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Michael R. Sinclair

Nigeria: from isolation to African leadership

In the same way that the major world powers, in their interaction with each other and the less predominant members of the world community, delimit the parameters of the prevailing international political systemic order; the states of the African continent (excluding South Africa and Namibia), through a contrived balance of interests (as embodied in the Charter of the OAU) seek to co-ordinate and regulate interaction between member-states themselves and with those state-actors outside of the African continent, thus delimiting the nature of the African sub-systemic order and the collective sub-systemic objective *vis-à-vis* the global system. The cohesion of the African sub-systemic order is dependent upon agreement among members of the sub-system on the nature and objective of external interaction. Thus the nature of any African state's role in the international political system is dependent upon the perception of the other members of the sub-system of the significance of the state concerned to their individual and collective sub-systemic interests. Thus the traditional Nigerian claim to continental leadership depends primarily upon at least the acquiescence, if not the sanction of those states over which Nigeria aspires to be predominant. Furthermore, it is logical that the perception of the continental actors of the sub-systemic predominance of Nigeria would serve to heighten or substantiate the perception of the major powers of the significance of Nigeria to their specific international interests. In short, the nature of the international role to which any African state may aspire is relative to the sub-systemic credibility of that role.

Several basic facts combine to make the African sub-system unique in international politics. The first of these features, is the continental geographic base encompassed by the sub-system, which although it has

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not yet attained its maximum geographic limits, includes the remaining white-ruled areas of Namibia and South Africa: first, in as much as these areas are inextricably and logically an integral part of the continental sub-system and African leaders aspire to the extension of the system to the entire continent; and secondly, because through the participation of southern African liberation movements at the conferences of the OAU (and many other international organizations) these regions are already accepted into provisional sub-systemic membership pending their liberation from white-rule.

A second characteristic of the African sub-system, is the relatively egalitarian distribution of power in the system. The configuration of power in the African sub-system is highly diffused. Since power (as the ability to exert influence) is based upon the classical elements of national capability, and while some African states may possess a degree of capability advantage over others (invariably economic), there is no predominant state or core. Rather the more tangible levels of national capability or power are relatively equally underdeveloped. Individual African states generally, therefore, have little capability in influencing the decisions of other African or non-African states and one of the most basic tenets of the sub-systemic cohesion is the imperative of collective systemic action in maximizing international interests and objectives.

In the third instance, the African sub-system does not fall under the shadow of either one of the super-powers as in the Middle East, Western Europe or Latin America for example, and consequently, African states are free to pursue any type of policy or ideological orientation without specific allegiance to either of the two major power blocs, within the limits of their economic and military dependence of course. However, a degree of historical/colonial determinism influences the nature and extent of interaction of many African states with the former colonial metropolises and, of course, all sub-systemic actors are individually or collectively subject to the influence of the global systemic dispensation. Other sub-systems may possess some of these characteristics but no other possesses them all.

As a consequence of this continental exclusivity, the relatively egalitarian distribution of power (or weakness) and the freedom from external domination, intra-systemic relations are generally highly fluid and competitive, and revolve around individually dominant personalities, rather than states as such. Thus it was that at the time of the formalization of the sub-system with the founding of the OAU in 1963, the continent was divided between the radicalism of Nkrumah, Keita, Sekou Toure and the so called Casablanca group on the one hand, and the moderation of the Monrovia group under the leadership of the likes of Tafawa Balewa, Haile Selassie, Senghor and Tubman on the other. While the Charter of the

OAU purported to represent a "balance of interest", it undoubtedly reflected a Monrovia bias. The principles of national sovereignty, national equality and non-interference in national affairs were enshrined in the Charter of the OAU as providing a legitimate basis for continental interaction and order. The primacy of the nation-state as reflected in the OAU Charter, effectively confirmed the permanence of the arbitrary colonial state boundaries, negated notions of pan-nationalism (previously so widely espoused) and enshrined in statute the supremacy of the interests of individual systemic actors. This is underscored by the fact that, despite many attempts, there has been no successful amalgamation of individual African states (excepting the federation of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, and the recent federation of Gambia and Senegal, which at any rate was dictated by practical expedience and not any pan-nationalist desire), nor has there been any successful secession. On the face of it, furthermore, all states were to be regarded as equal, irrespective of vast discrepancies in geographic and demographic size, or economic considerations. Thus individual personalities seeking to maximize national interests, are able to exert most influence in African politics, largely beyond the scope of *de facto* national capability or power. Hence the historically high degree of fluidity and competitiveness in African inter-state relations.

What arises from the essentially state-centric, individualistic nature of the African sub-system and the lack of any systemic core, is a tendency towards the formation of formal or informal ideological alignments and alliances of sub-regional co-operation. That is to say that the most militantly articulate ideological spokesmen of either the left or the right of the African political spectrum act as a gravitational pole for formal or informal alignments based primarily on the personal coincidence of ideological conviction of individual state leaders and secondarily, on the coincidence of personal historical/colonial experience. (This is exemplified by the common alignment among Francophone leaders, or the support for the "radical option" on the liberation struggle common to those states most recently liberated or most nearly affected by the conflict.)

In the same way that African states tend to align themselves around common ideological/political poles so as to weight the "egalitarian" systemic balance, the realities of differing economic and political capabilities, as these have developed since independence, have given rise to a series of states which in their predominance over regional neighbours are crucial for the creation of sub-regional alignments and alliances of co-operation (Nigeria, Kenya, Algeria, potentially Zaïre and ultimately South Africa, for example). Whereas such regional alignments are primarily economically based and dictated by practical economic and developmental imperatives they are obviously founded upon a mutual political *animus* of co-operation. The collapse of the East African Community is an example

of the imperatives of economic co-operation being subordinated to political divergences. Similarly, the formation of a southern African regional economic grouping (SADCC) which excludes South Africa, illustrates the deviance between practical politics and practical economics. So also the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) provides adequate illustration of the importance of political *animus* in the 15 year projection for West African regional consolidation.

The projected role of any African state, as an integral element of this sub-systemic environment is, therefore, perceived in sub-systemic terms, first, in relation to its significance to continental political/ideological alignments and secondly, in terms of the significance of its sub-regional alignment.

The most fundamental dictate of intra-systemic perception in the African sub-system is the coincidence or commonality of colonial/historical experience. Thus the broad division of the African continent into Francophone and Anglophone blocs or groupings remains significant because in the first instance, it is the oldest and probably the widest (and most generalistic) alignment of African states, and in the second place, because the historical basis of the division perpetuates a general socio-cultural distinction between African states which gravitate towards the French metropole and those aligned in the Commonwealth, which to a large extent is quite unnatural and militates against trans-national cohesion and African unity.

Nigeria, as an Anglophone state, was at the time of independence perceived by the Francophone states which surrounded it as being inherently hostile to their regional and continental interests, because the Nigerian nation-state encompassed more people than the rest of the West African region collectively and as such represented a regionally predominant British sphere of influence. This antagonism in the perceptual dispositions between Nigeria and Francophone West Africa was essentially a reflection of an historical antagonism between France and the United Kingdom, and was not necessarily the result of any inherent conflict of interests between the states themselves, other than a divergence in the socio-cultural orientation of the respective state élites (and Gaullist connivance in nurturing distrust between the opposing groupings). While Nigeria very much wanted to strengthen ties with these states, so as to encourage them to come to the voluntary conclusion that their economic and political destiny lay with Nigeria, it was realized that it would be many years before Nigeria possessed the economic strength to provide an alternative to dependence on France. Thus if Nigeria appeared too ambitious at this early stage it would prove counter-productive in the long-term.

The advent of Nigerian independence was perceived by the Anglophone

territories (most of whom were on the verge of independence) as an event of considerable significance for several reasons: first, because they anticipated that Nigeria would play a leading role in the championing of their own self-determination; and secondly, because Nigerian independence served to substantiate British *bona fides* in regard to self-rule for the remaining dependencies, which was doubted by many. Thirdly, Ghana specifically welcomed Nigeria's accession to the international stage as an ally in the struggle against South Africa and apartheid (which had been gaining momentum since 1948). However, the conservatism of the Nigerian élite contrasted sharply with the radicalism of Nkrumah and it was inevitable that ideologically fired conflict between Ghana and Nigeria would arise.

The inevitability of conflict between Ghana and Nigeria was underscored by the fact that both states believed themselves to have been preordained to lead black Africa. Ghana based its claim largely on the fact that it had been the first to be independent in black Africa. By contrast the Nigerians perceived their claim to leadership to be based on tangible geographic and demographic preponderance. Ghana, however, claimed superiority over Nigeria based on the assumption that it was, at that time, a more stable polity and more economically prosperous. However, the struggle for leadership between Ghana and Nigeria centred on the question of who should be Africa's spokesman in international affairs on such issues as anti-apartheid, anti-colonialism and neo-colonialism, African unity and African ideology.

The antagonistic apperception between the two states was exacerbated by the blatant British preference for the more pragmatic Nigerian line (especially in regard to the issue of UDI in Rhodesia) as opposed to the pan Africanist ideological radicalism associated with Nkrumah and Ghana. Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa was patronisingly referred to as the "Golden Voice of Africa". Furthermore, Nigeria was geographically distant from the main body of African Anglophone states which encompass an almost contiguous geographic area stretching through southern, central and eastern Africa. These states felt remote from any notion of Nigerian leadership either physical or ideological, and Nigeria, in turn, was confined in regional isolation.

Whereas the Anglophone and Francophone alignments were founded upon colonially determined socio-cultural affinity, ideological and political divergences gave rise to the alignment of African states along conservative/pragmatic and radical lines, formalized initially in the exclusively Francophone Brazzaville group and radical Casablanca group, drawn from both Francophone and Anglophone states. Nigeria played a leading role in subsuming the Brazzaville group within the wider, conservative Monrovia alignment, and ultimately uniting the Monrovia

and Casablanca groups under the Charter of the OAU. In as much as the Charter of the OAU incorporated the pragmatic principles characteristic of the Nigerian approach to intra-systemic relations, Nigeria had succeeded in outstripping Ghana in the ideological and African continental leadership stakes, and the original Casablanca radicals found themselves isolated in the new "consensual" continental alignment. However, Nigeria's leadership aspirations suffered a setback when the members of the OAU voted that the headquarters of the organization should be founded at Addis Ababa and not in Lagos as many Nigerians thought it rightfully should have been.

