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AND

S O U T H A F R I C A

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NATO AND SOUTH AFRICA

C O N T E N T S

Introduction	(ii)
An Alliance for All Seasons	1
Warren H. Jones	
NATO and the Cape Sea Route	9
General H.J. Kruls	
Sea Power in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic	11
Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, K.B.E.	
Annexure	16
- Extracts from "Die Burger" and "The Star".	
- Notes on Contributors.	

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INTRODUCTION

As this year is the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, it seemed appropriate to circulate to members information about the achievements of NATO. The article "An Alliance For All Seasons" by Warren H. Jones provides such information in some detail, although it does not purport to be an overall evaluation of NATO's role and the problems it has faced during the past twenty years.

The two articles which follow reflect the concern felt in some NATO quarters about the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, and relate to South Africa's strategic position in this regard. This concern was highlighted at a recent non-official NATO meeting in Washington, when the British delegation (not an official Government delegation) suggested in a working paper that NATO should extend its activities to the South Atlantic area - "with the possible inclusion of South Africa" - to meet the growing threat of Soviet sea-power in the region.

As reported in "The Star" of October 21, 1969, the British delegation to the Washington meeting urged NATO to extend its defence limits south of the Tropic of Cancer, because of the increasing importance of the Cape Sea route following the closure of the Suez Canal. They suggested that discussions on the problem might cover the supply, if South Africa requested it, of naval vessels and reconnaissance planes to assist in defence of the Cape of Good Hope sea route against submarine attack.

The British working paper acknowledged problems over the attitudes by some NATO members towards South Africa's apartheid policies, but posed a blunt question: "If the importance of these routes need any underlining, it is only necessary to ask the question of how Europe's shipping would fare if a hostile South Africa were to forbid its ports to vessels of NATO flag nations?". South Africa had co-operated in the past in joint naval exercises and provided port facilities to NATO countries, tankers and cargo ships at Cape Town and Durban. Through the Youngfield radio station at Cape Town, South Africa also provided NATO shipping with weather information and intelligence about Soviet naval movements.

"With the rapid expansion of the Soviet Navy and the increased importance of the Cape sea route following the closure of the Suez Canal, it can be argued that the limit on the treaty is politically and militarily obsolete, that it imposes an anachronistic restriction on efficient defence of NATO's interests", the British delegation's working paper said.

(A report on this meeting, which appeared in "Die Burger" of 21 October, 1969, is reproduced in an annexure, together with an editorial comment which appeared in "The Star" of the same date.)

/Earlier this...

(iii)

Earlier this year there were reports that the South African Government was discussing with other Governments the question of arrangements for the defence of the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean, including the idea of some sort of Southern Hemisphere pact with Brazil and Argentina on the one hand and Australia and New Zealand on the other. All the Governments concerned have denied that any such pact is contemplated. There have, however, been official visits by units of the South African Navy to South American ports and to Australia, and next year a ship of the Argentine Navy will join the South African Navy in manoeuvres.

On the 25th May, 1969, "The Star" noted that a Government White Paper on defence reflected the concern regarding the impending power-vacuum in the Indian Ocean. The White Paper revealed that the Republic would concentrate on strengthening and expanding its maritime defence programme. To add striking power to its naval vessels, and to provide for greater defence off the coast of South Africa, steps to be taken would include, the purchase of fast coastal patrol craft, the acquisition of light reconnaissance patrol aircraft to police coastal waters, possible provision of guided missiles on naval vessels, construction of a R14.4 million tidal basin and submarine base at Simonstown.

On 30th September, 1969, it was reported that Mr. Raymond V.B. Blackman, editor of the journal "Jane's Fighting Ships", 1969-70, had suggested that there be a new role for South Africa and other South Atlantic powers as part of a Greater Atlantic Treaty Organisation. He asked: "But why a separate SATO and NATO? Why not a combined SATO and NATO in the shape of a GATO or Greater Atlantic Treaty Organisation? Mr. Blackman recalled Dr. Hilgard Muller's visits to the Argentine and Brazil and the South African Navy's courtesy visits to the Argentine and Australia. He added: "All these exchanges reflect the growing concern of South Africa, custodian of the today never so important sea route round the Cape, over the power vacuum in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic caused by the withdrawal of British forces east of Suez and from the South Atlantic."

AN ALLIANCE FOR ALL SEASONS

By

Warren H. Jones

Two hundred years ago Edmund Burke spoke of "Men acute, inquisitive, dexterous, prompt in attack, ready in defense, full of resources..."

