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## International Affairs Bulletin

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## Smuts House Notes

This edition of the *Bulletin* contains the texts of five papers presented at a conference on "South Africa and its Neighbours: Policy Questions for the 1980's". The Conference, jointly sponsored by the SAIIA and the World Peace Foundation (WPF) of Boston, was held at Hilton, Natal, from 17-20 January, as the first major function of the Institute's Jubilee Year. It was attended by forty high-level representatives of the public and private sectors in South Africa and the United States, and it provided an opportunity for a frank and fruitful exchange of views between people in various positions of influence in their respective countries. It was then a further successful project in the programme of co-operation between the SAIIA and WPF (which was founded in 1910 with aims similar to those of the SAIIA).

Little did the two organisations know when they began planning the Conference in early 1983 how timely the proceedings would be. The controversy over South Africa's alleged "destabilisation" of her neighbours was at its height, and prospects for the region then seemed gloomy. The political hostility displayed by black-ruled Southern African states served as a background to the economic and military pressures exerted by Pretoria to elicit a more co-operative attitude from these states in general, and to force a cessation of assistance to African National Congress insurgents in particular.

Further, despite the patient mediation of the United States, in terms of the Reagan Administration's constructive engagement policy, spearheaded by Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Chester Crocker, negotiations over the future of South West Africa/Namibia remained bogged down. Initial contacts between the South African and Angolan governments in December 1982 and February 1983 had come to nought, and the insistence of the United States and South Africa on "linking" the independence of Namibia to the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola was becoming increasingly controversial.

By mid-January 1984, however, developments in both the western and eastern sectors of Southern Africa seemed to promise an end of the slide of the region into greater conflict. The offer to disengage South African troops from Southern Angola, made on 15 December during a major anti-SWAPO South African incursion into the area (code-named Operation Askari), was

the subject of intense diplomatic activity and was to be confirmed by the Prime Minister in Parliament on 31 January.

Preliminary meetings between Mozambican and South African officials in 1983 had led to the establishment of working groups on security (the area identified as determining progress over other areas), the Cahora Bassa Dam, broad *economic and financial relations and tourism*.

The culmination of these processes was still to come in the Lusaka Agreement of 16 February and the Nkomati Accord of 16 March and therefore could not be taken into account in the papers and deliberations of the Hilton Conference. However, sufficient evidence was available by then of new trends in the region to allow discussion to move away from the more sterile aspects of the debate over South Africa's "destabilisation" of the region.

For the same reason of timing, the authors of the papers here reproduced escaped the temptation of euphoria that followed the agreements referred to above, and they stressed rather the elements of continuity in regional relationships and Western policy. They therefore provided a salutary reminder of major and enduring problems.

Writing this note in the immediate wake of Prime Minister Botha's tour of seven European nations, one is reminded of these very elements of both change and continuity in South Africa's foreign relations. The tour itself bears witness, after more than two decades of top level diplomatic isolation, to a tentative emergence from this isolation, made possible by the Nkomati Accord and other signs of regional stabilisation, as well as by signs of domestic South African reform. But European governments, all in greater or lesser degree committed to a *policy of constructive engagement with South Africa* and unwilling to contemplate the prospect of destructive revolution, regarded these developments more in hope than in faith and made plain that their reception of Mr Botha was predicated on the need to impart to him their own feeling and that of the majority of their constituencies that he should go much further in both regional and domestic initiatives.

The outcome of the tour seems to indicate that, though both South Africans and Europeans had an opportunity to explain their positions on a wide range of issues at greater length than was anticipated, this has not yet led to any noticeable modification of these positions on either side. But the situation is not static in Southern Africa or in Europe, and at least new channels of communication have been opened up at a high level. Hopefully, they will be used effectively.

The Editor

The following five articles are the texts of papers delivered at a conference on

**SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS:  
POLICY QUESTIONS FOR THE 1980's**

held at Hilton, Natal,  
from 17-20 January 1984  
and organized jointly by the SAIIA and the  
World Peace Foundation, Boston

Robert Legvold

**The Soviet threat to Southern Africa**

There is no understanding Soviet policy and strategy in any region, including Southern Africa, without understanding Soviet foreign policy in general. And this cannot be understood without recognizing the Soviet Union's determination to be a global power, entitled to a role wherever it deems its interests at stake, with the power and influence to carry it off. It is also an alienated power. That is, Soviet leaders reject many aspects of the existing international order: its structure of power (viewed as still too favourable to the West), its economic hierarchy (viewed as still the creature of the industrialized market economies), its rules of play (viewed as still too favourable to American technique), and its obstacles to change (viewed as still too formidable to their friends and favourites). Soviet leaders, Andropov no less than Khrushchev, see their country as the single most powerful force for rectifying these "deficiencies". This they do without dreaming of conquering or controlling the world. They seek influence, not real estate—not even others' natural wealth.

The Soviet Union is also, for want of a better adjective, an ideological power. Its perspective on the world differs fundamentally from the United States', deriving as it does from a peculiar, often encrusted, and highly

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institutionalized set of beliefs. Without suggesting that the United States and its major allies are free of their own peculiar ideas, the Soviet outlook means that every important area of change becomes for East and West a contest of value as well as a test of strength. Cynical the Soviet leaders are, but in superficial ways, not at the core of their beliefs, and that is the problem.

This ambitious, alienated, and ideological power, however, exists in a world as complex and intractable for it as for others, a fact evident to Soviet leaders. The reality of a fragmenting international order plagues their policies as much as those of the West. The cohesion of Soviet alliances is as threatened as the West's, although in different ways. Enemies are as immediate and powerful, and, indeed, more numerous. Clients, particularly in the Third World, are as obstreperous and willful, and involvements with them as hazardous. Above all else, nuclear war casts as much of a shadow over Soviet policy as over the West's, though popular myth in many Western circles has it otherwise.

As a result, Soviet policy faces an impressive and not always easily reconciled set of tasks. In order of importance, as I judge Soviet priorities, these are first to secure the cohesion and stability of the Soviet domestic order by promoting an environment beyond Soviet borders which helps rather than hinders. Second, and by extension, policy's next most important task is to contribute to the endurance and viability of the Soviet alliance system in Eastern Europe. Third, policy must seek to avoid nuclear war. This belongs third because, as far as one can judge, Soviet leaders apparently would sacrifice it to the other two; they also, it seems, have a version of "better dead than (not) red", and events in Poland and the German Democratic Republic, not only in the Soviet Union, may trigger it.

Fourth, policy is expected to enhance Soviet influence over developments, conflicts in particular, within regions bordering the Soviet Union. Whether Soviet leaders fancy themselves someday ruling over the critical strategic theatres ringing their own lands from northeast Asia through the Persian Gulf to the Balkans is impossible to tell. This belongs to day dreams and Soviet leaders do not say much about their day dreams. Whether, short of this, they aim at a kind of *droit de regard* over military trends within neighbouring regions, making themselves in effect the security manager for each area, also cannot be settled based on the evidence. Soviet leaders, however, do make plain a determination to prevent any other power from retaining or amassing greater influence than they in these areas, to guarantee themselves a major role in dealing with change, particularly violent change, in these areas, and to see to it that Soviet interests, as they choose to define them, will be respected.

Fifth, and only fifth, policy is designed to reinforce Soviet standing as a power apart, possessing the same authority as the United States, the same claim to deference from lesser powers, the same opportunity to mediate and,

therefore, to influence international conflicts, and the same right to intervene in any quarter as Soviet leaders see fit. Crudely put, Soviet policy seeks to destroy America's double-standard for the superpowers while preserving one for everyone else.

Sixth, and only sixth, the Soviet Union means to undergird the global reach of its power with facilities, friendships, and political access in the most far-flung regions. From Southeast Asia to Central America, from Southern Africa to the Middle East, the Soviet Union wants more "coaling stations", parapets, and friends in high places. With these it intends to protect its own expanding lines of communication, lanes of commerce, and vast fishing fleet, and, it should not be doubted, *in war* to threaten those of its major Western adversaries.

Soviet leaders, however, also view this infrastructure as vital to the seventh task of policy: promoting (and protecting) change in tune with their notions of a more desirable world. This comes last, not because it is unimportant to Soviet leaders, but because the other six are still more important. Unless, however, it is recognized that Soviet leaders are driven at some level by more than the desire to aggrandize their nation's and their regime's power, a crucial policy impulse will be missed.

Only the last three of these objectives have much to do with most of the Third World and the dramas within. Soviet priorities in short, not merely Soviet objectives, are important. Russia, Europe, and surrounding territories remain the point of departure for Soviet foreign policy, not Southern Africa. And, when Soviet leaders address the problems closest and most critical to them, they do so directly, not vicariously, with roundabout strategies for assailing nearby adversaries from afar. Soviet policy in Southern Africa comes after, not as part of, Soviet policy in Europe and Asia.

True, the United States figures in all seven priorities, lending them a superficial unity. The only compelling threats to Soviet security and peace of mind, after all, at least the only consciously instigated ones, are those which Soviet leaders can imagine the United States raising or backing. The threat of China, for example, but for the shadow of American complicity, would not be nearly so menacing. Neither NATO nor Germany, but for the introduction of American power, would occupy Soviet policymakers as they do. Only the United States is the Soviet Union's fit partner and foe in shaping the nuclear threat. And only the United States sets the standard of superpower status — not to mention, setting the widest range of obstacles to its achievement by the Soviet Union.

The United States also lurks in the background of nearly everything of concern to the Soviet Union in the Third World. If any political force can threaten or impede the growth of Soviet facilities and access in the Third World, it is the United States. If these facilities and access are intended to constrain and counter the power of any particular country, it is the United



States'. If any other country's successes and failures in the Third World affect the overall global balance, they are, again, the United States'. If any other country can affect the pace and character of change nearly everywhere in the Third World, it is the United States. And, if any country symbolizes and leads history's alternative to socialism, it, too, is the United States.

Yet, the Soviet preoccupation with the United States hardly means that Soviet policy in places like Southern Africa is not the product of a great many other considerations. Nor does it make these regions only battle grounds in a Soviet-American contest and nothing more.

International politics is too complicated for that. And Soviet priorities are too disjointed. For Soviet leaders only regions on Soviet borders, like Europe, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia, are strategic preoccupations; only they are approached with strategic criteria constantly uppermost; only they regularly make it onto the daily agendas of the men at the top. Areas beyond are regions of opportunity, attractive precisely because change does not automatically threaten the underlying East-West balance and Soviet advances do not inevitably risk provoking superpower confrontation. Granted Soviet policymakers harbour a permanent urge to displace American power almost everywhere (along with French, Chinese, Israeli, and Saudi power), the urge has never become a compulsion. By the same token, gains in these areas are, from the Soviet perspective, worth fewer risks than Soviet stakes in the critical close-in theatres. If the superpowers come eyeball-to-eyeball again, it will not be over Nicaragua or Namibia, but over Iran or its equivalent. It will not, because the Soviet leadership has no intention of accepting a head-to-head military conflict with the Americans in Central America or Southern Africa. It has no intention of doing this, not only also because the military balance favours the United States in such cases, but also because neither is central to the strategic contest between East and West as the Soviet Union conceives it.

This is not to say that, when Soviet leaders think about Southern Africa, strategic considerations never cross their minds, or that the West's dependence on minerals from this area has no place in their calculations. On the contrary, nearly every Soviet piece of writing on the area alludes to the minerals. Some also refer to South Africa's position "at the junction of two oceans", giving the country "great strategic value to the West". Indeed, as this particular account concludes, "this is why it [South Africa] can be described as an extremely important bridgehead of world imperialism, whose loss would deal a telling blow to its own positions."<sup>1</sup> Rather I am arguing that, in the case of Southern Africa these are second-level considerations, a matter for wartime planners, a pleasant vision were these resources already under Soviet command, and not a primary guide to policy — policy that in reality must respond to richer and more immediate pressures.

## **Soviet policy in Sub-Saharan Africa**

The framework of Soviet policy in Southern Africa is Black Africa, not Europe. Understanding the twists and turns, aims and concerns, of Soviet policy below the Zambezi comes easier if one has some sense of the evolution of Soviet policy elsewhere on the continent. The Soviets, after all, have been engaged in this part of the world, struggling, hoping, learning, plotting for more than a quarter century. Much of that time their policy has been keyed to developments outside Southern Africa.

Leaving aside prehistory, that is Russia's eighteenth century liaison with Abyssinia and the Comintern's desultory liaison with the South African Communist Party, Africa became a serious, working object of Soviet foreign policy only with decolonization. Ghanaian independence in 1957 launched the Soviets in Africa. For the next decade Soviet policy surged and swelled from early naive expectation. Introduced to Sekou Touré's seemingly radical regime in Guinea in 1958 and Patrice Lumumba's Congo a year later, and knowing little about the soil from which they grew, Soviet leaders took Black Africa for a new revolutionary front. An exuberant Khrushchev was at the helm, and his vision of newly independent states, in ever increasing numbers revolting against Western tutelage and eventually Western political ways, went hand in hand with his other excesses: 1958 was a year after Sputnik and the first Soviet ICBM, the year the Soviet Union provoked the second great Berlin crisis, a power move to highlight the shift in power underway. 1959 was the year Khrushchev made his boast, later written into the 1961 Party Programme, of catching and passing the mightiest capitalist economy within eleven years.

His transport had little to do with an overt, comprehensive Soviet strategy. Its inspiration was written into events. The Soviet Union would press the Western powers in Central Europe, the fulcrum of the postwar world, and the momentum of Soviet scientific and economic progress coupled with the gathering force of defecting new nations would do the rest. In Africa, the Soviet Union arrived and began choosing sides immediately. By 1960 African states were dividing over the Congolese conflict, the Algerian war, and relations with former colonial powers. Moscow not merely sided with the so-called Casablanca group (Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic) against the so-called Brazzaville (later Monrovia) group of "splitters" and "imperialism's collaborators", it embraced the wave of the future. Its aid programme, its insinuated partnership in international forums, its imperious political advice for building the new society, virtually every aspect of its demeanour revealed Soviet expectations. Eventually the Soviet leadership, though in this case Khrushchev had less than full support from several of his colleagues, even persuaded itself that the most advanced of these states, a group labelled "revolutionary democracies," had escaped across the line into socialism or,

more accurately, onto the "path of socialist construction". Apparently inspired by the Cuban model, Khrushchev after 1963 pronounced a number of regimes—Algeria, Ghana, Mali, and the UAR—the genuine item, accepting their single-party systems as adequate substitutes for communist parties and their versions of Marxism, sometimes Leninism, as close enough.

Soon after Khrushchev fell in 1964, so did Algeria's Ben Bella, then Ghana's Nkrumah, then Mali's Keita. Much of the Soviet Union's second decade in Africa, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, was spent coming to terms with African realities. The Ghanaian, Malian, and other African revolutions had turned out to be mock enterprises, shallow affairs, as Soviet experts and policymakers now recognized, half-baked, undisciplined, and rushed. History's castoffs in the Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tunisia, and Zaire had more staying power. And, if there was a wave of the future, by 1967-68 it seemed to be African militaries, more and more of whom were pushing the politicians aside and assuming power themselves.

Over the next ten years, Soviet leaders set their sights more realistically, trimmed commitments—"We shall do the most for the cause of international revolution if we first build up our own Soviet society," they now said—and settled down to diversifying their relations with a wide array of African states, giving increasing attention to inherently significant countries like Nigeria and less to simply congenial ones.<sup>2</sup> They also lost interest in Africa.

In the mid-1970s the pendulum swung again. Dramatic change in Southern Africa released it. The sudden, unanticipated collapse of Portuguese colonialism in 1974 seemed in one fell swoop to alter the whole picture. Colonial salients now gave way not only to independent regimes but revolutions. These in turn seemed sure to increase the pressures on Rhodesia and Namibia, and, once they fell to black rule, on the Republic of South Africa itself. For the first time, developments in Southern Africa, in Soviet eyes, had become the wheelhouse of change on the continent, rather than as for so long in its tow.

Rarely does Soviet policy on any problem or in any region shift overnight, and I would be misleading the reader if I left the impression that this next stage in Soviet African policy began full-blown the day after the Cactano regime collapsed in Lisbon. It was neither so fulsome nor abrupt as that. In fact in the year or two before, Soviet observers had already begun to feel better about trends in Africa. The counter-revolutionary wave they feared with the collapse of so-called progressive regimes, the rise of African militaries, and daunting obstacles to development never materialized. Instead of a Thermidor, or, as Soviet commentators put it, the "Latin-Americanization" of Africa, the continent had settled into an uneasy political stasis, with change here and there, some moving in one direction, some in another. Regimes like the Ghanaian, that had lost their way had not lost it

completely, as a third generation of leaders took from both the Nkrumah experience and the backlash to it. Regimes that proclaimed socialism their goal—"scientific socialism," not, as the Soviets saw it, the bastardized African version—still cropped up. They emerged in Somalia, the Malagasy Republic, and Benin, to go with the ones already in place in Congo-Brazzaville and Guinea. to the toned-down satisfaction of Soviet observers, Africa's progressives this time around appeared less given to "leftist excesses" and false hopes. They, approving Soviet writers noted, were proceeding more sensibly with programmes to nationalize private holdings, expand the state sector, develop agriculture, and build grass-roots political organization. And they were unambiguous in their commitment to Marxism-Leninism, often spelling it out in their national constitutions.<sup>3</sup>

Then came the Portuguese revolution. In a relative instant it put Southern Africa's future in a new light. Soviet leaders, who for nearly a decade had left Africa to Africanists, suddenly took note. Africa, again, became a region of promise, an area capable of producing a revolutionary pattern, rather than merely the odd revolution. Soviet leaders were not reverting to old illusions. They had not forgotten the perishability of supposed African revolutions nor had they unlearned twenty years' of lessons in the frustrations that Africa holds for outsiders who come with preconceived notions. But, from all appearances, they placed a special faith in the men and regimes coming to power in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola. These were revolutions, as the Soviets judged them, made of stiffer stuff, in part because they were won in armed struggle, led by men who bore arms rather than pamphlets, and in part because they faced real and powerful external threats that would keep them from growing soft.

