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# International Affairs BULLETIN

Smuts House Notes

South Africa : Changing American Perceptions
John A. Marcum

Some Observations on US Media Coverage of South Africa in the 1980s
Helen Kitchen

The Foreign Policy Dynamics of Countries Great and Small in Africa and the South African Issue
I. William Zartman

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The USSR, its Communist Allies, and Southern Africa
David E. Albright

*Book Reviews*

VOL 4 NO 3 1980

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BULLETIN

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*Dr John A. Marcum* is Vice Chancellor of the University of California at Santa Cruz. He is also the author of the two-volume work, "The Angolan Revolution". His article published in this issue was presented to a United States — South Africa Leader Exchange Program (USSALEP) Symposium "Interacting Values in Contemporary Africa: a Transatlantic Symposium", held at the Wilderness, Cape Province, from 26-29 October 1980, and is also being issued as a USSALEP *Occasional Paper.*

*Mrs Helen Kitchen* is a leading American specialist on African affairs. Her published works include "The Press in Africa" (1956), "A Handbook of African Affairs" (1964) and "Africa: From Mystery to Maze" (produced in 1976 in her capacity as Director of the Africa Area Study of the Rockefeller-funded Commission on Critical Choices for Americans), as well as many articles. She was editor of *Africa Report* magazine from 1961 to 1968 and is currently editor and co-owner of the fortnightly *African Index.* She is the Executive Director of the United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program, and she is based in Washington DC.

Mrs Kitchen's article on American media coverage in South Africa was prepared in May 1980 as a background paper for the World Peace Foundation of Boston and the SA Institute of International Affairs. It has not previously been published.

*Professor I. William Zartman* is Director of African Studies, at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington. His article on the foreign policy dynamics of African countries is based on a paper read at the above-mentioned USSALEP Symposium in October.

*Professor Gerrit Olivier* is Professor of Political Science at the University of Pretoria. The article *Co-operation or national security? Choices and options for White and Black Africa,* is a slightly amended text of his address to the USSALEP Symposium in October.

*Dr David E. Albright* is Senior Text Editor of *Problems of Communism.* His article is the revised version of a paper presented at the USSALEP Symposium in October and it will also be published in "Munger Africana Library Notes".

Although it is not usual for lengthy reference notes to be included in *Bulletin* articles, it is felt that in the case of Dr Albright's article the inclusion of references to his sources will be useful to South African readers attempting to reach their own independent judgments on the subject under discussion.

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


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## NAMIBIA : OBSTACLES TO A SETTLEMENT

The present flurry of diplomatic activity on the Namibian problem, coupled to contradictory point-scoring statements by the principal parties to the conflict, tend to obscure both the subtleties and the seriousness of the problem. Sifting through the rhetoric and the political symbolism surrounding the issue it becomes clear that diplomatic efforts to reach an internationally recognised settlement to the problem face three basic difficulties.

Firstly, issues that revolve around techno-military matters. Secondly, issues that may be termed symbolic in terms of their possible ramifications for political change in South Africa itself. Finally, transitional issues that relate to the modalities and implementation of an international settlement. Colouring these issues are conflicting perceptual maps, different time frames and conflicting interests.

Issues of a techno-military nature that still have to be resolved, relate to the modalities of the DMZ. The more intractable issues are: The precise nature and timing of demilitarization by South African and Swapo forces prior to national elections; the effective monitoring of the proposed cease-fire; the nature of control over returning guerrillas and refugees; the extent of logistic cooperation between South African and UN forces and the effective monitoring and surveillance of the DMZ area in Angola and Zambia.

The symbolic issues relate to the possible or perceived implications of an independent Namibia under a Swapo regime. The ruling National Party seems not only too fearful of being accused by its rightwing of delivering the Territory to Swapo, but more important than this, it seems to fear that 1) such a development might radicalise Black thinking in South Africa itself, and 2) create a dangerous precedent at home in the sense that those who view change in a zero-sum fashion and are prepared to fight white minority power with the gun, are destined to succeed in the end. It is this apocalyptic and dialectic symbolism which Pretoria fears might become a permanent feature of the South African body politic.

The last set of difficulties may be termed 'transitional', in the sense that they relate to the mechanics of how to structure change in Namibia. These issues may be itemised as follows:

(a) The desireability of a multi-party conference compared to the continuation of bilateral and multi-lateral negotiations between Pretoria, the UN and the Western intermediaries.

(b) In connection with the idea of a multi-party conference, various potential pitfalls remain. Among them: The venue for, composition of, agenda for and time frame for such a conference. Pretoria's indication that it does not intend to participate in such a venture, because it sees no point in talking directly to Swapo, does not seem to be insurmountable. Indications are that Pretoria would accept an observer role in such a conference subject to the equal treatment of the internal parties.

(c) The complications which might flow from the outcome of the most recent white ethnic election in Namibia, and how that might relate to Pretoria's efforts to consolidate a centrist anti-Swapo force based on the DTA internally.

(d) The alleged partiality of the UN towards Swapo, coupled to efforts to make use of a new set of mediators in the negotiations.

The interplay among these three sets of factors provides both the dynamic opportunities and constraints for an internationally recognised settlement in Namibia.

**André du Pisani**

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**Note:**
As explained in the notes on authors four of the articles in this issue are based on papers presented at a recent Symposium of the United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program (USSALEP). The fifth is by Helen Kitchen who is Executive Director of USSALEP. As these important articles are all relevant to the debate on "South Africa and the International Community in the Eighties" (which has been pursued in the last two issues of the *Bulletin*), the SAIIA is very pleased to be able to publish the articles in this issue, with the co-operation of USSALEP.

## SOUTH AFRICA: CHANGING AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS

**John A. Marcum**

Since the Second World War, South Africa has come to assume an extraordinary salience in American consciousness. During this time, within the avalanche of social and technological change that has altered global politics, American awareness of South Africa has expanded and polarized. Concurrently, the paths of the two countries have contradictorily converged and diverged.

Fated to cope with a continuing swirl of demographic, scientific, ideological, environmental, even interspacial, change, South Africa and the United States can be confident that they will confront monumental problems of social adjustment in the years ahead. Influenced by the parallels, as well as contrasts, in their historical and contemporary circumstances, the two countries, as ethnically diverse industrial states, will face socio-political problems arguably more similar than dissimilar. The likeness and unlikeness of their responses to these problems will largely determine the way in which the two perceive and relate to one another through and beyond the rest of this century.

It was typically a class in British Commonwealth history that introduced this writer (a Californian at Stanford University) and other American undergraduates to South Africa in the late 1940s. None of us could have imagined then that within three decades student activists would be confronting (Stanford and other) university trustees all across America with demands to limit or eliminate investments in American and other corporations (very profitably) active in South Africa. Nor did we foresee that South Africa's place in American university curricula would soon shift from British Commonwealth studies to new fields: African history, race relations and Black studies.

South Africa seemed, after all, to be an unquestionable part of a western political and cultural realm labelled, with self-congratulatory relativism, the "free world". South Africa joined the allied cause in the Second World War well before the United States. Its troops and airmen helped expel Mussolini's legions from Ethiopia and Somalia; participated in the fierce desert warfare of North Africa — distinguishing themselves at the seige of Tobruk; and fought alongside American and Commonwealth forces through the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. Nearly 7,000 South Africans gave their lives in the war against Axis tyranny.

South Africa's military involvement in the defence of western democracies, moreover, did not end with the Second World War. South Africa shared with the United States an active postwar commitment to the principal of collective security, a commitment that Jan Smuts made in 1935 when he argued for League of Nations sanctions against Italy for its invasion of Ethiopia. After the war the two countries shared a new threat perception, fear of the expansionist designs they deemd to be inherent in Soviet Communism. Thus from October 1948 to April 1949, units of the South African Air Force flew 1240 missions in support of the West Berlin airlift. And from October 1950 to July 1953 a squadron of the South African Air Force flew for General MacArthur in the American-United Nations defence of South Korea.

It was not just participation in western military ventures that ensconced South Africa in American minds as an integral part of the West. American journalists and scholars commonly presented South Africa as a part of a "neo-European World" created by European settlement in the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand. They depicted South Africa as a neo-European society superimposed upon and bound by "inextricable" economic ties to a larger African society.[1] They assumed that over time the neo-European, not the African, society would prevail. For most American and British observers of the 1940s and 1950s, this meant that White-Black economic linkage in South Africa would be accompanied, in due course, by the political and social assimilation of black South Africans into the dominant western community.

Illustrative of this common but casual assumption was the tendency of the architects of pre- and post-War proposals for Atlantic unity routinely to include South Africa in their plans. Thus, for example, *Union Now,* the influential manifesto published by Clarence Streit in 1940, called for a federation of democratic states, including South Africa. Streit, who, after the war, enlisted business, intellectual and political leaders, toured American campuses and published a monthly, *Freedom and Union,* all in the cause of Atlantic Union, included South Africa among the fifteen "founder democracies" of his proposed federation.[2] Initially, since Blacks still lacked the right to vote, South African representation in the parliament of Streit's proposed Union was to be based on its white population. This would have given the country only 2 out of 280 Atlantic Union deputies. Implicitly, however, racial exclusion in South Africa was considered a transitional phenomenon. South Africa in its entirety was deemed to be a secure, if not yet internally fully integrated, part of the "demo-

cratic world". Indeed, many western observers, with a culture-bound sense of linear progress, considered the vast Afro-Asian colonies over which Europe still ruled as potential members of an expanded, acculturated, democratic world.

In retrospect, however, it seems as inevitable as it was unpredicted that the colonial empires of a war-weakened Europe would quickly collapse in the face of rising Afro-Asian nationalism. When coupled with the 1948 electoral triumph of a racially exclusionist Afrikaner nationalism inside South Africa, this global upheaval necessarily put in question all previous assumptions about South Africa's place in the world.

From 1948 on, the United States and South Africa continued to share a defensive aversion to Communism and Soviet power. American investment in booming South African industry grew—then soared to over $1.5 billion. But in other regards, the two countries' interests diverged. That the rise of new indpendent states in Asia and Africa, pledged to eliminate racial discrimination within and without their borders, coincided with the institutionalization of the racial theory and practice of apartheid by the ascendant Nationalist party in South Africa, meant that South Africa would inevitably become the target of a kind of protracted cold war. In words of one perceptive student of the subject: "The militant anti-Communism of the Nationalist Government made its leaders sensitive to the need for alliances. However, the very foundation of Nationalist domestic policy made the search for allies extremely difficult".[3] None of the several American-initiated regional military alliances formed in the late 1940s and the 1950s to respond to perceived Sino-Soviet expansionism encompassed South Africa. This was so, despite the very considerable strategic value attached to the South Atlantic, Cape and Indian Ocean shipping lanes in response to growing Western dependence on Middle Eastern oil. It was so despite the military and commercial importance ascribed to South African minerals, notably uranium, platinum, vanadium and gold.

Inexorably South Africa broke its ties with the increasingly non-Western Commonwealth. In 1963, independent black African states assembled in a regional Organization for African Unity (OAU) and reacted collectively against South Africa's constitutional exclusion of Blacks from its domestic body politic. The OAU states formed an African Liberation Committee mandated to support black nationalists seeking to overthrow both persisting colonial administrations and white minority governments of Southern Africa. As the list of independent African states lengthened to include, by 1980, the former Portuguese territories and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), South Africa was left in black African

eyes as the last, humiliating citadel of exclusionist white rule.

This same historical period was one of protest and change in domestic American race relations. With the rise of the civil rights movement, passage of anti-discrimination legislation, new availability of federal, state and foundation funds for black education, and development of the concept and practice of "affirmative action", that is action to compensate for disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, however, doors began to open for black people. They began to open to millions of others traditionally denied equal opportunity within American society.

One of the early catalysts of the civil rights surge of the 1960s was an embarrassing series of racial incidents in which diplomats from newly independent black African states sought and were denied food or lodging along American highways and in American cities. Africans thus helped to dramatize the circumstances of everyday life for many black Americans, circumstances akin to what some might call "petty apartheid". Racial discrimination and prejudice still persists in the United States, of course. There is a long historical legacy of inequality to overcome. But the rules of the game have changed and changes in social behaviour are unevenly but demonstrably following.

Referring to strides made toward greater social justice during the last two decades, an American State Department official recently commented: "Our own struggle for equality of rights has been profoundly difficult and often tragic. But we have achieved a momentum and a system of redress and remedy that give us hope — hope that the implications of our revolution of 200 years ago will be realized". Speaking in her role as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Patricia M. Derian went on to link the "never perfect but improving" domestic process of promoting democratic ideals to American foreign policy. Given that "American character and tradition find repression intolerable", she argued, it is logical that the United States should adopt a general policy of promoting human rights everywhere. It is logical that Congress voted in 1974-1976 to restrict security and development aid to states with bad human rights records and asked for regular Department of State reports on the status of human rights in all countries receiving US aid. It is logical also that Congress voted the Jackson-Vanik Amendment which linked trade benefits for the Soviet Union to liberalization of an anti-Jewish Soviet emigration policy.

Both domestic and international forces help shape the human rights dimensions of American foreign policy. Internally, when the Congressional Black Caucus recommends that the United States react to perceived human rights violations in South Africa

by recalling its ambassador and reducing its diplomatic mission, denying tax credits to companies investing in South Africa, or taking other, more draconian action, American Administrations feel obliged to listen and, at least, respond seriously.[5] When externally African states, notably a major oil supplier such as Nigeria, press for American economic disassociation from South Africa because of its policies of racial exclusion, American Administrations, be they Republican or Democrat, find themselves constrained to consider whom they can most or least afford to alienate and how much. Thus, in 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, attempting to mend fences and minimize losses in the wake of the Angolan War, felt obliged to speak out with uncustomary boldness on the human rights issue. South Africans, he said in his landmark Lusaka address, "must recognize that the world will continue to insist that the institutionalized separation of the races must end" and that the United States will "exercise all its efforts" in the direction of encouraging timely "evolution toward equality of opportunity and basic human rights for all South Africans".[6] His statement reflected a felt need to counter growing African alienation from the West with its attendant opportunity for expanded Soviet influence, even at the cost of damage to American-South African governmental relations.

In the absence of a consensus about or confidence in the ability effectively to encourage the evolution of which Secretary Kissinger spoke, American opinion has since 1976 further polarized. One segment of opinion, essentially pessimistic and led by a loose alliance of civil rights, religious, student, and other organizations, would cut ties, support economic sanctions, and even endorse black insurgency. The other segment, mindful of a common legacy of western humanism and believing in the suasive power of rational self-interest, would intensify efforts to promote peaceful change. Finding hope both in survey research that suggests white South Africans in general may be more prepared than their government for racial reform[7] and within the intense, open debate over political formulas and racial policies now taking place in South Africa,[8] the optimists' school, however, has found itself under criticism for what deriders see as its propensity for convenient, wishful thinking. Indicative of the intense anger that often underlies such derision, rational discussion of South African issues within such American scholarly circles as the African Studies Association has become next to impossible.

