FRANCO-SOUTH AFRICAN DIALOGUE

SUSTAINABLE SECURITY IN AFRICA

Compiled by Diane Philander

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Executive Summary

Franco-South African dialogue: Sustainable security in Africa presents the proceedings of a seminar on *Security in Africa: French and South African perspectives,* jointly organised and hosted by the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), the *Institut Français d'Afrique du Sud* (IFAS) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) on 18-19 April 2000 in Pretoria.

In his *Opening address,* Ambassador Tristan d'Albis emphasised the changing nature of international relations between countries, especially the changes evident in French involvement on the African continent. He underscored the importance of seminars such as this as examples of modern diplomacy. They are as much part of a strategic dialogue as the consultations of official structures. The deputy director-general of Defence, Mr WAWNhlapo, focused on the following points as essential ingredients in security partnership with Africa:

- It should be African-driven with non-African co-operation/assistance tailored to African needs and programmes.

- Training must comply with UN standards, but complement the continent's needs and circumstances.

- African capacity-building must enhance logistic and training capabilities to ensure that the continent become less dependent on foreign assistance.

In *The South African national identity and its key postulates,* Rocky Williams looks at the emerging national identity in the country and its implications for defence on a national, regional and international level. This identity rests essentially on:

- respect for democracy and the promotion of human rights;

- recognition of a common African-ness and the affirming of African potential;

- recognition and protection of cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity within the framework of a national constitution;

- a normative commitment to justice, reason and tolerance towards others; and

- a commitment to the constructive management of conflicts within South Africa and elsewhere.

The theoretical basis underlying security and development issues receives thorough attention in *Theoretical approaches to security and development* (Dr Lisa Thompson). She considers challenges to human security approaches in the analysis of the political economy of the Southern African region and point to tensions between theory derived from 'new security' and 'critical human security' studies. Her contribution is enhanced by an examination of *French political culture and African policy: From consensus to dissensus* (Prof Daniel Bourmaud). Prof Bourmaud traces the changes in French political attitude from a focus on Gaullist consensus, to what he calls 'dissensus', and points to the resulting changes in French policy towards involvement in Africa.

In the contribution on *Human security, governance and development in Africa* (Prof Maxi Schoeman), it is pointed out that the linkages between these issues should receive the attention of national, regional and international players. The central focus of good governance in human security, as well as in peacebuilding processes, is emphasised in the light of the crucial question: *Who benefits*? Adding a French economic perspective to this focus, *Lasting security and development in Africa* (Prof Philippe Hugon) considers the economic consequences of war and conflict, especially in terms of the insecurity of people and their possessions, as well as on economic growth. Food insecurity is used as a case study to highlight the plight of millions of people in Africa.

The practical lessons from several experiences with conflict, intervention, resolution and peacebuilding in Africa are presented in the contributions on *Lesotho: Lessons and challenges after a SADC intervention, 1998* (Sehoai Santho); *Peace promotion in the Great Lakes region: Regional and international responses to conflict in the DRC* (Mark Malan); and *The security imperatives of the crisis in West Africa: Preliminary thoughts* (Dr Abubakar Momoh)

Turning the focus on potential solutions to the intractable conflicts on the continent, in *Wanted — capacity to intervene: The evolution of conflict prevention and resolution in Africa* (Anthoni van Nieuwkerk), the author presents a concise summary of global developments in conflict

prevention and resolution measures. He calls for the introduction of 'peace maintenance' as an essential part of the resolution process. This reflective consideration is aptly offset by *Efforts at conflict prevention and resolution: The French experience* (Rear-Admiral Hervé Giraud), that presents the practical experiences of French military involvement in attempts to build a professional capacity for peace in Africa.

* The seminar drew a variety of delegates ranging from defence experts, academics, practitioners and other stakeholders. The organisers wish to thank them for their valuable contributions to the proceedings.

Chapter 1
Opening address
Ambassador Tristan d'Albis

I would like to thank the organisers of this Franco-South African encounter — the Institute of Global Dialogue, the Institute for Security Studies and the French Institute of South Africa. It is the fourth meeting of this kind, dedicated to Africa, following those in Pretoria (1993) and in Johannesburg and Paris (1998). Eminent speakers from South Africa, other countries on the African continent and France who will share their thoughts and participate in the debate, are thanked for their contributions.

France's presence in Africa, in spite of the accelerated modernisation of our policy, is unfortunately still sometimes seen in South Africa as a relic of the past. However, as I see it, it is precisely the emergence of a continent that is more independent and a master of its own destiny (*Africa fara da se*) that necessitates an increase in the number of its links with the exterior, and thus a form of partnership with the international players involved in Africa. Because of the grave conflicts that are about to be discussed, the risk is not one of so-called neo-colonial domination, but rather, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, one of marginalisation of the continent. It must not be forgotten that Africa, which was virtually absent from the preoccupations of the United Nations Security Council for a while, today accounts for two-thirds of the problems it is faced with. It therefore has a need for friends and for means. In this context, it is believed that South Africa and France, two of the real friends of Africa, have some things to say. The resolution of the crisis in the Great Lakes region, through the Lusaka agreements and with the strong involvement of the UN with a significant peacekeeping force, for example, became a major African and international issue that has engaged the attention of the Organisation of African Unity and the UN Security Council. The facilitation of the national Congolese dialogue by former President Masire will have to be supported by the international community and should include a French-African component for a better chance of success. The facilitation by Nelson Mandela in Burundi must also be recalled, as well as the situation in Angola, among other specific problems.

President Mbeki declared on radio RFI in 1998, before the visit of the French president to South Africa, that "France and the RSA must avoid shooting each other in the leg in Africa." With this in mind, the search can progress for the means to understand each other better, without excluding the possibility of sometimes acting together in a pragmatic way. France would prefer a more in-depth political and strategic dialogue with Pretoria; the country is a close partner with interests in Africa and very strong links to it, and an advocate of mobilising the European Union in favour of the continent.

A seminar such as this is a good example of modern diplomacy: it forms part of a honest

strategic dialogue, open and informal, that is as important as the consultations at the core of official structures that have been set up since 1994 within the bilateral framework (a forum for political dialogue in 1997, and a joint commission for defence in 1998). It is hoped that new ideas and an enhanced understanding will emerge from these deliberations around the question of the required resolution of armed conflicts by Africans themselves, in close co-operation with the international community.

Chapter 2
Opening remarks
WAW Nhlapo

I am honoured to have been invited to make some remarks at the opening of this important event and thank you for the opportunity to share some views.

It is appropriate that France and South Africa discuss Africa. After all, the two countries share a long history of involvement on the continent and should never forget that France's engagement in South Africa resulted, in the 17th century, from security considerations when the Huguenots had to find refuge from religious intolerance.

At the time, what is known today as South Africa was called the Cape of Good Hope. Today, the country's 'Rainbow Nation' has managed to tackle its own security concerns, hopefully with imagination and much hope for the future, a nation committed to the security of the region and the entire continent.

The timing of this symposium is excellent. It is indeed time to take stock of where Africa is after the turbulent, but liberating events of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War.

However, it is necessary to start off by asking: *Who* is Africa after the Cold War? It is therefore heartening to see that these deliberations start with a conceptual approach to the security problems of Africa. For too long, the problems of the patient were analysed without putting both the problems and the patient into the full context of history, anthropology, economics, social dynamics, psychology and philosophy, all elements that form part of a particular identity. For too long, Africa has been treated as the 'patient' and the rest of the world as the 'doctor'. It is an empirical fact that the contexts of *both* the doctor and the patient have a bearing on the treatment of any ailment.

Hence, unpacking the contexts from which South Africa and France approach Africa can only be a very useful exercise. If you will allow me the liberty of prophecy, I predict that the conclusions will recognise that the striving for equality and fraternity is embedded in the psyches of *both* countries. This alone is a solid foundation from which to depart on this journey.

The notion of human security, governance and development is closely connected with the first topic. These elements, it can be argued, are merely the visible manifestations of any nation's psyche. It would thus be prudent to analyse the link between human security, governance and development, on the one hand, and nationbuilding, on the other. It is well-known that states with no inherent sense of identity find it most difficult to entrench the values of good governance.

Our European brothers and sisters may be reminded that European nations had the 'luxury' of the Middle Ages to forge their national identities. Most often it was accompanied by what would today be regarded as something very close to genocide. The phenomenon of civil war after

liberation is also not unfamiliar to the West. France and the United States are but two examples. Yet, in Africa, we have had to engage in building nations across artificially determined borders, in the absence of common values, amidst a myriad of roleplayers, and in the glare of international media exposure like that of CNN, among others.

The focus on regional and international security arrangements should lead to a lively debate. This seminar will hopefully bring participants closer to an understanding of the complexity of the security arrangements in this part of the world. Let us not forget that Europe has developed its collective security system *after* it had built its nations into coherent wholes. In Africa, this has to be achieved *while* still being busy with nationbuilding and statebuilding. at the same time, it is expected, and strongly desired, that this will occur non-violently, which, I may add, has rarely happened anywhere else.

The discussion of approaches to conflict prevention and resolution appears to focus on specific areas of co-operation and on particular initiatives. In general, the South African government would prefer that initiatives are not undertaken in a piecemeal fashion and that they recognise all the aspects mentioned earlier. When talking about Africa's responsibilities, cognisance should be taken of the continent's capacity. The South African position on capacity-building is that it should be real, and not virtual. The *Guidelines for capacity-building for peacekeeping* dictate that Africa's capabilities should be enhanced in the following manner:

- It should be an African-driven process with non-African co-operation/assistance where appropriate and should be tailored to African needs and programmes.

- All training should be conducted according to UN standards, but also complemented by African needs and circumstances.

- African capacity-building should include the enhancement of African logistic and training capabilities and should become progressively less dependent on foreign assistance in this regard.

- The teaching of more than one of the OAU official languages should be enhanced to improve communication among members of peace missions.

These guidelines should also apply to initiatives that aim to build capacity in other areas within the conflict prevention and management spectrum.

Various initiatives have seen the light recently, which may stand a better chance of success because they are African in origin, but are also informed by international experience. Among these, the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (the CSSDCA) should be highlighted. This process, initiated by President Obasanjo of Nigeria, provides an holistic approach to conflict prevention and development. This initiative must be considered seriously. South Africa is totally committed to the process, because it will strengthen not only political co-ordination and co-operation in this field, but also draw in the wisdom to be found in civil society.

I trust that these deliberations will leave you with a greater understanding of Africa's challenges. But, I hope that you do not keep your newly found insights to yourselves. Ultimately, the plight of the poor and the destitute, the anguish of refugees and child soldiers and the bewilderment of the illiterate and ignorant, should haunt us day and night until we find ways in which to give them hope, equality and a new belief in the brotherhood of Man.

Only then will we be truthful to our vision of the African Renaissance.

* Deputy Director-General, Department of Defence, South Africa

Chapter 3
The south african national identity and its key postulates
Dr (Col) Rocky Williams

Introduction

Few countries in the international arena, or at least the governments that represent these sovereign entities, act in a totally spontaneous manner when making certain key strategic decisions. Most decisions made by governments, groups and individuals are based, to an extent, on certain strategic, conceptual and cultural assumptions (of varying degrees of clarity). To speak, therefore, of a South African national identity — an identity based on a series of interconnected philosophical and conceptual approaches towards the world — is to beg a series of interrelated questions which require 'unpacking' if any semblance of meaning is to be bestowed on the concept of a 'South African national identity':

- It assumes that there is a coherent national identity upon which these conceptual and strategic assumptions are based.

- It assumes that there is an integrated and overarching philosophical framework that can be truly defined as being a uniquely South African approach to the world.

- It assumes that it is possible to identify the different conceptual and strategic elements or themes which constitute this national world view.

- Perhaps most importantly, the positing of a national identity often assumes that such a national identity has indeed emerged from 'something'. One approach argues that national identity is pre-given, rooted in the mythical (often mystical) and preternatural mists of the past. This religious sense of identity assumes that identity is preordained, predetermined and (often) fatalistic. A second approach sees identity, as such, and all its related constructs as products of the teleological unfolding of the greater Hegelian absolute over which the human agency has little influence. The freedom to shape one's identity in this sense (whether individual or national) is simply to recognise the parameters of necessity. A more realistic approach, and one that is more consistent with the realities of history, is that identities are constructed, are continually changing, and are moulded by a continually changing matrix of historical, cultural and social factors.

These issues are by no means straightforward and require considerable debate before a national consensus on this national identity and the conceptual assumptions which do, or should underpin it is fully elaborated. It is argued in this paper, however, that while it is not possible to identify an holistic and integrated South African national identity (as yet), strong themes do exist which have historically pervaded South African political and intellectual discourse and which can be regarded as constituting the essential elements of a South African national identity. These are to be found in two main quarters. Firstly, they are present within the historical traditions and conflicts from which the present South Africa has emerged, and which

have shaped much of South Africa's current national political identity. Secondly, they are also to be found within existing government policy — most of which has been based on a wide-ranging consultative process which has included a wide spectrum of stakeholders from, among others, government, political society and civil society.

The historical basis of a South African national identity

South Africa does not possess, at this stage of its development at least, the integrated and coherent world view that France has managed to develop over the past two centuries. Neither does it possess the foreign policy cohesion and practice that France has been able to develop in Africa over the past four decades. This is not surprising and is a product of both South Africa's divided past and its ongoing endeavours to construct a post-apartheid foreign policy. For this reason alone it is erroneous for European, and sometimes even African analysts to portray South Africa as either an Anglo-Saxon country or a Western country in terms of its philosophical and conceptual contours.

To determine the emerging nature of the South African national identity also requires the recognition that this national identity cannot be simplistically derived from the expressed policies of its democratically elected government (although this is an important arena within which aspects of the South African national identity are constructed). Elements of an emerging national world view are to be found in informal quarters, in seemingly obscure cultural nooks and crannies, and in many of the myths that South Africans have constructed about themselves in the past and are currently creating. Chuter's words are apt in this regard:

> "Very often these public attitudes are uniformed, but they may be powerfully supported by the media and elsewhere, and they make up a significant part of the unspoken assumptions that experts themselves bring to their work ... there is, beyond the strategy elaborated by experts, an unofficial meta-strategy elaborated by non-experts; a complex of ideas, memories and associations that sets boundaries within which a government can work."[1]

Chuter provides further insight when he refers to the historical and cultural premises on which this national identity is often based. Although Chuter's observation refers to the construction of a national identity in France, his comments are applicable to any country attempting to define its national identity in historical, cultural and temporal terms:

> "It must be sought in pieces, and not learned in journals and policy statements, but in schoolbooks, popular histories, the media, incidental statements by politicians, inscriptions on monuments and a dozen other places where the French are talking informally to themselves, often in shorthand with nuances left out."[2]

Many of the common themes which pervade contemporary South African political discourse, for example, derive from the influence which modernism has exerted on both South African political and intellectual life. The influence of both Enlightenment principles and the concepts of modernity on South African political and intellectual life is strong. The constitutions of the Boer republics in the 19th century were strongly influenced by and modelled on European values and constitutions. The influence of Enlightenment thinking is strongly evident in the writings and activities of prominent 19th century South African liberal activists — Olive Schreiner and J X Merriman, for example — and is partially evident in certain political traditions — the so-called 'Cape Liberal tradition' and the narratives of the early African National Congress, for instance.

This influence, in both political and economic terms, was even more marked during the 20th century. In the economic domain, the advent of industrialisation, the increase in urbanisation and the emergence of the first elements of a modern state, brought millions of South Africans into the heart and onto the periphery of global modernity:

> "Urbanization had a homogenizing effect on the whole society and expanded the area of shared values among Africans, Coloureds, Indians and Whites. The Black leadership that grew within these circumstances accepted the modern world because they recognized its liberatory potential for opening up new vistas for themselves and their people. They were modernists."[3]

This was manifest in political terms in both the positive and the pejorative sense. In the positive sense, the language of resistance, largely dominated by the traditions of the ANC alliance, were markedly modernist in ethos. Nowhere is this more vividly demonstrated than in the values of the *Freedom Charter* — a document which reads like a compendium of 19th and early 20th century modernist values. More recently, the political discourse of the South African transition has been strongly influenced by classic modernist meta-narratives — rationality, humanism and a belief in the global emancipation of humankind, for example. This is vividly demonstrated in both the ethos of the negotiation process that unfolded between 1990 and 1994 and the letter of the *Interim Constitution* adopted in 1994. In a very real sense, therefore, the South African transition can be seen as a concrete extension of the very principles of the Enlightenment. According to Jordan, his vision is predicated on a belief in the following:

> "an inclusive nationhood rooted in the universalist, liberatory outlook of modernity and the realities and imperatives of South Africans of all races sharing a common territory."[4]

Against this backdrop, the pessimism pervading much postmodern discourse indeed appears to be more pertinent to a Eurocentric environment than it is to the countries of the developing world.

The impact of modernity upon South African society, however, has been ambiguous, contradictory and asymmetrical. It has been asymmetrical precisely because a feature of developing countries is the co-existence of different modes of production, political cultures, institutional forms and intellectual traditions. This is a product of the different political, ideological and intellectual 'layers' that have either been imposed on and/or generated within developing countries (an uneven development that manifests itself within South Africa as well). The present transition highlights the contradictory nature of this process, and this is reflected in the different debates and 'language games' which pervade the South African state and society.

On the one hand, the South African transition epitomises the triumph of the values and principles of modernity as argued by Jordan above — itself an encouraging phenomenon in the midst of the cynicism and despair of the late 20th century. In South Africa, this is manifested in a variety of different forms — the South African *Constitution* and the process through which it was compiled, South Africa's adherence to the normative and legal tenets of international law, the compassion which has underpinned South Africa's reconciliation process, and the extent to which the country is attempting to define a common identity among its diverse peoples as the basis for the creation of a non-racial sense of nationhood.

Yet, key areas of South African political and ideological discourse — whether referring to the reconstruction and development strategy, community policing policy, constitutional

development, or education — are characterised by the continual attempt to recognise, seek and affirm the diversity of traditions, suppressed histories, and regional and local peculiarities that are, in this sense, similar to many of the narratives of postmodern discourse. This is reinforced, in the positive sense, by the emphasis on cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic plurality that receives concrete expression in the South African *Constitution*, key post-1994 policy documents, the tendency towards decentralisation and regionalisation at both an economic and political level, and the growing diversity and influence of civil society over the formulation and execution of government policy.

In a somewhat more problematic sense, it manifests itself in the resurfacing (or creation) of various ethnic 'nationalisms' (often with extremely divisive consequences), the attempts by several groupings to separate themselves geographically from a common South African sovereignty, and the continual critique of the rational and normative methodology that underpins the current attempts to define a common 'South African-ness'. These countervailing discourses confirm the reality that, regardless of the unifying influences present at the 'centre' of the South African debate, an emerging plurality is evident throughout the fabric of contemporary South African political and social life.

In a very real sense, these seemingly conflicting tendencies have been reconciled within the heart of South African modernity — particularly since the advent of the Kempton Park negotiations and the adoption of the *Constitution*. South African modernity has grown from and conceded valuable space to pluralism and has accommodated within its architecture multicultural and linguistic diversity, regional and local autonomy, and diverse cultural recognition. Although South Africa cannot lay claim to a national identity that has existed for centuries, it is clearly in the process of constituting itself as a political nation. Indeed, this process is not vastly dissimilar from the process of political identity construction that characterised the creation of France's national identity since 1789.

South African national interest: Common themes, common concepts

Aspects of the diversity referred to above are to be found within South Africa's current national policy framework. Its foreign policy, for instance, reflects a strong normative orientation akin to the foreign policy dispositions of the Scandinavian countries. This includes a strong emphasis on the observance of human rights, the inculcation of a culture of democracy and good governance, a respect for cultural and political plurality, and a commitment to growth, development and progress. Interpolated into this foreign policy is a strong sense of South Africa's place in Africa as reflected in the vision of the African Renaissance, as well as the vision of an inclusive African humanism best exemplified in the different philosophical versions of *ubuntu*.

South Africa's domestic policy is strongly influenced by a range of normative and pragmatic perspectives. Its unique vision of participatory democracy and negotiation (as successfully practiced during the 1990-1994 negotiating period and, since 1994, in government itself) is buttressed by a national security policy that is strongly informed by the debates emerging from the human security arena. An emerging tension between its economic policy (notably influenced by neo-liberal theories of economics) and its national development strategy (influenced by socialist and developmental thinking) reflects the attempts by the country to define its place in both the domestic and international arena in a pragmatic, yet moral manner.

Throughout these discourses, it is evident that South Africa's world view, although homogeneous in its formal contours, admits to a heterogeneity of philosophical and political

influences. It is thus neither wholly 'north' nor 'south' in influence, neither Eurocentric nor totally Afrocentric in vision, but more accurately in the words of President Thabo Mbeki, as being a policy best described as "walking on two legs" — whether between the north and the south, Africa and Europe, or the Non-Aligned Movement and the rest of the world. The key ingredient of this 'walking on two legs' policy is for South Africa to be a catalytic facilitator and play a supportive role in the subregion, the region and the global arena in all efforts that are aimed at promoting dialogue, peace and stability, and, ultimately, an environment within which both South Africa and other African countries can develop.

The recent approval of South Africa's *White paper on South African participation in international peace missions* constituted a practical example of how the South African government, parliamentarians and civil society representatives attempted to define a common South African 'national interest' in light of these different influences. The question of defining South Africa's national interest had vexed policy planners within government for a number of years. Arguments during the process of formulating the white paper were torn between a minority and a majority opinion within the government and civil society groups involved in the process. Policy analysts in the minority, clustered mainly in some of the civil society groups, maintained that defining national interest within the context of a dynamic and pluralistic society was an exercise in futility. The sheer diversity of the country and the rapidly changing nature of global politics mitigated against the formulation of a core set of interests which could be said to guide the country in all its deliberations.

The majority opinion adopted a more Cartesian approach to the definition of national interest. Clustered in the Department of Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the intelligence community and some civil society groups, they maintained that such a definition was both necessary and possible for two reasons. The first was the belief that, without a definition of national interest, albeit embryonic and tentative, government policy would be relegated to a world of postmodern relativism. National policy had to proceed according to certain normative and national political guidelines, they argued. Secondly, it was argued that there were indeed common elements of such a national interest already in existence in South African political discourse.

A consensus position was finally adopted whereby it was acknowledged that, although it was difficult to outline the nature and content of South Africa's national interests in minute detail (particularly in light of the changing nature of global politics and the heterogeneity of South Africa as a nation), it was possible to provide a broad normative outline of South Africa's emerging national interests as based on its *Constitution*:

> "South Africa's emerging national interests are underpinned by the values enshrined in the Constitution, which encompass the security of the state and its citizens, the promotion of the social and economic well-being of its citizenry, the encouragement of global peace and stability, and participating in the process of ensuring regional peace, stability and development. These national interests are concretely reflected in key national policy documents — examples of which include the Constitution, a range of White Papers on the RDP, GEAR, the Transformation of the Public Service, Intelligence and Defence."[5]

From this definition of national interest, the linkage between South Africa's national interests and its participation in peace missions was a relatively straightforward exercise, although an attempt was made to prioritise those geographical areas within which South Africa would render assistance:

"In short it is in the South African national interest to assist peoples who suffer from famine, political repression, natural disasters, and the scourge of violent conflict. South Africa may thus provide civilian assistance and armed forces in common international efforts when properly authorized by international authorities to help in such efforts ...

Although South Africa acknowledges its global responsibilities, the prioritization afforded Africa in South African foreign policy makes Africa the prime focus of future engagements. South Africa has an obvious interest in preserving regional peace and stability in order to promote trade and development and to avoid the spill-over effects of conflicts in the neighbourhood."[6]

Conclusion

It is possible, at the current stage of South Africa's political and intellectual development, to identify a series of common themes that constitute the basic scaffolding of an emerging South African national identity. These are explicitly derived from both South Africa's history and its current policy positions. Key elements of this scaffolding include the following:

- respect for democracy and the promotion of human rights;

- recognition of a common African-ness and the affirming of African potential (the essence of the African Renaissance);

- recognition and protection of cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity within the framework of a national constitution;

- a strong normative commitment to the values of justice, reason and tolerance in dealings with one another and other non-South Africans; and

- a commitment to the constructive management of conflicts within South Africa and elsewhere.

Onto these values and principles there further values will, no doubt, be grafted. In future, the 'building-blocks' of this national identity are more likely to be derived from a more nuanced reading of the multiple cultural, subcultural and mythical influences that together will constitute the unifying elements of a national psyche.

Notes

1. D Chuter, *Humanity's soldier: France and international security (1919-2001),* Berghahn Books, Oxford/Providence, 1998, p 2.

2. Ibid, p 6.

3. P Jordan, *The national question in post-'94 South Africa,* Mayibuye, November/December 1997, p 17.

4. Ibid.

5. Republic of South Africa, *White paper on South African participation in international peace*

missions, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1999.

6. Ibid.

*Dr (Col) Rocky Williams is a former member of Umkhonto We Sizwe. He served as the Director of Operations Policy in the South African Ministry of Defence until his departure in late 1999. He is currently the Head: Security Sector Transformation Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.

Chapter 4
Theoretical approaches to security and development
Dr Lisa Thompson

Introduction

Few countries in the international arena, or at least the governments that represent these sovereign entities, act in a totally spontaneous manner when making certain key strategic decisions. Most decisions made by governments, groups and individuals are based, to an extent, on certain strategic, conceptual and cultural assumptions (of varying degrees of clarity). To speak, therefore, of a South African national identity — an identity based on a series of interconnected philosophical and conceptual approaches towards the world — is to beg a series of interrelated questions which require 'unpacking' if any semblance of meaning is to be bestowed on the concept of a 'South African national identity':

- It assumes that there is a coherent national identity upon which these conceptual and strategic assumptions are based.

- It assumes that there is an integrated and overarching philosophical framework that can be truly defined as being a uniquely South African approach to the world.

- It assumes that it is possible to identify the different conceptual and strategic elements or themes which constitute this national world view.

