

DIE SUID - AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT

VAN

INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

THE S.A. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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NUUSBRIEF/NEWSLETTER

1972 No. 1

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE

OF

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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INTRODUCTORY NOTES

This issue of the Newsletter includes the Report presented by our National Chairman to the biennial meeting of the Institute's National Executive Council, which was held in Cape Town on 21 February, 1972. As members may know, the National Executive Council consists of elected representatives of the six Branches of the Institute, and, in terms of the Institute's Constitution, it meets at least once every two years. Between meetings of the Council its Administrative Committee, to which all members of the Council belong, is responsible for the affairs of the Institute. The Administrative Committee meets regularly every second month in Johannesburg.

At the biennial meeting of the Council the officers of the Institute were elected for the ensuing two years. Dr. Leif Egeland was re-elected as National Chairman, and Mr. Gideon Roos was elected to the new post of Deputy Chairman of the Institute. Dr. W.J. Busschau and Mr. H.F. Oppenheimer were re-elected as Vice-Chairmen, together with the Chairmen of the Branches ex officio. These are at present Mr. W.T. Ferguson (Cape Town), Professor W.B. Vosloo (Stellenbosch), Mr. A.J. Karstaedt (Eastern Province), Professor E.N. Keen (Natal) and Mr. Leon Coetzee (Pretoria). In addition to being Deputy Chairman of the Institute, Mr. Gideon Roos is also Chairman of the Witwatersrand Branch.

Reference is made in the Report of the National Chairman to the Conference on "Accelerated Development in Southern Africa" (see also Newsletter 1971 No. 5), which was held at Jan Smuts House from 21 to 25 March. The approximately 270 participants and observers included persons from the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Madagascar, Malawi and South Africa's neighbouring states and territories, as well as from all South African universities, several government departments, homelands and black urban areas, various interested companies and other organisations, and so on. The wide representation of different academic disciplines, political views, interests, etc., which resulted in a frank exchange of views both inside and outside the formal conference sessions, was one of the most rewarding and encouraging aspects of the Conference. A wide range of subjects was discussed on the basis of approximately 30 prepared papers, and it is hoped that, as a result of these discussions, further study of particular questions in the field of accelerated development will be undertaken. A full report on the Conference, including the papers presented, will in due course be published.

The Institute is very pleased to have been able to co-operate with the Rand Afrikaans University and the Foundation for Foreign Affairs of Chicago, in the organising of this important and successful Conference.

The report on the Institute's previous major conference, which concerned the "Population Explosion", will shortly be available. It is being published by Macmillan (London), with the title "International Aspects of Overpopulation", and members will be receiving further information about it. The proceedings of the Symposium on "Natural Resources in Southern Africa", held at Jan Smuts House in December, 1971, are at present being prepared for publication.

It is regretted that there has been a delay in the distribution of this Newsletter. This has been due to the overriding demands on the Institute's small staff occasioned by the recent Conference.

THE DIRECTOR

S.A.I.I.A. NUUSBRIEF/NEWSLETTER

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EAST COAST ISLANDS

by

A.G. MOUNTAIN

Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to talk very frankly to you this evening on the East Coast Islands. I do not intend to shirk from the responsibility, which I feel a commentator has to his audience, of reflecting on the bad as well as on the good things these islands have to offer. It is more important I feel, and I am sure your Chairman had this in mind when he asked me to address you, to get an overall view of the countries under discussion rather than to hear the mere extolling of their many virtues.

MADAGASCAR

I would like to discuss each island in turn, starting with Madagascar. Madagascar is the fourth largest island in the world. It lies some 500 miles off the east coast of Africa, parallel to Mocambique. The island is 1580 kilometres (1 000 miles) long and 600 kilometres (370 miles) wide at its widest point. Its area covers 590 000 sq. kilometres or an area equal in size to France and the Benelux countries combined.

It is mainly a tropical country. It has a very varied climate due to its topography and prevailing wind systems. There are three major climatic zones: the Eastern plain, the Highlands and the Western plains.

The East coast covers a coastal strip some 500 kilometres wide, stretching from sea level to an altitude of 400 -500 metres. It is the wettest region of Madagascar and consequently the most fertile agricultural area. It rains almost all the year round; more than three meters (+ 120 inches) of rain are measured each year in Tamatave. The prevailing climate of the Eastern plain is equatorial, characterised by extreme humidity and rather constant heat.

