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Smuts House Notes

Second International Outlook Conference

“Foreign Powers and Africa” was the theme of the Institute’s second International Outlook Conference, held on 6 and 7 September, 1982, in Pretoria. The first of these annual conferences, organised primarily for the Institute’s corporate members, took place a year ago in Johannesburg, with the theme “Southern Africa in the World” and the Rt. Hon. Edward Heath as keynote speaker.

At this year’s Conference the keynote speaker was Dr Henry Kissinger who, accompanied by Mrs Nancy Kissinger, visited South Africa as a guest of the Institute to address the Conference. Other speakers were: the South African Foreign Minister, the Hon. R.F. Botha, M.P.; Professor Michael Howard, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford; Dr Volkmar Köhler, CDU member of the German Bundestag; Mr Fumihiko Togo, former Japanese Ambassador to the United States and a former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs; Dr C.F. Garbers, President of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in South Africa; Mr David Smith, former Minister in the Zimbabwe Government; Mr John Sewell, President of the Overseas Development Council in the United States; Dr Albert Bressand, Assistant Director of the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales in Paris; Mr Colin Eglin, M.P., National Chairman and Foreign Affairs spokesman of the Progressive Federal Party; and Mr Sam Motsuenyane, President of the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Chairman of the African Bank Ltd.

Dr Henry Kissinger’s address on “American Global Concerns and Africa” is reproduced, with minor amendments, in this issue of the *Bulletin*, together with the addresses of Professor Howard, Dr Köhler and Mr Togo. These addresses were all delivered in the first part of the Conference, which dealt with the political framework of the overall theme. In the second part the socio-economic dimensions were considered, and six papers were delivered, dealing with topics related to Africa’s needs, the role of international companies, the role of governments and governmental

organisations, and the response of African countries. These papers are being published by the Institute in a separate report. Finally, the introductory address of the South African Foreign Minister, Mr R.F. Botha, has already been published by the Institute as an Occasional Paper (December 1982).

The third International Outlook Conference will be held early in September, 1983. The theme will be concerned with the state of the world economy and the outlook for Southern Africa's external economic relations in today's increasingly interdependent world. Speakers of a high standard will again be drawn from different regions of the world to address the Conference, together with leading South African authorities. They will provide information and insights for the predominantly South African audience and hopefully contribute to a more informed and deeper understanding of the international economic environment and Southern Africa's place in it.

The main purpose of the Institute — which is to promote a more informed understanding of international issues, especially of those affecting our region of Africa — is thus being served by these annual Outlook Conferences.

* * * * *

White Opinion on Foreign Policy Issues

A notable recent event in the Institute's publications and research activities has been the appearance of an Occasional Paper, containing a report by Dr Deon Geldenhuys on the results of a public opinion survey commissioned by the Institute. The survey endeavoured to ascertain the level of information about foreign policy matters among white South Africans and their attitudes towards certain current issues and government policies. Dr Geldenhuys' report, which has attracted a great deal of attention in the media and elsewhere, interprets the revealing results of the survey and comments on the implications for the Government and the country generally.

The dominant impression which emerges from the answers given to most questions in the survey is the very high level of threat-consciousness among white South Africans and the accompanying hardline inclinations in regard to how South Africa should respond to these perceived external threats. The evidence of these attitudes may be welcomed by some as a clear indication that there is wide public support for the Government's strong stand against external threats, and that the public has taken heed of the Government's warnings about a "total onslaught". But, as Dr Geldenhuys has suggested, the majority of the white public may now have become even more "hawkish" than the Government itself, and this could provide problems for the Government, by limiting its room for

manoeuvre and restricting its options in attempting to resolve external disputes. For instance, on the Namibian issue — which shows no signs of being resolved at an early date, in spite of the persistence of the Western Five in their negotiating efforts for over five years — Dr Geldenhuys points out in his report that “Pretoria may well have to embark on a deliberate campaign to ‘educate’ the public on the need for and the risks of a negotiated end to the Namibian dispute”, in order to prevent a “strong conservative backlash” within South Africa in the event that a negotiated settlement produces a SWAPO régime in Windhoek.

This must be a worrying situation for many inside and outside government circles — as well as for concerned governments elsewhere — who wish to see a negotiated, internationally acceptable resolution of the Namibian conflict. The Government is in danger of becoming “boxed in” by the hawkish attitudes of its own electorate. Moreover, Dr Geldenhuys concludes his report with the view that “neither the threat-consciousness nor the hawkish inclinations of white South Africans will decline — but will, on the contrary, increase — as long as South Africa finds itself so drastically at odds with the wider international community over its domestic political arrangements”.

John Barratt
Director General, SAIIA

The articles in this issue of
International Affairs Bulletin
are the revised texts of addresses delivered
on the first day of the
SAIIA's Second International Outlook Conference;

FOREIGN POWERS AND AFRICA

held in Pretoria on 6 and 7 September, 1982.
Dr Henry Kissinger was the keynote speaker

Henry Kissinger

American global concerns and Africa

I am honoured by the opportunity to address this distinguished group, in a country whose future evolution is of great perhaps decisive importance for the prospects of the entire continent, if not of world politics.

And it is, as well, a daunting assignment. For South Africa is geographically almost as far from America as it is possible to be on this globe. Its problems reflect a different history and its domestic structure a contrasting set of values regarding the problem of race. At the same time South Africa has many ties to the industrialised countries and its strategic importance to the free world is undisputed. Thus America's attitude to your country is inevitably ambivalent — a constant tug of war between geopolitical and moral considerations. As I shall point out later, it is in the interest of freedom everywhere that this gap be progressively narrowed and ultimately eliminated.

My assignment here is to describe the international situation as it appears from an American perspective. It must be remembered that from

The Hon. Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford, from 1973 – January 1977, having been Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1969 – 1973. From 1957–1969 Dr Kissinger taught International Relations and Government at Harvard. In addition to many other published works, two volumes of his memoirs, *The White House Years* and *Years of Upheaval*, have been published.

the vantage point of the United States, Africa and southern Africa are part of larger global concerns, and our attitude toward this continent is incomprehensible otherwise. I will try to trace some of those broad perspectives; the American foreign policy in general; East-West relations; America and western Europe; and the problems of the developing world. Only in this context can one speak meaningfully about how America regards southern Africa and this country.

The American Perspective

The American perspective on world events has undergone dramatic changes in the last generation.

Americans do not have a long experience with foreign affairs. Our founding fathers were quite sophisticated in manipulating the European balance of power to secure our independence. Since then, however, a century and a half of isolation encouraged the illusion that we did not really need a foreign policy — or rather, that foreign involvement was purely a matter of choice for us: We could involve ourselves, or not, as we preferred. It took two world wars in this century to shatter this illusion, but certain preconceptions lingered in the American psyche, for some decades afterward.

Americans in the isolationist period tended to look down on what they considered the sordid power politics of Europe. Our avoidance of involvement in the balance of power appeared to us not as a boon conferred by distance and the protection of the British Navy, but as a virtue, as a sign of our moral superiority. Since 1945, we are permanently active in world affairs and have reluctantly had to face the realities of power. Nevertheless, we still tend to view the world in moral terms and to hold ourselves — and our friends — to a high standard of moral conduct as we see it. We fall short of it from time to time but only at heavy cost: The sacrifice of the domestic support needed to sustain American leadership in the world.

For a time after 1945, it seemed relatively easy for us to equate power and morality — the secret American dream. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States produced the amazing figure of over half of all the goods and services in the world. We were so overwhelmingly powerful that our Allies tended to follow our prescriptions; since we offered them military protection and substantial economic aid, it was a relatively harmonious partnership. The principal developing countries looked to us as the source of capital for their economic development. All this gave Americans a distorted picture of what foreign policy was about; it caused us to identify a fortunate and temporary concatenation with a permanent state of affairs. The Marshall Plan was in effect a projection of our domestic experience — an overseas application of the new deal, in

which economic progress brought with it political stability almost automatically. And the security problem represented by the Soviet Union, which prompted the Truman Doctrine and the foundation of NATO, seemed analogous to the threat posed by Hitler — that of unambiguous aggression by organised units across recognized frontiers.

It was a creative and brilliantly successful period of American foreign policy, yet never to be repeated. For our world leadership then was grounded in an inherently ephemeral set of conditions.

Since then we have seen that economic progress does not automatically produce political stability — sometimes quite the opposite. And threats to security can be much more manifold than attacks across national borders. Above all, from the late 1960's, for the first time, the United States was in the position that it had to conduct a foreign policy as most other nations in history: as one country among many, unable either to dominate the world or escape from it; forced to seek by persuasion, accommodation, negotiation what it could no longer achieve by unilateral fiat; obliged to learn the traditional techniques of balancing incentives and penalties; required to be steady, reliable, sensitive to marginal shifts in the balance of power and aware of the interconnections between events.

Today, political, economic, and military power are much more widely diffused. The United States represents only about 21 per cent of world GNP — powerful but no longer dominant.

The very balance of power which we have deplored through most of our national experience must henceforth be one of the guiding principles of our foreign policy. Our position toward the rest of the world has become analogous to that of Britain towards Europe for the better part of three centuries.

Britain could not permit Europe to be dominated by any single power regardless of its peaceful professions. Britain knew that its resources could not match those of the entire continent; therefore a Europe united against it would sooner or later be able to impose its will. America's global position is no different. If most of the rest of the world fell under hostile control — directly or indirectly — we would be outmatched. Maintaining the balance of power is not a favour we do others but an imperative of our survival.

This confronts us with three major difficulties. Despite the claims of its detractors, America is, as I pointed out, reluctant to base its claims on its power, preferring to prevail by the purity of its maxims. Americans also are uneasy with — indeed they resent — relative answers, which are the essence of a policy of equilibrium. Throughout our history every problem we have recognised as such proved soluble — that is to say, we found a final answer — if only to overwhelm it with resources. A world in which part of our task is maintaining the balance of power is by definition relativistic, inconclusive, morally unsatisfying.

Therefore, it is no accident that the main lines of the foreign policy that the United States has conducted for most of the post-war period have been attacked consistently by both ends of our political spectrum on the ground that it did not live up to American ideals and offered no final answers — by liberals because it was not sufficiently conciliatory, by conservatives because it was not adequately principled. One extreme tends to view foreign policy as a branch of psychiatry: the basic requirement of diplomacy, in this view, is to generate goodwill. Adversaries are believed to be hostile because they fear or resent us, because we have failed to reassure them that our objectives can be harmonised with theirs. Conflicts are seen to be an aberration from an otherwise natural state of harmony. This school of thought emphasises unilateral gestures of conciliation; it seeks negotiations regardless of Soviet acts of intransigence — and sometimes especially then. Communists in their view share some similar objectives; Third World nations — no matter how radical their professions — will rally to our standard if we only cleanse ourselves of our past errors.

The opposing school of thought tends to treat foreign policy as a branch of theology. Communism is consummate evil; there is no compromise with the devil. The new nations are either adversaries or cowards. In this view negotiation with the Soviet Union only confuses the American public and is itself a form of moral disarmament. And the new nations should be treated with indifference until they rally to our side. What is needed is to sound the trumpet, confront our enemies — and the walls of Jericho presumably will crumble.

Both these strains in American thinking, of course, have some features in common. Neither is comfortable with the notion of a long-term struggle without a final resolution; with a world in which ideals can be realized, at any point in time, only imperfectly and always gradually. Americans are, in some sense, in a state of permanent rebellion against the contemporary realities of world affairs.

Secondly, these psychological difficulties are compounded by the inherent complexity of assessing the balance of power in the modern period. Historically, military, economic, and political power were roughly congruent. In our time some countries are strong militarily but stagnant politically, for example the Soviet Union. Some countries, such as several oil producing states, are powerful economically but weak militarily. Some Third World nations have at times had a political influence out of proportion to their military and economic strength: India in the Fifties and early Sixties is a good example.

And the time scale for redressing the various balances is not identical. Restoration of the military balance is occurring more rapidly than the economic or political one. But success in one category of power does not

guarantee success in others.

These tensions produce a third obstacle to a consistent American diplomacy: our tendency to decide foreign policy issues by analogy to domestic disputes. This causes problems to be segmented into a series of individual decisions resolved by compromises between adversarial positions. In domestic legislation, where each issue is essentially discrete and completed with the passage of a law, this has proved quite effective — especially as in the democratic political tradition, the loser accepts his setback with grace also with the knowledge that he has a chance to renew the battle and perhaps prevail on another occasion. But foreign policy is a seamless web. Compromise between philosophical positions may yield the least common denominator, not the best conceived outcome in terms of a coherent, consistent long-term national strategy. The continual renewal of our domestic debate produces the lack of continuity about which some of our allies especially have complained. Each new administration seems to pride itself on repudiating the methods and assumptions of its predecessor. Leaving aside the merits, such a practice makes for no little uncertainty on the part of other nations. It causes friendly nations which depend on us to hedge their bets; it leaves adversaries confused.

For America, Vietnam was the catharsis that taught us our limits; but reality would have imposed itself in any event. The trauma of having to come to grips with a world of incomplete solutions and relative power is the mark of the American foreign policy debate in the Seventies. And we are emerging from it considerably wiser. The reflexive aversion to the balance of power has given way to a recognition of its essentiality. The period of self-doubt has come to an end. While tactical oscillations continue, the main trend of the current foreign policy has wide support.

But our friends must never forget the dual strains of American policy and the powerful impact of our historical convictions. Whatever the importance of geopolitics and equilibrium, however salient they may become in American foreign policy deliberations, the moral dimension of our national tradition will never disappear. At some point our foreign policy will always return to the wellspring of America's aspiration to promote justice, human dignity, and equality. And it will always give these terms a universal cast — not confined to a particular people. The task of American statesmanship is to combine these two strands into a consistent, coherent, and effective foreign policy.