- Perhaps most importantly, the positing of a national identity often assumes that such a national identity has indeed emerged from 'something'. One approach argues that national identity is pre-given, rooted in the mythical (often mystical) and preternatural mists of the past. This religious sense of identity assumes that identity is preordained, predetermined and (often) fatalistic. A second approach sees identity, as such, and all its related constructs as products of the teleological unfolding of the greater Hegelian absolute over which the human agency has little influence. The freedom to shape one's identity in this sense (whether individual or national) is simply to recognise the parameters of necessity. A more realistic approach, and one that is more consistent with the realities of history, is that identities are constructed, are continually changing, and are moulded by a continually changing matrix of historical, cultural and social factors.

These issues are by no means straightforward and require considerable debate before a national consensus on this national identity and the conceptual assumptions which do, or should underpin it is fully elaborated. It is argued in this paper, however, that while it is not possible to identify an holistic and integrated South African national identity (as yet), strong themes do exist which have historically pervaded South African political and intellectual discourse and

which can be regarded as constituting the essential elements of a South African national identity. These are to be found in two main quarters. Firstly, they are present within the historical traditions and conflicts from which the present South Africa has emerged, and which have shaped much of South Africa's current national political identity. Secondly, they are also to be found within existing government policy — most of which has been based on a wide-ranging consultative process which has included a wide spectrum of stakeholders from, among others, government, political society and civil society.

The historical basis of a South African national identity

South Africa does not possess, at this stage of its development at least, the integrated and coherent world view that France has managed to develop over the past two centuries. Neither does it possess the foreign policy cohesion and practice that France has been able to develop in Africa over the past four decades. This is not surprising and is a product of both South Africa's divided past and its ongoing endeavours to construct a post-apartheid foreign policy. For this reason alone it is erroneous for European, and sometimes even African analysts to portray South Africa as either an Anglo-Saxon country or a Western country in terms of its philosophical and conceptual contours.

To determine the emerging nature of the South African national identity also requires the recognition that this national identity cannot be simplistically derived from the expressed policies of its democratically elected government (although this is an important arena within which aspects of the South African national identity are constructed). Elements of an emerging national world view are to be found in informal quarters, in seemingly obscure cultural nooks and crannies, and in many of the myths that South Africans have constructed about themselves in the past and are currently creating. Chuter's words are apt in this regard:

> "Very often these public attitudes are uniformed, but they may be powerfully supported by the media and elsewhere, and they make up a significant part of the unspoken assumptions that experts themselves bring to their work ... there is, beyond the strategy elaborated by experts, an unofficial meta-strategy elaborated by non-experts; a complex of ideas, memories and associations that sets boundaries within which a government can work."[1]

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> "It must be sought in pieces, and not learned in journals and policy statements, but in schoolbooks, popular histories, the media, incidental statements by politicians, inscriptions on monuments and a dozen other places where the French are talking informally to themselves, often in shorthand with nuances left out."[2]

Many of the common themes which pervade contemporary South African political discourse, for example, derive from the influence which modernism has exerted on both South African political and intellectual life. The influence of both Enlightenment principles and the concepts of modernity on South African political and intellectual life is strong. The constitutions of the Boer republics in the 19th century were strongly influenced by and modelled on European values and constitutions. The influence of Enlightenment thinking is strongly evident in the writings and activities of prominent 19th century South African liberal activists — Olive Schreiner and J X

Merriman, for example — and is partially evident in certain political traditions — the so-called 'Cape Liberal tradition' and the narratives of the early African National Congress, for instance.

This influence, in both political and economic terms, was even more marked during the 20th century. In the economic domain, the advent of industrialisation, the increase in urbanisation and the emergence of the first elements of a modern state, brought millions of South Africans into the heart and onto the periphery of global modernity:

> "Urbanization had a homogenizing effect on the whole society and expanded the area of shared values among Africans, Coloureds, Indians and Whites. The Black leadership that grew within these circumstances accepted the modern world because they recognized its liberatory potential for opening up new vistas for themselves and their people. They were modernists."[3]

This was manifest in political terms in both the positive and the pejorative sense. In the positive sense, the language of resistance, largely dominated by the traditions of the ANC alliance, were markedly modernist in ethos. Nowhere is this more vividly demonstrated than in the values of the *Freedom Charter* — a document which reads like a compendium of 19th and early 20th century modernist values. More recently, the political discourse of the South African transition has been strongly influenced by classic modernist meta-narratives — rationality, humanism and a belief in the global emancipation of humankind, for example. This is vividly demonstrated in both the ethos of the negotiation process that unfolded between 1990 and 1994 and the letter of the *Interim Constitution* adopted in 1994. In a very real sense, therefore, the South African transition can be seen as a concrete extension of the very principles of the Enlightenment. According to Jordan, his vision is predicated on a belief in the following:

> "an inclusive nationhood rooted in the universalist, liberatory outlook of modernity and the realities and imperatives of South Africans of all races sharing a common territory."[4]

Against this backdrop, the pessimism pervading much postmodern discourse indeed appears to be more pertinent to a Eurocentric environment than it is to the countries of the developing world.

The impact of modernity upon South African society, however, has been ambiguous, contradictory and asymmetrical. It has been asymmetrical precisely because a feature of developing countries is the co-existence of different modes of production, political cultures, institutional forms and intellectual traditions. This is a product of the different political, ideological and intellectual 'layers' that have either been imposed on and/or generated within developing countries (an uneven development that manifests itself within South Africa as well). The present transition highlights the contradictory nature of this process, and this is reflected in the different debates and 'language games' which pervade the South African state and society.

On the one hand, the South African transition epitomises the triumph of the values and principles of modernity as argued by Jordan above — itself an encouraging phenomenon in the midst of the cynicism and despair of the late 20th century. In South Africa, this is manifested in a variety of different forms — the South African *Constitution* and the process through which it was compiled, South Africa's adherence to the normative and legal tenets of international law, the compassion which has underpinned South Africa's reconciliation process, and the extent to which the country is attempting to define a common identity among its diverse peoples as the basis for the creation of a non-racial sense of nationhood.

Yet, key areas of South African political and ideological discourse — whether referring to the reconstruction and development strategy, community policing policy, constitutional development, or education — are characterised by the continual attempt to recognise, seek and affirm the diversity of traditions, suppressed histories, and regional and local peculiarities that are, in this sense, similar to many of the narratives of postmodern discourse. This is reinforced, in the positive sense, by the emphasis on cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic plurality that receives concrete expression in the South African *Constitution*, key post-1994 policy documents, the tendency towards decentralisation and regionalisation at both an economic and political level, and the growing diversity and influence of civil society over the formulation and execution of government policy.

In a somewhat more problematic sense, it manifests itself in the resurfacing (or creation) of various ethnic 'nationalisms' (often with extremely divisive consequences), the attempts by several groupings to separate themselves geographically from a common South African sovereignty, and the continual critique of the rational and normative methodology that underpins the current attempts to define a common 'South African-ness'. These countervailing discourses confirm the reality that, regardless of the unifying influences present at the 'centre' of the South African debate, an emerging plurality is evident throughout the fabric of contemporary South African political and social life.

In a very real sense, these seemingly conflicting tendencies have been reconciled within the heart of South African modernity — particularly since the advent of the Kempton Park negotiations and the adoption of the *Constitution*. South African modernity has grown from and conceded valuable space to pluralism and has accommodated within its architecture multicultural and linguistic diversity, regional and local autonomy, and diverse cultural recognition. Although South Africa cannot lay claim to a national identity that has existed for centuries, it is clearly in the process of constituting itself as a political nation. Indeed, this process is not vastly dissimilar from the process of political identity construction that characterised the creation of France's national identity since 1789.

South African national interest: Common themes, common concepts

Aspects of the diversity referred to above are to be found within South Africa's current national policy framework. Its foreign policy, for instance, reflects a strong normative orientation akin to the foreign policy dispositions of the Scandinavian countries. This includes a strong emphasis on the observance of human rights, the inculcation of a culture of democracy and good governance, a respect for cultural and political plurality, and a commitment to growth, development and progress. Interpolated into this foreign policy is a strong sense of South Africa's place in Africa as reflected in the vision of the African Renaissance, as well as the vision of an inclusive African humanism best exemplified in the different philosophical versions of *ubuntu*.

South Africa's domestic policy is strongly influenced by a range of normative and pragmatic perspectives. Its unique vision of participatory democracy and negotiation (as successfully practiced during the 1990-1994 negotiating period and, since 1994, in government itself) is buttressed by a national security policy that is strongly informed by the debates emerging from the human security arena. An emerging tension between its economic policy (notably influenced by neo-liberal theories of economics) and its national development strategy (influenced by socialist and developmental thinking) reflects the attempts by the country to define its place in both the domestic and international arena in a pragmatic, yet moral manner.

Throughout these discourses, it is evident that South Africa's world view, although homogeneous in its formal contours, admits to a heterogeneity of philosophical and political influences. It is thus neither wholly 'north' nor 'south' in influence, neither Eurocentric nor totally Afrocentric in vision, but more accurately in the words of President Thabo Mbeki, as being a policy best described as "walking on two legs" — whether between the north and the south, Africa and Europe, or the Non-Aligned Movement and the rest of the world. The key ingredient of this 'walking on two legs' policy is for South Africa to be a catalytic facilitator and play a supportive role in the subregion, the region and the global arena in all efforts that are aimed at promoting dialogue, peace and stability, and, ultimately, an environment within which both South Africa and other African countries can develop.

The recent approval of South Africa's *White paper on South African participation in international peace missions* constituted a practical example of how the South African government, parliamentarians and civil society representatives attempted to define a common South African 'national interest' in light of these different influences. The question of defining South Africa's national interest had vexed policy planners within government for a number of years. Arguments during the process of formulating the white paper were torn between a minority and a majority opinion within the government and civil society groups involved in the process. Policy analysts in the minority, clustered mainly in some of the civil society groups, maintained that defining national interest within the context of a dynamic and pluralistic society was an exercise in futility. The sheer diversity of the country and the rapidly changing nature of global politics mitigated against the formulation of a core set of interests which could be said to guide the country in all its deliberations.

The majority opinion adopted a more Cartesian approach to the definition of national interest. Clustered in the Department of Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the intelligence community and some civil society groups, they maintained that such a definition was both necessary and possible for two reasons. The first was the belief that, without a definition of national interest, albeit embryonic and tentative, government policy would be relegated to a world of postmodern relativism. National policy had to proceed according to certain normative and national political guidelines, they argued. Secondly, it was argued that there were indeed common elements of such a national interest already in existence in South African political discourse.

A consensus position was finally adopted whereby it was acknowledged that, although it was difficult to outline the nature and content of South Africa's national interests in minute detail (particularly in light of the changing nature of global politics and the heterogeneity of South Africa as a nation), it was possible to provide a broad normative outline of South Africa's emerging national interests as based on its *Constitution*:

> "South Africa's emerging national interests are underpinned by the values enshrined in the Constitution, which encompass the security of the state and its citizens, the promotion of the social and economic well-being of its citizenry, the encouragement of global peace and stability, and participating in the process of ensuring regional peace, stability and development. These national interests are concretely reflected in key national policy documents — examples of which include the Constitution, a range of White Papers on the RDP, GEAR, the Transformation of the Public Service, Intelligence and Defence."[5]

From this definition of national interest, the linkage between South Africa's national interests and

its participation in peace missions was a relatively straightforward exercise, although an attempt was made to prioritise those geographical areas within which South Africa would render assistance:

> "In short it is in the South African national interest to assist peoples who suffer from famine, political repression, natural disasters, and the scourge of violent conflict. South Africa may thus provide civilian assistance and armed forces in common international efforts when properly authorized by international authorities to help in such efforts ...
>
> Although South Africa acknowledges its global responsibilities, the prioritization afforded Africa in South African foreign policy makes Africa the prime focus of future engagements. South Africa has an obvious interest in preserving regional peace and stability in order to promote trade and development and to avoid the spill-over effects of conflicts in the neighbourhood."[6]

Conclusion

It is possible, at the current stage of South Africa's political and intellectual development, to identify a series of common themes that constitute the basic scaffolding of an emerging South African national identity. These are explicitly derived from both South Africa's history and its current policy positions. Key elements of this scaffolding include the following:

- respect for democracy and the promotion of human rights;

- recognition of a common African-ness and the affirming of African potential (the essence of the African Renaissance);

- recognition and protection of cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity within the framework of a national constitution;

- a strong normative commitment to the values of justice, reason and tolerance in dealings with one another and other non-South Africans; and

- a commitment to the constructive management of conflicts within South Africa and elsewhere.

Onto these values and principles there further values will, no doubt, be grafted. In future, the 'building-blocks' of this national identity are more likely to be derived from a more nuanced reading of the multiple cultural, subcultural and mythical influences that together will constitute the unifying elements of a national psyche.

Notes

1. D Chuter, *Humanity's soldier: France and international security (1919-2001),* Berghahn Books, Oxford/Providence, 1998, p 2.

2. Ibid, p 6.

3. P Jordan, *The national question in post-'94 South Africa,* Mayibuye, November/December 1997, p 17.

4. Ibid.

5. Republic of South Africa, *White paper on South African participation in international peace missions*, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1999.

6. Ibid.

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Chapter 5
French political culture and African policy: From consensus to dissensus
Prof Daniel Bourmaud

Introduction

The cultural variable is the principal missing element in explanations of France's African policy. Analyses agree on the fact that this policy, since the countries became independent, is characterised by its singularity. Bonds of a simultaneously economic, monetary, military, linguistic nature, testify to an intense and almost fused relation between France and Africa. Some see in it the manifestation of a neo-colonialism with theoretical foundations drawing upon the imperialist model. Others see in it the illustration of the realism that governs any international relations. Yet others insist on the often private and personalised nature of the bonds instituted between the metropolis and its old colonies: the relation between state and state would fade in the face of patrimonial logic whose famous networks would constitute the cornerstone.

Without going into the fundamental debate about the relevance of these various explanations, it nevertheless seems necessary to stress that they all appear to be unable to account for the modifications which have affected France's African policy for several years, except to deny their reality. However, the relations between France and Africa, marked by an undeniable continuity since the beginning of the 1960s, are currently undergoing substantial changes both in terms of direction and institutionally. The passage of an African policy — set in a continuity that was long considered immutable — to an African policy which can be described as new at this stage, is less due to specifically African reasons than to the cultural change which has been affecting the French leadership for almost 20 years. Having been wed for a long time to a system of common values, the French ruling élite is today split between opposite cultural poles. The African policy, like all other public policies, is an incarnation of this change at work. The era of consensus has now been succeeded by the era of cultural heterogeneity, hence of conflict.

The French leading class and the Franco-African consensus

For almost three decades, relations between France and Africa were based on a concept common to the French leading class: the Gaullist consensus. This structured Franco-African relations and transcended partisan differences, especially as these relations formed part of the extension of a global political culture based on the idea of exception.

The political culture of exception

France's identity relates back to the idea of exception, in other words, the belief and the will to represent a singular political model. It does not fit into the scope of this paper to go back to the origins and basic elements of this singularity. However, its principal ingredients should be recalled.

The French exception is based on a body of values endowed with a universal vocation whose founding moment is symbolised by the Revolution of 1789 and, in particular, the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, even though the historical period of the *ancien régime* also contributes to nurture the myth of exception. These values — summarised in the republican trilogy of *freedom, equality, fraternity* — are represented by two key instruments: the *nation* and the *state*. The first constitutes the political embodiment of society, as surpassing particular identities, the crucible of the social bond and of democracy. The second enables the nation to have an instrument of action, which guarantees the republican principles. For these reasons, the French state is interventionist and centralist.

The politically homogeneous French model is also culturally so, in particular because of a common language which unifies the territory and the society. But, this language does not only live and function internally. It also participates in the external influence as a universal tool of communication. It is the expression of French influence, of that search for station that haunts the dreams of the ruling élite. In essence, the French model could not be limited to the hexagon (France) alone. It can express its genius and its mission only by spreading these to all those parts of the world that vitally need them. As the writer Victor Hugo noted in the 19th century: "Without France the world feels alone."

These representations, summarised in broad outline, delimit the contours of the cultural base common to the ruling élite. Transmitted and perpetuated by the mechanisms of specific socialisation instances, in particular the *Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques* (Free School of Political Sciences) under the 3rd Republic or the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* (*l'ENA* — National School of Administration) since World War II, it is possible to transcend divisions and partisan ideologies. In the French political system, convergences are revealed to be as powerful as oppositions. Foreign policy, in particular, gives concrete expression to this point of view where, if there is divergence with regard to the means, there is agreement on the objectives. France, seen as a great power, forms part of the heritage common to the French ruling élite. It governed the French presence in international relations under the 5th Republic where General Charles de Gaulle, in spite of a bipolar international system that was not very favourable towards the assertion of French power, was able to give body to the myth of exception.

African policy and Gaullist consensus

France of the 5th Republic deployed a policy in Africa that resisted the sudden ups and downs of the internal political system. Continuity, that keyword of specialists of France's African policy, defines the permanence of this policy irrespective of changes in rule. From Charles de Gaulle to François Mitterrand, and including Georges Pompidou and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the African policy was hardly subject to any other than marginal innovations. Essentially, the institutions, the actors and the representations remained the same. Such a communion deserves some thought. In fact, in its own way, Africa has permitted the elaboration of a specific version of the French exception.

Africa is the guarantor of France's standing in the world. Through it, France has at its disposal a sure resource, even when all others are disputed. Faced with the vicissitudes of history, Africa

has, in fact, always shown its fidelity. At the time of World War II, Africa under the aegis of Governor Felix Eboué, rallied a France that was still defeated and occupied. Decolonisation, far from introducing a break with the metropolis — with the exception of Guinea under Sékou Touré — showed how much the African élite remained attached to France. In short, Africa is experienced in French representations as a natural extension where the Francophone world and Francophilia merge. Symbiosis borders on fusion as testified by the recurring terminology about relationships between the protagonists: Does one not officially speak about the great Franco-African family?

The spontaneous closeness of the two groups gives a special place to Africa in the foreign policy of France. Africa appears so much won over to France's side that there is no need to discuss the question. A paradoxical and unforeseen situation is the result. Being a quasi-vital necessity to ensure France's rank, Africa is at the same time absent from considerations and thinking related to French foreign policy. As much as Europe, nuclear power or bipolarity sparks off debate, so much also does Africa shine in its absence. This unforeseen situation does not arise from negligence. It incisively expresses the fact that Africa does not pose a problem. Under any hypothesis, it constitutes a resource acquired by France, without any need for concern or consideration about the *why* and *wherefore*. Franco-African relations are practically dependent on the nature of the reality which imposes itself on the actors.

The institutionalised form of the relationship is a direct extension of this indisputable fact. Through a range of means, such as the CFA franc, military agreements, and others, France installed a mechanism of shared sovereignty which, in many ways, can be analysed as a questioning of the independence of states and consequently of Gaullist dogma. But, in this instance, contradiction is secondary. The main issue is that, due to its relationship with Africa, France has the illusion of having an international currency (the franc zone), an operational army officially put forward as the police of Africa, and thus of being a recognised power. In a bipolar world where it is threatened by marginalisation, France sees in Africa a continent of its own dimension that enables it to maintain this image of an actor of influence. Louis de Guiringaud, President Giscard d'Estaing's former minister of Foreign Affairs, best summarised this French-centred vision: "Africa is the only continent where with five hundred men France can claim to make History."

The French ruling élite agree with this idealised vision of Franco-African relations. The Gaullist consensus also extends to the left, as shown by France's African policy after the election of François Mitterrand as president of the Republic in 1981. The failure to reform co-operation as advocated by Jean-Pierre Cot is certainly due to the general outcry that this aroused both in France and in Africa among the players directly involved in the implementation of an often opaque relation. It is undeniable that, behind the idealised representations, shameful networks and interests prospered most of the time. But, the extraordinary silence of the ruling élite should also not be forgotten either. Both on the right and on the left, with few exceptions, consent prevailed. The rallying of the left, to tell the truth, does not constitute a real surprise. The same mechanisms of socialisation bound together a leading class within which partisan divisions were blurred behind a complicity rooted in time.

A consensus in crisis

The new direction given to France's African policy is often explained by the end of the Cold War. Although this argument is quite acceptable, it does not account for the changes that took place during the 1980s in the representations of the French ruling élite. The rallying of a broad section to the liberal paradigm could not remain without consequences for Franco-African relations. The

reform of the policy of co-operation and, *de facto*, of the African policy, is explained by the end of a homogeneous cultural system. Admittedly, the current dissensus does not result in a rigorously balanced division of respective forces. But, the time of the welded unity within the leading class seems to be over.

The liberal paradigm

The economic liberalism prevailing at the end of 20th century caused a shock to the whole system of values of the French leading class. The promotion of market values, competition and the values of the individual directly affected the foundations of the structure of French exception. The interventionist state, inherited from the Colbert tradition and consolidated in the course of history particularly just after the end of World War II, was given a pounding. The public sector, strengthened by the nationalisation programme of 1982, was subjected a few years later to the policies of privatisation adopted by the various governments which followed one another in power. The choice made in favour of the European Union supports the liberalisation of what had appeared to fall under a strict state monopoly for a long time. The end of the attachment to an interventionist and regulatory state is manifested within the leading class by a growing attraction to the private sector. Already under the seven-year term of President Giscard d'Estaing, osmosis had taken place between the public and private sectors, giving place to the phenomenon of *pantouflage*.[1] The phenomenon kept on increasing, culminating in a marked preference of the leading class for the private sector to the detriment of the public sector.[2] The French ruling élite, unified by its previous control over society by means of a multifunctional state, thus gradually moved away from its culture of public service towards a system of values based on mobility, profitability and success.

At the same time, the other elements of the French exception were faced by a challenge of the same magnitude. The nation, which is the political expression of the community, was counterbalanced by particular demands of identity. The rights of minorities, both regional (exacerbated by the policies of decentralisation) and gender-based, in particular, contributed to a reformulation of the idea of the nation, less and less homogeneous and more and more relativist, and officially affirming communities against the nation. In terms of language, an identical evolution occurred. The claim of a French language with universal status faded before what appeared to be the inevitable supremacy of English. For an increasing section of the ruling élite, the use of English in the deliberations of international authorities is no longer challenged.[3]

Without proceeding any further in the analysis of the symptoms, it is a fact that the feeling of exception regressed to make way for a less pre-eminent vision of France. This readjustment is expressed by the new rank that France assigns to itself in international relations at the start of the 21st century. By designating 'superpower' status to the United States, the minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Hubert Védrine, has officially recognised the downward revision of French ambitions. France is returned to the second rank, together with seven or eight states which certainly have considerable resources to affirm themselves, but cannot compete with the US, the only one that has all the constituent factors of power at its disposal. Such an admission would have been inconceivable 20 years ago. In the current context, it hardly raises any protest, as a dominant section of the leading class has now gradually accepted for two decades, and in the name of modernity, a more modest but also more ordinary vision of France.

The new direction of African policy

With a new vision of France comes a new vision of Africa. Africa as the natural extension of the metropolis in the discourse of exception, could not avoid being subjected to the effects of the

cultural shift that affected the French ruling élite. The outlines of the new African policy, as it has taken shape for slightly less than 10 years, conform to the liberal principles controlling the new dominant system of values of the leading class.

Faced with the inevitable process of globalisation where the market defines the lines of force, Africa is badly off. Downgraded, useless, it is seen to be of little interest. Situated outside the great flow of exchanges, poorly incorporated into international economic relations, it cannot merit attention. Admittedly, such a radically realistic vision could not be bluntly declared. Hence, soothing speeches are made in the international community on the duty of solidarity with regard to an Africa intended for modernity. But, in the minds of the decisionmakers, the choices have been made. The French ruling élite have endorsed the principles that govern the political and economic international programmes intended for the African continent. According to time-honoured expressions, the market democracy sets limits on the thought frameworks, not only of the leaders of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or even of the US, but also on those of the French élite. Renouncing the embodiment of a countermodel is explicit as demonstrated by the new version of the various elements of France's African policy.

Everywhere the state must give way to the market. Development, seen for a long time as the product of state intervention in independent Africa, could result only from the free operation of the market. From this follows a minimalist concept of the state, cut off from any active potential. The privatisation of public companies, the dismantling of public services, the policies of decentralisation, all relate to an Anglo-Saxon vision of the state, valid for any place and any circumstance, at a time when Africa has an urgent need for solid states. Neo-liberal economic policies ring the changes without France claiming to represent or promote another scenario. Since the doctrine of Balladur, prime minister from 1993 to 1995, which subjected France's aid programmes to prior agreement with the World Bank in accordance with the principles of structural adjustment, France never distanced itself from a close alignment with the tenets in force in Washington. The continued fall in public aid for development has the characteristics of this neo-liberal design where, according to the well-known maxim of 'trade not aid', commerce must prevail over assistance. Even if France remains one of the principal contributors of government aid for development, it has also aligned itself in this area with the prevailing practice. With development aid slightly exceeding 0.4% of gross domestic product, and falling constantly since its peak in 1994, France has returned to a lower level than that which prevailed some 20 years ago.[4]

At the same time, the end of the French model of safety has also dawned. For a long time described as the police of Africa, a reputation which it did not refute, France started a process of revising its military doctrine applying to sub-Saharan Africa. Direct intervention was set aside in favour of a policy of training and logistic support for African troops called to intervene within a multilateral framework where local conflicts would require it. The RECAMP programme corresponds to this new focus. The doctrine still has to be finalised, but appears to challenge the defence and safety agreements signed after independence.

Relations with Africa, based on the previous patrimonial policy that constituted the backbone of the French presence in Africa, were abandoned in favour of a deliberately continental approach in tune with the new principles. France's utilitarian African policy was obliged to support new emerging markets that correspond with possible future power centres. In this respect, South Africa represents the most promising actor, with Nigeria offering fewer guarantees because of the divisions which affect its internal political system. In terms of comparative advantages, Francophone Africa does not seem the most attractive, as it is not the best equipped in terms of demographics and economic dynamics. The setting-up of a 'priority zone of solidarity' makes

this break official by extending the French system to the whole of Africa. Development aid, the market and strategic interest will thus be better combined with regard to their respective virtues.

The outline of this new African policy does not mean that France has removed Africa from its concerns. But, the various elements that constitute this policy have their own coherence. They reflect a relatively ordinary view of Africa in French foreign policy. The new rules of the game that France has accepted, show that it has abandoned the attempt to assume its exception. The presence that it displays in Africa is still visible as France is less disinterested than others in what happens in sub-Saharan Africa. But, the stakes are obviously elsewhere.

The dissensus

The liberal paradigm and its African variation, dominant as they are in the representations of the ruling élite, are not devoid of all contradiction. Two zones of discontiguity can be found. The first lies in the permanence of a culture of exception, the second in the contradictions existing among the group of modernists.

Advocates of the Gaullist paradigm and, in a wider sense, of a culture of exception have not disappeared. They find support within the core of the French political community and are still able to gain acceptance for their point of view. This finds expression in events that have affected the course of France's African policy during the last 10 years. Since the pronouncement of the Balladur doctrine that signalled the entry of modernists into the field of African policy, the two streams have alternated. The election of Jacques Chirac to the presidency of the Republic in 1995 halted the process. The rationality of networks and loyalties inherited from the Gaullist period could again prevail. The victory of the French left in the legislative elections of 1997 again swung the balance in the other direction. The government of Lionel Jospin deliberately follows a policy of breaking with the Gaullist consensus. But, balance is always precarious as shown by the *coup d'état* in Côte d'Ivoire at the end of 1999: the two streams clashed, the government finally prevailing over the presidential view. Globally, the proponents of change have more assets in hand for reasons that have less to do with specifically African causes than with the French political system. The personnel directing the principal French policies are indeed essentially won over to the liberal paradigm. Consequently, there is a relatively homogeneous political discourse which makes it difficult to express the 'exceptionalist' current. The logic of electoral competition is based on an historical left/right partisan division, imperfectly reflecting the reality of current divisions. Only particular circumstances, such as the referendum on the Maastricht treaty, make it possible for the division to appear between the advocates of exception and the liberals. But, by definition, these circumstances, in the absence of a radical change of the political system, remain the exception.

The language of modernity is also not exempt from internal contradictions between the two subgroups of which it is composed: the politicians and civil society. United in their attachment to the liberal paradigm, they dissociate themselves in their relations from political action. Though they both condemn France's African policy in its traditional conception, they are likely to diverge on the way in which the programme should be continued. Those belonging to civil society — particularly non-governmental organisations (NGOs) — have a primarily ethical vision of relations with Africa. Sensitised to Africa through the humanitarian approach that has been very much in vogue for the last 20 years or so, they represent the second wave of development aid organisations. Their liberal-humanitarian approach has difficulty in accepting the liberal-realistic approach among political leaders. For the latter, African policy cannot exclusively follow moral considerations. Economic interests, in the oil sector in particular, or politico-military considerations can control choices in terms of alliances, or support, and are not necessarily

compatible with morality alone. As the new African policy deploys its logic, complicity could give way to a certain animosity.

There are latent tensions likely to emerge from the new African policy. They will be expressed with all the more strength when circumstances allow. The advocates of the liberal paradigm still have to impose their views fully, as they have not yet completely clarified them. Ultimately, this revised African policy is not free of contradictions. It does not have real 'marching orders', laying down its objectives, defining its interests and the means of reaching its goals. In short, it lacks a doctrine. Perhaps such an ambition is impossible because of the reactions which it could arouse. Ambiguity and a makeshift job sometimes make it possible to reconcile the expectations or the reticence of the various actors taking part in the Franco-African process with everyday life. But, the 'unvoiced comment' can also be a sign of fragility.

Notes

1. '*Pantouflage*' indicates the practice of a high-ranking public official leaving the public administration for a given period for a post in a private company. The statute of the civil service allows this mobility which, to a large extent, thus breaks down the former barriers between the two sectors.

2. This change has manifested itself in a particularly graphic way since 1997, with the difficulty encountered by several ministers in obtaining competent officials to occupy strategic positions in the central administration. The officials likely to be named for the posts in question were active in the private sector.

3. The example of Renault, the car manufacturer, which uses English as the language of internal written communications by the company management, demonstrates the extent of the change.

4. In 1983, French development aid amounted to 0.53% of GDP. This figure continued to increase until 1994 before starting to fall and has now stabilised around 0.4%. See D Bourmaud, *L'aide publique au développement en 1998: les moyens de la fin?* (Government aid for development in 1998: The end of the means?), Observatoire Permanent de la Coopération Française, Karthala, Paris, 1998.

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Chapter 6
Human security, governance and development in Africa
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Introduction

The brief of this paper is to explore the link between human security, governance and development in Africa. It is thus argued that, in essence, it is of little lasting value to emphasise this link only at the national or even regional level. What is needed, is to draw the link between national, international and global governance.

The link between human security, governance and development was drawn concisely and clearly in the Boutros-Ghali's report *An agenda for development* (1995) and given a specific

African emphasis and dimension in Kofi Annan's 1998 report *The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa*. In this paper, this link is explored in order to argue that there are some fundamental aspects related to peacebuilding that are not being addressed and that the human security-development-governance linkage cannot therefore be properly operationalised.

Three caveats

Before turning to the link between human security, governance and development, it is necessary to introduce three caveats, of which the latter two are, in themselves, of crucial importance to this discussion.

Firstly, my empirical and, to some extent, theoretical knowledge is largely confined to and predicated on the Southern African subcontinent, excluding the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This leads directly to the second caveat: despite the sometimes glib references to Africa or sub-Saharan Africa as if these regions are homogeneous in all or even broad aspects, the differences between African states are great and important, and often preclude broad and uniform policy prescriptions. The difficulty in treating all African states as somehow similar, especially when not defining or circumscribing what is meant by such similarity, is that some of them often have to be excluded in observations or attempts at generalisation with a view to theorising about the state in Africa. As Bayart *et al* state with reference to their exploration of the criminalisation of the state in Africa: the interaction of various processes and activities "has its origin in the *specific experiences of societies*."[1]

Annan, in his 1998 report on conflict in Africa, pays attention to the fact that though there are certain broad sources of conflict in Africa, there are also factors that are particular to specific situations and subregions. In Central Africa, there is competition for scarce land and water resources. In oil-producing countries, there is conflict generated by a local sense of exclusion from the benefits accruing from this activity and of having to cope with the environmental degradation resulting from oil extraction. In North Africa, there are tensions between seriously opposing visions of state and society.[2] And, in a number of countries, there is competition for access to mineral resources which then either results in or feeds existing conflict. Specificity and difference should be kept in mind in the deliberations lest the same fault is repeated that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank made for so long and with such negative and damaging consequences: treating specific cases in a generic way when it comes to 'solutions'. The irony, however, is clear: the constraints of time and space in the presentation of this paper result in this very sin of generalisation.

The third caveat is one that, to some extent, permeates the subtext of this paper and though it should not be allowed to paralyse arguments and analyses, it is good to remember it and when appropriate to even use it as a tool of analysis. This caveat lies in the fact that language can be manipulated to hide many things, to privilege certain actors or decisions, to dress up old concepts in new outfits, or it may mean different things to different people. In a recent paper, Thompson paid detailed attention to this problem with reference to the security discourse in Southern Africa.[3] She pointed out how alternative discourses are often appropriated by those who wield structural power in order to give their policies and decisions legitimacy and the appearance of radical change, while actually disguising the fact that conventional thinking and practices are still reigning supreme.

To give an example: the idea of privatisation features largely in the IMF and World Bank's structural adjustment programmes, ostensibly as a means of empowering *people* economically.

In this sense, it is in accordance with ideas about human development, for instance. Yet, it is known that, in a way, underlying the demand for privatisation is the expectation that it will make an economy more efficient, eventually to allow for debt repayment. In the case of some countries where these programmes have been implemented, privatisation served as a means for the governing élite and their cronies to lay their hands, this time legally so, on valuable and profitable assets. Therefore, discussions about sustainable development, human security and the like should be circumspect, keeping in mind Strange's sound advice: always ask *cui bono?* — *who benefits?*

What ails the 'state in Africa'?

It is impossible to list and discuss comprehensively the problems of 'the African state' in the limited space of this paper. Yet, in order to contextualise the arguments about good and bad governance at the national and international level, it is necessary to mention a number of problems facing the majority of states in Africa. Again, such a generalisation does not paint the complete picture.

The problems that African states face in relation to human security and development are mainly related to the way in which these states as producers of primary commodities have been integrated into the international division of labour. They also stem from the faultlines running through societies that had been artificially joined into 'states' without going through a natural evolution to a preferred form of political community. These faultlines — the lack of social and political cohesion, the lack of confidence and capacity to govern effectively, and a lack of resources, or rather, a lack of an efficient and fairly just and equitable distribution channel or mechanisms in these societies — are exacerbated by external penetration into the economies of such states. Political disorder, as Chabal and Daloz argue and demonstrate in their book *Africa Works,* becomes a chosen instrument of those who benefit from bad governance.[4] The authors, however, should have taken into account that political disorder does not only benefit the local élite, but also very much the international élite, both financial and political. Too much is at stake for those who reap the profits of disorder, and peace, security and development might disadvantage them. It must be emphasised again that these beneficiaries are also located in the external environment.

The security-development-governance nexus

Europe and the West's (including Japan) phenomenal development over the past half a century was built on the existence of peace at the international, but also at the domestic levels of these societies. It is therefore clear that development strategies are usually built on the implicit assumption of conditions of peace. These development strategies do not interrogate their own implicit assumptions. The wholesale adoption of northern development strategies, or the implementation of development strategies largely developed in or imitating northern growth paths, could therefore, perhaps in retrospect, never have paid off on a continent where the condition of positive peace does not exist.

At the same time, there is also the vexed problem that the deep foundations of peace and security seem to lie in the "economic, social and environmental spheres."[5] Furthermore, a perusal of the development history of the north shows clearly that the state played a pivotal role in development, and the contemporary debate about the so-called increasing irrelevance of the state, does not convincingly hide the fact that the state is still an important actor in development. Governance therefore also belongs in the security-development nexus. As the process and manner in which a society is politically organised and managed, governance can be either good

or bad.

The state, as an instrument of development, can be used by a government either to thwart or encourage development. It can hinder or actively undermine development through a variety of measures, ranging from erroneously equating economic development with economic growth and therefore not paying attention to the distribution of wealth, to simply using power to accumulate personal wealth. Concomitantly, a government can use the security apparatus of the state to create and maintain a secure environment in which its development strategies might flourish, or it can use this apparatus to support and assist its plundering of resources.

The extent to which a government is able to use its power positively or negatively, taking the well-being of the population as a yardstick, would seem to accord with the degree and scope of participation in decision-making. This assumption accounts for the value attached to democracy as a form of good governance. The less participation, and the greater the separation between 'state' and 'populace', the greater the opportunity for bad governance and its concomitant manifestations, such as authoritarianism, corruption and inefficiency, all aspects associated with a lack of development and with insecurity.

If it is accepted that the primary function of the state is to protect the well-being of its population and that such care is exercised through 'good' governance (a normative approach), it becomes clear that most states in sub-Saharan Africa have suffered from bad governance over the past several decades. A comparison of the *Human development reports* compiled by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) over time leads to the realisation that, in terms of quality of life indices, many countries have shown regression. The worst regression is experienced in societies embroiled in internal strife and civil war, thereby empirically proving the security-development nexus. It is tempting also to bring governance into the picture and to conclude that bad governance is the explanation for insecurity and underdevelopment. But, one should be careful. If governance is limited to the national (and subnational) levels of government, there are a number of dangers that may obscure the broad picture.

The first is that it then becomes easy to ascribe all of Africa's problems to Africans themselves, thereby simultaneously turning international involvement, for example, in the form of overseas development aid, into something innocent and friendly and almost patronising. It would mean that the north, and the way in which Africa had been incorporated over time into the international division of labour, have no bearing on and responsibility for the current crises besetting the majority of states in sub-Saharan Africa. Lastly, and this is the crux of the matter, it would obscure the fact that governance is a term also applicable to the international and global level.

Bad governments, in many instances, may carry the major blame for insecurity and underdevelopment, but more often than not, these governments were aided and abetted either directly by other international or external actors, or indirectly by processes and trends in the international political economy, pointing to at least aspects of bad governance in international regimes and institutions. Mobutu's Zaïre and apartheid South Africa are two examples. If democracy is taken to encourage and promote, and to be a characteristic of good governance, the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN Security Council, to name but a few, do not have much of a claim on the status of exhibiting good governance practices.

In short, development and security are promoted and maintained through good governance, but good governance refers to national *and* international practices. To get back to Thompson's argument mentioned earlier: the Bretton Woods institutions are the main proponents of good governance and democratisation as elements of political conditionality, yet, governance jargon is

used to obscure the lack of democracy in these institutions, as well as the extent to which their policies actually undermine development prospects in some cases. The damage done to Mozambique's cashew nut industry by shortsighted and badly informed World Bank demands over the past few years serves as a good example.[6] Such policies actually increase human insecurity and inhibits development. Another example is the World Bank estimate that sub-Saharan Africa loses US $20 billion per year in exports due to various forms of trade barriers implemented by developed countries.[7]

Furthermore, the apparent disjuncture between development and security discourses, particularly in the policy realm, further exacerbates underdevelopment and insecurity. Before exploring this premise further, it is necessary to point to an exception. There are times when the international community, again through financial institutions such as the IMF, do use financial instruments, for example, economic conditionality and the withholding of loans, in order to apply pressure that might, in the view of politicians, force a particular government to the negotiation table or to conduct democratic elections. Such was the case in Burundi in the mid-1990s, and earlier in Kenya to ensure that Moi hold elections.

But, these are often short-term measures, while the nexus between development, security and good governance at the deep level and with a view to the long term, is not taken into consideration. The continued protection, for instance, of 'grandfather' industries, such as agriculture, clothing and textiles in the north, especially the EU's CAP, also inhibits development and increases insecurity. More often than not, it is women, already defined as 'the poorest of the poor', who have to bear the brunt of such policies in the form of job losses.[8] Also, the continued pressure on developing countries to liberalise trade often boils down to the fact that they have to open their markets to industrial products from the north, thereby preventing an own industrial capacity from developing and, in some cases, even resulting in deindustrialisation.[9] These examples may seem to be ranging far away from security and the pressing problems of civil war and internal strife, but if the link between security and development is accepted, such instances of international bad governance are actually of great relevance to peacebuilding in Africa.

Peacebuilding and profitseeking

Mention was made earlier of the fact that development strategies have seldom taken into account the fact that post-World War II northern development and progress have been predicated on the existence of peace. It is as if this condition was conveniently forgotten when applying development strategies to and in Africa, or maybe, due to disciplinary boundaries, the connection between peace and development was not fully or properly comprehended. Yet, Boutros-Ghali's definition and discussion of peacebuilding reads almost like a brief history of the period after World War II.[10] The most important elements of peacebuilding, according to this report, are briefly:

- Development activities should start prior to the end of hostilities.
- Emergency relief should provide a starting point for development.
- Structures aimed at strengthening and solidifying peace should be supported.
- The effects of war on the population should be alleviated.

There are two aspects of peacebuilding not touched upon by the Boutros-Ghali report: the locus of responsibility for peacebuilding operations and the extent to which certain forms of international involvement in African conflicts inhibit and actively obstruct peacebuilding efforts. The Annan report deals with the first, placing a measure of responsibility on the international community in the form of UN involvement, again emphasising the link between national and

international governance.[11] Judging from the Angolan experience after the initial peacebuilding exercise of the mid-1990s, and from the lacklustre performance of the UN following the Lusaka peace accord in the DRC, it is doubtful whether the national/international governance link has been sufficiently conceptualised. This is perhaps an aspect that scholars should pay attention to, particularising the conceptualisation to fit individual cases.

Although Annan does mention economic motives as a cause of conflict in Africa, he does not take this into consideration in his recommendations on peacebuilding.[12] Yet, this is perhaps one of the most serious shortcomings in the current knowledge about peacemaking and peacebuilding, and in the frameworks negotiated and constructed to deal with conflict resolution. The profit motive inherent in many conflicts, it could be suggested, is perhaps the single most important aspect that should be dealt with in attempts at providing and maintaining peace and security and in promoting development. The locus of this link — the one between conflict and moneymaking — is at the level where the national and the international meet. It is therefore necessary to think of ways in which the political economy of war can be incorporated into the search for peace, taking the profit motive into account right from the start when a cease-fire is negotiated and dealing with it as a major variable in constructing a peacekeeping operation, right through to the peacebuilding phase of conflict resolution.

In this instance, governance, at the national and international level, is of primary importance. The role of local and international profiteers, and the many instances and opportunities for convergence between them should be taken into account. Vested interests should actually enjoy as much of the attention of peacemakers as any other considerations. The prolonging of the wars raging in Angola, Sierra Leone, the DRC, Sudan, Burundi and Rwanda all exhibit various forms of financial interest. Financial interests include a host of benefits to various groups, from local politicians and the military who grow rich on the war economy and black market trade, to druglords, international arms dealers, mercenaries and other forms of privatised security firms, and exploiters of natural resources. Continuing hostilities are sometimes worth more to those in or contesting power, than would be a stable and peaceful society characterised by good governance. Sometimes the apparent political will of a particular group or government to find a negotiated settlement perhaps has more to do with the expectation of control over scarce and valuable resources, than with the wish for peace.

Conclusion

Unless efforts at good governance as part of the peacebuilding process take account of the link between governance at the local and international level, and allow for and/or include all stakeholders in negotiations and the development of frameworks for peacebuilding, calls and plans for demobilisation, disarmament, good governance and international assistance for reconstruction and development, to mention but a few requirements, will be in vain. Neither peace, nor human security, development and good governance will be achieved. In attempts at conflict resolution, the question that begs to be asked and considered, is: *who benefits?*

Notes

1. J Bayart, S Ellis & B Hibou, *The criminalization of the state in Africa*, James Currey, Oxford, 1999, p 31.

2. K Annan, *The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa*, report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, United Nations, New York, 1998, paragraph E/15.

3. L Thompson, South and Southern African security dilemmas, paper presented at SARIPS annual colloquium on *Peace and security in Southern Africa: Challenges and opportunities*, Harare, September 1999.

4. P Chabal & J Daloz, *Africa works: Disorder as political instrument*, James Currey, Oxford, and Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1999.

5. B Boutros-Ghali, *An agenda for development*, United Nations, New York, 1995, p 12.

6. J Hanlon, Power without responsibility: The World Bank and Mozambican cashew nuts, final draft, *ROAPE*, 2000 (forthcoming).

7. World Bank, *Africa Reconstruct* 13(4), December 1999, p 33.

8. C September, COSATU's perspective on the SADC Protocol and its implication for labour, in Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, *Opportunities and challenges for women in Southern Africa: Report of a conference on the SADC free trade area*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Johannesburg, 12-13 April 1999.

9. See European Union/South African Free Trade Agreement. Also, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, ibid.

10. Boutros-Ghali, op cit, pp 21-22.

11. Annan, op cit, paragraphs 63-68.

12. Ibid, paragraph 14.

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Chapter 7
Lasting security and development in Africa
Prof Philippe Hugon

Introduction

This brief paper deals with the links between lasting security and development in Africa from the point of view of an economist.

Security refers to the acquisition of and respect for the rights of people that guarantee their safety. It implies preventing and limiting risks, crises and conflicts. It involves the establishment of institutions, governmental and non-governmental organisations, different types of regulations, and reactive, interactive or proactive attitudes on the part of private and public decisionmakers. *Insecurity* in Africa is the result, to various degrees, of *natural* or *human catastrophes*, the vulnerability of people and groups, and institutional failure (absence of a legally constituted state).

Economic development is an endogenous and cumulative process of increasing productivity and

of the long-term reduction of inequalities, enabling a growing number of the population to move from a vulnerable and insecure situation to one where there is better control over uncertainty and instability, and greater satisfaction of fundamental needs.

Faced with the increasing insecurity that affects people and with rising conflicts, traditional economic development initiatives have lost much of their significance. In many African countries, humanitarian and emergency aid has overtaken development aid and the very short term prevails over long-term projects. It is the responsibility of major countries and regional powers to contribute to greater safety.

The question of safety will be presented in this paper on two levels:

- the politics of states when dealing with the war economy; and
- the issue of goods and people through an examination of the links with economic growth.

Zones of tension and conflict in Africa[1]

The interaction between these two levels will be illustrated with reference to food insecurity and famines, before proposing a route to follow in order to achieve better security for both people and states.

The insecurity of states and the economy of war

Expansion and splitting up of conflicts in Africa

A large expanse of war zones can be observed on a world-wide scale. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, more than 60 conflicts resulted in 17 million refugees and the deaths of hundreds

of thousands of people. In Africa, it is estimated that, in the 11 countries involved in conflicts during the 1990s — Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Congo-Brazzaville — the number of deaths was between 3.8 and 6.8 million, or 2.4 to 4.3% of the sumtotal of the population in these countries (155 million). In 2000, 20% of the African population and 14 countries are involved in war. The number of refugees is estimated at 4 million and the number of displaced persons at 10 million.

The web of conflicts and increasing chaos around the DRC

In 2000, the web of violent conflicts, with the Democratic Republic of Congo at the epicentre, has resulted in coalitions with multiple interests:

- Support for Kabila comes from Angola (wanting to avoid attacks by UNITA), Namibia (allied with Angola), Zimbabwe (for mining and agricultural advantages and to show its power vis-à-vis South Africa), Sudan (of which the enemy (RDC) of its own enemy (Uganda) is its friend), as well as Hutu or affiliated (Mayi-Mayi) militias.

- The forces opposed to Kabila come from Uganda (whose troops plunder the riches of the RDC), Rwanda (opposed to Hutus related to Kabila), Burundi (linked to Rwanda), as well as from militias (the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, RCD-Goma, RCD-ML).

The stakes are of an ethnic order (Hutus against Tutsis), or hegemonic (Zimbabwe against South Africa and Uganda), or relate to policy or internal struggles (UNITA against the MPLA, the support of UNITA for Lissouba against the support of the MPLA for Sassou Nguesso in the Congo). There is a great risk of the conflict spreading further afield. The headlong rush of Mugabe in Zimbabwe towards economic bankruptcy led to the occupation of land by veterans of the war of independence, with the approval of the majority of blacks in South African townships. This can destabilise communities in the country.

Conflicts during the Cold War, characterised by ideological oppositions and the support of the major blocs, were succeeded by many forms of guerrilla warfare, to a greater extent taking place between Africans after the withdrawal of the major powers. The increase in the numbers of conflict zones in Africa is also the result of the resurgence of ethnic, religious or nationalist identities, the failure of legally constituted states and collapsing sovereignties, the interference of regional and international powers and a globalisation of international criminal organisations. Guerrilla wars depend on external support, preying on external production or assistance or on the capture of natural resources. There can also be synergy between guerrilla movements, for example, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone paid Charles Taylor a levy on diamonds which passed through Liberia to be exported to Europe.[2]

The economic factors of war

The causes of conflicts are found on various levels, among others:

- *local*: competition for limited land or for water;
- *national*: ethnic or political conflicts;
- *regional*: ties between political parties and regional support; and
- *international*: links with Mafia-type international networks.

The explanatory factors have to do with the political interests of the various powers, with perceptions of image, the stubborn assertion of identities, and with economic interests. All wars

do not have an economic cause, but all need financing. War can have the political aim of acceding to power by force or it can result from a profit motive. Many wars in Africa are related to the control of riches (diamonds, oil and drugs), to plundering or to the search for protection subject to remuneration. They rely on poverty and unemployment for the recruitment of militias. The opportunistic cost of war is less because youthful populations are unemployed and without resources. Wars are greatly facilitated by the widespread traffic in light weapons: among these the recycling and sale of surplus weaponry by the Eastern European countries.

Of course, these economic factors only apply under certain political conditions: the absence of a legally constituted state, the collapsing sovereignty of states, and the lack of democratic rules. Usually, authoritarian powers with little legitimacy control the security forces. This leads, in the absence of democratic debate, to armed struggles between opposing groups, resulting in a cycle of violence ending in the militarisation of society. This process can be fuelled from outside, through financing provided by other states or companies (notably mining or oil companies).

At a more basic level, African societies form part of *an informal world economy or a world without law*.[3] The globalisation in progress, which presents economic growth opportunities linked to the lifting of barriers, also leads to the rise of mafia economies and sales of weapons facilitated by the breakdown of communist countries, as well as drug-trafficking and money-laundering. Africa forms part of this international parallel economy that is, at the same time, a source for the accumulation of wealth and a contributing factor to conflicts and the disintegration/reconstitution of states. Diamonds, drugs and oil become products of trafficking before being 'laundered' in international networks. Conflicts result from the interdependence between the control of illicit products, the purchase of weapons, the mobilisation of militias and links with the international business world. Access to mining or oil riches leads to the 'straddling' between positions of power and positions associated with the accumulation of wealth.[4]

Table 1: Military expenditure and debt of African countries involved in war					
	% Military expenditure/GDP		Debt/GDP	Annual growth rate GNP per person	
	1985	1995	1995	1965-80	1980-93
Angola	225	4.8		0.6	
Burundi	3.0	5.0	114	2.4	0.9
Guinea Bissau	5.7	3.0	341	2.7	2.8
Eritrea		5.7			
Ethiopia	17.9	2.1	110	0.4	
Mozambique	22.5	3.7	450	0.6	-1.5
Rwanda	1.9	4.4	165	1.6	-1.2
Sierra Leone	1.0	5.7	187	0.7	-1.5
"Source: UNDP, Human development report 1997, United Nations Development Programme, New York, 1997."					

The economic effects of war and conflict

War has a high cost in terms of military expenditure and foreign debt. Table 1 shows some indicators for African countries at war. In 1999, Angola spent US $900 million of oil revenues for the purchase of military equipment. Zimbabwe and Uganda are bled dry by war. The economic bankruptcy of Zimbabwe has resulted in an inflation rate of 60%, a break with the Bretton Woods institutions and a headlong rush likely to lead to a large-scale exodus of white farmers

and a brain-drain. In Ethiopia, the cost of the war with Eritrea has been estimated at US $1 million per day.

Wars directly affect African economies. They lead to the destruction or the depreciation of physical resources (infrastructure, equipment), human resources and social resources based on trust and the rules or networks of relations.

The debate over long-term effects

In certain cases, war may appear to be a means of creating states, of making primitive acquisitions and of constituting the basis for the later productive accumulation of territories.[5] European nation-states were constituted, to a large extent, by means of war: 'the state makes war, war makes the state'. African societies find themselves on a long historical trajectory, unconnected to the present world.

Conversely, it can be considered that, in African states, wars are essential factors in economic underdevelopment, not only because of the resulting destruction of people or goods, but also because of the state of insecurity among economic agents. These factors result in widespread migrations and large numbers of refugees. They contribute to the proliferation of diseases such as Aids. They lead to insecurity about property rights and access to primary goods. Plundering escalates. A war is rather a factor in the disintegration of states. Today, wars have become internationalised through their weaponry, their alliances and their stakes. In a globalised universe, it cannot be assumed that the withdrawal of the old imperial powers leaves a clear field for an African history set outside of world time, erasing the period of colonisation and the artificiality of borders. Wars are also indicative of wheeling and dealing, vote-catching and a neo-patrimonial attitude that bind Africa's internal policies with more or less Mafia-style foreign relations.

The insecurity of people and goods and economic growth

Economic factors in African growth

For a long period, the per capita income of sub-Saharan Africa has stagnated, despite the marked differences between the region's 50 countries. The weak economic growth can be explained by a range of *economic factors*. In the long term, the determinants of African economic growth are interest rates on savings, the capacity for imports and improvements in productivity through various factors. Interest rates on savings of around 13% are limited by short-term performance, high insecurity, and the failure of financial systems. It is estimated that more than 40% of African savings are reinvested elsewhere. *Capacity for imports* is a function of the growth and diversification of exports. However, more than 90% of Africa's exports remain basic products with unstable and regressive prices in the long term. The *improvement in productivity factors* is inhibited by inefficiency in the allocation of resources, and the limited role given to the mastery of technology or to training and the use of skills.[6]

The role of security and the institutional environment

It is, however, necessary to take into account, besides these economic factors, questions around the institutional environment and insecurity. Economists have rediscovered obvious results, namely that military conflicts or civil wars, the failure of institutions, natural catastrophes and the absence of personal security or property rights play a determining role in weak African growth.

African economies are particularly vulnerable to *natural catastrophes, whether they are epidemiological, political or military*. These modify both rules and roles. Crises generally result in a marked differentiation between agents implementing survival practices, who accept to enter the cycle of debt and decapitalisation, and the 'sharks' or speculators with opportunist strategies. These processes can only be avoided if there are systems in place for self-insurance and to cover risks through binding credit, and security that is assured by private or public collective organisations.

The absence of a *security system* or of *social protection* encourages old-age insurance taken care of by children, or the mobilisation of a youthful labour force in an urban or rural environment, and thus a strong demographic growth that can create emergent effects on a collective level.

The absence of land security (property rights) is, at the same time, a way of managing extensive systems, of controlling migratory flows (the land is held by those who exploit it) and an obstacle to the intensification of agriculture. Land conflicts have been increasing both because land is more scarce — "the time of finished space starts in Africa"[z] — and because of the repurchasing of land that has become transferable, for example, in Côte d'Ivoire, the exodus of 25 000 citizens of Burkina Faso following the reinstitution of ancestral rights to land by the Kroumen.

The absence of the means to fight against generalised epidemics such as Aids leads to *medical insecurity* with devastating effects. Africa accounts for 86% of Aids deaths (13.7 million) and 70% of the affected population in the world (23.3 million). Is it necessary to recall that 99% of the money spent on Aids benefits 5% of the infected population (in western countries), or that the cost of AZT for the 4 million HIV-positive individuals in South Africa would represent 10 times the annual health budget?

Besides the human dramas (4 million orphans in Africa), Aids has economic and social consequences. It contributes, in particular, to the decapitalisation of the élite. It is the active and best qualified persons who are the most affected. Figures of 25% HIV-positive individuals are quoted for public officials in Côte d'Ivoire or for employees of the Eskom company in South Africa.

Table 2: Life expectancy at birth with or without Aids (years)*		
	With	Without
1985-1990	42.9	50.2
2000-2005	47.4	56.4
2010-2015	52.6	60.4
* 29 African countries most affected by HIV/Aids		

The collapse of states precludes the elementary means of social survival (security, respect for property rights, the provision of collective services) resulting in civil society taking charge (at best), or the installation of a predatory economy.

The impact of insecurity on African growth

Certain econometric studies such as that of Easterly and Levine, introduced ethnic divisions and

conflicts as a determining factor of weak African growth.[8] They are based on debatable methods, however, by assuming the number of ethnic groups to be a factor contributing to possible crises. Thus, Burundi or Rwanda, which are bi-ethnic, are seen as homogeneous and stable.

Work on the *country risk* introduces political risks as a determining factor for exporters and investors and as a constituent of the business climate, together with financial and business environment risks.[9]

The analysis has to be taken further. Instability and unrest create probability risks and uncertainty for the parties involved. There is uncertainty about the endurance of reforms. Theoretically diversified risks are not in fact so, because of the real risks of spreading and of false representations being extended to contrasting African situations (Afro-pessimism). Risks that can be anticipated by players are *coups d'état*, natural catastrophes and health risks. False representations, the result of Afro-pessimism, lead to pessimistic expectations that do not relate to real risks. The resulting short-term attitudes are obstacles to growth and economic development. In a risk context, agents prefer reversible solutions (option value), have a strong preference for liquidity, choose 'exit' solutions (of people or capital) and seek a rapid rate of return on capital. Uncertainty results in a lack of training and capitalisation.[10] Insecurity and the risks of war are important reasons for weak foreign investment in Africa (1% of the world's direct investments), whereas the rates of return on capital are the highest in the world (29%). The historical studies of north showed that the security of property rights was one of the determining factors of growth.

Links between the insecurity of states, goods and people: Food insecurity and famine

The inadequate satisfaction of fundamental needs or the lack of access to 'primary goods' — in accordance with the meaning of Sen, "goods that any man is supposed to want": freedom, education, health and food[11] — result in varying degrees from the two levels of insecurity discussed previously, namely states of war and the insecurity of people linked to institutional weaknesses and failures. The case of food insecurity serves as an example.

How are food insecurity and famine explained?

Famines in Africa are numerous, even though there are surpluses of food in the world today. There were precolonial famines, for example, in the empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai. Recent famines affected Ethiopia (1972/74, 1984/85), the Sahel (1973-74), Madagascar (1986), Sudan (1998), Lesotho (1983/85), Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger, Angola, and the former Zaïre, Uganda, Somalia (1992) and Liberia.[12]

There are several related factors that transform pockets of malnutrition into a nutritional catastrophe. There can be insufficient food availability due, in particular, to climatic variables or to a lack of creditworthy demand following a drop in income or a rise in food prices. There is generally a loss of rights as these result from factors such as purchasing power, public redistribution, or membership of social groups with associated rights and obligations. Malnutrition or famines can also result from the political actions of certain groups. States involved in conflict or guerrilla wars suffer more easily from famines. Warlords sow terror and seek to eliminate opposing groups by starving them; thus, in Somalia, after having starved the population by destroying peasant food production, these warlords plundered or blocked food aid initiatives in order to create famines.

In the case of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa in 2000, the combination of drought (three years without rain), the cost of the war with Eritrea, the pro-crisis role of Ethiopian governmental authorities (or at least their wait-and-see attitude) towards the marginalised ethnic nomads of the Ougaden, and the logistic difficulties related to conflicts, exacerbated food scarcity. Food blockades were always used as a weapon against enemies or minorities. African famines are the main consequence of political and military factors. Natural causes play a limited role today in comparison with human factors.

But, it is also important to take into account the strategies of the great international powers. It is recognised that the United States played a role in the Ethiopian famines by using food as a weapon to bring down the Marxist government, even though this government had wanted a rapid transformation of the social links with production which, as in many communist regimes, had created famines.

Faced with the same events of drought and falling production, a differentiation can be made, in the 1980s, between the *proactive* strategies of Botswana, the *reactive* strategies of Kenya and the *inactive* strategies of Ethiopia, Sudan, Madagascar (1986), Mali and Mozambique.

Famine thus appears to be a *systemic risk* resulting from a combination of factors:

> *temporary:* related to exogenous shocks such as natural catastrophes and politico-military conflicts, resulting in a major disturbance of the system;

> *structural:* related to the *underdevelopment* of food systems and the vulnerability of social systems, characterised by the vulnerability and exposure to food risk of the population due to insufficient availability, the failure of markets or the absence of rights;

> *institutional:* characterised by the absence of or defective information, prevention and regulation systems, manifested in uncontrolled spreading effects; and

> *political:* characterised by the absence or failure of strategic options: a pro-crisis attitude among the military, politicians or speculators, or the indifference, incompetence and passivity of unconcerned leaders.

Possible routes to solutions

The solutions are obviously complex and varied. Decision-making processes can seek to limit the catastrophe, to help the victims, or to avoid new crises. The parties involved can be negative (pro-crisis) passive (accepting), reactive (firefighting), preactive (anticipating), proactive (acting in advance to obtain the desired results) or interactive (guiding the interrelationships of events).

Safety can obviously not result from security measures that deal with the symptoms only and not with the causes of violence and conflicts. Possible solutions differ according to the applicable level: international conflicts, lack of legal states or systemic risk in a given sector. It can thus be considered that there is a *hierarchy of safety requirements* at the international level: the right to personal safety and universal human rights, social rights of access to primary goods which take on various forms according to specific societies, and individual property rights.

Figure: Process of systemic crisis

Shocks Drought Conflict	Crisis	Food system Production Consumption Intermediation logistics	Vulnerability	Social system Entitlement Capabilities Social relations
Failure		**Strategic options** Pro-crisis Inactive Reactive Proactive Interactive		
		Institutional system of prevention and regulation		

A differentiation is made between several modes of intervention at various levels.

The establishment of information systems, democratic rules and citizenship

Information plays an essential role in preventing or limiting crises. Due to the spread of conflicts since the end of the Cold War, and more numerous conflict zones or crisis areas, universal watchdogs have become insufficient. Zones of 'limited chaos' remain *terrae incognitae*. It is necessary to decentralise the means of observation. There are watchdogs, alarm signals or alert warnings that announce the imminence of catastrophes. It is relatively easy today with existing information systems to foresee the majority of catastrophes. The zones at risk are known. On the other hand, linkages between the circles of experts and the political decisionmakers remain missing.

Democracy can be considered as the form of government that limits the insecurity of people, such as that posed by the risk of famine. The functioning of an opposition and the transparency of information are essential. One of the reasons why a democracy reduces famine is that, according to the well-known maxim, no one would like to be in the place of one who dies of hunger. Political rights are necessary to satisfy needs and especially to express them. The social area must be transparent in order to defend the weakest. The 'voice' in the sense of Hirschman is essential to avoid famines. But the exercise of democracy is often limited to wealthy countries. Democracy results from rights acquired through struggle and agreements accepted by stakeholders. It is not imposed on societies from outside. It presupposes, in Africa, the establishment of political parties, associations and civil society organisations that permit citizens to participate actively.

The public opinions of industrialised countries are today flooded with information, yet inadequately informed about with many issues. They bear the miseries of the world more or less with compassion and, at best, delegate the responsibility to act to charitable or humanitarian organisations. They accept that government aid for development dropped sharply since 1990 and that it currently accounts for 0.22% of GDP against a stated objective of 0.7%. Opinionmakers, associations and political parties have a great responsibility to support an international citizenship.

The international question of regulating a 'world without law'

The most important action required to reduce insecurity in Africa relates to the regulation of a world without law. The measures imply negotiations about international public property and about systems of compliance with rules and standards. The scope extends from the control of offshore financiers, to traffickers in illicit products (drugs) or legal products controlled by mafias, including the trade in weapons. The numbers of international players have multiplied: societies, governments, representatives of civil society. Procedural issues and questions around jurisprudence are paramount in the absence of world government. International negotiations must take into account the interdependence of decision levels and the *web of hierarchies* in the decisionmaking processes.

International co-operation is essential, in particular, to limit the traffic in weapons, to control the trade in products that finance war (diamonds, oil and drugs), and to control offshore organisations linked to mafia-type economies. These agreements can be based on the model of the moratorium on the import, export and manufacture of light weapons signed by eight countries of West Africa in March 1997, or on that of the agreements signed within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Countries that export weapons, for example, could prohibit sales to debt-ridden countries that benefit from measures employed in poor, very indebted nations (PPTE).

In a world where the weight of multinational private corporations prevails over that of states, negotiations must also relate to codes of conduct of those involved in oil, diamonds, finance or the production of weapons.

The regional question of interdependencies and crossinterests

The implementation of joint projects, the creation of regional institutions and the facilitation of regional flows of trade, work and capital and thus of economic interdependencies are different means of facilitating dialogue and circumventing political antagonisms. Thus, in East Asia, the open and mainly uninstitutionalised play of interests across reticular regionalism is a manner of surpassing the very high degree of latent conflicts in a zone in the process of a huge arms build-up. Of course, there are regional players that exert polarising pressures and constitute hegemonic powers. The point is that these powers (Côte d'Ivoire within the ECOWAS or South Africa within SADC) should carry out their obligations with respect to the member states of the regional unions.

The legal state and the implementation of democracy

For many positivist or realist political analysts, but also for economists supportive of the idea of 'public choice', the state is defined by policy and by policymakers. In the case of neo-patrimonialists, ways are found around the rules or to make money. On the other hand, for economic analysts with a normative conception of a legal-rational state (according to Weber), or a benevolent state taking responsibility for the collective (Keynes), the institutionalised capacity of the state implies a separation of institutions and of those in power ('to obey rules so as not to obey people').

The responsibility for preventing and ending armed confrontations and for seeking peaceful solutions falls primarily on states, and regional and international organisations. The imposition of conditions for aid in support of a democratic approach and the establishment of legal states are obviously some of the answers to the prevention of conflicts.

The assumption of responsibility for the collective can also be ensured through a contract

involving civil society and the private sector with a schedule of conditions. There is also an obligation on government authorities to allow humanitarian organisations to respond to catastrophes if these authorities do not have the means to do so. The right to interfere has become a necessity in view of the deficiencies of legal states. Recently, national and international networks of private associations for international solidarity and assistance to victims have been formed. According to Jacques Forster:

> "*Humanitarian* action cannot be the continuation of political action by other means. It should neither be substituted for, nor be integrated into policy. The responsibility of the State in the humanitarian field is to promote, support and give the means to act to the impartial and independent humanitarian institutions."[13]

The point therefore is to build up democracy by increasing the number of decisionmaking authorities and opposition powers, accepting differences and managing different communities bound by the same social contract.

The rights of people

There are three principal opposing concepts relating to the rights of people:

> With the liberal concept, the *right to do* dominates. The only limit to freedom is what harms others. The right to private property is given priority. The market and democracy are supposed to answer to the preferences of individuals. The *liberals* promote the effectiveness of the market as a means to satisfy needs and, in particular, to avoid food crises. The free play of the market is supposed to result in a normal price. If there is competition between the 'monopolisers', their interest lies in stabilising prices by selling at a high price while buying at a low price. Market prices motivate producers. These lead to normal consumption. In the case of shocks, foreign trade is the best regulator. Interventionist policies can be poorly informed. The role of the state is to ensure the safety of goods and people and to permit the free flow of exchanges.

> According to the *collectivist* concept, the *right to have* dominates. Formal rights must be differentiated from real rights; there are also social rights. It is the state's role to satisfy fundamental nutritional, educational or medical needs.

> With the *social interaction or contractual* concept the *rights between* the agents dominate. Rights are credits in society which depend on social organisation and the capacity of citizens to exert their rights. According to Rawls, primary needs must be satisfied because of the veil of uncertainty. What is right is seen as independent from what is good, hence the priority given to procedure.[14]

Rights in social states can be placed in a hierarchical order as follows:

> rights to fundamental freedoms;

> inequalities arranged for the greatest advantage of the least privileged and for the advantage of those immediately above the most impoverished or the principle of *différence*; and

> equal opportunities.

If the case of *food security* is examined, security mechanisms are necessary for the most

vulnerable groups that are excluded from the market. Where there is a risk of famine, emergency measures impose themselves: aid, work programmes, regulating stocks. Public authorities have an essential role to prevent and to install safety nets. Systems of binding credit, informal micro-finance or decentralised financing systems are able to cover the risks and avoid the process of decapitalisation and debt for the most vulnerable populations.

The aim then is to implement preventive measures to avoid systemic risks and to mobilise the bulk of the participants, starting with information and rapid intervention systems. Of course, in the long term, the disappearance of famine depends on development policies leading to an increase in food availability through greater productivity, as well as an increase in creditworthy demand linked to redistribution policies. But, the fight against exclusion implies social actions in terms of access to credit, and support of popular initiatives.

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Chapter 8
Lesotho: Lessons and challenges after a SADC intervention, 1998
Sehoai Santho

Introduction

The major objective of this paper is to provide a broad overview of the Lesotho crisis of 1998 as a case study of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention in a small vulnerable state in Southern Africa. It illuminates the dilemmas and challenges of peacebuilding and of safeguarding democracy faced by regional supranational institutions. In discussing this case study, some general observations and lessons will be outlined which are relevant to the issues around Security in Africa.

Contextual imperatives for small states

Since its independence in 1966, Lesotho — a small state with a peculiar geopolitical position and features of structural dependence in relation to South Africa — has had to exercise its self-determination and sovereignty within this constraining environment. In this context, Lesotho has faced and continues to face dilemmas of economic and political survival. In determining their survival options, small states have to accept the following given features:

International economic dynamics, particularly in this era of globalisation, do not recognise the greater relative exposure of small states to exogenous economic dynamics which they have a limited capacity to influence, even though these determine economic survival options for small open economies.

The regionalisation process, where states in a subregion form regional blocs for co-operation and integration, has necessitated the creation of supranational frameworks like SADC where countries become stakeholders in the development and security concerns of their neighbours. In essence, given the imperatives of regionalism, the question for small

states is no longer whether they should take part in regionalism, but what kind of regionalism best suits them.2 The major challenge facing these regional institutions is to manage the legacies of dependence and countervail the hegemonic tendencies of big states in the economic and security spheres.

As small states that are, by definition, generally reliant in security and military terms, their capacity to exercise their sovereignty and assert their interests is dependent on a general environment of support and solidarity at the regional and subregional levels. In order to safeguard their vital strategic interests, these states are obliged to become members of regionalised interstate defence and security frameworks. Increasingly, these states are collaborating in enhancing their collective capacity to undertake joint peacekeeping exercises.

The critical insight from the determinants identified above is that exogenous factors play a predominant role in determining the economic and political survival options of small states both at the global and subregional levels.

Lesotho's problems of political consolidation and the sustenance of democracy

In light of the contextual factors identified above, the focus falls below on the specific features of Lesotho which have rendered it open to external intervention.

It is generally accepted that small states are susceptible to risks and threats, both from internal and external sources. Such states have a relatively lower threshold than larger states, given the interaction between size and vulnerability. As a concept, vulnerability is determined by the interaction of identified, crucial factors that determine the survival capabilities of a given small state. The following aspects of vulnerability can be identified for Lesotho:

physical and environmental vulnerability, ie carrying capacity limits due to land scarcity, over-stocking, population pressure, meagre resources and limited livelihood choices;

economic dependence on a dominant neighbour and asymmetrical relationships;

geopolitical vulnerability due to the status of being landlocked in relation to a dominant neighbour; and

weak state institutions and political processes due to legacies of authoritarian and military rule — these weak or soft institutions lack the capacity to manage and contain the pressure and stress of transition to a multiparty democracy and the virulent political contestation between rival parties.

The characteristics outlined above provided the environment that made the transition to multiparty democracy and the consolidation of this fragile democracy so problematic in Lesotho in the period 1993 to 1998. This period was characterised by chronic political instability, failure to manage the process of demilitarisation and civil military relations effectively, as well as intraparty conflicts and political party fragmentation. The role, functions and legitimacy of the electoral management system were severely tested. Hence, from this perspective, the 1998 political crisis over the administration and outcome of the election was the most violent manifestation of a multifaceted political crisis with deep socio-economic roots in a stressed socio-political environment.

In summary, the key elements of this crisis can be outlined as follows:

intense rivalry between élite-dominated political parties over access to state power and state resources within a worsening environment of poverty, unemployment and limited economic options;

structural youth unemployment and social/political exclusions of the youth, except when they are mobilised for short-term ends by belligerent political parties; and

an electoral system that gives unfair advantage to a dominant party in terms of the 'first-past-the-post' system.

The factors outlined above combined to create a volatile situation and a political crisis in the context of protests by aggrieved opposition parties over the 1998 elections.

The situation of chaos and anarchy that ensued precipitated the SADC intervention in August and September 1998.

The SADC intervention and challenges of post-conflict peacebuilding

The specific circumstances that precipitated the SADC intervention aimed at containing a situation of chaos, anarchy and a creeping *coup* in August and September 1998 are well-known and will not be systematically outlined here. General observations of some lessons learned from this episode will be offered.

Lessons of the SADC intervention in Lesotho

The SADC intervention in Lesotho was a case of trial and error in the operationalisation of peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacekeeping strategies in the SADC region, given the mismanagement of the transition from the Front-Line States (FLS) process to the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

There is still a lack of clarity about when SADC states are acting in concert and when one or two SADC member states act unilaterally, or claim to be acting on behalf of SADC.

The legal basis of and justification for responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security in Southern Africa and SADC's particular role in this regard are either vague or non-existent given the current state of affairs around the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

A shared vision about the concept and strategy for promoting collective regional security in Southern Africa remains lacking despite the October 1999 SADC meeting of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and SADC ministers of Foreign Affairs in Swaziland, where the status and role of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security were to be clarified.

Lessons for South Africa

The formulation of the *White paper on South African participation in international peace missions,* approved by the country's cabinet on 21 October 1998, was profoundly influenced by the disastrous intervention in Lesotho in September 1998.

Acknowledgement of the bad experiences/lessons of Operation Boleas by South Africa led to the establishment of the National Office for the Co-ordination of Peace Missions, located within Department of Foreign Affairs but with a seconded officer from the defence and police services.

Lessons for South Africa and Botswana

Dilemmas have been identified in determining the timing of an appropriate exit strategy for the SADC/South Africa/Botswana forces given the uncertainties about the security situation in Lesotho and prospects for a sustainable peace, in light of the current deadlock between the Interim Political Authority, the government of Lesotho and parliament, on preparations for elections in 2000.

The role of Interim Political Authority as a management institution is also in the spotlight in so far as it was an innovative peacebuilding initiative mandated to prepare for elections within 18 months. This period expired in May 2000 without any clear indications and timeframe for the long-awaited elections.

In conclusion a proposal for a post-conflict national peace accord (*Building national peace accord*) has been initiated by the Lesotho Network for Conflict Management, as a contribution by civil society to the process of national peacebuilding.

Proposal for the National Peace Building and Peace Monitoring System for Lesotho

Agreement

On 3 December 1999 the Government of Lesotho and the Interim Political Authority (IPA) signed a historic agreement whose fundamental spirit is to consolidate the country's young democracy, ensure a free and fair electoral contest and commit parties to constructive conflict resolution in the new millennium. His Excellency Chief Emeka Anyauko (Commonwealth Secretary-General), His Excellency Mr Edward Omotoso (United Nations Resident Coordinator) and His Excellency Salim Salim (Organization of African Unity Secretary-General) witnessed this epochal development in a country which is overwhelmingly conflict-ridden. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was represented by its Chairperson, His Excellency President Joachim Chissano of Mozambique, whose country has just recently emerged from a protracted violent conflict and is widely hailed as model for recovery from armed conflict to a stable democracy. It is worth noting that after more than two decades of protracted armed conflict, Mozambique managed to hold free and fair elections in 1994 and 1999, which ensured greater inclusivity and representation within the political system.

The Lesotho Network for Conflict Management (LNCM) would like to take this opportunity to commend all the parties for agreeing to settle their political differences by peaceful rather than by violent means. We believe that conflicts are embedded in all societies and could in fact become a dynamising force for social change. We, are however, cognisant of the stark reality that once conflicts assume violent proportions they are quickly transformed from being constructive to being destructive. Contemporary Lesotho has been engulfed in various forms of conflict, open and hidden, violent and non-violent, short-lived and protracted since its political independence from Britain in 1966. The critical highlights of Lesotho's conflict map include the 1970 forceful seizure of power by the then incumbent party; the 1986 military take-over of government; the 1994 temporary seizure of power by the King; the 1994 and 1995 military

scuffles and police mutiny and the 1998 violent encounter between the ruling party and opposition parties. All these conflict inflicted hefty and immeasurable costs on the poorly endowed Basotho nation. The most recent violent conflict of 1998 alone caused destruction estimated at an astronomic M160 million and rendered about 4000 people unemployed. A reconstruction and rehabilitation programme following this conflict is estimated at R300 million.

The Lesotho Network for Conflict Management (LNCM) is optimistic that the historic Agreement signed between the Government and IPA is a harbinger of constructive management of conflict in Lesotho and essentially heralds a new dawn in Lesotho politics; an era of political stability and tolerance of diverse political views and opinions. The agreement has many important essential elements:

> it introduces an electoral reform from the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) to a 80:50 mixed ratio of FPTOP and Proportional Representation (PR) with a view to expanding representation and ensuring inclusivity in the legislature;

> provides for a general election in 2000 under the administration and supervision of a new and reformulated Independent Electoral Commission (IEC);

> it establishes a Security Liaison Committee which will ensure that security and stability are assured throughout the process before, during and after the election;

> it affirms continued cooperation and mutual trust between the Government and IPA in the run-up to the election;

> it establishes a Joint Committee on the Media to ensure equitable access of all parties to media, especially state-controlled media;

> it establishes a Joint Implementation Committee which will oversee the entire implementation of the Agreement;

> it re-affirms the guarantor status of the Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe in the implementation of the Agreement.