Had he spoken these words in our time he might well have been referring to the representatives of the post-World War II free world nations who, realizing that peace was not finally assured, assembled under a banner of collective security. This assembly resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty, an alliance to prevent aggression, an instrument for joint permanent co-operation in the political, military, economic and social fields. Signed in 1949, the Treaty proclaimed, with the strength and wealth of the member nations at its service, the importance of economic and social progress while reaffirming a security policy based on the inherent right of collective self-defense as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

When the Alliance came into being 20 years ago even the most confirmed optimist could not fail to see the threat in the East. As the wartime Allied Forces reduced their armed strength and settled down to peace, the Soviet Union maintained its forces on a wartime footing. It was soon apparent that the Soviet territorial expansion that had begun during the war and ended with the annexation of about 390,000 square miles of territory in which more than 90,000,000 people lived, was an extension of an imperialist policy which was a threat to peace and security.

Extraordinary Achievements

In its pursuit of the defense of a way of life, NATO has made some extraordinary achievements and has maintained the cohesion of member states in the strategic and political fields. NATO also has continued to examine the important and complex problems confronting it in the field of conventional and nuclear weapons, and has advanced rapidly in the study of the various formulae proposed, or which might be proposed in the future, with particular respect to the sharing of nuclear responsibilities within the Alliance.

As a result, NATO has become a supereminence of defense, a center of expertise in the difficult profession of keeping the peace.

How did NATO reach such a stage of defensive maturity? High-minded ideals and principles aimed at guarding freedom and humanity are not, in themselves, effective weapons against an enemy. Communism respects only physical power, and the only meaningful deterrent to plans for world domination is the knowledge that aggression will be met by armed resistance.

From the very outset it was obvious that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be useless unless it were backed by effective military force. In 1950 the North Atlantic Council, supreme political authority for the Alliance, directed the creation of an integrated military command under a Supreme Commander who had sufficient authority to insure that national forces could be organized, trained and equipped as an Allied force in peace as well as in war. Thus came into being Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe - SHAPE - (from 1950 to 1967 near Paris, since then in southern Belgium) and Allied Command Europe - ACE. To insure adequate regional defenses under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), SHAPE has three major subordinate commands: AFNORTH, Allied Forces Northern Europe, with headquarters near Oslo, Norway; AFCENT, Allied Forces Central Europe, Brunssum, The Netherlands; AFSOUTH, Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy.

There are two other major NATO commands, Allied Command Atlantic, which defends the sea lanes between North America and Europe, and Allied Command Channel, charged with defense of the English Channel and the protection of communication lines between the United Kingdom and the Continent.

ACE and its sister commands are constantly developing strategies, force requirements and future programmes. Two of their main characteristics stand out: Overall control of total military power is vested in the political authority; and all plans and concepts of defense submitted to this authority for approval carry prior, unanimous acceptance by the top military authorities of the member nations.

Czechoslovakia

Soviet military capabilities are a constant threat to the nations of the North Atlantic Alliance, and the August 21, 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia proved that they are indeed highly mobile and combat-ready.

SACEUR's mission is to deter war, and, should the deterrent fail, defend the territory of ACE as far forward as possible. Available to SACEUR to fulfill this mission would be national or external forces, and the forces which eventually would be assigned to his command.

SACEUR is responsible for the defense of the NATO European area, from northernmost Norway to the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece and easternmost Turkey. Largest of NATO's major commands, ACE consists of land, air and naval forces from most member states of the Alliance.

Other forces - normally national and primarily nuclear in character - will be under SACEUR from a certain state of alert onwards: The UK "Strike Command," assigned to SACEUR since 1963; the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the Polaris submarines from the Holy Loch bases in Scotland which are on assigned patrols under SACEUR.

ACE forces form part of the overall NATO deterrent. However, to be effective, this deterrent must be prepared to meet every form of aggression and not be confined to the nuclear field. This is achieved by maintaining a significant number of conventional forces in Europe.

AMF Created

With the approval of the NATO governments, SACEUR in 1960 set up a small special force called the ACE Mobile Forces. The reasoning behind the creation of the AMF was that if an enemy attacked Central Europe, he would be opposed immediately by the forces of several member countries of the Alliance. However, if he attacked in Northern Norway, Greece or Turkey, for example, he would be opposed by NATO assigned forces, but they would be national and he might be tempted to believe that other help would not be forthcoming, especially if the action were local.

To prevent such a dangerous miscalculation, SACEUR's plan, with NATO Council consent, would be to dispatch immediately by air, to a tension area of ACE, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, a force consisting of units of various NATO countries.