The highland area has an average altitude varying between 1200 and 1400 metres and is formed by a chain of three mountain ranges separated by wide fertile valleys. The highland region offers considerable agricultural opportunities due to its altitude, the favourable level of rainfall (50-75 inches), the abundant water in the broad rivers that criss-cross the land, which seems so unbelievable to drought-conscious South Africans, and the fertile alluvial soils found in the valleys.

The central highland area slopes down to the Western Plains, where the country is hot and dry. The climate of the south is related to that of the west, but is characterised by even greater dryness approaching desert like conditions. The vegetation of these two areas is dominated by water-retaining plants such as cactus, bottle trees and baobabs.

For a South African, Madagascar is a particularly interesting island. Here Africa, Arabia and Malayo-Polynesia met to create a small nation of some 7 million people, whose similarity to anything we know in Africa is as close as it is different. The island's capital, Tananarive, in which some 330,000 people live, has the same dull musky odour of dirty drains and unswept streets which seem to hang so heavily about the cities of tropical Africa; it has the same pulsating rhythm of endless, seemingly purposeless human movement which throngs about the pavements of the main streets; perhaps fewer beggars and fewer deformed and diseased people who have to

eke out a wretched existence on the charity of a poor population; it has its full complement of people who have to make their beds on newspapers and sacks behind improvised walls of cardboard set up at the entrances of shops and buildings in down-town Tananarive. The towns of the island vibrate with the same clatter of old vehicles, most of which are taxis, which somehow manage to remain in one piece long enough to get their occupants to their destinations.

Madagascar has all this, which is so typical of Africa, but it has something more. It has a quiet enchantment that belongs only to that island and can be found nowhere else. Its fascination stems from an interplay of the island's history and its natural beauty.

The first people to set foot on the rich soils of Madagascar came from Malayo-Polynesia, and with them they brought the lilting rhythm of the present Malagasy tongue and perhaps the geniality that characterises the island's people. The next people to come were the slave-traders from Arabia who established bases on the West Coast and on the Comore Islands that lie between Africa and Madagascar. African slaves were later introduced by their Arab owners and today their emancipated offspring have become an integral part of the Malagasy people. The first Europeans were the Portuguese, then the Dutch and then the French and British. But it was the French who stayed and turned the Great Red Island into a colony of France in 1896, and as such it remained until Independence in 1960.

Over a century before that date however, the foundations were laid for the indigenous Merina dynasty, which ruled the island with the pomp, splendour and power befitting the great thrones of the 18th century Europe. In about 1811 Radama I, who had the previous year inherited the leadership of the powerful Merina tribe from his father Andriampoina-merina, assembled his warriors around his palace at Ambohimanga - which still stands today preserved in all its detail - in readiness for the sweep across the 12-mile valley to Tananarive ("The Place of One Thousand Warriors"), which was even then the principal settlement of the island. Radama won his battle and established a dynasty that lasted until the French forced its demise in 1896 and the last queen, Ranavalona III, died in exile in Algeria in 1927.

Perhaps the most remarkable reign was that of Ranavalona I. She was intensely nationalistic and was a pagan. She saw in Christianity, which had gained a firm foothold in the country by this time, a threat to her power and absolute control over her people. The churches were forcibly closed, most were destroyed and the Christians were persecuted. It was estimated that during her reign (1823 - 1851) about 150 000 Christians were put to death for their beliefs. But, as with many tyrants, she built up the land. With the assistance of an amazing French ex-Corporal, Jean Laborde, she built a cannon factory in 1837, a steel foundry, a glass works, an indigo dye-plant, a sugar factory, a soap works and a silk industry from cocoon to the woven fabric. Some of Laborde's buildings still stand today and one of his factory buildings at Mantasoa is used as a school.

