

WHITHER PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA?

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Monograph No 36

April 1999

Preface

Jakkie Cilliers, Institute for Security Studies

Armed conflict in Africa since the Cold War

Tom Lodge, University of the Witwatersrand

Crisis and response in Rwanda

Ampi Mpungwe, Tanzanian Hihg Commission

The United Nations and peacekeeping in Africa

Christopher Clapham, Lancaster University

Co-operation between the UN and the OAU in the management of African conflicts

Margaret Vogt, International Peace Academy

The ECOMOG experience with peacekeeping in West Africa

Eboe Hutchful, Wayne State University

A hard look to ghe future

Mark Malan, Institute for Security Studies

This publications is published in support of Training for Peace, a project sponsored by Norway and executed by the ISS in partnership with the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI) and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

Preface

Jakkie Cilliers, Institute for Security Studies

From 21 to 23 September 1998, the Institute for Security Studies presented, in conjunction with the Faculty of Military Science (University of Stellenbosch) a symposium on **International Peace and Security: The African Experience**. This event was hosted at the South African Military Academy in Saldanha, in support of the United Nations' programme of activities to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of UN peacekeeping.

The symposium was attended by some 150 international, regional and local participants from 25 countries. It focused on past, present and future African contributions to the maintenance of

international peace and security. This monograph can neither do justice to the full range of more than thirty papers that were delivered at the symposium, nor to the rich debate that was stimulated by these presentations. Indeed, this is not the intention. The aim of this monograph is rather to provide a brief but vivid overview of contemporary efforts to keep the peace in Africa, by publishing an edited version of those papers that dealt most directly with the subject within its contemporary context. Other papers with a more historical content will be published by the Military Academy.

The six papers are of uneven length and depth of analysis, but this adds to their overall accessibility and provides a refreshing blend of practitioner reflection and scholarly analyses of possible futures for peacekeeping in Africa. Tom Lodge begins with a deceptively brief, but thorough explanation of the causes and course of conflict in Africa since the Cold War. He provides a typology of latter-day African conflicts that helps to locate the further discussion of crisis and response, and to ameliorate any accusations of inadequacy in the latter. While there is little new in his analysis, Lodge provides an essential backdrop to any discussion on conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding in Africa where communities at war are often divided into numerous factions, there is sometimes no state to speak of and agreements are of limited value in the absence of compliance mechanisms. In this context, classical peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and diplomacy face challenges that are closely related to the collapse of the African state and the nature of African societies.

Ami Mpungwe follows with an atypical analysis of the crisis and response in Rwanda during the early 1990s. Instead of focusing on the failure of the international community to prevent the genocide of 1994, Ambassador Mpungwe concentrates on the conflict resolution efforts of Rwanda's regional neighbours. He relates positive elements from his personal experience as a negotiator during the process that led to the signing of the **Arusha Peace Agreement** in August 1993. Despite the collapse of this agreement a few months later, and the tragic consequences, it is apparent that there are a number of very pertinent lessons to be learned by contemporary peacemakers in the Great Lakes region.

The international response to the conflict in Rwanda is but one of the African peace missions discussed 'with ruthless brevity' by Christopher Clapham in an analysis that is somewhat less complimentary of the Arusha peace process. In defence of the UN mission in Rwanda, Clapham asserts that the Arusha accords amounted to a settlement that *"rested on an extraordinarily naive assumption that parties engaged in an intense conflict, who had agreed to participate in peace talks for essentially tactical reasons, could be expected to abide by the provisions of a complex agreement that required them to work closely and harmoniously together."*

By no means an apologist for UN peacekeeping in Africa, Clapham nevertheless does not argue in favour of disengagement from Africa. To the contrary, he concludes with the conviction that the insistence on international consensus as a precondition for undertaking a peacekeeping operation, would be equal to giving a veto to any reticent state over UN participation. *"Sometimes it may be necessary to jump in and — without self-delusion — hope for the best."*

According to Margaret Vogt, one of the most important post-Cold War innovations in the management of international peace and security is the concept of shared responsibility between the UN and regional organisations. She highlights the challenges of creating viable regional security regimes to deal with conflict resolution in Africa, and explores the evolving relationships between such organisations and the UN. The focus is not only on the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), but also on the contributions of so-called 'subregional' organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African

Development Community (SADC).

Eboe Hutchful continues on the theme of subregional mechanisms for conflict resolution with a detailed and very forthright account of peacekeeping operations under the auspices of ECOWAS, as conducted by the ECOWAS Monitoring Group known as ECOMOG. The ECOMOG operations conducted in Liberia and Sierra Leone serve to illustrate the difficulties and pitfalls of regional peacekeeping in Africa. Despite helping to bring an end to the Liberian crisis, the ECOMOG experience warns against conflating regional security with human security. Without the ability to impose acceptable standards of governance in the West African region, Hutchful concludes that "... *the regional security mechanism is likely to degenerate into a protection racket for autocrats.*"

In the final contribution, Mark Malan echoes many of the observations made by the other authors. He points to the ubiquity of complex emergencies in Africa, to the perceived failure of UN peace operations in Africa, and to the trend towards relying on subregional organisations such as ECOWAS to 'do something' in order to terminate contemporary African wars. He also calls for an honest, no-nonsense appraisal of these trends, which must surely lead to the admission that latter-day multinational peace operations in Africa are enforcement operations that have little in common with the purpose and principles of peacekeeping. If this is so, Malan argues, then the key challenge lies in articulating appropriate principles and a set of acceptable rules for these robust interventions. The solution may lie in conceiving peace enforcement as **international law enforcement** and in devising a related military doctrine to ensure compliance with international resolutions.

Collectively, the contributors thus provide a clear and concise picture of the status of peacekeeping in Africa — past and present — and point to some hard choices that will have to be made if future multinational peace operations are to make a real difference by creating stable environments upon which to build more lasting peace. Images of the troubled African continent are thus mitigated by the idea that something meaningful can be done if there is sufficient resolve to break through the hypocrisy that often surrounds efforts at conflict resolution in Africa.

Armed conflict in Africa since the Cold War **Tom Lodge, University of the Witwatersrand**

Introduction

In 1990, it seemed reasonable to predict that the end of Cold War conflict would lead to a substantial reduction in warfare in Africa. In two major regional theatres of warfare, Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa, the breadth and duration of local conflicts had been amplified and extended by the external support received by various governments as a consequence of great power rivalries. The capacity of African states for warmaking was vastly enhanced through their role as Cold War proxies. The end of international bipolar geostrategic competition in Africa should logically have reduced such capacity. Instead, its consequence has been an overall weakening of African states and an intensification of rebellions against their authority.

The aim of this introductory contribution is to try and make some sense of this seemingly anomalous security situation, for it is difficult to deliberate on modalities for conflict resolution without such an understanding. However, the intention is not to confuse the reader with a complicated discourse dealing with the 'root causes' of specific conflicts in Africa, for such exercises can be overwhelming in their complexity. The aim is rather to provide an overview of

the different types of conflict that Africa has witnessed during this decade, according to their most salient causal origins.

Broadly speaking, a typology of Africa's armed conflicts since 1990 can be constructed under the following seven issues:

- ethnic competition for control of the state;
- regional or secessionist rebellions;
- continuation of liberation conflicts;
- fundamentalist religious opposition to secular authority;
- warfare arising from state degeneration or state collapse;
- border disputes; and
- protracted conflict within politicised militaries.

Each is briefly described and discussed below, in the hope that this will provide a simplified map of the seemingly incomprehensible and that this, in turn, will enhance the concerns over the challenges of peace and security in Africa.

Ethnic Competition for Control of the State

The two most prominent examples of such conflict are the wars in Burundi and Rwanda, both featuring struggles for ascendancy between the culturally similar Tutsi and Hutu groups. These conflicts date from the immediate post-colonial period and originate in the encouragement of ethnic rivalries by the former Belgian administration.

During 1993 in Burundi, up to 100 000 people died in the fighting which followed a *coup* attempt by the Tutsi dominated army after the electoral victory of a mainly Hutu political party. Despite the presence of an OAU contingent that arrived to supply protection for the government in December 1993, clashes between the army and Hutu militias continued. In 1996, the army deposed President Ntibantunganya (a Hutu) and replaced him with the pre-1993 incumbent, Pierre Buyoya (a Tutsi). In reaction, neighbouring countries imposed sanctions on Burundi's external trade. By 1997, about 750 000 Burundian refugees were encamped across the country's borders, mainly in Zaire. A truce agreement in July 1998 ended most of the hostilities that had caused some 200 000 deaths, mainly of civilians, in five years.

Meanwhile, in neighbouring Rwanda the death in an air-crash during April 1994 of the elected President Habyarimana triggered genocidal massacres of Tutsi communities by the Hutu army. A successful invasion from Uganda by the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the installation of an RPF government helped to establish a measure of order, though fighting between RPF units and Hutu militias based in Zairian refugee camps continued. Up to a million people died in 1994. As a consequence of the continuing militia activity in the second half of 1997, 5 000 people were killed despite RPF involvement in the Congolese war which featured massacres of Hutu refugee communities and the destruction of militia bases in Zaire.

Regional or Secessionist Rebellions

Of these rebellions, the most protracted and bloody is the civil war in Sudan which began as far back as 1957. With a single five-year interlude of peace following a settlement in 1972, the rebellion resumed again in earnest in 1983. The modern phase of the war was prompted by a government decision during 1981 to disband the regional administration that had governed the southern part of the country. In contrast to the Muslim north, the six million inhabitants of southern Sudan are mainly Christian or animist, and British imperial policy had accentuated local perceptions of colonial-style domination by the North. The imposition of Sharia laws by the Khartoum government in 1983 added impetus to the smouldering rebellion of the newly formed Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM).

Regional rivalries have helped to sustain the conflict in Sudan. During the early stages, the SPLM and its Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) received assistance from Ethiopia, Libya and South Yemen, though Libya was to change sides in 1985 with a decision to support Khartoum. During the 1990s, the Sudanese government (now led increasingly by Islamic fundamentalists) has also enjoyed the military support of Iran. By 1988, the United Nations estimated that war-related famine had killed some 260 000 people and displaced many more from their homes.

Since 1996, there has been a resurgence of SPLA hostilities which may be partly ascribed to reinvigorated support from Ethiopia, which was, in turn, prompted by suspected Sudanese complicity in an assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarak during a visit to Addis Ababa. In response, Sudan began sponsoring Ethiopian rebels operating across the Sudanese border.

In West Africa, regional rebellions have included:

- the two year Tuareg uprising in northern Niger, ending with a peace treaty in April 1994;
- intermittent local insurgencies in southern Chad; and
- the Casamance secessionist movement in southern Senegal. The latter has had the most serious consequences to date, with the rebellion displacing about 20 000 refugees.

The Casamance province of Senegal was governed by Portugal before the Congress of Berlin. Its population is drawn from communities which straddle the border with Guinea-Bissau where the insurgent Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) was based until its expulsion by troops of Guinea-Bissau in 1997. Support for the Casamance separatists had promoted divisions within the army of Guinea-Bissau, following the dismissal of its pro-Casamance Chief of Staff. These tensions sparked off an army mutiny in the country in June 1997, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is still working to resolve the resulting crisis.

Continuation of Liberation Conflicts

In Angola, peace negotiations between *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) and the Angolan government during the course of the 1990s have been accompanied by intermittent warfare. The rejection of the results of the presidential elections in September 1992 by UNITA had as its immediate sequel some of the most severe and extensive conflict experienced in Angola's thirty-year war. The 1994 Lusaka Peace Accord of 20 November 1994 was intended to launch a process of demobilisation, military integration and the formation of a coalition administration. The ousting of the Mobutu regime in Kinshasa in May 1997 weakened UNITA's support in the region and helped to explain a more conciliatory predisposition by UNITA

leadership at the end of 1997. However, the opposition movement seems to have managed to reconstruct its lines of external support and, since February 1998, there has been a significant upsurge of UNITA attacks in the north and north-east of Angola. In June 1998, the government began registering the 15 to 34 age group for military service.

The protracted character of the Angolan war is attributable to the complexities of a liberation struggle which featured three popularly-based movements competing for ascendancy. It is a reflection of an especially fragmented colonial economy and the historic cultural divisions between a Bakongo business élite in the North, a creolised intelligentsia in the coastal capital, and the leadership of a relatively prosperous peasant community which developed along the Benguela railway. Massive external military assistance to the main contenders in the war after the collapse of Portuguese rule removed any incentives for compromise, accentuating ideological distinctions between them, and hugely expanding the scope of warfare.

A violent climax in South Africa's liberation struggle was reached in the period between 1990 and 1994 when hostilities between militarised followers of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha movement, accentuated by agent provocateur activities of state-sponsored agencies, caused 14 000 deaths, mainly in KwaZulu-Natal. Political competition between and within different organisations continues to be a source of violent conflict in the province, and this was responsible for about 200 deaths in the first half of 1998.

Fundamentalist Religious Opposition to Secular Authority

Some 50 000 people have died in Algeria as a consequence of a civil war which began in February 1992 after the declaration of a state of emergency by the government in reaction to the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the first round of parliamentary elections. The strength of the Algerian Islamic movement was principally a consequence of government policies in the 1970s which included the 'Arabisation' of a rapidly expanding secondary school system and the importation of Iraqi, Egyptian and Palestinian teachers trained in modern Islamic theological centres. Accelerating demographic increases, together with the indebtedness which followed the 1985 collapse of oil prices and an increase in unemployment of 200 000 more people per year in the 1980s combined to undercut the National Liberation Front (FLN) government's legitimacy.

In 1989, in the wake of food riots, a new constitution was adopted, that provided for the establishment of a multiparty system. Of the thirty new parties which were founded, however, most included some kind of affiliation to the notion of Islam as a state religion. The largest party, the FIS, was outspoken in its antipathy not just to secular government but also to liberal democracy.

Militarised Islamic opposition movements are active in several other North African countries, including Egypt and Libya. Muslims do not hold a monopoly on anti-secular rebellions, however. In northern Uganda, for example, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), established by prophetess Alice Lekwana in 1987 (driven into Sudanese exile in 1990) seeks to establish a government in Kampala based on the Ten Commandments. In what was seen as an attempt to discourage Ugandan backing to the SPLA, the LRA was re-armed by the Sudanese authorities in 1996. Since 1996, several thousands of civilians have been killed or mutilated and some 61 000 children have been abducted — many of whom have had to serve as conscripts in LRA units.

Warefare Arising from State Degeneration or State Collapse

The Liberian, Sierra Leone and Congolese conflicts each developed in countries in which state

institutions had been weakened by decades of corrupt predatory government and élite factionalism. In the case of Zaire, progressive state incapacity was signified by the deterioration of the country's communications system. By 1980, for example, the extent of the all-season road network had shrunk to twenty per cent of its 1960 total. Stalled democratisation and inflationary currency reform helped to further reduce the moral and coercive authority of the Kinshasa government during the 1990s, as did a series of army mutinies.

By the middle of this decade, effective administration was in the hands of a number of regional fiefdoms that had been largely built around the control of smuggling routes by military chiefs. The decisive factor in the ending of Mobutu's dictatorship was the cross-border conflict between Hutu refugee communities and the RPF. Zairian army complicity in Hutu raids prompted Rwandan support for the rebellion led by Laurent Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) and ensured the effective rout of Zairian Army (FAZ) resistance in the path of its victorious march to Kinshasa. President Kabila's dependence upon external allies has been underlined by the resurgence of rebellion after his repudiation of the Rwandans in mid-1998 and the subsequent internationalisation of the Zairian conflict. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia soon sent soldiers to defend the Kinshasa government against a second Ugandan/Rwandan sponsored invasion.

The Liberian state, as with Zaire, was one of Africa's leading recipients of United States aid during the 1980s, and by 1990 also exhibited a similar degree of state incompetence. Even so, the resilience of the rebellion by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) from its inception in 1990 to Taylor's eventual electoral victory in 1997 was substantially attributable to support received from regional allies. Particularly important was the ability of the NPFL to export Liberian iron ore, rubber and timber from the zones under its control from neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire. Taylor's main customer was France, for whom the NPFL's 'Greater Liberia' became the third source of tropical hardwood. However, French sympathy for the rebellion was probably more motivated by geopolitical considerations than by commercial gain.

Taylor's rebellion was directed against the government of former army sergeant Samuel Doe, whose 1980 *coup* had overthrown Africa's oldest political regime, the True Whigs. The True Whig Party was supported by descendants of resettled American slaves who, by the 1970s, had built an administration entirely around three dominant family clusters. Doe had 'civilianised' his administration after an election in which opposition parties rejected the results as fraudulent. The NPFL rebellion was fired by tensions from this period, but also drew support from an increasingly factionalised military.

The Liberian war was complicated, if not contained, by the presence of an ECOWAS peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, mainly of Nigerian composition, that was originally invited into the country by Doe. Since 1997, however, ECOMOG inclined towards Taylor's movement which, through its control of Monrovia, had succeeded in winning electoral authority. By this stage, the course of the conflict had generated a death toll of 150 000, as well as a series of regionally based warlords jockeying for national predominance through street-fighting in Monrovia.

Liberia's war was extended to Sierra Leone in 1991, with the creation of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) by Charles Taylor who hoped to discourage the Freetown government from participation in ECOMOG through his sponsorship of a Sierra Leone rebellion. Today, the RUF rebellion against an elected government backed by ECOMOG continues, while the rebels are succoured by Liberia and Burkina Faso. Both these countries seek to contest Nigerian hegemonic predominance in the region. The Sierra Leone war is believed to have displaced

over two million people, nearly half the country's population.

The fourth major conflict arising from state collapse has endured in Somalia since 1991, when the overthrow of President Siad Barré was followed by warfare between military factions led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid and interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed. As in Liberia, the organisation of state structures around regionally-organised patronage networks based on kinship and clan systems, made it especially susceptible to fragmentation with the removal of external support for central authority. Notwithstanding the presence of a UN-authorized peacekeeping force, totalling 35 000 soldiers at one stage, intermittent fighting between various clan-based military factions has continued up to the present. The human cost has been hideous: by the end of 1992, famine attributed to military operations had killed a quarter of all Somali children under the age of five.

Protracted Conflict Within Politicised Militaries

This category should be viewed as an early symptom of state collapse. It is evident, for example, in the June 1998 mutiny of the Guinea-Bissau army, a consequence of Guinean involvement in suppressing the Senegalese Casamance secessionist movement.

In Congo-Brazzaville, feuding between army militias loyal to rival political leaderships persisted between 1993 and 1997. In 1997, Angolan army intervention ensured the supremacy of troops loyal to president Denis Sassou-Nguesso. The Angolans view the incumbent administration in Brazzaville as an ally in their efforts to contain UNITA, which historically enjoyed support from the contending military faction loyal to former President Pascal Lissouba.

In Lesotho, traditional affinity between the army and the Lesotho National Party has helped to ensure hostility between military commanders and the Basotho National Congress government which was elected in 1993, thus intensifying factionalism within command structures. The resulting tensions have generated a succession of violent mutinies, the latest of which elicited a violent response from neighbouring South Africa.

Border Disputes

Disputes over the precise location of colonial frontiers have assumed a military dimension in the cases of Nigeria and Cameroon, Eritrea and its neighbours, and Botswana and Namibia. Between 1994 and 1996, Cameroon contested Nigeria's garrisoning of the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula before both sides submitted the issue of the region's legal status to international arbitration. Sporadic fighting between Nigerian and Cameroonian soldiers caused an exodus of 5 000 refugees.

In 1993 Namibia and Botswana became involved in a dispute over ownership of the Sedudu Island in the Chobe river. Botswana claimed that its investiture of the island by the Defence Force was in response to Namibian poaching activities. National competition for control over the Okavango/Chobe water reserves is probably the main reason for the tension between the two countries. While the status of the island is now under international review, Botswana has begun an ambitious programme of military expansion.

Finally, in the Horn of Africa, the new state of Eritrea has aggressively contested its boundaries with South Yemen and Djibouti, and most recently, with Ethiopia. In May 1998, large-scale tank and artillery battles between Eritrea and Ethiopia followed the Eritrean military occupation of the Yigra triangle, a barren 400-square kilometre region of desert. Subsequently both countries have mounted bombing raids on each other's towns. Part of the background to this dispute was

Ethiopia's refusal to accept currency parity after Eritrea's launch of the Nafka, the related cessation of Ethiopian purchases from Eritrea's oil refinery, mutual complaints about smuggling, and discrimination against Ethiopians in the Asmara job market.

Conclusion

Some of the most severe and protracted civil wars have occurred in countries in which the state has been especially weak. State weakness is sometimes a consequence of the absence of substantial precolonial political institutions (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia) which is often compounded by a particularly cursory brand of colonial administration (Sierra Leone, Somalia, southern Sudan). These factors are compounded by the absence of a unifying popular mobilisation by anti-colonial nationalist movements (Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo, and Somalia).

Another important characteristic of contemporary conflicts in Africa has been their escalation as a consequence of national rivalries within regions, especially over the acquisition of regional hegemonic status. In particular, the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, largely an expression of Nigeria's ambitions for regional political ascendancy, has prompted a proliferation and perpetuation of armed struggles in Sierra Leone. The displacement into exile of large refugee communities has been a further source of regional conflict proliferation, one that has been especially important in extending the scope of the conflict in the Great Lakes region.

Religious opposition to secular states is a comparatively new source of serious militarised insurgency in Africa. This is not because Islamic or Christian fundamentalism in itself is especially novel, but rather because powerful governments have proved willing to support such movements since the 1980s. Moreover, the expansion of secondary education and the changing status of youth have vastly increased the constituents of transnational religious movements.

Demographic shifts in favour of young people, struggles over resources (especially land), and warfare itself have seriously eroded patriarchal authority in Africa. One particularly grim consequence of these changes has been the enlistment of very young children as combatants in wars in Uganda, Sudan, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and, of course, South Africa.

Finally, it is sobering to note that, together with sacred rebellions against the bureaucracies inherited from colonial empires, there is a fresh propensity to challenge the frontiers laid down by the Congress of Berlin and sanctioned for three decades by the Organisation of African Unity. This suggests that even in those regions that are not characterised by state collapse, the authority of the African state system, so remarkably stable over the last century, is facing unprecedented challenges.

Crisis and response in Rwanda Ampi Mpungwe, Tanzanian Hihg Commission

Introduction

Most treatises on the Rwandan crisis of the early 1990s have focused on the failure of the international community to prevent the genocide and to bring peace and security to this tiny African country. This is not surprising, for the tragedy of these events should indeed continue to sound a wake-up call for those who turn a blind eye to the plight of victims in Africa. However, by concentrating too hard on the negative aspects of a perceived 'UN failure', some of the

positive lessons may be missed that can be learned from a regional peace process that actually worked, and worked well — up to a point.

Political tensions and conflicts in Rwanda have had a long history, dating back to the colonial period and even prior to that. The aim of this contribution, however, is to provide some perspective on that part of the conflict situation in Rwanda which immediately preceded and eventually culminated in the Arusha peace process. The emphasis is on regional and international response patterns and strategies in the conflict which erupted into civil war in Rwanda in October 1990. In particular, this is an attempt to share personal experiences gained during the Arusha peace process, beginning with the preparatory stages to its conclusion in August 1993.

While some thoughts are also shared on the long-term prospects for sustainable peace and stability in Rwanda and the entire Great Lakes region, the conclusion focuses on lessons learned. It is hoped that a few of these lessons particularly arising from the nature and character of the conflict, as well as the regional and international responses to it, may be noted by those engaged in attempts at resolving the ongoing conflicts in the Great Lakes region and elsewhere in Africa.

The Start of the Latest Civil War

Despite its small geographic size and landlocked position, the nature of the conflict situation in Rwanda is essentially much more complex and deeply rooted than is generally perceived. Its roots are probably as deep as the apartheid conflict in South Africa, and its complexity can be likened to that of the conflict in Palestine, Northern Ireland and, to a certain extent, in Bosnia. These conflicts, by their very nature and character, are extremely tenacious because they revolve around the fundamentals of human life: land, safety, security, identity, recognition, esteem and unhindered opportunities for human development as a whole.

