, with many of the external sanctions tailored to encouraging a specific but limited result. Rather, they obviously foresee a process of accumulating pressures which upon reaching some overall breaking point, or critical threshold in the tolerance of the regime, bring forth fairly rapidly the desired comprehensive transformation. (From the world of geology, this is the imagery of earthquake rather than of — as Ferguson and Cotter would surely agree — continental drift.)

Three things can be said about this earthquake conception of

how social change in South Africa might occur. First, in a reversal of the idea that "a chain is only as strong as its weakest link", it attacks apartheid at one of its strongest points, *i.e.*, white fear of loss of political self determination. Ferguson's and Cotter's reasonable insistence that white South Africans should not be allowed a permanent veto over the agenda for change in their country has blinded them to a simple sociological truth; namely that some social attitudes are more easily changed, are more *malleable* than others. By making a relatively imalleable social attitude the prime focus, they seem to at least delay the possibility of making substantial progress regarding more malleable social attitudes.

The second point is that the earthquake conception of "fundamental" change tends to see change as an event rather than a process. In particular, it makes nothing of Lawrence Schlemmer's observation that there are certain sorts of change which are likely to lead to other changes — a chain reaction of changes.⁷

Yet it is obviously the case that the malleability of any particular social attitude is not a given, but can itself vary given an appropriate setting. In 1966, for example, Percy Cohen, the British sociologist, hypothesized nine situations that should contribute to increased malleability of a given social attitude, among them situations characterized by (i) less involuted (involved) social relationships, (ii) less isolated social groups, (iii) less authoritarianism, and so forth.⁸ Sociologically speaking, Ferguson and Cotter might better adopt a strategy of trying to affect those features of South African society that contribute to the social attitudes they reject, instead of focusing upon the attitudes themselves (and especially the most imalleable of them) directly.

One of these basic causes, incidentally, according to Cohen, is the *hostility in-group members feel concerning out-group members*. It is interesting to speculate how foreign pressures on South Africa themselves affect such feelings on the part of those in power in the Republic.

The third point has to do with time. At best, the Ferguson and Cotter approach seems destined to produce no change defined by them as "significant" for some considerable period. Given the passions involved in the world outside regarding apartheid (as South African policy continues to be characterized abroad); passions which it seems to me many white South Africans underestimate; it appears inevitable that the Fergusons and Cotters of this world will become ever more frustrated, and identify white South Africa and not at all their own method as the principle cause of their frustration. The result will almost inevitably be an

increased readiness on the part of such individuals to endorse what Ferguson and Cotter call "highly controversial items", namely cessation of trade, withdrawal of current investment, military support for liberation forces, etc — the programme of the "radical revisionists", to quote David Yudelman.⁹ In the long run, the Ferguson and Cotter approach may well lead logically to its own abandonment, may "self-destruct" (in the vernacular), not because its goals are unworthy or impossible to realize in some ultimate sense, but because it is likely to have nothing to show for its efforts, as it defines success, for a very long time.

Of course, it may be suggested that the true significance of the Ferguson and Cotter forty-one steps should be seen in their "expressive" function rather than in their "instrumental" function, that is, their function of permitting the communication of moral disapproval. Indeed, this is an interpretation that is underwritten by the essentially symbolic nature of so many of these steps, or their low value-deprivation potential from the point of view of the Pretoria regime, but not all these steps lack "bite", assuming they were implemented. Recommendation 39, for example, would prohibit the importation of all South African goods into the United States on grounds of the allegation that they are produced by "slave labour", and the penultimate suggestion is that the United States deliberately depress the world gold price to reduce the Republic's foreign exchange earnings. While there may well be several functions being served concurrently in the articulation of these forty-one steps, it would seem to be wishful thinking on the part of white South Africans not to take seriously the determination of Ferguson and Cotter, and the many who think as they do in the United States, to "get results" in the Republic from the leverage they believe that country has in South Africa.

3. Resources

We now come to the question of resources-for-action, which would appear critical for the Ferguson and Cotter argument. Is American leverage over South Africa really appropriately represented by the metaphor of the thumb-screw, or have these Americans exaggerated their country's possible influence? It may not be unfair to these authors to begin this section by noting that the cut-off of Iranian oil to South Africa, which is referred to in their forty-first and (according to their account) most stringent recommendation, has in fact already occurred — with no apparent change in the daily lives of most South Africans. This appears to underline an adaptability of the regime to which Ferguson and Cotter would seem to pay insufficient heed.

Indeed, the very fact that the pressures Ferguson and Cotter outlined would not be applied all at once, but piecemeal in a graduated fashion, would seem to mean that the ability of the South African regime to adapt to these challenges would be significantly enhanced.

In 1965, Amelia C. Leiss published, with the help of a West Point US Army major, a paper analyzing the military requirements of an invasion and occupation of South Africa.¹⁰ The context was the expectation that the Republic might resist a judgment contrary to its wishes in the case regarding South West Africa which was then pending before the International Court of Justice. Leiss's conclusion was that from a purely military viewpoint, collective military measures against South Africa could succeed at tolerable costs to the West, given only the necessary political will. Fifteen years later, America's Viet Nam experience having largely occurred in the interim, it seems clear that there is no possibility of any Western state going to war against South Africa of its own volition. Were there to be such a war, one can scarcely doubt that South Africa would lose it, though not before inflicting great suffering upon its aggressor. There will probably be no such war, unless of course South Africa should begin it, a possibility one can dismiss out of hand.

American pressures then, assuming there are to be such on South Africa, will be essentially pacific in nature, if not entirely passive, though some will argue that the more extreme of these pressures would actually serve to promote rebellion in South Africa by, for example, throwing thousands of blacks out of work. (Indeed, Ferguson's and Cotter's odd approving reference at the end of their paper to the idea of white moderates taking to the streets in civil disobedience against the regime would seem to come close to conceding the point.) However, after reading a variety of discussions of American pressures on the Republic, and of foreign pressures generally, one is struck by the wide variation that exists in the perspectives of presumed experts, particularly the *non-agreement* among them as to how free of external influence the Republic really is.

