

ARMS MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME:

Operations Rachel 1996 - 1999

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Foreword

The police services of South Africa and Mozambique wish to express our sincere gratitude and thanks to the governments of our respective countries for enabling members of the police services to launch Operation Rachel.

We are also grateful to the people of both countries for their support and their belief in the future of our countries. The sponsors, both local and international, are thanked for the resources that were made available and for understanding the importance of these operations.

All the members of the police services who were and still are part of Operation Rachel are especially acknowledged for their commitment and hard work — we will never forget you. We also wish to thank the Institute for Security Studies for effectively documenting this piece of Southern African history.

Our efforts in Operation Rachel are dedicated to the children of both South Africa and Mozambique — if you do not understand your history, you will never know where your destination may be in the future.

***Commanding Structures
Joint Police Services
Operation Rachel***

Preface

Virginia Gamba

With the end of the Cold War proxy conflicts, Southern Africa has been left with large numbers of weapons. These weapons have kept social stability and human development hostage as they are used to fuel crime and violence. Given the regional nature of weapons proliferation, efforts undertaken with one or more partners have the best chance of success.

Various countries in Southern Africa have entered into bilateral or trilateral co-operation agreements around arms control issues. The agreement between Mozambique and South Africa perhaps has had the most success in destroying surplus weapons.

In recognition of the extent of illicit arms smuggling, motor vehicle theft and the

damaging effects that both were having on safety and security, Mozambique and South Africa signed a crime combating agreement in 1995. The agreement allows police forces of the two countries to undertake joint operations in response to common safety and security problems.

It was recognised that arms caches in Mozambique were a main source of arms being smuggled into South Africa. The joint operations (known as Operation Rachel) were established to find and destroy weapons within Mozambique left over from the war.

One of the main characteristics of the operations undertaken as part of Operation Rachel is that they have been intelligence-driven. It was agreed that both the Mozambican and South African police forces would gather information about cache locations. A team consisting of Mozambican and South African police would destroy the weapons on site. South Africa would pay the bulk of the costs of the operations and provide expertise on weapons and explosives disposal and destruction. As a result of increasing awareness about the programmes, private companies have become involved, giving incentives to informers who declare the location of arms caches. These informers are often women and children.

The Rachel operations also have an unorthodox policing approach. There is co-operation with individuals with information on arms caches who are often remunerated for disclosing their location. The rationale behind this approach is the belief that most of the cache caretakers have information about the whereabouts of other caches. *"If you prosecute at the outset you lose the person's co-operation to disclose other caches."*

Since the initiative was launched, Operation Rachel has gone from strength to strength. By September 1998, three such operations had already taken place. Police statistics indicate that these operations have destroyed more than 300 tons of firearms and about four million rounds of ammunition.

As a result of these successes, Operation Rachel IV was undertaken in October 1998. While previous operations focused on southern Mozambique, Rachel IV went into the central Sofala province. Over thirty bomb, explosive and firearm disposal experts of the South Africa Police Service and twelve Mozambican experts were involved in the operation. The operation destroyed more than 100 tons of illegal weapons, including two cannons, assault rifles, four types of handguns, three types of detonators, eight types of mortar bombs and five types of rocket launchers.

The expectation is that, if these operations continue to be as successful as they are now, eventually most caches in Mozambique will be destroyed and hence one of the sources of illegal weapons will have been eliminated. The lessons of Operation Rachel will prove valuable for other regions considering similar programmes.

The Arms Management Programme of the Institute for Security Studies — understanding the importance of this indigenous operation in the context of regional initiatives for the control, management and reduction of small arms in Southern Africa — offers the first full account of the evolution and nature of the series of recovery operations entitled 'Rachel' in this monograph.

The Arms Management Programme believes that examples such as these need to be understood by the national, regional and international communities, since they represent a special type of feasible and desirable subregional initiative, one that — in time — might

be perfected in order to generate a working model for other similar situations in the African context.

Small arms proliferation in Southern Africa *Virginia Gamba and Martinho Chachiua*

Introduction

Arms availability in Southern Africa

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Introduction

All weapons are seldom if ever collected at the end of an armed struggle. The conditions of insecurity that prevail in countries in transition (which are either entering the final stages of a collapsed state or are emerging from anarchy and war) are fertile ground for the maintenance and acquisition of light weapons and small arms by the community at large. Physical security and/or primacy, and economic needs are the fuel that keeps the trade in small arms moving. This trade, for the first time in history, does not require a new influx of weapons to be destabilising, depending instead on the constant movement of massive existing stocks in ever widening circles of distribution.

Thus, in countries which are moving in a downwards spiral towards anarchy or have already failed, the weak, the strong, and the corrupt have a common need to possess arms to ensure their self-defence, maintain an advantage, or exploit a situation. In addition, in nation-states emerging from conflict, the ownership of weapons not only has a security and primacy motivation, but also one based on economic imperatives. Impoverished groups of people, insecure about their own potential for economic development and survival, utilise weapons as if they were cheque books: robbing to cover basic needs, and/or exchanging guns for money or goods (as in Mozambique).

It is in this light that the problem of small arms proliferation in Africa must be considered, and why an initial examination of one subregion, in particular — Southern Africa — might be of importance in putting the whole into perspective. Southern Africa provides a good example of how weapons can spread through an area, and their negative impact on the communities of the subregion.

Arms Availability in Southern Africa

There is no accurate measure of the number of weapons circulating in Southern Africa. In Mozambique alone, estimates of weapons imported during the civil war range from 0,5 million to six million. During the United Nations peacekeeping operation (ONUMOZ, 1993-1995), nearly 190 000 weapons were collected. However, most of these weapons were not destroyed and soon found their way back to the streets of Maputo or into neighbouring states. In addition to the 4,1 million firearms licensed to civilians in South Africa (i.e. excluding weapons in the possession of the security forces), estimates of illegal weapons in circulation range from 400 000 to eight million.

In Angola, it is virtually impossible to estimate the number of available weapons. It was reported that, in 1992, 700 000 weapons were distributed to civilians by the government following the resumption of fierce fighting. During the demobilisation component of the most recent UN peacekeeping operation (UNAVEM III), only 34 425 weapons were collected, many of which were old and unserviceable. Combined with the small number of police and soldiers who have been demobilised, this indicated that most weapons and soldiers were kept apart from the now broken peace process. Should peace ever be established — and if the example set by Mozambique remains true for Angola — and people get rid of their weapons either through necessity or need, the impact on countries in the region could be at least as severe as it has been in Mozambique. Furthermore, apart from the arms stockpiled during the seventies and eighties, Angola continues to receive weapons regularly since 1992. The United States, Russia and Portugal have supplied arms and other military equipment to the Angolan government. Although sanctions to cut off UNITA's supplies were introduced on 1 October 1997, Savimbi has been able to find alternative routes of supply.¹ Without a doubt, the continued availability of small arms in the Angolan conflict has led to the resumption of the civil war in the country. The same principle fuelled the eruption of war in 1992.

In South Africa, the years since 1994 have seen an upsurge in the number of illegal and legal weapons in circulation. An average of 20 000 firearm licence applications were received each month in the period from January to March 1996, of which approximately 85 per cent were approved. South Africa also has an extremely high rate of lost and stolen firearms. According to the South African Minister for Safety and Security, an estimated 30 000 stolen licensed firearms enter the illegal market each year. In addition to these are the approximately 8 500 weapons lost or stolen annually from the police and defence force. The presence of these illegal weapons in the hands of criminals has prompted South Africans to arm themselves, causing an alarming increase in firearms available in the country which "... *may have profound implications for the stability of the Republic.*"

In Zimbabwe, the disarmament process that took place at independence was described as protracted. Thus, the concealment of weapons was "... *justified as a precaution, in the event of the independence process being sabotaged or manipulated by Rhodesian forces.*"² In the post-independence period, however, an influx of weapons from Mozambique, South Africa and Botswana has been reported. Peace in Mozambique and the end of apartheid in South Africa brought peace dividends to Zimbabwe by way of reduced arms inflows.³ However, the country's current involvement in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo may steer further arms into the country.

In Namibia, while demobilisation and reintegration were relatively successful, the close proximity to Angola, Zambia, Botswana and South Africa makes the country a potential growth point for arms proliferation. This statement also holds true for Swaziland which, while initially serving as a transit point, has acquired a proliferation dynamics of its own.⁴

For some time the major source of light weapons in Zambia were arms caches left by various liberation movements. But currently, given its long land borders, Zambia is increasingly becoming a transit country for arms. However, these arms fuel internal crime and political unrest while in transit.

Hence, the obvious conclusion: as long as available arms continue to proliferate in the region, peace, real stability and development will continue to be kept hostage by these

arms.

The circulation of small arms in the region

The movement of small arms in the region can be examined from two different perspectives: intrastate and interstate movements. The intrastate movement of small arms is characterised by the way in which weapons change hands from legal to illegal possession, on the one hand, and among illegal owners, on the other hand. The interstate movement refers to the cross-border movement of arms which takes place legally and/or illegally.

Internally, there are two ways in which arms move from legal to illegal owners. Corrupt police and army officers deliberately rent or sell their assigned weapons to criminals, and weapons are stolen or lost from official armouries or from legal licence holders. As pointed out above, estimates indicate that about 30 000 weapons stolen from individual legal owners, and 8 500 lost or stolen from the police and defence force, enter the criminal market annually in South Africa.⁵ In Mozambique, 12 000 weapons were reported stolen in 1994 alone.⁶ There are reports of security agents being involved in criminal activities where arms that were officially issued, are temporarily used illegally.

The internal circulation of weapons is further aggravated by:

- increasing crime and the lack of effective policing which, in turn, is partly caused by the transition process itself;**
- the rise of private security companies using weapons; and**
- demobilisation and disarmament in situations where mechanisms for reintegration of demobilised soldiers on the one hand, and control and regulations of arms and military skills, on the other, are inadequate.**

Apart from exceptional cases such as Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola supplying arms to the DRC government to fulfil the needs emerging from the conflict in the country, there are no major legal transfers of weapons between Southern African countries. The cross-border movement of illegal weapons, however, is quite commonplace. Cross-border arms trafficking is broadly facilitated, on the one hand, by the existence of increasingly well organised transnational criminal organisations and, on the other hand, the existence of well established covert arms supply networks across the region.

Indeed, one interesting phenomenon of cross-border arms trafficking is that the networks and routes utilised by organised criminal organisations which trade in weapons, seem to resemble old pipelines of illegal trade.

- Being unable to operate within their respective countries, liberation movements across the region devised mechanisms to procure arms supplies. They established regional supply structures through covert networks for the common cause of fighting colonialism and minority regimes. These networks operated between liberation movements themselves, and between these movements and their primary suppliers outside the region. After independence in the early 1960s, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi and, in the late 1970s, Angola and Mozambique hosted the remaining liberation movements in their territories, from where the activities of**

these networks were further promoted.