It was apparent that the AMF, composed of multinational forces from different areas, and faced with the problems of rapid deployment to remote areas, differences in language, climate and terrain, and variances in equipment, had to be exercised regularly to pinpoint and overcome these problems. Thus, the AMF Commander over the year carries out various study periods, command post exercises and field training exercises in each of the most likely deployment areas.

Several successful field training exercises have proved two things: that while a small special force cannot influence the land battle in Turkey, for instance, a reinforced brigade group makes a major contribution to a comparatively small army, such as Norway's; and that with ample cold weather, valuable experience can be gained in solving the problems associated with Arctic maneuvers. Exercises were held by AMF in the vital "flank" areas of Southeastern Europe, involving the airlift of 3,500 troops, tactical air squadrons and about 7 million pounds of freight, including 800 vehicles and seven helicopters - an impressive feat considering the vital time factor.

The most recent development to increase the strength of this force came in March 1967 when Canada became the first NATO country to contribute a second battalion to the ACE Mobile Force (Land).

The AMF dramatically demonstrates the solidarity and determination of the members of the Alliance and reduces the likelihood of an enemy's risking any form of aggression. Consequently, the AMF stands as a genuine contribution to peace in the NATO area.

Infrastructure

The manifold hard achievements of NATO over the past twenty years are truly remarkable. Most outstanding perhaps is the progress made in Common Infrastructure, which denotes all those fixed installations necessary for the deployment and operation of NATO forces - airfields, signal and telecommunications installations, military headquarters, pipelines and fuel storage facilities, radar warning and navigational aid stations, port installations, missile installations. Financed collectively by NATO member countries under the terms of the various cost-sharing agreements, the Infrastructure program represents the first time that the members of an alliance have pooled their resources to build up an adequate defensive establishment. An experiment stemming from a mutual determination to resist any act of aggression, NATO Common Infrastructure is a striking demonstration of what can be achieved - even in the most technical fields - when a spirit of international solidarity prevails. Since 1951, the number of NATO airfields, all operational and capable of handling modern aircraft, has increased from 20 to more than 200. The fuel pipeline system carrying fuel from Atlantic and Mediterranean ports to military vehicles and aircraft comprises some 5,600 miles. The current communications network has added about 27,300 miles of land lines, radio links and submarine cables to existing civilian networks.

Training bases have been set up for the air forces, for missile units, and for land forces to allow joint maneuvers. Naval installations are operational, many of them for the storage of petroleum products, fuel lubricants and ammunition. Also operating are missile sites and their corresponding ammunition storage areas, war headquarters, radio navigation aids and radar warning systems. A complex electronic system has been set up to enable the forces under the Air Defense Plan for Western Europe to counter, at very short notice, any modern act of aggression. A fully-integrated early warning system against enemy air attack operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

Communications Systems

Communications systems have been developed under the control of SHAPE and its major subordinate commands. These systems provide the command and control of forces in the fast moving action of modern warfare. The ACE High system, for instance, covers the NATO European area from the northernmost Norway to the eastern reaches of Turkey. Exercises repeatedly challenge these communications and SHAPE continually strives for higher standards in communications efficiency. A major improvement, for example, will be realized with the introduction next year of the NATO Satellite Communications System. An experimental link of that system has been in operation between SHAPE and AFSOUTH in Naples since June 1967.

Technical Race

The military and economic strength of industrialized nations today depends on their scientific and technical capacity. This has been demonstrated by events in NATO during the post-war years, and it is constantly and dramatically underlined by the technical achievements of the USSR, whose aim is to surpass the West in both the military and economic fields. Increasingly apparent is the fact that the future of the West is dependent to an ever-increasing degree on the rate at which science and technology advance.

NATO's interest is centered on bringing about the general conditions which will accelerate the pace of scientific progress. As a pivotal point of Western co-operation, NATO is assisting in the necessary direction, by assuring itself that efforts to deal with the problems of manpower shortages and science and technology deficiencies have the support of the governments concerned.

Since NATO's unique responsibility is defense, it has ascertained the requirements for scientific and technical manpower arising from current and projected defense plans. It has made and is making effective use of existing scientific resources by improved co-operation between member countries in defense research. Thus, in the event of an emergency, national plans exist for bringing about the best use of scientific resources in the common interest. Besides, the Council is kept advised on problems of science and technology of concern to the NATO Alliance.