It is our considered opinion that the spirit and letter of this Agreement will inspire all political actors in Lesotho to strive to deepen the country's democracy and political stability. Our politicians must strive to accept each other. They must recognise that their main vocation is to lead the country and assure its prosperity in the new millennium; not to compete in trading deadly political blows at the expense of the country. In all democracies a strong ruling party needs a strong opposition. Without a strong opposition democracy is undermined and ruling parties are easily tempted to drift towards veiled authoritarianism. Even a disruptive tendency under conditions of weak opposition or one-party parliament is common trend towards faction-fighting and ultimate rupture of the ruling party leading inevitably to the destabilization and polarization of the polity.

Summary

LNCM in cooperation with its partners is proposing to assist IPA and stakeholder organisations to formulate a Lesotho National Peace Accord. All parties are called to pledge themselves to support the implementation of the recommendations of the agreements signed between the Government of Lesotho and Interim Political Authority on 3 December 1999.

We give a brief outline of our proposal, which will be followed by detailed explanations if this proposal is approved.

Basic principles of the proposed National Peace Building and Monitoring system for Lesotho – Agreement

Freedom of conscience and belief; freedom of speech and expression; freedom of association with others; freedom of movement; peaceful assembly; peaceful political activity.

Codes of conduct

Political parties

All shall:

> Publicly and repeatedly condemn political violence and encourage political tolerance among their followers.

> Actively discourage and seek to prevent their members from carrying any weapons of any description to any meeting.

> Inform authorities of political events

> Immediately establish effective lines of communication between one another.

> Not apply violence to intimidate or threaten other people.

> Not use language calculated or likely to incite violence.

Securiy forces and the police

Provisions

The police shall:

> Endeavour to protect the people of Lesotho in a rigorously non-partisan fashion.

> Endeavour to prevent crimes and attempt to arrest and investigate all those reasonably suspected

> Be guided by a belief that they are accountable to society and conduct themselves so as to secure and retain the respect and approval of the public.

> Expect a higher standard of conduct from themselves than from others.

> Exercise restraint and use the minimum force that is appropriate.

> Establish a Police Board comprising members of the public and Lesotho Police Force in equal numbers.

Not allow any operation which undermines, promotes or influences any political party at the expense of another.

Endeavour to see that no dangerous weapons or firearms are possessed, carried or displayed by members of the public at any political gathering, procession or meeting.

Code of conduct: police and armed forces

All police officials accept that:

Their authority and power are dependent upon and subject to public approval.

Any offence or alleged offence by any member of the Police or the Armed Forces shall be thoroughly investigated and appropriate measures shall be taken.

Public favour and approval be sought by enforcing the law firmly, sensitively and with constant and absolute impartiality, giving effective and friendly service, reacting as quickly as possible to requests, and encouraging police-community relationship.

The least possible degree of force shall be used, and then only when persuasion, advice and warnings have failed to secure cooperation.

A condensed guide to the National Peace Building and Monitoring system for Lesotho – Agreement

The Proposed Peace Accord would be an unprecedented social contract, demanding a peaceful purpose from any single person in the land, backed up by structures to make it work.

It requires negotiation between all the parties and its core provisions are to bring about an end to violence, an inclusive multi-party democracy and social and economic reconstruction, with all signatories monitoring each other. This is a condensed summary of the proposed accord.

Principles

The Peace Accord has two basic aims: to create peace in Lesotho and help in the development of its people and reconstruction of society.

It accepts the principles of freedom of conscience and belief, freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, freedom of movement, peaceful assembly and peaceful political activity.

It creates an enabling environment for peace building, economic reconstruction and socio-economic development in Lesotho.

All the leaders who will sign the agreement are committed to a multi-party democracy for Lesotho, where all the people have the right to vote for their leaders and to hold them responsible for what they do.

People have the right to learn about all different points of view and all political parties. To achieve this, newspapers, radio and television must be free to report and discuss what is going on in the country.

Codes of conduct

How people behave – from individuals in communities to the leaders of the country, political leaders and the security forces – is an important factor in making sure that life is peaceful.

> The Peace Accord will have codes of conduct for political organisations, media agencies, security forces and the police, and will draw commitment from both youth organisations for observance.

> It sets out that political parties and organisations, and their officials, are not permitted to kill, injure, apply violence to, intimidate or threaten any person. It also requires that political parties and organisations give their full assistance to the police in the investigation of violence and help the police arrest offenders.

Security forces

The security forces have a big role to play in making peace. For this to happen, people also need to change their attitude towards the security forces, to put aside antagonism and distrust.

> The security forces must protect all people from criminal acts and must not take sides. They must try to prevent crimes and try to arrest people, who are suspected of committing crimes.

> The security forces are accountable to all of society and people must be able to trust and respect them. They must work together with communities to combat violence, not against them.

> Where force is necessary, they must use as little forces as possible.

Police

For the police, there are more detailed requirements, including special rules for investigating political crimes and regular consultation with local peace committees and community leaders.

> They must serve the community by protecting the people of Lesotho from all criminal acts and acts of political violence, and they must do this without bias against any political belief. The police must talk to local leaders about ways to work together to stop the violence.

Political organizations

To make peace work, influential leaders also have to behave in a responsible way. They cannot talk peace while making war. The Peace Accord has to have a code of conduct for political parties and organisations, which commits them to peaceful behaviour.

> All political parties and organisations must condemn violence publicly and encourage an understanding of democracy and tolerance. They must make sure that they can talk to their members and supporters, wherever they may be, to get this message across.

> People who work for or represent a political party or organization may not kill, injure, intimidate, threaten or be violent towards other people because they do not agree with their political beliefs.

They may not remove, damage, destroy, copy or change anything belonging to another organisation and they may not interfere with anyone travelling to or from a political party meeting.

No one can be forced to join or resign from a political party or organisation, or be forced to go to a meeting, or to give money, if they don't want to.

Political parties and organisations must also help the police in investigating violence and arresting the people involved, and may not protect their members or supporters if they know that they have done something wrong.

Media

The media should recognise their role in peace-building and monitoring, while at the same time they should be afforded freedom of expression. Media should have a self-developed Code of Ethics and in turn monitor adherence to this code.

Youth

Youth are an integral part of the society and should be involved in all decision-making processes. Youth are prospective future leaders of this country and as such, they should conduct themselves in ways that reflect this. Youth, through their structures, whether political, religious or otherwise, will pay a big role in peace monitoring and peace building.

Churches

Basotho are a highly religious nation and as such, churches play a big role in influencing the conduct of their constitution. Churches, church leaders and church workers should strive to unite Basotho and monitor this peace. It is the obligation of the church as the messengers of Jesus.

Dangerous weapons

The Peace Accord should also have rules for people going to public meetings and rallies or marches. No one may carry or show any weapons or gun and police may take away any illegal weapons they find.

Commission of inquiry

It is important that incidents of violence or intimidation are investigated and brought to an end. The Peace Accord will allow for this in the Commission of Inquiry into the prevention of Violence and Intimidation, where people can give evidence about what has happened to them or things they have seen.

The Commission, chaired by credible judicial authority, must find out the causes of the violence and tell the government what must be done to stop it. Anyone can give evidence without his or her name being made known.

Special courts

The peace Accord also allow for special courts to deal with the people causing violence, and for

justices of the peace to be appointed to act as peacemakers in their communities. The people appointed to those positions must be trusted, respected and well liked.

Socio-economic reconstruction and development concerns

It is important to give serious attention to the multi-faceted aspects of addressing the challenges of poverty, youth unemployment and development that Lesotho faces in the short, medium and long term period. The bedrock of sustaining democracy is a national development strategy that provides sustainable livelihood for all Basotho.

Structures and how they work

National level

National Peace Committee

> A "council of leaders" meets to make sure the Peace Accord works and to resolve disputes. All decisions are taken by consensus.

National Peace Secretariat

> Four people from the LNCM, one person from IPA, one person from Lesotho Council of NGOs and one person from the IEC co-ordinate District and local peace committees funded by IPA.

Commission of inquiry

> A permanent commission investigates the nature and causes of violence, identifies those responsible and recommends action to the Prime minister and IPA.

District level special criminal courts

> Special criminal courts to deal with unrest cases quickly and effectively, without delay. District dispute resolution committees

> Representatives from political organisations, community-based organisations, business and security forces attend to matters causing violence at local district level.

Each has an officer registering complaints of misconduct against the police.

Local dispute resolution committees

> Representatives who are aware of the needs of the community create trust between local leaders (including local police commanders) and settle disputes causing violence. The committee reports to the regional peace committee.

The National Peace Building and Peace Monitoring system – Agreement

National Peace Secretariat

Members

14 representatives of the Government and political parties.

Responsibilities

  The establishment of district and local peace committees
  Liaison with international observers
  Community building
  Appointment of justices of the peace accord.

National Peace Committee

Members

  National Peace Building and Peace Monitoring Agreement signatories.

Responsibilities

  Codes of conduct
  Defence Force Police
  Complaints of contravention
  Reconstruction and development
  Community-building revolving around transgression disputes.

National Peace Commission

Members

  Five or more commissioners drawn from the legal fraternity.

Responsibilities

  To investigate cases of violence and intimidation.

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Chapter 9
Peace promotion in the Great Lakes Region: Regional and international responses to conflict in the DRC
Mark Malan

Introduction

On 24 January 2000, the UN Security Council's *Month of Africa* debate reached its climax with a day-long meeting on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The meeting was addressed by no less than seven African heads of state, nine ministers and the secretaries-general of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity. The UN Secretary-General concluded that:

  "The 'Month of Africa' was a success not merely in drawing attention to the persistence of many of the [African] region's long-running conflicts, but in giving a

push to actual peace efforts. The real test now is for the momentum to be sustained."[1]

If the real test lies in sustaining the momentum towards peace in African countries that have been plagued for years by pernicious armed conflicts, then the acid test must be the case of the DRC. But, is there even an outside chance of resolving this particular conflict — described by Madeleine Albright as Africa's first "world war"[2] — through the medium of multilateral intervention?

The root causes of this conflict are both deep and wide, and it is being sustained by a web of intrigue that involves a multiplicity of key players acting in pursuit of diverse political, security and pecuniary interests. The brief of this paper is not to address these issues in any detail, but rather to look at the symptoms of the current malaise and to comment on the regional and international 'medicine' that has been prescribed to doctor it.

Allies and enemies

Kabila's accession to the presidency of the DRC on 17 May 1997 was not a typical palace *coup*, but a non-constitutional transfer of political power. His advance on the capital and the seat of power began on the periphery, with the capture of Bukavu and Goma, the major towns on Zaïre's eastern border with Rwanda. This was no accident, as Kabila's Democratic Alliance for the Liberation of Congo-Zaïre (ADFL) was initially dominated by Tutsis and supported by the Tutsi-dominated governments of Rwanda and Burundi. Kabila did not come to power in the DRC as the leader of a genuine Congolese rebellion. He was rather the local frontman for what was essentially a foreign legion.

In September 1996, Banyamulenge (Zaïrian Tutsi) rebels, many of whom had served with their kinspeople in the Rwandan army, were prompted by Zaïrian persecution (and their foreign backers' anticipation of an increase in Hutu militia and former Rwandan army attacks from their bases in the refugee camps of Eastern Zaïre) to launch an offensive against Mobutu's soldiers. The essential aim of this operation, carried out with the support and direct participation of Rwanda, Burundi and later also Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, was to dislodge the massive refugee settlements and thus dislocate the military preparations of the exiled Hutus. In Uganda's case, the motive was to disrupt the logistic co-operation offered to Sudan in its support for insurgent groups such as the West Bank Nile Front, the Lord's Resistance Army and Tabliq militia, which continued to torment north-east Uganda.

This originally limited operation extended itself by default, as the 'rebel forces' discovered that Mobutu's state was so fragile that few could be found to defend it with their lives. Indeed, much of the defence of Zaïre was undertaken by forces loaned by UNITA's Jonas Savimbi, who had a direct interest in succouring his old ally. By the same token, Angolan government forces intervened in the west of the country to ensure the rebel's victorious advance on Kinshasa.

Once in power, Kabila found himself in a quandary. The Banyamulenge-dominated People's Democratic Alliance, which formed the bulk of his fighting forces, was generally unpopular outside Kivu. Yet, its importance within Kabila's overarching ADFL made it essential for its leaders to be appointed to prominent positions in the new government, including the ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paul Karaha) and of Presidential Affairs (Deogratias Bugera). From these positions of strength, and with the tacit support of the Rwandan officers brought in to train and command a reformed army, the Tutsi faction was able to obstruct any tendency to broaden the political support base of the new regime.

Perhaps even more threatening to Kabila than his failure to secure wider support from established political figures elsewhere in the country, was his gradual alienation of key sponsors. Uganda was upset by his apparently cordial relations with Sudan and, together with Rwanda, became increasingly critical of his inability to carry out his part of the pact by preventing rebel incursions through the Kivu and Haut-Zaïre regions.

The deterioration of Kabila's relations with Rwanda and Uganda, and pressures from other elements within the ADFL, persuaded him that his excessive reliance on Tutsis, whether of Congolese or Rwandan origin, was unwise. Kabila responded by ordering Rwandan troops to leave the country, and began a purge of the army command to reduce Banyamulenge influence. At this point, Karaha and Bugera left the country, the former soon to join a rebellion initiated by Banyamulenge-dominated regiments in Kivu on 2 August 1998.

Initially, it appeared that the rebellion might repeat the pattern established by the 1996-97 insurgency, with rebel forces advancing across the country from their bases in the east. In a bold move, however, the rebel alliance flew troops across the country to the western seaboard, where they recruited the assistance of a number of soldiers of Mobutu's old army, encamped at Kitona and awaiting integration in the new Congolese army. Thus reinforced, they quickly seized Muanda and the port of Banana before moving on Matadi, the riverport supplying Kinshasa. In the east, rebel forces quickly established a hold on Goma and Bukavu before advancing on Kisangani, the country's third largest city.

Faced with a rapidly deteriorating military situation, Laurent Kabila denounced the rebellion as an invasion by Uganda and Rwanda, and sought to mobilise the Congolese around an anti-Tutsi banner. Having failed to establish a broad national following, this tactic was his only means to secure his short-term survival, though its consequences have still to be reckoned in terms of lives and its impact on recreating the country as an entity. He also appealed to other members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to come to the assistance of a fellow SADC state under external threat.[3]

Regional and international efforts at peace promotion

President Mugabe responded to the plea by convening, on 7-8 August 1998, a regional summit at Victoria Falls to discuss the crisis. The presidents of Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Rwanda, Zambia and the DRC attended. Little emerged from the summit, however, beyond the airing of mutual recriminations. On 17-18 August, the defence ministers of Angola, Zambia, Namibia and Zimbabwe met in Harare, agreeing that the government of Laurent Kabila would require the full support of SADC to guarantee its survival. Mugabe, speaking in his capacity as head of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security announced that the meeting had agreed that military aid should be sent to secure Kabila's position. Zimbabwe followed up by dispatching troops to help with Kabila's defence, assisted by Angola and later Namibia.

South Africa remained aloof from the fray, with the SADC chairperson, Nelson Mandela, espousing the need for dialogue and a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Mandela publicly reprimanded Mugabe for his inflammatory talk, and called upon SADC countries rather to work on a peaceful settlement. He convened an emergency summit of SADC leaders in Pretoria on 23 August 1998. The leaders present decided to confirm their recognition of the legitimacy of the government of the DRC and to call for an immediate cease-fire, to be followed by political dialogue on a peaceful settlement to the crisis. The meeting mandated President Mandela, as chairperson of SADC, to organise a cease-fire in consultation with the OAU Secretary General.

Calls for a cease-fire proved patently premature. On 26 August, the rebel forces made their first attempt to probe Kinshasa's defences from the south-west. Defensive artillery fire caused a substantial number of casualties among the civilian population in the sprawling informal settlements around the city. The following day, the axis of the rebel penetration into Kinshasa shifted to the north-east, with Angolan, Zimbabwean and Namibian forces committed to the defence of the city and its airport. This deployment proved crucial in warding off the rebel offensive in the west, causing the rebel forces to withdraw, and arguably averting a humanitarian disaster.

On 3 September, President Mandela surprised observers by announcing at a press conference that SADC had unanimously supported the military intervention by its member states in the DRC.[4] While this turnaround may have been designed to present a façade of subregional unity, there may also have been an expectation of reciprocity should South Africa ever overstep the mark (as in Lesotho). Whatever the reasons, the Durban announcement was substantiated at the 18th SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Mauritius on 13 and 14 September 1998. The Summit "welcomed initiatives by SADC and its Member States intended to assist in the restoration of peace, security and stability in DRC, in particular the Victoria Falls and Pretoria initiatives." Importantly, the SADC leaders "commended the Governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe for timeously providing troops to assist the Government and people of DRC."[5]

The Summit also appointed Zambian President Frederick Chiluba to lead mediation efforts in the DRC, assisted by the presidents of Tanzania and Mozambique.

By this stage, the UN Security Council had issued several presidential statements calling for an end to hostilities in the DRC. But it was only on 9 April 1999 that the Council decided to put some weight behind the peace process by agreeing on Resolution 1234. The resolution demanded "*an immediate halt to the hostilities*" and called for:

> "an all-inclusive process of political dialogue with a view to achieving national reconciliation and to the holding on an early date of democratic, free and fair elections …"[6]

A tall order indeed, but this is typical of the formula that has been applied in 'new generation' peace missions. Of course, the Security Council also expressed its support for the regional peacemaking initiatives under way, and called upon the international community to continue to support these efforts. These efforts were given impetus with the inauguration of Thabo Mbeki as South Africa's new president. A meeting held in Pretoria on 17 June 1999 brought together leaders from the 14 SADC member countries, as well as Rwanda, Uganda, Libya and Kenya. This meeting paved the way for a DRC summit which was scheduled for 25 June in Lusaka with the purpose of signing a cease-fire agreement.

The long awaited Lusaka summit was subject to several lengthy delays, as the preceding meeting of foreign ministers struggled to reach agreement on the technicalities of a draft cease-fire agreement. Eventually, on 10 July 1999, the agonising Lusaka process gave birth to a cease-fire agreement which was signed by the leaders of the six states parties to the conflict — but not by the Congolese rebel groups. The agreement provided for the cessation of hostilities within 24 hours of signature, and for the establishment within one week of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) for the purpose of overseeing the implementation of the agreement until such time as a UN peacekeeping force could be deployed. The accord also provided for the

initiation of an inter-Congolese dialogue on the political future of the DRC.[7]

Although very much a 'home-grown' agreement and the product of a regional peacemaking process, the Lusaka cease-fire accord placed a heavy burden of expectancy on a UN peacekeeping force. It also envisaged a number of 'peace enforcement' operations, including:

> the tracking down and disarming of armed groups;[8]

> screening mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war criminals; and

> handing over suspected *genocidaires* to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Chiluba cautioned that the signing of the accord would not automatically bring peace to the DRC and called on the UN Security Council to approve the deployment of a peacekeeping force "with a mandate commensurate to the task at hand."[9]

The cease-fire was due to come into place within 24 hours of the signing of the agreement (commonly interpreted as 31 August 1999, when the RCD signed). The JMC, representing all the signatories, was established under the cease-fire agreement to regulate and monitor the cessation of hostilities until the deployment of UN and OAU military observers. It was also to be responsible, together with the military observers, for peacekeeping functions until the deployment of a UN force.[10]

Five days after the states parties signed the Lusaka agreement, on 15 July 1999, the Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council that the UN side of the implementation of the cease-fire agreement should be dealt with in three phases of deployment:

> unarmed military liaison officers to the capitals of the signatories and, if the security situation permits, to the rear headquarters of the rebel groups;

> up to 500 military observers inside the DRC; and

> a peacekeeping force.[11]

On 6 August 1999, the Security Council duly approved the deployment of up to 90 military liaison officers to the capitals of the parties to the agreement. Their tasks, as mandated by Security Council Resolution 1258, included:

> assistance to the JMC and the parties in developing modalities for the implementation of the agreement;

> the provision of information to the Secretary-General regarding the situation on the ground; and

> assistance in refining a concept of operations for a possible further role for the UN.[12]

The mission set up its advance headquarters in Kinshasa and deployed military liaison officers in Kinshasa, Kigali, Kampala, Harare and Windhoek. Liaison officers were also sent to Bujumbura, to Lusaka as the provisional seat of the JMC, and to the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa. By January 2000, small teams of up to four liaison officers had managed to deploy to no more than nine locations in the DRC: Kinshasa, Kananga, Kindu, Goma, Boende, Lisala,

Gemena, Gbodolite and Isiro.

The ability of the military liaison officers and the technical assessment team to provide the Secretary-General with an accurate appraisal of the modalities for further UN deployment has been severely limited. The mission has not been able to deploy effectively, and has been prevented from executing its mandate as a result of inadequate security guarantees from the DRC government and differences with Kinshasa on the need for it to deploy UN officers in government-held areas. The UN team's capacity to help the JMC investigate cease-fire violations, make a security assessment of the country, and determine the present and future locations of combatants' positions would require it to deploy throughout the country and at the ill-defined battle fronts.

The ability to observe and report accurately on adherence to the Lusaka agreement is essential to the peace process. Since the end of August 1999, there have been continuous claims and counterclaims of cease-fire violations by both sides, including tank and artillery attacks, ground attacks with support from helicopter gunships, aerial bombing raids, attacks on civilians, territorial advances, troop deployments, blockades, and reinforcements within and across borders. The alleged cease-fire violations have been along and behind the frontlines and geographically widespread, including the provinces of Shaba, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, Equateur and Kivu.

All parties to the conflict (rightly or wrongly) see the UN as the solution to such violations. During the 24 January 2000 Security Council meeting on the DRC there were strident calls by just about every African leader present for the deployment of a 'full-fledged UN peacekeeping mission' without any further delay. In addition to the demand for a sizeable force, no less than six countries called for such a force to be established under Chapter VII of the *UN Charter*. These were the DRC, Mozambique (with Chissano also speaking in his capacity as chairperson of SADC), Zimbabwe (with Mugabe also talking on behalf of SADC), Uganda, Rwanda and Namibia.[13]

The Secretary-General was able to refer to his latest report (17 January 2000) which urges the Security Council to authorise a considerable expansion of the MONUC mission — from the 77 deployed liaison officers to 5 537 military observers and peacekeepers. According to the report, the military tasks of the expanded MONUC force would include military liaison, monitoring the cessation of hostilities, investigating cease-fire violations and verifying the disengagement of the various forces. Annan stressed that the troops:

> "would not serve as an interposition force nor would they be expected to extract military observers of civilian personnel by force. They would not have the capacity to protect civilian personnel from armed attack."[14]

Additional tasks — including facilitating the eventual disarmament and demobilisation of armed groups, and monitoring and verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces — would require the approval of the Council for a larger operation.[15]

The new deployment is basically conceived as an observer mission with formed units in support. The formed units of the expanded MONUC force were not expected to make a direct contribution to the military observers' capacity to monitor and report on troop disengagement and cease-fire violations. However, when the Security Council finally authorised the expanded MONUC mission, on 25 February 2000, it tasked the force to protect UN and JMC personnel, as well as civilians. Operative paragraph 8 of Resolution 1291 states that the Council:

"Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, *decides* that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence."[16]

Past lessons and the future of the DRC peace process

Military hostilities had hardly commenced on 2 August 1998 before the first of a number of increasingly complicated responses to the conflict in the DRC occurred. It can be argued that the UN, along with the OAU and SADC, did too much too early (in the realm of peacemaking), while the enforcement action that was taken by 'SADC Allied Forces' lacked the support of the international community and the subregional body. The 'peacemakers' and the 'peace enforcers' have thus been at odds from the outset, creating a very shaky foundation for the final layer of international response to the conflict — the deployment of UN peacekeepers.

The military intervention by three SADC member states, endorsed *ex post facto* by Summit — gave the impression of a subregional mandate and hence legitimacy to the intervention as an exercise in regional conflict resolution. Indeed, representatives of the SADC allies contend that, if they had not acted speedily and with resolve, then Kinshasa would have been racked by rebel forces, with great loss of civilian lives. But, the SADC heads of state and government never forged consensus around this intervention, and followed the path of peacemaking — including strident calls from a number of quarters for an 'immediate cease-fire' — while a controversial enforcement operation was still under way.

Of course, it is often easier to negotiate a cease-fire than it is to negotiate a more comprehensive political settlement. In Angola for example, a number of cease-fires and peace accords have been brokered by outsiders over the past two decades, only to be broken by the signatories themselves — despite significant international supervision and assistance. The Angolan case highlights the possible negative effects of third-party peacemaking — of pushing belligerents towards an agreement that they do not really want. It also confirms the fact that war-based economies will not disappear with the signing of formal peace agreements and the deployment of international observers and aid agencies. The obvious point to be made is that no one can impose preventive diplomacy, peacemaking or peacebuilding on parties if they are not willing to accept it.

In the DRC, the limits of peacemaking were not recognised. Indeed, despite the contemporary preoccupation with promoting the settlement of intrastate wars at the bargaining table, the record shows that negotiated peace has been a relatively rare outcome.[17] Moreover, too much unco-ordinated peacemaking, implemented too soon, can be counterproductive. The DRC peacemakers seem to have ignored Kofi Annan's report on conflict in Africa, in which the UN Secretary-General clearly states that peacemaking efforts need to be well co-ordinated and prepared. He warns that:

"the failure of the major external actors to maintain a common political approach to an erupting or ongoing crisis is one of the principal impediments to progress towards a solution … it is critically important that international actors avoid the temptation to undertake rival or competing efforts."[18]

The UN's approach of minimising risks though an incremental military deployment to the DRC is perhaps understandable, given the fragile nature of the Lusaka accord and an approach that relies entirely on consent and voluntary compliance by the signatory parties. As Annan puts it, "the political context, as well as the political, military and logistical constraints, justify a step-by-step approach adapted to the situation."[19] On the other hand, the worst way to try to cross a chasm is in small steps.

The incremental approach flies in the face of just about every recommendation of a series of 'lessons learned' seminars that were conducted in the wake of the failed UN missions in Somalia and Rwanda. The most fundamental lesson to emerge from these endeavours is that there must be a clear and achievable mandate backed by sufficient means for its execution. This clearly was not the case with the deployment of military liaison officers, and even the proposed 500 military observers, backed by four battalions with an expanded mandate, will be hard pressed to accomplish much more than their predecessors.

The lessons 'learned' from a succession of failed UN operations in Africa since 1992 all emphasise the fact that, if a peace operation is to be effective, it must be credible and perceived as such. The credibility of the operation is, in turn, a reflection of the parties' assessment of the force's capability to accomplish the mission.[20] At this stage, it is apparent that the parties to the conflict in the DRC have a much higher expectation of UN capabilities than would be provided by the proposed expansion of MONUC, and that the mission will face an immediate credibility crisis.

In this regard, Annan reported to the Security Council that:

> "If the [Lusaka] Agreement is to be carried out as signed, the formidable tasks expected of the United Nations will need to be carefully evaluated. In particular, it will be necessary to reflect on the question of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the armed groups in order to develop a realistic plan of action."[21]

This is the missing link in the Lusaka agreement, as it has been in most of the peace agreements of the 1990s. It appears that the notion of coercive disarmament has been accepted for the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in Sierra Leone — after a number of peacekeepers themselves have recently been disarmed by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels. However, the UN has never been able to get non-consensual micro-disarmament right. The performance of an expanded UNAMSIL may offer some vital clues to the viability of a much larger peace operation in the Congo.

Conclusion

The UN Security Council has been 'shamed' into support for a premature and extremely complicated cease-fire accord in the DRC. The UN is being dragged into a peace mission without any effective preceding enforcement action, without any clear demonstration of a will for peace by the belligerent parties, and without any notion of the eventual (political) endstate of UN engagement.

The challenges are immense — not only for the 500 MONUC observers and their infantry support base, but also for the envisaged follow-on peacekeeping force. The major political challenges to an expanded MONUC are false perceptions and expectations of what it is and what it can do, and denial of freedom of action. The operational challenges are equally daunting, and there can be little comfort in the fact that the Council has equipped an observer mission with

a Chapter VII mandate.

In Kosovo, the UN was dragged into a comprehensive peace mission in a small area of operations in the wake of the most devastating 'peace enforcement' action yet to be launched by the world's most powerful military alliance. The UN mission (UNMIK) still enjoys the security framework provided by ten times more KFOR troops than the total UN troops proposed for the United Nations Observer Mission in the DRC (MONUC) — the latter to be deployed in an area the size of Western Europe. In Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL deployed in a peace support role only after years of heavy enforcement action by ECOMOG forces. In the DRC, SADC's enforcement action was partial and incomplete, and the UN is attempting to deploy without a sound foundation created by coherent and credible regional action.

It will be unwise to hold one's breath and wait for UN peacekeepers to fix the conflict in the DRC. It is unlikely that MONUC will deploy if violations of the Lusaka agreement continue to be the rule rather than the exception. Without MONUC, there is no chance of more robust UN engagement. The ball is already back in the SADC court, with an urgent need to revisit the Lusaka cease-fire agreement. As agonising as this may seem, it should be remembered that it took ECOWAS six years, and intense military engagement, to broker the 14 peace agreements that eventually led to the Liberian elections of July 1997.[22] There is no reason to expect that the DRC conflict is amenable to a quicker fix than this.

Notes

1. IRIN Interview with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, New York, 1 February 2000.

2. In her address to the Security Council meeting on the DRC on 24 January 2000.

3. R Cornwell & J Potgieter, Africa Watch: A Large Peace of Africa?, _African Security Review 7(6)_, 1998, pp 74-86.

4. UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) for Central and Eastern Africa, _Update_ 494, 3 September 1998.

5. _Final communiqué of the 1998 SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government_, Grand Baie, Republic of Mauritius, 19 September 1998.

6. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1234, S/RES/1234 (1999), adopted by the Security Council at its 3993rd meeting, on 9 April 1999

7. The main provisions of the agreement included:

   * the immediate cessation of hostilities;

   * the establishment of the JMC, comprising the belligerent parties under a neutral chairperson appointed by the OAU, to investigate cease-fire violations, work out mechanisms to disarm identified militias and monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops according to an agreed schedule;

   * the deployment of an appropriate (peacekeeping and peace enforcement) UN mission tasked with disarming the armed groups, collecting weapons from civilians, and providing humanitarian assistance and protection to vulnerable populations; and

* initiating an inter-Congolese dialogue intended to lead to "a new political dispensation in the DRC."

8. The armed groups identified included Rwandan Interahamwe militia and the former Rwandan government forces (FAR); Congolese Mayi-Mayi militias; the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), the Uganda National Rescue Front II, the West Nile Bank Front and the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda; the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA); and the Burundian *Forces pour la défense de la démocratie* (FDD).

9. South African Broadcasting Corporation, 2 September 1999.

10. The establishment of the JMC was long delayed by negotiations over the appointment of a chairperson, wrangles about RCD representation and procedural issues, as well financing and logistical problems. Based in Lusaka, the JMC comprises two members each from the belligerent parties, including the MLC and both of the RCD factions, as well as 'neutral' observers from Zambia and representatives of the UN and OAU.

11. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preliminary Deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/1999/790, New York, 15 July 1999.

12. UN Security Council Press Release, SC/6711, 6 August 1999.

13. UN Security Council Press Release, *Seven African Heads of State Address Security Council in Day-long meeting on Democratic Republic of Congo*, SC/6789, 24 January 2000.

14. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*, A/52/871-S/1998/318, New York, January 2000.

15. S/1999/790, op. cit., paragraph 67.

16. UN Security Council, Resolution 1291, 25 February 2000, paragraph 8.

17. Ibid.

18. UN, A/52/871-S/1998/318, op cit, paragraph 20.

19. Ibid.

20. Examining several peace support operations over the past nine years that 'exemplify success', Daniel and Hayes conclude that: "The common thread throughout these examples is the quick deployment of robust forces which, possibly through shock effect, implicitly if not explicitly deliver the message that they mean business." D C F Daniel & B C Hayes, *Securing observance of UN mandates through the employment of military forces*, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1995. UNITAF, Operation Turquoise, Provide Comfort and Uphold Democracy are cited as operations that succeeded in successfully inducing co-operation from belligerents.

21. UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, S/2000/30, 17 January 2000.

22. The following ECOWAS accords played vital roles in resolving the Liberian crisis:

> ECOWAS Peace Plan (Banjul Communiqué) — August 1990.
> Bamako Cease-fire Agreement — 28 November 1990.
> Banjul Joint Statement — 21 December 1990.
> Lomé Agreement — 13 February 1991.
> Yamoussoukro I Accord — 30 June 1991.
> Yamoussoukro II Accord — 29 July 1991.
> Yamoussoukro III Accord — 17 September 1991.
> Yamoussoukro IV Accord — 30 October 1991.
> Geneva Cease-fire Agreement — 17 July 1993.
> Cotonou Accord — 25 July 1993.
> Akosombo Agreement — 12 September 1994.
> Accra Clarification — 21 December 1994.
> Abuja Accord — 19 August 1995.
> Abuja Accord Supplement — 17 August 1996.

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Chapter 10
The security imperatives of the crisis in West Africa: preliminary thoughts
Dr Abubakar Momoh

Introduction

West Africa is currently witnessing multiple and hydra-headed conflict situations. These situations are best described by the notion of a regime of dictatorship, of both the economic and political domains. Okon identifies five kinds of conflict: boundary conflict, conflict of governance, conflict of economic development, conflict resulting from foreign intervention, and conflict arising from the miniaturisation of society. For him, these all culminate in élite conflict, mass or communal conflict, and revolutionary conflict.[1]

There is no West African country that is not experiencing one or another of the kinds of conflict mentioned above

> Burkina Faso is facing a severe crisis resulting from human rights abuses and the 'stay-in-office' syndrome.

> The Casamance crisis is deepening in Senegal.

> In Côte d'Ivoire, the ruling party of ousted President Bédie was the first to legitimise the new regime after the *coup* of December 1999, and to offer his co-operation with its leaders.
> In Guinea Bissau, the deposing of Vieira has led to carnage and a near civil war situation.

> In Ghana, exiles are still struggling against Rawlings, claiming that he has a succession plan in which his wife is being positioned to take over the next government as president.

Ghana has never witnessed this kind of economic crisis in its entire history with the Cedi being devalued every week for months. Indeed, from October 1999 to April 2000, the Cedi has devalued by 1 000%.

In Togo, the opposition forces led by the son of the slain President Sylvanus Olympio are still insisting that Eyadema rigged himself back to power.

The economic hardship in Benin intensified and became protracted since Matthew Kerekou became president. The current economic crisis is deepening.

The political crisis in Niger and Mali remain unresolved as the clamour of people for genuine democracy rather than incessant killings has not been accepted by the ruling class.

In Nigeria, the oil-minority question and separatist agitations are still unresolved. Recently, the issue around the reintroduction of Sharia law saw the mindless massacre of no less than 5 000 Nigerians in Kaduna town.

No matter how individual member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have attempted to cover up their internal crises, they all suffer from ill-health. But, this ill-health is a result of the fact that, in a fundamental sense, there is no democratic and accountable government in the entire subregion. Some of the governments are military, others are party-dominated governments sitting tight, yet others are foreign-driven, neo-liberal and unaccountable governments. The various so-called reforms and programmes to open up undertaken by of these regimes have virtually led to the consolidation of the hegemony of the ruling class and the exploitation deprivation and impoverishment of the toiling masses of the subregion. Economically, in many of the countries, negative growth has been recorded for more than ten years.

The ECOWAS-ECOMOG debacle

The formation of ECOWAS was the outcome of the signing of the Lagos treaty in 1975. From the outset, Francophone African countries were suspicious of its formation. They viewed it as an attempt to impose Nigeria's hegemony in the subregion, with the most vocal opponents being Félix Houphouét-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire and Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal. Indeed, Côte d'Ivoire, along with other Francophone countries such as Gabon, had supported Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. Part of the lesson Nigeria learned from the war was that there was a need for a subregional organisation where the problems of the subregion could be discussed. It is a paradox that the initiative for ECOWAS was guided by the imperative for collective security, yet, the outcome was an economic platform. Part of the reason for this may be found in the obstacles and difficulties posed by some Francophone countries. When the Francophone countries were proving too difficult, General Yakubu Gowon, then Nigeria's head of state, approached Togo's President Eyadema, and after long talks, Eyadema agreed to persuade other Francophone West Africa countries to join in the initiative. Sékou Touré's Guinea was the only Francophone country that departed from the orthodoxy. Indeed, Houphouét-Boigny also did not sign the Lagos treaty, but, however, did reluctantly accept the idea of ECOWAS.

ECOWAS is, in essence, an economic group with the major objective of facilitating internal trade and monetary integration in the subregion. For these reasons, member countries agreed to the clause calling for the free movement of citizens, goods and capital. But, many issues crippled

the economic objectives of ECOWAS, including the four *Lomé conventions* and the parallel Francophone networks that were put in place to undermine ECOWAS. These included a Francophone currency — the CFA franc — a joint bank with headquarters in Dakar, and several defence and cultural pacts with France, all in the spirit of *pacta sunt servanda.* Yet, these initiatives undermined the spirit and objectives of ECOWAS. Even France created the Franco-African summit just to undermine the Organisation of African Unity — it served as a parallel purpose for Francophone West Africa. What is curious in all this is the vigour, tenacity and commitment with which Francophone African states pursued the French agenda to the prejudice and detriment of the African or West African agenda. By July 1977, the Francophone countries of West Africa had gathered in Abidjan to sign the *Accord de non-agression et de coopération en matière de défense (ANAD).* The signatories were Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal and Togo. This, in part, led ECOWAS to sign the *Non-aggression pact* in Lagos in May 1978 and later, in 1981, the *Mutual Assistance on Defence* (MAD) agreement was adopted. The contention is that, contrary to what appeared in the literature on these issues, the historical sequence of these events needs to be appreciated. The central point here is that, by 1981, for all practical purposes, Francophone countries that saw MAD as an initiative of the Anglophone West African countries had abandoned ECOWAS. The perception was that everything created within the ECOWAS framework, clearly showed the hand of Nigeria, and fingers were always pointed in accusation that it was attempting to dominate the rest of the subregion. Most initiatives were interpreted as such, and member states of the subregion that are not Anglophone would therefore rather not support an action with a Nigerian influence.

It is in this spirit that the events should be seen that culminated in the establishment of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. Two other points need to be underscored here, albeit briefly. Firstly, Nigeria is the only country in Africa that is bordered only by Francophone countries— Chad to the north-east, Cameroon to the east, Niger to the north-west, Benin to the west and São Tomé to the south. The latter was used as a springboard in support of Biafra. Part of the support for Biafra by the Francophone countries in Africa arose from the fact that France supported Biafra. Mercenaries of French origin fought alongside the Biafran. Secondly, Nigeria had either been involved in controversial issues with these countries or went to war with them for a similar reason for years. Nigeria was the dominant nation in the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad in 1979-1981. The force was involved in controversy when the government of Goukonni Waddaye was overthrown by the rebel forces of Hissese Habré. The blame was placed on Nigeria. Nigeria was also involved in territorial clashes with Cameroon over the oil-rich border town of Bakassi. This led to the killing of several soldiers and civilians on both sides. These controversial events — with Nigeria as *dramatis personae* — took place in 1981 at about the same time the MAD was signed.

How did ECOMOG come about and what is the basis of the controversy surrounding it? Indeed, the simplest interpretation that can be given to the 1978 and 1981 ECOWAS treaties is that they had forced the Community to venture into the defence or military arena. The depth of this involvement is only subject to the way in which the relevant clauses in the treaties are interpreted. ECOMOG meant that ECOWAS had gone beyond its original mandate that was purely economic in content. In articles 2, 3 and 4, the *Protocol on non-aggression* is very explicit. It is necessary to quote them extensively because of the current erroneous 'internal affairs' thesis that is used to condemn or undermine the ECOMOG mandate. The point here is not to judge the political correctness of these articles, but rather to establish precisely what the documents say. It is one thing to question the principles and quite another to quarrel with the politics. It will be wrong, however, not to make an analytical distinction between principles and politics. Part of the disagreement among ECOWAS member states about ECOMOG arises from

this confusion — this is without prejudice to the mind-set or fixation existing among Francophone members of the Community.

> "Each Member State shall refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of other Member States" (article 2).

> "Each Member State shall undertake to prevent foreigners resident on its territory from committing the acts referred to in Article 2 above against the sovereignty and integrity of other Member States" (article 3).

> "Each Member state shall undertake to prevent non-resident foreigners from using its territory as a base for committing the acts referred to in Article 2 above against the sovereignty and integrity of Member States" (article 4).

The proponents of the 'internal affairs' thesis have raised issues about the above clauses. Yet, nowhere in these clauses does the protocol envisage or refer to *internal conflicts*. The claim is that, on account of these articles, ECOMOG had no right to intervene in Liberia, since the events in the country were purely its own internal affair. This view was clearly canvassed, particularly by the Francophone countries led by Houphouét-Boigny and Blaise Campoare. But, these leaders had reasons for canvassing their views rather than what is states in the clauses. This will be returned to later in this paper.

In respect of MAD, ECOWAS agreed to the formation of the Allied Forces of the Community (AFFC). In Chapter II, section 1, article 6(3), it states: "The Authority shall act on the expediency of military action and entrust its execution to the Force commander of Allied Forces of the Community." Article 8(2) states: "In an emergency, the Defence Council shall examine the situation, the strategy to be adopted and the means of intervention to be used."

These sections and subsections have been given all kinds of interpretations, often bordering on misrepresentation, Lined and coloured by politics. The political rather than the legal basis of ECOMOG's action has thus been given undue importance. Underlying this is the fact that the legal issues contained in the various legal instruments of ECOWAS are open-ended and, in the absence of genuine and sober interpretation, politics simply takes over. As for politics, it is not a matter of who is wrong or right, but a question of in whose favour the balance of forces is. This has further widened the gulf between Anglophone and Francophone West African countries. The interest of the latter was further united with that of France. The question may be asked, what France's interest is in all this. Can binary oppositions be identified in the understanding of French relations with Africa — your loss is my gain, and vice versa? What is the most healthy basis for containing French interest in a pan-African community? Or are both inherently contradictory? French mercenaries, it should be stated, were involved in the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone and their traders were involved in mining in the two countries during the period of the wars. South African mercenaries were recruited through Executive Outcomes (EO), first by Captain Valentine Strasser and later by Tejjan Kabbah, at a rate of US $1.5 million per day to help ward off the rebels.

ECOMOG: The politics of Liberia and Sierra Leone

General Ibrahim Babangida, at the time Nigeria's head of state, urged ECOWAS to establish a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) for the Community. Its main role would be to intervene whenever a crisis broke out. By 1990, the SMC convened an emergency meeting of foreign

ministers in Freetown, with the major preoccupation to ensure a cease-fire in Liberia among the forces of Sergeant Doe and the rebel groups, led by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). It was in this spirit that ECOMOG was formed and asked to enter Liberia in August 1990.

The Francophone West Africa States protested that the Mediation Committee had no right to create a peace-keeping force without the consummate Authority of Heads of State of ECOWAS. According to the 1981 Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence 'the Authority of ECOWAS is the only organ to authorise the creation and movement of the ECOWAS force'. The ECOMOG force, it was argued, was not properly constituted, due consultation was not carried out and the ECOMOG force should not have been deployed in an internal conflict situation in the first place.

Several points need to be underscored here:

> Before this initiative, Babangida had secretly supplied arms to Doe to fight the rebels. This created an anti-Nigerian feeling among the rebels and their allies, principally Campoare and Houphouét-Boigny. The former was said to have assisted Taylor's forces in military training and the procurement of arms through Libya. Indeed, Thomas Sankara was said to have been killed in October 1988, the month Taylor entered Ouagadougou. Houphouét-Boigny was aggrieved because Doe killed his father-in-law, William Tolbert, in order to take over power.

> Doe had urged the University of Liberia to establish the Babangida School of International Affairs. Some Nigerian scholars were drafted there to teach. Nigeria also convinced the African Development Bank to reschedule the US $35 million debt of Liberia.

> The decision by the SMC to establish ECOMOG and the move to get the force into Liberia were never approved by the heads of state summit meeting of ECOWAS. Indeed, the first summit meeting took place in Bamako in November 1990. This was three months after ECOMOG had moved into Liberia. It was convened as an extraordinary summit meeting because of the urgency and gravity of the crisis at hand. This became an additional grudge of the Francophone countries. It was at the Bamako meeting that concrete decisions about a national conference culminating in an interim government and subsequently in general elections were reached. All other parties accepted this except Taylor.

> There was still heavy fighting on the ground when ECOMOG moved into Liberia under the Ghanaian field commander, Lieutenant-General Arnold Quainoo. The General was basically unsure of what to do in light of the situation on the ground. He was therefore replaced by a Nigerian army general, Joshua Dogonyaro. Since then, all subsequent field commanders of ECOMOG were Nigerian (Kupulati, Olurin, Bakut, Inienger, and others).

> The SMC consisted mainly of Anglophone countries and some reluctant Francophone countries (Nigeria, Ghana, The Gambia, Mali and Togo). Both Togo and Mali refused to contribute troops to the initial ECOMOG force in Liberia.

> The ECOMOG force systematically grew from 4 000 to 6 000 to 10 000, and eventually to 15 000. Of this total, Nigeria contributed 10 000 of the force and also provided close to 90% of the financial support.

It was under the first Nigerian ECOMOG commander that the mandate changed from that of peacekeeping to peace enforcement. This continued for three years until General Adetunji Olurin took over to pursue a more traditional peacekeeping role. But, this was also occasioned by several other factors.

The SMC has been expanded from a group of five to nine countries to gain greater legitimacy. At the time, it included prominent Francophone countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Guinea. Ghana and Nigeria were also members. Soglo of Benin was the ECOWAS chairperson. The need for change was clearly noted when Francophone countries formed their own 'group of five' comprising Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Togo, Guinea Bissau and The Gambia. As Mortimer notes, "the Committee effectively supplanted the SMC as the primary diplomatic actor."[2]

A set of decisions followed that initially took on a less military and more political character. The decisions involved the ECOWAS heads of state summit meeting and embraced the Francophone leaders in a more inclusive way. The objective was to see how Liberian warlords were going to pave the way for the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), headed by Amos Sawyer (favoured by Nigeria) and for general elections to take place. It was felt that the killing of Doe at the ECOMOG headquarters by Yormie Johnson (who was favoured by ECOMOG, partly because he headed a splinter group of the NPFL) would facilitate the peace process. This was a mistaken view as more splinter groups emerged, such as ULIMO-Mandigo and ULIMO-Krahn (the latter was seen to fight the cause of Doe partly because its members came from the same ethnic group and some of them were former presidential guards).

The most important of the events that followed were:

> the ECOWAS heads of state summit meeting in Bamako, 27-28 November 1990;
> the joint statement by the three warring groups in Liberia in Banjul, 21 December 1990;
> the third summit meeting of the SMC in Lomé, 12-13 February 1991;
> the joint declaration on the Liberian situation in Lomé, 1 March 1991;
> the All-Liberian National Conference in Monrovia, 15 March — 20 April 1991;
> the fourth summit of ECOWAS, 4-6 July 1991, and the four Yamoussoukro mini-summits;
> the informal consultation of the ECOWAS Committee of Five in Geneva, 6-7 April 1992; and
> the Ministerial Evaluation Meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Five in Dakar, 1 May 1992.

From the above, it may be discerned that there was greater Francophone participation soon after the Bamako summit meeting. Indeed, after the Yamoussoukro meeting, Houphouét-Boigny became genuinely involved with the process and some of the consultations that took place in Geneva were at his insistence, on his sick bed.

Another player that must not escape mention is the United States. Ordinarily, the US should have been concerned about the Liberian crisis because of its historical connection to the Americo-Liberians. But, the country merely evacuated its citizens. Much later, it supported the peace process indirectly through Senegal. Under Diouf's leadership as ECOWAS chairperson, the US agreed to provide support for the military equipment needs of Senegal to the value of US $15 million. In addition, it wrote off Senegal's debt of US $45 million. As a result of this, Senegal sent 1 500 troops to join the ECOMOG force. The United Nations under Boutros-Ghali was invited by ECOWAS to contribute to the peace process in Liberia and it agreed to participate in the election monitoring exercise. Mosha was asked to assess the situation on the ground in

Liberia. The OAU sent Canaan Banana on a similar mission. In order to legitimise ECOMOG and in the light of calls for its expansion, the OAU agreed to finance the participation of three East African countries in the peacekeeping effort. The broadening of the peacekeeping initiative assisted the peace process significantly, as did its internationalisation, following the involvement of the OAU and the UN.

It is matter of conjecture whether there would have been peace if Charles Taylor lost the elections in Liberia.

In respect of Sierra Leone, Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Force (RUF) has been closely associated with Taylor since its inception. Indeed, Taylor introduced Sankoh to Libya's Muammar Ghaddafi who was said to have sponsored Sankoh's military training. After being trained, he returned to fight for Taylor's NPFL in Liberia. He had been implicated in attempted military *coups* in Sierra Leone in the 1970s and was imprisoned for his involvement. It was after his release from prison that he found his way to Liberia and then to Libya. Many of the guerrillas of both the RUF and NPFL were trained by the same people and had many things in common, including the manner of conscripting child soldiers and vandalising property. From the beginning, Taylor supported the Sierra Leonean rebels. The RUF launched its first attack in March 1991 in Bomaru and Sienga, both small towns in the Kailahum district in eastern Sierra Leone, with the objective of overthrowing the government of Joseph Momoh. It was during the RUF insurgence that some junior officers took over power of the country on 29 April 1992. They were led by Captain Valentine Strasser who overthrew the government of Joseph Momoh accusing it of not pursuing the RUF-induced war in a decisive manner and for starving troops of weapons and logistics. Strasser established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) and promised to overrun the RUF in a short time. Determined to do this, the government increased the strength of the army to 14 000. Many of the recruits were youths. By April 1995, the war had escalated. Strasser contacted the South African-based Executive Outcomes (EO) to send mercenaries to support him. However, in January 1996, Brigadier Maada Bio toppled Captain Stasser with the help of EO-trained units under his control. This led to a 28-article peace accord in Abidjan. The accord, among others, called for:

> the demobilisation and resettlement of combatants;

> the transformation of the RUF into a political party;

> the establishment of a UN-controlled monitoring committee and a joint monitoring group consisting of all the warring factions;

> the withdrawal of foreign forces (particularly EO);

> the conduct of general elections; and

> the implementation of socio-economic reforms.

The result was the election victory of Tejjan Kabbah's Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). However, Kabbah transformed the Kamajors (a civil defence group opposed to both the government forces and the RUF), into a modern private army with modern rifles, rewarded for their service by paying them allowances. The Kamajors came from the predominantly Mende people. By May 1997, the Kamajors numbered 20 000. They were trained by both the Nigerian Army and EO. Their leader, Chief Sam Hinga-Norman was appointed as the deputy defence minister of Sierra Leone. This irked the standing army and, partly as a result, Major Johnny-Paul

Koroma overthrew the government. On 23 October 1997, ECOWAS organised a peace plan, urging the warring factors to adhere to the Abidjan accord. This yielded no dividends.

On 18 February 1998, a combined team of the Nigerian Army, the Kamajors and 200 Sandline International mercenaries launched land and air attacks on Freetown, and eventually deposed the Junta, uprooted the rebels and restored Kabbah to power. At this time, ECOMOG had completed its mission in Liberia, and smoothly moved into Sierra Leone to join forces with other groups struggling to oust the rebels. ECOMOG successfully took over Freetown and the State House on 12 February 1998. Koroma was forced to flee. Meanwhile, Sankoh, who was also involved, was lured to Nigeria and put under house arrest during the period when Koroma was in power. The Sierra Leone crisis culminated in the *Lomé Peace Accord*, charted in line with UN guidelines on security and disarmament. The accord states, *inter alia*, that there is a need for the encampment, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants. Mercenaries are to be withdrawn with immediate effect from Sierra Leone and ECOMOG is to be transformed into a peacekeeping body similar to the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). Its membership should be broadened to include as many countries as possible.[3] The agreement granted pardon to the rebels and gave them lucrative posts in the government. For instance, Foday Sankoh was appointed as vice-president of Sierra Leone by default. He was given the portfolio of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development. This gave him control over the mining and marketing of gold and diamonds, among others. Many saw this accord as rewarding treason and rebellion in a war in which Sierra Leone lost about 50 000 people out of a population of 4.4 million. One fundamental moral question arose in the Sierra Leone crisis. Nigerian president at the time, General Sani Abacha, stated that he wanted to restore democracy in Sierra Leone by ousting the rebels from power. Nigerians and Sierra Leoneans questioned the moral basis of his attitude. After all, he was a military and not a democratic ruler himself, but more fundamentally, he himself annulled an election in his own country and jailed the president-elect.

ECOMOG also participated in the peacekeeping initiative in Guinea Bissau after rebel attacks necessitated the government to invite Senegalese and Guinean (Conakry) troops to assist it. Following the *Abuja Peace Accord* of 31 October 1995, it was agreed that all foreign troops should be withdrawn and a cease-fire declared. This was to pave the way for ECOMOG forces. Although ECOMOG actually deployed forces to the country, fighting did not cease as the rebels protested the inability of ECOMOG to disarm the presidential guard that mainly originated from Vieira's ethnic group, the Pepel. Indeed, ECOMOG exacerbated the crisis. Eventually, Vieira had to flee the country and, in the process, the current government had to succumb to pressure to address issues of human rights abuses. Mass graves are being discovered daily, so are secret documents about plots against the opposition forces.

Cost of ECOMOG

ECOMOG has been run at great social, financial and political cost to the subregion and, particularly, to Nigeria. Socially, Nigerians were unable to integrate properly into the subregion as they were seen as exacerbating the crisis in Liberia. The NPFL specifically targeted civilians of Nigerian origin during the war and murdered them in cold blood. Those murdered included the renowned Nigerian journalist, Chris Imodibie of *The Guardian*. Politically, Nigeria became isolated, but more so because the military junta of Abacha had annulled an election that was free and fair. The US and the entire European Union (EU) had placed all sorts of embargoes on Nigeria. Hence, although those countries wanted to assist in the Liberian crisis, they were hesitant if not reluctant to do so. Many of them had channelled their assistance indirectly. For instance, apart from the money provided to Senegal by the US, some US $10 million was spent

in 1996 by the US government to purchase military equipment for Guinea, Mali, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The British government spent £20 million on ECOMOG with an additional pledge of £30 million. In terms of financial cost, nobody seems to know exactly how much was spent on ECOMOG. Tom Ikim, Nigeria's foreign minister, once quoted a figure of US $4 billion, while Abacha himself made reference to US $3 billion back in 1997.[4] Meanwhile, ECOMOG remained active in Liberia and later in Sierra Leone until 1999. If Abacha's figures were available, then it can be hypothesised that about US $7 billion were spent on ECOMOG. The government of President Olesegun Obasanjo is yet to release current financial figures spent by Nigeria on ECOMOG.

ANAD and the Francophone divide

There is no doubt that the French influence in West Africa is very high. For instance, when Mali and Burkina Faso had bitter clashes in 1985, Nigeria offered to mediate. But, both countries turned down this gesture and took the matter to ANAD countries that eventually settled it.

ANAD is a more stable and institutionalised organisation than ECOMOG. Formed by seven Francophone countries in July 1987 — Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo — ANAD consists of three organs: the Summit of Heads of States and Governments, the Council of Ministers and the permanent Secretariat. The Secretariat has 40 staff members. Although Admiral Diam, the Secretary-General of ANAD, told a recent gathering that ANAD is not funded by France, many people found it difficult to accept this assertion. It is seen by many as an outfit meant to undermine ECOWAS. But, it has to be conceded that ANAD has a more institutionalised structure than ECOMOG. It is argued that ECOMOG does not have a clear relationship with the ECOWAS Secretariat, neither has there been a civilian on the team to co-ordinate its activities, thus giving political support for its actions.

Also in existence in the region is the wider politics of security outfits played out by various foreign military assistance networks, the most important being the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), the *Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix* (RECAMP) and the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT). What is worrying about these groups is how they target African countries and the manner in which countries are selected to benefit from their programmes. Warren Christopher started one such initiative in 1997 with beneficiaries including Mali, Senegal and Ghana. The same year, France organised what it called *Nangbeto '97* with Benin, Togo and Burkina Faso as participants. The project was meant to train the troops of recipient countries in crisis intervention. France also earmarked CFA30 million for the establishment of a peacekeeping training centre in Yamoussoukro.

On a general political plane, the *Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (Central Bank of West Africa States — BCEAO) and *the Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (Economic Community of West Africa — CEAO) not only parallel the role of ECOWAS, but in addition, more than fulfil, at least for the Francophone countries of West Africa, the key objectives of ECOWAS. In no small way, this makes ECOWAS unimportant to them. The Franco-Africa summit has already been alluded to that parallels and in some ways undermines the OAU. The Yamoussoukro meeting was very useful to the resolution of the Liberian crisis. The symbolism of Yamoussoukro is that it was held on the territory of Houphouét-Boigny. As one writer asserts:

> "The ECOWAS crisis brings into focus the long struggles for the survival of the sub-regional body, the collapse of which portends immense implications for Nigeria. Francophone ECOWAS members have shown very little respect or concern for the

organisation. While many of them have defaulted in paying their dues for up to five consecutive years, they strain to meet all obligations to the *Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (CEAO), which is their own version of ECOWAS, and *Conseil de l'Entente*, a political organisation to which some of them also belong. Burkinabe President, Blaise Campoare is Chairman of both organisations which may be the reason why he appears to be acting as spokesman for the Francophone countries."[5]

The last point that needs to be underscored here is that, for France, its relations with former colonies are informed by defence and other forms of agreements in the spirit of *pacta sunt servanda.* Although Nigeria only shares borders with Francophone countries, this in itself is not a source of threat. As Akinterinwa notes:

"The Francophone neighbours of Nigeria do not themselves pose any direct threat to Nigeria as they are generally weaker even if their total resources are put together. They only pose threats indirectly, thanks to the powerful presence of the French in the neighbourhood."[6]

It should be mentioned that, during the various Bakassi-inspired conflicts with Nigeria, France was always at hand to shore up and reinforce Cameroon's military capacity. Meanwhile, the quarrel over Bakassi is based on who actually owns the oil-rich border territory. France sees itself as being in competition with Nigeria over the Francophone countries for exports of goods and for cheap raw materials.

Lessons learned or matters arising?

It is clear that, if the UN and OAU had not entered the fray to save Nigeria's face, there was no way that ECOMOG could have muddled through in Liberia. The first clear lesson to learn here is that there is a need to standardise the parameters used to bring warring parties to accept peaceful settlements of crises. It is clear that, if ECOMOG had not reverted to its original mandate — peacekeeping — the OAU and UN were not likely to support it. Secondly, there is a need for confidence-building measures. These would allay the fears of both the warring parties to the dispute and their allies. Peacekeepers must not base their point of departure on the assumption that rebels are always wrong, or that the state is right because it is the state. There is also a need for the continuous assessment and reassessment of the initial mandate of a mission, at all time taking into account the changing realities on the ground. In the case of ECOMOG, it violated its mandate and everything that was done, was subject to the whims and caprices of the field commander and the Nigerian government.

Two further lessons clearly transpire from this:

All military decisions must be subject to political assessment.

No members of or contributors to a peacekeeping mission should become so powerful that they are able to provide and control virtually all field commanders, as well as the military instructions.

Such power could be suicidal and catastrophic. It undermines the morale and integrity of other nations that contributed troops and also reinforces the claim of hegemonic domination where there are big nations such as Nigeria in West Africa.

Another lesson is that, countries dealing with subregional matters should be flexible and willing to accept mistakes, and ready to adhere to the democratic decisions of the subregional collective. In the case of Nigeria, generals Babangida and Abacha started off with the conviction that they could not have been wrong about their role in ECOMOG. Their views were dogmatic and were carried through in an authoritarian manner. Two further factors that greatly affected the ECOMOG mission were pride and the militarist culture. Leaders personalised the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises in such a way that it gave the impression that they had personal scores to settle with Taylor, Sankoh, and others. They also saw themselves as military leaders who could not accept defeat from a so-called 'ragtag' army of non-professional soldiers led by Taylor, and the like.

The next lesson is that it is crucial to take early warning signals seriously. Everybody saw how Sergeant Doe massacred close to 3 000 people who were perceived as detractors, yet no head of state in the subregion condemned him. Even when it was clear that Taylor's fighting machine was almost subduing Doe, nobody advised him, among the club of heads of state, to resign. Doe himself only agreed to resign after the NPFL had confined him to the presidential palace for six months, and after having lost everything except the palace itself to the rebels.

It is also necessary to address the issue of domination by Anglophone countries, as perceived by Francophone countries. Above all, the 'conspiracy thesis' must be erased among Anglophone countries, which always perceive the Francophone countries as uncritically doing things without really making any independent choice — all in the name of cliquish camaraderie.

A further lesson is that the pan-African orientation of unity and integration in relations among member states must be internalised. In this regard, matters of collective security of the subregion are emphasised. Indeed, the notion of security itself needs reconceptualisation and deconstruction in such way that it address the lives of ordinary people in the subregion. Security is clearly seen from two contrasting perspectives — that of the heads of states, and that of the ordinary people, one more abstract, while the other is very concrete and addresses material livelihood.

MAD and ANAD cannot co-exist. One should give way to the other. Security is such a delicate matter that it should not be subjected to politicking. MAD was not the cause of the crisis in Liberia, but the attitude of member states in response to the invocation of the MAD agreements in the intervention in Liberia, was criticised in such a way that made MAD the scapegoat. As it is, MAD and ANAD do not seem to complement, but rather to antagonise each other. The politics of the Anglophone-Francophone divide clearly play a part in this division. Since MAD is a more all-embracing agreement, it has the potential to unite all, if given the chance. ANAD does not have the same potential.

Furthermore, there is also clearly a need to show interest in post-war reconstruction. What should happen to those who lose their property? What form should reconciliation take? How should destitute people, orphans, victims of rape (who may have contracted HIV in the process) be treated? What will constitute justice for the civilian population who were mere victims of the war?

Finally, the unwillingness to carry along the Francophone countries by force of conviction, through a culture of tolerance, patience, understanding and persuasion, goes far in showing what militarism could do to the psyche of a people under military rule.

Other concerns are also of importance. When the issue of the Anglophone-Francophone divide

is addressed by scholars, the impression is given that the same pathologies and antipathies that govern élite and diplomatic relations percolate downwards to the ordinary people in the subregion. This is not true for several reasons. Even before the ECOWAS protocol permitted the free movement of people, many of the informal sector traders never accepted the colonial boundaries as sacrosanct. For many of them, the informal trade sector has existed for centuries and they inherited their professions from their forebears. But, more importantly, the relatives of many people, by consanguinity, are spread over two or more countries cutting across the Anglophone-Francophone divide. They have never allowed this divide to affect them (indeed, to them it is meaningless, both socially and politically). Whenever they meet, they speak their native dialect and not English or French. A typical example is the Egun-speaking people who are balkanised into English-speaking Nigeria and French-speaking Benin. For these people, state policies have not affected, in any fundamental way, their sociological relations. Indeed, the latter form of relationship has more heuristic meaning for them than the former. The same can be said for the Hausa of Nigeria and the Fulani of Niger who are spread across West Africa, from Senegal to Nigeria.

Notes

1. A Okon, Nigerian foreign policy towards Africa, *Journal of Modern African Studies* 37(1), 1998, p 82.

2. R Mortimer, ECOMOG, Liberia and regional security in West Africa, in D Rothchild & EKeller, *Africa in the new international order: Rethinking state sovereignty and regional security,* Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1996, p 154.

3. Centre for Democracy and development, Ghana, 1999, p 22.

4. See the Nigerian daily newspaper, *This Day,* 3 August 1997.

5. Cited in E Bassey, *Nigeria and its immediate neighbours: Constraints and prospects of subregional security in the 1990s,* Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1994, pp 43-44.

6. B Akinterinwa, cited in A Olukushi et al, *Structural adjustment in West Africa,* Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1994, p 46.

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Chapter 11
Wanted — capacity to intervene: The evolution of conflict prevention and resolution in Africa
Anthoni van Nieuwkerk

Introduction

The brief for this paper is a broad overview of approaches to conflict prevention and resolution. It therefore looks at the evolution of modern-day preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping doctrines and their impact on Africa. It also briefly touches upon Africa's own experiences and asks whether it is not better to develop new understanding of the challenges facing the continent, and consequently, to probe new approaches to the resolution of long-standing

conflicts in Southern Africa and elsewhere on the continent.

The scope of the problem

Why must time be spent thinking about conflict, its prevention and its resolution? Should the focus not rather fall on poverty and its alleviation? For millions of people, particularly in the global south, *both* violent conflict and poverty continue to define political life. As conditions in Angola show, development cannot flourish under conditions of war. Even though both should be considered (or the nexus between the two, as peacebuilders tend to do), it is to experiences of conflict management that this paper is dedicated.

The post-Cold War, post-apartheid and postmodern world is even more violent than the preceding turbulent years of east-west rivalry. Indeed, the five years between 1990 and 1995 proved to be twice as lethal as any half decade since the end of World War II. According to one calculation, there were 93 wars involving 70 countries. Of the 22 million people who perished in armed conflict since 1945, 5.5 million died during the early 1990s. Furthermore, war has ceased to be primarily a profession of arms: if at the beginning of the 20th century 90% of war deaths were soldiers, by the end, on average, 75% are civilians. Apart from war, there is the phenomenon of state-sponsored violence — that is, the mass murder of civilians. According to one rough estimate, the number of victims of state violence not related to war in the 20th century amount to 155 million. The top three murderous regimes of the century include communist China, the Soviet Union, and the Nazi Third Reich.[1]

And the situation in Africa?[2] In 1999, President Thabo Mbeki remarked that "the one spot in the world where things seem to be regressing is the African continent"; *Le Monde diplomatique* wondered whether the era of Afro-optimism had not given way to *Afrique-cauchemar* (an African nightmare);[3] and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had this to say:

> "[I]n addition to the war tearing the DRC apart, in Congo-Brazzaville, a conflict unnoticed by the world has claimed thousands of lives; in the first four months of 1999 alone, the renewal of the civil war in Angola has displaced 780 000 people, bringing to some 1.5 million the number who have been driven from their homes; the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, where human wave attacks have produced thousands of battlefield casualties and deaths, has displaced over 550 000 people; some 440 000 refugees have poured out of Sierra Leone into Guinea and Liberia during an eight-year conflict characterised by brutality — and a further 310 000 people are displaced within Sierra Leone; in the Sudan, since 1983, Africa's longest running war has caused nearly 2 million deaths. In Africa as a whole, there are now some 4 million refugees, and probably at least 10 million internally displaced persons."[4]

There are various ways to look at and interpret war and conflict in Africa. The way one defines a problem obviously determines the nature of the response. There is no single, encompassing and all-inclusive theoretical approach with which to understand Africa's problems. Instead, analysts have developed various approaches, of which three are mentioned as examples.

Douglas Anglin provides a useful scheme within which to 'place' or locate African conflicts.[5] He identifies three *key sources of conflict*: military ambition, territorial ambition, and resource ambition. He also identifies three *conflict systems* in sub-Saharan Africa. Each has an epicentre which constitutes the principal source of regional destabilisation. Thus, in the *Great Lakes region*, Rwanda has been the major instigator of hostilities throughout the region, and

particularly in the eastern Congo. In the *Horn of Africa*, conflict has been more dispersed, with Sudan and more recently Eritrea as the prime provocateurs and the southern Sudan/Uganda and Ethiopia/Eritrea borders the main nodal points. In *West Africa*, Liberia has been the wellspring for much of the misery inflicted on unfortunate Sierra Leoneans.

In 1998, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, released a key report entitled *The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa.* In it, he broadly identified the causes of conflict in Africa as:

> *historical:* the colonial legacy of exploitation and conquest, and the cold war legacy of superpower support for repressive African regimes;

> *internal:* the nature of political power in many African states, together with the real and perceived consequences of capturing and maintaining power; and

> *economic:* those who profit from chaos and lack of accountability, and who may have little or no interest in stopping a conflict and much interest in prolonging it — such as international arms merchants, or the protagonists themselves.

A more theoretical approach puts *state collapse* at the centre of the explanation. Increasingly, a wide array of analysts such as Allen, Clapham, Chabal and Daloz, Duffield, Mazrui, Human Rights Watch, and others write on the politics of endemic violence and self-enrichment which is associated with the process of state collapse in Africa.[6] This kind of analysis — as part of a probing, vibrant, paradigmatic debate — has obvious implications for potential actions in situations such as those in the Great Lakes, the Horn of Africa, or Sierra Leone.

It is for these reasons that a close focus on the development and record of conflict prevention and resolution is required, and the following sections will attempt to unpack these concepts systematically.

The evolution of preventive diplomacy doctrines

How are the conflicts, such as those referred to above, being dealt with at the level of the international community? The first article of the first chapter of the *UN Charter* states that the first purpose of the UN is to "maintain international peace and security." It undertakes to do this through collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression (or other breaches of the peace). Regardless of its success rate, the UN system is the only multipurpose universal organisation with the authority to promote conditions conducive to the prevention of violent conflict and the redressing of the causes of conflict once it has occurred. As Doyle has remarked, the UN holds a unique claim on legitimate authority in international peace and war,[7] and in the words of Kofi Annan:

> "For the United Nations there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict. The prevention of conflict begins and ends with the promotion of human security and human development."[8]

It is for these reasons that this discussion of conflict prevention and resolution starts on the level of the UN.

It is generally recognised that the dynamics of the Cold War largely prevented the UN from effectively carrying out its primary objectives. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the

UN's agenda for peace and security rapidly expanded. In this period, the Security Council quadrupled the number of resolutions issued, tripled the peacekeeping operations authorised, and increased from one to seven per year the number of economic sanctions imposed. Military forces deployed in peacekeeping operations increased from fewer than 10 000 to more than 70 000. The annual peacekeeping budget accordingly shot up from US $230 million to $3.6 billion in the same period.[9] All of this reflected the new international political and legal environment in which the UN operated. It also testified to the new, expanded role the international community wanted the UN to perform. Therefore, in 1992, at the request of the Security Council, Boutros-Ghali prepared the conceptual foundations for of an ambitious UN role in peace and security in his seminal report, *An agenda for peace*. Boutros-Ghali highlighted five key roles which he hoped the UN would play in the context of rapidly changing post-Cold War politics. Although the report came in for severe criticism in later years (which will be examined below), it is useful to revisit its conceptual approach. The five interconnected roles are:

Preventive diplomacy: This refers to action undertaken in order "to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur." Examples of 'action' would include confidence-building measures, fact-finding, and early warning. According to Gareth Evans, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait would be an example of the failure to use preventive diplomacy, while the cessation of North Korea's nuclear activities in 1993 would be an example of early and successful preventive diplomacy.[10]

Peace enforcement: Action with or without the consent of the parties to ensure compliance with a cease-fire mandated by the Security Council acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the *UN Charter*. These military forces are composed of heavily armed, national forces operating under the direction of the Secretary-General.

Peacemaking: Mediations and negotiations designed "to bring hostile parties to agreement" through peaceful means such as those found under Chapter VI of the *UN Charter*.

Peacekeeping: Military and civilian deployments for the sake of establishing a "UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned." This is a confidence-building measure to monitor a truce between the parties as diplomats strive to negotiate a comprehensive peace, or officials attempt to implement an agreed peace.

Post-conflict peacebuilding: Measures undertaken to foster economic and social co-operation to build confidence among previously warring parties; develop infrastructure (social, political, economic) to prevent future violence; and lay the foundations for a durable peace.

Initial assessments of the UN's 'new' post-Cold War role were bright and optimistic. From the perspective of the north, the UN's newly found assertiveness reconciled an advocacy of collective security, universal human rights, and humanitarian solidarity with the need to refocus Cold War spending on domestic reform at home. However, as is now known, post-Cold War conflicts proved too complex, intractable and enduring for even the so-called 'new globalism' to resolve. Assertive multilateralism climaxed during the Gulf War in 1991 and withered with the disaster in Somalia in 1993.

Generally, then, how can the UN doctrine on conflict prevention and resolution be described? According to Doyle, peacekeeping operations — as defined above — have come to encompass

three distinct activities that have evolved as 'generations' of UN peace operations.[11] In traditional peacekeeping, sometimes called *first generation peacekeeping*, unarmed or lightly armed UN forces are stationed between hostile parties to monitor a truce, troop withdrawal, or buffer zone while political negotiations go forward. It is not always clear what these achieved: conflict delayed rather than resolved? The second category, called *second generation operations* by Boutros-Ghali, involves the implementation of complex, multidimensional peace agreements. Peacekeepers often engage in various police and civilian tasks, of which the goal is a long-term settlement of the underlying conflict. Namibia would be a good example of a successful second generation multidimensional peacekeeping operation. In Boutros-Ghali's lexicon, 'peace enforcement' missions — in effect 'war-making' missions — such as those in Korea in 1950 and against Iraq in the Gulf War, are *third generation operations*. They extend from low-level military operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the enforcement of cease-fires. The defining characteristic is lack of consent by one or more of the parties to some or all of the UN mandate.

However, might this understanding of the international community and the UN's approach to conflict prevention and resolution be too simplistic? Could the bland terms of description hide underlying problems with the approach? Surely, reality is much more complex than what it is made out to be in *An agenda for peace*? Consider the critique developed by Jarat Chopra and colleagues. The argument is that, where states fail (collapse) and where warlordism emerges, a comprehensive political strategy is needed to pull together all forms of intervention and assistance that may be required. This is controversially termed 'peace maintenance' (to distinguish it from peacekeeping and peace enforcement).[12]

A better description of second generation peace operations than that provided above comes from Chopra. In his view, the challenging (post-Cold War) environment of internal conflicts necessitated the development of a concept for the limited and gradually escalating use of armed force for multinational missions. UN military operations could be divided into nine categories, arranged in three levels of varying degrees of force. At one extreme were level one operations: the familiar tasks of observer missions and peacekeeping forces. At the other end were the level three tasks of sanctions and high-intensity operations (characteristic of articles 41 and 42, respectively, of the *UN Charter*). The five level two tasks in between represented the latest doctrinal developments, as follows:

Preventive deployment: A UN force may be deployed to an area where tension is rising between two parties, to avoid the outbreak of hostilities (such as the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission — UNIKOM)

Internal conflict resolution measures: A UN force may be required to underwrite a multiparty cease-fire within a state. It may have to demobilise and canton warring parties, secure their weapons, and stabilise the theatre of conflict (such as the UN operation in Mozambique)

Assistance to interim civil authorities: A UN force may be required to underwrite a transition process and the transfer of power in a country re-establishing its civil society from the ashes of conflict. Tasks include managing returning refugees, elections, infrastructure redevelopment (such as the UN operations in Namibia, Cambodia and El Salvador)

Protection of humanitarian relief operations: A UN force may be deployed to establish a mounting base, delivery site, and corridor between warring sides to protect the provision

and distribution of relief (mixed successes in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Iraq)

Guarantee and denial of movement: A UN force may be called upon to secure the rights of passage in international waterways and airspace, or across national territory, or it may have to restrict movements of 'delinquent' parties (such as in Bosnia and Iraq) .

Second generation peacekeeping became somewhat of a misnomer. It confused the narrowly defined practice of peacekeeping, on the one hand, and second generation operations that were not exclusively reliant on the consent of belligerents and that did not restrict the use of force to self-defence alone, on the other. According to Chopra, the application of a diplomatic peacekeeping approach in challenging environments is precisely what proved fatal in Cambodia, Angola and the former Yugoslavia.[13] Furthermore, the artificiality of a third generation of peace operations has exacerbated the confusion. When Boutros-Ghali first acknowledged the emergence of a second generation, he also suggested the existence — simultaneously, and rather illogically, therefore — of a third generation, defined by institutional 'peacebuilding'. These concepts have since become more distorted by a reversal of their meanings: second generation operations have been defined as consensual peace-building, and third generation operations as peace enforcement equated with high-intensity enforcement.

The complex, multifunctional operations of the second phase, designed to supervise transitions from conditions of social conflict to minimal political order, had limited impact because of excessive reliance on either diplomatic peacekeeping or military peace enforcement. Consequently, transitional arrangements required, but did not achieve better co-ordination between military forces, humanitarian assistance, and civilian components organising elections, protecting human rights, or conducting administrative and executive tasks of government. In short, another concept became necessary.

The problem faced by UN operations on the ground can be explained as follows. The UN has to contend with the contradictory phenomena of too much order and authority by a powerful government, such as in El Salvador or Namibia, and of the varying degrees of anarchy, as in Cambodia and Somalia. In the incoherent malaise of factionalism, a kind of warlord syndrome emerged in which the appetites of power could mobilise destructive forces (religion in Lebanon, ethnicity in the former Yugoslavia, clan lineage in Somalia). Unchecked by either a weakened population below or the diluted resolve of the international community above, factional leaders proliferated and inherited the places where UN deployments proved ineffective. Interstate diplomacy conducted by bureaucrats between factional leaders in internal conflicts served to further fragment conditions of anarchy. Use of military force without sufficiently clear political objectives inevitably led to confrontation.

The current third phase of peace operations doctrine therefore needs to elaborate functional dimensions of a political framework, and this is where Chopra introduces the concept of 'peace maintenance'. In his view, to avoid being undermined, the UN must deploy decisively and establish a centre of gravity around which local individuals and institutions can coalesce until a new authority structure is established and transferred to a legitimately determined, indigenous leadership. In the interim period, the UN needs to counterbalance or even displace the oppressor or warlords. This implies that the UN claims jurisdiction over the entire territory and ought to deploy throughout if it can. It establishes a direct relationship with the local people who will eventually participate in the reconstitution of authority and inherit the newly established institutions.

