International Affairs Bulletin

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Smuts House Notes

In a country like South Africa it is not easy to interest large numbers of people in political affairs far beyond the borders. Even when it can be demonstrated that events elsewhere might indirectly affect South Africa or might possibly provide lessons that could be applied to South Africa's peculiar problems, it is like pulling teeth to get South Africans, most especially people in the Black and Afrikaner communities, to abandon their insularity just for a while, and to entertain new and exotic ideas. To a large extent this sort of thinking is reinforced by the view that South Africa is unique, *sui generis,* and thereby it does not conform to patterns and categories devised to help us understand other societies. I do not share that view.

But such short-sightedness is surprising to me in light of the fact that the discussions and political struggles now taking place in this country over the creation of a new constitutional order are being framed in the language of "consociationalism". This concept itself is an import produced by a Dutch political scientist, Professor Arend Lijphart. His own scholarship originally did not address itself to South African matters, but concentrated on other multi-ethnic and multi-racial societies. If consociationalism figures so prominently in South Africa's search for a twentieth century dispensation, does it not also stand to reason that there may be other ideas and practices out there that might be helpful in understanding South Africa's foreign and domestic problems. Sharply focussed new ideas, and even broad paradigms ought not to be dismissed simply because superficially they appear to deal with other peoples and other times.

It is this myopia, this foreshortened horizon, that so frustrates South African scholars who study foreign cultures. At the SAIIA's workshop on "European Foreign Policy Concepts Toward Africa" in early July, four European scholars and writers, British, Dutch, French and German, presented papers about their countries' policies in Africa. When the topic of discussion was the policy-making process in European or American states or when it covered affairs outside of Africa and even policies in Black

Africa, interest among the South African participants seemed to flag. It was regarded as "too academic" or "not relevant to our situation." On the second day of that conference, (which by the way had been jointly sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung of Bonn,) when papers dealt specifically with Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa itself, discussion took on a fervor that had been missing during the first day. By that time, however, some Black participants had lost interest and failed to return.

To be sure, this is just one example of the problem. But I would suggest that this tendency to look inward is more widespread than we realize. If a program at the Institute of International Affairs occasionally faces this challenge, and presumably those invited to participate have a greater interest in affairs international, one can imagine the breadth and depth of boredom in the larger society.

For this reason, the important role of the Institute of International Affairs in this country becomes undeniable. As an institution independent of official government or partisan positions and with ties far beyond South Africa's borders, the Institute is well-situated to keep foreign issues before the public, most particularly before the enlightened opinion makers of South Africa. They must constantly be made aware that although, at first glance, an international subject might appear to be remote from South Africans' concerns, in reality it may have the potential to open up new insights into South African affairs. In science, paradigmatic breakthroughs often emerge where they are least expected. Their capacity to ramify is great. Who would have thought that mathematics would have contributed to the study of societies through the method of systems analysis? Or that the detailed study of laboratory mice or peas or honey bees would shed light on the human condition? The Institute can contribute to a breaking down of South Africa's insularity if only we continue to entertain ostensibly remote ideas in an open and intelligent atmosphere.

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James Barber

Supping with the devil —
Zimbabwe–South Africa relations

"We've got to sup with the devil or starve, but if we starve many other African countries starve with us. And that's where South Africa knows it's got us cornered for a long time to come".[1] That was the judgement of one of Robert Mugabe's aides in October 1981.

Mr Mugabe and his colleagues have come to power after waging a "liberation struggle" to free Zimbabwe from "racial oppression" and "capitalist exploitation", but their triumph is clouded by the realization that on their border, and dominating the southern African subcontinent is the Republic of South Africa, which they believe is built on the very principles they have challenged and defeated in their own country. Not surprisingly the hostility and suspicion is reciprocated on the South African side of the border. To many White South Africans Robert Mugabe and his government are their "devils" — for they believe that Mugabe came to power through a terrorist campaign backed by communist powers, that he is now intent on introducing socialism in his own country, and on giving what support he dares to the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) in their "terrorist" assault on South Africa.

As the two governments and their supporters are divided by this gulf of attitudes and values, the relationship is always likely to be difficult — one in which suspicion rather than trust predominates — and that distrust will be compounded if each side continues, as at present, to interpret the actions and motives of the other in the worst light. Yet neither side can escape the other. Zimbabwe's economic dependence on South Africa is obvious to all. As a land-locked country she has to rely on her neighbours for access to the outside world, and South Africa's ports and transport system which have always been important became even more so in the 1970s, when, for

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one reason or another, the Mozambique ports were not available. It has been estimated that at the beginning of 1980 almost 90 per cent of Zimbabwe's traffic was passing through the South African ports, and while by 1982 with the reopening of the Mozambique border, the proportion had fallen to 70 per cent, the Zimbabwe Government is determined to reduce it even further. However, it seems probable that for the foreseeable future Zimbabwe will have to continue to move many of its goods through the Republic.[2]

Zimbabwe's reliance is not confined to transport, for South Africa is her major trading partner. In 1980 she took 17 per cent (Z$59m) of Zimbabwe's total exports, while West Germany was next with 10 per cent (Z$31m), and her position in supplying imports to Zimbabwe was even more marked, with 26 per cent (Z$105m) while Britain followed with 9 per cent (Z$32m)[3]. South Africa is especially important to Zimbabwe's manufacturing industries. In 1980 they sent 41 per cent of their products to the Republic and they would have difficulty in finding alternative markets because of the low purchasing power of neighbouring Black states.[4] South Africa is also a major source of investment, tourists, and skilled labour, and is the home of many of the parent companies whose subsidiaries operate in Zimbabwe. All these economic links were greatly reinforced during the period of UDI when Rhodesia virtually became South Africa's client state. For instance, it has been estimated that during the 1970s the Rhodesian private sector was receiving up to US$40m a year in credit from South Africa, and that from 1977 to 1979 the commercial banks negotiated loans of up to US$200m to pay for the war.[5] At the time of independence about three quarters of Zimbabwe's public debt was payable in the Republic, and similarly the influence of South African companies had increased as sanctions were applied and the Republic became the main conduit for Rhodesia's international transactions.

The new Zimbabwe Government cannot escape these inherited economic ties, and it was not without significance that one of the early visitors to Mr Mugabe after independence was the major capitalist figure of southern Africa, Mr Harry Oppenheimer, the Chairman of the Anglo American Corporation. Mugabe's aide was right when he said that "we've got to sup with the devil", but the reason is as much Zimbabwe's own economic dependence on South Africa as concern about the potential suffering of other Black states.

Yet while Zimbabwe's economic dependence on the Republic is so striking the balance of the relationship is not all one way. Even in economic terms there are advantages for South Africa. The Zimbabwe ministers sometimes claim that an economic break would hurt South Africa as much as their own country. That is gross exaggeration, for South Africa's is much the larger economy and only a small proportion of her economic

activity is linked to Zimbabwe, but, as is clear from the previous discussion, South Africa does derive benefit. However, it is in security, diplomatic, and political terms that Zimbabwe's importance to South Africa really stands out.

First, the position Zimbabwe adopts towards the armed struggle of the Black liberation movements is an abiding South African concern, and the government's threats that it will attack Zimbabwe if bases are established there is indication of that.

Second, Zimbabwe provides an important link with the rest of Africa — not only in the physical sense of the routes into central Africa but also in the sense that the attitudes of the Black states throughout the continent will be influenced by the relationship South Africa establishes with her most important neighbour.

Third, and linked to this last point, South Africa's hopes of building a group of interdependent southern African states must be greatly influenced by the relationship she can establish with Zimbabwe.

Fourth, the relationship will have wider international implications, for the major Western states have given substantial backing to Zimbabwe.

Finally, Zimbabwe is important to South Africa because it acts as a mirror of herself, although the reflection is not an entirely accurate one, for South Africa is a much larger, richer, and more complex society. But Zimbabwe is the nearest parallel and inevitably South Africans are going to judge what happens there in the light of their own predicament.

The broad picture, therefore, is that South Africa and Zimbabwe are locked together, by geography and mutual interests as clearly as they are divided by political commitment and ideology. Being "locked together" is not an easy relationship, and there was tension and misunderstanding between the two countries long before Zimbabwe's independence. Despite the binding tie of White minority rule, the relationship between South Africa and the old Rhodesia was littered with disputes and misunderstandings — from the Jameson raid to UDI.

The strucutre of the subcontinent helps to explain that, for South Africa is so much the dominant element that all her neighbours must feel a sense of threat, irrespective of their political and ideological complexion. Of these neighbours Zimbabwe is clearly the most advanced economically, but that does not remove her sense of being under threat. The South Africans find this difficult to accept, but actions which they see as offering help and support will often be perceived by the neighbours as another reminder of their dependence.

The neighbours in trying to reduce their dependence have now formed the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), which has the dual aims of reducing economic reliance on the Republic, and demonstrating the Black governments' determination to keep her at

arm's length politically. The SADCC is made up of nine Black states, including Zimbabwe. From its inception the emphasis has been on "economic liberation" — on reducing dependence on South Africa rather than confronting her. It does not aim at formal economic integration, but at developing alternative transport and communications systems, co-ordinating foreign aid, and promoting trade and industry.[6]

Zimbabwe is heavily involved in the enterprise, and because of her relative economic strength she could well become the cog around which it turns. Already she is to provide the first Secretary-General, and has responsibility for food security — a role especially attractive to Zimbabwe which is aware of its potential as the granary of central Africa. However, SADCC is a long-term venture and it will not be possible to evaluate its success for several years. If it is to come near to its objectives it will require not only external support, but internal political stability, continued co-operation among its members, and considerable administrative and technical competence. None of these can be taken as given. While a target date of ten years has been set for Zimbabwe to break all ties with South Africa it seems more realistic to assume that even if SADCC is a success it will reduce Zimbabwe's dependence on the Republic but not eliminate it.

Meanwhile South Africa remains the economic giant of southern Africa, and nothing can change that quickly. South Africa's Black neighbours will still have no choice but to rely on her, and, while a giant may command respect or fear, it seldom induces love. The inbuilt tension of being "locked together" will persist in Zimbabwe–South African relations.

In its attempts to solve the dilemmas created by its continuing relations with South Africa, the Zimbabwe Government has drawn two distinctions. The first is between economic and political relations. Shortly after independence Zimbabwe broke off diplomatic relations with South Africa and has also refused ministerial dealings with her, but repeatedly Mr Mugabe and his ministers have said that their political opposition does not imply any lessening of economic links. Trade and investment, they say, should continue despite political differences. In April 1981 Mr Mugabe stated; "Our position is that we shall continue to maintain trade relations with South Africa to the extent that South Africa makes it possible for us to do so. We would hope that South Africa would reciprocate and not resort unduly to hostile acts against us. . . . We are pledged to peaceful co-existence with it. We are opposed to the politics of South Africa, but we do not regard the people of South Africa as our enemies at all".[7]

The second distinction comes in Zimbabwe's support for the Black nationalists of South Africa — the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congres (PAC). While the Zimbabwe Government says that it will give full political backing to these parties and endorses the Organization of African Unity's support for them, it also says it is not prepared to

provide bases from which a guerrilla war could be waged. In June 1981 Mugabe said; "We are entitled to give political support to the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia. It is our duty under the Organization of African Unity. We are committed to fostering the liberation struggle". But then he added; "We have said we will not create conditions in this country which can be used by any organization for carrying out military attacks against our neighbours, including South Africa".[8]

The first of the Zimbabwe distinctions — that between economic and political relations — echoes the appeals which South Africa's Prime Ministers, John Vorster and P.W. Botha, have made in their attempts to establish stronger contacts with their Black neighbours, first through the "outward policy", and later through the idea of a "constellation of states". In promoting these ideas they both argued that South Africa could enjoy good economic relations with her neighbours whatever their political complexion.

However, in its relations with Zimbabwe the South African Government often appears to have given priority to political objectives — to demonstrating its power over the new state by the use of economic links as political levers. That was particularly noticeable in 1981 when the South African Government decided: (a) To withdraw 25 locomotives it had loaned to Zimbabwe, at a time when Zimbabwe Railways were under great strain; (b) to give one year's notice of the end of a preferential trade agreement which had been in force since 1964; (c) to refuse to renew work permits for Zimbabweans working in the Republic; (d) to introduce visas for travel between the countries — which has adversely affected the Zimbabwe tourist trade; and (e) to impose delays on the transport of goods to Zimbabwe. In the case of oil the South Africans have insisted that full payment is received for each delivery before a new one is made.