Ferguson and Cotter themselves believe the "shopping list" of possible American actions short of mandatory economic sanctions to be "enormous", suggesting great cumulative power. Similarly, in arguing against the so-called "citadel assumption" of South African invulnerability to outside pressures, Pauline Baker, (who was shortly to join the staff of US Senator Dick Clark), wrote in 1976:

It is not inconceivable that what are regarded as Lilliputian threats to the maintenance of separate development may

ultimately subdue the Gulliverian giant.¹¹

Two years later a colleague of mine, Ann Seidman, and her daughter, Neva Makgetla, concluded that "without the continuing contribution made by United States transnational companies, it seems unlikely that the white-minority regime in South Africa could continue to maintain and expand its modern military establishment".¹²

Now consider the following contrasting statements, which while perhaps not logically incompatible with the foregoing, suggest quite a different overall appraisal of South Africa's inherent strength. Concerning the Republic's military position, Richard Betts, an analyst with the Brookings Institution in Washington, wrote last year that: "Given South Africa's geographic position and the weakness of black African states, there is realistically no conventional threat that Pretoria could not handle easily".¹³ Somewhat earlier Robert Schrire decided that "the Americans lack the effective leverage to induce the South African Government to comply with their demands".¹⁴ And after a most thorough empirical examination of the question, the economist Arnt Spandau concluded that "there is little doubt that even a one hundred percent investment boycott would not have dealt South Africa a death blow" in 1976.¹⁵ In a sense the image in these matters is as significant as the reality. Lawrence Schlemmer's observation thus may be important that "white South Africans, quite correctly, do not see their country as helplessly dependent on the West".¹⁶

While it is tempting to try to explain the difference between these two sets of quotations in terms of some variation of the "illusion of American omnipotence" and an appropriate Afrikaner parallel — to show objectivity, a non-psychological approach is more useful. After all, Ferguson and Cotter do not claim that America can, or should, "topple" the South African Government all by itself. They believe white South Africa can be forced to go to the bargaining table by American pressures acting in the context of other international and domestic pressures on the Republic. In this connection, it seems to me significant that the Ferguson and Cotter, Baker, and Seidman and Makgetla pieces quoted above, were all written shortly after the 1976 Soweto riots and were clearly influenced by them. For their parts, the other commentators, writing perhaps at greater distance — temporal or otherwise — from Soweto, seem more ready to consider United States pressures in isolation, divorced particularly from the local scene.

One comes to share Schrire's estimate that the United States stands far more alone in the world than many American com-

mentators appear to grant, in its economic freedom of action to pressurise South Africa. South Africa's other major trading partners are simply too dependent upon their economic relations with the Republic to make it feasible for them to contemplate a protracted period of economic warfare against Pretoria. However, standing alone, American influence, even should it be marshalled forthrightly is not going to be decisive.

On the other hand, one cannot be sanguine about the prospects for unending domestic tranquility in South Africa. Thus in the event of what the game-theorists call a "worst case" scenario, it seems to be that American pressures on South Africa would be less of an inducement than Ferguson and Cotter believe, but more serious for the country than many South Africans apparently accept. Were the domestic scene to remain calm, American pressures would be bothersome and annoying, but fairly easily compensated for. Granted there is an important difference between these two outcomes from a white South African perspective, however in both cases the role of the United States would be relatively minor.

It is, of course, not impossible to imagine a train of events that might bring all of South Africa's major trading partners into concerted action against her. Permanent intransigence on the part of Pretoria in its dealings with the United Nations over Namibia might bring this result, as could some Sharpeville-like event which particularly outraged the conscience of millions in the West. Much of the "divestiture" discussion in the West today should be seen as an extremely adept public education effort directed at preparing the way for such a moment. However, the campaign such concerted action would support would clearly not be one directed at graduated pressures, but at sudden, irresistible economic and conceivably even military sanctions. In estimating the likely success of an effort such as this, the following finding of Professor Spandau seems especially telling:

A fifty per cent export boycott would be accompanied by inconceivable hardship. Some 1.1 million people would become unemployed, and the very poorest would be affected most severely. In fact, more than half a million blacks presently employed in mining and agriculture would join the ranks of the 'industrial reserve army'. The decline in income payments would come to about R2.6 billion; whites and non-whites alike would be thrown into distress.¹⁷

In conclusion, one might focus on two quite separate questions.

First, this paper has attempted to give exclusive attention to empirical matters, especially presumptions of cause and effect,

yet one should be sensitive to the normative implications that are contained in the Ferguson and Cotter proposals. Unquestionably, there is presumption in the most basic premise of the article that South Africa's internal arrangements are somehow the business of Americans. Arguments on this matter have in the past tended to focus on the proposition that apartheid represents a threat to world peace, or that the uniqueness of official race discrimination in the contemporary world somehow gives the rest of us the right to intervene, but more impressive is a newer argument which has in fact an empirical base. It is that it is illogical (dishonest) for a foreign country which has (to take the American case) nearly 2 billion dollars invested here, and which in 1977 was South Africa's second most important overall trading partner, to argue that its citizens are not contributing to the "persistence" (to use David Easton's word) of the South African political system. However, one is not persuaded by the companion argument, which radicals often introduce, that mere foreign recognition of the South African regime gives essential legitimacy to apartheid. Nonetheless an impressive material stake in a society does inevitably create its own network of obligations and one must concur with Philip Mason's 1964 conclusion that South Africa is the world's business: "It can no longer be held that its internal affairs are purely domestic".¹⁸

The problem, of course, is to define the nature of these external obligations and in particular to identify effective empirical means for responsibly discharging them. The overall conclusion of this paper is that the thumb-screw approach to South Africa will certainly fail measured against its own purposes, foremostly because it misconstrues the extent of American influence. It could only work and maybe not even then, were the external world to present South Africa with a united front which seems most unlikely at present.

It is perhaps not surprising that the Ferguson and Cotter approach is so poorly designed, for to some extent it is a compromise of fundamentally different points of view. Ferguson and Cotter desire to be "tough", but recognizing the limitations of American political will, they rule out most of the really "tough" weapons the United States may have before even getting to the first of their forty-one points. In the case of many of these points, what they are suggesting are symbolic gestures — appointment of a black American as US Ambassador, or relatively minor assistance, *i.e.* travel documents, to liberation groups. However gratifying such actions might be to South African blacks — and no doubt they would serve to raise black morale — they could only be annoying "pinpricks" to the regime

in Pretoria.

The second and final question that I wish to raise, but cannot yet answer fully is, "So What?" Is anything of value lost as a result of this American self-deception? In trying to do too much, do we forfeit worthwhile opportunities we might otherwise have? Or do we actually contribute to outcomes we might not wish to see, *i.e.* reaction or revolution? One is repeatedly told that American influence on official and white South Africa has never been less, due to reactions against a number of seemingly loosely related happenings, among them Vice President Mondale's Vienna reference to "one man, one vote", any number of statements made at different times by Ambassador Young, and (most important) the perception that the American Government failed to uphold promises to support South Africa in 1975 in Angola. The South African Cabinet, it is said, has decided to ignore American pressure and advice which are regarded as self-serving and often offensive and uninformed.

Yet in quite a different vein, Alexander Johnston of the University of Natal states in a recent book review that "even a modest amount of pressure can contribute to the erosion of a target state's legitimacy" and "provide openings and precedents for lobbyists intent on further, incremental pressures". It is only when "arbitrary and apocalyptic criteria of 'effectiveness' are raised", Johnston continues disapprovingly, "that the seriousness of international pressures ... on South Africa is in doubt".¹⁹

Early in their article, Ferguson and Cotter declare that "left to itself, South African society appears to possess neither the will nor the resources to effect fundamental alterations in its political structure through a non-violent process". Of course, one cannot know for sure, though arguably most foreign observers of South Africa over the past thirty years would agree with this appraisal. Could it be, then, as inferred from Johnston's remarks, that some sort of causal link does exist between Ferguson and Cotter, representing a class of foreign pressures on the Republic, and the National Party's present commitment to change, such as it is. Although none of us expects ever to find his own thumb in a thumb-screw, just hearing others talk of such a possibility tends to focus the mind.