Ranavalona II, who succeeded Radama II after his assassination in 1853, had her eccentricities. She decided that one of the hills on which Tananarive is built, should be removed as it somehow spoilt the view from her palace. Thousands of workers were employed and using their bare hands and simple baskets, they removed one-third of the mountain's side. Today a huge eroded gash bears stark witness to the whims of a capricious queen. She also decreed that all houses were to be built in the same style and her legacy lingers on. A newcomer to Madagascar is immediately impressed by the quaint but

architecturally similar houses built out of blood red mud. (Laterite is a prominent mineral in the soil of Madagascar). The houses rise up to two and occasionally three stories in tall, thin structures with acutely pitched roofs. A verandah runs around each floor if the owner is wealthy; it only stretches across the front if the owner is less well-to-do and if he is poor, the house will have no verandah at all. The presence or lack of a verandah is therefore often the only way of distinguishing between the rich and poor as a result of Ranavalona's decree perpetuating uniformity.

In 1875 when the great imperial powers of Europe sat in Berlin and carved up the world to suit themselves, Madagascar fell to the lot of the French. Eleven years later the Tricolor fluttered above the roofs of Tananarive and the direction of the country came from France. But control only came after a long and bitter duel had been fought between the Madagascans and the French who wanted Madagascar's trade, control over her raw materials and a base in the Indian Ocean.

The French retained control of the island until 1942 when, after the fall of France and the establishment of the puppet Vichy regime, a British and South African force occupied it in order to prevent its becoming a base for German submarines. Diego-Suarez, which lies at the northern tip of the island, has one of the world's finest natural harbours and could have offered the Germans a much-needed base from which they could have attacked Allied shipping plying along the life-line routes to the East. Today a solitary rusting French submarine, lying half-submerged in the dirty waters of the little port of Diego, is all that remains of those desperate hours and British rule in Madagascar.

In 1948 the island was rocked by a national uprising against the French administration. The French had 18,000 soldiers on the island before the fighting ceased. Thirty settlers, most of whom were Creoles, 1,000 soldiers and many thousand Malagasy were killed. The Malagasy lost the battle for independence in 1948 but ultimately won their campaign. On the 26th June, 1960, the Republic of Malagasy came into being. Today it is an independent country with associate membership of the European Economic Community and is a member of the Afro-Malagasy Common Organisation (an association of ex-French territories) and a signatory of the Organisation of African Unity.

I would like to turn not to consider the island's economic potential. Because of its varied climate and physical features Madagascar has an exciting agricultural potential which, to date, has barely been touched. The principal crop grown on the island is rice of which 1 760 000 tons were produced in 1968. Other principal crops include:

<u>Crop</u>	<u>Annual Production (1968)</u>
Coffee	66 000 tons
Cotton (seed)	11 400 tons
Bananas	15 000 tons
Ground Nuts	43 000 tons
Butter Beans	10 200 tons
Raffia	8 900 tons
Sisal fibre	21 500 tons
Vanilla	1 000 tons
Wine (hectolitres)	13 000 tons
Sugar	98 000 tons
Cloves	5 000 tons

Growth of agricultural production is restrained by the scattered locations of arable land; the traditional land tenure system in terms of which the land is divided among all heirs; the difficulties due to the lack of an adequate transportation system; and the remoteness of collection centres and major world markets. As a result any large scale agricultural development has had to be undertaken by the government.

Along the eastern seaboard of the island, vast virgin forests of natural hardwoods await exploitation and although attempts have been made to extract the timber, little has been achieved due to lack of know-how and capital.

Madagascar has one of the highest cattle to population ratios in the world. There are over 10 000 000 head of Zebu cattle on the island. On the average 11 000 head are exported annually and 900 000 head are slaughtered for local consumption. Madagascar is not plagued with animal diseases to the same extent as countries in Africa.

The fishing industry on the island is limited and is largely restricted to those industries which use the country's agricultural production as raw materials.

There are two automobile assembly plants which are situated in Tananarive. SOMACOA, which began operations in 1962 assembles Renaults and Peugeots, and has a production of around 3 000 vehicles a year. ECAM, which is the other assembly plant, assembles about 900 Citroens per annum, half of which are commercial vehicles. The company plans to assemble Land Rovers in the near future.