Traditionally lacking philosophical or ideological zeal and devoid of charismatic "father-figure" leadership, pre-civil war Nigeria was largely overshadowed by the more vociferous ideologues of the continent — thus, for example, Nyerere's *Ujamaa* doctrine of African socialism and his outspokenness on African self-reliance and unity, free from big power intervention, gave Tanzania a far more substantive claim to continental leadership than the ideologically moribund and generally conservative, but physically impressive Nigeria. Furthermore, the headquarters of the OAU Liberation Committee were sited in Dar-es-Salaam and the Tanzanian leader gained considerable influence over the secretariat and control of the funding of the Liberation Committee, to the point where it was difficult to conceive of the Liberation Committee as distinct from the Tanzanian polity. Nyerere was generally perceived as the champion of the liberation struggle in Africa; Tanzania as the "frontline-state by proxy" and the Mecca of the politically exiled and dispossessed. Tanzania thus gained a measure of sub-systemic significance and Nyerere a degree of diplomatic prestige and influence incommensurate with the impoverished *de facto* capability of the state. Similarly, the individualistic and personalised nature of intra-systemic relations projected the more dynamic and charismatic leaders to the forefront of the African stage and thus Kaunda, Kenyatta, Nyerere and Milton Obote were able to dominate the Anglophone group, while Senghor became the spiritual leader of the Francophone group.

At a time when the primary concern of the sub-system was the consolidation of the tenuous unity among member-states and secondly, the liberation of the remaining colonial dependencies (most particularly Rhodesia) and the elimination of apartheid, the continental alignment was dominated by those factions most vociferously radical in their attitude to these issues. Whereas Nigeria had sought to focus her external objective on the apartheid issue (as evidenced by Nigeria's role in the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth), the country was generally perceived to be in opposition to those radical factions which, in their high level of visibility and articulation, were seen to be of most influence in the sub-system at this time. Such relative conservatism certainly found favour

for Nigeria with the United Kingdom and its Western allies, but placed Nigeria on the periphery of the mainstream of African opinion, and the majority of states (most particularly Tanzania, Zambia and Ghana) criticized the country for being more concerned with appeasement of the Western powers than with the African sub-systemic objective.

The collapse of the domestic authority of the Balewa government in Nigeria and the subsequent *coups d'état* were doubtlessly of grave concern to those African governments similarly poised, and the fact that secessionist and irredentist tendencies were to be found in every African state made the Nigerian dilemma of paramount sub-systemic significance. For this reason, all sub-systemic members had a vested interest in ending the Nigerian civil war as soon as possible, but the member-states aligned themselves around a divergence of opinion as to the appropriate collective role which the other members of the sub-system should play in bringing about a settlement of the conflict. Thus Zambia and Tanzania adopted a boldly interventionist attitude, arising from the conviction that African unity was a primary systemic responsibility and that the Nigerian conflict threatened continental stability and the individual sovereignty of the members of the African sub-system. Nyerere made plain that he was intent on preventing the United Nations or the big powers from intervening in Nigeria, and with the co-operation of Zambia's Kaunda, sought alliance with Kenya and Uganda (its east African Anglophone allies) in advocating direct African intervention in the conflict to mediate a settlement. However, Kenya had enjoyed firm and friendly relations with the Nigerian Federal Government and Obote in Uganda faced a very real threat of secession from the Buganda. Both were reluctant to support wholeheartedly the Zambian/Tanzanian initiative.

President Mobutu of Zaïre, in turn, anxious to establish a measure of diplomatic prestige for himself and an aura of statesmanship on the eve of the September 1967 OAU summit conference in Zaïre, actively canvassed support for a Zaïre-led peace initiative of the OAU. The lobbying of the different factions subsequently divided the OAU summit on the measures to be taken, and eventually six states (Zaïre, Liberia, Ghana, Niger, Cameroon and Ethiopia) were delegated to investigate what role the OAU could play in the resolution of the conflict.

The Ivory Coast (and to a lesser extent Gabon, Dahomey and Cameroon) had an interest, in terms of long-term influence in Francophone West Africa, in dividing the Nigerian federal structure and thus connived with France in supporting Biafra. Furthermore, Houphouët Boigny of the Ivory Coast remained uncommitted to the OAU (having been a champion of the Brazzaville group) and, therefore, did not share the sentiments of those concerned with continental unity. Thus as the conflict dragged on and international involvement escalated, four members of the

OAU (Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia) extended diplomatic recognition to Biafra during April/May 1968.

The eventual defeat of the Biafran secessionists by the Nigerian Federal Forces was of considerable prestige value to the Nigerian Federal Government. Nigeria's smaller neighbours (Dahomey, Togo, Cameroon, Upper Volta, for example) perceived with trepidation the enormity, not only in regional terms, but by continental standards, of the military force which Nigeria had built up during the three years of the civil war and which the Federal Military Government now seemed unwilling and unable to disband. Furthermore, the Nigerian economy had emerged from the civil war in a remarkably sound condition and immediately upon the cessation of hostilities the growth in foreign investment and trade exceeded all previous levels, making Nigeria the most significant area of West European trade and investment on the African continent, outside of South Africa, and presaging the so-called "petro-naira boom". Motivated by the political imperative of re-establishing Nigerian credibility and authority in the sub-system the Nigerian leadership, in contrast to the pre-civil war era, sought to project the Nigerian presence in all intra-systemic interaction. It indulged in forceful rhetoric, backed by the confidence of a battle-trained military force, of a size unparalleled on the continent, and relative economic wealth which freed the country from dependency on foreign aid. The latter enabled Nigeria to distribute limited economic largesse on an *ad hoc* basis among various African states for primarily political ends. Thus the ruling élite in Nigeria sought to shape continental alignments, and was no longer content to be merely peripheral to the principal sub-systemic trends.

No member of the African sub-system was left untouched by the new energy of the Nigerian diplomacy as established during the first half of the 1970s. There was, for example, the Nigerian initiative in convening an extra-ordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers over the alleged invasion of Guinea by foreign mercenaries; also we may note Gowon's extended campaign of personal diplomatic contact for the reconciliation and consolidation of intra-systemic relations; and finally, there was the Nigerian leadership of the African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) in negotiating the Lomé Convention governing economic relations between the ACP states and the EEC. Furthermore, Nigeria doubled its financial contribution to the OAU Liberation Committee Fund, extended its hospitality to many of the freedom movements (notably Cabral of the PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau, Tambo of the ANC of South Africa and Muzorewa of the Rhodesian ANC) and pledged Nigerian physical, and undivided spiritual and moral support for the liberation of the entire continent.

At this time, the African sub-system was in a state of some flux, and

disillusionment arose with the systemic rationale in the wake of the collective impotence of the OAU in finding a settlement to the Nigerian civil war or even of maintaining a façade of continental unity. Thus Nigeria came to be perceived as the marshal of the prevailing systemic order. It, for example, organized the OAU majority against the pro-South African détente faction; it reconciled the pro and anti-Amin factions; prevailed upon all member-states to submit to OAU mediation; and committed Nigeria to regional economic integration. The sub-systemic leadership credentials of Nigeria were eventually endorsed by the other African states when Gowon was elected chairman of the OAU in 1973, in advance of Tanzania's established candidature.

Nigeria increasingly came to be perceived by its continental counterparts as the only African state with an economic and military capability sufficient to lend a measure of credibility to African rhetoric on the issue of southern Africa — the main stumbling-block to continental unity. The double standards of the major Western powers, in paying lip-service to African attitudes while increasing trade and investment in South Africa, combined with the economic dependence and military weakness of the majority of African states to frustrate the attainment of the African objective in southern Africa and to largely negate African initiatives at the United Nations. While most African states acknowledged the significance of Nigeria's role in presenting the African case at the United Nations, Nigeria was criticized for not taking more direct action, and even accused of double-dealing in the expansion of Nigerian relations with France and the intimate nature of Anglo-Nigerian relations after 1973. A latent antagonism towards Nigeria on the part of Zambia and Tanzania persisted despite the much publicized post-war reconciliation between these states; both Zambia and Tanzania perceived Nigeria to be hypocritical in its commitment to southern African liberation, in as much as Nigeria was apparently not prepared to make any real economic sacrifice (and on the contrary was enjoying an economic boom) while the frontline-states bore the brunt of the economic side-effects of the southern African conflict. Nigeria resented the Tanzanian monopoly of the OAU Liberation Committee; Tanzania and Zambia opposed Nigeria in its support of Amin in Uganda, but Nyerere gracefully sacrificed his rightful claim to the OAU chairmanship in 1973 to the greater "weight of Nigeria".

On the other hand, West African Francophone states remained suspicious of Nigerian sub-regional integrationist endeavours, Senegal and the Ivory Coast specifically, perceiving the Nigerian initiative as a threat to Francophone cohesion and an endeavour to subordinate the region to Nigerian predominance. However, the smaller West African states (particularly Togo and Dahomey) perceived economic co-operation with Nigeria to be a political and economic necessity. The choice of Nigeria in

1973 to head the OAU in advance of Tanzania, whose president was an esteemed sub-systemic leader, awakened suspicion among the smaller African states and those less favourably disposed towards Nigeria of the country's continental ambitions. With the tacit alliance of Gabon and Cameroon, which harboured an historic antagonism towards Nigeria marked by frequent border clashes — President Mobutu of Zaïre sought to reassert his personal leadership in continental affairs and thus, pursued a consistently abrasive policy towards Nigeria. Zaïre is an important sphere of French and Chinese influence and on the grounds of the geographic predominance of Zaïre, the country was perceived as an alternate focus for sub-regional alignment, more favourable to Sino-French interests than the growing Nigerian predominance. It was in the interest of Zaïre to exploit and substantiate this perception.

Intra-systemic perceptions are most markedly influenced by personal relationships, and the energy with which Gowon pursued his personal diplomacy in the continent was indeed the primary reason for Nigerian influence prior to 1979. However, Nigeria remained geographically isolated from major sub-regional alliances, such as the East African Community (now defunct), the southern African frontline-states and most pertinently of all, the OCEA. Thus the signing of the Protocol establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 was not only of major sub-regional significance to Nigeria, but also fundamental to the consolidation of Nigeria's continental status.