For five years, from 1974 to 1979, Soviet excitement mounted. Not blindly or unrealistically. Soviet leaders were not thinking of all of Africa when they contemplated the significance of developments in these three countries. They knew many parts of the continent would remain untouched. But in Southern Africa, Mozambique and Angola were only a first instalment. There a process greater than any single country, they assumed, was fast approaching dénouement. Out of it the area would emerge re-made. And once there were "progressive," maybe even revolutionary regimes in Salisbury and Windhoek as well as Luanda and Maputo, what they knew still to be the long, arduous issue of South Africa would nonetheless at last become inescapable. History would have written another small but distinctive chapter. The West would not be the better for it. And the growing list of African states that Soviet analysts celebrated, ten states in the first rank, six in the second, would take on a new colouration.<sup>4</sup>

It was not to be, not in any case so smoothly as Soviet leaders had anticipated in 1975-76. In Zimbabwe the process went awry—or, if not awry, then its own way. Power there passed to Black Africans, progressive

Black Africans, not despite the West, but in the end through the West's good offices. Afterwards Zimbabwe's new rulers hardly threw themselves into the struggle to liberate the remainder of Southern Africa and hardly rushed to embrace their would-be Soviet benefactors. Namibia, too, disappointed Soviet expectations. By the early 1980s Soviet observers could tell that Namibian independence was not, as the French say, for tomorrow. Coupled with major new distractions elsewhere, in Afghanistan, Poland, the Middle East, not to mention, in U.S.-Soviet relations, Southern Africa's cloudier future stilled Soviet enthusiasm. By the early 1980s Soviet leaders were, again, taking the long view and day-to-day African concerns, South Africa included, were once more in the hands of Africanists and other middle-level bureaucrats.

### **Soviet Policy in Southern Africa**

The Soviet Union has not methodically applied itself to the problems and opportunities of Southern Africa. Its contemporary involvement does not grow out of a long-term, carefully invested strategy tracing back to the start of the anti-colonial struggle, let alone back to the Third Comintern Congress in 1921 and the first appearance of the South African Communist Party. In a real sense, the beginning of Soviet policy in Southern Africa is hardly a decade old. 1974 is the divide. All the long years of public diplomacy and sloganeering for "national liberation" and all the aid channelled to the MPLA, FRELIMO, and later to the ANC and SWAPO were part of a different era. Physically, strategically, and conceptually the current Soviet position originates with Mozambique's and Angola's independence.

Their independence when it came caught the Soviet leaders by surprise. They like everyone else had no way of foretelling the Portuguese revolution and the effects it would unleash. As far as they were concerned, and much as they may have regretted it, on the eve of April 1974 the status quo in Southern Africa looked roughly as stable to them as it did to the American authors of NSSM 39. While they had every intention of keeping up the drumbeat of condemnation and every intention of continuing their support to anti-colonial and anti-apartheid groups, neither their commentary nor their actions suggest any inkling of what was about to happen. Indeed, after 1972 they had cut off aid to Neto's MPLA, as they concentrated on the bickering within the party, only to hastily resume it in early 1974.

When the Soviet leadership suddenly awakened to the portent of far-reaching change, it did not move instantly or decisively nor did it devise a whole strategy leading from Angola to Zimbabwe to Namibia. Soviet actions in the early confusion of the Angolan civil war were tentative and uncertain, hardly the determined moves of a leadership with its mind made up and its ultimate goal firmly set.<sup>5</sup> And such has been the character of Soviet policy in the region ever since.

Aside from wanting their friends, the MPLA in Angola and ZAPU in Rhodesia, to share in power, Soviet policymakers gave no indication of aiming for a particular outcome. Nor did they seem especially eager to meddle with their military power. In Angola, their first steps unfolded cautiously, even hesitantly. Arms were sent to the MPLA and in increasing numbers by fall 1974, a period of substantially expanded Chinese assistance to the FNLA. But in January 1975, when under OAU pressure the three contending Angolan factions agreed to a coalition government come independence and a shared arrangement for the transition, the Soviets backed the idea.<sup>6</sup> Throughout the spring, as the situation deteriorated and the fighting between the FNLA and MPLA increased, particularly by May when the FNLA seemed to be getting the better of it, Soviet public statements appealed for strong Portuguese action to head off a civil war.<sup>7</sup> The Soviet media also reaffirmed the importance of a coalition government and, on at least one occasion, criticized outside intervention from any quarter.<sup>8</sup>

As one looks back on the tangled set of moves, counter moves, and separate moves that followed, several aspects of Soviet behaviour are striking. First, while clearly the Soviets wanted the MPLA to hold its own among the warring factions and planned to give it considerable military support, nothing suggests that until the last moment was a large-scale direct joint intervention with the Cubans contemplated. Instead they apparently calculated that, provided the MPLA's military position was not undermined, it would do fine in whatever political arrangement was finally made, all the more because the radical officers in the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement were expected to stack the deck in its favour. The Soviet Union, as they saw the situation, had no reason to get out front. Second, while the South African role does not account for the steady increase in Soviet military aid over the summer months nor the initial appearance of Cuban advisers in June, nearly two months before the first South African patrols crossed into Angola, the South African decision to become heavily involved in October does appear to have been a turning point in the Soviet leadership's own thinking. Within a week of South Africa's escalation, the air and sea-lift of Cuban troops had begun (suggesting, of course, that the contingency planning had been done weeks before). Third, throughout the Soviet-Cuban intervention, Soviet leaders kept a wary eye on others, particularly the United States, the OAU, and, until late summer 1975 when it pulled out, China. Even after the large-scale Soviet-Cuban military operation began, Soviet leaders appeared ready to retreat if the United States drew itself up and did something. Not until the Senate ruled this out December 19 were Soviet leaders confident they were home free. Never until the very end was the die cast.

Taken as a whole, Soviet actions in Angola have implications important for understanding the broader thrust of Soviet policy in the region. First, there is every reason to believe that a determined counter intervention on the

United States' part (leaving aside its questionable wisdom on other grounds) would have reversed the Soviet decision. Second, there is even reason to believe that, had the Americans made an issue of preserving the Alvor accords and avoiding superpower intervention early on—indeed had they focused on the issue at all in the context of US-Soviet relations—the Soviets would have been responsive. That would have still left the Cubans, who, if Carlos Rafael Rodriguez is to be taken at his word, had committed themselves even before they knew the Soviets were on board and who could have mounted some kind of an operation even without Soviet support. It would also have been no guarantee of a different outcome within Angola itself. But it is a critical piece of evidence suggesting that Soviet policy in the region is neither so single-minded, undeflectable, nor ambitious as many assume.

What Soviet behaviour in Angola hinted, its behaviour in Rhodesia demonstrated. Faced with major constraints, headed by the determination of the Frontline States to recapture control over regional crises from the superpowers, Soviet policy relented.<sup>9</sup> Looked at from this distance, the more remarkable aspect of Soviet actions was not how much military assistance was given to ZAPU and its military arm, some of it doubtless outside the OAU framework, or how readily the notion of armed struggle was embraced by them. The more remarkable aspect was how docilely the Soviets let the Frontline States control the state of play, how unopportunist (or inept) they were in exploiting politics within the Patriotic Front, how feebly they resisted the Lancaster House settlement, and ultimately how little they did, indeed, wanted to do to set their defeated clients against Mugabe and his people after the February 1980 elections.

True, events dealt them as allies the weaker of the contending factions and, true, this time the OAU in the form of the Frontline States, the Western powers, foremostly the British, and even the South Africans (in pushing Ian Smith toward a settlement of some kind) all closed, rather than opened, opportunities to them. But this does not gainsay the resigned Soviet response nor the impact the whole experience has had on Soviet thinking about the region. Indeed, Soviet behaviour in the Namibian case, has since 1978 been almost identical. Grumbling, it has gone along with Security Council Resolution 435 and the role of the Contact States in shepherding it. It has gone along with virtually the same rationalization by which it abstained in voting on the original (1977) UK-US UN resolutions for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia: the Africans want it. In this case, not only the Frontline States favour a settlement within the guidelines of Resolution 435, but, as Soviet accounts note, SWAPO, too, has embraced the idea, and, while Moscow has its reservations, it has made it plain that it will not act on them.<sup>10</sup>

This is one side of Soviet policy in the region, an important side if the

Soviet challenge in Southern Africa is to be accurately understood and insights derived for dealing more effectively with it. But there are other sides as well. When in 1974 Soviet leaders made Southern Africa the focus of their hopes and attention, they were also re-entering Africa as a certain kind of benefactor—as the military patron of “progressive” change. Somewhere along the line they had given up pretending that they had an all-purpose, all-around role to play. Economic development, other than token contributions, gestures to reassure friends or secure commodities, became the West’s problem (and duty, as Soviet representatives to UNCTAD and other forums liked to stress).

The figures spoke for themselves. From 1975 to 1979, Soviet arms deliveries to sub-Saharan African governments totalled \$3,3 billion, seventeen times their value in the decade 1961–1971.<sup>11</sup> Economic credits meanwhile fell from \$492 million in 1961–1971 to \$335 million in 1975–1979 (even though Soviet economic credits to the Third World in general rose steadily from \$3,8 billion in 1955–1964 to \$6,2 billion in 1965–1974 to \$10,6 billion 1975–1981).<sup>12</sup> In 1981 the Soviet Union signed \$2 billion in arms sales contracts with sub-Saharan African governments, almost four times the economic assistance given to the area over the previous quarter century.<sup>13</sup> (Western economic aid to these states in 1981 was \$6 billion.)

Moreover, these aggregate statistics failed to indicate, as David Albright has pointed out, the special place the Soviet Union came to occupy in the military efforts of a growing number of Black African states, including Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.<sup>14</sup> From 1975 to 1979, \$500 million of Angola’s \$890 million arms purchases came from the Soviet Union, \$170 million of Mozambique’s \$240 million, and \$1,5 billion of Ethiopia’s \$1,8 billion. (Western and multilateral agency economic assistance to Ethiopia over this period was \$725 million, Soviet economic assistance, \$125 million; Western aid to Angola \$131 million, Soviet, \$15 million; Western aid to Mozambique, \$350 million, Soviet, \$5 million.)

These sums—and their effect would only be heightened by adding trade statistics and numbers of military advisers—represented both a plight and a conception. A plight because the Soviet Union lacked the resources to contribute more in other areas, or so Soviet leaders said and doubtless thought. Gromyko often and pointedly explained to Third World audiences simply how little his country had to give. But a conception because Soviet leaders, having grasped the mantle of a global power and built their military strength to a certain point, believed they should play a more direct and active role in defending “progressive” forces in places like Southern Africa. And sometimes defending these forces meant helping them to defeat opponents who stood in their way. Admiral Gorshkov, the father of the modern Soviet navy, from the early 1970s spoke of protecting the “national liberation struggle,” and made this one of the rationales for a stronger navy. Others



also, long before Southern Africa exploded in change, began writing of the link between the Soviet Union's growing ability to intervene with force and the course of national liberation.<sup>15</sup> When the Angolan events broke, Soviet leaders were in a mood to get involved, albeit cautiously.

Returning to Africa as a military patron also represents both a commitment and an opportunity. The Soviets tend to see themselves, along with the Cubans and one or two of their East European allies, as the only force able and willing to provide substantial military aid to so-called liberation groups. When these groups triumph, as in Angola and Mozambique, the commitment almost automatically transfers to aiding with their national security. Both as a matter of Soviet credibility in the Third World at large (the Soviets, too, to judge from some of the private rationalizations offered after the invasion of Afghanistan have a fear of appearing weak if Third World clients can be intimidated or overthrown) and as entrée with new and insecure regimes, the Soviet Union takes on itself a share of their defence. Hence, the warnings of the Soviet ambassador in Mozambique ("If our friends are attacked, we will have an appropriate answer") and the visit to Mozambique ports by two Soviet warships after the South African raid on ANC facilities at Matola in January 1981.<sup>16</sup> Hence, the recent quiet, but direct warnings to Pretoria over its aggressive acts in Angola.

These are not open-ended commitments. Nor are they evidence of a Brezhnev Doctrine for Angola and Mozambique; were either regime to begin unravelling internally the Soviet Union is unlikely to save it by direct military intervention. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has carefully tailored the kinds of arms that it supplies and hedged its own direct role. Were it, as one sensible observer has noted, to provide Mozambique with more sophisticated weapons or assume a direct role in the counterinsurgency effort against the *Movimento Nacional da Resistência de Moçambique* (MNR) or were it to make public its threats to South Africa over the attacks on Angola and ostentatiously to take a larger part in preparing Angolan defences, as it is doing in Syria, that would be another matter.<sup>17</sup> The Soviets have not been in a hurry to escalate their involvement to this extent, granted that Africans have placed their own limits on military ties.

The Soviet Union, however, is not militarily engaged in Southern Africa out of generosity (although its leaders, like the leaders of other great powers with forces dispatched around the world, may think so). It is there because opportunity beckons and because, once there, to leave involves risks and implied losses. First is the chance to add to the complement of air strips, bunkering facilities, storage depots, and communications installations serving the Soviet Union's sprawling military establishment. These, Soviet leaders want, foremostly to keep an eye on and to offset the global infrastructure of America's capacity for waging general war, including its

strategic nuclear component, and then to beef up the tools by which they, in descending order of priority, (1) protect their proliferating lines of communication and commerce, (2) checkmate the West's, particularly the United States', ability to intervene with force, while in some instances mounting interventions of their own, and (3) intimidate local governments that "get out of line" (as the Ghanaians did in seizing Soviet fishermen in 1967) or bolster them with the visit of frigates or admirals when friends are in domestic trouble (as Somalia's Siad Barre was on two separate occasions, in 1969 and 1970 and the Seychelles' France Albert René was in 1981).

Second, the Soviets are eager to demonstrate that history is moving in the right direction, zig-zags and all. Much of their definition of success and, indeed, much of their sense of legitimacy—the legitimacy of the "Soviet experience"—rests on changes like those in Angola, Nicaragua, Yemen, and above all Vietnam, a fact driven home at every Party congress and by every major foreign policy speech in between. Trends alone, even if not much aided by the Soviets, as in Nicaragua or Mozambique, matter to them, reassure them, buoy them. If the Soviets have played a role, so easily and pre-eminently a military role, the effect is still more powerful.

Third, and often not so distinguishable from the second, Soviet leaders instinctively favour trends or events diminishing U.S. power and influence. On the surface of it, Southern Africa has from the start appeared to the Soviets as a place where U.S. influence must inevitably erode. If by playing the role of military benefactor the Soviets can speed the process, most assuredly they will. The trick for them is always to work at the problem indirectly—to displace the Americans, not to defeat them. Defeating them is a high risk proposition for which, in any event, in all but the most favourable circumstances the Soviet Union does not have adequate military power.

Because Soviet policy in Southern Africa is the creature of all these contending impulses, and no one of them alone, least of all the last, it is not accompanied by a coherent, well-honed strategy dedicated to a single objective. To believe the Soviet Union measures every step in accord with a consuming desire to capture the strategically valuable minerals in the region, and this to strangle Europe and, through Europe, the United States, requires incredible powers of simplification and, what a psychologist would call, tendency for projection. No doubt Soviet leaders would welcome the leverage that control over the flow of minerals would yield—were it in fact as great as worst-case analysts fear. But there is literally no evidence in what they write, in what the more candid among them say privately, or in their actions to date suggesting that a "resource war" is a conscious, first-order priority or practical guide to workaday policy.<sup>18</sup>

### **Soviet Policy toward South Africa**

*South Africa, as any Soviet policymaker or scholarly analyst knows, is the*

ultimate issue in Southern Africa, may be in all of Africa. Yet the Soviet Union really does not have a South African policy, much as it does not have an Israeli policy in the Middle East, only a policy toward a situation, accompanied by a half-strategy. The situation comes in two parts: South Africa's internal evolution and the prospects for far-reaching change and, second, but invariably ahead of the fate of South Africa, the challenge raised by South Africa's counter offensive within the region. These, of course, are reinforcing, acutely so since 1974. What begins in the Soviet mind as an opportunity to affect the outcome in South Africa from neighbouring states ends, at the moment, in the challenge raised by South Africa's determination to erase that opportunity and restore, through intimidation, a *de facto* cordon sanitaire. Added to this mix is the American role, always a looming factor in Soviet calculations.

To begin where the Soviet leadership almost certainly does not, with the destruction of apartheid and the transformation of South African society: for, neither drives Soviet policy. Not that Soviet leaders are insincere in their commitment to black rule in South Africa and, better yet, black rule with socialism. Because, however, the chances of either happening soon are slim, even in their view, policy focuses on more imminent issues. South Africa's revolution serves as a lode star, it seems, rather than a constant, immediate source of policy. As a practical consequence, therefore, the Soviet strategy for South Africa is long-term and still basically evolutionary. Soviet leaders, following in effect the more expert judgment of the South African Communist Party (SACP), in their most optimistic moments speak of "winning liberation" within the "lifetime of the present generation," but privately their specialists hold less hope.

South Africa is not, as Soviet observers know full well, Rhodesia. Its social and political foundations are hardly about to crumble. Armed struggle will not soon carry the day, and, indeed, for this reason, Soviet analysts continue to assign it a subordinate and secondary role. Change, as they see it, will only come out of a long-term political struggle, designed to shrink, what they call, the "social base" of apartheid. South Africa's revolution is to be a fatal erosion by defection, with critical segments of the society turning their backs on the Afrikaners, rather than a gathering storm of revolutionary warriors over-running the institutions of power. Soviet analysts count on a loose, multi-tiered process: at its base are the Blacks, oppressed, disenfranchised, and presumably increasingly disaffected, youth in particular; then the Asians and Coloureds; then leaders of social and economic institutions such as religious figures, who reject apartheid (Denis Hurley, the President of the Catholic Bishops' Conference, Alan Bocsak, the President of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, and Desmond Tutu, the General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches are all mentioned) and business circles, who fear the effects of social conflict, including "influential foreign

investors” and local business circles (e.g., as noted in Soviet accounts, the National Development and Administration Fund, the Federal Chamber of Industry, and the Association of Chambers of Commerce). And finally there are the liberal forces among the white population, who recognize the injustice and even more the impossibility of preserving institutionalized discrimination on such a scale, forces growing most rapidly, again, say the Soviets, among the youth.

Inevitably these different segments of society and a host of organizations representing them may head in different directions, say the Soviets, resisting the system in their own ways. But the critical effect will be cumulative: be it the strengthening of black trade unions and the rise of “civic protests” against the growth of prices, rents, and transport services or the more timid unease of business leaders raising their voices against racial discrimination “as incompatible with economic growth.” Students organizing, creating strike funds, and working with African trade unions are as much a part of the process as young Blacks fleeing their homeland and preparing themselves for the South African underground at Mazimbu or in the Angolan camps. Armed violence is treated as a galvanizing mechanism, a means to hearten Blacks faced with the seemingly overwhelming power of the state, a fillip to less bold protesters, reinforcement for business interests worried about mounting disorder, and proof to the regime that its defences are no longer unbreachable. The last, at a time when “contradictions are now rending the ‘white tribe,’” when the Nationalist Party has split and “seditious ideas have penetrated even racist institutions that only recently seemed immutable—the Dutch Reformed Church and even the Broederbond,” is expected to pay even greater dividends.<sup>19</sup>

The process, as Soviet observers apparently envisage it, is not so much the ascendancy of revolutionary violence toward some moment of truth as it is a synergism among the many forces at work within South African society, accelerated by armed struggle, hollowing out the underpinnings of the system, until at some distant point it begins to crumble and change. The image of South Africa someday going up in revolutionary flames rarely, if ever, appears in Soviet analyses.