US-Soviet Relations

With this as background, let me turn to the East-West conflict. The Soviet Union presents us with a multifaceted challenge: A Superpower militarily, stagnant politically, in a crisis economically. The Soviet Union

is clearly militarily extremely powerful. Even as the moral claims of its ideology prove more and more hollow, the Soviet system is growing in military strength and geopolitical reach. Historically, the emergence of a new power usually produced a coalition against it, and a new equilibrium could be achieved only after a test of strength. In the nuclear age, such a contest would threaten global cataclysm.

The maintenance of peace is therefore a task of unprecedented complexity. It is obviously the duty of the West to maintain the military balance and to resist Soviet expansionism. The Soviet Union *must* learn — through the West's vigilant resistance — that encroachments on the global equilibrium will not be tolerated. It cannot be beyond the West's capability — superior as we are in economic strength — to accomplish this.

However, a great change has taken place in the nature of military power. Strategic nuclear power is no assurance that challenges will be deterred, or countered, locally. In the Fifties the industrial democracies relied on their strategic nuclear arsenal, substituting technology for the burden of conventional armament. But the American nuclear superiority began to disappear in the Sixties. Technology tended toward equality, and numbers approached levels beyond which additional increments of destructiveness lost all relationship to the objectives likely to be in dispute. Arms control theory and practice, with their formal emphasis on equality, accelerated and legitimised this trend.

Logically, once the Soviet Union acquired the capacity to threaten the United States with direct nuclear retaliation, the American pledge to launch an all-out nuclear war on behalf of Europe was bound increasingly to lose its credibility and public acceptance — and so would NATO's defence strategy. For that strategy now rested on the threat to initiate mutual suicide. But governments were reluctant to face the financial and domestic implications of the conventional-force buildup that was required. They continued the existing strategy, seeking to compensate for the implausibility of the pledge of all-out nuclear defence by more emphatic reiteration of it.

In these circumstances, the West faces a profound moral as well as practical challenge. The risks of nuclear war produce a feeling of revulsion verging on abdication. Yet if in the democracies, avoidance of war becomes the sole objective of foreign policy, the world is open to the domination of the most ruthless. The deepest challenge to the democracies is to build support for the proposition that peace must be based on freedom as well as restraint; that leaving the world to the totalitarians can produce horrors even greater than the risks of resistance: witness Indochina.

The legacy of the evasions of two decades is a precarious combination of a reliance on nuclear defence, trends toward nuclear stalemate, growing

nuclear pacifism, and continued deficiencies in conventional forces. If the democracies are reluctant to resort to nuclear weapons, and if they continue to evade the necessity of building up their conventional forces, then the Western Alliance is left with no defence policy at all, and we are risking the collapse of the military balance that has made possible thirty-five years of Western security, prosperity, and democracy. We will in effect have disarmed ourselves unilaterally while sitting on the most destructive stockpile of weapons that the world has seen.

Thus the West, if it wants to maintain any public support for defense, has no choice except to build up its conventional forces substantially.

But this is not in itself a strategy. While maintaining the balance of power, we must not lose sight of the moral and political framework that gives it meaning. It is clear that public sentiment in the democratic nations will not sustain a policy of equilibrium without a parallel effort to end or reduce conflict. Electorates will not support defence programmes or a vigorous foreign policy if they imagine that their governments are the cause of tensions or if serious efforts are not being made to push back the spectre of nuclear war.

It is for this reason that arms control and efforts to reduce tensions have been on the agenda of US-Soviet relations for most of the last fifteen years. Arms control is not a substitute for a secure military balance, but it can be a way of maintaining it at lower levels of forces or of reducing the risks of the outbreak of nuclear conflict by miscalculation or panic. President Reagan has made forthcoming proposals for strategic arms reductions. He has wisely focused not only on reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, but on those types and characteristics of strategic weapons that most pose the danger of surprise attack or first strike. And he has stressed as well the need for restraint in superpower conduct.

Thus a long-term strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union must combine power and diplomacy; both resistance to challenges and a willingness to resolve political problems through negotiation. Both defence of Western values and a recognition that we are forced to co-exist on this planet in an era of thermonuclear weapons.

This becomes all the more important, because the inherent instabilities of the Soviet system will make negotiations inevitable sooner or later.

Both sides in the East-West confrontation are betting on history. And one of the ironies of the post-war period is the extraordinary structural weakness that is now seen to lie beneath the impressive surface of Soviet power.

The Soviet economy is a vast cumbersome machine burdened with administrative bottlenecks, pervasive inefficiency, low productivity and a level of performance all tending toward stagnation. It seems to require a black market, that is, a secret free market, to function at all. The dilemma

of communism is that it seems impossible to run a modern economy by a system of total planning; yet it may not be possible to maintain a communist state *without* a system of total planning.

In the 65-year history of the Soviet state, it has never managed a legitimate, regular succession of political leadership. The system has failed to deal seriously with the aspirations of the intellectual and managerial elite that industrialisation inevitably spawns; instead the Soviet intelligentsia is a cynical, careerist "new class" corrupted by privilege, its creativity stifled by heavy-handed political rigidity. And the system has yet to cope with the looming reality of its growing non-Russian population, soon to be a majority, with the severe social and political tensions this will entail.

Finally, in every communist state — it is almost an historic joke — the ultimate systemic crisis, latent if not evident, is over the role of the Communist Party. What is the function of a Communist Party once it is entrenched in power? It is not needed to run the government, or the economy, or the military. It is the guardian of an ideological legitimacy that has long since lost its motivating appeal. The Party's functionaries specialize in dealing with internal crises which their centralised system has created and external crises into which their ambitions tempt them. In Poland, the Communist Party was nearly swept away because of its irrelevance, impotence, and total repudiation by the Polish workers in whose name it claimed to rule. It is another historic joke that the only spontaneous revolutions in industrialised countries have been against Communist governments.

And we are only at the beginning of that process of transformation. If Moscow is prevented by a firm Western policy from deflecting its internal tensions into international crises, it is likely to find only disillusionment in the boast that history is on its side.

Then the time for serious negotiations on a broad front will have arrived. The industrial democracies must convey now that they stand ready to negotiate seriously, and that they will respect the legitimate security interests of a Soviet Union conducting the policies of a national state and not of a revolutionary power seeking to overthrow or subvert the existing order. But diplomacy toward the Soviet Union is at the core of some current disputes between the United States and its European allies.

America and Europe

Relations between America and Europe have undergone many periods of stress in the past generation. To a significant degree, this is the result of one of the great successes of American policy: our support for the economic recovery of Europe and Japan, and for European integration. To some extent, American expectations were exuberant and perhaps somewhat naïve. It was thought by some of the sponsors of European

unity that a revived and unified Europe would share our burdens and continue to follow our lead; it was not considered that a stronger Europe would inevitably assert its own identity and role. Hence the occasionally petulant reaction. In fact, a stronger, unified Europe is in America's interest even if its perceptions at times differ from ours.

It would be idle to deny that fundamental differences have arisen over an exorbitant number of issues. Some difference of perspective is, of course, inevitable in any coalition of sovereign states. But today the Western Alliance is at odds over central issues of East-West diplomacy, international economic policy, the Middle East, Central America, and relations with the Third World. Indeed, it is hard to find an important issue on which the allies are united. Sooner or later such divisions *must* affect the field of European security as well. For too long the allies have evaded uncomfortable questions that divided us; our evasions are now coming home to roost.

In too many NATO countries, the impression is created that it is America's attempt to restore the military balance which threatens the peace and must be resisted. Little attention is paid to the colossal Soviet military buildup over the last twenty years or to a whole series of aggressive Soviet actions, from the dispatch of Cuban troops to Africa through the occupation of Afghanistan to the repression of freedom in Poland, which threaten the global equilibrium.

Even less attention is paid to some basic facts of post-war history: that but for Stalin's pressures in the immediate post-war period American troops would have been withdrawn from Europe in the Forties, as indeed they were from Korea: that but for the Korean War the US military budget would have shrunk to derisory levels; that it was the threat to the freedom of Berlin in the late Fifties which accelerated the American military buildup; that for a variety of reasons the United States stopped expanding its strategic arsenal in the late Sixties and slowed its modernisation for the better part of the Seventies; and that *all* wars in the post-war period have broken out where there were *no* American forces and *no* nuclear weapons, while Europe under American nuclear protection has enjoyed the longest period of peace in its history.

The clamour in much of the West is therefore addressed to the wrong governments. Unmatched as it is by comparable agitation in the East, it poses the danger that a psychological imbalance, indeed a form of unilateral disarmament, will compound the regional military imbalances which have already produced such a sense of insecurity in almost all countries around the periphery of the Soviet Union.

But the basic problem within the Alliance does not derive from public demonstrations; it resides in the attitudes of governments. Three major differences have arisen: over military strategy and its corollary of arms

control, over the nature of East–West relations, and over East–West trade.

The transformation of the military balance has affected European-American relations acutely. So long as America possessed strategic nuclear superiority, the agreed strategy relying on nuclear defence coincided with the determination to banish war from European territory. But the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile puts a premium on the West's capacity for local conventional defence. Many in Europe recoil before that prospect, and not only because of the economic burden involved. They shy away from building a credible European conventional defence for fear that American troops will feel free to go home, and that it will weaken the American commitment to resort to strategic nuclear retaliation. Yet evasion of conventional defence in the longer term only makes the current American deployment in Europe untenable. Too strong for a trip wire, too weak for local resistance, the current NATO military establishment persists in a never-never land which encourages public escapism and inter-allied quarrels over security.

Some allies seek in arms control an escape from this dilemma. But arms control can stabilise or reduce only those armaments which exist; it cannot substitute for an adequate defence policy. If used to evade complex choices, it can have a doubly harmful impact: Freezing an untenable strategy while creating the illusion of political progress. The Alliance must agree on a coherent strategy if it is to give meaning to its defence policy and direction to East–West negotiations on the limitation of arms.

The second problem concerns East–West relations in general. The myth has developed in many quarters in Europe that the American administration is needlessly confrontational, too obsessed with the military balance, and too little interested in detente. It is an interesting and ironic reversal of historical roles. In the closing years of the Second World War, there were significant differences of philosophy between America and Britain. Many Americans thought Churchill needlessly preoccupied with the postwar balance of power, too rigidly anti-Soviet, too “colonialist” in his attitude to what is now called the Third World, and too little dedicated to building the fundamentally new, pacific international order toward which American idealism has always tended. Churchill undoubtedly saw the Americans as naive, moralistic, eager to evade the realities of security and their own share of responsibility for maintaining the global balance of power. While the United States has never abandoned its earlier moralism, it has been forced by post-war realities to deal, however reluctantly, with the problems of equilibrium. Concurrently, many in Europe seem paradoxically to have moved to the positions that America vacated and to have adopted some of the illusions to which Americans clung in years of isolation from global responsibility.

Whether the US Government's tactical judgments are always correct

need not be debated in this forum. But, in my view, America's insistence that true detente be based on maintaining the balance of power is correct; I believe that any attempt to base East-West relations on general goodwill or economic relations is doomed. The threat to world peace has not been American rhetoric — even in its most exuberant versions — but the Soviet military buildup and the Soviet geopolitical offensive from Angola and Ethiopia, South Yemen and Afghanistan, to the crackdown in Poland, and the Soviet Union's continuing support to various terrorist subversive groups around the world. Our objective is not to promote conflict, but to bring an end to Soviet assaults on the global equilibrium through a substantial reduction of military forces and a code of restrained international conduct.

As I have suggested, I expect that the Soviet system will have to come to grips with its internal and external stresses within this decade. At that point a major negotiation can and must take place. But such a negotiation can succeed only if the West does not give up its assets unilaterally ahead of time.

This is at the heart of the dispute over East-West trade, of which the recent European uproar over President Reagan's decision to block construction of the Siberian natural gas pipeline is symptomatic.

The fundamental problem can be defined as follows: Theoretically, trade reflects the mutual benefit of both parties. But East-West trade is distorted by two factors: By an objective analysis, the Soviet Union and its satellites are infinitely more dependent on East-West trade than the industrial democracies. The Soviet Union cannot feed itself without the non-communist world's grain; it cannot develop without Western technology and capital. The typical Western product for sale in the East contains advanced technology, hence new ideas; what the Soviet Union has to offer in return is raw materials — products which contain no conceptual input. The inequality in benefits would long since have reduced trade to a trickle had not Western governments stepped in with direct or hidden credits, which now amount to nearly \$90 billion for the communist world. In addition, many export prices are subsidised by West European governments directly or indirectly. The communist countries thus are not only gaining a relative advantage in trade; they are being financed by the nations against whom they are simultaneously conducting a geopolitical offensive. Lenin's dictum that capitalists would compete to sell the rope with which they are to be hanged is coming true with a vengeance — for Lenin never guessed that Western governments would provide the money to buy the rope and subsidise the price to facilitate the purchase.

For these reasons, the issues raised by President Reagan with respect to the Soviet pipeline are central — whatever the views of the immediate tactics. If the industrial democracies subsidise exports and credits and

provide large foreign exchange earnings to the Soviet Union during a period of a Soviet military buildup, proxy forces in Africa, brutal pressure on Poland, and occupation of Afghanistan, what possible incentive can the Soviet leadership have for the fundamental negotiations I outlined earlier?

