



The European Union and Africa:

Developing partnerships for peace and security

**The European Union and Africa
Developing Partnerships
for Peace and Security**

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos and Romy Chevallier

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Table of Contents

Introduction and Acknowledgements	v
Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Bernard Bot	vii
The European Union and Africa: Developing Partnerships for Peace and Security	1
Conflict and Security in Africa	1
Africa's framework for peace and security	5
– AU organs and instruments	7
The EU framework for peace and security	14
– The EU's engagement with Africa	18
– Regional Instruments	23
– Cotonou	24
– The African Peace Facility (APF)	25
– The Africa Strategy	27
– The EU's participation in African conflicts	30
Areas in which synergy and co-operation can be improved	33

Lessons learnt from experiences of conflict resolution	37
– Post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) activities	39
Conclusion: The Way Forward	41
Acronyms	47
Appendix: Conference Programme	49

Introduction and Acknowledgements

Peace and security are the greatest challenges facing the African continent as it strives to achieve its Millennium Development Goals and to build stable and well-functioning societies that will foster the economic development of its citizens. Since the end of the colonial era, Africa has been racked by conflicts, both within and between states. African leaders have tended to regard security as meaning only that of the state. Their reluctance to extend that definition beyond the traditional framework of sovereignty when addressing internal and cross-border conflicts, despotism and massacres undermined the credibility of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), established in 1964.

Since the late 1990s a growing sense of the need to develop institutions that will enable Africa to deal with its conflicts has emerged among African heads of state. The establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002 signalled the culmination of this recognition. Although the initial assessments of the AU's progress towards assisting the development of a security framework for the continent are relatively positive, its capacity to deal with the management and resolution of conflict and reconstruction after the end of war is challenged by the limitations of its resources (and those of its member states).

The European Union (EU) has played a prominent supportive role in the development and consolidation of the new peace and security architecture in Africa. The EU had to deal with its own conflict resolution challenges in the 1990s in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, particularly in the collapse of some states and the formation of new states that ensued, for example in the Balkans. During the last decade, the EU countries have tried to forge a more tightly-linked security and foreign policy structure, a process that has also encountered difficulties.

There are lessons for each of the two regions to learn from their attempts to establish zones of peace and security. In October 2005, on the occasion of the visit to South Africa of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Dr Bernard Bot, a conference entitled 'Towards Peace and Security: The European Union and Africa' was held by the Royal Netherlands Embassy and the South African Institute of International Affairs. Its aim was threefold:

- to reflect on the experiences of conflict resolution and peace and security in Europe and Africa;
- to share lessons derived from each region's experiences; and
- to explore how the partnership between the European Union and Africa on matters concerning peace and security could be further strengthened.

This report is based on the proceedings of that conference. It does not attempt to investigate in detail every aspect of the extant instruments of both the AU and the EU, but aims to provide an overview. It also focuses on some aspects of peace and security initiatives in Africa, such as standby forces and demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration procedures. A copy of the programme is appended at the back of the report.

The authors would like to thank the Royal Netherlands Embassy for funding both the conference and the report, and for its valuable contributions to the programme. In particular, the assistance provided by the ambassador, Mr Frans Engering; Mr Eddy Middeldorp (who was the deputy chief of mission during the planning phase of the conference and is now ambassador to Zambia); and Mr Jock Geselschap, second secretary, political co-operation, deserve acknowledgement.

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos
National Director
South African Institute of International Affairs

**Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, Bernard Bot
Pretoria, 11 October 2005**

**Towards African-European Partnership
for Peace and Security**

Let me take you back to the year 1482, when a Portuguese ship sailed up the river Congo. Its captain, Diogo Cão, sent out messengers to contact the local ruler, but when they did not return he took four unsuspecting visitors to his ship and brought them back to Portugal with him. A few years later three of them were allowed to return. What happened to the fourth is not clear.

What is clear is that this incident was the beginning of a long and painful chapter in the history of Congo. As you all know, it was turned into the private property of King Leopold of Belgium at the Berlin Conference in 1885, where the whole of Africa was sliced up and divided among the colonial rulers of the day. Later it became a Belgian colony, and its people fought a bloody war of independence after the Second World War. Victory was theirs on 30 June 1960. But Congo's first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, who was democratically elected, only led the country for 7 months. He was murdered in January 1961.

It is the spirit of democracy and respect for human rights that we need to revive in Central Africa today. This is a daunting task, given that in the forty years since Lumumba's death a very different spirit, that of lawlessness and cruelty, has been prevalent in and around Congo. We have witnessed one civil war after another. The current conflict is sometimes referred to as Africa's world war. Major-General Patrick Cammaert of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps commands the United Nations forces in eastern Congo, an area rich in minerals and precious metals. Although he has seen action in

many crisis areas around the world, he says he has never before encountered such unspeakable atrocities. Putting a stop to the wars in Central Africa and allowing stability and order to return is both a moral imperative and in our collective interest. Fortunately, South Africa and the Netherlands, as well as the European Union and the African Union, see eye to eye on this. It proves that geographical distance and unity of purpose can go hand in hand.

The Congolese example may not tell us the whole story about the historical relationship between Europe and Africa, but it illustrates many of the major themes. This is not the occasion to examine that historical relationship in detail, but I would like to discuss a phenomenon which has dominated both the colonial and the post-colonial era in Africa, and that is what I would call the lack of 'democratic space'.

I mean the ability of a country's citizens to participate in debate about the future of their society. While Africa's liberation movements did seek to create that democratic space for their people, all too often democracy did not take root. Tragically, many of Africa's own leaders became as autocratic as the colonial regimes before them. The logic of the Cold War, which divided the world in two camps, made matters worse. Fortunately, the shining example of South Africa and the African National Congress shows that it is possible, through self-discipline and idealism, to lead a society through great changes and at the same time respect the basic principles of democracy and human rights.

The end of the Cold War opened up the potential for new democratic space. Much of that potential has yet to be fulfilled. So now it is our joint task to promote the spirit of democracy all over Africa. South Africa's example may inspire other parts of your great continent. The struggle for democracy is never an easy one. Like any great struggle for change, it will be accompanied by upheaval and instability. We will see new political movements and courageous civil society organisations striving to bring justice and optimism to

the people. Unfortunately, we must also be ready to take action against greedy political opportunists seeking short-term personal gain at the expense of the common good.

Political instability, violence and 'human insecurity' reinforce each other. And the ordinary people are always hardest hit. They find themselves caught in a vicious circle, unable to satisfy their basic needs and with nobody to turn to. Public authorities become so weak that they effectively cease to function at all. What is left of the democratic space is then all too easily filled by petty dictators or religious extremists who make their own rules and lead people into civil war. And, remember, civil war is often contagious: the insurrection in Liberia drew all the country's neighbours into a war spanning two decades, with shifting frontlines and changing alliances. The war in Congo, like a magnet, has drawn in most of the neighbouring countries as well. Where violence prevails, there can be no development. That is a basic rule. We must try to reverse this dynamic, because where development does take place, the risk of conflict decreases. For that very reason, the theme of peace and security has been at the core of the relationship between Europe and Africa over the last couple of years. In many cases we have had to temporarily set aside the development agenda and focus on conflict resolution instead, precisely to create the conditions for later development.

This beautiful country, South Africa, has of course gone through its own unique historical experience. That experience may not have followed the classic colonial pattern, but it was certainly characterised by oppression, violence and injustice. We Dutch acknowledge our own role in South Africa's history as early colonisers. But we are also proud of the support our country gave to South Africans struggling to end apartheid. In 1994, when apartheid was finally abolished, this unique country developed an equally unique way of driving out the demons of the past. South Africa's innovative Truth and Reconciliation Commission helped to expose the crimes of the past and fostered reconciliation. It thereby paved

the way for a successful rainbow nation in which all citizens can claim their rightful place. South Africa has adopted an all-inclusive and non-racial Constitution and an exemplary Bill of Rights, inspired by the Freedom Charter. It is interesting to note that this Freedom Charter was composed by the ANC leadership as early as 1955. When we celebrated its 50th anniversary in June, it was clear that fundamental freedoms and basic human rights are universal and timeless. In other words, South Africa both created and filled its own democratic space. A country that has gone through such a remarkable transformation has every reason to want to share its experience with other countries on its continent and beyond. South Africa was instrumental in creating the African Union and establishing the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad). The African Union and Nepad may turn out to be the first steps on the way to an African renaissance, to the rebirth of Africa.

Europe too has had to overcome the demons of the past. After two devastating world wars, Europeans built a Union that is united by basic principles and values. We still disagree about many things and the European Union, like any other organisation, has its share of disappointments and failures, and even the odd crisis every now and then. But the heart of the matter, the understanding that holds the Union together, is that conflicts and differences are to be reconciled around the negotiating table and not through the barrel of a gun, and that all of us may defend our national interests as long as we keep in mind the general European interest. The European Union is always glad to share its experience with Africa, whenever and wherever Africa wishes.

The European Union's policy towards Africa is laid out in its Common Position on Conflict Prevention and in its Action Plan for European Security and Defence Policy Support to Peace and Security in Africa. In these documents the European Union recognises the principle of African ownership and establishes the conditions for supporting individual countries, or organisations like the African Union or SADC, through peacekeeping missions and

activities aimed at Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR).

It is good to see that the African Union and the European Union have become ever closer partners in recent years. Under the United Nations flag, both the African Union and the European Union have worked for peace in Sudan and Congo. Recently the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has demonstrated a similar willingness to assist the African Union in securing peace in Sudan. I am impressed that at this early stage, while the African Union is still developing its institutions, it has succeeded in putting peacekeeping troops on the ground in Sudan. Let us all continue to build on this important step. The signing of Sudan's North-South Peace Agreement was a tremendous step forward, but we must not forget that the violence in Darfur is far from over, as the African Union rightly stated recently.

