


# INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT VAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

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*INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA*

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## INTRODUCTION

DENIS VENTER

The aim of this Symposium on *International Relations in Southern Africa* was to place in perspective, to some extent at least, South Africa's relations with those states which can be included within the general geographical area of *Southern Africa* - Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, South West Africa, Angola, Rhodesia, Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi, as well as Madagascar and Mauritius. Thus the choice of subjects on which papers were presented was intended to cover the broad spectrum of economic and political relations, scientific and technical co-operation, the security question<sup>+</sup> and the objectives of the Republic's foreign policy in this region.

The necessity of meaningful contact on technical and functional levels - that is, levels of contact which have direct relevance to economic, social, technical and humanitarian matters - is of cardinal importance in the framework of international relations in Southern Africa, especially in view of the deep divisions on the political level. Co-operation on the non-political level can help significantly to relax an explosive political situation which until now has existed in Southern Africa, and to lead in the long term to an opening up of the phenomenal potential of this sub-continent.

Southern Africa can in the future become a show window of successful interstate co-operation on a regional level. But this will be a difficult road, strewn with problems. Tactful, circumspect and yet daring statesmanship will be demanded from both Black and White in this situation.

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In his paper, included in this volume, *Professor Lombard* points out that a model for international economic co-operation in Southern Africa must focus on territorial or regional decentralisation of political power to the respective states, especially in regard to production, trade and finance, and that "factor movements" between the territories or regions indicates the need for specific administrative machinery for collective decision-taking in respect of these economic functions.

*Professor Nierwoudt* declares that, because of the internationalisation of the apartheid question in the era after World War II and the progressive deterioration which this has brought about in South Africa's external relations, the Republic has to make an earnest effort to formulate a purposeful African policy. Africa is the key to full acceptance by the world community, and in this regard Southern Africa fills a cardinal position.

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<sup>+</sup>Copyright on the paper *Security Problems in Southern Africa* by Commodore R.A. Edwards, SM, presented at the Symposium, is held by the South African Defence Force. It has been published in *Paratus*, Vol 24, No. 6 (June 1973). Consequently it is not included in this volume.

Perhaps in the past South Africa has relied too much on the so-called "telephone diplomacy" in its relations with its immediate neighbour states. It is only logical that diplomatic relations should now be further developed with these states.

*Professor Moolman* points to the important role which scientific co-operation ought to play, not only to enrich and extend knowledge, but also to build bridges between nations. Respect for and acceptance of the Black man as scientific equal should not be seen as a threat, but as a further contribution to better human relations which alone can lead to a greater degree of security and hope for the future in the sub-continent of Africa.

*Dr. Hilgard Muller* visualizes for the future a Southern Africa which will consist of sovereign independent states - including independent Homelands - economically and financially modelled along the same lines as the European Economic Community. Therefore, in the coming years, this area will become to a greater degree one of priority for South Africa. The Republic will continue to pursue a policy of co-existence on a friendly basis and with mutual respect, not only in Southern Africa, but also in Africa as a whole.

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This Symposium was the first effort of a Branch of the South African Institute of International Affairs to undertake a project on this scale. It is hoped that it will encourage other Branches of the Institute to launch similar undertakings. The intention of the Pretoria Branch is now to make Symposiums of this nature a regular institution, and in so doing to help to realise the objectives of the Institute, namely to contribute, on a scientific and fully independent basis, to a wider understanding of international relations in general; to a greater awareness of South Africa's role in Africa and in the rest of the world; and to a constructive interest by the South African public in the development of South Africa's external relations. In the rapidly changing world scene and in the light of the dramatic developments on the African continent in particular, the Institute's work throughout South Africa becomes more important than ever.

Portugal's coup on 25 April, 1974, will undoubtedly have far-reaching consequences for Southern Africa. The process of decolonisation in the Portuguese African territories will now be rapidly accelerated, in spite of General Antonio de Spínola's intention to slow down somewhat the process. The withdrawal of Portugal from Angola and Mozambique may create an untenable security problem for Rhodesia, and the Government of Mr. Ian Smith may find that its position can rapidly deteriorate, unless new settlement negotiations with the Rhodesian nationalists can take place soon.

South Africa, too, will have to make a serious reassessment of its position, not only in Southern Africa, but also in Black Africa as a whole. Dialogue with Africa, which appeared so promising at the beginning of the Seventies, has largely collapsed, not only because of the obstinacy of certain militant African states, but also as a result of vacillation, lack of quick action to make use of potentially favourable circumstances, and even indiscretions on South Africa's part. It is absolutely essential that the process of "dialogue" or communication should be re-activated. South Africa will in the near future no longer be cut off from the rest

of Black Africa by a buffer zone or "*cordon sanitaire*" - the Portuguese territories and Rhodesia - and will have to take into account the realities of this situation. Courageous new initiatives will be expected from the South African Government in the coming months, in order to reach some or other *modus vivendi* with Africa. In this regard policy in Southern Africa in particular will be a cardinal factor, for obvious reasons: the imminent decolonising of Angola and Mozambique; the need for a satisfactory settlement of the Rhodesian question; and the desirability of a resolution of the differences which have dragged on for decades between South Africa and the United Nations over South West Africa.

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The sincere thanks of the Institute, and of the Pretoria Branch in particular, are due to the contributors to this volume, as well as to all who participated in the Symposium. The Institute is grateful to the University of Pretoria for the provision of facilities for the Symposium, and also to the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Africa Institute and Mr. O. Davies for assistance with the translation of some of the papers from Afrikaans.

A special debt of gratitude is due from the Pretoria Branch and the Editor to the Director and staff of the Institute at Jan Smuts House for the preparation of this volume for publication.

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Editor  
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## ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: SOME PRECONDITIONS

J.A. LOMBARD

### 1. *Politics and Economics*

The popularity of the idea of economic co-operation in Southern Africa is said to be due to its material advantages. I have often come across the view that the ultimate objective of the protagonists of this or that form of economic co-operation is political, yet even in such cases material advance was an intermediate objective to be achieved in order to gain support for the political idea. This is, for example, very clearly illustrated in the history of the European Economic Community ever since its predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community, was first mooted during the early 1950's. Although Messrs. Monnet and Schuman looked forward to the establishment of a kind of order in which it would be physically impossible for France and Germany to go to war again, and Prof. Walter Hallstein always referred to the Community as a *political exercise* in the economic field, the millions of ordinary citizens voting for the idea, had in mind the disappearance of customs officials at the national borders and the opportunities of buying foreign produced goods at lower prices. In a sense, therefore, the EEC may be said to be a case of economic considerations leading to political results.

The case of the United States of America illustrates the relationship between the economics and the politics of international co-operation from an opposite historical evolution, namely from politics to economics. When the United States was originally established, the Articles of Confederation did not provide for any regulation of interstate trade. It soon transpired, however, that a government without the power to prevent economic disintegration within its borders, was politically ineffective; hence the addition of sections 8 - 10 to Article 1 of the Constitution at the Convention in 1787.

The history of economic relationships between people and nations provides many more examples of the general principle that all forms of economic relationships imply some form of political arrangement, and vice versa.

The question to which this paper is addressed is how this general principle works out in the sub-continent of Southern Africa, south of the sixth parallel. What political order do our economic opportunities require, or vice versa, what economic conditions do our political objectives presuppose? For the purposes of the discussion I shall accept as single parties to the prospective economic co-operation and its relevant political order, the following: Angola, Mocambique, Zambia, Malawi, Rhodesia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, the several Bantu Homelands in the Republic as well as Owambo and Kavango in South West Africa, and the Republic of South Africa.



These separate social subsets of a total of about 52 million people are almost all seeking political freedom and material advance through the institution of the nation state - conceived as the separation of the nations in mutually exclusive geographical areas and under sovereign governments. The political process of establishing these national political freedoms from European colonial rule started in 1910 with the formation of the Union of South Africa, which gained full sovereignty in 1934 and became a republic in 1961. Malawi and Zambia became republics in 1964, Botswana in 1966 while Lesotho and Swaziland became independent monarchies in 1966 and 1968, respectively. Rhodesia declared its independence unilaterally in 1965 as a monarchy, changing to a republic in 1970. South West Africa has been administered by South Africa under the mandate system of the defunct League of Nations since 1920, while Owambo and Kavango have reached the stage of self-governing territories in 1973. Within the Republic of South Africa the Transkei gained selfgoverning status in 1963 while seven other Homelands<sup>1</sup> have done so since.

## 2. *The Implications of Political Separatism in International Economic Relations*

In this section I wish to develop briefly a general frame of reference in connection with the international economic relationships between the nation states emerging in Southern Africa. The practical implications of this approach will be the main concern of the rest of the paper.

A nation state, in the classical sense of this idea may emerge from a process of centralisation from below, i.e. integration out of urbanism or regionalism, such as took place in Europe after the Middle Ages. Conversely the nation state may emerge from a process of decentralisation from above, i.e. differentiation out of an over-arching colonialism or pater-nalism, such as the present generation in Africa is experiencing.

This difference in the way in which nation states came about in Western Europe and Southern Africa respectively has at least two important implications in economic affairs. In the first place, the European integration from urbanism involved the expansion of the size of the domestic market and the size of the domestic resource base. It is unnecessary for me to enter into economic technicalities in order to prove that such a process usually produces more material welfare *per capita* of the population - particularly, and this is important, when the integration encompasses communities with similar demographic features. In Southern Africa, the decentralisation from colonialism involved the reduction of the domestic market and the domestic resource base in the case of Zambia, Malawi and Rhodesia. In the case of the Union of South Africa the decolonisation of the four provinces conformed to the European style, because it was accompanied by their integration into the Union.

In the case of the former "High Commission Territories", Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, their markets were not functionally linked

before independence. Because their respective markets were virtually irrelevant to one another's production and income, the political separation which followed decolonisation changed their respective economic situations but little. These three territories could, if they wished to do so, ignore each other politically without much economic consequence! Their respective trade and monetary relationships with the Republic were, of course, much more important, but the question of political decentralisation from the Republican government did not arise in their case.

The second implication of the two different processes of nationalism is the effect on the administration and co-ordination of economic affairs. A process of centralisation of decision-making brings about a reduction of explicit co-ordinating functions since the number of independently motivated and independently powered decision-makers are less - time lags in information are reduced or removed altogether, etc. A process of decentralisation of decisions *about matters of mutual concern*, obviously increases the intensity of the explicit arrangements for co-ordination which have to be made - making the process of economic co-operation much more complex. The complexity of the co-ordination and co-operation in a politically decentralised system not only adds directly to the cost of administration, but may in addition, indirectly cause losses in productivity when the system of co-ordination is not economically ideal in practice.

These logical implications of political separatism do not, of course, discredit the idea in principle. They do suggest, however, that the programme of making the decentralized sovereign governments *politically viable*, must explicitly acknowledge and attend to these logical implications of institutional decentralisation in a functionally integral system.

In other words, the task before us is not to put the political objective, on the one hand, and its economic implications, on the other hand, on a scale to find out if the objective outweighs its implications. That would be no more than a subjective value judgement; for some people the objective is important enough to outweigh any thing. The task is to identify the implications as "things which need effective attention if the political objective is to materialize". This the analyst must say - even if he has to shout to be heard!

In this spirit, I wish to formulate the economic implications of separate freedoms within the political arrangement of a plurality of nation states in Southern Africa as follows:-

- (a) The decentralisation to separate states of authority
  - (i) in purely local affairs, and
  - (ii) with respect to the exports of the respective states to *the rest of the world*, introduces no *new* limits on economic advance nor any *new* complications in co-ordinating administration.