- As an antithesis to this development, colonial and minority regimes, and later one-party states that were subject to increasing international isolation, had no other way but to establish their own covert networks. Arms covert networks involving secondary and tertiary dealers that had linkages between themselves and between them and their suppliers elsewhere, were put in place to circumvent international sanctions.⁷ For example, the IISS Military Balance 1974-1975, quoted by Nkiwane, states that

*"There are no known formal agreements between the white minority territories of Southern Africa, but the links exist in practice. Periodical meetings on common security matters have taken place between the defence authorities of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal: there are hot pursuit agreements relating to certain frontier areas ..."*⁸

- The old African smuggling routes for prohibited goods have been reinforced by the human relationships that have been forged through large population movements steered by the war. In other words, refugees crossed the borders to neighbouring countries during the wars. Most of them may have remained in the host countries for more than five years. Under such circumstances, they established relationships with the local population and gained valuable knowledge of the society as a whole. Once back in their home country, these relationships have made it easy for them to use their networks and knowledge for both legal and illegal deals. To this end, the traditional supply networks of prohibited goods have been 'resurrected'.

Thus, the connections between old networks are clearly being used for new small arms trafficking. On the one hand, when Cold War proxy conflicts ended and minority regimes were defeated, these covert arms supply networks were already in place. On the other hand, the end of these conflicts had altered the strategic and the security environment. Security needs were scaled down and the focus of security policy shifted. As a result, the security apparatus had to be downsized and restructured. Demobilisation, rationalisation and disarmament have been common features of the political discourse in Mozambique, South Africa, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia, to mention but a few examples. As a result of these processes, both the soldier being demobilised and his weapon became redundant.

The movement of arms has also been fuelled by ineffective demobilisation and reintegration processes and a lack of economic alternatives for some key communities that were involved in former security organisations. When retrenchment of large numbers of demobilised soldiers took place in an unstable environment, "... *frustrations at the slow pace of transitions prompted some of those who had learned little during the conflict but the use of arms [to] occasionally [employ] this dangerous skill or the availability of weapons to earn themselves a living.*"⁹ Thus, disaffected sectors of both former liberation and rebel movements and security agents of colonial and minority regimes are currently running arms smuggling operations for commercial and criminal objectives. For example, among the prominent South Africans suppliers to UNITA are Portuguese-speaking businessmen¹⁰ with interests in Mozambique and South Africa who are certainly involved in supplying arms to rebel movements after the independence of Mozambique and Angola. By similar considerations, the Zambian government is unable to stop existing arms supply operations to UNITA. Meek has indicated that "...

arms smuggling routes from Mozambique through Swaziland are generally those used by Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) cadres during internal conflict in South Africa."¹¹ There is no doubt that the networks smuggling arms from Mozambique into South Africa include former South African Defence Force officers, ANC cadres, demobilised RENAMO guerrillas, FRELIMO soldiers, hunters aiming at getting rich quickly, and very likely former refugees. The controversial arrest of a senior South African Foreign Affairs official in Mozambique on charges of arms smuggling in 1998, is a strong suggestion of involvement by a variety of players.¹²

The knowledge and political and social connections that sustain these networks are well rooted, as the new, often understaffed and underresourced security agencies¹³ are unable to effectively trace such trade in arms. By the same token, research has struggled to trace arms smuggling routes. However, it is certain that weapons following old routes move freely throughout the region. Whenever a conflict erupts in the region, weapons will certainly reach such a new destination in a matter of days without any problems whatsoever.

Irrespective of the patterns of circulation, the real problem with the increased availability of small arms in Southern Africa is not so much the actual trade itself or the movement of weapons to conflict areas, although this is particularly grievous to regional stability in Southern Africa. The more pervasive and long-term damage generated by the availability of weapons in the region manifests itself in terms of their impact in the creation and maintaining of a culture of violence among rural and urban communities in Southern Africa.

This is an important element when considering the reasons and need for proposing an international code of conduct for the control of trafficking in light weapons. In analysing the effects of the increased availability of unregulated and uncontrolled light weapons on society, it is clear that the influx of guns can change the value systems of individuals and societies, making them *more — not less — insecure*, as well as more violent. Thus, from a humanitarian point of view, it is in everybody's interest to connect light weapons with violence for, if weapons are left uncontrolled, the negative impact of their presence in societies will continue to produce intolerance, abuse and death.

In short, two points need to be made clear. It is important to understand that the movement of small arms in Southern Africa is fuelled by different motives on both the supply and demand sides. For this same reason and taking into account the complexity of the issue in respect to the dynamics of the movements, visually different categories of roles should and can be constructed for members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with regard to the circulation of small arms. This can promote the potential to control arms at regional level. The categories that can be entertained, are as follows:

- countries where weapons originate (although they may not be producers): South Africa, Mozambique and Angola;
- countries through which weapons mainly transit: Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Swaziland; and
- end-user countries: mainly Angola, South Africa and the DRC.

The problems associated with each category must be seen in their own light and control measures that primarily affect the supply of weapons across borders could specifically be tackled with reference to each group of countries. However, for programmes that can actually lead to the reduction in the demand for small arms, a different approach needs to be taken which have more to do with policing, development and education than with regional control mechanisms.

The linkage of despair, violence and intolerance to the increased availability of light weapons is becoming more apparent in the daily lives of entire populations. If other connections, such as those between organised crime and guns, and between international relief organisations and guns,¹⁴ are also taken into account, the international community would have no choice but to accept that the control and regulation of light weapons are of equal — if not greater — importance than control over arms of other kinds.

Regional Control Potential

Despite its infancy and structural problems, the Southern African community of countries has the potential to control illicit small arms trafficking and to reduce existing stockpiles of weapons. This potential is manifest in the fact that:

- most of the countries in the region genuinely desire peace and development, having seen the disruptive effect of conflict in their territories: Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Swaziland are examples;
- a subregional structure already exists in the body of SADC that provides a forum for high level discussions of common concerns;
- there are reasonably efficient existing *ad hoc* organisations through which small arms issues could be co-ordinated among member states, while they finalise the strategies and vehicles for long-term control of this issue, i.e. the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO); and
- some countries in the region have already decided to prioritise policies related to the control of crime, violence and weapons availability in their own national strategies — South Africa and Mozambique.

With the growing willingness to co-operate on these issues, and with some structures for consultation already in place, the Southern African community has an advantage over other subregions in Africa in terms of the control of illicit small arms trafficking. The big question is how to go about to make the existing structures operational and effective, not only in the short term, but also in the long term. On the negative side, there is as yet no agreement in the region on each member state's responsibility towards the control of illicit small arms trafficking, and there is as yet no regional thinking on this issue. This will eventually be established. The process, nevertheless, can be accelerated if ongoing international and extraregional initiatives such as those of the UN, the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union (EU) and, eventually, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) undertake to share their experiences and responsibilities — co-ordinating their efforts to fit broad objectives as guideline generators, implementers or assistants to other ongoing processes. Moves in the right direction have emerged during 1998, leading not only to an increased willingness of the OAU to take on a leadership role

on the continent (as seen in the dissemination of a series of newsletters on the problem of small arms proliferation, and by the report that its Secretary General has been mandated to become involved at the 1999 summit in Algiers), but also to an increased interest in reinforcing and strengthening SARPCCO as a mechanism for action in controlling and reducing illicit small arms. By the same token, countries such as South Africa have reinforced their own initiatives in this direction, leading the way with initiatives to destroy rather than sell surplus weapons in their national armouries and encouraging the discussions within SARPCCO to generate a regional convention similar to the one signed by the OAS on the control of illicit weapons.

If this co-operative and co-ordinated approach to small arms is adopted by the countries concerned, everyone will have the opportunity to benefit from others' experiences. Each region will have something to teach the other, and controls will become a reality which might stand a chance to reduce this global scourge successfully in the future. In this context, the lessons accrued from successive Rachel operations become vital to any regional initiatives that might develop further in Southern Africa and — indeed — in Africa as a whole.

The evolution of Operation Rachel, 1996-1999

Martinho Chachiua

Introduction

Context: From political to criminal violence

Political contingencies and the need for common ground

Operation Rachel: Structure, functioning, cost and results

Rachel I

Rachel II

Rachel III

Rachel IV

Introduction

Developments towards the end of the 1980s were indicative of the unprecedented political changes ahead for both South Africa and Mozambique. The main content of these developments was the fact that 'politics through war' was gradually being pushed aside. It seemed that, once this process was completed, security would be guaranteed. However, war legacies, a surfeit of weapons, redundant soldiers and social dislocation — combined with poverty, environmental degradation and widespread epidemics — did not improve the security of individuals.

Of these legacies, the widespread availability of weapons has had the most far-reaching security effects. These weapons, previously used for political and ideological reasons, now fuelled criminal violence in both countries. As Cock¹⁵ explains, the social categories that sustain the demand for, and the use of light weapons have cultural and economic motivations. On the one hand, these weapons that were now used in the service of crime, acquired a high level of mobility that neither respected national

territorial borders, nor political and ideological divides. On the other hand, the democratic transition period(s) was characterised by weak safety and security institutions, increasingly unable to protect the citizens and their property. The feeling of insecurity among the population clearly became a major problem. The lack of security threatened to jeopardise development and, with no development, political progress remained superficial and fragile.

These were the hard realities confronting the elected governments in Mozambique and South Africa during 1994. Enhanced co-operation became one of the most promising avenues to follow, but the road was not free of constraints. Historical factors and mutual suspicion stood in the way of a meaningful co-operation arrangement that only enlightened wisdom from both sides could remove.

On the positive end of the continuum was the fact that the general political and strategic environment was conducive to uncontroversial and quick political agreements. The end of apartheid provided South Africa with free entry into SADC and other regional arrangements. This new political environment that came into being in an uneasy region meant that the challenge ahead was to give practical and operational content to historically empty political agreements. In other words, while political agreements were extremely important — by virtue of defining strategic directions — the attitudes displayed during co-operation and implementation processes would ultimately determine their success or failure.

It is with these propositions in mind that this monograph examines the bilateral co-operation between the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) since 1996. The specific co-operation took the form of a joint weapons removal operation, code named 'Rachel'. Firstly, this section describes the context in which the need for the joint operation emerged, based on a political environment that yielded easily, due to the convergent political processes in both countries and the perception of a common destiny. Secondly, the *ad hoc* implementation strategy is considered that was to become vital for the success of the initiative. Thirdly, the connections that were made during successive phases of this operation are considered. Finally, the potential of 'Rachel' is analysed in terms of its further development in the Southern African region.

Context: From Political to Criminal Violence

For the purpose of this section, it is assumed that Mozambique and South Africa were in states of civil war before 1994. The violence directly or indirectly related to these wars, is regarded as political violence.¹⁶ This proposition neither precludes the fact that criminal violence might have taken place during the conflicts, nor that political violence has come to an end in these countries. It is simply intended to emphasise that, prior to 1994, politically motivated violence overruled violence of other kinds.

South Africa

After peaking in the period between 1990 and 1994,¹⁷ political violence in South Africa, in general, and between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and ANC supporters in KwaZulu-Natal, in particular, declined considerably in the aftermath of the April 1994 elections. From an average of 244 deaths per month in the period prior to elections, politically motivated deaths declined to 144 in 1995.¹⁸ While political violence has eased

since 1994, violent crime has increased.

According to the Nedcor/ISS Crime Index, five categories of the most violent crime seemed to have stabilised in the post-1994 period, but remain considerably high compared to the period prior to 1994.¹⁹ Weapons played an important role in these crime categories with, for instance, 39,8% of all reported murders during the first six months of 1995 committed with firearms. During the same period, 33 441 robberies were reported of which 26 563 (79,4%) were firearms-related.²⁰ Furthermore, while the predominant weapons in KwaZulu-Natal were kwasha (home-made weapons) before 1990, political activists and criminals increasingly acquired AK47s, R4s and G3s since then, and "*... gun running became a massive commercial operation.*"²¹ Most of these weapons entered the market as a result of ineffective disarmament and demobilisation processes both in Mozambique and South Africa.