Moreover, despite the quickening of events since 1974, Soviet commentators apparently also recognize the many cross-currents at work within South African society, beginning with the attitude of the white worker. Though theoretically a natural ally, in fact, white workers are “infected with racial prejudice”. The struggle “to clear their minds of the poisonous fumes of chauvinism”, writes Yusuf Dadoo, the Chairman of the SACP in the *World Marxist Review*, “will be long and hard”.<sup>20</sup> And within the black community there is, thanks to the Bantustan policy, as Soviet authors acknowledge, a “stratum interested in the success of [the regime’s] racist policy and ready to cooperate with it”.<sup>21</sup> As the chiefs, the administrative elite

and "nascent African bourgeoisie" in the Bantustans can be bought off, so, admit Soviet authors, can some of the leaders of the Coloureds. Several Soviet sources have commented on the decision of Alan Hendrickse and D.M. Curry to swing the support of the Labour Party behind the constitutional reform of 1983.<sup>22</sup> Were these complications, and a great many others like them, not enough, one has to add, as Soviet commentators do, the problems of waging guerilla warfare in a country without jungles, the timidity of neighbouring states in the grip of South Africa's economic power or under the shadow of its military might, divisions within the OAU, the leverage the South African regime has over its African population through the elaborate apartheid system, and ultimately the sheer strength of South Africa's army, police, and other instruments of control. Toppling the system from within—and Soviet commentators repeatedly underscore that the battle will have to be fought and won within South Africa—will not be easy.

Despite their belief in fighting and winning the battle within South Africa, however, Soviet leaders also see the context beyond South African borders as important, indeed, as the rear of the revolution. Since South Africa does too, and has adopted a highly offensive strategy to deal with it, the Soviet Union's most immediate priority is to checkmate South African policy, a task rather beyond its means.

The Soviets make no bones about the general sequence: "African countries," they maintain, have been effectively practicing "the tactics of 'selecting the weakest link' and advancing stage-by-stage to their ultimate objective of ending colonial rule".<sup>23</sup> First the French were defeated in Algeria, then after a long struggle, the Portuguese in all their African colonies. "After that goal was accomplished, action was shifted to Zimbabwe and Namibia." And now to Namibia and South Africa. Never mind this fairy-tale account of what Africa has been up to over the last twenty years; in this sequence, countries in South Africa's strategic rear, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, have a critical role to perform. Soviet leaders are mindful of the hazards compelling these countries to play this role with great caution, but they are expected to play it nonetheless, and in playing it to alter the context of the South African struggle. While the Soviets are not likely to push the leaderships of these countries beyond the risks they dare run, Soviet readiness to aid with Angolan and Mozambique defences and with the arming and training of ANC insurgents is meant to buck them up.<sup>24</sup>

True, the Soviet Union has been cautious itself, avoiding a precipitate and deep involvement. True, it assigns to many others roles ahead of its own. Take, for example, Angolan defence. When Soviet writers deal with the threats facing Angola, "fraternal assistance" from the socialist countries is never among the first items mentioned. In Veniamin Midtsev's hierarchy, Soviet aid comes fifth, after the restraining influence of Western nations like France and West Germany who are less quick than the Americans to excuse

Pretoria, after the "unbending resolve of the leadership and the people of Angola to uphold the independence of their country", after "the support from other Frontline States", and after OAU solidarity.<sup>25</sup> That was never the order during the Vietnam war, and it is not today the order in the Middle East.

Before making too much of Soviet restraint in this case, however, some thought should be given to the recent evolution of events. In Soviet commentary, 1981 has emerged as something of a watershed. Since then, Soviet authors insist, the South African offensive has taken on a new character, and so has the larger context in which it unfolds. The escalation of the military assault on the ANC beyond South African borders deep into Angola and against targets in Mozambique and Lesotho as well as the expanded efforts to destabilize Angola, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique, Soviet authorities maintain, are largely a consequence of the shift in U.S. policy under Ronald Reagan.<sup>26</sup>

We are, thus, brought back to a larger dimension of the problem. For most of the Carter years, the Soviet leadership paid scant attention to the interaction of U.S. and South African policies. While it resented the American role in mediating change in the region and disdained the Young-McHenry-Lake inflection as merely an attempt to salvage selfish American interests, it also comfortably assumed that the United States would not do well with the new "revolutionary" regimes and that the U.S. rift with South Africa would only help, since it was not likely to go far enough to alter South African behaviour nor far enough to satisfy the African states, only far enough to undermine any prospect of US-RSA collaboration. Under Ford, Soviet leaders were actually eager to divorce Southern African developments from US-Soviet relations. Whatever they thought first of the gambit implicit in NSSM 39 and then the flip-flop and sudden energizing of U.S. diplomacy in the region in 1976, their over-riding interest was in decoupling Angolan developments and others to follow from East-West détente. They were not about to make an issue of U.S. policy in the area while struggling to fend off Henry Kissinger's efforts to make their's a major issue.

The situation now, however, is quite the reverse. The interconnection of U.S. and South African policies is, again, of importance to the Soviet leadership. Reagan's alleged global offensive and South Africa's regional offensive, they insist and no doubt believe, flow together. Part of Soviet strategy, of course, is to persuade the remainder of Africa, to the degree it needs persuading, that an "unholy alliance" has been struck between the two countries. Every measure of economic assistance (the 1982 \$1,1 billion IMF loan), every step toward military co-operation (easing restrictions on the sale of military-strategic goods) or crypto-military co-operation (lifting the ban on exports of nuclear power equipment and plutonium-3), every U.S.

Security Council veto protecting South Africa, and every visit of one country's intelligence or military officials to the other are picked up and trumpeted in Soviet accounts.<sup>27</sup>

Where before U.S. and South African leaders were said to have only partly overlapping interests and divergent tactics, according to Soviet analysis, the contrast has been wiped away since January 1981. Now the two countries are said to be on the same wavelength, pursuing largely identical objectives by complementary means. The Americans, they say, seek to preserve, "though not without some facelifting", a South African regime "that would be a reliable ally"; to "suppress or to disorganize the national liberation movement in South Africa"; to stall in Namibia while "fostering pro-Western forces there capable of counteracting SWAPO"; to "destabilize the countries of socialist orientation in the region" while "dragging them into various talks at which it is difficult to discern the carrot from the stick"; to "undermine the group of Frontline States"; and, "last but not least, to guarantee for American corporations unimpeded access to the region's raw materials".<sup>28</sup> Phrased in this way, there is little with which the Soviets would think the South African Government disagrees.

Until recently, however, notwithstanding growing frustration and anger, the Soviet Union has tended to downplay the effectiveness of Administration policy and, by extension, the potency of its supposed alliance with South Africa. Thus, despite the sweeping aims attributed to the Administration, the malevolence of its attitude toward the Soviet Union and its friends, and the inflexibility of its policy, Soviet leaders seemed unimpressed with Washington's accomplishments. Or, at least, that was the posture struck. Over the last month or so, however, there are signs that Moscow's mood is changing substantially. No longer are Soviet diplomats and institute types talking only about the frustrations of not being able "to do business with this administration", a judgment most Soviet observers had reached by last summer. Over the last several months, with the collapse of the intermediate-range nuclear missile force (INF) negotiations in Geneva, the U.S. invasion of Granada and escalating pressures on Nicaragua, and mounting instability in the Middle East, many Soviets are now glumly, and with considerable alarm, talking about a complete collapse of the restraining framework of arms control and the renewed risk of direct confrontation between the superpowers.

Two separate concerns have merged to push Soviet leaders beyond their earlier defiant equanimity to this new level of apprehension: First, largely because of their view of the Administration's behaviour in the area of arms control, in particular, its handling of the Soviet walkout from the INF talks, Soviet leaders are convinced the Administration does not take the Soviet Union seriously; that it believes the Soviet leadership is merely playing games; and that it fails to understand the peril now facing the entire edifice of

arms control, including START. (Rather than yielding on the issue of their own missiles in Europe, the Soviets, if and when they return to START, will make the American Pershing 2s and ground-launched cruise missiles part of the bill, making, as they are aware, the Soviet proposal still more non-negotiable in American eyes. START, they sense, is about to become moribund.) Second, recent U.S. actions in the Caribbean and Central America, together with its use of military force in the Middle East, apparently persuade Soviet leaders that the Administration is not nearly so passive as its moderate American friends claim. Soviet analysts are not suggesting that Reagan and his people want a confrontation with the Soviet Union or, for that matter, a test of American strength in the Middle East. But they are worried by what the Administration may stumble into, particularly, when as they judge from its actions in Central America, its disposition is self-confident and assertive. And, for all the Soviet leadership's distractions, they know that there are circumstances from which it, too, will not retreat.

This shift of mood, if it is occurring, has potential implications for Soviet actions in Southern Africa. During the first two and a half years of the Reagan Administration, Soviet leaders hewed to a course set at the time of Zimbabwe independence. Minus the inflated expectations of 1974-79, it consisted of pressing forward with diplomatic, military, and party ties with Angola and Mozambique and, where possible, with Zimbabwe, a modest but steady contribution to Angola and Mozambique's defence, and a major role in supplying and training the ANC. To this they added an intensive effort to exploit the Reagan Administration's policy of "constructive engagement" with Pretoria and apparent backsliding on the Namibian question.<sup>29</sup> Over the last three years they have waged an intensive propaganda effort in their media and, one can be sure, in private conversations with African leaders, to drive home the significance of Washington's alleged alliance with South Africa. But I know of no indication that they acted more militantly — for example, by substantially increasing the tempo of arms deliveries into the area or by kicking up a fuss over the moderate behaviour of the Frontline States.

If they, however, are beginning to view the Administration in a more disturbing light, so are they likely to view events in Southern Africa differently. Southern Africa, as I indicated earlier, is not likely to be the place where Soviet leaders make their stand against the Reagan Administration. Nor are they likely, in any circumstance, to intervene recklessly in the area. Nor are they likely to sweep aside sentiments and preferences of the Frontline States, because keeping in step with their policies has become a cardinal guideline of Soviet policy. But they are likely to feel the need to prove a stiffening resolve. And they are likely to want to show American clients, such as they assume South Africa to be, that a more assertive United States does not guarantee them more freedom of manoeuvre.

If this is the case, then one might expect the Soviet Union to become more



directly involved in Angola and Mozambique's defence, supplying more advanced equipment and Soviet personnel to man it. One might also expect gestures of military support, high-level contact between the Soviet military and the military of any of these states willing to have it, more frequent visits by Soviet naval task forces, and the like. The Soviets are also likely to take a tougher line with the South Africans, warning them in public and in private to curb their military attacks on Angola and their ambitions for UNITA. They may also take a more active role in training ANC insurgents on the ground, instead of the indirect role they play now. And, in general, they are likely to strike a more aggressive pose for the Frontline States, encouraging them to act more firmly as well. This is not quite the strategic offensive that conservatives imagine the Soviet Union has underway, but it would mean a more assertive Soviet policy in Southern Africa, originating in a steadily deteriorating East-West relationship.

#### Notes

1. A. Runov, "South Africa: Citadel of Racism and Reaction, *International Affairs*, no. 11 (November 1976), p. 72.
2. Not that Moscow now for the first time approached Africa's more moderate regimes. From 1962-63, when relations were established with the likes of Senegal, Nigeria, and Kenya, the Soviet Union had actively sought expanded ties.
3. See E. Melnikov, "Politicheskie preobrazovaniya v Afrikanских stranakh sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii" (Political transformations in African states of a socialist orientation, *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, no. 12 (December 1981), p. 121. For a fuller and enthusiastic discussion of the notion of African states of "a socialist orientation," giving the concept the patina of theoretical importance see Anatoly Gromyko, *Afrika: Progress, trudnosti i perspektivy* (Africa: Progress, Problems, and Prospects) (Moscow: "mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya," 1981), in particular, pp. 75-97.
4. By the late 1970s Soviet commentators grouped Algeria, Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Guinea, Congo, Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Tanzania in a category of states making "far-reaching economic and social changes... facilitating and accelerating their possible transition to socialism." (A tame version of the 1963-64 formulation.) A second cluster of states—Guinea-Bissau, the Cape Verde Islands, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Mali, and Zimbabwe—were said to be taking constructive but less advanced steps. See, for example, Gleb Starushenko, "Chosen Path," *New Times*, no. 40 (October 1980), p. 18. Starushenko is the Deputy Director of the African Institute.
5. There are a number of useful commentaries on the Soviet role in the Angolan War, including Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Decision-Making on the Intervention in Angola," in David E. Albright (ed.), *Communism in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 87-117 as well as his "The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Spring/Summer 1978); Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980); Colin Legum, "Angola and the Horn of Africa," in Stephen S. Kaplan et al., *Mailed Fist, Velvet Glove: Soviet Armed forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1979); and Peter Vanneman and Martin

- James, "The Soviet Intervention in Angola: Intentions and Implication," *Strategic Review* (Summer 1976). But the most balanced and incisive account is in Larry C. Napper, "The African Terrain and U.S.-Soviet Conflict in Angola and Rhodesia," in Alexander L. George (ed.), *Managing US-Soviet Rivalry* (Boulder: Westview, 1983), pp. 155-85.
6. See, for example, *Pravda*, February 16, 1975, p. 5. In contrast, the Americans did not publicly endorse the notion of a coalition government until summer 1975, too late.
  7. See Napper, "The African Terrain and U.S.-Soviet Conflict," p. 160.
  8. *Izvestiya*, May 21, 1975.
  9. Not only did the five Frontline States (Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, and Angola) push ZAPU and ZANU into collaborating in the Patriotic Front and take the lead in managing the diplomacy among all key parties, including the British and the Americans, they also saw to it that all, or nearly all, arms to ZAPU and ZANU were channelled through the OAU Liberation Committee as well as determining what kinds of weapons could be introduced into the conflict. They did all this because, as Kenneth Kaunda had said, "Our failure to find a solution here [in Angola] confirms that the Organization of African Unity has no power to shape the destiny of Africa. Power is in the hands of the superpowers, to whom we are handing Africa by our failure."
  10. See Veniamin Midtsev, "Abetting the Racists," *New Times*, no. 45 (November 1979), pp. 23-24. Significantly, Midtsev is a senior Africanist in the International Department of the CPSU's Central Committee.
  11. David E. Albright, *The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s*, The Washington Papers No. 101 (Washington: Praeger Special Studies, 1983), p. 7. In neither case do these totals include assistance to so-called national liberation movements.
  12. The first statistics, adjusted by the author to exclude north African countries, are from *Soviet Economic Prospects for the 1970s*, Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 768; the second from Albright, *The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa*, p. 95.
  13. *Background Brief*, The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London), July 1983.
  14. Albright, *The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa*, p. 16. By 1975-1979 Albright reports that 17 African countries were primarily dependent on the Soviet Union for arms supplies, four of them exclusively dependent. (p. 8).
  15. The best illustration was V.M. Kulish (ed.), *Voennaya sila i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* (Military force and international relations) (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1972), particularly the chapters written by A.M. Dudin and Yu.N. Listvinov.
  16. *Le Monde*, March 20, 1981.
  17. Seth Singleton, "The Shared Tactical Goals of South Africa and the Soviet Union," *Africa Notes* of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, no. 12, April 26, 1983, p. 3.
  18. I will not belabour the point here because I have had my say on this subject in congressional testimony and in "The Strategic Implications of the Soviet Union's Nonfuel Mineral Resource Policy," *The Journal of Resource Management and Technology*, Vol. 12, no. 1 (January 1983), pp. 47-55. Frankly what one believes on this score depends more on how one understands the basic character of Soviet foreign policy than it does on the issue itself. If one believes with James Arnold Miller that Brezhnev "at a secret meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Prague in 1973" said "that the Soviet objective was world dominance by the year 1985, and that the control of Europe's sources of energy and nonfuel minerals would reduce it to the condition of a hostage to Moscow," or, if one believes with former Ambassador Donald B. Sole

- that "as recently as [also] 1973 Leonid Brezhnev is reported to have told President Barre of Somalia [also] in Prague: 'Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends, the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of central and southern Africa,'" elaborate analyses of Soviet foreign policy probably do not much matter. Nor, for that matter, does the fact that Barre was not in Prague in 1973. (The Miller quote is from *Alarm: Alert Letter on the Availability of Raw Materials* mimeo., Issue No. 54, September 1983, p. 3. The Sole quote is from an interview with him in *Africa Report* (September-October 1981), p. 14-19.)
19. Boris Asoyan, "Split in the 'White Tribe,'" *New Times*, no. 19 (May 1982), p. 22.
  20. Yusuf Dadoo, "Crisis of the Racist System in the South of Africa," *World Marxist Review*, no. 12 (December 1982), p. 19.
  21. Runov, "South Africa," pp. 67-8.
  22. See, for example, L. Skuratov, "Racist Stratagem," *New Times*, no. 13 (March 1983), pp. 22-3.
  23. Anatoly Gromyko (ed.), *Vneshnyaya politika stran Afriki* (The Foreign Policy of African Countries) (Moscow: "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya," 1981), p. 93.
  24. By and large Zimbabwe has not provided facilities to the ANC, complying with assurances given on the eve of independence, a circumstance about which the Soviets are silent. The other countries on South African borders do not provide bases to the ANC, a fact the Soviets acknowledge and accept.
  25. Veniamin Miltsev, "Explosive Situation," *New Times*, no. 34 (August 1982), pp. 9-10.
  26. Presumably Soviet analysts know that the proximate cause was the increase in ANC sabotage, in particular, the successful attack on SASOL plants in mid-1980, but, at the same time, Soviet leaders are doubtless convinced that Reagan's policy is the decisive factor.
  27. See, for example, Y. Tarabrin, "U.S. Expansionist Policy in Africa" *International Affairs*, no. 10 (October 1983), pp. 41-50, and his "Afrika v globalnoi strategii imperializma" (Africa in the Global Strategy of Imperialism), *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, no. 2 (February 1982), pp. 25-37; as well as A. Urmov, "Alyans Vashington-Pretoriya i Afrika" (The Washington-Pretoria Alliance and Africa), *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, no. 3. (March 1982), pp. 46-58.
  28. Tarabrin, "U.S. Expansionist Policy in Africa," p. 42.
  29. On the last, beyond a constant stream of commentary in the central press, see V. Yu. Vasilkov, "Problema Namibii i Positsiya SShA" (The Namibian Problem and the Position of the U. S. A.), *SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, no. 4 (April 1983), pp. 49-52.