- (b) The territorial or regional decentralisation of political authority to states with regard to production, trade, finance, and factor movements among the territories or regions must imply either
  - (i) explicit administrative machinery for collective decision-making about these economic functions; or, alternatively,
  - (ii) the fragmentation of the market with its implications for economic growth; or, alternatively,
  - (iii) political frustration at the state or national level.
  
- (c) There are no cases outside (a) and (b). States which wish to ignore each other politically without committing economic suicide will seek to be in position (a) (ii). If (a) (ii) is not economically possible and assuming that (b) (iii) is politically undesirable while (b) (ii) is economically unacceptable, (b) (i) is the case to focus on for the strategy of international economic co-operation.

### 3. *The Dilemma of the Liberal*

The logic of the previous section depends upon no ideology - except that of nationalism and then only as its political point of departure. How the administrative machinery for collective decision-making in economic affairs is designed in practice, is, however, a matter which could be approached in several ideological ways. There is the *communist approach*: to risk a great deal of political frustration at the state or national level in favour of decisions by the leader state and the reduction to the minimum of the need for explicit interstate co-ordination. The cardinal principle of the political economy of Russian communism is, after all, *central planning*. There is, at the other end, *philosophical anarchy* i.e. the refusal to do anything about the problem and to let it be handled by *ad hoc* bargaining. Thirdly, there is the *liberal approach* - to decentralize to a maximum extent consistent with the maintenance of order in the system as a whole. This latter approach, I have always believed to be the fundamental philosophy of the Afrikaners in politics and of the English in economics.

The term "liberal" has unfortunately received a restricted meaning in South African party political jargon which its very rich intellectual past in both English political economy and Dutch jurisprudence does not deserve, and I must frankly record a protest in passing against such impoverishment of both the Afrikaans and English languages.

As a specific authority for my use of the term "liberal" or "liberalism" in political economy, I refer the reader to the collection of essays by Lionel Robbins, the foremost living English economist in the liberal tradition.<sup>2</sup>

The process of political separation, "separatism", of which the nation states in Southern Africa are all examples, is not in itself a liberal solution to the problem of freedom. In fact, separatism can be the vehicle of an entirely different ideology while the idea of national sovereignty "and its inviolability" is equally alien to the most fundamental conceptions of liberalism. "Hence comes the dogma of the fundamental equality of states - which in our time has led to the crowning absurdity of voting arrangements at international assemblies which give equal votes to say, Panama and the United States of America."<sup>3</sup>

And yet "no one would deny some broad differences of historical evolution justifying some separation, and some grievances which make unified living together exceptionally difficult: no one in his right senses would urge that the Anglo-Indian problem could possibly have been settled by giving every Indian the right to elect a representative at Westminster!"<sup>4</sup>

Robbins, in discussing the preconditions for federation, mentioned two - firstly, the existence of adequate communication and secondly, "and much more important", the existence of "a certain degree of like-mindedness between the powers surrendering sovereign functions. You cannot begin to create federal power if there exists complete disagreement on the objectives and ideals in the service of which federal power may be used. You will not surrender control of your destiny to majorities whose intentions and whose conceptions of the true ends of life you fear to be inimical to your own". On this basis Robbins had no illusions about the functional significance of the British Commonwealth, and the idea of a world federation with normal federal powers was equally impracticable.

Even the promotion of the free movement of people from one part of the world to the other cannot be unequivocally endorsed by the liberal, particularly in the case where the "inhabitants of a certain area are so fixed in habits of rapid multiplication that there is no hope of speedy change"<sup>6</sup> - if, that is to say, there are no signs of effective diminution in the size of the average family so that a tendency to over-population persists.

The liberal mind, I believe, is in a dilemma over the entire issue of centralisation or decentralisation of political power. There simply do not seem to be universally valid normative principles in this regard. On the whole, however, "the philosophy of liberalism builds much on the decentralized initiative of individuals and groups which is made possible by the institutions of private and corporate property".<sup>7</sup>

One thing was, however, clear to the liberal, and this distinguishes him sharply from the anarchist: there must be some central preservation of law and order. If there is to be any liberty at all, there must also be order, and if there is to be order there must also be authority. "It is a pure delusion to suppose that in a free society *everything* can be arranged by specific and voluntary agreements".<sup>8</sup> This demand for the conditions of order and continuity, is the basic element of the attitude of the liberal mind to "the grand problem of relations between nations".<sup>9</sup>

The next question, and the most important one from a practical point of view, is *to define the nature of that order* which is to allow the maximum freedom to each nation in those economic activities which are of mutual concern because of the complementary or, which is more difficult, the competitiveness of the activities. It is obvious that if one party enjoys absolute freedom of action, no other party enjoys any.

#### 4. *Trade in Southern Africa*

The percentages of the population involved in subsistence farming in all "African" communities is still high. As far as these people are concerned, sophisticated politics and economics of the kind considered here do not yet exist. For the remaining more than 50 per cent of the people in the market economy, the domestic value added in production depended very highly on the export of agricultural and mineral products. None of these countries, except Rhodesia and South Africa offered much scope for more trade with each other through greater division of labour. They were already "highly specialised". On the other hand, these exports were, with some notable exceptions of Lesotho and Rhodesia not very highly geared on the economies of one another.

Angola and Mocambique, are regarded as constitutional parts of Portugal despite some minor adjustments which were made in 1972 to provide them with a greater measure of local autonomy. Trade with the rest of Southern Africa remains at a minimum despite considerable economic growth, particularly in Angola. On the whole, figures for the late sixties show that their trading interests in Southern Africa have declined relative to their trade with Europe. Since there is no question of the political separation of the peoples of Angola and Mocambique from Portugal, our political economy model should fix on decisions in Lisbon.<sup>10</sup>

As far as more formal economic co-operation between their economies and that of the rest of Southern Africa is concerned, the policy in Lisbon is at present geared to Portuguese co-operation with the European Economic Community, a strategy which directly affects economic activity in the African Portuguese states. The common interests of the Republic and Portugal in the combating of terrorism in Southern Africa has, for the same reason (namely opportunities in European co-operation) not led to greater economic co-operation.

With regard to the other nation states except the emerging states in the Republic of South Africa, trade statistics for 1964 and 1968 show that during these immediate post-independence years, economic communication within the sub-continent receded significantly - as table I in the appendix shows very clearly. In all cases, except Lesotho and Rhodesia, dependence upon each other for marketing their exports was very low, and declined even further.

In 1964, Rhodesia and South Africa were the only significant sellers elsewhere in Africa and were in fact the principal suppliers except

in Angola and Mocambique. In 1968 the Rhodesian position showed significant structural changes as a consequence of the boycott, particularly vis-a-vis Zambia and South Africa, while the latter seemed to have filled the gap left by the severance of the important trade relations between Rhodesia and Zambia. Although South African exports to all countries increased by 1968, many countries reduced their relative dependence on the sub-continent for their requirements. All these increases are, of course in money terms, which were seriously affected by the inflation of commodity prices between 1964 and 1968. On the whole, therefore, the statistics do not create the impression that trade communications were improving between 1964 and 1968. Even Lesotho and Swaziland, who in 1964 were highly geared to South Africa in both their import and export trade, increasingly marketed in the rest of the world.

The facts, accordingly, seem to indicate that separation seriously harmed Rhodesia and Zambia, insofar as no suitable administrative system of economic co-operation could be devised to handle their mutual interdependence, whereas Malawi, with a less sophisticated international trade, and a greater degree of self-subsistence was less economically affected by the political separation.

In the case of Botswana and Swaziland, their separate decolonisation was much more successful in this sense, because they had few economic ties with each other. With regard to their trade with the Republic, the pattern observed seems to suggest that their political efforts to disassociate harmonizes with their increasing ability to produce for export to *the rest of the world*. Although their imports still largely come from the Republic, this can be, under the new customs agreement in force since 1969, be either a source of state revenue, or a basis for some local industrialisation through import replacement. On the whole, however, the latter alternative is severely limited by the small size of the local market.

The one country about which concern may be expressed is, of course, Lesotho. Its economic viability was problematic even before it was launched upon its own political recognisances, and, despite a number of interesting developments, a Development Corporation and a Casino, Lesotho remains economically non-viable. It has a population of about 1 million which has for years been growing at a rate about 25 per cent below the average of other African populations in Southern Africa. That shortfall may well be accounted for by the rapid growth of the South Sotho population of the Republic. Moreover, not less than 40 per cent of the national income of the remaining 1 million is derived from wages earned in the Republic. The system of economic support and the code of co-ordinating decisions which this political unit will always need was an issue which the British Colonial Office did not solve before it withdrew.

5. *The South African Homelands*

Although the abovementioned nation states in Southern Africa usually attract all the attention in debates on economic co-operation in Southern Africa, the fact is that their activities economically speaking, account for only one quarter of the situation. The people involved in these cases (i.e. excluding Angola and Mocambique) number about 15 million or about 30 per cent of the total population on the sub-continent - and very large percentages of them still live in the system of political tribalism and economically isolated subsistence.

More than three quarters of the marketed economic activity on the sub-continent takes place among the 21 million people in the Republic of South Africa now in the process of designing their respective and separate political freedoms within the framework of geographically sovereign nation states. This latter process of political decentralisation is bound to be of much greater economic impact than the decolonisation of Rhodesia, Zambia, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. In short, as the well-known old Afrikaans saying goes: „Hef aan lê voor!”<sup>1</sup> The acid test of successful political separatism in Southern Africa will be applied in South Africa. And short of military considerations, the acid test will consist of economic considerations.

It is again impossible to go into detail in this paper, but there can be little doubt that a number of cases similar to that of Lesotho may arise. In all cases the sale of labour to the Republic proper is a vastly more important "export", or income base, than the sale of commodities. In all cases the domestic market is too small to support self-sustained industrial development, while the all important opportunities in agriculture still await the managerial revolution.

The "labour model" of economic co-operation between the Bantu states and the Republic of South Africa will, apart from a host of other structural defects and dangers, place a tremendous strain on the administrative machinery of collective decision-making and co-ordination. I do not think we can contemplate the idea of a system of international economic co-operation on such a basis as the dominant functional element of the system. Labour migration will probably have to remain a significant function in the inter-regional or international economic relationships of Southern Africa, but it will have to be replaced by something else as the dominant function - this something else is either commodity trade with the Homelands which means industrial decentralisation, or the creation of new Bantu political power structures in the areas of the existing industrial poles.

The obliteration of the basic regional dispersion of the Bantu nations in this way, will not, however, solve the problem of income distribution among the different population groups. If the significance of regions is destroyed by practically complete polarisation around the few metropolitan nodes, the *functional* distribution - i.e. between

wages and profits - will be the next prospect of the political economy in Southern Africa.

Again, the true liberal approach to these prospects is that none of them offer impossible or even awfully difficult problems of political economy - provided always that the freedoms involved in the processes of bargaining are not such as to undermine the basic law and order of society.



Table 1.- International trade in Southern Africa  
as percentage of the gross national  
product, 1965 - 1967.

Country	Imports			Exports		
	1965	1966	1967	1965	1966	1967
Republic of South Africa	24,2	20,3	21,8	14,4	15,1	14,8
Lesotho	56,6	66,8	49,9	15,2	12,8	8,8
Swaziland	54,5	49,0	69,2	64,3	73,3	79,4
Botswana	46,4	48,7	56,4	28,5	28,0	23,2
Rhodesia	34,1	24,5	25,3	44,9	28,2	25,5
Zambia	38,5	38,2	40,7	69,3	76,5	62,6
Malawi	23,8	28,1	25,1	16,8	18,0	20,2
Angola	20,9	21,3	27,1	21,4	22,7	23,5
Mocambique	14,8	16,8	15,3	9,2	9,1	9,3

Source: Departement Ekonomie, Ekonomiese Samewerking  
in Suidelike Afrika, Human Sciences Research  
Council - Research Project.