Doubtless many of the reasons behind the South African decisions had nothing to do with the political differences between the two governments. For instance, the South African Government insists that it needed the locomotives at a time when South African railways were under heavy pressure. Even more obviously, it is in South Africa's interests to change the terms of the preferential trade agreement, which favours Zimbabwe, for while Zimbabwe is allowed to place quotas on South African imports there is no reciprocal arrangement. Furthermore, some of the goods covered by the agreement — such as tobacco, furniture and textiles — directly compete with similar South African goods, and, in South African eyes, have an unfair advantage because of cheaper labour in Zimbabwe.

There are, therefore, a number of reasons for the decisions, but if, as Vorster and Botha had previously suggested, South Africa's emphasis is on building economic relations with neighbours despite political differences, some of the reasons look thin.

For instance, the recalled locomotives may have been of some value to South Africa but the situation was not critical, and in the scale of railway operations in the Republic they can only have had a marginal effect. If the South African Government were intent on co-operation, the economic reward would not seem worth the political tension and misunderstanding which was created.

Another example is the decision to withdraw work permits for Zimbabweans. This followed a speech in which one of the Zimbabwe ministers, Dr Nathan Shamuyarira, said that the Zimbabwe Government did not approve of their fellow countrymen working in the apartheid state. It is easy to understand the South African resentment at such a statement, but the response was very strong, and came despite clarification from Zimbabwe that while the government did not formally approve labour relations with the Republic it left to individuals the decision of whether or not to work there. In sharp retaliation the South African Government decided that the annual work permits would not be renewed for any Zimbabweans, unless they had been resident in South Africa before 1958. It was estimated that about 30 000 people would be affected by this decision. That response suggests that the South Africans were prepared to emphasise political differences at the expense of economic co-operation. They might argue that they were only exercising a "tit for tat" policy, but if they were, it was an economic "tit" (the withdrawal of the work permits) for a rhetorical "tat" (Shamuyarira's statement).

South Africa's attempts to use economic links as political levers was virtually admitted in Parliament by the Minister of Transport, Mr Hendrick Schoeman. In replying to questions about the withdrawal of the locomotives he said that before agreeing to their return the South African Government wanted to have direct talks with Zimbabwe ministers, not only about locomotives but about other matters such as the role of the ANC in Zimbabwe, and the dangers of allowing terrorist bases. Schoeman's mention of the need for direct talks with the Zimbabwe ministers is a persistent South African theme. The refusal of the Zimbabwe ministers to meet their South African counterparts — on the ground that this would represent a political recognition of the Republic, and anyway the relationship can be handled by officials — has angered the South Africans. They argue that in the end it is the political ministers and not the officials who run governments, and if the Zimbabwe Government wants to deal with South Africa it has to recognize that.

Why has South Africa adopted such a tough approach to Zimbabwe? One explanation is that, consciously or unconsciously, the South African Government has shifted its priorities in southern Africa, so that instead of trying to build a group of states bound together by economic interests its top priority is now to build fortress South Africa, ready for the total

onslaught.

The emphasis on security has increased following the collapse of the Portuguese empire and Ian Smith's Rhodesia, as the challenge of Black nationalism has come to lap directly against South Africa's own borders. With this change the old distinction between economic and political ties becomes insignificant, as does another of the old South African distinctions — that it would co-operate with other states but not interfere in their internal affairs. That claim can no longer be sustained following South Africa's military interventions in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia.

A second and related reason for the change in priorities is the postponement of hopes of building a southern African group of states. Although the South Africans have presented their aims in the subcontinent in terms of the primacy of economic relations these have always been linked to the political hope that a group of "moderate" Black states would emerge ready to adopt a passive role towards South Africa. If that hope is to succeed it requires a compliant Zimbabwe, and the South Africans believed they were about to achieve that with the return to power of Bishop Muzorewa. Mugabe's election victory frustrated that belief and, with communist governments in Mozambique and Angola, the South Africans had little choice but to withdraw into themselves. In consequence the South African Government, although keeping alive the broad hope of co-operation, gives less prominence to the concept of "a constellation of states", and when it is discussed it is usually confined to relations with the "independent homelands", and so is a matter more of domestic than foreign concern.

A third reason for the South Africans' tough line towards Zimbabwe is their inability or unwillingness to reconcile themselves to the political outcome of the struggle for Zimbabwe, and to amend their hostile image of Mugabe's Government. As noted above the outcome of the independence election came as a terrible blow — all the worse because the South African Government had played an active part in the diplomatic efforts leading to the Lancaster House Agreement. While the South Africans had confidently backed Bishop Muzorewa, they had portrayed Robert Mugabe as a Marxist terrorist whose victory would be the worst of all possible outcomes.

With such a firmly implanted image it is not surprising that White South Africans, both in the government and among the general public, have come to perceive Mugabe's Zimbabwe as a threat. The Minister of Police, Louis le Grange, has warned Zimbabwe that South Africa will hit back at any country that harbours terrorists. And he went on to say; "We are aware of the African nationalist terrorists in Zimbabwe . . . We are not prepared to co-operate with a country which harbours terrorist forces against the Republic and we will attack and destroy such bases".[9] The White public view is also hostile and suspicious. There is evidence that a high proportion of White South Africans, particularly supporters of the

National Party and to a lesser extent other groups, too, are inclined to believe that the Government of Zimbabwe constitutes a threat to South Africa's safety.[10]

The hostility and suspicion is reciprocated in Zimbabwe. Although there are no comparable opinion polls it is reasonable to assume that a similar hostile picture would emerge if the Blacks of Zimbabwe were asked to give their views of South Africa. Certainly such fears have been expressed by political leaders. In March 1982 when Robert Mugabe announced that all citizens would have to do military training, he said; "We have enemies in South Africa who are trying to destroy us. You never know when your enemy may strike".

While on their side South Africans believe that Zimbabwe may well be prepared to help the Black nationalist forces, the Zimbabweans suspect that the South Africans want to destabilize their country, and recent cases in which White members of the security and police services have been uncovered as South African agents reinforce that view. Further fuel for Zimbabwe's suspicions was provided by attacks on the supply lines through Mozambique by the Mozambique Resistance Movement, a guerrilla group which is said to be supported by the South Africans. The assumption is that South Africa wanted to demonstrate Zimbabwe's vulnerability and dependence on South Africa.

Also, regular reference is made in Zimbabwe to 5 000 Muzorewa supporters ("dissidents") who are said to be training in South Africa, ready to infiltrate into Zimbabwe. That may or may not be true but it reflects a state of mind, and decisions are made on what is believed to be true, not what is true.

The gulf of attitudes between the two sides is further reflected in their interpretations of the past and their predictions of the future.

Looking to the past there is a striking contrast in views of the Lancaster House Agreement which led to Zimbabwe's independence. In Zimbabwe ministers, such as Mr Edson Zvogbo, complain that the agreement is unfair to the Blacks because it entrenches unreasonable rights and privileges for the White minority, and they accuse the British Government of secretly inserting clauses in the agreement which further strengthened the White position.

Many Whites in South Africa have a very different view. They see Lancaster House as a betrayal. That is clear in attitudes to Lord Carrington who steered the Lancaster House Conference to agreement. Far from gaining prestige for that, he became a villain in the eyes of some White South Africans. When Carrington resigned as Foreign Secretary over the Falkland Island dispute, the leader in *The Citizen* newspaper was headlined "Good Riddance". It started by saying "Phew! What a relief. Lord Carry-on-Selling-the-White-man-down-the-River Carrington, the British Foreign Sec-

retary has resigned", and concluded, "To Lord Carrington we say: Good riddance. You deserve your comeuppance. The only pity is that it didn't come sooner".[11]

In predicting the future, both sides anticipate conflict and instability in the other state — the Zimbabweans assume that there will be a Black liberation struggle in South Africa, while the South Africans assume that Mugabe's Government is inherently unstable because of tribal rivalries and socialist policies coupled with administrative incompetence. Ministers in both countries express concern about a potential refugee problem that will arise for them when the conflict on the other side explodes.

One of the lessons that emerges from the discussion so far is that it is impossible to divorce political and economic relations. If you believe that you are supping with the devil, it will affect your appetite and the way you handle the meal. There is sure to be strain between a government that practises apartheid and one that has come to power in a liberation struggle to overthrow White minority rule.

The dual policy of contact with confrontation produces apparently contradictory attitudes, and the problem for those who are trying to make the distinction is that people on the other side have different perceptions. This is certainly a problem for the Zimbabwe Government, and the difficulty extends not only to the attittudes of the South African Government but also to businessmen.

As Zimbabwe was entering its third year of independence, Robert Mugabe made a speech which was plainly intended to reassure foreign investors and businessmen. He said that "Every investment, whether South African, American, or British which we find in the country is equally secure. Whatever investments South Africans have in this country is not prejudiced by the fact that it is from South Africa." Although Mr Mugabe made no mention of "nationalisation", he did speak of government "participation", but assured businessmen that the government had no plans for taking over management as it did not have the expertise or ability.

Yet even in a conciliatory speech Mr Mugabe could not avoid restating his government's position on issues which have caused concern to businessmen, however unreasonable that concern may be. Because of past fears, because his government still carries the "socialist" label, its every move is viewed with suspicion by those who are committed to the "free market". In the interview, Mr Mugabe mentioned the government's decisions to lay down a minimum wage and to introduce worker participation in management. "These", he said, "are some of the notions that frighten people who want a completely free situation where government has not got a regulating hand, otherwise we will be running an exploitive system and we don't intend to encourage exploitation in this country".[12].

Equally, the distinction that the Zimbabwe Government draws in its

support for the Black nationalist groups is not easily accepted by the South African Government. While the Zimbabwe ministers have repeatedly said that there will be no bases on Zimbabwe's soil, the South African Government also pays attention to satements such as those made by Mr Mugabe at the funeral of Mr Joe Gqabi, the ANC representative in Salisbury, who was assassinated. (There was suspicion in Zimbabwe that it had been done by South African agents.) At the funeral Mr Mugabe said that apartheid was an insane policy and those who adopt it must themselves be insane. He pledged the people of Zimbabwe to the common struggle with the ANC. Statements like that, visits to Zimbabwe by Mr Sam Njoma, the SWAPO President, and also by the Cuban Foreign Minister, and speeches by Zimbabwe ministers in which the Republic is branded as a racist, exploitive society whose days are numbered, have infuriated the South African Government and persuade them that Zimbabwe may well give active support to guerrilla groups.

Another lesson that can be drawn is that the tension between the two countries has obvious implications for the southern African subcontinent as a whole and could gain increasing international attention to become an area of potential global tension and rivalry. The South African Government never tires of emphasising the dangers of communist expansion, and doubtless that danger exists, but there is no agreement about the source of the danger. While South Africa sees it as an external threat, most Western states believe the danger lies mainly inside South Africa itself — in the government's racial policies and the threat of internal disorder that arises from that. Western attitudes are especially important in the case of Zimbabwe because the Western states have committed themselves to giving aid and support. This places Zimbabwe in a different category to Angola and Mozambique. In their case, when the hostility has flared into armed conflict with South Africa the Western response has been muted because it has few direct commitments, although the Eastern bloc has become involved. However, if there was direct conflict between South Africa and Zimbabwe the Western position would be very different, and it would be difficult to avoid involvement.

So far the dangers and difficulties of the Zimbabwe–South Africa relationship have been stressed, but the picture is far from one of complete antagonism. There is constant interaction between the two states, most of which is peaceful and mutually beneficial. There is the possibility that both governments will increasingly recognize the advantages of tolerating the other. In the early months of 1982 there were signs that this might be taking place, as Zimbabwe ministers usually avoided provocative speeches, and on the South African side the locomotives were returned and the trade agreement was extended while negotiations continued. However, if mutual tolerance is to grow there will have to be a revision of the image

each side has of the other. If this is to happen it will probably come from a calculation of hard-headed interest.

On the South African side, the first realization could be that it is strongly in the Republic's interests to have a stable Zimbabwe. A breakdown of order there would not only adversely affect the South African economy and the Republic's links with the rest of central Africa, but could also create the conditions for the penetration of guerrilla groups. A stable government in Zimbabwe will seek to avoid direct military confrontation with South Africa, because of the heavy cost, and Robert Mugabe offers the best hope of stability. However much he and his ministers dislike apartheid, they appreciate that their interests are served by avoiding conflict with the Republic.