For all people, however, the chance for, indeed the imperative of peaceful change, remains an overriding social and existential concern, no matter what the odds. We recognize that there is "no simple" let alone American, answer to South African problems.

Assuredly, those problems can be resolved only by South Africans, black and white, "talking and reasoning together".[9] But inevitably concerned Americans, be they liberal or conservative, black or white, look to their own experiences for clues as to how they might more imaginatively and effectively relate to the commanding human drama destined to unfold in this beautiful, conflicted country. Americans must eschew "made in America" constitutional prescriptions. Might they, however, find in the processes by which American society is attempting to meet the exigencies of its own racial and cultural diversity, a suggestive basis for constructive dialogue with South Africans?

To answer the question one should address the circumstances in the writer's state, California. With a population comparable in size to that of South Africa, California is undergoing rapid and massive demographic change. Birthrate and immigration trends evoke predictions that California will soon become America's first Third World state. By the mid-1990s, "Anglos" (Caucasians) are expected to be in a minority.

In these circumstances one option would be for California's traditional elites to attempt to safeguard their pre-eminence by gerrymandering political districts, limiting access to critical skills and professions, and pressing the federal government to close and police the Mexican border. But in the long run, repressive policies would only exacerbate, not solve, the demographic problem.

So, California is seeking to accommodate its burgeoning Chicano, black and Asian communities within the conceptual framework of what we call "affirmative action". Affirmative action is predicated on the assumption that the costs of exclusion, costs in social instability, lower economic productivity and political coercion, will ultimately outweigh the short-range costs of compensatory educational and employment initiatives. It sets and measures its success by targeted goals. It constructs uniform processes through which to achieve those goals. It depends for results on the politically articulated and accepted assertion of an urgent social imperative. As an example of affirmative action, the University of California is embarked upon a major planning exercise in order that it may respond to the unfamiliar needs of growing numbers of "non-traditional" students. Within its financial means it must find ways to increase minority student enrolment and minority faculty hiring, expand course offerings in "basic skills" (notably expository writing and pre-calculus mathematics), and mount academic advising and psychological counselling programmes specially designed to support students of differing cultural backgrounds. Complicating matters, these

efforts must take place in a climate of economic uncertainty and of an absolute (demographic) decline in (Anglo) enrolments. Compensatory recruitment, innovative pedagogy and short term financial sacrifice by an affluent "new minority" will be necessary — along with firm political resolve. Even then, the task will test our ingenuity.

Turning back to South Africa with the eyes of a California educator, one cannot resist repeating the question. Is it not just conceivable that within the common need to devise social, economic and political processes for letting outsiders in, for becoming inclusionists, Americans and South Africans may find the basis for a new relationship? Might they find themselves allies, once again, this time under a broad banner of nationally adapted "affirmative action" transcending Western or African identity? There could be no more compelling and unifying a cause than that of a timely mutual endeavour to pry open the doors to equal opportunity within our respective societies. A shared commitment to that cause would provide us with a worthy foundation on which to unite in common quest for a more just human order. Given changed global and regional realities, such a commitment may represent South Africa's best or only hope for emerging from the difficult years just ahead, as a nation of either Africa or the West.

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2 The fifteen, as set forth in the 1940 and 1949 editions of *Union Now* included the United Kingdom Australia, Canada, New Zealand Union of South Africa Ireland (six Commonwealth states), Belgium France, Netherlands, Switzerland Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and the United States Clarence K Streit, *Union Now The Proposal for Inter-Democracy Federal Union* (New York Harper and Bros , 1940), p 9

3 Jack Spence, 'South Africa and the Modern World", in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds), *The Oxford History of South Africa*, II, *South Africa 1879 1966* (New York Oxford University Press, 1971), p 479

4 See Patricia M Derian, "Human Rights, A World Perspective", speech before the National Association of Human Rights Workers, Nashville, Oct 15, 1978

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8 See Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilized Can South Africa Change?* (New Haven Yale University Press, 1979) especially pp 286-302, and Richard Bissell and Chester Crocker, eds , *South Africa into the 1980s* (Boulder Colo Western Press, 1979), especially pp 233-241

9 See Vice President Walter Mondale, "Africa and the U S Shared Values ', speech at Lagos, Nigeria, July 22, 1980

# SOME OBSERVATIONS ON U S MEDIA COVERAGE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE 1980s

**Helen Kitchen**

In evaluating American media coverage of South Africa, a distinction needs to be drawn at the outset between (1) advocacy journalism and (2) the mainstream media.

In the first category are the films, journals, newsletters, and other publications of (a) various organizations and individuals deeply committed to furthering the achievement of majority rule throughout southern Africa, on grounds that are primarily humanitarian or ethnic rather than ideological, and (b) Marxist or quasi-Marxist organizations which view southern Africa as a battleground in a worldwide class struggle and target multinational corporations for reasons that differ from those of Afrocentric and/or church-related pressure groups. Some would argue that the "advocacy" ranks should include apartheid apologists at the far right end of the political (and journalistic) spectrum, but the eclipse of South Africa's supportive Department of Information has rendered this element largely voiceless.

### The Safari Tradition

South Africans, whatever their ethnicity or socio-political base, are likely to be bewildered and disappointed by the attention given to their country on an average day in the mainstream American press. Despite the awesome size of American newspapers and the fact that a significant number of representatives of the American media are based in Johannesburg, coverage of South Africa is sporadic, crisis-oriented, and, more often than not, devoid of the contextual institutional history or sociology required to understand almost any political event in what is surely one of the world's most complicated societies.

Last Sunday's issue of the *The New York Times,* consisting of 423 pages (not counting advertising supplements) and weighing almost two kilos, contained only two stories on sub-Saharan Africa: a news break from Uganda on the military coup and a chopped and thus thoroughly confusing despatch by John Burns from Cape Town on the 8,000 pages of additional Erasmus Commission testimony released the previous week.

Headline writers, schooled to produce definitive labels, continue to confuse and mislead readers with a sequence of flat and contradictory statements about the Botha Government that over-

simplify the abstruse process by which acquiescence of the white electorate is achieved on controversial issues in South Africa. A selection at radom: "Rightists Challenging Plans to Ease South African Racial Policy", "Botha Fights a Challenge from South African Right", "Botha May Bypass his MPs to Force Pace of Change", "Conservative Whites in South Africa Begin to Call for Social Changes", "Changes Foreign and Domestic Stall Attempts to Ease Apartheid", "Apartheid is Not 'Dead', But In Transition", "'Petty Apartheid' Thrives Despite Botha's Reform Promises", "South Africa's Botha Goes Out on a Limb", "Botha Threat to Resign Adverts Cabinet Split", "South Africa's Powerful Secret Society Mends Rift Between Two Top Leaders". Similarly, headlines that herald "Rumblings of Race War" on the basis of an isolated incident of small-scale urban violence are drawing sweeping conclusions that would not be drawn from a similar incident in any other society; they may be right in the long run, but not on the basis of the immediate development reported.

Allthough South Africans may develop various levels of paranoia about American media coverage of developments below the Limpopo, a closer reading of the American press and systematic monitoring of television news will establish that there is very little pattern to American media coverage of *any* part of Africa.

This was brought home to this writer in April, while trying to put together a story on the Organization of African Unity's April 28-29 extraordinary economic summit in Lagos — the first time in 17 years of the OAU's existence that Africa's heads of state met to talk specifically about the continent's critical economic problems and prospects. One learned from the American media that Liberia's foreign minister was not allowed to land at Lagos, not one word could be found on the content of the meeting in any one of five major American daily newspapers.

Similarly, the recent strikes of Coloured students in South Africa received daily coverage up to, but not including, the Prime Minister's conciliatory meeting with Coloured leaders in May.

Anyone resident in the United States seeking follow-through coverage of Africa as a whole must supplement the locally available printed word with subscriptions to at least two London newspapers (with the *Financial Times* at the head of the list); *Agence France Presse's* tri-weekly roundup from Paris, or a substitute; the *Financial Mail* and a clipping (English-language) and translation (Afrikaans) service from South Africa: and a selection of publications from other parts of Africa. The task of putting together a coherent sequential account of a given event in Africa requires today, as it did when this writer got into the business of

assembling the pieces of African puzzles 20 years ago, an inordinate amount of pick-and-shovel work and a keen eye for red herrings.

To the extent that American press coverage of Africa has become more professional, more conscientious, and less patronizing in the past decade, this has occurred because of the professionalism and conscientiousness of many of the correspondents sent out to do their African stint. What appears to be still lacking, however, is sustained attention at the news management level about what the individual contributions add up to, or should add up to, over a given period of time.

Partly because United States history is not perceived as interwoven with that of Africa in the way that Britain's and France's histories are, there remains a certain ambivalence concerning the extent to which either the media or policy-makers should engage African issues. In the case of South Africa there is an unconscious reluctance to take National Party politics seriously — as if to do so would be an act of disloyalty to the disenfranchised majority. In a sense, as the the following two commentaries suggest, the American media continue to approach Africa as unkwown territory yet to be explored:

> In 1869, James Gordon Bennett of the *The New York Herald* sent Henry Morton Stanley off to Africa with these cosmic instructions: "I want you to attend the opening of the Suez Canal and then proceed up the Nile. Send us detailed descriptions of everything likely to interest the American tourists. Then go to Jerusalem, Constantinople, the Crimea, the Caspian Sea, through Persia as far as India. After that you can start looking around for Livingstone. If he is dead, bring back every possible proof of his death".
>
> More than a hundred years later, the American press is still engaged in a voyage of discovery in relation to Africa. In contrast to Britain and France, where journalists have made a prestigious lifetime career of becoming authorities on Africa, an American journalist is expected to approach Africa as a short-term assignment in the safari tradition. The reward for those who explore their domain conscientiously is promotion to an area of greater journalistic (and diplomatic) priority. (This) practice of sending talented and innovative generalists to Africa produces the kind of "zingers" that please editors but results in an incomplete mosaic and a lack of institutional memory.

— W.A.J. Payne, "Through a Glass Darkly: The Media and Africa", in *Africa: From Mystery to Maze,* ed. Helen Kitchen (1976)

There seem to be a number of Christopher Columbuses setting out from the United States to discover Africa for the first time. It's been there a long time.

— British Prime Minister James Callaghan, in a Washington, D.C. press conference, May 31, 1978.

This "discovery" phenomenon was illustrated anew a few weeks ago when the Washington bureau of one of the two major weekly news-magazines sought help in putting together what was purported to be a major evaluation of policy decisions awaiting incoming Secretary of State Muskie in relation to southern Africa. The staff member working on the story from the Washington end admitted to no previous experience with Africa. And, in the end, what must have amounted to several hundred hours of staff time in New York and Washington (not to mention the time of "experts" and "practitioners" queried at length for ideas and documentation) resulted in the inclusion of no more than a few boiler plate sentences on Africa in the Muskie story, of which seven words were devoted to South Africa. The concern is not that Africa necessarily should have had higher billing, but rather the "safari" process by which the subject was approached.

This experience was not an aberration; at least twice a month this writer receives a frantic telephone call from someone somewhere in the United States who urgently needs bodies to fill pre-selected stereotypical roles — "a hard-line Afrikaner", "a black radical", "a spokesman for the US Government", a representative of "business" — for a radio or television "talk show" on South Africa. My counsel that enlightenment on the issues rather than contrived confrontation might be a greater service to listeners often strikes the caller as a great revelation — but the commitment to creating a "show" usually remains paramount.

The awkwardness with which Americans in policymaking roles and in the media approach Africa has something to do with our lack of clear perception of what the continent represents to the United States.

Should American involvement in Africa be primarily reactive to the degree of involvement of other world powers? To the support given by African governments to the position of the United States on non-African issues? To the acute human needs of a continent in which are located 18 of the 29 nations classified by the United Nations as the world's least developed? To the opportunities for mutual economic benefits that present themselves as the extent of Africa's subsoil resources becomes better known? Or should we perceive Africa as a vast body of land

around which the United States Navy and merchant fleet must find their way to reach areas of greater priority? To what extent should American policy (and American media coverage) be influenced by the consideration that over 12 percent of our citizens are of African descent, and that Afro-Americans increasingly identify with the pressures of their ethnic kin for an end to privileged white minority rule in southern Africa?

Because there are no easy answers to these questions, there is little reason to expect that U.S. policymakers are close to devising a coherent strategy for dealing with southern Africa, or that the American media is likely to go beyond its present random coverage of developments there. Both will continue to be whipsawed between the interests and ideologies of conflicting groups in the United States and in Africa.

#### The Other Side of the Press Freedom Issue

Whereas the concern in South Africa is with the power, present and potential, of the government to control the press, many Americans are increasingly uncomfortable about the ways in which the political and economic power of the U.S. media has mushroomed in recent years and where it will all end. Concern focuses on two areas: (1) the arrogance of those who gather and dispense the news, and (2) the accelerating trend toward concentration of control of the country's newspapers, television, radio, and magazines in the hands of a narrowing circle of corporations.

*Arrogance.* Two prestigious veterans of the Washington press corps are among those who view the narcissism of the present generation of journalists with some apprehensiveness:

> There's a narcissim in the press today — both print and broadcast — that I don't remember as a young reporter. Journalists display a great deal of arrogance. There are egomaniacs in television, but there is even more inbred smugness in the average newspaper city room, especially at the successful newspapers ... It's as though the chief — and almost the only — function of journalism is the adversary one. That's one very important function, but it's certainly not the whole of it ...

— Eric Sevareid, in an April 1980 interview with *Dateline*, an annual publication of the Overseas Press Club (Washington, D.C.)

> I am old enough to remember when the entire Washington press corps numbered only a few hundred. I remember my first presidential press conference — May 15, 1936 — when no

more than two dozen reporters gathered around President Roosevelt's desk in the Oval Office ... President Roosevelt could, and often did, just think out loud without fear that every word was put indelibly upon the record ... The modern President has no such latitude. He must live in constant fear of the slip-of-the-tongue ... The President has thus lost an opportunity to be frank and open. The press has lost an opportunity to share his thought-processes, which, without being the stuff of tomorrow's headlines, nonetheless could help them do a better job of informing their readers and listeners ...

We should be wary of giving an impression that we and our government are adversaries because it is upon press and government together that all our liberties depend. We should be especially wary of claiming for ourselves alone exemptions from the obligations of all citizens ... The risk is that the people may think us arrogant. That First Amendment we cherish is not some immutable right handed down to Moses on Mt. Sinai. It's a political right granted by the people in a political document, and what the people grant they can, if they ever choose, take away. There is no liberty that cannot be abused and none that cannot be lost ...

— Vermont Royster, from remarks made on receiving the Fourth Estate Award from the National Press Club. Adapted for publication in *The Wall Street Journal,* December 13, 1978.

*Media Conglomerates.* It is in the Congress, among government officials, among consumer advocates and public interest lawyers, and in the working ranks of journalism that concern is mobilizing about the media conglomerate phenomenon. As Christopher Swan wrote in *The Christian Science Monitor* on May 6, *1980:*

More and more news media are falling into fewer and fewer hands. Today, eight companies control the three television networks, *Time* and *Newsweek* magazines, *The New York Times, The Washington Post* and *Washington Star* (the only two newspapers in the nation's capital). *The Wall Street Journal. The Los Angeles Times,* television stations in the most important cities covering at least 40 percent of the TV audience, the leading radio networks and stations, major segments of the cable television industry, leading book publishing companies, a string of newspapers in other key cities across the country, and a bevy of other media and non-media enterprises ...