Trade justified by commercial considerations is one thing — though even there I have always believed that the United States has been too profligate in the use of its agricultural resources. But subsidies or concessionary credits or bargain prices determined by other than strictly commercial considerations should certainly be made the subject of political negotiations. So far as one can tell, no serious study was made of possible alternative sources of energy for Western Europe, such as the largest deposits of Norwegian natural gas. If the industrial democracies feel the necessity of subsidising their exports by easy pricing and credit policies, the creative area for such efforts is in the developing world, particularly in the moderate, market oriented countries, not in the Soviet Bloc.

It is urgent for the industrial democracies to end the petty and unworthy disputes over tactics and concentrate on developing a common strategy. They must decide on a united approach to credit, exports, and alternative energy supplies.

The Developing Nations: Africa

These issues may or may not seem of direct interest to South Africa but they define the context of American views of Africa and of your own country. And the American perspective on Africa is part of an over-all perception of the developing world.

The emergence of the developing countries no doubt will one day be seen as one of the seminal events in world history. In 1945 there were some 50 sovereign states; after a generation of decolonisation the number had tripled. Never before had foreign policy to be conducted with such a multiplicity of states in a world of instantaneous communication, shadowed by the spectre of nuclear war and under the pressures of a complex economic interdependence. For while the developing nations could not hope to achieve their aims without the aid of the industrialised states, the latter in turn could not sustain their prosperity without an assured supply of energy and raw materials at a fair price.

Mutual need did not necessarily — or at least immediately — produce mutual understanding or even serious dialogue. A vast philosophical gap separated the two sides. Many in the West saw in the new nations a replica of their own constitutional evolution; on the contrary, the new states were quite often in active rebellion against not only the tutelage but the institutions of the colonial powers. There was the naive Western assumption that the challenge to political stability was largely economic; that economic growth would more or less automatically produce political

stability. In fact, in many countries economic development undermined the traditional elements of political order. Iran is a good example. The Shah — for many years hailed as a modernising secular reformer — was overthrown by a coalition of forces that felt threatened by social progress, led by reactionary feudal landlords who resisted land reform, by Mullahs who objected to mass education, women's rights, and the cultural influences of the modern world, and by professionals threatened by the inflation inseparable from industrialisation. And the same process could repeat itself elsewhere, under conditions of the success of economic and social advance. The corollary is, of course, that economic and social advance not buttressed by corresponding political change makes an explosion inevitable.

Many new nations, after an initial flirtation with parliamentary democracy, chose some version of Marxism as their model. They did so ironically not because of the efficacy of Marxist economics but rather because its political theory provided a kind of answer to the riddle of political legitimacy. Marxism furnished a justification for oligarchic and occasionally one-man rule without the inconvenience of elections. But it brought with it as well the usual baggage of Marxist economic planning with the well known consequences of stagnation, administrative rigidity, and corruption.

For a while, these Marxist regimes sought to use the so-called non-aligned movement to exact by political pressure the economic development assistance that their system wasted and their politics made meaningless. The secretariat of the so-called group of 77 fell more or less into their hands. I once reviewed the declarations of the non-aligned conferences in the late 1970s and I found not a single statement of approbation for anything done by the United States nor any criticism of actions by the Soviet Union. Now it is statistically impossible for the United States to be wrong 100 per cent of the time and for the Soviet Union never to make a mistake. And it is absurd for a group to call itself "Non-Aligned" while professing such one-sided views.

Something deeper, more intangible was involved. There existed, to be sure, a certain ideological affinity for "Socialism" which came to be identified with the Soviet Union and an understandable resentment of historical colonialism. More important was the consciousness that criticism of the United States involved next to no risk while the penalties for opposition to the Soviet Union could be severe. This was all the more true because many developing countries, and almost all of those of Africa, faced exactly the opposite of the problem of their Western counterparts at a comparable stage of historical evolution. Most Western countries were nations before they formed states; in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world, the state often preceded the nation. Boundaries were

frequently artificial, reflecting the convenience and territorial compromises of former colonial rulers. In these circumstances the concept of a loyal opposition — the essence of modern democracy — is difficult to implement for reality supports the natural temptation of political leaders to consider an assault on their personal position as a threat to domestic cohesion. By the same token, an outside power known to have a considerable capacity for subversion can gain a disproportionate influence.

And yet sooner or later reality will impose itself. The Soviet Union can threaten subversion but offer no useful development programme. It exports weapons and proxy troops but no hope for economic or diplomatic progress. The non-aligned movement may at last begin to live up to its name. We are thus in a position to think of a serious and realistic economic and political dialogue with the developing nations of Africa and elsewhere based on true reciprocity and without ideological blinders.

The following principles should govern this dialogue:

As a superpower the United States has an interest — together where possible with its allies — to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting the uncertainties, dislocations, and occasional turmoil of the process of development. Americans are beginning to learn that the danger of subversion or of exploited local discontent must be dealt with in a timeframe more immediate than even the best designed process of development and reform. We know even when some potential victims do not, that once Soviet totalitarianism — or its various proxy forms — is established, the process is very difficult to reverse. Indeed under the Brezhnev doctrine the Soviet Union claims the right to impose this irreversibility by force. For all these reasons the United States cannot abdicate its strategic interests in developing countries even when it is less than satisfied with all local circumstances. We will not fail to respond if the Soviet Union or its proxies seek to dominate areas of vital concern to us.

At the same time the developing world, and Africa especially, should not be viewed simply or even primarily as an arena of superpower confrontation. For the objective of our foreign policy must be to create an international system that most of its members wish to maintain. No international order can survive unless the more than 100 new and developing nations become supporting participants in it. And they will feel that only if they have a stake by sharing in the fruits of progress. The true challenge to the West is not to our economic capacity, but to our political understanding. We should not let ourselves be blackmailed; but we cannot make our contribution to international peace unless we help fulfill the hopes and aspirations of the responsible African states and other members of the developing world. In a broad sense, this is an important component of America's strategic interest in a stable and peaceful international order.

The conditions for such a dialogue have improved considerably in

recent years. Developing countries, especially in Africa, need not listen to Western preachments about the hopelessness of the Marxist system: All they have to do is survey the results of African experiments with it. In case after case, socialist models have brought near-bankruptcy to countries richly endowed with natural and human resources and vast potential. This need not continue to be so, but to reverse the trend toward stagnation and decay will require a new look at reality.

It is also becoming clear that tactics of confrontation are self-defeating. Developing nations in Africa are increasingly learning that if they rely on Soviet or proxy forces they will mortgage their independence. And more and more members of the so-called non-aligned grouping are coming to the realisation that they must find some relationship between their political rhetoric and their economic and social aspirations. They are sovereign states; they have a right to whatever domestic system and foreign policy they choose. But the industrial democracies are also sovereign, and have a right to give assistance to friends rather than congenital opponents. We have political, economic, and moral reasons to give aid, but Third World nations cannot expect both to conduct foreign policies consistently hostile to us and at the same time to receive our economic support. They will have to decide what meaning to give to genuine non-alignment.

Finally, in a period of austerity in the industrialised world, official aid budgets are not going to be substantially increased. Developing countries will have to adjust to the reality that foreign private investment is the most promising source of development capital. And they will have to reflect about the political and economic incentives to attract such capital.

As for the United States, there is every reason to hope that we have transcended our traditional oscillation between considering the developing nations simply as cold-war pawns and the sentimentality of seeking to win over radicals by pretending to share their slogans. Revolutionaries will not be charmed out of the convictions of a lifetime by invocations of abstract goodwill. The United States is at last prepared for a mature partnership based on mutually realistic expectations. We must find the means both to help the developing countries toward sustainable economic growth and to expand the world trading system which is the key to the wellbeing of all societies. On this basis there is an unusual opportunity for a new constructive relationship.

South Africa

And so I come at last to my host country, the Republic of South Africa. I am not here with a blueprint of how to solve problems that the centuries have spawned and decades have made intractable. I want to describe how your country's international situation appears to a well-disposed outsider. There seem to me to be four fundamental realities.

First: In terms of resources and technical skill, South Africa is in a unique position to promote the peace and progress of the continent. There would be extraordinary prospects were South Africa able to achieve an accommodation with its neighbours.

Second: Black Africa has an immense stake in the shared enterprise of building security and prosperity in Africa: The potential value of constructive relations with its neighbour to the south should be clear. Black Africa pays an enormous price, moreover, when its countries allow themselves to be occupied by tens of thousands of non-African combat troops — irrespective of the pretext for their being there. There is no profit for Africans if the continent remains a battleground for superpower contention in its crudest form. Those in Moscow and Havana who seek to perpetuate the presence of foreign troops in Africa do not have Africa's interests in mind; they undoubtedly prefer the perpetuation of tensions and seek to *prevent* conditions of co-operation and mutual security among the nations of the continent.

All African states need to face up to this truth. A better alternative is available.

Third: South Africa is of the greatest strategic importance to the non-communist world, not only geographically but also in terms of resources, some of them nearly irreplaceable elsewhere.

Fourth: However this last reality has one powerful limiting condition. Even the best-disposed Americans are shaped and bound by their country's deeply held ideals of liberty. South Africans must not deceive themselves with comforting thoughts about strategic geography and resources into believing that severe moral and political differences will not override them. Nor can even the most geopolitically-oriented American statesmen fail to take into account the aspirations and convictions of the preponderant majority of the continent, as they have been impressed upon me in recent days in Zambia and Zimbabwe.

South Africans have a right to ask for some patience with respect to the special complexities of their situation. But that time is not unlimited. Those who wish South Africa well, and would like it to take its full place in international affairs, will not be able to find common ground with you as long as the system of institutionalised racial discrimination persists.

The steps that have been taken to ease petty apartheid, the measures to broaden the political rights of Coloureds and Indians and the economic conditions of Blacks — and the signs that your Government is trying to think creatively and promote change and is paying a serious political price for it — these are noted, and appreciated. But your friends would render you no service if they implied that these were anything but the first steps on a long journey.

The present policy will *not* provide the ultimate solution to the problem

of power sharing, (either in political arrangements or homeland policy.) Devising a more equitable form of federalism or confederalism — or some other just political institutions depends on the creativity and determination of *all the peoples of South Africa*. I can only say that a system which respects human dignity, extends due process, provides for equal individual rights and protects the principle of citizenship will garner sympathetic outside support in many quarters.

The efforts being made to improve the economic and educational status of Blacks, moreover, imply their own political logic. As the Black population rises in its skills and capabilities, it will increasingly develop its own articulate leadership and consciousness of its condition — and its potential. Thus, as so often before in history, the more genuine the material progress being made by the Black community — the more it creates the need for an appropriate political framework.

I do not pretend to know the details of the final destination. Too many outsiders have offered facile slogans drawn from the experience of homogeneous societies and different historical circumstances. Clearly South Africa will have to find its own path. South Africa's friends would eagerly extend support to any constructive solution that embodies the fundamental principles of human dignity, civil rights, and full political participation. The best advice a friend can offer now is to plead urgently for a heroic effort to take the initiative in consultation with all the peoples of this country, to devise new structures and concepts compatible with the fundamental values of other Western societies. History is kind to political leaders who use a margin of choice while it is still available; those who wait on events are usually overwhelmed by them.

The period before pressures become overwhelming should be used for an act of constructive statesmanship. The best way to keep Soviet influence out of the region is first to ameliorate and then to eliminate the conditions which facilitate its entry.

In this context I must mention the negotiations over Namibia which have now reached a critical stage. They are an essential first step. If this festering problem is resolved there is a chance for a period of calm and restraint which could give diplomacy an opportunity to ameliorate the tensions encumbering Southern Africa's future. A diplomatic settlement offers hope of containing or reducing the spiral of cross-border violence and establishing a more secure future for all the states of the region.

Ending cross-border violence by all sides clearly requires as well the withdrawal of Cuban combat forces from Angola in parallel with the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia. Such conditions will make it possible for the US to recognise the Angolan regime.

I do not know whether Southern Africa is heading for further tragedy, or for a future of progress and reconciliation. I know only that the history

of the remainder of this century will be full of dramatic events, and much of the history of that period will be made on this continent. Your beautiful and dramatic country will be a major actor in the unfolding drama. Your friends can only wish you well in any efforts to provide that the continent on which you live can be a showplace for the peace of the world and the reconciliation of the races.

Michael Howard

Europe, the Superpowers and Africa

Of the three entities in the title, whose relationship I have been invited to discuss, only the second one, "The Superpowers", is self-explanatory. Even if one defines "Europe" in terms of Western Europe (and there is no historical, cultural or geographic reason why one should do so), we are still dealing with a most diverse group of communities, about whose attitudes to and relations with the African continent any generalization is likely to be wrong. The same applies yet more strongly to Africa itself, even if we confine the term (and the existence of the OAU inhibits us from doing so) to Sub-Saharan Africa. "Black Africa", from Chad to Mozambique, from Sudan to Zambia, is almost infinitely diverse. This diversity however is mitigated by two factors of cohesion. One is common hostility to the Republic of South Africa, whose regime evokes in all of them a deep sense of racial community. The other is (with inconsiderable exceptions) a shared experience of European colonization, which has moulded a series of "special relationships" with their former masters; relationships not necessarily welcome, but as inescapable as the link that bound Prospero and Caliban in *The Tempest*:

You taught me language, and my profit on't
Is, I know how to curse.

Not all European powers were involved in the colonization of Africa, but Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Belgium make up a respectable list. On the Africans themselves the impact of European rule was in some places superficial, elsewhere profound. The difference between Anglophone and Francophone Africa is not one of language alone; and even if it were, language, through moulding consciousness, creates

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much else besides. Much as the new African states may wish, with the weary connivance of their former masters, to create a brand new political structure, neither party can escape from their past.