Table 2.-Inter-regional trade of Southern Africa as percentage of total trade, 1964 and 1968.

Country	Imports		Exports	
	1964	1968	1964	1968
	per cent	per cent	per cent	per cent
South Africa and South West Africa	4,3	5,0	13,8	19,3
Lesotho	89,9	97,1	94,2	52,9
Swaziland	84,2	90,9	36,7	20,4
Botswana	93,5	66,8	50,5	20,0
Rhodesia	35,1	55,1	42,5	47,5
Zambia	73,1	32,8	9,2	2,8
Malawi	59,6	34,2	24,9	17,4
Ang	4,0	4,6	2,4	3,6
Mocambique	19,1	14,1	15,8	15,5

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3. *Ibid.*, p.147.
4. *Ibid.*, p.148.
5. *Ibid.*, p.152.
6. *Ibid.*, p.123.
7. *Ibid.*, p.150.
8. *Ibid.*, p.149.
9. *Ibid.*,
10. Current developments of the *coup d' etat* of 25 April 1974 might have far-reaching effects.
11. English translation of saying „hef aan lê voor" is "the most difficult part of the work still to come."

POLITICAL RELATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

C.F. NIEUWOUDT

1. *The Changing World*

The history of the world, and in particular that of Western civilization, has been characterized by numerous wars. Literally hundreds of wars, from the Trojan War to the present crisis in the Middle East, have taken place. Wright has noted 278 wars waged by important states during the years 1480 to 1941. Although wars and all forms of terroristic violence are naturally rejected by all civilized people, they nevertheless have fulfilled important functions. Each war in history has made the world aware of the existence, rôle and importance of the respective countries involved. This is even more so today with the advent of the modern communications media. Korea, Vietnam and the Middle East have become household names, not least of all in South Africa, and this has led to greater interest in the world around us. One consequence has been that it is difficult to differentiate between that which is of purely domestic interest and that which has a wider, international context. Today, the 140 or so countries in the world have an intense interest in what happens in the world community.

Three major wars have afflicted the world and effected radical changes in the past two centuries. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars placed the emphasis on Europe and the independence of the American states. World War I saw the stress being laid on the Balkans and the Middle East and the rejection of colonisation. In contrast, World War II resulted in a process of decolonisation in Africa and South-East Asia. This process saw the number of independent states in Africa rise from a handful in 1945 to more than 40. Indeed this rapid process of independence in Africa, which has been accompanied by the death of thousands of people, has in many respects made Africa the centre of international interest. Viewed rationally, the African states have had more than their fair share of the international limelight. In the process, however, South Africa and her rôle, place and relationship with Africa have become of intense interest to the world in general.

The new spirit that has permeated the world in the past 25 years has had repercussions on South Africa in two respects. On the one hand, world public opinion - in consequence of the causes and effects of World War II - developed a strong race consciousness. The exceptional racial composition in South Africa, and the expression it found in the internal political system, inevitably made the country a focal point of world interest. For here was a microcosm of the world's pluralistic racial relationship - and this generated intense political interest. The relations between the various population groups were of wider importance than purely racial, however, for it was realised that this was not merely a question of different races but of civilizations seeking to maintain their identities. On the other hand, the peoples of South Africa, both White and Non-White, who had in the past often been inclined to be isolationist, became more aware of the importance of the international community. The realization dawned that in the world of today, South Africa - as in the case of any other country - cannot live in isolation. Indeed, each passing day brings greater appreciation of the fact that South Africa is part of a modern, dynamic

world. In terms of practical politics, however, this does not mean the mere acceptance of a factual situation. On the contrary, it demands knowledge and insight in order that changing circumstances can continually be evaluated with a view to adapting policy.

For the purposes of this paper which is concerned with "international political relations in Southern Africa" it is expressly stated that the point of departure is our own state, the Republic of South Africa. The emphasis will accordingly fall on South Africa's relations in Southern Africa. This implies, in turn, that right at the outset and in order to avoid any subsequent lack of clarity, two basic aspects will be discussed, namely the concepts *international relations* and *Southern Africa*.

## 2. *International Relations*

The modern state is the outcome of a long process of cultural, scientific, technological, economic and social development. In this process the national state with all its characteristics has emerged. International relations thus concern the mutual relations between these states. A state seeking recognition and acceptance must conform to certain basic requirements in respect of boundaries, permanent population, stable governmental institutions and independence or sovereignty. If all these requirements are satisfied then one has a state which up to now has been the dominant actor in international politics. However, the state is and remains a political phenomenon and institution and therefore all the interests of states are rooted in political considerations. Both in theory and practice, however, a distinction is drawn between various types of relations, namely:

- (i) political relations, *inter alia* peace, war, boundaries, treaties;
- (ii) economic relations, e.g. raw materials, markets (the whole fabric of international trade); and
- (iii) social relations including sport, health, religion and education.

In spite of this division of relations, however, the economic and social aspects can never be divorced from political or constitutional factors. The reason for this is simply that each state is under the control and authority of a government and that government is a political phenomenon with institutions that regulate the day to day activities of every citizen. People find their right of existence within the state and this is true of any other group. Even the activities of transnational institutions takes place within the framework of individual states; in other words the state is the nucleus around which international relations revolve. As soon as the government acts, therefore, in a particular matter, that matter - irrespective of its nature - immediately assumes a political form because the political aspect remains of overriding importance.

In this instance, we are concerned with the external relations between states. It is assumed, therefore, that in the first place there are independent states which are recognized and accepted and in the second place that in some respect or another those states are in contact with one another. The concern is not with the nature and form of the relations but merely with acknowledgement of the existence of relations. The relations between states can be in two directions, namely:

- (i) peaceful relations which include co-operation or competition in peace or in war; and
- (ii) non-peaceful relations which indicate conflict and strife and which can be of a violent or non-violent nature.

International relations thus refer to all activities of states which transcend the national boundaries of the state. These include the relations between governments, groups and individuals in all spheres of life, irrespective of the objectives of these, in other words, the contacts which both the government and the people make across their national borders. But, because the government exercises authority in and over the state, all relations are formed with the express or tacit sanction of the government. For this reason the government accepts final responsibility.

If the scope of the external relations of states is analyzed in broad terms, it is necessary to differentiate between:

- (i) relations which assume a world-wide form, e.g. health or telecommunications;
- (ii) relations which relate to two states only, e.g. friendship treaties and cultural agreements; and
- (iii) relations affecting a group of states, in other words, states which are found in a specific geographical region and whose relations are therefore more of regional interest.

The misconception that international relations are conducted only on a universal or world-wide basis must therefore be repudiated immediately. As soon as two or more states are involved in a matter, we are concerned with questions of international relations. In this instance, we are concerned with international political relations in Southern Africa and this assuredly forms part of the broader pattern of international relations. For this reason all the customs and rules pertaining to the relations between states - however vague these might be - are applicable to Southern Africa.

### 3. *Southern Africa*

It is accepted that Southern Africa forms a region or regional entity. This implies that the relations between the states and the entity of which they are part should be analyzed. These do not include merely the pure political aspects but also the physical and cultural, i.e. all those basic elements that are of importance. Thus, in this case it is not only the formal relations between states but the relationships between the various populations found in Southern Africa. The problem is, however, different to that in most other cases of regional co-operation because of a divergent political, social and cultural outlook found within the same entity. Indeed, there is often sharp contrast between the various interests which result in a lower level of reciprocity than meaningful regional co-operation normally demands. These circumstances require more refined diplomacy and a closer understanding of underlying internal problems than would normally be the case.

Because of the exceptional position South Africa occupies in the world, these facts cannot be ignored; they are simply facts which must be confronted. For this reason our task is far more demanding than generally realised.

If it is accepted that Southern Africa is a region, it is imperative to determine which territories and areas are included in this region. The size of the region is open to argument but under normal circumstances Southern Africa would comprise the following:<sup>+</sup>

<u>State</u>	<u>Area (km<sup>2</sup>)</u>		<u>Population</u>	
1. South Africa	471 445		21 402 470	
South West Africa	<u>318 261</u>	789 706	<u>746 328</u>	22 148 798
2. Angola	481 226		4 840 719	
Mocambique	<u>297 731</u>	778 957	<u>6 603 653</u>	11 444 372
3. Rhodesia		150 333		3 857 460
4. Botswana		220 000		593 000
5. Lesotho		11 716		978 000
6. Swaziland		6 704		395 138
7. Zambia		290 587		3 496 010
8. Malawi		36 841		4 312 000
9. Madagascar		230 123		6 335 810
10. Mauritius		<u>720</u>		<u>775 573</u>
		<u>2 515 687</u>		<u>54 336 161</u>

For the purpose of analysis these areas can be divided into various categories.

It has already been mentioned that the approach of this paper is the international relations of South Africa in Southern Africa. It is advisable, therefore, to take a look at the various categories so that a better picture of the region can be formed.

The Portuguese territories of Angola and Mocambique comprise 31% of the total area of Southern Africa and have 20% of the total population; yet they are not independent states. Although the "Authorization Act on Overseas Territories, 1972" refers to them as "states" and provision is made for a greater measure of local self-government, they are still part of Portugal. South Africa's relations with Angola and Mocambique are accordingly determined by the authorities in Lisbon. There is no question

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<sup>+</sup> Population statistics are out of date in some cases and thus not correct. Nevertheless this does not affect the analysis.

of individual relations and yet these areas comprise a quarter of the whole of Southern Africa. Relations between South Africa and Portugal are relatively sound because of common security problems rather than broader cultural and social concord. Indeed, there are radical differences, especially on social policy.

In the case of Rhodesia, a huge question mark hangs over her international status. Although the country fulfils all the requirements of a state, namely territory, population, authority and independence, the question of international recognition remains. No *de facto* or *de jure* recognition has yet taken place. In the circumstances, South Africa maintains the *status quo*, more particularly because of security reasons, but this is as far as relations can extend under present circumstances. Further extension of relations would not be desirable in a broader Southern Africa context as other recognized states in the region do not acknowledge Rhodesia. South Africa must thus conduct her policy with great circumspection.

The former British "High Commission Territories" of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland together comprise 10% of the area and 3% of the population. These states all border on South Africa and are geographically closely integrated with the Republic. According to all the rules and customs of international politics, international relations between these states should be particularly intimate. Despite the favourable situation and the strong cohesion of economic and social factors, constitutional relations are more on an *ad hoc* basis than anything else. In fact, this has been called "telephone diplomacy" which is not of much significance.

In the case of Malawi which comprises 1,46% of the total area and 8% of the population, diplomatic relations have been concluded and relations are reasonably normal. Excluding Mauritius, Malawi is the most distant country from South Africa and it could have been expected that direct relations would have been of less importance than in the case of states which border directly on South Africa.

Zambia, which comprises 11,55% of the total area and has 6% of the total population, has no friendly international relations with South Africa. In fact, relations, mainly because of security reasons, are strained. Yet numerous factors make Zambia part of Southern Africa. In the case of Madagascar and Mauritius, the erstwhile French areas, which together comprise 9% of the area and 13% of the population, there are virtually no friendly relations.