A further hard-headed South African calculation would be to recognize that their faith in Muzorewa was misplaced. It was most improbable that after a bloody civil war "a moderate" would emerge as Zimbabwe's leader — a compliant pheonix arising from the ashes. Moreover if Muzorewa had succeeded, his power base may have been insecure, partly because of the difficulties he would have faced in dealing with the Patriotic Front's armies (ZANLA and ZIPRA), and also because personally he was not a strong or competent leader. Ironically, therefore, Mugabe turns out to be the best choice as leader from South Africa's point of view because he can offer the best chance of stability and of strong leadership.

If White South Africans are to change their image they will have to recognize the considerable achievements of the new Zimbabwe, and to abandon their reflex reaction of dismissing it as an inherently unstable state heading for economic ruin. Undoubtedly Zimbabwe faces major problems as the government tries to retain a vigorous economy while fulfilling its commitment to a more even distribution of goods and rewards.[13] It has made promises about the provision of social services and the redistribution of land, which are impractical. There is also the danger that the rapid growth of the public sector will lead to problems encountered in other Black states of nepotism, corruption and inefficiency, and the outward flow of skilled White workers is another worry. Yet, while recognizing such problems, the achievements of the new Zimbabwe Government are substantial. The rival armies have been successfully merged into a single national army, and while there are still bands of armed "dissidents" — offshoots from the old guerrilla armies — these are a relatively small problem when measured against the prospect of renewed civil war that could have confronted the new state. Also, and despite the split with Mr Joshua Nkomo, Mr Mugabe has achieved considerable political stability, and seems firmly in control without introducing the personality cult which is found in some Black states. That has been reinforced by his policy of reconciliation between the races. It is difficult to believe that two and a half

years ago a bitter and bloody civil war was being waged, in which up to 30 000 lives were lost. The healing of wounds has been a major achievement of the Zimbabwe Government.

On the economic side there is also much to admire, as well as obvious problems. Overall, the Zimbabwe economy is much stronger than that of other Black states, not only in the level of sophistication but in its relatively broad base — with important mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors. In the first two years of independence there was an impressive growth rate of 14 per cent and 8 per cent, and while there was a down turn in the mining industry which reflected the international recession, the manufacturing and agricultural sectors did well, with marked revivals in areas such as tobacco. The railway situation has improved with the arrival of American locomotives and Indian mechanics. Also the land resettlement scheme has got off to a reasonable start, although there will be future problems if the government attempts to implement its undertaking to settle 160 000 families in two years.

Looking to the future, it would be advantageous for both South Africa and Zimbabwe to build on Zimbabwe's economic strength, but if that is to happen it will need continued co-operation — the supping with the devil will have to go on. One of the dangers for Zimbabwe is that the South African gloomy predictions will become self fulfilling, and in this respect the attitude of businessmen is as important as that of the government. Zimbabwe will face a serious economic position if business confidence collapses, and that confidence is fragile. For instance, the mining companies are deeply suspicious of the government's proposed mineral marketing board. The government protests that the fears are unfounded, but if, for good or poor reasons, the companies lose confidence the important mining sector could go into decline. Mr Mugabe has the delicate task of balancing on the one hand White fears, and on the other Black expectations and his government's commitment to a more equal society. In doing that he walks a tightrope. The tightrope will, however, be more difficult to walk if the relationship with South Africa deteriorates further, for not only will it increase the political problems but also the task of reconciliation between the races in Zimbabwe.

What of Zimbabwe's future attitude to the liberation struggle in South Africa? The commitment is likely to remain and so will the tension with the South African Government. It seems unlikely that Mugabe's Government will be prepared to abandon its political hostility or to establish contacts at a ministerial level, despite the continuing economic dependence. It also seems most unlikely (unless there is a break down of order in South Africa) that the Zimbabwe Government will allow guerrilla bases to be established in its country because of the fear of South African reprisals and the local instability that is created by such bases.

Accepting that limitation, Zimbabwe's greatest contribution to change in South Africa could be to demonstrate that a Black government has the ability to run a country with a flourishing economy and with racial tolerance The achievement of internal objectives by the Mugabe Government could therefore become its greatest contribution to change and reform in South Africa

Notes

1 *Rand Daily Mail*, (Johannesburg) 13 10 1981
2 Figures drawn from article by Larry Bowman, Michael Bratten, and Rukudzo Murapa "Zimbabwe and South Africa Dependency, Destabilization and Liberation" to be published in Thomas Callaghy (Ed) *South Africa in Southern Africa* (N Y Praeger 1982)
3 *Zimbabwe Digest of Statistics* (Zimbabwe Government Printer) December 1981
4 See David Wield "Manufacturing Industry' in Colin Stoneman (Ed) *Zimbabwe s Inheritance* (Macmillan 1981)
5 Bowman *et al* op cit
6 See Gavin Maasdorp *New Economic Groupings in Southern Africa the PTA and the SADCC* (Economic Research Unit, University of Natal)
7 *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg) 19 4 1981
8 *Star* (Johannesburg) 9 6 1981
9 *Star* (Johannesburg) 9 5 1981
10 Unpublished opinion poll conducted on behalf of the South African Institute of International Affairs in early 1982
11 *The Citizen* (Johannesburg) 6 4 1982
12 *The Cape Times* (Cape Town) 20 4 1982
13 See Colin Stoneman (Ed) *Zimbabwe s Inheritance* (Macmillan 1981)

George H. Wittman

Political and military background for France's intervention capability

"As far as France is concerned, there are two points, at least, on which the treaty (of the North Atlantic) must be revised. . . . What are these two essential points for France? The first, I have indicated to you, is the limitation of the alliance to only the zone of Europe. We consider that, at least among the world powers of the West, there must be a certain organization, from the point of view of the Alliance with respect to their political behaviour, and eventually their strategic behaviour, outside of Europe. *Particularly in the Middle East and in Africa* where the three powers are constantly involved. Moreover, if there is not agreement among the principal participants of the Atlantic Alliance toward other countries outside of Europe, how will it be possible, indefinitely, to maintain the Alliance in Europe? This must be remedied."

This statement which speaks so clearly for itself was made by Charles de Gaulle in September 1960. Its appropriateness to today is as obvious as is its clarity. What is particularly important to realize is that the politics — and economics — of Africa and the Middle East were seen as essential elements of Alliance interests by that most independent of French leaders rather than the oft held view in the United States that French strategic thinking in respect to these regions was simply competitive or parochial, and usually both. This is not to say that such factors have not existed. They have — sometimes to a degree of extraordinary pettiness nurtured by even less attractive aspects of commercial avarice and national chauvinism. But this has been true also of Britain and the United States in one or another context. The interpretation of De Gaulle's statement can certainly

be debated in terms of division of spheres of influence, joint assumption of politico-military responsibility or some combination of both. Yet, undeniably, there is the message of concern about and commitment to the strategic value of the Middle East and Africa.

When the socialist government of Francois Mitterand came to power in the summer of 1981, there were many who expected considerable change in France's Middle East and African policies. Shifts of emphasis have indeed occurred. However, in the essential aspects of security relations the same concern and commitment that is implicit in the De Gaulle view still drives French policy today and continues to underpin its regional military role. It is the historical evolution of France's political involvement — most particularly in respect to its African presence — that holds the key to understanding not only French perception of its military commitment to the point of obligation but also the acceptance of this French military perception by former colonies.

Continuity marks the history of France's African policy from the Third Republic's colonial period to independence granted under the Fifth Republic in 1960. Briefly, the milestones of this evolution are: (1) the Brazzaville Conference of 1944 generally broadening representation of overseas people, (2) the 1956 Loi-Cadre which established territorial assemblies, (3) the referendum imposed by De Gaulle in 1958 on a constitution for a "French Community", and (4) independence in 1960 which was made viable by bilateral co-operation agreements with each newly independent country.

There was a remarkable progression under three different political regimes: the provisional regime where all power was concentrated under General de Gaulle, a parliamentary regime marked by the predominance of an assembly with ever-changing majorities, and finally, a regime that gave primacy to the executive. The first of these regimes clearly laid the groundwork in French African policy, the second implemented it by establishing the legal equality of all people in the French Union, and the third legitimized the equality of the states of the Union, by granting full independence.

Typically, under colonial rule the vast majority of *indigenes* had no political rights or role. However, the Constitution of 1946 extended representation in the French parliament to all native people in overseas lands. The government sought to create a new type of interracial democratic community, to be called *Union Francaise*. The preamble to the constitution stated that "France shall form with the peoples of her overseas territories a union based upon equality of rights and privileges, without distinction as to race or religion". Considerable emphasis was placed upon the formative role of native representation. Thus new African leaders were trained in modern government through direct participation in the political life of metropol-

itan France, a practice unique in Western parliamentary institutions. This has been of inestimable value in drawing the later independent African states and their leaders close to France. The lessons have been passed on through later generations.

Before World War II French colonies were grouped into two administrative units, the Federation of West Africa (AOF), formed in 1904, and the Federation of Equatorial Africa (AEF), formed in 1910. In neither instance was the federation based on an ethnic, tribal or political pre-colonial unity of the area. French conquest for the most part ignored or destroyed the pre-existing structures. The federations were basically an administrative convenience. They enabled France to oversee the regions in the most economic manner while satisfying French commitment to centralized government. The constitutional forms under which AOF and AEF were administered were virtually identical. At the head was a Governor General residing in Dakar (AOF) and Brazzaville (AEF). In his office rested control of all local civilian, judicial and military services. The Governor General reported to the Minister of Colonies in Paris. Empowered to intervene at any level, the Governor General was advised by a Council appointed by him. Theoretically this Council could include well-educated Africans (evolués). In fact, the highly centralized system worked for the careful exclusion of virtually all Africans from the government process.

The 1946 Constitution was the first legal alteration of this formula. Each territory gained an assembly with limited legislative powers and the right to make recommendations to the Governor General. Executive power, however, remained with the Governor.

The first major step towards self-government was the Loi-Cadre of 1956. Gaston Defferre, the current Minister of Interior in today's French Government, was Minister of Overseas Territories in the Mollet government at the time. The Loi-Cadre empowered the French government to implement measures which would lead to decentralization in the territories so that the population would be more closely involved in management of their own affairs. It was Defferre's interest in decentralization which drove this policy change. It is worth while to note that when the British introduced reforms in regions under their rule, they did so for each colony individually. There was no overall plan imposed simultaneously. Most administrators at the time believed the Loi-Cadre was necessary to prevent a secessionist movement such as the one started in Algeria, and the one which had succeeded in Indochina. It had become increasingly difficult for the French to enforce their rule and the Loi-Cadre conveniently shifted responsibility to African politicians. Mitterand, who was at that time Minister of Justice, had warned that only a federation with a "fraternal and egalitarian community" would preserve French power from "the plains of Flanders to the forests of Equatorial Africa".

The special interest that the current Mitterand Government has in Third World affairs and most particularly Africa has its genesis in these earlier official and personal involvements. It is important to note that the same ties that De Gaulle later referred to in 1960 between the security of Europe with Africa (and the Middle East), Mitterand and Defferre also had recognized and indeed acted upon earlier. The credentials as "participators" rather than mere polemicists of today's French government leaders are well established where it counts — in Africa. It makes the Mitterand Government commitment to "actions extérieures" that much more credible and effective in political terms.

The questions of the relations among the territories of AOF and AEF and the ties between these and France were the major political issues at the heart of the debate of the Loi-Cadre. With the exception of the Black African party, Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA), there was virtually no call for independence before 1958.

The 1958 Constitution led to the abolition of AOF and AEF; each territory was linked directly to the French Community, as the former Union came to be called. Control over key areas of foreign affairs, defence and fiscal policy remained in the hands of the Community. When a referendum on this constitution was held in October 1958, the option was offered of becoming independent by rejecting the constitution or of voting for it and becoming a member of the Community. It was quite clear, however, that voting for independence would deprive the territory of any French aid. When Guinea alone voted negatively, the French withdrew all their personnel, aid and whatever equipment that could be shipped. The East Germans quickly moved in, and all sides suffered from "the example". With the Algerian war escalating and growing demands for independence throughout Africa, the constitution of the Community was rapidly overtaken and all territories except for French Somaliland (Djibouti) became independent in 1960. The constitutional links between France and her African overseas territories were replaced by contractual *accords de cooperation* which each signed at the time of independence. In essence, they provided for co-operation across the board in matters of foreign policy, defence, finance and education.