Donald Sole

## **The goals of the West in Southern Africa: a South African view**

It is common cause that the decade of the eighties has been and will continue to be one of conflict and confrontation, that the uneasy balance of power set up in the fifties in the wake of World War II has been disturbed by the fact that the superpowers are far less in control of events in their spheres of influence than at any time since 1945, and that the world's somewhat precarious economic equilibrium is being increasingly undermined by the constantly widening disparity in the incomes of the first and third world nations.

It will be remembered that Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski, when serving as President Carter's National Security Adviser, referred to an "arc of crisis" stretching from Bangladesh through India, Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East, Somalia, Central Africa and down through Southern Africa to the Cape of Good Hope. Southern Africa will certainly continue to be viewed as an area of crisis or potential crisis for the rest of the decade, but it is my submission that the degree of priority to be accorded to this area by the West will gradually decline, unless of course a situation should arise predicating the possibility of direct Soviet military intervention and a confrontation with South Africa on that account. Before discussing this submission in more detail it might be as well to emphasise that the concept of "the West" is a concept that, in South African eyes at least, is becoming more and more amorphous. White South Africans at one time considered themselves part of "the West". This is no longer true, especially of the younger generation. There is much more emphasis on our Africanism, although some Government spokesmen will continue to talk about the need to maintain "our Western standards and values". So when one seeks to determine the goals of the West in Southern Africa, it is first necessary to define what constitutes "the West".

In this context, for most practical purposes, there are only four countries whose relationships with Southern Africa are regarded here as of major

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importance. They are, in that order, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and France. These four countries can be regarded as constituting "the West", in South African eyes. The attitude of other Western countries is viewed as entirely peripheral. This is particularly true of a country like Holland, despite the Dutch ancestry of the greater part of South Africa's white population.

Furthermore, as a South African I am very conscious of the extent to which, amongst the four countries, there is a wide and growing disparity of interest and views with respect to their goals in Southern Africa, more particularly in South Africa.

On the other hand there is certainly an identity of interest as well; and if I could sum up their common goal in Southern Africa in one word, that word would be "stability". The current instability in Southern Africa, with respect to both the region as a whole and to some of the individual countries making up the region, is their major source of concern. To shore up the stability both of the region itself and of a number of individual countries within the region, requires from them an expenditure of effort, manpower and financial resources, (in varying degrees) which is at present not inconsiderable in relation to the demand of their overall political strategy. All will therefore endorse and support any move which will have the effect of bringing greater stability to the region as such or to those individual countries which are a source of concern.

All four countries similarly view developments in South Africa as providing the key to the attainment of stability in the region and in most of the countries comprising the region. None has any illusions about the overriding economic, political and military importance of South Africa, despite the lip service paid from time to time at the United Nations, at Commonwealth gatherings and in meetings in the European Community, to the views of other members of the region and of their supporters in the Third World.

With respect to South Africa itself, despite the disparity of attitudes to which I have referred and which I shall attempt to delineate in greater detail a little later on, I believe that the four countries would endorse, as a goal to which they could all subscribe, the establishment of a politico-socio-economic order in this country which would (*in order of priority*):

- ensure stability and orderly development;
- improve the quality of life for all;
- progressively provide for the elimination of discrimination against the person and for equal economic opportunity for all;
- make it possible for all national, ethnic and other groups to participate suitably in the decision making process;
- and
- ensure a fair and equitable role for all in the exercise of political power, not

on the basis of one man one vote, but on a basis which would have to be worked out through consensus by South Africans themselves in the course of this decade. Whatever the exact outcome of these deliberations, there should be clear evidence that it rests on the implicit consent, if not the explicit approval, of the governed.

Turning now to the goals of the four countries individually, South Africans see the objectives of the Reagan Administration as having been most clearly defined in the address by Lawrence Eagleburger, U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs, on 23 June 1983, entitled "Southern Africa: America's responsibility for peace and change". This is a statement with which you will be familiar but it may be as well to recall the highlights:

- In respect of Namibia, the implementation of Security Council 435 on the pre-requisite basis of an agreed programme of withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola concomitant with the staged withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia as provided for under 435.
- In respect of Angola, a quid pro quo (still to be defined) for the withdrawal of Cuban troops.
- The promotion of regional security by the encouragement of constructive dialogue among the components of the region, the urging of restraint in resort to violence or subversion, the avoidance of polarization.
- The promotion of economic progress by the provision of economic and technical assistance.
- In South Africa itself, the application of such leverage as is available with the objective of producing peaceful change in the form of clearly visible evolutionary progress for the less privileged components of the South African population.

In the interest of stability, the United States is clearly committed to support of all the existing governments in the region, with the exception of that of Angola, where the growing strength and authority of Savimbi's Unita has created a factor, the complications of which are only beginning to be properly perceived by Washington. But the MNR in Mozambique does not appear to be regarded in Washington in the same light and Samora Machel's Government is treated as a viable one, as a government to be supported and strengthened, within limits. The other governments in the region—Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe are viewed as relatively stable, viable sovereign units with Zimbabwe providing a particular challenge to U.S. involvement in the area. In American eyes (to quote Eagleburger) "because of its key geographic position and relatively strong economic base, it is important that Zimbabwe not fail as a new nation".

With respect to South Africa, the United States is seen as having a number of specific objectives in the humanitarian field not spelled out in Eagleburger's statement, objectives of which I was made very much aware

during my tenure of office in Washington. The objectives form part of the policy of constructive engagement and include (not in any order of priority):

- progressive elimination of the practice of detention without trial;
- greater recognition of the right of freedom for South Africans to travel abroad;  
and, concomitant with this,
- facilities (in the form of visas) for all holders of valid U.S. passports to visit South Africa;
- a winding down of the policy of population removals coupled with the need to ensure that when they take place they are carried out with the utmost consideration for those being moved;
- progressive abolition of the colour bar at the work place (including equal pay for equal work, equal eligibility for promotion, housing subsidies, participation in trade union activities etc.);
- reversal of the practice of withdrawal of South African citizenship from persons whose homelands have been declared independent even though in many cases such persons no longer have any connection with the homelands in question;
- cessation of practices which are seen as insults to human dignity, especially where discrimination on grounds of colour is involved.

An American objective in a totally unrelated field is to prevent South Africa becoming a nuclear power, but fortunately or unfortunately, (depending on one's viewpoint), the nuclear policies *vis à vis* South Africa implemented by successive U.S. Administrations in the last ten years have been counter-productive, simply serving as an incentive to those in South Africa who have advocated that this country should use its natural and technological resources to master the entire nuclear fuel cycle.

How do South Africans view the American objectives which I have outlined?

At the onset I would submit that most South Africans welcome the current United States initiatives and degree of engagement in Southern Africa.

This is so for a number of reasons:

- the United States is a superpower and, as a symbol of strength, its political and economic presence is seen as promoting stability, especially in circumstances where the withdrawal of the former colonial powers has created something of a vacuum open to exploitation by the other superpower;
- although an economic giant the United States is not seen as an economic neo-colonialist whose intervention might be viewed as something of a threat;
- nor is the United States seen as having any imperialist ambitions either for herself or for her protégés;
- the greater the degree of U.S. engagement the greater the claims which

can be made on her for economic and technical assistance by the less developed countries in the region, from which South Africa benefits indirectly since her responsibility to contribute to their economic uplift is correspondingly lighter;

- United States ideologies with their mixture of emphasis on capitalism on the one hand and development of individual freedoms on the other, are more compatible with the interests of the region than any other ideologies, especially Marxism or socialism;
- no other non-African power of consequence is seen as having a real stake in the region apart from the USSR since the former colonial powers are credited with comparatively little influence.

The reverse side of this coin is that American objectives which involve intervention in domestic affairs are frequently resented, especially by the governments concerned, whether the governments be black or white. Prime Minister Mugabe can be as hostile to what he regards as American intervention in domestic politics as Prime Minister Botha. Nearly all the governments in the region are particularly sensitive on this issue. Nevertheless I have no doubt that the majority of the population which thinks about such matters views the balance flowing from American engagement in the affairs of the region as a distinctly positive one, also that this majority is to be found amongst the Blacks as well as the Whites. Blacks tend to welcome the *degree* of engagement even when they disagree with the *direction* of the policy being followed.

The United Kingdom, as the ex-colonial power has historical, economic and cultural links with the region which are far closer than those of the United States. Quite naturally there is a far wider and deeper concern about events and developments in the region, not only on the part of the British Government but also on the part of the British people, than is to be found in the U.S. However, in view of the increasing orientation of Britain towards Europe, that interest seems to be rapidly declining except among officials who have their own empires to maintain, and among academics. To a South African, British Government attitudes and objectives in Southern Africa appear as an amalgam of contradictions, lacking clear cut direction. Angola, Mozambique, Zaire are outside the sphere of British responsibility. Britain's former colonies, now members of the Commonwealth, are an acknowledged responsibility, but especially since the euphoria over Zimbabwe has evaporated, these former colonies now independent do not represent an achievement in which Britons as a nation take much pride. They are a drain on the United Kingdom exchequer and the often vitriolic criticisms of British policy emanating from some of their leaders, such as Prime Minister Mugabe and President Kaunda, are an irritation to be borne stoically and with resignation. Broadly speaking, the relicts of empire have become an embarrassment, but policies and relationships are so



institutionalized not least in terms of the Commonwealth ties, that this embarrassment cannot be admitted even to oneself. It is nevertheless likely that with the passage of time the gestures which Britain policy regularly has to make as part of the Commonwealth relationship or in the context of these countries' membership of the Third World, will become less frequent.

If this analysis has substance, it follows that the principal British objective is to reduce the United Kingdom's commitment in the region, to the extent that this is feasible without too obviously giving the appearance of reneging on responsibilities. To this end Britain must contribute what it can, in the form of diplomacy, pressure and moral suasion, to promote stability and economic prosperity. This task is, however, greatly complicated, if not rendered virtually impossible, by the nature of the relationship with South Africa.

Britain's investment in and economic ties with South Africa are, in real terms, as opposed to verbiage, the dominant factor in her relations with the region. Britain thus has an important stake in South Africa's stability and prosperity. The extent of this stake tends to be underplayed, but the British Board of Trade has no illusions about the contribution which South African prosperity can make to British prosperity. Hence, for example, the emphatic rejection of economic sanctions. But on issues other than economic, where gestures and statements can make the news columns, the British Government, at the prompting principally of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, does not hesitate to align itself with the objectives with respect to South Africa of the overwhelming majority of the members of the Commonwealth, of the OAU and of the Third World. Sir Geoffrey Howe's castigation of South Africa on the eve of his departure to attend the Commonwealth Conference in New Delhi in November, is a case in point.

In this context, it may be interesting to refer to two illustrations of where British policy differs significantly from United States policy. The British do not accept the Cuban "linkage" concept which is a cornerstone of U. S. policy on Namibia. The British seek to apply sanctions on sporting relations with South Africa, an approach which contrasts strikingly with the American *laissez faire* attitude in this respect. In both cases the British policy derives, although by no means entirely, directly from Commonwealth pressures.

Quite naturally Britain is supportive, while purporting to act independently, of most of the American objectives in Southern Africa which I outlined earlier, but the impression remains that the primary emotion which animates the British mind is a wish that the problems of Southern Africa would simply all go away.

The conduct of German foreign policy *vis à vis* Southern Africa has been in the hands of the successive leaders of the Freie Demokratische Partei for the past decade and a half. The last three German Chancellors — Brand, Schmidt and Kohl — have had no real interest in Southern Africa. All have, however,

sought to play a major role in other more important spheres of German foreign policy. This has meant that Genscher — and Scheel before him — have had a comparatively free hand in developing German Government attitudes towards South Africa, apart from occasional forays by Social Democrat left-wingers and CSU right wingers.

Of Genscher in particular, it can be said that he aspired to define goals for Germany's African policy which would enable him to achieve triumphs that would take him out from under the shadow of the Chancellor's wing, which so limited his initiative in most other spheres of foreign policy. (He has found out, as others before him, that few succeed in making their reputations in Africa.)

It has also been a consistent objective not to allow the Federal Republic to be overshadowed or out-manoeuvred by the German Democratic Republic in the only continent where the two states compete on anything like equal terms. East German interest and influence in parts of the Southern African region have not been inconsiderable, notably so in Angola and Mozambique. In these circumstances the Federal Republic is prepared to go a long way in vying for African favour in the region wherever there appears a danger of being outbid by the Democratic Republic.

With respect to Namibia, because of the continuing presence and importance of the German speaking element in the Territory, Bonn has always felt that it has a major stake. It is perhaps a commentary on these ties that a city as small as Windhoek has two *direct* flights a week to Frankfurt, something unparalleled by any other city of comparable size anywhere in the world. It is therefore an understandable objective of West German diplomacy to ensure the safety and security of the German speaking population even though the majority are no longer German citizens. It is partly this special interest which makes the West Germans more inclined to follow the U.S. lead than any other member of the Contact Group. The Federal Republic is also more willing to provide economic aid to an independent Namibia than any other member of the Contact Group apart from the United States. It is, however, a West German objective to keep its options open, partly so that it can at all times exercise influence on behalf of the German speaking minority. The German Foreign Office is therefore careful to cultivate Sam Nujoma and characteristically enough, for example, let it be known that Nujoma had been invited to visit Foreign Minister Genscher as a *quid pro quo* (although not so stated) for Minister Pik Botha's call in Bonn in November.

With reference to South Africa itself there is no question that the German economy has an important stake in the stability and expansion of the South African economy. The Federal Republic is South Africa's largest trading partner (sharing the top spot alternately with the United States) with the Federal Republic having a consistently favourable trade balance. German investment has expanded enormously in the last fifteen years. It is therefore a

goal of German policy to maintain and consolidate this happy position, but to do so with as little publicity as possible so as not to invite too much criticism from the Africans or facilitate exploitation on this score by East German propaganda. Whenever any kind of spotlight is focussed on West German/South African relations, as happened for example on the occasion of Pik Botha's visit to Bonn, there is inevitably a display of German rhetoric in denunciation of South Africa's racial policies and other aspects of the South African scene which are anathema to politicians, officials and media representatives still very conscious of the country's Nazi past. The West Germans would always prefer not to have visits from South African Cabinet Ministers and significantly enough do not send their own Cabinet Ministers to South Africa (except as part of the Contact Group). In almost every sphere the Germans believe that the less the publicity the greater the co-operation that is feasible, especially in the area of economic relations.

It flows from this that the principal German goal in Southern Africa is the maintenance of a stable and prosperous South Africa and coupled with this, the reduction to a minimum of the controversies with which any association with South Africa is surrounded.

France has always been an enigma for South Africa (except for French-speaking Zaire), in spite of her reputation of being the most successful ex-colonial power in Africa. This is so, only partly on account of the language barrier. The English-speaking African countries in Southern Africa have never quite trusted the French. There has been better rapport on the part of the Angolans and Mozambicans, flowing inter-alia from the speedy French recognition of the MPLA in Angola, but the French have never shown much more than academic interest in the former Portuguese territories. South Africa, too, has found it difficult to understand what French objectives are in the area. France has, in the past, been an object of admiration on the part of the white South Africans for her skill in providing South Africa with arms without too much alienation of African opinion and for the success she has obtained in other sectors of the export drive, including the contract for South Africa's first nuclear power station at Koeberg. But South Africans remain distrustful and much more so since the advent of President Mitterand whose Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, has a reputation dating back to the days of his association with the now defunct CCTA (Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa), a reputation of outright hostility to South Africa. The impression which Cheysson gave in his CCTA days was that he resented South Africa's leadership aspirations in CCTA matters and felt that she should be reduced to size. This impression of him persists now that he is Foreign Minister. In his case it is not a question of seeking to curry favour with the Africans of the Third World (cf. Sir Geoffrey Howe and the Commonwealth) because that is not French style. It is simply a distaste for all things South African, which has been given added dimension, in terms of

French distrust of Reagan's foreign policy by the fact that the United States is pursuing a policy of constructive engagement *vis à vis* South and Southern Africa.

The French attitude is reflected in the *de facto* withdrawal from the Contact Group, in the ban on the French rugby tour to South Africa, in the refusal to provide enriched uranium for fuelling the nuclear power reactor at Koeberg and in the strident criticisms of South Africa at international conferences — to quote only a few examples.

Accordingly, France's principal goal in Southern Africa is seen as being to cut South Africa down to size, to reduce her ability to dominate the sub-continent, politically, economically and militarily and thereby to achieve a greater equilibrium of forces in the region in question. But this is not a goal which is pursued with a great deal of zeal and enthusiasm, because the interest is simply not there.

This brief account of the disparities in the respective goals of the four Western countries principally concerned with Southern Africa will, I trust, underline how misleading it can be to speak of "Western goals" as such. Obviously there is a considerable degree of identity of interest and objectives (which I sought to delineate at the beginning of this address) but this communality of interests is declining and not growing.

More important, however, in any discussion of goals is the question of the leverage available to achieve those goals. It is my submission that with respect to South Africa, the only one of the four countries with any real leverage is the United States and, as Chester Crocker has consistently emphasised, this is far more limited than is generally realised. Fundamentally, the leverage flows most strongly from the fact that U.S. policy of constructive engagement in Southern Africa, in its broad strategy although not in all its detail, is seen by so many South Africans as being in the long-term interests of South Africa itself. This approach is not shared by all members of the South African Government but it remains true that the abandonment by the United States Government of what is viewed as the first clear-cut, imaginative, and comprehensive policy *vis à vis* Southern Africa ever to be developed by U.S. policy makers would be regarded as a setback of some magnitude, to be avoided, if necessary by concessions, if these are feasible without too much direct harm to South African interests. Thinking South Africans realize that for "constructive engagement" to be viable in American eyes it must produce visible dividends in the form of observable and registrable changes in South African policy, especially in circumstances where the prospects of reaching a settlement on Namibia may remain remote.

Great Britain certainly has varying degrees of leverage with respect to her former colonies in the region, but with respect to South Africa the only potential leverage I can visualize is in the field of sport. For example, if the

English Rugby Union defies the injunctions of the British Government and sends a national team to tour South Africa this year, there will be considerable pressure on the South African Rugby Board, by way of a reciprocal gesture, to do even more than it has done up to now to promote full integration in South African rugby.