My own country strongly supports the build-up of the African Union, both politically and materially. The creation of an African Standby Force under authority of the African Union will be a major contribution to peace and stability on this continent. Of course, the African Union is not the only major organisation actively promoting peace and security in Africa, which is why it is so important that it has the option of delegating tasks to regional organisations like ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD. ECOWAS of course plays a pivotal role in crisis management and peacekeeping in Liberia and elsewhere in West Africa. And the SADC regional brigade established a few months ago as part of the AU Standby Force will boost Southern Africa's peacekeeping abilities.

The Netherlands believes that South Africa plays a crucial role in promoting peace and security. We see South Africa as an exporter of stability, both through the example it sets for other countries and through its active foreign policy. South Africa is also a key contributor to the African Union. We admire the mediation efforts President Mbeki and South African ministers have undertaken in Sudan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ivory Coast.

In both Burundi and Ivory Coast, South Africa brokered a ceasefire in the form of a 'Pretoria Agreement'. We would like to see a proliferation of Pretoria Agreements all over the continent – and beyond – as long they are numbered, so that we can tell them apart.

Given that our two countries have such unity of purpose, it makes sense for us to work together more closely on peace and security in Africa. I am therefore proud to announce that I signed an agreement with [South African Defence] Minister Lekota this morning stating that the Netherlands will contribute five million euros in support of South Africa's efforts to demobilise and reintegrate rebel soldiers in eastern Congo. If we stay the course, our joint efforts can help create the conditions for free and fair elections in the DRC in the near future. That would be a truly important achievement. In addition, our two countries are studying the possibility of entering into a strategic partnership for peace and security in Africa. This initiative involves our countries' foreign and defence ministries, as well as Dutch and South African think tanks. The aim is to build an enduring framework for co-operation that builds on our countries' relative strengths. Later today Ms Dlamini-Zuma and I will be discussing these plans.

Peacekeepers on the ground, though crucial, cannot secure peace, security and development by themselves. Africa is beset not only by military conflicts, but also by hunger, drought, and disease. HIV/Aids in particular is having a devastating effect, which extends far beyond the realm of public health. When Aids destroys human lives, it also deprives the health, education and security sectors of essential human resources, posing a real threat to national security. We therefore have to make the fight against Aids an integral part of our approach to peace and security in Africa. South Africa's anti-Aids plan is very promising and, if fully implemented, could become one of the most meaningful counteroffensives against Aids to date. The countries of Africa are displaying a growing willingness to solve problems on their own continent and to take serious responsibility for their security and development. This reminds me of a passage in

the last letter Patrice Lumumba sent from prison to his wife shortly before he died:

To my children whom I leave and whom perhaps I will see no more, I wish that they be told that the future of Congo is beautiful and that it expects for each Congolese, to accomplish the sacred task of reconstruction of our independence and sovereignty; for without dignity there is no liberty, without justice there is no dignity, and without independence there are no free men.

These words of freedom still inspire today as they did then. Tragically, Lumumba's vision for his beloved Congo has not become a reality. But there are two reasons to keep hoping that democracy and dignity will reach the heart of Africa. First of all, another giant of this continent – the great nation of South Africa – has shown that it is possible to achieve independence and sovereignty, dignity and liberty. Thanks to Nelson Mandela and other heroes all South Africans today are free men. The other source of hope is that Africans and Europeans are making common cause against war, poverty and disease. There is a transcontinental coalition working towards solutions for Africa's troubles. We Europeans want to help, not only because we see it as a moral duty, but because we have a strong interest in an Africa that is peaceful and prosperous.

May today's conference serve as a symbol of African-European cooperation and help us deepen our common understanding of the challenges we face and the strategies we can use to overcome them.

The European Union and Africa: Developing Partnerships for Peace and Security

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos and Romy Chevallier¹

Conflict and security in Africa

In many parts of the African continent during the last half-decade, an outbreak of peace has occurred. This has coincided with the adoption by influential African leaders of a more assertive approach towards addressing Africa's problems. Some of the most notable achievements of these five years have been the peace agreements concluded in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Sudan (the North-South conflict), Burundi and Liberia. The peace in these countries remains fragile, however, and underlying tensions have flared into open conflict in other parts of Africa. The continuing instability in countries such as the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, eastern DRC, Guinea, Somalia and parts of Sudan (Darfur and the North-East region) illustrate both the vast difficulties of creating functional polities and the huge task that confronts the fledgling AU and its international partners.

The creation of the AU and various subsidiary bodies dedicated to dealing with peace and security issues is a sign of a new momentum within Africa towards tackling its own proliferating conflicts. The Constitutive Act of the AU recognises that one of the greatest hindrances to peace and security emanates from poor governance within states. This makes it necessary to expand the definition of the

¹ ELIZABETH SIDIROPOULOS and ROMY CHEVALLIER are respectively the national director and the EU-Africa researcher at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), based at University of the Witwatersrand. SAIIA's EU-Africa research programme is funded by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

term 'security' from its narrow focus on protection of states and their political elites to the broader concept of human security. Among the basic principles it sets out, the Act stipulates '[t]he right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'.²

Security now incorporates a comprehensive agenda which covers both politico-military threats such as inter-state war, internal war, war crimes and coups d'état and other sources of instability like poor governance, lack of respect for human rights and the rule of law, hunger, disease and poverty.³ Accordingly, much of the security architecture built in Africa since 2000 aims to address not only short-term threats to peace and security but also to develop a foundation for the elimination of the root causes of these problems — poor governance, and the lack of democracy, of accountability and of systems for channelling grievances.

How does the adoption of such a security agenda operate in conjunction with the long-established practice of asserting the absolute sovereignty of the state? This is a challenge that cannot easily be resolved. Meeting it forms part of the longer-term project of removing many of the causes of instability and conflict in African countries by ensuring the security of ordinary citizens.

The biggest security threat to African states does not come from foreign invasions of the sort that faced Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. Instead it originates in civil wars which are also regional in nature. Neighbouring states have often provided support to one side or another in an internal war in another country to further their own

² The African Union, *Constitutive Act of the African Union*. Article 4(h), 'Principles'. Lome: AU, 11 July 2000.

³ Hammerstad A, 'People, states and regions', in Hammerstad A (ed.), *People, States and Regions: Building a Collaborative Security Regime in Southern Africa*. Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2005. p.7.

agendas. Their engagement is usually driven equally by the desire to enrich the elite and to ensure their own political longevity and security. Again, both the state embroiled in civil war and its neighbours often suffer from, and are products of, the weak state syndrome. This causes insecurity for not only their own citizens but the population of the whole region.

Security has become a global issue that cannot be dealt with in isolation. Conflicts in Africa affect Europe and other continents. For example, North Africa's proximity to the European states situated on the northern shores of the Mediterranean means that the EU is the first-hand recipient of African immigrants and refugees. Also, Africa's war economies spawn transnational criminal networks and feed into existing trafficking syndicates, while its failing states are both causes and victims of this vicious cycle of violence and profiteering. Transnational problems such as crime, terrorism, disease and environmental degradation are of concern not only to Africa but to the global community.

Conflicts of the kind described above, which are characteristic of Africa, have had a disruptive long-term effect on African economies. They have destroyed the productive human capacity and infrastructure necessary for development, and weakened internal social, economic and administrative structures (although often the absence of such frameworks was the catalyst for instability in the first instance).

To address the multiple facets of war and insecurity in Africa, the AU requires complementary partnerships with states and other regional institutions outside the continent. The EU has been a crucial source of political/security, economic and developmental co-operation for some time. Recently, it has focused on developing a more integrated approach to the various instruments that govern both its policy and its engagement with African regions. This culminated in the release in October 2005 of the EU's Africa Strategy paper, which was adopted by the Heads of Government in December.

However, it is important to recognise that at the heart of any partnership between Europe and Africa should lie a careful assessment of the most effective areas in which to intervene. The biggest challenge facing peace and security in Africa is dealing with failing or dysfunctional states. The literature on this subject does not define these terms accurately, and tends to lump unlike examples together, but the key to understanding what is meant by 'failing states' (countries which are fragile or 'at risk of instability') is that 'states can fail or be failing in many different ways'.⁴ Dealing with the security and socio-economic challenges confronted by such states requires political perspective: 'The causes of state failure are always political even if there is an important economic or social component, and thus both analysis of and policies directed at fragile states cannot ignore politics'.⁵

Bearing Woodward's admonition in mind, one has to approach questions about how to foster peace and security through the AU and EU mechanisms by taking a step back and recognising the need for differentiated solutions to the problems of individual countries. Adopting a homogeneous and prescriptive approach to conflict management and prevention is a recipe for failure. Four points are critical to helping failing states to recover:

- understanding the historical frameworks and peculiarities of individual countries;
- taking cognisance of the regional environment when planning conflict resolution and state rebuilding;
- adopting realistic time frames for the engagement of international and regional institutions; and

⁴ Woodward SL, 'Fragile States: Exploring the Concept'. Paper presented to the States and Security Learning Group at the Peace and Social Justice meeting of the Ford Foundation, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 29 November 2004.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.5.

- ensuring at the outset that resources (in terms of both funding and appropriately qualified personnel) are sufficient to deal with the demands of implementation.

Equally important is the need to ensure that there is a common understanding of the problem, and that the most important regional actors are in charge of the process. Here, the identification and co-optation of the pivotal states in that particular region are crucial to making the peace-building process work.

Africa's framework for peace and security

By all accounts, the OAU, a product of the phase of African state development that followed immediately after decolonisation, focused for much of the Cold War period on the anti-apartheid struggle. It was unable to address the complex nature of peace, security and development on the continent. Because of its strong adherence to an absolutist interpretation of sovereignty, the Organisation and the sub-regional organisations in Africa at the time neglected the broader definition of security, and in so doing excluded the safety of African citizens as a relevant concern.