For the French administrators independence meant an end to the careers in the former colonies. The Corps of Overseas Administrators was abolished in 1959. But the French in Africa remained to a large extent and, in fact, were reinforced by former residents of Algeria and Indochina. The British colonial service administrators, at independence, had to decide whether they wanted to retire under a lump-sum scheme, or, if offered the opportunity, to become part of the new state's civil service. Given these alternatives, most British officials departed. French officials could reserve the right to be integrated in the metropolitan civil service, while serving

for an indefinite period in former overseas territories on "detached service". Such an arrangement encouraged hundreds of administrators to stay in Africa continuing to play important roles in the central administration of the new states. The new states found it convenient to employ other French ex-colonial officials whose salaries were then carried by the French technical assistance budget. In former British territories some colonial officers were retained but it was at far greater cost to the new states. The French civilian administrative and commercial presence thus remained a powerful post-independence factor and a "natural" parallel to French military commitment.

It would be naïve to overlook the advantage to the newly independent governments of the close military tie that was maintained with France. Whether or not a substantial French Army presence was stationed in a given country, the potential of their involvement upon request of the government in power acted then (as it continues to act today) as an important source of internal political security. With three to four hundred thousand French citizens currently residing in former French Africa, the potential of this involvement serves well the interests of both sides.

Throughout the post-independence period the French military presence remained relatively unchallenged. Slowly, and not without pain, the military adapted to their altered role. The revamping of the French Army after the Algerian war, separating it from active involvement in political decisions, professionalized and, in the true sense of the word, modernized the French military planning and operational objective in the former colonies. Traumatic as the Algerian experience was, the French Army must be credited with an excellent command and tactical reformation and an equally valuable reformation of spirit. Again, it should be noted that co-operative agreements with key African countries as well as clear-cut acceptance of the French security umbrella among former colonial territories gave necessary structure to contemporary political/military aims of France.

The French military presence overseas is in several forms:

The first are the *forces de souveraineté*. These units are stationed in France's overseas departments and overseas territories — DOM-TOM for short — located under four commands: The Antilles/Guyana, Polynesia (including nuclear testing grounds), New Caledonia and Indian Ocean (Reunion and Mayotte). A total of approximately 18 000 men comprise these land, sea and air forces.

The second are the *forces de présence*. These units are stationed permanently in countries with which France has specific defence co-operation agreements, e.g., Gabon, Djibouti, Senegal, Ivory Coast. These forces have a total complement of approximately 5 700 men.

The third are the *forces d'assistance rapide*. Headquartered in metroplitan France these units can be air and sea lifted on temporary operations, as was

the case in Zaïre, Chad, Central African Republic, etc. Additionally, these forces are available for special assignment as with the United Nations in Lebanon and with the proposed multi-national peace-keeping force in the Sinai. Although dedicated primarily to external operations, the units in this force also carry secondary missions in support of France's own territorial defence. In total, the three principal ground force elements of the 11th Para Division, 9th Marine Infantry Division and 31st Half Brigade which constitute this force number approximately 21 000 men.

The basic authorization for military actions external to France appears to rest currently on a political document, the preamble to the law of 19th June 1976, which implemented the military planning for the years 1977–1982. It stipulates that the forces should be able to contribute to the security of countries with which France has political, military or economic accords. The breadth of this wording gives rather substantial leeway for application. Another source for using the intervention forces can be found in the general instructions for the use of armed forces as approved by the Chief of Staff of French armies on 12th January 1979: "Overseas, armed forces must be able to support the government's decisions in pursuing its policies, the defense of the national interest, the prevention and settlement of crises or conflicts in which France may be directly or indirectly involved". Specific areas for possible intervention include the Mediterranean Basin, the overseas department and territories (DOM-TOM), vital maritime communication lines, and countries with which France has defence accords of co-operation.

It is the ". . . prevention and settlement of crises or conflicts in which France may be directly or indirectly involved" that allows the broadest possible interpretation of mission. Whereas in practice there is generally a commitment to responding only to a bona fide request for intervention by an "authorized government official" (head of host government or head of state), there is also the perception that certain extreme cases can be acted upon when no such clear request has been made. Those attempting an overthrow of a pro-French government in a country of "strategic" importance to France might not be able to count on the French military waiting patiently for a properly formed request by a government under siege. A pragmatic application of the principle of "danger to lives and property of French citizens, political concerns or strategic interests" could be expected to be put into effect.

In spite of an acute awareness of the concerns of the Third World in general and Africa in particular, the new socialist government of Francois Mitterand shows every sign of continuing the basic policy and theory of involvement in respect to external actions that existed before. This government is as concerned with the security of Africa as were previous ones, and for basically all the same reasons. The continuation of the legendary

"Monsieur Para", General Lacaze, as Chief of Staff of the Armies has been indication enough for most observers that France under Mitterand remains equally serious in its commitment to the security of the region and French interests therein.

The character of the French military relationship with its civilian government leadership combined with pragmatic experience over the last two decades has been responsible for a broad but clear elucidation of line of command and decision in respect to *actions extérieures*. This was succinctly put by General Jacques Servranckx (*Défense Nationale,* "Les actions récentes de la France en Afrique", November 1980). He states that a specific action of this type is initiated by the President who takes the decision to proceed; the Chief of Staff of the Armies details, organizes and directs the project; the operational commander executes the mission.

Obviously the Chief of Staff of the Armies is in the pivotal position as it is he and his staff who act as the "junction of the political and military domains", as General Servranckx puts it. However, it is equally clear that there is *a priori* responsibility of the President both to the government and the military. In respect to the former there must be a careful evaluation of risk, extent and timing of the action. In the latter instance, the mission must be properly defined so as to clearly set forth objectives along with political and diplomatic limitations. This is essential as a guide to the Chief of Staff in terms of his subsequent responsibilities in organization and targeting. And it goes without saying that without a well-defined and orderly evolution of these first two elements of the operational triad, the field commander has little chance of successfully executing the mission.

If the foregoing appears merely belabouring the obvious, one need only review the history of the American *action extérieure* in Iran. This was a lesson not only for the United States but one which the French are well aware must be repeatedly kept in the foreground of consideration and preparation of their own future external actions. The character of these special actions is correctly referred to by General Servranckx as having to have several characteristics to ensure success; quick reaction, secrecy and surprise in development and performance, and measured use of force appropriate to the political/military requirements of the mission.

The theory and doctrine is clear, but what of the complex elements of application?

As we have seen, the French *forces d'assistance rapide* have extensive roots politically, legally and in a certain sense culturally in Africa. The combination of permanently stationed units and the mutually accepted ready availability of crack units that can be air and sea lifted from France is in fact an integral part of the security structure for a large number of African nations. This is not a massive presence. On the contrary, the units are designed and trained to operate in especially small numbers. A company of

150 soldiers is considered a substantial force that is often broken down into smaller components capable of operating on their own in garrison or on mission for protracted periods. The "major" operation in Shaba Province in Zaïre in 1978 was handled by an augmented parachute battalion which, including support elements, totalled less than 800 men. Yet these are regular units of the French Army not "special forces" *per se*. True, there is a built-in intelligence structure applicable to African military operations. But in no sense are these solely African-oriented units.

The administrative structure of the agreements with the four nations with which France has separate defence accords allows for a permanent stationing of *forces de présence*. Their role with the host government is defined by the overall agreement. This runs from the fairly restricted role in Djibouti (not for use in internal law and order, not as a base of support for armed intervention externally, only to be used in defence of territory as a result of external invasion) — to Gabon where virtual total freedom of movement is made quite explicit.

In fact, it is the administrative and operational diversity that constitutes an essential strength of French overseas military force capability. Able to operate in distinctive small units appropriate to the needs of the given country and specific mission therein, areas of possible friction and misunderstanding with the host governments is minimalized. Obviously the fact that most of these nations own military forces are primarily French-equipped and trained in the French tradition acts as an advantage. The discipline of the permanently assigned forces (*les forces de présence*) is reportedly quite good — as it would have to be to remain politically acceptable to the host governments. Local problems naturally arise, but these are well within manageable limits.

The willingness to accept the responsibility of what is clearly a "military partnership" with a broad range of developing nations, particularly in Africa, is driven in part by the ability to adequately assume that responsibility. One element clearly influences the other. The political desire is accomplishable because of the military capability — and vice versa. This is a lesson for the United States in its own professed willingness to assume security responsibilities in the Persian Gulf, for instance. Along with application of the reminder of "wishing will not make it so" is an additional adage that is appropriate to learning from French military operations outside their own country — "experience counts". Since June 1976 French *forces d'assistance rapide* have taken on operational missions in six African countries — sometimes several times. These do not even include various instances where elements of permanently stationed *forces de présence* have manoeuvred for security purposes within the confines of host nation borders. The fact is that the French know well how to back up their overseas political commitment with military capability because they've done it —

often. This factor of experience is of inestimable value for both the military and political components of France's external security structure. It is an area in which the United States is at a disadvantage in Africa and the Middle East.

Of equal importance is the need to recognize that the areas in which French intervention have been and continue to be most likely are ones in which there is usually a shared history, including an all important *lingua franca*. Thus, whereas the United States can seek to learn from certain operational and command methodologies of French forces, the reality of *actions assistance extérieures* as military and political efforts places the French experience to an important extent in a unique context.

However, the French have needs also. They are not totally self-sufficient in international political and diplomatic leverage. There are many areas of the world — and the Persian Gulf is one of them — in which France's military operational capability is severely limited, yet their strategic dependence on a free flow of oil is a matter of national security. Domestic economics as well as limited availability of men and material plays an important role in restricting French capabilities — as they do the United States. The diversity of mutual interests are most apparent in the African context. The United States, with few assets able to influence events in Chad, is nonetheless extremely desirous of blocking Libyan expansion. French capabilities fit this bill well. On a more complex strategic plane Namibia represents a political military issue in which the new perception of French acceptance as a stalwart of the Third World and the United States' closer relationship with South Africa can be combined to bridge the separate camps in the tortuous development of Namibian independence.

There are shared interests, some clear, some evolving and some to be expected though as yet unencountered. It is the nature of the relationship between the United States and France — friends in arms as we have been reminded recently for two hundred years! Independence of policy is in fact a cornerstone of both nations' ultimate security conception. But now even more than in the past the breadth of political and military problems we face around the world is a threat to our mutual security. Whether the terminology be co-operation, co-ordination or consultation of and on political military objectives — whether detailed planning for contingencies should be reinforced with dedication of men and material to each other before instances of crisis — the admonition by De Gaulle in 1960 still holds. It is not possible to delimit the strategic interests of France and the United States to Europe. "There must be a certain organization, from the point of view of the alliance with respect to their political behaviour, and eventually their strategic behaviour, outside of Europe. Particularly in the Middle East and in Africa".

Michael R. Sinclair

The proposals of the constitutional committee of the President's Council

The imperative for constitutional reform in South Africa and the perceived inadequacy of the so-called Westminster system in providing for political development and stability in South Africa was first officially raised in 1975 by the Theron Commission of Inquiry into matters relating to the Coloured population group. In the political context, the Theron Commission found that the now defunct Coloured People's Representative Council (CRC) was discredited and lacked any political legitimacy within the Coloured Community. The Commission circumspectly recommended the restoration of the Coloured vote in the central Parliament, but acknowledged that a new constitutional dispensation might be necessary to achieve this. A Government White Paper on the recommendations of the Theron Commission subsequently spurned most of the Commission's advice.

Nevertheless, the Theron Commission, I believe, is a watershed in the political history of this country, since it set in train the debate on constitutional reform and a process of consultation for a more just and viable social, economic and political dispensation. The debate among the Afrikaner political and intellectual elite on political reform was sharply focused by the riots of 1976 and the publication in 1977, by the Nationalist Party, of a constitutional blueprint intended to bring the Coloured and Indian people into the central decision-making process.

The 1977 National Party constitutional plan proposed three separate Parliaments for White, Coloured and Indian people. The White Parliament would transfer all matters which specifically concerned Coloured people and Indians to their respective Parliaments. Each of these population groups would have its own Prime Minister and Cabinet. The ratio suggested was 17 Ministers for the 185 member White Parliament, five Ministers for the 92 member Coloured Parliament and three for the 46 member Indian Parliament.