These developments further increased the demand for illicit weapons for criminal activities in South Africa and, as a result, increasing numbers of licit weapons were required and acquired for self-defence. Statistics provided by the Central Firearms Register (CFR) show that, in 1996, South Africa had approximately 4,1 million licensed firearms in the hands of some 1,9 million owners. The statistics also show that the CFR received between 18 000 and 20 000 licence applications per month during this time.²² On the other end of the spectrum, rough estimates of illegal possession indicate the existence of between 400 000 and eight million small arms circulating in, through and out of South Africa.²³

Mozambique

The end of the armed conflict in Mozambique left large numbers of redundant weapons in the hands of demobilised soldiers and civilians, as well as caches hidden in the bush.²⁴ The failure of the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) to undertake a comprehensive disarmament process has been extensively reported.²⁵ Irrespective of the reasons why disarmament has been problematic in one of the most successful UN peacekeeping missions, the hard fact, as Vines puts it, is that, "*[a]lthough the conflict ended, the networks controlling light weapons supplies simply found new customers, using existing caches and networks to traffic weapons to neighbouring states, specially South Africa.*"²⁶ The gap between the number of weapons thought to be in the country and weapons collected at the end of the peace process was so big that it clearly represented the potential for internal and external instability in Mozambique in the post-election period.

Secondly, given the weakness of the country's economy, the social and economic reintegration of former combatants and persons returning from exile became a nightmare. A pilot study of the Refugee Studies Programme²⁷ found no evidence linking former soldiers with armed crime. It recognised, however, that the lack of formal employment coupled with the inability of the small-scale agricultural sector to guarantee the subsistence of rural families, forced former combatants to look for alternative income through the informal commerce of urban centres. The vulnerability to crime of all kinds in this setting is real, not only because the products on offer in the informal economy are stolen, but also because the temptation to use anything to guarantee survival, including weapons, is very high. Incidents of demobilised soldiers selling weapons to criminals and/or using weapons for criminal activities themselves were reported on many occasions.²⁸ Besides, the simple fact that rural elements joined the unemployed 'army'

in urban areas became a potentially destabilising factor in itself.

Thirdly, weak state institutions were unable to maintain law and order, in general, and the police were particularly unable to provide effective solutions to rising crime rates. Thus, weapons moved from war to crime with impunity, threatening to transform Mozambique into a society where only the logic of the powerful prevailed.29

Linkages between South Africa and Mozambique

The situation prevailing in Mozambique and South Africa in the aftermath of the general elections in both countries led to a synergy that impacted mostly on the illicit weapons market.

When political violence was eased as a result of the political engineering that culminated in the 1994 elections, the pipelines for illegal weapons transfers were already in place. Criminal motivations just replaced political ones in the use of these pipelines. The traditional political and ideological drives of regional arms deals were replaced by criminal ones. This apolitical, regional cross-border movement of weapons rapidly spiralled: weapons began to move from relatively stable areas to more unstable and violence-ridden ones in the region and further afield. Hence, the increased demand for weapons in South Africa was easily fulfilled through the already existing arms pipelines linking the two countries.30

It was thus that gun-running from Mozambique to South Africa became a major concern for both the South African and Mozambican police services. In response, both governments embarked on a variety of domestic and bilateral measures in attempts to curb arms proliferation and lessen its effects.

Domestic measures include a combination of prevention, confiscation, amnesty and buy-back initiatives, and heavy penalties for offenders. The South African Arms and Ammunition Act of 1969, was tightened in 1993, 1994 and 1998³¹ and is currently being further debated in order to control and tighten the legal acquisition of arms. At the same time, South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and SAPS joint operations have been undertaken to combat the rising criminality in the country. SAPS figures of confiscated weapons support the importance of policing efforts. Indeed, as a result of the efforts of the firearms unit, 16 291 illegal arms were seized in 1995 alone.32

Comprehensive government policy was formulated, following these early attempts to curb crime and weapons. The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) was unveiled in 1996 and is managed by the Secretariat for Safety and Security. The NCPS is a multidepartmental initiative that centres on law enforcement and long-term prevention through improved policing, as well as the co-operation of the criminal justice system as a whole.

South Africa has taken steps to address the spread of illicit small arms in the country and the region from both an arms control and a crime prevention perspective. The South African Department of Foreign Affairs has recently released a position paper on small arms and light weapons proliferation. This document outlines the appropriate steps to stem the proliferation of these weapons in the viewpoint of the South African government. It suggests the need for:

- an holistic approach with concurrent action at national, regional and international

levels focusing on both licit and illicit small arms and light weapons; and

- a regional initiative for the control of weapons proliferation in Africa.

The position paper emphasises that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons must be viewed from an inclusive perspective of arms control and disarmament, post-conflict peacebuilding, conflict prevention and socio-economic development. It proposes practical measures for co-ordination and co-operation at national, regional and international levels. At the national level, these include:

- enhancement of legislation and regulation; and
- reduction of the current number of existing weapons.

At the regional level, proposed actions are:

- confidence-building and transparency measures;
- steps to prevent the inflow of weapons to affected regions; and
- co-operative partnerships between governments, international and regional organisations and non-governmental organisations.

The crime prevention approach as proposed in the NCPS, includes a strategy on firearms policy that aims at:

- improving controls over the possession of legal firearms (both private ownership and those owned by state security structures);
- preventing legal firearms from becoming illegal through criminal activity;
- taking proactive steps to reduce the number of existing firearms in the country;
- preventing the inflow of illegal weapons; and
- mobilising public and political support for the above processes.

To date, the South African government has actively been improving controls over land borders and has reduced the number of international airports in the country. Efforts to improve the inspection and clearance of goods at sea ports are also under way. In addition, the current legislation regulating civilian ownership of firearms is under review and new legislation is expected to be tabled before Parliament in 1999.

In Mozambique, the authorities recognised small arms proliferation as a security challenge.³³ The Mozambican Attorney-General stated that:

*"... a large demand for illegal firearms in South Africa has prompted Mozambican gun-runners to extend their sources of such weapons and gun-running has formed part of several types of organised crime in [the] country, including drug trafficking, car theft, and money laundering."*³⁴

Manuel Antonio, then the Minister of the Interior, announced a national master plan in April 1995 to curb illegal weapons circulating in the country. The plan included the

deployment of permanent police units to patrol the main roads, the re-establishment of district police commands and the creation of a special unit for the destruction of arms caches. In addition, an increasing awareness among civil society prompted the launch of anti-arms campaigns, such as the Arms into Hoes project of the Christian Council of Mozambique, and those of Gun-Free South Africa (GFSA).

Following the launching of the master plan, Mozambican police were reported to have apprehended thirty armed gangs and uncovered 69 arms caches in three months. Between January and July 1995, the police seized more than 6 000 arms and 24 000 rounds of ammunition. Ambushes along the highway stopped shortly after the deployment of 'Lightning Battalion' (a police special unit created in response to ambushes and armed attacks along the highway between Mozambique and South Africa).³⁵

However, none of these were enough to control and reduce the problem itself. Given the porousness of the countries' borders, the existing supply networks and routes, and the interconnection between illicit arms and other cross-border crimes, such as vehicle theft and drug trafficking, any unilateral progress in either country clearly became insufficient. For example, SAPS estimates show that the South African police recover only ten per cent of illegal arms entering the country.³⁶ Furthermore, in 1995, as Latham rightly described, *"the government [of Mozambique] is destitute. It cannot afford to buy shoes for its policemen, most of whom walk the streets in an odd assortment of sandals, trainers and tennis shoes."*³⁷

In view of the above, it can be argued that the political transition processes in both Mozambique and South Africa were accompanied by:

- increased small arms proliferation;
- a shift in the use of weapons from war to crime;
- an increase in violent crime;
- an expansion of the illegal arms market within and between the countries;
- a lack of state capacity to provide security for the public; and
- ultimately, the potential for general social instability.

As a result, the democratically elected governments of Mozambique and South Africa were faced with increasing levels of violent crime exacerbated by the widespread proliferation of arms. Latham³⁸ commented that

"... there is no longer an ideological war being fought on Mozambican soil, but citizens complain that, if the violence has abated, it has far from disappeared ... No property is safe and horror stories of ambushes, shooting and stabbing abound."

In the case of South Africa, the sources of weapons were clearly the domestic defence industry, the remains of the political conflict, and increasingly — but not exclusively — arms smuggled from Mozambique. As pointed out above, weapons could be found in Mozambique in the hands of demobilised soldiers and civilians, and cached in the bushes.³⁹ It was recognised that the bulk of arms being smuggled out of Mozambique came mainly from caches. Hence, destroying caches before the weapons reached smugglers became the basis for the bilateral political willingness to co-operate. This led to the creation of Operation Rachel.

Political Contingencies and the need for Common Ground

Against the background of common problems described above, it has to be remembered that the recent history of the relationship between South Africa and Mozambique was characterised by hostilities. The two defence and security establishments fought an undeclared war for the previous two decades, and regarded each other as enemies. This made collaboration processes difficult, if not impossible in the past. Besides, co-operation between South Africa and its neighbours was long regarded with suspicion. Given its relative power, South Africa is perceived as having hegemonic aspirations. As a result of the sensitivity of security issues, co-operation in this area suffers the most from such a suspicious environment. Thus, even though the Mozambican and South African police services have attempted to co-operate before 1994, distrust and a lack of political clearance prevented the institutions to work together in a meaningful manner.⁴⁰ Therefore, despite the fact that arms smuggling and proliferation between the two countries became a common security challenge, and co-operation became clearly not an option but an imperative, political awareness and willingness were prerequisites. Obviously, the new distended strategic environment, enhanced by the political transformation in both countries, laid the ground for settling these differences.

Although the political environment of the post-1994 period removed some of the obstacles for co-operation, it was the pressure brought about by the rise in violence and crime in both countries that sparked the final agreement. With the end of internal conflicts, both in South Africa and Mozambique, arms proliferation and its related violent crime were taken as factors which could jeopardise the political progress that was achieved. Shaw rightly argued that, in South Africa, "*[c]rime is ... implicitly and explicitly seen as a central test of the capacity of the Government to rule and the new democracy to consolidate.*"⁴¹ The same became apparent early on in Mozambique with crime in Maputo spiralling out of control. How could democracies consolidate and develop when South Africa was losing an estimated R31,3 billion, or 5,6% of its gross domestic product in 1995 to crime,⁴² and Mozambique was not attracting a critical mass of investors due to its insecure environment? The toll of crime itself on business and potential investment was enhanced by its direct and indirect costs that society had to bear as a result of the prevailing insecurity. The use of scarce resources to tend to the treatment of firearms-related casualties in hospitals, for example, put a heavy burden on the Mozambican and South African health authorities alike.⁴³ Furthermore, the lack of trust in the protection offered by the police generated a mushrooming of private security companies, which, in themselves, compounded the problem of the increased availability of firearms.

In recognition that neither country was achieving rapid progress in controlling its own internal security concerns, and because both were considered to be part of these problems, Mozambique and South Africa felt that they had no choice but to co-operate across borders. As a result, the presidents of the two countries, Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique and Nelson Mandela of South Africa, met in March 1995 to sign a co-operation agreement, In Respect of Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in the Field of Crime Combating.