On the whole, therefore, the position of South Africa in Southern Africa is far less favourable than is generally realized. The Republic with 31% of the total area and 40% of the total population or about a third and two-fifths of the area and population respectively, has normal constitutional relations with only one recognized state, namely Malawi. Relations with the Portuguese territories and Rhodesia, which are not recognized states but which nevertheless comprise about one-third of Southern Africa, have a question mark against them in the context of international politics. Relations are of a non-friendly nature with about 25% of the total region.

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\* i.e. of those being considered in this paper.



#### 4. *The Relations of South Africa to Southern Africa*

If South Africa's position and thus the rôle which must be fulfilled in international politics is reviewed, there is sufficient reason for deep concern. In spite of what might be said, it would appear that there is even less acceptance of South Africa today than was the case a quarter of a century ago. Indeed it would appear that, despite sporadic successes, the position in respect of positive acceptance of South Africa by the world community has deteriorated. The basic reason for this is the evolution of South Africa's domestic policy of multi-national development. Legally we feel entirely justified in pursuing our own domestic policy, without any form of interference from outside, but in terms of the new world morality that has become fashionable since World War II and which has found general acceptance particularly since the 1950's, South Africa's domestic affairs are of general world importance. This is simply a fact and must be seen and accepted in that light by those who formulate South African policy.

The solution of the dilemma in which South Africa currently finds herself, is to be found in Africa. Unless there is greater acceptance of the Republic by African states there cannot be hope that any significant progress will be made in international relations. Africa is thus the gateway to full acceptance by the world community. But Southern Africa, in turn, is the gateway to Africa and herein lies the basic problem. Mention has already been made of the fact that with the exception of Malawi, little progress has been made. Even with our immediate neighbours there has been no particular breakthrough and there is thus no question of any drastic change.

In the historical course of events, successive governments in South Africa have not given sufficient attention to South Africa in an African context. General Smuts, during his tenure of office, did not go much beyond the idea of good neighbourliness. Contact was made with the various mother countries and an effort made to prevent the arming of the local population and to expand economic ties with Africa. General Hertzog acknowledged South Africa's rootedness to Africa but his policy of "South Africa First" only sought to maintain the *status quo*. Dr. Malan took over in the post-war era, but nevertheless accepted that South Africa's interests were tied up with those of the colonial powers. Although he realized that South Africa could not divorce herself geographically from the continent, he also maintained a policy of *status quo* rather than of expanding contact. Communism had to be kept out of Africa; independence had to be granted gradually; technical and scientific co-operation had to be improved, but a general expansion of diplomatic representation did not take place. During the term of office of Mr. Strijdom, the attitude was one of wait and see rather than a change of policy. Mr. Strijdom's approach, in fact, was one of co-operation between Whites, especially in Southern Africa, and the expansion of trade. Thus during the rule of this group of prime ministers, South Africa's policy towards Africa and more particularly Southern Africa did not undergo any radical change.

The process of independence in Africa built up such momentum during Dr. Verwoerd's premiership that South Africa and the rest of the world were confronted by an accomplished fact. African states began entering world politics and erstwhile colonial institutions fell one after the other. Decolonisation became a fact and with it came a strong sense of

anti-colonialism in these states and elsewhere in the world. Although Verwoerd accepted that the friendship of the African states would have to be obtained, he did not view this as necessarily implying the conclusion of diplomatic relations. During these years an effort was made to obtain acceptance of South Africa and her domestic policy by African states and to obtain recognition of the fact that the Republic was part of Africa. Relations were accordingly on an *ad hoc* basis more than anything else, but nevertheless the foundations for dialogue with the leaders of Africa were laid. This policy of dialogue was continued under the administration of Mr. Vorster. Dialogue, however, is no magical word. It is part of normal diplomatic procedure, namely to make contact around the conference table. However, there is one noteworthy difference and that is that at present it is accepted that equality should be the basis for discussion.

South Africa is seen as an inextricable part of Africa and for this reason an attempt is made systematically to conclude relations with African states. In this respect, the stress has fallen in the main on Southern Africa, because it is realized that matters have to be rectified here. In contrast to this declared policy, however, little progress has been made in strengthening diplomatic contacts, in particular with neighbouring states. The most important development up to now, however, has been the fact that a start has been made in making contact.

South Africa's relations with Southern Africa must thus be seen in terms of the historical development of the foreign policy of the Republic which, in turn, is a reflection of internal policy and trends. Relations, however, are always based on the concept of two-way traffic. Firstly, there is one's own state which seeks for various reasons to expand its relations with other states. Secondly, there are the other states, in this case the whole of Southern Africa, which must be taken into account. A similar desire to establish relations must exist among these states. The crux of the matter is that there are two parties and relations must be acceptable to both.

In the case of Southern Africa the recognized states, with the exception of South Africa, are all Black states. Now, in spite of many internal problems, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is the umbrella organization which handles the interests of the African states, or at any rate purports to do so. The OAU, however, has adopted decolonisation and the rejection of racism as policy and is supported in this way by world opinion. Active support has even been given in this regard to the so-called "liberation movements". This policy was very clearly formulated in the "Manifesto on Southern Africa" in Lusaka in 1969. This document rejected dialogue with South Africa, supported the liberation of the "oppressed populations" and condemned racial discrimination. It was stated that the Black states of Africa had no choice but to support OAU policy. The internationally recognized states of Southern Africa are all members of the OAU and are thus obliged to accept this policy. Although some of these states are inclined to engage in dialogue with South Africa, they cannot openly defy the OAU.

The real problem of South Africa in Southern Africa lies in her own internal politics based on the principle of separate development. The foreign policy of a state takes into consideration the maintenance of its sovereignty and security; the welfare of its citizens, the promotion

of its prestige and power and the maintenance of its way of life (which often involves ideological considerations). In the case of South Africa, official policy for the past 25 years has recognized that this can be achieved only within the framework of separate development. But separate development is coupled to the word "apartheid" which, in the view of the African states, is based on racial discrimination. In this view, they are supported by virtually all states, including the mother countries, but more particularly by the socialist states of the world which see this dispute with South Africa as a means of building up spheres of influence in Africa. In any event it must be borne in mind that the vast majority of the states and populations of the world are Non-White.

It must be accepted that under normal circumstances, physical factors play a major rôle in determining the foreign policy of a state. Factors such as geographical location; natural resources, such as minerals, food production and power; industrial capacity and development can clearly have much influence. However, it is also conceded that non-physical factors exercise major influence, *inter alia* the values of society, religion, culture and the population itself. If there is a relatively large measure of homogeneity of population the physical factors will frequently play a dominant rôle. Where this is not the case, however, such as in Southern Africa, human factors will often be dominant to an excessive degree. The idea that the Black man in Africa is interested only in bread and butter issues must thus be rejected. Freedom and equality play just as important a rôle in Africa; and this fact has been ignored in the past. Because of this South Africa has not met with success in efforts to make a breakthrough to the continent. Too much emphasis has been placed on physical aspects, such as the wealth of the country, her industrial capacity and the economic potential for supplying aid or assistance.

##### 5. *Guidelines for the Future*

These few remarks serve to give a picture of the constitutional position of South Africa in a Southern African context. Obviously it is not a comprehensive picture, but then it was not my purpose to give a comprehensive picture on this occasion. My purpose was purely to indicate the crux of the problem and, in my opinion, this is one of basic human relations. In an international political sense, however, this expands into problems affecting relations between nations. International relations, as already mentioned, are not merely relations between governments. This might have been the case in the past, but in the modern state the people themselves are involved to an increasing extent. Thus not much is achieved by concentrating on those who happen to be the leaders of the state. Because, as the concept *international* indicates, the people also speak to the people; it is not merely a case of government speaking to government.

The foreign relations of a state have an affect on the state as a whole. They are of importance to every citizen or group or institution and not merely to the government and the ruling party alone. In the case of South Africa, foreign relations affect all inhabitants, both White and Non-White. Although in a democratic state there are governing and opposition parties there ought to be a relatively large consensus on foreign relations. There should not be violent party differences on South Africa's rôle, place and policy in Southern Africa as these would jeopardize the country's future and the continued existence of the state,

because these aspects affect the life and welfare of every citizen irrespective of race, colour or faith. Unnecessary penetration of foreign policy into party politics can therefore only cause harm and troubled relations.

The international political process (and this applies to Southern Africa as well) experiences both centripetal and centrifugal forces. In terms of practical politics this means determining those interests that are of common interest. There is little sense in being over-idealistic and trying to initiate change at too high a level. Indeed if policy-makers are realistic they often have to move to the level of the man in the street where the interests are of a common nature, usually of social or economic content. If co-operation is obtained on this level, further co-operation, even political co-operation, usually follows as a matter of course.

Due to various circumstances and the fact that South Africa's foreign relations have been attuned in the past to those of Britain, insufficient attention has been given to a distinctive South African policy on Africa. Nor has South Africa kept pace with an entirely new situation created by the rapid emergence of independent states in Africa. Policy is still defined in terms of Western diplomacy as conducted by the colonial powers. Consequently South Africa has not kept pace with the new developments in Africa. It has, for example, become necessary that the Africa Section in the Department of Foreign Affairs be strengthened considerably and that the services of more experts in various disciplines be made use of. Consideration can also be given to making use of outside expertise to effect contact, even at an unofficial level. Experience elsewhere in the world has been that much success can be derived from such a policy.

Up to now South Africa has always been closely concerned with events in Rhodesia, Angola and Mocambique. Many states and certainly most African states mention South Africa and these territories in the same breath and link them to a common policy of colonialism and suppression. Although South Africa naturally shows intense interest, especially in security aspects, and is even involved in events in these territories, it is an open question whether this is not all too "natural" a situation. General Hertzog's policy of "South Africa First" in respect of Europe also laid the foundation for a Southern African policy. This implies that one must first ask what is in South Africa's interest before South Africa becomes involved in events in Rhodesia, Angola and Mocambique. Thus the idea of a virtually inevitable connection with these territories must be rejected; we must be critical in respect of the international action of our good friends.

The generally prevalent view that the Organization of African Unity is a body of clowns must also be placed under the microscope. The OAU is an organization of African states and no Black state can ignore it - all are members of the organization. If it were to break up because of internal problems, which appears improbable after 10 years, it will simply be replaced by a new organization. South Africa is thus compelled to take note of the OAU and take account of it in determining her policy. Any confrontation with the OAU would cause a bipolarization between South Africa and the rest of Africa. Such a confrontation would jeopardize the objective of bringing the Southern African region closer together. Worse

still, it could give rise to a mobilization of forces against the Republic which could even be of a violent nature. If it is accepted that the present Homelands will be developed into independent states, account must be taken of the fact that they are potentially members of the OAU and this would cause a further deterioration of the situation.

Up to now South Africa has formal diplomatic relations only with Malawi but not with her immediate neighbours, namely Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. Whatever the reason for this, it is not exactly a logical situation in an international political sense. Under normal circumstances any state has numerous common interests with states bordering on it, e.g. political, economic and social interests. Thus it is normally meaningful to conclude diplomatic relations first with those states which are one's immediate neighbours. In the case of South Africa formal relations with these states could have created the opportunity for contact with the rest of Southern Africa and the OAU. They could have fulfilled the rôle of intermediaries - probably with great success, for not only is there the question of interdependence, but they probably also have a close understanding of South Africa's internal problems. Any active neglect in this regard could result in these states breaking away from South Africa and seeking alliance with the rest of Africa. This, in turn, could lead to a deterioration in South Africa's position in Southern Africa.