It's not just newspaper chains doing the buying, either. Large

corporations are taking over ownership of the press. General Electric is in the process of buying Cox Broadcasting. After American Express' attempt to take over McGraw-Hill was vigorously repulsed, Amex successfully bought 50 percent of Warner Cable, one of the dominant forces in the burgeoning cable industry. Other corporate giants have been making discreet inquiries into media companies that may come on the market ...

*Implications for South Africa.* While these facts suggest to some that the ingredients exist for manipulation of news in favour of "corporate" viewpoints, there is little evidence in the smorgasbord coverage of South Africa in the U.S. press or television to suggest that any kind of overall manipulation is, in fact, occurring. The daily fare offered by mainstream American media, as previously indicated, continues to nurture and reflect American schizophrenia about South Africa.

#### Prospects for the 1980s

For a variety of reasons, the coverage of South Africa by American correspondents is likely to continue to provide discontinuous segments of the South African story. These reasons include the language barrier that reduces the accessability of resident American newsmen to the press of the governing establishment, the resulting over-dependence on English-language interpretations and critiques of Afrikaner thinking, the requirement to avoid becoming labelled in the home office as an apologist for apartheid, the local requirement to safeguard both press credentials and diverse sources of information, and the fact-of-life that "problems" and "incidents" are more likely than "scene-setters" to get placed in the highly competitive battle for tomorrow's space.

Critics from the right (such as the Washington-based "Accuracy in Media" watchdog organization) correctly note that there is a gross imbalance in the space given by major U.S. newspapers to human rights stories in South Africa (254 such stories in *The New York Times* in 1978, amounting to 75 percent of all *Times* stories on South Africa; 124 human rights stories in *The Washington Post*, amounting to 45 percent of total coverage) as compared with space given to human rights violations in Cambodia, Idi Amin's Uganda, or Vietnam. This complaint loses some of its validity, however, when one notes that 1977 was the year of Steve Biko's death, that South Africa will remain inescapably more vulnerable to close monitoring in the human rights area because it purports to be a society based on Christian and Western values, and that

domestic considerations (i.e. reader demand) in the United States require that appropriate attention be given to each turn of the wheel in South African race relations.

As for the future, American media coverage of South Africa (and thus mainstream American perceptions of South Africa) will be very much influenced by what there is to report. As another writer in this series has noted, the bulk of Americans have decidedly negative "feelings" about the way South African society is organized, even though only a small percentage could describe the ethnicity of the population, the history of the country, or the political system with any degree of precision. Yet neither the American media taken as a whole nor the bulk of Americans are (yet) committed to the assumption that South Africa's future should or necessarily will be determined by apocalyptic black-white confrontation.

There is a persistent strain of optimism in Americans, and in American journalists. Thus the American media coverage of South Africa, for all its capriciousness, is likely to cling to a hope held by most Americans. This is a hope that South Africa itself, rather than carrots extended and sticks inflicted by outsiders, will generate the vision, the adaptability to realities, the common sense, and the courage to move toward the process of negotiating among all its citizenry a future, however orthodox or however innovative, that will be agreed upon rather than imposed.

A factor that will continue to affect American media coverage of South Africa is the difficulty outsiders have in understanding, much less interpreting for a general readership, the tactic of deliberate obfuscation of policy shifts employed by the government to confuse conservative opponents of change. Impatience in tracking the nuances of this two-steps-forward-one-step-back process has a great deal to do with the hot-and-cold media coverage accorded Prime Minister P.W. Botha.

The more important question, and one with major implications for U.S. reporting on South Africa in the 1980s, is whether or for how long South Africans outside the governing establishment will continue to adapt to this perceived requirement to obfuscate adjustments to new political and social realities.

# THE FOREIGN POLICY DYNAMICS OF COUNTRIES GREAT AND SMALL IN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN ISSUE

**I. William Zartman**

Like any new states, those in Africa are growing into a fuller development and realization of their position in foreign relations. This development includes a greater awareness of the means of foreign policy, a fuller understanding of security and interest, and a greater familiarity with the ways and norms of international relations. In some cases, it also involves a growth of power and an awareness of its limitations where growth is beyond grasp. In each of these areas, as African states seek to develop a greater control over their external environment, there is a dual process of revision and accommodation. Concerning some aspects, new actors seek to change the environment and the ways of operating in it; with regard to others, they learn to accept things as they are.

One important area in which many of these elements come together concerns the structure of inter-state relations. As states develop both their ends and their means and as they learn to operate within the constraints both elements impose, a pattern of relations evolves, involving relative strength and weakness as well as habits of friendship and hostility. States learn to know "their world" and their place in it. The broader their power and their interests, the larger "their world" and in the narrowest sense, a poor, weak state's "world" encompasses only its neighbours. At the end of the Twentieth Century, in the shrinking world of today, even small states are obliged to develop a broader sense of events than merely those of their neighbourhood, but this does not change the value. Even small states discover interests in the Law of the Sea and the Group of 77 because they find some power through membership in such forums. Most importantly however, commensurate with their power and interests, states develop a sense of structure of relations with those states around them, and this structure carries with it one or more dynamics of its own.

This paper investigates the structure of African relations and looks into dynamics as a means of understanding policy and policy settings. It is based on the idea that in the current stage of development of African international relations, the growth of states in power and interests has led to a characteristic search for rank and order within subregional arenas. Since this search is primarily structural, it implies certain felt imperatives of interaction that are more powerful than other motivational sources, including ideology.

Thus, firstly where two or three states, equal in power, cohabit the same subregion, relations tend to be unstable because the states seek a favourable "pecking order". Secondly, where one state is much more powerful than its neighbours, the "pecking order" being therefore manifest, states on the next level of power seek distant, if not hostile relations, in order to preserve their autonomy of action, whereas smaller states may gravitate to one group or another according to their location. Thirdly, since the current phase of African international relations precludes firm alliances against other African states, these dynamics take on a stronger expression through conflict than through co-operation, and this characteristic impedes the spread of conflict. (Of course, power can be borrowed from the outside through engagements and alliances, in pursuit of the same goals of structure and rank).

It is not artificial to speak of phases of African international relations, and the evolution of these phases is generally well enough accepted to need only recalling. In the late 1950s, even before full independence in some cases, international relations took a Kautilyan or checkerboard form in which neighbours were enemies and neighbours' neighbours were friends, as seen in interlocking relations among Maghrebi states or parties and among such groups as the Mali Federation, the Union of African States and the Council of the Entente. These relations were usually — but not always — overshadowed by a structure imparted by the various colonial empires. This pattern grew rapidly, but briefly, into a balance of power system between two alliances in which the means of conflict was the increase of membership in the alliance; the Brazzaville Group led to the creation of the Casablanca Group and then to the enlarged Monrovia Group.

The third phase resulted in the creation of a concert system within the Organization of African Unity, whose formal answer to the structure of relations has been accepted unquestioned ever since. In this system, shifting factions, but never firm alliances, are formed on a succession of problems that are handled in regularly scheduled meetings. However, within the system, and particularly during the late 1970s, some states have grown sufficiently in power resources and governmental coherence to become concerned with subregional structures and rankings as a basis of their policy. It should be noted that this is the same historic process as seen in the drive of European states to attain the status of major power in the Baltic or in the Mediterranean, or in the long continental rivalry between France and Germany, *mutatis mutandis*. It is, therefore, to the subregions that attention should be turned. The purpose here is not to report new data, for which there is no space in this brief presentation, but to bring out

some patterns and relationships that will help in understanding known data.

North African relations are structured on the basis of a bipolar rivalry, with a number of important onlookers and surrounded by a vast area of power vacuum that invites spillover from the central rivals and others. The rivalry concerns Morocco and Algeria, two growing states of equal population and military weight, but unequal territory and economic weight. The rivalry is heightened by the very different historical bases of the two states — historic monarchy *vs* new revolutionary colonial-inheritance, and is justified (but not created) by basic ideological differences — bourgeois pluralist liberalism *vs* Arab socialism. It is expressed as well in different external orientations, with Morocco generally following an accommodationist policy toward the developed world and Algeria leading the Group of 77 in a confrontationist assault on the north. On the ground, the rivalry finds its immediate expression in a border war which has been going on in various forms since, or even before, Moroccan independence. As of 1980, the current form concerns both an unratified boundary bewteen the two countries and a conflict over larger territory to the south in the Western Sahara, to be discussed below. However, border war is only the form, not the substance, of the conflict. The basic issue is Morocco's desire to attain counterweight proportions compared with Algeria, and Algeria's desire to ensure that Morocco remains smaller in territory and resources, and hence in power, in order to preserve what the Algerians often call "regional equilibrium".

Within the region are also two other second level states, each with major elements of power but with perceived interests that keep them peripheral to the rivalry. Tunisia is smaller in all ways except for per capita G.N.P. than the polar rivals, and so is concerned with preserving its automony against possible encroachment of powerful neighbours, rather than contesting a ranking order in the subregion. Libya's policy is also the product of its power position: G.N.P. that exceeds Algeria's but a population base that is smaller than Tunisia's. Libya's drive, therefore, is not toward participation in the subregional rivalry; and indeed it lies between regions rather than clearly within one of them; its immediate concern is the acquisition of a larger population base, in accordance with an ideology that gives it messianic pretensions of leadership within the Islamic, Arab and Saharan worlds. It is the latter element which completes the structure of North Africa, for the desert surrounds it with a glacis that defines the subregion and that provides an area of power vacuum into which the states can carry their struggles of power and interest. Algeria and

Libya occupy much of the Sahara in their own right, but both extend their power into the Western Sahara in search of a client state. Moroccan claims over the Mauritanian and Algerian Sahara, now reduced to claims over the Western Sahara, like Libyan claims over northern Chad (Aouzou strip) and its military penetration into Niger and Chad, are attempts to fill the power vacuum in order to improve its position in the sub-region. Only by reinforcing the sovereignty of the weak Saharan states — as France is doing in Mauritania, and the OAU and Nigeria are seeking to do in Chad — can the competition among North African states be contained, although the very act of "reinforcing sovereignty" by an outside power is merely another state's act of entry into the competition.

The structure of relations in West Africa is quite different. Although the colonial structure of interlocking non-communicating territories was challenged from the start by the U.A.S. and the All-African Peoples Conference, it has long prevailed and is only gradually being eroded. A more natural structure of relations is taking its place, built around a large polar state, Nigeria, and a number of smaller states of similar power and interests reacting against the weight of Nigeria, and also interacting among each other in contests over rank. Preoccupied by internal cohesion and diffident about its size, Nigeria in the 1960s played a modest role in West African relations, and was challenged primarily by its English-speaking colleague with greater power and interests, the Ghana of Nkrumah. Since the Biafran War, Nigeria has gained governmental coherence, oil, a trained army, and a less diffident sense of mission. It is therefore not merely in a traditional anti-colonial role, but also in the role of the dominant sub-regional power, that it seeks to replace France as the guarantor of order around it. Such policies as intervention in Chad and the sposorship of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) flow from its role image as dominant power in the sub-region.

At the second level, the structure is not as clear, but the existence of bilateral rivalries among similar states is strong. Before the breakup of the French West African Federation (AOF), relations within it were polarized on the attraction of the two major port cities, Dakar and Abidjan, and their hinterlands. When the European Development Fund was established under the Yaounde Agreements, the one point on which the Africans could agree initially was that Senegal and the Ivory Coast would have equal shares in the Fund. However, Senegal's position has slipped and the political instability of the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River (OMVS) has not provided it with a

supportive sub-regional alliance. The Ivory Coast maintains its economic club with greater effectiveness as a political alliance in the form of the Conseil de l'Entente. Abijan has also posed a specific rank-order challenge to its larger and ostensibly stronger neighbour, Ghana, in the famous ten-year wager of Houphouet-Boigny to Nkrumah, and has probably won, without resorting to the military and territorial conflicts typical of Morocco and Algeria. On could pursue an analysis of the foreign policies of the lesser states of the sub-region in relation to the polar power and the second-level rivalries, but space does not permit this, and the lesser actors are not as important to the general configuration of the subregional structure.

In East Africa, significant changes in structure have appeared during the 1970s, but the structure itself is less developed than in the north and the west. This is partly because the sub-region is less well defined. There is a pull on at least one member to the south, as Tanzania acts within the group of Frontline States. More important is the pull of the Arab region, which complicates sub-regional dynamics. The core of the sub-region however illustrates one of the dynamic principles. Three countries of comparable population and G.N.P. — Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania — have perpetuated a rivalry over wealth, status and power, since independence; to the point of destroying their own sub-regional organization of co-operation. They have moved outside the initial circle in search of allies and support, and Kenya and Tanzania have struggled over the control of the third member. In this region there is no polar state with predominant power and relations have been characteristically unstable from the start. Considering the sub-region more broadly, however, an interesting development occurred in the 1970s in the rise of a state not yet into a polar or dominant position, to be sure, but at least into a position of greater weight in the sub-region. The increase in the size of the Ethiopian army and in the scope of the revolutionary government's foreign policy role image, added to the overwhelming predominance of the country in terms of population, gives Ethiopia the potential for a polar role. Through its alliance with Kenya, it has been able to break the Muslim encirclement that the Ahmaric fortress has long felt, but lately it has been able to neutralize the Sudanese front and concentrate its conflict on the Somali (and Eritrean) fronts.

Thus the sub-region has the configuration of two clusters of states — one of unstable equals, the other of polarized conflict — joined together on occassion by conflict and alliance. The role of Ethiopia and the position of Tanzania in the sub-region are two elements that will determine its structure in the near future.

In Central Africa, the same inchoateness of structure appears because the power potential of the states in the sub-region has not developed as it has in the north or even in the west. Potentially, the relations and policies of the sub-region are polarized around the predominant mass of Zaire, although its political incoherence reduces the weight of its large population and total G.N.P. (and even its large army). The remaining Equatorial states are disperate enough by various measures — population, G.N.P., ideology, military — to avoid the ranking rivalries of East or West Africa, and it will take a greater degree of development on the part of either Zaire or of the second-level states — Cameroun, Congo, Gabon — than seems likely in the near future, to provide a more active dynamic than the low level co-operation now contained by their longstanding customs union, U.D.E.A.C.

If this type of analysis is relevant to the developing parts of the continent, it is particularly applicable to Southern Africa. More than simply an inchoate pattern of relations, in Southern Africa there is a struggle for structures; between proponents of constellation and proponents of confrontation. Each represents a typically African and international system of relations. Constellation is the more usual, for it seeks to gather less developed and hence less powerful states around a polar power, in this case the Republic of South Africa, the most developed state of the continent. The structure is based on economic ties and organization, leaving the more sensitive political ties implicit. Thus, constellation corresponds to the type of relations obtained by Nigeria through E.C.O.W.A.S. or less stably by Zaire through U.E.A.C. Because development provides external market penetration and creates a demand for labour, the potentialities for constellation are even greater in Southern than in West or Central Africa.