The decision by African states in 2000 to abandon the old structures and create a new continental architecture provided an opportunity to remove the inherent shortcomings and failings of the OAU. The Constitutive Act of the AU was drafted in 2000, and the new Union came into effect at the Durban Summit in 2002. The AU had a much more comprehensive mandate than its predecessor. It incorporated the accelerated socio-economic integration of the continent, and advocated a more focused approach to dealing with conflict. The Constitutive Act underlined the links between peace, security and development,⁶ and stressed in its preamble that the conflict in Africa

⁶ See Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

was a major impediment to the socio-economic progress of the continent. There was therefore a need to promote peace, security and stability.

The Act also extended the AU's mandate to incorporate conditional sovereignty, that is 'the right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity'.⁷ The various decision-making bodies of the AU represent a new institutional form of governance for the African continent. The AU's doctrine has evolved from non-interference to a refusal to remain indifferent to human suffering. The responsibility to protect African citizens from war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity is incorporated in the AU's guiding principles.

The establishment of the AU marked the culmination of a growing need felt by some African leaders to begin dealing with the inherent tension in African politics between the responsibility of leaders to embrace democratic governance and the inviolability conferred by sovereignty.⁸ The most notable step in this direction taken prior to the AU's establishment was the decision taken at the OAU summit meeting in Algiers in 1999 not to tolerate any unconstitutional changes of government. Equally notable, at least on paper, was the adoption nearly two decades earlier (in 1981) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples's Rights, in Nairobi⁹ and the Grand Bay Declaration and Plan of Action on Human Rights. The Human Rights Charter led to the establishment of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, which is based in Banjul, The

⁷ The African Union, *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, *op. cit.*

⁸ See Sidiropoulos E & T Hughes, 'Between democratic governance and sovereignty: The challenge of South Africa's Africa policy', in Sidiropoulos E (ed.), *Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future: South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994–2004*. Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2004.

⁹ Cilliers J, executive director of the Institute for Security Studies, presentation made at conference on 'Towards Peace and Security: The EU and Africa', Pretoria, 11 October 2005.

Gambia. The Charter is the only such document to have been ratified by all of the African states.

At the conference organised jointly by SAIIA and the Royal Netherlands Embassy, the ambassador of the Delegation of the European Commission, Lodewijk Briët, noted the differences in approach to integration between the EU and the AU. Europe had moved from integration in the trade and economic sphere to encompass 'only much more recently political, military and justice and home affairs matters... The AU project is instead tackling Peace and Security, human rights and democracy, and regional integration issues all at the same time and from the start'.¹⁰

AU organs and instruments

The AU Constitutive Act makes provision for an ambitious array of institutions intended to deal with peace and security issues in a holistic fashion. These include the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Pan-African Parliament, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) and the Court of Justice. The AU has also developed various instruments specifically designed for conflict resolution.¹¹ Apart from the PSC, these include the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), and the Panel of the Wise, although not all of them have been fully constituted at this point.

The *AU Commission* serves as the Union's Secretariat, and thus plays a central role in the daily management of the AU. The Peace and Security pillar is a key element of the Commission and focuses on combating terrorism and the prevention, management and

¹⁰ Briët L, ambassador of the Delegation of the EC to South Africa, presentation made at conference on 'Towards Peace and Security: The EU and Africa', Pretoria, 11 October 2005.

¹¹ www.african-union.org

resolution of conflict. The Political Affairs pillar is also important, as its remit is human rights, democracy, good governance, electoral institutions, humanitarian affairs, civil society organisations, refugees, returnees and internally displaced people.¹²

The Protocol of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, which established the *Peace and Security Council* (PSC), was adopted in Durban, in July 2002, and entered into force on 26 December 2003, after being ratified by the required majority of states. The establishment of the PSC is a remarkable leap forward for conflict prevention. Its mandate states that the PSC will provide a 'collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa'.¹³ The PSC not only acts as the anchor for the continental peace and security framework but also makes it possible for the AU to become more politically engaged. Article 5 of the PSC Protocol sets out its objectives, which include the development of a common AU defence policy and the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law and the protection of human rights.

The PSC, together with the Commission Chair, can authorise the deployment of peace support missions and recommend intervention in the case of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. It is within this framework that an innovative African approach to peacekeeping, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction should be built.

In February 2004 at Sirte, Libya, the AU adopted a Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy. This was followed in January 2005 by the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact, signed in Abuja.

As already indicated, the PSC is supported by the Commission; the envisaged African Standby Force, which is capable of rapid

¹² Cilliers J, *Peace, Security and Democracy in Africa? A Summary of Outcomes from the 2002 OAU/AU Summits in Durban*. ISS Paper 60, August 2002, p.6.

¹³ *Ibid*, p.8.

deployment to keep or enforce the peace; a Panel of the Wise; and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).

The *African Standby Force* (ASF) is provided for in the PSC Protocol, and is to include civilian and military components. Its mandate derives from the UN Charter, Chapter VIII (on regional organisations); the AU Constitutive Act; the Peace and Security Protocol; and the Common African Defence and Security Policy. The ASF will consist of standby brigades of 3,500–5,000 troops in each of Africa's five regions. This will essentially provide the AU with a combined standby capacity of approximately 20,000 troops.¹⁴ The ASF is expected to have a rapid deployment/early entry capability as well.

The ASF was designed to be used in six possible mission scenarios,¹⁵ which range from observer missions to interventions:

1. Military advice to a political mission;
2. An AU observer mission co-deployed with a UN peacekeeping mission;
3. A stand-alone AU observer mission;
4. A traditional peacekeeping or preventative deployment mission;
5. Complex multi-dimensional peace operations; or
6. Peace enforcement, or what the ASF Framework document refers to as 'intervention missions'.

The speed with which the ASF's brigades can be deployed ranges from their being operational within 30 days for simple scenarios (1–4) to within 90 days for complex scenarios (5). The time scale for intervention missions (6) should be deployment within 14 days, although, as Brigadier-General Pal Martins noted in his presentation at the conference, the feasibility of sending troops to the scene of

¹⁴ De Coning C, 'Refining the African Standby Force concept', *Conflict Trends*, ACCORD, 2/2004, p.21.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

conflict within a fortnight was questionable at this stage, given the limited resources at hand.

The ASF's mandate for deployment will come from the PSC, while command and control is to be vested in the Commission's Chair and delegated to the Peace and Security Commissioner. Martins reported that the regional communities would have to seek approval from the AU before deploying forces, and the AU would in turn seek approval from the UN Security Council. However, because in certain circumstances an intervention might have to be made before the appropriate authorisation could be obtained, the approval of the AU and/or the UN would be sought *ex post facto* in these special cases.

In May 2003 the African Chiefs of Defence Staff reached an agreement on the framework for the proposed ASF, which would be established in two phases. *Phase I* was to be completed by 30 June 2005, by which time the AU was expected to be able to deploy and manage monitoring missions (whether for the AU or for a combined UN–EU action). By then the regions would have developed a standby brigade capacity (that is, have formed brigades with sufficient training to fulfil the functions envisaged in scenarios 1–3). Within the same time limit, the AU also undertook to draw up a roster of 300–500 military observers and 240 police officers from member states who would be able to present themselves for service in any country in Africa on 14 days' notice. Also, by then the AU planned to establish a standby system of police units. This would comprise two company-level units (of approximately 225 police personnel each), which could be deployed in support of complex peacekeeping operations on 90 days' notice.¹⁶

Phase II was to extend from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010, by which date the AU should have developed the capacity to manage scenarios 4–6. However, these deadlines were highly ambitious, and have had to be extended.

¹⁶ Kent V & M Malan, 'The African Standby Force: Progress and prospects', *African Security Review*, 12/3, p.73.

The Southern, West and East African regions have come closest to meeting the ASF requirements. The SADC Brigade, which has its headquarters in Botswana, has secured pledges from member states of between 4,000 and 6,000 troops, and has already established Planning Elements (PLANELM). The East African Brigade, based in Ethiopia, has its PLANELM in Kenya. Because countries in the region have overlapping memberships in various organisations, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been authorised by the AU to co-ordinate the ASF in East Africa as an interim measure. The West African Brigade is by far the most advanced operationally, partly because ECOWAS has already notched up an impressive record of participation in peace operations. Its headquarters are in Nigeria, and member states have pledged some 6,500 troops. The Central and North African Brigades have made the least progress.

Foreign partners are regarded by the AU as integral to launching the ASF. This undertaking is expected to result in a deepening of multilateral and bilateral relationships between the AU and the EU countries. Martins also suggested that the AU should consider developing similar partnerships with countries in the East, such as China. Areas of co-operation with countries outside Africa to advance the ASF included the provision of assistance in technical matters, and financial and logistical support.¹⁷ In addition, the AU's plan for the ASF envisages that international partners will participate in the regional workshops whose purpose is to provide an estimate of the cost of the logistical system, command, control, communication and information system infrastructure and training concept for Africa as a whole, and provide recommendations for its implementation.¹⁸

¹⁷ Martins P, *SaferAfrica*, presentation made at the conference on 'Towards Peace and Security: The EU and Africa', Pretoria, 11 October 2005.

¹⁸ Cilliers J & M Malan, *Progress with the African Standby Force*, ISS Paper 98, May 2005, p.4.

While the objectives of the ASF are both laudable and comprehensive, turning the planning into a reality faces many hurdles. As Martins pointed out, the most serious of these relate to addressing the funding shortfall and the lack of logistical and technical capacity, both of which constrain the AU's efforts. Additional challenges include the need for co-ordination within and between regions, and the harmonisation and interoperability of the AU's efforts with those of its external partners.

The proposed *Panel of the Wise* is a sub-structure of the PSC. Its members will be drawn from highly-respected African personalities who have made a contribution to peace-building and development on the continent. The function of the Panel is to assist the Council and AU Commission with the maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.