Finally, the future of the Homelands must also be taken into account. It is accepted, and it has repeatedly been confirmed, that these territories will eventually attain independent status. This means that the Transkei or KwaZulu, for example, will in the full sense of the word be states with their own territory, population and government, exercising sovereign authority over both internal and external affairs. Constitutionally speaking, they will be free to conclude relations with whatever state or organization they wish to. It can also be expected that they will seek closer links with Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland as well as with the other states of Africa and the OAU. For this reason it is essential that the foundation for sound relations with these future states be laid now. It is also desirable to begin training officials who can handle their foreign relations. Where they are already making increasing contact with the outside world, it is advisable that an instrument be placed in their hands that will enable them to meet their future responsibilities. It might be discovered in the future that these emergent states have the key to locking or unlocking doors for South Africa. If it is borne in mind that these future states, together with Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, will form a massive horseshoe stretching from Port Elizabeth around the industrial heartland of South Africa to Mafeking it is all the more important that sound relations be established.

If the whole question of international relations in Southern Africa is reviewed, in conclusion, it must be remembered at all times that basically we are dealing here with human beings. But, as circumstances have dictated, we have people belonging to various civilizations with their own sense of values. Western international political processes cannot, therefore, be applied summarily to this situation. There must be adaptations and changes, no less in South Africa's foreign policy, in order to ensure meaningful co-operation. In political science co-operation always means the achievement of working compromises which will enable political development. But to achieve compromise there must be dialogue and a dialogue policy is, therefore, really the only answer to better human relations in Southern Africa.

## TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC CO-OPERATION

J.H. MOOLMAN

My purpose is firstly to give a brief review of technical and scientific co-operation between South Africa and the rest of Africa prior to the rupture which came in 1962 and secondly to give an equally brief *résumé* of the position today. I will then conclude my paper by seeking an answer to the question as to what South Africa must now do in this field - how can we, under present circumstances, promote co-operation and why must we strive for co-operation.

### 1. *Co-operation in Africa Prior to 1962*<sup>1</sup>

Co-operation between African states and territories occurred for many years on an *ad hoc* basis and South Africa at all times demonstrated her willingness to collaborate with others in order to combat human disease, animal disease and pests and to contribute her share to tackling the plethora of technical and scientific problems confronting the continent.

After the Second World War, however, efforts were made to place this type of co-operation on a more organized and permanent base and the colonial powers concluded a number of agreements towards this end.

The first Pan-African conference of scientists was held in Johannesburg in 1949 and the following year representatives of Belgium, France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Rhodesia and South Africa decided to establish an organization that would promote scientific co-operation in Africa south of the Sahara. Thus was formed the CCTA (this abbreviated form representing the French initials of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara) and the CSA (Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara).

The CCTA consisted of representatives of the states mentioned above, with Ghana and Liberia joining at a later stage and even states such as the Sudan, Ethiopia and Somaliland taking part in specialist meetings, conferences, symposia, etc. The Commission met annually and its activities were concentrated on

- (a) technical conferences, symposia, training centres;
- (b) information bureaux, technical committees, correspondents;
- (c) joint research projects; and
- (d) technical aid.

The CCTA organized three or four international technical conferences every year at which the foremost experts in a number of spheres met and made recommendations on a wide variety of subjects. In addition to these conferences, specialized committees met more regularly and there was hardly any scientific subject which was left unexplored.

The information bureaux collected and classified information and disseminated this information through the medium of publications.

The following bureaux were in existence:

- (a) The Inter-African Bureau for Soils and Rural Economy (BIS) in Paris.
- (b) The Inter-African Bureau for Epizootic Diseases (IBED) in Muguga, Kenya.
- (c) The Tsetse Fly and Trypanosomiasis Permanent Inter-African Bureau (BPITT) in Kinshasa.
- (d) The Inter-African Labour Institute (ILI) in Brazzaville.
- (e) The Inter-African Pedological Service (SPI) at Yangambi, Zaïre.

Correspondents, advisory committees, etc. were appointed in fields where permanent bureaux or institutes were not in existence, e.g. technical advisory committees on soil, various types of diseases, agriculture, housing, statistics, social science, linguistics, maps and surveys, nutrition, road building, education, health, etc. Special correspondents on geology and climatology were appointed and the well-known Climatological Atlas for Africa which was compiled under the editorship of Professor Jackson of the University of the Witwatersrand, was one of the many products of this time. Apart from the abovementioned atlas a number of research projects were initiated and dealt with subjects such as: science and the development of Africa; a demographic atlas; a study on absenteeism and productivity; a study on migration in West Africa; maps on vegetation and an international atlas on West Africa.

A foundation for mutual aid in Africa was even established in 1957 with the task of providing technical aid to developing states.

The CSA was a purely scientific body, comprising eminent independent scientists.

The CSA/CCTA created comprehensive "machinery" in Africa for the co-ordination and stimulation of scientific work and there was hardly an aspect of the scientific sphere in which they did not operate. South Africa played a leading role in both organizations and it was Government policy to take part in the activities of these organizations on a large scale. Big delegations were sent to various conferences and large amounts of money were expended by governments on this praiseworthy, non-political scientific organization.

These were the good days of scientific co-operation, but, unhappily, they were to come to an end. As newly independent states came into being on the continent, political problems multiplied and hostility towards South Africa mounted; this outstanding organization was destroyed and South Africa was rejected.

The CSA/CCTA were absorbed into the OAU in 1965 and a decade of scientific co-operation came to an end. Dr. Gruhn of the University of California said in October 1971 about this development which is now part of history:

"White South Africa and Rhodesia had considerable experience and interest in dealing with the technical and scientific problems of the African continent. Their experts provided the backbone of most CSA/CCTA-sponsored conferences, giving no indication of political motivation, and many of them were on

the permanent staff. The official stance of South Africa was to emphasize the non-political, scientific approach. But newly independent African countries found her presence intolerable. ... From the technical point of view, the departure (in 1962) of the many high-calibre South African scientists was a serious blow, South Africa's contribution to CCTA had been considerable."<sup>2</sup>

## 2. *Present Inter-state Co-operation in Southern Africa*

Apropos of the work of two of the bureaux of CSA/CCTA, namely BIS (Paris) and SPI (Zaire) it was decided at that time to divide Africa into four regional committees, each consisting of experts from the region concerned. In this way the *Southern African Regional Committee for the Conservation and Utilization of the Soil* (SARCCUS) came into being along with three similar regional committees in other parts of Africa. The "Southern Region" initially consisted of Angola, the Katanga and Kasai provinces of what was then the Belgian Congo (Zaire), Nyasaland (Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), (Southern) Rhodesia, Mocambique, the Bechuanaland Protectorate (Botswana), Basutoland (Lesotho), Swaziland and South Africa. The foundation meeting of SARCCUS was held in Pretoria in June 1950 under the chairmanship of Dr. J.C. Ross. The aims of SARCCUS have been summarized as follows:

"The object of the Committee is to promote closer technical co-operation among territories comprising the Southern African Region in all matters relating to the control and prevention of soil erosion and the conservation, protection, improvement and rational utilization of the soil, the vegetation and the sources and resources of water supply in the territories concerned."<sup>3</sup>

Subsequently contact between the four regional committees was broken and the three northern committees were absorbed into the OAU. Zambia and Zaire withdrew from SARCCUS with the result that the Committee today consists of Angola, Mocambique, Rhodesia, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, São Tomé and Príncipe, and South Africa.

SARCCUS has met 13 times in the various member states since 1953. The permanent head office of the Committee is in Pretoria and the official languages are English, Portuguese and French.

"From the outset SARCCUS endeavoured to concern itself primarily with matters of policy rather than with the finer technical detail of problems which cropped up. For this reason the delegations attending meetings of the Commission consist as far as possible of professional officers of great seniority and wide experience. In fact, it is preferable that they are men concerned with the direction of policy in their own countries and competent to speak with authority on behalf of their Governments."<sup>4</sup>



According to the present director, Professor D.M. Joubert, the major contribution made so far by SARCCUS has been to promote contact. Secondly, it has also influenced the policies of the participating states.

SARCCUS is today the only inter-state organization for technical and scientific co-operation in Southern Africa but, as in the case of South Africa, it is isolated from the rest of Africa. There is a measure of co-operation through the World Reference Centre for Bluetongue and Horseshickness (which has had its head office at Onderstepoort since 1966), the International Office of Epizootic Disease and the International Locust Organization but otherwise co-operation is restricted to non-official organizations and is of a sporadic nature, although the South African Government is anxious to co-operate and continues to extend a hand of friendship to others on the continent. Nevertheless, scientific and technical co-operation has not ceased.

### 3. *Present South African Contributions*

#### *Scientific research<sup>5</sup>*

South African organizations which currently provide consultancy services to other countries in Southern Africa include the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) and the South African Weather Bureau. Their research covers a wide field and has already been of inestimable benefit to neighbouring states confronted with problems similar to those experienced in South Africa.

An example is the CSIR's National Institute for Personnel Research which in 1967/68 responded to 48 enquiries from Zambia, Swaziland, Lesotho, Rhodesia, Botswana, Zaïre, Malawi, Tanzania, Ghana and Senegal as well as countries outside Africa.

Mines in Rhodesia, Zambia and other neighbouring states make extensive use of the many services and facilities (such as facilities for the routine testing of steel wire ropes) offered by the CSIR's National Mechanical Engineering Research Institute.

The Bureau of Standards plays a prominent role in standardization matters in Southern Africa, frequently being approached by neighbouring states for advice on standardization problems. One of the primary needs of a developing country is the establishment of a system of standards that can help industry from the earliest stages to ensure satisfactory quality control. The compilation of national standards has become a major task of SABS.

South African standards have been framed to suit local climatic conditions and these conditions are similar to those found in the other countries of Southern Africa. Hence SABS's standards can be applied with very few modifications and in this way developing countries are spared much time, trouble and money. It has been estimated that it costs about R15 000 to prepare a standard specification.

Complete sets of SABS specifications - totalling more than 1 000 - have been presented to Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius and Swaziland. A request was received from Madagascar for the translation into French of

30 SABS standards.

In accordance with the Bureau's policy of assisting developing countries, a senior official was seconded to Malawi to assist that country in establishing its own standards organization.

In the meteorological sphere, the South African Weather Bureau is playing an important role in Southern Africa. As the weather services of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have not yet been able to start their own weather forecasting, the Pretoria Weather Bureau compiles weather forecasts for these countries together with the regional forecasts for South Africa. Daily weather bulletins for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, issued by the Weather Bureau, include maximum and minimum temperatures and rainfall figures. (The Weather Bureau has 20 weather stations in Lesotho and 38 in Swaziland.) The South African Weather Bureau also takes part in an international project for the collation of data from selected stations in South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, Mocambique, Zaïre, Zambia, offshore islands and the Antarctic on monthly and average temperatures, air pressure, humidity, total rainfall and sunshine figures as well as data on the upper atmosphere. (Daily weather reports received in Pretoria from the island stations are used extensively by meteorological services in the Southern Hemisphere).

#### *Personnel aid*

Personnel assistance is a vital form of assistance in developing countries. Several key positions in neighbouring countries are filled by South African civil servants who have been seconded by the South African Government for temporary service in a professional, technical or administrative capacity. In February 1972, it was reported that South Africa had seconded 53 civil servants to African countries in the preceding three years. Positions occupied by seconded persons include those of Chief Justice, Chief Electoral Officer and Director of Information.

In 1969 an official of the South African Public Service Commission spent four months in Malawi helping to initiate a new series of training courses for civil servants. In the same year an agreement was concluded between the South African and Swaziland governments in terms of which South Africa would recruit, pay and equip South Africans to work in Swaziland's local administration.

In addition, non-governmental organizations have seconded officials for various periods to neighbouring countries. For example, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) has seconded officials to the broadcasting services of both Lesotho and Malawi. The SABC has donated a 20 KW shortwave transmitter worth R56 000 to Malawi and donated R17 000 for a new studio at Zomba. Also on a non-governmental level, the National Development and Management Foundation of South Africa assists in training personnel by organizing courses to teach managerial skills to businessmen and government officials in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and other countries. In Swaziland this has been extended by the mounting of courses on subjects ranging from financial planning to the setting up and management of a wage board.

Other examples of non-governmental personnel aid include the attendance in 1971 of six members of the Lesotho Mounted Police at an

intensive two months' training course in traffic duties organised by the Johannesburg Traffic Department. In the engineering field there is, *inter alia*, a free technical advisory service provided to Lesotho by the South African Institute of Civil Engineers.

#### *Veterinary aid and co-operation*

South Africa co-operates closely with the countries of Southern Africa - and countries farther afield - in combatting diseases such as foot and mouth, lung sickness and malaria and pests such as tsetse-fly. South African agricultural experts have helped combat foot and mouth disease in neighbouring countries (in 1969, for instance, more than 60 veterinarians and ancillary personnel were sent to Swaziland for this purpose); have trained meat inspectors responsible for approving slaughter stock for export from Botswana; have advised Malawi on the establishment of an organization and facilities for veterinary research and diagnostic services; and have advised on the improvement of cattle herds in several African countries.

Numerous examples can be quoted of South African assistance in this sphere; the following represent examples of assistance rendered by the Veterinary Research Institute at Onderstepoort in the year 1970/71. Ten scientists from Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Mocambique and Rhodesia visited the Institute during that year, some on post-graduate study for several months. At the request of Botswana, the Institute assisted in a tick survey in the Gaborone area with the aim of introducing an effective tick control scheme. South African scientists took part in tsetse-fly eradication campaigns with Rhodesia, Angola and Mocambique. Two specimens for isolation and typing of horsesickness were received from Nigeria and Botswana. In the case of bluetongue, four specimens for virus isolation, were received from Egypt and three from Nigeria. Substantial quantities of vaccine are supplied to various African countries every year.

Agricultural assistance has also come from the private sector in South Africa. In 1968 two Friesland heifers and a bull were donated by the South African Government and six heifers by the Friesland Cattle Breeders' Association of South Africa to the College of Agriculture in Malawi. The Friesland Cattle Breeders' Association has also presented registered Friesland bulls since 1970 to Angola, Lesotho, Mocambique and Zambia. In 1967 the Afrikander Cattle Breeders' Society donated 11 bulls to Botswana.

#### *Medical and health aid*

South Africa provides assistance not only in promoting animal health in Africa but also in improving the health of humans. The country's neighbours benefit from the work of the South African Institute for Medical Research, the five medical schools in South Africa, the facilities for specialized medical treatment, the blood transfusion services and the well-organized channels for the distribution of medicaments. Vaccines and serums are readily available to meet the specific needs arising in Southern Africa and elsewhere on the continent.

Often when a serious threat of epidemic is suspected in nearby countries, South African medical specialists are on the spot within hours. For instance, in 1968, when 20 people died of bubonic plague in the Mhaleshoek District of Lesotho, South African specialists determined the causes, nature and

extent of the outbreak. In August 1972, South Africa donated 250 000 doses of polio, whooping cough and measles vaccine valued at R30 000 to Malawi for an immunization campaign among Malawian children. South African scientists have and still are performing pioneering work in combatting kwashiorkor, sleeping sickness, malaria, bilharzia, typhus, poliomyelitis, silicosis, syphilis and many other diseases and afflictions.

The world-famous Baragwanath Hospital outside Johannesburg has trained many nurses and radiographers from Malawi and Lesotho as well as Black Rhodesians. Facilities at South African medical schools are available to students from neighbouring countries and the South African Government provides nursing bursaries for Lesotho students.

Major assistance operations in the health sphere that have been mounted from the private South African sector are the medical shuttle services to Lesotho and Swaziland. The service to Lesotho was arranged by the South African industrialist, Dr. Anton Rupert, and operates from Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Cape Town and other cities. Since 3 February 1968 when the first team flew to Maseru until October 1972, 313 volunteer specialists and 319 theatre sisters had made 122 visits performed 1 946 operations and given 4 842 consultations.

A medical service similar to that in Lesotho is also being operated in Swaziland by a team of Johannesburg specialists under the sponsorship of Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, Chairman of the Anglo American Corporation. In the first 2½ years this scheme was in operation, the team saw about 10 000 patients and performed about 2 000 operations.

In addition, hundreds of medical students at South African universities do voluntary work in hospitals in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi during their vacations. The South African Government as well as commercial firms and charitable organizations have donated appreciable quantities of equipment, medicines, surgical dressings, blood supplies, etc. to further the medical assistance schemes in other countries. An important feature of the medical shuttle services is the experience gained by Basotho and Swazi doctors and theatre personnel by working with top people in their profession.

#### *Construction*

An area in which there is substantial co-operation between the countries of Southern Africa is in water and power supplies. The most spectacular project on which there has been inter-state co-operation is the R352 million Cabora Bassa Dam in Mocambique. Not only has the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa granted a R20 million credit to the Portuguese Government for certain aspects of this project but major South African companies (such as Anglo American, LTA Limited and Vecor) are associated in the ZAMCO consortium building the dam. South Africa's agreement to purchase power from the Cabora Bassa scheme has helped make it a practical proposition. Likewise South Africa's acceptance in principle of the feasibility of the Madibamatso River scheme in the Lesotho Highlands has made that scheme a practical proposition although it has not yet been finalized.

Other examples of major construction works undertaken by South African firms include the Swaziland railway and the Mpinde-Nova Freixo railway.

Since 1968 the South African Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) has supplied the Maseru-Roma-Moriya area of Lesotho with power at advantageous rates thus allowing the transfer of the diesel power station at Roma to Mahaleshoek which had not previously had power. In 1972, the power supply of Swaziland was linked to that of South Africa, allowing Swaziland to draw any shortfall in power requirements from across the border. Swaziland, in addition, is investigating the possibility of building a 1.500 KW power station in the vicinity of her large low-grade coal deposits at Mpaka. If South Africa purchases a large portion of this power it could mean annual earnings of R30 million for Swaziland; otherwise the scheme will have to be scaled down to Swaziland's needs.

#### *Humanitarian and emergency aid*

South African assistance to the peoples of Africa takes many forms. Some of it can be classed as humanitarian and emergency assistance. In addition to routine assistance in the fields of animal and human health, individual instances of humanitarian or emergency assistance include the following: in 1964 a South African Air Force aircraft was sent to Zaïre with urgently needed medical and first aid and food at the request of Prime Minister Tshombe; in 1965 South Africa donated 100 000 bags of grain valued at R315 000 to Lesotho to relieve starvation at the request of Prime Minister Jonathan who subsequently said that his people would never forget the help given them in "Lesotho's darkest hour"; in 1966 South Africa gave aid to Botswana to the extent of more than R200 000 when famine threatened that country; during the Biafran war South Africa donated R10 000 to the International Red Cross for victims of the war; in 1968, 82 South African farmers loaned 230 tractors for an operation in which the lands of nine border villages in Lesotho were ploughed for the maize season; in 1969 the South African Air Force airlifted emergency supplies to 30 000 starving people in the Qacha's Nek area of Lesotho; in 1972 South Africa sent eight proto teams to Rhodesia to assist in rescue work after the Wankie Colliery disaster and subsequently the Chamber of Mines donated R25 000 to the Wankie disaster relief fund.

#### *Private enterprise*

South African private enterprise has always played an important role in the territories of Southern Africa. For instance, before the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, South Africa had R333 million invested in Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi and South African investment continues to be considerable in these countries - especially in Rhodesia and Zambia. Of the estimated private investment of R70 million to R80 million in Swaziland between 1960 and 1966 one-third was from South African sources. One aspect of this investment is that Swaziland's sugar industry would in all probability not have achieved its present efficiency and scope had it not been for the capital investment, technical knowledge and experience provided by the South African industry. Another aspect is that it is doubtful whether Swaziland would today have a profitable iron-ore export trade, a railway line and all the attendant services and opportunities were it not for the initiative and funds of large South African companies.

In so far as Botswana is concerned it can be said that South African capital and initiative have been responsible for most of the industrial development in that country. As in other Southern African

countries, South African mining houses have played an important role in mining development and in future Botswana will have to continue to rely heavily on South African concerns for its mining development.

It would be impossible to give a full list of South African private investment in African countries. But one example is provided by the South African Mutual Life Assurance Society which had the following amounts invested in African countries on 30 June 1972: Botswana R135 000, Kenya R13 million, Lesotho R412 000, Malawi R2,45 million, Rhodesia R91 million and Swaziland R478 000.

A major assistance operation from the private South African sector has been that mounted by Dr. Anton Rupert, the South African industrialist, who is honorary industrial adviser to the Lesotho Government. Dr. Rupert initiated the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) and arranged for one of his senior executives, Mr. Wynand van Graan, to be seconded to the post of managing director of the Corporation. The LNDC has brought direct foreign investment to Lesotho of more than R14,5 million; has an income from its own commercial activities of more than R800 000 a year which it re-invests in Lesotho and has created an impressive list of industries including a 250 room hotel, a national airline, an assembly plant for tractors, a weaving factory, a clothing factory, a light-fitting factory, a diamond cutting and polishing factory, a jewellery workshop, two potteries and a candle factory.

Dr. Rupert was also the prime mover behind the establishment in 1972 of a development bank known as EDESA (Economic Development Equatorial and Southern Africa) which is registered in Luxembourg with an authorized capital of \$20 million. EDESA was established for the purpose of making available private capital investment in the independent and developing states and adjacent islands of Equatorial and Southern Africa in order to uplift the standard of living of the inhabitants. The operational headquarters of the bank are in Switzerland.

#### *Mission work*

An appreciable contribution has been made down the years in the mission fields of Southern Africa by South African-based churches. The Dutch Reformed Church, for example, spends about R1,75 million annually on mission work as well as educational, health and related services in Malawi, Rhodesia, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Of this amount at least R700 000 is contributed by the Church's members in South Africa. (A total of R4,5 million is contributed by members to mission work both inside and outside the Republic.)

The Church of the Province of South Africa (Anglican) is also active in the mission field. In 1971 the following contributions were made to the work of the Church in independent African states through the Department of Missions: Lesotho R8 611, Malawi R825, Nigeria R1 234, the Sudan R500, Swaziland R4 160 and Tanzania R2 000.

The Presbyterian Church of Southern Africa's Church Extension and Aid Committee made grants totalling R17 700 for missionary and educational work among Black Rhodesians in 1971.

Another Example of spiritual aid is assistance rendered by the

Students' Mission Society of the University of the Free State in helping to build churches and church halls.

In the field of education, assistance from South Africa in recent years has included annual instalments totalling R100 000 to the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland at Roma, Lesotho, from the Anglo American Corporation and De Beers Consolidated Mines. In 1967 leading South African businessmen established an educational trust fund to promote education in Lesotho.

*Tourism and nature conservation*

South African private enterprise is playing an increasingly important role in the development of tourism in Southern Africa. Several major hotel complexes have been built in neighbouring countries by South African groups. For instance, the Southern Sun group is spending about R2 million on hotels in Botswana, Mauritius and the Seychelles in addition to having hotels in Rhodesia and Mocambique as well as South Africa itself. The new accent on tourism as a revenue earner is reflected in the establishment of the Southern African Regional Tourism Council (SARTOC) whose main objective is to promote and develop tourism through regional co-operation. So far South Africa, Malawi, Mauritius, Portugal and Swaziland have signed the articles of agreement. A ministerial meeting to launch SARTOC was held in Mauritius in March 1973 and the organization's Secretariat is in Malawi.