Forward-looking Policy

The results of this forward-looking policy have been nothing short of tremendous. One of its products - the aftermath of a detailed study on air defense within the NATO defense system - was the SHAPE Technical Center (STC). Established in March, 1963, by decision of the North Atlantic Council, this Center today under SACEUR's direction is a well-organized and well-equipped technical institute, with a staff of about 100 scientific experts from most of the 15 NATO countries. It receives advice and recommendations from a Scientific Committee of National Representatives. Through the professionalism, talent and skill of the staff the program and scope of the Center - originally limited to matters of air defense - was expanded to include other subjects suitable for scientific evaluation. Specifically, the STC evaluates the effectiveness and survivability of air defense weapon systems against aircraft and missile attack, taking into account the constraints posed by the sites - evaluation of exercises, assistance in NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) planning, command and control, and force structure analysis. A general purpose digital computer helps to solve mathematical problems, and to process data collected, for example, in exercises, and to assist in computer-supported war games. Another high speed, high capacity computer aids this work.

Other important and related tasks of the Center: research and limited development - but not engineering for manufacture - in the

field of anti-submarine warfare, including oceanography; operational research and analysis, advisory and consultant work, and exploratory research. Therefore, the essential task of the Center is to provide scientific and technical advice and assistance through the whole spectrum of operations in Allied Command Europe.

Standardization Gains

The steady Allied accomplishments in the field of standardization are of particular significance. When NATO was first set up in 1949, rearmament for defense was the order of the day. Forces were being expanded and equipment was needed. The drawbacks to rapid production were many. World War II had left the armament industries of most Western Europe in shambles, and the surviving industrial plant had switched over to civilian production. Besides, economic troubles made most countries unwilling to divert scarce resources to defense production or hard-earned foreign exchange to military purchases from abroad. Mutual aid from the United States and Canada bridged the immediate gap, as improvements in the economic climate gradually allowed most countries to provide more from their own resources.

The first steps in rationalizing defense production were made in 1949 by the Military Production and Supply Board and its successor, in 1950, the Defense Production Board. These boards succeeded in preparing specialised studies which recommended means of increasing production in fields of greatest deficiency. There followed long years of proposals and plans for the reconciliation of military requirements, including arms and equipment; problems involving production and logistics; security, and the lack of an overall equipment master plan and a supranational authority.

Later developments showed the momentous reversal of this state of affairs, largely as the result of the 1954 NATO Council action in establishing a Committee to advise and make recommendations on defense production matters. The Committee took over the work of correlated production programs and of other production activities, particularly work on standardization and the exchange of technical information. Standardization of items of equipment, components and spare parts was recognized at an early stage as being important because it can lead to a simplification of the logistic support of forces and is a necessary forerunner of co-ordination of production. Technical standardization is not an end in itself and projects for standardization are therefore discussed carefully between nations and the NATO International Staff, which handles the preparation of all studies and secretarial work.

Citing Results

Detailing the progress in this field would require a lengthy separate treatment. However, certain hard examples can be cited.

Examples of items or areas for which technical Standardization Agreements have been promulgated are specifications for explosives of various types, vehicle components and attachments, a priority list of electronic valves, impact tests for steels for guns, the adoption of a standard atmosphere for ballistic purposes, and rules for the conversion of dimensions on drawings of United States origin for countries using the metric system.

As a result of high-level discussions and decisions, the NATO military production program has been able to develop, or project: the G91 lightweight tactical reconnaissance aircraft; the Breguet Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft; the Hawk surface-to-air missile system; the Sidewinder air-to-air missile system; an anti-submarine torpedo; the F 104 G Starfighter multi-purpose fighter aircraft; the Bullpup, the AS-30 air-to-surface missiles, and 7.62 mm ammunition.

The need to find sources of spare parts for the extensive range of items of equipment of North American origin was examined by a group of NATO experts. The problem then fell to groups set up for the centralized procurement of certain parts. Following a US proposal to establish an effective regional system for the supply of spare parts by the progressive delegation of national functions to a central organisation, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organisation emerged in 1958. Established by the Council on the recommendation of the Defense Production Committee, it consists of a central agency which is the management element, working under the policy guidance of a Board of Directors composed of one member from each participating nation.

The main tasks of the Agency are to analyse the spare parts requirements of member countries as well as their own resources, to plan and adopt joint maintenance and overhaul arrangements, to organize the supply of spare parts, and to exchange information on technical problems.

Specific examples are the supply of spare parts and service for NIKE air defense missile systems and HONEST JOHN rockets; planning for logistic procurement for spare parts for the Starfighter plane, and full logistic support for SIDEWINDER. In addition, it is concerned with aircraft, vehicles, certain types of artillery, small arms and electronic equipment, and in particular, has responsibility for supply and maintenance services for the Forward Scatter Communications System.

Benefits Accrued

From the foregoing, the concrete achievements of NATO are quite apparent. More nebulous, and less publicized, but profoundly important, are the intangible milestones marking NATO's progress.