But there are certain problems with constellation that grow out of its innate nature, in addition to others that are inherent in its African nature. As other sub-regions have shown, polarized relations create suspicion and hostility on the part of the second-level states in direct proportion to the perceived weight of the polar power. Since the operative mechanism is perception, the reaction may be based on potential or on open behaviour, depending on the viewer; a reformed "heavy" may well still appear dangerously overbearing and a potential giant may create as much suspicion as a real one. Furthermore, as other sub-regions have shown, second-level states are likely to be engaged in their own rank rivalries unless united by a common external cause, so that polarized relations may leave the dominant power in the position of playing on the rivalries of those around it, but they may also leave it as the focus of that rivalry and its uncomfortable arbiter.

Finally, third-level states can be expected to be attracted to others on one of the higher levels depending on their geographic position and other vulnerabilities. In sum, there are dynamics inherent in constellation that make it a structure of control rather than a structure of co-operation, a fact that all parties cannot be expected to ignore.

Beyond its innate dynamics, constellation runs up against an overwhelming African fact: that South Africa is not a welcome partner for any state of the continent, or put differently, no matter how strong economic relations are (or perhaps even, the stronger they are), they are unavowable politically. Thus the political payoffs of an economic constellation are limited. This in general is a situation characteristic of African sub-regional co-operation, as the political restraints on the Entente, E.C.O.W.A.S., U.D.E.A.C. and U.E.A.C., and the East African Common Market show, but the characteristic is accentuated by the nature of Southern African relations.

Instead, this limitation underlies a competing structure of relations, the pattern of confrontation along the battleline. In confrontation, the second-level states combine against the dominant state and implement conflict by all available means, submerging their ranking rivalries in the struggle against the common enemy.

Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe all have similar power bases, with Angola and Zimbabwe being equal in population and G.N.P., and Zambia and Zimbabwe together leading in per capita G.N.P., and Mozambique leading in population. Such a situation would doubtless be more conducive to rivalry and maneouvering among these four leading Frontline States; or even among these and additional and larger states such as Zaire and Tanzania who might feel part of the sub-region; were it not for the fact of their more recently achieved independence and their immediate needs for internal consolidation. To satisfy these needs, confrontation is a more compatible model of external relations, because of its political focus, than is constellation. Constellation, of course, also has its external enemy, communist penetration, but it is one that is totally unappealing to the Frontline States and totally unsuited to their needs of solidarity-making during internal consolidation. In fact, confrontation as a structure of relations is merely constellation carried to the extreme of its political logic, that is, with the radicals expelled. Yet the expulsion of the radicals means the destruction of the constellation in form, just as the inclusion of the radicals means the destruction of the constellation in substance.

The structures of confrontation also have their problems, relating primarily to the same question that challenges constellation,

the nature of the structure. It is not clear whether the Frontline States are in a military, ideological or economic alliance, even though each or all of these aspects are necessary to give meaning to the political alliance they seek. Member states are too weak for effective conventional military co-operation, too disparate for ideological harmony, and too dependent, underdeveloped and un-coordinated — most basically, in regard to transport — for economic effectiveness. Meetings for policy co-ordination, as in Lusaka in April and Maputo to come, have sought to change this, but changes are necessarily slow and limited.

Constellation can only be effective when South Africa becomes acceptable to the Frontline States, not *vice versa*, or in other words, when confrontation becomes irrelevant. This does not mean that confrontation need take a conventional military form or need produce a victor, since victory and defeat in conventional terms are not in the nature of the conflict. Confrontation is not a rank order conflict such as the one between Morocco and Algeria, in which the internal system of the states in not at stake. It is a conflict over legitimacy and legitimacy is sometimes hard to recognise. South Africa has to attain it, to be able to take part in political relations in the region. Black Africa has to recognise it, and to know at what point in the process to recognise that South Africa is heading in an acceptable direction, as the Lusaka Declaration states.

The outcome usually being unclear in politics, it is unlikely that either one or the other structure will prevail, but that in itself is a significant outcome. Some underlying vestiges of constellation are likely to remain despite the best efforts at de-linkage; in that sense, constellation can undermine confrontation. But if the Frontline States are too weak to confront effectively, they are above all too hostile to coalesce with South Africa; in that sense, confrontation destroys constellation. Both systems co-existed and struggled for predominance in the past; neither has been destroyed and both remain to contend in the 1980s. But the fact is that constellation has changed its nature and confrontation has moved forward on the ground. In the process, the intensity of both has been attenuated, and that, rather than destruction of the other structure, may be the best that the proponents of each pattern may be able to obtain.

## CO-OPERATION OR NATIONAL SECURITY? CHOICES AND OPTIONS FOR WHITE AND BLACK AFRICA

**Gerrit Olivier**

For reasons which are fairly obvious Black Africa plays a dominant role in South Africa's internal and external politics. First and perhaps foremost among these reasons is the important strategic reality that South Africa is geographically an integral part of the African continent. Secondly, South Africa has a vital interest in the type of political and social objectives pursued by African states and the effect these could have on future conflict and policy patterns on the continent. Thirdly, because of their fundamental opposition to South Africa's race policies, African states are important agents in the mobilisation of international opposition against South Africa and thus are mainly responsible for the deterioration of South Africa's bilateral and multilateral links with the world at large. Fourthly, developments in Africa, especially in the most southern tier of the continent have a direct and profound impact on the dynamics of the internal policies of both South Africa and Namibia.

South African policy-makers are, of course, well aware of the fact that if the country's international position is to improve it would first of all have to come to terms, or eliminate if possible, Black African opposition. This brings one to the problem of options and choices.

The *sine qua non* of improved international relations is drastic political reform on the home-front. In this regard it is not necessary to say more than that South Africans should realize that in the world of today the difference between domestic and international politics has become increasingly vague. In fact, the behaviour and interactions of nations are not isolated and self-contained, but part of a much wider field of behaviour and interaction. This tendency to internationalize domestic, social and political problems, makes it difficulut to reach a general consensus as to what is legitimate or acceptable.

As yet, South Africa's internal policies are nowhere near the level of international acceptability. Moreover, it is doubtful whether any reform by a White government short of majority rule in a unitary state would meet with general international approval. This being the situation, South Africa must devise ways and means to circumvent impossible demands and to buy time to bring about its own reforms, with the hope that these reforms will

stabilize the internal conflict situation. At the same time, while such reforms are being planned and implemented, South African policy-makers should start thinking about an improved foreign policy, one which could lend support to the successes being achieved on the home front.

In view of Southern Africa's immediate importance in this respect, the question arises: how could South Africa achieve its goals in the region? The two postures which have been receiving foremost attention devolve on national security and interdependence. Ever since the decolonization of Black Africa and the subsequent hostile encirclement of South Africa, national security has been the primary policy of the Government. In view of the persuasiveness of the national security argument, South African political leaders used it as a slogan to generate support for their policies and to justify strategies designed, at considerable cost, to bolster the economic, political and military structure of South Africa. Today, under the leadership of the new Prime Minister, the saliency of national security is higher than ever before. Within the context of terminology such as "total onslaught" and "total strategy" a formidable bureaucratic and military machine operates continuously to safeguard South Africa's national security in the sea of hostility in which it finds itself.

More recently, albeit somewhat paradoxically, interdependence became part of the South African political rhetoric. Thus the question which begs itself is: can the interdependence rhetoric and national security symbolism coexist? Narrowly defined interdependence suggests that conflicts of interest are passé whereas national security conveys the notion that conflicts will persist. Of course, it would be wrong to suggest that once interdependence prevails conflict will disappear. The point is, however, that the nature and degree of conflict will change once interdependence prevails. This is exactly what South African policy-makers have in mind: to change the nature of the conflict situation in South Africa through economic co-operation. To put it in a nutshell, South Africa offers material progress in exchange for peaceful co-existence. One could conclude, therefore, that to the extent that co-operation succeeds, the emphasis will shift away from national security.

There are, quite obviously, great asymmetries in the whole dependence situation in Southern Africa, which could provide valuable sources of influence for the actors on both sides. South Africa being the less dependent party, endeavours to use that interdependent relationship as a source of power to negotiate better relations with the black states. The black states, on the other hand, being the more dependent, for various ideological

reasons reject an interdependent relationship with South Africa and are taking various steps towards diminishing it. South Africa believes, however, that this negative stance will prove itself abortive over the longer term. This belief is strengthened by circumstances such as the failure of economic policies, continued instability, perpetual shortages of consumer goods and the underdeveloped nature of the majority of African states south of the Sahara.

By now it has also become clear that these states cannot expect massive assistance from outside sources. The biggest possible donor, the USA, gives more aid to Egypt than to all of sub-Saharan Africa because of its own strategic interests. This will inevitably lead to greater African vulnerability to internal instability and Soviet penetration — which will have a detrimental effect on the whole region including South Africa. In view of South Africa's economic strength it ought to be able to play a more positive role in preventing the worsening of the situation. One could conclude that although both sides are sensitive to these threats, and on account of the degree of interdependence that exists, the vulnerability of the black states is greater.

However, South Africa's dilemma is that although the abovementioned vulnerability asymmetry runs strongly in its favour, it does not really constitute a source of power which could be used constructively to affect the outcome of events in Southern Africa to its benefit. Furthermore, any strategy on the part of South Africa to manipulate the interdependence seems to evoke counter strategies.

The vexing problem facing South African foreign policymakers is: how to use the favourable asymmetrical interdependencies as a source of power in its relations with African states? This problem is compounded by the fact that the *de facto* relationship of interdependence between South Africa and the black states is being affected by various other sets of relationships, both on regional and global levels. Situations such as South Africa's pariah status in the world community, and the messianic commitment of African states towards the so-called liberation of South Africa have led to active policies supported by governments and international bodies outside South Africa, and on both sides of the iron curtain, aimed at disengagement and isolation *vis-a-vis* South Africa. The effect of it all is an artificial separation of interests which were they to be pooled, could benefit the entire southern tier of the African continent.

The artificiality of the situation is clearly demonstrated by the dualism in the actions of the black states themselves. South African exports of food and industrial products to the rest of Africa

are booming and the South African Railways render services deep into the heart of Africa. However, with the exception of Malawi, African states prefer to deal with South Africa in a clandestine way in order not to antagonize the OAU or to afford political mileage to South Africa.

Obvioulsy, this state of affairs does not serve the best interests of Southern Africa as a whole, and the question is how long will this stalemate last? Being in a revolutionary frame of mind, some African leaders do not seem to care much about the disruptive effect of their posture *vis-a-vis* South Africa on the economic development of their own societies. South Africa, on the other hand, realises that internal reform is an essential condition for breaking this stalemate and is working towards this end. But the paradoxical truth is that while some progress is being made with internal reform, no corresponding improvement takes place in Black African attitudes. Indeed, there seems to be a hardening of attitudes.

If economic objectives only were at stake, co-operation might succeed, but economic objectives have political implications and the real problem is that South Africa's economic linkages with African states are limited because of the latter's refusal to have their political interests traded off. Thus, in spite of South Africa's military and economic preponderance, it is unable to use its power to control the outcome of issues in which it is weak. This places a question mark over the peacetime utility of South Africa's economic and military power as instruments of foreign policy. It is well known that South Africa's policy towards Black Africa is not based on a holding strategy. On the contrary, its policies towards Africa over the last three decades have been deliberately aimed at improving diplomatic relations, establishing a security community and enhancing economic co-operation. "The road to the world leads through Africa", has become a familiar slogan in South Africa's foreign policy rhetoric. However, most of the efforts to establish formal peaceful linkages with Africa have proved sterile, and generally the position continues to worsen. It is also a well-known fact that the black states in the southern region are giving their urgent attention to ways and means of lessening their dependence on South Africa.

It cannot be denied that this negative reaction of African states towards constructive co-operation with South Africa is not necessarily a true reflection of their objective national interests. Although the majority of these states vehemently reject South Africa's race policies, they would nevertheless have acted in a different way had it not been for the constant international demands urging them to refrain from dealing with South Africa. Because

public opinion in the Western democratic sense does not play a significant role in African states, it is relatively easy for the leadership to put ideological objectives before material welfare. One can only speculate on how long African leaders will continue to enjoy this freedom of action. With the stability in many Southern African states already precarious and with virtually no meaningful and consistent external aid to count on, only Soviet Russia will benefit if the door of co-operation remains shut for South Africa.

Against the background of the above analysis of the position taken up by both sides, it seems highly unlikely that the conflict in Southern Africa could be resolved by military or economic means only. There is a decidedly classical no-win situation between South Africa and other African states and the longer the struggle continues the more devastating it will be for both sides.

It may sound highly idealistic, but it does seem that a lasting solution would only be possible if the discrepancies between White and Black Africa concerning essential human values could be eliminated. It stands to reason that relations between South Africa and Black Africa will only improve and normalize if Whites and Blacks could enjoy equal formal status in Africa. In contemporary Africa both white and black regimes are guilty of intolerant attitudes and racial discrimination, whether *de facto* or *de jure*. Legalized apartheid in South Africa and the undemocratic elimination of the white man in black states are equally objectionable because, these policies reflect the same type of cultural chauvinism and racialistic attitudes.

Essentially what seems to be absent is the restraining influence of a moral consensus between White and Black Africa. Many white South Africans find it difficult to commit themselves wholly to Africa. Europe is still their spiritual *heimat* with the result that differences of race are compounded by artificial cleavages caused by artificially maintained class and even cast differences. The simple truth is that Whites in this country regarding themselves as Europeans and not as Africans, are guilty of an arrogant colonial mentality which makes it impossible to find a common law of existence for black and white in Africa. While this gulf persists, there can be no basis for lasting peace between black and white in Africa because the restraining influence of common values and common interests are absent.

This does not mean that only black values are functional, or that western democratic values have become obsolete in the African context. Indeed, the standards set by Black Africa in the field of human rights are not exemplary and should be seen in the same negative light as South Africa's apartheid laws. In the light of their own struggle against colonialism and exploitation, Black

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African states should set a worthy example as far as human rights are concerned and do more to improve the quality of life of their own peoples if their efforts to effect change in South Africa are to be taken seriously.

Right now, the position in Africa looks sombre. At the African economic summit conference held in Lagos earlier this year, the Secretary-General of the OAU declared, "Africa is in mortal danger, its survival is at stake, yes, Africa is dying". From a moralistic point of view, it is not only imperative for South Africa to change, but also for those black states, where human rights exist in name only to change.

However, South Africa should not use the double standards argument to escape the urgency of speeding up the dismantling of institutionalized discrimination. While the apartheid system is still in force, South Africa not only alienates itself from the West (whose values it professes to follow) but also from the rest of Africa. Being an African state, it will have to come to terms with the realities of this continent. Similarly, Black Africa will have to accept the legitimacy and permanency of the white man in Africa and discipline itself to overcome its own deficiencies in democracy, human rights and social and economic progress.