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A further proposal put forward a Council of Cabinets consisting of the three Prime Ministers, six White Ministers, three Coloured Ministers and two Indian Ministers. The Council of Cabinets would deal with matters of common concern. This Council of Cabinets, which was clearly intended to be the central decision making body, was to be headed by an Executive President. The President would be elected by an electoral college made up of 50 White, 25 Coloured and 13 Indian members of Parliament.

Lastly, the proposals made provision for a non-parliamentary President's Council which would advise the Council of Cabinets on matters of common concern. The President's Council, it was proposed, should consist of 20 members elected by the White Parliament, 10 by the Coloured Parliament and 20 appointed by the President.

This plan was endorsed by the provincial congresses (the main party policy making institution) of the National Party and subsequently formed one of the main planks in the party's election platform which saw the National Party gain its biggest majority in Parliament ever. (It is indeed ironic that this plan should appear to be the main point of dispute between the National Party and the splinter Conservative Party.)

In April 1979, these constitutional proposals were embodied in a Bill for a new Constitution and laid before Parliament. However, before the Bill was read for the first time, it was referred to a Joint Select Committee of Parliament for further consideration, and to allow "adequate time and opportunity for representations". In July 1979, the Select Committee was converted into a Commission of Inquiry into the Constitution, under the chairmanship of Alwyn Schlebusch, then Minister of Justice and the Interior. (All parties represented in Parliament served on this Commission which reviewed a considerable volume of evidence.)

The Schlebusch Commission laid an Interim Report before Parliament in May 1980 and recommended: the abolition of the Senate; the introduction of an additional 20 members of the Assembly appointed by the State President on a proportional basis; the creation of a new office of Vice-State President; the establishment of an advisory body composed of black South African citizens (this recommendation was accepted and embodied in section 106 (4) (b) of the Constitution Act (No. 32 of 1961) but was not implemented); and lastly, the Schlebusch Commission recommended the establishment of the President's Council.

. The President's Council, in the words of the Schlebusch Commission, would be an advisory body composed of nationally-acknowledged experts in their respective disciplines drawn from the White, Coloured, Indian and Chinese communities and persons recognised as leaders by their respective communities.

The institution of the President's Council took place on the 3rd February 1981 and now, less than sixteen months later, the Constitutional

Committee of the President's Council has made its first recommendations to government.

Turning to the reports of the Constitutional Committee, I shall look first at the report on government at the national level and then at the proposals on local and regional management systems, although the two are obviously completely inter-related.

Clearly there are two dimensions to constitution-making — first, a philosophical dimension, and secondly, a structural dimension. A constitution is a set of principles and technical regulations, encompassing, and largely determined by, the values of the society it is designed to govern. Thus the formal constitutional framework of a state ought to reflect the aggregate of values, interests and motivating premises of the society concerned.

The Constitutional Committee has recognised this fact, and presents its recommendations for the constitutional restructuring of the South African polity through the weighing of alternatives and the drawing of conclusions in the light of specific premises or assumptions. On this basis the Constitutional Committee identifies eight broad assumptions which constitute the parameters or framework within which the evidence before the Committee was weighed and the proposals formulated.

Firstly, the Committee stresses the need to eliminate and obviate group or segmental domination. While the salience of this point is more or less self-evident, it is useful to quote the Committee's motivation for the normative premises adopted; "The normative premises adopted by the Committee pre-suppose the establishment of a system of government which is broadly representative of, and accountable to, the communities it is intended to serve: in a nutshell, a democratic system. The Committee's commitment in this regard applies to all levels of government in the new constitutional order. However, as the Committee has come to appreciate, positing a democratic system as a goal is one thing; realising it in South Africa's particular circumstances is something else . . ."[1]

Secondly, the Committee expresses its opposition to discrimination in all its forms. In the constitutional context, it states that whatever governmental forms it may recommend, and however inclusive in their application they may be, these forms should satisfy the requirement of equal civil and political rights. This means that in respect of the groups which, initially at least (in the view of the Committee), should participate at the level of central government — the Whites, Coloureds and Indians — there should be fully equal treatment. (It may be noted that members of the Committee have subsequently claimed that the "door has not been closed" on the participation of urban Blacks in central government at some future stage.)

Thirdly, the Committee stresses the necessity for political development,

as judged by such values as democracy, liberty, justice, prosperity, equality of opportunity, security, efficiency, self-respect and the protection of identity and culture. The Committee emphasizes the need to increase the degree of democratization in South Africa as measured by; (a) the inclusiveness of the franchise, and (b) the extent of freedom of opposition. The Committee argues that the inclusiveness of the franchise matters in respect of the degree of democratization only in so far as, and to the extent that, freedom of opposition exists. (For example, universal suffrage exists in the Soviet Union, but not democracy in its Western sense.)

In the fourth place, the Committee makes the point that its proposals must be premised by the "plural" (heterogeneous/multi-ethnic) character of our society. It argues that failure to adapt their proposals to these realities would not be conducive to political stability.

Fifthly, the Committee argues that its proposals assume the need for strong central government, since "strong" government is necessary to make possible both order and progress. (It is interesting that the Committee has opted for the use of the word "strong" and not stable in this context.) Furthermore, in an almost contradictory fashion, the Committee declares itself in favour of limited government, but argues that "limited government" is compatible with strong government, since a government (in the words of the Report) may be strong without being "widely interventionist".

Sixthly, the Committee accepts the need for constitutional mechanisms which will effectively protect group as well as individual rights. This, I think, is made clear by the foregoing assumptions and specifically the Committee's rejection of majoritarianism.

In the seventh place, the Committee assumes that a single political system which included all groups, whether on a simple majoritarian or an all-embracing consociational basis, could not function as a successful democracy in foreseeable circumstances. This point is later qualified in so far as it is stated that if the consociational model were to operate successfully in the context of the White, Coloured and Indian communities, if in particular it were to bring about a more democratic political system, then "other possibilities might present themselves".[2] However, the Committee observes, that a single political system which included permanent Blacks could not function as a successful democracy in foreseeable circumstances and suggests that this ". . . has little to do with differences of colour as such and much to do with cultural differences, relative numbers, conflicting interests and divergent political objectives."[3]

Finally, the Committee assumes that a single political system in South Africa which included Coloureds and Indians on an equal basis with Whites could function successfully as a consociational democracy. Consociational democracy refers to the system evolved in certain highly plural societies

(e.g. the Netherlands, Austria and until a few years ago the Lebanon) in which the segmental or group nature of the society is recognised, the leadership elites and the various groups are consciously involved in decision-making, and certain techniques (notably vetoes, depolitization, proportionality and coalitions) are used to regulate potential group conflict. The theory of consociational democracy has been developed in opposition to the orthodox majoritarian "winner takes all" model.

In the theoretical concept of consociationalism, most commonly associated with Arend Lijphart, there are four key features: (a) all significant segments of a society co-operate in government; (b) each segment of the coalition government has a right of veto when its own vital interests are threatened; (c) power is distributed or "shared" on a proportional basis; and (d) purposive depoliticization through the devolution of political authority and responsibility to the parochial or local levels. Clearly, the essence of consociationalism is government by compromise and consensus between all major groups to what Lijphart calls the "grand coalition".

Lijphart has subsequently suggested that the Constitutional Committee's notion of consociationalism is a travesty of his conception of the theory, most specifically since the majority Black sector of the South African political community is excluded from the so-called consociational dispensation. Clearly implicit in the classic theory of consociationalism is the collaboration of all groups in the society, in the process of government. Furthermore, consociationalism assumes a socialization process in which all societal groups develop sufficient common ground to make their collaboration in government feasible, while simultaneously maintaining group autonomy. This situation clearly does not pertain in South Africa, and besides the fact that the Constitutional Committee (both in its constitution and recommendations) perpetuates the South African penchant for the arbitrary institution of political structures on South African society, its disregard for the social preconditions for consociationalism, as well as Black opinion, must indeed render questionable the use of the term "consociationalism" in the context of its report.

Turning to the structural aspects of constitution making, the Committee on the basis of the above premises, considered six options: simple majoritarianism in a single state ("one-man-one-vote") — the Committee rejected this option on the grounds of their rejection of group domination. It was argued that a majoritarian system, regardless of the constitutional fetters and regardless of whether the state was unitary or federal, would lead to Black domination.

Secondly, the Committee dismissed the idea of radical partition, which would imply the creation of independent homelands for the Coloured and Indian communities, in addition to the Black "national states". The premise underlying the Committee's rejection of this option is apparently the

Committee's commitment to increasing the degree of democratization in South Africa.

Thirdly, the Committee does not recommend a continuation of the policy of national states for Africans and one person, one vote for Coloureds, Indians and Whites. (That is to say, a simple majoritarian system for these three groups, implying a common voters' role and multi-racial political parties.) However, it is the latter aspect which finds disfavour with the Committee, since the Committee goes to some lengths in stating its support for the policy of separate national states. This stand is premised by the need to minimise group domination and inter-group conflict, the need to promote the conditions of self-respect by avoiding both Black and White domination, and the need to safeguard the culture and identity of individuals and groups.

Option four found favour with the Committee, namely, "multiple partition" and consociational democracy for Whites, Coloureds and Indians, i.e. the notion of "segmental autonomy". This implies that all groups — African, Coloured, Indian and White retain their group/ethnic autonomy; the Africans in the national states and the Coloured, Indian and White groups in a single political system. It is this option which underlies the recommendations of the Committee.

The fifth option of an all embracing consociational system (including Blacks) was considered by the Committee as unlikely to operate as a democracy and therefore dismissed. In the sixth place, the Committee rejected the option of a continuation of the policy of separate Black national states together with a consociational or majoritarian (one-man-one-vote) dispensation for Blacks outside the national states, Coloureds, Indians and Whites.

Government, according to the proposals, ought to be headed by an Executive President (initially to be elected by the present Assembly) for a term of seven years. The formal functions envisaged for the President include appointing the Premier (or Prime Minister) and in consultation with the Premier appointing members of the Cabinet, dissolving Parliament, holding referendums, and in conjunction with the Cabinet, initiating legislation. In the Committee's view, members of the Cabinet should not simultaneously be members of the legislative body. However, except for the fact that they will not be allowed to vote, the premier, ministers and deputy ministers could be expected to participate in the deliberations of the legislative, exactly as they do at present.

It is these specific aspects of the proposals which have drawn most fire from the Committee's critics. One must acknowledge two points though: firstly, that the Committee's report (by its own admission) is incomplete; and secondly, that if reform in South Africa is to be successfully implemented in the face of the very considerable odds then, indeed, a strong po-

litical leader is necessary. However, whether an executive presidency will in itself help to resolve the underlying and deeply entrenched conflicts in South Africa is open to serious dispute. Given South Africa's tradition of entrenched political leadership, working for the preservation and consolidation of political power, as well as the merger of party, state and national interest and the inseparable identification of all three with Afrikanerdom, the apparent failure of the Committee to insist upon closely prescribed checks and balances to curb the power of the President is indeed an understandable cause for concern.

Criteria against which "responsible", Western-style Presidencies are measured include direct participation by the mass of the electorate in the choice of candidate for executive office, a restriction on the length of time any one person may hold office, and a network of legislative and judicial checks on executive power. For members of the Constitutional Committee to claim, *post facto*, that they did not foresee the necessity of allaying fears of the inherent dictatorial potential in their proposal, when measured against South African political reality, is an astounding revelation which flies in the face of several motivating premises, not least the value ascribed to "democracy, liberty and justice".

Essentially the criticism of this proposal stems from the fact that the Executive (i.e. both President and Cabinet) would not be responsible to the electorate. One assumes that the legislature would be able to pass a vote of no confidence in any member of the Cabinet and that the legislature could actually decline to pass the budget. But, as it stands, it appears as though the President has the power to dissolve the legislature as and when he sees fit, which is bound to be seen to imply that if the legislature should adopt an attitude contrary to the President's will, the President may dissolve the legislature and call new elections in the hope of having the electorate return a more favourably disposed legislature. At worst, the Executive could rule without the consent of the legislature if a situation of prolonged political crisis occurred.

Nevertheless, I think one must accept the Committee's motives in proposing an extra-parliamentary executive precisely in the spirit which it is put: "The Committee has answered the need for reform by proposing a non-parliamentary executive headed by a president; and it has answered the needs of the poly-ethnicity of the society by insisting that the president be elected in such a way as to encourage him to be supra-ethnic, because true to the *leitmotiv* of the state, he should govern in the general interest and not in pursuit of sectional interests."[4] The reality, however, as the Committee ought to have recognised, may be somewhat different.