We can therefore begin by saying that in spite of their several diversities, Africa and Europe are connected by a relationship that is quite independent of either Superpower, and makes it difficult for European statesmen to consider Africa primarily in terms of Superpower confrontation. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States displayed more than the most marginal of interest in Africa before the 1950's, and the absence of knowledge of, or even curiosity about, African affairs that one still finds even in American academic circles would no doubt be paralleled in Soviet universities outside specialized institutes. But those Europeans most concerned with African affairs (and by "Europeans" I shall from now on signify French and British unless I specify otherwise) are usually those most reluctant to see Africa in any kind of "cold war" perspective; but it is rare to find even an American scholar — and I suspect impossible to find a Russian — who thinks about it in any other terms.

This is not, I believe, because Europeans are particularly naive about Soviet intentions. Rather it is because of their experience of African idiosyncracies; of African capacity to reject certain aspects of exogenous cultures and absorb others, making them into something defiantly and unmistakably their own. African socialism certainly owes something to Marx and Lenin, probably studied at the London School of Economics or at the Sorbonne. But it owes even more to the Christian missionary schools in which so many of the present generation of African leaders were educated; to the experience (good or bad) of benevolent colonial authoritarianism; but most of all to cultural patterns that persisted unchanged through the hundred years or so of colonial rule. No serious Africanist can visualize the continent as a simple arena for ideological struggle, a prize to be fought over between the "Free" and the communist worlds. But it is an area full of its own internecine conflicts, the protagonists in which can be relied on to exploit the Great Power rivalry for their own purposes. European analysts therefore prefer to consider Africa's relations with the Superpowers in terms of intra-African rivalries, to which the Superpowers are, at least initially, peripheral; and there is a strong prejudice in favour of the belief that Superpower intervention is likely to prove counterproductive, both for their own interests and for those of the party on whose behalf they intervene. American reluctance to intervene in Angola was widely regarded in Europe, not as a lamentable failure of nerve, but as an admirable if not entirely typical example of wise restraint.

European attitudes towards South Africa and its conflicts with its northern neighbours are powerfully affected by their relationship with, and their

perception of, the Black African states. About these attitudes it is unwise to generalize even within specific European countries, let alone between them. Attitudes in Britain are most complex of all. Britain more than any other country is dependent on its commercial ties with South Africa. At a populist level we probably have more sympathy with the White minority than any of our European neighbours. Resentment at racial immigration into Britain, wartime memories among the old generation, desire to maintain sporting links among the younger, all feed into a strong if inarticulate South African lobby. But against this are the traditional liberal views which dominate (I am glad to say) Whitehall, and which are reinforced by every new revelation of the activities of the South African security police. These views also dominate all political parties except a small group on the right wing of the Conservatives, and they are widely reflected in all parts of the Press. Even the *Realpolitik* of the City of London and the great trading corporations is modified by their awareness of Britain's comparable dependence on good trading relations with Black Africa, particularly Nigeria. Beyond this there is a general perception, shared by successive British Governments of all parties and reinforced by their Commonwealth partners (whose influence on such questions must not be underestimated) that there is nothing to be gained by supporting a regime that has earned the hostility of the entire non-aligned world, and a great deal to be lost. Other regimes may be no less repressive, and the behaviour of their security forces no less outrageous, but no other quite so overtly bases its oppression on the factor of Race.

These conflicting interests have produced in the British Government's attitude towards South Africa a combination of moral disapproval with uninhibited pursuit of self-interest; a Pecksniffian and sanctimonious position that no one can applaud, but to which it is difficult to suggest a realistic alternative. The attitude of her European neighbours is little different, though, as is so often the case, the North Europeans are more prolific in their moral condemnation, the Southern in their pursuit of self-interest. The French continue to display their usual skill in maintaining excellent relations with their associates in Black Africa while exploiting every opportunity to trade, especially in armaments, with the South. But in general it is the desire to maintain close and friendly links with Black Africa, as expressed in the Lomé Convention, that has determined the European attitude to South Africa, rather than moral condemnation of a regime whose repressiveness differs from many others only in being more effective.

Europeans are thus, in general, more conscious of the North-South (or rather the Black-White) confrontation in Africa than of the East-West, and are resistant to attempts by Americans, and still more by South Africans, to equate the two. But before saying anything more about European

attitudes towards African problems, I must deal with the second side, as it were, of the triangle: Europe's attitude to the rivalry of the Super-Powers.

Like most people of my generation I have been brought up to see Europe (or rather, Western Europe, with Eastern Europe as *terra irredenta*) simply as one part, with the United States, of "the West", or more euphemistically, "the Free World"; a partner in the enterprise of preserving and extending pluralist democratic government and containing the expansion of Soviet imperialism into our own territories or anyone else's. I certainly do not see Europe as an actor on the world scene equally detached and aloof from both Superpowers. In this respect at least I find myself in agreement with the polemicists of the Soviet Union for whom Western Europe is merely one element in a single world system of bourgeois finance capitalism which embraces not only Western Europe and the United States but also Japan, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and the capitalist states of South-East Asia. And if we look at the matter in strictly economic terms we have to admit that they are right. This is a global system, linked by a more or less free flow of trade and capital, highly interdependent and dominated by a rather small number of banking houses and corporations on whose efficient functioning the prosperity of the whole depends. When Washington (or rather New York) sneezes, everyone catches cold, and the same applies to Frankfurt, London and Tokyo. Even if we were to dismiss the ideological and cultural affinities that bind us together as ineffectual romanticism, the hard realities of economic interest tie Western Europe into this Western system and cut us off from that dominated by the Soviet Union. If we are to dismiss anyone as being impractical and romantic, it must be those groups who wish to see Western Europe as "non-aligned".

Just the same, the old Atlanticist clichés are beginning to have rather a dated look. A whole generation has passed since that post-war decade when American capital, ideology and military power filled the vacuum left in Western Europe by the exhaustion and the destruction of the Second World War. During that generation a great deal has changed. Europe has now recovered, both politically and economically, to a point where her economic prosperity embarrasses and challenges that of the United States. This has not only produced conflicts, inevitable in a free market system, between the industries of the two groups, particularly marked in such vulnerable areas as the steel and automobile industries. Economic prosperity has also restored in Western Europe aspirations to political autonomy; aspirations blocked mainly by the cultural and other diversities which so far have made it impossible to clothe the skeleton of the European Economic Community with any kind of political or military flesh and blood. It is notable that it is in those countries where economic recovery has been least spectacular, Britain and Italy, that traditional

Atlanticist sentiment has remained at its strongest. But if we look at the two most successful European powers, we find that France has reasserted herself as an independent actor on the world scene acknowledging no obligations whatever to the United States. The position of West Germany is more ambiguous, but within the framework of a loyal *Westpolitik* she has pursued an independent *Ostpolitik*, of reconciliation with her compatriots of the DDR and of conciliation with the Soviet Union; one that accords with her historic centrist policies in the European system but is viewed with deep suspicion, if not in Washington then everywhere else in the United States.

These developments have brought about a growing divergence between Western Europe and the United States over relations with the Soviet Union. Whereas the United States still regards the Soviet Union as a global adversary in an irreconcilable confrontation of power and ideology — a confrontation in which there is no room for neutrals and which can end only in victory for one side or the other (a mirror image, in fact, of the official Soviet view of the confrontation) the Europeans rather see the Soviet Union as a difficult and neurotic neighbour, but one with whom accommodation is possible and with whom they must somehow learn to live. Where the United States is primarily conscious of the growth of Soviet military power, the Europeans stress rather the social strains and calamitous economic weakness within the Soviet Empire. Where Americans see in Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the dangerous extension of the Soviet military reach, Europeans tend to read it, as they read the crisis in Poland, as evidence of Soviet political failure. Where Americans see in trade with the Soviet Union a gratuitous donation to Soviet economic and military strength, Europeans regard it as an acceptable price to pay if it increases the economic resilience on which, in the long run, their own security depends.

So we see the paradox that the West Europeans, the most exposed and vulnerable members of the Western community, display more self-confidence in their handling of the Soviet Union than does their immensely more powerful and threatened ally the United States. Many Americans attribute this to a mixture of greed, irresponsibility and weakness, but there is more to it than that. There is a reluctance in Western Europe to regard the Soviet Union as completely unregenerate, as a total and implacable adversary. We still tend to see them, perhaps anachronistically, as the same Russians with whom we have been interacting, sometimes as allies, sometimes as adversaries, for the past four hundred years; unreliable, paranoid, generously idealistic, brutal but withal manageable. Left wing parties in Europe retain their sympathy for the aspirations of the Russian Revolution, even though most of them now condemn the horrific consequences to which it gave rise. For them the

Russians may be deviant but they are not alien. Many Conservatives, especially in the bureaucracies, are unwilling to discount all those centuries of diplomatic intercourse when Russia was part of the European system, or to believe that as a result of the Revolution the Russians have changed their spots to the extent that they themselves would like the world to suppose. Their attitude is best summed up in de Gaulle's vision of a Europe reunited from the Atlantic to the Urals.

This is of course a fantasy. The Soviet Union does not stop at the Urals, and it is a fantasy which the British, whose concern with Russian expansion in Asia has long historic roots, are less inclined than their continental neighbours to share. But it is equally a fantasy to assume that the United States stops at the Alleghenies; a fantasy that has been harshly dispelled by political events in America during the last fifteen years. For America has changed just as much as has Europe over the course of a generation. The East Coast Atlanticists, those Ivy-League, European-oriented elites whose vision and enterprise launched the Atlantic Community, are now elder statesmen. The political and economic centre of gravity has moved from the East Coast to the South and West. Presidential advisers are less likely to be drawn from Harvard-trained corporation lawyers from New York than from Californian real-estate and advertising agencies. This group contains people of great ability, but they have little sympathy for Europe, no background in international politics, and a very hard line indeed towards the Soviet Union; an entity that they view not as a historical community but as an abstract amalgam of ideological hostility and military power. During the Nixon Administration the presence and talents of Henry Kissinger kept these figures in the background, at least so far as foreign policy was concerned. Under President Reagan the attempts of Mr Alexander Haig to keep them at bay have been less successful. Today we have to deal with an American administration whose conduct of international relations, whether in the fields of economics, politics or military affairs, is not marred by any residual sympathy for European susceptibilities, or concern for the welfare of the peoples of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

Thus, although there is no question of a breach between the United States and its European allies, and no serious danger as yet of European "neutralism", the relations between the two are now marked by recurrent tensions arising from genuine differences of interest and perception. This is nowhere more apparent than in their approaches towards Third World questions in general, and African in particular. There is not very much response in Europe to those geopolitical analyses so popular in the United States that depict the African continent in terms of a land mass controlling sea lanes vital to the maritime communities of the North Atlantic; a mass over which the Soviet Union wishes to acquire a total and, for the West,

lethal dominance that can be countered only by supporting the sole reliable bulwark of anti-Communism in the area, namely South Africa. Even if one were to accept this analysis as valid, the question would still arise as to whether the best way either to effect or to combat "control of the African land mass" is to align oneself with the one state to which every other on the continent has declared itself irredeemably hostile; and over whose own political and social stability there hangs in the long run, I am afraid, a very large question mark indeed.

A less pretentious version of the geo-political argument is advanced by some naval strategists, who postulate the advantages offered by naval bases in South Africa in protecting access to the oil resources of the Middle East in the event of a prolonged war with the Soviet Union. Without arguing about the plausibility of such a scenario (which would have to take into account the Soviet capacity to deny the West those resources by much more direct means) we have to consider whether that eventuality is so probable that the West should allow it to determine its whole peacetime policy towards the African continent; and whether such an alignment would not provide the Soviet Union with opportunities of penetration into Black Africa that would give them in their turn considerable strategic advantages in any struggle for control of the waters both of the Indian Ocean and of the South Atlantic.

This is a question that must be left to naval experts. But the naval element is only one of many that have to be taken into account in calculating Western interests in Africa, and few Europeans — even European strategists — would argue that it is in any way the most important.

There can be little doubt that the Soviet Union is very alive to the strategic advantages that "control" of the African coasts would give them in any armed conflict with the West: they have their admirals as well. But outside the Horn of Africa, whose conflicts are *sui generis*, the main opportunities for Soviet penetration have been provided by the struggle between White South Africa and its Black neighbours which was brought to a head by the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in 1974. The indigenous elements that seized power in Angola and Mozambique were, inevitably, socialists and *Marxisant*. The South African Government naturally dreaded the advance of African socialism to their own borders, with all the opportunities this would give for the destabilization of their own White minority government, and, in Angola, attempted intervention. The newly independent states were not reluctant to turn to Moscow for help, and the Soviet Union, with its Cuban associates, was not reluctant to help them. One may argue endlessly as to whether a credible threat of American intervention, could one have been made, would have deterred the Soviet Union from fishing in these troubled waters. Perhaps it would;

but the danger would then have been that the United States would have had to underwrite, in association with South Africa, the stability of a client regime, the White provenance of whose support would be a source of chronic weakness. The United States had only just, with enormous difficulty and no little humiliation, disentangled itself from a comparable situation in South-East Asia. It was only common prudence that deterred it from becoming involved in another.