The existing deficiencies on both sides cannot be removed overnight, but through conciliatory attitudes, encouragement of progress and mutual co-operation a brighter and happier future could be built for both white and black in Africa.

The theoretical distinction made in this article between interdependence and national security is based on the analysis of Robert O Keohane and Joseph S Nye *Power and Independence — World politics in transition* (Little Brown, Boston, 1977), Chapter 1

# THE USSR, ITS COMMUNIST ALLIES, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA*

**David E. Albright**

Since the demise of the Portuguese empire in the mid-1970s, the USSR and its Communist allies — notably, Cuba and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) — have manifestly increased their activities in Southern Africa. However, the key issue concerning these activities is not so much their expansion, but the way in which the leaderships in Moscow, Havana, and East Berlin view them. In short, what sort of policy underlies such undertakings?

In approaching this subject, it is important to bear in mind several things. To begin with, one must really speak of policies, rather than just a single policy. Both Cuba and the GDR have perceived interests and objectives in the area which are distinct from those of the Soviet Union.[1] Fidel Castro, for example, has long regarded himself as a champion of "national liberation" and revolution in the Third World, and he has sought to project such an image abroad. Indeed, his government provided military advisers and other forms of aid to selected "national liberation" movements in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World as long ago as the early 1960s — at a time when considerable tension existed between Havana and Moscow. By the same token, the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, the most important institution of the Castro regime, have tended to favour activism in Africa for their own organizational reasons. They have seen military engagements overseas not only as a way of enhancing their international prestige and their political influence at home, but also as a means of improving their military effectiveness and upgrading the weapons systems they have available to them. For its part, the GDR has felt a need to develop close relations with the existing and potential black governments throughout Africa to strengthen its delimitation from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In the early 1970s, the GDR managed to gain nearly universal diplomatic recognition as well as membership in the United Nations, but to do so, it had to accept a special relationship with the FRG which greatly weakened the foundations of the

*This article is a revised version of a paper prepared for presentation at a Transatlantic Symposium on "Interacting Values in Contemporary Africa", sponsored by USSALEP and held near Cape Town, South Africa, in late October 1980. The views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the assessments of the U.S. government.

division of Germany between East and West. Thus, the leadership in East Berlin has been increasingly concerned about solidifying the division in every manner possible in order to ensure domestic stability and internal security in the GDR. East German leaders have also evinced a growing desire to guarantee access to the raw materials and minerals in Southern Africa as a hedge against reduction of supplies from fellow members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Since the GDR does not have a great many natural resources of its own, it must buy a large portion of its raw materials, minerals, and food from abroad, and it has in the past obtained the bulk of these imports from other CMEA states, especially the USSR. With the mounting economic problems of the Soviet Union and Moscow's need to meet rising domestic demands for such goods, however, there has been increasing question as to how long such an approach will be viable.

Moreover, both Havana and East Berlin have looked upon co-operation with the USSR in Africa as a means of enhancing their leverage on Soviet policy in places of more immediate concern to them. The present regimes in Cuba and the GDR each depend heavily upon Soviet support to remain in power. Fidel Castro's government, for instance, receives large amounts of economic aid from the Soviet Union, to say nothing of military supplies. The GDR government, similarly, relies greatly upon the USSR to defend its diplomatic position in Europe and to prevent domestic challenges to its authority. Under such circumstances, there is considerable danger that Moscow may ride roughshod over Cuban or GDR concerns unless Cuban and East German leaders can at least partially offset their dependence by showing the Soviet Union that retaining their goodwill has positive, not just negative, aspects. What happened during the Soviet push for detente in the early 1970s affords a good illustration of this danger. Moscow forced the GDR to be more forthcoming on matters such as Berlin than the East Germans wished to be, and it even brought about the replacement of Walter Ulbricht as First Secretary of the GDR's governing party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), when he tried to resist Soviet pressure to get in step with the USSR.

Despite the fact that Cuba and the GDR have their own separate interests and objectives, however, neither possesses a great many capabilities for operating independently in Southern Africa.[2] For example, although both can and do provide military advisers to various governments and groups in the area, each lacks the air- and sealift capacity as well as the logistical support base to project significant military power there on its own. Furthermore, neither boasts sufficient economic resources to make

much of an impact on the region's economic needs. Cuba is a developing country, and, as already noted, it at present requires large infusions of Soviet aid to subsist. What it can offer in the economic realm is essentially technical assistance, especially personnel. Although the GDR is more industrialized and has a higher standard of living than any other Communist state, it has experienced mounting economic problems at home over the last decade, particularly since the beginning of the rise of world oil prices in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. As a consequence, it has had to impose heavy restrictions on economic help to and trade with all Third World countries.

In addition, Cuba and the GDR, because they seek to increase their leverage on Soviet policy in areas less remote from them than Africa, find themselves under other constraints in Southern Africa. They can basically work toward this end only through co-operation with the USSR in the region. Activities of too independent a nature in the area run the risk of being counterproductive in the broader context. While each has the option of trying to persuade Moscow to pursue a course in line with its own prescriptions, neither can marshall major inducements in this regard aside from the force of the logic of its argument.

Therefore, both Cuba and the GDR have had to tailor their concrete ventures to the broad framework of Soviet policy. For this reason, as well as in its own right, Soviet policy requires detailed consideration.

#### Soviet Interests in Southern Africa

Soviet policy toward Southern Africa has been fairly complicated, This characteristic stems from the complexities of the relationship among the USSR's interests, capabilities, objectives, strategy, and involvements. In the abstract, each of these elements should flow inexorably out of the preceding ones, but in practice such neat linkages rarely, if ever pertain with regard to any country's foreign policy. For states, like the Soviet Union, with concerns that blanket the globe, the linkages tend to become very intricate indeed when one focuses on policy toward any individual geographic area.

Moscow's perceived interests apropos of Southern Africa specifically can be grouped under two general headings. From the Soviet standpoint, one is positive in nature; the other is negative.

The positive category encompasses four items. First, the USSR has an interest in playing a role in the resolution of racial conflict in the area to reinforce its claims to status as a global power. As early as the late 1950s, Nikita Khrushchev sought to win recognition as a global power for the USSR in the wake of Soviet achieve-

ments in rocketry, but as it became clear in the early 1960s, and especially after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, that the United States still enjoyed nuclear superiority, Moscow temporarily abandoned this effort. With the buildup of Soviet strategic forces in the 1960s, however, the USSR in the 1970s revived its claims to such a status. In April 1971, for instance, *USSR Foreign Minister* Andrei Gromyko averred: "Today there is no question of any significance which can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it".[3] Yet, as Soviet leaders are exceedingly conscious, global power status must be self-achieved, self-asserted, and self-sustained. It does not flow from divine right or the consent of the international community.[4] Thus, the more major international issues to whose resolution the USSR can show it is indispensable, the greater weight its contentions that it is a global power will have. And the racial conflict in Southern Africa certainly qualifies as a major international issue in Soviet eyes.[5]

Second, the USSR has an interest in gaining local support to maintain a presence in the area. To validate a claim to global power status, any country must demonstrate global reach, and such a demonstration normally requires not just intermittent forays into distant regions but a sustained presence in those regions. Establishing this kind of presence in any given area is greatly facilitated by the co-operation of local governments there. Soviet leaders have given ample signs in Southern Africa that they understand this fact. Not only has the USSR reached agreement with the black-ruled states there on many political, cultural, and economic activities that have brought Soviet personnel into the area, but it has also obtained the approval of some of them for certain types of Soviet military ventures. The last include the supply of arms and military advisers, calls of Soviet warships at local ports, and the use of airfields by Soviet planes for purposes of reconnaissance.

Third, the USSR has an interest in guaranteeing access to the raw materials and minerals in the area. Southern Africa is richly endowed with the latter in particular. Among these are oil, platinum, chrome, vanadium, gold, manganese, fluorspar, diamonds, nickel, uranium, zinc, phosphate, asbestos, antimony, lead, iron ore, coal, titanium, copper, quartz, alabaster, and silicate. South Africa alone has the largest reserves of platinum, chrome, vanadium, gold, manganese, and fluorspar of any country in the world. It also ranks second in reserves of diamonds; third in reserves of nickel; fourth in reserves of uranium, zinc, and phosphate; fifth in reserves of asbestos, antimony, and lead; sixth in reserves of iron ore and coal; eighth in reserves of titanium; and tenth in reserves of copper.[6] While

Soviet commentaries invariably stress the West's alleged designs on these minerals and eschew any hint of a Soviet concern with them, the commentaries reveal a clear understanding of the magnitude of these resources,[7] and this is sufficient to make them of considerable potential value to Moscow as it endeavours to cope with some problems that loom on the horizon for the USSR. Although the USSR itself possesses enough reserves of the minerals Southern Africa has to offer to make it essentially self-sufficient, claims on Soviet output of such minerals do not stem just from domestic demand. The USSR also serves as the major supplier of these minerals to its fellow members of CMEA, particularly those in Eastern Europe. As of the early 1980s, however, the Soviet Union already appears to be finding it hard to meet CMEA needs in the case of oil, and the likelihood that it will experience increasing difficulties in this realm as the decade progresses seems high. Similar states of affairs could arise in the near future with respect to other minerals as well.[8] Under these circumstances, Moscow has strong incentives to ensure access to Southern Africa's mineral resources for itself and its allies. These incentives are bolstered by specific economic conditions in the USSR itself. Because of inefficiencies of extraction, the location of deposits, the investments required to exploit deposits, and other factors, it may soon become cheaper for the Soviet Union to meet a portion of its internal demand for minerals such as iron ore through imports than to rely essentially on domestic production.[9]

Fourth, the USSR has an interest in the radicalization of the area. Moscow does not, to be sure, see much chance of the emergence there in the near future of governments which it would regard as genuinely Marxist-Leninist in character. For example, it describes the self-styled Marxists-Leninists who rule Angola and Mozambique at present as "revolutionary democrats", maintaining that "there have been no irreversible processes" in these countries yet.[10] Furthermore, it depicts "the strengthening of ... political independence" and "the consolidation of ... economic independence" even here as "complex and lengthy processes during which the people have to overcome major difficulties".[11] Nevertheless, Soviet officials are highly aware of the benefits that the USSR derived from the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa and the rise to power of radical black governments in the former Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa,[12] and Soviet commentaries suggest that Moscow expects similar political transitions in the region to produce comparable results.[13] While the coolness toward the USSR of the new government of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe may have dampened this expectation

somewhat, there is no indication that it has disappeared.

The negative category of Soviet interests includes three items. First, the USSR has an interest in undermining the position of the West in the area. In Moscow's eyes, the Soviet Union is engaged in a competition with the West for influence in Southern Africa, and this competition amounts to a zero-sum game. That is, gains for one side involve losses for the other side, and vice versa. a Soviet analyst recently conveyed the perspective in the following fashion with regard to Africa as a whole: "Despite all efforts undertaken by the United States, the main tendency consists in the gradual weakening of the positions of the leading Western powers on the continent. With the material and moral-political support of the socialist comminity, the African people are inflicting one defeat after another on imperialism".[14] In such a framework, Western influence must decrease for the Soviet role in Southern Africa to grow. At the same time, Moscow regards a precipitate departure by the West from the region as undesirable from the Soviet standpoint. As it has pointed out in a more general context, "the Soviet Union's potential for rendering economic assistance is not infinite", and, "of course, the Soviet Union cannot fail to be concerned for the well-being of its own people".[15] Thus, Soviet commentators have come more and more to emphasize the need for "a long-term strategy" for "the industrialization of the former colonies and semi-colonies according to fundamentally different principles of social and international economic relations than those inherent in capitalism".[16]

Second, the USSR has an interest in limiting, and wherever possible, reducing Chinese influence in the area. For years now, Moscow has viewed the People's Republic of China as a threat to the USSR's efforts to establish itself as the chief patron of "national liberation" and revolutionary movements throughout the Third World, and especially in Africa.[17] Soviet writers have repeatedly charged Beijing with seeking "to present Maoism as the only new and revolutionary liberation doctrine suited to African conditions" and "to undermine the solidarity of the three revolutionary trends in the modern world" by setting "the national liberation movements against the world socialist system and the international workers movement".[18] As evidence, they have cited particularly China's support of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) against the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the Angolan civil war of the mid-1970s.[19] In such a context, the struggle with China for influence in Southern Africa assumes the features of a zero-sum game, too.

Third, the USSR has an interest in impeding Western access to

the raw materials and minerals in the area and in disrupting Western use of the sea lanes around the southern end of the continent. As noted previously, Southern Africa, and especially South Africa, has a great wealth of minerals. Moreover, these mineral resources are plainly of significance to the West. For example, the region constitutes the major non-Communist source of supply of a number of minerals important to the West's advanced industrialized economies — e.g., chromium, platinum, manganese.[20] The sea lanes that lie around the region have equal significance for the West. More than half of Western Europe's oil and 20 percent of the United States' oil travels through these waters on its way from the Persian Gulf to its ultimate destination.[21] Of such facts, Moscow is exceptionally well aware. Indeed, Soviet commentaries harp on them continually — always with the implication that they reflect Western vulnerabilities.[22]

#### Conflicting Interests

To some extent, these various interests are complementary to one another, but they are not entirely so. For instance, attempts to impose a solution of the racial conflict in Southern Africa to substantiate the USSR's global power status could have an adverse impact on efforts to gain local support to maintain a presence in the area. By the same token, undertakings to impede Western access to the minerals of the region would be hard to reconcile with long-term attempts to eliminate Western influence there in ways that did not entail crushing economic burdens for the Soviet Union.

Far more critical, Southern Africa does not exist in a vacuum for the USSR, and some of these interests conflict with other, broader interest that Moscow perceives. Soviet leaders, for example, seem to believe that the USSR has an interest in avoiding escalation of the racial conflict and guerrilla wars of the area into a nuclear confrontation with the United States. Although they have argued that detente does not prohibit them from assisting "national liberation movements" in the Third World, they have in practice kept a close eye on the reactions of the United States as they have stepped up their intervention in African countries such as Angola and Ethiopia. Only when it has become manifest that the United States is not going to respond militarily have they committed the USSR in an all-out fashion.[23] Similarly, Moscow seems to see an interest in eschewing actions in places like Southern Africa which would encourage the United States to try to regain strategic military superiority. It recognizes that Soviet behaviour in Afghanistan has fuelled talk in the United States about such a move, and it fears that the United States has the means to

achieve this goal if the country actually sets out to do so.[24]

Soviet leaders also seem to regard it as in the USSR's interest to refrain from activities in areas like Southern Africa which would cause Western Europe to reduce its economic ties with CMEA countries. During the 1970s, trade between Western Europe and CMEA expanded greatly; moreover, Western Europe constituted the major source of what new technology the USSR acquired from abroad. When the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 threatened to disrupt these links, Moscow quickly sought to prevent such a development. Leonid Brezhnev, for example, has met with both French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to assure them of the Soviet Union's continued dedication to detente.