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LOMÉ II : THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE

Klaus Baron von der Ropp

Aspects of West European Development Policy

It took about a year of tough bargaining, marked by a number of crises, before the convention of Lomé (II) — named after the Togolese capital where it was originally signed — was finalised on 31 October 1979, and certain provisions of the Convention came into force on 1 March 1980. Lomé II, as the new Convention is usually called, marks an unbroken succession of treaties of a similar nature, i.e. the Conventions of Yaoundé I and II and Lomé I. Like Lomé II, the previous Conventions also had a validity of five years. The parties to Lomé II are the nine EEC nations and no less than forty-two countries of sub-Saharan Africa,* ten of the Caribbean and seven of the South-Western Pacific, collectively dubbed the ACP states.¹

There is still hope that, notwithstanding Soviet pressure, the Peoples Republics of Angola and Mozambique will join the Convention which embraces EC co-operation with the majority of the world's least developed countries in the fields of trade, finance, technology, industry and agriculture. Considering that the EC supported Portugal in its colonial wars out of which Mozambique and Angola emerged as independent states in the mid-70s, the very fact that they attended the Lomé II negotia-

It is understood that Zimbabwe will apply for membership of Lomé II

tions as observers should be regarded as a breakthrough. This success is further enhanced by the fact that both these states have had to depend largely on the help of the USSR, the German Democratic Republic (the GDR) and Cuba to preserve their precarious domestic stability.

Lomé II must be viewed in context with a number of existing or nascent co-operation agreements between the European Community and other Third World nations. Of particular interest in this connection are the treaties with the Mediterranean countries and the co-operation with the member nations of ASEAN. The latter link has been particularly promoted by Bonn Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher and has been finalised by formal treaties.

Furthermore, Lomé II must be seen in conjunction with the benefits which the EC⁺ Commission in Brussels grants the developing countries. These benefits include the important general system of tariff preferences, food assistance, and special measures for emergencies plus a certain amount of financial and technical assistance for non-ACP countries.

However, the Lomé Treaties tower over all comparative treaties of this nature in terms of volume of aid, trade preferences granted and political relevance in general. As such, Lomé II should be seen as the nub of common West European development policy.

The main initiator of Lomé I and II, the able and energetic EC Commissioner Claude Cheysson, some time ago in an interview told the Abidjan (Ivory Coast) daily *Fraternité Matin* (12 June 1979) that co-operation after Lomé was a "*dialogue Nord-Sud en famille*". This might be an exaggeration, but, after the virtual total failure of UNCTAD V in Manila (May 1979) — from the perspective point of the developing countries — and the likely intensification of the international distribution struggle as a result, Lomé appears as a rare case of fruitful multilateral co-operation between the industrialised and the underdeveloped countries. After all, 45 per cent of the UNCTAD V participants are parties to the Lomé II Convention.

It is worth noting as a peripheral issue that periodic reports about institutionalised co-operation between Comecon and ACP countries such as Jamaica, Guyana, the Peoples Republic of Congo and Ethiopia (plus, of course, Angola and Mozambique) or indeed their impending membership of Comecon are probably without foundation. Comecon and its member states lack Third World experience with which the EC is richly endowed —

⁺ Whilst the Lomé Treaty is formally signed between the EEC and the ACP states, for the sake of convenience we shall regard all three European Communities as a single one; the European Community (EC)

primarily because of the membership of France and Britain in the EC — and its funds seem to be largely exhausted due to development assistance to Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam.² It can thus be assumed that in the 1980's any kind of co-operation with *Comecon* is no viable alternative — even for the so-called progressive ACP states — to co-operation with Western Europe within the framework of the Lomé Convention.

However, the experience with UNCTAD V ultimately indicates that the forthcoming gigantic distribution struggle will take place primarily between West and South rather than between East and South. The opening speech for the Lomé II negotiations in July 1978 by P.J. Patterson — then president of the ACP Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister of Jamaica — demonstrated the extent to which the Third World demand for a new international economic order dominates all West-South talks. According to Patterson EC-ACP negotiations were an important step for the ACP countries in the realisation of their ideas of a radical change of the existing international economic order. Bonn Foreign Minister Genscher, on the other hand, speaking as President of the EC Council of Ministers, restricted himself to referring to Lomé I as a model of co-operation among partners and saying that this would be consolidated in Lomé II.

It is therefore not surprising that the Lomé II talks were frequently marked by serious differences. In the ACP camp it was primarily the delegates of particularly Jamaica and Barbados and Nigeria who were prominent in this respect, and they were fairly successful in introducing the aggressive UNCTAD — type tone in the Brussels negotiations. This aggressiveness following the failures of UNCTAD IV and V, makes the conclusion of the Lomé II negotiations virtually on schedule even more remarkable and praiseworthy.

Dialogue Nord-Sud en famille or EEC-ACP Confrontation?

Naturally the Lomé II talks were only occasionally attended by the sixty-eight ministers concerned within the framework of the joint meetings of the EC and ACP Councils of Ministers. As a rule, the EC Commission, authorised by the EC Council of Ministers, negotiated with the President of the ACP Council of Ministers. They were assisted by members of the nine EEC Governments and the Ambassadors' Committee of the ACP nations.

It is well known that the ideas of the ACP countries on the re-shaping of their ties with Western Europe differed greatly. Most of the Francophone countries, for instance, were — and still are — quite conciliatory in their bargaining. A considerable number

of Anglophone countries, on the other hand, put forward tough demands in a manner that was often not diplomatic. The Nigerians frequently used a very sharp tone; but it should be borne in mind that, as with Lomé I, they stood to benefit relatively little, except in the field of industrial co-operation. It is also noteworthy that the general expressions of dissatisfaction by ACP states in 1978/79 were much more vehement than in the Lomé I negotiations five years earlier. Such divisions made it particularly important for the fifty-nine ACP countries to have an institution in Brussels that attempted to co-ordinate their diverging ideas. Considering that Lomé II is essentially a West European-African Convention, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) had sought to take the initiative in a number of instances: forty-two of the fifty-nine ACP countries (plus Angola and Mozambique) are OAU members. However, all attempts by the OAU to involve itself in the negotiations foundered on the fact that the OAU is a purely political organisation, and as such may be ill-equipped to deal with the international economic relations because it lacks the necessary expertise and specialised knowledge. The absence of the OAU, which attended the latest Lomé talks only in observer status lends importance for the co-ordination of the ideas for the fifty-nine developing countries to the Brussels-based ACP Secretariat headed by the very able Malian Tieoulé Konate.

The most important elements of the new, and in many instances very complicated, Lomé Convention are briefly depicted and evaluated below. It should be noted at the outset that many differences of opinion remained until the signing of the Convention and have apparently meant that certain passages of Lomé II are less precise than those of Lomé I. In other words, differences of opinion that remained until the very end were apparently solved only through vague formulations in the text of the Convention, which leaves them open to interpretation.