Within Rwanda, the above characteristics are further reflected in the equally deeply rooted mutual suspicion, fear, distrust, hatred and even contempt among members of the two main ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi. These cleavages have persisted despite the fact that the two groups share a common language and culture, with intermarriages across ethnic lines further serving to blur objective differences. However, many decades of conflicting ethnic ideologies led to unequal opportunities for the different ethnic groups of Rwanda. One group would deny the other the right to freely enjoy the most fundamental political and human rights; to rise to the fullest potential; to be respected and esteemed; and to secure those rights and conditions for themselves, their children and their children's children.

Under such conditions, ethnic and political tensions have defined the Rwandan society. Ethnic-driven (although sometimes camouflaged) violent political eruptions assumed a cyclical character in the late 1950s, 1963, 1972 and again in the genocide of 1994. The Tutsi people became the main victims of these repetitive cyclical massacres and political killings, in addition to the continual internal repression of both Tutsis and Hutus in various geographical locations (depending upon who wielded the power).

Throughout this period, there had been significant numbers of Tutsis in exile, many of whom had frequently but unsuccessfully attempted to return to Rwanda. However, following adequate political and military preparations inside Uganda, the political crisis in Rwanda reached a climax on 1 October 1990, when the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the military wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded the country, using Uganda as its rear base. At that stage, the

fundamental issues nationally were the power structure and powersharing, and the related issues of refugee repatriation and an immediate halt to massacres and political suppression.

The external military pressure from the RPF, coupled with internal political pressure, compelled the late President Habyarimana, very unwillingly, to undertake political reforms and embrace the concept of multiparty democracy in December 1990. However, these measures turned out to be too little and were instituted too late in the day: the war between the government and RPF forces raged on while the internal political pressures and resistance further intensified.

The Initial Response

The nature and character of the initial response by regional neighbours, when the war broke out in October 1990, fell squarely within the prevailing paradigm of African responses to internal conflicts. It was based on the 'summit' approach. The initial objectives were to achieve a peaceful settlement to the conflict, beginning with a cessation of the hostilities or a cease-fire agreement.

Several rounds of regional summits were held in this regard, with the first held in Mwanza, Tanzania, on 17 October 1990. Subsequent summits were held in Gbadolite, former Zaire (26 October 1990); Goma, former Zaire (20 November 1990); Zanzibar, Tanzania (17 February 1991); Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania (19 February 1991), N'sele, former Zaire (29 March 1991), and again in Gbadolite, former Zaire (18 September 1991).

This proliferation of summits which characterised the regional response to the conflict in Rwanda, between October 1990 when the conflict erupted, until September 1991, did eventually produce a cease-fire agreement (at N'sele on 29 March 1991) which was later amended at Gbadolite on 16 September 1991. However, the cease-fire agreement was short-lived, as President Habyarimana, despite his political and diplomatic overtures, still believed in the military solution, and conflicting interests among regional and international players denied the agreement the total and genuine support that was imperative for its success.

The Arusha Peace Process

The breakdown of the N'sele cease-fire agreement resulted in the continuation and intensification of the war in Rwanda. However, the subsequent military realities on the battlefield, experienced during the first quarter of 1992, forced both parties to genuinely reach out for a peaceful solution, even if for a limited spell and on a trial basis. As a result, the parties to the conflict (the Rwandan coalition government and the RPF delegations) decided to meet directly in Belgium and France between May and June 1992, to negotiate and finally reach agreement on a framework for a settlement. While President Mobutu remained the mediator of the talks, President Mwinyi of Tanzania was unanimously appointed to be the facilitator, and Arusha became the preferred venue for the negotiations. The parties also requested the continued active involvement of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in the negotiations, as well as that of regional neighbours. Other observers came from France, Belgium, the United States, Germany and the United Nations.

In its preparatory work, the Tanzanian team² co-ordinated and presided over the negotiating process. It spent much time between February and June 1992 in an attempt to evolve a comprehensive appreciation of the deeply rooted character of the conflict, in both its historical and prevailing dynamics. This was done largely through quiet but regular and consistent communication with all the key players in the conflict. The team also learned valuable lessons from the gaps that became apparent in the 'summit' approach, as well as from the experience of

the resolution models of other conflicts in Africa, particularly those in Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and the transition process that was taking place in South Africa at the time.

Potentially successful factors were built into the negotiation framework, while factors that could lead to failure were set aside or eliminated. One major decision was to move away from the 'summit' approach and focus on the finer details of the conflict. The team also took note of the positive disposition that had evolved among the parties to the conflict. This was largely occasioned by the fact that the government forces had suffered serious defeats at the battlefield while the RPF force, though victorious, was still perceived to be a Tutsi minority force and doubts remained with regard to the sustainability of its control over a Hutu majority country.

A comprehensive settlement framework was finalised with the two parties in Dakar, Senegal, in June 1992, during the OAU summit. It contained clear goals and objectives for the entire process, including an elaborate road map and visible signposts for a negotiation process that would lead to sustainable peace and stability in Rwanda, through a working democratic order, respect for human rights and good governance. The challenge, of course, would be to reach a negotiated agreement on appropriate implementation strategies.

The Arusha Peace Negotiations

Two days after the negotiations started on 10 July 1992 in Arusha, a cease-fire agreement was signed. At that stage, it was particularly brought to the attention of the parties to the conflict that no meaningful peace negotiations could start unless a working cease-fire was in place. Besides outlining modalities for the cessation of hostilities, the cease-fire agreement also provided for a monitoring role to be played by the OAU, through the deployment of a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG). Military observers were provided by Senegal and Mali (Francophone) and Zimbabwe and Nigeria (Anglophone), with a mandate to monitor both the RPF and the government forces.

Observers from neighbouring countries were deliberately excluded, in order to avoid any undue influence arising from regionally vested interests. Furthermore, the parties had also agreed to the creation of a Joint Political Military Commission (JPMC) with the dual mandate of monitoring and implementing the cease-fire agreement and ultimately, the peace agreement. It is important to note that, as a result of the high level of trust and confidence that was built into the Arusha peace process, a working cease-fire prevailed throughout the thirteen-month negotiating phase, with only fifty monitors on the ground to undertake oversight under the auspices of the OAU.

The negotiations, forging ahead almost on a continuous basis and building on the momentum gained on the way, saw the signing of the **Protocol on the Rule of Law** on 18 August 1992. This Protocol identified and addressed the main sources of the conflict and defined the principles, structures and processes of establishing a new order in Rwanda based on national unity, reconciliation, democracy, pluralism and respect for the fundamental principles of human rights.

It took almost another five months to negotiate and agree on the **Protocol on Power Sharing** which was signed on 9 January 1993. The Protocol identified and created organs of state with their respective powers to be proportionally shared by the main political forces during the transitional period. These organs were the presidency; the broad-based transitional government; the transitional National Assembly and the judiciary.

The **Protocol on the Repatriation of Refugees and Resettlement of Displaced Persons** was

eventually signed on 9 June 1993. It laid down the mechanisms for voluntary repatriation of refugees who were scattered all over the neighbouring countries and further afield, as well as their resettlement in Rwanda. The resettlement of refugees and that of internally displaced persons would have to take place amid the practical realities of the shortage of land in Rwanda.

Apart from the **Protocol on Power Sharing**, perhaps the most difficult protocol to negotiate in the Arusha process, was the one on the formation of a new national army, through the integration of the two forces of the parties to the conflict. The negotiations started in January 1992 and were concluded on 3 August 1993 with the signing of the **Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces**. In addition to the provision of a formula for vertical and horizontal integration, particularly in command and control areas, the adjusted proportional composition of the rank and file also offered ethnic balance and assurances. This substantially allayed fears about the possibility of one element of the military surprising or over-running the other. The Protocol defined the mission, size, and structure of the force, as well as procedures for the assembly and integration of the two forces into a National Army and *gendarmerie* (police). It did the same for other security organs, i.e. Security and Intelligence, Prisons and Immigration. The role of the Neutral International Forces, which was to oversee the transitional process, was also clearly defined.

The **Protocol on Miscellaneous Matters and Final Provisions** was also signed on 3 August 1993. It dealt with additional issues such as:

- the determination of the duration of the transitional period;
- the timetable for the implementation of the peace agreement;
- the relationship between the peace agreement and the National Constitution; and
- procedures for the indictment of the President in case of violations of the peace agreement.

Finally, in the presence of all the regional leaders, the comprehensive **Arusha Peace Agreement** was signed by President Habyarimana and the then Chairman of the RPF, Colonel Alexis Kanyarwenge, on 4 August 1993. At that stage, the Arusha peace process was heralded as Africa's most strategic and successful response to an African conflict to date. It was one of those rare occasions when an African conflict was seen to have been resolved in Africa by African people themselves.

For the first time ever, the people of Rwanda, across all ethnic and political divides, had resolved their armed conflict peacefully, on their own, but with the strong support of their regional neighbours and the active participation of the OAU which provided a Military Observer team. A working relationship between the OAU and the UN also evolved out of the Arusha peace process, including a clearly defined role for international co-operation. The Arusha peace process also became a positive prelude to the formation of the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution that was instituted after the adoption of a resolution at the Cairo OAU Summit of July 1993.

Success, Failure and Apathy

The greatest success of the Arusha peace process is to be found in the manner in which it managed to restore trust and confidence among Rwandans of different ethnic groups — through addressing all the key areas in detail which had contributed to the conflict situation in Rwanda

over decades. This was largely made possible by adopting a negotiation strategy which encouraged the parties to negotiate issues directly and in their own language with a view to achieve clear and common understanding on every issue that was negotiated.

The negotiation process, which lasted for thirteen months, had all the time that was needed, and tackled every piece of detail which helped to remove fear, distrust and hatred. In turn, the process built confidence and trust in an evolutionary and incremental manner among the parties to the conflict.

The successful implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, therefore, depended greatly on the sustainability of this trust, confidence and positive spirit, throughout the implementation phases. This could only be achieved if the time schedules, which were painstakingly negotiated and agreed upon, were adhered to — particularly those related to putting the transitional structures in place. These structures were critical in keeping the positive spirit alive, removing obstacles, and pushing the process forward.

The UN, which was entrusted with the responsibility of creating the requisite environment for the establishment and operation of those structures through the deployment of adequate military and civilian observers, would therefore play a decisive role in the success of the implementation process.

Without attempting to apportion any blame, it was unfortunate that the bureaucratic procedures of the UN did not allow for the timely deployment of the requisite number of military observers. This had an extremely negative impact on the adherence to time schedules and delayed the establishment of the transitional structures. Other developments within the region also opened up old fears and distrust that had been allayed by the Arusha process. In particular, the assassination of the democratically elected Hutu President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, revived animosities among the extremist Hutus of Rwanda. Rwanda's regional neighbours and the OAU should also have maintained closer observation of the developments in the immediate post-Arusha phase, instead of putting all the hope and responsibility in the hands of the UN.

The combination of the above omissions availed much time and space for the forces supporting the *status quo* inside Rwanda to plan, train and arm the Interahamwe forces, without the existence of any neutral structure to monitor, control and prevent. Those extreme Hutu elements saw danger in peace and security in war and were thus able to bring the Arusha spirit to a sad end, through the genocide in April 1994, which led to the loss of a million lives.

When the massacres started, the response of the international community to the collapse of the **Arusha Peace Agreement** was disappointing to say the least. The little action that was taken, was largely *ad hoc*, incoherent and unco-ordinated. At best, this was limited to the provision of relief and emergency supplies to refugees and displaced persons — particularly during the short period that CNN, the BBC, Sky News and other media networks were broadcasting shocking television images of the genocide.

Even that minimal response was largely driven by the concerned and sympathetic attitudes and outcry expressed by public opinion, and not by the moral and political leadership of the so-called pioneers and leaders of the new global order of humanisation. The limited response in providing relief and emergency supplies to victims of genocidal murder had about the same effect as an aspirin would have on a dying patient.

Beyond the Genocide

Without going into the details of the final and bloody round of civil war in Rwanda, the peace that has eventually emerged, is a fragile one that has to be nurtured. Medium to long-term prospects for sustainable peace and stability in Rwanda would very much hinge upon the continued ability of the RPF government to stabilise the country. This will require the maintenance of sufficient political space to establish and strengthen an inclusive political system that is underpinned by democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights and good governance.

Long-term prospects for an enlarged and meaningful political space for Rwandans would largely depend on the ability and commitment of the people themselves. The government and people need to work closely with the international community, to evolve creative development models that take full account of both the troubled history of Rwanda and the densely populated, small sized and landlocked characteristics of the country. These should be economic models and strategies that would facilitate substantial economic growth, poverty alleviation and employment creation — models that move beyond absolute dependency on the limited land and peasant agriculture.

There must also be effective regional dimensions to these endeavours. Certainly, the political developments surrounding Rwanda, in the rest of the Great Lakes region, should be considered. Significant support by the international community should also aim at the strengthening of the regional economic co-operation structures such as the Kagera Basin Organisation (KBO), East African Co-operation (EAC) and the Great Lakes States Economic Community (GLSEC). Strategies that would lead to internal and regional economic integration are quite critical in the endeavours to widen political and economic space inside Rwanda, as well as in the rest of the Great Lakes region.

It is heartening to note that, inside Rwanda, particularly after many years of wars and massacres, a critical mass of citizens exist who perceive themselves as national rather than ethnic members. These people only need a supportive environment to entrench and expand into a dominant political force, that would enhance and reinforce a civic culture and national ethos that seeks to establish and deepen the roots of democracy, respect for human rights and principles of good governance. They have realised that conflict and wars are running out of fashion in the world, as so many countries become focused on issues of economic growth, based on sustainable peace and stability.

Conclusion

In the midst of renewed turmoil and armed conflict involving several countries and many peoples in the Great Lakes region, there are some pertinent lessons to be learned from the Arusha peace process. It is clear, for example, that the endeavours of African countries to deal effectively with political conflict on the continent should begin with a proper and objective appreciation of the nature and character of those conflicts. Deep-rooted conflicts are obviously more difficult to resolve than more recent conflicts which revolve around disagreements over, for example, common boundaries (as in the case of the Namibia-Botswana border dispute) or the authenticity of election results (as in the case of Lesotho).

This factor challenges anyone who attempts to resolve deep-rooted conflicts on a lasting and sustainable basis, to evolve a different model and strategies of conflict resolution than those that are usually applied in short-lived conflicts. The Arusha peace process amply demonstrated this fact, as opposed to the 'summit' approach that had preceded it. The Arusha peace process included only one summit that occurred, appropriately, during the signing ceremony of the **Arusha Peace Agreement** on 4 August 1993.

The commencement of the negotiation process should be preceded by sufficient evidence of the existence of a positive disposition to a negotiated settlement among all parties, arrived at on their own or through inducements and assurances that discount the efficacy of military solutions. In the absence of such a positive disposition, the process would be characterised more by posturing than actual movement, as indeed happened during the 'summit' phase of 1990/1991.

There must also be adequate preparations on the part of the mediators, in terms of a negotiation framework which has clear and shared goals and objectives, as well as a thoroughly worked out road map and signposts that can guide the peace drivers to the intended destination. The negotiation process requires sufficient time, energy and resources, in order to address and reverse all the elements that, until then, sustained mutual hatred, fear and distrust. This must be done in a manner that also builds trust and confidence among the belligerents, in an evolutionary and incremental manner. It is a serious miscalculation to assume that the resolution of a deeply rooted conflict can easily be achieved through inducing changes in attitudes among the belligerents — or that their hate, rage, fears, distrust and expectations can simply be dealt with through moral and political appeals or the imposition of political or military force.

It is unfortunate but quite understandable that a 'summit' approach usually runs short of both the time and the details that are required to address all the critical issues. However, such an approach to deeply rooted conflicts has the positive advantage of raising the moral and political profile of the conflict. It demonstrates a high level of commitment and may unleash sufficient synergy to advance any generally supported subsequent initiatives and processes. Summits and their available resources can be used effectively to advance the peace process where more detailed negotiations get stuck.

The experience gained from the 'summit' approach to conflict resolution in Rwanda has also brought to the fore the importance of unity of purpose among the regional and external players engaged in mediation. The existence of divisions and the pursuit of vested interests among regional and other external players, at the expense of the core focus on the internal challenges of the conflict, tend to reduce rather than enhance the chances for early solution. Similarly, multiple rather than unified and focused initiatives tend to confound the search for solutions. When there are multiple initiatives, it is always difficult to confine one or some of the parties to a specific framework which enjoys broad support.

In view of the profound distrust, fear and suspicions that characterise deep-rooted conflicts, the neutrality of and confidence in the mediator among all parties to the conflict, are quite critical. The initial designation of the late President Mobutu as mediator did not augur well for the meaningful resolution of the Rwandan conflict, largely because of his vested interest and personal friendship with the late President Habyarimana. The best case scenario would be to encourage the parties to the conflict to negotiate directly, where possible on their own territory, as happened with the conflict resolution process in South Africa. If this should not be possible, a neutral mediator who is acceptable and enjoys the confidence of both parties should be identified and deployed.

Finally, the most meaningful response in dealing with deeply rooted conflicts needs to encompass effective follow-through mechanisms and requires the active engagement of all regional neighbours and the international community as a whole. Regional developments must also be closely monitored as they tend to affect the implementation of any peace plan. Unfortunately, this was the weakest point in the Arusha Peace Agreement, which contributed greatly to its collapse.

Endnotes

1. Ambassador Ami Mpungwe was directly involved with attempts to solve the political conflict in Rwanda. From July 1992 to August 1993, he was appointed by the government of Tanzania to co-ordinate and chair the Arusha peace negotiations on Rwanda. He was honoured to do so on behalf of the President of Tanzania, who was the regional facilitator for the negotiations.
2. This team was lead by the author.

The United Nations and peacekeeping in Africa **Christopher Clapham, Lancaster University**

Introduction

Africa has been by far the most important regional setting for the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations.¹ During the Cold War period, the sole substantial UN engagement in peacekeeping on the continent (if the operation in Sinai is excluded), the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC, 1960-64), dwarfed all other activities in this field in which the UN was involved.² Of the thirty peacekeeping operations established by the UN since 1988, fourteen, or nearly half, have been in Africa.³ Several of these operations, such as the UN's role in monitoring the 1994 elections in South Africa, have been minor in scope, and would scarcely qualify as 'peacekeeping' in the normal sense of the word. But others, such as those in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, and most of all in Somalia, have been among the organisation's most important initiatives in peacekeeping and conflict resolution since the end of the Cold War.

For better or worse, Africa has had a critical impact in defining the limits and possibilities of the post-Cold War global order, and the place of the UN within it. An assessment of this record should therefore help to provide some understanding of the role of the UN, of peacekeeping, and even of Africa in the emerging global order — or disorder.

The United Nations

The obvious place to start is with the UN itself, even though it must immediately be pointed out that much of its record cannot fairly be ascribed to the organisation, but has reflected the dilemmas that any attempt to resolve often intense and intractable problems would have confronted. Even in cases where the UN may be regarded as having failed (and it has also had some important successes), there is generally little to suggest that another organisation, such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), would have done any better. Nonetheless, the UN does bring to the task not only some distinctive capabilities, but also a number of weaknesses.

On the positive side, it has the enormous advantage of constituting the world's sole global political organisation, with the authority to act (to the extent that it is able to obtain agreement among its leading members) on behalf of the international community as a whole. In so far as there is anything that can be described as 'the international community', the UN is its voice. Against that, its weaknesses, to a large extent, are the mirror image of its strengths. The end of the Cold War, while liberating the UN to play something approaching the task envisaged by its founders in 1945, has also revealed the constraints under which the task would inevitably have to be carried out — in the process disappointing many of the exaggerated expectations that arose in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The UN must obtain broad agreement to its actions in the first place, if not among all its members, then at least among the most important of them, and especially the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council. Deployment of any force requires the support of two-thirds of the members of the Security Council (currently nine out of fifteen), and the absence of a veto from any of the P5. The UN is thus not an autonomous actor, but the expression of an international consensus, to the extent that it is possible to obtain. This issue on the whole, has been less problematic in Africa than in much of the rest of the world. The continent did not form one of the major focuses for superpower hegemony or competition (unlike, say, Central America and Central Europe on the one hand, or the Middle East and South-east Asia on the other), so that compromise between the superpowers was more readily obtained here than elsewhere. This helps to account for the relative success of both ONUC (despite some major differences between the United States and the Soviet Union), and of the Angola-Namibia accords of 1988.

It is also worth noting that, although Africa's two major former colonial powers, the United Kingdom and France, are among the P5, no major UN operation (among which would be included those in Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia and Western Sahara) has taken place in former French or British colonies, except for Somalia which includes the former British Somaliland.⁴ While the British or (especially) French presence on the Security Council has sometimes been significant, for example, in obtaining UN authority for the controversial *Opération Turquoise* in Rwanda in 1994, it has affected the role of the UN in Africa far less than might have been expected. The role of the US, on the other hand, has been critical on occasion, most obviously in Somalia, but also in the tragically misguided decision to withdraw the bulk of forces deployed in the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from the country at the outbreak of the genocide in April 1994.

The internal politics of such a large and peculiarly constructed organisation as the UN have also affected the management of peacekeeping operations in Africa. These have not only included the relationship between the secretariat (and especially the Secretary-General) and the P5 states, but also that between headquarters in New York and operations on the ground. Secretaries-General, invariably drawn from fairly small states (and in the case of the last two incumbents from Africa itself), tend to favour a more activist role than the major powers, and one which the US in particular has been reluctant to pay for. Nor has the standing of the Secretary-General himself been entirely beyond question: regional perceptions of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's actions in the Horn of Africa were deeply affected by policies with which he had been associated in his previous position in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. In the case of both Somalia and Rwanda — to revert to two of the most traumatic experiences of attempted peacekeeping in Africa — the UN found itself both at odds with the leader of its operations on the ground (Mahomed Sahnoun in Somalia, Romeo Dallaire in Rwanda), and on other occasions unable to exercise operational control over forces (US Rangers in Somalia, the French in Rwanda) which were at least technically deployed under its authority.

The UN, moreover, has had to act in collaboration with both major member states and with regional organisations and powers. This was indeed envisaged in the **UN Charter**, but in practice has meant that, rather than laying down the framework of a global order that would be implemented through other organisations at the regional level, it has had to put together coalitions of states and organisations in order to operate at all, in the process becoming the prisoner of its allies to some extent. At least in Africa, this has been most evident in Liberia, where the UN only entered the scene as an adjunct to the regional initiative put together by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which, in itself, was heavily under the influence of the hegemonic ambitions of its major state, Nigeria, and indeed the personal contacts and economic interests of Nigeria's rulers. That Nigeria had a government that was

both military and notoriously corrupt added to the embarrassment, but did nothing to alter the fact that no settlement was possible without Nigerian engagement.

In the abortive Arusha agreement on Rwanda, the UN was brought in to assist in guaranteeing a settlement negotiated in association with the OAU, whose Secretary General, former Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Salim Ahmed Salim was anxious to use it to enhance the organisation's standing in the resolution of conflicts within African member states. On some occasions, as for example in Mozambique, the UN's ability to work with a broadly united set of regional states has greatly enhanced its capacity. On others, as in Somalia, the endemic conflicts of the Horn meant that there was no effective regional security structure to back up the UN intervention, a deficiency scarcely rectified by attempts to bring, in addition to the OAU, the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in on the act. In short, regional partnerships are often unavoidable, and are usually essential to success, but also place constraints on the kind of settlement that the UN is able to seek.

The United Nations is thus a cumbersome participant in the attempted settlement of Africa's fluid and complex conflicts. Hampered by its peculiar decision-making mechanisms, chronically short of cash, constantly having to look over its shoulder to the demands of major powers, it is characteristically under pressure to find cheap and quick-fix solutions to conflicts — the ruthless factionalism of Liberian or Somali warlords, for instance, or the appalling ethnic divisions of Burundi and Rwanda — which are almost impossible to understand from distant New York. But it is likewise inconceivable, on the other hand, that such conflicts could be resolved without any involvement on the part of the global organisation.