ECOWAS represents the largest sub-regional alignment of African states ever created in the continent. It collectively represents the most important area of foreign trade and investment in the continent (concentrated particularly in the Ivory Coast and Nigeria), and ultimately is of political significance, in that it represents a mutual political commitment between the member-states (however basic at this stage). As such, it provides Nigeria with a constituency from which to project its leadership ambitions, quite beyond the finite bounds of Nigerian geographic area or the influence of personal diplomacy. There can be little doubt, that while ECOWAS has been initiated as a primarily economic co-operative, Nigeria will be most concerned to consolidate the co-operative *animus* which the organization represents. Ultimately it is hoped ECOWAS (if it endures) will take on the role of a continentally predominant political alignment.

At the outset it was contended that the projected role of any African state, as an integral element of the African sub-systemic environment, is significant in relation to the principal continental political alignments and that specific state's sub-regional standing. Nigeria as the essential hub of ECOWAS, both in the organization's sub-regional ramifications and in terms of a political entente of self-evident continental predominance, has

consolidated a measure of unparalleled sub-systemic significance. It is difficult to conceive of any other sub-regional alignment of comparable economic and political significance emerging in the continent (other than a southern African sub-regional organization dominated by South Africa, which until the termination of white rule in that country is most unlikely). Nigeria, in bridging the Francophone/Anglophone cleavage in West Africa and in consolidating so large a regional constituency, has altered the historic sub-systemic configuration and succeeded in weighting the sub-systemic "balance" to the point where Nigerian acquiescence in the prevailing continental order, or any deviation from the prevailing systemic dispensation is a *sine qua non*. The perception of other African states in seeking to manifest their sub-systemic ego-roles, is influenced accordingly.

The perception of the African states of the predominant significance of Nigeria in African affairs has been underscored in recent times by Nigeria's initiative in rebuffing the United States and in marshalling the OAU acceptance of the Nigerian-backed MPLA government in Angola. Nigeria's diplomatic mediation in the Shaba-Angolan/Zaire conflict and the Nigerian role in bringing about the Lancaster House constitutional negotiations between the warring factions in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia and the British Government, should also be acknowledged. Indeed, there can be little doubt that Nigeria has weighted the sub-systemic balance in its favour and is credibly perceived as a sub-systemic "heavyweight". (Nigeria even successfully opposed the nomination by the OAU member-states of Niger as one of the African group UN Security Council members in 1978 and was itself subsequently elected to the Security Council.) The nature of intra-African state relations, however, remains fundamentally unchanged. Thus while Nigeria might have effectively bridged the Francophone/Anglophone cleavage (the most basic sub-systemic alignment) and consolidated a sub-regional support base which endows the state with a political significance quite beyond physical and leadership capabilities, personal affinity between state-leaders remains the singularly most significant perceptual dictate of intra-systemic relations in Africa.

It is contrary to the egalitarian, ego-centric nature of the African sub-systemic dispensation for African states to acknowledge the preponderance or leadership of any particular African state, despite vast discrepancies in *de facto* capability between these states. Nigeria has maximized its role in intra-African state relations through such means as extended personal diplomacy, mediation forays in every continental conflict, and the creation of ECOWAS.

The issues of southern Africa/apartheid have remained the most persistently salient features of sub-systemic concern since the inception of the African sub-system. The Nigerians have focused their external

objective on the South African/apartheid issue, and in the same way that this focus has become the most fundamental element of Nigerian self-assertion in international politics, Nigeria has succeeded in setting herself up in direct juxtaposition to South Africa in the perceptual scan of the other members of the external environment (both international and sub-systemic). The world powers are forced to seek to balance their interests in South Africa, with those in the rest of black Africa, in as much as Nigeria has personified and articulated the attitudes of the rest of black Africa, and most importantly, because Nigeria is the only state in black Africa which, at least in theory, could exert any measure of economic/political retribution on world powers for non-compliance with African demands on southern African issues. To this extent, the remaining sub-systemic members have little option (given their inability to match Nigerian capability) but to acquiesce in the perception of the world powers of Nigeria as the leader of the African continent.

The nationalization of British petroleum interests in Nigeria in August 1979, as an act of direct political "trade-off" for British compliance with African demands for an all-party conference on Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, operationalized a long-standing threat. However, in practical terms this "denial control" leverage, upon which much of Nigeria's perceived influence and predominance is based is of extremely limited credibility. It is an obvious truism that Nigeria is far more dependent upon the income derived from the sale of 48 per cent of its crude oil production to the United States than the United States is dependent upon the importation of 17 per cent of domestic petroleum requirement from Nigeria. Similarly, Britain exports far more to Nigeria than she imports. While so large an export market is of manifest significance to the United Kingdom, a Nigerian embargo on British imports would produce catastrophic side-effects in the Nigerian industrial and consumer economy, and would inevitably imperil the exceptionally tenuous Nigerian domestic political balance. With a population growth of substantial "positive" proportions and a shortage of basic food supply of almost equally substantial "negative" proportions, the viability of the Nigerian state is absolutely dependent upon foreign investment and the uninterrupted sale of Nigerian petroleum resources. These are required to maintain Nigerian economic growth and development ahead of (or at least in keeping with) population growth and to generate sufficient foreign capital to enable Nigerians to supplement the shortfall in their subsistent food supply.

Far more fundamental is the fact that the African continent has, in recent years, become the primary arena in which the international systemic equilibrium is weighted to either West or East, left or right. The Western powers have been compromised in their endeavours to win favour in black Africa (to counter Soviet influence) by their historical economic/strategic

interest in, and commitment to South Africa, and so have found it expedient in terms of global strategic interests to pay lip-service to the attitudes of Africa. Nigeria has long established itself as the primary continental spokesman on South African issues (as manifest particularly in Nigeria's role in the UN Committee on Apartheid and Council for Namibia). Given the economic potential of Nigeria, the major Western powers have perceived it to be in their interest to elevate Nigeria publicly to a position of continental leadership. However, these same Western states, while proclaiming Nigerian leadership and winning the favour of black Africa for their "positive" attitude to black African interests, continue to reap economic advantages in both Nigeria and South Africa.

Nigeria is obviously aware of the inherent contradiction in the acclaim of the Western powers of Nigerian leadership in the continent and the very limited *de facto* leverage which Nigeria has over these powers. Thus it can be concluded that Nigeria appreciates the linkage between this international acclaim and the African sub-systemic environment. The high degree of public significance accorded Nigeria by the Western powers establishes Nigeria firmly in the sub-systemic perception as the only African state which can effectively counter the established Western interests in South Africa. Therefore, the remaining African sub-systemic actors, through their acquiescence, in effect substantiate the Western perception and concurrently elevate Nigeria to the African sub-systemic leadership pedestal in their own perceptions. This despite the inherently egoistic and nationalistic nature of intra-systemic African relations, which make such perception fundamentally contradictory to the egalitarian balance of the African sub-systemic alignment.

The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and the South African Response

Regional politics have witnessed the proposed constellation of southern African states (CONSAS) being reduced to two separate entities — an inner constellation or confederation of states embracing South Africa and the self-governing states which formerly formed part of the motherland and the outer constellation or the nine¹ remaining regional states which have grouped themselves within SADCC. A comparison between CONSAS and SADCC reveals a number of striking similarities and a variety of profound dissimilarities.² Insofar as both groupings aspire primarily to accelerated economic development within their respective regions, they can be viewed as similar. The SADCC objectives are set out in their declaration “Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation” as follows:

- (a) reduction of economic dependence particularly, but not only on the Republic of South Africa;
- (b) forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration;
- (c) the mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies; and
- (d) concerted action to secure international co-operation within the framework of a strategy for economic liberation.

The objectives of CONSAS have generally been described as peace and prosperity for the peoples of the subcontinent.

Not only are both groupings primarily concerned with the economic upliftment of their peoples for which an impressive array of initiatives have been announced over the past 18 months, but their priorities too are similar — transport, manpower, agriculture, etc. Their institutional structures are also similar — a loose pyramid with heads of government at

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the top level, ministers at the middle level and more regular contact between senior officials at the lowest level. There is an absolute rejection of ambitious structures, of a bureaucracy and of centralization. Their approaches are similar — pragmatic and informal. Both groupings amount to a form of sub-regional functional co-operation based on economic interdependence. The main emphasis is placed on technical/functional co-operation, leaving participating states free to reserve their position on certain political or non-economic issues if they so desire. Both groupings constitute a régime of consultation and co-ordination in those areas which qualify for a regional multilateral focus.

It is encouraging that both groupings are loose structures on co-operative rather than integrative lines. It makes economic sense. Where southern Africa exhibits a rich diversity of cultures, ideologies and value systems, a loose structure is particularly appropriate. That is why within South Africa itself there is a movement away from the rigid Westminster-style government in the direction of decentralization of power. In 1910 when the British withdrew from South Africa, they left behind a unitary State with 11 black, brown and white nations within its boundaries, governed by an independent white government. The system has lacked constitutional flexibility yet there are still those who ignore the fact that we are an African nation and who dictate stereotype constitutional formulae derived from Western Europe and North America for our problems. Democracy in a highly pluralist population structure cannot be secured by a simple method of majority rule according to the European or American systems. In a unitary state where bargaining is decided by majority rule, it would lead to conflict and chaos. Domination by one people of another must be avoided. Hence our insistence that universal suffrage is acceptable within each of the different population groups within South Africa. That is why we are moving towards confederalism as a solution to our constitutional problems and that is why a loose regional structure is also appropriate at this stage.

In neither case is there a loss of sovereignty. Supranationalism such as presently epitomized in the EEC involves a partial loss of sovereignty on the part of the constituent states. In a federation, there is an even further loss of sovereignty on the part of the constituent states to such an extent that sovereignty is shared by two powers, one of which, the central power, has priority. If it does not already possess such priority, then it often develops sovereign priority thus leading to a form of political domination over the constituent parts. This was, for example, what caused dissatisfaction by Quebec over the Canadian federal government. History is strewn with examples where the centrifugal forces resulting from national subdivisions were ignored. The Hapsburg Empire is a European example. Africa, with its ethnic divisions, has many examples where the

constituent units were not bound by a sufficiently strong sense of cultural unity to enable federation to proceed.