That the Americans were likely to be so prudent was no doubt a factor in Soviet calculations, but the Soviet-sponsored intervention did not arouse so much alarm in Europe as might have been expected. Not only, as we have seen, did the Europeans have some experience of African capacity to convert exogenous ideology and aid to their own purposes, but they had had intimate and sometimes painful experience of the inability of African successor regimes, with their vast problems of administration and voracious need for resources, to free themselves of dependence on the Western interests that had developed their economies and the Western markets that they supplied. It was a cause of no great surprise therefore when in Angola Cuban troops ended up guarding the installations of Gulf Oil, and when Mozambique became if anything yet more dependent on its economic links with South Africa. Realization of this continuing dependence enables us to set in the right perspective the subversive paramilitary activities sponsored by the Soviet consul-general in Mozambique. This realization also lay behind the British (and no doubt also the American) calculation, that the Marxist-led regime of Mr Mugabe, once it was shown to command effective popular support, provided a better guarantee of future stability in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia than the White-backed government of Bishop Muzorewa, after it had become obvious that the Bourbon policy of White supremacy under Ian Smith provided a recipe for certain disaster.

Clearly Zimbabwe has not achieved stability yet. The problem of reconciling inter-tribal rivalries, satisfying popular expectations yet preserving enough confidence among Western nations to prevent a haemorrhage of capital and skills, a problem that besets all African successor states, is no easier to solve in Zimbabwe than elsewhere. But it is a problem that can be solved by Africans alone, and it is one that has little relevance to the ideologies of the Cold War. In the eyes of most Europeans the future of Namibia can only be settled in the same way, and whatever its shortcomings SWAPO appears to most of us in Europe to be the only organization legitimized by sufficient popular support to be able to do it.

One can understand the reluctance of the South Africans to relinquish their grip on Namibia. To those brought up to believe that the spread of African socialism is only an element in "the total onslaught of Godless Communism", the advance of the frontiers of this alien and hostile creed

into the very heartland of the Republic must appear as a strategic catastrophe. Even those who take a more neutral view of African national socialism must admit that the South Africans have here a real, and alarming problem. Even if the "Front Line States" are likely to be too concerned with their own internal problems to be interested in actively prosecuting the race war in South Africa, there is no doubt where their sympathies lie; and they can hardly refrain from providing at least sanctuary and support for Azanian "freedom fighters" if called upon to do so. Even if they wished, however, they do not have the degree of social control needed to police their long frontiers and prevent succour finding its way to such groups from native or foreign sympathisers. Nor is it politically possible for them publicly to disown them. Watching the build-up of hostile forces beyond their frontiers the South Africans will have every incentive, if not justification, to pre-empt their attacks by overt or covert means. The struggle will continue, and the Blacks will be naturally inclined, in pursuit of the struggle, to accept arms, advice and training from any friendly quarter; the Soviet Union not excluded.

The extent of Soviet support for insurgency in South Africa lends some plausibility to the South African claim that they are manning the bulwarks against the global Communist onslaught; but the nature of the South African regime makes it difficult to regard it, save under the kind of desperate emergency that brought the West and the Soviet Union into alliance against Nazi Germany, as a convincing partner in the defence of democratic values. After all, Hitler was also manning the barriers against the advance of "Godless communism". The problem lies not in the help that the Soviet Union and its allies are providing to the Front Line states, but in the internal conditions in South Africa, the apparent development of "an objective revolutionary situation" that makes such help acceptable. Nobody in the West, apart from a few fanatics, wishes to see South Africa collapse into revolutionary chaos. Most are clear sighted enough to realize that under any successor regime that is likely to emerge all but a tiny elite, whether Black, White or Coloured, will look back to the present position, with all its inequity, as to a vanished Eden. But there are many who fear that in supporting the existing South African Government they would be aligning themselves with not only an unworthy but ultimately a lost cause. Everyone is happy to make hay while the sun shines, but even the least ideologically-motivated European businessman is reluctant to be found backing a loser.

There is nothing specifically "European" about this attitude. It is one widely held in the United States as well, and there is a broad consensus on both sides of the Atlantic about the policies that should be adopted to handle the situation. We must use such leverage as we have with the Frontline States to persuade them to withhold support from the guerrillas

and from those forces, internal and external, that wish to supply them, while pressing the South African Government in those policy initiatives that will reconcile those Black elites on whose support the stability of the Republic must ultimately rest. It is a policy easy to sketch out in broad outline. Comparable situations in the Middle East and South-East Asia have shown how desperately difficult it is to apply in practise. The Rhodesian settlement provides one encouraging successful example, but even that was made possible only by a prolonged and exhausting war.

Where European attitudes differ, I suspect, from those dominant in the United States is in a widespread feeling that in the last resort the collapse of the present White regime would have to be accepted, and that we would have to learn to live with its successors as we have learned to live with successor regimes elsewhere in Africa and the rest of the world. The implications of any such outcome are quite horrifying to contemplate, and even to mention it reeks of defeatism. In the Republic itself there would be anarchy, ineluctably succeeded by tyranny, and the resultant economic collapse would shake the world's trading system to its foundations. The impact of such a catastrophe would be comparable to that of the Russian Revolution itself. But such revolutions are eruptions occasioned by tensions and conflicts lying deep within the society concerned. They can be neither averted nor reversed by external intervention. Two centuries of experience suggests that under such circumstances the only feasible role for outside powers, however sympathetic they may have been to the *ancien regime*, is rescue-work, damage limitation, and help with reconstruction once the dust has settled. Nothing provides a revolutionary regime with more effective, and instant, legitimacy than the perception that the old order is being propped up by foreign bayonets. In an African context, nothing would more rapidly unleash a continent-wide race war.

Musings of this kind may seem unnecessarily apocalyptic, but they do have an immediate policy relevance. It has to be made clear to both sides that in the last resort the South African Government cannot rely on Western support in its suppression of the Black liberation movements, and the fact that its enemies are receiving support from our adversaries does not give it any claim on our help. Any misunderstanding on this point could be fatal.

It would be arrogant to imply that these views are typical of Europeans generally. I would claim however that they are widely shared. The British Government cannot ignore its strong liberal pressure-groups, much less the views of its Commonwealth partners. The French Government under M. Mitterand has given priority to a "Third World" orientation wherever this does not directly conflict with French interests. The Germans are above all concerned with avoiding involvement in conflicts outside Europe. The idealists of Northern Europe are vociferous in their hostility

to the South African regime, while the political leaders of Southern Europe have trouble enough of their own without involving themselves in other peoples'. In the event of a war erupting in South Africa the European reaction would be to remain as uninvolved as possible, and to make peace at the earliest feasible moment with whichever group emerged victorious, whatever its political complexion and whatever the extent of its reliance on Soviet support. It would be ignorant to imply that these views are not also widely held in the United States. There is nothing specifically "European" about them. But it would be fair to suggest that they are not characteristic of the declaratory policy of the Reagan Administration or of its ideological supporters, and the tendency of these groups to see Southern Africa almost exclusively in terms of Superpower confrontation has caused in Europe genuine alarm.

Admittedly on this issue, as on so many others, the Reagan Administration has moved a long way in the past eighteen months. The general lack of interest in the United States in African affairs makes U-turns in this region easier than in many others; Mrs Kirkpatrick's ill-advised contacts with the South African military authorities have been disclaimed, and Chester Crocker's handling of South African affairs for the State Department seem little different from the Nixon policy of "constructive engagement". The United States, no less than its European partners, is struggling to move the South African Government to take bolder initiatives on its own account to avert disaster.

What the American attitude would be in the event of "disaster" is, however, less clear. It is unlikely that the United States would accept "losing South Africa" so philosophically as would the Europeans. There seems to be an instinctive tendency on the part of the American people to see international relations as a "zero-sum game" that one either wins or loses, and the view of the Third World as an arena of conflict between the forces of tyranny and those of freedom dies hard. The fact that the Soviet Union backs a particular group or a particular country is seen as sufficient cause in itself to support its opponents; the idea that Soviet and American interests might in some cases coincide, or at least not necessarily conflict, is a very difficult one to get across to an American electorate. However subtle and far-sighted the policy of successive American Administrations, there would still be powerful support for the view that the overthrow of the White government in South Africa would be a catastrophic loss for "the Free World", and a huge increment to the power of the Soviet Union, and that American power should in the last resort be committed to prevent this from happening. As with Israel, however badly it may behave internally and externally, the survival of South Africa (that is, White-dominated South Africa) is believed by many to be so vital to the interests of the West that American power should if necessary be used to underwrite

it. Their perception of this is bound to be a factor in the South African Government's own handling of the situation.

Where the Soviet Union perceives its own interests to lie is a matter for speculation. The Russians cannot altogether regret the continued existence of so convenient a devil-figure, which provides them with so many opportunities for influence and propaganda in Black Africa. They have no cause to suppose that any Black successor regime would be compliant with their demands, and they can certainly foresee how importunate would be its clamour for aid. The collapse of the South African economy with all its implications for the international trading system is something about which they must feel ambivalent: like St. Augustine's chastity, however desirable in the abstract, it would be inconvenient to implement immediately. It is by no means clear, in short, that in South Africa the Superpowers are necessarily playing a zero-sum game.

For most Europeans the question of Soviet involvement in Africa is marginal to the problems of that continent, and that creates difficulties with those Americans who consider it to be central. This difference of view does not arise out of the distinction that Henry Kissinger once mistakenly drew (and has since publicly regretted) between the global interests of the United States and the "regional" interests of its European partners. If anything the interests of the Europeans in Africa are more considerable, and they are certainly of longer standing, than those of the United States. It is the very intensity of European involvement in Africa, their intimate knowledge of so many parts of it and their consciousness of the part they have played in its development that make them resistant to the "reductionism" that characterizes the rhetoric of the Reagan Administration. The problems of Africa has to be comprehended, and if possible solved, in their own terms. The solutions can only come from the Africans themselves. Whatever they may be, they are unlikely to give much satisfaction to the ideologues either of the East or the West.

Europe's role in Africa: a German view

May I begin by expressing my gratitude for your invitation to explain my views to you on this subject. As an active politician, I do not speak with the detachment of the scientist. Although a dedicated European, I do not have any political mandate for Europe. Nor do I represent the Government of my country — unless you mean tomorrow's Government! The opinions expressed here by me are also those of my political friends, i.e. the strongest political grouping in the Federal Republic of Germany. I expressed this very same view in 1980 to the governmental representatives of Black Africa in Arusha, within the framework of meetings of the Social Democratic Friedrich Ebert Foundation, just as I expressed it in our parliament, too, even though this was not an easy task. Some of you know the relevant texts.

Our country must fulfil its role in Europe and also throughout the world in accordance with its wide-ranging political and economic interests. The Federal Republic's policy, geared towards these goals, is bilateral in nature. Moreover, as we are a member of the United Nations and the Atlantic Alliance, as well as the European Community, it is also of a multilateral nature. At the same time, these various links make it virtually impossible for a middle-ranking power to avoid certain misunderstandings and annoyances within the overall context of German policy. One particularly regrettable fact is that Europe has still not adequately developed the uniform political voice and strength which corresponds to its potential. This observation applies in particular to Europe's relationship with Africa and to its manifold political and economic problems. It would be foolish of us to try and deny that our English and French neighbours have much more concrete links in Africa than we do for various historic and political reasons, not to mention their long-standing economic

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interests. As a result, we can operate with fewer inhibitions — although there are significant exceptions. Extensive parts of Africa do not speak our language but that of our neighbours, and it was these neighbours of ours who brought them into close contact with the European Community. Despite these reservations, I am convinced that the spiritual and political foundations of the European Community will be effectively strengthened.

Preserving and changing traditional systems, as well as shaping the necessary changes are problems which are not confined to Africa. Though subject to other preconditions, we ourselves have to develop in similar areas of tension. The whole international system even seems to us to fluctuate between the poles of established order and change.

The crisis afflicting the world political system may be ascribed to various political, economic, sociopolitical and social factors. At the time when this system arose, only about 30 to 40 states in the world had any real role to play.

Today, the community of nations comprises approximately 150 independent states. Clearly, that very number must in itself render any orientation process difficult.

All these countries which have entered the world's political scene since the mid-Fifties wish to find an appropriate place. They aspire to a hearing; and very often their new role engenders a great and sometimes exaggerated craving for recognition. Moreover, they are often inwardly not fully developed and their great cultural diversity is only now just beginning to become effective in the world community. Together, these factors are leading to insecurity and to disintegration of the hitherto existing international system. The resulting problems are compounded by the increased self-awareness on the part of the developing countries — a self-awareness which is decisively connected with the year of the first oil-crisis, 1973.

However, more and more developing countries are now on the path leading to integration within the international system. At the same time, the industrialized states have to provide the necessary assistance. They are being called upon to submit constructive proposals and to overcome their largely prohibitive policy. The way forward to participation by all states in world events can at best be promoted by the so-called global dialogue; but it cannot be definitively settled in detail. That would constitute an unrealistic assumption by virtue of the very fact that the developing countries are not a homogeneous group, but one marked by virtually inconceivable diversity in regional, economic, sociological, social and cultural terms. Growing importance will therefore attach in future to interregional forms of dialogue designed to permit a better approach to special situations.

The basic condition underlying integration consists in the willingness to

carry out changes in existing inner-state circumstances on all sides. Only a policy of adaptation to changed views as well as to new economic and social situations can ensure continued development. The important thing is to promote change and not to let things get into a rut.

When the Government of my country takes a close look at these views, it may perhaps not share them in full. Under the impact produced by the Brandt Commission's Report, some high-ranking representatives of the Bonn Coalition are disseminating the view that the establishment of reformed global orders forms the essential condition for resolving the decisive problems. On the other hand, governmental practice in Bonn presents the picture of a pronounced pragmatism. And thus I stick to my views.