The preamble to the Agreement states that the "*... parties are desirous of concluding such an agreement in order to contribute towards peace, stability, security, prosperity and crime combating.*"⁴⁴ For both countries, security, peace and stability are in part a function of the extent that crime can be prevented, controlled or fought. In Article 6, the Agreement provides that the parties, in "*... recognising the incidence of organised crime*

and the need for close co-operation in addressing the problem ..." shall undertake:

- the exchange of crime information on regular basis on arms;
- the planning and co-ordination of operations, including covert operations; and
- technical assistance and expertise where these are required for the purpose of criminal investigation.

Despite the common ground and improved political settings, the Agreement became an operational nightmare. A sound implementation strategy, therefore, became critical for the achievement of actual goals. The different security institutions were thus expected to work out this strategy. This was easier said than done in the context of the historical and structural differences between them.

Article 2 provides that:

*"This agreement shall in no way be construed as derogating from any provision of: (a) laws of respective parties regarding extradition; (b) any extradition agreement which is in force or may be entered into between the parties; and, (c) the co-operation agreement entered into between the government of the Republic of South Africa and the government of the Republic of Mozambique on 20 July 1994."*⁴⁵

Article 3, however, gives broad discretionary powers to the safety and security portfolio ministers. As a matter of fact, paragraph 3.2 states that:

"The Ministers shall consult each other and advise their governments as to how the legislative or administrative steps that may be necessary for the implementation of the provisions of this agreement and remove any legal obstacles or impediments that may be found to exist in the execution of the provisions of this agreement."

Thus, the Agreement actively attempted to create an environment conducive to effective working relations between the safety and security institutions of the countries. A peculiar characteristic of the Agreement is that it not only outlined what needed to be done, but also carefully set out the conditions that would allow co-operation between two very different and distrustful agencies. The Agreement could not rely on existing *ad hoc* arrangements, but became a confidence-building measure in itself aimed at improved working relationships between the two parties to the Agreement. Whereas other regional arrangements had started off as *ad hoc* measures that were eventually institutionalised (for example, SARPCCO), Operation Rachel became the opposite — an institutionalised arrangement providing an umbrella for *ad hoc* co-operation.

The Agreement and the political discourse surrounding it were tailored in such a way that it would foster a sense of ownership at all levels. According to Director Naude⁴⁶ of the SAPS firearms special unit, the opposition in Mozambique — RENAMO in particular — was consulted prior to the operation. Even though the agreement between Eastern Transvaal (now Mpumalanga) and the Governor of Gaza province has nothing to do with the joint operation, the need for local authorities to support the operation led Mike Bester, then acting police commissioner, to consider that *"... weapons raids across border had been authorised by the 12 June [1995] agreement between Eastern Transvaal Premier Mathews Phosa and Mozambican authorities [Gaza Province Governor, Eugenio Nhumaio]."*⁴⁷

Operation Rachel: structure, functioning, cost and Results

As is clear from the previous section, the governments of South Africa and Mozambique made sure that a common ground was defined, before the police agencies started to work together. It was explicitly recognised that the security challenges emerging from the illegal flow of firearms into South Africa and the potential of existing arms caches to disrupt rural safety in Mozambique should be put above any political agenda. For South Africa, it was important that caches were identified and the weapons destroyed to prevent them from being smuggled into its territory were they fuelled violent crime.⁴⁸ For Mozambique, rural safety, the eradication of violence and the general disarmament of people in rural areas were the main aims.

At the outset, it was vital to identify common concerns. Problems had to be defined in such a way that neither country would be seen as helping the other, but that each was in the process of serving its own country's security needs. In other words, the destruction of arms caches in Mozambique by SAPS had to be interpreted as part of its mandate in maintaining law and order within South Africa. SAPS officials working in Mozambican territory were fulfilling their duties and they had to commit themselves fully to their task, as they would have done if they were policing Johannesburg streets. For the Mozambican police service, this operation was just an additional effort in the country's process of demilitarising society.

Having conceived the problem in this way, the question was how to go about this task in the light of the characteristics of each country. Mozambique had neither the financial resources nor the expertise to destroy arms caches. SAPS lacked the knowledge of the Mozambican terrain and had no legal right to operate inside Mozambique. The combination of problems became a strength: SAPS would not only supply the bulk of the financial resources, but also landmine-resistant vehicles and other specialised equipment, as well as highly trained senior police officers. Mozambique would gather intelligence and with its knowledge of the local conditions, facilitate contacts with local communities. Given the circumstances around arms caches, it was decided, in addition:

- *The arms caches destruction operation would be intelligence-driven.* It was agreed that both Mozambican and South African police forces would gather intelligence about these caches. The two teams jointly plotted the caches on a global position system (GPS) map. A team of Mozambican and South African police experts would subsequently be deployed to the field to destroy the weapons in situ.
- *The operations should have an unorthodox policing approach.* While one would expect individuals holding arms caches to be prosecuted in a traditional proactive policing operation, individuals were co-opted, worked with and generally rewarded for disclosing arms caches in this case. There were several reasons for this approach, for instance, the belief that most of the cache informers knew of more than one cache. Hence, "*if you prosecute at the outset, you lose his/her co-operation in disclosing other caches,*"⁴⁹ argued a South African police officer. In the Mozambican post-conflict situation, a proactive police operation also ran the risk of being easily politicised, for most of the caches had been kept for political objectives.⁵⁰ For the sake of reconciliation, an undeclared amnesty was therefore introduced as a component of the operation. Finally, given the poverty prevailing in the rural areas of the country, it was decided to reward people disclosing arms

caches. A modest buy-back component was also introduced.

- *An equal partnership should be fostered between the two police forces.*
- Hence, a joint command structure should be put in place.

With this structure in mind, the first operation, code named 'Rachel', was launched on 11 August 1995.

Rachel I

The operation started with an exchange of information related to arms caches. The Mozambican side had to verify this information by contacting informers and confirming the existence of these arms caches. Between 11 and 26 October 1995, 45 police officers from the SAPS Task Force (Air Wing, Crime Intelligence Service and Bomb Disposal Unit) were deployed. The team was divided into two groups — one operated in the Ponta-d'Ouro area and the other moved northwards to the Massingir area. The South African government provided R 301 223 for the operation. A joint command comprising one senior police officer from each country was established in Maputo. While the joint command was responsible for co-ordinating the actual work, including taking decisions regarding current operational contingencies, each team representative referred to its respective police headquarters for clearance.

Based on information that was gathered, appointments with informers were arranged. Before proceeding to the caches, local authorities and the population were made aware of the nature of the operation. The briefing sessions were also an opportunity for public awareness raising. Informers guided the police teams to the caches, where most of the weapons had been buried under the ground. Depending on the assessment made by the experts of the quantity of arms found, the accessibility of the location and the security of the people in the vicinity, the weapons were destroyed in the original location or moved to a more appropriate place. Sometimes, a public destruction session was arranged where the media were invited as witnesses. The public destruction sessions were also used as a means for raising public awareness of the operation.

As far as informers were concerned, a cash reward was given. No rigid criteria were used to define the value of the reward. It depended mostly on the value of the cache which, in turn, was determined at the discretion of the team through negotiations with informers. Broadly speaking, the quantity and quality of the weapons that were found, played an important role in determining the amount of the reward. Since rewarding was used as an incentive for disclosing caches, the value was also greatly influenced by indications that the informer might know of other caches. Informers were further mobilised to disclose more caches that they were aware of, and were also encouraged to pass on their experience to other people.

According to Monguela,⁵¹ while the involvement of local police officers has been a feature of all the operations, the general co-ordination had to be left in the hands of senior officers from the Mozambique Police General Command in Maputo to ensure that the visiting police team was properly treated. The need to involve local police officers was mainly based on their knowledge of the area and, particularly, the imperative to establish sound relationships with local communities.

The support of local communities is deemed a critical factor, because they are valuable sources of information. Director Naude, in appreciation of the role of local populations, stated that, if operation Rachel has been successful, this success should be attributed to the people of Mozambique who, tired of war and violence, did not want more weapons freely available in their country.⁵²

At the outset, difficulties of all kinds were experienced. Some were of a structural and others of a contingency nature. The former were mainly those related with resources and the general context in which the operation took place. For example, South African police officers deployed in Mozambique found the working conditions somewhat inhuman (lack of basic infrastructure and general living conditions). In fact, when Lieutenant-General Wouter Grove, head of the SAPS Crime Intelligence Service, flew to Maputo shortly after the first deployment, he went not only to confer with senior Mozambican officials, but also

"... to visit SAPS task team on the ground in Mozambique [in order to ascertain] their welfare first-hand to ensure that everything possible is being done to support them in the field [where they are] ... working in extremely difficult and primitive conditions."⁵³

Another structural problem was related to language. Communication between the members of the two police teams was not always easy, due to language differences. This made the selection process much more difficult for the Mozambican police service because, besides expertise, language had to be one of the criteria. It was important to make sure that the task force teams communicated between themselves, as a lack of dialogue could cause minor problems to deteriorate into major conflicts that would jeopardise the whole operation.

Furthermore, the differences in operational skills between police officers were potential sources of misunderstanding. Indeed, as Director Naude pointed out, some specialised SAPS officers found it difficult to work with their Mozambican counterparts on specific issues at the beginning, due to their weak technical skills, for instance, in handling explosives. A final structural difficulty worth mentioning was the lack of resources among Mozambican officers. Indeed, the illicit firearms unit at the general command of the Police of the Republic of Mozambique, which was responsible for actions around arms caches since the end of the armed conflict in 1994, has a budget of only about R15 000⁵⁴ a month, with no available vehicle. This makes their work — required to find arms caches as part of the intelligence gathering operation — mainly dependent on South African resources.

Other day-to-day contingencies had the potential of hampering the relative success of the operation. Examples were personality-related conflicts, cultural differences, perceptions evolving from the prevailing prejudices, to name but a few.

As pointed out above, the two police forces had regarded each other as enemies before and neither was sure to what extent the other had changed. This certainly resulted in speculation whether there were hidden agendas or not. Distrust thus characterised the first encounter between the two police forces. For example, during the first operation, Mozambican police officers implicitly questioned why SAPS officials insisted on identifying the origin of the weapons that were found, only when they were sure that these weapons were not of South African make. This suggests that they perceived the South African task force team to have had a parallel agenda of dismissing old allegations

that one of the major suppliers of weapons for the conflict in Mozambique was South Africa. If this view had prevailed, the operation could have been politicised.

Table 1: Weapons destroyed during Operation Rachel I

Category	Quantity
Firearms	1 120
Pistols	8
Anti-personnel mines	96
Landmines	3
Hand grenades	407
Mortars	379
Launchers	43
Projectiles	202
Boosters	219
Cannons	6
Ammunition	23 182
Magazines	344
Other accessories	1 008

Source: SAPS, Weaponry Recovered and Destroyed During Operation Rachel I, Consolidated Statistics

Another example related to the way in which Mozambican police officers regarded their counterparts, due to the fact that they hardly ever saw black SAPS officers as members of the teams. There were also claims that some of the police officers deployed for Rachel I displayed racist behaviour.

From the South African side, even though interviewed SAPS officers have dismissed the point, it seems that frequent reports about rampant corruption within the security forces in Mozambique had created an image of a corrupt police force that deserved no trust.