West Germany has some leverage with respect to Namibia because of her willingness to provide economic aid when the Territory becomes independent, but as far as South Africa is concerned the only leverage that would apply might be the restriction of credit, something which would be difficult to implement — as previous attempts with respect to Hermes guarantees have shown — and which in the event might well be self-defeating. All four countries, as a result of the increasing demands made on their talents and resources in areas of greater importance to them far removed from Southern Africa, will tend, with the passage of time, and by virtue of greater recognition of their limited leverage, to run down their commitments in the region, unless, as stated earlier, the Soviet Union should feel inclined to become *militarily* involved in support of its surrogates — a prospect which I believe is improbable, although its possibility should obviously not be excluded.

All of which leads to the conclusion that short of a global conflict, the destinies of the nations of Southern Africa will be decided by the Southern Africans themselves and that for the so-called Western Powers either to seek to prescribe goals to the Southern Africans or to set goals for themselves — while it may be a fascinating academic exercise — will have little effect on the reality of things.

Donald F. McHenry

## The goals of the West

It is increasingly difficult to speak of the goals of the West as a monolithic entity. They are not. Increasingly, members of the Western countries assume positions, sometimes conflicting ones, on issues in Europe, Latin America and Africa; not to mention Southern Africa. Even concerning the area on which the West is most united and which, in many respects, holds the West together, namely relations with the Soviet Union and the maintenance of security, there is no clear consensus of Western opinion.

If one looks at the tactics used to achieve goals, the diversity of views is also pronounced and has importance. Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, all members of the late (and lamented) Western Contact Group on Namibia, are no less desirous than the United States of achieving independence for Namibia, and an independent Western oriented government in Angola. Yet they have clearly parted company from the United States in its effort to condition Namibian independence on Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Similarly, those Contact Group members disapprove of United States policy on the Soviet gas pipeline, on the Middle East and US intervention in Grenada.

Even sharper differences within the West are introduced when one includes the goals and tactics of other countries generally included in the Western group: the Scandinavian countries, other NATO members, and those Asian, Latin American and African countries who, by culture and political outlook, consider themselves Western. Some of these countries would be included in almost any definition of the West, but to do so is to reinforce the presence of diversity in outlook.

South Africa has historically identified itself with the West, and to be sure, South Africa shares a number of goals with the West, but it is not simply for purposes of public posturing or geography that South Africa is isolated in many respects from other Western countries. Indeed, even on the most notable expression of group action to achieve a common goal, namely

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NATO, South Africa was pointedly excluded. In fact, South Africa, which likes to identify itself as Western, anti-communist, capitalist and Christian, can be said to pursue many policies and practices which have none of these characteristics. South Africa's racial policies and the policies of the white redoubt stand shoulder to shoulder with poverty and political domination, factors which help to cultivate the cause of communism in the area and, therefore, surely do not serve the objectives of the West.

However, many white South Africans, partly out of sincere belief but also in part because of tactics, would argue that there are, nevertheless, many things that South Africa and the West have in common. They argue that South Africa's location astride the Cape route, its technologically advanced society, and its storhouse of valuable raw materials, make South Africa essential to the West even if the latter finds the aroma of the association objectionable.

As noted above, it is obvious that South Africa shares some common goals with the West, but so does the Soviet Union! Thus, *some* common goals are not enough. Admission to the fraternity, if you will, requires a greater measure of commonality; not simply on some or any goals, but on those goals which the group considers essential. Put negatively, there cannot be *sharp differences on essential questions*.

There will be (and have been), obviously, circumstances when South Africa and the West will make common cause. Those circumstances are carefully limited and will be subject to the greatest scrutiny — even when there appear to be common objectives. It was not only because the United States Congress questioned the wisdom of *US involvement in Angola*, in 1975, that it passed the Clark Amendment prohibiting further involvement. The Amendment also reflected the desire of Congress to avoid involvement in active collaboration with an “international polecat”.

But I have yet to deal with the belief that South Africa's strategic and economic assets make it vital to the West, and the stated but also sometimes unstated assumption that in the world of self-interested men and cynics, these assets will offset South Africa's status. This assertion simply does not hold up under analysis, either in the opinion of informed students of the area or, I would suggest, in the analysis of a South African national security council. For surely, a South African national security council would not confuse its functions — and therefore its findings — with the South African Broadcasting Corporation.

South Africa does have valuable resources, it is in an important participant in international trade, disruption of which would be a major inconvenience. But South Africa itself is proof that such disadvantages can be overcome. Iran is proof that valuable resources cannot be eaten or hoarded. Iran also is proof that disruption can spring from the very policies advanced in the cause of stability.

Finally, that old chestnut about South Africa's role in protecting the Cape sea route is just that — an old chestnut. The Cape route is protected by its distance from any likely potential adversary but, more importantly, by the route's vital nature and a recognition by a potential adversary that action to disrupt its traffic would mean that a more fundamental decision, war, had been taken.

To be fair, I do not wish to underplay South Africa's assets. Were I at the SABC or at the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, I would tout those assets, too. Their job is to make the most of what they have. They do so with uncomfortable effectiveness within South Africa and among uninformed and conservative elements in the United States. But I would not for a moment confuse useful with vital. South Africa's list of assets is useful, but even their usefulness is not without liability, so long as current South African policies continue.

This leads me to suggest that to approach our conference in terms of Western goals or simply the Soviet threat, is to distort or to miss entirely the nature of the problems of the area and the manner in which Western efforts to counter a Soviet threat might be pursued effectively. Nevertheless, let me deal with the assigned subject, Western goals, within the qualifications discussed above. The *principal* goal is that level of political consensus within South Africa which will enable all of its people to govern themselves. This objective should not be stated so subtly as to mislead, it entails a commitment to full political participation, a process in which South Africa has yet to make a start.

Such a commitment, like the ripples produced by a pebble dropped in water, would have an ever-widening positive effect for peace and security within South Africa and the region. A political consensus

- Would enable South Africans to resolve the legitimate grievances within their society;
- Would remove a major source of tension between South Africa and its neighbours. Here it should be recalled that South Africa's neighbours and the Organisation of African States have already committed themselves to work with South Africa to solve its problems provided South Africa commits itself to the goal of equal participation by all its citizens.
- Would provide a basis for co-operation between South Africa and its neighbours in full recognition of the fact that historical, geographic, and political realities have made interdependence a reality which, although it may be altered, cannot be overlooked;
- Would enable South Africa to use its considerable resources and technical know-how towards the efficient resolution of its internal development problems, as well as of those in countries further north;
- Would enable African countries and international institutions to move towards economic and political development;



- Would remove South Africa from its pariah status and enable the country to play a legitimate role in helping its neighbours to pursue the common objective of protecting their independence.

Current South African policy is not along these lines simply because it cannot accept the first step, or if it does have a so-called "hidden agenda", cannot admit to acceptance even in a long-range time frame. With no visible effort to reach a political consensus at home, South Africa cannot expect to reach a political consensus among its neighbours. Similarly, South Africa has no hope of enjoying that relationship which it could hope to have with the West.

South Africa's neighbours recognise, indeed cannot escape, South Africa's economic stranglehold on the region, as well as its unquestioned military superiority. At the same time, they have sought to maintain their principled opposition to apartheid. They do so with various levels of commitment. In some instances, it is unlikely that neighbouring African states could prevent attacks by South Africans against South Africa from their territories even if they wished.

Rather than resolve its internal problems, or even use its economic power as its principal weapon, South Africa has chosen the military option of destabilization. On occasion, it has used its economic power in a similarly destructive and antagonizing manner. These actions are an embarrassment to the Reagan Administration, which, although it wishes to promote a pragmatic relationship with South Africa, can hardly justify the acts (nor their scale and timing) carried out by South Africa, and by South African supported groups, against its neighbours. The loss of lives is obviously counter to American policy, but so is the destruction of economic infrastructure in Mozambique which adversely affects American economic assistance to Zimbabwe.

To be sure, South Africa's policy of destabilization has led to recent talks with Mozambique. In the past, widely publicised "secret" talks were held also with Angola. Such talks, particularly on economic questions, are not inconsistent with a recognition by those countries of the economic dependence which they have inherited. However, South Africa wishes to go further, insisting that neighbouring countries resolve problems relating to South Africans, and arising as a result of South African policies against South Africans within South Africa. That the neighbouring countries can do something to control such activities from their countries is an obvious fact. How much they can do, and indeed whether they can politically afford to do more, is an open question.

Thus we come full circle to the problem of the West with South Africa. Whatever economic, political or strategic interests the West may have in Southern Africa, are put at risk by South Africa's internal policy. Second, tension within South Africa and between South Africa and its neighbours

will not be reduced so long as South Africa's internal problems remain unaddressed. Third, so long as legitimate grievances remain among South Africans, those grievances will be exploited by external forces such as Cuba and the Soviet Union, and the attention of the region will be diverted from essential development needs.

It is clear, therefore, that the principal goal of the West in South Africa must be the desire to see South Africa reach a political consensus within South Africa. It is the failure to do so which sets off a chain of events inconsistent with Western interests and which, if reversed, has the greatest chance of contributing to peace and security in the region.

## Economic Linkages

The economic linkages between South Africa and its neighbours have developed over time as a reflection of the contrasting structures and stages of development of the countries in question. They represent, therefore, attempts by the respective countries to maximize the benefits to be gained from economic co-operation, but also to minimize the disadvantages that economic interaction involves for some of these countries. In addition to such economic considerations, the further evolution of co-operative arrangements in the economic sphere has in recent years also become subject increasingly to political and security constraints. In this paper an attempt will be made to identify some of the policy choices that have already arisen for the various governments in the region, and to sketch some possible outcomes of the actual process of decision-making on those choices.

### I

To begin with, the nature and circumstances of the countries in question must be described briefly. In terms of the latest World Bank classification, Southern Africa includes several of the least developed countries, with 1981 per capita incomes of less than or not much over US\$410 per annum. Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and in certain respects Malawi, are in terms of their populations small states with relatively underdeveloped infrastructures, surplus populations relative to the available productive employment opportunities, landlocked, and not fully able to feed their own populations adequately. Within and along the borders of the Republic of South Africa the recently independent countries of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, and the self-governing national states, can in economic terms be regarded in a comparable category. It must, however, be recognised that Botswana and Bophuthatswana, for example, and to a certain extent also Swaziland, have good mining resources, that Malawi and Venda have good agricultural potentials which in the case of Malawi in particular has been realised to some extent, that Lesotho and Transkei have promising

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possibilities for hydro-electric development, and so on. These countries are therefore not without economic prospects.

A second group of countries have somewhat larger populations, better developed infrastructures, a wider spectrum of natural resources, more extensive urban development, and have in some cases already achieved somewhat higher income levels. In this category are countries like Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, and in certain respects also Mozambique and Angola. Amongst them, however, there are also countries that are landlocked, and in most of these countries a certain slippage has taken place since their independence in the effectiveness of economic management and in the utilisation of their existing infrastructures. Nevertheless, all these countries still have the inherent potential to be successful in economic development, provided they can maintain reasonable political stability, keep or achieve control over security situations and maintain a reasonable balance between the realistic production possibilities of their economies and the economic expectations which have been awakened amongst their populations by the independence process and subsequent political developments.

The Republic of South Africa is in a last category of its own in Southern Africa. It is far and away the biggest economy in the region, with a population approaching 30 million if the TBVC countries are included, a gross domestic product in 1982 of some US\$73 billion, imports and exports which amounted in the same year to respectively some US\$24 billion and US\$21 billion, and a per capita gross national income of about US\$3 000. It is also an economy that is relatively independent from foreign capital, with only 10 per cent of the gross domestic fixed investment in the period since World War II having been financed by net inflows of foreign capital. It is virtually self-sufficient in food production, and in normal years indeed a substantial exporter of agricultural products. On balance it is also virtually self-sufficient in energy, and it has a diversified economic structure, with manufacturing accounting for about 25 per cent of the gross domestic product.

In the period since World War II the average growth rate of the South African economy has been well over 4 per cent per annum in the real gross domestic product, while projections for the future indicate that an average growth rate of 5 per cent per annum is not unattainable. As pointed out above, however, in its sphere of direct responsibility there are areas that are in economic respects much more comparable to the poorest countries in the region.

Seen purely from the perspective of this bird's-eye view of the economies of Southern Africa it appears to be fairly self-evident that there are potentially considerable advantages for the smaller, poorer countries in co-operation with the stronger and larger economy of the Republic of South Africa. Such

co-operation provides them, and can further provide them, with access to markets for their products and to inputs for their productive processes, to skills and management expertise, and to certain important infrastructural facilities such as harbours and rail routes, the use of an efficient electricity generation network, and water facilities. A close association with the Republic of South Africa can also provide these countries with the possibility of benefiting from the favourable investment image that the South African economy enjoys in the advanced countries.

From another perspective, to be sure, these countries could also suffer very considerable disadvantages from their proximity to their stronger and more well-off neighbour if they should not co-operate with it in the economic field. This is so because the dynamics of the development taking place in the stronger South African economy tend to draw most activities in the sub-continent towards the already developed parts of Southern Africa and away from the peripheral economies of the other countries and states. Unless specific measures are taken to encourage a wider dispersal of economic activities, the chances of achieving successful development in the peripheral economies are therefore much smaller.

Seen from the perspective of the RSA economy it is less directly apparent why South Africa should be interested in the development of the weaker economies in the region, and therefore in economic co-operation towards that end. After all, only somewhat more than 10 per cent of the non-gold exports of South Africa normally go to the rest of Africa, and only part of that to the other economies in Southern Africa. Very few really essential imports are imported into South Africa from these countries, and although the contracting of unskilled migrant labour from the surrounding states has played a significant role in South Africa's past development, its importance in the overall labour supply has diminished considerably over recent years. On the whole it can safely be said that the RSA is much less dependent on the rest of Africa, and specifically of Southern Africa, than the other countries in the region are dependent on the RSA. However, closer examination does reveal sound reasons for South Africa to take a positive interest in the development of the rest of Southern Africa. These reasons are partly political and strategic in nature, but to a significant extent also economic.

In the first place, economic instability and retrogression in neighbouring countries must inevitably lead to political instability, which can affect the security situation in ways that can hold definite disadvantages for South Africa. This may include the pressure of job-seekers from these countries on South Africa as a result of the economic deterioration in their own countries, which could worsen the security situation by undermining the orderly cross border movement of workers, and make it more difficult for the RSA to deal affectively with its own problem of unemployment and under-employment. Such circumstances can also have a negative effect on the investment image of

the whole region, including the RSA, as past experience has shown, and it could lift an important restraint on the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. More positively, economic co-operation leading to development in the economies of the other countries in Southern Africa would offer a potential for the RSA to increase its exports to these countries—even although it cannot be foreseen that in the near future this would become an export market for South Africa which would rival the developed Western countries. If the co-operation could be extended to having some value added to South African products in neighbouring countries, such products could gain more favourable access to much wider markets than they now have.

In the second place, a possible outcome of the RSA turning its back on the economic problems of the countries of Southern Africa, could be that alternative groupings, such as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, could gain more ground. With good reason the view in the RSA tends to be that such alternative groupings cannot succeed, simply because they do not take into account the reality of the economic interdependence between the countries of Southern Africa that already exists. However, attempts at such alternative groupings do contain the danger that they could lead to a large-scale misallocation and waste of resources, and also that they can reinforce the building up of tension in the region, with the various implications of that which have already been mentioned.

## II

Both from the viewpoint of the RSA and of the other countries in the region there are, therefore, significant opportunities for mutually beneficial co-operation if only the economic factors are taken into consideration. The reality of the opportunities is proven in various ways by the economic relationships that already exist. This is evidenced, for example, by the reliable transport routes which countries like Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, and even Zaïre enjoy through the RSA, and in the assistance which South Africa provides with the maintenance of the transport routes in countries such as Mozambique. South Africa has also proved itself to be a dependable, and in several instances the most important source of essential imports for these countries—especially of food, but also of other products such as consumer goods and mining equipment. Furthermore, South Africa provides employment opportunities for the surplus populations of the different countries in the region as exemplified by some 300 thousand contract workers from surrounding countries working in the RSA. For some of these countries, such as Lesotho, the income that they receive from this source is of crucial importance, while for others, such as Mozambique, it is also particularly significant.

These economic links have also come to be reflected in various

institutional arrangements between the RSA and the other countries in question. The Custom Union Agreement between the RSA and the BLS countries, and similar agreements between the RSA and TBVC countries, provide the most well-known examples of such institutional co-operation. The Customs Union ensures a free flow of goods and services, a common external tariff, but with the possibility of special protective measures for the smaller countries to nurture their infant industries, and a sharing of the customs and excise revenue pool between the member countries, with an inbuilt additional transfer factor in favour of the smaller countries. Another co-operative arrangement is the Rand Monetary Agreement between the RSA, Lesotho and Swaziland, and between the RSA and the TBVC countries. There are also bilateral trade agreements with Malawi and Zimbabwe, and a whole spectrum of other agreements exist in areas such as labour, agriculture, health, and tourism. Finally, there have been several instances of bilateral co-operation on particular infrastructural projects such as the Cahora Bassa scheme, and the Calueque scheme in the north of Namibia, and potentially there are several other such possibilities.

However, there are also political realities that cannot be ignored, and which have to an increasing extent inhibited the realisation of the opportunities that are so apparent in the economic sphere. The black-ruled countries in the region, other than the TBVC countries, show a strong affinity and associate themselves strongly with international political groupings such as the Organisation for African Unity and various other Third World political groupings. This affinity and these associations strongly inhibit any open associations with the RSA, and have indeed in recent years led to a movement aimed at reducing the significance of economic ties with South Africa, as exemplified in the SADCC.

The TBVC countries are a relatively new factor in the situation, whose significance can easily be underestimated because of official standpoints that they should not be recognized. In fact their desire for international recognition and South Africa's obligations towards them have tended to limit the RSA's capacity to seek co-operation with the other countries in the region. This is so, on the one hand, because of the unwillingness of the other countries to associate themselves in any way with South Africa's policy of emancipation of states in its own sphere of influence, and on the other hand, because quite naturally the TBVC countries expect South Africa to take up the cudgels on their behalf in its relations with other countries in the region.

When Transkei, and later on Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei became independent, the approach that was initially followed was to a large extent to create co-operative arrangements between the RSA and these newly independent countries which paralleled those with the BLS and other countries in the region. The thinking behind this was that at some point in the future it would be possible to bring together the co-operative institutional

arrangements between the RSA and, respectively, the BLS and the TBVC countries. Also, it allowed South Africa to conclude such agreements with the TBVC countries without coming into conflict with its BLS partners, who were prepared to accept them as domestic RSA arrangements as long as they were not expected to receive the TBVC countries as members in their own right in, for example the SABLs Customs Union.