These points may be checked against concrete facts. The German Government largely negotiated the Second Lomé Agreement as an economic system in terms of regulative criteria and examined the possibility of its application all over the world. Our allies had already rejected this systematic approach at their 1979 world economic summit in Tokyo. At the same time, they pursued their own legitimate economic goals. In the event, the subsidizing element in the Agreement predominated. Despite all the demands voiced by the European Parliament, its role as a means of developing economic and social change remained modest. The same holds true of its effect as the basis for joint forms of political approach between 56 States of the Third World and Europe. During the new negotiations on the substantial catalogue of benefits provided under this Agreement, we shall press for the realization of the above-mentioned goals. These questions clearly possess considerable importance for relations between Africa and Europe.

As regards bilateral relations, German policy-makers have defined numerous varied points of main effort in Africa — such as in Morocco, Egypt and Sudan; the Sahel Zone, Nigeria and Kenya; the Horn of Africa; and Tanzania. The circumstances underlying this approach are of a quite different nature in foreign policy and in development policy. As far as the safeguarding of geostrategic interests is concerned, there are certain additional wishes which I would voice — for example vis-à-vis Mauritius and Madagascar. But especially as regards these states, it would be possible to ask questions of South African policy. You are all aware of the emphasis placed by our Federal Government in its policy towards the frontline states and Zimbabwe. (R. von Lucius gave a precise account of this in the journal "Die politische Meinung" in November/December 1981). In supporting the SADCC and assisting scholarship-holders from Zimbabwe, the Federal Government is taking a risk — but, in our opinion, a risk which can be justified, at least in part.

It would be a fascinating task to discuss all this in detail. However, I

shall now try to determine our fundamental position on these issues.

In the opinion prevailing among my friends, German policy on Africa constitutes an integral part of the Federal Republic of Germany's foreign policy. In this field, special problems exist in regard to the Republic of South Africa and to South West Africa/Namibia. Mutual economic links and dependencies as well as common cultural interests stress the great significance which Europe and its neighbouring continent to the south possess for each other.

The geographic and economic position of southern Africa and its deposits of raw materials make it imperative to counteract the Soviet Union's attempt to extend its influence to other states in Africa. A particular danger consists in the influence and the operations of other non-African communist states, the instigation of wars by proxy and the terrorist activities of organizations which, under the guise of freedom movements, are in reality pursuing totalitarian aims.

The areas of political tension in Africa exercise a direct effect upon German, European and Atlantic interests. There exists the danger of a change in the world balance of power which will pose a threat to peace.

Our policy on Africa must be on its guard against self-deception, wishful thinking and the deliberate misguiding of others. The cultural and civilizational achievements of the black and white populations of southern Africa must not be destroyed. (In this context, it is interesting to study the cover-picture of "Frontline" II, 2, of December 1981).

In our view, the preservation of German interests consists in applying those principles which serve to safeguard and guarantee peace, justice, democracy and prosperity. The significance of this for our policy towards southern Africa is as follows:

In order to guarantee a peaceful development by all states in southern Africa in freedom, the Federal Republic must use its good offices vis-à-vis the relevant governments in promoting the swift implementation of political, legal and social changes. At the same time, it must beware of any vociferous intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.

The essential issue consists in maintaining the existing freedom, winning new freedoms, and guaranteeing secure relations between people of different race and colour.

European enterprises throughout Africa have rendered an important contribution to this by virtue of their exemplary conduct. Lively discussions are taking place in our country about these questions. Let me stress the following point in regard to the importance of this question for the domestic political scene in our country:

African policy must not become a function of the internal politics of European and North American states.

Renunciation of the threat and use of force constitutes one of the

principles of our foreign policy. However, the principle of renouncing force does not permit any options in its application. Those who seize power by means of force and terror also use force and terror to remain in power. For that reason, it is necessary to bring about the necessary changes in southern Africa by peaceful means. This demand applies in particular to the neighbouring states of the above-mentioned countries. In no circumstances must the Federal Republic of Germany give its direct or indirect support to acts of violence or the threat to use force.

We reject the curtailing or even the breaking-off of diplomatic relations with one of the states of southern Africa. In that way, German policy would lose any possibility of exercising its influence. The Federal Republic of Germany must also adhere to the established principles of international co-operation towards southern Africa. At the same time, it is also acting in the enlightened long-term interest of many African states.

Just as we unswervingly insist upon the right of the German people to accomplish the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination, so we also insist upon the right of all peoples to decide for themselves about their political future. The foreign policy pursued by the Federal Republic of Germany must therefore also serve in southern Africa towards strengthening the preconditions for a free exercise of the right of self-determination for all peoples and groups of the population living there and for supporting the possibility of peaceful and dignified relations between all the races, peoples and tribes who have lived in this region for centuries. The Federal Republic of Germany has an obligation to advocate the realization of human rights. The rights and freedoms of every individual man and woman set out in the Declaration of Human Rights and the UN covenants on human rights as well as in our constitution, the Basic Law, are indivisible.

All people are equally entitled to protection against arbitrary acts by the state, to social justice, and to participation in the political decision-making process.

Any racial, religious, political or social discrimination because of a person's colour and religion or the type of government existing in his country constitute infringements of human rights. Just as emphatically as we wish to see the end of apartheid in southern Africa, we also oppose a policy which demands the realization of human rights only in certain countries, whilst tolerating or even promoting severe infringements of such rights in others.

Viewed in this light, South Africa also represents a problem for our own policy. There has existed a much greater awareness of this in our country since the mid-Seventies. During the period 1976 to 1980, the German Federal Government's policy towards South Africa was substantially influenced by the Carter Administration. As is generally

known, this in turn was stamped by the opinions of UN Ambassador Andrew Young, who had no experience of foreign policy. His concern was to transfer the "American model" to South Africa. He failed to perceive that the US system cannot be transferred to a completely different country. Unfortunately, the Federal Government and Federal Foreign Minister Genscher have accepted the US views without the necessary reservations. Hans-Dietrich Genscher and some important representatives of the US Government (Carter, Mondalè, Young, McHenry) — though not, for example David Owen — demanded a policy of "one man—one vote" for South Africa. However, there were also voices of caution in the ranks of the German Government such as Egon Bahr's interview with the "Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt" in July 1977, or the Free Democratic Party's election declaration of October 1980. However, I was astonished to find that these varying statements were never quoted in speeches delivered in the plenary sessions of the United Nations. Regrettably, these speeches were not marked by any real struggle or search for answers to highly complex problems.

I have already made it clear that we in the CDU/CSU regard the overcoming of apartheid as indispensable and we adopt a critical attitude to the long-standing homelands policy. Any possible criticism of many other things in the world does not alter this fact — and that includes any possible self-criticism. But let us recall an observation ascribed to Dr Kissinger. He is reported to have stated after his first talks with the then Prime Minister of South Africa, Balthazar Johannes Vorster, that after meeting him he felt he had met a character from the Old Testament living in the 20th century. What does this imply? Presumably at least one thing: those who want freedom and self-determination for the Blacks in South Africa must not only take into account the determination as well as the military and economic strength of the White South Africans, whether English- or Afrikaans-speaking. They must also concede to this White African nation the only thing it does not possess: namely security for its children and grandchildren. Freedom for Black South Africa presupposes the finding of a way to protect, in terms of power politics, the right of existence for the White African nation as well as for the Coloureds and Indians there. Those people who do not realize this — and we level this reproach at the German Federal Government and the former American Administration — are hardly achieving anything more than simply presenting to South Africa an abyss of awful violence.

We read with great interest the remarks made by Mr Crocker in the edition of "Foreign Affairs" published at the end of 1979 or beginning of 1980. It is indeed our task in the West to encourage the conflicting parties of South Africa to go to the conference table and thus decide on the political and economic future of their country.

We in the Western countries act as honest brokers. And one of the more important tasks for an honest broker is to submit compromise proposals to the conflicting parties.

On the basis of the principles developed at the beginning of my talk, my friends and I draw the following consequences in our policy towards the Republic of South Africa and towards South West Africa/Namibia, whilst giving due consideration to the varying historic, cultural and political conditions which exist there.

We advocate that freely elected representatives of all peaceful forces in the Republic of South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia should undertake joint efforts towards agreeing on a constitutional federative form of living together. This ought to grant all citizens their rights and to permit all groups of the population to participate equally in the process of political decision-making and at the same time to guarantee this in the long term. The principle of "one man—one vote" must not become the basis for the oppression of other races and groups of the population and for totalitarian conditions of power. The important question is to work towards the achievement of peaceful compromises between minorities and majorities. The moderate political forces deserve special support. This also accords with the interest of the Black population.

The unilateral ordering of constitutional models does not contribute towards promoting the goals of the peaceful forces.

We urge the governments of the neighbouring states in southern Africa to participate in resolving the existing disputes solely by peaceful means. They should also use their influence to exclude the misuse of their territories for hostile undertakings.

We urge our Government to make constructive use, jointly with its allies, of the political, diplomatic and economic instruments available to the Western countries in order to support all efforts towards a peaceful change in southern Africa and towards counteracting a policy of violence in an alleged liberation.

The primary aim in this must lie in promoting the social, economic and cultural advancement of the non-Whites in general and the Black-African population in particular.

Subject to the precondition of a satisfactory reorganization, the Federal Republic of Germany ought to use its influence in the European Community to ensure that the states of southern Africa obtain substantial trading facilities. This is particularly the case since, for many states, these countries are an indispensable trade partner with whom they entertain far-reaching economic relations today.

We deem Europe's economic co-operation with the states of southern Africa to be a dictate of practical rationality. This promotes a peaceful development. By working together as partners, business enterprises and

labour unions, trade and industry in Europe and southern Africa can make a decisive contribution — especially in economically disadvantaged areas — towards creating new jobs, improving the infrastructures and reducing social injustices.

Boycott measures largely afflict the socially weak sections of the population. They prevent progress and intensify tensions and conflicts. For this reason, they must therefore be rejected.

We attach great importance to the peace-making activities of the churches in southern Africa and their self-sacrificing services to people often rendered in difficult conditions. The churches can and must make an essential contribution by virtue of the good tidings which they proclaim and practise in overcoming hatred and destruction, as well as in strengthening peace, hope and human dignity. A partisan attitude by which the churches become involved with violence jeopardizes the churches' mission of promoting reconciliation among the whole of humankind.

We favour a strengthening of human and cultural relations with all peoples of Africa. In this way, one can counteract an economic, cultural or even moral isolation — an isolation certain to alienate people from those political principles which remain indispensable for peaceful international relations in freedom and social justice.

We support all those forces who endeavour, by peaceful means, to eliminate the dangerous discriminations between people of different race and colour. We do so because these are incompatible with human dignity. This implies, in particular, that we must overcome existing inequalities in the educational system and in working life. We realize quite clearly that the members of different races and peoples have different cultural backgrounds and do not always live by the same set of values in their thoughts and actions. We also have a concept of the objective difficulties facing our proposals. For that reason, we are willing to help if this is desired for constructive reforms.

The following points emerge in regard to South West Africa/Namibia. On this issue, German policy is firmly integrated with that of the Group of Five. During President Carter's term of office, many a critical mistake was committed not only by the USA but also by the Federal Republic of Germany.

We include among these mistakes the Federal Government's decision to close its consulate in Windhoek. In so doing, the Federal Government was seen by the rest of the world to bow to the demands of the militant communist-dominated SWAPO and to the pressure of its sympathisers in Africa. At the same time, this step impaired the efforts undertaken by the groups of the population in South West Africa over a period of many years to find a peaceful path leading to independence.

Nevertheless, the approach adopted by the Five in their initiative was correct: it paves the way for the holding of free elections and subsequent granting of independence to Namibia. We accepted UN Resolution 435, even though it only opens up a formal path leading to Namibia's independence. But we also understood South Africa's misgivings about the Security Council's resolution on Walvis Bay and on the question of SWAPO bases in Namibia. The outcome was foreseeable. The SWA/Namibia initiative undertaken by the Five was virtually finished by the middle of 1979. With this in mind, we keenly welcome the role played since January 1980 by Dr Chester Crocker, an old friend of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. It is thanks to his knowledge and skill that the initiative on South West Africa/Namibia was revived and that it may even prove successful. In this context, we support American efforts to induce the Cubans to pull out of Angola. Perhaps it would be recommendable to replace Cuban forces by an OAU force in order to prevent Angola from sinking into chaos when the Cubans leave Angola.

We recognize German responsibility towards an independent Namibia. How can incentives be created so as to induce at least the Namibians of German descent to stay in the country? Otherwise, it will not only be the economy which will rapidly deteriorate.

Our conclusions are as follows: peace, independence and human rights can also only be realized for Namibia in a democratic and social constitutional state whose Government is the product of free and independent elections and which does not base its existence on terror and intimidation of the population.

The basic conditions for democratic elections in Namibia are these:

- All political forces must receive the same opportunities and possibilities in preparing and holding the elections.
- No group must have the right of sole representation. The granting by a UN majority to SWAPO of a claim to sole representation is incompatible with free, constitutional and democratic principles.
- The threat and use of force before, during and after the elections must be renounced in order to accord with the principles of renouncing the use of force and ensuring respect for human rights.
- The "Democratic Turnhalle Alliance", embracing as it does the ethnic diversity of all Namibian groups of the population and aspiring to a peaceful path towards independence, must remain an integral part of international negotiations.
- Sufficient time must be left for the preparation of elections; and the free and impartial holding of these elections must be the real aim of international co-operation.
- Those Namibians who have been arrested and abducted in African states for political reasons must be given the possibility of returning home.

Up to the point of time when Namibia becomes independent, the Republic of South Africa must grant the country's hitherto elected representatives such freedom of action as accords with their democratic mandate.

In the interest of an economically secure future for the people of Namibia, the Federal Republic of Germany should now already provide effective support by promoting private investments and by adopting other suitable measures.