Turning to the legislative body, the Committee proposes a single chamber (unicameral) legislature in which the White, Coloured and Indian electorate is represented, structured on the principal of "segmental auton-

omy". In other words, representation in Parliament should be on a group basis, as opposed to cross-cutting, intra-communal party-political representation. While it is suggested that special provision be made for matters essentially of interest to a particular community, the successful functioning of the legislature will depend on the degree to which the political leaders of all three communities are able to achieve a consensus. (This is fundamental to the notion of consociationalism.)

The Committee does not specify the exact ratio of proportional group representation, but clearly the White group will be overwhelmingly dominant. The legislature, therefore, will necessarily function on the basis of issue alliances forged across party lines. Thus, for example, the PFP representatives within the White group (should this party collaborate in the implementation of the new system) would need to forge alliances with, say, the Coloured Labour Party and/or one or more of the Indian political parties represented in Parliament in opposing or advancing a particular issue in Parliament. One could envisage a situation where the Coloured and Indian groups are unanimous on a specific issue and in alliance with, say, the PFP representatives in the White group could defeat the predominant sector of the White group.

The Committee's concern for "segmental autonomy" would seem to indicate a preference for racially separate voters' rolls, but this is left undefined. So too, the legislative process has been left undefined, but clearly the power of Parliament, as the organ of government directly elected by, and directly answerable to the electorate, has been greatly reduced. This pattern is in keeping with general theories for political development which acknowledge two parallel developments in a process of political reform: first, the concentration of power in the hands of the executive; and secondly, a devolution of power and authority to the local level, or the so-called second and third tier of government.

The Constitutional Committee's proposals for government on the second and third level are contained in the Joint Report (with the Committee for Economic Affairs) on Local and Regional Management Systems. The overriding objective of the recommendations contained in this report is maximum devolution of power to local and regional authorities. To define the exact relationship between the central executive and the local/regional authorities and to co-ordinate this relationship, the Committee recommends the institution of a Ministry of Local Government, represented by a Minister in the Executive.

At the level of Provincial/Regional Management the Committee envisages that South Africa should be divided into eight regions for the purpose of regional administration. As to the structure of regional administrations, the Report presents two alternatives: (a) eight regional/provincial racially mixed (Coloured, Indian and White) executive committees *appointed* by the

central executive (President and Cabinet); or (b) eight *elected* provincial councils, consisting of Whites, Coloureds and Indians, but deprived of all legislative power, (The Councils thus becoming purely executive/administrative bodies.) Furthermore, the Committee recommends the establishment of seven metropolitan authorities, encompassed by the four major urban/industrial complexes in South Africa; namely, Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereniging (PWV) Area, the Cape Peninsula, Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage complexes and Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg areas. It is suggested that the seven metropolitan bodies should have authority in the following areas: Pretoria and environs; Central Witwatersrand (including the West Rand); the East Rand; the Vaal Triangle, Durban, Pinetown and environs; Port Elizabeth, Dispatch and Uitenhage; the Cape Peninsula and environs.

These metropolitan authorities will consist of representatives of elected local authorities (Black, White, Coloured and Indian) and will be responsible for so-called "hard" services. That is to say, those infrastructural services which are of common importance to all areas: metropolitan planning; road/street and stormwater control systems; electricity and water supply; transport; fire services; sewage and waste disposal. Representation on the metropolitan authorities will be proportionate to the extent of taxable immovable property, thus ensuring White predominance. (It is significant to note that there are no overtly racial criteria for local government, but this is negated by the fact that the iniquitous Group Areas Act survives unscathed.)

Finally, the Committee argues strongly for a far greater degree of autonomy and power for elected local authorities (or municipalities). It is proposed that the franchise at local authority level be open to all residents of the area over the age of 18, with a loaded system of additional votes being accredited to individual and corporate owners of immovable property. Thus, considering the laws restricting land ownership in this country, elected local authorities could be White, Coloured, Indian or mixed, on the one hand, while Black local authorities (which in terms of the Local Authorities Act pertaining to Black Urban Areas just passed by Parliament, are to acquire status akin to their White municipal counterparts) will stand as racially exclusive.

These local authorities are to be entrusted with the so-called "soft" functions, which implies the power to make regulations and by-laws, and to function in a general administrative capacity.

In sum, the characteristic pattern of these two inter-related reports is the simultaneous concentration and devolution of power. The reasoning in this is clear; for the best part of thirty years the South African Parliament has been dominated by the National Party and the party caucus, which, as we have so often witnessed, acts as a powerful brake on political reform. The

President Council's stratagem is to defuse the potential for party-political conflict by retaining Parliament, but depriving it of any real power. Effective political power is divided between the lowest rung of authority, the local and regional councils, and the highest — an all powerful executive president. This plan would insulate the executive from the characteristic party political bickering and dissension which the continuing process of reform is likely to evoke. At the same time, however, the plan makes provision for a far greater degree of democratic participation at the local level. The overriding motive is simply that the issues of open swimming pools and theatres, for example, should not be a concern for central government; the local authorities will be required to deal with issues of this nature, while the executive rules the country in the "national interest".

This is the theory, in practice it depends entirely on how much the government finds acceptable, and more importantly, the pace of implementation of those aspects which are found acceptable. In the wake of the National Party Caucus meeting on 5th June, the so-called "guidelines" which are to form the basis for negotiation with the Coloured and Indian communities, appear to be far closer to the 1977 proposals than the President's Council plan.

Reports are that the Government's "guidelines" are for an indirectly elected Executive President to preside over a multi-racial cabinet where members of the executive will retain their seats in Parliament. No Prime Minister or Premier, this function being taken over by the President, while the leaders of the three groups represented in Parliament would fulfil an important role. The Parliament would be one sovereign body with three separate chambers, that is to say the Coloured, Indian and White members of Parliament would meet in the same building but not in the same chamber. A process of joint consultation through a system of committees is proposed so as to negotiate consensus between the groups before Bills are submitted in each chamber. (Doubtlessly, this aspect of the proposals is premised on the fear that inter-group coalitions within a single chamber parliament might jeopardize National Party dominance.) Furthermore, the government seems intent on expanding the size of the President's Council to include members indirectly elected.

It appears likely that the proposals for second tier government (the abolition of the Provincial Councils and the creation of eight new regional administrations) will be temporarily shelved, not the least because of the considerable expense involved, the lack of trained officials of all races, and the sensitivity of this far-reaching restructuring, but also because the implementation of the proposals for second tier government are dependent on the institution of the recommendations for local authorities first. There does not appear to be any reason why the latter proposals should not be implemented at the same time as those at central government level.

This appears to be the Government's framework for negotiation. However, voices on both left and right of the South African political spectrum are likely to be raised in anguish before the implementation of any of these proposals.

The fundamental inadequacy of these constitutional plans, from the perspective of the liberal political constituency in South Africa, is the exclusion of Blacks, both from the drafting stages and the final blue-print. Claims by members of the President's Council that the "doors have been left open" or that "other possibilities may present themselves" are perceived as shallow after-thoughts. Furthermore, it is argued that the President's Council, because it is a nominated body, inevitably is dominated by members sympathetic to National Party views, and that the Indian and Coloured members of the President's Council are not representative of these communities. However, the choice of participation or rejection is not a simple one. As far as the Progressive Federal Party is concerned, if it declines to participate in the new constitutional scheme, because of the exclusion of Blacks, it will be excluded from Parliament and will face the political wilderness. If the PFP co-operates on the understanding that Blacks will be incorporated at some later stage, then there will be a considerable loss of face, in the light of the PFP's refusal to join the President's Council.

Either way, it seems to me that the PFP is set to lose support, on the one hand, because the bulk of the PFP supporters are only marginally supporters of Progressive policy (as made clear in the Johannesburg Municipal elections). The Prime Minister and the Nationalist Party, regardless of how much of the proposed reform is implemented, have acquired the undeniable aura of reformers, prepared not only to do battle with their own party-spoilers, but boldly to confront Nationalist shibboleths. It can be expected that the Nationalist Party will gain considerable support from the middle-of-the-road English voter in their appeal to the electorate for support in carrying out the reform programme.

On the other hand, if the PFP does co-operate and join the new political dispensation it will almost certainly alienate many of its more liberal supporters (most especially its younger supporters). Furthermore, it will certainly have difficulty convincing the more radical Black constituency of its *bona fides* in joining what the PFP camp has called a "sham". Indeed the PFP will become part of the "non-black" bloc which Blacks perceive as ganging-up against them.

The Coloured leaders, and perhaps to a greater extent, the Indian leaders face very much the same dilemma. At what price collaboration? Certainly those community leaders who refuse any share in the new dispensation will face the prospect of political isolation, simply because they will be peripheral to the issues most intimately affecting their communities and will not have the power to influence such issues. However, the price of

collaboration, in terms of future relations between Coloureds, Indians and Africans will inevitably be high. Co-operation will imply a sell-out, an alliance of non-African groups against the African majority. Africans are not likely to take kindly to the idea of Coloureds and Indians championing their cause in the corridors of power.

From the perspective of the right, most notably the Conservative Party and the HNP, the choice is no less complicated. Clearly the opposition of this sector is against any form of power-sharing. Now that power-sharing is on the verge of becoming a reality, will they continue to oppose liberalization from within Parliament and the local authorities, despite the risk of sitting cheek by jowl with Coloureds and Indians? If they refuse to face this prospect, then effectively these parties will not be able to participate in elections without compromising their declared policy position. At the same time, it seems to me that this constituency is set to gain a large degree of grass root rural Afrikaner and some conservative English voter support.

The most overwhelmingly important factor in the consideration of the prospects for constitutional stability is the attitude of the Black majority. Excluded from the President's Council and largely ignored in the consitutional proposals, it is unlikely that Black attitudes will be favourable. Blacks perceive the extension of the central political family to include Coloureds and Indians as a clear polarization of non-Blacks against the African majority. Many cries have been heard against the exclusion of Blacks from the negotiation process, but what Blacks do these critics mean? The authoritative investigations of the Buthelezi Commission established that a clear majority of Blacks support the ANC, it is also established that a majority of Blacks harboured feelings of deep militancy. The answer, it seems, is clear: until the ANC is legitimised and accepted as a partner in the negotiation process, then the Black majority will spurn the efforts of government. Of course, it may be argued that the introduction of sweeping reforms will defuse the militancy of the ANC cause, I believe the reverse to be true; that is to say, that reform will in fact heighten Black awareness of their disadvantaged position *vis-a-vis* the other groups and will also lead to higher levels of political expectations among this majority sector of our population. (If Coloureds and Indians can be accepted into Parliament, can the rights of the Black majority be of any lesser worth?) The formal rejection, by the White power structure, of even a token Black share in central decisionmaking processes obviates any belief among the Black majority in the possibility of modest or evolutionary options.

In theory, the President's Council was to be autonomous and unfettered by political preconditions. However, in reality the Council (and the Constitutional Committee specifically) has deliberated within closely prescribed political parameters. Besides the fact that the majority of the members of the Committee are public supporters of National Party policy, both

the Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs have, on numerous occasions, pre-empted the Committee's recommendations by unambiguously dismissing universal franchise, a common voters' roll, a unitary state, a consociational system, a federation in any form, or any suggestion that urban Blacks be included in the new dispensation.

Now that the Consitutional Committee's plan and the Government's response has crystallized as almost a carbon copy of the National Party's 1977 proposals, one may justifiably wonder why it was necessary for Government to subject its established objectives to such an elaborate (and indeed, costly) series of enquiries, when the volumes of expert evidence accumulated over the five year period have ultimately been moulded into a rubber stamp for Government objectives. However, there can now be little doubt about the nature of Government strategy.

The Constitutional Committee has opened the way for the institution, by a simple majority vote of the Assembly (probably early in 1983) of an Executive President with all the characteristics of an autocrat, who will hold office for a seven year period, without any restriction on the President's eligibility for re-election after than period. This "strong-man" (variously described as a potential De Gaulle, Mussolini or Bonaparte) will embody the ultimate political authority in the South African polity. This move is designed as much to nullify PFP influence in the decision-making processes, as that of the Conservative Party. Furthermore, taking the point already made, that neither of these two parties could participate in the new constitutional dispensation structure without severely compromising the principles upon which their policies are premised, it is possible to argue that the prospects of a one-party Parliament are about to become a reality. It is also a fact that an extra-parliamentary opposition is inevitably far more radical or reactionary (as the case may be) and thus, the potential for violent conflict must escalate.

Central to the Government's strategy are considerations of political arithmetic. Government objectives have recently been articulated by the Minister of Co-operation and Development who has stated that after the independence of Qwa-Qwa, Kwa Ndebele, Gazankulu and Lebowa there would only be 6,25 million Black citizens of KwaZulu and Kangwane still under Parliament's control. With the excision of Kangwane and northern areas of KwaZulu from South Africa, this figure now stands at approximately 4,75 million — just over half the number of Whites, Coloureds and Asians in South Africa.

Such motivations, on the part of Government, have been confirmed by Dr Jan Grobler (National Party information chief) in published correspondence with Dr Andries Treurnicht at the time of the Conservative breakaway. The Government's aim is to create a "non-black" bloc, structured in such a way as not to jeopardize Afrikaner political hegemony, and to

widen the White power base by incorporating the 3 million Coloureds and Indians, who might otherwise ultimately align themselves with the Black majority.

Naïveté, or eternal human optimism, leads one to grasp at straws of hope in the political dispensation now being shaped, but such straws are few and weak. The fundamental flaw in all this politicking is that it merely seeks to alter the power-structure in South Africa, by encompassing *Coloureds and Indians within the White political family*. The Constitutional Committee appears to have failed to grasp the dynamics of constitution making, that is to say, the process by which dynamic social forces combine and interact to bridge the cleavage between divergent group interests in the first place, and shape political institutions, in the second.

The shaping of political institutions, the reform of these institutions and the potential for political innovation is determined by the nature of the process by which divergent and conflicting social forces and group interests are reconciled and common ground identified by free bargaining and "trade off" between groups reacting to market forces. I believe that a process of this nature contains an inherent potential for the self-stabilization of the community. On this basis, I suggest, there is substantial possible overlap between Black and White interests, even on the constitutional level.

In this context, the one redeeming feature is the recommendation for local and metropolitan government. But then again, considering the laws on property ownership, rights of residence and the socio-economic disadvantage of Blacks, this is purely a theoretical redemption. Unless one considers the normal, unstoppable processes of Black advancement: by the turn of the century the Black population will double; 75 per cent of Blacks will be urbanized; 81,2 per cent of the total labour force will be Black; eight out of ten skilled workers will be Black; there will be two million Black pupils in secondary schools; Black consumer spending will account for by far the major share of total.[5] Clearly thus, the proposals for central government, as they relate to Blacks are a fantasy.

Indeed, the ramifications are manifold, but in conclusion, I think two points are pertinent. First, that the success of the reform process will largely depend on the creation of the appropriate climate for reform. If reform is to succeed then it is imperative that intra-communal alliances, mutual trust and loyalty, as well as a common national bond be nurtured. This depends on the belief among all groups that government is acting in their interests. I believe that this latter point has been recognized by the Constitutional Committee, in so far as it calls for a government declaration of intent, which would seek to establish government's *bona fides* and good intentions.

However, government intentions are clear and the present reality is quite the opposite. There is a deep mistrust of government and a deep-

seated disillusionment among a significant proportion of all sectors of the population. The highly autocratic nature of the legislation which has passed through Parliament during this last session has served to heighten tension and suspicion. One may certainly argue, as I have suggested earlier, that security and stability must be maintained during the inherently unstable period of reform, but without any indication of the time-scale for the implementation of reform, or any constitutional guarantee of a return to "freedom of opposition" and hence maximum democracy (the parallel used by the President's Council) our recent political history lends credibility to the widely held notion that reform is merely a stratagem for the entrenchment of White political dominance. The institution of political reform, without parallel development in social and political attitudes does not offer any guarantee of stability and conflict avoidance.

The second concluding point (closely allied to the first) arises from the Report on regional and local government. The Committee, in a little noticed paragraph, identifies what, in my opinion, is the key to our future; namely that neither forced segregation nor forced integration ought to pattern our political and socio-economic development. This in effect means that South African society should be structured by voluntary group alliances and associations formed along lines of common and converging individual and group interests. This suggestion turns the concept of ethnicity and apartheid on its head. However, it is a fact that the plethora of discriminatory legislation which characterizes our statute books makes this impossible for the foreseeable future.

I make these points with the purpose of illustrating that constitutional reform is really only a small (and in my opinion lesser) part of the statutory reform necessary to ensure the stability of South Africa's future: politically, economically and socially.

Notes

1. Republic of South Africa, *First Report of the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council*, P. C. 3/1982, Government Printers, para 3 19–3.20 at pp. 17–18.
2. *Ibid*, para 4.34 at p 40.
3. *Ibid*, para 3.20 at p. 19.
4. *Ibid*, para 6.20 at p. 57.
5. Welsh, D, *The Liberal School of Thought in South African Politics*, Address to the Political Science Association of South Africa, June 1982.

Book Reviews

UNIONS OF STATES
The theory and practice of confederation
Murray Forsyth
Leicester University Press, 1981, 236 pp.

This is a comprehensive study — the first in English — of the origins and functions of political confederations or unions of states. The author shows their relevance to the contemporary scene, explaining that it was his interest in the emergence and development of the European Economic Community that led him to undertake this essay.

A confederation is different from a federation: the former is a union of states, the latter is a state (albeit not unitary) in itself, constituting a union of the peoples or nations which comprise it. A confederation is a fragile structure with a minimum of power at the centre, and not infrequently, by reason of that fragility, it develops into a federation.

The author describes the famous confederations which have emerged since late medieval times — the old Swiss Confederation (1291–1798), the restored Swiss Confederation (1815–1848); the United Provinces of the Netherlands (1579–1795); the German Bund (1815–1866); and the Confederation of the United States of America (1781 to 1789). He also surveys in depth the relevant views of the outstanding European and American political theorists of the period.

The characteristics of a "classical" confederation included the following:

- a foedus or treaty binding the states together, primarily for defence and security;
- the establishment of mutual obligations of support;
- the homogeneity of the members of the union;
- a Diet or Assembly in which the several member states had representative members, and which was capable of making laws;
- provision for arbitration on matters of dispute between the member states;
- some control over armed forces or the creation of a federal army;
- such a status in international law as to entitle the union to international recognition;
- some organ to administer confederal matters.

Confederations first came into being for reasons of defence and security but the author emphasizes the growing importance in recent times of the economic factor and thus the emergence of economic confederations. Bringing his survey up to the present he writes, "that the European Econ-

omic Community is an economic confederation standing in line of descent from the economic provisions contained in the Constitution of the American Union 1789, the Zollverein established in 1834 and the Benelux Union of 1948, is clear both from its content and its form".

The South African reader will find special interest in comparisons which may be drawn between the historical examples of confederations discussed in the book, and the emerging Southern African Constellation of States and the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Council. The former (otherwise known as CONSAS) comprises South Africa, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Ciskei. The members of the latter (SADCC) are Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania with the possible accession of Zaïre and Namibia. Southern Africa is seen as being split between these rival camps.

Of particular significance for the purpose of this review is CONSAS. It is described as a Constellation of States created for the mutual security and economic benefit of its members. It is, or will become, a "kind" or "sort" of confederation. It will have a Council of States and a Secretariat. There is to be a Development Bank. Finally, inasmuch as bi-lateral non-aggression treaties were concluded between South Africa and Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (?) respectively, immediately prior to their independence, these could form the basis for a confederal defence pact. It is said that a member state by joining CONSAS will not lose any sovereignty and it has the right to withdraw in its own interests.

It has been pointed out that as CONSAS comprises only South Africa and its former homelands, "it could be argued that it is essentially an internal device to join together, both economically and politically, what separate development has put asunder". On this hypothesis its genesis is completely the reverse of that of confederations elsewhere. Nevertheless it clearly has, or will have, a number of features in common with those of such confederations. Accordingly, although the South African Prime Minister stresses the fact that his country is an African state and eschews what he describes as stereotyped Western constitutional formulae, it is submitted that much is to be learnt from a study of "Union of States".

The author concludes with an illuminating discussion of the significance of confederal and other states in the international system.

Both constitutional planners and students will find this a useful and thought-provoking book.

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RACE DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
A Review
Edited by Sheila van der Horst. Assistant editor Jane Reid
David Philip, Cape Town; Rex Collings, London, 1981, 246 pp.

The objectives of this collection of articles are stated under the heading "Acknowledgements" (and not in the Introduction as one would expect). "This book . . . forms part of the Constructive Programme for Sound Intergroup Relations which was launched in 1976 by . . . the Centre for Intergroup Studies, in an attempt to contribute towards better understanding and better relations among members of the different population groups. The book aims to sketch the present situation — with a little history to provide perspective and understanding — in nine important areas of social life." The nine areas of social life are discussed in nine chapters: *The Just Political Order* by R.A. Schrire; *The Just Legal Order* by John Dugard and W.H.B. Dean; *Employment* by Sheila T. van der Horst; *Education* by Franz Auerbach and David Welsh; *Urban Housing* by Pauline Morris and Sheila T. van der Horst; *Health* by J.V.O. Reid; *State Social Pensions, Grants and Social Welfare* by Hansi Pollak; *Religion* by Piet Meiring, J.A. van Wyk and Patrick Giddy; and *Recreational Facilities, Sport and Voluntary Associations* by Judy Cornell and Oscar Wollheim. These chapters are, with notable exceptions in parts of the first two, devoted to descriptions of statutory, bureaucratic and customary practices which consign the majority of South Africa's people to the category of semi-persons. Most of the chapters were first drafted in 1976 (the papers by Dugard and Dean were delivered at a SAIRR conference in 1978) and updated till 1979/80.

In her Introduction the editor provides a brief but useful overview of "changes in law and policy" on influx control, industrial relations, education and housing during 1980. In composition and style it reads like an excerpt from a well known annual survey of such matters. Though the introduction holds the promise of much useful information, it is with some reluctance that one turns to the task of reading the book from cover to cover. Descriptive surveys are essential but rarely animating books.

Contrary to such expectations, Schrire's article is an eminently readable analysis of the political *status quo* and some alternatives to it. Though the article does not contribute much that is new to the debate on political alternatives, it is a very good summary statement of the issues and options as seen by supporters of negotiated "consociational" alternatives.

Chapter 2 reinforces the hope that this may be more than just a book of factual descriptions. Dugard identifies some characteristics of racial discrimination and discusses the South African laws which "most patently offend each of the standards identified". He also deals with security legislation which violates Western conceptions of human rights — and notes

some judicial practices which reinforce this. In the same chapter W.H.B. Dean recommends some form of affirmative action as a means to overcome the effects of customary and past discrimination.

Chapters 3 to 9 are highly informative surveys of the fields with which they deal. Unfortunately most of them also tend to read like surveys. One has to be a dedicated chaser of facts and figures — or a reviewer of books — to persist in struggling through page after page of such material. I cannot resist a somewhat unfair comparison between the style and contents of these chapters and Thomas Gradgrind's view of life: "In this life, we want nothing but Facts, Sir; nothing but Facts!" Only specialists in the respective fields can judge the accuracy of the descriptions, but since the authors are themselves acknowledged experts in these fields, I have no doubt that these chapters should be recommended as briefcase companions for persons who need ready access to the disturbing facts and figures of discrimination. For this purpose the detailed table of contents and the eleven-page (double column) index of the book are in themselves commendable.

The article or book which contains everything any particular reviewer wants to see in it has yet to be written. Authors' and editors' rights to exclude what they like are recognized by this reviewer. Some themes which could have received more attention are, nevertheless, listed below:

(i)   *Auerbach & Welsh:* Technical, vocational and university education.
(ii)   *Meiring, Van Wyk & Giddy:* African Independent Churches. (How can churches which originated as reactions to apartheid and to religious and racial discrimination be characterized as "apolitical"? Such reactions are profoundly political actions. What — one wonders — is the political potential of a church which can draw 2 million devotees to a weekend of celebrations?)
(iii)   *Schrire, Van der Horst, Pollak and Cornell & Wollheim:* Statutory advisory and regulatory bodies. (What is the significance of the establishment — or changes in legislation regarding the composition — of bodies such as the National Manpower Commission, the Social and Associated Workers' Council and the National Nursing Council? The establishment of statutory councils invariably entails regulation of the persons and activities concerned. Do the trends in this regard simply signify a measure of desegregation, or are they indicative of co-optive strategies designed to replace discrimination — as a means of domination — with "corporatist" types of control?)
(iv)   *Cornell and Wollheim:* The attempts of the South African Sociological Association to change its clothes could have been contrasted with the achievements of the Association for Sociology in Southern Africa.

Descriptions of South Africa's present would not be complete without some comments on "change". Much of the contents of the various chap-

ters are directly or obliquely concerned with this topic. As such the book serves as a useful guide to trends prevalent at the end of the Seventies. The significance of the changes described is a matter of personal perspective. One could, for instance, disagree with the editor's (admittedly qualified) labelling of some "changes and reversals" in policy as "substantial", "profound", "dramatic" and "significant". Reading through the chapters on employment, housing, social welfare and recreational facilities etc. it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the government is involved, not in a serious and consistent programme of change, but in an elaborate game of snakes and ladders. A statement by Hansi Pollak — in her article on pensions, grants and welfare — captures the essence of "change" in South Africa; "It is paradoxical that the new welfare dispensation brings about statutory racial separation of all aspects of welfare and fragmentation in administration and control at the very time that the rigidities of separate development are being modified in other aspects of national life." The key terms in this sentence are *paradoxical* and *modified*. For example: influx control has been modified to enable Africans who have Section 10 rights to move somewhat more freely from one urban area to another. Paradoxically the modifications also provide for more severe penalties for the unlawful employment of African workers. The official system of industrial relations has been modified to enable participation by Africans. Paradoxically the new system is designed to strenghten control over trade unions.

Perhaps these are not paradoxes, and perhaps the government is after all involved in a consistent programme of "change" — change that is designed to maintain the essentials of the present pattern of domination. Interpretation of such matters is beyond the stated aims of the book. In terms of these aims the authors were on the whole suitably cautious in their pronouncements on the significance of the trends they describe. It might, however, have been a good idea to add some interpretative sections or chapters. These could situate discrimination within the context of power and domination — which is what discrimination is about — and provide explicit links with the issues regarding the just society which are raised in chapters 1 and 2.

All the chapters contain implicit or explicit policy guidelines. Amongst the explicit guidelines only those suggested by Schrire do not leave the impression that they are mere footnotes to the descriptions. Dean's suggestions contradict the individualist conceptions of human rights which underlie Dugard's analysis. (The combination of condensed versions of two independently written papers in one chapter represents a Reader's Digest-type practice which should be discouraged.) The other guidelines no doubt reflect the considered opinions of their authors, and they are generally consistent with the relevant descriptions, but policy proposals have ideological, political, economic and other implications which need to be

discussed. It is, for example, by no means self-evident that "home *ownership** should be promoted for all groups" as a matter of "immediate priority". The implications of proposals must be analysed if they are to be regarded as more than incidental articulations of personal preferences.

Hopefully the guidelines will form the theme for further efforts by the Centre for Intergroup Studies and for a subsequent publication. In the meantime those students of South African politics who, after familiarizing themselves with the state of the nation want to consider analyses dealing with policies and strategies for change could turn to F. van Zyl Slabbert and Jeff Opland's collection of papers and commentaries on *South Africa: Dilemmas of Evolutionary Change.*

Race Discrimination is a very useful reference book. As a source of descriptive material it will contribute much to the aim of promoting understanding of the present situation. But one may ask if understanding is possible without stronger, more explicit, attempts at interpretations of the situation. And even descriptions can perhaps be phrased in ways which would encourage the reader to keep on reading.

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* *Emphasis added.*

BRITISH PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM
Edited by P. Wilkinson
Allen & Unwin, UK, 1981, 193 pp.

Die onderhawige werk bestaan uit 'n inleiding en nege hoofstukke, oorwegend deur Britse akademici geskryf. Die redakteur, Paul Wilkinson, het al 'n aantal werke oor terreur die lig laat sien en toon besondere insig in die onderwerp.

In hoofstuk een word die politiek en propaganda van die *Provisional IRA* behandel; in hoofstuk twee die verwantskap tussen openbare mening en die *Provisional IRA* in Noord-Ierland; in hoofstuk drie leierskapsprobleme in die IRA; in hoofstuk vier terreur in Ierland en die Britse reaksie; in hoofstuk vyf terreur in Wes-Duitsland; in hoofstuk ses die Britse polisie en terrorisme; in hoofstuk sewe die hantering van ontvoerings; in hoofstuk agt die Verenigde Nasies Konvensie teen die neem van gyselaars; en in hoofstuk nege voorstelle vir nasionale en internasionale reaksies met betrekking tot terrorisme.

Stellings word deurgaans deur verwysings gestaaf en die boek vorm 'n goeie eenheid alhoewel oorvleueling tog voorkom en hoofstuk vyf nie heeltemal inpas by die res van die werk nie. Deurgaans word teoretiese perspektiewe met feite deurvleg en is dit 'n waardevolle werk vir beide studente van die onderwerp sowel as instansies wat in teen-insurgensie betrokke is.

Alhoewel die werk hoofsaaklik uit die oogpunt van terreur in "liberale demokrasieë" geskryf is, het dit tog ook wyer toepassing. In die slothoofstuk wat deur Wilkinson geskryf is, word belangwekkende stellings gemaak. Op bl. 162 word byvoorbeeld verklaar dat "to counter terrorism effectively the tough-line approach involves waging two kinds of war: a military-security war to contain and reduce terrorist violence, and a political and psychological war to secure the popular consent and support which must be the basis of any effective modern democratic government. It is fallacious to assume that terrorists need mass support before they can perpetrate murder and destruction . . . many contemporary terrorist groups are numerically tiny. Yet it is important for the success of anti-terrorist operations that popular support for the terrorists should remain limited to a minority — indeed that they be (as) isolated as possible from the general population".

In die lig van die ANC se verklaarde strategie om die "massas in Suid-Afrika te mobiliseer" is die bogenoemde stelling ooglopend belangrik.

Op bl. 164 word dit weer gestel dat: "The government should not engage in dialogue and negotiation with groups which are actively engaged in promoting, committing or supporting terrorism. To do so only lends the terrorists publicity, status, and worst of all, a spurious respectability".

Hieruit blyk die probleem van onderhandeling met 'n organisasie soos die ANC weer eens, alhoewel sommige mense onmiddellik daarop sal wys dat die stelling van Wilkinson net op "liberale demokrasieë" betrekking het en nie op byvoorbeeld die situasie in Suid-Afrika nie.

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CHINA: POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Tony Saich
Macmillan International College Editions, London, 1981, 265 pp.

Tony Saich's book *China: Politics and Government* is a very useful text-
book on Chinese politics and present-day socio-economic organization.
Although he utilizes a thematic approach in most of the book, he begins
with three historical, chronological chapters: From Revolution to Liber-
ation (1911–1949), The First Seventeen Years (1949–1965), and The Cul-
tural Revolution and Its Aftermath (1965–1980). Despite covering the years
1911 to 1949 in under thirty pages, Saich's writing is smooth and concise,
though perhaps assuming a higher knowledge of events in contemporary
Chinese history than might be the case in an introductory course. The fol-
lowing two chapters cover in detail the period 1949–1965 of economic re-
construction (centralized five-year plans), learning from the Soviet Union
(the "Leaning to One Side" policy), the beginnings of a Chinese path to
socialism (the "Hundred Flowers" campaign and the "Great Leap For-
ward" policy), and the period 1965–1980 of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution with its aftermath of reconstruction (1969–1976) and the search
for a successor(s) to Mao Zedong (1976–present).

The remaining seven chapters, plus an epilogue, utilize the above men-
tioned thematic approach to discuss Mao's theoretical contribution (Chap-
ter 4), the structures and processes of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
and the state administrative structure (Chapters 5–6), the People's Liber-
ation Army (PLA) (Chapter 7), social and political controls (Chapter 8),
and a comparison of urban and rural China (Chapters 9–10). Considerable
attention is given to explaining and analyzing Mao Zedong's thought (in-
cluding his theory of contradictions, the mass-line, permanent revolution,
the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc.) and placing it within the frame-
work of Marxism-Leninism. Both the party and state structures (central
and non-central levels of organization) are discussed in detail with the aid
of a number of very good and up-to-date (as of January 1981) figures and
tables (with sources).

In discussing the role of the military (PLA) in Chinese politics, Saich
outlines the organization of the PLA and the People's Militia, but also pro-
vides an analysis of Lin Biao's role in the political events of the late 1960s
(as well as being designated as Mao Zedong's chosen successor at the 9th
National Party Congress — 1969) and his fall from power in the early
1970s. In view of the recently renewed emphasis on the "Four Moderniza-
tions" (i.e. modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence, and
science and technology), he provides an interesting summary of the on-
going debate on "the correct role of the military and the need for it to be
modernized" (pp. 156–159). Another interesting and informative chapter is

the one on Chinese methods of political and social control, including coercive (legal), remunerative (incentives), and normative (socialization) controls. Under normative controls, he provides short but concise overviews on the role of intellectuals, education and mass participation within contemporary Chinese society. Unfortunately there is little discussion of China's eight minor political parties (pp. 96 and 238 ff), in addition to the CCP: a major difference between the consitutionally-established political systems of China and the Soviet Union, though hardly resulting in any difference in practical operation (i.e. the national "communist party" dominates the political system). Nor is there any discussion of the role of the national ethnic minorities (approximately 5 per cent of China's population) in the socio-political process and whether they will ultimately be integrated into the 95 per cent Han-Chinese culture, despite the inclusion of five autonomous ("national ethnic") regions within the overall state structure and of internal autonomous "areas" within China's 21 provinces. Neither is the role (or social status) of religions, including Ancestor Worship, Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity, within China discussed.

The two chapters on rural and urban China, besides being interesting analyses on their own, provide a very effective comparison of these two socio-economic and geographical aspects of China today. But his discussion on how rural China had its agriculture first co-operativized in the early 1950s and later pushed into a communization programme (pp. 205–212) appears to omit a mention of the social costs and state sanctions employed (as compared to such costs and sanctions in the Soviet Union as a result of Stalin's expropriation of the kulak's land and resultant agricultural collectivization, for example). Further there is no discussion as to the role of occupational interest groups, a topic which has increasingly been analyzed in relation to the Soviet political system; while few and scattered, similar studies within the Chinese political system have been done, such as Michel Oksenberg's "Occupational Groups and the Chinese Cultural Revolution". Saich concludes with an epilogue taking the story of Mao Zedong's successors up to January 1981, which includes a number of key party and state leadership changes and the controversial Trial of the "Gang of Four".

On the book's presentation, as has been noted, Saich makes good and plentiful use of figures and tables throughout. Also he has used the Pinyin system of romanizing Chinese characters rather than the pre-1979 Wade-Giles system (for example Mao Zedong instead of Mao Tse-Tung). But he has thoughtfully included a listing of both the Pinyin and the more familiar spellings of frequently occurring names (people and places), though more names could have been placed on the list (i.e. Lin Biao, Hu Qiaomu, Li Xiannian, and even Mao's early 1930s Jiangxi Soviet). The footnotes, al-

though grouped at the end of the book are very detailed and can be easily used (in addition to the "selected further reading" section, which is divided by chapter topics) for greater in-depth study. The book index is competent, though not overly inclusive. In general, this is a very functional and detailed introductory course textbook for Chinese politics. But it could be utilitized for higher level courses if supplemented with additional specialized readings. In terms of the present textbook market, this is a good-value introductory text.

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Books received for review

THE PROMISE OF PEACE
Bruton
Blackwell. £2.25, pb.

IMAGINARY WITNESS
Schoolman
Collier Macmillan. Approx. R25,55.

AMERICA ARMS FOR A NEW CENTURY
Abrahamson
Collier Macmillan. Approx. R23,30.

RUBEL ON KARL MARX
O'Malley
Cambridge. Approx. R32,00.

RACISM AND REACTION
Ratcliff
Routledge & Kegan Paul. Approx. R27,05.

DECISION MAKING IN SOVIET POLITICS
Lowenhardt
Macmillan. Approx. R32,00.

SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE FAILURE OF THE STATE
Hadley
Allen & Unwin. Approx. R20,95.

EAST-WEST STRATEGIC BALANCE
Millar
Macmillan. R15,70.

PUBLIC INTEREST IN LIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS OF AFFLUENCE
Holsworth
Schenkman. Approx. R12,15.

UNDER ONE FLAG
Jaensch
George Allen & Unwin. Approx. R32,00.

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