Can the UN do this? Chopra himself cautions that such an approach needs a psychological shift

in the mindset of the international community. Furthermore, it needs specifics. In his view, "the evolution of civil administration and the UN's political role in internal conflicts (should) build on the organisation's experience and in joint form will be more cost-effective than reliance on military peace-enforcement."[14] Others are more sceptical. Chester Crocker (in the foreword to Chopra's book!) remarks that not all will be persuaded that such holistic strategic planning for intervention by leading actors in the international community is feasible or even desirable. He raises a list of old order, realist objections — peace maintenance sounds like "unrestrained internationalism delinked from considerations of national interest" and so on. More importantly, a chapter by Bratt systematically identifies the obstacles which 'peace maintainers' need to overcome, ranging from conceptual to the eminently practical. Regarding the conceptual, it must be asked what the connection is between 'peace maintenance' and the critical interpretation of 'peacebuilding'.[15] This paper cannot deal with the detail except to concur that peace maintenance "has yet to undergo a rigorous debate over its merits and deficiencies." It becomes somewhat of an urgent task if Africa's pathologies are considered and the immediate challenge of bringing peace to the Great Lakes, Angola, Sudan, Eritrea/Ethiopia and others. These are all examples of fractured societies in need of solutions through a harmonisation of diplomatic, humanitarian, civilian and military objectives as part of an overall political framework.

Preventive diplomacy in Africa: Experiences of the OAU and SADC

The experience of the OAU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in conflict prevention and resolution deserves attention. Before concluding that the experience has been sufficiently limited and disappointing to warrant the consideration of alternative vehicles for conflict transformation, a background introduction is in order.

From an international or global perspective, the UN is seen as the only institution with the necessary depth and width to address (but not always solve) violent conflict between or among societies. Some decentralisation of its prime function has always been envisaged (even the League of Nations noted the validity of regional organisations for securing the maintenance of peace). The Security Council carries primary responsibility, but in the spirit of the post-Cold War era, regional action is seen as a matter of decentralisation, delegation and co-operation with UN efforts. The UN clearly also does not have the funding, human resources and other capacities required to deal with all conflicts. The *UN Charter* devotes chapter VIII (articles 52-54) to regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. As Boutros-Ghali points out in his 1992 *Agenda*, such regional organisations "possess a potential that should be utilised in serving the functions [of] preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building." However, Boutros-Ghali's successor, Kofi Annan, presented a different perspective — more informed and realistic, perhaps. In his 1998 report on Africa's crisis, he notes that, despite the UN's intense post-1990 attention to Africa's problems (for example, of the 32 peacekeeping operations launched by the UN between 1989 and 1998, 13 were deployed in Africa), the international community is reluctant to get involved. Its experiences in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia have resulted in a great reluctance to assume the *political* and *financial exposure* associated with deploying peacekeeping operations.

For Annan, the UN has learned important lessons. The mistakes of Somalia produced a mindset which continues to hamper UN capacity to respond swiftly and decisively to crises. This, according to Annan, was tragically evident in the UN's inaction over the Rwandan tragedy: "that experience highlighted the crucial importance of swift intervention in a conflict and, above all, of political will to act in the face of a catastrophe." A positive lesson was drawn from the UN operation in Mozambique. There, its influence was augmented through constant dialogue with

the parties on the ground and with other states. For Annan, this showed that, in the right circumstances, peacekeeping operations can offer a flexible and uniquely adapted means to confront conflict in Africa. The successive UN deployments in Angola have indicated the crucial need for realistic peace agreements, and the importance of having a credible deterrent capacity within a peacekeeping operation in situations that remain dangerous and volatile.

What are the roles for UN (and regional) peacekeeping in Africa? The Secretary-General lists quite a number, key among them:[16]

> separating the protagonists and monitoring their conduct;
> implementing comprehensive settlements;
> deploying preventively;
> protecting humanitarian interests;
> authorising the use of forceful action;[17]
> co-deploying with regional, subregional or multinational forces;[18]
> strengthening Africa's capacity for peacekeeping;
> protecting civilians in situations of conflict;
> addressing refugee security issues;
> mitigating the social and environmental impact of refugees on host countries; and
> co-ordinating humanitarian aid and assistance.

Turning to the OAU, what is the reality of its experience on the ground? According to the Secretary General of the organisation, Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU "as a regional organisation is entrusted with the responsibility of promoting the unity and solidarity of the African states as well as *ensuring peaceful settlements of disputes*…"[19] He identifies the role of the OAU as being an 'amalgam' of facilitating negotiations between those in conflict, constructive involvement by way of diplomatic action and mediation of conflicts, and peace observation, including the preventive deployment of military observers. Writing in 1995, Salim also foresaw the organisation expanding into peacekeeping "to close the operational gap that the organisation experiences from time to time."[20]

Unfortunately, the OAU has many handicaps — all well-documented. Salim's effort to illustrate the organisation's efficacy as a stabilising force in African conflicts is not quite convincing, especially given the examples he uses: Liberia, Congo, Gabon, Lesotho and Rwanda. Perhaps its essential nature — a 'creature of compromise' — is the biggest drawback in what it can do to prevent or resolve conflicts. The obsessive focus of the *OAU Charter* on 'solidarity' among member states, as well as on 'respect for sovereignty and independence', effectively handicaps it when confronted with conflicts over boundaries, territory, or human rights. The OAU is managed and controlled by the state élite, many of whom were and are responsible for the conflicts their 'club' is supposed to address. The OAU's mediation successes can mostly be attributed to the personal diplomacy of 'legitimate' and respectable leaders, a role played by very few.[21]

In the view of Olara Otunnu, most regional organisations such as the OAU are still far from able to play the role envisaged for them in Chapter VIII of the *UN Charter*, mainly because of their lack of relevant tradition, financial resources, political prestige and credibility, impartiality and operational capacity.[22] In similar vein, Shannon Field writes that, despite myriad ideas, the OAU has been handicapped by a lack of resources.[23] Chronic funding difficulties have prevented the organisation from assuming the conflict management role envisioned by its leaders. Substantial work has been done on creating a blueprint for African security that is embodied in the *Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution* which is

meant to anticipate and prevent conflicts. The mechanism incorporates collective and regional approaches to internal and interstate security, and is indeed, as Field argues, a "bold conceptual leap in African thinking about security."[24] However, operationalising the collective security plans of the mechanism (its Central Organ) have been almost impossible due to resource constraints; efforts to build peacekeeping capacity have received lukewarm support.

But, there is a possible role for the OAU in conflict prevention. It can continue to assist with building peacekeeping capacity. A small group of analysts has recommended that the OAU focuses its efforts on conflict prevention and confidence-building measures through, for example, the Elders' Council for Peace.[25] Using the preventive diplomacy approach, it could draw on the talents of African elder statesmen (no women?) and distinguished personalities. Field concludes that "until the OAU becomes financially more independent, it will likely play an intermediary role between the UN and sub-regional organisations" — a depressing statement, but difficult to dispute.[26]

If it is accepted that, for the various reasons advanced above, the OAU occupies a position of minor influence in the great question of conflict prevention and resolution, then the attention must shift to subregional institutions such as SADC. Is SADC's capacity to deal with these issues, as outlined by the UN Secretary-General above, any different? Sadly, the history of SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security is a similar tale of inappropriate design, suffocating influence of an arrogant state élite, and lack of resources.[27] Despite upbeat assessments of a renewed role and future impact, it is difficult to see SADC overcoming the hurdles it faces. Although the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) works well on a technical level28 (and in the process pushing functional co-operation as the key to SADC's success), the organisation is caught, in essence, in a situation it purposely created. Invoking sovereignty and national interest, very few of the ruling élite in Southern Africa would want to see a powerful and influential Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, and consequently, it will continue to bow to the wishes of its political masters. The continuing crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is proof of that. It will not be able to comprehend, let alone deal with the forces which are tearing SADC apart — war in Angola and the Great Lakes region coupled to refugee flows and small arms throughout; undemocratic tendencies in small states such as Lesotho, Swaziland and the Seychelles; threats to democracy in Zambia and Zimbabwe; natural disasters striking at the heart of Mozambique; and poverty-related threats to human security throughout.

Conclusion: Old conflicts, new approaches?

How then should the question of conflict prevention and resolution in Southern Africa be approached? Can violent conflict really be understood without seriously considering the context of poverty, underdevelopment and dependency? Asked differently, what needs to be in place for the DRC conflict to be resolved? In this concluding section, a few tentative ideas are put forward.

First of all, the Great Lakes conflagration is perhaps Southern Africa, the continent and the international community's biggest and most complex challenge in terms of conflict resolution. And it is not immediately clear that international intervention — commonly understood as bringing the abilities of the UN, the OAU and SADC to bear on the situation — is the obvious route to go. Mark Malan argued that, in the DRC, these organisations "did too much too early", while the enforcement action that was taken by SADC Allied Forces lacked the support of the international community and the subregional body. He concludes that the 'peacemakers' and 'peace enforcers' have been at odds from the outset, creating a very shaky foundation for the

final layer of international response to the conflict — the deployment of UN peacekeepers.[28] This is a sobering perspective and puts the challenge in perspective.

In recent articles, it was argued that SADC and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security should not be put on a pedestal from whence it will direct rescue operations.[29] It does not have the capacity to, nor was it designed for this reason. Secondly, a broader framework must be adopted for understanding the obstacles to the region's revival — or put differently, for understanding the nature of the region's reconstruction and development agenda. It is a daunting task but possible if less state-centric concepts such as human security, peacebuilding, or peace maintenance are employed:

> *Human security* is a concept which emerged out of debates which broadened the concept of security from a preoccupation with the security of the state by military means, to that of people through prevention and the non-violent management of conflict and other fractures. For example, in the popularly known Kampala document of 1991, security was conceptualised as follows: "The security of a nation must be construed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights."[30]

> The concept of *peacebuilding* advances this approach. Peacebuilding involves efforts to promote human security in war-torn societies, and can be defined as processes and interventions that reduce or eliminate the root causes of a conflict. Seen in this way, it provides an important link between the debates on development and security.

> *Peace maintenance* addresses the question of how to manage conflict under conditions of state collapse. It is an innovative concept designed to alleviate the problem of fractured societies through a harmonisation of diplomatic, humanitarian, civilian and military objectives as part of an overall political framework.[31] The umbrella framework that co-ordinates these elements will need a UN administrator as politician if complex transitional arrangements in internal conflicts are to be successful. To date, the UN has not adequately developed political strategies commensurate with diplomatic, military and humanitarian activities. This is what the proponents of peace maintenance are calling for, and this, it is proposed, is what the conflict in the DRC and in other parts of Africa calls for.

Having established that resolving violent conflict and war — by building, restoring and keeping peace — is a complex, multidimensional human endeavour, do past and current practices offer appropriate routes? What will work in the DRC? Are the experiences of the international community such that fine-tuning and adjustments are in order? *More peacekeeping, but better organised?* Should it be accepted — to the realist's delight — that because life is brutal, nasty and short, states should merely soften conditions of suffering where it is in their self-interest? *Less peacekeeping, on an* ad hoc *basis?* Or can conflict be transformed? If so, should less faith be put in states and state structures, and the roles of civil society, social movements, international non-governmental organisations and the like rather be explored? *More peace building and peace maintenance?* These questions beg for urgent answers.

Notes

1. Quoted by M Ehrke, Germany: United, rich, unhappy, *International Politics and Society* 1, 2000, p 84.

2. Quoted by D Anglin, Conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, July 1998 — July 1999, *Southern African Perspectives* 81, 1999, p 1.

3. Ibid, p 2.

4. Ibid, pp 2-3.

5. For a good discussion and overview see C Allen, Warfare, endemic violence and state collapse in Africa, *Review of African Political Economy* 81, 1999.

6. M Doyle, Discovering the limits and potential of peacekeeping, in O Otunnu & M Doyle, *Peacemaking and peacekeeping for the new century*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 1998, p 10.

7. K Annan, *The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa*, 1998 Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, <www.un.org>.

8. Doyle, op cit, p 3.

9. G Evans, Preventive action and conflict resolution, in Otunnu & Doyle, op cit, pp 66-70.

10. Ibid.

11. J Chopra (ed), *The politics of peace maintenance*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998.

12. Ibid, p 6.

13. Ibid, p 16.

14. For a discussion of conceptual innovations in the 'peacebuilding' genre, see A van Nieuwkerk, Looking ahead: Peacebuilding in Southern Africa, *Global Dialogue* 5(1), 2000.

15. See Annan, op cit, for a thorough discussion.

16. As Annan notes, the obligation to obtain Security Council authorisation prior to the use of force is clear; but while authorising forceful action by member states or coalitions of states can sometimes be an effective response to such situations, it also raises many questions for the future, particularly the need to enhance the Security Council's ability to monitor activities that have been authorised.

17. The collaboration with ECOMOG succeeded in restoring peace in Liberia.

18. S A Salim, The OAU role in conflict management, in Otunnu & Doyle, op cit, p 247.

19. Ibid, p 249.

20. One possible candidate might be Haile Selassie's mediation efforts in the 1960s and early 1970s. See B Agyeman-Duah, The role of the OAU, in D Zormelo & P Mayer, *Peace-keeping and peace-making: Changes in international politics and implications for peace in Africa*, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Accra, 1996.

21. O Otunnu, The peace-and-security agenda of the United Nations, in Otunnu & Doyle, op cit, p 303.

22. S Field, Whither regional peace and security: the DRC after the war, unpublished paper, February 2000.

23. Ibid.

24. See C de Coning, *Preparing for the third millennium: Towards a policy framework for the OAU conflict management mechanism*, Accord Occasional Paper 4, 1999. Laurie Nathan provides a challenging analysis on the question of why Africa's conflicts were — and are — resistant to mediation efforts. See L Nathan, When push comes to shove: The failure of international mediation in African civil wars, *Track Two* 8(2), 1999.

25. Field, op cit.

26. There is a great academic debate on SADC and its Organ. On the one hand, see the prolific output of the Institute for Security Studies, <www.issafrica.org>. On the other, see the approach by Walter Tapfumanei in newsletters produced by the Institute for Global Dialogue, <www.igd.org.za>, or Accord <www.accord.org.za>.

27. It is at the level of the ISDSC, aided by generous amounts of donor money, that regional confidence-building is being promoted. The Harare-based Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) is one example of this approach. Tapfumanei, Cilliers and others report that the ISDSC is making steady progress with co-operation in the fields of disaster management, satellite communications, peacekeeping training and doctrine, and public security issues such as drug-trafficking and firearm-smuggling. See J Cilliers, *Building security in Southern Africa: An update on the evolving architecture*, ISS Monograph 43, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 1999.

28. M Malan, *The UN 'Month of Africa': A push for actual peace efforts or a fig leaf on the DRC?,* ISS Paper 44, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, February 2000, p 2. To get a better sense of the challenge faced by peacekeepers, consider the tasks of a suggested mandate for a UN peacekeeping force in the DRC:

* working with the Joint Military Commission and the OAU in its implementation;

* observing and monitoring the cessation of hostilities;

* investigating violations of the cease-fire agreement and taking measures to ensure compliance;

* supervising the disengagement of forces as stipulated in the cease-fire agreement;

* providing and maintaining humanitarian assistance to and protecting displaced persons;

* collecting weapons from civilians and storing them;

* scheduling and supervising the withdrawal of all foreign forces; as well as

* a number of 'peace enforcement' operations such as the tracking down and disarming of armed groups; screening mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war criminals; and handing over suspected genocidaires to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Malan, pp 4-5).

29. A van Nieuwkerk, Promoting peace and security in Southern Africa, *Global Dialogue* 4(3), 1999; A van Nieuwkerk, Looking ahead: Peace-building in Southern Africa, *Global Dialogue* 5(1), 2000.

30. Quoted by A du Pisani, Security and defence: Concepts and discourse in Southern Africa, paper read at the *Conference on Demilitarisation and Peacebuilding in Southern Africa*, Pretoria, March 2000.

31. Bratt, in Chopra, op cit, p 123.

Chapter 12
Efforts at conflict prevention and resolution: The french experience
Rear-Admiral Hervé Giraud

Preventive diplomacy in Africa

A focus on conflict prevention and resolution clearly falls within the ambit of *preventive diplomacy*. This concept can be characterised in the following manner: defining, assessing and managing those crises that emerge suddenly around the world. The appearance of this concept in the 1990s is not by chance. It coincided with the emergence of three main factors: the arrival of public opinion on the international scene, the evolution of the notion of conflict and, finally, the development of *multilateral structures* (international, regional and subregional organisations).

From a new UN approach …

While multilateral structures are the real forums for preventive diplomacy, they have always considered prevention as a *duty*. The United Nations has dedicated Chapter VI of the *UN Charter* to this issue, which clearly states the notion of duty in article 33:

> "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

At the regional level, a mechanism for the prevention, management and regulation of conflicts was created within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1993 to "*bring a new institutional dynamism to the conflict management process on the continent.*"[1] Finally, at the subregional level, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) also outlined a joint defence and security policy during its summit in Maputo in 1993. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with ECOMOG, its Monitoring Group, and the Peace and Security Council of Central Africa known as COPAX have also had the same concern. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in the Horn of Africa is also moving in the same direction, with its considerations of, among others, a Conflict Early Warning mechanism (CEWARN).

The UN has always been perceived as the most important guarantor of maintaining peace

around the globe.[2] However, it seems to be adopting a new approach towards African affairs. Concretely, the UN's focus is increasingly on *having peacekeeping operations dealt with by the OAU, subregional organisations or government groups* in a region affected by a crisis (for example, the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) in the Central African Republic, or the OAU's mediation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict).

There is therefore a reinforcement of the linkage between the UN and the OAU through co-operation: the establishment of a trust fund for the prevention of African conflicts, a liaison office at the OAU headquarters, a training assistance team, and others. The aim is to co-ordinate the various initiatives more effectively by avoiding their being overtaken by events. Is this co-ordinating role of the UN not restrictive if the philosophy adopted in 1948 in San Francisco is considered? This is the first question that could be asked.

… To encourage (sub)regional organisations to assume more responsibility

Whatever the answer to this question, ensuring the co-ordination of the various initiatives is far from being obvious. Numerous structural obstacles tend to slow down co-operation. For this reason, the OAU and the UN could envisage a reflective process at institutional and relational levels. With this in mind, it would be interesting to undertake, on the one hand, a reconsideration of the structure of the central mechanism of the OAU and, on the other, a reassessment of the co-operation between the UN and the OAU. At this stage, the fact must be highlighted that the project to create a joint working group focused on peacekeeping matters was recently reactivated. This working group would enable the exchange of views and information, as well as the more effective co-ordination of activities.

If the UN-OAU relationship is fundamental, those between the OAU and subregional organisations are even more so, as these represent the spearheads of conflict prevention and resolution in Africa. Indeed, the sharing of roles seems to have occurred between the OAU and subregional organisations. If the OAU focuses essentially on actions of preventive diplomacy (mediation), then the creation of peacekeeping forces and their intervention actions are more the domain of subregional organisations (the Southern African Development Community (SADC), ECOWAS, COPAX, IGAD, and others) that operate under the aegis of the UN and the OAU. It should be added, at this stage, that *these multinational organisations can hardly operate without external support*. The proposal of General Eyadema, the president of Togo, concerning the creation of subregional force units that "could receive material and financial external support" is significant in this regard.[3]

It is clear that this African dynamic must be supported. The fundamental needs of the main organisations can be summarised as follows: logistic, financial and material support, as well as training, more particularly, training in management and peacekeeping. Western countries could not remain passive, and diverse bilateral and multilateral initiatives have been undertaken to reinforce this dynamic.

Bilateral and multilateral dimensions in Africa

On a global scale, defence and security issues are, strictly speaking, generally envisaged within a bilateral framework, while peacekeeping issues are seen within a multilateral framework. These two types of initiatives are complementary and, through co-operation and partnership, function together in efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts. In this regard, the bilateral military relations with South Africa are significant in terms of their contribution to stability in the Southern African subregion. This notion is reinforced when looking at the respective Franco-South African

participation in multilateral exercises organised by either party.

Bilateral relations between France and South Africa

Bilateral co-operation between South Africa and France has been beneficial to the region. The future itself *appears even more promising*. The attention has been focused more particularly on the regular exchange of officers in the two countries' respective training facilities, visiting and putting in at South African harbours, and on developing the relationship between internal security forces and the French *Gendarmerie nationale*, as well as with officials of the two health services. After signing the intergovernmental co-operation agreement and beginning a strategic dialogue during Spring 1998, a new commission has met in May 2000, in the same spirit as that of Spring 1999. This commission will serve as a framework for reinforcing bilateral and multilateral actions.

The multilateral dimension

The multilateral dimension has been fully exemplified by the two countries during the foreign military and humanitarian interventions in Mozambique and Madagascar. Indeed, following cyclone *Eline* and tropical storm *Gloria* during February and March 2000, South Africa, the driving force behind SADC, promptly intervened in these areas by deploying considerable means. France, for its part, was also quick to participate in humanitarian aid operations with, initially, a C160 cargo carrier, followed by the deployment of the Jeanne d'Arc helicopter carrier and another C160 cargo carrier. The remarkable and spontaneous co-operation and co-ordination between both armies in this operation have to be acknowledged. In another area, France and South Africa *jointly participated* in the multinational interforce peacekeeping exercises during operations *Blue Crane* (South Africa in April 1999), and *Tulip* (Madagascar, May 1999). This dynamic could be prolonged during the next cycle of the *Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix* (RECAMP) programme.

RECAMP

To what extent can a programme such as RECAMP answer the needs of African people as mentioned above?

RECAMP, the concrete *application* of the tripartite agreement signed in May 1997 in New York by France, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), aims to reinforce African capacity in maintaining peace. It is based on the principle of standby force units as defined by the UN (Chapter VI of the *UN Charter*). In practice, RECAMP is about educating, training and partly equipping African peacekeeping forces at subregional level with the help of donor countries. Thus, it should enable participating African countries to engage units in peacekeeping operations on the continent. *This tool is meant to be at the disposal of all African countries, without any discrimination or selection criteria*. French action is essentially focused on training soldiers (particularly officers), prepositioning equipment and implementing training cycles at subregional level. Two main types of exercises have already been undertaken: *Guidimakha '98* with ECOWAS, and *Gabon 2000* with COPAX. The results of these exercises were very positively received by both donors, and contributing and participating countries.

In accordance with UN viewpoints, RECAMP principles are harmonised with those of subregional organisations and the OAU. There are four principles:

  multilateralism: establishing a partnership between donor countries and African

contributing countries;

access to all African countries: the benefit accrued from RECAMP must be open to all African countries, without any exclusivity, particularly regional or linguistic, where the subregion serves as the framework of privileged action;

transparency: contributions are made known to all countries, and operations are limited to peacekeeping and humanitarian aid; and

standby forces: obtaining a non-permanent peacekeeping capacity, consisting of force units that can be rapidly mobilised; this capacity is founded on the existing military structures of African countries. However, while these force units are intended for stability on the African continent, their deployment must not disturb regional balance.

While this type of initiative assists in effectively preventing and resolving conflicts, it is not without imperfections and any improvement is obviously welcome. One such an improvement arises out of the current European dynamic.

The European dynamic

As far as France is concerned, an initiative such as RECAMP is not well-founded unless it fits into the European interest and context. Most Western countries continue to undertake initiatives in favour of the African continent, whether of a humanitarian or peacekeeping nature. Due to their number and sometimes redundancy, the efficacy of these initiatives is sometimes limited.

France's main objective is to combine these efforts under one larger programme such as RECAMP, and thus to improve the European dimension. The success of such a programme will be even more significant if the multiple initiatives are combined in a coherent whole, supported by the strong political will of member states of the European Union. In this regard, military developments in the EU (still in the early stages) could assist in defining Europe's Africa policy in the long run.

Controlling arms

The initiatives devoted to the security of subregions in Africa can only be efficient if the control of arms and military budgets are also taken into account. Indeed, any state in search of security and stability must benefit from a budget that will allow it to develop military means that are realistic and proportionate to its needs. Such a military budget must not be overestimated.

It still happens too often in Africa that military budgets do not reflect actual needs. The result is oversized military forces, which generally lead to deficits in other areas (mainly linked to the development of civil society) and, in the long run, to a destabilisation of the country. The destabilisation risk is often exacerbated by the proliferation of light weapons and small arms which can extend to the subregional level.

To ensure security in a subregion, it is fundamental to monitor arms proliferation and to ensure that the military is appropriate to the true needs of a country. With this in mind, the monitoring of light weapons proliferation and the search for a balance in military budgets are approved of and supported. This support was officially ratified in November 1999 by the Organisation for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) during its summit of heads of states in Istanbul. The OSCE is applying this position on a regional level through operations led within the UN. In addition (and

this is perhaps a reflection that needs to be developed at SADC level), the OSCE operates more especially in Africa via initiatives such as that of the ECOWAS moratorium that aims at regulating the import, export and manufacture of light weapons.[4]

Concluding remarks

In this paper, two main aspects of efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts were highlighted.

Security in Africa is increasingly organised by and tends to be the responsibility of players at the regional and subregional level. The OAU and subregional organisations have considerable potential at their disposal that is presently hampered by structural constraints.

If these organisations become seriously concerned with the reorganisation of their central organs, if reinforcing the links between them and redefining their security and defence policies become the priority of their members, then *the implementation of a policy of centralised security as it concerns external partners, implies that such partners must provide the technical, logistic and financial support that is indispensable for success*. This is the aim of every bilateral and multilateral action, and of programmes such as RECAMP, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), and others.

Co-operation between South Africa and France can only be part of a relationship based on trust and mutual knowledge. The youthfulness and dynamics of South Africa, the means and experience of France, and the accelerated construction of Europe, must be seen as assets from which the Southern African region can benefit in preventing and resolving conflicts in Africa.

In terms of military co-operation, increased exchanges and systematic participation of French and South African military forces in multinational exercises, such as those of RECAMP or Geranium on Réunion Island, will represent the main lines of co-operation between the two countries. Finally, in addition to their actual and material benefits, these initiatives and relationships are and must remain signs and symbols of hope for the stability of the African continent, and for the solidarity among its members.

Notes

1. OAU report, 1993.

2. Article 24 of the UN Charter: "The main responsibility for maintaining peace and international security."

3. This proposal was made during his many activities that followed the Summit of Biarritz in 1994.

4. In November 1996, Mali launched this moratorium project, approved in Abuja in October 1998.

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