The Federal Republic of Germany regards a free Namibia as a welcome partner for close political, economic and cultural relations. We advocate the commencement of political, economic and cultural co-operation with the Federal Republic of Germany as well as negotiations on Namibia's association with the European Community immediately after independence.

The founding of an independent and democratic Namibia renders an important contribution to peace on the African continent so often convulsed by bloody conflicts and civil wars.

You will have noticed that my repeated call is for a political dialogue as a means of shaping the area of tension between established order and permanent change. Particularly for that reason, I am very grateful for the dialogue at this conference and thus to our hosts who created this possibility. They offered me the chance of developing the thoughts expressed by my political friends. But it holds at least equal importance to me to hear and to examine your arguments and perspectives in these days. It is gratifying to note that the exchange of views between politicians, social groups and scientists of the Federal Republic of Germany and South Africa has taken place on a considerable scale and in considerable depth. Particularly among the scientists in our country, there are highly qualified personalities such as Theodor Hanf, H. Weiland, J. Blenck, R. von Lucius, and Klaus van der Ropp, who have been searching for nearly two decades and in very close contact with Black, Brown and White South Africans for political solutions and compromise formulae. There is a growing demand for their knowledge and skill abroad as may be seen from their international publications. The significance of Theodor Hanf does not require any commentary. His advice is also sought by those in South Africa who are looking for a peaceful compromise.

Equally, South African scientists are conducting a continuous dialogue with all political and social groups in the Federal Republic. They are taking the West German discussion about compromises back to South Africa. We shall push ahead with this dialogue. Moreover, we are noting with great interest how influential Afrikaans newspapers (Rapport, Beeld, Die Vaderland, Die Transvaler, Woord en Daad) are also backing a dialogue between the Black nationalist movement and the South African

Government. With the greater support provided by the next German Governments, the German experts on South Africa can add their skills to this dialogue.

These are also the lines along which the lively contact which we maintain with the Inkatha movement of Gatsha Buthelezi is taking place. We admire Buthelezi's work and we are impressed by his political proposals. Our attitude is reflected in the commitments undertaken by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Durban and Kwazulu. For us, South Africa is not a theoretical problem: it has long since posed a concrete challenge. Many people in our country regard this in the same light — and quite rightly so if only we interpret our role honestly and modestly enough.

Fumihiko Togo

Africa in the context of Japanese foreign policy

I am grateful for the invitation to this conference of the South African Institute of International Affairs, as an indication of the interest the Institute takes in East Asia which is located almost at the other end of the globe. I shall first present in very brief terms an international outlook in my part of the world, and then proceed to Japan's approach to Africa.

The situation in East Asia currently is relatively stable in the troubled world of today. The structure of the international relations in East Asia is based on the interrelationships among the three major powers: the United States, China and the USSR.

The United States has played a major role in maintaining the stability of this part of the world since the time when its military presence filled the vacuum of power created in the aftermath of the war. She provides a strategic balance of power in East Asia in the face of the growing military build-up of the Soviet Union. The Russian air and sea forces cast a shadow from Vietnam in the south, through eastern Siberia and the four islands off the coast of northern Japan, up to Kamchatka in the north. It is only the United States military forces that can counterbalance these Russian forces which are obviously beyond the need of their border defense.

China, once in close ties with the USSR, has been in confrontational relations with the latter. The present leadership in China has in recent years set its policy priority on domestic economic development and opened its economic door to the Western nations. China no doubt has many political and economic problems at home, if only for the reason of the sheer size of a one billion population, but the current direction taken by the leadership is certainly conducive to the international stability of the area.

Mr Fumihiko Togo, who entered the service of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1939, became Director of the American Affairs Bureau in 1967, Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam in 1970, and was Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1974-1976. Mr Togo was Japan's Ambassador to the US from 1976-1980; and holds currently, amongst other positions, that of Executive Adviser to the Nippon Steel Corporation and Special Adviser to the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

The Korean peninsula is where the forces of these three major powers converge. The stationing of the American forces continues to preserve a military balance between the North and the South. At this moment, both China and the USSR purport to respect the so-called autonomous line of policy of North Korea. Obviously each of them has to take heed not to push North Korea to the other. In these circumstances it is not likely that a shooting war be reopened, but the tension continues nonetheless. For all practical purposes the unification of the two Koreas is not in sight. The forces of the three major powers are delicately reflected on the divided peninsula.

In South-east Asia, Indochina continues to be a trouble spot in the aftermath of the Vietnam war which ended in tragedy for the free world. Vietnam still maintains a substantial number of forces in Cambodia and allows the Russians to make use of military bases. On the other hand, the five ASEAN nations — Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore — are steadily making progress in internal development. Politically the ASEAN nations play an important role among the moderate group in the non-aligned world. The continued presence and participation of the United States in this region is welcomed by these nations in view of the shadow of the Russian military build-up and of their potential vulnerability toward China, should she take a different approach to South-east Asia.

I have reviewed the main international issues which surround Japan as I see them. Japan is committed to a democratic form of government and free and open market economy. It is therefore only logical that she maintains close relations with the United States. The Japanese-American Security Treaty is one of the main pillars of security for the free nations of East Asia. Japan and China normalized their relations ten years ago, and both recognize the benefits they gain from the good relations having been cultivated since the normalization. China used to be highly critical of the Japanese-American Security Treaty, but has changed her position to that treaty out of her own strategic interest. The Republic of Korea is a very important neighbour to Japan, and as is often the case with neighbouring nations, there exist various issues politically and economically between them, but basically Japan is in a position to support the Republic of Korea in her effort to reject the unification of the peninsula on North Korea's terms. Japan maintains good relations with the nations of ASEAN, and is one of the main donors of economic assistance to these countries. Japan keeps close contact with them in such political issues as the resolution of the conflict in Indochina or in cultivating a sense of common interest among the nations on the rim of the Pacific Ocean.

In the area of economy, Japan is known to be a small island nation with no natural resources. Her war-torn economy was put on the road to

reconstruction by the assistance extended by the United States. The ten years of high growth was triggered at the end of the Fifties by a three hundred million dollar loan also extended by the United States. It was in the mid-Sixties that Japan had for the first time after the war marked a small trade surplus vis-à-vis the United States. Times have changed, and Japan now has a rather substantial trade surplus with both the United States and the Western European countries. As the economy grew stronger in the course of the Seventies, Japan's external aid steadily expanded. The aggregate foreign aid increased from 1,8 billion dollars in 1970 to 6,8 billion dollars in 1980. The official development assistance in the same decade increased from half a billion dollars to 3,3 billion dollars. The ODA was more than doubled in the three year period up to 1980, and the plan is now under way, in spite of the very stringent government finance, to extend ODA from 1981 through to '85, twice as much as the preceding five year period, or a little over 21 billion dollars.

As one of the industrial democracies, Japan plays her part in the structure of stability in East Asia, and continues to expand external economic assistance, thereby contributing to the development and international peace in the region.

Africa used to be a remote continent in the Japanese mind. The continent of Africa was known only through stories of the explorers in previous centuries. One of the very few Japanese associated with Africa south of the Sahara was Dr Noguchi, a medical scientist who had devoted himself to the study of yellow fever, himself dying of it in Accra in 1928. The world-wide changes that have taken place after the Second World War have inevitably brought Japan and Africa closer. Probably the first official encounter was on the occasion of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955 between the Japanese and Ethiopian and Liberian delegates.

In the course of the Sixties when the wave of national independence brought about a new Africa, Japan was preoccupied with economic reconstruction and expansion. Geographically apart, and in the absence of colonial ties with Africa, Japan had no part in the struggles for national independence in Africa. In the context of international power politics, those struggles very often resulted in involvement of the East and the West. While the Western nations were taken as the inheritors of the old imperialism, the East was identified as the guiding force of the so-called national liberation.

Japan watched the tumultuous development in Africa with concern. It was very important for the free nations of the West that the newly independent nations of Africa were not alienated from them. Japan's initial contacts with the African states were made at the United Nations. The Japanese delegation at the United Nations made conscious efforts to

cultivate friendly relations with its African counterparts. It is my view that the African nations entertained a sense of affinity toward Japan as an Asian nation even though she is classified as one of the industrial democracies. The relations between Japan and the African nations have grown successfully, particularly as economic interchanges have been developing in recent years.

I must refer, in the context of the overall Japanese-African relations, to the problem of racial discrimination. Japan's position on this problem has been well known since the time of the Versailles Peace Treaty when she proposed a provision on the principle of non-discrimination by race or nationality to be incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Consequently Japan has faithfully abided by the various resolutions of the United Nations on this problem, and continues to follow with serious concern the situation in southern Africa. Regrettably there exist currently certain limitations in traffic between Japan and South Africa. It is hoped that the Government of South Africa should continue to move toward the resolution of this difficult issue. In Namibia it is encouraging to note that substantial progress has been made toward eventual independence through the efforts rendered by South Africa and the United States and other members of the Contact Group. Though Japan is not a member of this Group, she has on occasions expressed her intention at the United Nations to make contributions to that process. The improvement in the political climate in Southern Africa not only benefits the parties directly involved, but also contributes to the interests of the free world, as political instability often invites the other side to intervene in African affairs.

When Russia sent her military forces into Afghanistan at the end of 1979, most of the African nations reacted critically against her. As the general political situation in Africa stabilizes, the image of the USSR as liberator gradually fades. It is now realized that the economic co-operation that the nations of Africa really need, comes not from the East, but from the Western nations. Now that the African nations play their part in international politics and economy as the largest group in the non-aligned world, the general relationships between the industrial democracies and the African nations are increasingly important for the interest of the free world.

The external economic assistance of Japan has steadily increased. After the war Japan had carried out reparations to her neighbouring nations in the form of "the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work", as stipulated in the Peace Treaty. In economic effect the reparation of this form was the forerunner of Japan's overseas economic co-operation. As the Japanese economy grew in strength, so was the external economic assistance increased, motivated by a sense of responsibility to contribute, through economic means, to the international

stability and welfare of mankind. This foreign assistance ranges from humanitarian aid, agricultural development, improvement of infrastructure, to industrial development.

About a half of the external economic assistance of Japan has been addressed to Southeast Asia with which Japan has close political, economic and cultural relations. Japan's assistance to the African nations has started relatively late, but is increasing at a higher pace than those to the other parts of the world. Of a little over 23 billion dollars of economic assistance extended by Japan in the twenty year period up to 1980, 47 per cent went to Asia, 25 to Latin America, 15 to the Middle East, and 7,5 to Africa. However, in 1980 alone when the total assistance amounted to a little over 5 billion dollars, the share of Asia was 53 per cent, Latin America and the Middle East 18 each, and Africa 9,4. As to the official development assistance, Africa's share in the twenty year period was 6 per cent, while in 1980 it was 11,4, or 223 million dollars. In fact the African share of Japan's ODA in 1980 was ten times that of 1972. In other words, somewhere around 10 per cent of Japan's assistance is now extended to the nations of Africa, and the upward trend will no doubt continue in view of the growing general interest between Japan and Africa and the great economic potential of Africa.

The earlier Japanese aid projects were mostly in the area of infrastructure, such as the airport of Mombasa in Kenya, a dam and power plant in Nigeria, and railroad projects in Zaire and Gabon. More attention has been given to the agricultural projects in recent years, as seen in the case of grain storage facilities in Kenya and a large irrigation project in Nigeria. Parallel with these project aids, Japan is extending assistance in technical training in the field of agriculture, transportation and communication, as well as medical and other social development works.

The Japanese overseas youth volunteers enjoy a high reputation in Africa as junior experts in various fields. Multilaterally, Japan is the largest contributor to the African Development Fund, and Japan's contribution of 270 million dollars to the African Development Bank is the second largest among the non-African nations. For the assistance to the refugees in Africa Japan last year pledged 20 million dollars, of which 5 million dollars was contributed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and 8 million dollars to the World Food Programme. Africa is a big continent, and Japan's participation in its development has to be selective. However, considerable progress has been made in recent years.

Japan's trade with the African nations is also on the upward trend, currently in the order of 10 billion dollars both ways, or roughly 10 per cent of the total African trade. Africa's share in Japanese trade in 1980 was 4,5 per cent in export and 2,4 per cent in import. Exports from Japan consist of such industrial products as automobiles, electronic products and

ships, and generally double the amount of imports from the African nations. The South African market occupies one third of these exports. Japan imports such primary products as mineral ore, copper, maize and coffee, with which Africa is abundantly endowed. South Africa's export to Japan is about one half of the total African export to Japan, and the Japanese-South African trade is roughly balanced at the level of 2 billion dollars each way. While the trade between Japan and the African nations has been structurally imbalanced, Japan's investment in Africa in the past thirty years amounts to 1,4 billion dollars, or about 4 per cent of her total foreign investment. The Japanese investment in Africa ranges from textiles, fishing, resources development, electric appliances, to automobile assembly. Because of the complementary nature of the Japanese and African economies, and of the great wealth of natural resources, particularly precious mineral resources, the economic and trade relationships between Japan and Africa hold great potential.

I have spoken earlier about Japan's part in East Asia in the promotion of political stability and economic development of the region. For a trading nation with no natural resources of her own, international peace and stability is vital for her survival. For this reason, and in the present world of interdependence, the political situation in Africa is now more relevant to Japan's interest than ever. The African continent is a complex international society, and moreover, intra-African issues are often susceptible to intervention from outside. The general approach of Japan to Africa is to contribute, through economic means, to the development of the African nations and to the promotion of a political climate favourable to the free world.

Japan's relations with the African nations are relatively new. She has had no political involvement with the African continent in previous centuries. The economic ties between Japan and the African nations are yet in an initial stage. Africa is a big continent with a large number of nations, and it has to be a long process to cultivate closer political and economic relationships. On the other hand there are visible signs of the awareness of mutual interest in both Japan and the African nations. I wish to conclude my remarks on a tone of optimism on the future of Japanese-African relationships.

Book Reviews

APARTHEID, CHANGE AND THE N.G. KERK

J.H.P. Serfontein

Taurus, Johannesburg, 1982, 295 pp.

“Anybody wanting to know and interpret Afrikaner Nationalist thinking, and attempting to assess the chances of ‘real and fundamental change’ in South Africa must have an understanding of the role and thinking of the N.G. Kerk”, states the author in the opening pages of the book, and he sets himself the task to supply just that understanding of South Africa’s biggest White church and the role of its political and theological brain child, Apartheid. He does so with relentless clarity and some 100 pages of documentary proof taken mostly from official and authoritative papers by the N.G. Kerk or its office bearers.

There are various reasons for the relevance of this book now. Ireland, Poland and Iran, apart from South Africa, are live illustrations that religion is still a decisive force in areas of political and socio-economic instability; the present Nationalist Party came to power on an Apartheid ticket partially formulated and wholly endorsed by the N.G. Kerk; Prime Minister Botha, reading the signs of the times, if not the writing on the wall, embarked on a desperate effort to “reform” his government’s traditional policy. It is common cause that he can only succeed in curbing Apartheid’s long reign of terror in as far as the church which originated it, will allow him. More voices with more scriptural argument and increasing insistence condemn the policy as unchristian and inhuman.

Serfontein is better qualified than most to pick out the various historical and political strands with which the N.G. Kerk, in alliance with the Nationalist Party and the secret Afrikaner Broederbond, wove the fabric of Apartheid. He has published numerous press reports on all of them, and one of his books is an authoritative analysis of the Broederbond. He has, moreover, during the past twenty-five years studied the South African church scene assiduously, even to the point of painful personal involvement.

The author produced the book in twenty four days in order to supply the meeting of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, in August this year, at Ottawa, with a briefing document. It certainly bears the marks of speed, but its timing and presentation could not have been more apposite. Two of the churches represented were the N.G. Kerk and the N.H. Kerk

both of which traditionally and constitutionally preach and practise Apartheid.

Some time before Ottawa, Professor David Bosch, a Minister of the N.G. Kerk and South Africa's leading specialist in Missionary Science, branded Apartheid a heresy in the light of Scripture. In Ottawa, Dr Allan Boesak, representing the N.G. Sendingkerk, charged the Nederduits Gereformeerde and the Nederduitsch Hervormde Churches of South Africa with the deliberate practice of this heresy.

Notwithstanding these two churches' able arguments and insistent use of Apartheid's more respectable synonym, "separate development", Serfontein's briefing document left them no escape. Ottawa, representing 70 million members of the Reformed Churches all over the world, branded these two "Whites only" members of its Alliance as heretical, and stripped them of all meaningful participation in its deliberations until such time as they would have repented of their heresy of Apartheid.

The unanimously accepted verdict contains an element of inadvertent irony. These two churches some years previously condemned the undersigned as a heretic and Beyers Naude's Christian Institute as heretical, on account of their opposition to Apartheid in their respective churches.

Section A of the book analyses Apartheid, and the harsh and heartless application of the policy. It has systematically destroyed race relations in South Africa, and reduced the country's reputation from its international standing of respectability to being the skunk of the world. It damaged forever the quality and the condition of literally millions of lives by forcible removals, restrictions, bannings and detentions without trial.

The Prime Minister's desperate efforts to reverse the havoc of the Verwoerd-Vorster era resulted in the creation of the President's Council, whose first task in redrafting the constitution is to remove "unnecessary" discrimination and the most obnoxious facets of the policy. These proposals in turn split the Nationalist party into two. The book is sceptical about Prime Minister Botha's chances of success. He is hamstrung by the H.N.P. and the fledgeling Conservative Party under Dr Treurnicht. Moreover, the Prime Minister and "verligte" Nationalists do not really reject the racial ideology, they only want to *reform* its application. The Carlton Conference as well as the subsequent Good Hope Conference, merely meant a *de facto* involvement of big business in the policy. Mr Botha is not going to dismantle Apartheid, he is only going to *reform* it, and for that he has the support not only of the majority of Afrikaners, but also of the English speakers. On analysis his Twelve Point Plan nowhere rejects Apartheid.

Section B deals with the N.G. Kerk's pivotal position in Afrikanerdom, its encouragement of the people through every crisis of its existence from

the Great Trek through two Anglo-Boer wars, the Rebellion of 1914, the depression of the '30s and the last World War. "The policy of the N.G.K. towards racial and political matters reads like a blueprint of the policies of the National Party government" (p. 63). In fact, the church's organization of itself in racially separate entities supplied the government with a model. Moderator Dr Kleynhans proudly stated some four years ago: "It is not the N.G.K. which follows the government, it is the other way round: we were first with a policy of separate development . . .".

Indeed, the "Immorality", the "Mixed Marriages" and the "Separate Areas" Acts resulted from church representations to Government since the '30s and especially since 1948. It published its official stand on race and politics in 1974, under the title, *Ras, Volk en Nasie en Volkeverhoudinge in die lig van die Skrif*. The gist of the work is that Apartheid is the only Christian solution for South Africa. Ottawa quoted it frequently and the post-Ottawa Synod Meeting in Pretoria in September, resolved to rewrite it. It contains too many ambiguities and embarrassing statements for the church now.

Some seventy pages describe the fundamental involvement of the church in politics through its close association with the Nationalist Government and its secret power-house, the Broederbond.

Its support for Apartheid, and the Broederbond membership of the majority of its Ministers, in various ways led to tension between the N.G.K. and the "daughter" churches born from its missionary work over the past two centuries.

The N.G. Kerk on the ecumenical level is becoming more and more isolated. Dr Verwoerd's intervention against the anti-Apartheid resolutions of the Cottesloe Conference in 1960, led to its withdrawal from the World Council of Churches, and its membership of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches is in jeopardy. On the one hand there are healthy signs that the pressures from without and the increasing number of "rebels" from within are forcing a massive rethink on matters like joint worship, the fundamental principle of church unity, the tenability of the "Mixed Marriages" and "Immorality" Acts, and the close relationship between the church and the secret society, the Afrikaner Broederbond. More and more ministers and professors of the church join the "daughter" churches in open criticism of their church's stand in political and racial matters.

Notwithstanding this tide of opposition in the church itself, and the efforts of the "Verligte" Nationalists to reform the policy, the author is sceptical of meaningful change: "The N.P. Government will never voluntarily change this policy, nor will the N.G.K. under its present Broederbond controlled leadership ever accept the idea of one non-racial church" is his final conclusion on p. 195.

The October meeting of the N.G.K. Synod at Pretoria, scarcely two

months after the publication of Serfontein's book, seems to underline the reasons for his scepticism. The moderate leaders like Prof. Johan Heyns, Willie Jonker and Dawie Bosch, did not attain a place on the executive "moderatuur". The church is again headed by a dedicated member of the Broederbond, Ds. Kobus Potgieter. It rejected Ottawa's verdict of heresy on its practice of Apartheid, and the only person to receive its standing ovation was Dr Andries Treurnicht.

Intended as a briefing document for Ottawa, the book certainly constitutes the best and most balanced guide so far for everybody interested in reading into the political and ecclesiastical future of our land.

ALBERT GEYSER

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As a rule, I steer well clear of any books on rugby and rugby tours.

Generally, and with few exceptions, I find them to have similar formats, to be full of statistics, to be badly written, and to be dull and boring.

Demo rugby tours, however, to the discerning and astute author, can and often do, add a refreshing dimension of intrigue, drama, mystery, politics and cops and demonstrators stuff to an invariably mundane and frequently hackneyed subject.

"Barbed Wire Boks" is just such a book.

It will win no Nobel prize. As an impassioned, analytical account of what the 1981 Springbok Rugby tour did and meant to New Zealand, however, the highly readable, and entertaining account of the heartache, the misery, the agony and the little ecstasy brought by Wynand Claasen's team to that rugby-mad country, should be absorbed and digested by all South Africans who advocate such tours. In fact, in the international sport impasse South Africa finds itself in, and in which it will undoubtedly be to an even greater degree after that unfortunate tour, the book should certainly be read by all South African sportsmen and women, sports administrators and certainly politicians.

Don Cameron, the chief rugby writer of New Zealand's biggest Newspaper, *the New Zealand Herald*, and author of the book, not only relates the day by day, match by match and blow by blow journey of the Springboks through New Zealand, but prefaces this tour of woe with a brief, comprehensive assessment of all the warring factions.

Besides the rugby, he tells the unbiased tale of the politicians and their politics; of the New Zealand rugby authorities and their politics; of the reactions of the Springbok tourists under siege protected by the largest police force ever mustered in his country in peacetime; of the demonstrators and their demonstrations; of justice and injustice; of right and wrong; of the havoc and confusion wrought on all New Zealanders.

"A disaster it assuredly was. Eight weeks of bitterness, of a country divided, of protesters of all shades of political persuasion and idealism pitting themselves against police squads which grew from 300 to over 2 000 during the tour. Most of all a disaster for the sport of rugby", is how Cameron prefaces his book.

Later he writes, on seeing for the first time, the barbed wire entanglements placed by the army round the field at Palmerstone North; "But, Good Lord in heaven, barbed wire! It reeks of warfare, of evil. Is rugby worthwhile if it must be played in a fortress or a prison camp?"

And, on the final page of his "tour diary", and near final page of the

book, Cameron states “There will never be a tour like it, should there ever be another Springbok visit”.

Fair comment from a fair book, just as much as Stewart Harris wrote in “Political Football”, eleven years ago, about another ill fated Springbok rugby tour to Australia in 1971.

TOMMY BEDFORD,
SAIIA member,
Pietermaritzburg Branch.

Letter

REPLY TO JAMES BARBER

In his review of my book*, "Economic Power in Anglo-South African Diplomacy", James Barber claims, *inter alia*, that my overall hypothesis "does not stand up", but arrives at this conclusion by demolishing an argument which I do not advance.

According to Barber, I claim that South Africa's economic grip on Britain was *the major factor* shaping British policy towards South Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, whereas what I claim in fact is that it was simply the major factor amongst those pulling Britain *towards* South Africa. Contrary to Barber's impression, I do not attempt to weigh it against the force of those considerations pulling Britain *away from* South Africa in these years as well. Since the premise of his criticism is incorrect, the arguments which Barber subsequently builds upon it are beside the point.

In a further display of obtuseness, Barber next seeks to show how my argument breaks down in the particular instance of the Simonstown negotiations. First he points to my remark that since the public records for this time remain closed we cannot know for certain whether South African economic concessions were "specifically linked" to British political and military concessions, and claims that with this admission I am condemned out of my own mouth. This is an extraordinary assertion: with the emphasis clearly on the word "specifically", I was obviously stating nothing more than that we cannot yet know whether the deal was explicit or (more likely) implicit in the negotiations. Secondly, in a further comment which reveals that Barber understands the Simonstown Agreement as little now as he did when he wrote his book *South Africa's Foreign Policy*, he argues that I am mistaken to deny that Britain also obtained gains from this Agreement.

This misses the point in sensational style, that point being that while Britain gave away far more than it received under the formal terms of the Agreement, it was repaid in the coin of economic advantage in understandings, explicit or implicit, which were arrived at at the same period. Barber has not understood this argument, let alone met it.

In providing me with concluding advice, Barber consummates his *tour de force* with a tautology: "In any relationship 'power' is based on the degree to which one side can make the other bend to its will" (emphasis added). Since in fact power *is* the degree to which one side can make the other bend to its will, it will be seen that it is Barber's illuminating contention that

power is based on itself. If there is any lingering doubt that the orthodox, Chatham House version of Britain's South Africa policy is bankrupt, this review should remove it.

GEOFF BERRIDGE,
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* See *International Affairs Bulletin*, Vol. 6, no. 2, 1982. pp. 35-37.

Books received for review

POLITICAL CAPACITY IN DEVELOPING SOCIETIES

Somjee

Macmillan Press Limited. Approx. R38,75 pb.

THE NUCLEAR QUESTION: THE U.S. AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1946-1976

Mandelbaum

Cambridge University Press. Approx. R15,60 pb.

INSIDE THE MIDDLE EAST

Hiro

London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Approx. R32,60 pb.

MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE NUCLEAR AGE

Till *et al*

Macmillan Press Limited. Approx. R50,25 pb.

THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES

Turner & McMullen

George Allen & Unwin for the RIIA. Approx. R48,95 pb.

Recent SAIIA Publications

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- Barratt, John. *The Namibian dilemma: factors preventing a settlement.*
Botha, R.F. *The development of Africa and the role of outside powers.*
de Montbrial, Thierry. *The outlook for Southern Africa: a view from Europe.*
du Pisani, André. *Namibia after Geneva.*
Gutteridge, William. *Prospects for arms control and disarmament.*
Lankin, E. *The Middle Eastern outlook.*
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Senghor, Leopold-Sédar. *Senghor speaks on Africa.*
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This publication presents an analysis and assessment of the results of a public opinion survey, commissioned by the SAIIA as part of a wider research project on the formulation of South African foreign policy. This perceptive and clear analysis of the survey results by Dr Deon Geldenhuis highlights for the reader the main features of current white attitudes on foreign policy issues, and brings to light certain widely and strongly held attitudes existing among the white public.

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