The privately-financed South African Nature Foundation (founded in 1968 as the South African Wildlife Foundation) has financed major nature conservation projects in Southern Africa to a total of more than R400 000 during the first four years of its operation.

Other assistance from South Africa in the field of nature conservation includes the donation by the Natal Parks Board of 600 carp fingerlings to the breeding scheme of the Lesotho Department of Fisheries and later assistance from the Board in stocking Lesotho's rivers with trout.

*Agricultural assistance and the marketing of produce*

The agricultural products of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland - which represent major economic sectors in these countries - are to a very large extent marketed as an integral part of those of South Africa. Beef carcasses and slaughtered stock are exported from Swaziland and Botswana to South Africa under controlled marketing schemes which are administered by the South African Livestock and Meat Industries Control Board. The total value of beef and sheep imports from these states together with those from South West Africa was about R41,7 million and just under R2 million respectively during 1970/71.

The entire marketable tobacco crop from Swaziland is annually sold in South Africa (after being admitted duty free in terms of the Customs Union Agreement) at the same annual ruling prices fixed by the Tobacco Board for the various South African types and classes of tobacco. The mass and value of Swaziland tobacco sold on the South African market have increased from 80 326 kg and R38 500 respectively in 1969/70 to 187 805 kg and R114 000 respectively in 1971/72. The Trade Agreement between the governments of Malawi and South Africa provides for the annual importation by South Africa

of not less than 226 796 kg of leaf tobacco from Malawi but this quantity was in effect doubled during the 1971/72 season.

The South African Banana Control Board also imports bananas annually from Swaziland as well as from Mocambique. In the case of Swaziland 86 419 units of 20 kg were imported in 1971/72 and payments to producers in that country amounted to R127 900. In the case of Mocambique about 305 000 units of 20 kg were imported in 1971/72 and payments to producers amounted to R451 500 although the corresponding figures for the previous season, at about 451 400 units and R939 000 respectively, were higher.

In the 1970/71 season, the South African Wool Board sold 2 684 kg of wool (valued at R1 024) from Swaziland, 17 706 kg (valued at R6 255) from Rhodesia and 4 156 634 kg (valued at R961 250) from Lesotho. Not only does the Wool Board market the Lesotho clip - that country's principal export - but it makes an annual grant for the promotion of the Lesotho wool industry, has seconded a merino expert to the kingdom, conducts courses of one or two months' duration and is assisting in the development of a sheep stud farm at Mokhotlong. The value of the assistance to Lesotho by the South African Wool Board in 1971/72 amounted to R33 000.

In 1968 the South African Mohair Board announced that it was seconding its chief technical officer to Lesotho for two years and was making an annual contribution of R 2 500 to the Lesotho mohair industry. The Young Pioneers movement in Malawi sent two of its members to South Africa for an intensive six months' training course in sheep farming and in 1968 Malawi was given a gift of 54 dorper sheep by South Africa.

#### 4. *An Evaluation of the Present Situation and a Look at the Future*

In the first section of this paper the golden years of scientific and technical co-operation were outlined. In the second section a fairly extensive review of the scope of South Africa's present co-operation and assistance was given and from this it is clear that the geographic area of co-operation has shrunk, virtually from the Sahara to the Zambezi. In this reduced area the nature of South Africa's activities has also changed. Today they are borne by institutions such as SARCCUS, the CSIR, SABS, Onderstepoort and a few examples of private initiative such as the Rupert and Oppenheimer initiatives.

My impression is that South Africa's scientific and technical co-operation effort could be far more dynamic, even in Southern Africa. It is certainly not aggressive. Many South Africans are disappointed that there is so little co-operation and continue to extend the hand of friendship and greater co-operation. The official policy is also one which favours greater co-operation on the condition that the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs is adhered to, that aid is non-political and that it is meaningful assistance in the sense that it helps the people of Africa to help themselves. In other words, the assistance that results from co-operation must not be in the form of gifts but must be assistance which leads to development.

Where other countries freely offer assistance, the South African Government only provides aid when specifically requested to do so. One reason for this is that South Africa is not interested in "buying" goodwill and does not want to run the risk of being accused of having "neo-colonialist aspirations" in Africa. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that no



needy country with self-respect is anxious to go hat in hand in search of assistance, especially when aid is volunteered by other countries.

If one looks at the picture of co-operation in a realistic light, then it becomes clear that South African assistance is confined to a small group of countries which are more or less friendly towards her, or which find themselves in the same boat as South Africa or are so economically dependent on the Republic that they have no alternative but to accept co-operation and aid. Even a country such as Botswana has publicly declared that she wants no aid from South Africa. The hand of co-operation, even though it is extended in a spirit of sincere goodwill, is struck aside because most of the Black states want no contact with South Africa whatsoever and if an emergency arises and they have no alternative but to seek South African assistance then this is concealed as much as possible. Why?

The answer is obvious: negative political factors dominate the whole situation to such an extent that co-operation is virtually impossible.

The further question then arises whether the scientists and technologists should be at all concerned in trying to achieve co-operation or offering assistance except to those who are prepared to act in a spirit of co-operation. If the hand is so often struck aside why continue to extend it? Why not wait until the political situation has improved?

In my opinion we may not cease to extend the hand of friendship and we should try to extend it in a more acceptable fashion. There are two main reasons for this.

Firstly, we cannot in today's world live properly and develop without continuous scientific, technical and other contact and without co-operation. Development comes through knowledge which we absorb from outside our frontiers, which we recruit or which we generate locally.

It is so, that South Africa has a larger pool of scientific knowledge and technical know-how than any other African state south of the Sahara and we are accordingly in a position to share that knowledge to our benefit and to that of others on the continent. It is a supreme tragedy that the political situation bedevils the flow of knowledge and contact and sometimes even makes it impossible.

Political problems, however, are no excuse for scientists not to promote co-operation actively and consciously and seek contact.

It is precisely in the scientific and technological sphere that politics can largely be shunted into the background or ignored completely. Thus it is necessary to seek contact more consciously and promote co-operation in this sphere.

How?

By developing a system where Black and White scientists can meet one another on a personal and unofficial level in scientific organisations. Why can the various medical organizations which deliberate regularly with one another in so many ways not extend an invitation to the Black doctor to meet them round the conference table? The same applies to the engineer, the physicist, the economist and many other professions concerned solely with

technical and scientific endeavour. A positive approach and a determination to co-operate can lead to the opening of many avenues of contact and co-operation even if this is achieved in the beginning without fanfares and trumpets. There is always the danger, of course, that there will be malicious demonstrations or attempts to involve scientific organizations in politics but the scientist and academician can overcome this problem by constantly insisting on keeping politics out of his deliberations. He must be on guard not to allow his own political prejudices to permeate his scientific activities.

Far more would be achieved in the field of co-operation than is presently the case if the scientific world were to make a more dynamic attempt to achieve co-operation.

I find in recent sporting developments an example of what could be achieved with equal ease - perhaps even more easily - in the scientific sphere. If politics can be kept out of sport with the determination with which it was kept out of the International Games in April 1973, then the same should be applicable to the scientific sphere. And, indeed, this is already taking place on a limited scale. An example is the recent conference of South African university lecturers in Bantu Development Administration and Applied Anthropology in which a few Bantu lecturers took part. At about the same time, the South African Institute of International Affairs and the Rand Afrikaans University held another multi-racial meeting on accelerated development.

It is possible to create and maintain a friendly scientific atmosphere even within a wider unfriendly political atmosphere. It is also possible to attract scientists, even from unfriendly African states, to our scientific and technological meetings and in this way promote contact and co-operation. There is opportunity for a large outward movement in the scientific sphere and it is the duty of South African scientists and their organizations to grasp this opportunity in a positive manner.

If the primary reason for greater scientific and technological contact is the interests of science itself, then there is a secondary reason that is equally as important in a wider sphere, and that is human relations. Although it is not always possible to separate science and politics completely from one another, it is possible to achieve separation to such a degree that scientific activities can be conducted in a scientific atmosphere without a hostile political atmosphere intervening. In this way the scientist can have a salutary influence on the political situation. Regrettably, it is not easy today to build the big bridges of political co-operation between South Africa and the majority of African states and perhaps it will still be many years before we attain a situation where there is cordial political co-operation. However, it is certainly possible to build small foot bridges of scientific co-operation even if this is on a personal and unofficial level. This is the road which scientific co-operation must select until such time as a state of harmony is attained, as in the days of the CSA/CCTA.

All that the scientist can ask the politician in all fairness is: "Don't make things unnecessarily difficult or impossible for us. Make it possible for us to receive and accommodate our Black colleagues in our midst in an honourable manner".

What justice and fairness or even ordinary common sense is there

in a situation where, on the one hand, we extend the hand of friendship to scientists but, on the other hand, are unwilling to ensure that they are treated as ordinary, honourable and dignified people in our country?

I would like, in this regard, to refer specifically to my own people - the Afrikaners, Afrikaans universities and Afrikaans scientific organizations including the Academy for Arts and Science. Extend a scientific hand of friendship to your Black colleague in Africa and receive him with the same sense of dignity that he can enjoy in any country in the world. Do not think that his presence on the campus of Pretoria University to take part there in a scientific symposium or conference or even a meeting such as this today in this hall is a threat or a dangerous type of integration. Respect and the acceptance of a Black scientist as a professional equal is no threat but a small contribution to better human relations and greater security and hope for the future.

In conclusion, a final viewpoint: scientific dialogue means that on each side of the conference table there will be a scientist. If the subject is of a medical nature, dialogue assumes that there will be a discussion between doctors. The same goes for engineers, geologists, etc. Now it is so, that in Africa there are very few scientists with whom one can have perceptive dialogue. This must not be seen as a reason for turning one's back on dialogue but rather as the very reason why dialogue is necessary - in order to promote science. If it is our policy to help the Black man help himself then it is very necessary that we should help those who are walking the difficult road of scientific progress. For many reasons it is an exceptionally difficult road for the Black man to walk because his own facilities are still so limited, despite the special facilities which we have created for him in this country. He needs more than just the Homeland universities, particularly as he climbs higher and higher up the ladder of science. It is necessary that we look even to the Afrikaans universities with the purpose of creating more opportunities for the Black intellectual, especially in the field of specialization.

My whole plea today, therefore, is really one that the scientists of South Africa should, on an unofficial basis and through their own organizations, extend the hand of co-operation and assistance to the Black man and not wait for the Government to try and do so on an official level. This implies more aggressive, scientific dialogue in the interests of scientific development but also in the interests of better human relations. To my mind it is significant that the director-general of SARCCUS singles out contact as the most important contribution made by this organization. It is an illustration of the need for sound White-Black contact and where can this be achieved more profitably than in the scientific world.

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*SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN A SOUTHERN AFRICAN CONTEXT*

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In the light of current trends it has become unrealistic to speak of a Southern Africa policy without taking into account other extraneous factors. Today Southern Africa is embroiled willy-nilly in controversies by various world powers, smaller countries and groups, for diverse reasons and at every possible opportunity. In brief, this part of Africa has become a handy pawn on the chessboard, to be used by the players for the advancement of their own interests. The real interests of Southern Africa in general, and those of each of the various countries and nations comprising this area, are seldom considered. There is also no disposition to allow them to decide calmly and objectively in what way their own interests may be best served. A clear example of this is the opposition to the South African Government's policy of enabling the inhabitants of South West Africa to decide themselves on their own future.