Whatever the appeal of 'African solutions to African problems', neither the OAU nor individual African states or subregional organisations have the resources required to reach and implement such solutions. Nor have attempts by individual external states to create frameworks for regional security in Africa led to anything more than a slanging match between the two most prominent of these states, the US and France. Some African conflicts have generated an extraordinary proliferation of 'special envoys' from all manner of regional organisations (including entirely non-African ones such as the European Union), attempting to negotiate settlements, at best only in partial collaboration with one another. The UN, for all its problems, is the only body capable of superimposing any global coherence on the search for regional order.

Peacekeeping in Africa⁵

The problems that the UN has had to face in Africa also reflect the peculiar difficulties of peacekeeping itself, and the wide divergence between what may be regarded as the 'classic' role of peacekeeping and, especially in Africa, the kinds of conflict which the UN and other would-be peacekeepers have been called on to resolve. Classic peacekeeping, as James has defined it, "*... refers to the international help which is sometimes sent to an immediate problem area when disputing states wish, at least for the time being, to live in peace.*"⁶ Critical to this conception of peacekeeping are that the peace to be kept is one between disputing states, and that these states — at least provisionally and temporarily — have agreed on some basis for living in peace, which external forces are then called on to help police. This agreement, in turn, creates the conditions for what Margaret Carey has identified as the basic principles of peacekeeping:⁷

- that it should take place with the consent of the states in conflict;
- that the peacekeepers should act as impartial brokers; and

- that force should be used only in self-defence.

No major African peacekeeping operation, whether undertaken by the UN or by anyone else, has met these conditions. Most importantly, no such operation has involved any conflict between states at all. Direct conflicts between states in Africa have been relatively rare, and none of those that have taken place have involved any substantial commitment of resources to peacekeeping operations.⁸ At most, they have involved only relatively low-level attempts at mediation or demarcation, by the UN in the case of the Nigeria-Cameroon and Chad-Libya border disputes,⁹ and by other states and organisations in the dispute between Eritrea and Yemen. Virtually all African conflicts which have involved external peacekeepers or peacemakers have been conflicts within states, even though such conflicts have often involved — as a result of the permeability of Africa's state frontiers, and tacit or overt support for conflicting parties by external states — an international dimension.

Such conflicts not only create major operational difficulties, which will be touched upon in later in this article, but they also raise critical issues of standing. The UN, like other international organisations, is an organisation of states: it is indeed the global 'trade union' of states. The **UN Charter** rests on the distinction between 'domestic' and 'international' spheres at critical points, and the organisation has only very limited powers to intervene in matters which concern the domestic jurisdiction of states. Chapter VII of the **UN Charter** does permit the UN to concern itself with any issue that presents a threat to international peace and security, a formula that has been used to enable it to involve itself in a number of essentially internal conflicts, including the issue of apartheid in South Africa, for example, but that it should become involved at all in the issues that have captured its attention in Africa is at least paradoxical.

The state-centredness of the UN instantly renders the premise of impartiality extremely problematic. While it is possible for an institution formed in this way to remain impartial in issues concerning two or more of its own member states, it is scarcely possible for it to remain so with regard to conflicting parties which are states and ones which are not. For a start, it normally requires the consent of the state concerned to become involved in the conflict in the first place (if it can identify such a state — and in Somalia it could not); and such consent is only likely to be given if the government concerned believes that such involvement will benefit itself. Furthermore, the operating principles and assumptions of institutions formed by states will almost inevitably incline them towards solutions conceived in statist terms, notably the maintenance of the territorial integrity of an existing state, and the extension of effective state control over the whole of its territory. This obviously does not vitiate the possibility of the UN becoming involved in conflict-resolution in Africa, or at least sometimes, of such involvement being successful. It does mean, however, that it is only likely to be successful if the parameters of the eventual resolution are implicitly accepted from the outset.

It was implicit, for example, in the resolution of the conflicts both in Mozambique (where it was generally successful) and in Angola (where it tragically failed) that the respective incumbent governments of the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo) and the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) would stay in power, and that the conflict resolution processes would essentially involve the negotiation of appropriate 'side payments' (such as specified positions in central government, or a limited degree of autonomy in running the governments of particular regions) to the main opposition group. It is barely possible to conceive what would have happened had Frelimo or the MPLA lost their respective elections to the National Resistance Movement in Mozambique (Renamo) or the *União Nacional para a Independência de Angola* (UNITA), and the insurgents had consequently demanded the right to form new governments in Maputo or Luanda. One can safely assume, however, that no smooth handover

would have occurred.

Indeed, it was the recognition by key elements in the incumbent National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRNDD) power structure that the full acceptance of the **Arusha Peace Agreement** would have involved their exclusion from power that triggered the Rwandan genocide of 1994. It is almost equally inconceivable that the UN (much less the OAU) could carry the responsibility for a peace settlement that involved the dismemberment of the territory of an existing state. Once the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia had been agreed to by the two governments concerned, for example, it was possible for the UN to become involved (in a very limited capacity) to validate the results of the subsequent referendum through which the division was formally legitimated. For the UN to propose such a separation in the first place, against the opposition of the Ethiopian government, would scarcely have been possible.

The fact that peacekeepers (or the states that send them) inevitably arrive with implicit agendas of their own creates difficulties in the relationship between the peacekeepers and the 'peacekept'.¹⁰ In particular, those whose prospects for success are diminished by the presence of peacekeepers will treat them with suspicion or hostility, even if they have been induced by external pressure to agree to their arrival in principle. In turn, this is likely to lead to incidents, often of an apparently quite trivial kind, which serve to deepen suspicions on either side, and may eventually lead — as most obviously in the breakdown of relations first between the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and subsequently the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and Mahomed Farah Aidid — to the outbreak of open conflict between the peacekeepers and one of the domestic parties. It was likewise evident that the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) was implicitly hostile to Savimbi and UNITA (and for very good reason, many would add), and that relations between the two were always liable to break down, whereas relations between UNAVEM and the government in Luanda, however strained they sometimes may have been, rested on the solid understanding that both were ultimately trying to achieve the same objective of a settlement to the war that would leave the MPLA in power.

Engagement in peacekeeping operations in civil conflicts, inherently more invidious and usually also more hazardous than the simple interposition of a peacekeeping force between states that have already agreed to the conditions for its deployment, also raises tricky questions about the composition of the force itself. Operations of this kind, of which the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia provide non-African examples, are less likely to be restricted to forces provided by the generally small, distant and neutral states which have formed the backbone of 'classical' peacekeeping operations. They are more likely to draw on major states which have hegemonic ambitions (which also, of course, involve hegemonic responsibilities) that, in turn, affect perceptions of their neutrality. The extreme case of such hegemonic involvement is that of French forces in *Opération Turquoise*, but the leading roles of the US in UNITAF, and of Nigeria in the the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) force in Liberia, are equally clear.

It should be emphasised that there is nothing inherently wrong with hegemony, which may indeed be necessary to ensure the stability of potentially highly unstable regional systems, and which characteristically requires any would-be hegemon to assume the often considerable costs involved in maintaining order.¹¹ However, it does move peacekeeping firmly out of the sphere of pure benevolence and global good citizenship in which it is often placed, and into that of power politics. Hegemonic peacekeeping, which involves participation by an alliance of states under the leadership of a dominant power, also raises issues within the alliance itself, since other players may be pursuing agendas at least partially at variance with those of the leader.

The Italian forces engaged in Operation Restore Hope, for example, evidently had as their primary objective the restoration of Italian influence in a former colony, which in turn led to an extreme reluctance to become involved in any activity which might create political difficulties, and to a preference for handling potentially tricky problems by bribery rather than force. Forces from Guinea and Sierra Leone in ECOMOG, obviously concerned about the impact of the Liberian war on their own neighbouring territories, likewise had agendas which did not always coincide with those of the Nigerian leadership of the operation.

In summary, peacekeepers in Africa have been plunged into the most intractable problems in attempting to maintain some kind of order on one of the world's most violent and unstable continents. For them the relatively straightforward tasks of merely policing agreements between states are not an option. They have been called on, rather, to prop up (or re-create) collapsing states; to intervene in vicious civil wars; and to negotiate and, if need be, enforce peace settlements among conflicting parties whose commitment to any peaceful resolution of conflicts was often at best extremely uncertain, and at worst no more than a façade behind which to prepare a resumption of hostilities. The situations which they encountered on the ground, have often been quite different from what they had expected, and the twists and turns of the conflicting parties have required the managers of operations on the ground to redefine their missions, in frantic communication with a political leadership outside the conflict zone which saw things in a very different light. Their own motives (plausibly enough, sometimes) have been called into question, and the motives of different states engaged in the same operation have not always been consistent. The support of a united international community could not be taken for granted. In short, it has been a veritable can of worms.

Tales of Triumph and Disaster

To show how these general considerations have been realised in practice, and to draw some conclusions about the factors essential to success or failure, it is necessary to look, however briefly, at some of the actual experiences of the UN in African peacekeeping. What seem to be the five most important operations, those in Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda and Somalia, have therefore been selected, and ranked in descending order of 'success', from the most successful at the start to the least successful at the end.

Namibia¹²

The Namibian settlement, and the role of peacekeepers within it, fell well outside the general run of peacekeeping operations discussed in this article, and its inclusion helps to point to the very different circumstances generally found elsewhere. The robustness of the settlement, which enabled it to survive major weaknesses in the peacekeeping operation itself, rested on its unambiguous location in the politics of decolonisation. The idea that colonial territories were entitled to become independent, following an election in which rivals for the control of its post-independence government competed for support from indigenous voters, has formed the bedrock for the creation of the African state system and, in most cases, its implementation has been completely unproblematic.

However, problems arose in three cases — Eritrea, Namibia and Western Sahara — where the territory of a former colony was controlled by a neighbouring state, which sought (tacitly in Namibia after the 1960s, explicitly in the other two cases) to incorporate it into its own territory, and where this incorporation was resisted by a movement which claimed to represent the people of the colony itself. All that was needed for a normal decolonisation process to be implemented was for the occupying state to agree to it, a breakthrough achieved in the Namibian case with

the Angola-Namibia accords of December 1988.¹³

The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) subsequently had the task of supervising an apparently uncontentious transition. Its smaller than envisaged size and slow deployment, both the result of weaknesses within the UN structure already identified (notably cumbersome decision-making, and the reluctance especially of the P5 states to provide the necessary funds), would probably have resulted in the derailment of a less robust settlement. Forces of the South-West African Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO) crossed the border from Angola on the day the cease-fire leading to the transition was due to come into effect, and were bloodily suppressed by South African forces with the consent of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (UNSGSR) who was in charge of UNTAG.¹⁴ The UNSGSR himself, astonishingly, had only arrived in Namibia the day before, and the deployment of the UN force to northern Namibia, where the most difficult problems were obviously likely to arise, had not yet taken place.

That the whole peace process did not collapse, was due to the continuing commitment of all the major parties, including South Africa, SWAPO, Angola and a united international community. Though UNTAG subsequently got its act together, and some elements of the operation worked extremely well, the achievement of Namibian independence was not a triumph of UN peacekeeping, but a success by default.

Mozambique¹⁵

Mozambique, by contrast, is the clearest example of the success of the peacekeeping process itself, accompanied as this was (and indeed had to be) by a massive range of co-ordinated diplomatic and humanitarian activities. The war in Mozambique, unlike that in Namibia, was a classic example of the extremely messy kind of conflict — part domestic, part international, part ethnic, part ideological, and militarily unresolvable — with which modern Africa has been plagued. That it should have given way to a peace settlement which, no matter how fragile it may be, has so far brought one of the most war-shattered countries in Africa some five years of peace, is a remarkable achievement. In that achievement, equally, the UN, and especially the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), has had a central place.

Oddly, that place did not include any major role in the negotiation of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed between the Frelimo government of Mozambique and its Renamo rival in October 1992. Though the involvement of international organisations in implementing settlements which they have had no part in reaching, has understandably been identified as a significant source of subsequent problems, this happens to have been precisely the case in the UN's most successful experience of peacekeeping in Africa. Still more remarkably, a critical role at this stage was played by an unofficial mediator, the Roman Catholic Sant'Egidio community, while the Italian government provided most of the necessary diplomatic resources. The UN was brought in at a relatively late stage, in order to assure the verification of an agreement which had already been reached in its essentials by the conflicting parties.

Once established, however, ONUMOZ was able to assume a core co-ordinating position. One element in this was that the UNSGSR in charge of the operation, Italian Aldo Ajello, was ideally placed to link the informal processes through which the GPA had been negotiated to the subsequent, much larger scale and more complex operation of assuring its implementation. Another was that the UNSGSR was able to exercise control not only over the peacekeeping aspects of the settlement in the more limited sense of the term, but also over the related and extremely important humanitarian programme, including the co-ordination of assistance for the internally displaced and returning refugees, and the integration of demobilised soldiers. The

provision of humanitarian assistance, especially to areas of the country controlled by Renamo, was a critical element in the 'side-payments' needed to keep Renamo on board.

More important than all of these, however, was the ability of the UNSGSR to call on the support of a remarkably united international community. Given the end of the Cold War (in which Mozambique, unlike Angola, had been only marginally involved), the absence (again unlike Angola) of substantial resources within the country, and especially the settlement in South Africa, no major external actor, whether global or regional, had any interest in helping to maintain the conflict. This meant that the UNSGSR could call on the leverage provided by each combatant's major external supporters to help bring them in line when necessary. This process was symbolised by the foray into Renamo-held territory of the British aid minister, Lynda Chalker, to persuade Renamo leader, Dhlakama, to participate in the elections, after he had threatened to pull out of the process only shortly before they were due to be held in October 1994. It also enabled him to call on donors to help provide the funds for a Netherlands proposal for subsidies to former soldiers, while the US helped to fund Dhlakama's election campaign.

The success or failure of peacekeeping operations always looks inevitable in hindsight. The success of the Mozambique operation by no means looked inevitable at the time. The war in Mozambique had been among the most vicious in Africa, not least in the horrors inflicted on innocent people, and Dhlakama was by no means 'obviously' more sincere in his approach to the peace process than, say, Savimbi. Even though Renamo's electoral success in central Mozambique came as a surprise to many observers, and a considerable shock to the Frelimo government, this success did serve to give the movement a continuing stake in the peace process. There were nonetheless elements in the conflict, notably the relative weakness of Renamo and the absence of external support for continued fighting, which enabled skilled mediation and the effective implementation of the GPA to lead to a peaceful outcome. The same outcome could scarcely be expected, regardless of the quality of the UN operation, in situations in which equivalent underlying conditions were not present.

Angola¹⁶

Of all the peacekeeping operations discussed with ruthless brevity in this article, the one in Angola suffers the most from the constraints of the occasion. It has now lasted for nearly ten years, during which UN involvement has been expressed through four distinct missions: the first United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) was established following the Angola-Namibia accords of December 1988, with the limited goal of verifying the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, a task successfully achieved by June 1991. Its successor, UNAVEM II, was formed to verify the implementation of the Bicesse Agreement, which had been signed between the MPLA government of Angola and the UNITA opposition in May 1991, and collapsed following UNITA's rejection of the election results in October 1992, leading to massive devastation and loss of life in the resumed civil war. UNAVEM III sought to pick up the pieces, following the revival of the peace process with the Lusaka Protocol of November 1994, and was superseded in June 1997 by the more modestly resourced UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). Over this long period, UN peacekeepers in Angola have attempted to do completely different things under very different circumstances.

The Angolan case also raises the most intense controversies over whether its most traumatic failure, the collapse in 1992/93, was due to mistakes on the part of the UN, or whether it was due to the structure of the situation itself, and the behaviour of participants (notably Savimbi) over whom the UN had no control — controversies which are all the more pointed in the light of the apparently inexorable slide to renewed war at the time of writing in August 1998. For those

who see the breakdown as an avoidable tragedy, the key mistakes lay in the drastically reduced scale of the UNAVEM II operation, resulting from financial constraints, and the eagerness to find a quick-fix solution to the Angolan imbroglio especially of the US. For them, the involvement of the UN at a relatively late stage (as in Mozambique) in implementing an agreement without playing any significant part in its negotiation, also resulted in a flawed agreement, with the UN being given little more than an observer role. The success of UNAVEM I, which involved no more than the supervision of an agreement between states within a 'classic' peacekeeping scenario, encouraged the belief that the vastly more difficult task of implementing a peace accord between the parties to the civil war in Angola could be equally easily accomplished. Despite its inherent flaws, however, Anstee believed that UNAVEM II came "... *tantalisingly close to success.*"¹⁷

From a 'structuralist' viewpoint, on the other hand, the failure of UNAVEM II could be regarded as the inevitable result of the untimely insertion of a peacekeeping operation into a situation in which there was no peace to keep. All the way down the line, the comparison with Mozambique points to the foolhardiness of expecting a similar outcome in Angola. The major movement, UNITA, possessed a range of resources (notably through its control over much of Angola's diamond trade) far greater than its Mozambican counterpart, Renamo. Its leader, Savimbi, had ambitions or pretensions far greater than those of Dhlakama. Angola's wealth, by no means entirely to be found in oil and diamonds, made it a far more inviting target than dirt-poor Mozambique (by World Bank measures the poorest country in the world), and correspondingly encouraged fishing in troubled waters, not only by states but also by a range of corporations and dodgy entrepreneurs.

Most important of all, perhaps, the international chemistry was different. The Angolan war was far too readily seen merely as the result of Cold War rivalries on the one hand, and of apartheid destabilisation on the other, a scenario that encouraged the delusion that the Angola-Namibia accords and the South African transition would cut off the oxygen which had kept the fires burning. Whereas the Mozambican blaze could be relatively easily isolated, however, that in Angola was also fuelled by wider conflicts, and especially developments in Congo-Kinshasa, with which Angola has a long and completely unmanageable border. Given that 'peacekeeping' in this context essentially meant trying to persuade Savimbi to stop fighting, the plentiful resources with which to keep going, meant that he could not be made to do so. A larger UNAVEM II operation, from this perspective, would not have made much difference.

UNAVEM III, with its tortuous attempts to implement the **Lusaka Protocol**, provides only a partial test of the competing interpretations of the failure of UNAVEM II. Certainly, every care was taken to ensure that previous mistakes were not repeated. The scale of the operation, with a peacekeeping force of some 7 000 troops, was vastly greater. Much more care was taken with the sequencing of the different phases of the peace process, with the incorporation of UNITA nominees into the government in Luanda, the implementation of the cease-fire, and the integration of UNITA troops into a unified national army. The Security Council was ready to bring additional pressure to bear on Savimbi when needed, including UN sanctions — a rare but not unique example of these being imposed on a non-state entity. At the same time, the international setting for the implementation of the peace process improved with the overthrow of Savimbi's major remaining ally, Mobutu in Congo-Kinshasa, and the displacement of Lissouba by Sassou-Nguesso through the direct military involvement of the Angolan government, in Congo-Brazzaville. That peace should remain so uncertain, even with the improvements to the peacekeeping operation itself and in the international context, points to the extraordinary difficulties of the Angolan situation.

Rwanda18

The experience of peacekeeping in Rwanda has clear parallels with Angola. Again, the UN was brought in at a fairly late stage of the proceedings, in order to help guarantee a peace settlement reached under international mediation between the incumbent government and an insurgent movement. Even more so than in Angola, the settlement rested on an extraordinarily naive assumption that parties engaged in an intense conflict, who had agreed to participate in peace talks for essentially tactical reasons, could be expected to abide by the provisions of a complex agreement that required them to work closely and harmoniously together.

The **Arusha Peace Agreement** was negotiated in the period July 1992 to August 1993 between the Rwandan government (itself at the time consisting of a precarious coalition of parties) and the insurgent Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and called for a UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) to help assure security while the transitional arrangements were being put in place. In the event, external pressure on Rwanda's President Habyarimana to implement the accords, which would seriously have imperilled the position of his MRNDD party, led in April 1994 to his assassination by MRNDD militants, and the immediate unleashing of an organised programme of genocide which probably caused close to a million deaths. The failure of the Rwandan peace process resulted, not from the shortcomings of UNAMIR which had been deployed in a futile attempt to guarantee the unworkable, but from the assumptions that underlay the attempt to apply a 'liberal' ideology of peacemaking — power-sharing, human rights guarantees, free and fair elections, and so forth — to a situation in which none of them applied.

The tragedy of UNAMIR, and the heavy shadow that it cast on the credibility of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, arose not from its failure to carry out its original mandate, but from the refusal of UN headquarters in New York to permit it to attempt a completely different one. At the start of the genocide, UNAMIR commander General Dallaire desperately sought UN backing for a strengthened operation designed simply to protect human life. Instead, the Security Council ordered UNAMIR's withdrawal, except for a token 270 troops, abandoning hundreds of thousands of Rwandans to a grisly death at the hands of murder squads orchestrated by high officials in the MRNDD. For this decision, which was strongly influenced by a determination to avert the problems encountered over the previous year and a half by UN peacekeepers in Somalia, both the US and then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appear to have borne a heavy share of the responsibility.

There is, of course, no saying how much a strengthened UNAMIR might have been able to achieve, and at what cost to its own forces; it is equally the case that its success or failure could not have been described as 'peacekeeping'. Its desertion of Rwanda at its time of greatest need nonetheless left a lasting impression, and soured relations especially with the RPF government which took over after its victory in the resumed civil war. The subsequent UN operation, UNAMIR II, performed some useful functions, notably in helping to mediate relations between the new Rwandan government and the international community, but it was never a peacekeeping operation in any meaningful sense of the term, and was withdrawn in 1996.

Somalia19

The UN operations in Somalia, finally, and notably the US-led UNITAF intervention (1992/93) and its UNOSOM II successor (1993/95), represent the extreme cases among UN-orchestrated attempts to create peace where there was none to keep. As in Angola, there is room for dispute over the extent to which the failures of the intervention were due to what Lewis and Mayall (two thoroughly moderate and unexcitable commentators) describe as "... *this inordinately expensive,*

poorly led and coordinated, and incredibly cumbersome UN operation,"²⁰ as against the extent to which they were the result of the structural conditions within which any attempt to bring peace and a measure of humanitarian relief to Somalia and its suffering population would have had to work.

On the one hand, the conditions were as unpropitious as could be imagined. Unlike any of the other four cases discussed above, there was not even the pretence of a peace settlement between the conflicting parties which the UN could have helped to implement. Such agreements as were reached in meetings of rival warlords convened by would-be mediators outside the country (usually in Addis Ababa) were no more than tactical gestures designed to be jettisoned as soon as the participants returned home. Nor did these warlords and their factions represent a real source of leverage that could have been used by mediators in order to construct a viable political order, if they had even been induced to accept one. Little more than coalitions put together for purposes of self-enrichment, with a fairly feeble binding of clan solidarity, they were always liable to fragment if any of their leaders sought to induce his followers to accept any course of action that was not to their immediate advantage. The combination of high levels of militarisation and social fragmentation made it a nightmare environment for any peacekeeper to operate in.

On the other hand, the catalogue of ineptitudes displayed in Somalia lead firmly back to the UN itself. The organisation's first attempt to grapple with the issue through the modestly resourced UNOSOM I mission led by Mahomed Sahnoun (the only one of the numerous figures involved in the operation to emerge from it with enhanced credibility), failed as a result of a well-publicised disagreement over tactics between Sahnoun and UN headquarters, which essentially turned on headquarters' determination to seek a quick-fix solution, in place of Sahnoun's desire to work over the long term through insidious diplomacy. It was a mistake that was to cost the UN very dear. Once the US became deeply involved, during the 'lame duck' period which followed Bush's defeat in the November 1992 US presidential election, the operation certainly could not be faulted for two of the failings which have often been criticised in other peacekeeping missions, a shortage of funds and slow decision-making. It did raise, however, in the most intense form, the problem of the relations between the UN and its single most important member state.

Many of the subsequent failures, though readily classed as tactical and rectifiable mistakes, followed from problems inherent in the operation itself to a large extent. In particular, the US government was unable or unwilling to carry the political costs which could have resulted from any attempt to use its apparently overwhelming military force in order to impose a settlement, while lacking both the skills and the long-term commitment that would have been needed to negotiate one. The most important of these costs was the need to avert casualties. The failure to disarm the major combatants at an early stage of the operation can be ascribed to this need; and the deaths of a small number of American servicemen following a failed attempt to arrest the most important faction leader, Mahomed Farah Aidid, led to the US' precipitate withdrawal. In the event, the whole operation not only enhanced the standing of the very faction leaders who had created the conflict in the first place, but greatly enriched them into the bargain.

Conclusion

Margaret Carey suggests four eminently sensible conditions which must be in place, for UN peacekeeping operations to succeed:²¹

- The warring parties must be ready to put aside the military quest for power and pursue the

settlement of the conflict through peaceful means.

- A clear political strategy is necessary to address the underlying causes of the conflict and prescribe steps toward national reconciliation.
- An operation's mandate must clearly set out the tasks entrusted to it.
- The international community must be ready to provide both its political and financial support to the operation.

Sensible though these conditions are, it is doubtful whether they can be met, and it is not even clear whether they should be. The situations into which peacekeepers are liable to be thrust, are necessarily messy and insecure. The motives of warring parties are almost invariably suspect, and their willingness to pursue a settlement through peaceful means is likely to be slight, unless their arms can be sharply twisted in the process. The underlying causes of conflict will usually lie deep — centuries deep in some cases — and the ideal of national reconciliation will be one that only the most naive can have any hope of achieving. Indeed, the very phrase 'national reconciliation' itself begs the question whether anything plausibly describable as a 'nation' exists, and incorporates the characteristic assumption of international institutions that problems can be settled within the structure of the existing state system.

However carefully one may try to set out the tasks of the peacekeeping operation, the peacekeepers will find themselves, once they arrive, enmeshed in fluid situations, in which their own actions cannot be circumscribed by resolutions, no matter how carefully these may be drafted in New York. The 'international community', finally, exists only when all of the states significant to an operation are of broadly the same mind; and even though securing consensus is a very important task that has to be pursued with diplomatic skill and dedication, to insist on its achievement as a precondition for undertaking a peacekeeping operation would be to give any potentially awkward state a veto over UN participation. Sometimes it may be necessary to jump in and — without self-delusion — hope for the best.

Individual states and international institutions take part in peacekeeping operations for a mixture of motives. These certainly include the hope of building a better kind of international system, rudely shaken though many of these hopes have been during the post-Cold War period with which the preceding discussion is concerned. Such motives often encompass the feeling that, even if the prospects for success seem to be slight, the UN or regional organisations cannot simply stand by and do nothing: it may be better to try and fail, than not to try at all. In some cases — and here the US engagement in Somalia comes to mind — media pressure may be such that 'something must be done'. States and international institutions equally take part in such operations because of interests, by no means necessarily bad ones, of their own.

It is therefore a futile exercise to prescribe to the UN, or to anyone else, how they should react to pressures to participate in peacekeeping operations in Africa. It is they who have to take decisions, and not the academics. However, two final conclusions may be drawn which are both short and obvious. First of all, the extent of what the UN can achieve to mitigate the consequences of conflict in Africa, though not entirely negligible, is nonetheless extremely limited, and no great hopes and expectations should be placed on it. Secondly, in cases where peacekeeping operations do take place, there is a substantial body of experience, much of it bitter, which can and should be used in order to enhance the prospects for relative success, and to limit the dangers of causing actual damage, in approaching the always hazardous and often dispiriting task of trying to promote international peace and security in Africa.

Endnotes

1. Definitions of 'peacekeeping' vary, and some usages explicitly distinguish peacekeeping from other operations such as peacemaking or peace enforcement, the critical difference being that peacekeepers can use force only in self-defence. In this chapter, the term is used in its broadest sense, to include any deployment of military forces for security purposes under UN authority.
2. In R Higgins, **United Nations peacekeeping 1946-1967: Documents and commentary**, Oxford University Press, Oxford, four-volumes, various dates, ONUC accounts for a whole volume (3, 1980), far more than any other operation.
3. Sir M Goulding *The United Nations and conflict in post-Cold War Africa*, talk to the Royal African Society, London, 18 June 1998. I am most grateful to Sir Marrack, Warden of St. Antony's College, Oxford, and former UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, for making his notes available to me for this contribution. I am also grateful to my colleague David Travers for comments on the first draft.
4. Relatively minor peacekeeping missions have been sent to some former UK and French colonies, including Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic.
5. We are fortunate in the recent appearance of a volume, which in addition to discussions of a number of general issues (of which I must admit to have written one), includes case studies of Zimbabwe, Chad, Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi. See O Furley & R May (eds.), **Peacekeeping in Africa**, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1998.
6. A James, **Peacekeeping in international politics**, Macmillan, London, 1990, p. 1.
7. M Carey *Peacekeeping in Africa: Recent evolution and prospects*, in Furley & May, op. cit., p. 13.
8. As it happens, what would be the first such an operation is under discussion at the time of writing: the possible deployment of neutral forces under the auspices of the OAU in the area in dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea in mid-1998.
9. Noted in Goulding, op. cit.
10. For an elaboration of these dynamics, see C Clapham, *Being peacekept*, in Furley & May, op. cit.
11. The 'theory of hegemonic stability' is familiar to all students of the global economy.
12. See D Pankhurst, *Namibia*, in Furley & May, op. cit. For more detailed accounts, see L Cliffe et al., **The transition to independence in Namibia**, Lynne Rienner, London, 1994; C Leys & J Saul (eds.), **Namibia's liberation struggle: The two-edged sword**, James Currey, London, 1995.
13. 'All' is putting it mildly; in all three cases, considerable violence took place, and in Eritrea especially, the breakthrough occurred only after a traumatic thirty-year war.
14. Whether the SWAPO/PLAN forces were seeking to establish effective military control in

advance of the elections, or whether they were (as claimed) merely looking for UNTAG stations at which to register and demobilise, is contested but immaterial.

15. S Barnes, *Peacekeeping in Mozambique*, in Furley & May, op. cit. See also H Abrahamsson & A Nilsson, **Mozambique: The troubled transition**, Zed, London, 1995; UN, **The United Nations and Mozambique**, United Nations, New York, 1995; C Alden, *The UN and the resolution of conflict in Mozambique*, **Journal of Modern African Studies**, 33(1), 1995; A Vines, **Renamo: From terrorism to democracy in Mozambique?**, James Currey, London, 1996.
16. See B Munslow, *Angola: The search for peace and reconstruction*, in Furley & May, op. cit. I have also been able to consult a pre-publication text of N MacQueen, *Peacekeeping by attrition: The United Nations in Angola*, **Journal of Modern African Studies**, 36(3), September 1998. Former UNSGSR Margaret Anstee has written a personal account, **Orphan of the Cold War: The inside story of the collapse of the Angolan Peace Process**, 1992-3, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1996.
17. Anstee, *ibid.*, p. 527.
18. See O Furley, *Rwanda and Burundi: Peacekeeping amidst massacres*, in Furley & May, op. cit. For analyses of the international aspects of the Rwandan tragedy, see especially Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, **The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience**, 5 volumes, Copenhagen, 1996; B D Jones, *Intervention without borders: Humanitarian intervention in Rwanda, 1990-94*, **Millennium**, 24(2), 1995; C Clapham, *Rwanda: The perils of peacemaking*, **Journal of Peace Research**, 35(2), 1998.
19. P Woodward, *Somalia*, in Furley & May, op. cit. There is, of course, a massive literature on the Somali intervention. For a quasi-official American view, see J L Hirsch & R B Oakley, **Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on peacemaking and peacekeeping**, US Institute of Peace, Washington, 1995; for the UN account, see **The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996**, United Nations, New York, 1996. For other and more critical assessments, see J Drysdale, **Whatever happened to Somalia?**, Haan, London, 1994; I Lewis & J Mayall, *Somalia*, in J Mayall (ed.), **The new interventionism: United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996; R Omaar & A de Waal, **Somalia: Crimes and blunders**, James Currey, London, 1994.
20. Lewis & Mayall, *ibid.*, p. 123.
21. Carey, op. cit., p. 26.

Co-operation between the UN and the OAU in the management of African conflicts **Margaret Vogt, International Peace Academy**

Introduction

One of the most important innovations in the management of international security in the post-Cold War era is the concept of shared responsibility between the United Nations and some

regional organisations for the effective management of conflicts within the regions of the world. Africa is the first region where extensive efforts have been made recently to formalise the relationship between the UN and the regional organisation, in this case the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), with the specific objective of enhancing the management of conflicts in the region. There is a clear history to the primary place that the United Nations has ascribed to its relations with Africa.

Following the end of the Cold War, Africa's security landscape changed drastically and, to some extent, the process of transformation is still ongoing. The internal stability of many countries in Africa came under tremendous threat. Authoritarian regimes and repressive governments that had operated under the protection of one or the other of the superpowers were challenged as it became apparent that these powers and even the former colonial powers were no longer interested in investing their military resources in the defence of specific African regimes. During the Cold War, the position of Africa was rated as central to the stability of the spheres of interest of the superpowers. African states joined the community of independent nations when most of them acquired independence in the 1960s and 1970s. The newly independent African states were courted for their political support in the evolving international system. They were also encouraged to adopt the political ideologies of one or the other of the superpowers in efforts to expand their spheres of influence. For this reason, the character of the regime was not considered to be the important factor. On the contrary, great investments were made by the superpowers to assure the internal stability of 'friendly' regimes. Once the Cold War ended, however, and Communism was no longer considered to be a threat to international peace and security, external powers were no longer interested in regime stability in Africa.

The withdrawal of the superpowers from direct interventions to support regime stability in Africa unleashed a series of revolts against the authoritarian nature of governance in many African countries, and especially against the creeping poverty, and the great inequity in resource distribution and access to economic and political powers. Military insurgency and civilian-led armed revolts became a common feature of the post-Cold War political landscape in Africa. The Secretary-General of the UN, in his report presented in April 1998, noted that, since 1970, "*... more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast majority of them intra-state in origin.*" He noted further that, "*... in 1996 alone, 14 of 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees returnees and displaced persons.*" The most frequent news from Africa after the Cold War has been reports of new outbreaks of violent conflicts, horrendous incidences of massacres and the genocide of innocent civilians and people of opposing ethnic groups. Government has become irrelevant to the economic well-being and security of most Africans. The following became common to Africa:

- 'collapsed states', where the instruments of governance and central authority simply disappear and are replaced by anarchy; and
- 'failed states', where central authority remains only in name, with the central government unable to assert its political power or to discharge its social responsibility to the people.

In some of these incidences, powerful armed insurgents and local authorities have imposed new rules and established new relationships with the people, often threatening their security and economic well-being.

The Challenge

The ascendancy in the number of internal wars in Africa and the incidences of state failure have challenged all the traditional tools of international conflict management and have become a source of embarrassment to the managers of international security. The international system is unable or unwilling to address the fundamental causes of these conflicts, nor is it able to provide acceptable and adequate frameworks for the effective management or resolution of these conflicts. The traditional tools of international conflict management have not been effective in the management of contemporary conflicts in Africa. The fundamental problem is the issue of interest. The major powers that control the international security apparatus, of which the UN provides the major and most critical framework for international action, are no longer interested in huge investments, either of human or material resources in the security and stability of the African region. The withdrawal of the major powers from Africa has been apparent since the end of the Cold War.

When the Liberian civil war broke out in December 1989, after already having claimed the lives of thousands of people, there was practically no interest shown by the international community in this development. By June 1990, it was obvious that Liberia was a failed state. Thousands of Liberians and people from neighbouring African countries living in Liberia had lost their lives in an internal war in which both the government forces and the insurgency groups were killing unarmed civilians with impunity. The UN did not intervene in the war. The argument was that the **UN Charter** prevented it from getting involved in a purely internal crisis. It was argued that, since the war in Liberia was internal, the UN could not intervene to protect the innocent. This was despite the fact that the Liberian government had obviously collapsed, had become one of the warring factions, and was just as brutal in its assault against unarmed civilians. The marginalisation of Africa became obvious from 1990 onwards when the lack of responsiveness by the international system to the conflicts in Liberia and later in Somalia is considered. The two conflicts claimed thousands of innocent lives and occurred at the time when Security Council members were busy implementing one of the most expensive military interventions in modern times to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

The Gulf War was an interstate war and thus justified the full attention that was given to it by the UN. Many political analysts were of the opinion that the terrible humanitarian disasters in Liberia and Somalia deserved far more attention from the international community because these conflicts affected the lives of thousands of innocent people.

The UN did intervene in an internal crisis in Somalia to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In 1992, the civil war in Somalia and the activities of the Somali militia prevented the cultivation and free flow of food to the population. Intensive fighting among the militia resulted in the destruction of vital infrastructure, homes, as well as the complete breakdown of social services. Central authority collapsed and various regions came under the control of the factional militia who could not agree to form a new national government. The initial United Nations Observer Force (UNOSOM I) that was deployed to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance was completely ineffectual in persuading the factions to allow the flow of humanitarian assistance to the population centres and to the rural areas. This situation resulted in the massive starvation of a large proportion of the population. Moved by extensive media coverage of the Somali disaster, the United States decided to mobilise a more robust intervention force consisting of troop contributions by some of the Security Council members to compel the factional militia to allow access to the international humanitarian agencies for the delivery of support. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was to operate outside of the framework of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), which was extensively augmented into one of the largest UN operations ever undertaken.

While the 1992 UN interventions were initially successful in allowing access for the delivery of international support, the force, especially UNITAF, soon experienced tremendous opposition, especially from one of the Somali factions as they sought to forcefully disarm the militias. The situation became more complex and ugly when, in 1993, the Somali National Alliance (SNA) militia under the command of Mohammed Aidid, killed eighteen US Marines who were part of the UNITAF forces and dragged their bodies around Mogadishu. The SNA militia later killed 25 Pakistani peacekeepers following an ambush. The US immediately withdrew its forces from UNITAF and other Security Council members soon followed. This series of incidences, coupled with the heightened hostility against the international community in Somalia led to the decision of the Security Council to withdraw from Somalia.

The experiences of the UN in Somalia affected its approach to the sharing of responsibility with regional organisations in the management of international security. The complications which resulted from UNITAF's attempt to operate an enforcement mandate in Somalia made the UN wary of operating multidimensional peace missions, especially when it has to enforce its mandate. The fear of entrapment in a complex civil war, similar to the experience in Somalia, inhibited the Security Council from authorising an expansion of the UN's presence in Rwanda in June 1994 when the conflict escalated beyond the control of the small UN intervention force that was then on the ground. Rather than augment the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and change its mandate to allow it to employ enforcement action, the Security Council ordered the UN force to withdraw from Rwanda when all information indicated that a serious security breakdown was imminent. It is widely accepted that this decision left the space wide open for the horrible genocide that ensued soon after the withdrawal of the majority of the UN force. In 1994, more than 500 000 Rwandans were massacred within days in a horrible genocidal conflict which could have been prevented.

Again quoting the UN Secretary-General in his report on Africa, Kofi Annan bluntly admitted the failure of leadership by the international community: *"By not averting these colossal human tragedies, African leaders have failed the people of Africa; the international community has failed them, the United Nations has failed them."* Having admitted the failures and inadequacies of the past, to what extent is the international community better prepared to avert the crises of the future? How can African governments, organisations and civil society ensure that the management of regional security is more adequately structured to avert crises in future? This represents the fundamental challenge to the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and the UN system. The concept of co-operation between the UN and the OAU stems from the desire to put a mechanism in place which would be effective in preventing future conflicts, and when these occur, to manage them effectively to ensure that the minimum human, material and political damage is experienced.

The Evolution of Regional Security Regimes in Africa

The deterioration of security in Africa, especially the rise in the number and intensity of internal conflicts, led to a reopening of the debate on the need for an OAU security agenda. The OAU agreed to institute the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993. The OAU Mechanism provides for:

- a central decision-making body, the Central Organ, consisting of about sixteen member states (the current chair, the past chair and the incoming chair of the organisation, and selected states representing the subregions in Africa); the Central Organ meets at three levels: Heads of State, ministerial and ambassadorial; and

- the Division of Conflict Management within the OAU Secretariat, the agency responsible for the implementation and secretarial functions of the Mechanism.

Among other functions, the OAU Mechanism is meant to augment the capacity of the OAU Secretariat and the political leadership to manage conflicts in Africa more effectively. The Mechanism should enable the Secretary General to initiate action in the management of conflicts in the region and to mobilise resources, both within Africa and from the international system, for effective conflict management in the region.

Since the adoption of the Mechanism, discussions on how it could be made operational have centred on the development of the capacity of the OAU to expand its role in conflict prevention through the expansion of the organisation's ability to predict potential conflicts by using a wide range of early-warning systems. In this regard, it is expected that the partnership with the UN will expand the ability of the regional organisation to tap into the extensive information resources that are available within the UN system. Furthermore, partnerships with a wide range of African institutions will provide the OAU with points of entry into many African states, both for collating information and for the implementation of preventive measures. It is also expected that more relationships between the OAU and different levels of non-state actors and institutions would expand the scope of the organisation.

The challenges facing the OAU in its efforts to establish an early-warning capability are the same as those facing all international organisations. The knowledge of an impending conflict does not always translate into the political will to act. The decision to intervene is more often based on the political calculation of states of where their greatest interest lies. The capacity of the OAU with regard to conflict mediation should be developed and expanded as it is an area where many believe the organisation has been reasonably successful. The OAU and the UN were unable to mobilise intervention forces successfully to de-escalate the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville or in the Comoro, even if it was acknowledged that such interventions would not necessarily have facilitated the peace processes.

The establishment of *ad hoc* commissions of heads of states on specific conflict situations could also occur. (In such an instance, an OAU summit vests the co-ordination of the organisation's intervention in specific conflicts to a group of heads of states that act on behalf of the whole and report accordingly). An *ad hoc* commission of Mozambique's neighbours contributed by applying pressure on the two factions during the Mozambican peace talks and at the implementation stages to ensure that they remained committed to the objectives of peace. In Somalia, Ethiopia was given the responsibility of co-ordinating the facilitation of the peace process. Increasingly, subregional organisations or groupings of subregional states have assumed the lead role, not only in the political management of the peace process, but also in military intervention. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mounted the ECOMOG interventions into Liberia and Sierra Leone. These interventions were critical to the successful stabilisation of the security of these countries and the establishment of democratically elected governments. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia have recently intervened on behalf of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The OAU provides the framework for the mediation of the Congo crisis that involves Uganda and Rwanda, which are not members of SADC.

The OAU has expanded the concept of political mediation to allow for the continuing role of its special envoys over an extended period so that they would have the opportunity to shepherd the process to a logical and successful conclusion. It is now a standard practice that the OAU Secretary General appoints a special envoy or representative to support the political facilitation

of conflicts in the region. The OAU and the UN appointed a Joint Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region. The current practice is for both organisations to collaborate through the activities of their Special Envoys in the political mediation of a specific conflict. The choice of the organisation that would assume the leadership role depends on the history and the stage of the conflict. Increasingly, the UN allows the OAU or the relevant subregional organisation to assume the principal role in political and even in military interventions into conflicts in the African region.

The OAU's activities also include peace operations which are essentially civilian political missions consisting of OAU political officers to provide technical management and advisory support to peace negotiation teams and for the implementation of political decisions. Working with special envoys, such political missions have monitored and facilitated peace and constitutional talks in some countries, for example, Congo-Brazzaville and Sierra Leone. They have provided political support, observed electoral processes and facilitated discussions between some governments and the opposition, again more recently in Sierra Leone where the OAU remained engaged in the negotiations between the rebel group and the government.

The OAU has also deployed military observer missions to Rwanda and Burundi. While these have had mixed results, the thinking is that the OAU has a comparative advantage to effectively prevent the escalation of conflicts through the use of its observers, subject to adequate funding, management and organisation. It has been argued that the presence of OAU observers in Rwanda delayed the collapse of general security in that country. It is further argued that the transfer of the mission to the UN contributed to the massacre that occurred in 1994. Even after the UN decided to withdraw from Rwanda, it was only the African component of the UN team that remained. In Burundi, the OAU observer force, though very small and with limited reach, has remained in the country even despite the imposition of sanctions, and the withdrawal of other international organisations and governments.

Critical Issues In UN/OAU Co-operation: Complementary Roles

The increasing reluctance or lack of political will of Security Council members and Western European powers to commit their troops to UN military interventions in Africa is the reason for the heightened interest to invest in the development of the OAU Mechanism. The expectation is that, since the UN is unlikely to authorise a major peace operation in Africa, Africans themselves should be equipped to perform this function. However, beyond the issue of the transfer of responsibility to regional organisations is the more fundamental issue of comparative advantage.

When it becomes necessary to mount an intervention into a conflict situation, either as a preventive measure or for peacekeeping or peacemaking, at what level should such an intervention occur? Should all responsibilities for international peace and security remain particularly with the UN, since this body already has the capacity and framework to take such initiatives? Is there a role for regional organisations in the management of disputes occurring within their regions? The question of the comparative advantage of the OAU to mount peacekeeping missions in Africa, as opposed to the UN and subregional organisations has been analysed.

A school of thought in Africa argues that the OAU lacks the institutional structure, managerial capacity and resources to manage a peacekeeping operation properly. As a result, some argue that this task should be left to the UN, since it has the comparative advantage in this regard. Furthermore, it is argued that the role of the OAU should be limited to the preparation of African

forces for UN operations and to support UN efforts at peacekeeping. The OAU's capability may be more limited as the concept of multidimensional peace operations becomes a greater reality, consequently necessitating the modification of mandates during an operation and the use of enforcement action. Another school of thought argues that the experience of the Somali operation has reduced the political will of many European countries and the US, in particular, to deploy their ground forces in peace operations in Africa, especially under a UN command. Africa is increasingly required to provide the 'bodies' for UN peace operations in an arrangement in which the logistic, technical, transport and other support facilities will be provided by Western European states and the US, perhaps through the UN and even possibly directly in a bilateral relationship with the OAU. In recent experiences, the OAU has found that, even when Africans are prepared to provide the forces for deployment in UN operations in Africa, the Security Council is reluctant to authorise such missions. Some of the Security Council members do not want to commit resources to African operations that may continue for indefinite periods. This was the experience in Congo-Brazzaville, Sierra Leone and the Comoro.

An understanding of the concept 'comparative advantage' in the management of conflicts is important in a region where several actors are increasingly becoming involved in the same conflict. Before the end of the Cold War, the options in the division of labour between the UN, the regional organisations and the subregional organisations were clearly understood: the UN mounted military peace operations and deployed political missions, while regional organisations concentrated on preventive political and diplomatic measures. In the post-Cold War era, with the proliferation of internal conflicts and the increasing intensity of conflicts, this division is no longer clear.

For example, the OAU limited its role to the facilitation of political mediation and reconciliation for the reasons discussed above, and did not develop its security instruments. The attempt by the major powers to promote an OAU intervention in Chad failed, as had previous interventions by Nigerian forces in the past. The OAU mounted the peacekeeping force, even though it lacked the policy framework, technical support and financial capability to manage a peace operation. The OAU peacekeeping force consisted of troops drawn largely from the states contiguous to Chad. Nigeria supplied the bulk of the troops, the force commander, and underwrote the cost of the operation, while France and the US financed the participation of forces from Senegal and the former Zaire. The OAU could not provide the communication and technical support for the force, and troops could not be deployed in good time as a result. Failures in communication at critical times on policy issues undermined the entire operation. There was confusion over the interpretation of the mandate and the force commander failed to receive clear instructions from Addis Ababa until the OAU force was overrun by the rebel force and had to be withdrawn.

The OAU has focused its efforts on laying the ground rules for its role in regional security management. The first meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of African states took place in Addis Ababa in June 1996 with the purpose of discussing common strategies for managing the security problems of Africa. This body concluded that the first stages in the development of African capacity should be the standardisation of training programmes, logistics and communication resources for peacekeeping, the development of a regional concept of operations, and the integration of planning at the level of the OAU. However, it is becoming evident that, to be fully effective, major restructuring of the OAU Secretariat would be required. The current emphasis on the development of an early-warning capacity would remain fundamentally flawed if the system cannot quickly prevent the escalation of crises on the continent nor provide a clear road map towards their solution.

The Role of SubRegional Organisations

The assumption exists that, because regional organisations are close to a conflict and are more familiar with the local conditions, they have a comparative advantage to play the lead role in the negotiation of such conflicts.

However, it is not always true that regional organisations have the comparative advantage to act. Where incumbents are powerful, with independent resources to prosecute the conflict, with relatively limited dependency on external support, and the ability to manage their international public relations, both international and regional organisations can only have limited impact on their positions. This is the case with the parties to the Angolan civil war who are accused of stalling the peace process by delaying the quartering of their forces. The UN and regional states can appeal for co-operation, but they have relatively limited effective weapons to use as pressure. In Mozambique, on the other hand, the war fatigue of the people and soldiers, the denial of support to Renamo by South Africa following the end of apartheid, the pressure from its neighbours, and incentives given by the international donor community contributed to the two Mozambican factions' engagement in the peace process until the demobilisation of the belligerent forces were completed and elections held.

Many of the conflicts in Africa have raised the possibility of enforcement action. Chapter VII of the **UN Charter** vests the responsibility for the use of enforcement action in the UN, allowing regional organisations to act only with its permission. However, as a result of the problems caused by the use of enforcement action in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, many have argued that the UN is not poised to conduct credible enforcement action. This is partly ascribed to its mode of operation. The UN does not operate an integrated military command structure — urgent decisions on key issues relating to mandates and, by extension, the concepts of operation, have to be discussed by the Security Council whose decisions are based purely on the political perspectives of its members and their national interests. Secondly, the UN has no independent military resources, nor a large security account that can be used for deployment to theatres of conflict with flexibility and speed. It also does not have the necessary resources to use as back up when such conflicts escalate. The UN has to depend on what its member states agree to make available, which varies according to each conflict, as contributing states have to approve the particular missions and the functions for which their forces are employed.

Proposals for the provision of a rapid reaction capability by the UN have been stalled by some Security Council members based on the argument that such a capability would be expensive for the international organisation to sustain, and for reasons similar to those discussed above. This is in addition to the political arguments on the impact of the use of UN forces for enforcement on the perception of the organisation's partiality in the eyes of the incumbents, as well as the confusion that may be caused in the minds of the people. The distinction between the forces for peacekeeping and those for enforcement may become blurred. For some, the concept of the UN prosecuting an assertive defence negates its role as an organisation aimed at the pacific settlement of disputes. For example, during the period in which ECOMOG instituted enforcement action in Liberia, the Nigerian Air Force was extensively employed in aggressive air operations to cut the supply lines of the factions, resulting in many civilian casualties.

While complications similar to the UN's experience in operating enforcement action are likely to attend such attempts by the OAU, the regional organisation is currently even less structured than the UN to handle peace operations. The political difficulties of establishing a framework for effective command and control may equally be a problem, especially given the tradition in the OAU for decisions to be taken through consensus. However, the same sensitivity did not inhibit ECOWAS from mounting peace operations in Liberia and conducting enforcement action. ECOWAS's role, however, was facilitated by hegemonic roles, especially those of Nigeria and

Ghana. The two countries provided the bulk of the initial force that was deployed in Liberia. Nigeria, in particular, provided about eighty per cent of the force when ECOMOG's strength was increased to 12 000 during Operation Octopus in October 1992 before it was again decreased from 1993.

The sizes of the Nigerian and Ghanaian contingents were partially informed by the reluctance of some of the members of the Committee of Nine, principally Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Togo to contribute troops to ECOMOG. However, there is an added problem arising from the capacity of regional states. Many of the states in West Africa have relatively small armies with a stronger emphasis on internal security concerns in their security doctrine. Since many have serious internal problems, they probably could not spare the men and the resources to deploy forces to another country. For example, the government in Togo was paralysed for longer than a year between 1993 and 1994 due to a political crisis, with opposition groups demanding change to a democratic political process. Mali experienced a crisis with the rebellion by its Touareg population. In 1991-1992, Benin was just recovering from a serious constitutional crisis and the push for the institution of multiparty democracy. These West African countries have had the added complication of having to finance their participation in Liberia.

Unlike UN peacekeeping where participants are reimbursed for their contribution to operations, ECOWAS did not have the resources to fund peace operations, and the Peace Fund for Liberia which was launched by the UN did not attract adequate contributions to meet the needs of the operation. Given the problems of human and material resources, only Nigeria and Ghana were in a position to provide the necessary resources for the Liberian operation. ECOMOG was more strongly perceived as a Nigerian operation when the overall command of force came under a Nigerian force commander. The concept of operations for the force was largely directed from the Nigerian capital until the Committee of Nine and the Chiefs of Staff of the ECOMOG force contributing states started to meet regularly from 1995. The lessons learned in Liberia suggest that it is at the level of the subregion that assertive peace operations can be more easily initiated and successfully sustained in situations pertaining to the internal security of states. Only states that are directly affected by the impact of a crisis in their neighbourhood would be willing to invest the resources and would exhibit the staying power required for seeing the operation through.

The fundamental issue that underlies the management of conflicts in any region remains the same, whether or not such conflicts are internal or interstate. The management of international security is heavily dependent on the willing and the able. For example, extensive attention is being given to the crisis in the economies of some Asian countries, especially to those in Japan and Russia, because it is believed that crises in these countries would directly affect the interests of the major powers in the international system.

The **UN Charter** contains a bill of rights aimed at protecting the fundamental rights of the individual. The OAU adopted a set of political principles in 1991, which its member states agreed would serve as the guiding principles for the management of the region and their countries. Members of the OAU are also signatories to international protocols on human rights. The OAU itself has adopted an African principle on human rights.

Early-warning signs are replete with information of economic and political crises in many African countries. Authoritarianism, economic and social collapse, extensive abuse of human rights have all become the way of life in many countries on the continent. There is no discussion of economic and social packages to bale these countries out. Neither are discussions being held to force governments to adhere to fundamental political principles. The OAU is just as guilty as the

UN. Very often, early-warning signs are not acted upon because it is difficult to evolve a coalition of the willing and the able.

It has become apparent that the UN can be effectively mobilised to intervene in a crisis when the interest of the major powers, especially the Security Council members, is affected. In the past few years, the Secretaries-General of the UN have lamented their inability to mobilise sufficient international support, even from the Security Council members, for major crises in those regions of the world that are not considered as central to the interest of the major powers.

The move towards regionalism is being encouraged because it is expected that regional organisations would be better able to provide the necessary focus to the security crises in their regions. The OAU and subregional organisations have improved the timing and the extent of their interventions in internal crises. Operating under a rule of confidentiality which denies them the opportunity to gain recognition for what they do, these organisations, just like the UN, depend upon the willingness and ability of regional hegemonies to act. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea were able and willing to commit their national resources to the management of the conflicts in these countries and, as a result, ECOWAS could be effectively engaged. Senegal and Guinea have also deployed their forces to Guinea-Bissau to prevent the crisis in this country from affecting their own security. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, a coalition of the willing and able — Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, acting on behalf of SADC — deployed their forces to support the government of Laurent Kabila against an insurgency movement that is supported by external actors. Regional and subregional organisations themselves are dependent upon their ability to mobilise a coalition of the willing and able. What happens when it is impossible to mobilise such coalitions? What happens to the management of such conflicts? What happens to the people?

The Development of Systems and Institutions

The UN, the OAU and African governments, since the current Secretary-General of the UN assumed office in 1996, have been engaged in discussions on ways and means through which the two organisations can collaborate to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa more effectively. On 25 September 1997, the Security Council convened at the ministerial level to discuss ways through which the world body can improve its co-operation with the OAU in managing conflicts in Africa. The Secretary-General of the UN issued an important report on 13 April 1998 dealing with **The causes of conflicts and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa**. The UN has further established a political liaison office at the OAU to enhance information flow and the co-ordination of the political activities of the two organisations in Africa. As mentioned earlier, special representatives of the Secretary-General in specific conflict situations, operate in close consultation with the OAU. In addition to discussions at the highest political levels, the Secretaries-General of the two organisations have directed that staff of the relevant departments should meet with OAU counterparts to design a working relationship which will enable the UN to support the OAU more directly. In December 1997 and May 1998, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations convened an African Peacekeeping Training Strategy Session which was attended by 64 delegations, including representatives from 27 African countries.

At the time of writing, the Security Council is scheduled to meet on 24 September to discuss the Secretary-General's report and to consider the outcome of the deliberations of six Security Council working groups established to negotiate the detailed agreement on what the Security Council will do to solidify co-operation with the OAU and Africa in the management of conflicts on the continent. The objective of this series of meetings and consultations is to develop an

institutional relationship through which the UN can provide support to peace and conflict management in Africa. One of the most urgent requirements is its support for the operationalisation of the OAU Mechanism.

The UN enhanced its own peacekeeping capabilities after the Somalia debacle with more extensive arrangements for mission planning, and standby arrangements with countries that would designate their preparedness to participate in UN peacekeeping in advance of a conflict. A situation room is now fully operational, staffed by civilian and military officers and, finally, the UN has a fully developed section for peacekeeping training. The objective is to link the various facilities of the UN to the OAU, and for the UN to assist the OAU to develop similar capacities. It is hoped that closer collaboration between the organisations will enable the UN and African regional and subregional organisations to acquire a better understanding of conflicts, and how they should be prevented and managed. The concept of joint deployment of OAU and UN missions is being actively examined with the objective of ensuring that each organisation is brought in to do what it can do best in a specific situation.

One of the most innovative aspects of the Secretary-General's report is his emphasis on peacebuilding issues, especially those of economic development as a contribution to conflict prevention and conflict management. The Secretary-General particularly emphasised the need to involve international economic and financial institutions in the management of all aspects of conflicts. He suggests that economic tools should be fully integrated into the mechanisms for conflict management, arguing that, ultimately, the state of health of the economies of countries in the region will have a major impact on the state of security. The OAU was encouraged to implement plans for the establishment of the African Economic Community and to expand the functions of this grouping to include support for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The recommendations of the UN Secretary-General are at the cutting edge. The ideal arrangement will be one in which the OAU is fully involved in all aspects of the preparation of African forces for UN operations. The OAU should also be in a position to deploy peace missions to African conflicts, based on a mandate from the Security Council and with active political and financial support from the UN. A great deal of the recommendations and approaches suggested by the UN Secretary-General was already contained in the report and in recommendations made by the second meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the OAU Central Organ. These recommendations form the framework used by the OAU for the operationalisation of its Mechanism.

In the meantime, some of the subregional organisations are also at the cutting edge of conflict management. As mentioned above, SADC and ECOWAS have been able to mobilise quickly and to intervene in situations of conflict, especially when enforcement action was required. ECOWAS adopted a Draft Mechanism for conflict management in July 1998, which the heads of state have considered in October. SADC had already adopted its own Mechanism. Similar subregional mechanisms are required in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in the Great Lakes region and Central Africa, and in North Africa. Again, the report of the second meeting of the OAU Chiefs of Staff provides a clear road map to guide the relations between the OAU, subregional organisations and the UN. It is important for subregional Organisations to be included in current discussions and planning. It is particularly important for them to begin a series of discussions with the OAU similar to the one ongoing between the UN and the OAU. Subregional mechanisms should be closely related to and integrated with the OAU Mechanism.

Conclusion

The implementation of some of these initiatives will revolutionise the way in which conflict is managed in Africa. However, these plans will work only to the extent that the Security Council and the superpowers are willing to provide financial and logistic support to the continent for conflict management. The fact that some of the most important members of the Security Council have not paid their dues to the UN and have refused to operate through the organisation will remain a major handicap. The UN Secretary-General has tried to establish a mechanism through which UN resources can be made available to Africa for conflict management as a matter of routine. It will become important when Africa presents an agenda for the management of conflicts in the region for the UN Security Council to be ready to provide the logistic and other critical technological support.

The OAU and African subregional organisations need to be clearer on the moral and political principles which should inform the relationships between and within states on the continent. These organisations should uphold minimum standards, of which the violation should be penalised equally across the board, and not only when the culprit is a relatively less powerful member of the organisation. It is desirable for the different subregions throughout the continent to develop mechanisms to manage conflict in their regions. The process through which consensus is developed for these mechanisms is important for the resolution of the underlying security crises of each region. Security perceptions and threats of aggression from states that are contiguous are forced into the open in the process of negotiating these mechanisms. If properly handled, this process can lead to greater transparency and confidence. Such a process is urgently required in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, two regions where underlying internal and transregional security threats have resulted in a great deal of intrastate and transborder conflicts and interventions.

The ECOMOG experience with peacekeeping in West Africa **Eboe Hutchful, Wayne State University**

Introduction

ECOMOG, the Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been hailed, with some justification, as a landmark in regional peacekeeping in Africa, if not a pointer to the new shape of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period. A new type of vicious and intractable conflict is making traditional peacekeeping obsolete, and mandating a different (and tougher) approach to peacekeeping than in the past. The very nature of post-Cold War conflicts faces both peacekeepers and peace negotiators with daunting new challenges. These conflicts are cruel and protracted, make no distinction between combatants and civilians, often have no discernible political agendas (unlike the Cold War insurgencies), and are relatively resistant to external pressure.

On the whole, the international community has been slow to recognise these changes and, since Somalia, reluctant to get involved, assuming (rightly or wrongly) that international intervention will have limited efficacy. Given this situation, marginal countries, particularly those in Africa, have no option but to design their own collective security system. This was specifically recognised by the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, who proposed in **An Agenda for Peace** that regional organisations take the lead in regional peacekeeping. The ECOMOG operation in Liberia is an often painful example of the transition between the old and 'new' modes of peacekeeping, which tend to be regionally-based.

The Significance of ECOMOG Peace Operations

If ECOMOG is any indication, however, the path to regional peacekeeping is not an easy one. The weaker states in the West African region had difficulty mobilising the resources required to deal decisively with the Liberian crisis, becoming overwhelmingly dependent upon one regional power to sustain the operation. The ECOMOG operation occurred at a difficult time for the states in the region, when they themselves were involved in painful economic reforms and their own legitimacy, in most cases, was subject to internal criticism and pressures. The intervention was also complicated by linguistic and geopolitical rivalries and by cleavages within ECOWAS itself, and undermined by debilitating arguments about its legitimacy and organisation.

These difficulties were partially due to the fact that ECOWAS and its member countries, like the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), had been notoriously slow to take issues of regional security seriously. Long standing mutual security protocols that should have allowed ECOWAS to anticipate crises were not implemented. Regionalism also proved as much a source of weakness as of strength in the operation: its advantages were genuine interest (as well as self-interest) in the issues and intimate knowledge of the local political terrain (both necessary for sustained and meaningful engagement); its disadvantages were the danger of partisanship and the lack of neutrality and, in the ECOWAS case, the militarisation of existing regional conflicts and cleavages. In other words, regional (or subregional) actors are liable to be both too close to the issues and too interested in the outcomes. International intervention was ultimately required to break the deadlock.

Despite repeated setbacks, the Liberian operation was ultimately successful for several reasons:

most importantly, the political will and staying power of ECOWAS;

the ability of the organisation to shift the mandate of its forces from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and peacemaking as developments on the ground dictated, and to turn to regional (OAU) and international (UN) initiatives as its own subregional initiatives flagged; and

ultimately, the growing consensus among states in the region that conflict was self-defeating and that sovereign interests were best served by a credible common security mechanism.

At the same time, however, it is suggested that this realisation of the importance of common security mechanisms at the interstate level is not enough. Arguably, it is issues of human security, which lie within the borders of these states, and which such states are much more reluctant or less able to resolve, that foment violent conflicts.

The ECOMOG experience also demonstrates the necessity to go beyond traditional peacekeeping narratives — with their almost exclusive focus on the ‘intervention sites’- to new and broader fields of investigation, in particular in understanding how involvement in peacekeeping influences political processes in those states which are themselves engaged in these operations. What does involvement in protracted and expensive peacekeeping operations imply for weak states and for their own fiscal and resource viability and state-building processes? How do such states deal with the stresses and responsibilities of regional peacekeeping? How are decisions to launch or sustain peacekeeping operations taken? Why do some regimes become involved and others not, and why do some withdraw and others stay the course? There is also little idea of how the nature of regimes involved in peacekeeping affects the conduct of the operations. For instance, did it matter that most of the countries involved in

ECOWAS were themselves under military regimes with contested legitimacies?

Such questions deserve some attention. Peacekeeping operations are, after all, no longer episodic exercises for some of these states and their militaries. On the contrary, they have become both a major form of outdoor relief for budget-strapped armed forces, and (ironically) the closest that these largely idle armies will come to seeing any form of 'action'. Involvement in peacekeeping has also come to play a variety of roles in shaping relations between political authorities and their armed forces. In other words, peacekeeping serves certain domestic purposes and may involve certain domestic impacts.

The ECOMOG operation and its challenges can only be understood against the background of the 'geopolitical facts' of the region. Five of these were particularly important. The first was the Anglophone/Francophone cleavage in the region, a cleavage as linguistic as it is cultural and political. Of the sixteen members of ECOWAS, nine are French-speaking, five are English-speaking, while two (Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde) are Lusophone. Previous attempts at regional co-operation within West Africa have reflected, and continue to do so, these colonial linguistic and political affinities, particularly among the Francophone states. ECOWAS itself was the first attempt to overcome these historical alignments and to initiate some form of overarching regional integration; its limited success was an indication of the durability of some of these colonial relationships. A second factor was the dominance of Nigeria within the region, in terms of population and economic resources, a dominance which was greatly augmented by the oil boom in the 1970s. However, Nigeria's pre-eminence was not uncontested.

One 'traditional' source of challenge was the former colonial power, France. A driving force of French post-colonial policy in West Africa had been to checkmate Nigerian influence in the region, particularly in relation to its former colonies; this had informed French support for Biafra in the Nigerian civil war. Following the end of the civil war, and with the oil boom in Nigeria, however, the two powers developed several areas of common interest, political (a desire for regional stability), as well as economic (French commercial and industrial interests in Nigeria developed rapidly in the 1970s, making France one of the largest foreign investors in the country). During the same period, however, both powers found themselves being challenged by a new pretender, Libya, as it attempted to extend its influence in the region through support for armed insurrections and other radical movements. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Nigeria and France, supported by the United States, closed ranks to counter Libyan penetration in Chad and elsewhere in West Africa.

A final geopolitical factor of significance was the pervasive praetorianism in the region; this, it is suggested, was germane to both explaining the rebellions that provoked the ECOMOG intervention, as well as the manner in which ECOMOG states rationalised and conducted their operations. In sum, this regional picture constitutes essential background to an understanding of the course of the ECOWAS intervention into Liberia, and its subsequent actions in Sierra Leone.

Legality and Legitimacy of ECOMOG Operations

Both the origins and diplomacy of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia have been extensively analysed elsewhere, and will not be covered in detail here.¹ Suffice it to say that, during Christmas 1989, an attack was launched into Liberia by Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), from the neighbouring state of Côte d'Ivoire. This attack was allegedly aided by units from the Burkina Faso armed forces. In August 1990, following peace moves initiated by the regional organisation, an ECOWAS intervention force, ECOMOG, landed in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia.

In theory, an ECOWAS mutual defence treaty, signed in Freetown in 1981, should have governed this intervention.² The 1981 treaty recognised any aggression against a member state as aggression against the whole community. It anticipated three possible scenarios:

an internal armed conflict in a member state organised and actively supported from without, and likely to endanger the peace and security of the entire community;

an armed conflict between two or more member states; or

an external armed threat or aggression.

The treaty provided for certain organisational structures around which intervention would be built. These were:

an ECOWAS Authority to act as the supreme organ to determine when to invoke the protocol and determine the necessity for military action;

a Defence Council, composed of the Foreign and Defence ministers of member states, to assist the Authority in this function;

a Defence Commission of Chiefs of Defence of member states, responsible for examining the technical aspects of any defence issue and implementing any duties assigned by the Defence Council;

a Deputy Executive Secretary (Military), who would be a senior serving military officer, to take charge of the administration and implementation of defence; and

Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC), consisting of designated units of armed forces of member states, under a force commander appointed by the ECOWAS Authority on the advice of the Defence Council.

These national units were to be based in their respective countries, but organised for joint military exercises or deployed for armed intervention and/or assistance.

Significantly, the 1981 treaty was preceded by the establishment in June 1978 of L'ANAD (*Accord de non-agression et d'assistance en matière de défense* or Treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance, and Mutual Defence), in Abidjan by seven Francophone countries: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and Togo, with Guinea Conakry and Benin as observers. This mechanism mediated the conflict between Mali and Burkina Faso in 1985-86.

However, the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia did not follow the script envisaged by the 1981 treaty.³ One reason was that the treaty itself was never implemented. Rather, the intervention was initiated by the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), a specialised body formed by ECOWAS three months earlier with the limited and specific mandate of mediating disputes between two or more member states. The members of the SMC consisted of three Anglophone states (Nigeria, Ghana, and the Gambia) and two Francophone ones (Togo and Mali). One difficulty was that no reference was made to civil wars in the mandate of the SMC.

However, once the decision had been taken to send in the monitoring force, the two Francophone members of the SMC, Mali and Togo, declined to contribute forces.⁴ Of the Francophone states, only Guinea (though not originally a member of the SMC) consented to contribute troops, partly because of its membership (together with Liberia and Sierra Leone) of

the Mano River Union, and partly in reaction to the slaughter of Mandingo traders from Guinea by Taylor's forces. This partnership was formalised when ECOWAS split the command between the three countries contributing the largest forces, with Ghana contributing the force commander, Guinea the deputy force commander, and Nigeria the chief of staff.

While well intentioned, these decisions, in effect, meant that a small group of member states lacking the required mandate, committed the regional organisation to what turned out to be a protracted and expensive military enterprise. These origins led to bitter legal wrangling and questions about the legitimacy of the ECOMOG initiative. Some countries felt that adequate consultations had not been undertaken before the force was deployed. More fundamentally, they questioned what they saw as an illegal extension of the mandate of ECOWAS from economic issues, as enshrined in its charter, to military concerns. They argued that an organisation established primarily, if not solely, for the facilitation of economic integration, had no mandate to take on political and security-related responsibilities, even for humanitarian reasons.

There were also questions whether the 1981 protocol on mutual defence, on which the entire concept of intervention was built, provided enough scope and authority for actions of this magnitude. There were several responses to these objections. The first was that the conflict became internationalised when Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso allowed Taylor to launch his attack from within their borders. Secondly, it was argued that the deployment of ECOMOG was the only option left for these subregional states in a situation of complete breakdown of sovereign authority. Third, to those who argued that the mandate of ECOWAS was limited to economic objectives, it was retorted that economic integration could not take place in a security vacuum.⁵

To further complicate the picture, there was a similar lack of consensus among the rebels in relation to the ECOWAS intervention. While Doe and other Liberian factions accepted the **Banjul Accord**, Taylor, whose forces were at the gates of Monrovia, and who suspected that the intervention was designed to cheat him out of victory, rejected it. The subsequent landing by ECOMOG was welcomed (and indeed assisted) by Prince Johnson and his faction, the INPFL (a breakaway from the NPFL), but opposed by Taylor, whose faction declared ECOMOG an invading force and fired on it as it landed, causing several casualties. ECOMOG thus broke with a cardinal principle of traditional peacekeeping: the necessity of obtaining the agreement of all warring parties to external intervention. Consequently, it was forced to take sides and ally itself with some of the very warlords and political forces that it was designed to restrain, and was thus compromised from the very beginning by a perceived lack of neutrality.

Motives and Interests

The legal arguments around the issue of mandate and legitimacy masked deeper political and diplomatic rivalries and conflicts of interest within ECOWAS itself, mirroring, in particular, the linguistic divisions in the region. Two Francophone states (Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire) were directly instrumental in the launching of Taylor's incursion. On the other hand, the ECOMOG force that opposed the rebels consisted of (with the exception of Guinea) Anglophone states. Thus, whatever the merits of the case, the formation of ECOMOG, with its almost exclusively Anglophone membership, posed the possibility that ECOWAS would be split into two military factions or defence arrangements, one Anglophone and the other Francophone. The leading role of Nigeria in initiating the ECOMOG intervention also rekindled Francophone fears of Nigerian 'hegemony'. The result of these cleavages was that both the rebels and the ECOMOG intervention force had allies and advocates within ECOWAS. Over time, both factions

progressively also lost the capacity to exercise control over their 'allies' and the course of events, particularly as new factions proliferated.

Thus underlying and complicating the ECOMOG intervention from the very beginning were the contrasting geopolitical objectives and roles of key ECOWAS players.⁶ Several explanations have been offered for the involvement of Côte d'Ivoire in Taylor's adventure (thus, oddly, placing the Ivorians in the same camp as the Libyans whose 'adventurism' and 'subversion' had been condemned by Houphouët-Boigny in the past). The initial motivation appears to have been Houphouët-Boigny's disgust at the exceptional brutality of Doe's regime and, in particular, his anger at the murder of President Tolbert and his son (the latter, also Houphouët-Boigny's son-in-law, had been dragged out of the American Embassy where he had taken refuge, and shot). However, once Taylor had launched his attack, other motives came into play. The first was opposition to Nigerian (and Anglophone) 'hegemony' in the region, a cornerstone of Ivorian and French policy since the 1960s. Secondly, various French firms and Ivorian middlemen became involved in lucrative diamond, rubber, and logging business deals with Taylor's 'Greater Liberia' headquarters in Gbarnga.

The role of Burkina Faso in training Taylor's troops and funneling Libyan arms, as well as providing several hundred troops and commanders to the rebels has also received some attention in the literature.⁷ President Campaore, the Burkina leader, is also related by marriage to Houphouët-Boigny. In addition to the traditional dependence of Burkina on Côte d'Ivoire, Campaore was indebted to Houphouët-Boigny for his support in the conflict with Campaore's more radical predecessor, Sankara, who had sought to radicalise regional politics as well as to challenge the historically lopsided relations with Côte d'Ivoire. On the other hand, Campaore may also have been returning a favour to Taylor, whose men, in Burkina for training, were said to have been implicated in the murder of Sankara. However, Campaore may also have had his own complex agenda, which included the need to cultivate the patronage of the Libyans, and perhaps a desire to reclaim some of the revolutionary cachet lost with the fall of Sankara.

On the Nigerian side, several personal as well as economic motives, have been cited as principal reasons for the intervention. Among these was Babangida's friendship with Doe (in fact, Doe had appealed personally to Babangida to intervene to save his regime). But there were also economic interests at stake, such as an agreement to exploit the Bong iron ore mine in Liberia to feed the Ajaokuta iron mill, which would have been endangered with Doe's removal. According to this view, ECOMOG was used to provide collective cover for what were, in fact, Nigeria's unilateral objectives. On the other hand, Nigerian leaders justified their participation in ECOMOG on more dispassionate grounds, as consistent with a national tradition of peacekeeping, and the need for humanitarian intervention to stop the carnage in Liberia.

While there was some truth to both positions,⁸ Nigeria's goals were again actually more complex than either position would suggest. One of these was concern with regional political stability. It should be recalled that Nigerian governments had taken a militant stance against radical subaltern military *coups* in the region. Thus, in 1979 when Rawlings overthrew a regime of senior military officers and executed several of them for corruption, the government of General Obasanjo put pressure on the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) by cutting off oil supplies. When Doe staged his *coup* a year later, the Nigerian government, now under civilian control, again took a militant stance, barring Doe from attending the OAU Heads of State meeting in Lagos and co-ordinating the move to deny him the succession as Chairman of the OAU. When Babangida came to power, however, relations with Doe improved. But the earlier pattern was repeated when Rawlings staged his second *coup* in 1981.⁹ The actions of these Nigerian governments can be ascribed to political and ideological considerations (the desire of

the ascendant Nigerian bourgeoisie to act as a conservative bulwark of stability in the region), as well as to specific institutional factors (the anxiety of its military faction to avoid a repetition of the traumatic uprising of their own ranks in July 1966).¹⁰

However, Taylor's civilian insurgency raised a somewhat different set of concerns that transcended the friendship between Doe and Babangida: the fear that the defeat of an official army by civilian insurgents (as in Uganda) would potentially have undermined the political standing of the military in the entire region. (It is reported that in the initial stages of the intervention, Babangida stressed this element in his speeches to his military commanders). The wildfire advance of the rebellions by Taylor in Liberia and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, and the lack of effective resistance by the armed forces of both countries, could hardly have assuaged these fears. More ominously still, the presence of known dissidents from other West African states in Taylor's army also suggested that Taylor (and his Libyan sponsors) had a wider regional design, that once Liberia and Sierra Leone had fallen, other West African states would have followed.

While it is clear enough that, without Nigeria's massive contribution in funding and manpower, the ECOMOG operation could not have been sustained, there were, on the other hand, significant problems associated with Nigeria's pre-eminence in the endeavour. Firstly, the perceived closeness of Nigerian rulers to Doe compromised the appearance of neutrality and gave Taylor the excuse to continue the war by representing it narrowly as a direct contest between the NPFL (and hence the 'Liberian nation') and Nigerian 'invaders'. Secondly, as has been shown, it aroused traditional fears of Nigerian 'hegemony' among the Francophone states in the region, although these 'fears' were manufactured to a large extent. Thirdly, Nigeria's own failed transition undermined the credibility of the claim of restoring democracy and the rule of law in other troubled states, and became a source of acute embarrassment. On the other hand, it was clear that Nigerian rulers were also using the ECOMOG operation, not altogether unsuccessfully, to deflect attention from their own legitimization crisis at home and to circumvent attempts by the international community to ostracize the regime.

However, some accounts suggest that it was Ghana, rather than Nigeria, which initiated the idea of intervention, with a plan to mount an operation into Monrovia to extricate Ghanaian refugees trapped in the embassy there.¹¹ As it transpired, the adoption of the idea of a monitoring force following the Banjul peace agreement made such a unilateral intervention unnecessary. In addition to the humanitarian issue, the Ghana regime was also concerned by the fact that Taylor's men included known Ghanaian dissidents (such as a Major Suleiman who had been implicated in earlier armed attacks on the regime from outside the country).¹² While Ghana would form a firm partnership with Nigeria in ECOMOG, the goals of the two powers were not identical in every respect.¹³

For instance, while the Nigerians were seen as pro-Doe, the Ghanaians were disgusted with the Liberian president who, in their view, was playing the race card against the Americo-Liberian population, and whom they suspected to be an American agent. They were more favourably inclined towards Major-General Quiwonkpa, Doe's main rival, and were repulsed by his brutal murder by Doe. Unlike the Nigerians, the Ghanaians were much more inclined to pull the plug on Doe; according to some accounts, General Quainoo, the first (Ghanaian) ECOMOG force commander, was under instructions not to resist Doe's capture by his enemies should the opportunity arise. If this version of events is true, Doe's capture (and subsequent murder) by Prince Johnson's men, right from under the nose of ECOMOG troops at the force headquarters outside Monrovia, could not have been entirely fortuitous.¹⁴ This may also have been the conclusion of the Nigerians, who insisted on the removal of Quainoo as force commander

following this incident. Subsequently, the Nigerians staged their own 'coup' within ECOMOG, unilaterally replacing Quainoo with their own Josiah Dogonyaro while Quainoo was away in Accra.¹⁵

Military, Political and Diplomatic Challenges

From a military standpoint, the ECOMOG operation in Liberia started off inauspiciously, beset by problems with military equipment, logistics, training and interoperability, and aggravated by language differences. ECOMOG units initially landed without intelligence or military maps of Monrovia; some without their personal weapons, and with inadequate supplies of boots and uniforms, and lacking adequate logistics.¹⁶ Initially, each country also insisted on having a say in the disposition of its national forces, and 'national' commanders insisted on communicating or seeking clearance directly from their home governments. The overall force commander frequently found himself bargaining with, as well as acting as a go-between for contributor states. Some of these problems persisted: eight years into the operation, ECOMOG commander General Shelpidi identified "... *differences in language, training, equipment and orientation*" as key issues in interoperability within ECOMOG, stressing the need for bilingual language training in the region, as well as joint training and standardisation of equipment.¹⁷

These difficulties were not surprising, given the state of many of the armed forces in the region. In the case of the Ghana Armed Forces (just to cite one example), a review commissioned by the government in 1987 reported that the operational state of readiness of the Army was so low that none of the infantry brigades could readily launch one fully equipped battalion into operation and, correspondingly, that none of the infantry battalions could launch even one fully equipped company into action. Less than ten per cent of the transport fleet of any of the infantry units was operational owing to a lack of tyres and spare parts. Equipment was often obsolete or unserviceable. Of a total of 43 assorted aircraft in the inventory of the Air Force, only five were serviceable. Of eight ships officially on the active list in the Navy, only two were in a semi-operational condition, even though several were only a few years old.¹⁸ A similar story could be told of the Nigerian fleet of C-130 transport aircraft, at one time the largest in Africa, but virtually grounded by the lack of maintenance prior to the Liberian intervention.

In other respects, ECOMOG operations have raised many questions about the performance of armies in the region that have yet to be fully discussed. The lack of proper training and equipment led to inappropriate battlefield strategies, such as the indiscriminate Nigerian aerial bombing raids during Operation 120 Hours in Liberia and the well-publicised naval bombardment of Freetown, in which hundreds of civilians were killed. There have also been many reports (including several from within the force itself) alleging ECOMOG involvement in looting and illicit mining activities. There were also many instances of corruption in the administration of the ECOMOG armed forces in the field.¹⁹ Nevertheless, generalisations should be avoided, since there were observable differences in the performance of national armies, as well as in their quality of administration. For instance, in Operation Octopus, Taylor's forces were able to break through the Nigerian lines but not those of the Senegalese. Nigerian troops, technically better funded, complained frequently of a lack of food at a time when the Ghanaians were being well fed.

Indeed, the difference between the official and warlord armies became blurred over time as ECOMOG units cultivated their own warlords (or stimulated ethnic rivalries) to counterattack Taylor's forces, or as the Sierra Leone government employed Kamajors and hired mercenary armies (Executive Outcomes) for use against the RUF forces. A 'strategic' reason for this blurring of the lines between conventional and irregular armies lay in the fact that the very

nature of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone placed conventional armed forces in extremely ambiguous and dangerous situations, and limited their effectiveness.²⁰ There were two types of forces that responded more effectively than official or multinational forces: mercenaries or private armies with less ambiguous mandates or, ironically enough, other warlords, whose methods were better adjusted to the physical and tactical terrain.²¹

Another characteristic of the ECOMOG operation was the tenuous control exercised over the field force by the political directorate, technically the ECOWAS Secretariat. To a large extent, this was due to the fact that ECOWAS was unable to play its anticipated role in relation to the funding of the force. It had been agreed that troops from participating countries were to be self-sufficient for the first thirty days, after which ECOWAS was to pick up the funding, but it was unable to do so. This made it difficult for the ECOWAS directorate to claim control over a military force that was acting in its name, but for which it could not pay. It fortified perceptions of ECOMOG as a 'Nigerian' operation. As far as the participating countries were concerned, funding and other resource constraints (including communications) led to commanders on the ground being given considerable latitude to conduct operations as they saw fit, and to deal with problems as they arose. As it turned out, this was a blessing in disguise, since it provided flexibility on the ground and avoided the delays normally associated with UN peacekeeping operations.

However, possibly the most notable aspect of the ECOWAS initiative was less the military than the diplomatic dimension. By every conceivable measure, Liberia was a diplomatic minefield. Commitments were repeatedly made and broken. In all, there were approximately ten cease-fires and seventeen negotiated agreements before 'peace' was achieved with the elections in 1997. Taylor was the worst, but by no means only offender in this respect. For instance, Ivorian leaders failed to shut off the border as required by the Yamoussoukro process, and other ECOWAS leaders, including both Soglo and Rawlings, would express the sentiment that the Nigerians were determined to dictate the peace process, and that no peace was possible unless they were the prime players.²²

In addition to the recalcitrance of individual players, the difficulty in securing commitments to agreements was due to two characteristics of the warlord formations, which have become a feature of these wars. Firstly, their easy access to light weapons and small arms procured largely (though not exclusively) from growing private and black market arms sources and funded by exploiting raw material resources under their control — makes them able to operate with minimal international patronage or support, and thus relatively resistant to external pressure. Secondly, unlike the earlier Cold War insurgencies, these warlords have little by way of political organisation or agenda, or compelling motivations to seek peace; the war is its own justification. Thirdly, the low costs of entry and their own lack of internal ideological coherence pose the danger of splintering and thus the consequent proliferation of warlord factions. Negotiated agreements were rendered academic by the emergence of new warlord factions.

These characteristics make warlord formations a nightmare for peace negotiators, as well. As has been seen, however, some of these 'warlord factions' (such as ULIMO-K, the Alhaji Kromah faction of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy and the Liberian Peace Council) were actually generated by governments or they collaborated closely with official armies, while others were breakaways from existing factions (INPFL, ULIMO-J, the Roosevelt Johnson faction and the Sierra Leone People's Democratic League (SLPDL), an RUF breakaway under Alimany Sankoh).

If the process seemed interminable and often thankless, the ECOWAS peace negotiations

nevertheless moved in three or four distinct phases, in retrospect, each crucial to the process of generating and broadening consensus. The first was the SMC phase that resulted in the creation of ECOMOG, but at the same time alienated the Francophone supporters of Taylor. This was followed by the so-called Yamoussoukro phase, which sought to 'de-Nigerianise' ECOMOG (by bringing in Senegalese troops) while shifting control of the diplomatic dimension to Houphouet-Boigny and Francophone countries considered to be favourably disposed to Taylor. However, this also failed to secure agreement, largely because of Taylor's continuing refractiveness, and led Taylor's 'patrons' to reconsider their relationship with him. This stage was followed by a broadening of the negotiating process, signified by the creation of the 'Committee of Nine', drawn respectively from both 'factions' (the former SMC and the 'Yamo' camp), with responsibility to monitor the **Cotonou Accord** of October 1992.

This latter stage in the process was carried forward at Abuja in November 1992, where a call was once again made for a cease-fire, combined with a land, sea and air embargo against the NPFL. Taylor accepted, and then broke this latest cease-fire, resulting in Nigerian aircraft carrying out Operation 120 Hours — a sustained bombardment against his forces. This, in effect, exhausted regional initiatives, and led to an appeal by ECOWAS to both the OAU and the UN Security Council for assistance. The OAU and the international community brought two crucial (if largely symbolic) resources which had been missing from the subregional peace process: firstly, transparency and impartiality; and secondly, legitimacy through force of international oversight and sanction.²³

Ironically, a crucial factor in the success of the ECOWAS peace effort was the manner in which military, political and diplomatic initiatives were articulated — or rather 'disarticulated'. In the UN system, the relationship between field commanders and the political directorate — centred around the Security Council and the office of the Secretary-General and/or their representatives — has always bedevilled peacekeeping operations. In this sense, the tenuous control over ECOMOG by the ECOWAS Secretariat noted earlier was actually a positive factor in the success of ECOMOG. It facilitated what was, in effect, a two-track approach to military operations, on the one hand, and diplomatic negotiations, on the other, permitting the former to be disengaged to a surprising degree from the fractious politics of ECOWAS itself. Military operations were thus not held hostage to political bickering.

While Nigeria and the SMC countries abdicated control of the diplomatic process, they were able to retain control of the military operation; the dual track allowed other forces to be brought into — and even to take leadership of — the protracted and often inconclusive negotiating process, without affecting military resolve on the ground. The ability to sustain military pressure, in turn, was crucial in sustaining the diplomatic momentum, thereby forcing recalcitrant warlords to return to the bargaining table.

Political Dynamics Within the Troop Contributing Countries

The ECOMOG experience also demonstrates the need to go beyond the traditional concerns of peacekeeping literature to arrive at some understanding of the impact of peacekeeping on domestic political processes within countries that participate in such operations. The decision to participate in peacekeeping or peace enforcement activities, whether in the case of Nigeria in ECOMOG, Zimbabwe in the Congo-Kinshasa, or South Africa in Lesotho, has often been taken under circumstances that have significant repercussions for domestic politics, in particular in the area of accountability, as well as for fiscal stability. In all these instances, military operations were launched (and sustained) with no political consultation with domestic political constituencies and no attempt to reach a consensus with critics.

Participation in peacekeeping may also partially reflect domestic political imperatives, obvious examples being the Babangida and Abacha regimes. A corollary is how the political nature of regimes shapes peacekeeping interventions and their outcomes. To be sure, the conflicts in the West African region could not be understood without reference to the deep history of praetorianism in the region. This was clear in the background to the rebellions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, both of which began, albeit to various degrees, as movements of armed resistance to brutal dictatorships and failing states²⁴ and, secondly, in the fact that, with one exception, all the countries that participated in ECOMOG were themselves under military rule (though some would subsequently undertake 'democratic' transitions involving the constitutionalisation of the erstwhile military regime).²⁵

There was thus some irony to the fact that, at the time of the **Banjul Accord** which opened the way for the ECOMOG intervention in 1990 (of which the demand for free elections was a critical component), ECOMOG countries were themselves under military rulers who refused to concede to the demands for elections emanating from their own struggling civil societies.²⁶ Indeed, from the point of view of political legitimacy, there was often little to choose between the official heads of state in the region and the warlords whom they were fighting.²⁷

The ability of ECOMOG countries, and Nigeria in particular, to sustain the almost indefinite support of the force in a period of critical economic and fiscal difficulty at home, could only be explained in terms of the existence of authoritarian political structures, which did not permit any political debate on, oversight of or accountability towards these actions.

It can be assumed that, given the high economic costs (not to mention human casualties), a more democratic regime would have difficulty to sustain this role. Ironically, the same authoritarian context that facilitated decisive regional action undermined the meaning of security in the sense of human and political rights at the same time. Likewise, the military nature of these regimes helps to explain why ECOMOG itself, as a peacekeeping enterprise, remained primarily a military venture, with little of the collateral civilian activities that have come to be associated with peacekeeping (such as policing, human rights monitoring and other forms of humanitarian activity, and the setting up of administrative structures in 'pacified' areas). Civil society organisations in the region concerned with conflict resolution have also complained that the siting of ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja (where it would be directly under the influence of Abacha's regime) created an atmosphere of militarisation, which discouraged civilian participation. In this sense, the nature of regimes may affect the conduct of peacekeeping.

Yet another impact of ECOMOG may be the development of a militarised form of regionalism, involving increasing integration between military structures and personnel in the region, through regular joint training exercises and meetings of the ECOWAS Chiefs of Staff, facilitated by foreign military programmes and initiatives (mainly American and French). These military relationships have a focused and coherent character, largely missing from the historically fractured relationships which have tended to characterise ECOWAS political authorities (not to mention the weak civil society linkages in the region). In other words, ECOMOG is accomplishing military integration while it is failing to realise economic integration.

At another level, peacekeeping has become a major form of outdoor relief for budget-strapped armed forces. As Erskine says of Ghanaian troops in Lebanon:

"Op Sunrise' undoubtedly helped to improve the living standards of our troops. For once they could afford freezers, cookers, hi-fi systems, television sets and all sorts of household items normally too expensive for them. A corn-milling machine — known to the Ghanaian troops as a

*'knicker-knocker' — became the status symbol for all troops on 'Op Sunrise'. Almost every soldier bought one, either to use commercially, or to sell."*28

Soldiers were not the only ones to benefit. Payments to the Ghanaian government by the UN for peacekeeping operations, though modest, have helped to subsidise military spending at a time of severely diminishing military budgets. Put unkindly, 'peacekeeping' has become a new form of low wage labour export. By contrast, of course, Liberia and Sierra Leone were far from being well-heeled peacekeeping operations, making it necessary for ECOMOG soldiers to compensate by literally 'mining' the battlefield in both countries (ECOMOG troops have repeatedly been accused of prolonging the conflict for this reason). Politically, on the other hand, peacekeeping payments can also be a poisoned chalice, as both the Ghanaian and Togolese authorities have realised.29

Given the lack of transparency, it is difficult to determine how much participating West African countries have spent to support their ECOMOG operations, although Nigeria's contribution has conservatively been estimated to be well in excess of US \$500 million (though much of this was recycled back into the country through military contracts and other forms of patronage),30 and it is known that unscheduled ECOMOG expenditures were also in part responsible for the record fiscal deficits suffered by Ghana in 1992.

Peacekeeping operations may also play various roles in shaping political relations with the armed forces. In the Ghanaian case cited above, troop earnings from peacekeeping operations abroad have become a major factor in stabilising relations between the army and the Rawlings government, with participation in peacekeeping operations carefully regulated so that all soldiers feel that they have fair access to opportunities to augment their income. In the case of Nigeria, on the other hand, Abacha used ECOMOG postings to get rid of troublesome units and officers, many of whom were subsequently sent off on retirement at the end of their posting. Among the other unanticipated (and unsavoury) 'spin-offs' of participation in peacekeeping are the reported use of ECOMOG veterans in internal 'peacekeeping operations' in the Ogoni area, and the proliferation of small arms in Nigeria, thought to have been smuggled in by soldiers returning from the Liberian theatre of operations.

Conclusion

ECOMOG, its glaring deficiencies notwithstanding, is an important example of the emerging modes of regionally based peacekeeping. Yet, the ECOMOG operations also demonstrate the difficulties and pitfalls of such regional peacekeeping. In a geopolitically fissured region like West Africa, regionalism proved to be a problematic vehicle for intervention. While regional self-interest forced ECOWAS to stay in the operation, factional frictions within the organisation (exploited in turn by the warlords), forced a prolongation of the conflict. On the other hand, many of the challenges faced by ECOWAS/ECOMOG were also inherent in the very nature of post-Cold War conflicts and peacekeeping. The deep-seated causes of these conflicts, and the lack of overwhelming military advantage on the part of governments and intervention forces, make for protracted violence, and call for political commitment as well as open-endedness in the intervention agenda (in the ECOMOG case, the peacekeepers went in expecting the intervention to last between six and twelve months, and ended up with an involvement that lasted eight years).

These challenges are likely to be exacerbated in the context of weak regional states and collectivities, as ECOWAS demonstrates. The ECOMOG operation occurred at a difficult moment for the states in the region. Firstly, the members of the regional organisation were

themselves involved in complex political transitions, with most of their regimes under considerable challenge from their own civil societies. Secondly, the war generated huge resource demands — economic, military, political and diplomatic — that these states were ill-equipped to fulfil, and which the international community was disinclined to deliver. Thirdly, the structural and political crises that sustained these rebellions — economic stress, state decay and delegitimisation, the dislocation of youth — were present among other states in the region. There was thus a real danger that the conflict would spread beyond the borders of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The major dilemma of weak states is that they are vulnerable to such regional disturbances, but have limited power to stop or suppress them. Ironically, it was arguably this very sense of their own vulnerability, and of the possibility of a 'domino effect' within the region, that furnished ECOWAS with the political will to remain engaged in the Liberian issue.

Despite the often discouraging prospects, the ECOMOG operation was ultimately successful for several reasons. The first was the sheer political will and tenacity of ECOWAS. The organisation did not have the option of cutting and running, for reasons that were as much self-interested as humanitarian. The second was the ability to combine three phases of conflict resolution: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement, thereby changing mandates of forces in the field as developments on the ground required (a flexibility due, ironically, to the autonomy enjoyed by the military command and as a result of the weak control exercised by the ECOWAS directorate). In addition, the subregional, regional, and international initiatives each brought different strengths and weaknesses to the peace process.

One of the more notable achievements of ECOMOG, in the long term, is its success in pushing the region from argument to consensus and from division to unity on matters of regional security. Prior to the Liberian crisis, as well as throughout the early stages of the intervention, ECOWAS members displayed little commitment to the ideals of regional security embodied in the 1981 treaty. This cynical disregard was apparent, on the one side, in the way in which certain Francophone states connived in the attack on Liberia and deliberately frustrated peace initiatives and, on the other side, in the way in which the intervening states (Nigeria in particular) acted unilaterally and resisted control by the regional political directorate. And as has been shown, the operation was bedevilled by linguistic and geopolitical rivalries, and undermined by questions about its legitimacy and format. Following the 'resolution' of the Liberian crisis, two crises have revived and extended these disputes in particular.

The first is the 25 May 1997 *coup* that overthrew the newly installed democratic civilian government in Sierra Leone. The Nigerians responded to the *coup* with a naval bombardment of Freetown, followed by an invasion a year later to dislodge the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) *coup*-makers by force. While the earlier ECOMOG intervention into Sierra Leone had generated little controversy, largely because of the (mistaken) assumption that the RUF was merely a creature of the Liberian NPFL, these later events evoked very different responses. Those opposed to the second ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone pointed to the 'material' differences between Liberia and Sierra Leone: in the latter case, the civil war had ended, and a government had been elected into power. This made the event of 25 May an internal affair outside the competence of the 1981 Agreement. Hence Bundu Abass, who had put forward arguments in support of the intervention into Liberia as Secretary-General of ECOWAS, now made powerful arguments opposing the (Nigerian) intervention into Sierra Leone.³¹

The intervention also raised fears once more of Nigerian unilateralism. However, there was unanimity within the ranks of ECOWAS, the OAU and the international community that the *coup* was intolerable and could not be allowed to stand. This rationalisation, missing in the 1981

treaty, suggests an expanding horizon of what constitutes 'regional security' and of the acceptable justifications for intervention.

The second event is the civil war in Guinea-Bissau, which began as a military rebellion following an attempt by President Nino Vieira to remove his armed chief, General Asunmane Mane, on charges of trading arms with Casamance rebels across the border in Senegal. Forces from Senegal and Guinea intervened to support Vieira's government, but unlike Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOMOG forces were not committed. One explanation was that the Anglophone countries in ECOMOG were anxious to pay back Senegal and the Francophone countries for their earlier lack of support to ECOMOG. It should be noted, however, that the mediation effort in Guinea-Bissau, by contrast, was not conducted exclusively by ECOWAS, but co-ordinated with the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), which included Portugal, and there was some ill-disguised rivalry with ECOWAS.³²

These 'post-Liberia' developments have revived several issues. For example, what are the parameters for intervention (in other words, which conflicts in the region qualify for intervention, and which not)? Who initiates intervention? Should intervention be unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral? With reference to Guinea-Bissau, how is 'region' to be defined? Is the criterion territorial, or linguistic? Another source of debate is how the mutual security mechanism is to be defined. It is noteworthy that the L'ANAD structure has continued to exist alongside the ECOWAS mutual defence arrangement.

In December 1997, the Fourth Extraordinary Summit of the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government held in Lomé directly confronted these issues, approving the establishment of a regional mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, and regional security. Following this, a meeting of experts in Banjul in July 1998 drafted a set of proposals for such a Mechanism for the approval of the ECOWAS Heads of State meeting in Ouagadougou in October.³³ These proposals recognised that "... *though the organization [ECOWAS] was established for the primary purpose of economic integration of the region, economic development can only be effectively pursued in a secure and stable environment*", thus getting around the 'constitutional' issue that had earlier generated such heat.

The mechanism consisted of an elaborate set of structures, with a Mediation and Security Council of nine member states at the apex, elected from among the sixteen members of the organisation, and responsible for taking decisions on issues of regional peace and security on behalf of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State. The military force would continue to be called ECOMOG. ECOMOG would be deployed in accordance with the terms of the 1981 treaty (see above). But there was also a significant new twist. While the provisions for intervention would not extend to "... *internal situations that are sustained and maintained from within*", it would apply to those situations in which an internally-driven conflict:

threatened to trigger a humanitarian disaster;

posed a serious threat to peace and security in the subregion; or

erupted "... *following the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically-elected government.*"

These prescriptions are the result of a growing consensus within the region and between the various factions in ECOWAS that conflict is self-defeating. As a result, states in the region were able to demonstrate considerable flexibility, redefining their positions in order to promote consensus regarding the nature of regional security mechanisms. For the region, the conflicts in

Liberia and Sierra Leone have been a traumatic experience, conferring both a sense of its vulnerability as well as its 'regionness'. After years of myopic focus on national sovereignty and security, West African states now see the connection between domestic anarchy and regional political instability much more clearly. States are ready to concede that 'my neighbour's business is my business' and, correspondingly, accepting the necessity of acting collaboratively within a regional framework to tackle these problems rather than attempting to seek favoured status and arrangements with external powers.

Notwithstanding this consensus, which helped to facilitate an end to the Liberian crisis, the ECOMOG experience teaches the important lesson that one should not conflate regional security and human security. The sharp polarisation that greeted Abacha's sudden death in June — with those who remembered him primarily for his contributions to regional peacekeeping (such as the OAU Secretary General and President Kabbah of Sierra Leone) celebrating him as a 'great statesman', while those (including the majority of Nigerians) who recalled his brutal repression of human rights and democracy at home rejoicing publicly — demonstrated the tension in the region between these two forms of security. The authoritarian structures prevalent in the region facilitated external intervention to support regional security but, at the same time, undermined human security on the domestic front. There have been further indications that, while regional political stability is a necessary condition for human security, it is far from sufficient.

The settlements that brought 'peace' to Liberia and Sierra Leone did not forcefully seek to address the domestic issues (of governance, economic justice and exclusion, etc.) at the root of regional conflagration. The end of hostilities in Liberia, capped by 'successful' elections, has not prevented the reappearance, under Taylor's government, of many of the same abuses which provoked the war in the first place. In many respects, the post-civil war government in Liberia has assumed the predatory hues common to the region's governments. After its prodigious sacrifices to ensure peace, ECOWAS has shown much less inclination or ability to impose acceptable standards of governance on the region. Without this, the 'regional security' mechanism is liable to degenerate into a protection racket for autocrats.³⁴

Endnotes

1. See, for example, E K Aning, *The international dimensions of internal conflict: The case of Liberia and West Africa*, Working Paper, Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen, June 1997; Y Gershoni, *War without end and an end to war: The prolonged war in Liberia and Sierra Leone*, **African Studies Review**, 40(3), December 1997; R A Mortimer, ECOMOG, *Liberia, and regional security in West Africa*, in E J Keller & D Rothchild (eds.), **Africa in the new international order: Rethinking state sovereignty and regional security**, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1996; E Nwokedi, **Regional integration and regional security: ECOMOG, Nigeria, and the Liberian crisis**, Center d'Etudes d'Afrique Noire, Bordeaux, 1992; and M Vogt, *Nigeria in Liberia: Historical and political analysis of ECOMOG*, in M Vogt & E E Ekoko (eds.), **Nigeria in international peacekeeping 1960-1992**, Malthouse Press, Oxford, 1993.
2. The treaty was adopted in 1986 by eleven of the sixteen ECOWAS member states, following an earlier Protocol on Non-Aggression signed in 1978.
3. The applicability of the actual provisions of the treaty to the specific case of Liberia (and later Sierra Leone) was to become one of the key issues of contention within ECOWAS itself. See Vogt, 1993, op. cit.; M Vogt, *The involvement of ECOWAS in Liberia's*

peacekeeping, in Keller & Rothchild, 1996, op. cit.

4. According to some sources, Togo was also a strong supporter of Taylor.
5. Vogt, 1993, op. cit.
6. Scholarly studies of ECOMOG in the countries that participated in the intervention have been few and overwhelmingly associated with Nigerian scholars. By contrast, works by Ghanaian and Francophone scholars have been few and far between. This has tended to mean that Nigeria's participation and motives have received far more attention than those of other actors in the region.
7. See, for example, Gershoni, op. cit.; P Richards, *Rebellion in Liberia and Sierra Leone: A crisis of youth?*, in O Furley (ed.), **Conflict in Africa**, I B Taurus, London, 1995.
8. Both views have been espoused by Nigerian scholars (see, for example, GJYoroms, *ECOMOG and West African security: A Nigerian perspective*, **Issue**, 21(1-2), 1993; and Nwokedi, op. cit.).
9. This time, however, the government of President Shagari sought to go a step further, allegedly contemplating an invasion of Ghana in collaboration with American intelligence.
10. On the latter, see R Luckham, **The Nigerian military: A sociological analysis of authority and revolt**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971.
11. The refugees included other West African nationals, mainly Nigerians. According to one account, before going in, the Ghanaians decided to inform the Nigerians. Two days later, however, the Nigerian government, without responding to or consulting with the Ghanaians, announced that they were going into Liberia with Ghana. Interview with Ghanaian officials, July 1998.
12. The Ghanaian government would also discover that, in spite of their friendship with the Libyans, the latter were harbouring Ghanaian dissidents, as well as dissidents from several West African countries, in their training camps. Several Ghanaian sources dispute the account, first circulated by Byron Tarr, that Taylor was released to the custody of Campaore, and that it was from this point that he played the alleged role in the assassination. In any case, this account is made suspect by the fact that the Ghanaians were known to be strong supporters of Sankara, and were greatly upset by his untimely death. They insist rather that after his release from custody, Taylor was taken to the Ivorian border and released. From there, he made his way to Burkina Faso, where the Libyans introduced him to Campaore. It is possible that Sankara was already dead by the time Taylor was freed. See SBTarr, *The ECOMOG initiative in Liberia: A Liberian perspective*, **Issue**, 21(1-2) 1993
13. Unlike Nigeria, Ghana has avoided charges of partisanship and tended to define her mission within ECOMOG much more in harmony with traditional peacekeeping norms.
14. In fact, it was alleged at the time that Doe's capture was actually plotted at a meeting between Quainoo and Prince Johnson on 9 September 1990. See the account in **West Africa**, 15-21 October 1990, pp. 2652.
15. This action was taken without consultation with the Ghanaians, and contrary to the division

of labour at the command level established by ECOWAS (which specified that a Ghanaian head the force).

16. See C Y Iweze, *Nigeria in Liberia: The Military Operations of ECOMOG*, in Vogt & Ekoko, op. cit.
17. **The Ghanaian Chronicle**, 15-16 July, 1998, citing proceedings of an ECOWAS Forum on conflict management in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
18. See E Hutchful, *Military policy and reform in Ghana*, **Journal of Modern African Studies**, 35(1), 1997.
19. An example was the major who banked the salary of his troops in a foreign bank for several months and collected the interest. This kind of practice by peacekeeping commanders could not have been unusual: earlier, seven Lieutenant-Colonels and their paymasters who had served in the Middle East were dismissed by General Quainoo (then General Officer Commanding of the Ghana Armed Forces) for similar corruption.
20. This included the use by the combatants of child soldiers, the absence of any distinction between combatants and civilians, and the shifting boundaries between peacekeeping and combat. The encounter with child soldiers, renowned for their callousness and brutality, psychologically scarred some of the ECOMOG soldiers. As one said, "[a]fter you have been in Liberia, you will never look at children in the same way again." See for example HRW, **Easy prey: Child soldiers in Liberia**, Human Rights Watch, New York, 1994.
21. See H Howe, *Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and regional peacekeeping*, **International Security**, 21(3), 1997; A Urvell, *African security in the post-Cold War era: An examination of multinational vs private security forces*, **African Journal of Political Science**, 3(1), 1998.
22. Interviews with a former Benin Foreign Minister and with Ghanaian officials, July 1998.
23. Nevertheless, UN efforts bolstered those of ECOWAS (and the OAU) in important ways. Security Council Resolution 788 imposed an arms embargo against Liberia but exempted ECOMOG. The **Cotonou Accord** of 25 July 1993, which was brokered in Geneva under the joint chairmanship of the UN, OAU and ECOWAS, defined (and thus legitimated) the ECOMOG role as that of monitoring the cease-fire and supervising the disarmament. Troops from Uganda and Tanzania were also introduced late in 1993, once again with the intention of diluting the Nigerian role in ECOMOG, but were withdrawn in early 1994. Though frustrated in its immediate objectives, in part because of the emergence of new warlord factions, the accord became the template for later negotiations.
24. Richards op. cit.; Gershoni, op. cit.
25. Indeed, the insurgencies would stimulate further militarisation: during the operation, two of the ECOMOG armies (namely, those of Sierra Leone and the Gambia), went home and overthrew their governments, acting out of grievances directly connected with the conduct of the peacekeeping operations.
26. According to one civilian minister who participated in these negotiations, part of the explanation for this apparent paradox (the demand by military regimes for a form of governance that they were not prepared to concede to their own populations), may

perhaps be found in the fact that, like the ECOWAS Executive Director, Abbas Bundu, the ECOWAS Foreign ministers were civilian, trying to send their own message to their home governments regarding the need for democracy. Interview, Accra, 2 September 1988.

27. At least one author has extended the term 'warlord' to Abacha himself. See W Reno, **Warlord politics and African states**, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1997.
28. By being out of the country on peacekeeping assignments after 1974 (following his brief tenure as Army Commander), Erskine himself was able to avoid the institutional collapse and mutinies that, in 1979, resulted in the execution of nine senior officers and a purge of others. When he returned in the mid-1980s, he was one of the very few senior officers in the Ghana armed forces with his reputation intact.
29. In the case of Ghana, disputes over the lack of transparency in relation to UN peacekeeping funds featured in the conflicts between the President and his Vice-President that degenerated into blows in the winter of 1995. Another example comes from Togo, where troops from MISAB (Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Bangui Accords) contingent who had not been paid their allowances are said to have formed the nucleus of an opposition movement to Eyadema within the military barracks.
30. ECOMOG-related contracts have been described as a 'goldmine' for certain people in Nigeria close to the ruling regime. Former ECOMOG 'warriors' in Nigeria have also been described as 'flashing' wealth gained both legitimately and illicitly from the operation.
31. B Abass, **West Africa**, 30 June-6 July, 1997, p. 1040-1.
32. It has been speculated that Portuguese involvement may have been motivated in part by the desire to stem the drift of Guinea-Bissau — which had recently joined the CFA monetary zone — into the Francophone orbit.
33. *ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security: Draft Mechanism*, adopted at the Meeting of ECOWAS Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs and Security, Banjul, 23-24 July 1998.
34. In this respect, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security seems to be ahead of ECOWAS in attempting to integrate issues of politics, security and development into a coherent framework seeking, among other objectives, to promote 'common political value systems and institutions'.

A hard look to the future

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Introduction₁

Most deliberations on conflict resolution in Africa focus on pacific forms of peace maintenance — such as 'peacekeeping', 'preventive diplomacy', and 'peacebuilding'. Indeed, the topic of 'peace enforcement' has been virtually ignored as if it were extremely impolite to raise it in academic or political spheres. This is most unfortunate, for current trends in African peace maintenance efforts, as Eboe Hutchful has illustrated, point to a far more robust type of third-party intervention than is presently acceptable in orthodox debates on the future of United Nations peacekeeping.

Christopher Clapham also points to the fact that the UN has not been able to react effectively to the imperative to intervene in African states in the throes of complex emergencies. In many post-Cold War crises, it has not been able to enforce international humanitarian law, to ensure stability, or to provide security for the provision of humanitarian assistance for those in dire need. This is partly because multinational interventions under the UN flag have been and continue to be based on the peacekeeping principles of impartiality, consent, and the non-use of force except in self-defence — principles which are extremely tenuous in the turmoil of intrastate conflicts.

Yet, these principles are the only ones available at present. While former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali coined the phrase 'peace enforcement', he subsequently had to admit that he did not provide a universally accepted definition or concept for its implementation. 'Peace enforcement' has existed since 1992 solely in the realm of theory, which generally envisages peace enforcement units intervening impartially in a civil war in order to compel the warring parties to peace talks, so that a peacekeeping operation can be established. This would appear to be just the type of medicine that Africa needs to help cure a number of festering internecine conflicts.

By way of conclusion, therefore, this contribution re-examines the notion of peace enforcement as an appropriate and potentially viable concept for peace maintenance in Africa. It also suggests a point of departure that would facilitate the evolution of a body of military doctrine for the meaningful support of peace processes where peace does not yet exist.

Why Bother?

The inability of the international community to cope with crises such as those in Somalia and Rwanda, is often explained in terms of a lack of political will. However, even had such 'political will' been mustered, it is doubtful whether the UN would have known what to do with it. The world body is far more comfortable with the Chapter VI tools of conflict resolution — most notably the concept of 'preventive diplomacy'. As Adelman and Suhrke have noted:

"There was considerable international investment in preventive diplomacy in Rwanda, but when this failed and genocide ensued, the international community effectively disengaged. Humanitarian relief within Rwanda and to refugees across the border soon resumed, but these efforts were designed to deal with the consequences of conflict, rather than the violence itself."2

Dealing with violence is not only considered risky and expensive, it is also potentially 'messy', and may sully the reputation of the world body. Thus the 'politically correct' school continues with its fixation with Chapter VI and its reluctance to seriously consider how to make peace enforcement work. For example, Corum contends:

"Peace enforcement operations have absorbed an enormous amount of UN troops, money, and energy, with little to show for it ... the cost, the heavy casualties, and the lack of success of peace enforcement operations have damaged the credibility and prestige of the UN, and are placing other operations at risk."3

However, there is a minority viewpoint that is less concerned with prestige and more concerned with humanity. This school believes that the inability of the Security Council to enforce its decisions in less conventional military situations than Operation Desert Storm is the most serious setback for the world organisation since the end of the Cold War. It is also felt that the capacity to deploy credible and effective peace enforcement units could make a decisive

difference in the early stages of a crisis.

Such pro-intervention arguments are almost always based on ethics. In a humanitarian emergency, it is morally reprehensible to stand by and do nothing, even if the only way to intervene effectively requires lethal force. On the other hand, the anti-intervention argument is based on pragmatism, focusing as it does on what is possible and effective, rather than what is right. The way to move forward is clearly to unify these positions by focusing on what is both right and effective.⁴

The strongest practical argument for attempting to develop a viable concept for peace enforcement, however, is the fact that 'peace enforcement' operations have been and will continue to be conducted by the UN (Congo, Somalia, and arguably Bosnia); by regional arrangements (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Bosnia and Kosovo, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in West Africa and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the former Soviet republics); by single powers (the United States in Sudan and Afghanistan); by mercenaries (e.g. Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone) and by interested neighbours (e.g. Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe in Congo-Kinshasa). Unlike UN peacekeeping, however, the lack of doctrinal development means that, in each instance, the interventionists play according to their own principles and rules (or the lack of). Advancing the cause of doctrinal development for peace enforcement is therefore anything but a bellicose exercise — it is a necessity for those who wish to see the use of force in the name of peace exercised judiciously, and controlled by legitimate authority according to acceptable principles and standards.

As Smith has observed, "... *the real issue is not the role of UN forces and how well they do. The real issue is whether, how and with what objective to organise external intervention into complex conflicts. This issue is not going to go away.*"⁵ In the largely internal conflicts of the future, the states involved and their regional neighbours will be ill-equipped to manage or limit problems through regional security agreements, and the international community's penchant for long-term solutions will be too slow. The lack of alternatives will therefore raise the question of direct intervention by those states with the capacity to do so — and the military arm will be a crucial factor.⁶

Progress with Military Doctrine for Peace Enforcement

Mainstream thinking on responses to conflict reflects a preoccupation with establishing peace and democracy in a war-torn society in one fell swoop. States are reluctant to intervene in third-party conflicts unless a cease-fire is in place, and the warring parties have agreed to a comprehensive 'peace' plan which begins with the voluntary assembly, disarmament and demobilisation of belligerents, and ends soon thereafter with the staging of free and fair elections for government. Such conflict resolution initiatives have come to be known as 'wider peacekeeping' or 'multifunctional peacekeeping'. There is, according to the principles and doctrine that have guided such interventions, no place for the use of force by multinational military forces deployed to support the peace process.

In the absence of binding and comprehensive peace agreements in crisis situations, and of any progress in the direction of peace enforcement at the political level, the military has been left out on a limb — with the unenviable task of developing doctrine for operations that governments still seem to find 'unthinkable'. One British officer puts it this way:

"It may well be argued that whilst ... 'Wider Peacekeeping' offers the policy makers some

*chance of success at a relatively low cost (relative to peace enforcement), they are highly unlikely to resource peace enforcement. This may be the case, but it is still incumbent upon the military to have a doctrine that gives the policy maker the option [of choosing to launch a peace enforcement mission]. What the British Army now requires is an AFM for Peace Support Operations which ... enunciates an approach for peace enforcement."*⁷

Such an approach is indeed enunciated in the new British Army field manual on peace support operations which, unlike **AFM Wider Peacekeeping**, devotes significant attention to the concept and conduct of peace enforcement operations. However, in true military fashion, the proposed concept of peace enforcement proceeds from a firm base — the established theory of peacekeeping operations. The draft manual states, for example, that peace enforcement and peacekeeping "... are both operations designed to achieve the same end-state, that is a long-term peace settlement ... PE will generally be the precursor to a PK operation."⁸ It goes on to suggest that a peace enforcement operation "... will be necessary when the commander's estimate deduces that PK techniques alone will not achieve the end-state [implicitly, a long-term peace settlement]."⁹

Other sections of the field manual deal respectively with *The Transition from PK to PE* and *Transition PE to PK*, indicating that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are somehow conceived as adjacent points on a continuum which allow for easy transition from one to the other.¹⁰

The US Army has also been attempting to conceive a viable point of departure for peace enforcement. The issue of executing peace enforcement operations was first addressed in doctrine in the April 1996 draft of **US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Stability and Support Operations**. According to US Army doctrine, peace enforcement operations are framed by 'politically sensitive' rules of engagement and involve the threat or use of armed intervention to compel hostile belligerents to comply with international sanctions or resolutions.¹¹ This is perhaps slightly closer to the mark than the British Army approach, but it also does not go far enough beyond the boundaries of peacekeeping.

Boutros-Ghali's **An Agenda for Peace** clearly recommended that the Security Council "... consider[s] the utilisation of peace enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance."¹² These 'terms of reference', however, must encompass more than the US Army's conception of 'ROE' — rules of engagement governing the use of force. They must define the very nature of 'peace enforcement' and the essence of the task of the peace enforcer.

While the British and American militaries have made some attempts to devise an operational doctrine for peace enforcement, most national doctrines on forceful interventions in the cause of peace continue to amount to "... a counsel of inaction bordering on paralysis."¹³ This explains why, when driven by the 'CNN factor', attempts have been made at international 'peace enforcement' without a conceptual framework of where, when, and to what end to use force. Situations such as those in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda have been considered on a case-by-case basis, with only very vague criteria for evaluating the utility of force. The danger with such 'ad hoc' is that individual determinations may form an unintended pattern that later constitutes a set of *de facto* principles of operation — a pattern that can already be discerned in the British and US Army doctrines on peace enforcement as derivatives of peacekeeping.¹⁴

The successful implementation of peace enforcement therefore requires more than knee-jerk reactions to media inspired sentiments of international sympathy, and it definitely requires a

fundamentally different point of departure to that of a 'peace agreement'. According to Guest:

"We need a rationale for humanitarian intervention not dependent on TV images and the mood of the moment. It has to start with human rights, the prohibition against genocide, and the Geneva Conventions, which lay out clear guidelines for civilians caught in conflict. These universal standards were massively abused before or during every recent crisis. If governments were to enforce these laws, as they are obliged to do, there would be less unpredictability about their humanitarian response."¹⁵

For governments, the violation of human rights is a legitimate international concern, affirmed by the **UN Charter**, the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights**, and the **Helsinki Accords**. The principle of humanity, as codified in international law and practice, demands that people are treated humanely in all circumstances, and that everything possible is done to alleviate human suffering and to assure respect for the individual. The dictates of humanity, as stipulated in law, should therefore be the essential starting point for the development of an international capacity for peace enforcement, as "*... the UN is under moral and legal duty to defend, uphold and apply the principle of humanity wherever and whenever possible.*"¹⁶ If the politicians cannot revisit such basic truths, then it is perhaps necessary for the military to forget about the contrived principles of peacekeeping and to get back to basics when thinking about peace enforcement.

Back to Basics

A seemingly obvious, but extremely profound general principle of conflict resolution was identified by the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda report: "*... respect for international law and norms will tend to diminish conflict, whereas violations will tend to stoke it.*" The report continues to (under)state the fact that "*[t]he behaviour of state and presumptive state actors was in this respect less than adequate, and mostly counter-productive.*"¹⁷ This statement clearly refers not only to the direct parties to the conflict, but also to all those who profited from the conflict, and those who meddled in or abstained from efforts to resolve it. The report contains the following indictment:

International law and associated principles designed to uphold international order were repeatedly violated, including sanctity of national borders and arms embargoes.

International refugee law was not observed.

The legal right and moral obligation to intervene to stop genocide was not acted upon.

Human rights law was repeatedly and severely transgressed with impunity.

Donors continued to give economic aid and, in one case, also substantial military assistance to a government linked to systematic violations of human rights.¹⁸

It is evident that international law, as an effective restraint on behaviour, requires not merely the existence of legal principles, but also the willingness of governments and non-state actors to comply with them. Non-compliance with international law is a function of several factors, but the most pertinent is **the ability of actors to violate the law without serious threat of sanctions.**¹⁹ Compliance with authority is reinforced and strengthened by the probability of enforcing the law against those who may transgress it. Most people, even in failing states, comply with the fundamentals of humanitarian law. They do not murder their neighbours, or rape and plunder as a matter of course. In order to maintain the compliance habits of the many, it is also not necessary to achieve perfect enforcement against violators. If a reasonable

percentage are indeed convicted and punished, this is generally sufficient to make crime an unattractive option to most.20

The issue of punishment for crimes always raises the most basic questions of justice, order and social conflict — and agreement on such issues always seems elusive. While the morality of punishment remains ‘incurably relative’, it is generally accepted that punishing offenders implies the imposition of some form of ‘hard treatment’, and that it involves some form of ‘unpleasant consequence’. The imposition of punishment may be justified on a number of grounds, the most basic being retributive, or simply that the penalty is seen as deserved for the offence concerned. But in the realm of ‘peace enforcement’, there is more utility in the practical or instrumental benefit of punishing offenders. Here the principle aim of imposing a penalty for an offence should be to deter its repetition, or to incapacitate the offenders.21

However, governments remain extremely reluctant to invoke the full force of international law to address issues, which are not perceived as directly related to their national interests and related foreign policy guidelines. This is obviously reflected in their attitude towards peace enforcement. Military thinkers need to break this mould if they wish to devise **a doctrine that gives the policy-maker the option of choosing to launch a peace enforcement mission**. The military is, per definition, an enforcement tool without equal. It is however, not an appropriate instrument for fighting “... *the deep battle for consent*.”22 Preoccupation with the latter is an unfortunate hangover from British wider peacekeeping doctrine, which is retarding new thinking on the conduct of peace enforcement operations. Moreover, Western military organisations are extremely reluctant to engage in anything akin to policing functions, and crime remains “... *a virtually overlooked environment in Army doctrinal thinking*.”23

Such attitudes do not reflect the realities of the type of environment in which peace enforcement operations have been contemplated. This is one of ‘failed states’ which, while suffering from varying intensities of internal armed conflict, are definitively characterised by **lawlessness**. In Hobessian thought, the first requirement of political and moral institutions is that they should provide citizens with security. In failed states, the government system has broken down and there is no rule of law. In such an environment, there is a blurring of crime and war — the type of ‘not war-not crime’ situation that characterises most contemporary complex emergencies. Intervening forces are unlikely to be confronted by either legitimate national armies or by the typical criminals that police are accustomed to dealing with. Rather, they will face criminal-soldiers representing non-state entities such as clans, local militias, mercenary forces, private armies, guerrilla movements, corporations, and drug cartels.24

The term ‘peace enforcement’ is not only a contradiction in terms, it is also an obvious misnomer when contemplated for a failed-state environment, as enforcing peace (were it possible) would also presume that peace exists. According to the International Peace Academy, peace is “[a] condition that exists in the relations between groups, classes or states when there is an absence of violence (direct or indirect) or the threat of violence.” Direct violence is, in turn, defined as “... *a condition that exists when human beings deliberately kill or physically injure other human beings*.”25 The Security Council must surely be obliged to declare a threat to the peace (or an offence under international law) **when human beings deliberately kill or physically injure other human beings** on a massive scale, and to authorise effective intervention in order to terminate such actions. Where national laws do not exist or have no effect in preventing murder and maiming, international law, in the form of an appropriate Security Council resolution, must surely fill the breach.

Peace Enforcement as International Law Enforcement26

According to Doyle, "... one cannot define peace as nothing short of economic justice or social harmony without losing an understanding of peace as something different from and, possibly, less demanding than those other worthwhile goals."²⁷ He distinguishes between a temporary peace which can be achieved through coercion, and more durable peace which involves aspects of legitimacy, political participation, social integration and economic development. The bottom line, however, is that "... it does appear difficult, if not impossible, to secure the higher, more dynamic aspects of peace before the lower aspects of law and order are met."²⁸

While national policy guidelines for participation in peace support operations continue to stress the need for a 'comprehensive and lasting solution' as a precondition for involvement, there are strong arguments for a far more modest assessment of the attainable goals of intervention. As Clapham has noted, "[t]he essential requirement for any would-be interventionist is to take a hard-headed approach to the situation, and disregard outcomes that result from mere wishful thinking."²⁹ The objective of peace enforcement as a military undertaking, therefore, should simply be to enforce international law as precursor or as an adjunct to broader non-military peace processes.

Where a national legal order has lost its efficacy, to the extent that it no longer protects the citizenry from the grossest of human rights abuses, a higher body of law must be invoked — at least until a new legitimacy has been established at the national level. The problem, however, is that the efficacy of international law itself is widely doubted, and the will to act is often sadly lacking. The current body of international law is predominantly "... a system of agreements between independent and sovereign collectivities, usually states that defines how relations between and among them will be conducted."³⁰ It has therefore proved more effective in restraining the behaviour of states towards other states than it has in restraining the behaviour of states towards their own citizens. This is why the Security Council needs to adopt the role of emergency legislature when intrastate anarchy prevails.

If peace enforcement can be viewed as akin to international law enforcement, then the principles and practices for the conduct of such operations become much clearer and logically more consistent. While it has been extremely difficult to bend the principles of war to fit in with the conduct of peace support operations, this is not so with the principles of law enforcement. Indeed, it is common practice in many countries to refer to police officers as 'peace officers' (and even for military officers to be granted the *ex officio* powers of 'Justice of the Peace').

Reduced to its simplest terms, the law to be enforced during a peace enforcement operation is the one that circumscribes the particular type of peace that is to be enforced. This law should typically be framed in a resolution of the UN Security Council, which authorises the use of force to ensure compliance with a set of terms which the world body feels are essential to the pursuit of a higher-order condition of peace. This would include general tenets of international law pertinent to the conflict situation, as well as specific treaties designed to deal with the particular problem of lawlessness in the area of operations.

The mandate of the peace enforcer, or the ground law which s/he is tasked to uphold, should be clearly derived from this resolution and codified in terms which are as clear and unambiguous as possible. Instead of the vague and often altruistic terms embraced in the mandate of wider peacekeepers, peace enforcers need a much clearer notion of exactly what laws they are supposed to uphold or enforce.

Hitherto, peacekeepers have typically been mandated to 'monitor and assist in the compliance of the parties to the terms of the general peace agreement', which usually includes separation,

assembly and disarmament of categories of belligerents. The peace enforcer may pursue a similar mandate, but its terms must be reduced to articles of law. For example, the peace enforcer must know that it is an **offence** for any person/group of persons other than those serving in the international force, force 'A', or force 'B' to be in possession of an automatic firearm. Once various categories of offences are identified and documented, the peace enforcer must have the power to arrest the perpetrators of such offences — whether they are individuals, informal groups, or highly organised entities such as military units. The Chapter VII Security Council resolution would acknowledge that forceful arrests will most likely be necessary, and it must therefore also provide for elements of force application that are superior to those most likely to be encountered during the conduct of operations.


Most judicial systems do not regard ignorance of the law as an excuse for transgressions. If this tenet is to be applied in the realm of international law enforcement (peace enforcement), as it should be, a massive effort would have to be put into communicating the essentials of this law to the population in the area of operations — especially the belligerents, who are most likely to transgress this law. This means that the law must be reduced to terms clearly understandable to the population at large, as well as to the law (peace) enforcers. Moreover, in line with the deterrence theory of punishment, successful 'arrests' must be well-publicised, as well as the punishment meted out to perpetrators. It is through such practical examples of 'crime and punishment' that people quickly become educated about legal boundaries and the implications of transgression, and learn that compliant behaviour is in their own best interests.

The analogy between law enforcement and peace enforcement obviously does not end here. Peace enforcers must also be bound by the due process of the law, which includes provisions for the detention, trial, and possibly incarceration of offenders. Such processes either do not exist, or are not effective at present. This, however, is a political rather than a military challenge — unless some type of international martial law is contemplated. The latter may indeed be a tactical and operational necessity, and an option that might supplement higher order legal development.

While attempts to persuade governments that such a concept of international law enforcement is a necessary and viable instrument for conflict resolution in the failed state environment may be futile, it may just be possible to steer military thinking in this direction.

A New Conceptual Model

The presently accepted conceptual model for peace support operations emphasises consent as the critical divide between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.³¹ However, consent is not the critical issue in the type of operations outlined above. What separates the latter from peacekeeping is rather the necessity to use force in order to ensure compliance. Impartiality, both as a principle and as a definitive boundary between peace support and war, remains intact. The importance of consent, in so far as it may promote peaceful compliance, is recognised — not as a principle, but as something which, though desirable, declines with increasing use of coercion. This awareness contributes to the judicious use of force. The relationship between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and war is illustrated in the simple diagram below.



According to this conception, the 'grey area' between peacekeeping and warfighting becomes more focused — not on the issue of consent and 'consent promoting techniques', but on the whole issue of **compliance**. Indeed, compliance is at the heart of both the evolving US and British doctrine on peace enforcement, but it is either understated or implicit to current thinking. The probability of compliance is obviously enhanced by **credibility**. According to British doctrine, credibility depends on a peace enforcement force being perceived as willing and capable of 'over-matching' whatever opposition it might be offered.³² This raises the issue of **commitment**. The more coercion needed during peace enforcement operations, the more will or commitment will be needed by the forces involved and their political masters. As Brown has noted, "... *the costs of action are higher and the probabilities of success are lower ... Coercive actions should therefore be undertaken selectively, with great care, and with great determination.*"³³

Credibility and the probability of compliance will also be enhanced by **impartiality**, or the treatment of all as equal in the eyes of the law. If one party consistently refuses to comply, then peace enforcement requires firm (and perhaps forceful) action against that party. This is clearly not (or need not be) the same as taking sides with a party/parties that indeed comply with international authority.

This concept of peace enforcement can work well, as long as there is a reasonable chance of outperforming the 'competition'. In the failing states of Africa, the competition faced by the would-be peace enforcer may not be too stiff. Originally armed and trained by the major powers, rebel movements now typically rely on lightly armed foot soldiers, and their ability to mobilise local populations to join their cause through persuasion or coercion. They often have no access to more sophisticated weaponry than assault rifles, light machine guns and mortars.

Moreover, while the risks of wounding and fatalities are obviously far less, it would be wrong to blindly assert that peacekeeping is financially a much cheaper option than peace enforcement. At the height of the Angolan operation, for example, the UN was spending one million US dollars a day on peacekeeping, in addition to hundreds of millions in humanitarian aid.

Peacekeeping Versus Peace Enforcement in Angola

The failure of the UN peace process in Angola has been graphically described by former World Food Programme representative in Southern Africa, Mercedes Sayagues, in an article with the appropriate title of *No war, no peace, no Angola peace, no Angola solution*.³⁴ Sayagues describes the 'peacekeeping' environment in Angola since 1991 as "... *an amorphous condition of neither war nor peace ... an exhausting series of war, peace agreement, demobilisation, lack of war, threats of war, lack of peace ... a permanent bleeding and rape of people and*

resources." She criticises the deceased UN Special Representative Alioune Blondin Beye for never publicly assigning blame for the many violations of the peace accords and UN resolutions. This appeared to have been official policy since the first incomplete demobilisation of 1991/92, with the UN accepting excuses for not handing over territory, not presenting fighters, not relinquishing weapons, and repeatedly missing deadlines. This strategy of accepting delays and saving face prolonged rather than resolved the conflict.³⁵

While at the brink of another full-scale civil war, Angola has endured eight years of a 'not crime-not war' environment since the deployment of UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) in June 1991. In fact, there has been very little 'peace' to keep in an environment where UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi has not complied with the pertinent resolutions. He kept fighting when he lost the (fair) 1992 elections. And after signing the Lusaka peace accords that led to UNAVEM III, he did not demobilise his armed forces, let go of the diamond fields, allow the government to administer the country, and convert his armed movement into a peaceful opposition party.

The latter is not surprising, for there was no real will for peace. In the 'not crime-not war' economy, there are plenty of opportunities for both ruthless criminals and corrupt high-ranking officials to flourish. If there had been real (or a semblance of) peace, the people of Angola no doubt would have demanded to know why oil and diamond revenue is never spent on alleviating their wretched poverty. To cope in this environment, the UN initially sent in UNAVEM II, a weak little force with a Utopian mandate. When this mission failed after an over-hasty electoral debacle, the much stronger UNAVEM III was sent in, also with a peacekeeping mandate and posture.

UNAVEM III never had the 'teeth' or resolve to enforce international law. In fact, the mission never really carried the weight of anything resembling a legal statute. For example, the type of verbs used in Security Council Resolution 976 (1995, establishing UNAVEM III) indicate that compliance by the parties has been optional, rather than compulsory: 'welcoming', 'reiterating', 'noting', 'calling upon', and 'urging' are hardly the type of words that inspire compliance. While typical of verbiage used in all resolutions, the fact is that the only demand made under the eighteen points of Resolution 976 was that "*... all concerned in Angola take the necessary measures to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of United Nations and other personnel deployed under UNAVEM III.*"³⁶ From the start, this demand was patently ignored by UNITA.

Weak resolutions obviously provide for weak mandates. In broad outline, the military component of UNAVEM III had a mandate only to verify, monitor, supervise and assist with relevant aspects of the peace process. These included:

- the withdrawal, quartering and demobilisation of UNITA forces;

- the collection and storage of UNITA armaments; and

- the movement of government forces (FAA) to barracks;

It is because of the failure by the parties involved to comply with these critical elements of the UNAVEM mandate that the FAA and UNITA still remain ready to transform the 'not crime-not war' environment into one of open armed conflict, and to make a mockery of the international community's eight year investment in a Utopian vision of Angolan peace.

Retrospective speculation about what might have been done at an early stage in Angola may have little value for the victims of the ongoing conflict in the country. It is possible, however, that a much tougher early reaction to non-compliance with the **Peace Accords for Angola** (31 May

1991), the Lusaka Protocol (20 November 1994), and (especially) the string of relevant Security Council resolutions would have led to a vast improvement over the current situation.

If compliance had been enforced from the outset, the capacity to wage internal war in Angola would no longer exist — even if the will to do so was still there. While addressing the latter issue constitutes a political challenge, compliance with disarmament and demobilisation provisions clearly constituted a military challenge which could not be met without substantive powers of inducement. As Stedman has argued, "*... some conflicts must be intensified before they get resolved.*"³⁷ Similarly, Miller makes a strong argument for 'relative justice', a concept which recognises that there is no monopoly on good or evil.³⁸

Relative justice, in the Angolan scenario, would have involved a multinational force which had a Security Council mandate that, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorised it to use force when necessary to uphold the tenets of international law (clearly specified in the resolution which established the mission, or in subsequent Security Council resolutions if there was indeed a transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement). In particular, the multinational force would have been charged with enforcing the Security Council decision for UNITA forces to hand over their weapons and to report to quartering areas for demobilisation.³⁹

While UNITA has been cited as a 'guilty party', the object to which force would be applied is any person, group or organisation that does not comply with the tenets of international law as specified in the mission mandate. Obviously, peaceful arrests would be preferred, and would likely be more common after consistent and impartial enforcement of the law acts as a deterrent for non-compliance and resisting the authority of the force. Of course, as with any peace support operation, the peace enforcement operation would have to fit in with a much broader peace process that would involve many of the existing array of less aversive conflict resolution 'tools'.⁴⁰

Conclusion

The 'crisis in external response' to African conflicts has not been precipitated by any single event. It is, rather, the result of a confluence of a number of clear changes in the post Cold-War security environment. These have been superimposed on the dynamics of the ongoing struggle for power in Africa in such a way that the international community is ill-equipped to cope with the new realities. For example, the de-legitimisation of unilateral national interventions in the affairs of weak or failing states was accompanied by a concomitant belief in the legitimacy and efficacy of multinational responses to threats to peace and security, even when these emanate from intrastate conflicts. The realities of the international response to conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, etc., obviously do not support this belief.

Aside from the limitations imposed by financial constraints, domestic politics, and the whole issue of national interest, there is also conceptual confusion over appropriate modalities for effective responses. Such confusion is an inevitable outcome of the above contradictions and the tensions between 'morality' and effectiveness. A perceived solution to this dilemma has been found in the idea that the whole issue of dealing with African crises can be resolved by referring it back to its source (Africa), thus allowing the developed world to concentrate on resolving conflicts which it understands and which have a greater impact on its direct interests.

Thus far, however, all efforts to assist African countries in building capacity to participate in peace support operations have focused on peacekeeping. European and US training initiatives have all claimed adherence to 'standard UN doctrine', which is clearly outmoded for anything

but consensual interventions where firm peace agreements exist. Events in countries such as Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have exposed the folly of such an approach, and have indicated that there is a gaping hole in the existing repertoire of international responses to conflict in Africa. In particular, there is a dearth of multinational actors who are willing to employ force judiciously in order to establish minimum standards of law and order, and to take the necessary physical and financial risks implied by such a course of action.

The conceptual model of peace enforcement presented above does not address the issue of political will, for this was not the intention. It does provide, however, a doctrinal basis that would give policy-makers the option of choosing to launch a peace enforcement mission that can work. It also provides the basis for the development of principles and rules for future African interventions in neighbourhood conflicts, something which is desperately needed if Africa is not to become the ghetto of international peacekeeping.

Endnotes

1. This contribution borrows extensively from an article by the author entitled *Peace enforcement: The real peace support challenge in Africa*, **African Security Review**, 7(5), 1998.
2. H Adelman & A Suhrke, *The international response to conflict and genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda experience*, **Early Warning and Conflict Management**, (Study 2), Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March, 1996, p. 71.
3. J S Corum, *Operational problems in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations*, in J Cilliers & G Mills (eds.), **Peacekeeping in Africa**, IDP and SALLA, Johannesburg, 1995, p. 132.
4. D Smith, *Interventionist dilemmas and justice*, in A McDermott (ed.) **Humanitarian force**, PRIO Report 4/97, Oslo, 1997, p. 24.
5. Ibid., p. 14.
6. Ibid., p. 20.
7. *Peace enforcement — What is it and does it require a doctrine?*, **Ghana Armed Forces**, Command and Staff College Senior Division Peace Support Operations Precipis, 1997, p. E-4.
8. British Army, **Army field manual: Peace support operations**, (second draft), p.3-1.
9. Ibid., p. 3-3.
10. Ibid., p. 3-4.
11. **US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations**, GPO, Washington, DC, June 1993, p. 13-7; and Centre for Army Lessons Learned, **Operations other than war: Peace operations**, IV, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 1993, p. 1-2.
12. B Boutros-Ghali, **An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and**

- peacemaking**, United Nations, New York, 1992 (author's emphasis).
13. Former US Secretary of State, George Schultz, commenting on the criteria for the use of force enunciated in 1984 by Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger. Quoted in C Stevenson, *The evolving Clinton doctrine on the use of force*, **Armed Forces and Society**, 22(4), 1996, p. 515.
 14. D M Snow, **Peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-enforcement: The US role in the new international order**, US Army War College, February 1993, <carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/>
 15. I Guest, *How and when to intervene for humanity*, **Christian Science Monitor**, 12 February 1996.
 16. J O C Jonah, *Developing a United Nations capacity for humanitarian support operations*, in L Gordenker & T G Weiss (eds.), **Soldiers, peacekeepers and disasters**, MacMillan/International Peace Academy, London, 1991, p. 82.
 17. Adelman & Suhrke, op. cit., p. 72.
 18. Ibid.
 19. W Jones & S Rosen, **The logic of international relations**, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1982, p. 455
 20. K W Deutsch, **Politics and government: How people decide their fate**, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1980, pp. 15-16.
 21. For an elaboration on the 'contested nature of punishment', see R Sparks, *Prisons, punishment and penalty*, in E McLaughlin & J Munice (eds.), **Controlling crime**, Sage, London, 1996, pp. 199-201.
 22. In the evolving British doctrine, concern is expressed that a transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement operations "... would need to be balanced against any negative effects on the deep battle for consent." British Army, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
 23. R J Bunker, *Failed state operational environment concepts*, **Military Review**, 77(5), 1997, p. 90.
 24. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
 25. International Peace Academy, **Peacekeeper's handbook**, Pergamon, New York, 1984, p. 7.
 26. The more appropriate term 'peacemaking' has been reserved by the UN to refer to diplomatic means to end fighting. A number of other suggestions have been made to refer more appropriately to international operations where force may be applied in an impartial manner to ensure compliance with norms of stability. These include terms such as 'peace imposition' and 'peace creation', but this does not solve the misnomer dilemma. Boutros-Ghali attempted to resolve this problem by referring to "*cease-fire enforcement*". However, this term is too narrowly conceived to adequately describe the range of enforcement measures that are needed in a failed state environment. It obviously does not provide for

situations in which a formal cease-fire agreement does not exist. Although this article argues the case for what is essentially a concept of 'international law enforcement', the term 'peace enforcement' has been widely accepted as descriptive of military actions to impose compliance for the sake of peace. Thus, despite the reservations expressed above, it will be used for the sake of continuity. It is also useful in that it forces one to revisit the notion of 'peace' within the type of environment where enforcement actions become necessary.

27. M W Doyle, *Peacebuilding in Cambodia*, **IPA Policy Briefing Series**, December 1996, p. 3.
28. Ibid.
29. C Clapham, *Problems of peace enforcement: Some lessons from multinational peacekeeping operations in Africa*, in J Cilliers & G Mills (eds.), **Peacekeeping in Africa**, 2, IDP and Saiia, Halfway House, 1995, p. 151.
30. D S Papp, **Contemporary international relations: Frameworks for understanding**, Macmillan, New York, 1984, p. 392.
31. This was clearly presented in the British AFM Wider Peacekeeping and has been carried over into **Army Field Manual: Peace Support Operations**. The consent divide is also prominent in US Army doctrinal thinking.
32. British Army, op. cit., p. 3-3.
33. M E Brown, *Internal conflict and international action*, in M E Brown (ed.), **The international dimensions of internal conflict**, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996, p.605.
34. M Sayagues, *No war, no peace, no Angola peace, no Angola solution*, **Weekly Mail & Guardian**, 3-9 July 1998.
35. Ibid.
36. UN, **Security Council Resolution 976 (1995) on the establishment of the UN Angola Verification Mission III**, United Nations, New York, paragraph 16.
37. S J Stedman, *Alchemy for a new world order*, **Foreign Affairs**, 74(3), 1995, p. 20.
38. R B Miller, **Interpretations of conflict**, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1991.
39. The use of UNITA forces as an example of non-compliance is merely intended to lend an element of realism to a hypothetical situation. The intention is not to apportion blame (any more so than has already been done), or to exacerbate existing tensions in Angola.
40. For purposes of simplicity, this scenario has not illustrated more complicated enforcement concepts such as 'graduated military power escalations' to deal with non-complying belligerents. For an interesting 'menu' of escalation responses and a discussion of the risks to credibility of graduating forceful responses, see H Swannack Jr. & D R Gray, *Peace enforcement operations*, **Military Review**, November-December 1997, pp. 7-8.