A final example is one related to cultural differences. According to SAPS police officers, there were a few small problems regarding food preferences at the beginning. While some of these complaints may arguably be true, there is no doubt that they were fuelled by old perceptions. Superficial as this may be, it had the potential to endanger the working relationship between the parties.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, the operation recovered 1 120 weapons of various calibre and other assorted war materiel, including mortar tubes and bombs, AK-47 rifles, RPG-7 rocket launchers, hand grenades, landmines, limpet mines, PPSH sub-machine guns, explosives and 23 182 rounds of ammunition (see Table 1).

Summary

As conceived, the operation simultaneously had to tackle the security concerns of South Africa, as well as those of Mozambique. Each of the task force teams had to be able to see the results in terms of the solution of security problems in its own country. The operation therefore had to be undertaken in such a way that it fulfilled this objective. The only way that this could possibly be achieved, was to concentrate on the immediate borders of both countries. This would allow both the South African and Mozambican authorities to link the retrieval of any weapon to criminal images or the probable illicit trade in their respective countries. South Africa, for instance, could easily convey the message that arms were found and destroyed literally on the border, thus showing that, if not destroyed, the potential of easily crossing the border and being used in criminal activities or for other purposes inside the country is clearly high. The head of the

National Crime Investigation Service, Wouter Grove, explicitly conveyed this idea by commenting that "*[t]he operation was a major success for President Nelson Mandela's community safety plan announced in May.*"⁵⁵ This seems to explain that, although most of the caches were clearly in the central part of the country (Sofala and Zambezia),⁵⁶ the first Operation Rachel took place around Maputo and Gaza provinces.

Both countries presented the results as a breakthrough in their fight against crime. Both at the political and operational levels, the enthusiasm to repeat the experience was clear.

Rachel II

Although the second Rachel operation followed in the steps of the first one, there were some subtle differences. The prevailing philosophy was that the first operation should not be judged in terms of the quantity of arms recovered, but in terms of the lives and property which could be lost if these weapons were put to use and the operation's contribution to stability in these countries. In this way, any result could be taken as adequate to justify a second Rachel operation. Though the results may not have been as successful in absolute terms as it has been claimed, Rachel was meant to continue. SAPS stated that "*the operation had shown the success that could be achieved through co-operation ... in the fight against crime,*"⁵⁷ thus proving this point.

Public reports emphasising successes suggested that the operation was above question. Negative factors were being worked out diplomatically in the period between Rachel I and Rachel II. These problems have never been publicly acknowledged. However, a reading between the lines of the statement that "*[o]ur breakthrough in establishing a good working relationship with our Mozambican counterparts and citizens of Mozambique will definitely contribute to stemming the flow of criminal activities into South Africa,*"⁵⁸ suggests that, after a closer look at Rachel I, changes had to be made.

From the statement it is quite clear that most of these changes were related to improving relationships between the two teams and the population, as well as among police officers themselves. A one-week training course was undertaken. The content of the training course included, among others, explosives and booby-trap handling techniques, techniques for safely digging under ground caches, and communications. Above all, the training was aimed at teambuilding.

When Rachel II was launched a year later, some important changes had been made. A global positioning system (GPS) was introduced for general use. The leadership had to make sure that unconfirmed allegations that "*... a series of scandals involving tipping off traffickers prior to raids and involvement of both South African officials and their Mozambican counterparts with these traffickers,*"⁵⁹ were dealt with in a diplomatic manner.

Based on each party's complaints, personality clashes, for example, were seemingly sorted out by removing some of the officers on the police task force team from the operation. Although this may seem a weak argument, Mozambican officials have indicated that, for the success of the operation, some of their colleagues from both SAPS and the PRM had to be removed.⁶⁰ The indication by Director Naude⁶¹ that the operation demanded a specific kind of person who is friendly and can persevere, supports this argument.

Another example of change was the fact that, in response to the potential problems

resulting from the insistence on tracking the origins of weapons that were found, this was no longer pursued in Rachel II. Spontaneously, or by rational decision, the emphasis was placed on destroying weapons as opposed to finding their origins. The causes of the problem were to be set aside, as they were a legacy of the past. The concern was how to get rid of these weapons. To this end, contacts between the two teams were eased by way of simplifying the bureaucratic process. This demonstrated the need for concentrating on the common interests and overlooking the factors which could divide the parties. A common uniform and insignia, in Portuguese and English, indicating South Africa/Mozambique police joint operation, were also introduced to foster a sense of unity. Above all, by making small changes, the leadership demonstrated their responsiveness towards both teams that, from the point of view of confidence-building, had a great impact.

With all these issues in mind, the exercise of intelligence gathering was repeated. Arms caches were jointly plotted on a GPS map. The police teams were deployed between 30 September and 5 October 1996. Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane provinces had been earmarked for Rachel II and a joint command was established in Xai-Xai, Gaza. A two-way radio communication station was established at the bordering area of Pafuri aimed at providing communication links between the teams on the ground and the police headquarters in Pretoria and Maputo. South Africa made available some R565 033 and other resources, including helicopters for the operation. The teams consisted of 36 SAPS and 22 PRM officers. Areas covered by Rachel II included Funhalouro and Maputo Province in the south. At the end of the operation, a fair number of weapons were recovered and destroyed (see Table 2).

Table 2: Weapons destroyed during Operation Rachel II

Category/Accessory of weapons	Quantity
Firearms	475
Pistols	13
Anti-personnel mines	577
Landmines	4
Hand grenades	66
Hand grenade detonators	54
Detonators	230
Mortars	292
Launchers	59
Projectiles	51
Boosters	17
Cannons	5
Ammunition	136 631
Magazines	577
Other Accessories	694
Source: SAPS, Weaponry Recovered and Destroyed During Operation Rachel II, Consolidated Statistics	

Despite the improved environment, the quantitative success was less than expected (See Table 5). Rachel II recovered and destroyed less than half the number of firearms destroyed in Rachel I. The reasons for the lack of success seem to lie beyond the operation's effectiveness. This may be due to the fact that, while people may be predisposed to collaborate with the police for crime prevention and combat, the willingness to disclose the position of hidden caches is mediated by general confidence in the twin processes of pacification and democratisation, as well as the prevailing economic hardship in the country.

Indeed, because the general elections in October 1994 were successful in Mozambique, the political environment of 1995 was marked by an overall consensus on the need for joint efforts to reconstruct the country. The most important manifestation of this mood was demonstrated, among others, by the meeting between President Chissano and Dhlakama⁶² to discuss the arms proliferation problem and the parliamentary consensus over the government's five-year programme.

Abrahamsson and Nilsson named this positive political mood among the politicians the "*spirit of reconciliation policy*."⁶³ No matter what the reasons might have been, the political environment seems to have determined a fairly high level of people's confidence in the peace and democratisation process at the time. This is especially true for those who might have kept arms for political reasons. The reintegration support scheme also still provided some sustenance for demobilised soldiers. In such circumstances, the political value of weapons decreased and hence, whoever might have kept a weapon for political reasons was tempted to hand it in at the first opportunity.⁶⁴ This may explain the relative success of Rachel I.

However, the popular confidence in the peace and democratisation process in Mozambique that coincided with Rachel I, decreased from the end of 1996 as the political environment clouded. The remaining expectations of Renamo to play a considerable political role in the country, were jeopardised by the discussion around local elections. The government was tough in its attempts to force Renamo to vote against the local elections bill package. Renamo, in turn, threatened to block the elections. The tension increased up to the point that the language used by both parties suggested a potential resort to armed actions.⁶⁵ At the same time, the reintegration subsidies were no longer paid. These issues had increased the political value of arms caches. Hence, political control over such caches seemed to have tightened and cache caretakers were less willing to disclose their existence. This suggests that the politically harsh environment since the second half of 1996 was less conducive for politically held caches to be handed in, hence the difference in quantities of weapons recovered during Rachel II.

Despite the less spectacular results of Rachel II, the commitment to proceed remained unchanged in both countries. This was partly due to the fact that the parties were convinced that more weapons were still lying in the Mozambican bush, and partly because the operation had gained a momentum of its own.

Summary

During Rachel II, the responsiveness of the leadership enhanced the confidence between police teams and among police officers. South African police helicopters, which initially had to refer to Maputo for clearance every time they crossed the borders, no longer needed to go through all these bureaucratic red tape. Contacts between police officials were reportedly taking place on a daily basis. A clear shift from functional partnership to amicable friendship was taking root among police officers. Finally, an unconfirmed decline in arms smuggling into South Africa was interpreted as a result of the Rachel operations. Raul Freia, spokesperson for the General Command of the PRM believed that, if the operation continues, Mozambique will be free of weapons in a couple of years.⁶⁶

The image of attaching arms caches in Mozambique to crime in South Africa was maintained. South African Minister for Safety and Security, Sydney Mufamadi reiterated this view: "*One shudders to think what the consequences might have been if these*

weapons had made their way across the border and into the sea of illegal weapons that is contributing to South Africa's crime problem, as well as afflicting Mozambique's own cities and towns."⁶⁷ In a meeting between Mufamadi and his Mozambican counterpart, Almerino Manhenje, joint efforts in fighting crime were further emphasised. As far as the Rachel operations were concerned, it seems that a decision to expand northwards to search for weapons caches in the central Mozambican area was taken at this time. Certainly, there was a belief that once there were no more weapons in the southern provinces of Mozambique, chances were that arms smugglers could still operate as far afield as Sofala and Zambezia, bringing weapons into Maputo and then into South Africa.

The rationale became clear: there would be no rest before the Mozambican territory was free of arms.

The operations had also managed to attract civil society's attention. Companies in South Africa expressed willingness to provide incentives such as sweets for children and women handing weapons or ammunition to the team. Moreover, Director Naude noted an increasing voluntary and unpaid collaboration by the local population, particularly women and children, with the operation. The willingness of the local population helped to sustain the morale of the task team and provided the foundation for Rachel III.

Rachel III

At this junction, the information gathering had become a routine, ongoing activity that fed information to the joint GPS maps. The third operation was launched on 21 July and lasted until 9 August 1997. It was aimed at covering Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane in the south, and Sofala and Manica in the centre of the country. A group of 24 SAPS officers, joined by twelve PRM officers, were deployed. For the sake of team cohesion, there was a need to use the same officers as before and avoid bringing in new officers unless circumstances demanded it.

Rachel III was launched against a background of:

- a reiterated political commitment;
- a sound working relationship between members of the joint team;
- improved skills and methods of arms collection among police officers;
- an improved understanding of and support by the community;
- an ever sensible civil society; and
- conversely, increased cost.

The prevailing political commitment and improved relationships among the police officers have been described above. Although it may seem that the removal of Interior Minister Manuel Antonio late in 1996 had nothing to do with the operation, it has been seen as a further signal by the Mozambican government that it will fight corruption within its security apparatus. With the appointment of the new minister, relations improved even further.

As far as skills development was concerned — explosive disposal, booby-trap handling and other security measures — the Mozambican team was reported to have acquired the necessary skills to carry on with the operation on its own at this stage.⁶⁸ The need for intelligence and enhanced community participation was further recognised. Given the increasing role played by women and children, new incentives were used. Various companies from the South African private sector started supporting Rachel by providing

foodstuffs to be given to the local population as incentives. The importance of communication for the success of the operation led to the introduction of satellite phones that made contacts much easier.