The benefits accruing to the civilian population from the infrastructure projects, the communications systems improvement, the pipeline, the maintenance and supply functions, the contracts

for aircraft and weaponry, are incalculable. National economies have been strengthened by the spending and by the more effective use of manpower. People of diverse national backgrounds have learned how to live and work together, furthering international understanding and consequently the prospects of a continuing peace. NATO research has encouraged youth in the many countries to believe in the Alliance and has instilled in them a hope for the future. Finally - and most important - during the 20 years of the North Atlantic Treaty's existence, the integrity of NATO territory has been maintained, peace has been preserved, and military security has solidified the stability that is necessary to the advance of economic prosperity. The philosopher Schiller wrote: "The most pious may not live in peace, if it does not please his wicked neighbor..." And it is exactly for this reason that NATO, looking confidently and technologically to the future, will continue to discharge its two main functions: maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression, and other forms of pressure, and defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. Beyond this, NATO must continue to add to the framework within which the underlying political issues can be solved.

Contingency planning rests to a large degree on the evolution of the political and social events of our times. At the same time, the adaptation of NATO's forces and defense plans to changing conditions is a dynamic and continuing one. To implement this, the Alliance has developed its modern strategic concept and an up-to-date five-year force plan extending through 1973 and is hard at work developing force proposals to 1975.

Since wars began in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed. The defense of the entire Western World, is well within the collective capabilities of the great Alliance that NATO represents.

This then, is the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance - Anno Domini 1969 - the defense response to the age-old Biblical admonition:

"Be sober, be vigilant; because your adversary----
as a roaring lion walketh about, seeking whom he may devour..."

NATO AND THE CAPE SEA ROUTES

by

General H.J. Kruls

On the occasion of NATO's twentieth anniversary, members of the Alliance as well as the political parties of the members' countries have been re-assessing the position of NATO. And, of course, the same re-assessment took place within the organs of the Alliance itself.

The most important general conclusion was that NATO entered its 21st year under circumstances which necessitate more than ever the continuation of its existence, not one of its members even considering the option of giving notice to quit.

There is hardly a part of the world at the present time without more or less serious trouble. Many of these happenings have a direct influence on the interests of NATO countries, while at the same time NATO, with its present limitations, is not in a position to intervene. A striking example of this is the Israel-Arab war. This conflict is changing the balance of power in the Mediterranean, strongly affecting the security of Western Europe, while simultaneously one of the world's most important sea communications, especially for oil transportation, has been closed for several years. The fuel transport line has been switched from the Suez Canal-Mediterranean route to the Indian Ocean-Cape-Southern Atlantic route through other oceans, with other means, and ... under different threats.

The Indian Ocean, for instance, is no longer a "British Lake", a land-locked sea of considerable dimensions the entrances and exits of which were controlled by the Royal Navy. The old maritime power - India - is and might ever remain unable to take over the position of dominant naval power in the Indian Ocean. British sea power is withdrawing, and Russian sea power is alert and, with its strong submarine forces in the Far East, is able to penetrate into the Indian Ocean and threaten the vital sea communications.

The situation in the South Atlantic may be different, but the fact remains that Russian naval forces, and in the first place submarines, can easily concentrate in the South Atlantic either after running the Cape or by going from the Black Sea fleet via Gibraltar.

Then it must further be considered that South Africa, whose strategic position in this respect is so dominant, is not enjoying the undivided friendship of the countries whose sea communications

are once again dependent on the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope. This fact disturbs the strengthening of South African armed forces and military cooperation in safeguarding Western sea communications. And a final look at the eastern shores of the African Continent may show that these are full of potential dangers for the lifelines of the West through both the Indian and the South Atlantic Oceans.

In the world of today there are two great Powers on whose shoulders has remained for the past few years the main responsibility for world peace: the United States and the Soviet Union. They do not have the means to maintain international order everywhere in the world. However, they both have strong nuclear forces, and the strength of these forces in combination with the mutual fear for their almost unlimited destructive capacity might be an acceptable safeguard against a great nuclear war. A nuclear conflict can only be expected as a consequence of miscalculation when one of the Powers has taken the risk of waging a big war with conventional or, maybe, tactical nuclear forces.

Nuclear balance of power may give the world reasonable protection against major wars. However, against many other kinds of conflicts, including those which could arise from the situation in Asia and Africa and those connected with the sea communications through the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans, nuclear power will offer only a very limited protection.

NATO is not in a position to solve this problem, but it could initiate as a matter of great urgency the careful study of all the aspects of the safety of the Round-the-Cape sea lanes. Then, as soon as the facts and possibilities are known, the NATO countries could serve their own interests by considering the military, political and economic steps they will have to take in cooperation with all concerned.

SEA POWER IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
AND SOUTHERN ATLANTIC

By

Vice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, K.B.E.

The security of sea communications in the Indian Ocean has been taken for granted for many years. But recent developments, in particular the projected British withdrawal from Singapore, have altered the balance of power. So any discussion must be preceded by an appreciation of the intentions of potentially hostile powers, both in the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans.

In the Indian Ocean, the possibility of Chinese intervention cannot be altogether disregarded - during the Indian-Chinese confrontation, the Indian Navy was reported to be preparing to defend the Andaman Islands. In addition, the Chinese have made determined and not unsuccessful efforts to gain political influence in Tanzania by means of aid programmes. Yet despite the number of officers and men which is larger than the Royal Navy, there are few ocean going surface ships and the object of the Chinese Navy seems to be to defend the long coastline. So other than with submarines, and China has about thirty, mainly of the Soviet W type, the chance of an excursion into the Indian Ocean seems to be remote.

The Russian Navy, however, cannot be disregarded in any ocean these days, and I start, therefore, with a brief discussion of its possibilities. Speculation on Russian motives at sea is easy to start and difficult to conclude with certainty. Russia has a large, well trained, ocean going Navy with a high proportion of modern ships. The submarine fleet, the largest in the world, consists of a mix of conventional and nuclear powered and of torpedo and missile firing boats. The cruisers, destroyers and frigates are equipped with a combination of surface to surface missiles, surface to air missiles, guns and anti-submarine weapons. The fleet is supported by a powerful shore base airforce, but there are no aircraft carriers for fixed wing aircraft. Two Helicopter carriers, which could presumably be converted to operate VTOL aircraft, have recently joined the Fleet. There is a sizeable and growing Amphibious Force, and the Naval Infantry (Marines) have been re-activated.

One school of thought believes that Naval policy since 1945 has been predominantly defensive. It suggests that the Soviet leaders believed that the West would attack, and that with such an overwhelming superior force on their land frontiers, danger could only come from the sea, from amphibious forces or carrier borne aircraft. Hence the early production of a vast fleet of comparatively short

range submarines and the later accent on surface to surface missiles to sink hostile carriers. The build up of a force of long range missile firing submarines is considered a natural response to the American Polaris and the increase in the range and mobility of the surface ships due to the need to protect the rapidly growing Soviet merchant shipping and fishing fleets which now operate in every ocean. This view may be right, though it shows very poor judgement in the initial appreciation that a weak and disarmed West would attack the U.S.S.R.

Another view is that the Russian leaders have consistently lagged behind in their strategic thinking; that they built a great submarine fleet with another Battle of the Atlantic in mind and that when thermo-nuclear weapons made a long conventional war at sea unlikely, the role of the submarines was changed to defence against NATO aircraft carriers. Later still, when the nuclear stalemate became evident, the possibility of a limited war at sea was considered. Certainly the inability to interfere with the American blockade of Cuba must have been a traumatic experience and in similar circumstances today the Russians might be able to escort ships past any blockade. The ability to embarrass such operations as the American landings in Lebanon in 1958 must also seem attractive. Finally, this school of thought believes that Russia has been somewhat tardily convinced of the importance of a naval presence and now uses its fleets to try to influence policy abroad, especially in the newly independent nations.

We will never know with certainty which is the right answer but it is essential to discuss the possible uses of what is now a formidable, world wide threat to the interests of the non-Communist world. It will be noticed that there has been no mention of trouble between Russia and China - not because the possibility does not exist but because it is unlikely to take place in the Indian Ocean or South Atlantic.

Even before the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, the shipping route round the Cape of Good Hope was important to maritime strategy. Its importance since the closure has much increased - over two thousand ships were diverted to the Cape route in the twelve months following the closure of the Canal. Moreover the building of super tankers and very large ore carriers, and the probability of the production of large container ships in the near future has much diminished the importance of the Suez Canal if and when it is re-opened. Indeed some experts think that it will not, in future, be an economic proposition.

Today, all supplies between Europe and the Middle East, the Indian sub-Continent, South East Asia, the Far East and Australia must pass the Cape which has become a more vital crossroad for shipping than ever before. Moreover, from the point of view of the United Kingdom, the planned withdrawal of British Forces from "East

of Suez" increases the importance of Simonstown, because the British Government, in the words of the White Paper on Defence of 1969 "will make whatever contribution we judge necessary and practicable towards keeping the peace in other parts of the world (outside Europe)" and have promised regular exercises with forces sent to South East Asia and Australasia from Britain.

It is fortunate, therefore, that the Defence agreement between the South African and British Governments of June 1955, remains substantially in force, though modified in 1967, and it is to be hoped that political differences will not make necessary any further changes in the agreement which allows ships of the Royal Navy to use Simonstown both in peace and war.

Let us now consider the oceans which the Cape link - the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The South Atlantic is still an area of strategic stability. To the west, the Central and South American seaboard states have sizeable navies which are linked to the United States Navy by the Organization of American States. To the east, the newly independent African states of western Africa are either politically neutral or still orientated towards the non-Communist world. But units of the Russian navy have visited Guinea, Ghana and more recently Nigeria and there has been a clear attempt to gain political influence by the supply of arms. Possibly the Russians hope to get agreement to use west African harbours as they have in Syria and Egypt. It would be a serious setback if the Russians did obtain a foothold in west Africa because of the potential threat to shipping from Europe to the Cape.

In the Indian Ocean, the British withdrawal has already left something of a vacuum which has not yet been filled. The United Kingdom has, however, retained rights to use the harbour of Addu Atoll with its sheltered anchorage in addition to the airfield at Gan and still has the ability to return to the area. The Indian Navy would clearly like to fill the vacuum and Indian policy was hostile to British proposals to develop Island bases such as Diego Garcia. But the Indian Navy is small and its posture dictated by the rift with Pakistan. India has accepted Russian ships and submarines and Russian naval visits to India have been made. There seems no sign, however, that the Russians can establish a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean, for which some type of base rights would be needed, but, again, if such a situation did develop it would be extremely serious.

Russian policy continues to be dynamic. A squadron visited Colombo in 1968, and a projected visit to Mauritius, the newest independent state in the area, has also been announced. The Russian Navy is evidently getting acclimatised and hopes to extend Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean by the use of the Hammer and Sickle. It is paradoxical that this policy should coincide with British withdrawal - a withdrawal which has been hailed in some quarters in

Britain as a logical sequence of the end of Imperialism and of the anachronism of the old fashioned Gunboat Diplomacy. Maybe this theory (or apologia) is right and the Russians are wrong. Personally I have my doubts and believe that Russian policy is shrewd and realistic.

What are the threats to the stability of the Cape route? It is convenient to discuss them under three headings: international, national and threats stemming from great power conflict.

Frequent proposals are made for United Nations sanctions against South Africa in connection with "apartheid" or the demand to hand over the control of South West Africa. A vote in the Assembly would be overwhelmingly in favour, but those nations which are capable of enforcing such sanctions as a blockade are likely to abstain or vote against. It is to be hoped that no such attempt will be made, for any interference with the free use of Cape Town and Durban - which could be the result of even a partial blockade - would seriously handicap the flow of shipping round the Cape.

Relations between South Africa and her immediate maritime neighbours, Mozambique and Angola are good and seem likely to remain so. Nationalist guerrilla activities in these Portuguese colonies have so far shown little achievement, though any change would be serious. But even so, it would appear unlikely that any overt outside interference would be possible, and the United Nations could hardly condone aggression against South Africa. Left alone, South Africa has sufficient strength to defend itself and also to keep the Cape route safe for world shipping.

These shipping routes round the Cape might, however, prove tempting to a power interested in upsetting the economies of the non-Communist world, and it has been suggested that under the umbrella of the Nuclear Stalemate torpedo attacks or mining by submarines might cause great damage and confusion. This may be true, but the precedents are not propitious. The Italian efforts to stop supplies reaching Spanish Government ports in August 1937, led to the speedy organisation of an international conference at Nyon which agreed that French and British warships and aircraft should patrol designated shipping lanes in the Mediterranean. The effect was immediate and the sinking of ships stopped promptly. Given the use of South African harbours and airfields, a similar international effort could be arranged and I have no doubt that it would be effective. Generally, therefore, I think it most unlikely that any such attempt would be made under present conditions.

What are the interests of the NATO powers in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic? The first requirement is that the regions should remain politically friendly and stable and that international trade should continue to grow. With this comes the need for the free flow of shipping.

What should NATO policy be? In the Indian Ocean, it seems important to encourage and help the countries with long coast lines to build up efficient, though not necessarily large, naval forces which will be able to fill any vacuum from within. Neither India or Pakistan can assume their rightful duties as protectors of shipping in the Indian Ocean until they have settled their differences. They should be combining to produce plans for the defence of the Indian Ocean instead of single plans to fight each other.