Moscow appears to feel, too, that the USSR has an interest in abstaining from behaviour in places such as Southern Africa which would fan the distrust that its move into Afghanistan has generated among Third World countries. Throughout the 1970s, the Soviet Union worked diligently, with the help of Cuba and other sympathetic states, to persuade Third World countries that the socialist states are the "natural allies" of the world's non-aligned. The real division of the globe, it contended, lay not between big and small, the rich and poor, but between socialism and imperialism.[25] Although the USSR's growing disposition to intervene in conflicts in Africa produced misgivings on the part of some Third World countries, the trend in the Third World prior to the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan was toward acceptance of this argument. However, the Afghanistan affair has drastically altered the situation. Not only did most of the Third World support the UN General Assembly resolution in January 1980 to condemn the Soviet invasion — the only African states that endorsed the USSR's version of the intervention were Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia — but a large number of countries echoed the view of Nigeria's UN ambassador that "in the end" the nonaligned countries had to conclude that "there are no natural allies".[26] Without retreating from their charted path in Afghanistan, Soviet leaders have evinced a strong desire to mitigate this damage to their position in the Third World. For instance, they have tried to give the appearance of flexibility with regard to the length of time Soviet troops will remain in Afghanistan, they vigorously lobbied Third World (especially Islamic countries) not to boycott the Olympic games, and they have even enlisted Central Asian Muslims to present the Soviet case for the invasion to the Third World.[27]

More indirectly, but no less significantly, the interests that Moscow perceives in Southern Africa inevitably compete with the

interests that it perceives in other parts of the world. Since the USSR has pretensions as a global power, Soviet leaders have defined its interests in those terms. Indeed, there is virtually no place in the world now about which they do not articulate some type of Soviet interest. At the same time, the USSR must confront its lack of omnipotence. Because it does not have unlimited resources, it cannot possibly pursue all its interests simultaneously. Therefore, Moscow must pick and choose among its interests. This situation pits those in one area against those in others.

#### Geopolitical Priorities and Capabilities

The concrete Soviet objectives in Southern Africa that have emerged from this welter of considerations have been determined by a mixture of Moscow's geopolitical priorities and the USSR's general capabilities to operate in the region. As to the former, Southern Africa occupies a position well down on the list. Since the early days of the Bolshevik Revolution, Europe has stood at the centre of Moscow's geopolitical concerns. It was from Europe that the chief threats to the Soviet state originated during the interwar period, culminating in the traumatic German invasion of 1941. Moreover, Europe has been the main arena of the USSR's competition with the United States since the end of World War II. Soviet commentators, it is true, find it expedient to speak of South Africa as a European implant on the African continent, but they leave no doubt that they understand fully the physical and psychological distance that separates it from Western Europe.[28]

East Asia has followed close behind Europe since at least the 1960s. The USSR found itself in armed combat with Japan from time to time during the 1930s and 1940s and had an indirect role in the war on the Korean peninsula in the 1950s, but it was not until after the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s that the area took on its current importance for Moscow. In the mid-1960s, Mao Zedong revived Chinese complaints about the "unequal treaties" that had transferred vast Asian territories from the Chinese Empire to Tsarist Russia, and Beijing acquired nuclear weapons. This combination of events convinced Soviet leaders of the presence of a security threat on their eastern borders. Japan's rise as a major economic power during the 1960s merely confirmed the critical nature of the region in Moscow's eyes.

Third place on the list has gone to the southern rimlands of the USSR — that is, the countries forming an arc south of the Soviet Union, from South Asia around to North Africa — since the mid-1960s. Prior to then, it should be underscored, Moscow had bestowed this ranking on varied groupings of states over the

years. During the early post-revolutionary period, for example, it accorded the honour to the countries to the USSR's immediate south. Later, with Josef Stalin's rise to power and the advent of the world depression, it broadened the focus to the colonies of the West European powers more generally — first with the aim of weakening these powers in the European context, but afterward with the goal of encouraging them to resist the pressures of Fascist Germany. In the initial post-World War II years, it limited the ranking to essentially the colonies and newly emerging states of South and Southeast Asia. As empires collapsed and more and more colonies acquired their independence, Nikita Khrushchev expanded the scope of concern once again — to include Asia as a whole, then Africa as well, and ultimately even Latin America. But disappointment with the behaviour of many of the states in these areas soon caused him to narrow its definition to those states which he deemed had genuine revolutionary potential. Conviction that there was little possibility for Communist breakthroughs in the Third World in the foreseeable future led Khrushchev's successors to abandon his concept of the ranking in the mid-1960s and to replace it with concentration on the southern rimlands of the USSR. In contrast with the flux of earlier years, no new shifts in the nature of the ranking have now occurred for a substantial period of time. Such stability would appear to indicate that the southern rimlands of the USSR have gained a fairly firm hold on the third spot on Moscow's list of geopolitical priorities.

Beyond this level, it is somewhat harder to pin down precise rankings, for these have fluctuated greatly in recent years, largely in line with the opportunities available to the USSR. Nevertheless, one thing directly relevant to the comparative position of Southern Africa in these rankings can be said. The Horn of Africa clearly enjoys a higher priority than does Southern Africa. Serious Soviet attention to the Horn began in the late 1950s and picked up appreciably in the 1960s, especially with Moscow's courtship of Somalia. By the early 1970s, the USSR had acquired access to various facilities of military utility in Somalia, including the port at Berbera, and soon thereafter it concluded a treaty of friendship and co-operation with Mogadishu — the first such document it had signed with any African country. When its efforts to cultivate ties as well with the revolutionary military government in Ethiopia resulted in the loss of its position in Somalia, Moscow moved to bolster its relations with Ethiopia by conducting a massive air — and sealift of weapons, Cuban combat troops, and Soviet military advisers into the country to repel the invading Somali forces that sought to wrest the Ogaden from Addis Ababa' control. This effort led to an investment of nearly

$2 billion in arms alone. In carrying out these diverse ventures, the USSR has evinced a keen awareness of the Horn's strategic importance. This derives not only from its location at one end of the transit route between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean (via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea) but also from its proximity to the outlet of the Persian Gulf, whence flow many of the West's vital oil supplies.[29]

Soviet capabilities to function in Southern Africa have reached significant dimensions, but they are by no means unlimited. In the political and diplomatic realm, the USSR has a number of assets upon which it can draw. Since the late 1950s, Moscow has sought to train a corps of academic specialists on Africa, and while this effort has proceeded in fits and starts in accordance with the ups and downs of Soviet relations with the continent, the results by this juncture are reasonably impressive. Not only do these specialists turn out substantial quantities of writings about Africa — including Southern Africa — but they also engage in dialogue with the educated elite of the continent, politicians as well as intellectuals and academicians, through correspondence, mutual visits, and the like. Since the late 1950s, too, Moscow has developed a body of diplomats with experience in working on African problems and in African coutries. In the case of Southern Africa, their direct contacts with the local African milieu (specifically, with Zambia) began in the 1960s and have expanded considerably over the intervening years. It should be underlined as well that the division between academic specialist and diplomat is somewhat artificial, for individuals tend to move back and forth between the two roles. Prior to his posting to Zambia in the mid-1970s, for example, the current Soviet ambassador there, V. Solodovnikov, served as director of the African Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences for a decade. Only two (banned) Communist parties exist in the area — the multiracial South African Communist Party and the Lesotho Communist Party — but both are pro-Soviet in orientation. Of the two, the former is by far the more significant. Though in itself a weak and largely exile organization, it maintains close ties with the multiracial African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. Indeed, some of its members (predominantly whites) reportedly hold posts in the ANC apparatus.[30] Thus, the South African party constitutes an avenue of influence on the ANC for Moscow. It should likewise be noted that even though Soviet officials regard the ruling parties of Angola and Mozambique as "revolutionary-democratic" organizations rather than the Marxist-Leninist bodies that they claim to be, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has still forged party-to-party links with them. In

keeping with these, it has even furnished ideological and organizational training for the cadres of the African parties.[31] Although such institutional ties by no means provide the USSR with control over the ruling bodies in the two African states, they do afford an additional channel through which Moscow can communicate with the Angolan and Mozambican leaderships and press its views. The nonaligned movement offers the USSR some potential for shaping events in Southern Africa because of the close Soviet relationship with Cuba, Havana's contention that the USSR is a "natural ally" of the nonaligned, and Fidel Castro's position as nominal head of the movement until the movement's next summit. That potential, however, has dropped greatly as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent response of the Third World to the intervention. Finally, the USSR's status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council is of some consequence with regard to Southern Africa. Not only does it permit Moscow to have a say in defining any threats to international security in that area, but it also allows Soviet leaders to obstruct any UN attempt to deal with such threats, by virtue of the veto powers that this status confers.

It is in the economic sphere that Soviet capabilities for influencing events in Southern Africa are weakest. In part, this weakness stems from the general condition of the Soviet economy. Although the USSR has a gross national product of only about half that of the United States, the 1970s witnessed a drop in the annual growth rate of its GNP to about 3 percent. Moreover, even the most optimistic estimates for the 1980s foresee a growth rate of somewhat less than 3 percent, while the more pessimistic projections run all the way to total stagnation.[32] These gloomy prospects reflect not only the end of the era when high rates of growth could be assured through increasing inputs of labour and capital, but also an impending energy crisis and a manpower shortage. In part, the weakness derives from structural imbalances between the Soviet economy and the economies of Southern Africa. Despite the potential utility of at least some of the raw materials and minerals available in Southern Africa, the USSR has a primary need for advanced technology and sophisticated manufactured goods to cope with the deficiencies and problems of its domestic economy, and these it must obtain largely from the industrialized capitalist states. To finance such imports, it must either export to the industrialized capitalist states or pay in hard currency. Because of the overall restrictions on its capacity to export and of its limited reserves of hard currency, it finds great constraints on its ability to trade with any of the developing world. Throughout most of the 1970s, for instance, Soviet trade with the in-

dustrialized capitalist states made up roughly 25-30 percent of the USSR's overall foreign trade, while trade with all the developing states together comprised only about half that figure.[33]

In trying to define Soviet capabilities in Southern Africa precisely, however, one must recognize that the USSR's economic performance to date in the area may somewhat understate these capabilities. To begin with, it must be remembered that the former Portuguese colonies in the region did not gain their independence — and hence become candidates for assistance and potential trade partners — until the mid-1970s. Furthermore, aid and trade figures for the 1970s may reflect Moscow's priorities in committing its finite resources far more than its capabilities. Although Southern Africa received only $22 million in Soviet economic aid during 1970-78, Moscow's total economic help to Third World countries during that period amounted to $10,529 million.[34] Much the same picture emerges with respect to trade. During 1976-78, the USSR's average annual exports to Southern Africa amounted to 50,0 million rubles, and its average annual imports from the region totalled 11,7 million rubles. These figures compared with average annual exports to all developing countries of a little more than 4 billion rubles and average annual imports from them of roughly 3,7 billion rubles.[35]

Soviet capabilities in the military realm have now reached substantial proportions. For a long while, the USSR has had the capacity to supply enough arms and military advisers to Southern Africa to sustain prolonged guerrilla struggles thoughout the area and/or meet the needs of local independent states there. Indeed, it had by the 1970s become the largest producer of conventional arms in the world; moreover, Moscow has traditionally evinced reluctance simply to discard obsolescent weaponry. The critical factor governing arms transfers and the dispatch of military advisers, then, has been, and continues to be, the willingness of local elements in Southern Africa to accept them from the USSR.

What is relatively new is the Soviet capacity to project its own force and/or that of its allies into Southern Africa. Since 1969, there has been a permanent Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and a Soviet West Africa patrol has operated in the Eastern Atlantic since 1970. Both of these naval forces could move to the waters off Southern Africa on fairly short notice. The USSR has improved its air- and sealift capabilities to the point where its own troops and/or those of its allies could be dispatched in strength to the area. By and large, the airlift elements (numbering 1,550 aircraft) are topflight in nature, and Moscow is continuing to enhance them by replacing the An-12 with the I1-76, which

has a cargo capacity of 44 tons — double that of the An-12. The sealift elements, in contrast, are quantitatively and qualitatively in a lower league, although the Soviets are attempting to remedy the weaknesses. In 1978, for example, the USSR completed the first of a new class of amphibious ships, each of which carries four landing craft, and construction of roll-on/roll-off ships proceeds apace, with more than 20 of them already in service. As for troops, Moscow has in recent years created several new airborne divisions (though some reportedly are not maintained at full strength in men and equipment), bringing the total to eight. In addition, it has some special duty brigades that it can employ to supplement these units. With regard to naval infantry, the USSR has 12,000 men altogether. They are divided into five naval infantry regiments — each with three infantry battalions and one tank battalion — dispersed among the USSR's four fleets. For air cover, these naval infantry forces must rely on the limited types of planes that the *Kiev*-class vertical-takeoff aircraft carriers (of which only two have thus far entered service) can accommodate.[36]

But, as Moscow well knows, military capabilities cannot be assessed in the abstract. That is, precise military capabilities depend upon the concrete circumstances under which the use of armed forces would take place. And a close look at the USSR's capabilities in the most likely contexts for its direct military involvement in Southern Africa points up the limited nature of its capacity to operate in the area militarily.

In the event that the USSR sought to come to the aid of a political faction in one of the black-ruled states in Southern Africa after the outbreak of a civil war or some other breakdown of central authority, the opposing elements would have little chance without outside help, for local military forces in these countries are no match for Soviet troops, or even the troops of an ally such as Cuba, equipped with sophisticated Soviet arms. However, as Moscow is keenly aware, it is far from certain that these opposing elements would be unable to obtain outside assistance, and Western, particularly US, aid would render the outcome of the strife far more problematic — with the possible exception of a conflict in Angola, where an estimated 19,000 Cuban troops remain in the aftermath of the 1975-76 civil war.[37] Soviet leaders, of course, would have the option of transferring at least some of the Cuban troops in Angola to the scene of any conflict, but they would still probably have to dispatch additional troops from the USSR or one of its allies to take care of the security situation in Angola and to wage the battle under way elsewhere. Here some of the advantages that the United States enjoys in terms of capabilities for

the projection of its forces to remote theatres would become a factor.

According to a reliable estimate at the end of 1978, the United States can airlift twice as much, in terms of millions of ton-miles a day, as the Soviet Union, for American transports have longer ranges than their Soviet counterparts and possess an in-flight refuelling capability. The US amphibious fleet boasts three times as much single-lift capacity as its Soviet counterpart. Not only is the US Marine Corps 15 times as large as the Soviet Naval Infantry, but it can sustain operations for a month without resupply, as compared with a week for the Soviet forces. US carrier-based aircraft greatly surpass the USSR's sea-based aircraft in range, endurance, and firepower. Furthermore, the capacity of the United States to conduct underway replenishment of aircraft while forces are in transit vastly exceeds that of the Soviet Union.[38]

Perhaps more probable would be Soviet intervention on behalf of black elements attempting to topple the white-controlled governments in Namibia or South Africa. In either case, the USSR and/or its allies would come up against South African military forces. Although leading South African military figures such as Minister of Defence Magnus Malan have cautioned that the Pretoria government cannot hope to win a sustained war against both domestic and foreign foes, that government's capacity for defending terrain under its purview is nonetheless formidable at present. The Republic of South Africa has standing armed forces of 86,050, and it can mobilize 404,500 men on short notice. A prolonged callup of such dimensions, to be sure, would greatly disrupt the national economy, but the availability of this number on even a short-term basis still constitutes a powerful deterrent factor. In addition, the Republic possesses more than 400 combat aircraft in operational and training units. Among these are 51 French Mirage III and 46 F-1 fighter planes. It also boasts some 310 tanks, assorted rocket launchers and antitank weapons, and 33 naval combatants. While it denies that it has developed nuclear weapons, there can be no doubt that it has the resources and technical know-how to do so. Finally, it has an industrialized economy which has produced roughly half of the weapons and military equipment in the hands of its armed forces at the moment, thus making it the least militarily dependent of all African states.[39]

To engage forces of this magnitude and sophistication frontally would plainly require at minimum major participation of line units of the Soviet army. Of the USSR's two main allies in Southern Africa, Cuba could likely muster at most about 50,000

troops even if it withdrew the contingents that it currently has stationed in Angola and Ethiopia,[40] and the German Democratic Republic probably would not be able to furnish nearly that many. In the unlikely event that Moscow decided to commit all its various airborne and naval infantry units to the undertaking, the total forces still would amount to no more than 150,000 men.[41] Thus, they would face enormous odds unless buttressed by army line units.

Providing logistical background for such a military contingent would be a considerable task at the distances entailed — even if the USSR succeeded in gaining access to facilities in nearby states for transit purposes. Moreover, the West, and especially the United States, could compound the difficulty by interdicting both the sea and air supply routes. In this manner, it might well succeed in thwarting the enterprise without becoming directly involved in the ground warfare — as long as the conflict remained localized.

All things considered, then, the USSR's ability to spearhead an all-out assault on South Africa seems highly constrained at present. Its real capacities lie more in the sphere of aerial and naval harassment of South African forces. Yet even such ventures would probably necessitate safe sanctuaries in neighbouring states, and they would entail a substantial risk of escalation of the conflict by South Africa.

#### Objectives and Performance

In light of its geopolitical priorities and its capabilities for operating in Southern Africa, the USSR has established five limited interlocking objectives in the area for at least the medium term. They are (1) to stake out a role for itself in the ultimate denoument of the racial conflict in the region; (2) to promote the emergence of radical black governments in Namibia and South Africa; (3) to win local acceptance of the legitmacy of a Soviet political, economic, and even military presence in the area; (4) to weaken (though not to eradicate) the Western position in the region;[42] and (5) to curb and, to the extent possible, lessen Chinese influence in the area. Fulfillment of these goals, Moscow recognizes, constitutes a prerequisite for the pursuit of more ambitious ends. Indeed, Soviet officials often betray a painful awareness that in a number of other places in Africa the USSR has suffered bitter disappointments because it has allowed itself to become carried away with optimism about what could be accomplished in the foreseeable future.[43]

In working toward the goals upon which it has settled, the USSR has adopted a simple strategy. Specifically, it has sought to

win recognition for itself as the prime supporter of "anti-imperialist" and anti-racist forces in Southern Africa.[44] This strategy neatly integrates its various objectives into a concrete programme with a great deal of potential appeal among the local African peoples.

Since the demise of Portugal's African empire in the mid-1970s first convinced the Soviets that significant new opportunities were opening up in the area, Moscow's efforts to implement its chosen strategy have taken a multiplicity of forms. The USSR championed strong UN sanctions against Rhodesia until a settlement involving the guerrilla insurgents of the Patriotic Front took place there, and it has for years urged the UN General Assembly to reject the credentials of the representatives of the current South African government and deny them South Africa's seat in the organization. It has moved to solidify both state and party relations with the professedly Marxist-Leninist states of Angola and Mozambique; indeed, it has signed treaties of friendship and co-operation with both. It has established itself as the chief patron of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), the body that is conducting guerrilla warfare in Namibia, and has reinforced its long-standing ties with the African National Congress, the oldest "national liberation" movement in South Africa. It has even forged diplomatic links with Botswana and Lesotho, two of the less ideological states in the region. Perhaps the most substantial Soviet undertakings have been in the military sphere. Not only did the USSR combine forces with Cuba to assist the Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to assume power in Angola, but an estimated 1,300 Soviet and East European military advisers and 19,000 Cuban troops still remain in the country to help deal with the security threat that the Luanda government perceives from South Africa and with opposition guerrilla forces that continue to operate in the bush, particularly in the south.[45] It likewise established itself as the main arms supplier for Mozambique in the mid-1970s and for Zambia in early 1980.[46] Though precise figures are unavailable, it is clear as well that the USSR has become the major source of weapons for the "national liberation" movements in the area. Until the March 1980 election in Rhodesia, the primary recipients among these movements were Joshua Nkomo's wing of the Patriotic Front of Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and SWAPO in Namibia, but with the settlement in Rhodesia, Soviet assistance to ZAPU has apparently ceased. While the ANC of South Africa may get some arms from the USSR, this flow is at present quite modest because the ANC has not yet managed to launch a full-fledged guerrilla struggle on South African soil.

It is important to realize, however, that to date these labours have not produced fruits entirely satisfactory from Moscow's standpoint. Although both Angola and Mozambique continue to be militarily dependent on the Soviet Union, each has in recent years sought to expand its contacts and ties with the West — especially in the economic sphere. Furthermore, each has pressured Swapo to co-operate with the Western powers, working under UN auspices, in trying to bring about a negotiated solution to the conflict in Namibia. Despite Zambia's reluctant turn to the USSR for defensive arms, Lusaka reaffirmed its commitment to nonalignment by not supporting Moscow's version of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan when the UN voted on the issue in January 1980. As the Soviets well know, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia has long harboured deep suspicions of Soviet intentions in the region. Aside from increased contacts, the new ties with Botswana and Lesotho have netted the USSR little in the short run. Certainly, the two countries have not changed their basic orientations. Undoubtedly the most severe setback the USSR has encountered has been in Zimbabwe. Because Moscow had backed ZAPU aganist ZANU before the formation of the Patriotic Front and maintained rather distant relations with Robert Mugabe even after the Front came into being, the USSR found itself at least temporarily out in the cold in the wake of Mugabe's victory in the March 1980 balloting. Mugabe's new government waited six months before it invited the Soviet Union to open an embassy in Salisbury. Close identification with the ANC has also had its disadvantages for the USSR. The ANC's long-standing rival, the Pan'Africanist Congress, has not displayed a great deal of vitality in recent years, but now both must vie for the leadership of South Africa's increasingly militant black community with other groups that have emerged within the country over the last decade or so — the Black Consciousness organizations, the Zulu-based Inkatha, etc. These new grassroots groups tend to regard the ANC and the PAC as essentially out of touch with the internal situation in South Africa because of prolonged exile, and most observers believe that the ideas of the Black Consciousness movement (though not necessarily the organizations) hold greater attraction for the country's black population of the 1980s than those of the multiracial ANC.[47] Moscow has already shown signs — particularly since events in Zimbabwe again demonstrated the perils of favouring one nationalist faction over others in volatile African situations — of wanting to broaden its long-term options beyond association with the ANC alone, but it has not had much luck in doing so thus far. Although the USSR has made overtures to some students involved in the

Black Consciousness movement who have fled South Africa, these have been greeted with considerable caution. Soviet relations with all the new groups remain tenuous at best.

### The Future

Up to now, our analysis has dealt with the current policies of the USSR and its allies toward Southern Africa. There remains the questions of the prospects for the years immediately ahead.

What can be said in this regard with the least fear of contradiction is that Soviet policy will continue to shape the overall approach of the Communist alliance. While neither Cuba nor the GDR seems likely to abandon the individual interests that it has perceived with respect to Southern Africa, there is little possibility that either will succeed in greatly enhancing its capabilities to pursue those interests in the foreseeable future. Therefore, both will have to work within the broad parameters of Soviet policy to hope to be effective.

The exact nature of what Soviet policy will be is far less certain. For the moment, the USSR does not possess the capabilities to do anything it wishes in Southern Africa, but capabilities can alter. Furthermore, even with its present capabilities, Moscow could certainly bring to bear more resources in the area than its existing goals demand, if it opted to re-order its geopolitical priorities. Thus, Soviet policy must not be treated as fixed in concrete.

Nevertheless, changes — in Southern Africa or elsewhere in the world — of a magnitude that would dramatically affect Soviet policy in the area in the near term appear relatively improbable. Indeed, Moscow itself seems to discount such a possibility. Soviet analysts, for example, convey a strong sense that while a black-ruled government will ultimately emerge in South Africa, the struggle there will be a protracted one.[48]

## NOTES

1. For careful weighing of the evidence regarding Cuban interests and objectives, see William J. Durch, *The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola*, Professional Paper No. 201 (Arlington, Va., Center for Naval Analyses, September 1977); Edward Gonzalez, "Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa", in David E. Albright (ed.), *Communism in Africa* (Bloomington, Ind. Indiana University Press, 1980); idem, "Cuban Policy Toward Africa: Activities, Motivations, and Outcomes", in David E. Albright and Jiri Valenta (eds.), *The Communist States and Africa* (Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, Forthcoming); William M. LeoGrande, "Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in Africa", *Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos*, January 1980. On the GDR, see John M. Starrels, "GDR Foreign Policy", *Problems of Communism, March-April 1980*, Melvin Croan, "A New Afrika Korps?" *The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1980*; idem, "East Germany and Africa", in Albright and Valenta, *The Communist States and Africa*.

2 See, for instance, Gonzalez, "Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa', Croan, 'East Germany and Africa"
3 *Pravda*, April 4, 1971
4 See Vernon V Aspaturian, Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces', *Problems of Communism* May-June 1980
5 For a good illustration see the article by Anatoly Gromyko, Director of the African Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the son of Foreign Minister Gromyko, entitled Western Diplomacy vs Southern Africa" *International Affairs* (Moscow), March 1979
6 See, for example, David Rees *Soviet Strategic Penetration of Africa* (London, Institute for Conflict Studies November 1976) pp 2 3, W C J van Rensburg and D A Pretorius, *South Africa's Strategic Minerals — Pieces on a Continental Chess Board* (Johannesburg Valiant Publishers 1977)
7 See, for instance, V Baryshnikov, Raw Material Resources of Africa" *International Affairs*, December 1974, Dimitri Volsky, Southern Version of NATO" *New Times* No 36 September 1976
8 See Leslie Dienes, 'The Soviet Union An Energy Crunch Ahead?" *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1977 and the contributions by Dienes Marshall I Goldman, Richard Lee and James R Lecky, Michael R Dohan and Lawrence H Theriot and JeNelle Matheson, in U S Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change* (Washington, D C , U S Government Printing Office, 1979), Vol 1
9 See, for example, Allen J Lenz and Hedija H Kravalis, 'An Analysis of Recent and Potential Soviet and East European Exports to Fifteen Industrialized Western Countries', in U S Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economies Post Helsinki* (Washington, D C , U S Government Printing Office, August 25, 1977), Goldman loc cit
10 R A Ulianovskii, "On the Countries of Socialist Orientation", *Kommunist*, No 11, July 1979, p 118 Ulianovskii is a deputy director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union For an equally definitive analysis see the book by K N Brutents, another deputy director of the International Department, entitled *Osvobodivshiesia strany v gody* /The Liberated Countries in the 1970s (Moscow Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1979)
11 V Alekseyev, "Mozambique Builds a New Life', *International Affairs* October 1979, p 77
12 See, for instance, Anatoly Gromyko, 'Africa in the Strategy of Neo-Colonialism', ibid , November 1978, p 86
13 Gromyko, 'Western Diplomacy vs Southern Africa" is typical
14 M L Vishnevskii, Washington's Policy in Africa and American African Studies", *SShA* January 1980 p 118
15 Soviet memorandum submitted to the United Nations by Foreign Minister Gromyko on October 4, 1976, in *Pravda*, October 5, 1976
16 See V Rymalov, "Newly Free Countries Problems of Economic Development" *International Affairs*, July 1978 p 58
17 See George T Yu, 'Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa", in Albright *Communism in Africa*
18 G Kromushin, "Ideological Struggles in Africa", *International Affairs*, June 1979, p 55 See also Y Semyonov, "Peking and the National Liberation Movement", ibid , January 1980
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21 See, for instance, Bissell, loc cit , pp 214-215, *Africa News* October 1980, pp 6-7
22 For typical illustrations, see Volsky, loc cit 1 S Ulianovskaia, *South Africa Racism Doomed* (Moscow, Znanie, 1978), p 20, quoted in Morris Rothenburg, *The USSR and Africa New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power* (Washington, D C Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980) p 222, Gromyko, "Africa in the Strategy of Neo-Colonialism", p 84, V Kudriavtsev in *Izvestiia*, May 4, 1979
23 See Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Decision-Making on the Intervention in Angola", in Albright *Communism in Africa*, Rothenburg, *The USSR and Africa*, pp 11-50
24 For treatment of this perspective, see Aspaturian, loc cit
25 See William M LeoGrande, "Evolution of the Nonaligned Movement", *Problems of Communism* January-February 1980
26 *The Washington Post*, January 11, 1980
27 For a typical illustration, see the talk of Ziauddin Babakhanov, Chairman of the Muslim Spiritual Board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan, broadcast by Radio Moscow on January 29 1980
28 For a representative treatment, see Gromyko, "Western Diplomacy vs Southern Africa '
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31 See, for instance, C P Nemanov, 'Parties of the Vanguard Type in the African Countries of Socialist Orientation", *Narody Azii i afriki*, No 2 (1979) p 27
32 See the contributions of Holland Hunter, Herbert Block, and Imogene Edwards, Margaret Hughes, and James Noren, in *Soviet Economy in a time of Change*, Vol 1, Seweryn Bialer, "The Politics of Stringency in the USSR", *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1980

33. See the annual volumes of the *Statisticheskii yezhegodnik stranchlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoi Vzaimopomoshchi* /Statistical Yearbook of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance/ (Moscow. CMEA Secretariat)
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38. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1978*, p. 12
39. On South Africa's military strength, see particularly International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1980-1981*; Chester A. Crocker, "Current and Projected Military Balances in Southern Africa". in Bissell and Crocker, op cit ; W. Scott Thompson and Brett Silvers, "South Africa in Soviet Strategy", in ibid. For clear evidence that Moscow is aware of South Africa's capabilities, see, for example, Tatiana Krasnopevtseva, "Military and Economic Potential", *Azii i Afriki Segodnia*, February 1979, p. 22
40. See Gonzalez, "Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa".
41. Each of the airborne divisions has roughly 7,000 men, and the naval infantry, as already mentioned, numbers 12,000 See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1980-1981*
42. Even orthodox Soviet commentators have persistently argued that "socialist-oriented states" in the Third World should attract Western capital and work out "a system of regulation .. that will guarantee the interests of the radical regimes and grant sufficient advantages to foreign investors to attract them". See, for example, "How to Interpret the Peculiarities and Level of Development of Capitalism in Latin America", *Latinskaia Amerika*, January-February 1979, pp. 69-70 In this connection, it is not insignificant that Cuban troops today help guard the Gulf Oil facilities located in Angola's exclave of Cabinda
43. See, for instance, Brutents, *Osvobodivshaesia strany v 70-e gody*, pp. 67-77
44. Highly explicit reflections of Soviet strategy may be found in Gromyko, "Africa in the Strategy of Neo-colonialism", pp 84-89, and especially idem, "Western Diplomacy vs Southern Africa", pp 20-28.
45. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978*, p. 4.
46. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1968-1977* (Washington, D C. 1979), p. 157; *The Washington Post*, February 8, 1980
47. For discussion of the cleavages within the black community of South Africa, see, for instance, Steven F. McDonald, "The Black Community", in Bissell and Crocker, op. cit
48. For a typical illustration, see A.B. Davidson, "Where Is South Africa Going?" *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2 (1978), pp. 15-17.