However, while these factors suggested a conducive and co-operative environment for the operation, costs started to escalate. Indeed, Rachel III cost R600 452 — just R266 000 less than the cost of Rachel I and II combined. Two factors seem to have contributed to the increased costs:

- *The expansion of the operation northwards* meant that the further afield it moved, the more expensive it became. Almost all of the costs incurred, are directly proportional to distance. In addition, the problem of accessibility also influenced costs. In Mozambique, the further north one ventures, the worse the roads become and the more difficult to gain access to remote areas. This increased the demand to use helicopters. As result of these factors, South African police officers have voiced their concerns over costs, which threaten the continuation of the operation.
- *The longer the operation takes, the more expensive intelligence gathering and rewarding informers become.* According to Monguela, information about arms caches is becoming more costly as time passes. Informers are aware that they can get material and financial benefits from the fact that they know where weapons are. As they sense a demand for their services, it is logical that the price will escalate. This is especially true in a context of rampant poverty. There is no doubt in Naude's mind that many of these people sell weapons in the first place (or try to get as much out of the Rachel as they can), to meet their basic needs. He argues that one needs to build schools, hospitals and roads, and provide clean water to reward these communities that suffered severely from the war and are now willing to get rid of weapons.⁶⁹ This added another factor to the operation. While security calculations had determined the political will, the commitment of police officers, as well as people's willingness to support the initiative at the beginning, these were no longer sufficient to keep the momentum going. Human needs and socio-economic development imperatives have to be considered. This adds the debate around the security/development dichotomy, showing that security problems cannot be effectively dealt with, without addressing general socio-economic development issues.

With this mixture of enthusiasm and concern about costs, Rachel III took place. The results were much more encouraging than those of Rachel II (see Table 3). These results were immediately published in police statements, both in South Africa and Mozambique.

Table 3: Weapons destroyed during Operation Rachel III

Category/Accessory of weapons	Quantity
Firearms	5 584
Pistols	78
Anti-personnel mines	518
Landmines	4
Hand grenades	336
Hand grenade detonators	153
Detonators	602
Mortars	3 726
Launchers	79
Projectiles	2 340

Boosters	83
Cannons	13
Ammunition	3 000 000
Magazines	3 674
Other Accessories	301
Source: SAPS, Weaponry Recovered and Destroyed During Operation Rachel III, Consolidated Statistics	

According to Director Reg Crewe of the SAPS Detective Service, this operation was by far the most successful.⁷⁰ Among the joint operation team members everything seemed more on track than before. Furthermore, the team increasingly believed that further operations were needed, since the number of reported caches had increased significantly as additional provinces were targeted and people clearly showed their willingness to co-operate. Monguela indicated that more than sixty caches had been identified and plotted on maps, but resource constraints loomed large on both sides.

Summary

The relatively poor results of Rachel II and the increasing costs did not prevent a further operation from taking place, thanks to the political commitment, the sound working relationship among police officers, and an increasing awareness and willingness by the community to support the operation. The operation's structure and procedures have taken root, and its philosophy has been internalised among police officers. In all, the operation has gained a momentum of its own. This environment was further enhanced by the success of Rachel III, providing an uncontroversial basis for the following operation.

Rachel IV

At the end of Rachel III, the enthusiasm among both officers and the leadership became more pronounced. Everything seemed to be going according to plan. The results were regarded as particularly successful, feeding the hope that, if the operation continued, the country would soon be free of arms. In turn, South Africa would free itself from one of the sources of illegal firearms in the near future. Given the field reports of reported caches, there was no doubt that the next operation would be even more successful. These factors allowed South Africa to commit more resources to the next operation. Indeed, 31 well-trained bomb disposal, explosives and firearm experts and task force operatives, assisted by twelve Mozambican colleagues were deployed for a three-week long operation in Rachel IV. The operation cost R1 120 144 or about twice as much as Rachel III.

More than sixty caches plotted on the GPS map and spread through southern and central Mozambique filled the team's work schedule. Rachel IV was classified as the biggest cross-border operation SAPS had ever undertaken. The team was divided into two groups. One started from the central province of Sofala and Zambezia moving southwards, and the other moved from Maputo towards the north. The two groups would meet halfway.

An initial clearance problem was experienced. According to Mozambican police officers co-ordinating the operation from the Mozambican side, every operation of this kind has to be cleared at the highest political level possible. The delay this time was due to the fact that the starting dates coincided with the absence of both Minister Almerino Manhenje and the President. Thus, "*... at our level, our South African colleagues were on standby until the clearance was given.*"⁷¹

This delay meant that the team could not fulfil appointments arranged with informers. As a result, the team had to look for informers once they arrived on site. Further delays were experienced because, according to Assistant Commissioner Suiker Britz of SAPS, inhabitants of remote rural areas were reluctant to co-operate with the team.⁷² This was also the result of the team being split into two groups, with some of the contact people on the police's side thus not present in the specific site where their informers were. Informers had problems dealing with strange police officers. In one instance in Mapai, caches were not excavated until Monguela,⁷³ who had made the initial contact, was present.

Another new problem was that of communication and co-ordination between the operation teams and other security agencies within Mozambique, particularly the army. Indeed, according to a SAPS officer, some of the caches that were already plotted on the GPS map, were destroyed by the Mozambican defence force. While the fact that the caches have been destroyed is good, the lack of communication led to a duplication of efforts and a waste of resources. Notwithstanding these organisational problems, the operation has been considered successful (see Table 4).

Table 4: Weapons destroyed during Operation Rachel IV

Category/Accessory of weapons	Quantity
Firearms	4 712
Pistols	7
Anti-personnel mines	5 160
Landmines	77
Hand grenades	451
Hand grenade detonators	217
Detonators	58
Mortars	2 997
Launchers	82
Projectiles	5 545
Boosters	923
Cannons	9
Ammunition	155 494
Magazines	1 317
Other Accessories	
Source: SAPS, Weaponry Recovered and Destroyed During Operation Rachel IV, Consolidated Statistics	

Summary

At this stage, there are suspicions that weapons remain in the country, mainly north of the Save River. Within police circles, the willingness to proceed is maintained. The Mozambican Minister of Home Affairs, Almerino Manhenje, has indicated that the top priority for his ministry in 1999, remains the retrieval of weapons from caches.⁷⁴ The South African NCPS also remains committed to fight illicit weapons. There are indications that SAPS have earmarked R1,5 million for Rachel operations in 1999.

However, doubts exist as the operation is becoming extremely expensive and common ground is being lost. As a matter of fact, arms smuggling from Mozambique into South Africa are reported to have decreased substantially. The further north the cache is found, the weaker the argument that one can attach weapons recovery to South African security concerns. With this in mind, the prospects that South Africa will remain committed to pay for the operation in the north of Mozambique are slim within the present parameters.

Table 5: Rachel Operations statistics

Category	Rachel I	Rachel II	Rachel II	Rachel IV	Total
Firearms	1 120	475	5 584	4 712	11 891
Pistols	8	13	78	7	106
Anti-personnel mines	96	577	518	5 160	6 351
Landmines	3	4	4	77	88
Hand grenades	407	66	336	451	1 260
Hand grenade detonators		54	153	217	424
Detonators		230	602	58	890
Mortars		292	3 726	2 997	7 015
Launchers	43	59	79	82	263
Projectiles	202	51	2 340	5 545	8 138
Boosters	219	17	83	923	1 242
Cannons	6	5	13	9	33
Ammunition	23 182	136 631	3 000 000	155 494	3 315 307
Magazines	344	577	3 674	1 317	5 912
Other Accessories	1 008	694	301	876	2 879

The Mozambican police are ready to continue this work, provided that financial resources and the technical means are made available. Whether the Mozambican government is in a position to cover the costs of the operation in the near future is doubtful, unless a generous aiding hand is extended. No matter what happens from now on, Operation Rachel has been an unprecedented success, not so much because of the number of weapons that were retrieved, but because it has worked effectively.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Martinho Chachiu

Figures such as 11 891 firearms, 106 pistols, 6 351 anti-personal mines and 3 192 337 rounds of ammunition (see Table 5) represent a success that cannot be underestimated. However, it remains true that these weapons are still a drop in the ocean of the estimated figures of arms existing in the country. What makes Operation Rachel a special case is not the fact that it completely solved the problem for which it was undertaken in the first place. It managed creatively to forge a sound working relationship between two police forces that:

- had never worked together in any meaningful way before;
- regarded each other as enemies;
- had uneven operational capabilities; and
- had an unequal endowment of resources.

Key success factors

The philosophy on which the operation was based, was crucial to its success. The parties understood that, in the post-conflict situation in Mozambique, a proactive policing approach would either not manage to retrieve any weapons in the country or politicise the issue. A proactive policing strategy would only find very reluctant community support, if any at all. With no support, there was nothing the police could do to locate the caches. On the other hand, if any weapons caches could be found, the prosecution of those found in possession of these caches would become a political animal with the

potential of jeopardising the whole reconciliation process. As it stands now, the latter is a prerequisite for any disarmament in Mozambique. It was therefore wisely decided that the operation would be intelligence-driven. In addition, an undeclared plain amnesty would be given to those found with weapons. This was not only a disarmament measure, but also a move towards political reconciliation. Given the levels of poverty, informers and caretakers of arms caches would be rewarded as an incentive and an informal buy-back component was brought in. In short, Rachel was a combination of undeclared amnesty and buy-back programmes. The formula emerging from the combination of these two components was that of disarming the bush with the support of the people living in it. The bush concealed these weapons and people knew where they were. Operations of this kind must therefore clearly be apolitical in nature.

A flexible and ad hoc implementation strategy, aimed at confidence-building was created. Given the converging transitions in the countries, political agreements reached in haste may be misleading, as they may seem to have emerged from a tabula rasa principle applied to the recent history of the region. One needs to understand that, while politicians may have buried recent conflictual relationships, the security apparatuses of the two countries and individual police officers may have retained some resentment. In other words, political agreements too easily reached may be empty of practical content and hence, the attitudes throughout the implementation process will have to be thoroughly measured. The lesson is clear: "... *take it easy, do not get upset with your counterparts. After signing the agreement, let the ground officers determine what needs to be done. Listen to the ground officers' needs and complaints.*" Thus, every step in the implementation process has to be based on the experience of the previous phase. Allowing daily contacts between police officers helps to build a sense of common duty.

Mutual responsiveness and a sense of common interest are sine qua nons. In situations where stereotypes and distrust between police officers abound that can boil over into conflict, certain personal relationships can colour the reports made throughout the exercise. At outset, those involved have to be responsive to their partners' concerns, no matter how trivial the problems may be. By trying to find a mutually satisfying solution, these problems can be sorted out. Replacing police officers whenever a complaint is presented and attempting to find the most suitable officers have been the best strategies of the Rachel operations. These are directly related to a sense of common interest. It has been a permanent feature of the Rachel operation that both the political and operational levels regarded the operation as part of their individual domestic problems. The motives, as well as the results were translated into the security concerns of each country participating in the operation. There was no support relationship. Each of the police forces was doing its own job with the means at its disposal. It is therefore necessary to define the problem in such a way that it clearly shows the concerns of each party. One of the lessons included: "... *never forget that interest is the underlying motive of any political arrangement and make sure to contemplate yours as well as that of your counterpart.*"

Utilising sound evaluation and correction exercises with diplomatic input is an effective formula. Although there are no reports specifically evaluating individual Rachel operations, it is obvious that a very thorough evaluation took place after each operation. These evaluations were not once-off activities. They took place throughout the year that, on average, separated one operation from the next. During this process, problems were solved in a highly diplomatic manner based on well-founded discretion. Talking to police officers from both sides, one gets the impression that there were no problems. This

attitude has allowed a common discourse to develop over the course of the operation. The common preferred terms were success, success and success. This unified and positive approach kept hopes high even when success was not that obvious. Given the lengthy periods between operations, *ad hoc* contacts to solve current problems were put in place. This was possible because permanent contact channels were open. This arrangement also bought time for thorough planning. The lesson is clearly: "... *dramatise the results but not the problems.*"

All stakeholders have to be identified. The politically motivated hypothesis that the bush has weapons and that people just know the places where they are kept, is necessary to maintain sound relationships with the local population. The success of any operation is in its ability to understand the environment in which it takes place. Every factor had to be equated. The Rachel operations correctly managed to identify local communities as some of the most important stakeholders. It is therefore important to monitor their changing needs throughout the exercise and, where possible, provide timely responses to their needs. At the beginning, the involvement of local communities was to be encouraged through small rewards to informers. When women and children became increasingly important, sweets and other incentives were introduced. Though the team had neither the mandate nor the resources, it noted that these communities need development initiatives and the police therefore also became educators of local communities.