The *Continental Early Warning System* (CEWS) is designed to anticipate and prevent conflicts. It will consist of an observation headquarters (the 'Situation Room') situated in the Conflict Management Directorate, and its function will be to collect and analyse data¹⁹ obtained from its connection with the observation and monitoring units of the regional mechanisms. The System will be used to provide information on conflict situations, and briefings for the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission on appropriate responses. The Chair of the Commission is obliged to bring any matter which might threaten peace, security and stability on the continent to the attention of the PSC. The CEWS is to be structured in such a way that any situation judged to pass a certain threshold of gravity will have to be tabled in the PSC and discussed.

The *Peace Fund*, which the AU inherited from the OAU, is the repository of the payments allocated in the AU's regular budget and voluntary contributions from member states, the private sector, civil society and international donors. The function of the Fund is to

¹⁹ Powell K, *The AU's emerging peace and security regime: opportunities and challenges for delivering on the responsibility to protect*. Monograph No 119, May 2005.

'provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security'.²⁰

Other institutions that have a bearing on the AU's programme to bring about peace and security are the following.

- The *Pan-African Parliament* (PAP) aims to promote the principles of human rights and democracy in Africa; to encourage good governance, transparency and accountability in member states; and promote peace, security and stability.²¹
- The *Economic, Social and Cultural Council* (ECOSOCC) is an advisory organ composed of different social and professional groups from the member states of the AU. One of its components is a Peace and Security Committee which focuses on issues relating to the anticipation, prevention, management and resolution of conflict. It also concerns itself with post-conflict reconstruction and peace building; the prevention and combating of terrorism; the use of child soldiers; drug trafficking; and the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons.
- The *African Court of Justice* is to be the principal judicial organ of the AU. Once established, its purpose will be to interpret the Constitutive Act and treaties and protocols to the Act. This court is intended to be distinct from the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights.²²
- The *African Commission of Human and Peoples' Rights*, based in Banjul, The Gambia, is charged with ensuring the promotion and protection of human rights, both individual and collective, across the continent. However, the Commission's work has been

²⁰ PSC Protocol, article 21(1).

²¹ www.pan-african-parliament.org.

²² This Court was provided for in terms of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, which was adopted by the OAU in 1998. However, it has not yet come into force because the requisite number of states have not ratified it.

seriously hampered in the past by both a lack of funding and its limited ability to make an impact at the political level.

The EU framework for peace and security

The long process of Europe's integration was motivated by the need for peace and security felt by the European states, which had suffered two devastating wars within 20 years of each other in the first half of the 20th century. Although the efforts towards integration in Western Europe had by 1990 made another war between its states seem impossible, the collapse of the Soviet Union exposed the continuing vulnerability of countries on the fringes of the European Community. The difficulties encountered in mobilising a common European approach to the events unfolding in the Balkans throughout the 1990s (the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed the emergence of its successor states) indicated very clearly how divided opinions in Europe were. International conferences were convened, mediators appointed and agreements on recognition or sanctions were made. But it was the decision by the US to deploy troops that was the catalyst, both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo, for an end to hostilities, even though peace in both regions remains fragile today.

The process of establishing a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was started in 1992, with the Maastricht Treaty. Its terms stated that the CFSP covers 'all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence'. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 gave the Commission a greater say in policy formulation, and created the position of High Representative for the CFSP. The High Representative would be answerable to the member states through the Council of Ministers, rather than to the Community (through the Commission).

At the Cologne summit held in June 1999, the European leaders agreed on a common defence strategy, and at the European Council meeting that took place in Nice in December 2000 the member states agreed to create a rapid reaction force of 60,000 men by 2003. The objective was to create the capability to deploy these troops, with air and naval support, within 60 days. However, it proved impossible to organise a force of that size within the time envisaged.

The concept of Battle Groups, which would comprise units of 1,500 troops, was launched in 2004. These units were to have the capability of reacting fast and forcefully in trouble spots outside EU territory. Battle Groups can be formed by one state or by a group of states (including NATO countries in Europe which are candidates for accession to the EU). These Groups should be able to launch an operation within five days of receiving approval by the Council, and should be deployed no later than 10 days after the decision has been made. Furthermore, in response to a crisis or an urgent request from the UN, the EU should be able to undertake two Battle Group-sized operations simultaneously for a period of up to 120 days. The purpose of Battle Groups was to have forces that could undertake the full range of military tasks identified by the European Security Strategy (ESS). An initial commitment of 13 Battle Groups was made.

The ESS was adopted by the leaders of countries belonging to the EU in December 2003. The Strategy set out the most serious threats Europe faced in the aftermath of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001. In support of the breadth of the context employed, the ESS document argues that because the EU was inevitably a global player, it 'should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world'.²³

The ESS makes specific mention of the need to tackle regional conflicts (such as those in the Great Lakes region of Africa), state failure and organised crime, because in an era of global threats, these

²³ *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p.1.

impinge on Europe's security. Importantly, in terms of sharing a common global vision with Africa, the Strategy emphasises the primacy of the UN framework in maintaining international peace and security. This outlook is shared by the AU, which sees a world order based on multilateral co-operation as an important policy objective. The document also notes that effective regional organisations such as the AU can strengthen global governance, and should therefore be supported. The ESS vision has shaped the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which is the successor of the European Security Defence Identity (ESDI) under NATO, and is considered a major element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The ESDP incorporates a common security and defence policy that aims to strengthen the EU's external ability to deal with humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, and crisis management operations outside Europe, through the development of the Union's civilian and military capabilities.

The director of the Clingendael Institute, Professor Rob de Wijk, in his presentation at the conference, commented on the reasons that Europe needed armed forces, as set out by Javier Solana, the High Representative for the CFSP. The latter emphasised that Europe's ability to deploy troops beyond its borders would be critical if it had to protect its interests, such as energy security, and to fight terrorism. De Wijk commented that although such an approach (using force to achieve such objectives) was in many ways 'un-European', it demonstrated a realisation that resorting to armed action in certain circumstances might be unavoidable; and that therefore Europe needed to possess the capacity to project military power. Other demands, apart from guarding against terrorism and protecting energy supplies, might be made on the EU's military resources. For example, tackling regional conflicts and rescuing failing or fragile states also required an ability to deploy rapidly in countries beyond Europe's borders. The danger of failed states is underlined specifically in the ESS document: 'state failure is an alarming

phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability'.²⁴

Indeed, the EU's experiences in the DRC, when it mounted Operation Artemis, were borne in mind when the establishment of rapidly deployable units was proposed. The rationale was to be able to intervene in²⁵

conflicts far outside Europe, with their main focus being Africa (but also elsewhere), and to stabilise the situation until sufficient military forces — United Nations peacekeeping troops or armed forces from other organisations — were on hand to settle it.

The Battle Group concept has certain weaknesses. Its nature demands greater interoperability between the forces and the adoption of common standards, especially given that the Netherlands, for example, offers troops to both the Battle Groups and the NATO rapid response force. Furthermore, the need for advanced command and control structures is as important, given that Europe places more emphasis on stabilisation operations than on war-fighting. Indeed, the logistical requirements of the Battle Groups have exposed the EU's lack of military hardware resources in areas such as airlift capacity, battlefield surveillance, interoperable equipment and communications systems.

The Department of Strategic and Defence Studies in Helsinki argues that the size of the units means that they cannot form the core of any European army: 'Such ambitions or development could be identified if so wanted from the general ESDP development, and not from the Battlegroup concept. The Battlegroups have war-fighting capabilities but no capacity to fight wars'.²⁶ The Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies notes that there

²⁴ *Ibid*, p.4.

²⁵ Kamp KH, 'European 'battle groups': A new stimulus for the european security and defense policy?', *Analysen und Argumente*, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 15/2004, p.2.

²⁶ See www.euractiv.com/Article?tcaturi=tcm:29-150151-16&type=LinksDossier.

are competing views on how and when Battle Groups will be used, and how they might work with, or under, UN authority.

The EU's engagement with Africa

In an address to the South African Institute of International Affairs in June 2005, the president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, said:²⁷

If Europe does not engage at the very moment Africans are striving to help themselves, it diminishes us Europeans as human beings... A stable and secure neighbour in Africa is of great strategic interest to the EU.

Of course, the involvement of European countries in Africa goes back centuries. Former colonial powers continue to retain a close engagement, both political and economic, with their former colonies. However, the EU as an institution has also been very active in Africa. It is by far the largest contributor of aid (both multilateral and bilateral) to the continent. African countries continue to have close trading ties with the EU, and the latter is a substantial investor in African countries. The development of a co-operative partnership on peace and security issues is equally important.

This section of the report will focus on those areas of co-operation between the EU and Africa that are relevant to peace and security.

The EC has supported the AU since its inception in 2002, and in turn the AU considers the EC a 'natural ally' which can offer it the benefit of its own experience with integration processes. The EU has an obvious interest in a strong pan-African organisation that can provide a solid political framework on which to mount African-led responses to development challenges. The EU has several other

²⁷ Address by Jose Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, at the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 24 June 2005.

good reasons to foster its partnership with the AU, according to Lodewijk Briët.²⁸

Firstly, stronger co-operation with the AU would simplify the EU's relations with Africa. Whereas in the past the EU has had to establish and maintain relationships with different forums and partners, the AU represents a single partner that can articulate common positions and speak on behalf of the entire African continent.

Secondly, a stronger AU, by developing 'African standards' like the Peer Review Mechanism, could ideally Africanise these governance values, and in so doing reduce the need for conditions on aid from external sources. The standards of current conditions imposed by the EU on African states are flawed, subject to discrepancies between states and a source of tension between the EU and African countries.

Thirdly, closer links with the AU would enable the EU to modernise its Africa agenda. Through a strengthened partnership with the AU, the EU could introduce new elements of co-operation which cannot be undertaken by means of the existing instruments. A single, powerful African interlocutor is needed to address issues such as peace and security, security sector reform and terrorism; and to discuss new concerns, such as global warming.

Fourthly, closer ties with the AU would complete the range of existing partnership agreements with Africa. Adding a pan-African dimension to the current co-operation treaties the EU has entered into with Africa (The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership — EMP — with North Africa; Cotonou with the African' Caribbean and Pacific countries — ACP; and the Trade, Development Co-operation Agreement — TDCA — with South Africa) will add value in a number of areas. Some problems, such as migration, are by their nature pan-African rather than sub-regional or specific ACP concerns. The EU's approach should respond to this reality.

²⁸ Briët, presentation made at the conference on 'Towards Peace and Security: The EU and Africa', Pretoria, 11 October 2005.

The overall objectives of the EU are to recognise the AU and its adjunct, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad), as the main interlocutor for Africa. In giving the AU political and operational legitimisation, the EU will reinforce its role within and outside the African continent. It will also strengthen the capacity of the AU Commission to act credibly in the security, governance, trade and development areas.

Briët made a number of recommendations on how to achieve these objectives. Most of them focus on broadening the EC's partnership with the AU to include other areas of mutual interest, and building on the positive relationship already established on matters concerning peace and security.

Briët's recommendations were as follows.

- *Strengthen the political dialogue.* Effective and permanent political give-and-take with the AU is crucial to creating a sound mutual understanding of the long-term objectives of the AU and the EU, and to promoting respect for common values throughout the continent.
- *Strengthen the policy dialogue.* While debates over policy in the area of peace and security have taken place with the AU, the EC has not yet re-examined its policies in some sectors, including its governance, trade and development strategies, in the light of the new pan-African policies and programmes. Discussion with the AU is necessary so that the EC can integrate its development policies with the AU's. The topics for dialogue should include not only the traditional sectors in which the EC has long-standing experience (like transport, agriculture and economic integration) but also 'new' non-traditional sectors (such as immigration, terrorism and climate change). Examples of actions that should be undertaken are:
 - setting up a joint task force involving the services of both Commissions on sectors of mutual interest;

- improving the compatibility between EU co-operation at sub-regional level and the AU/Nepad policies; and
- developing the Joint Monitoring Mechanism on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) agreed by the two Commissions.
- *Define an operational agenda.* The drawing up of a concrete operational agenda that will support the efforts of the AU is necessary to give some substance to the EU's political commitment to the partnership. The Commission has sufficient experience and suitable instruments to design a programme for co-operation with the AU. Possible examples of actions that an operational agenda might list are as follows.
 - The EC should provide substantial financial support to the operational and institutional development strategy of the AU. In order to respect African ownership, this aid should take the form of budget support or basket funding. To date €50 million has been allocated for this purpose.
 - The EC should recognise the AU as a full co-operating partner, and therefore as eligible for funding under the Cotonou, EMP and TDCA agreements.
 - The EC should broaden the co-operation and support it offers beyond peace and security to other areas, such as governance, culture, spanning the digital divide, trade, migration, social and economic integration and transnational crime networks.
 - The EC should launch twinning initiatives between civil society groups and representatives of the private sector and of cultural and academic institutions in Africa and Europe. The idea would be to open up the current relationship between the two bodies to other sections of society, and in so doing to ensure the development of a constituency that supports the EU–AU partnership in both Africa and Europe.

The EC's chief priorities are to build a constituency within the EU that backs the AU, and to make its relationship with the AU compatible with its existing partnership agreements in Africa. To succeed in the first, the EC needs to develop greater endorsement of the AU constituency among member states. Because of their specific interest in Africa or their connections to specific regions, certain member countries have been reluctant to engage in a reinforced partnership with Africa as a whole. On the second priority, introducing a new partnership arrangement that in some respects supersedes the three co-operation agreements the EU already has with Africa (Cotonou, EMP and the TDCA) will require harmonisation with them. The challenge for the EU is to make the geographical divisions reflected in its various agreements with different parts of the continent compatible with its pan-African approach and to build political, legal and financial bridges.

The engagement between the EU and Africa at summit level began with the Cairo summit in 2000. Its aim was to forge a strategic partnership between the two continents. A Plan of Action was adopted that prioritised (among other things) the respect for, and protection of, human rights, democratic principles and institutions, the rule of law and good governance; peace-building and the prevention, management and resolution of conflict in Africa; and development measures (such as improving education, health and food security) to combat poverty. The Cairo Action Plan also initiated the operationalisation of the OAU Early Warning System (subsequently the CEWS) and support for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).

The first ministerial meeting between Africa and the EU after the Cairo summit was held in October 2001 in Brussels. Progress was made in addressing issues of regional integration, HIV/Aids, food security, human rights, democracy and good governance. However, the instability in the Great Lakes region at the time brought about the realisation that the two should focus more fully on co-operative efforts to remedy the situation. The EU therefore increased its

support to the prevention and resolution of the conflicts in the Great Lakes by providing substantial financial resources, both through the European Development Fund (EDF), the development instrument of the Cotonou agreement, and through its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The second summit meeting of the EU and Africa was due to take place in April 2003 in Lisbon. However, it had to be indefinitely postponed by the European Council because of a disagreement over the attendance of the president of Zimbabwe.²⁹

Regional instruments

The EU's regional approach to conflict prevention in Africa has a variety of legal instruments at its disposal, among them the Cotonou Agreement; the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa; the EMP and Association agreements; and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

The EU's engagement with North Africa is conducted by means of the EMP and Association Agreements, the ENP and the ENP Action Plans. The EMP was launched in 1995. One of the most important aims of this partnership, as set out in the Barcelona Declaration, is to establish a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue across the Mediterranean. As already mentioned, EU–North African security co-operation is particularly pertinent to the Union's security because North Africa is situated so close to Europe. Interaction takes place on numerous levels, and includes the fight against terrorism and illegal immigration; the strengthening of border controls, intelligence

²⁹ The EU had instituted sanctions against President Mugabe which did not allow him to enter any EU country. The leaders of the African states refused to agree to the summit if he was prevented from attending.

sharing and the monitoring of financial transfers; the prevention of drug-trafficking; and control of the spread of diseases.

Cotonou

The Cotonou Agreement, signed between the ACP States and the EU in 2000, represents a new stage in a co-operation which began with the signing of the first co-operation convention (Yaoundé Convention) in 1964 and continued in the four successive Lomé Conventions.

The main objectives of the Agreement are the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty, and the gradual integration of the ACP states into the global economy, while simultaneously fostering the aims of sustainable development. Cotonou has three main dimensions: politics, trade and development. Security interventions, which normally take the form of recommendations relating to peace-building, conflict prevention and dispute resolution policies, fall under the political pillar of the Agreement's policy for sub-Saharan Africa. The partnership concentrates on regional initiatives and on building local capacities in particular, but retains its original emphasis on respect for human rights, good governance, democratic principles based on the rule of law and transparent and accountable governance. The Agreement also includes provisions to ensure that financial resources are not diverted from development objectives.

Article 96 of the Agreement lays down criteria in terms of which appropriate measures can be taken in cases of violation by one of the parties of the essential requirements of the Agreement (respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law). This article has been the cause of much contention. The High Representative stressed in November 2005 that there would be an 'advantage in developing such consultations before things have gone wrong (as

foreseen in the revised Agreement) and perhaps through creating some link with the APRM'.³⁰

The African Peace Facility (APF)

To provide financial support to peacekeeping missions in Africa, the EC approved a request by the AU in 2003 to establish a €250 million³¹ development fund, the African Peace Facility, to serve the continent's security requirements. Part of the €250 million consists of €126.4 million earmarked for African countries under the 9th European Development Fund (EDF), the financial instrument of the Cotonou agreement. A further €123.6 million comes from unallocated reserves in the long-term 'development envelope' of the EU. The EDF funding for the APF is due to be replaced by another financial mechanism after 2007. Under the Financial Perspective 2007–13 additional funds will be provided under a new budget line, provisionally called the Stability Instrument. Because stabilisation after the end of a war or a political crisis requires sustained and flexible engagement and a high degree of flexibility in decision-making and budget allocation, the Instrument, as a single legal entity, is expected to strengthen the EU's capacity to respond to crises and post-crisis reconstruction.

Each operation financed by the APF has to be initiated by the AU and/or the relevant sub-regional organisation, and be consistent with UN principles and objectives. A decision by a sub-regional organisation to undertake an operation requires the AU's approval. Funding from the APF can be used only for the operational costs of peace missions, but excludes various categories of expenditure,

³⁰ Contribution by the EU High Representative, Javier Solana, to the EU Strategy for Africa, Brussels, 21 November 2005, S377/05, p.5.

³¹ This was to be broken down into €200 million for support to peacekeeping; €34 million for technical assistance; €2 million for monitoring and evaluation; €1 million for auditing; and €12 million for contingencies.

including ammunition, arms, specific military equipment, salaries of soldiers and military training. The APF is³²

something of an anomaly, [as] it supports a peace and security operation [which falls under the CFSP and ESDP for which the Council and the member states have primary responsibility] but is administered by the Commission, which has no mandate for and thus experience in military matters because these normally are reserved for the Council.

The APF has been fully operational since June 2004, and in its current form will run until 2007. In addition, EU member states have contributed individually to the peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts of the AU and sub-regional organisations. The Facility has provided financial backing for some capacity-building work and two peace support operations, the *Force Multinationale du CEMAC* in Central African Republic (FOMUC), managed by the sub-regional organisation *Communauté Economique et Monétaire en Afrique Centrale* (CEMAC), and the African Mission to Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur, under the aegis of the AU.

The APF is the focal point of the EU–AU partnership on security, and could provide a good model for the funding of African-led missions in future, provided the issue of whether it is financially sustainable is successfully addressed.

In an evaluation of the APF conducted by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) in 2005, a number of recommendations are outlined. These include the necessity of establishing certain key principles to justify continued EU financial support to African-led peace support operations. These would cover ownership, sustainability, longer-term funding, an integrated approach to conflict (such as support for prevention and reconstruction), and differentiation between small or forgotten crises

³² International Crisis Group (ICG), *The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning Combination*, Africa Report no. 99, 25 October 2005, p.7.

and politically sensitive conflicts.³³ The ECDPM assessment also notes that improved institutional capacity in the APF is 'absolutely necessary and should be the main focus of EU donors'.³⁴

The Africa Strategy

The EU's Africa Strategy was adopted by the EU Council on 16 December 2005. Its aim is to place the various Africa strategies and policies of the Commission, the member states and the European Community within a single framework.³⁵ This will improve the complementarity and coherence of European policies and actions in Africa. However, at present the EU's institutions do not correspond with this policy framework.³⁶

The Strategy's main objective is to promote the achievement of the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa. To this end, the EU will focus on the areas that are considered prerequisites for the MDGs: peace and security and good governance; the creation of improved economic growth, trade and interconnection; and aspects of human development, such as social cohesion.³⁷

The Strategy offers an expanded and more comprehensive definition of security in Africa that addresses both politico-military

³³ The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Evidence submitted to the UK House of Lords Inquiry, sub-committee C, February 2006, p.6.

³⁴ *Ibid*, p.9.

³⁵ Grimm S & N Kielwein, *The European Union's Strategy for Africa — Coherence in the Face of a Complex Changing Continent?* German Development Institute Briefing Paper, 9/2005.

³⁶ ECDPM, *op. cit.*, p.2.

³⁷ Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, *EU Africa Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-Africa Pact to Accelerate Africa's Development*, {SEC(2005)1255}, p.3.

threats and social sources of instability. The EU believes that good and effective governance is an essential condition for stability in Africa, and has consequently launched a Governance Initiative that encourages participation in the AU's African Peer Review Mechanism, to which 25 states have signed up. It also provides support to help African countries to implement APRM-driven reforms. The Strategy also emphasises the importance of both credible national institutions at all levels and appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks. The document makes particular reference to the EU's APF, the 'financial foundation'³⁸ of Africa's emerging peace and security architecture, and encourages the AU and sub-regional organisations in Africa not only to take the lead in conflict management in Africa but to co-ordinate and implement the Plan of Action.³⁹

It is time now, building on this experience, to set up a more comprehensive EU approach complementing these Community instruments through CSFP/ESDP approaches... The EU should also pursue a common policy responding to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's call for establishing an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities, exploring the synergies between the different organisations involved and developing organisational capacities of African institutions, in particular through a proposed ten-year capacity building plan of action.

The Strategy seeks to support efforts to promote stability at all stages of the conflict cycle by:

- developing a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention which would include addressing the structural causes of conflict, promoting dialogue and reconciliation, and developing a culture of conflict prevention in fragile states;
- co-operating in addressing common security threats (such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction);

³⁸ *Ibid*, p.22.

³⁹ *Ibid*.

- assisting African peace support operations, notably through replenishing the financial reserves of the APF;
- undertaking disarmament, to break the cycle of conflict;
- preserving peace in post-conflict situations; and
- preventing the plunder of natural resources to prolong conflict by promoting better management of these resources and their sale, through instruments such as the Kimberley Process and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

Another prerequisite for reaching the MDGs is supporting legitimate and effective governance, which the EU says it will pursue by building effective and credible central institutions (such as police, judicial and auditing services); launching a Governance Initiative to encourage countries to participate in the APRM process; fighting corruption and organised crime by encouraging African partners to join the EITI; and requesting companies based in EU countries but operating in Africa to disclose information relating to corruption.

Javier Solana, in his contribution to the Strategy, remarked that ‘the major challenges that the EU will meet over the next 10–15 years — migration, energy, political Islam, terrorism and climate change — also need to be addressed in Africa’.⁴⁰ He emphasised that to create the conditions for development and democracy, peace and security must first be achieved. The ESDP was therefore one of the key policy instruments for the EU in its dealings with Africa. A successful strategy for Africa also required the development of a trilateral partnership between the EU, the UN and the AU. The EU should seek ‘more coherence with other donors, important partners in Africa and now emerging powers like China’. The adoption of a *regional* approach to conflicts in Africa, similar to the way in which the EU was operating in the Great Lakes, was essential, even though it had been less successful in West Africa.

⁴⁰ Contribution by the EU High Representative, Javier Solana, to the EU Strategy for Africa, *op. cit.*, p.1.

One of the difficulties of carrying out the Strategy is an absence of integrated institutional mechanisms and budgetary frameworks which would allow the EC/EU to treat Africa as a single entity. For example, the EC deals with sub-Saharan Africa through the Directorate-General (DG) Development, while DG External Relations deals with North Africa in the context of the ENP. The new EU budget for 2007–13 seeks to address this issue by creating new budgetary instruments and a revised Cotonou Agreement that will allow for cross-funding.⁴¹ However, one can also question whether it is wise to attempt a single strategy when dealing with African conflicts. The process of integration should not ignore the very different interests driving European engagement in North Africa as against its reasons for involvement in sub-Saharan Africa. Equally, there is a differentiated relationship between the EU and countries such as South Africa, least developed states and those characterised as fragile or failing.

The ECDPM, in a submission to the House of Lords on the Africa Strategy, recommended that the capacity-building funds lodged with the APF should be devoted to⁴²

establish[ing] the African continental peace and security architecture agreed by the AU, one component of which is the ASF. Funding for the ASF is a key element of the support the EU can provide, but there is also considerable technical know-how that can be provided.

The EU's participation in African conflicts

Military observers from EU member states have traditionally participated in the UN's peacekeeping operations in Africa. The EU is still the largest financial contributor to the UN system. It pays 37% of the regular budget, and two-fifths of the costs of UN

⁴¹ ECDPM, *op. cit.*

⁴² *Ibid*, p.9.

peacekeeping. The EU recognises that the UN plays a primary role in the management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. The ESS also acknowledges the important part that the UN performs in global security. This recognition is reflected in the conditions established for the APF, and is confirmed in the EU's 2005 Strategy.

However, a significant shift has occurred over the last two years. The EU's strategy towards Africa is now leaning more towards peacekeeping missions decided, led, operated and staffed by the AU or its sub-regional organisations. This is the result of a belief that Africans should take ownership of conflict resolution and peacekeeping initiatives on the continent.

To date, the EU has undertaken three missions under the auspices of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Operation Artemis was an autonomous EU operation, which took place from June to September 2003, and worked towards maintaining peace in the Eastern DRC. The EU deployed a robust peace enforcement mission into Ituri for four months, to stabilise the region while the UN prepared a more complex peace-building response.⁴³ Operation Artemis was the EU's first out-of-area operation. It used the Battle Groups concept, and confirmed the necessity (identified by the planners of the concept) to focus on time-limited operations that provided a clear exit strategy.

EUPOL-KINSHASA/EUSEC-DR CONGO was the EU's police mission in the DRC, in which its Integrated Police Unit provided both assistance and advice on security sector reform. This EU mission was launched in April 2005, and is still active today. This was the first-ever civilian ESDP mission in Africa. It emphasised the impact that small deployments can have on critical elements of a conflict situation, and the enormous contribution that EU missions can make to fill the resource gap.

⁴³ De Coning, *op. cit.*, p.23.

AMIS and CIVPOL was a mission initiated by the AU in Darfur in January 2004. It has been extended until 30 September 2006. The support provided by the EU to AMIS was largely intended to help it meet its logistical needs. EU advisers also supplemented the mission's planning and operational capabilities.⁴⁴

Total no. of UN and EU international peacekeeping, peace-building and crisis prevention missions globally: December 2005		
	<i>United Nations</i>	<i>European Union</i>
No. of international military personnel globally	62,109	7,031
Breakdown of total in Africa	50,836	(31 are stationed in Darfur in support of the AU-led AMIS II mission)
No. of international police personnel globally	6,263	494
Breakdown of total in Africa	3,215	50 (25 are stationed in the DRC-EUPOL KINSHASA) (25 are stationed in Darfur in support of the AU-led AMIS II mission)
No. of international civilians personnel globally	6,842	544
Breakdown of total in Africa	4,242	13 (5 are stationed in the DRC-EUPOL KINSHASA) (8 are stationed in the DRC-EUSEC)
Source: Centre for International Peace Operations, 2005		

⁴⁴ ICG, *op. cit.*, p.10.

Recently, the UN asked the EU to deploy some 800 troops in the DRC to help preserve the peace during the elections, which were scheduled to take place in mid-2006. Germany has agreed to lead the 1,500-strong mission. Other EU countries that are to contribute troops include Austria, France, Ireland, Poland, Portugal and Spain. However, concerns have been raised, by Germany in particular, that the mandate is vague and that very little impact could be made by the mission, given its small size and the vast extent of the DRC.

Areas in which synergy and co-operation can be improved

In his presentation at the conference, Dr Jakkie Cilliers, executive director of the Institute for Security Studies suggested seven steps towards achieving greater synergy and co-operation between the AU and the EU.

First, achieving consensus on the definition of human security versus state/regime/elite security, notwithstanding the broader definitions in AU agreements and protocols, is necessary. He noted that there were also differences in interpretation of human security between the North and South. In many instances Africans consider poverty alleviation and food security as the most important element of peace and security, while Northern donors tend to prioritise issues of good governance and legitimate leadership. This conflict of interpretation often manifests itself in substantial budget allocations to instruments such as the ASF, while human rights institutions are neglected. This applies equally to AU and EU allocations. Cilliers emphasised that it was critical for the EU to engage with a broader range of bodies than the PSC and Political Affairs sections of the AU. For example, greater financial support for the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in the Gambia was also very important.

Second, seeking coherence between regional economic communities (RECs) and the AU is crucial. There is a vast gap between the two that is replicated in the difference in ambition of each of the RECs, and the speed at which they are integrating. The RECs do not necessarily regard themselves as subsidiaries of the AU, and thus there is no consonance of policies between the AU and the RECs. (This was also noted in the establishment of the standby brigades. Some regions went ahead even though the AU policy framework had not been finalised.) Moreover, the relationships between the RECs are complicated by the overlapping memberships of countries, the duplication of functions and capacities, and the differences in political and financial commitment of member states. The answer to this 'cacophony', said Cilliers, 'lies in Brussels and not in Addis'. The EU can help to rationalise Africa's RECs. This would also help Africa to make better use of its scarce resources. The key challenge for Africans in such a situation would be how to use donor assistance most effectively.

The EU could contribute by encouraging the AU to establish vertical links between itself and the RECs, and horizontal links between the different RECs. The EU should support REC capacity-building when a comprehensive framework for conflict prevention, management and reconstruction is established.⁴⁵ Some RECs, such as ECOWAS and SADC, already have functional conflict prevention instruments, with stronger institutions and broader and more interventionist security mandates.⁴⁶ Other regions in Africa, however, may acknowledge conflict prevention as a pertinent issue, but have yet to develop effective strategies that could lead to policy

⁴⁵ Cilliers J, presentation, 11 October 2005.

⁴⁶ In 2001, for example, SADC signed the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. This Protocol rejuvenated the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security.

implementation.⁴⁷ Thus the capabilities and response time of RECs in Africa differ tremendously.

ECOWAS has done most to transform ideas into action, while the AU has been bolder in addressing security crises on the continent. SADC has a long way to go to 'overcome the schism between rhetoric and practice when addressing actual, practical security problems in the sub-region'.⁴⁸

Third, continuing to build the capacity and deployment ability of the ASF so that it can play a meaningful role in support of peace operations in Africa is vital. The peacekeeping missions by the AU are essentially bridges leading to UN operations (for example, AMIS has extended its mandate until September 2006, after which it will be replaced by UNMIS in Darfur), because of its limited financial and human resources. Cilliers stressed that being succeeded by a UN mission would have to be the exit strategy used by any AU mission, and that therefore the integration of peacekeeping in Africa with the UN system was critical. The UN is the sole organisation possessing the capabilities necessary to respond to the types of 'complex emergency that characterise conflict in Africa... For the foreseeable future, only the UN has the capacity to implement multifunctional mission mandates in Africa'.⁴⁹ Developing an interlocking system between the UN, the EU and the AU for conflict prevention and management and reconstruction afterwards would help to address the 'security gap' in peace missions (i.e. the civil-military divide), and make the ASF more than just a military concept. Effective post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and the restoration of the justice system were also very important, and could be best accomplished by a trilateral approach.

⁴⁷ ECDPM, *In Brief 4: Regional approaches to conflict prevention in African European support to African processes*, 22 January 2004.

⁴⁸ Hammerstad A, *op. cit.*, p.12.

⁴⁹ Cilliers & Malan, *op. cit.*, pp.17–18.

Fourth, closing the gap between analysis and action in the context of the CEWS is another necessary step.

Fifth, making the PSC system work should be high on the agenda. This would necessitate establishing the Panel of the Wise, institutionalising the Military Staff Committee, and strengthening the numbers and skills of the PSC secretariat.

Sixth, ensuring continued financial support from donors and African states is essential to carrying out the AU's plans to improve continental peace and security. The AU's financial resources are scanty. Apart from African contributions, the EU has made a substantial contribution to ensuring the financial sustainability of the PSC. Out of the original €250 million donated by the EU, the APF has committed €103 million and paid out €64 million (to AMIS and CEMAC). It has also allocated €6 million and spent €1.5 million on capacity building.

At present the AU's Peace Fund depends on five African countries and international donors. This is clearly not a sufficient guarantee that it will continue to be sustainable, given the great need in Africa for such operations, and the consequent demands upon the Fund.

In contrast, contributions made by African states to the UN for peacekeeping are often reimbursed. For example, 60% of the amount South Africa spent on its contribution to MONUC (approximately ZAR 400 million) will be repaid by the UN. The advantage for African countries of contributing to UN operations, as opposed to the AU Fund or sub-regional peacekeeping operations, is not difficult to grasp.

To provide a more predictable funding mechanism, the EU should work with Africans to develop a new entity that will replace the APF.

Seventh, establishing appropriate support mechanisms to prevent conflict and to restore states after peace has been agreed is necessary. This would involve analysing the lessons learnt during earlier missions and identifying the best practices developed during these peace operations. Two potentially useful case studies are available in

Burundi and Darfur. It is also essential that the EU, together with the AU and other African institutions, should take a regional view of conflict in Africa that would incorporate building constituencies for regional conflict prevention. This would involve a wide range of stakeholders, including parliamentarians and representatives of both civil society and local and multinational business interests.

Both the AU and RECs tend to suffer from shortages of personnel and managerial skills, and therefore have difficulty in playing a stronger role in the African peace and security architecture. Both the AU and its donor countries should seek to address the problems relating to the absorption and retention of skills experienced by personnel in Africa's various security institutions.

Lessons learnt from experiences of conflict resolution

Many European actors have been mediating or negotiating an end to conflict since the 1990s, and African undertakings of such roles have increased since 1995. As the new AU security architecture evolves, it will be vital to its success to initiate a process of continual monitoring and evaluation of its performance, and of its partnerships with key actors such as the EU.

An examination of three AU involvements in conflict resolution in Sudan, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire is instructive. In all three, the AU played a critical role in attempting to negotiate ceasefires or agreements. In addition, in the case of Sudan, the AU also deployed troops. The most important common element to emerge from these engagements is that the credibility and legitimacy of the mediator are not enough to ensure the continuation of a peace process. Institutional back-up for the heads of state or elder statesmen who negotiate the interim agreement is necessary to ensure its implementation. As Vasu Gounden, the executive director of

ACCORD, noted,⁵⁰ while both Nelson Mandela and Jacob Zuma were successful in their attempts to push for agreements in Burundi, they were given very little institutional support.

Gounden also cautioned that pre-negotiation or ceasefire agreements are short-lived and fairly unstable. Therefore the follow-up period is critical, and requires that the external parties should continue to be fully engaged. Furthermore, substantive agreements should be followed up by arrangements for implementation. To ensure this, a mediation team is required to work with the parties concerned from the outset, continuing throughout the process until the post-conflict phase is reached. Equally important are mechanisms for the monitoring and evaluation of the peace agreements. Partnerships between the AU and international players, both in groups and as individual members, are necessary to make independent supervision possible, given that the AU has insufficient troop strength and logistical capacity to enforce ceasefires and protect civilians.

Regional organisations and neighbouring states could play an important role in helping to design conflict resolution strategies, and the AU should draw them into the mediation processes.

If mediation and any peace agreement are to be successful, due consideration should be given to the power imbalances that prevail between the various parties to the conflict. Any intervention strategy by the AU would also need to factor in the part played in conflicts by 'valuable spoils' such as oil. Mechanisms such as the Kimberley Process or the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative provide useful vehicles for addressing the exploitation of natural resources to finance wars.

Conflict mitigation by means of peace agreements is not enough to ensure a stable or permanent outcome. The process of restoring

⁵⁰ Gounden, V, executive director of ACCORD, presentation made at the conference on 'Towards Peace and Security: The EU and Africa', Pretoria, 11 October 2005.

security has to attempt to address the root causes of the conflict, and to initiate confidence-building mechanisms if a lasting solution is to be reached. However, a peace agreement, which provides a temporary respite in the hostilities, creates a space in which the real points at issue can be addressed.

Post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) activities

An important element of conflict resolution is the series of processes relating to reconstruction, which require a pragmatic programme of implementation and a much longer time frame — at least a decade. For this reason, supporting the stabilisation of post-conflict situations and designing and carrying out coherent regional and national strategies for disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and reinsertion (DDRR) that include child soldiers are critical. If countries emerging from conflict fail to address DDRR adequately, the consolidation of the state that emerges after the war could be severely hampered. As Salomao Mungoi from the Development of Resources for Peacebuilding (PROPAZ) in Mozambique pointed out⁵¹, DDRR efforts should involve ex-combatants in peace-building, although he cautioned against the ‘political manipulation’ of former fighters.

Waldemar Vrey of the DDR Office of ONUB used the experience of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process in Burundi which started in 2004 to identify various important issues arising from post-conflict situations, warning that in the interests of sustaining peace they should not be overlooked.⁵² The DDR strategy

⁵¹ Mungoi, S, PROPAZ Mozambique, presentation made at the conference on ‘Towards Peace and Security: The EU and Africa’, Pretoria, 11 October 2005.

⁵² Vrey, Waldemar, SSR of the DDR Office of ONUB, presentation made at the conference on ‘Towards Peace and Security: The EU and Africa’, Pretoria, 11 October 2005.

used in Burundi was developed by the Executive Secretariat of the National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration, the World Bank's multi-country demobilisation and reintegration programme, the AU mission, the UN office in Burundi, ONUB and UNICEF (which took responsibility for the child soldiers). Some of the provisional lessons Vrey elicited from Burundi were as follows.

First, it is important to avoid succumbing to political pressure to deal with disarmament and demobilisation first, leaving reintegration for later. A reintegration strategy manages the movement of the individual ex-combatant from a military to a civilian environment, and while it is a much longer process than either disarmament or demobilisation, it is by far the most important.

Second, at the level of the national DDR programme, acquiring the capabilities to reintegrate is very important. The office handling reintegration should be separated from those controlling the disarmament, demobilisation and reinsertion aspects of the programme.