Those who meddle in Southern Africa's affairs do not actually resort to military force - at present the blackmailing, or attempted blackmailing, is still limited to the economic and political levels. The objective of exploiting Southern Africa is conveniently masked by the false front of a campaign against what is called colonialism and racism. The campaign is not waged against "whites", but against phantoms which are created and then have to be shot down. These concepts are also not defined, since that may cause embarrassment to those waging the campaign. It would be quite interesting to subject the manifestation of racism and neo-colonialism in our present world to a scientific analysis. The time has come to expose the real racists and neo-colonialists.

The vendetta against South Africa is not concerned with the realities of the situation. It is based on the use of slogans that are useful in the fight for selfish aims. I could give many instances to illustrate this point, but that is not the purpose of this discussion. I may just mention one example which indicates most clearly what we are faced with. I have spoken on previous occasions of the so-called low wages paid by foreign firms to their non-white employees in South Africa. Whenever discussing this subject, it is, of course, necessary to emphasize that the Government itself took the lead in attempting to narrow the gap between white and non-white wages. We did not wait for foreign firms or organisations to enlighten us in this respect. The initiative was taken by South Africa. But the point I wish to emphasize is that those who give the most publicity to the alleged pressure to which overseas firms are subjected, know just as well as we do, or perhaps even better, that in probably half the countries of the world the employees of such firms are worse off than in South Africa. Not the slightest mention is made of this fact. Their concern thus is not for a social problem; they are merely exploiting an issue for political gain.

I have on two earlier occasions publicly expressed the hope that the newspapers which took the initiative on the wage position in South Africa would divulge the true facts concerning conditions in other countries.

The reaction was disappointing. It is encouraging, however, to note that the British Sunday newspaper, "The Sunday Telegraph", recently published an interesting article, from which it appears that the situation of the black worker in South Africa is far better than that of black workers in the rest of the continent. I am convinced that this is also the case in comparison with several other parts of the world. Perhaps now, other overseas newspapers will bring this matter to the attention of the world at large.

How is the political campaign conducted against us? In the forefront I should place the so-called Apartheid Committee of the UN, which has over the years become an entity seeking to perpetuate its own existence and its empire-building. This committee serves as co-ordinator of the campaign and is enthusiastically supported by the UN's information media. Furthermore, it sees to it that its agents are present at virtually every international meeting, where they attempt to prevent South Africa's participation, or to have our credentials rejected, or to get resolutions adopted condemning our policy. These tactics are applied with monotonous regularity, even at international gatherings of a purely scientific nature.

Secondly, there is another body, the Special Committee on Colonialism, which travels about year after year, at the expense of the UN, to propagate the disintegration of the established order, especially in Southern Africa. Representatives from 24 countries, including Russia and Communist China, serve on this Committee. Just imagine - the greatest imperialist of modern times is one of the foremost members of this body! Russian imperialism has taken large parts of Europe securely into its iron grip. This imperialism differs from the old, long-gone colonialism in only two respects: Russia's colonies are not separated from her by the sea, and her methods are characterised by a ruthlessness which would have made 19th century imperialists shudder.

Thirdly, I wish to mention the "Council for South West Africa". This council was formed almost seven years ago by the UN to arrange, among other things, the take-over of the administration of South West Africa from South Africa. Of course, we have never recognised this Council in any way. This body again showed its true colours during the recent contacts with the Secretary-General of the UN. Whereas the Security Council decided that contacts with us should be maintained and that it would then determine the stand it should take in the light of the Secretary-General's report, the Council for South West Africa urged the Secretary-General, even before my talks with him in Geneva, not to proceed with his task. In a letter to the Secretary-General the Council said, *inter alia*: "To maintain contacts with the South African regime" - note the word "regime" - "would mean an acceptance of its policy on the part of the United Nations; therefore the Council opposes continuation of the dialogue." Does this look like an effort to find a solution, or are political aims being futhered to the detriment of the interests of those directly concerned?

These bodies in turn inspire others which are just as assiduous in seeking the destruction of the established order in Southern Africa. Eventually this venom reaches the OAU. I wish, immediately, to give you the assurance that I by no means suggest that all members of the OAU support this politically motivated campaign. Those who do so, however, succeed by virtue of their numerical strength in regularly relaying condemnatory

decisions and proposals for drastic action to the UN, where these are used to blackmail others into following the flood, however unwillingly.

What should we do in these circumstances, we here in Southern Africa, who against our will or wish are involved in this situation? In the first place we should distinguish objectively and analytically between the various groups seeking to influence developments in Southern Africa:

- (i) Foremost, on the negative side, are the Communist states, and especially the two giants among them. Here we are confronted with governments which seek the expansion of power, but which cover up their objective with the false label of "liberation". Their blandishments sound like the purest innocence. They would never dream of establishing their Communism in Africa. They merely wish to act as the humanists of the century, as "liberators".

One of our greatest problems is that Africa as a whole does not see the wolf's real character at this stage - that she cannot realise that the Communists' efforts are aimed at the domination of Africa, and that for the realisation of this objective it is essential that Southern Africa should first be subjected. With great cunning, even governments that speak out against Communism are assisted, but they are gradually infiltrated until one day the real followers and supporters of Moscow and Peking can take power into their own hands. In their campaign against the established governments of Southern Africa they go about in sheep's clothing with a view to deceiving other future victims that already appear on their lists.

I cannot in this discussion deal with the clashes between the great Communist giants. That subject alone, seen within our African context, could make an interesting study. However, it must be said here that both powers have the same evil significance for Africa.

- (ii) The second position on the negative side is occupied by the militant, even racist, proponents of African nationalism, those who believe that Africa will never really be free until Southern Africa is also ruled according to their recipe.
- (iii) Thirdly, there are those countries which do not actively participate in the campaign on their own initiative, but who do not wish to dissent openly from OAU decisions. In this category there are, of course, many countries that are not African states.
- (iv) In the fourth place we have those - a minority - who, in the general interest, would like to see a more realistic approach.

There is virtually nothing South Africa can do to persuade the Communist countries, on humanitarian grounds, to abandon their policy which will be catastrophic for all of us in Africa. Humanitarian considerations carry no weight with them. Nevertheless even those countries must realise that South Africa's aim for and contribution towards a stable Southern Africa is to the benefit of all concerned. It is, for example, in the interests of the whole world that the sea-route round the Cape should be safe and open to all, that the ships of all countries should be able to sail unhindered along the coast of an ordered and peaceful Southern Africa. It is to the benefit of all that in case of difficulty, whether as a result of ships' mechanical problems or because of storms, or as part of the ordinary routine, there should be properly equipped harbours where repairs can be made or safety can be found, or where the normal ships' requirements can be obtained.

Economic development in Africa creates potential markets for the whole world, and there is no better way of bringing this about than by expanding and stimulating such markets from the south, with its highly developed industries and powerful economy. The important contributions rendered by South Africa in this regard definitely deserves more acknowledgement.

From our side we do not hold it against a country such as Russia that it accepts Communism as its ideology and form of government. We reject Communism, but if Russia's people desire it, that is their affair. We all ask is that it should not be foisted on others or on us. The big Communist countries have the opportunity in Africa and Southern Africa to show to humanity that they have come to realise that peaceful co-existence on a global basis is also in their interest. If they should continue their undermining activities - something for which they were so well-known in the past in Europe and elsewhere - the chances for a period of real *détente* would remain very slim.

It is inherent in our policy not to provoke anyone or to live in a state of enmity with others. We are prepared to trade with everybody. We are prepared to maintain peaceful relations with all countries. However, we should be failing in our duty towards our own people and Southern Africa as a whole, if we were to allow ourselves to be lulled to sleep, thus drifting towards complete unpreparedness. Stretching out a hand of friendship does not mean that one is prepared to lay one's head on the block, in the very presence of the executioner.

To those African countries which condemn South Africa unreservedly, as well as those who accept our co-operation in some or other form, I should like to give the assurance that we are just as conscious of nationhood as they are themselves. With our historical background, we know as well as anyone else that one cannot and dare not suppress national self-consciousness. Nor do we wish to do so. We are willing to grant to others exactly what we claim for ourselves. We know from our own experience that, in the light of everything that has been said against us, there are many who simply refuse to believe us. But we do not expect them to accept us blindly on trust alone. All we ask is that they judge us according to our deeds. We live in a dynamic, not a static, community. We believe in evolution, not revolution, and there is continual progress on the road towards the realisation of national self-consciousness by all our population groups. Our purpose is to persuade African countries, in the light of our achievements within our own boundaries, of the sincerity of our approach, and to make them



realise that it is also in the interest of other countries of Southern Africa that stability and progress be maintained. We trust that as African countries become convinced from their own experience that confrontations and direct clashes are of no benefit to anyone, greater acceptance of peaceful co-existence will develop on all sides.

Finally, I should like to address myself to those who would like to see a more realistic approach in the general interests of all concerned. Ten to fifteen years ago Africa entered a new era in its political development. Today it is more specifically Southern Africa that is standing on the threshold of a new dispensation. Great changes must be expected during the next decade. It is highly probable that the total number of independent states in Southern Africa will in future comprise a quarter or a somewhat larger portion of the grand total in Africa. I say this in the light of the constitutional development of our Bantu Homelands. There is no reason to fear that these states will be economically less viable than most of the other states in Africa. Already 56 per cent of the other states of Africa fall into a *per capita* income group that is lower than those of the nine territories within the Republic which will eventually become independent states; 36 per cent of the African states fall into the same group as these nine territories, and only 7 per cent are in a higher *per capita* income bracket.

Southern Africa possesses a relatively more advanced infrastructure. Harbour facilities, road and rail systems to the harbours, as well as modern and extensive media of communication, are available. One does not have to be an optimist to believe that Southern Africa can develop more rapidly than other parts of Africa. Excellent potential also exists for the development of power and water resources on a regional basis.

Of course, this all presupposes a gradual, orderly, and peaceful development which will be concomitant with the economic growth of these countries. However, this will only be possible if those concerned act responsibly within the area. One of the first aims of our policy which is calculated to create a new, modern Southern Africa, is to inculcate such a spirit of responsibility within our area. In this connection a heavy responsibility rests upon the leaders of the present Homelands. By acting in a level-headed and far-seeing manner - not only in what they do, but also in what they say - they will help to engender trust and to hasten development in their own countries.

This Southern Africa will consist of sovereign independent states that will nevertheless, it is hoped, collaborate in their own interest in the economic sphere. In the present economic and financial state of affairs it is no longer possible for any one country to continue in isolation. We need only look at the ECC to see the trend indicated for the future. Of course, we do not yet know on what basis the Southern Africa of the future will organise mutual economic collaboration among her member states. As more states join in, it may become increasingly difficult to maintain the customs union. I am convinced, however, that future developments will present a practical solution.

As I see it, our broad foreign policy objectives will in future also be aimed at the expansion of co-operation, especially in the economic

and commercial spheres, in all parts of the world. As in the past, we shall be prepared to bear our part of the responsibility for maintaining peace, tranquillity and order. We shall stretch out a hand of friendship to all countries of the world, and in Africa, in particular, we shall continue our endeavours to achieve co-existence in friendship and on a basis of mutual respect. I feel, however, that Southern Africa even more so than heretofore, will have to be our first priority in the years to come, since in the first instance it is in Southern Africa that we must help build a secure future for ourselves and our descendants - a future for all the countries and people of this area.