So until the rift is closed, western naval forces should be available in the region, and afterwards it should always remain possible to intervene with force when invited to assist defence against aggression from without or subversion from within. The United Kingdom is busy withdrawing from "East of Suez", but it is not too late to reverse part of the movement and to make available mobile seaborne forces ready to help maintain stability. The infrastructure of bases exists, the local goodwill remains; all that is needed is the determination to spare the money required. The American Navy has never maintained a permanent force in the Indian Ocean and it is likely to be an unpopular concept politically. But the thought of the joint use of the remaining British bases should not be discarded.

In this connection, there have been suggestions in South Africa that they should join Brazil, Argentine, the Indian Ocean states, Australia and New Zealand in the defence of the Indian Ocean, and a high level Naval visit from the Argentine is expected. But this can only be a pipe dream with the present Government's racial policies.

NATO policy, therefore, should be to persuade the South African Government to modify its policy of Apartheid so that it can join harmoniously in the concert of nations. In this way, the worst dangers, both to South Africa and to the western world, could be avoided.

In both oceans, every effort should be made to prevent the Soviet Navy gaining a permanent foothold. This can be achieved by persuasion rather than threats. We must make clear to the nations of the area that we are reliable allies and generous friends and are motivated by an unselfish wish for stability rather than by gain.

Above all, there should be a NATO policy for the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic. NATO's interest in maintaining political stability and in increasing international trade and prosperity in the region is eminently respectable, and it deserves the concerted policy which alone can gain success.

ANNEXURE

DIE BURGER - 21 Oktober, 1969.

Russiese Gevaar in Suid-Atlantiese Oseaan

SAMEWERKING TUSSEN S.A. EN NAVO VOORSIEN

Britse afgevaardigdes het gister hier op 'n private konferensie van NAVO-lande voorgestel dat die organisasie sy samewerking in die Suid-Atlantiese Oseaan uitbrei, met die moontlike insluiting van Suid-Afrika, om sodoende die toenemende Russiese gevaar die hoof te bied.

Hulle het voorgestel dat samesprekinge oor dié probleem die verskaffing van vlootvaartuie en verkenningsvliegtuie kan insluit om die roete om die Kaap teen duikboot- en oppervlak-aanvalle te beskerm, as Suid-Afrika hierom sou vra.

'n Britse parlamentslid, Eldon Griffiths, sekretaris van die Konserwatiewe Party se parlementêre komitee vir buitelandse sake, het die verslag waarin die voorstelle gedoen word, by die konferensie ingedien.

Hy het gesê hy praat namens die Britse Atlantiese komitee. Hy het gewaarsku dat Rusland voordeel probeer trek uit die lugleegte in die Suid-Atlantiese Oseaan aangesien NAVO se verdedigingsooreenkomste nie tot in dié gebied strek nie.

„Met die snelle ontwikkeling van Rusland se seemag en die toenemende belangrikheid van die Kaapse roete ná die sluiting van die Suezkanaal, kan aangevoer word dat dié beperking in die verdrag in politieke en militêre sin verouderd is.”

In die verslag word nie formeel voorgestel dat die verdedigingsgebied van NAVO uitgebrei word of dat nuwe lede toegelaat word nie, maar daar word gemeld dat tienduisend skepe in die agttien maande ná die sluiting van die Suezkanaal om die Kaap gevaar het en dat die veiligheid van die Suid-Atlantiese roetes verseker moet word.

„Om voldoende beskerming aan die roetes te gee, mag nouer samewerking tussen NAVO se vlootmag en die vlootmagte van Brasilië, Argentinië, Uruguay en Suid-Afrika noodsaaklik blyk,” lui die verslag.

/"The Star" - 21 October ...

"THE STAR" - 21 October, 1969.

NATO LOOKS SOUTH?

Naval Intelligence from several points coincides to illustrate the significant changes having to be made in South African, and Western, thinking on naval defence as compared with that immediately after the last war. Then, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and the North and South Atlantic were very much the preserve of the West, with the only real possibility of hostile action limited to submarines.

Today the West is without a firm friend among the Moslem countries along the southern Mediterranean, while Russia now frequently has as many as 70 warships in that area. In the Indian Ocean the activity of Russian warships and spy trawlers near Mauritius is demanding attention. And in the Atlantic Russian naval activity has been increasing.

Naval operations these days are considered extremely risky without powerful air cover, and this the Russians cannot yet provide in these areas, with the possible exception of the Mediterranean. But it is timely for a Washington conference on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to consider a plea - from the British delegates - to extend naval co-operation to the South Atlantic and possibly include South Africa. The conference is non-governmental, but enjoys considerable non-official status. The member nations of NATO would be wise to consider the proposed extension of their organisation.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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