The future?

As to the future of Operation Rachel, a problem which emerges if such an operation is seen as mandated by national security concerns alone, is that it cannot continue indefinitely: it becomes the hostage of its own success. When success is achieved, the common ground that seems to be the prerequisite for the operation's success, will progressively close down.

It is almost certain that, when the common concerns have been completely addressed, the operation will have to come to an end. Although the interest of South Africa is that of a Mozambique without arms caches at the level of political discourse, it will be difficult for SAPS to spend scarce resources in practice to track down weapons in the north of Mozambique. This will specifically be the case if SAPS finds it difficult to establish a direct link between remote arms caches in Mozambique and current security problems in South Africa. For Mozambique, it is time to mobilise resources to disarm its bush further north of the Zambeze River.

This dynamic points the way to two scenarios:

- The Operation Rachel chapter can be successfully closed down and each country proceed in their own course.
- Operation Rachel can be elevated to a first step towards a regional plan of action where member states of a subgroup promote their regional concerns over national ones.

It is here where the positive coincidence emerges: as the bilateral Operation Rachel reaches its culmination and cannot be further justified under national interests alone, it now meets with the emergence of serious regional initiatives that have prioritised the management and reduction of small arms proliferation in Southern Africa. This emerging

trend comes hopefully in time to permit Operation Rachel to restructure itself under regional imperatives over and above national interests. Therefore, Operation Rachel could become a bridge between the national and the regional. This opportunity should not be lost.

Endnotes

1. R Cornwell & J Potgieter, *Private militias and arms proliferation in Southern Africa*, Paper presented at the International Conference on Southern African Security, Centro de Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais, Maputo, 19-20 November 1998, p. 7.
2. T Nkiwane, *Small arms flows in Zimbabwe*, in T Nkiwane, M Chachia & S Meek, *Weapons flows in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland*, ISS Monograph, 35, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, January 1999, p. 6.
3. Nkiwane reported a decrease in reported unlawful possession of weapons since 1992. See *ibid.*, table 2, p. 8.
4. S Meek, *Illegal weapons proliferation in Swaziland*, in Nkiwane et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 66-73.
5. Cornwell & Potgieter, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
6. G Oosthuysen, *Small arms proliferation and control in Southern Africa*, Southern African Series, South African Institute of International Affairs, Braamfontein, 1996, p. 51.
7. Frelimo co-operation with ZANU was contrasted with the CIO's role in moulding the Mozambican rebel movement Renamo; the antithesis to the close relationship between the ANC and Frelimo was the role of the SADF's arms supply to Renamo; South African direct and indirect (through arms supply to Unita) intervention in Angola was part of its fight against both Swapo and the ANC whose cadres were accommodated by the MPLA government; and so on.
8. Nkiwane, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
9. Cornwell & Potgieter, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Meek, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
12. Irrespective whether he was framed, as he has insistently claimed, or not, the hard fact is that this case clearly indicates that former covert arms supplies networks involving liberation/rebel movements and former SADF officers are still in place, serving both the commercial and criminal goals of individuals.

13. Also, the lack of effective policing and law enforcement capabilities in most Southern African countries has generated a genuine proliferation of private security companies in a bid to 'privatise security' in the African context. These companies are also responsible for the movement of weapons, since they rely on these instruments for their work and operations. At the same time, some of these companies have been known to buy and sell illegal weapons, and to move them covertly across borders. This is also an important consideration in understanding the movement of weapons and the demand side of the market.
14. It is important to note that international criminal organisations consider guns as vehicles necessary for their sustenance and survival. They are not an end in themselves, but an important adjunct to their operations. This was not always so. In the 1970s, for example, there was a strong connection between guns as the focus of interest and drugs as the vehicle to buy guns. Today, that connection has reverted with guns occupying the adjunct position. It thus follows that a passport to the criminal community today is a gun and not a commodity. Likewise, the needs of international relief organisations in the field is no longer a safe, albeit temporary, environment in which to operate with efficiency. Since the operation in the former Yugoslavia, when cease-fires were not a sine qua non for the beginning of a peace process, international relief operators have constantly been jeopardised by the inability to provide for their own security, never mind that of the recipients of their relief. From the anarchy of snipers in Sarajevo to the banditry of armed groups on the road from Luanda to Benguela; from the inability to access Eastern Zaire or Albania to the difficulty in inspecting camps of repatriates in Rwanda and Burundi, international relief organisations are increasingly hostage to a man with a gun, than ever before in the history of their operations. At times, they themselves have had to hire men with guns for the protection of their mission — the same men who would rob them at night, protected them by day, as was the case in Somalia. At other times, they have assisted villages in demining efforts only to see the villagers re-mine the village - as happened in Mozambique— to ensure the permanence of the assistance.
15. J Cock, *The link between security and development: The problem of light weapons proliferation in Southern Africa*, African Security Review, 5(5), 1996, pp. 4-22.
16. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between politics and crime in South Africa, see M Shaw, *South Africa: Crime in transition*, ISS Paper, 17, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, March 1997.
17. During this period, political violence was reported to be steered by the so-called 'third force'.
18. Cock, op. cit., p. 7.
19. Nedcor/ISS, Crime Index, 2(3), 1998, pp. 1-5.
20. Oosthuysen, op. cit., p. 11.
21. Cock, op. cit., p. 7.
22. Gun Free South Africa, *Stopping gun violence in South Africa*,

23. Oosthuysen, op. cit., p. 22.
24. See MChachiua, *The status of arms flows in Mozambique*, in Nkiwane et al., op. cit., pp. 27-31.
25. For the discussion on the ONUMOZ failure to disarm Mozambique, see among others E Berman, *Managing arms in peace processes: Mozambique*, UNIDIR, New York and Geneva, 1996; Chachiua, op. cit.; A Vines, *Light weapons transfers, human rights violations and armed banditry in Southern Africa*, paper prepared for Light weapons Proliferation and Opportunities for Control, International Workshop, British American Security Information Council Project on Light Weapons, London, 30 June - 2 July 1996; A Vines *The struggle continues: Light weapons destruction in Mozambique*, Basic Papers on International Security Issues, 25, April 1998; and Oosthuysen, op. cit.
26. Vines, 1998, *ibid.*, p. 1.
27. Study conducted by Refugee Study Programme cited by Vines, *ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
29. For Mozambican arms related crimes, see Chachiua, op. cit.; Vines, 1996, op. cit., p. 10.
30. Meek points to the fact that old arms pipelines are still being used by smugglers. See Meek, op. cit., pp. 52-58.
31. According to the Electronic Mail & Guardian, Safety and Security Minister Sydney Mufamadi approved a regulation aimed at preventing gangsters from borrowing licensed firearms. See Electronic Mail & Guardian, www.mg.co.za/mg/za/news.html, 21 August 1998; see also V Gamba, *Regional efforts to control light weapons proliferation in Southern Africa: An overview*, Academy-Carnegie Book on Light Weapons, draft, May 1998, pp. 3-8.
32. P Batchelor, *Intra-state conflict, political violence and small arms proliferation in Africa*, in V Gamba (ed.), *Society under siege: Crime, violence and illegal weapons*, TCP Series, 1, Institute for Security Studies, Halfway House, 1997, p. 109.
33. Vines reported that, as far back as 1995, Manuel Antonio, then Minister of Interior, recognised small arms proliferation as a major government problem; see Vines, 1996, op. cit., p. 10.
34. Antonio Namburete, Mozambican Attorney General speaking in a Pretoria Crime conference, Quoted in Africa Research Bulletin, 35(9), 9 September 1998, p. 13245.
35. See Vines, 1998, op. cit., p. 6.
36. Oosthuysen, op. cit., p. 65.

37. **B Latham, *Mozambique: Illegal weapons trade threatens security*, Africa Information Afrique, <www.AIAZIM@mango.zw>, 6 March 1995.**
38. **Ibid.**
39. **For a discussion on how arms are found in Mozambique, see Chachiua, op. cit.**
40. **A Bule and J J Monguela, Interviews, Mozambican police officers, Maputo, January 1999.**
41. **Shaw, op. cit., p. 1.**
42. **This is an estimate of the cost of crime to South African economy; see Vines, 1998, op. cit., p. 9.**
43. **Estimates given by a Maputo hospital caregiver indicated that, in 1996, two bullet-related casualties were reported every day. See ISS, TCP Survey, type One, 96-Moz-06, 1996.**
44. **Preamble, Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and the Government of South Africa In respect of Co-operation and Mutual Assistance in the field of crime Combating.**
45. **Ibid.**
46. **Interview, Pretoria, October 1998.**
47. **M Bester cited by Reuters News Service, 19 June 1995.**
48. **South African Police Service officials have consistently argued that the aim of Operation Rachel, as far as SAPS is concerned, was a preventive measure of tracking down and destroying weapons in Mozambique before they are smuggled into South Africa. Certainly, this justifies why the operation has consistently concentrated on the southern part of Mozambique and most particularly around the border districts.**
49. **Naude, Interview, Pretoria, October 1998.**
50. **Chachiua provides a detailed discussion on the motives behind the arms caches; see Chachiua, op. cit.**
51. **Interview, January 1999.**
52. **Naude, op. cit.**
53. **W Grove, quoted by the BBC Monitoring Service: Africa, 27 June 1995.**
54. **This is an approximation of the value of 30 000 000 Meticaais at an average exchange rate of 2 000.00Mt/R1.**
55. **National Crime Investigation Service chief W Grove quoted by Reuters News**

Service, Johannesburg, 29 June 1995

56. E Simbine, *Perto de 12 mil armas Recolhidas de Esconderijos*, Noticias, 15 de Setembro de 1997.
57. SAPS quoted by Reuters News Service, 30 June 1995
58. W Grove, quoted by Reuters News Service, 6 September 1995.
59. Vines, 1998, op. cit., p. 11.
60. Bule & Monguela, op. cit.
61. Naude, Interview, Pretoria, January 1999.
62. President Chissano met Dhlakama to discuss arms proliferation in the country. Their joint initiative aborted shortly because Dhlakama wanted a joint team to investigate which Chissano found unacceptable; see Vines, 1996, op. cit., p. 8.
63. H Abrahamsson & A Nilsson, *The Washington Consensus e Moçambique*, Padrigu Papers, Gothenburg University, 1995, p. 11.
64. Criminals may have taken advantage of this situation by removing these weapons. Vines report that mine clearance companies found that unknown individuals removed uncovered weapons before destruction; see Vines, 1998, op. cit.
65. Two Media Fax editorials for its issues of 2 and 3 June question declarations made by a Frelimo senior member suggesting that there was a force ready to be used if this was necessary. See also AWEPA, *Boletim Sobre o Processo de Paz em Moçambique Número 18 - Junho de 1997*, www.mozambique.mz/awepa/awepa18/oprocess.htm.
66. Raul Freia, cited by Simbine, op. cit., p. 1.
67. Sydney Mufamadi, Minister for Safety and Security quoted by BBC Monitoring Service, 12 June 1997.
68. Naude, Interview, Pretoria 1999.
69. Interview, Pretoria, October 1998.
70. A Belinda, SAF/Mozambique, <gopher.voa.gov:70/00/newswire/tue/SAF-MOZAMBIQUE>, as at 12 August 1998.
71. J J Monguela, Interview, Maputo, January 1999.
72. S Britz quoted in *Police net tons of hidden arms caches in special operation*, The Star, 3 November 1998, p. 1.
73. Monguela was in the team which started from the north, hence he could not be in Mapai at the time when the other group was supposed to excavate the caches there.