However, in response to the increasing assertiveness of the TBVC countries and as a logical evolution of the South African Government's policy of emancipating these states, there has been an increasing tendency to create more far-reaching sets of arrangements between the RSA and the TBVC countries than those that exist between the RSA and other countries in the region, and in some instances even to create substitute sets of arrangements. This is exemplified in the multilateral structure of consultative mechanisms which have been created between the SATVBC countries after their Summit Meeting of November 1982, and also in the recent creation of the Development Bank of Southern Africa. These developments increasingly raise the question of the relative priority between the Customs Union and other arrangements of the RSA with the BLS and other countries, as against those with the TBVC countries.

### III

*Were it not for these political factors, with the TBVC countries on the one hand, the rest of Southern Africa on the other, and the RSA in the middle, the further evolution of economic co-operation between South Africa and its neighbours could have been pursued much more directly than may now be realistic, in the short term at least. This could have included the possibility to utilise more fully the whole spectrum of possibilities for co-operation which the existing Custom Union Agreement offers, rather than putting all the emphasis on the revenue-sharing aspect, as has tended to be the case up to now. This could have been done, for example, by activating the Agreement's provisions for co-operation in areas such as industrial development policy. One possibility that would exist within such a context, could be the extension to all the members of a wider Customs Union of the industrial decentralisation measures which the RSA and the TBVC countries have jointly launched, and which have made it even more difficult than before for the BLS countries to attract industries towards them.*

There are also certain weaknesses in the present Customs Union Agreement which could have been dealt with in such a wider context of economic co-operation. The present 42 per cent additional amount that the smaller countries receive out of the common customs and excise pool was intended originally to compensate for some of the disadvantages that the smaller countries experience as a result of their close proximity to the RSA and from the free flow of goods between them and the RSA. It is, however, a



very arbitrary way of compensating for such disadvantages, and within a less politically influenced environment it would have been possible to consider more appropriate arrangements for achieving the same purpose. Participation by all the member countries of such an extended Customs Union in a common development fund, which could well have been administered by the Development Bank of Southern Africa, together with an extension of the industrial decentralisation programme as suggested above, might have been one way of achieving this purpose.

Given the various political constraints, however, these further developments in mutually beneficial economic co-operation in Southern Africa are not likely to be pursued directly or realised fully in the short to medium term. There is, on the one hand, considerable hesitancy on the part of the BLS countries to enter into any new economic agreements with the RSA, especially to the extent that this could be seen as condoning aspects of South Africa's policies that have long been rejected in international circles. On the other hand, it can reasonably be assumed that the TBVC countries would insist on priority being given by South Africa to its economic relations with them, and on at least some understanding being reached with regard to their status in Southern Africa, as preconditions for drawing other countries into such a closer economic relationship with the RSA.

#### IV

Must one now conclude, in view of the political constraints mentioned above, that the possibilities for extending the scope of economic co-operation between South Africa and its neighbours must be written off? This need not be the case, since the objective possibilities of mutually beneficial economic co-operation continue to exist, notwithstanding the inhibiting political factors that have been mentioned. However, political constraints do mean that a less direct approach may have to be followed towards realising the opportunities for extended co-operation.

As far as the narrower circle of participants in the customs union are concerned, such an approach could well start from the present negotiations that are under way between South Africa and the BLS countries on a revision of aspects of the Customs Union Agreement. Rather than focusing these negotiations on an *ad hoc* basis on particular aspects of the Agreement with which the respective parties are unhappy, they could be directed towards a thorough reconsideration of the role of the Agreement in economic co-operation between the member countries, and an exploration of ways in which the various provisions of the Agreement could be utilized more effectively, or amended where necessary, to realize that role more fully. In such a process, attention could also be given to possible ways in which South Africa's commitments towards the TBVC states could be honoured without confronting the BLS countries with impossible political choices.

Such an understanding possibly need not at this stage involve full international recognition, but it would most likely have to involve something better, from the point of view of the TBVC countries, than the present complete unwillingness to allow for even a working relationship with them. Southern Africa is not completely unfamiliar with finding ways to overcome political inhibitions to make sound economic arrangements work—in fact, the way in which both independent states, as full members, and self-governing states, as components of the RSA membership, have been accommodated as participating states in the Development Bank of Southern Africa, provides a recent example of such a *modus vivendi*. Acceptance by all concerned that the TBVC states have in fact assumed decision-making responsibilities in functional areas involved in economic co-operation, and that their presence in co-operative arrangements is therefore functionally necessary, could possibly form the basis of such an arrangement.

A process of negotiation such as suggested here is likely to take some time, and may be subjected to severe strains arising from short-term demands by the various interested parties. It could, therefore, greatly assist the process if the two groups of governments—i.e. South Africa and the BLS Governments, on the one hand, and South Africa and the TBVC Governments, on the other—could at an early stage agree on joint statements of intent confirming their commitments towards continuing the Customs Union, recognizing that there are aspects of the current operation of the Union which require reconsideration, and committing themselves to a serious attempt to resolve such issues.

The advantages of such an approach are, from the point of view of the BLS countries, that it does not require them to enter into new formal agreements with the RSA, but involves the adjustment to changing circumstances of an existing agreement, the justification for which has long been accepted by allies of the BLS countries. From the point of view of South Africa, it holds out the possibility of continuing the most visible co-operative arrangement it has with a group of internationally recognized African states, while bringing about changes in aspects of the Agreement less satisfactory to it, and at the same time allowing it to meet the demands of the TBVC states.

From the viewpoint of the TBVC states, it holds out the possibility of a more acceptable working relationship with other countries in the region than now exists. From the viewpoint of all the countries involved, it also allows time to resolve security matters that are at issue between them.

This still leaves open the relations between South Africa and the second group of countries mentioned earlier on. Apart from the fact that historically those countries, with the exception of South West Africa/Namibia and with the addition of Malawi, have not been part of the narrower Customs Union Circle with South Africa, it must also be remembered that there are not only political limitations on the scope for closer co-operative arrangements in

Southern Africa. There are also economic limitations. The resources of South Africa are limited both in financial and in human terms, and attempts to widen the scope of co-operation through the Customs Union and other arrangements too ambitiously, might dissipate those limited resources and undermine the effectiveness of co-operation very severely. In respect of this second group of countries, therefore, the appropriate course of action would rather appear to be to build on existing bilateral relationships, along the lines of the recently announced working arrangement between South Africa and Mozambique, and the more longstanding relationship between South Africa and Malawi.

## V

To sum up, there are indeed significant opportunities for economic co-operation between South Africa and its neighbours, with potential advantages for all of them. To some extent those advantages are already being realised, but their further realization depends on some restructuring of the presently existing agreements and other arrangements between the respective countries. Political considerations impose certain constraints on the process of bringing about such a restructuring, and economic constraints will also determine what the feasible nature and scope of such a restructuring might be. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the possibilities for extended economic co-operation could be fully realized if some normalisation of the security situation in the region cannot be achieved.

However, the stakes are sufficiently high to warrant an attempt at realizing those possibilities. It is suggested here that a careful and patient approach, taking due account of the sensitivities involved, but coupled to a clear intention to pursue the potential advantages of economic co-operation, has a reasonable chance of realizing them in the medium to longer term.

Henry Bienen

## **Economic interests and security issues in Southern Africa**

### **Southern Africa: Economic Background**

South Africa is able to wield a large economic stick *vis-à-vis* its neighbours in Southern Africa. It can provide important carrots to those neighbours and to African countries farther north through technical assistance, aid, and trade relations. The relative strength of South Africa's economy among weak African ones is evident.

South Africa is a major economic power in Africa. This point is clear from the comparative statistics on income levels and rates of growth. South Africa is the only African country except for the oil exporters, Libya and Algeria, ranked by the World Bank as "upper middle-income". South Africa's annual rate of GNP growth per capita between 1960–81 was 2,3 per cent. This is low for the period compared to industrial countries and compared to upper middle-income developing countries such as Malaysia, Mexico, Brazil and Korea. But given the poor performances of African economies in the 1970's, few are above South Africa's growth rates. (Kenya, Lesotho, Cameroon, Tunisia, Malawi, Egypt, Nigeria) and a few are close to South Africa's (Togo and Ivory Coast).<sup>1</sup>

The *World Development Report* does not provide information on the sectoral rates of growth of South Africa's economy. Data on the structure of the economy makes it clear that only Zimbabwe among Black African countries comes close to South Africa in terms of industrialization and the share of product occupied by the manufacturing sector.<sup>2</sup> South Africa does not have a really buoyant performance for food production. Its average index of food production per capita for 1979–81 is 104 against a base of 1969–71. However, only Ivory Coast and Tunisia did better in Africa during this period.<sup>3</sup> Only South Africa has been a reliable exporter of food grains in Africa in the 1970s–1980s, failing to export only in years of disastrous drought such as 1982–83.

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The magnitude of South Africa's development compared to other African countries can perhaps best be seen by looking at comparative per capita energy consumption figures. South Africa is four to six times larger than most North African countries and eight to fifteen times larger than most Black African countries. South Africa does do better on quality of life indicators compared to other African countries — indicators such as life expectancy and daily per capita calorie supply — but not so much better as its higher income and development levels would imply.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, in terms of technological and infrastructural development, comparisons show a South African position in Africa that is at least as high as predictions from per capita energy consumption. South Africa has technologies in mining and in coal to liquid fuel and nuclear energy which are advanced by world standards. It has its own armaments production industries. Its equipment superiority (not to say its ability to maintain equipment and keep advanced arms in the field) is great.<sup>5</sup>

### Patterns of Dependency

South Africa exports more to African states than it imports. While trade between South Africa and individual states is not broken down publicly, South African exports to Africa more than doubled between 1970 and 1980.

TABLE I  
Selected South African Export Markets (in US\$ million)

	1970	1973	1976	1979
United Kingdom	624	1 010	1 147	1 121
United States	181	232	527	1 908
Argentina	3	4	9	190
Brazil	1	11	31	120*
Taiwan	1	25	172	246
Israel	5	24	36	125
Venezuela	4	12	69	20
Africa	369	466	521	617

Source: IMF, *Direction of Trade Yearbook*, 1975 and 1980 (Washington: IMF).

\*Data from *South African Digest*, August 29, 1980, p. 2.

Food, manufactured goods, and petroleum products account for important shares of South Africa's exports to Southern African States. These states are heavily dependent of South Africa for transport machinery and plastics especially. While South Africa itself buys electricity generated by Mozambique's Cahora Bassa Dam, receiving supplies amounting in the past to some 10 per cent of the South African Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) total supplies, it sells electricity to Mozambique,<sup>6</sup> Lesotho,


Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Botswana and Namibia have asked to be linked to the South African power grid.<sup>7</sup>

By 1980, according to the Department of Customs and Excise in Pretoria, South Africa's exports to African countries exceeded \$1 billion. Imports rose to a record \$345 million for January–November period in 1980.<sup>8</sup> Most of South Africa's African trade is with Southern African states. Tanzania and Angola have the least trade with South Africa among the nine states of the Southern African region.<sup>9</sup> South Africa's trade relations with Southern Africa are not reciprocal. While over a third of Mozambique's trade and over a quarter of Zimbabwe's is with South Africa, South Africa exports more to Britain or Switzerland than the 10 per cent of its exports that go to all of Africa.<sup>10</sup> On the imports side, South Africa receives only 2 per cent from all of Africa. Unofficial trade through middlemen, if counted, would produce somewhat higher trade figures for South Africa with Africa than official South African figures, but the share of trade with Africa would remain relatively small.

Trade of Southern African countries with South Africa is asymmetrical. What is not crucial for South Africa is crucial for many of its trade partners in Southern Africa. For Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, trade with South Africa is overwhelmingly important. For Mozambique it is crucial, and has risen, not fallen, in the last few years. Zimbabwe's trade with South Africa has fallen as a share of its total trade since independence but it has not fallen in absolute terms and forty per cent of its manufacturing exports went to South Africa on preferential terms until South Africa temporarily annulled a seventeen year old trade-preference agreement in 1981.<sup>11</sup> Zambia has been able to diversify trade away from South Africa. Angola and Tanzania have never been large trade partners of South Africa. For Malawi, trade with South Africa is important and South Africa provides some key exports to Zaire.

While we should not exaggerate the tightness and comprehensiveness of Southern Africa as an economic region, this area constitutes a regional economic subsystem more than any other part of Africa because trade relations are relatively extensive and because transport and communications facilities link the region. Also, labour migrates from Southern African states to South Africa. Formal agreements link Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho through the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) and for Lesotho and Swaziland through the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) to which Namibia also belongs.

At the present time, a network of transport and communication grids, labour migration patterns, and formal economic unions lead to a pattern of dependence of Southern African states on South Africa. The dependence is not now a mutual one. Copper and other mineral exports from Zaire, Zimbabwe, and Zambia must exit through South Africa and Mozambique's



Map 1. Principal Railway Routes, Southern Africa

Source: Kenneth W. Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence*, (Berkeley: University of California Press) p. 52. Reprinted here with kind permission of University of California Press.


ports or take a longer and more costly rail and road path through to Tanzania's clogged ports via uncertain transport systems. The Angolan Civil War has led to the periodic closing of the Benguela Railroad making that route highly uncertain too. Only Mozambique can easily ship its goods through its own ports, but Mozambique, too, earns revenue from the shipment of South African exports through its harbours. And Mozambique uses South African technicians to manage its own ports. Moreover, alternative shipping and transport facilities through Mozambique are highly vulnerable to sabotage. For example, an oil pipeline from Beira in

Mozambique to Untali in Zimbabwe, when functioning, would relieve the railways of having to move oil to Zimbabwe. But in October, 1981, the road bridge, (and the adjacent railway bridge) which carries the pipeline and which links Beira to Maputo and to Zimbabwe was damaged.<sup>12</sup> It is thought that the Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM) damaged this pipeline and railway. It is widely alleged that South Africa has backed the MRM in order to pressure Mozambique and to make it compliant on issues of security concern to South Africa, especially border stabilization, assistance to the African National Congress, general hostility to South Africa and to its homelands policy. Thus, indirectly, South Africa can affect transport grids through Mozambique. It can through military means and through covert means reach them directly. And, South Africa can prevent or slow up the railway stock, maintenance equipment, and technical assistance to keep Zimbabwe's railways moving. It brought chaos to Zimbabwe in 1982 by delaying petrol and railway imports, and it produced similar results with a slowdown of imports to Lesotho in June 1983. By its support for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and by its own military reach to Angola, South Africa can keep the Benguela Railway cut, hindering copper exports from Zambia and Zaire across Angola.<sup>13</sup>

As in trade, the transport dependencies between South Africa and its neighbours are not mutual. It is true that South Africa's own ports are congested and it is easier to export from the Transvaal abroad via Mozambique's ports. Thus, freight increased on the railways from South Africa to Mozambique from 15 000 to 30 000 tons a day between 1980-81.<sup>14</sup> Some 15-17 per cent of South Africa's exports go through Mozambique. Indeed, while the MRM has disrupted power grids, the railway has continued to operate through to Mozambique's ports. A disruption of Mozambique's railways would raise costs to South Africa; a disruption of South Africa's railways for Zimbabwe and the BLS states would be extremely serious. While Zambia can now export through the Tazara Railway, this is an uncertain proposition given the state of Tanzania's ports and railway maintenance. And for Mozambique itself, freight charges on South African exports are a major foreign exchange earner.

The movement of labour from Southern African states to South Africa is characterized also by asymmetrical relationships. South Africa employs migrant labour from all the neighbouring states except Zambia. While the number of foreign workers used as migrant labourers has been reduced over the last years, non-South African workers comprise over forty per cent of the total mining work force.<sup>15</sup> South Africa might prefer to use labour from Botswana, Lesotho, and Mozambique for political and economic leverage against those countries; it might also want fewer South African Blacks in the mines. But it can reduce, and it has done so, the number of migrants. In 1974, a little over twenty per cent of workers in the mines were from South Africa;





Map 2. Migration of Foreign Africans

Source: Kenneth W. Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence*, (Berkeley: University of California Press) p. 61. Reprinted here with kind permission of University of California Press.

by 1981 they had accounted for sixty per cent.<sup>16</sup> The large decline was from Mozambique. Cuts in migrant workers to South Africa seriously affect the foreign exchange earnings of Southern African states. Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho all had more migrant labourers abroad than they had wage earners at home, although not all were in South Africa.<sup>17</sup>

Along with trade and control of transport networks, South Africa uses preferences and subsidies as well as technical assistance, aid, and direct investment to further its goals. South Africa ceased to subsidize wheat and

maize to Lesotho in 1976.<sup>18</sup> After Zaire left the Central Selling Organization (De Beers) for diamonds it found it more costly to market its own diamonds. South Africa's direct investment in Zimbabwe and Namibia are very large.

While all the Southern African states, except Tanzania, have some dependency on South Africa, the type and degree of intensity differs between states. For some, the transport and communication grids are in South Africa's hands. This is true for Zimbabwe, Zambia, the BLS states, and to lesser extents for Angola, Zaire, Malawi, and even Mozambique. Some are major exporters of labour to South Africa, including the BLS states, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi. All but Tanzania, Angola, and Zambia import large quantities from South Africa and significant shares of exports of Zimbabwe, Namibia, the BLS states go to or through South Africa.

### **Economics and Security**

What is clear, and it has been so from the start of South Africa's economic relations with African states, is that economic co-operation and economic punishment are in the service of South Africa's foreign policy goals and domestic security concerns. There does not appear in the South African scheme of things to be a "low politics" of economic policy and economic affairs.<sup>19</sup> Economic policies towards African states are very direct instruments for political influence.<sup>20</sup>

South Africa's attitudes and policies towards economic ties and economic development in Southern Africa have been determined by political and security concerns from the time that Black African states became independent until the collapse of white power in the Portuguese territories and in Rhodesia. (Zaire, 1960; Tanzania, 1961; Malawi and Zambia, 1964; Botswana, Lesotho, 1966; Swaziland, 1968; Mozambique and Angola, 1973; Zimbabwe, 1980.) When South Africa has moved to reach out to Black African states, first under Dr Verwoerd, and then, after 1966, more eagerly under Prime Minister Vorster and Foreign Minister Muller, it held out various economic benefits. It maintained some of those benefits even during periods when it was actively punishing neighbouring states. Thus, although South Africa recently has made military incursions into Lesotho and Mozambique, it did not cut off all economic ties with those countries. But it has used its economic relations as a weapon first and foremost.

South Africa sustained the Smith rebellion in Rhodesia at some economic cost and it ended its support not when the economic pinch became too great but when it decided that for security and political purposes a continuation of white regime in Rhodesia was more of a problem than an advantage. South Africa seems willing to sustain its positions in Namibia despite significant financial costs. It is hard to see that its Namibian policies, any more than the policies that evolved towards Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, are governed primarily by a calculation of economic costs and benefits or by any long run economic

advantages to maintaining the positions of white minority regimes. Rather, these policies, like earlier ones, have been determined more by external security concerns and internal domestic political ones.

This is not to imply that South Africa has never had economic interests in mind when formulating its policies towards states to the north. South Africa moved into mining and fishing and manufacturing projects in the Portuguese colonies. And it invested heavily in both the Cahora Bassa Dam on the Zambezi above Tete and in the Cunene Dam in southern Angola, near the Namibian border.<sup>21</sup> South Africa was interested in buying large amounts of the projected power of these dams and in using water for irrigation. But South Africa's access to hydroelectric power has not depended on good relations with Angola and Mozambique and it has certainly been willing to put at risk those relations. Indeed, it has supported the MRM in Mozambique which blew up facilities which cost South Africa access to Cahora Bassa's electricity source. Whether or not the MRM was given a green light to do this, the South Africans know that insurgent movements cannot be controlled closely and that insurrection and warfare in Angola and Mozambique put infrastructure in jeopardy, including facilities that South Africa itself values. Because of the Angolan war, the hydroelectric station at Cunene along the Ruacana Falls as been used only occasionally.<sup>22</sup>

There has been frequent discussion of economic regionalism in Southern Africa and of building political ties on the basis of economic co-operation. The prospects for economic co-operation during times when South Africa was reaching out to neighbouring states, and when a number of those states were not yet independent, was predicated on friendly foreign relations. But at the core of economic co-operation from South Africa's point of view was a demand that South Africa's establishing separate states for its "Bantu" populations (Homelands, Bantustans) be accepted.<sup>23</sup> The idea of friendly foreign relations was easier to postulate when Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia were ruled by Whites and when Malawi seemed to accept South Africa's provisos in the late 1960s and early 1970s.<sup>24</sup> The collapse of Portuguese rule in the mid-1970s altered the prospects irrevocably for what South Africa called a possible "Commonwealth of Southern Africa". The independence of Zimbabwe was simply the nail in the coffin of this idea.

Southern African states have maintained economic relations with South Africa out of dependence and necessity, but they would not agree to accept the "Homelands" policy and to acquiesce in the system of separate development. They would only cease to give aid and succour to South African dissidents under military and economic pressures. These the South Africans applied extensively in what has come to be called the policy of destabilization.

Short of intense economic and military pressure, South Africa was not able to translate its economic power into political influence in Southern

Africa in the 1970s. It could not prohibit independence for Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. It could not make those states friendly to it after they became independent. It could be argued that South Africa lost regional power all through the 1970s even though Black African states' economic performances were not strong and South Africa remained as economically dominant as ever. What South Africa has been able to do is to exploit internal divisions in Angola, and it may possibly be able to do this in the future in Zimbabwe. It has supported dissidents in Mozambique and Lesotho and it has taken advantage of structural weaknesses and economic policy mistakes to increase its economic leverage over Mozambique.

Where economic leverage has not been extensive—in Angola as compared to Mozambique, Zimbabwe and the BLS states—South Africa's own military involvement and the magnitude of military support for UNITA have been crucial in helping to weaken the MPLA regime. The latter's own weakness and inability to come to political terms with its opponents is relevant of course. But South Africa has not turned its economic strength directly into consistent political leverage over states aside from the BLS ones.<sup>25</sup> For the larger states, and even Botswana and Lesotho at various times, South Africa has not faced completely compliant states. It has made the Southern African states lessen their support for insurgents through economic strangulation or the threat of it and through direct military punishment. But economic carrots have not allowed South Africa to have its way and economic pressure, unless carried far, has not been completely effective.

South Africa can get its way in the short and medium runs by using strong economic and military pressure. But it will not be able to create security for itself or get acceptance of its internal policies via what has, at various times, been called a "co-prosperity sphere" or a "Southern African commonwealth of states" or most recently a "constellation of states".<sup>26</sup> The last would involve: monetary arrangements such as those of the Rand Monetary Union; a Southern African multilateral development bank; customs unions; industrialization location co-operation; regional development co-operation. While there may be advantages to neighbouring states in the formation of regional organizations for economic development, political considerations which revolve around South Africa's domestic policies will preclude states from co-operative ventures beyond what economic necessity requires.

It is true that political power is often highly centralized in Black African states, especially in the spheres of foreign policy and foreign economic policy. Domestic interest groups who might exert pressure on foreign affairs are weak. Foreign policy bureaucracies that might constrain leaders' prerogatives are undeveloped. Nonetheless, South Africa's policies constitute an issue that in many Black African states unify rather than split elites. They also engage the attention of masses of Africans. Thus any overt

Southern African compliance with South Africa, beyond what is deemed necessary would be extremely difficult for most states. Of course, elites may make their own private deals and transactions and they have done so in Zaire and Malawi and even in Kenya. But few states have adopted Malawi's relatively open economic stance towards South Africa and none other has established diplomatic relations with her.<sup>27</sup> Even Malawi has at various times cut back on sending labour migrants to South Africa (only to reverse its policy and again start labour migration in 1977) and has tried to avoid South Africa's complete embrace. Malawi has also joined the Southern African Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC).

### **SADCC and Regional Co-operation**

It is not just political aversion to South Africa's racial and constitutional policies that makes states leary of economic arrangements with that country. Nor is it only that Southern African states fear that a "constellation of states" would encourage and legitimate South Africa's homeland policies, linking the homelands to the BLS and other states in parallel arrangements. It is also that small states fear the economic embrace of a larger, more powerful neighbour.<sup>28</sup> Even if South Africa were to be ruled by Blacks, we can conjecture that Southern African states would show a degree of ambivalence similar to that which has marked West African states' attitudes towards Nigeria and that country's dominant role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nigeria has treaded lightly, for the most part, given the economic and political sensitivities of its ECOWAS partners, but it has also used its oil as a weapon against Ghana after the first Rawlings coup. It has rapidly and brutally repatriated hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians, Chadians and people from Niger and the Cameroons. Its markets are an attraction as are its resources, but its size and weight also make other states nervous.

South Africa's economy is in many ways even more dominant *vis-à-vis* its neighbours than Nigeria's is compared to other West African states. South Africa's transport grid gives greater leverage as does its technological advancement; it has more effective military might compared to its neighbours than Nigeria has compared to states in West Africa. Thus, politics apart, Southern African states might be looking for co-operative arrangements but they would also be looking for ways to lessen their dependency on South Africa and would be fearful of its power. They would be fearful that formal economic arrangements would build in and institutionalize South Africa's central position.<sup>29</sup> Politics are not apart of course, and South Africa has proved willing to use its economic power in a coercive fashion.

Thus, despite the Southern African states' argument that the SADCC is not directed against South Africa, SADCC clearly is an attempt to lessen

dependence on South Africa and to create economic alternatives to the South African giant.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, in policy terms, SADCC has come to be a mirror of South Africa's own linkage of regional economic co-operation and domestic politics. South Africa has in mind tighter integration with and greater dependence of Southern African economies on its own economy. The SADCC countries want to reduce South African leverage by linking the Southern African states with new rail and road networks estimated to cost at least \$2 billion over a decade.<sup>31</sup> And, South Africa has hoped that a constellation of states would allow it to proceed with its homelands policies. SADCC countries, and the donors who will bear the burdens of SADCC's transport, communications, agricultural, and health investments, hope that economic development in Southern Africa will enhance political stability, thus showing South Africa that neighbouring African states can both develop and rule themselves without strife. It is argued that if this occurs, some South Africans at least will reassess their views on sharing power among the races. Also, it has been suggested that a major donor commitment to SADCC will show South Africa that Western countries are serious about aligning themselves with forces of change in South Africa.<sup>32</sup> Another presumed benefit from helping Southern African states to develop would be a lessening of Western dependence on the mineral flows from South Africa. South Africa would control copper exports from Zaire and Zambia less if new transport grids were created. Similarly, chrome exports from Zimbabwe, and possibly other mineral exports from that country could, it is argued, be exported through Mozambique's ports, thus lessening South Africa's control over strategic minerals.

### **Western Interests**

The United States, and especially Europe, have a vested interest in the maintenance of access to minerals from Southern Africa. The creation of new transport grids would create a greater possibility for exporting minerals from Southern Africa if instability increased within South Africa itself and if that country's own transport and mining facilities were endangered. However, if South Africa felt that neighbouring countries were supporting insurgents who put her own infrastructures and production at risk, we can only assume that it would lash out at neighbouring states, as it already has done in a limited way in Lesotho and Mozambique and in a more extensive fashion in Angola. Thus, the only way to guarantee access to Southern Africa's strategic minerals is to create stability within the region as a whole. This means that South Africa must have an internal evolution such that the risks of domestic insurgency are lessened and such that neighbouring states feel that change is occurring in a positive direction from their point of view. At the same time, South Africa must believe that its neighbours are willing to allow for positive evolution and not try to destabilize it. For while the means of destabilization

on the part of Southern African states in South Africa are at present less than are South Africa's abilities to disrupt their economies and policies, South Africa is not without long run security concerns.

Do the Western powers have anything to fear from a Southern African minerals cartel if economic and political co-operation could be constructed in the region? It is true that a substantial share of the world reserves of gold, manganese, vanadium, platinum and chromium reserves are located in South Africa (plus Zimbabwe for chromium). A major proportion of the world's principal cobalt reserves are in Zaire and Zambia. The Soviet Union is another repository of platinum-based metals and gold. It cannot be a large market for Southern African minerals but its co-operation is necessary for price collusion. It has little to offer in the way of economic assistance.

There are major disputes among analysts concerning the probability, duration, and impact of interruptions in minerals supplies. There are also disputes about the impact of new technologies, especially deep-sea mining for manganese, cobalt, copper and nickel and there are uncertainties about the likelihood of major new discoveries. Different judgments about Western vulnerabilities rest also on assessments of the potential for conservation, recycling, demand reducing technologies, and substitution of other minerals.<sup>33</sup> However, there is little likelihood that co-operative relations among Southern African states would raise more risks than conflictual ones.

South Africa already has a lot to say about exports of strategic minerals from Southern Africa. It makes its case for support from the West in part on its reputation as a reliable supplier. One could argue that if South Africa had no security pressures it might be willing to collude with its neighbours on supply and price. This argument rests less on the possibilities for regional co-operation and collusion in Southern Africa than on a view as to the power and interests of a South Africa which did not feel threatened and did not need Western support and thus could alter supply and price relationships. For the short, medium, and perhaps long runs, inter-state and internal conflict rather than regional co-operation raise supply interruption risks for strategic minerals.

At the present time, the depressed economies of Southern Africa are in an especially weakened state and cannot hold supplies off markets. Drought has struck hard at Botswana and Zimbabwe (and at South Africa, too). Depressed copper prices have affected Zaire and Zambia, both dependent for their revenues on copper exports. Civil strife has been large scale in Angola and has grown in Mozambique over the last two years. Zimbabwe, too, has been affected by ethnic and political conflict. Conflict has persisted in Namibia. In the economic and political climates which have existed, it has been difficult to attract significant new investment to most Southern African states although some large donor commitments were raised.<sup>34</sup> USAID, for one, has believed that SADCC is worth supporting and that while the

resolution of political turmoil in Southern Africa is essential for effective long-term development, enlarged and inventive development programmes can ease the political transition and minimize the damage to economies.<sup>35</sup>

The Western donors have supported SADCC but they have not protested effectively against South Africa's policies which have struck at the economies of the SADCC countries. South Africa's support for insurgency in Angola and Mozambique and the use of economic weapons against Lesotho and Zimbabwe have weakened the economies of these countries.<sup>36</sup> The effect of the destabilization policies has been to make Southern African countries less attractive for investors and less able to focus on longer range economic policies. The USA has supported both SADCC and a policy of constructive engagement with South Africa. But constructive engagement has become perceived widely in Africa as a policy which gives South Africa a green light to weaken the very economies that aid to SADCC is meant to support.

### **A Co-operative Future?**

It is debatable whether South Africa's policies have been designed to influence and to warn Southern African countries and make them more sensitive to South Africa's security concerns or whether South Africa wants weakened and unstable neighbours. South Africa has frequently denied that unstable neighbours are to its advantage.<sup>37</sup> When Mozambique became independent, South Africa stated its acceptance of that independence and would not permit local recruitment of mercenaries who might bid for power in Mozambique. Prime Minister Vorster insisted that what South Africa wanted was for Mozambique to be a country that would not allow itself to be used for attacks against South Africa and that would have a stable government.<sup>38</sup> What made Angola very different from Mozambique was that Angola had been used as a springboard for anti-South African actions in Namibia; that there was Cuban and Soviet early military involvement in Angola; that the Angolan anti-colonial movement was split; and that South Africa had much more economic leverage to use against Mozambique than against Angola. Angola, of all the Southern African states close to South Africa—excluding the geographically removed Tanzania—is least economically dependent on South Africa. Thus in order to exert political influence, South Africa required more direct military means. When South Africa perceived later that Mozambique was harbouring South African insurgents, it was willing to take direct actions. But its activities in Mozambique have been more *ad hoc* and on a lower level than those in support of UNITA and directly in Angola.

While South Africa has not appeared to try to bring down the Machel regime in Mozambique, it has been willing to punish it. Towards Angola, on the other hand, South Africa has more complicated and varied motives: the



removal of Cuban troops; the unwillingness so far to see a SWAPO regime in Namibia; the unwillingness to abandon support for Savimbi who acts as a buffer for Namibia. One must ask if the South Africans also hope for a friendly regime in Luanda and one that would co-operate economically and politically with them? Posing this question raises two additional "what if" questions. First, if South Africa was assured by its neighbours that their territory would not be used against South Africa for staging assaults and also that they would not actively oppose the homelands and separate development policies, what would regional economic development patterns look like? Second, if a regime was in power in South Africa that was not anathema to Black African states, what would regional economic policies look like?

There is some uncertainty as to whether neighbouring states will ever be able to satisfy South Africa that they will provide no safe haven for insurgents. Weak states in Southern Africa often do not have complete control over their own countryside. Zimbabwean insurgents on Zambia's soil during the anti-Smith war were probably stronger than the Zambian army. Mozambique cannot put down the MRM insurgency. It might have a difficult time if it wanted to end the use of its territory by anti-South African groups. But even assuming that Southern African states can and will comply with South Africa's wishes, by their very existence to some extent they are a challenge to doctrines of white supremacy. South Africa might not want their economic development to proceed smoothly. Surely, it would want to retain important levers of economic control to maintain their economic dependency. There might well be more co-operation between South Africa and other Southern African states but failing fundamental change within South Africa, this co-operation would continue to be limited and would be defined by the economic needs of Southern African states on the one hand and South Africa's security concerns on the other.

If there were fundamental political changes in South Africa, Southern African states would not want to be dominated by a large, near-by power. They would look for economic relationships elsewhere in Africa too, as well as among themselves. But Southern African states are neither equally dependent on South Africa, nor do they all share common purposes, political systems, and outlooks. Their economies are hardly complementary although Zimbabwe might in the future carry out some of the economic role that South Africa now performs as a food exporter and manufacturing centre. However, just as Southern African states would not want to be dominated by South Africa, even a Black-led South Africa, they would not want to be dominated by Zimbabwe either. Customs unions and free trade areas have in Africa been dominated by the strongest economy, thus we could expect that Southern African states will want to proliferate economic relationships if

they can do so without prohibitive cost. In a "friendly" Southern Africa, Zimbabwe might still move to fill certain trade roles that South Africa has dominated.

Tanzania has looked south for political reasons. Its politics have imposed certain economic costs on it, especially commitments to investment in transport facilities in order to help lessen Zambian dependence on South Africa and the former Rhodesia prior to Zimbabwe's independence. Tanzania's economic centre of gravity would once again be oriented towards Kenya and Uganda if better political relations obtained in East Africa. Angola and Zaire might have more economic dealings, and Zaire and Angola might both look to more extensive relations with Central African countries as well as with Southern African ones if they were more in harmony with each other and had internal peace which would facilitate the development of their economies in different parts of their countries.

Under all conditions of politics in Southern Africa, the states of the region will be economically linked. But also under all conditions, they would try to de-link from South Africa to some extent. A hostile South Africa gives greater incentive to the de-linking for states for whom this is a conceivable strategy: Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

One scheme for lessening Botswana's and Zimbabwe's transport dependence on South Africa involves a projected Trans-Kalahari railroad. But this project, which would be very expensive, also involves a projection of an independent Namibia giving Zimbabwe and Botswana access to the Atlantic Ocean, and allowing Botswana to develop minerals in its western areas.<sup>39</sup>

New Southern African road networks also envision construction through Namibia. But this would only lessen dependence on South Africa if Namibia becomes independent, and even then an independent Namibia would remain in South Africa's economic thrall. A SWAPO-ruled Namibia would be at least as vulnerable to South African supported insurgency as Mozambique or Angola. Thus, even if more co-operation comes about between SADCC states and their economic ties grow, they will still be hostage to an unfriendly South Africa if there continues in the Republic a regime determined to maintain white supremacy. Nor will it be easy to create complementarities and division of labour among the SADCC economies. Even if SADCC emphasizes mutual benefit through project development, there is no quick fix for the problems of Southern African economies and for their dependence on South Africa. Regional organizations cannot overcome ingrained structural difficulties.

Finally, the argument has been made that South Africa needs its hinterland for markets, unlimited labour, and investment opportunities. Without such access, it has been said, South Africa will begin to atrophy as did Rhodesia.<sup>40</sup> This seems dubious reasoning. South Africa has a large labour supply from

its own homelands if needed. It uses less migrant labour than in earlier years. Its trade with Southern Africa is not large as a share of its world trade. Southern Africa will continue to require imports of food and manufacturing equipment and South Africa will have comparative advantages in exporting to Southern African states. But even if neighbouring states should truly refuse to import from South Africa, that country can export outside of Africa. And Southern African states will have to export through South Africa for many years.

South Africa would benefit from a co-operative future with Southern African states and they would benefit also. But South Africa can continue to exist in a non-co-operative, even hostile environment in Southern Africa. Perhaps not all Southern African regimes as presently constituted can say the same. Southern African states can, and have to some extent, re-oriented their economies away from South Africa.<sup>41</sup> But those economies can be damaged by punitive actions from the south.

Mutual economic benefits will not overcome political conflict in Southern Africa in the sense that hostile states will come together for co-operative economic ventures which will then work to ameliorate political strife. Economic necessity does moderate the policies of Southern African states towards South Africa. So far, economic necessities have not moderated the activities of South Africa towards its weaker neighbours. Perhaps this will occur in the future, but there is not much present evidence for this prediction.

#### Notes

1. *World Development Report*, (The World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1983) pp. 148-149. For recent trends in South Africa's economy see U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, *Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States; South Africa*, March, 1983.
2. *Ibid.* p. 152-153.
3. *Ibid.* p. 158-159.
4. *Ibid.* p. 194-195.
5. See the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1983-84*, London, 1983, pp. 66-81.
6. Power from Cahora Bassa, originating in Mozambique, goes through South Africa's Appolo Station near Pretoria and then returns to Mozambique, even supplying Maputo. In 1980 Mozambican dissidents sabotaged the power lines to South Africa, depriving ESCOM and Mozambique of this source.
7. Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time is Running Out* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981) pp. 290-291.
8. *Ibid.* p. 288.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *The Economist*, July 16, 1983, using South African Foreign Trade Office's statistics. Also see for South Africa's economic relations with southern African states: T. Malan, "Mozambique's and Zambia's Economic Relations with South Africa," *ISSUP Strategic Review*, January, 1981 and various issues of the Economist Intelligence Unit's *Economic Reviews of Southern Africa*.

11. For discussion of the trade preference agreements between Zimbabwe and South Africa see Larry Bowman, Michael Bratton, and Rudzo Murapa, "Zimbabwe and South Africa: Dependency, Destabilization and Liberation," in Callaghy, *op. cit.*, p. 341.
12. Owen Ellison Kahn, "South Africa and the Political Economy of Minerals in Southern Africa: the Case of Zimbabwe and Chromium," *Ibid.*, p. 97.
13. For discussions of Zimbabwe's and Mozambique's dependence on South Africa for transport in order to export, see Bowman, et. al., *op. cit.*, and Thomas Callaghy, "Apartheid and Socialism: Southern Africa's Relations With Angola and Mozambique," in Callaghy, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-266.
14. Kenneth Grundy, "South Africa in the Political Economy of Southern Africa," in Gwendolen Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., *International Politics in Southern Africa* (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1982) p. 168.
15. *South Africa: Time is Running Out, op. cit.*, p. 291.
16. Callaghy, *op. cit.*, p. 303.
17. Kenneth Grundy, "Economic Patterns in the New Southern African Balance," in Gwendolen Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1979), p. 308.
18. Bernard Magubane, "Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland: South Africa's Hostages in Revolt," in Callaghy, *op. cit.*, p. 363.
19. For an early discussion of South Africa's economic and political dominance in a systematic set of relationships, see Larry Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. XII, No. 3, September, 1968, pp. 231-261.
20. Even membership in a technical organization such as SARCCUS, the Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and Utilization of Soil, was described as being important in the early 1970s for contact and influence as well as technical cooperation. See D.M. Joubert, "The Contribution of SARCCUS to Development and Cooperation in Southern Africa," *The South African Journal of African Affairs*, vol. 3, 1973, pp. 1-7. Zimbabwe left SARCCUS in October, 1980.
21. Larry Bowman, "South Africa's Strategy and Its Implications for the United States," *International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 1, January, 1971, p. 25. According to Grundy, *Economic Patterns*, p. 298, South Africa's Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) originally did not want to buy from Cahora Bassa as a source. Grundy maintains that ESCOM was pushed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the South African Industrial Development Corporation to participate in Cahora Bassa.
22. Wolfgang Thomas, "The Economy in Transition to Independence," in Robert Rotberg, ed., *Namibia: Political and Economic Prospects* (Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath, 1983) p. 45.
23. For a statement of this linkage see Eschel M. Rhoadie, "South Africa: Towards A New Commonwealth?" in Christian Potholm and Richard Dale, eds., *Southern Africa in Perspective* (New York: The Free Press, 1972) p. 276-297.
24. A trade pact was signed with Malawi in 1968. South Africa established good relations with the Malagasy Republic at this time and a large trade mission from South Africa went to Malagasy in 1969.
25. For a statement of the limits of South Africa's economic influence see Kenneth Grundy, "South Africa in the Political Economy of Southern Africa," p. 151.
26. See Willie Breytenbach, ed., *The Constellation of States: A Consideration* (Johannesburg: South Africa Foundation, 1980).
27. A number of African leaders have openly met with South African leaders, however; including President Kaunda, Houphouet-Boigny and Tolbert. Grundy, *op. cit.*, p.

- 157, points out how the "constellation of states" concept is tied to domestic concerns. When Prime Minister Botha explained the underlying reasons for this framework, he stressed the need to promote free enterprise and to resist the Marxist onslaught. See *Towards a Constellation of States in Southern Africa: Meeting Between the Prime Minister and Business Leaders*, Johannesburg, November 22, 1979 (Pretoria: Information Service of South Africa, n. d.) as found in *International Politics in Southern Africa*, *op. cit.*, p. 243, fn. 26.
28. On a number of occasions, President Kaunda of Zambia has voiced the fear that a constellation of states would mean that Southern African states would be satellites or puppets of South Africa. See *Rand Daily Mail*, November 26, 1979, as found in Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Regional Policy," in Michael Clough, ed., *Changing Realities in Southern Africa* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, Research Series No. 47, 1982). Geldenhuys reviews very well South Africa's regional policies, linking those policies to domestic concerns.
  29. *South Africa: Time is Running Out*, p. 294. It has also been argued that a constellation of states might move South Africa to internal reforms and/or create more, rather than less economic balance in the region. These do not seem to be ideas that are widely shared in Southern Africa.
  30. It has been argued that the origins of SADCC can be traced to the Frontline States, founded in 1974 to pursue independence for Zimbabwe. Indeed, some would push the origins of SADCC back to the conference of East and Central African Heads of State, founded in Nairobi in 1966, where regional cooperation and liberation in southern Africa were discussed. See Michael Clough and John Ravenhill, "Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: The Southern African Development Coordination Conference," in Clough, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 162.
  31. Various aims including upgrading port facilities in Beira, Nacala, Maputo (Mozambique), Lobito (Angola) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania). Southern African states look towards a time when Walvis Bay might be a west coast outlet for Zambia and Botswana, and possibly Zimbabwe when rail links between Francistown and Gobabis become economically feasible. Of course, this presumes that Walvis Bay is not controlled by South Africa. Reopening and upgrading the Benguela Railroad and assisting the Tazara Railroad to become more efficient also are anticipated. Linking Malawi to the Zambian border via rail and through Lake Malawi into the Tazara system has also been discussed. Zaire, which is not a SADCC member is brought into discussion on rail networks.
  32. *Time is Running Out*, *op. cit.*, p. 445.
  33. I do not want to rehash these debates again. For fuller presentations of the analyses which argue that U.S. and Western vulnerability is not critical in the short run and that long run policies for stockpiling, new sources, and new technologies and substitution can be developed, see: Robert S. Jaster, *Southern Africa in Conflict: Implications for U.S. Policies in the 1980s* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1982); Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, *South Africa: Time is Running Out* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), Chapter 14, pp. 310-22; Robert Perlman and Anthony Murray, "Resources and Conflict: Requirements and Vulnerabilities of the Industrialized World," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 167, *Third World Conflict and International Security*, Part II (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); Michael Shafer, "Mineral Myths," *Foreign Policy*, No. 47 (Summer 1982), pp. 154-71; and U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, "Imports of Minerals from South Africa by the U.S. and OECD Countries," (Washington, D.C., September 1980). For analyses which argue that there is a strategic threat to the United States resulting

from access to resources problems, see: Council on Economics and National Security, *Strategic Minerals: A Resource Crisis* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980); Walter F. Hahn and Alvin J. Cottrell, *Soviet Shadow Over Africa* (Coral Gables, Fla.: Centre for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1976); Ministry of Information, Embassy of South Africa, "South Africa: Persian Gulf of Minerals," No. 9/80 (Washington, D.C.: 1980); and Daniel S. Mariaschin, "Soviet Union is on the Move: It Fights Western Control of Strategic Raw Materials," *Los Angeles Times*, February 13, 1981.

Useful general analyses include: U.N. Centre of Transnational Corporations, *The Activities of Transnational Corporations in the Industrial Mining, and Military Sectors of Southern Africa* (New York: United Nations, 1980); and William N. Raiford, *The European Role in Africa and U.S. Interests*, Report No. 81-202F (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1981). Specifically on South Africa's impact on Zimbabwe's chrome exports, see Kahn, *op. cit.*

34. Western states and international organizations and development banks pledged \$65 million to SADC in 1980, although much of this was a renewal of bilateral loans and aid pledged earlier. Annual investment in South Africa runs about ten times the total for the nine Southern African states. Negative annual rates of investment have been occurring in Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia between 1970-79. See Jeremy Ben-Ami, "United States Economic Policy Towards Southern Africa," Woodrow Wilson School, March, 1983, Princeton.
35. In 1977, the U.S. Congress requested USAID to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the development needs of Southern Africa to determine what contributions U.S. assistance could make. USAID recruited Roy Stacey, who had been on the Club du Sahel Secretariat to lead the U.S. effort.
36. One assessment of damage to Angola's infrastructure since 1975 is \$7 billion. *The Economist*, July 16, 1983, p. 21. Of course, the cost is from civil war not just from South Africa's actions.
37. But *The Economist*, July 16, 1983, p. 28, says that South Africa's strategists talk of a "shield of instability" in Southern Africa and the "Lebanonization" of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
38. Geldenhuys, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
39. Clough and Ravenhill *op. cit.*, 182.
40. Kenneth Grundy, "Economic Patterns in the New Southern African Balance," p. 312.
41. Dependence can increase too. Mozambique's food imports from South Africa almost tripled between 1979-81. The Rhodesian war for independence worked to increase Zambia's dependence on South Africa.

## Book Review

THE DIPLOMACY OF ISOLATION: South African Foreign policy-making

Deon Geldenhuys

*Johannesburg: MacMillan South Africa, for the SAILA, 1984. 295 p. h.c. R19,95*

Professor Geldenhuys's study of South African foreign policy-making under Prime Ministers John Vorster and P. W. Botha, from 1966 to 1981, is undoubtedly the most comprehensive and intensely researched examination of the conduct of South African foreign policy that has so far appeared. It is as far in advance of any similar publication dealing with this subject as the 747 jumbo-jet is of the piston-engined D.C., and is likely to remain the standard work on the period in question for a long time to come. That someone entirely outside the Department of Foreign Affairs should have achieved such insight into the conduct and administration of the matters falling within its departmental jurisdiction is a tribute in the first place to the thoroughness of the research, and in the second place to the perspicacity of the author. In sponsoring the whole undertaking, as part of the programme for the celebration of its Golden Jubilee, the South African Institute of International Affairs certainly chose well.

Professor Geldenhuys and the Institute have also performed a public service of the first order, bearing in mind the widespread ignorance in this country of foreign affairs in general and of how they are conducted, an ignorance for which the Department of Foreign Affairs itself has in the past been partly to blame.

Unlike the practice in what were formerly the sister dominions of Canada, *Australia and New Zealand, for example, the Department has never produced an annual report. For a few years, from 1946, it published White Papers on Proceedings Relating to South Africa at the United Nations. Subsequently, there was an occasional White Paper e.g. on the High Commission Territories, and there were surveys on South West Africa, but generally speaking little appeared from Departmental sources regarding the problems with which the Department was dealing. (I leave out of account, in this context, the publications of the former Department of Information).*

Furthermore, during the focal period covered by Professor Geldenhuys's survey (1966–81), it was the practice that virtually the only official (apart from the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister) who made any pronouncement on foreign affairs was the Director General of Foreign Affairs, someone who was renowned—some would say notorious—for playing his cards very close to his chest.

Departmental liaison with the local media, with accredited foreign correspondents, with academics, institutes and the universities, was

*minimal*, except when it suited the Minister to "leak" a story or other information to a pro-Government newspaper. The overriding importance of effective public relations as an adjunct to foreign policy was neither properly appreciated nor well understood and it was only with the advent of Pik Botha as Foreign Minister that changes in this regard were progressively introduced. But even then the objective was more to provide selective information than to promote informed discussion, possibly because it was felt (with some justification) that, given the widespread public ignorance of *foreign policy problems*, a long time must inevitably elapse before informed public discussion, on anything like the scale applicable elsewhere outside of Africa and Asia, would be feasible in South Africa.

In circumstances where Professor Geldenhuys' volume, abounding as it does with evidence of so much detailed research, is legitimately deserving of the highest praise, it may seem churlish to subject it to criticism from someone who was at times directly, at other times indirectly, on the inside of events and who thus enjoyed advantages to which the author as an outsider *could never aspire*. Nevertheless, the comments which follow are submitted as a tribute to the author's scholarship, rather than as a criticism of his failings. Moreover, while diplomacy must have its secrets, there are many occasions where candour and frankness have their own special contribution to make.

In keeping with this philosophy, my first point of emphasis is that it would seem that Professor Geldenhuys' draft was not reviewed before publication by an "insider" from the Department, or if this did happen, that the "insider" did not do his job properly. There are a couple of minor inaccuracies to which an "insider" would have drawn attention, there are several omissions of some consequence which an "insider" would have noticed at once, and there are occasional errors of understanding or interpretation which in the aggregate may convey misleading impressions.

*A few examples will suffice:*

Bill Clark (United States Under Secretary for State) had discussions with Prime Minister Botha in Cape Town not Pretoria (page 73).

Instances of omissions of some consequence in any review of foreign policy include:

Nuclear policy; South Africa's role in providing uranium to the Western World and in the founding of the International Atomic Energy Agency; South Africa's attitude to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and alleged development of a bomb-making potential;

South Africa's role in Antarctica, preceded by the annexation of Prince Edward and Marion Islands (the one and only acquisition of territory by a sovereign South Africa);

The impact on bilateral relations, especially with the United States and Germany, of policies adopted by the Department of the Interior with regard



to the withholding of visas for citizens of overseas countries wishing to visit South Africa, and of passports for South African citizens desiring to visit abroad.

As an example of misunderstanding or misinterpretation, may I quote Professor Geldenhuys' description of the Cabinet (page 21) in the post-Smuts era as "the principal forum for the formation of foreign policy". This was not my experience. Prior to the advent of the State Security Council, the impression which I, as an official, received was that foreign policy was formulated by:

- (i) the Foreign Minister
- (ii) the Foreign Minister in consultation with the Prime Minister
- (iii) the Prime Minister (very much the case under Dr Verwoerd)
- (iv) the Prime Minister in consultation with the Department—sidestepping the Foreign Minister—which also happened frequently under both Dr Verwoerd and Mr Vorster
- (v) the Foreign Minister in consultation with the Department
- (vi) the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The Cabinet's role, when it was consulted, was one of discussion and decision-making, *not* formulation. In addition there were, of course, in Prime Minister Vorster's time, the independent foreign policy initiatives undertaken with his knowledge by:

Minister P. W. Botha and the South African Defence Force; Minister C. P. Mulder and the Department of Information; General van den Bergh and the Bureau of State Security; all of which are discussed in detail by Professor Geldenhuys.

As someone who spent over 44 years as a career foreign service official and who knew personally every Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, from Hertzog in 1938, to P. W. Botha and Pik Botha today, I may be regarded as somewhat chauvinistic or self-centred when I say that Professor Geldenhuys does less than justice to the role of the professional diplomats in the making of South African foreign policy.

Nevertheless I make no apologies for this assertion. Understandably the role of the professional diplomat is normally cloaked in a considerable degree of anonymity, so that it is difficult to extract an objective assessment of this contribution from published material. Furthermore, it is normal practice in the public service for Cabinet Ministers to reap the kudos and public acclaim for policies initiated by their professional advisers. Nevertheless, I should have liked to have seen greater recognition accorded, in a study of this high calibre, to the role of the professional diplomats, especially bearing in mind that great attention is given, not unjustly, to the foreign policy-making role of an official outside the ranks of the professionals, *viz.* Eschel Rhoodie.

Thus it would have been appropriate to refer at least in general terms to the sterling contribution of the head of the Africa Division, Mr. Rae Killan,

whose integrity and dedication have been so important in laying the groundwork for the improvement of relations with other African states, when a confluence of circumstances made this possible.

It would be invidious, certainly for me, to mention *specific* examples of what I have in mind, because the Foreign Ministers under whom the professionals served are still around, but the same reservation does not attach to the earlier era which is the subject of Chapter I. I therefore recall, simply by way of example, several important foreign policy initiatives during that period which to the best of my recollection originated with the professionals: the annexation of Prince Edward and Marion Islands, as previously mentioned; the establishment of the Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara (which broke down with the advent of independence for the African colonies in the sixties); the participation in the Berlin air-lift in which South Africa was the only country from the southern hemisphere to take part; the participation in the Korean War; the attitude to be adopted following Ian Smith's announcement proclaiming Rhodesian independence.

One would also like to quote a few examples of foreign policy blunders (either of omission or commission) that would have been avoided had the advice of the professionals been followed, but even in respect of this early period it would be impracticable to do so, bearing in mind *inter alia* the provisions of South Africa's Official Secrets legislation.

Despite these remarks, which reflect some of the problems inherent in writing about South African foreign policy, it would be inappropriate to conclude without again emphasising the breadth and depth of the spectrum examined by Professor Geldenhuys and the quality of his writing. His book should not only be compulsory (and pleasurable) reading for all, here and abroad, professional or otherwise, concerned with South Africa's foreign policy, but will also, I hope, stimulate others — particularly those who were in special positions of *political* responsibility such as former Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller — to make their own contribution, whether by way of comment on Professor Geldenhuys' conclusions, or in the form of independently written memoirs or other publications.

Professor Geldenhuys ends the introduction to his study with the following paragraph:

"This book admittedly leaves many empirical and theoretical questions unanswered, but this might prove beneficial in the long run in that it might encourage further systematic research in a field that is vitally important for South Africa's future relations with the outside world."

It is fervently to be desired that there will be a response to this challenge from other academic quarters, because there is no doubt that if we can develop in this country a degree of foreign policy expertise outside the ranks of the politicians and the professionals, this could be a valuable contribution in promoting Prime Minister P. W. Botha's objective of closer co-operation

between the public and private sectors in the handling of South Africa's increasingly complex political, economic and social problems.

AMBASSADOR DONALD SOLE

Newlands

Cape Town.

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