Third, the generic scheduling of DDR in that order should be reconsidered. Instead, reintegration should follow disarmament (i.e. DRD). It is preferable that combatants should not be demobilised until they have been trained to re-enter civilian life.

Fourth, ex-combatants should be seen as making a contribution to rebuilding the economy: 'Paid and unproductive ex-combatants and former soldiers are up to mischief'.

Fifth, the type of reintegration training offered should also be designed to respond to the requirements of the national economy. Related to this is the need to secure long-term employment for ex-combatants. Training should be linked with the principles outlined in poverty reduction strategy papers.

Conclusion: The Way Forward

Peace is clearly an important although not a sufficient precondition for development. To quote Amartya Sen,⁵³ a Nobel Prize winner,

Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states.

He goes on to say that development is the process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy, including⁵⁴

elementary capabilities like being able to avoid such deprivations as starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality, as well as the freedoms that are associated with being literate and numerate, enjoying political participation and uncensored speech and so on.

Achieving security, therefore, is a critical component of the development and freedom continuum. This precept informs the approaches of both Africa and Europe to achieving peace and security in their respective regions. But the challenges are great, partly because solutions must be sought not in generic handbooks, but in the historical specificities of each case.

Africa's move towards the creation of more effective continental and regional institutions signals the implementation phase of its commitment to taking ownership of its future. These institutions cover not only the areas of peace and security but development in general. Africa is by far the world's poorest continent, although its framework for renewal and development is one of the most ambitious and innovative. Given the continent's limited resources, the involvement of partners from the developed world, such as the EU, must form part of the overall 'business plan' for achieving peace

⁵³ Sen A, *Development as Freedom*. New York: Anchor Books, 2000, p.3.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p.36.

and security. However, what is critical for an effective partnership is a clear understanding on both sides of the structure designed for that purpose; of the principles guiding the relationship; of the real shortcomings and hindrances to achieving the objectives; and of the need for predictability in the commitment of assistance, over long periods and within time frames, to allow for proper planning.

The EU's 2005 Africa Strategy recognises the importance of ownership of the peace and security process by Africans, and of real partnership based on equality. However, to strengthen the security relationship between the EU and the AU, a number of areas require specific attention.

The AU suffers from severe capacity and skills constraints that hamper it in carrying out peacekeeping missions. Even more important is its inability to meet the multifaceted requirements of conflict resolution (and more specifically reconstruction) on the continent. If these functions are not carried out properly, all earlier successes in arriving at transitional agreements and processes may prove fruitless.

The most serious lacks in capacity and skills relate to management capacity,⁵⁵ mission planning, the funding of missions and the limited number of troops available for operations.⁵⁶ The regional and continental institutions are of recent origin, and have not yet reached full strength (certainly as regards peace and security design and implementation). Although regional security organisations play a critical role in the AU's security planning and contribute to the safety of states and people, they suffer from all of the shortcomings mentioned above.⁵⁷ Another constraint is the weakness of the early

⁵⁵ Cilliers & Malan, *op. cit.*, pp.16–17.

⁵⁶ For example, large African contributors of troops to the UN, such as Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Ghana and Zambia, may find it difficult to maintain their current deployment levels in UN peace operations and simultaneously to participate meaningfully in sub-regional standby brigade initiatives.

⁵⁷ Hammerstad A, *op. cit.*, p.15.

warning systems, which are neither fully-fledged nor regionally integrated, but which are crucial for conflict prevention.

Peacekeeping missions also need to be fully integrated into the overall development framework of the country or region concerned after the conflict has ended. This requires the deployment of complex peace missions which need to provide for civilian policing, security sector reform, the re-establishment of political institutions and rule of law, and addressing the consequences of war economies and the activities of organised criminal networks. When a mission is helping a fragile state the challenges become even greater, and the points of intervention as well as the means more complex and numerous.

The EU's co-operation with the AU attempts to address many of these shortcomings. In the short term, the question of the future of the APF should be placed high on the agendas of both the EU and the AU. Its functionality has been proven. While there is room for revision and modifications, the Facility should not be closed prematurely. Nor should it be deprived of the opportunity to make a difference after 2007, when its current mandate ends. Consideration should be given to expanding its mandate to include financing more direct military support. For example, should the EU's involvement with AMIS in Sudan be drastically reduced, it would undermine significantly the ability of the mission to carry out its task in Darfur in the absence of a UN deployment. As Gounden noted, delegation of responsibility should not become an abrogation of responsibility.

However, while assistance from external sources is essential to the AU's efforts to improve peace and security, it cannot replace the political will in African states and in the structures they have created to take politically difficult decisions, even if they go against the grain of continental solidarity and consensus. African leaders should ensure that any vacuum brought about by inaction is not filled by foreign parties, whether acting for states or movements, who are pursuing their own agendas.

To foster the broader goal of better governance and improved accountability in African leaders, the EU should also continue to support the contributions of civil society (and particularly of African organisations), and consult it when designing and implementing its peace and security strategies. Civil society also has an important role to play in monitoring and participating in the processes of peace-making and reconstruction.

Any discourse on improving peace and security co-operation between the AU and the EU must acknowledge the link between development and aid. There has been an ongoing debate about how aid can be used more efficiently. There is also an argument that co-ordination between various actors (not only from the North as opposed to the South, but also within Africa) should be improved, and that more effective use should be made of trilateral co-operation. Again, international donors are becoming increasingly aware of the role that regionally powerful states can play in mediation within their regions. For example, South Africa's relationship with the EU is regarded as having assumed the status of a 'strategic partnership'. Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt play similar roles in other regional communities in Africa.

The interaction between donors and the AU that occurred in Sudan brought the difficulties of co-ordinating a multiplicity of actors to the fore. It also demonstrated the administrative and management burden this places on an AU Commission that is experiencing human resource constraints. The problems are compounded by the lack of complementarity in the various EU structures, which have difficulty in harmonising the actions of the Commission and the Council, for example, or the assistance provided by the EU with that of individual member states. Co-ordination between the various facets of peacekeeping support becomes even more necessary in the light of the AU's inability to deploy multidimensional missions. This underlines the need to 'trilateralise' co-operation in complex operations involving the EU, the AU and the UN. Equally crucial to the viability of AU

interventions is the deployment of a UN mission to provide the AU's forces with an exit strategy. Thus the integration of peace support missions into the UN framework is essential.

These are all areas that require serious attention when the concrete implementation of the partnership between the EU and the AU in the field of peace and security is discussed. In the end, the AU will prove more effective only if the donors are prepared to support, and above all to finance, the AU's policies.⁵⁸

Both the EU and the AU share a strategic interest in an interdependent security and development environment. They have both embarked on an ambitious 'institutional evolution', which in Africa's case may be the catalyst for more stable and developmentally-oriented societies. The relationship created under these new peace and security instruments is a new one for both the AU and the EU. The lessons learnt during this initial phase should be used to refine the partnership and to build an enduring institutional capacity that will move Africa and its people from insecurity to peace and development.

⁵⁸ Klingebiel S, 'Africa's new peace and security architecture: Converging the roles of external actors and African interests', *African Security Review*, 14/2, 2005, p.41.

Acronyms

ACCORD	African Centre for the Active Resolution of Conflict Disputes
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ASF	African Standby Force
AMIS	African Mission to Sudan
APF	African Peace Facility
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
CEMAC	<i>Communauté Economique et Monétaire en Afrique Centrale</i> /Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission/European Community
ECDFM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements
ESS	European Security Strategy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union

The European Union and Africa

EUPOL KINSHASA	European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa
EUSEC– DR CONGO	European Security Sector Reform Mission
FOMUC	<i>Force du Multinationale du CEMAC/</i> Multinational Force of CEMAC
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PCR	Post-conflict reconstruction
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PROPAZ RECs	Development of Resources for Peacebuilding Regional economic communities
SADC SSR TDCA	Southern African Development Community Security Sector Reform Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement
UN	United Nations
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan

Appendix



The Royal Netherlands Embassy
and the South African Institute of International Affairs
cordially invite you to a seminar on

Towards Peace and Security: The EU and Africa

on the occasion of the opening of the new
Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
at 210 Queen Wilhelmina Avenue (corner Muckleneuk Street),
Pretoria, 11 October 2005.

Programme

- 10h00–10h30 **Registration**
- 10h30–10h45 **Welcome and introduction**
Ambassador Frans Engering, Royal Netherlands Embassy
- 10h45–11h15 **Keynote address**
Dr Bernard Bot, Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs
- 11h15–12h15 **Session One:**
**The EU–AU Partnership —
New Opportunities for Co-operation**
EU engagement with the AU institutions: The Way Forward
Ambassador Lodewijk Briët (EC Delegation)
The AU's security architecture:
Possible areas for co-operation and synergy
Dr Jakkie Cilliers (ISS)

The European Union and Africa

12h15–13h15 **Lunch**

13h15–14h15 **Session Two: Conflict Resolution**

Lessons from the AU's conflict resolution experience:

Sudan, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire

Vasu Gounden (ACCORD)

Lessons for managing conflicts: Europe in the 1990s

Professor Rob de Wijk (Royal Netherlands Military Academy and Clingendael Institute)

14h15–14h30 **Tea**

14h30–15h30 **Session Three:**

The Formation of Multi-Country Stand-By Forces

The AU's regional standby-brigades

Pal Martins (Safer Africa)

The EU battle groups and NATO response force

Professor Rob de Wijk (Royal Netherlands Military Academy and Clingendael Institute)

15h30–15h45 **Tea**

15h45–16h45 **Session Four:**

The Challenges of Re-Integrating Former Combatants

The case of Mozambique

Salomao Mungoi (Propaz, Mozambique)

The case of Burundi

Waldemar Vrey (SSR - DDR Office of ONUB)

16h45–17h00 **Summary and conclusion**

Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (SAIIA)

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