## BOOK REVIEWS

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*F. McA. Clifford-Vaughan*
*Department of Political Science (University of Natal), 1979. 44pp.*

**SOUTH AFRICA : CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE?**
**Factual Review**
*Institute for Strategic Studies (University of Pretoria), 1980. 30pp.*

**SOUTH AFRICA'S NARROWING SECURITY OPTIONS**
**Adelphi Papers No. 159**
*Robert S. Jaster*
*The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1980. 51pp.*

The two ISSUP Publications by *M.R. Sinclair* entitled "The Strategic Significance of Tanzania", and "The Strategic Significance of the Horn of Africa", both seek to evaluate strategic significance as a theoretical concept, and then to analyse the situations in these two regions within the confines of the theoretical parameters. Both regions have been of contemporary concern; the Horn in the Somalian-Ethiopian struggle and Tanzania in its manoeuvres into Uganda and other developments.

Sinclair bases his model of strategic significance on three criteria: the resources of national capability; the ego-role perception of the nation-state concerned; and the external milieu's perception of the strategic significance of that nation-state. He wisely points to the caveat, that the continuing dynamism of international relations should not be neglected as an element in the model.

In the case of Tanzania, Sinclair notes the lack of development, (due to the brevity of the colonial experience, unfavourable geographical disposition), as constraining the realised capability potential of the nation-state, yet points to positive capability seen in its stable and unified political organisation. Also, the politico-

strategic location of Tanzania in central East Africa to land-locked neighbours and the frontline state position arising from the southern African struggle. He sees the prime positive capability resource as being the political influence of Tanzania in the regional and international spheres, which is perceived through policies of self-determination, self-reliance and non-alignment in the national strategy of the nation-state. This ego-role perception is given the needed feedback in accounting for the strategic significance of Tanzania, by the external environment's confirmation of the significance of the political influence of the nation-state in both the international and regional arenas.

In contrast to Tanzania, the Horn's negative capability potentials of divergent and dynamic pursuit of national interests on the part of Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, are given strategic significance by major power involvement in exploiting the regional instabilities. The major power interests in the region have been seen by Sinclair to emanate from the location of the region to the Red Sea, the oil producing nations, the Indian Ocean, and the Middle East. However, he misinterprets the Soviet perceptions of the strategic significance of the Horn, by pandering to the ideological considerations of Soviet policy as overruling the more cogent impacts to this system. His reasons for allocating *de facto* strategic significance on the part of the United States and the USSR to the Horn of Africa, are clouded by his narrow analysis of the capability potentials and role perceptions on the part of the individual nation-states of the region themselves. Certainly, the continuing impasse in the area needs to be more adequately explained.

*F. McA. Clifford-Vaughan's* four introductory lectures on strategic studies is a welcome booklet for those unshod in this depressing, yet at the same time exciting, aspect of international relations. Well-documented and admirably presented, it seems regrettable that scholarship could not adequately be developed given the size of the publication. Analysing the main strategic concepts, Clifford-Vaughan presents a lively description of his understanding of these, drawn from the writings of scholars, statesmen and soldiers, yet a sense of incompleteness pervades the study. However, the importance of the booklet should be seen in its publication in South Africa, where certainly "war is too serious to be left to the Generals" — and perhaps the fuller implications of belligerent action and reaction should be disseminated to the public at large.

Particularly in his section on "The Brutal Choice for South Africans", Clifford-Vaughan points to the necessity of the whole population understanding the scope of threats to their security,

and the reasons why these threats exist. Although sidestepping prescriptions for softening the opportunities for conflict in the region, and leaning to the more clinical explanations of insecurity, Clifford-Vaughan appeals that: "action to gain and keep the trust of the black population, as well as the wholehearted support of the white community, must be our strategy — must be South Africa's choice — there are no soft options". One of the major shortcomings in Clifford-Vaughan's analysis, is that South Africa, (as a reactionary middle power in the international environment), is neither understood nor examined in sufficient detail as a threat to international stability *per se,* as are revolutionary powers in this regard.

*The third ISSUP publication,* concentrating primarily on South Africa, is divided into two strategic concepts: conventional deterrence (by D.J. Mortimer) and nuclear deterrence (by M. Hough).

*Mortimer* delves superficially into the concept of conventional deterrence, and endeavours to explain that although there might be difficulties in the SADF's ability to carry out offensive operations in certain military situations, the credibility of the conventional deterrent is certainly not questioned when it comes to "the conviction in the mind of the aggressor that the defender has the will to use his forces".

*Hough* then states "that South Africa at present will obtain limited strategic and few political advantages from the manufacture of nuclear arms" and that she should keep her options open by not signing the NPT (non-proliferation treaty), so that "only if the threat increases to a degree that there is no other choice", (seemingly when international pressure reaches a breaking-point in South African policy-makers' perceptions of tolerance to its priorities of security and survival), "as a last resort, would it appear sensible from a strategic point of view for South Africa to develop nuclear weapons".

The 'bomb in the basement' option seems to be a credible deterrent to Hough at this juncture, in South Africa's ability to control the tempo of international pressure to change her internal situation — a rather narrow perception of the alternative stability and security brought about by international pressure's positive influence on the South African situation. Although this publication avoids deep factual evidence and original insight, it does offer some evidence of the existence of interested pockets of strategists outside of the traditional South African monopoly on this subject — the military.

The most absorbing publication reviewed was undoubtedly *R.S. Jaster's* "South Africa's Narrowing Security Options"

(Adelphi Paper No. 159), which analyses South Africa's security strategies from 1948 until the present. In the most lucid literary and scholarly fashion, Jaster explores the intricacies of South Africa's defective security policies which he sees as being brought about as a result of "distorted perceptions of threat and misreadings of the motives and likely behaviour of foreign actors". In detail, he examines the National party leadership's changing perceptions of threats (both internal and external), and the policies and strategies adopted in response to these perceptions. Great emphasis is placed on the post-1975 altered perceptions of threats, and policies leading to the security options facing the 'garrison state'.

Jaster admirably grapples with shrouded issues like the Angola debacle of 1976, and with insight (not easily afforded by the Defence Act and limited information) he manages to spell out the conventional and nuclear deterrent aspirations of South Africa in much more depth than do the articles by Mortimer and Hough. Jaster sees "the cumulative militarization of South African society" since 1975 in trends like: "a dramatic change in the perceived threat and in South Africa's response to it; sharp increases in defence spending and a rise in the defence share of the budget and GNP; and englarged military 'presence' in South African life; the growing role and involvement of the military in policy-making, (and) a broad mobilization of the population".

The most incisive section of the study is his forecast for security options for the 1980's. Here particularly, weaknesses in Clifford-Vaughan's publication are brought to the fore, as Jaster seems to cut to the soul of the security issue within the myriad of entanggled contributory factors, impinging on the South African mentality. Noting the country's "fear of a large-scale conventional military attack across her northern borders, (and) ... concern (over the) accession of Mr Mugabe to power in Zimbabwe, (and) ... the gradual rise in terrorism, fed and stimulated by neighbouring territories", Jaster suggests a "strong possibility that South Africa might, at some point, detonate a nuclear device if she has not already done so". Finally, he clearly sees that "the realities of domestic politics and bureaucratic inertia ... will continue to inhibit the Government from moving far enough or fast enough on race policy to put a stop to the rising tide of global hostility and belligerence directed at the white minority".

From this most refreshing investigation into the main thrusts of South African history and developments since 1948, Jaster has succeeded in providing not only the scholar and strategist with a most illuminating study, but has availed a hopefully concerned South African populace with facilities to a more balanced under-

standing of their plight.

*Bryan Bench,*
*Department of International Relations,*
*University of the Witwatersrand.*

**BREAD UPON THE WATERS**
The Developing Law of the Sea
*Charles Fincham and William van Rensburg,*
*Turtledove Publishing, 1980. 248pp.*

Many books have been written on the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the "new law of the sea" as it will emerge upon the signing of a Convention at the end of this Conference.

This work, I have no hesitation in stating, is one of the best of the general studies on the topic. This may appear to be a sweeping statement yet a reading of the work will bear me out.

The authors have succeeded in compressing into its pages in a highly understandable and intelligible form an incredible quantity of political, military, economic, ecological, scientific, and administrative matters pertaining to the Law of the Sea. The authors' undoubted expertise in their subject and experience in the matters discussed by them emerges in each and every chapter.

The logical sequence of the various chapters sets out the whole subject from the idea sponsored by Ambassador Pardo in the UN General Assembly in 1967 to the comprehensive Convention which will, according to all indications, be completed next year. The book sets out succinctly and in an immensely readable form the restructuring of the new law of the sea as it has emerged from the gargantuan and unique Conference — surely the greatest international legal conference of all times.

By ignoring technicalities and irrelevancies only the important facts and arguments have been presented. They have been presented in a form acceptable to the lawyer, diplomat, student and layman.

As an introduction to the topic this work is of an absolute international standing.

It is so ironic that this country — which, due to political considerations, has been unable to attend the Conference since 1975 — has produced two authors who have presented such an excellent book, a book declared by Ambassador Shabtai Rosenne (one of the most eminent international laywers alive today) to be "an introduction of classical standing".

*George N. Barrie,*
*Department of Foreign Affairs,*
*Pretoria.*

**MICROPOLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA — A TECHNICAL UNIT DURING AND AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION**

*Marc Blecher and Gordon White*
*The Macmillan Press, (US edition), 1979*

Since the start of the process of normalisation of relations between the USA and the People's Republic of China in the mid-1970s, there has been a noted upsurge in the number of publications on the latter country by American scholars. In contrast to the majority of recent publications and most of the political research on China, that tended to focus on the national level, this particular work focuses on an institution at the grass roots of contemporary China — a technical unit in a remote part of western China.

In an attempt to answer the basic question : is China a significantly different place because of the Cultural Revolution? The main focus of the study is the analysis of the structure and functioning of the technical unit during the period from 1966 to 1974 (although data was gathered for the period 1968 to 1973). The issues involved include the various dimensions of collective political participation, the nature of personal political involvement and the relationship between the "movement" in this particular unit and the nationwide ideological content and political dynamics of the Cultural Revolution.

The methodology employed by the authors in gathering data presents some unique difficulties : all their data was gathered in more than eighty hours of interviews with only one former member of the unit under study, who emigrated to Hong Kong

shortly after the end of the Cultural Revolution. In a long defence of their methodology the authors set forth their reasons for dispelling any doubt concerning issues such as accuracy and bias. Their explanations appear credible. Yet one is nevertheless left with some reservations.

The Cultural Revolution was without doubt the most disruptive period in post-revolutionary China, in which mass politics erupted throughout China over a period of about six years. In the process of pursuing their research objectives, the authors set about them in a systematic way, with chapters on the unit, the nature of general issues, and the influence and impact of the Cultural Revolution. However, if this book is read without some previous knowledge of the background and national issues involved in the period of the Cultural Revolution, the reader will be left with a feeling almost of irritation. The reason for this is tied up with the fact that the focus is on an unknown unit in an unknown part of China, with the information supplied by an unknown and unidentified emigrant.

The findings and general conclusions by the authors therefore seem to hang in the air, despite their sincere efforts to present a scientific political analysis, and despite their obvious knowledge of Chinese politics.

This book can therefore be termed esoteric in the extreme, catering for those with a deep knowledge of Chinese affairs, and with an insatiable hunger for knowledge about the obscure and hidden facts about contemporary China.

*Daan Prinsloo,*
*Head, Centre for Asian Studies,*
*Rand Afrikaans University.*

## BOOKS RECEIVED FOR REVIEW

**BRITISH ECONOMIC POLICY 1960—74**
*Blackaby*
*Cambridge University Press. Approx. R17,80 ppr.*

**THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1979**
*Butler*
*Macmillan. Approx. R42,60 hc.*

**THE TRAGEDY OF ENLIGHTMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL**
*Connerton*
*Cambridge University Press. Approx. R22,20 hc.*

**NORTHERN IRELAND**
*Flackes*
*Gill and Macmillan. Approx. R27,05 hc.*

**CONTEMPORARY FRANCE**
*Hanley*
*Routledge and Kegan Paul. Approx. R9,55 ppr.*

**NORTHERN IRELAND: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS**
*Heskin*
*G & M. Approx. R19,90 hc.*

**THE POLITICS OF THE US SUPREME COURT**
*Hodder-Williams*
*Allen & Unwin. Approx. R12,00 ppr.*

**THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION**
*Lall*
*Mac. Approx. R32,00 hc.*

**THE BEGINNINGS OF COMMUNIST RULE IN POLAND**
*Polonsky*
*Routledge and Kegan Paul. Approx. R30,90 hc.*

## Errata:

We apologise for the following typographical errors which occurred in *Bulletin* vol. 4, ño. 2, in the article "South Africa's trade relations: foreign and regional interdependence" by Dr Jacqueline Matthews;

*p.3. Second paragraph.* Contributory factors ... follows, *read* Contributory factors ... follows.
*p.4. Table I.* Totals adjusted (1973 $100) *should read* 1973 = 100.

*p.7. Table II.* 9173 *should read* 1973
*lower right hand corner.* 10 *should read* 100.

*p.9. second paragraph.* For thereoretically *read* theoretically and for ecnomic *read* economic.

*p.10. Table III* (1975 U$) *should read* (1975 US $)

*p.14. first paragraph.* For benetifts *read* benefits.

*p.16. last line.* For Independent *read* independent.

*p.18. References. Formula in 5 should read*

$$\frac{A+B+C}{D+E+F+G} \times H \times 1.42$$

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### Bibliographical Series

(No. 6) *Letters to Smuts: correspondence relating to the personal library of General J.C. Smuts, 1902 — 1950.* Compiled by Jacqueline A. Kalley, Elna Schoeman and Joy Willers, with an introduction by Professor Noel Garson. (Published on behalf of the Smuts Memorial Trust.) 1980. Price R10.

(No. 7) *South Africa's Foreign Relations, 1961 — 1979: a select and partially annotated bibliography.* Compiled by Gail Lynda Rogaly. 1980. Price R25.

### Special Publication

Available from booksellers

**Rotberg, Robert and Barratt, John (eds.)** *Conflict and compromise in South Africa.* Cape Town: David Philip, 1980. Price R9,00.

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