Both the SADCC and CONSAS initiatives are in the nature of co-operative efforts in which each state still retains control of the nature and extent of participation. There is no immediate integrative aim though it can be postulated that the inner constellation together with Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana already constitutes an integrated economic area³ were it not for the absence of the free flow of labour and the withdrawal of Botswana from the Rand Monetary Area. It is recognized that two distinct and fundamental aspects of economic co-operation exist — efforts to integrate markets on the one hand and co-operative efforts on the other.⁴ Both groupings constitute co-operative efforts. From economic and developmental points of view integration in southern Africa is not considered favourable. What is needed is a multilateral approach to regional planning and regional development co-operation.⁵ Because of South Africa's economically powerful position in the sub-continent, integration — which inevitably leads to a polarization of growth around existing focal points in the more developed areas — will favour South Africa.

South Africa is an economic giant in the subcontinent just as Nigeria is a giant within the ECOWAS grouping of West African States. The gross domestic product of South Africa is three times that of the SADCC states.⁶ Economic integration in southern Africa would consequently lead to economic domination by South Africa. That we do not want. Without South Africa the SADCC states are at a far more favourable stage for economic integration. They all exhibit low industrialization, their economies are all small in terms of purchasing power and they represent an area rich in resources and population (36 million in 1979).⁷ Were SADCC aiming at integration, the exclusion of South Africa would make economic sense. But even within the SADCC grouping there are states — take Zimbabwe and Mozambique — whose development levels are so great that integration or even a quasi-integration hardly seems feasible.

There are yet other economic factors which inhibit comprehensive regional integration, except perhaps a technological type of integration. Apart from the importance of developmental parity to which reference has been made, the economists Jacob Viner and Friedrich List determined that customs unions are only justified among states whose productive patterns are fairly competitive *before* union and which have the possibility of becoming more complementary *after* union.⁸ What is needed in southern Africa is just the opposite to a customs union, that is, protection of the industrial potential of lesser-developed areas to promote the development of competitiveness and diversification. That is why the Southern African Customs Union is not just a customs union — it also serves as a type of

development union in that article 6 of the agreement specifically allows the lesser-developed member states, namely Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana, to "levy additional duties on goods imported into its area to enable new industries in its area to meet competition from other producers or manufacturers in the common customs area . . ." There are also fiscal aspects. Integration in the flow of money and capital is not possible unless the business cycle policies of the various member states are integrated under one supranational body. It would therefore be necessary to seek prior agreement with partner states before floating major loans on the capital market. The economic conditions and postures of the states of southern Africa are so diverse that it would be virtually impossible to arrive at common denominators within a multilateral arrangement. A common approach to economic relationships with the outside world would, for example, be extremely difficult. Furthermore, economic integration usually goes hand in hand with political integration which would be even more difficult in southern Africa. It must therefore be postulated that economic integration in southern Africa is neither possible nor desirable at this stage.

There are of course many fields in which co-operative efforts could be expanded without proceeding to integration — power and water supply, transport, tourism, manpower, research standardization, pest control, etc. There are sufficient factors such as climate, geology, soil, fauna, flora, insect and other pests, population structures, economic patterns, a heritage of British rule and traditional languages to bind the states of southern Africa into what the American political scientist Karl Deutsch calls a pluralistic security community. It is therefore illogical to divide the subcontinent into two separate economic groupings. It flies in the face of economic reality and runs counter to the economic imperatives of our region. Dr Leistner of the Africa Institute in Pretoria says that in many instances attempts at co-operation with the exclusion of South Africa will be as meaningful as Hamlet without the prince."

Reverse co-operation aimed at excluding any one country can only be politically and economically counter-productive. It could in fact contribute to confrontation politics which is exactly what both groupings are trying to avoid. One is reminded of the adage — if they don't eat we don't sleep. South Africa therefore wants these states to develop and the launching of a number of initiatives over the past two years is proof hereof.¹⁰ Their sincerity is reflected *inter alia* in the expanded official development assistance programme.¹¹ South Africa is able and willing to fulfil the role of economic generator and her economic pre-eminence should not be a deterrent to closer functional co-operation. She can provide those elements for economic growth in southern Africa which are absent elsewhere on the continent — technical and entrepreneurial skills, capital, currency

convertibility, trade and transport links and electric power supply. In a scholarly treatise on regional integration, Karl Deutsch came to the conclusion that large states play a decisive role since cores of power create strong political and economic attraction.¹² The economies of the SADCC states are in fact inter-connected with the South African economy to a far greater extent than they are with each other's economies and the states of the region are becoming more interdependent, not less so.¹³ South Africa sees the subcontinent as an economic unit and does not believe that the economic division of southern Africa serves the true interests of the region.

Though South Africa is saddened at the artificial division of the subcontinent, it welcomes the SADCC efforts to improve their own economic situation and circumstances. We believe, and economists bear us out on this point, that if conditions improve and go well around us, then the same will apply to South Africa itself. Economic growth and development leads to economic integration and if these states are successful all the regional states will become more interdependent until a stage is reached where it will be too expensive to remain enemies and not to co-operate.¹⁴ This implies co-ordination without which growth and development will be seriously restrained and limited. We also welcome the platform the SADCC states have created with which to obtain capital and assistance from the Western industrial world. We appreciate and share their desire not to be over-dependent on one state or source of supply. This is a reflection of the age in which we live and on the modern nation-state system itself. Nor do we see SADCC as a deliberate move to isolate South Africa but as part of an ongoing process toward regional economic integration in Africa. Already in 1975 the Economic Commission for Africa set in motion a series of negotiations in southern Africa which culminated in a summit meeting in Lusaka on 21 December 1981 to sign a treaty establishing a preferential trade area in east and southern Africa.¹⁵ This regional trade area is then intended to serve as a foundation for a subregional common market, leading to an economic community in ten years. This in turn is part of an overall plan — as decided at the April 1980 Lagos Summit — to establish by the year 2000, an African Economic Community.

South Africa looks forward to the day when the two groupings — SADCC and CONSAS — merge to their mutual benefit. At the same time there is a recognition that the formation of the two groupings has "led to a kind of stalemate situation which would effectively limit the chances of violent conflict".¹⁶ We believe that the co-ordinated use of the wet resources of the north of the region with the dry south could transform the subcontinent into a breadbasket of the world. Our desire to co-operate more closely is not a new phenomenon in history. Particularly since World War II regional states have manifested a desire for closer inter-

governmental consultation with one or other form of economic integration in mind. Regional groupings have sprung up all over the world, except southern Africa. Commentators urge us to imitate these groupings because certain of them achieved a measure of success. The EEC in particular is put forward as a model for closer economic co-operation.¹⁷ I do not deny the merits of the European experiment — but a significant aspect of the surge in community building in Europe in the early fifties was that it was checked by the vested interests of nationalism. Integration therefore proceeded in the economic sphere but was smothered in the spheres of politics and defence. This is highly relevant for us in southern Africa for it shows that states, in their search for material efficiency, cannot ignore the deep roots of nationality and cultural identity. The states of southern Africa cherish their recently-won independence and will not therefore willingly submit their sovereignty to a highly integrated form of association. Quite apart from these organic aspects we must look to the very *raison d'être* of the EEC. Here we observe that while the industrial nations of the EEC seek the removal of tariff and trade restrictions, African countries wish to promote development and be less dependent on the export of primary products. Unlike European states, African states have little to trade amongst themselves while European countries exhibited an impressive industrial base *before* economic integration was attempted. The EEC is therefore a model developed for countries which have already reached a level of more or less development parity. It is therefore inappropriate to slavishly imitate models from other parts of the world.

Closer home examples of shattered experiments in constitution-building abound. Centrifugal forces of one sort or another have jeopardised all attempts at integration in Africa. The break-up of the Central African Federation resulted from an artificially-created structure being foisted on ideologically reluctant partners. The East African Community on which certain Western states had pinned their hopes, also came to naught as a result of a reluctance to relinquish sovereignty and the disproportionate balance of development within the newly-created unit. These experiments clearly reflect the difficulty in integrating states at different levels of development within the poly-ethnic African milieu. It is for this reason that the loose structures of the two groupings — SADCC and CONSAS — have considerable merit. A step-by-step approach in our vision of a subcontinent of peace and security is called for. But the political will to move in that direction requires a settlement of the Namibian question and a more equitable re-structuring of the constitutional framework within South Africa. Both are within sight and the eighties¹⁸ may prove to be the decade in which the basis for a new regional dispensation were laid — with the merging of SADCC and CONSAS.

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Revolutionary Warfare

In this article I would like to examine the notion of revolutionary war as it has developed, particularly in the twentieth century, and then touch on the relevance of the theory and practice of this kind of warfare to the current South African political scene.

I do not propose to get into complicated problems of definition — there are whole books written about the question of defining revolution and revolutionary war — but, accepting that it may indeed be simple-minded and open to challenge, I offer the following simple definition: revolution in its simplest possible terms is an event which seeks to transform the state or the existing *status quo*, economically, politically and socially, by violent means. In other words, it is an attempt to bring about a social, economic and political transformation by use of violence.

The first point to be made about the characteristic features of revolutionary war revealed over the past thirty years, is that there must in any revolutionary conflict be a profound element of ideological passion. This seems crucial, if only to motivate those who lead such revolutions. Ideology is one of those terms which political theorists spend many happy hours debating and trying to define, but again, let me offer a very simple and straightforward definition. An ideology is a concept, an explanation if you like, of politics, which does three things. It offers an explanation of the past, announces present discontents and projects a vision of the future. An ideology such as Marxism or Fascism (though perhaps not conservatism or liberalism) seems to be a dynamic phenomenon, offering an interpretation of past, present and future, and interpreting past, present and future as a process of purposeful change leading ultimately to a final solution for all

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men's ills. This solution is expressed ultimately in the creation of a new society where history, as it were, will eventually come to a full stop.

The task of any revolutionary élite (who are necessary to overthrow an existing political economic structure) is of course to translate the complexities of a sophisticated ideology like Marxism into terms which are simple enough to be understood by those who support the élite. What this emphasis on ideology would seem to demonstrate is the profound and necessary relationship between violent means and the political ends or goals which those means are designed to achieve. Revolutionary war, insofar as there is a necessary and vital connection between means and ends, is ultimately Clausewitzian in conception. That is to say, the means chosen, the violent means chosen (because the revolutionary has a variety of means open to him depending on circumstances) must always have a direct and practical relevance for the political objectives sought.