(i) Trade

Expectedly provisions governing trade were the focal point of the Lomé II discussions and negotiations. The ACP countries continue to view unhampered access for *all* their products to the large industrial markets as a *prerequisite* for sustained growth and a smooth integration of their national economies into the world economy and there can be no escaping the fact that the trade privileges granted to the ACP countries in the EC market, whilst generous on paper, have been subject to *continuous* erosion. Although ACP exports to Western Europe doubled from 1970 to 1976, the proportion of EC imports from ACP countries

fell from 6.7 to 6.4 per cent. The fact that in the first quarter of 1979, the ACP countries for the first time achieved a surplus of 600 million accounting units* in their trade with the EC area should not give rise to too much optimism because this figure was primarily based on raw materials. The oil producers Nigeria and Gabon and the copper exporters Zaire and Zambia have benefited, on the other hand the exports of the Cameroon, Ghana and Kenya fell.

In most exportable goods, the ACP countries are so uncompetitive that they have been unable to keep pace with the progressive and world-wide liberalisation of EC trade. Moreover, the enlargement of the EC with the addition of three relatively highly-developed developing countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal) may hamper the competitiveness of the ACP nations. Furthermore, this southwards widening of the community may also shift limited development funds from the ACP region southwards in Europe itself.

As a matter of principle, Lomé I granted the products of ACP countries free access to Community markets, only a number of agricultural products, the so-called Agriculture Market Order goods, were exempted from the principle. These provisions have applied since February 1975, when Lomé I came into force, without reciprocity for EC exports to the ACP countries. In other words, a lopsided free trade zone operated in regard to this issue and Lomé II adheres to this system. It recognises the fact that the weaker parties to the treaty should enjoy special protection in their trade with industrialised countries. Pointing to the great importance of the export of single crop agricultural goods for some of the ACP nations, (for example: beef for Botswana), the ACP countries insisted that the EC abolish import duties and other levies for Agriculture Market Order goods exports as well. At the very least they maintain that these economies should be granted Most Favoured Nation status such as granted in other EC Preference Agreements. The Europeans have to a limited degree acceded to the wishes for further trade liberalisation. While the two above mentioned ACP demands were turned down, some existing duty-free ceilings in favour of the ACP countries were enlarged or redrafted to include additional products: this concerns import quotas for beef, tomatoes, carrots, onions and some other goods.

A paper of the EC Commission that was distributed before negotiations, promulgated the idea that the investment and, hence, trade policies of the ACP countries should be influenced by *compulsory* consultations within the framework of Lomé II.

One unit of account (ua) = † DM 2.63/ £0.60/\$US 1.40

This proposal, somewhat rashly dubbed as an attempt at government investment control, clearly bore the stamp of the French Socialist, Claude Cheysson. It was hoped that this would prevent the ACP countries from increasingly producing goods that are unsuitable for the vital EC market. The initiative was however turned down by both parties — naturally for very different reasons.

Notwithstanding ACP opposition, Lomé II also contains a protective clause in favour of the EC and its members. It follows essentially the clause in Lomé I which enables the EC to hamper the import to Western Europe of certain ACP products in case of serious possible disturbance for one of the sectors of the Community's economy. For instance: this could involve making it more difficult to export textiles to EC countries whose textile industries are struggling against unemployment, however this protective clause has never been used so far.

The industrial potential of the ACP countries is small and, as a result, their products are frequently not very competitive. After all, Tanzania is not a Singapore nor is Nigeria a South Korea, and there is no change in sight. What can change, however, is the economic situation in Western Europe, and this could make the electorate call for protectionist measures against everybody.

One of the new features in Lomé II is that any invocation of the protective clause must be preceded by consultations with the ACP country concerned. In fact, the ACP nations even went so far as to demand a contractually binding co-determination on this which was naturally unsuccessful.

(ii) **Stabilisation of Export Earnings**

Much has been written — and rightly so — about the disastrous consequences of fluctuating commodity prices for the economies of developing countries. To propound only a market economy thesis in this connection would, in the case of many ACP countries, be tantamount to degrading them to the role of recipients of aid that would have the character of permanent subsidies. With this in mind, Lomé I in a major innovation, introduced a system for the Stabilisation of Export Earnings (STABEX) for a number of important agricultural products and iron ore. The system provides limited protection against export shortfalls caused by unfavourable economic conditions, *i.e.* diminished demand in the EC or by reduced production due to natural disasters, and becomes operational only when a number of conditions have been met; above all, that the export of a specific commodity be of considerable importance for the economy of the ACP country concerned. Depending on the

degree of development in the recipient country, STABEX payments are made either in the form of a non-repayable grant or as a loan on extremely favourable terms.

Under Lomé I — and this shows one of its limitations — the STABEX system had a fund totalling 382 million units of account. The importance which the ACP countries attributed to the STABEX system is also demonstrated by their demand that *all* their export goods be put on the STABEX list in Lomé II. If nothing else, the enormous cost to the EEC should have made it obvious from the very beginning that such a demand could not be met.

Despite these hurdles, the European Community made a number of remarkable concessions on STABEX in Lomé II. Thus, for instance, the list now includes forty-four agricultural products. Moreover, the terms under which a country can claim STABEX funds have been improved and the so-called triggering threshold lowered. In addition, the fund has been raised to 500 million units of account for the duration of Lomé II.

Under the STABEX system the only mineral covered was iron ore and there is a likelihood that iron ore will also be struck from the list under Lomé II. The EEC intends to pursue a different course regarding minerals and it has managed to persist with this intention at talks with the ACP group. The new system does not involve measures to stabilise export earnings — notwithstanding the fact that it is occasionally misleadingly referred to as a STABEX system for minerals. Instead, the EEC provides credits to the tune of 280 million accounting units. These credits are structured as a blend of an investment policy, EEC raw materials interests and bridging facilities in case of shortfalls in earning. The system can thus be termed as a minerals crisis fund.

(iii) The EEC-ACP Minerals Crisis Fund

Like STABEX, the new system also applies only to products whose export is of particular importance to individual ACP countries. Under the existing agreement, these include copper and cobalt (Zambia, Zaire and Papua-New Guinea), phosphates (Senegal and Togo), bauxite and aluminium (Guyana, Guinea-Conakry, Surinam and Jamaica), manganese (Gabon), tin (Ruanda) and, under special provisions, iron ore (Liberia and, later, Mauretania).

The minerals support mechanism is triggered when — due to natural disasters, technical breakdowns or political unrest — massive earnings or production shortfalls (10 per cent) occur and when the export dependence threshold in the preceding four years has averaged 15 per cent or 10 per cent for the least

developed countries, such loans carry an interest rate of 1 per cent and are repayable within thirty years after a ten-year period of grace.

The system has come under considerable attack by Zambia, Zaire, Papua-New Guinea and Mauretania. They argue that the Community's sole objective is to preserve those production capacities in times of crisis that serve its own economies with minerals. What they wanted instead, was a stabilisation of their export earnings in the interest of sustained development. The exclusion from the list of a number of minerals (among them chrome, graphite and perhaps uranium) has also come under fire. The ACP group even went so far as to consider voicing this criticism in an official unilateral declaration on Lomé II.

(iv) EEC-ACP Financial Co-operation

Even a newspaper like *Le Monde*, which strongly sympathises with the ideas and interests of the Third World, reported relatively little on the course and results of the Lomé II talks, although the sharp dispute over the volume of the new European Development Fund (EDF) was widely publicised. The dispute led in May 1979 to an indefinite adjournment — at a time when, according to the French, which then presided over the talks, the Convention should have been closed. The ideas of the two sides appeared simply too far apart to be bridged. On the one hand the ACP group demanded that the EDF should be tripled for Lomé II: an increase from 3.17 billion to 10.5 billion accounting units. Their main argument was that of general inflation, the excessive price increases for industrial goods which they customarily buy in Western Europe and the increased number of ACP countries to fifty-nine (and soon possibly sixty-two).

The Community, on the other hand, argued that these factors had been taken into account by raising the Fund for Lomé II to 5.1 billion units of account. Justifiably, the EC pointed to the large bilateral development contributions made by its members and the Community's own (and still to be increased) development aid outside the European Development Fund — primarily payments under the Sugar Protocol, imports of beef and food assistance etc.

These arguments and the widespread concern among ACP countries that a further delay in signing Lomé II would lead to a vacuum once Lomé I expired finally led to a compromise. The outcome was very close to the original ideas of the EC and was thus far removed from those of the ACP group. It was agreed that the EC provide 3.712 billion units of account between 1980 and 1985 and that the European Investment Bank provide an

additional 685 million units of account. Added to this are 180 million units of account from the EC budget for the maintenance of the so-called "Euroembassies" in ACP countries plus, from the European Development Fund, 550 million and 280 million units of account for the financing of STABEX and the minerals crisis fund respectively.

Moreover — and this is another innovation — the European Investment Bank (EIB) is to provide another 200 million units of account for technical assistance in the development and exploitation of ore deposits.

The above initiatives should be viewed in conjunction with the stagnation and the subsequent decline of West European investments in the ACP region over the past few years. Mining was particularly badly hit by these declining developments. These were due not only to siting disadvantages but in many instances also to legal uncertainty, *i.e.* inadequate or nonexistent investment safeguards. It thus remains to be seen whether the EEC will succeed in realising its intention to conclude special investment protection agreements with the ACP countries concerned in order to promote these mining industry projects.

(v) Special Co-operation In the Sectors of Industry and Agriculture

Apart from the Brussels Centre for Industrial Development which has been in existence for some years, a new centre for Agro-technical Co-operation is now to be established, though this will be rather poorly funded. Both institutions are meant to act as mediator between interested business circles in the EEC and ACP regions. It remains to be seen, however, whether the new institution will succeed in making even a moderate contribution towards relieving the frequently extreme agricultural malaise in many ACP countries.

Anyone comparing the agricultures of most African states during the colonial era with conditions in 1980 will frequently find that there has been a continuous decline. Apart from South Africa and Zimbabwe, only Kenya can feed itself from its domestic production. Yet there used to be a considerable number of states that could do so during colonial rule. Many black African governments have either no agricultural policy at all or at best an extremely poor one: Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, Uganda and Nigeria are telling examples of this phenomenon.

(vi) Investment Safeguards

The important problem of investment safeguards, under Lomé II, was unable to be solved satisfactorily. The original intention was to include a relevant clause in the text of Lomé I, but

this would have lagged behind the five major provisions of a classical investment protection clause. The introduction of such a passage in Lomé I was opposed by some of the so-called progressive ACP countries, as they argued that this was inconsistent with their national sovereignty. As a result of this uncertainty Europeans now have little interest in investing in many of the ACP states and only occasionally can this situation be alleviated by bilateral agreements. The political weight behind an extensive investment protection clause as part of an encompassing multilateral treaty would of course be incomparably greater than that of mere bilateral agreements. But the Lomé II negotiations showed that countries such as Ethiopia, Tanzania, Benin or Madagascar are simply not prepared to include such clauses in Lomé - type conventions because they considered them politically intolerable.

It should not go unmentioned that the West European countries were themselves unable to reach agreement on whether Lomé II should contain at least a modified and less stringent investment protection clause. For the three EEC countries (West Germany, Britain and France) that have satisfactory bilateral agreements on investment safeguards with a considerable number of ACP countries, this would naturally have meant a worsening of their legal positions for their own network of investment guarantees would have been prejudiced.

The majority of the ACP countries realised that Lomé II should have offered more safeguards for West European business interests in order to mobilise additional private sector funds for their own development. A Belgian initiative that took primarily the interests of the smaller EEC countries into account seemed to point a way out of the dilemma. This was the development of a type of "most favoured nation" clause, contractually granted by an ACP country to an EEC member, wherein investment protection would be extended to all other EEC nations. Judging by the little that has become known about this plan, it did not generate a breakthrough, but it brought some improvement in the legal position of Lomé I where this issue was incorporated in the insubstantial Article 38.

Perhaps a possible Lomé III (1985 to 1990) will contain a clause that will go further and will largely correspond to a classical investment protection clause. If not, West European business might well continue to favour countries outside black Africa for investment.

(vii) The Handling of Some Political Issues

The question whether Lomé II should contain a Human

Rights clause was a bone of contention at the Brussels negotiations from the first day. It was primarily the events during the eight-year terror regime of Idi Amin in Uganda, one of the ACP states, that prompted this issue. Yielding to pressure from London, the EC Council of Ministers in its declaration of 21 June 1976, deplored the conditions in that country and resolved that aid granted to Uganda under Lomé I be structured in such a manner as to prevent the Kampala Government from using it for the suppression of its own people.

Although such a step seemed politically justifiable, it was in terms of international law somewhat questionable. Since Lomé I contains no clause to the effect that development aid must ultimately and in the broadest sense serve to realise Human Rights, the 1976 declaration of the EC Council of Ministers unilaterally interfered with Lomé I and as a result, probably violated international law. The insertion in Lomé II of a limited Human Rights clause was intended to clarify the future legal position. It is worth noting in this connection that the Brussels authorities certainly had detailed information on the terror regimes of Macias Nguema (Equatorial Guinea) and Jean-Bedel Bokassa (Central African Empire) even before the two dictators were toppled, and that the same applies to similar regimes in the ACP region.

It is understandable that the EEC pressed to make the granting of future development aid contingent on the observance of a few fundamental human rights. However the ACP group vehemently opposed this and its objections gained the upper hand in the end. Its main line of rebuttal was the supposedly purely economic nature of Lomé II and the dubious contention that such a clause would amount to interference by the EEC in the domestic affairs of other countries.

The parliament-like EC-ACP bodies, *i.e.* the Consultative Assembly and its Representative Committee, will as in the past, devote attention to the problems of Southern Africa (especially South Africa) and the policy of EC countries towards that region, and this could provide an opportunity to develop a constructive South Africa policy. Naturally, this would have to amount to more than a vehement and unconditional condemnation of South Africa's internal system of institutionalised racism, justified though this may be. Instead, it should also — and with the same vehemence — demand that the apartheid regime be replaced by a new order for South Africa — an order that would also provide a future for the white and the brown Africans who have been part of the country for more than three centuries. This

would have to include permanent copper-bottomed guarantees securing the white and the brown Africans' right to existence.

Such an approach is frequently overlooked for reasons of political opportunism or ideological conviction. A March 1979 "Report of the Committee on Development and Co-operation" of the European Parliament was particularly gratifying because it was recognised that a solution to South Africa's problems lay in either "a federation *sui generis*" or in "genuine partition". It is however extremely disconcerting that this report was redrafted a short while later and was denuded of many of its constructive elements.

Adoption by the EC and the EC-ACP authorities of the often one-sided theses of the OAU and the United Nations cannot solve the problems of the Republic of South Africa. Perhaps hope will only dawn once the conflicts in and over the Republic of South Africa have become even more acute. It is at that point that, within the framework of Western Europe, the Governments of Britain and France, which are simply more competent in such matters, will have to seek an equitable compromise to solve this explosive conflict.

All politically relevant groups and parties of Western Europe are certainly agreed that the compromise to be realised can only be drafted by a National Convention of all important groups of black, white and brown South Africans. Only thus will it be possible to prevent South Africa from eventually being engulfed by an inferno — and impose an intolerable burden on ACP-EEC co-operation.

Seen in this light, Lomé II might not only bring many economic advantages to Africans and Europeans as well as to the Caribbean and Pacific peoples, but could also be a contributing factor in bringing one of the most dangerous regional conflicts closer to a peaceful solution.

NOTES

1. *Parties to the Convention:*

ACP Countries

Original 46

Africa

Benin
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon

Central African Republic
Chad
Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Ivory Coast
Kenya

Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Upper Volta
Zaire
Zambia

Caribbean

Bahamas
Barbados
Grenada
Guyana
Jamaica
Trinidad and Tobago

Pacific

Fiji
Tonga
Western Samoa

Additional 13

Cape Verde
Comoros
Dominica
Djibouti
Kiribati
Papua New Guinea
Sao Tome/Principe
Seychelles
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Solomon Islands
Surinam
Tuvalu

EEC 9

Belgium
Denmark
France
Fed. Rep. of Germany
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
United Kingdom

France:

Overseas Departments

Guadeloupe
Guiana
Martinique
Reunion
St. Pierre et Miquelon

Territories

New Hebrides (Anglo-French Condominium)
Mayotte
New Caledonia and Dependencies
French Polynesia
French Southern and Antarctic Territories
Wallis and Futuna Islands

Netherlands:

Overseas Countries

Netherlands Antilles
Aruba
Bonaire
Curacao
Saba
St. Eustatius
St. Martin

Britain:

Overseas Countries and Territories

New Hebrides (Anglo-French Condominium)
Anguilla
Belize
British Antarctic Territory
British Indian Ocean Territory
British Virgin Islands
Brunei
Cayman Islands
Falkland Islands
Montserrat
Nevis and Anguilla
Pitcairn Island
St. Helena and Dependencies
St. Kitts
Turks and Caicos Island

- 2 Important pioneering work in the East's alliance with the "South" is to be found in Siegfried Kupper, "Akte Programme für schwierige Aufgaben / Zur 33. Tagung des RGW" in *Deutschland Archiv* Cologne 1979, no. 8 pp. 794-797 and Jürgen Notzold "Die RGW-Staaten und der Nord-Süd-Dialog" in *Außenpolitik* 2/79, pp. 192-209.
- 3 For a discussion on such guarantees see Jürgen Blenck and Klaus Baron von der Ropp, "Republic of South Africa - Is Partition a Solution?" in *South African Journal of African Affairs*, Pretoria vol. 7, no. 1, 1977 pp. 21-32 and Klaus Baron von der Ropp, "Is Territorial Partition a Strategy for Peaceful change in South Africa?" in *International Affairs Bulletin*, Johannesburg vol. 3, no. 1, June 1979 pp. 36-47.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE RISE AND CRISIS OF AFRIKANER POWER

Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee

David Philip, Cape Town, 1979. 308 pp.

SOUTH AFRICA'S OPTIONS: STRATEGIES FOR SHARING POWER.

F. van Zyl Slabbert and David Welsh

David Philip, Cape Town, 1979. 196 pp.

SOUTH AFRICA AFTER VORSTER

M.T.W. Arnheim

Howard Timmins Publishers, Cape Town, 1979. 203 pp.

Pioneer societies are strongly inclined to consider their history as being almost entirely made by the purposeful application of man's energies and ingenuity. And in the same light their futures are seen to depend significantly on acts of human will. So it is not surprising that writings on the present and future political state of South Africa generally tend to assume that critical turning points in the history of societies are manipulable. In these essays the format is fairly standard. The historical and political conditions of South Africa are interpreted and possible futures are envisaged. These futures are then presented to South Africans in the form of choices to be made now or in short years ahead.

This essentially is the analytical sequence followed in these books under review. *Heribert Adam* describes a veritable Hobson's choice with which he argues the Afrikaner establishment will soon be confronted. His main point is that the cost of "privilege maintenance" has risen sharply in recent years and that it will keep escalating. He foresees continued international pressure, especially from Western powers, an increasing reluctance on the part of multinationals to invest in South Africa, domestic inflation, unemployment, heightened racial tension and conflict. Ultimately, Adam insists, Afrikaner power holders will have to decide whether to endure high costs or to make an attempt to reverse trends by new policies. If the former stance is adopted, Adam says that only two outcomes are possible. Either the Afrikaner establishment will be progressively weakened by rising costs, or splits will occur and new political alliances will emerge. *Hermann Giliomee's* superb analysis of the economic advance of Afrikaners underscores the likelihood that such splits will take place. He shows that from 1936 to 1977, the percentage of Afrikaners in agricultural occupations declined from about 40% to

under 10%. Over the same period, the percentage of Afrikaners engaged in white collar jobs increased from 27,5% to over 65% (p. 169). As a result of these and similar developments, there are now important divergencies of interest among Afrikaners; also, a growing Afrikaner business sector shares vital interests with that of English-speakers.

The concern of *F. van Zyl Slabbert and David Welsh* is with general political options available to South Africans. They see a choice between only two — the “politics of seige” and the “politics of negotiation”. Regarding the former, “repressive seige”, by which a regime holds on to the *status quo* at all costs, is distinguished from “seige under a modernizing oligarchy”. Supposed to characterize the current political situation in South Africa, this more moderate type of seige politics, while it involves unilateral white decision-making, is responsive to the need for change. What Slabbert and Welsh advocate instead is the politics of negotiation by which all South Africans participate through authentic representatives in the making of fundamental decisions which will establish a democratic South Africa.

The point of *M.T.W. Arnheim's* study is that in the case of South Africa such a democratic political solution is impossible. He argues that if the present polity of concessions to Blacks continues, then only two alternatives remain — “Black domination or White” (p. 185).

The importance of Arnheim's book is that it introduces into the current debate on South Africa a critical perspective which has been relatively neglected. Moreover, the perspective is grounded in a solid and impressively large body of scholarship. Arnheim's thesis is that reform, rather than helping to avoid revolution, actually induces it. He writes that it is “precisely a policy of reform which produces a sense of relative deprivation, which in turn give rise to revolutionary sentiments and thence to revolution” (p. 92). What causes a sense of relative deprivation (RD) is a perceived distance between what people expect and aspire to, on the one hand, and what, on the other, they actually get. Thus Arnheim maintains that to create a black middle class is counterproductive. A middle class is one driven by increasingly higher expectations which, especially in the context of South Africa, cannot easily be satisfied. Consequently, a black middle class will be a radicalizing rather than a stabilizing force.

In support of this thesis, Arnheim cites Tocqueville's analysis of the French Revolution. Tocqueville showed that the hotbeds of revolution were those where progressive reform had been implemented and that support for the regime was firm in economically backward and depressed areas where little change had

occurred. And he quotes W.G. Runciman's study of class attitudes to social inequalities in Britain in the 1960's which disproved the belief that, in a system of stratification, those near the top are most pleased with it and those at the bottom most dissatisfied. Arnheim thus makes his case but the theoretical underpinning could have been stronger. Arnheim overlooks or is unaware of principal work in the field. The concept of relative deprivation has been developed by a long list of, mainly American, scholars, such as Lyford P. Edwards, Crane Brinton, Chalmers Johnson, James C. Davies and Ted Gurr. A Presidential Commission in the United States considered RD to be the main cause of violent disturbance in America in the 1960's; officially and academically, there it is the accepted way to explain student uprisings and black protest.

In the other books, this theory and its implications regarding reform are not considered. In *Slabbert and Welsh*, relative deprivation is mentioned in a non-theoretical context (p. 97), and Adam touches on it empirically. He says that the history of black politics raises doubts about the capacity of an African middle class to act as a buffer. "Rather than pacifying militancy, relatively privileged professionals have led the black resistance in ways similar to how Afrikaner intellectuals fanned, cultural mobilization" (p. 291). Still, Adam argues that the major problem to be corrected in South Africa is the whole system of "coercive stability and enforced immobility".

While *Slabbert and Welsh* see reform essentially as a good, they do review an abundance of theoretical and comparative evidence to indicate the almost insuperable obstacles that exist to the establishment of democracy in South Africa. They look into the politics of divided societies and the possibilities there for democratic government. They analyze the nature of the conflict in South Africa and the evolution of its constitutional and political structure. Their conclusion is that the conditions associated with the constitution and viability of consociational democracy are not present in the case of South Africa; that ethnic divisions are wide and aggravated by "institutional inequalities", and they see no quick solutions. They express doubt, for example, that inequalities in income distribution could be reduced to reasonable dimensions in less than a generation. Yet against this evidence they call for a negotiated settlement leading to the foundations of a democratic constitution. They believe that sides can be brought to the negotiating table if neither is seen to gain at the expense of the other; if the benefits of collaboration are perceived to outweigh costs of alternative action.

There is thus a fault between the main body and the conclu-

sion of the book by Slabbert and Welsh. The body is largely the result of work by the authors as scholars; the conclusion is manifestly political.

In *Adam and Giliomee*, conditions conducive to the establishment of consociational democracy are also seen not to exist in South Africa. Adam points to three "decisive obstacles". First is the fact that group membership is not voluntary; that ethnic identification is defined by the dominant minority. Second, leadership of "segmented groups" involved in a potential grand coalition is not authentic in the sense that it is not freely chosen by the group concerned. And finally, there is vast unequal distribution of power and resources among competing groups. Thus, according to Adam, major changes have to precede attempts to establish democracy in South Africa; and, for that to transpire, Afrikaners will have to be ethnically demobilised. Some hope is seen ultimately for negotiated federalism whereby decision-making would be decentralised but in which there would be a just and proportional exchange of revenue at the central level.

These books are clearly not sanguine concerning the future of South Africa. And for different reasons all oppose present policy directions. Regarding the homelands, for example, *Arnheim* thinks that, that policy will solidify and radicalize Africans; the others consider it to be an appressive act designed by a dominant minority to maintain political control where it counts.

There is of course nothing inevitable in history and to every analysis there is at least one other side. Lenin opposed reform for the working class in Czarist Russia because he felt it would dampen its revolutionary temper. Also, to predict futures based on current trends is dicey. Western policy toward South Africa, for one thing, is not a constant and it will be influenced by changing East-West relations. And can it really be asserted confidently that a group such as the Afrikaner, which historically acted as an ethnic unit, will split on economic grounds?

Nonetheless, these books enliven and contribute to the continuing debate on the future of South Africa. What they imply is that for pioneer societies in particular, the making of history, so to speak, may be infinitely easier than its unmaking.

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CONFLICT AND PROGRESS: FIFTY YEARS OF RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Ellen Hellman and Henry Lever (Editors)

Macmillan South Africa, Johannesburg. 278 pp.

Bearing in mind the Institute of Race Relations' generally high standards in research and documentation it is a pity that the fiftieth anniversary of the Institute should have been celebrated with the publication of such a lack-lustre collection of essays. Perhaps the occasion of its publication helped to condition its quality: anniversaries tend to be marked by a certain complacency and much of the scholarship in this volume is evidently unruffled by recent approaches and ideas. The material here is often useful and competently presented; only occasionally does it contribute original insights.

To take each contribution in turn. The book opens with a short history of the Institute by Ellen Hellman. Here the evolution of the Institute's approach, the shape of its organisational structure and the nature of its activities are extensively described. While the author is not insensitive to the limited nature of the Institute's achievements in certain fields, it could be argued that she underestimates the significance of its historic role in others. Viewed in the context of an increasingly repressive and unequal social order it may seem justifiable to contend that reformist organisations have failed "in their main field of endeavour" (p 5). Marxist historians have argued that an underlying purpose of such institutions has been in the field of social control and that here they have made a considerable impact. By refusing to consider seriously such analyses Dr Hellman does less than justice to her subject.

The author of the following chapter on South African politics appears to be unaware that anything has been written on his subject since the *Oxford History of South Africa*. While more recent scholarship may be said to have short-circuited some of the difficulties arising out of any discussion of nationalism it has provided rather more convincing explanations for white political behaviour than Rene de Villiers' "tribal call to the blood" (p 32). Moreover it is fairly tendentious to suggest without elaboration that the 1936 Hertzog Bills were "the foundation on which the edifice of apartheid was to be erected" (p. 32). Restrictions on black franchise and land allocation were enacted long before 1936. Equally questionable is the assertion that the Progressive Party has presented "the real choice" before the electorate (p. 38). Towards the end of the chapter are four pages on coloured politics which somehow manage to avoid even mentioning the

Unity Movement. Fortunately, discussion of South African politics is not limited to this chapter. Patrick Laurence's treatment of 'Black Politics in Transition' is sensitive and scholarly. Especially useful are his contextual and thematic comparisons drawn between 'Africanism' and 'black consciousness'. The tensions that exist between black Consciousness leaders and homeland politicians (especially Buthelezi) are usefully clarified. However the author could have broadened his scope to take into account the development of workplace resistance and the relationship between elite and mass political preoccupations. This might have enabled him to indicate more clearly the underlying causes of political unrest in the 1970s.