74. Almerino Manhenje cited by Mozambique News Agency, Telinforma (English), 1761, 7 January 1999.

Appendix: Agreement between the government of the Republic of Mozambique and the government of the Republic of South Africa

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN RESPECT OF CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FIELD OF CRIME COMBATING PREAMBLE

WHEREAS the President of the Republic of South of South Africa and the President of the Republic of Mozambique have entered into a general agreement for co-operation between the two Governments.

AND WHEREAS the supremacy of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each state and the upholding of their laws are recognised;

AND WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Mozambique (hereinafter referred to as "The Parties") acknowledge the cordial relations which exist between them and their peoples;

AND WHEREAS the President of the Republic of South Africa and the President of the Republic of Mozambique are to sign the agreement of co-operation and mutual assistance in terms of their respective laws;

AND WHEREAS the Parties are mutually desirous of concluding such an agreement in order to contribute towards peace, stability, security, prosperity and the combating of crime,

NOW THEREFORE, the Parties hereby agree as follows -

ARTICLE 1

INTERPRETATION

1.1 In this Agreement, unless the context otherwise indicates -

(a) "extra-territorial area" in relation to -

(i) (aa) the Republic of South Africa, means the territory of the

Republic of Mozambique, including the territorial waters of that Republic;

(bb) the Republic of Mozambique, means the territory of South Africa, including the territorial waters of that Republic;

(ii) any police official of any such Police Force/Service, means the territorial area including the territorial waters in which the other such Police Service has jurisdiction;

(b) "hosting State", hosting Police Force/Service" of "hosting police official", in relation to any act or conduct, or any other matter, means the State, Police Service or official, as the case may be, in the territory of which such act or conduct takes place, or such matter is relevant or to be attended to, or which or who may legitimately, without reference to this Agreement, operate in connection with any such act, conduct or matter in such territory, as the case may be;

(c) "Ministers" mean the Minister of Safety and Security of the Republic of South Africa and the Minister of Interior or the Republic of Mozambique;

(d) "Mozambique means the Republic of Mozambique;

(e) "Party" includes an acceding Party contemplated in Article 11;

(f) "Police official", in relation to any Party or its Police Service, means an official who is a member of the Police Service of such Party, or of such Police Service, as the case may be;

(g) "South Africa" means the Republic of South Africa.

ARTICLE 2

LEGAL PROVISIONS

2.1 This agreement shall in no way be construed as derogating from any provision of —

(a) the laws of the respective Parties regarding extradition;

(b) any Extradition Agreement which is in force or may be entered into between the Parties; and

(c) the Co-operation Agreement entered into between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Mozambique on 20 July 1994.

ARTICLE 3

RIGHT OF ENTRY OF POLICE OFFICIALS

3.1 In the circumstances set out in Article 4, and subject to the conditions set out in Article 5, any police official shall, for the purposes set out in this Agreement, be allowed to enter into, and to be present in, or to travel through or across an extra-territorial area whenever necessary, provided that such right shall at no time be exercised in conflict with the laws of the relevant extra-territorial area.

3.2 The Ministers shall consult with each other and advise their respective Governments as to the legislative or administrative steps that may be necessary for the implementation of the provisions of this Agreement and to remove any legal obstacles or impediments that may be found to exist in the execution of the provisions of this Agreement.

3.3 The Ministers shall advise their respective Governments as to any other action which may be necessary to ensure that the performance of police functions by any police official in an extra-territorial area, is lawful in every respect.

3.4 Any entry by a police official into an extra-territorial area in terms of this Agreement will be subject to any applicable law pertaining to any such entry.

ARTICLE 4

CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH RIGHT OF ENTRY MAY BE EXERCISED

4. The entry of any police official into an extra-territorial area may be allowed -

(a) where such entry is necessary for the purpose of any police investigation or for the seizure of exhibits relating to an offence or suspected offence committed in or in respect of the territorial area or State of such police official;

(b) for the purpose of tracing and interrogating a witness in connection with any such offence, and taking the steps authorised by law to obtain his present in a court of competent jurisdiction; and

(c) for the purpose of the co-operation and assistance contemplated in this Agreement.

4.2 Officials of the hosting Police Force/Service will be responsible

(a) for the tracing, arresting, detaining, guarding or keeping in custody of any person suspected of having committed any relevant offence and to take such steps as he or she is authorised to by law in order to effect his or her extradition for trial in a court of competent jurisdiction;

(b) for the purpose of searching for, and seizing, removing or transporting of any exhibit known or suspected to be involved in the commission of such offence; and

(c) for such other acts as may from time to time in any urgent or extra-ordinary circumstances be authorised by the Ministers or, with their prior approval, by the responsible officials of the Police Service concerned.

ARTICLE 5

CONDITIONS FOR EXERCISE OF RIGHT OF ENTRY

5.1 Entry referred to in Article 3 shall be exercised subject to the following conditions -

(a) A police official who intends to enter the extra-territorial area shall prior to crossing the relevant international border, obtain the approval of —

- (i) in the case of such official being a member of the South African Police Service, the officer or officers which the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service may from time to time designate in writing for this purpose;**
- (ii) in the case of such an official being a member of the Mozambican Police Service, the officer or officers which the General Commander of the Mozambican Police Service may from time to time designate in writing for this purpose;**
- (b) The National Commissioner of the South African Police Service and the General Commander of the Mozambican Police Service agree to inform each other of the particulars of the officers referred to in sub-article 5.1 (a)(I) and (ii)**
- (c) upon receipt of such a request, the officers referred to in sub-paragraphs (I) and (ii) above, shall immediately forward the request to his counterpart who will in turn make the necessary arrangements for such an entry and the assistance to be afforded;**
- (d) the responsible officer of the hosting Police Service shall without delay convey the nature of the arrangements to his counterpart;**
- (e) no official entry and/or request for assistance will be granted otherwise than in accordance with the terms of this agreement;**
- (f) under no circumstances will the visiting police official have right to act on his or her own, but will at all times be accompanied by a member of the hosting Police Service and all actions to be taken will be done by the hosting police official concerned; and**
- (g) the provisions of paragraph (e) shall not prevent the visiting police official from accompanying the hosting police official during the carrying out of his duties in terms of the provisions of this Agreement.**

5.2 The provisions of sub-article 5.1 shall not apply where a police official intends to enter an extra-territorial area merely for the purpose of travelling through or crossing the border of the extra-territorial area in his private capacity.

5.3 The visiting police official shall during his presence in his official capacity in or on an extra-territorial area, at all times conduct his activities in consultation with the hosting police official.

5.4 Any police official who has entered an extra-territorial area and who acts in a manner contrary to any provision of this Agreement, or who otherwise misconduct himself, shall immediately be reported to the police official under whose auspices the visit was arranged, who shall, in consultation with his counterpart in the hosting State, take such steps as may in their opinion be necessary to remedy the breach or as may otherwise be required by the law.

5.5 Whenever it is deemed necessary to extradite a person from the hosting State, the extradition proceedings will be effected strictly in accordance with the applicable laws and in terms of any extradition agreement which may be in force between the Parties at the time of carrying out of such proceedings.

ARTICLE 6

SPECIFIC AREAS OF CO-OPERATION

6.1 Recognising the high incidence of organised crime and the need for close-operation in addressing the problem, the Parties shall provide for :

(a) the exchange of crime related information on a regular basis;

(b) the planning, co-ordination and execution of joint operations including covert operations;

(c) technical assistance and expertise where the same is required for the purposes of criminal investigations :

Provided that the provisions of sub-articles 4.2, 5.3 and 5.4 shall mutatis mutandis apply to a police official whilst present in an extra-territorial area in pursuance of the provisions of this Article.

6.2 Recognising the need for stolen property to be returned to its legal owner the Parties shall with due regard to their respective laws relating to the disposal of such property, do their utmost to obtain this objective. In this regard the relevant Police Force/Service undertakes to make such possible arrangements as may be necessary to enable a complainant to identify his or her property and to advise as to what steps need to be taken to procure its return.

ARTICLE 7

OTHER MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN

7.1 Where either of the Police Force/Service of the Parties request assistance or logistical support in connection with execution of their functions from the other, such assistance and support shall be rendered when and whenever it is reasonably practical and possible and, furthermore, subject to the conditions set out in Article 9.

7.2 The Police Force/Service of either of the Parties shall, if so requested in writing, render all reasonable advice, support or assistance to the requesting Force/Service in relation to the training of its officials, the improvement or development of its organisation or administration or the promotion of its expertise with regard to the performance of police functions.

ARTICLE 8

LIABILITY

8.1 In the event of any legal proceedings being instituted in connection with the actions of the police official in accordance with this Agreement, each of the Parties shall be liable for the actions of its own police officials and in this regard the Parties hereby indemnify each other against liability of whatsoever nature.

8.2 In the event of any loss or damages sustained by the Police Force/Service of a Party or any police official acting in accordance with this Agreement, such loss or damages will be borne by the Police Force/Service or the Police Force/Service of which such official is a member, as the case may be.

ARTICLE 9

EXPENDITURE

9.1 Any expenses incurred in terms of a provision of this Agreement by either of the Parties at the request of the other party shall be at the expense of the requesting Party. The requesting Party shall upon receipt of proof of expenditure incurred by the other Party, reimburse that Party with such expenditure.

9.2 The provisions of sub-article 9.1 shall not apply where, in any particular case, the Ministers have in writing agreed otherwise.

ARTICLE 10

AMENDMENT AND ADDITIONS

10.1 Any amendment or addition to this Agreement shall only be of force and effect if agreed to in writing and signed by both Parties.

ARTICLE 11

OTHER SIGNATORIES

11.1 By mutual consent the Government of any other State may be invited to become, by means of the representation of its responsible Minister, a signatory to this Agreement in which event such signatory State will become a full Party to this Agreement.

11.2 In such an event any amendment or addition to this Agreement shall be effected in accordance with the provisions of Article 10.

ARTICLE 12

ENTERING INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force until terminated by either Party through diplomatic channels by notice in writing of not less than 6 months.

In witness whereof this Agreement was signed and sealed in four originals, two in English and two in Portuguese, both versions being equally authentic.

THUS DONE aton this day of 19

**NELSON ROLINHLANHLA MANDELA PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA**

**JOAQUIM ALBERTO CHISSANO
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF MOZAMBIQUE
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE**