Swaziland Moves: Perceptions and Patterns of Modern Migration

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Acknowledgements

INTRODUCTION: MIGRATION AND POLICY IN MODERN SWAZILAND

The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) is committed to supporting basic research on the dimensions, causes and consequences of cross-border and internal migration within the SADC region and to making the results accessible to a range of interest groups. We believe that a well-informed policy-maker or official is more likely to appreciate the workability of policy choices in the area of migration and immigration management. Policies based on poor or misleading information will not only fail but could have negative unintended consequences. From a human rights perspective, we are concerned that without accurate information about migration, decisions may be made which will violate constitutional guarantees and arouse public hostility towards non-citizens.

SAMP is also committed to conducting policy research at a regional scale. Research in one country, such as Swaziland, can be systematically compared with the results from other SADC countries to highlight similarities and differences, and to ascertain the degree to which governments face similar challenges of migration management. The information can also be useful to civil society and NGOs as they attempt to deal with the challenges of migrant integration and xenophobia. Economic data on migration impacts can be invaluable to a wide range of actors, including government and the private sector. Ultimately, the successful management of migration in Southern Africa depends on inter-governmental cooperation in data collection and policy harmonization. SAMP believes that the next step is to gather reliable and accurate data on the volumes, trends, causes, impacts and remedies of migration at a regional scale. Only then can there be informed debate and forward movement on regional harmonization.

Swaziland has an unusually rich migration history. Swazi men and women have been migrating across colonial and international borders for decades for a multiplicity of reasons. Within the country, post-independence economic development was accompanied by rapid urbanization. As in many countries of the region, the monitoring of these processes through the ongoing collection of migration and immigration statistics is a challenging task. In this respect, the research community can play a vital role in supplementing official and census data collection with sound and representative inter-censual surveys of citizens and non-citizens, migrants and non-migrants.

In an effort to provide the government and people of Swaziland with basic, up-to-date information on migration trends, volumes, impacts, and attitudes, SAMP entered into a research partnership with the University of Swaziland. This publication represents the first phase of

this ongoing collaboration, bringing together the research findings from two national surveys of migration attitudes and behaviours undertaken in Swaziland in 2001 and 2002.

In general, SAMP and its partners trust that the results of the surveys reported here will help government and civil society in Swaziland to construct the knowledge base about migration that is urgently needed. These findings clearly reveal the distinctiveness of the Swaziland experience with in- and out-migration. However, Swaziland also shares many policy concerns and dilemmas about migration with its neighbouring states. International experience shows that effective migration management is not something that a state can unilaterally implement. A renewed cooperative, regional, and harmonized approach (based on sound and reliable migration data and analysis) within SADC is therefore essential. This publication is designed to provide the people and government of Swaziland with the information to advance towards that goal.

Chapter One

Migration from Swaziland to South Africa: An Overview

HISTORIES OF SWAZI MIGRATION

L abour migration from Swaziland to South Africa is nothing new. It began in earnest in the late nineteenth century when young Swazi men started working in Johannesburg and the Natal coal mines to pay taxes and to pay lobola.[1] By the 1920s, the Witwatersrand gold mines were the main employer of Swazi migrants. The Native Recruiting Corporation (NRC) set up shop in 1912 and by 1920 had a monopoly on recruiting for the mines. Over the following decades, Swaziland continued to supply between 2% and 5% of the mine workforce. The numbers were not large in absolute terms but for a country as small as Swaziland, the social and economic impact was considerable.[2]

The absolute numbers of Swazi mine migrants peaked during the 1980s at close to 20,000, as Swaziland became a favoured source of labour at many mines (Table 1.1). By 1990, one in ten miners were from Swaziland. During the 1990s, however, there were mass retrenchments on the mines and the Swazi complement fell by almost 50%. Swaziland continues to be a minor supplier of mine labour, and Swazi workers are sill liked by certain mining companies. Most supplier countries and areas were hit by downsizing and retrenchments. Swaziland's

Table 1.1: Swazi Migration to South African Mines, 1920-2000			
Year	No. of Swazi	Total Foreign	% Swazi
1920	3,449	99,950	3.5
1925	3,999	94,234	4.2
1930	4,345	99,355	4.4
1935	6,865	112,498	6.1
1940	7,152	168,058	4.3
1945	5,688	158,967	3.6
1950	6,619	172,816	3.8
1955	6,682	192,934	3.5
1960	6,623	233,808	2.8
1965	5,580	232,610	2.4
1970	6,269	265,143	2.4
1975	8,391	220,293	3.8
1980	8,090	182,499	4.4
1985	12,365	196,068	6.3
1990	17,757	192,044	9.2
1995	15,304	169,340	9.0
2000	9,360	131,112	7.1

"market share" fell from 10% of foreign miners in 1990 to 7% in 2000. At the present time, around 9,000 Swazi work on the South African mines. Historically, and down to the present, the majority of migrant miners come from the south of the country.

Wage employment within Swaziland was scarce until the 1930s when British and South African companies began to exploit the country's rich natural resources.[3] The Havelock asbestos mine in the north and the sugar plantations in the lowveld began to employ several thousand people each year.[4] Other economic activities also provided local employment including iron and coal mining, tourism and services. A small manufacturing sector was established in the 1960s and continued to grow around Matsapha. The growth of urban centres provided additional employment opportunities.

Despite increased internal economic opportunity, migrants continued to go to South Africa for work (Table 1.2). Indeed, Swaziland's pattern of internal economic development tended to ignore the south, reinforcing the historical connections of that area with the South African labour market. The south of Swaziland continued to be dependent on migration to South Africa for income and household security.[5]

Migration to South Africa was traditionally male. In part this was because of the demand of the South African mines and farms for young men. On the other hand, there were strong patriarchal forces in Swaziland which resisted women leaving the home. Royalty, chiefs, household heads and colonial officials all opposed the migration of young women to South Africa.[6] Despite this powerful "stick factor," Swazi women did migrate to the urban centres of South Africa from the 1930s onwards. The numbers were not large but they did signify the erosion of patriarchal power in Swaziland. After 1963, and the restriction of in-migration of women migrants by the apartheid government, the numbers fell again.

Table 1.2: African-born People Resident in South Africa			
	Swaziland	Total African	%
1911	21,662	229,207	9.5
1921	29,177	279,819	10.4
1936	31,092	333,777	9.3
1946	33,738	556,807	6.1
1951	42,914	605,992	7.1
1970	29,167	516,044	5.7
1980	31,981	376,483	8.5
1985	30,722	317,010	9.7
Source: South African Census			

By the 1990s, Swazi were employed in a variety of occupations inside and outside the country. Domestically, the major employers were commercial agriculture, manufacturing and services. Externally, the main employer of migrants was still the South African gold mines. Swazi also worked in the agribusiness and tourism industries of Mpumalanga, the South African manufacturing sector and in domestic service in many towns in Mpumalanga and Gauteng.

The long history of Swazi migrant contact with South Africa is clearly revealed in the survey whose results are reported in Chapter Two of this publication. The parents of nearly 40% of adult Swazi interviewed in the survey had worked in South Africa. Around a quarter even have grandparents who have worked in South Africa. The Swazi profile of personal interaction is similar to that of Lesotho. Historically, the Swazi profile is most like that of Botswana (Table 1.3).

The respondents were also asked whether they had ever visited South Africa themselves. Nearly 80% responded in the affirmative, comparable to Lesotho (Table 1.4). The average number of lifetime visits was 27 with a range between 1 and 400. In the last five years, the average number of visits was 17 while the maximum was 250. These figures simply confirm again the intensity of historical and contemporary interaction between the two countries.

The first Swaziland Census was conducted in 1898 and recorded a total of 43,512 people in the country. Later censuses also recorded information on the gender breakdown of the population as well as distinguishing between residents, absentees (employed outside the country), foreign African residents, Europeans and coloureds. The summary census data for the colonial period is presented in Table 1.5.

Table 1.3: Family History of Migration to South Africa by Country (%)						
	Swaziland	Botswana	Lesotho	Mozambique	Zimbabwe	Total
Visited SA	79	40	81	29	23	42
Parents Worked in SA	39	41	81	53	24	50
Grandparents Worked in SA	26	26	51	32	23	34
Source: SAMP POS Data Base						

Table 1.4: Personal Visits to South Africa by Country (%)					
	Swaziland	Botswana	Lesotho	Mozambique	Zimbabwe
Visited SA	79	40	81	29	23
Never Visited	21	60	19	71	76
Source: SAMP POS Data Base					

Three migration-related trends are evident: (a) a growth over time in the number of people recorded as working outside the country (absentees); (b) early in-migration of white immigrants, a population that had grown to around 10,000 by the time of independence in 1968; and (c) a small foreign African presence in the country from the 1930s onwards. Only two censuses actually recorded the number of foreigners in the country. In 1956, a total of 1,653 foreign workers were working in Swaziland primarily in the asbestos mines (1,049), citrus plantations (313) and forests (64). The migrants were mainly from Mozambique with small numbers from as far afield as Malawi. After independence, it became more difficult to obtain work in Swaziland, and the numbers declined.

After 1984, the numbers of Mozambicans in Swaziland mushroomed once again. This time, however, the majority came in search of refuge, not work.[7] The civil war in Mozambique devastated large swathes of the countryside and precipitated a desperate search for safe havens elsewhere in the region. Swaziland was one of those host states. Whole families moved to the country. Some stayed in camps; others, especially those in the border areas, gave allegiance to local chiefs and received land to cultivate. Many of the refugee families sent migrants onwards. In one survey of refugee households in the late 1980s, as many as 30% had a family member working in South Africa.[8] The visible presence of Mozambicans in the country led to a hardening of public attitudes. Although many Mozambicans subsequently left and went home, the legacy of this period persists in Swazi attitudes towards foreigners.

Table 1.5: Population of Colonial Swaziland						
	Resident	Absentee	Foreign	European	Coloured	Total
1898						43,512
1904	84,529			890	72	85,491
1911	98,733	(est) 8,500		1,083	143	108,459
1921	104,305	5,990		2,205	451	112,951
1936	143,709	9,561		2,740	705	156,715
1946	172,592	8,677	2,782	3,201	745	187,997
1956	218,016	11,728	3,470	5,919	1,378	240,511
1966	362,468	19,219	n/a	9,176	4,401	395,264
Source: Report on 1966 Swaziland Population Census						

CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION STREAMS

The lengthy and extensive historical contact between Swaziland and South Africa raises interesting questions in light of recent post-1990 changes in the regional migration regime. After 1990, cross-border movement to South Africa from neighbouring countries escalated dramatically. This was also true of Swaziland.

More generally there is a clear need to re-conceptualize the nature of Swazi movement to South Africa. The types and motives for movement are far more complex, varied and dynamic than is allowed by traditional stereotypes. And many of these forms of movement are either neutral in their impact on South Africa or are positively advantageous to that country.

Since 1990, there have been a number of major shifts in migration between Swaziland and South Africa. First, the sheer number of people moving between the two countries jumped dramatically (Table 1.6). The political liberation of South Africa made South Africa a far more attractive place to visit, to shop and to trade with.

Table 1.6: Swazi Cross-Border Travel to South Africa	
Year	No.
1991	182,792
1992	429,195
1993	464,906
1994	546,651
1995	664,863
1996	620,137
1997	712,491
1998	766,188
1999	785,062
2000	742,621
2001	751,538
2002	788,842
2003	809,049
Source: Statistics South Africa	

Second, it appears that legal and clandestine movements between the two countries for employment or economic gain have increased. The immediate impact of South Africa's political transformation was a

slow-down in the Swazi economy as sanctions-busting companies relocated back to South Africa. Unemployment soared and migration to South Africa became about the only alternative for many. By definition it is difficult to ascertain the numbers involved. However, either they were not large or Swazi undocumented migrants were able to disguise themselves extremely well in South Africa. Between 1990 and 1997, for example, a mere 10,587 people were deported to Swaziland from South Africa (only 1.2% of the total number of deportees).

Table 1.7: Deportation of Swazis from South Africa			
Year	Swaziland	Total	%
1994	981	90,692	1.1
1995	837	157,084	0.5
1996	1,589	180,713	0.9
1997	1,055	176,351	0.6
1998	2,186	181,286	1.2
1999	5,610	183,861	3.1
2000	3,571	170,317	2.1
2001	3,258	156,123	2.1
Total	19,087	1,296,427	0.0
Source: SA Department of Home Affairs			

Third, a post-1990 "brain drain" from Swaziland to South Africa has been reported in Swaziland, particularly in the health and educational sectors. However, more research is needed on the dimensions and impact of the movement of skilled personnel from one country to the other.

Finally, there has been a major increase in cross-border trading between Swaziland and South Africa. This activity is growing rapidly, particularly amongst women. The majority take handicraft goods from Swaziland to sell in different areas of South Africa. The normal practice is to hire buses which leave Swaziland on Fridays in the afternoon. Once they have sold their items in South Africa the women buy goods with the proceeds for sale in Swaziland. These are usually clothing materials which are bought cheaply from South African wholesalers and sold at higher prices in Swaziland.

Cross-border trading between Swaziland and South Africa has received very little research and policy attention to date. As a result, the experiences of Swazi cross-border traders, and the contribution of their activities to the Swazi economy at both the macro and micro levels have yet to be analyzed. Policy makers need to consider appropriate

policies of a supportive nature because cross-border trading plays a very important role in the economy of Swaziland.

MODERN MIGRATION DYNAMICS

REASONS FOR MIGRATION

For those involved in the study of migration processes, those who work in immigration departments and those who are engaged in the formulation of immigration policies, it is important to analyse the reasons behind Swazi migration to South Africa. The 2001 SAMP survey reported in Chapter Two provides important new insights into the complexity of contemporary cross-border movements between Swaziland and South Africa. As noted above, nearly 80% of respondents in a nationally-representative sample had visited South Africa in the past. When asked the reason for their most recent visit, it became clear that work was not the main reason for going (Table 1.8). This finding challenges the assumption-common in South Africa-that every person from neighbouring countries is after employment.[9] The survey results do not mean that Swazis do not consider South Africa as a land of job opportunity; it only indicates that the majority have other reasons for going.

The survey revealed that the main purpose was to visit family and friends (44%). Next in importance were tourism (14.2%) and business (8.5%). Around 13% had gone to shop or to trade. Only 8.5% went to work or look for work. This is lower than for any other SADC country for which this question was asked by SAMP. The equivalent figure in other countries was as follows: Mozambique (67%), Zimbabwe (29%), Lesotho (25%), Namibia (13%) and Botswana (10%).[10] Of course, since the question only asked about the most recent visit, it is probable that a number of people who had previously migrated for work were not included.

However, the results do challenge some longstanding assumptions about Swazi migration to South Africa. In particular, they show that cross-border movement to South Africa should no longer be seen exclusively or even predominantly as a work-related phenomenon (labour migration). The high proportion of visitors to family and friends in South Africa simply confirms the strong cultural and social ties of the two countries, a fact that South Africans might well take more seriously in future.

Table 1.8: Reasons for Most Recent Visit to South Africa		
	No.	%
Visit family and friends	202	44.0
Holiday/tourism	65	14.2
Business	39	8.5
To work	31	6.8
Shopping	30	6.5
Buy and sell goods	27	5.9
Medical treatment	23	5.5
University/technikon	10	2.2
School	8	1.7
Look for work	8	1.7
Other	16	3.5
Total	459	100.0

Tourism, business, trade and shopping are clearly important motivations for Swazi entering South Africa (accounting in total for a third of all visits to South Africa). All of these movements are economically advantageous for South Africa. This again should help destroy the image of Swazi interaction with South Africa as being completely disadvantageous to the latter. Tourism boosts the South African tourism industry and business and shopping facilitate commercial exchanges between the two countries.

Around 5% of respondents indicated that they had gone to South Africa for medical treatment. The Swaziland healthcare system is now over-burdened by HIV/AIDS patients, under-staffed and under-resourced. People are forced to travel long distances to the nearest clinic. In border areas, people tend to go to clinics in South Africa. Higher income groups in the cities also go to South Africa for private medical treatment; the expense is considerable but patients are guaranteed a standard of medical attention unavailable in Swaziland. The Swaziland government has also established an official Referral System to South African hospitals or clinics for certain diseases and medical conditions.

MIGRANT PROFILE

In general, migration behaviour does not correlate strongly with income, although higher income groups have a slightly higher probability of migrating. More marked is a bi-polar correlation with level of education. Two distinctive groups can be identified: (a) those with little formal education and (b) those with more than 12 years education. The first group would include many mineworkers. The latter group suggests

that many migrants from Swaziland to South Africa are in the skilled category. This group also visited South Africa more frequently.

One of the more interesting findings of the survey was that the majority of current labour migrants from Swaziland to South Africa are from the urban areas. Traditionally, migration currents to South Africa have been dominated by men from rural Swaziland. The new pattern of a greater intensity of cross-border migration from the urban centres of Swaziland is connected to rural-urban migration inside Swaziland, and can also be seen as an indication of increasing urban poverty in the country. In terms of out-migration from the rural areas, the relative decline in importance may also indicate the reality of shrinking employment opportunities in the South African mining industry.

Two general sets of factors are often advanced as motivating factors for out-migration in Africa: political instability and economic decline. The survey therefore sought to collect data on people's perceptions of the political and economic situation in Swaziland. Although the majority of cross-border movement is not work-related, there are grounds for thinking that this could change in the future. The country has a very high rate of unemployment, and its economic performance at the moment is not encouraging. The failure of official strategies of poverty reduction is prompting more citizens to look to South Africa for jobs. Swazi have little confidence in the future economic prospects of their country. When asked to provide factors that would make them migrate to South Africa in the future, the most popular response was jobs (32.1%).

Gender Differences

Gender has always featured prominently in most migration currents, and the same is true of Swazi movements to South Africa. Traditionally men have dominated in terms of numbers, but at the same time there has been little documentation of female migrants. The situation was made worse by the fact that colonial officials and the Swazi indigenous leadership were negative toward female migration.

In recent years female migrants have increased in number and indications are that they might soon be more than male migrants. This change is brought about by shrinking job opportunities in South Africa, while there has been an increase in trading activities between Swaziland and South Africa and most of it is dominated by women. Previously female migrants were domestic workers or sex workers; now, the majority of them are cross-border traders. It appears that their numbers will continue to increase as local employment opportunities continue to dwindle.

It has always been difficult for Swazi women to engage in migration

especially for work purposes. Swazi men have always preferred to maintain women in the home, especially in the rural areas. Married women were the most affected as their investments were subjected to the double control of their fathers and husbands. Consequently, it has always been easier for single women to migrate compared to married women. But the general trend has been constant frustration of female migration.

The issue of migrant decision making is very important in any social setting. In a patriarchal society such as Swaziland, the issue is even more pertinent. There is sufficient evidence to show that women have not had the privilege of making their own decisions on issues of migration.[11] Swazi men have always emphasized that children and women should seek the permission of their fathers, husbands, and male guardians before engaging in any form of migration. During the colonial period Swazi men even adopted specific strategies to frustrate female migration. Despite male opposition, Swazi women have always engaged in migration for various reasons.

When the respondents were asked about the role of the family in encouraging or discouraging family members to migrate, 54.4% said that their families would discourage/strongly discourage migration. Only 11.3% said that migration would be strongly encouraged (Table 1.8). The finding is surprising given that Swazi society is under stress when it comes to issues of family reproduction. With escalating poverty, especially in Swazi rural areas, one would expect the migration of family members to be one of the main survival strategies supported by most people. It is possible that traditional notions of migration still have a strong influence on people's perceptions. In the past, migration has been associated with family disintegration, and is thus viewed negatively.

Table 1.9: Family Attitudes Towards Migration		
	No.	%
Strongly encourage	66	11.3
Encourage	146	25.0
Neither encourage nor discourage	54	9.3
Discourage	163	28.0
Strongly discourage	154	26.4
Total	583	100.0

Despite a general lack of enthusiasm for migration as a survival strategy, the survey revealed that most decisions to migrate to South Africa are taken by the individual. The majority (72%) stated that if they wanted to migrate they would personally make the decision to migrate

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to South Africa. Around 63% of those who would make their own decision were located in the urban areas, suggesting that rural dwellers have their mobility more controlled by family members compared to their urban counterparts.

The survey revealed that 57.7% of those saying they would make the personal decision to migrate were male and only 42.3% were female. The gender difference here is an indication that men still enjoy more personal decision-making freedom than women. While there has been some change from the past, the survey reveals that female mobility is still trapped in the vestiges of the old patriarchal order.

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CHAPTER TWO

GOING TO SOUTH AFRICA: SWAZI ATTITUDES TO CROSS-BORDER MIGRATION

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary Swazi attitudes to cross-border migration have undoubtedly been shaped by the long history of interaction between Swaziland and South Africa. Swazi migrants are not an unfamiliar sight in South Africa. However, very little is known about contemporary Swazi attitudes and migration behaviours. This chapter is primarily based on the first ever national survey of Swazi public opinion on migration issues. The survey instrument used was developed by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) and had been previously implemented in six other SADC countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe).

The survey provides unique and unprecedented insights into the Swaziland migration phenomenon, as experienced by citizens and migrants themselves. The sample size was 600 and was representative of the social, economic and gender composition of the Swazi population. This ensures the possibility of cross-national comparison with other SADC countries although some care must be exercised given the time lapse between implementation in other countries and in Swaziland.

Policies need to be informed by public opinions on migration and immigration policies. The chapter is therefore also designed to provide policy-makers in Swaziland and the SADC with migration information that can facilitate new policy directions that can promote national migration policy reform, as well as regional integration and cooperation.

PROFILE OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS

The survey aimed to randomly interview a representative sample of the adult population of Swaziland. In the final analysis, a total of 600 interviews were conducted in every district of the country. Of the total number of people interviewed, 360 (60%) were urban and 240 (40%) rural dwellers. A good gender balance was achieved (304 males v 292 females). In terms of the age distribution, there was an excellent spread in terms of age groups with an age range from 15 to 80 (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1: Age Distribution		
	No.	%
15-22	153	25.6
23-29	142	23.8
30-45	150	25.1
46	152	25.5
Total	597	100.0

In terms of marital status, 39% of the sample were unmarried. The research instrument made no distinction between marriage through civil law or through Swazi law and custom. This is an important qualification because the two types of marriages can produce marked differences in terms of who is empowered to migrate or make a decision to migrate. However, the sample does allow for a distinction in propensity to migrate between the married and unmarried. There may be an additional gender difference between unmarried males and females. In Swaziland's highly patriarchal society, fathers are empowered to play a crucial role in the mobility of their daughters.

The majority of the respondents had received some formal education with only 26 (4.4%) having had no schooling. The majority had some high school education or had completed high school (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2: Educational Level		
	No.	%
No schooling	26	4.4
Some primary school	76	12.7
Primary school completed	57	9.5
Some high school	160	26.5
High school completed	134	22.4
Some university	57	9.5
Some university completed	43	7.2
Post-graduate	15	2.5
Other post-secondary qualification	29	4.9
Total	597	100.0

MIGRATION DURATION

One of the most pervasive migration myths in South Africa is that people are pouring into the country from throughout the African continent and have no intention whatsoever of leaving again.[12] Previous SAMP research has demonstrated that this is a major fallacy. Impermanence and circulation, not permanence, is the predominant characteristic of migration to South Africa from its neighbours. This finding was confirmed, once again, in the Swaziland case.

Only 16% of the sample expressed a strong desire to go and live in South Africa, with another 16% having a moderate desire to do so (Table 2.3). When the question was reframed in terms of a desire to go

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and live in South Africa for a short period, the answers were somewhat different. Only 20% wanted to go and live in South Africa for a short period (up to two years) but another 36% had a moderate desire to do so.

Table 2.3: Desire to Live Permanently in South Africa		
	No.	%
A great extent	98	16.4
Some extent	99	16.6
Not much	94	15.7
Not at all	306	51.3
Total	597	100.0

Table 2.4: Desire to Live Temporarily in South Africa		
	No.	%
A great extent	122	20.4
Some extent	217	36.3
Not much	108	18.1
Not at all	150	25.1
Total	597	100.0

Desire and likelihood are two different things. Whereas 16% wanted to go to South Africa to live permanently, only 12% thought it was very likely that they would do so (Table 2.5).

Table 2.5: Likelihood of Living Permanently in South Africa		
	No.	%
Very likely	70	11.9
Likely	108	18.3
Neither likely nor unlikely	40	6.8
Unlikely	122	20.7
Very unlikely	249	42.3
Total	589	100.0

Gender and residence made a difference to the answers to this question. Of those who were very likely to go to South Africa, 56% were male and 44% female. Seventy-three percent of those who said it was very likely that they would migrate to South Africa were urban dwellers while 27% were rural dwellers.

On the likelihood of going to South Africa to live for a short period in the future, the majority responded in the affirmative (60% likely/very likely) (Table 2.6). Interestingly-and unusually-the numbers who feel that it is likely they will go to South Africa temporarily are greater than those who say they wish to do so. While the responses suggest enormous interest in spending some time in South Africa on a temporary basis, there is also a sense that many see migration as inevitable.

Table 2.6: Likelihood of Living Temporarily in South Africa		
No.	%	
Very likely	107	18.1
Likely	248	42.0
Neither likely nor unlikely	41	6.9
Unlikely	70	11.9
Very unlikely	124	21.0
Total	590	100.0

Given the extensive cross-border migrant networks of the Swazi, it is unsurprising that they are very knowledgeable about getting to South Africa and what to do when they get there. For instance, 92% pointed out that they knew how to obtain travel documents to South Africa. As many as 71% claimed that they would have a place to go and stay on arrival in South Africa (Table 2.7).

Table 2.7: Place To Go on First Arrival in South Africa		
	No.	%
I know about this	387	70.7
I do not know about this, but I know how I could find out	67	12.2
I do not know about this, but I might be able to find out	31	5.7
I do not know about this, and I do not know how to find out	62	11.3
Total	547	100.0

SWAZI ATTITUDES TO SOUTH AFRICA

There is an assumption in South Africa that the "pull factors" of their own country completely outweigh the "stick factors" in the migrants' country of origin. This is clearly an erroneous assumption. How do Swazis perceive South Africa? As a "land of milk and honey"? Or as a necessary evil? It is therefore informative to assess Swazi attitudes towards South Africa and to see how such atti-

tudes have impacted on migration currents to South Africa.

The respondents were asked to compare Swaziland and South Africa in terms of their perception of reasons to go and to stay. Asked what factors might prompt them to go to South Africa, employment was cited in 32% of cases. Next was healthcare at 12.1%. South Africa's educational system was only mentioned by 6.7%. In contrast, jobs ranked very low as a reason to stay in Swaziland (0.6%). The advantages of Swaziland were non-economic including peace (28.9%), personal and family safety (11%) and the relative absence of crime (8.8%). In contrast, South Africa is not seen as a place where personal safety is secure (mentioned by only 0.3%). Interestingly, South Africa's political reforms do not make the country attractive to Swazis (Tables 2.8, 2.9).

Table 2.8: Reasons To Go to South Africa		
	No.	%
Land	21	1.8
Water	9	0.8
Food	19	1.6
Houses	41	3.5
Jobs	379	32.1
Treatment by employers	23	1.9
Trade	48	4.1
Overall living conditions	44	3.7
Safety of self and family	2	0.2
Crime	3	.03
Peace	8	0.7
Education/schools	79	6.7
Healthcare	143	12.1
Place to raise your family	3	0.3
HIV/AIDS	3	0.3
Freedom	47	4.0
Democracy	70	5.9
Travel documents	2	0.2
Shopping	103	8.7
Nothing	40	3.4
Pension fund (for old age)	52	4.4
Entertainment/recreation facilities	10	0.8
Other	39	3.3
Total	1,188	100.0
Note: Respondents allowed more than one answer		

Table 2.9: Reasons To Stay at Home in Swaziland		
	No.	%
Land	197	15.7
Water	22	1.7
Food	55	4.4
Houses	5	0.4
Jobs	8	0.6
Treatment by employers	5	0.4
Trade	1	0.1
Overall living conditions	60	4.8
Safety of self and family	139	11.0
Crime	111	8.8
Peace	363	28.9
Education/schools	68	5.4
Healthcare/disease	11	0.9
Place to raise your family	53	4.2
HIV/AIDS	6	0.5
Freedom	69	5.5
Democracy	5	0.4
Travel documents	6	0.5
Shopping	39	3.1
I grew up in this country	5	0.4
Nothing	30	2.4
Total	1,258	100.0
Note: Respondents allowed more than one answer		

Asked another way, it is clear that the greatest worry that Swazi have about South Africa is the threat of violence and crime (Table 2.10). Over half saw this as a major problem confronting Swazis going to South Africa. Such attitudes may well be based on concrete experience. The local media has recently been full of reports about Swazis being victims of violent crime when they go across the border. On the other hand, the majority of those who have been to South Africa report a positive experience (73.8% positive/very positive). Overall, only 30% have an unfavourable/very unfavourable impression of South Africa.

Comparatively, on issues such as the availability of jobs, trading opportunities, and availability of decent healthcare, Swazis feel that South Africa is better than Swaziland. However, they felt that Swaziland was better than South Africa in a number of areas including access to land, peace, and an environment in which to raise children.

Table 2.10: Concerns about Swazis Who Go to South Africa		
	No.	%
Becoming involved in an affair	10	1.7
Get injured	338	27.6
Become a victim of crime	290	23.7
Become involved in a crime	61	5.0
Get a disease	147	12.0
Have a second family	38	3.1
Never come back	165	13.5
Lose our language and our culture	30	2.4
Lose religious or moral values	19	1.6
Others	73	6.0
Total	1,171	100.0
Note: Respondents allowed more than one answer		

ATTITUDES TO BORDERS

There has been considerable policy discussion within the SADC on the issue of softer borders.[13] The volume of undocumented migration across borders would also tend to suggest a possible disregard or distaste on the ground for these markers of national territory. Given also that many Swazi regard their western border with South Africa as historically illegitimate, the question of general attitudes towards borders is of considerable significance.

In fact, borders are extremely important to Swazis. As many as 75.1% agree/strongly agree on the importance of the country's borders. Only 12.2% see the country's borders as irrelevant. Borders should be markers of national territory but not barriers to movement. A slight majority of Swazi (51.9%) feel that people in Southern Africa should be able to move freely between countries (Table 2.11)

Most Swazi also recognize that the border with South Africa is rea-

Table 2.11: Swazi Attitudes to Freedom of Movement		
People in Southern Africa should be able to cross borders freely	No.	%
Strongly agree	111	18.7
Agree	197	33.2
Neither agree nor disagree	23	3.9
Disagree	158	26.6
Strongly disagree	105	17.7
Total	594	100.0

sonably porous in reality. More people than not (43.5% versus 31.2%) felt that if they were to try and cross illegally, it was unlikely that they would be caught. The actual or perceived porousness of the borders has serious financial implications for both the Swaziland and South African governments. It may not be economical to spend large amounts of money on border surveillance. Only about 31.2% responded by saying it was unlikely that they would cross without being caught.

Swazi certainly feel that official South African immigration policy should be more relaxed (Table 2.12). Nearly 30% feel that there should be a policy of unrestricted access. More, however, feel that there should be a policy of access tied to job availability. Their view of a desirable South African policy differs markedly from that of South Africans themselves, who favour a much more restrictive approach.

Table 2.12: Swazi Attitudes to South African Immigration Policy		
	South Africans (%)	Swazi (%)
Let anyone into South Africa who wants to enter	6	28
Let people into South Africa as long as there are jobs	17	48
Place strict limits on the numbers of foreigners	45	23
Prohibit all people entering into South Africa from other countries	25	1
Don't know	7	0
N	3,500	587

The majority of Swazis moving between these countries respect the borders and do so legally. Less than 5% said they had entered South Africa without a passport on their last visit (Table 2.13). Presently no visa is required from Swazis entering South Africa. In spite of the high percentage of people who enter with passports, illegal crossing takes place. The border has been porous for decades as people have crossed anywhere along it to visit friends and family on the South African side.[14] Such movements have been so numerous and frequent that even members of the South African security forces who patrol the border have given up arresting the culprits.

Table 2.13: Swazis who Entered South Africa with Passport		
	No.	%
Yes	442	95.7
No	20	4.3
Total	462	100.0

NON-CITIZEN RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Since Swaziland is inevitably affected by the policies of its much larger neighbour, it is of interest to know what Swazis themselves think about those policies. First, the respondents were asked about what rights they thought non-South Africans should enjoy in South Africa. The majority (73%) felt that people from outside South Africa should enjoy the same rights as South African citizens (see Table 2.14). Another way of putting this is that most Swazi agree with the basic precepts of the South African constitution.

Table 2.14: Rights for African Immigrants in South Africa		
African Immigrants should enjoy the same rights as South Africans	No.	%
Strongly disagree	35	6.0
Disagree	105	17.9
Neither agree nor disagree	17	2.9
Agree	261	44.5
Strongly agree	166	28.3
Have not heard enough about it	2	0.3
Total	586	100.0

Second, immigrants in Southern Africa are often viewed as coming to take away jobs from the local population. For instance, the Swazi have complained that Mozambicans, and other immigrants from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, are responsible for the country's high unemployment rate.[15] However, a large majority of Swazis feel that migrants to South Africa should enjoy the same employment opportunities as nationals (Table 2.15). In other words, they should not be discriminated against in the job market. Constitutionally, this is one of only two areas (voting being the other) where non-citizens do not enjoy the same rights as South African citizens.

Third, the respondents were asked if they felt that Africans from other countries should enjoy the right to vote in South Africa. Many of them (54.5%) did not feel that voting rights should be extended to Africans from other countries. However there was an appreciable number (36.6%) who felt that such a right should be extended to Africans from other countries. This happened in the 1994 election but not since.

Fifth, on the issue of citizenship most Swazis feel that people from other African countries should have the right to become South African citizens. About 69% of the Swazi agreed/strongly agreed with this statement.

Table 2.15: Job opportunities for Immigrants		
Immigrants should have the same employment chance as South Africans	No.	%
Strongly disagree	10	6.0
Disagree	88	17.9
Neither agree nor disagree	14	2.9
Agree	293	44.5
Strongly agree	185	28.3
Have not heard enough about it	4	0.3
Total	594	100.0

Finally, the issue of regional identity plays a potentially significant role in shaping people's attitudes. In the survey the Swazi were asked whether they felt South African policy should favour Africans from the Southern Africa region. The majority (60.5%) did not feel that people from the Southern African region should be given preferential treatment in South Africa (see Table 2.12). As interesting is that 61.9% of the respondents did not even feel that Swazi should be given preferential treatment.

Table 2.16: Preferential Treatment for SADC Citizens		
Southern Africans should be given special treatment in South Africa	No.	%
Strongly disagree	122	20.9
Disagree	231	39.6
Neither agree nor disagree	46	7.9
Agree	120	20.5
Strongly agree	60	10.3
Have not heard enough about it	5	0.9
Total	584	100.0
Swazis should be given special treatment in South Africa	No.	%
Strongly disagree	120	20.6
Disagree	241	41.3
Neither agree nor disagree	45	7.7
Agree	106	18.2
Strongly agree	67	11.5
Have not heard enough about it	4	0.7
Total	583	100.0

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CONCLUSION

Swazi opinions on migration from Swaziland to South Africa are important because they focus our attention on several issues which have shaped and still shape behaviours and perceptions of cross-border migration in Southern Africa. Perceptions become crucial in the construction of migration images in the region. Knowledge of public opinion and attitudes on cross-border migration should enable the construction of policies that are not far removed from the people but are shaped by public perceptions.

In general, there is nothing particularly surprising in these results in that they broadly conform to those from other SADC countries in the region. Swazi have been migrating to South Africa for decades. They go there for a variety of reasons. The most common reasons are actually economically advantageous for South Africa. What is striking is that of all the countries in the region, Swaziland shows the lowest proportion of people who go to South Africa to work or to look for work. South Africans think people from other African states come to South Africa primarily to looking for work. That is certainly far from the case with the Swazi.

The SAMP survey reported here has made it possible for us to come up with a profile of contemporary cross-border travellers to South Africa from Swaziland. For instance, we now have evidence that Swazi cross-border migrants come from all walks of life, but the majority are those who have received some formal education. They go to South Africa for a basket of reasons. There is also an indication that women form a substantial element of cross border migrants to South Africa. This shows a gender revision compared to the male-dominated migration currents of previous decades.

In common with migrants from all the other SADC states, Swazi continue to regard Swaziland as home and maintain strong economic and domestic ties with their home countries. Movement, even for work, is a temporary phenomenon. In the quality of life areas that really matter, Swazi think of their own country as a much better place to live. Very few who cross that border intend to stay away permanently.

CHAPTER THREE

RIGHTS FOR SOME:
SWAZI ATTITUDES TO MIGRANTS,
IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

INTRODUCTION

In 2001, SAMP embarked on a second national migration survey in Swaziland. In contrast to the earlier survey which examined Swazi migration to South Africa (Chapter Two), the National Immigration Policy Survey (or NIPS) aimed to assess Swazi attitudes towards foreigners in the country and Swazi knowledge and attitudes toward existing national policies on immigration. The importance of this survey to Swaziland can hardly be over-emphasized in light of the fact that the post-colonial Swazi state has experienced an influx of migrants who left their countries largely because of political instability and civil war. Consequently, foreign migrants have become a real and important element of the country's social and economic landscape.[16]

For policy purposes it is crucial to have a clear understanding of how the Swazi feel about foreigners in their country. This can assist policy makers to make the right choices on policy directions, especially those aimed at building a culture of tolerance and accommodation. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the responses accumulated during the NIPS project in Swaziland.

The chapter discusses a variety of issues including strength of national identity, attitudes towards foreigners, action the Swazi are likely to take against foreigners, immigration policy attitudes, and refugee policy attitudes. Several variables which could possibly influence responses were identified. These included the age of the respondents, formal education status, gender, household income, work status, social class position, and travel history. It was hypothesized that each of these variables has an impact on people's views about themselves and others.

METHODOLOGY

The Swaziland NIPS was conducted in the towns of Manzini, Siteki and Nhlangano. The selection of these towns was determined by their history of contact with immigrants. Manzini is generally referred to as the "Hub of Swaziland" because it occupies a central position which makes it a convergence point for both people and commodities for exchange. Siteki is located along the Swaziland-Mozambique border and in the past has received a large number of Mozambican refugees. Nhlangano is located next to the border with South Africa and people from Kwazulu-Natal enter the country mainly through the Nhlangano area. Those destined for South Africa using the southern border largely go through Nhlangano.

A total of 750 people were interviewed and each town was allocated 250 interviews. Within each town a specific sampling procedure was

conducted first at the level of selecting the individuals to be interviewed, and second, the households to be targeted. At the level of individual selection, the age groups of 16-24, 25-34, 35-49, and over 50 were targeted. Gender was also considered important. The interviewers alternated male and female respondents rotating them through the four age groups mentioned above. Finally, all those interviewed had to be citizens of Swaziland.[17]

Household selection was done using a stratified systematic cluster method. The population size of each town was determined, as was that of each residential area. The population size of each residential area was used to allocate the number of interviews such that the more populous areas were allocated more interviews. This was done to minimize the problem of unequal representation. Within each residential area the interviews were conducted in clusters of six and the distance between clusters represented a specific interval.

PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

Understanding the personal characteristics of the sample gives us the opportunity to better comprehend the manner in which they view certain situations. For instance, the world view of poor people can be different from that of the rich. Also the perceptions of women may be very different from those of men, at least partly reflecting the power relations in a particular society. In any research situation, therefore, knowing who our informants are gives a better understanding of why they see things the way they do.

Demographically, the majority (66.8%) of those interviewed were between 25 and 49 years of age (Table 3.1). This means that the survey did not capture the views of teenagers and those over 50 years. As previously noted, nearly half of the respondents were holders of post-graduate and diploma certificates. Only 2% of the sample had no formal education.

The sample had the desired gender balance and there was a very good spread of household income types. Education is certainly not an automatic ticket to higher income. However-consistent with the nature of the sample-as many as 62.7 % were in formal employment. But 50% classified themselves as working class and a further 18% as poor.

In spite of the over-representation in certain categories, the sample is sufficiently diverse to permit most of the hypotheses to be tested. The characteristics of the respondents give the researcher the scope to map the general pattern of Swazi attitudes to immigrant policies.

Table 3.1: Characteristics of the Respondents		
Age	No.	%
16-24	123	18.9
25-34	220	33.8
35-49	215	33.0
50-98	93	14.3
Total	651	100.0
Formal Education	No.	%
None	14	2.0
Grades 1-7	50	7.2
Grades 8-12	304	43.6
Post-graduate/diploma	330	47.3
Total	698	100.0
Race	No.	%
White	6	0.8
Black	672	94.8
Coloured	30	4.2
Other	1	1.0
Total	709	100.0
Sex	No.	%
Male	354	49.9
Female	356	50.1
Total	710	100.0
Household Income	No.	%
1-1,000	159	26.7
1,001-2,500	170	28.6
2,501-4,000	137	23.0
4,001	129	21.7
Total	595	100.0
Work Status	No.	%
Formal employment	448	62.7
Informal employment	64	9.0
Unemployed - looking	89	12.4
Unemployed - not looking	114	15.9
Total	715	100.0

Table 3.2: Characteristics of the Respondents		
Class	No.	%
Poor	125	17.9
Working class	348	49.8
Middle class	206	29.5
Upper middle class	20	2.9
Total	699	100.0
Language spoken most at home	No.	%
English	32	4.5
Afrikaans	2	0.3
Zulu	4	0.6
Swazi	677	94.6
Total	715	100.0
Primary Religious Affiliation	No.	%
Christian	657	91.1
Muslim	9	1.2
Other	2	0.3
Atheist	3	0.4
Christian Independent	19	2.6
Traditional	31	4.3
Total	721	100.0

TRAVEL EXPERIENCE

Getting an opportunity to travel or live outside one's own country is crucial to attitude formation because it brings contact with other people whose cultural practices are different. In general, it can be hypothesized that those who have travelled will display greater open-mindedness and tolerance than those who have not.

As Table 3.3 shows, only 10.4% of the sample have never left Swaziland. This does not allow us to really test the travel hypothesis. As many as 26.4% said they had lived outside Swaziland. This might suggest that those who have lived outside the country for an extended period would have different attitudes than those who have simply travelled abroad. No significant difference emerged, however.

What is interesting in terms of Swazi migration patterns is where people have been to and for how long (Table 3.4). About 40% had traveled to South Africa, with smaller numbers having visited Mozambique (15%), Lesotho (11%) and Botswana (10%). Only 2.3%

Table 3.3: Travel Outside Swaziland		
	No.	%
Never left Swaziland	75	10.4
Travelled outside of Swaziland	457	63.2
Lived outside of Swaziland	191	26.4
Total	723	100.0

Table 3.4: Travel Destinations Outside Swaziland		
Places traveled to outside own country	No.	%
South Africa	631	40.4
Mozambique	227	14.6
Lesotho	176	11.3
Botswana	162	10.4
Zimbabwe	89	5.7
Never traveled outside home country	74	4.7
Europe and North America	61	3.9
Namibia	42	2.7
Africa (outside Southern Africa)	36	2.3
Zambia	26	1.7
Malawi	18	1.2
Asia, India and China	11	0.7
Angola	7	0.4
Total	1,560	100.0

had been to other parts of Africa outside SADC and 4% to Europe and/or North America. Swazis are extremely well-travelled but their movements have very largely been within the Southern African region.

Of the approximately one quarter of the sample who have lived outside Swaziland for longer than six months, South Africa was easily the most important destination (Table 3.5).

ON BEING SWAZI

People's views about themselves and their nationality are very important because they can play a crucial role in the manner in which they relate to "other" people. In the NIPS, the respondents were first asked about race, class, language and religion as markers of personal identity. For Swazi, language and religion are far more important than class and race as markers of identity (Table 3.6). Nearly three quarters (73.4 %) of those interviewed felt that language

Table 3.5: Residence Destinations Outside Swaziland		
Places lived in outside own country for more than six months	No.	%
South Africa	135	57.9
Europe and North America	38	16.3
Lesotho	15	6.4
Mozambique	12	5.2
Botswana	11	4.7
Zimbabwe	7	3.0
Africa (outside Southern Africa)	6	2.6
Zambia	5	2.1
Asia, India and China	3	0.0
Angola	1	0.0
Total	233	100.0

was important/very important to how they see themselves. This is perhaps understandable because the Swazi speak one language, and over their history it has played a very important role in the construction of both personal and national identity. Indeed, many Swazi feel that speaking siSwati is the primary requirement for being considered a Swazi. Religion ranks even more highly (83.3 %) as a marker of self-identity. Given that 91% of the sample gave "Christian" as their religious affiliation, this is a clear indicator of the importance of Christianity in the lives of most Swazi.

Nearly 80% of those interviewed said that "being a Swazi" was a very important part of how they see themselves. A similar percentage wanted their children to think of themselves as Swazi (Table 3.7). Responses on these issues were uninfluenced by age, formal education, race, class, household income, work status, or travel history.

Personal identity can also be looked at in terms of views about meeting people of different cultural background. The survey revealed that the Swazi have no problem mixing with other people. Seventy-eight percent said they enjoyed meeting people who were different from themselves and only 7.9% disliked meeting new people. Three quarters agreed that meeting people from other cultures was an enriching experience and 60% said that they could easily accept people from different cultures. Such positive responses held for almost all social categories, with slight variations by household income, class, and travel history. For instance, people of higher income tended to feel more strongly that interacting with people who are different was enjoyable. The same emphatic and positive response was seen from upper-middle class people, and those who had lived outside Swaziland. The only anomaly in

Table 3.6: Markers of Personal Identity		
How important is race to how you see yourself?	No.	%
Very important	200	29.1
Important	152	22.1
Neutral	145	21.1
Not important	163	23.7
Very unimportant	28	4.1
Total	688	100.0
How important is class to how you see yourself?	No.	%
Very important	92	13.6
Important	153	22.6
Neutral	185	27.3
Not important	205	30.3
Very unimportant	42	6.2
Total	677	100.0
How important is language to how you see yourself?	No.	%
Very important	288	41.9
Important	217	31.5
Neutral	91	13.2
Not important	70	10.2
Very unimportant	22	3.2
Total	688	100.0
How important is religion to how you see yourself?	No.	%
Very important	398	58.6
Important	168	24.7
Neutral	52	7.7
Not important	34	5.0
Very unimportant	27	4.0
Total	679	100.0

this general picture was that very few (7.2%) felt that they could trust someone from another culture. This may mean that while generally the Swazi interact well with people from other cultures, they do so with a certain degree of suspicion.

Swazi also have strong views about national identity, about what it means to be a Swazi. Generally, Swazi feel that being black is not very important in being a true Swazi national, possibly a reflection of the reality of white settlement and integration. Certainly, despite the gross injustices of the colonial period, the Swazi have been able to construct

Table 3.7: Swazi Attitudes to Being Swazi		
Being Swazi is a very important part of how you see yourself	No.	%
Strongly agree	300	42.1
Agree	246	34.6
Neither agree nor disagree	89	12.5
Disagree	56	7.9
Strongly disagree	21	2.9
Total	712	100.0
You want your children to think of themselves as Swazi	No.	%
Strongly agree	262	37.1
Agree	280	39.6
Neither agree nor disagree	101	14.3
Disagree	50	7.1
Strongly disagree	14	2.0
Total	707	100.0
It makes you feel proud to be a Swazi	No.	%
Strongly agree	305	43.1
Agree	232	32.8
Neither agree nor disagree	97	13.7
Disagree	57	8.1
Strongly disagree	16	2.3
Total	707	100.0

an appreciable level of racial harmony. The highly-influential King Sobhuza II always emphasized that black and white Swazis should live together as one family. In one of his speeches he likened the black and white races in Swaziland to the black and white keys of a piano which in order to produce good music must work together in harmony.

There were, however, differences in the responses between groups. For instance, people with no formal education tended to feel that being black was more essential to being a true Swazi and those with higher levels of formal education felt it was not essential. Sobhuza's philosophy appears to have been more successful among the more educated.

Nor do Swazi consider that speaking an African language is important for one to be considered a true Swazi. About 30% said it was not very important and 33.6% said it was not at all important. The response was unexpected given the stress that most Swazi put on their language as the key marker of belonging. To the Swazi, the crucial language is not just any African language, but their own language, siSiwati. Possibly, therefore, the response would have been different if the question had

Table 3.8: Cultural Tolerance

You enjoy interacting with people who are different	No.	%
Strongly agree	190	26.8
Agree	369	52.0
Neither agree nor disagree	71	10.0
Disagree	63	8.9
Strongly disagree	17	2.4
Total	710	100.0
You dislike meeting new people	No.	%
Strongly agree	15	2.1
Agree	41	5.8
Neither agree nor disagree	52	7.3
Disagree	389	54.6
Strongly disagree	216	30.3
Total	713	100.0
Exposure to different cultures enriches one life	No.	%
Strongly agree	223	32.1
Agree	302	43.5
Neither agree nor disagree	83	11.9
Disagree	58	8.3
Strongly disagree	29	4.2
Total	695	100.0
It is easy to trust someone from a different culture	No.	%
Strongly agree	9	1.3
Agree	41	5.9
Neither agree nor disagree	118	16.9
Disagree	317	45.4
Strongly disagree	214	30.6
Total	699	100.0
You can usually accept people from other cultures	No.	%
Strongly agree	69	9.8
Agree	353	50.1
Neither agree nor disagree	112	15.9
Disagree	117	16.6
Strongly disagree	54	7.7
Total	705	100.0

Table 3.9: Attitudes to Markers of Swazi National Identity		
Being black	No.	%
Essential	98	14.0
Important	96	13.7
Not very important	250	35.7
Not at all important	257	36.7
Total	701	100.0
Speaking an African language	No.	%
Essential	81	11.7
Important	171	24.6
Not very important	209	30.1
Not at all important	233	33.6
Total	694	100.0

asked about siSwati more specifically.

Several other variables were used to gather information about Swazi attitudes to national identity. For instance, they were asked about the importance of birth. About 52.8% said being born in Swaziland was essential or important, while 47.2% said it was not very important or not at all important (see Table 3.10).

Table 3.10: Importance of Being Born in Swaziland to Being a 'True' Swazi		
Being born in Swaziland	No.	%
Essential	166	23.4
Important	208	29.4
Not very important	199	28.1
Not at all important	135	19.1
Total	708	100.0

It is important to note that women formed the majority of those who said being born in Swaziland was important. This is understandable because women have had their children born in Swaziland by non-Swazi men discriminated against including being denied national scholarships.

The Swazi were also asked how important it is to have parents who were born in Swaziland in defining a true Swazi. More than half (54.9%) said it was essential or important, while 45.1% said it was not very important or not at all important (see Table 3.11).

When asked about the importance of having grandparents who were born in Swaziland, about 50.5% said it was essential or important, while

Table 3.11: Importance of Having Parents Born in Swaziland

Having parents who were born in Swaziland	No.	%
Essential	153	21.8
Important	233	33.1
Not very important	228	32.4
Not at all important	89	12.7
Total	703	100.0

49.5% said it was not very important or not at all important (see Table 3.12).

Table 3.12: Importance of Having Grandparents Born in Swaziland

Having grandparents who were born in Swaziland	No.	%
Essential	130	18.4
Important	227	32.1
Not very important	238	33.7
Not at all important	112	15.8
Total	707	100.0

What comes out from the statistical data is that Swazi are divided on the issue of the nature of Swazi-ness. But it is crucial to note that Swazi society is not very assimilative in terms of accepting people as Swazi. For instance, when it comes to birth, Swazis believe that even if you are born in Swaziland, or your parents and grandparents were born in Swaziland, that does not determine who is a true Swazi. The general attitude is that a true Swazi is identifiable by an appropriate clan name.

The next question attempted to determine if Swazi make a distinction between citizenship and "being Swazi." The simple answer is that they do. Only 16.5% of the survey respondents felt that white citizens were "true or mostly Swazi" (Table 3.13). The equivalent figure for black people was 83.5%. Coloureds ranked higher than whites, at 41.3%. Asian citizens ranked very low, with only 6.1% saying they were true or mostly Swazi. Complete and unconditional acceptance as a Swazi is reserved primarily for black people considered indigenous to the country. The possible reason for this attitude is the issue of cultural and linguistic homogeneity which has been a major characteristic of Swazi society. To be Swazi has always been conceived in terms of speaking siSwati, practicing what is considered to be typical of Swazi culture, and bearing a Swazi clan name.

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Table 3.13: Citizenship, Race and Swazi Identity		
How 'Swazi' are citizens of specified race groups?		
Whites	No.	%
Completely Swazi	58	8.6
Mostly Swazi	53	7.9
Somewhat Swazi	358	53.0
Not Swazi	206	30.5
Total	675	100.0
Blacks	No.	%
Completely Swazi	236	34.0
Mostly Swazi	344	49.5
Somewhat Swazi	105	15.1
Not Swazi	10	1.4
Total	695	100.0
Coloureds	No.	%
Completely Swazi	79	11.7
Mostly Swazi	200	29.6
Somewhat Swazi	336	49.7
Not Swazi	61	9.0
Total	676	100.0
Indians/Asians/Chinese	No.	%
Completely Swazi	24	3.8
Mostly Swazi	15	2.3
Somewhat Swazi	108	16.9
Not Swazi	493	77.0
Total	640	100.0

The respondents were asked what an outsider would have to do to be accepted as Swazi. There was a strong feeling that foreigners should abandon both their language and culture in order to become Swazi. These feelings were strongest amongst the under 25s, the over 50s, those with no or little formal education, low income groups and those who had never traveled outside the country.

Throughout the period of Sobhuza's leadership in the post-colonial period the theme of the preservation of Swazi culture punctuated most of his speeches. Language and culture, and especially their preservation, were seen as the cornerstone of being a Swazi. It is now generally accepted that this theme in Sobhuza's reign was part of the larger agenda of preserving the institution of monarchy. Among the Swazi, it created a specific attitude toward other cultures.

Perceptions of Economic Conditions

People's perceptions of their personal and national economic conditions are very important and can crystallize into attitudes against others, especially those perceived as a threat to economic interests. Xenophobia breeds in times of economic hardship. The survey revealed that the majority are presently dissatisfied with their personal economic conditions (Table 3.14). A clear majority (61.4 %) were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied with their personal economic conditions. However, not all was doom and gloom with 43.1% feeling that things would improve over the next year.

Variables such as age, formal education, and gender do not make any significant difference to perceptions of economic circumstance. Only social class made a statistically significant difference (Table 3.15). Nearly seventy percent of those who self-identified as "poor" and 65% of those who considered themselves "working class" were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied. The level of dissatisfaction thus declines as one moves up the social ladder.

Table 3.14: Perceptions of Personal Economic Conditions		
Opinion about personal economic conditions	No.	%
Very satisfied	20	2.8
Satisfied	120	16.8
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	136	19.0
Dissatisfied	329	46.1
Very dissatisfied	109	15.3
Total	714	100.0
Opinion about personal economic conditions in one years' time	No.	%
Much better	75	10.7
Better	226	32.4
Same	175	25.1
Worse	166	23.8
Much worse	56	8.0
Total	698	100.0

Dissatisfaction with personal economic conditions in Swaziland at this particular point in time is understandable because the management and performance of the Swazi economy has done very little to reduce the level of poverty. The poor have continued to be marginalized, and the gap between the rich and poor has continued to grow. The situation

Table 3.15: Class and Perceptions of Personal Economic Conditions		
Poor	No.	%
Very satisfied	1	0.8
Satisfied	20	16.7
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	16	13.3
Dissatisfied	65	54.2
Very dissatisfied	18	15.0
Total	120	100.0
Working class	No.	%
Very satisfied	7	2.0
Satisfied	41	11.8
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	73	21.0
Dissatisfied	170	49.0
Very dissatisfied	56	16.1
Total	347	100.0
Middle class	No.	%
Very satisfied	7	3.4
Satisfied	50	24.5
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	37	18.1
Dissatisfied	87	42.6
Very dissatisfied	23	11.3
Total	204	100.0
Upper middle class	No.	%
Very satisfied	5	25.0
Satisfied	5	25.0
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	6	30.0
Dissatisfied	2	10.0
Very dissatisfied	2	10.0
Total	20	100.0

has been made worse by the increasing level of unemployment. In the period prior to the survey, more jobs were lost as companies retrenched to cut costs.

While some respondents were prepared to be cautiously optimistic about their personal economic circumstances, they did not demonstrate the same kind of optimism about the future of the national economy. Most (68.7%) were dissatisfied/very dissatisfied with economic conditions in Swaziland (Table 3.16). And only 31.6% felt that things would be better in a year's time.

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Table 3.16: Perceptions of National Economy		
Satisfied with economic conditions in Swaziland	No.	%
Very satisfied	3	0.4
Satisfied	100	14.1
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	119	16.8
Dissatisfied	377	53.1
Very dissatisfied	111	15.6
Total	710	100.0
Expectations of economic conditions in Swaziland in one year's time	No.	%
Much better	62	9.1
Better	154	22.5
Same	171	25.0
Worse	219	32.0
Much worse	79	11.5
Total	685	100.0

Dissatisfaction was uniform across all groups. The government's management of the economy does not inspire confidence amongst respondents. The political situation in the country may also have caused concerns about the future viability of the Swazi economy.

When jobs are scarce, and prospects dim, outsiders are often accused of "stealing" jobs. There is a definite tendency among the Swazi to relate unavailability of jobs in the country to the presence of foreigners. About 66% of those interviewed indicated that they had heard about someone losing a job to a foreigner (Table 3.17). Nearly 55% said they knew of someone to whom this had happened. However, 82% reported that it had never happened to them personally.

SWAZI ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGNERS

The respondents were first asked why they thought that outsiders came to Swaziland. Interestingly, no one response stood out above the rest (Table 3.18). Issues such as unfavourable political and economic conditions in their own countries were slightly more prominent. In sum, the reasons why people come to Swaziland are seen as pretty varied. Unlike South Africa, there is no perception that foreigners only come for work and to make mischief.

People's contact with others different from them may play an important part in shaping attitudes. The survey revealed that the urbanized Swazi has considerable contact with people from different parts of the world (Table 3.19). They have most contact with South Africans and

Table 3.17: Perceptions and Experience of Job Loss to Foreigners		
Have you ever heard of someone losing a job to a foreigner?	No.	%
More than once	326	49.5
Once	110	16.7
Never	223	33.8
Total	659	100.0
Do you personally know anyone who has lost a job to a foreigner?	No.	%
More than once	203	32.3
Once	141	22.4
Never	285	45.3
Total	629	100.0
Have you ever been denied a job because it was given to a foreigner?	No.	%
More than once	61	9.1
Once	61	9.1
Never	548	81.8
Total	670	100.0

Table 3.18: Reasons Why People Come to Swaziland		
	No.	%
Worse/bad economy in foreigner's home country	298	9.9
Better economy here	302	10.0
Political conditions in foreigner's home country	430	14.2
Political conditions here	245	8.1
To commit crimes/cause trouble	129	4.3
Hunger/famine in foreigner's home country	331	10.9
Better healthcare etc and good quality of life here	169	5.6
To develop our country	184	6.1
Visit, holiday, meet people	423	14.0
Move here permanently/to immigrate	111	3.7
Worse/bad environment in foreigner's home country	192	6.3
Better environment/population conditions here	203	6.7
Other	8	0.3
Total	3,025	100.0

least with Asians. In the case of contact with people from South Africa, friendship and family ties were emphasized as the main basis for contact (Table 3.20).

The majority of those interviewed said that their personal contact with people from other regions (except Asia) has been positive (Table

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Table 3.19: Swazi Contact with People from Other Regions		
People from North America and Europe	No.	%
Great deal	61	8.9
Some	254	37.1
Hardly at all	106	15.5
None	264	38.5
Total	685	100.0
People from Southern African countries	No.	%
Great deal	143	20.5
Some	361	51.6
Hardly at all	56	8.0
None	139	19.9
Total	699	100.0
People from other countries in Africa	No.	%
Great deal	100	14.2
Some	378	53.8
Hardly at all	80	11.4
None	145	20.6
Total	703	100.0
People from Asia	No.	%
Great deal	41	5.9
Some	249	35.8
Hardly at all	134	19.3
None	272	39.1
Total	696	100.0
People from South Africa	No.	%
Great deal	329	46.9
Some	289	41.2
Hardly at all	19	2.7
None	65	9.3
Total	702	100.0

3.18). The general view in Swaziland is that people from Asia, particularly Indians, are not trustworthy in business dealings.

As a way to assess the degree of contact that Swazi have with non-Swazi in the country, the respondents were asked about their primary source of information about foreigners (Table 3.21). Nearly a third cited personal contacts. Just over 40% said the media. This pattern, assuming a non-xenophobic media, suggests a good deal of first and second-hand

Table 3.20: Reasons for Contact with South Africans		
	No.	%
Work for/with them	226	14.7
Live next to them	195	12.7
Are friends with them	352	22.9
Children go to school with them	145	9.4
Buy things from them or sell things to them	290	18.9
Other	10	0.7
Family and relatives	319	20.8
Total	1,537	100.0

interaction. In an ideal world, this would translate into people being better informed about foreigners in the country. This could be one reason why attitudes are generally so positive (Table 3.22).

The respondents also do not feel that the country is overrun with foreigners. However, Mozambique is definitely seen as the primary source of foreign migrants, followed by Zambia and then South Africa (Table 3.23).

The general attitude of the Swazi is that the number of foreigners entering the country continues to increase with more than half feeling that it has "greatly increased." This is probably where Swazi impressions diverge somewhat from the reality on the ground.

In the NIPS exercise in Swaziland, respondents were asked what they thought about people from different regions of the world, on a scale of 0-10. Blacks were considered to be the most hardworking with a score of 7.1, followed by whites with a score of 6.7. On the issue of perceived intelligence whites ranked first with a score of 8.4 followed by blacks with a score of 7.0. Whites also came top on the issue of perceived honesty with a score of 6.7 while Indians/Asians were said to be the least honest with a score of 3.4.

One anomalous finding is that the Swazi have a more favourable opinion of whites than other black groups. For instance, whites had a score of 6.1 while people from Southern Africa had a score of 5.7 and those from the rest of Africa had a score of 5.6. The respondents thus have a lower opinion of other Africans than they do of people from Europe and North America. SADC citizens are viewed marginally more positively than Africans from elsewhere on the continent, but the difference is not stark.

With regards to what foreigners do in Swaziland, the responses were equally strong on both the positive and the negative scales (Table 3.24). However, the score for taking jobs (6.2) was higher than creating jobs (5.7). Compared to similar results in South Africa, foreigners are not

Table 3.21: Quality of Contact with Others		
Southern Africa	No.	%
Very positive	83	15.5
Positive	293	54.7
Neither positive nor negative	127	23.7
Negative	25	4.7
Very negative	8	1.5
Total	536	100.0
Other parts of Africa	No.	%
Very positive	46	8.7
Positive	268	51.0
Neither positive nor negative	165	31.4
Negative	36	6.8
Very negative	11	2.1
Total	526	100.0
Europe/North America	No.	%
Very positive	53	14.1
Positive	179	47.5
Neither positive nor negative	123	32.6
Negative	20	5.3
Very negative	2	0.5
Total	377	100.0
Asia	No.	%
Very positive	21	5.8
Positive	115	31.6
Neither positive nor negative	154	42.3
Negative	59	16.2
Very negative	15	4.1
Total	364	100.0
South Africa	No.	%
Very positive	175	28.2
Positive	330	53.1
Neither positive nor negative	102	16.4
Negative	10	1.6
Very negative	4	0.6
Total	621	100.0

Table 3.22: Sources of Information about Foreigners		
	No.	%
Television	391	16.4
Meeting and talking to them personally	386	16.2
Newspapers	374	15.7
Radio	367	15.4
At work	315	13.2
Through friends	266	11.2
Magazines	261	11.0
Other	12	0.5
Internet	5	0.2
Family	1	0.0
Total	2,378	100.0

Table 3.23: Perceived Origins of Foreign Citizens in Swaziland		
Where do most foreigners living in Swaziland come from?	No.	%
Mozambique	690	24.8
Zambia	309	11.1
South Africa	300	10.8
Asia/China/Australia	235	8.4
East Africa	187	6.7
West Africa	183	6.6
Zimbabwe	179	6.4
Central Africa	155	5.6
Angola	99	3.6
Europe/North America	99	3.6
Malawi	92	3.3
Botswana	72	2.6
North Africa	72	2.6
Lesotho	68	2.4
Namibia	42	1.5
Total	2,782	100.0

overly-associated with bringing disease or committing crimes. Those that work are, however, seen as remitting money outside the country.

Consistent with the generally tolerant and non-xenophobic attitudes of Swazi, respondents did not have any problems interacting with foreigners on a whole range of economic and social fronts. Most were very unlikely or unlikely to do anything about foreign citizens moving into

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Table 3.24: Perceived Activities of Southern Africans in Swaziland		
	No.	Mean
Bring skills needed by Swaziland	718	6.0
Take jobs from Swazis	715	6.2
Commit crimes in Swaziland	715	6.3
Create jobs for Swazis	713	5.7
Use Swaziland's welfare services	712	6.7
Bring diseases to Swaziland	712	5.9
Send earnings out of Swaziland	709	7.5

their neighbourhood (67.6%), operating a business in their area (64.7%), having children in the same school (77.4%), or becoming a co-worker (62.6%) (Table 3.25).

SWAZI IMMIGRATION POLICY ATTITUDES

The best way for policy makers to be in touch with the policies they formulate and implement is to get the attitudes of the general public. It is, therefore, important for policy makers to have a good idea of what the Swazi think the government needs to do about people coming from outside the country. For instance, it would be worthwhile to know what the Swazi think about the movement of people into the country. The survey revealed that Swazis are not comfortable with the unregulated entry of people into the country. About 85% felt that too many foreigners were being allowed in by government, with only 11% feeling the number was "just right." In general, people also wanted the Swaziland government to strictly limit the number of foreigners who can enter the country (Table 3.26).

Restrictionism was favoured by most social groups although it tended to be more pronounced among the young, the poorly-educated and the unemployed.

The respondents were supportive of the government giving special preference to foreigners who come to work in the country legally, for specific periods and who have skills not possessed by Swazis. The same sentiment applies to those who come to the country to invest money in the Swazi economy and create jobs (Table 3.27). Swazi acceptance of immigrants and migrants is thus conditional on their ability to contribute to the improvement of the Swazi economy and the development of the country in general. Consistent with this position, the vast majority (over 80%) favoured allowing traders from other countries to operate in Swaziland and only 30% said they would oppose allowing foreigners to establish small businesses in Swaziland.

Table 3.25: Likelihood of Action Against Southern Africans		
How likely would you be to take action against them:		
Moving into your neighbourhood	No.	%
Very likely	62	9.4
Likely	152	23.0
Unlikely	269	40.8
Very unlikely	177	26.8
Total	660	100.0
Operating a business in your area	No.	%
Very likely	75	11.1
Likely	161	23.9
Unlikely	268	39.5
Very unlikely	170	25.2
Total	674	100.0
Sitting in the same classroom as your child	No.	%
Very likely	48	7.2
Likely	103	15.4
Unlikely	264	39.5
Very unlikely	253	37.9
Total	668	100.0
Becoming one of your co-workers	No.	%
Very likely	37	5.6
Likely	145	21.8
Unlikely	255	38.4
Very unlikely	227	34.2
Total	664	100.0

In terms of measures to control immigration, Swazis do not support harsh measures such as turning on the electric fence along borders. However 39% indicated that they would support government allocation of money for border protection. They also support the use of the army to patrol Swaziland's borders. At the same time, the majority were opposed to government increasing taxes to cover the expenses of increased patrols.

Relatively few of the respondents supported a blanket deportation policy for all non-citizens (13.7% support/strongly support). Most did favour a hard line against "illegal immigrants" (78.4% support/strongly support deportation) and criminals (86.5% support/strongly support deportation). A surprisingly high 45% favoured a policy of deporting people who made no contribution to the economy. This is indicative

Table 3.26: Preferred Government Policies on Immigration

What should the government do about people from other countries?	No.	Mean
Let anyone into Swaziland who wants to enter	74	10.9
Let people into Swaziland as long as there are jobs	140	20.6
Strictly limit number of foreigners who can enter Swaziland	440	64.9
Prohibit people from entering Swaziland	24	3.5
Total	678	100.0

Table 3.27: Immigration Preferences

Should government give preference to foreigners who:		
Come to work here legally as permanent residents	No.	%
Strongly support	85	12.7
Support	214	32.0
Neither support nor oppose	157	23.5
Strongly oppose	142	21.2
Oppose	71	10.6
Total	669	100.0
Come to work here legally for a specific period	No.	%
Strongly support	125	18.4
Support	316	46.5
Neither support nor oppose	128	18.8
Strongly oppose	67	9.9
Oppose	44	6.5
Total	680	100.0
With skills not possedby Swazis	No.	%
Strongly support	318	46.8
Support	264	38.9
Neither support nor oppose	63	9.3
Strongly oppose	28	4.1
Oppose	6	0.9
Total	679	100.0
Who will invest money in the Swazi economy and create jobs	No.	%
Strongly support	436	63.5
Support	187	27.2
Neither support nor oppose	37	5.4
Strongly oppose	14	2.0
Oppose	13	1.9
Total	687	100.0

again of the importance of economic considerations in people's thinking about government immigration policy.

Swaziland is not currently a big recipient of refugees but certainly has been in the past, particularly from Mozambique. We might expect that this experience would shape Swazi understanding of and attitudes towards refugee protection.

The respondents show strong support for a government policy giving asylum to people escaping war and persecution in their country (87.8%) (Table 3.28). At the same time, 67.2% of those interviewed oppose or strongly oppose increasing the number of refugees who enter Swaziland. And slightly more than half opposed funding for refugee protection coming from the Swazi budget. Nearly 60% also oppose/strongly apposed granting permanent residence to refugees. There was a strong feeling that the government should send refugees back to their countries when the risk of harm abated (82.3%). Respondents were divided on whether refugees should be required to live in camps. However, more people opposed this policy than supported it.

RIGHTS FOR NON-SWAZIS

One of the ways of getting at the attitudes of people towards foreign citizens in their country is to get their views on the issue of rights that should be accorded to outsiders. In general, whatever constitutions might say about equality, citizens generally feel that the rights an individual is entitled to depends on their migration status. In other words, there is rarely any sense of equal rights for all when it comes to migration. Swaziland certainly fits this broader pattern.

In the NIPS, the respondents were asked about freedom of speech, the right to vote, the right to legal protection, and the right to social services. In each case, they were asked if the members of four different groups (citizens, temporary residents, refugees and "illegal immigrants") should enjoy these rights unconditionally, conditionally or never. As expected, the vast majority feel that citizens should enjoy all of these rights in unrestricted fashion (80-90%). None of the other groups are viewed as automatically entitled to any of these rights. Temporary residents and refugees are accorded rights under certain conditions and "illegal immigrants" very few rights at all.