John Dugard's description of "Racial legislation and Civil Rights" is admirably clear and makes some subtle and valuable distinctions concerning the alterations over the last fifty years in the quality of repression and discrimination. His chapter is followed by an account of the "Changing face of the Economy" by Sheila van der Horst. Here there is a quantity of useful statistical material concerning the racial composition of the workforce, upward mobility in the black workforce, fluctuations in employment, wages, etc. but little analysis. Her contention that the "basic cause (of poverty) . . . is the familiar Third World problem of a rapidly increasing population on a limited area of land combined with a failure to adopt new types of methods of production" is scarcely revealing. Here was the opportunity to critically discuss some of the themes raised by marxist political economists in recent years: the consequences of capital intensification, structural underdevelopment, marginalisation and underdevelopment of the periphery. Again the challenged posed by recent scholarship is sidestepped. However the chapter does have the merits of being comprehensive and up to date, qualities it shares with David Welsh's concise and persuasive narration of half a century of urbanisation and municipal maladministration.

E.G. Malherbe brings the approaches and concerns of a dedicated educational administrator to his account of conflict and progress in education. In consequence progress (or retrogression) is presented almost purely in statistical terms; there is virtually no discussion of the changing content of education or the degree of its appropriateness to the local environment. Issues of conflict have been considerably wider than those singled out for discussion by Dr Malherbe: the language issue and ethnic separation. And surely there are more moral arguments for educational integration than those set out in this passage:

The mere fact that people who have a high-school and uni-

versity education are more articulate than the untutored rural masses makes it more possible for them to ventilate their grievances and to become labelled as agitators. This is especially so among the blacks. Where, however, they attend mixed universities they are more likely to learn that there are limits beyond which one does not go, that certain things are "not done" in a university. Association with the white students acts as a restraining influence . . . (p. 183).

To Henry Lever and John Barratt fall the unrewarding tasks of discussing racial attitudes and South African foreign policy respectively. Unrewarding in the first case because, as Professor Lever himself makes clear, attitudes are difficult to measure or evaluate and in themselves have dubious predicative utility. South African foreign policy, because it has until fairly recently been more a matter of reflex than initiative, is a fairly dull subject though John Barratt's treatment of it is lucid and sensible.

The final essay is a discussion of change in South African literature by Adam Small. It is hardly lucid though never dull. His basic theme is that Afrikaner writers are faced with the most insurmountable problems in preserving their creativity and integrity as power "endangers its own culture". Drawing on the work of Van Wyk Louw he contends that to a large measure they have succeeded in winning a battle that only blacks among English medium writers appear to be ready to fight. The essay is polemical rather than analytical in character but it does have the virtue, alone in this volume, of being provocative.

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INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE IN AFRICAN CONTEXT

A.J.G.M. Sanders

Butterworths and Co; Durban, 1979. 259 pp.

There is much to commend in Mr Sanders's book. It contains a succinct and perceptive overview of many of the problems which have dogged the theory of international law for centuries. It offers an account of the role played by Africa and African thinkers in the international legal order that is subduedly sympathetic, but not servile; and it is imbued with the author's awareness that "(r)egrettably, most modern Western general textbooks on international law pay scant attention to (the) ideo-

logical conflict" (p. 158) that underlies and often explains theoretical disputes in the discipline. For these reasons the book deserves to be welcomed: it offers the reader an enhanced understanding not only of Africa's role in international law, but of his own ideological predispositions in approaching the subject.

However, the book is not an unmitigated success. Its main flaw is that instead of cohering under the aegis of its title, it falls into three rather disparate parts. Parts one and three deal with the "jurisprudential" aspects of Mr Sanders's topic while part two deals with Africa. The division should not have been so acute. To have tied the theoretical aspects and the topic more closely to its African milieu would not merely have satisfied a schematic requirement, it would frequently have illuminated.

So the old debate about the effect and practice of recognition in international law (pp. 188 ff.) could have been enhanced by some reference, at least, to recent African history. There was, after all, Biafra; while Angola's two regimes in 1975 (and their simultaneous recognition by opposing sets of governments) offer useful fodder to a writer trying to enlighten a debate that has tended generally to become rather abstract. And above all, Africa now has (though its possession is somewhat ungracious) three new Southern African "States". Or are they? Is the best parallel with Transkei (and the younger progeny of grand apartheid) truly with a state like East Germany, which sought recognition for some twenty years before obtaining it from the West? (The present Foreign Minister has claimed just this). Or is it rather with Manchukuo, the puppet state the Japanese set up in Manchuria in 1932, and which was almost universally denied international recognition until its demise upon its post World War II liberation? Mr Sanders need, of course, not have canvassed all these possibilities, but his brief mention of Transkei and Bophuthatswana (p. 194) is not satisfactory. It is so elliptical as to leave one to wonder what the writer intended by his reference, or if he preferred to remain so non-committal as not to intend anything at all.

This treatment in fact reflects a more general shortcoming in the book. Mr Sanders is frank (and, as has been said, sympathetic) in his treatment of Africa and the aspirations of its thinkers and statesmen in the international legal order. He treats some issues — still delicate for a Southern African writer (Portuguese colonialism, nationalist movements, the urge towards "self-determination") — with a notable if unimposing honesty. But I sensed a reluctance to explore the full implications of Africa's indisputable obsession with Southern Africa. Since, for instance,

South Africans are not regularly informed by their national broadcasting service or by the establishment press of the flagrant illegality — by the only relevant law, international law — of what is delicately termed South Africa's "presence" in Namibia, one could perhaps have hoped that Mr Sanders would have dealt with the issue at more length and in more detail than he does (pp. 76-77).

And could the intriguing new international "crime of apartheid" — (which Mr Donald Woods's "International Register of Apartheid Criminals", if nothing else, has made topical) — not have received some discussion in the section (p. 210f) where the author deals with individuals' crimes against international law? Most striking in this context I found the author's choice of an example to illustrate a country which failed, after the imposition by the Security Council of mandatory sanctions on the Smith regime in Zimbabwe, to fulfil its obligations under international law by not adapting its national law so as to give effect to the Security Council's binding decision (pp. 216-217). Mr Sanders's choice falls on the United States and its 1971 statute authorising the importation of Rhodesian chrome. In all temperance, it must be said that Mr Sanders may have selected at least one other example. His illustrative choice of the United States is offensive not because it is inappropriate, but because, it is so bland. Nowhere else does the author give us cause to expect such blandness from him.

One need not view the "African context" of Mr Sanders's topic from a parochially Southern African point of view to find his treatment of the examples listed above less than satisfactory. One could argue quite coldly that Africa itself and its predilection for Southern African issues make the author's treatment of these topics incomplete.

But if one has been exacting in one's demands of this book, this is at least in part because the overall quality of Mr Sanders's work, and his ambition in tackling it, invite one to be exacting. This book is useful, not on any plane of "philosophical reflection" — (see the expectations inaptly aroused by the writer's foreword) — but as a valuable and perceptive entrée to Africa's role in the international legal order, and to some of the conceptual difficulties which still beset that order.

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