Clausewitz, that extraordinary nineteenth-century strategic thinker, who lived in the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution, has a continuing relevance for anyone who thinks about war and peace, violence and revolution. One may see his great contribution as being to recognise — writing as he did just in the period after the revolutionary wars — that in the future the State would find it increasingly difficult to relate means and ends in the neat rational instrumental way which he claimed was vital if war indeed was to be a continuation of politics. He speculated in effect that after the French Revolution the world was entering an era of passionate nationalism, of mass-armies, of complete popular involvement in war and its by-products, which would render it increasingly difficult for states to co-ordinate military means and political objectives, in the way, for example, that their eighteenth-century counterparts, the so-called "enlightened monarchs", had done.

If one looks carefully at the history of the eighteenth century up to the outbreak of the French Revolution, one has a sense of an international society in which there was little, if any, ideological cleavage, because everyone in that society, particularly those who ruled, were agreed on the importance of retaining "enlightened monarchy" as the political system most appropriate to Europe at that time. The balance of power was the instrument on which that international society was manipulated, both in military and peaceful terms. Clausewitz maintained that in future, because of the nature of the international society which was coming into being, wars would tend to become absolute wars, unlimited wars, using unlimited means for the achievement of unlimited objectives, unlike the limited wars and limited ends of the eighteenth century.

This speculation was borne out. Wider experience of wars in the nineteenth century, particularly in the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century, as seen for instance in the conduct of the Anglo-Boer

War and the conduct of the First and Second World Wars, provides the spectacle of statesmen struggling manfully but by and large unsuccessfully to follow Clausewitz's dictum to choose where they could the most appropriate military means for the achievement of a particular political objective. Statesmen in these circumstances increasingly found themselves trapped by the ideological visions which they had spun in order to persuade the people to make the kinds of sacrifices which these kinds of wars required if they were to be won. In those circumstances, means came to be confused with ends, and very often means tended to triumph over ends.

The one exception to all this was revolutionary war, because one could argue that a revolutionary war as it began to ferment and develop in the nineteenth century and to become much more sophisticated and widespread in the twentieth, is Clausewitzian in essence in most respects. The revolutionary knows that he cannot hope to succeed unless he takes into account the political context in which his revolutionary military activity is conducted. In this sense one can argue legitimately, that for Lenin and for Mao-tse-Tung — both avid students of Clausewitz who had adapted his writings to their own particular needs and their own particular problems — revolutionary war was essentially Clausewitzian.

At least at one level of theoretical analysis one can describe revolutionary war as unlimited war for unlimited ends, particularly as the work of revolution begins at the earliest stage of selective terrorism, at the stage when the revolutionary tries to mobilize people behind him. Precisely because he is weak and the forces of the state are strong, the revolutionary has to mobilize and use all the resources at his disposal if he is to have any hope of building his campaign in such a way that he can ultimately effectively challenge the authority and military might of the state.

What the revolutionary wants is a complete transformation of the society. He wants not simply the destruction of the old order, although that is certainly an important objective, but he wants to substitute for that old order a new one based on the principles of the ideology that he espouses. In that sense the end is unlimited, as compared with the end objective of the statesman, conventional war conducted in an orthodox manner.

We have to recognize that in practice even the revolutionary has to display a degree of discrimination in his choice and use of violent means, but, of course, the one advantage that he has and has always had in this respect, is that popular ideological identification with his cause is a very considerable and desired advantage. The more people identify with him, the more people recognize that his cause is one worth fighting for and making sacrifices for, presumably the better the revolutionary is able to

combat the strength and capabilities of the state. By contrast orthodox politicians fighting orthodox wars, as the First World War so aptly demonstrated, found that too passionate an ideological identification with the cause tended ultimately to hamstring them and to make it impossible for them to negotiate peace. Hence the war went on needlessly and lives were lost until in the final analysis one might conclude that everyone lost.

Now, apart from ideology, there are certain practical criteria which have to be met for war to qualify as revolutionary. All the great revolutionaries of the twentieth century, Lenin and Mao in particular, have recognized that the establishment of a degree of party organization is vital if the necessary conditions for the ultimate overthrow of the state are to be brought about. A vanguard as Lenin defined it, is required, if only to plan and control the pace of revolutionary events. Mao-tse-Tung's contribution to the Marxist revolution, which is the one which has dominated revolution in the Third World in the twentieth century, was to recognize very early on that revolution, if it was to take place at all and be successful, would have to be based on the peasant class rather than on the urban worker. In 1917, Russia, or Lenin, provided the model revolution based on upheaval in the city, trying as it were to activate the urban worker as the spearhead of the revolution.

However, after some failures early in the twenties, when urban revolution proved itself to be unsuccessful, Mao quickly recognized that the countryside was the area where mobilization or support would be most profitable. If one reads his work, watches his practice and considers his successes, particularly as achieved by Ho-Chi-Minh and General Giap in Vietnam, it is clear that for Mao the first stage was critical insofar as it involved mobilizing support for the revolutionary cause. This meant, for example, establishing in a rural area cells of like-minded supporters willing to undertake the arduous work of political conversion to the revolutionary cause. It also meant surreptitiously acquiring simple and primitive weapons. But the most important aspect of this first phase of the revolutionary process for Mao and for his South-Asian successors was this work of political education, arousing the peasantry into an articulate understanding of their sense of grievance, very often connected — as it was in China and Vietnam — with the structure of the land system and the distribution of wealth between various layers of peasantry. For Mao, these activities all had to be undertaken before one could start any major revolutionary activity of the orthodox kind.

Once established, cadres could be divided into two groups, those who were charged specifically with educating peasants into an awareness of their difficulties and problems; and military cadres, those who would begin a process of selective terrorism against the agents of the state, most typically, government officials, chiefs, headmen and unpopular landlords.

It was this combination of political education with selective terror which was characteristic of this first phase, as Mao defined it. Mao recognized that it is at this stage of the game that the revolutionary is at his most vulnerable, in the sense that the work of political education, of political indoctrination (agitprop as it is sometimes called) has very often to be done in the open, and therefore those who indulge in it are exposing themselves to capture or destruction by the forces of the state. This problem is made worse if the would-be revolutionary is combining a rural campaign with an urban campaign of demonstrations, strikes and protests, to make urban workers similarly aware of their problems and difficulties. If the state takes upon itself a counter-insurgent role at this point, particularly in the urban areas, it is most likely to nip revolution in the bud.

Presuming that the state for one reason or another is unable or unwilling to take sharp measures against this early organization of revolution, then the activity proceeds to the so-called second stage, which is guerrilla war in its classical form, a technique or tactic used in a variety of circumstances throughout history.

The second stage, at least for Mao-tse-Tung, represented this activity of guerrilla war, indulging in the traditional tactic of hit-and-run activity against the ruling classes, against bureaucratic targets, against military targets. The guerrilla takes advantage of the fact that the state cannot easily find or capture him if he operates in small numbers in a large rural area. Thinking in Clausewitzian terms, the programme of guerrilla activity is aimed at forcing the state (particularly if it is one with some reputation of liberal behaviour) into repressive counter measures, thereby weakening the state's legitimacy in the eyes of the majority.

Ultimately though, if one follows the Maoist view of revolutionary war, success depends upon the capacity of the movement to do more than just irritate the state by hit-and-run tactics of the sort that I have described. If the guerrilla movement is to truly revolutionize the society and the state in which it is operating, it has to establish liberated zones, areas where the guerrilla high command, or revolutionary high command, can create structures of authority and legitimacy in the social, economic and political spheres which parallel the structures of the state.

One finds examples, certainly in the history of Mao's campaign in China, and the campaign of the Vietcong in Vietnam in the 1960s, of guerrilla movements establishing such parallel structures, setting up rudimentary schools, health services, social services; redistributing land, organizing the economy of those areas in such a way that the peasant finds himself better off than he was under the old system under the existing state.

Again, one notices the emphasis on the political aspect of the activity. Ultimately the state will be left simply holding the towns, and then the

third phase, direct confrontation with the enemy or the state can commence. Given external support from one of the superpowers one ought soon to be able to challenge the state by conventional means. This is, of course, precisely what happened to the French in Indo-China in 1954. They found themselves fighting well-organized conventional Vietnamese infantry. Similarly by the time the American collapse in Vietnam occurred, they too were well into the third stage, confronting their enemy in orthodox conventional terms.

Those are the three stages which Mao thought were crucial if a revolutionary war were to be successful. It is significant that the kinds of war we call revolutionary in the literature have almost all occurred in the Third World, in the aftermath of colonial withdrawal and colonial collapse or sometimes as a prelude to the process of colonial withdrawal and colonial collapse. Algeria was a classic example where this kind of conflict was fought — one thinks of Indo-China as yet another. And one of the reasons why the Vietnamese and the Algerians (those two examples being the most prominent) were successful, was because they were dealing with a metropolis, with a political authority which was many hundreds, if not thousands, of miles away. It made some difference to the success of the Algerian FLN and to the Vietnamese under Ho-Chi-Minh that the enemy they were really fighting was not so much in Saigon or in Algeria, but rather in Paris or in Washington. Guerrillas fighting this kind of war very quickly realized that ultimately it was enough perhaps not so much to win a conflict but to force the enemy into a stalemate which with the appropriate political and psychological attention would become progressively unendurable.

This is precisely what happened to the French (more especially to the French in Indo-China) and finally to the United States in Vietnam. To use that rather crude phrase which has become a feature of this kind of literature, "as the body count mounts" on the side of the counter-insurgents so the will of those who are in the metropolis in France or the United States in these cases tends to weaken, tends to demonstrate an unwillingness to sustain the conflict to the bitter end. It is widely acknowledged, for example, that the French army in Algeria had the FLN guerrilla army almost under control. Many French Generals and advisers argued that if they had been allowed to continue they could ultimately have brought Algeria completely under French control. But the political metropolis in Paris collapsed and with the army being stabbed in the back, as it thought, the war came to an end. The same is true of the United States and Vietnam.

There have been a variety of modifications to the theory outlined above; I shall deal with two. Firstly, Che Guevara who played a significant role in the liberation of Cuba from Batista as Castro's lieutenant, took the view,

following Castro's success, that the whole of the continent of Latin America was ripe for revolutionary penetration, for a repetition of what had happened in Cuba. But although influenced clearly by Mao, and Mao's experience in the 1930s in bringing down the government of China, he introduced a major modification to Mao's thesis, with the belief that one could eliminate the first stage. It was his view that one could arouse the slumbering peasants from their torpor to a realization of their problems and then directly to support for the revolution by demonstrating to them the capacity of a small guerrilla band to make life difficult for the state.

This was a major departure from Mao's theory and it was given enormous coverage in the literature, because Che had a resident biographer along with him, Régis Debray, who wrote a number of books in the process of following Che around, advising him and helping in his attempts to promote revolution in Latin America. As we know, however, this elimination of the first stage turned out to be disastrous. Che found that the peasants in Bolivia showed little interest in what he was trying to do and he was easy prey for the Bolivian Government who ultimately captured and killed him. Debray, interestingly enough, unlike so many intellectuals, was willing to admit that he and Che had been wrong and there was a succession of *mea culpas* in books that he subsequently wrote, pointing out their errors and mistakes.

There is a qualification one must add straight away. I have given the impression throughout that revolutions come to an end once the existing structure has been overthrown, and that that is the end of the enterprise. I think major revolutionary theorists — Mao included, and Franz Fanon who used to write about the Algerian experience — would argue that revolution does not come to an end with the end of physical hostilities, the expulsion of colonial power, but rather that the revolution must continue well into the post-independence period, because the process of bringing about the new Utopian society is not something that happens overnight but occurs over a period of time.

It is argued by people like Fanon and others that the experience of indulging in prolonged revolutionary activity has a psychological impact on those who survive, in the sense that once the period of violence is over, and the colonial power has been expelled, they become new men incapable of creating this new state. While this rings curiously to Western ears, and is a rather frightening doctrine, the fact is that to some degree both Fanon and Mao were right, because both recognized that those who succeeded to power would become bureaucratic, orthodox and bourgeois in their thinking and manipulation of the new state's institutions. Therefore it was important to have periodic purges to ensure that the revolutionary spirit was never submerged. Hence the Cultural Revolution, an attempt by Mao to get the Chinese people back to that spirit which had enabled them to

take power in the first place in 1949 and which had been spoilt thereafter, as he argued, by bureaucratic or political processes. This point is worth stressing because it is the justification that many people offer for revolution. The argument is that one cannot create genuine new states in the Third World, free of all colonial experience, or taint, until one has gone through this violent period. Violence has not just a physical implication in a sense that it destroys the old state, but it has also a personal, psychological implication in the sense that it creates new psyches.

The second variation of revolutionary theory and practice that has become evident over the last ten or fifteen years is the phenomenon of urban guerrilla warfare. There are many examples of urban guerrilla warfare in the West, Latin America, Africa and elsewhere. If one is looking for a theory of urban guerrilla warfare, one has again to look to Latin America where an intellectual called Carlos Marighella wrote an extraordinary pamphlet called *The Mini-Manual of Urban Guerrilla War* which laid down ground rules for the conduct of such war.

Urban guerrilla war flies in the face of all Mao's teachings and indeed Mao's experience. The assumption is that the real battlefield is the city, the urban complex rather than the rural area. One can see that Latin American revolutionaries were forced in the sixties to use urban techniques because Che had demonstrated that the peasantry were simply not willing or able to respond to the kind of strategy of rural guerrilla war which up until then had seemed appropriate. But it quickly became apparent that the city was very often the graveyard of the urban guerrilla. The difficulty was that although it was clear that urban guerrillas were against the existing system, they nevertheless lacked any clear ideological picture of what they were trying to put in the place of the existing state structure. The theory very often rested on the assumption that all that had to be done was to indulge in terrorist activity because this would have the effect of forcing a reaction of repressive measures, ultimately making it impossible for the state to govern that society. In those circumstances a spontaneous revolution would arise and the urban guerrillas could take over. But that did not happen. There are very few instances, if any, of changes in government being brought about by urban guerrilla war, certainly not in the Latin American context. It seems that the problem with urban guerrilla war at a fairly theoretical level, is that it tends to get stuck in the first stage of terrorist activity or even the early second stage of Mao's tripartite treatise. It is difficult to know what represents the second stage or the third stage in the urban context.

The other problem is, I think, that it is difficult to know what constitutes territory in the city. Mao stressed throughout that it was necessary to ensure possession of chunks of territory which could be gradually expanded at the expense of the state. In that way the cities could

then be encircled and complete change ultimately brought about.

But what constitutes territory in the city? The urban guerrilla lacks the space and the time, the two main factors favouring the rural guerrilla. The result of urban guerrilla warfare in Latin America was often simply the willingness of the state to take the most ruthless measures against urban guerrillas, in the process establishing itself as an even more aggressive state than the one which had sparked off the conflict in the first place.

My own view is that urban guerrilla warfare alone is insufficient to bring down a moderately powerful industrial society. By itself, it can be an irritant, but not much more. I think Northern Ireland illustrates this very clearly. There has been a pattern of urban guerrilla war in Northern Ireland for thirteen years, yet what is so extraordinary about places like Northern Ireland is that even in those nasty circumstances people go about their daily business, enjoy the benefits of the social system, go to school and university, get married, have children, die and get buried. Provided a government is willing, as I think the British Government has been willing for the last ten years, to accept a certain level of violence, a certain level of disruption, there is little that the urban guerrilla can do in these circumstances. As I think the IRA has demonstrated time and time again, they have been unable, for very special reasons, to bring about the demise of British power and authority in Northern Ireland, and this despite the fact that the British in treating the IRA have been subject to inhibitions and restraints of a moral, philosophical and political kind which do not pertain elsewhere. The long-term prospects of urban guerrilla war as a technique for bringing about violent change seem not to be very good unless they are seen as supporting some wider insurgency based on the rural context.

Counter-insurgency and the relevance of the above discussion to South Africa remain to be considered.

Counter-insurgency, that is to say an attempt by the state to contain and ultimately defeat a revolutionary or guerrilla movement, has to be equally Clausewitzian to attain some degree of success. A counter-insurgent has to think in political as well as military terms. If he persists in thinking of the solution to a guerrilla uprising as being a purely military solution, he will ultimately find himself in very serious difficulties. This is an obvious point, not particularly profound, but it has been borne out by the experience of counter-insurgencies all over the world for the last thirty years. There are not many examples of successful counter-insurgency. Two that are always quoted in the textbooks, are the Philippines in the early 1950s, and Malaya in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

I will confine my remarks to Malaya to illustrate why, in that particular case, the British were successful. In the first place, the British very quickly realized that the Communist Chinese were a minority among the Malayan population. And secondly, they recognized that dealing with Communist

insurgents required special techniques which were not appropriate to a conventional war. What they did was to create 45 villages well away from the scene of the battle, thereby cutting the guerrillas off from the sources of their traditional support, and leaving them unable to get food, weapons, or the kind of refreshment required if the war was to be prosecuted.

The real success behind the Malayan experience was that the British at a very early stage made it clear to the Malayan majority that they, the British, had no desire to stay in Malaya forever. Once they had wrapped up the insurgency they would leave and give the Malayan people self-government and independence. They began to advance Malaya rapidly towards the desired goal of independence and self-government. This was a political option with which the Chinese Communists in Malaya could not compete. Of course, they had another advantage; they had been in Malaya for a very long time, there was a well-established judicial/political/economic structure controlled by the British and they were therefore in a position to cope with a Chinese Communist insurgency when it arose.

Interestingly enough, when the United States found itself having to cope with Vietnamese insurgency, they studied the British experience in Malaya for models which they might employ with profit in the Vietnamese context. Indeed, Sir Robert Thompson, who was largely responsible for the technical side of the success which paved the way of the British in Malaya, was recruited by the United States as an adviser. He advocated the same policy. But the critical difference between Vietnam and Malaya was that Vietnam was an artificial creation that was brought into being in 1954 at the Geneva Conference. It was a corrupt decadent society which did not command loyalty or legitimacy in the eyes of the great majority of the people. The United States found itself having both to create and defend that state as it was in the process of being created, an almost impossible task for any counter-insurgent.

I am not sure that what has been said can be exactly related to South Africa, but some points are worth mentioning in this context. There has been a great debate over the last twenty-five years, to which I myself have contributed, about the relevance of the traditional theory of revolutionary war for South African conditions. It has been the subject of much discussion in literature, and on the whole a large number of observers, amongst whom I include myself, have taken the view over the years that the Maoist theory which has become the prevalent mode of revolutionary activity, is not easily applied in this kind of context, if at all. That is because the conditions that exist in South Africa are so different from conditions in the Third World where revolution has been successful.

Firstly, South Africa is a modern industrial state. It is not a corrupt, decadent, artificial creation like South Vietnam or the China that Mao toppled in the 1920s and 1930s. It has always had, for example, a very

impressive spectrum of political, bureaucratic, economic and military capabilities. These could be described as a sort of built-in counter-insurgency capability in advance of such insurgency occurring. The very structure of apartheid, the way it is bureaucratically organized, the way the day-to-day life of the African is controlled, this is the stuff of counter-insurgency, this is what the British and others had to improvise after insurgency had begun.

One had the impression in the 1960s and early 1970s that here was a state which was capable of manipulating its environment almost at will. After all, the military bureaucracy could not easily be penetrated or subverted from within, as happened in Iran. Iran collapsed, it seems, because the military bureaucracy and other agencies and structures of statehood had been well penetrated by people hostile to the Shah. That does not seem to me to be an option open to those who want to bring about the same outcome in South Africa. Indeed in the 1960s and early 1970s revolutionary change of the kind that I have described as happening elsewhere seemed most improbable. What the state had, and still has, though to a modified degree, in the 1960s and early 1970s was both a deterrent and a defensive capability. It was able to control and manipulate its internal and external environment almost at will. It could deter simply by the fact of its strength and skill. It could deter the outbreak of violence against itself at however low a level, and even if deterrence had broken down, as it did briefly in 1960 at the time of Sharpeville, there was still a major defensive capability which could easily keep this kind of insurgency at bay.

And yet, as one considers the 1980s, one cannot help feeling that the deterrent function of the state's capabilities, which was so impressive in the 1960s and 1970s, seems to be weaker. It has not been destroyed or eliminated, far from it. But it seems to be weaker in a sense that the state does not seem able to deter a variety of violent activities such as violence following industrial unrest, the strikes, boycotts and stay-at-homes that occur in the townships and have been a feature of South African life since the Soweto riots in 1976. It has not been able to deter the sporadic, low-level infiltration of urban guerrillas that has taken place over the last two years. To that extent, there is a difference between the state's capacity in the 1960s and the state's capabilities today. Nevertheless, one has to recognize that despite this slight weakening in deterrent capability, there is in an administrative way very clearly a defensive capability which can cope and will cope with such violence when it does occur.

To put it in the form of a general proposition, it may be that South Africa is entering a period of "violent equilibrium". What this means is that the state can hold the ring, it can retain its hold and maintain the functions of the state in reasonably efficient order, but it has to accept that

there are going to be instances of violence at a variety of levels, which may over the very long run increase in scope and magnitude. The British role in Northern Ireland could be described as being representative of the phenomenon of violent equilibrium.

However, South Africa has an advantage over those states that have succumbed to revolutionary war. For one thing, there is no metropolis. Pretoria is the metropolis and that makes a difference. There is no possibility of a weakening of the will 6 000 miles away. One can perhaps say that at the end of the day, a society that might ultimately find itself fighting for its survival (and white South Africans are not unique in this respect), is less likely to be restrained or inhibited from using ruthless techniques in counter-insurgency, in the way that the British have been restrained. If Northern Ireland fell into the sea tomorrow, most Englishmen would shake their heads in wonderment, but on the whole would not feel that the end of the world had come.

If one has to cope with insurgency, even if it is low-key and sporadic at the moment, one needs a political dimension to any counter-insurgency programme that the state might have in mind to mount, and clearly the South African state recognizes this.

Perhaps the irony, the really tragic irony, is that if revolutionary war ever got under way in South Africa, the state would have little to offer in terms of this political dimension to the great uncommitted majority. Apartheid would hardly do as a cultural ideology in opposition to what was presumably being offered by the state's opponents.

Book Reviews

BRITISH POLITICAL PARTIES

The emergence of a modern party system

Alan R. Ball

Macmillan, London, 1981, 292 pp.

THE REORGANISATION OF BRITISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Old orthodoxies and a political perspective

John Dearlove

Cambridge University Press, 1979, 308 pp.

These are interesting times for students of British politics: not only does the party system appear to be undergoing one of its rare changes but the subject of central-local government relations has become one of considerable political controversy. The two books considered here appear, therefore, to have topicality on their side.

Not since Labour replaced the Liberals as one of the two main parties 60 years ago has change in the British party system seemed as likely as it does at present — “breaking the mould” is the image currently in vogue. The Social Democrats, in alliance with the Liberals, seem set fair either to become a new centre force in a multi-party system or to replace Labour as the alternative to the Conservatives in a new version of the two party system.

Against this background a book on the *emergence of the modern party system* is timely. Mr Ball deals with the period since 1867 which he divides into four sections: 1867–1922, 1922–1940, 1940–1964 and the period since 1964, which he labels “The Two-Party system under attack”. Apart from a quibble about his choice of 1940 rather than 1945 as the dividing line between inter-war and post-war systems, these are sensible categories which should be helpful to students. Useful, too, to students should be the list of party leaders since 1867, the glossary of terms and a helpful

bibliography.

On the earlier periods, Mr Ball presents his material clearly and fairly. The nearer he moves to the present time, the more his judgments are likely to strike some as more open to question. Inevitably the danger with a book of this kind is that students will absorb the author's opinions as well as his facts without distinguishing between the two. Perhaps the most striking example in the book is the treatment of Hugh Gaitskell. Clearly Mr Gaitskell is not one of Mr Ball's political heroes: we read of "the political insensitivity of Gaitskell" (p. 164). Four pages later we learn that "Gaitskell's obstinate handling of the intra-party conflict served to inflame the situation" (p. 168); and then comes "Gaitskell's tactless attempt to change Clause IV" (p. 174). The other side of the picture is less stressed: for example, that Gaitskell showed greater courage than some of his successors as Labour leader in resisting unrealistic policies passed by the Party Conference; or that had he succeeded in changing Clause IV of the Party's constitution, then the Party might have been better able to cope with the challenges of the 1970s and 1980s. Instead of which it was by 1979 attracting a lower level of electoral support than at any time since the 1930s and now appears irrevocably split. Mr Callaghan, too, comes in for some subtle prodding. We learn of his "insensitivity" to union reaction (p. 229) and that "the winter of discontent . . . was chiefly the result of serious miscalculations by the Callaghan government" (p. 236). One might have supposed that the trade unions bore a rather greater share of the blame.

In a similar vein, Mr Ball speaks of recent constitutional changes in the Labour Party with a straight face; they are "proposals to democratise the party" (p. 225); at the very least one might have expected democratise to have been placed inside inverted commas. Similarly, the automatic re-selection of MPs is a "more democratic procedure" (p. 241), but why this is so is not made clear.

With a book of this kind a reviewer possesses a certain advantage over the author with the passage of time. Unfairly, but irresistibly, one points to some of Mr Ball's judgments as looking less plausible now than when they were written. Of the Labour Party he concludes "the left and right in the party occupy the same ideological space" (p. 243). With nearly 30 Labour MPs having defected to the Social Democrats in the past year, there should be a little more room in that space now. Nor does the final sentence of the book look quite as convincing now: "But on the available evidence, unless there is a change in the electoral system a major realignment in British politics seems unlikely" (p. 263).

Apart from a little trouble with the placing of adverbs and, something he shares with the other author considered here, a tendency to use will when he means shall, Mr Ball writes clearly and to the point.

By contrast *Mr Dearlove* has written a work which is heavy going.

Anyone seeking an account of the reorganization of British local government will look in vain here. The sub-title is somewhat more revealing about the book's actual subject matter. This is to suggest that many of the ideas for change in local government have been based on unproven assumptions; in other words, on orthodoxies which were carried forward either without research or, sometimes, despite research findings. Up to a point one might readily concede that there is something in what Mr Dearlove is saying but he tends to grind his reader into the ground with a kind of argumentative overkill. Moreover, behind the plea for more research lies a more ideological moral: his target is the "traditional literature" which stands "accused of displaying an unwarranted dogmatism" (p. 9). Since Mr Dearlove has asserted on the previous page that the State, far from being neutral, "works in the essential interest of the few" (p. 8), the reader is entitled to wonder who is being dogmatic. The bulk of the book is concerned with the impact of the orthodoxies on the debate about local government boundaries and management and in particular about the calibre of councillors and officers. In a final, rather discursive, chapter Mr Dearlove's conspiracy theory of local government change emerges fully. In the course of this he cites a number of sources in support of his judgment about the role of the State. Those less easily impressed by such sources will remain unconvinced by his message.

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NORTHERN IRELAND

A political directory 1968-1979

W.D. Flackes

Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1980

POLICY AND GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Lessons of devolution

D. Birrell and A. Muric

Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1980

NORTHERN IRELAND

A psychological analysis

K. Heskin

Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1980

Political violence in Northern Ireland poses no credible threat to world peace, nor does it claim many lives by the standards of the Third World. But the situation is a complex and tragic one of great longevity, and for a West European industrial state it is aberrant, even bizarre, and so commands the attention and compels attempts to explain.

W.D. Flackes has been B.B.C. Northern Ireland political correspondent since 1964. Virtually every evening since then he has appeared on the television screen commenting on the latest cross-currents and undertows in Unionist politics, or trying to read portents in the political shadow and terrorist substance of the Republican Movement. The verve and élan with which he does this remain undiminished by time, and untarnished by the often depressing and even squalid nature of the intelligence he has to impart. It is fitting then that he should have compiled this most useful handbook. The bulk of the text is taken up with a dictionary of names and organizations, but there is also a chronology of principal events; a guide to the systems of government under which Northern Ireland has been ruled since 1968, and a list of the office holders in them; a digest of election results, and a short essay on the security system.

A measure of Ulster's political instability can be taken from Mr Flackes' opening sentence in the government section; "There can be few parts of the world where two totally different systems of government have collapsed in the space of little more than two years," and from the fact that "elections" contains no less than thirteen sub-sections to cover the eleven years.

Contemporary history is a kind of limbo into which people, events, organizations, plans and policies disappear. Chronology is chronically confused, the trivial and exotic are difficult to distinguish from the substantial and significant, information is dauntingly scattered through

newspaper cuttings, pamphlets and ephemeral journals. This is especially true of complex, violent and quickly changing situations. Mr Flackes has done a great service to anyone interested in the pathology of Ulster's troubles.

The partition of Ireland in 1922, forced on the British Government and the leaders of Ulster Unionism a relationship which neither really wanted, a devolved form of government which had been designed to fulfil a different purpose. The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 provided for two Home Rule Parliaments, one for the six north-eastern counties and another for the rest of the island. Powers were to be devolved from Westminster to these two bodies, and they were to co-operate through a Council of Ireland representative of both. Thus were Irish Nationalism, Ulster Unionism, and the integrity of the British Empire to be resolved.

However, this exercise in squaring the circle bore no relation to the realities of Irish politics, and the Act was virtually a dead letter by the time it was passed. All that remained was the definition of the relationship between the Northern Ireland Parliament and Westminster which was the basis of the government of Northern Ireland until 1972. *Derek Birrell and Alan Murie* have written a study of this relationship which goes beyond the constitutional framework to a detailed appraisal of the day-to-day working of all important aspects of government.

The authors' approach is sober and meticulous, and they cast interesting light on the workings of devolution, especially on the difficulties of effective control from the centre. They are a little self-conscious about their approach, and stress the weakness of isolating a particular set of political institutions or constitutional arrangements from other factors. "Other Factors" certainly loom large in Northern Ireland, but the structure and business of government are important variables in their own right, and Birrell and Murie have made a good job of studying them. Certainly their conclusions are pessimistic enough to earn the approval of well-informed observers of the Ulster problem.

When a random, preliminary sample of the pages of a volume sent for review yields the following sentence, suspicions are aroused;

"The superego trip indulged in by the British government that terrorist activities in Northern Ireland are merely criminal not only flies in the face of objective facts, but is particularly offensive to large sections of the Catholic community whose version of reality is quite different from that of British government ministers and officials at Westminster and Stormont."

This is confused, ambiguous, tendentious and spuriously *ex cathedra*. A rather sneering self-consciously trendy style ("superego trip") gives the *coup de grâce* to a reasonable, if arguable political judgement. The rest of *Mr Heskin's* work rises above this sample but is still of distinctly uneven

quality. What he has attempted is to relate some of the research preoccupations of social psychologists to some of the major political problems of Northern Ireland.

The results are not uniformly impressive. For instance, in a treatment of leadership he offers an interesting essay on the character of the Reverend Ian Paisley which owes more to a bit of diligent delving in the press cuttings and some shrewd judgement than it does to the bits of psychological theory which are draped around as rather superfluous props.

His essay on terrorism attacks some popular stereotypes — that of the “psychopathic terrorist” for instance — and hits its targets well, but he is confronted with the unrewarding task of trying to “avoid becoming ensnared in moralistic and . . . ultimately counter-productive stances” while protesting that, “this should not be taken as indicative of a personal indifference to the morality of terrorist activity . . .”

The impression of unevenness is compounded by at least one serious factual error (the British media are accused on page 14 of “declining to report” a particular instance of brutal treatment of a Catholic woman by British soldiers; the reviewer clearly recalls reading extensive coverage of the event in several newspapers) and an irritating habit of slipping from references to laboratory experiments to sociological generalization based on casual observation and back again. The overall impression is of an enterprise that is so ambitious that its execution is bound to look tentative and threadbare.

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BRITAIN'S MOMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1914-1971

Elizabeth Monroe

Chatto & Windus, London, 1981, 226 pp.

The plan of Miss Monroe's book roughly divides into three parts:

1. Britain's years of importance in the Middle East: 1918-1945
2. The years of impotence: 1945-1954
3. The fragmentation of power and the Suez crisis: 1955-1956

Prior to World War I, Britain had little direct contact with the Arabs. During and after that war, she played the principal part in the area for nearly forty years. After that, she lost this near monopoly of influence and became one of several powers operating in the Middle East, as she was before 1914.

The year, therefore, of 1914 as the commencement of the book seems appropriate, but why, according to its title, the book is supposed to end in 1971 remains a mystery. In fact, the last chapter, entitled "Fragmentation of Power", deals with the years 1955-1956, the Suez crisis and the end of British power in the Middle East. The years therefore 1914-1956 would have constituted a well-marked period of history, with a beginning and an end. From the British point of view, these years cover the period during which she was generally regarded as the friend and mentor of the Arabs in general, until, her task completed, for good or ill, she resigned, or lost, her pre-eminence and became one of several interested powers.

From the Arab point of view, these same years cover the commencement of the Nationalist Movement, through its various vicissitudes, until all the countries in the area had obtained independent governments.

Although the lands stretching from Egypt to the Persian Gulf were not part of the Empire as such, they were of special interest to Britain, partly because of the supplies of oil and partly on account of the sea and air routes to India and Australasia. In fact, contrary to popular belief, Britain's sole preoccupation with the Middle East was her need to pass through the area for trade. This fact comes out quite clearly in Miss Monroe's book, as do many other important points: the habit of authority, the resentment at the intrusion of power greater than Britain's, the underestimation of local nationalism and the distaste for Egypt that coloured British action all along.

The book ends with a detailed explanation and re-evaluation of the Suez crisis, the only part which makes for gripping reading and history. Other than that, and apart from the fact that the title brilliantly and wittily "encapsulates Britain's short moment" in the span of centuries of Middle East history, Miss Monroe's book does not sustain the interest of the

reader. It is possible to agree with every word of the book, yet to feel that something is missing. Elizabeth Monroe produces the lyrics, but not the music. Her book, full of symbolic jargon, irritating detail, and obscure and complicated prose (“The Peace Conference was just sitting down to the main conundrums of the German treaty when the first of the Middle Eastern malcontents demonstrated the effects of inattention.”) has clearly been written for academic eyes only and not “for anyone interested in imperial history and the shifting balance of world power”, as is claimed by Peter Mansfield in his foreword.

In fact, short of the last two chapters, the book’s only success lies in anaesthetizing the reader until he has enough energy to do one thing: turn the page and not come back for an encore.

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Books received for review

ECONOMIC POWER IN ANGLO SOUTH AFRICAN DIPLOMACY

Berridge

Macmillan. Approx. R42,60.

THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

Grosser

Macmillan. Approx. R9,45 pb

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISORDER

Helleiner

Macmillan. Approx. R30,55 hc.

WHITE COLLAR POWER

Juddery

George Allen & Unwin. Approx. R29,75.

THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND APPEASEMENT 1936-1939

Macdonald

Macmillan. Approx. R32,00.

THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Mitchell

Macmillan. Approx. R42,60.

INTEGRATION AND UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT

Seers

Macmillan. Approx. R53,30 hc.

CHARTER 77 & HUMAN RIGHTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Skilling

George Allen & Unwin. Approx. R42,60.

DOCUMENTS IN COMMUNIST AFFAIRS

Szajkowski

Macmillan. Approx. R42,60.

BRITISH PERSPECTIVE ON TERRORISM

Wilkinson

George Allen & Unwin. Approx. R12,00.

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Recent titles are:

Du Pisani, André; *Namibia Since Geneva*.

Pifer, Alan; *South Africa in the American Mind, (Commemoration Day Lecture, University of the Witwatersrand, 14.10.1981.)*

Books

The American People and South Africa, edited by Alfred O. Hero, jr, and John Barratt. This is the second book resulting from the joint programme initiated by the SAIIA and the World Peace Foundation of Boston, with the purpose of studying the broad issues of Mutual concern in relations between South Africa and the West. It is available from the publishers, David Philip, Cape Town, or from booksellers. (*Conflict and Compromise in South Africa*, edited by Robert I. Rotberg and John Barratt, was the first book emanating from the programme, but this is now out of print).

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Bibliographical Series/Bibliografiesereeks

No. 8. *South Africa and the United Nations: a select and annotated bibliography*. Compiled by Elna Schoeman, 244 pp. R25,00.

This bibliography comprises over 1 000 annotated references to documentation and relevant literature pertaining to the United Nations, its specialized agencies and South Africa. The extensive indexing of all UN resolutions concerning South Africa is a noteworthy feature, together with a subject guide and author index. This is an essential reference work for all who are interested in the field of international organizations and South Africa's international relations.

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Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation of Africa Ltd
De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd
Diesel Electric Holdings (Pty) Ltd
Discount House of South Africa Ltd, The
Dorbyl Ltd
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Federale Chemiese Beleggings Bpk
Feefood Bpk
Federale Volksbeleggings Bpk
Federated Insurance Company Ltd
Fedmech Holdings Ltd
Ferguson Brothers, Hall, Stewart & Company Inc
Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd
Ford Motor Company of SA (Pty) Ltd
Foschini Ltd
Freight Services Holdings Ltd
French Bank of Southern Africa Ltd
Gallant Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd
Garicks Ltd
Gelvenor Textiles (Pty) Ltd
General Mining Union Corporation Ltd
General Motors SA (Pty) Ltd
General Tire & Rubber Company SA Ltd
Gerling Global Reinsurance Company of SA Ltd
Gold Fields of SA Ltd
Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Company (SA) (Pty) Ltd
Grace, W. R., Africa (Pty) Ltd
Grand Bazaars

Grestermans Stores Ltd
Gregory Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd
Group Five Engineering Ltd
Gubb & Inggs Ltd
Haggie Rand Ltd
Hewker Sidelley Electric Africa (Pty) Ltd
Huettis Corporation Ltd
Hunt Leuchars & Hepburn Ltd
IBM South Africa (Pty) Ltd
Impeni Cold Storage & Supply Company Ltd
Industrial & Commercial Holdings Group Ltd
Industrial Development Corporation of SA Ltd
ISCOR
Ivor Jones, Roy and Company Inc
Jaff & Company Ltd
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company Ltd
Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd
Kohler Brothers Ltd
Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd
Lockhart, I.M. (Pty) Ltd
Lucas Foundings SA (Pty) Ltd
McCarthy Toyota Ltd
Malbak Ltd
Messina (Transvaal) Development Company Ltd
Metal Box South Africa Ltd
Matboerd Ltd
Mobil Oil Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York
Moser Industries (Pty) Ltd
Murray & Roberts Ltd
Murray & Roberts (Cape) Ltd
Nashua (SA) (Pty) Ltd
Nasionale Pers Bpk
Natal Tanning Extract Company Ltd
Natal Witness (Pty) Ltd, The
National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd, The
National Trading Company Ltd
NCA Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd
Nedbank Group Ltd, The
Nissho Iwai Corporation
Norex Holdings (Pty) Ltd
Ochla Holdings (Pty) Ltd
Ovenslone Investments Ltd
Parker Pen (Pty) Ltd, The
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company
Pep Group of Companies
Percy Fitzpatrick Memorial Trust
Petersen (Pty) Ltd
Phelps Dodge Mining Ltd
Philips Electronics Holdings (Pty) Ltd
Pick 'n' Pay Stores Ltd
Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd
Plascon Parthenon Paint Company
Premier Group Ltd, The
Press Supplies Ltd
Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd
Price Waterhouse & Company
Protea Assurance Company Ltd
Protea Holdings Ltd
Raphael, Leo & Sons (Pty) Ltd
Rambrandt Group Ltd
Rennies Consolidated Holdings Ltd
Reunert & Lenz Ltd
Rex Trueform Clothing Company Ltd
Richleigh Shoes (Pty) Ltd
Rio Tinto Management Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd
Roche Products (Pty) Ltd
Romatec Ltd
Sage Holdings Ltd
Sam Newman Ltd
SANLAM
SASOL
Schindler Lifts (SA) (Pty) Ltd
Scottford Mills (Pty) Ltd
Seardel Investment Corporation Ltd
Sentrachem Ltd
Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd
Shield Insurance Company Ltd
Siemens Ltd
Simpson, Frankel, Hearn, Kruger Inc
Smith, C.G. Ltd
Smith, C.G. Sugar Ltd
South African Associated Newspapers Ltd
South African Bata Shoe Company Ltd, The

South African Breweries Ltd, The
South African Cyanamid (Pty) Ltd
South African Druggists Ltd
South African General Electric Company (Pty) Ltd
South African Marine Corporation Ltd
South African Mutual Life Assurance Society
South African Permanent Building Society, The
South African Sugar Association
Southern African Muso's Rights Organization
Southern Life Association, The
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Stewart & Lloyds of SA Ltd
Suprama Ltd
Swiss South African Reinsurance Company Ltd
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Tiger Tots & National Milling Company Ltd
Tongaat Group Ltd, The
Total South Africa (Pty) Ltd
Toyota South Africa Ltd
Troworths Ltd
Union Carbide Southern Africa (USA) Inc
Union Cotton Mills (Pty) Ltd
Uniroyal (Pty) Ltd
United Building Society
United Tobacco Company Ltd
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Wesco Investments Ltd
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