To illustrate the point Tables 3.29 and 3.30 present the results on two of the rights: freedom of speech and legal protection. Interestingly, freedom of speech is to be circumscribed in the case of most non-citizens. Swazi are more generous when it comes to legal protection. In the case of temporary workers/visitors, 53% of the respondents felt that they

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Table 3.28: Attitudes to Refugee Protection		
The government of Swaziland should:		
Give asylum to people escaping war and persecution	No.	%
Strongly support	294	42.7
Support	310	45.1
Neither support nor oppose	43	6.3
Strongly oppose	27	3.9
Oppose	14	2.0
Total	688	100.0
Increase the number of refugees who enter Swaziland	No.	%
Strongly support	20	2.9
Support	29	4.2
Neither support nor oppose	138	19.8
Strongly oppose	326	46.8
Oppose	184	26.4
Total	697	100.0
Grant permanent residence to refugees (5 years)	No.	%
Strongly support	26	3.8
Support	129	18.7
Neither support nor oppose	128	18.6
Strongly oppose	266	38.6
Oppose	140	20.3
Total	689	100.0
Send refugees back to their own countries	No.	%
Strongly support	289	41.2
Support	288	41.1
Neither support nor oppose	64	9.1
Strongly oppose	38	5.4
Oppose	22	3.1
Total	701	100.00
Require all refugees to live in camps near the border	No.	%
Strongly support	61	9.0
Support	148	21.9
Neither support nor oppose	180	26.6
Strongly oppose	202	29.9
Oppose	85	12.6
Total	676	100.0

Table 3.28 continued		
The government of Swaziland should:		
Use money from the Swazi budget to shelter refugees	No.	%
Strongly support	40	5.9
Support	137	20.1
Neither support nor oppose	148	21.7
Strongly oppose	186	27.2
Oppose	172	25.2
Total	683	100.0

should enjoy an automatic right to legal protection. The corresponding figures were 50% for refugees and only 31% for "illegal immigrants."

Swazi attitudes on the issue of rights seem to suggest that immigrants should have no automatic rights or should not enjoy certain rights while within Swaziland. To some extent this may be a reflection of the political landscape in the country. However, Swazi have no difficulty in

Table 3.29: Freedom of Speech		
The right to say what you want should be granted to:		
Citizens of Swaziland	No.	%
Always	574	80.1
Depends on circumstances	134	18.7
Never	9	1.3
Total	717	100.0
Temporary workers/visitors	No.	%
Always	56	8.0
Depends on circumstances	369	52.5
Never	278	39.5
Total	703	100.0
Refugees	No.	%
Always	50	7.2
Depends on circumstances	260	37.2
Never	389	55.7
Total	699	100.0
Illegal immigrants	No.	%
Always	13	1.9
Depends on circumstances	76	10.9
Never	611	87.3
Total	700	100.0

Table 3.30: Right to Legal Protection		
The right to legal protection should be granted to:		
Citizens of Swaziland	No.	%
Always	648	90.5
Depends on circumstances	57	8.0
Never	11	1.5
Total	716	100.0
Temporary workers/visitors	No.	%
Always	378	53.7
Depends on circumstances	253	35.9
Never	73	10.4
Total	704	100.0
Refugees	No.	%
Always	352	50.1
Depends on circumstances	226	32.2
Never	124	17.7
Total	702	100.0
Illegal immigrants	No.	%
Always	217	30.9
Depends on circumstances	161	22.9
Never	324	46.2
Total	702	100.0

averring that citizens should enjoy all basic human rights. There is certainly a need for improved awareness that certain basic human rights should be enjoyed by all people in a country. Lest Swazi views be seen as rather harsh, however, it should be remembered that they are amongst the most generous in the region as a whole.[18]

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Several issues important to policy-makers in Swaziland emerged during the course of the National Immigration Policy Survey:

- One issue stands out as of particular importance in shaping Swazi attitudes towards foreigners: economic circumstances. Swazi who perceive themselves as poor and working class are usually less tolerant of outsiders than the better off. Otherwise, attitudes to the outsider transcend issues of class, ethnicity and educational achievements.

- One implication of this is that economic conditions, personal and national, actual and perceived will influence the reception of outsiders, including refugees, in Swaziland. This survey showed that Swazi are generally dissatisfied with those conditions and do not expect them to improve. Attitudes are therefore likely to harden rather than relax.

- When jobs are scarce and economic prospects uncertain, foreigners are often blamed for high unemployment rates. Swazis, like many others, do tend to see a relationship between the two. However, much of this is hearsay and not based on personal experience. Two-thirds say they had heard of cases where a Swazi has lost a job to a non-citizen. However, 80% of those interviewed have no personal experience of this happening to them, suggesting that the threat is more apparent than real.

- Swazi are certainly more tolerant and less xenophobic than many other peoples in the region, particularly South Africans and Namibians. A South African in Swaziland will receive a much better reception than a Swazi in South Africa. Swazi are very secure in their own identity and do not seem as threatened by outsiders. Indeed, most enjoy meeting and interacting with people from other cultures. Nationalism and a strong sense of national identity do not translate in Swaziland, as they do in so many other contexts, into an antipathy towards anyone who does not "belong."

- Possibly exaggerated because of the urban bias of the sample, many have experience of travelling and even living outside the country. They also interact regularly with non-Swazi people inside the country. Travel and interaction do tend to explain, in part, why Swazi take a positive and non-judgemental view of outsiders.

- As regards immigration and refugee policy, Swazi do not fall into the trap of so many others in the region. They recognize that people come for a variety of reasons, some good, some bad, and

they certainly do not exaggerate the foreign presence in the country. On the other hand, they do not favour an "open door" policy. They want immigration policies that are tied to economic gain for Swaziland.

- Where the Swazi could benefit is from more public education on human rights issues. Just because a person is not a Swazi does not mean that they automatically forfeit certain basic rights. Understandable perhaps, though not entirely defensible, is that those in the country illegally should not be entitled to these rights and freedoms. But when such attitudes also extend to genuine refugees and legal temporary residents, there is a definite potential problem.

- Certainly one can conclude that Swaziland's past and present experience with refugees has not left a particularly enlightened population about the country's international obligations towards refugee protection. Again, this is something that a systematic programme of public education would help to rectify.

Various policy recommendations follow from the analysis in this and the preceding chapter:

- SAMP recommends a thorough review of existing immigration and refugee policy and legislation in Swaziland. Other countries in the region are finding that their policies and legislation are no longer appropriate in a globalizing world. Swaziland could benefit from a similar overhaul.

- Within the SADC, there are growing moves towards standardization and harmonization of migration policy. Swaziland should ensure that it is au fait with these developments and position itself as a supporter of such moves. Historically, they are inevitable and the country would do well to review its policies on these issues as part of the general overview.

- There is still a need to educate the Swazi that immigrants are not necessarily a threat to Swazi economic interests. They must be aware that the poor economic performance of their country has no direct linkage to the presence of immigrants. Such awareness would encourage the Swazi to direct their energies to providing solutions to real problems confronting the Swazi economy.

- Although from the survey it can be concluded that the Swazi are not particularly xenophobic, a lot could still be done to improve the Swazi level of tolerance of people from outside. Presently, Swazi tolerance of outsiders is largely conditional upon positive contribution to the growth and development of the Swazi economy. Hence, people with skills and investment

capital are considered favourably. The Swazi need to be educated that tolerance should not necessarily be selective except in cases where there is a demonstrable inability to abide by the law.

- Similarly, a lot more could be done to educate people about the realities of Swaziland's obligations to protect refugees. Swazis need to understand that refugees living in the country, immediately on arrival, construct socio-economic networks which become a fundamental part of their lives. They can become as rooted in the country as the indigenous population. It is therefore a source of concern that an overwhelming majority of the Swazi in the survey say that refugees should never be granted permanent residence, that their rights should be curtailed when in the country and that they should be sent back to their countries.

ENDNOTES

1   Jonathan Crush, *The Struggle for Swazi Labour, 1890-1920* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1987).

2   Alan Booth, "The Development of the Swazi Labour Market, 1900-1968" *South African Labour Bulletin* 7 (1982), pp. 34-57.

3   Hamilton Simelane, *Colonialism and Economic Change in Swaziland, 1940-1960* (Manzini: JAN Publishing, 2003).

4   Alan Booth, "Capitalism and the Competition for Swazi Labour, 1945-1960" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 13(1986): 125-50; and Jonathan Crush, "The Construction of Compound Authority: Drinking at Havelock, 1938-1944" In Jonathan Crush and Charles Ambler, eds., *Liquor and Labor in Southern Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1992).

5   Booth, "Capitalism."

6   Miranda Miles, "Missing Women: Reflections on the Experiences of Swazi Migrant Women on the Rand, 1920-1970" *Geojournal* 30 (1994), pp. 85-92.

7   JoAnn McGregor, "People Without Fathers: Mozambicans in Swaziland, 1888-1993" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 20 (1994), pp. 545-68.

8   Ibid.

9   For studies of South African attitudes to non-South Africans, see David McDonald, Lovemore Zinyama, Bob Mattes and John Gay, *Challenging Xenophobia: Myths and Realities about Cross-Border Migration in Southern Africa*. SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 7, 1998; and Jonathan Crush, *Immigration, Xenophobia and Human Rights in South Africa*. SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 22, 2001.

10 David McDonald, ed., *On Borders: Perspectives on International Migration in Southern Africa* (New York and Cape Town: St Martin's Press and SAMP, 2000), p. 232; and John Oucho, Eugene Campbell and Elizabeth Mukamaambo, *Botswana: Migration Perspectives and Prospects*. SAMP Migration Policy Series, No. 19, 2000, p. 29.

11 Miles, "Missing Women."

12 McDonald, *On Borders*.

13 John Oucho and Jonathan Crush, "Contra Free Movement: South Africa and SADC Migration Protocols" *Africa Today* 48 (2001), pp.139-58.

14 Thabo Sebela, "Trans-boundary Migrancy in Southern Africa: Studies from Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland" In Jim Whitman, ed., *Migrants, Citizens and the State in Southern Africa* (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp.102-16.

15 McGregor, "People Without Fathers."

16 Ibid.

17 Ideally, the sample should also have been representative of the socio-economic and educational spread of the population of these three centres. However, in the city of Manzini the interviewers (primarily female) were

understandably extremely reluctant to conduct interviews in the low income areas, which are the areas with higher crime rates. Manzini is considered to be the leading crime area in the country. In the final analysis, 330 or 47.3% of those interviewed were holders of post graduate certificates and diplomas, while 304 or 43.6% had gone as far as grades 8 and 12. This leads to an important qualification. What this chapter therefore represents is primarily the views of urban-based, relatively well-educated Swazi people.

18 Jonathan Crush and Wade Pendleton, *Regionalizing Xenophobia? Citizen Attitudes to Immigration and Refugee Policy in Southern Africa*. SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 30, 2004.

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