Madagascar has well developed internal and international air services (there are two direct flights each way per week between Tananarive and Johannesburg) and good postal, telephone and telex communications. However, road and rail facilities are inadequate. Because of poor internal communications, a good deal of transporting about the island has to be done by barges and light coasters. Madagascar has about 20 harbours along its 5 000 kilometres of coastline and transshipments result in high transport costs

Before leaving Madagascar, Mr. Chairman, may I turn to dwell very briefly on the political situation and the island's relationship with South Africa.

Madagascar gained its Independence from France on the 26th June, 1960, but has retained very close links with that country. It is a member of the Afro-Malagasy Common Organisation (OCAM) and has associate membership of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). The Malagasy Republic is a signatory to the Organisation of African Unity. However, notwithstanding that body's hostile attitude towards South Africa, official Government policy welcomes closer trade relationships with South Africa and as we all know, a trade agreement was recently signed between the two countries and a commission has been established with the recent visit of Malagasy Officials to South Africa to study and to define areas of joint co-operation.

President Tsiranana, who can be described as a moderate and is pro-West, has recently gained his third overwhelming mandate of solidarity from his people in the third post Independence elections held recently - again his party, the Social Democrat Party, gained 93 of the 96 seats of the National Assembly. However, President Tsiranana has not been in good health recently and the line of succession is not clearly defined, which casts a lingering doubt about continued political stability on the island after his death.

The official opposition is Left-wing orientated and was active before the last elections, criticising the government's economic and foreign policies, including President Tsiranana's then tentative steps towards the normalisation of relations with South Africa. However the strength of the A.K.F.M. Party, for what it is worth, is restricted almost entirely to the Tananarive area and the party is virtually unknown elsewhere on the island.

Severe disturbances were experienced at Tulear in the south-west with the emergence of strong man Andre Rasampa who tried to take advantage of Tsiranana's ill health and gain the presidency for himself. However, he overplayed his hand and President Tsiranana first demoted him from Vice President to a lesser position in the party and government and then, after further political disturbances, had him removed from office altogether and jailed. The island now breathes more freely.

Madagascar has to face the problems of a tribal land tenure system that allows all men to own land, but which results in small uneconomic productive units. It has to contend with the problems of primitive agricultural techniques and tribal inertia. It has a very limited industrial sector and very few service industries. Furthermore, and typical of most underdeveloped countries, there is an acute shortage of capital and technical know-how - the two vital requirements for a developing economy. Notwithstanding the financial and technical aid the island has received, and is currently receiving from France, certain western countries and the different International Development Agencies, there is an enormous void that has to be filled if this giant island is to reach economic take-off.

South Africa can help to fill this void and thereby win a firm ally in this turbulent world of international power politics. At the same time South Africa could reap some of the economic rewards this rich ripening country has to offer. Furthermore, any stimulation of the Malagasy economy and development of the country as a whole will assist the island's charismatic but ailing leader, President Tsiranana and his ruling Social Democratic Party, which is pro-west and is well-disposed towards South Africa, to entrench the forces of reason and peaceful development.

The thought of this vast island, which flanks South Africa's eastern seaboard and commands a gateway to the Indian Ocean and the soft under-belly of the world, falling prey to the subtle and manoeuvring men of World Revolution should send a cold shudder down the spine of any person who wants to see peace and prosperity in Southern Africa.

REUNION.

Mr. Chairman, I do not propose to dwell on Reunion for any length of time, since of the three islands, it has the least to offer us, business-wise, in South Africa.

The island which is only 980 sq. miles in extent, lies some 500 miles east of Madagascar. The centre of the island rises up in giant volcanic contortions to over 10 000 feet above sea-level, and in the south lies the Piton de la Fournaise which is an active volcano that last erupted in 1969. Fringing this central highland area is a lowland coastal plain on which the principal crop - sugar - is grown.

The population of Reunion in 1967 was 426 000 and is estimated to be increasing at about 2,85% per annum. The European population is estimated at about 5 000 and comprises local businessmen, expatriate government officials and their families. The capital is St. Denis, situated on the north-west coast.

Although the island has limited natural resources and no manufacturing industry, the standard of living is relatively high and there is no serious unemployment problem as in Mauritius. Reunion has the second highest ratio of number of cars to length of road in the world (only exceeded by the U.S.A.). There are 40 000 motor cars on the island, or approximately one motor car to 10 people (including children) and approximately 5 000 new motor cars are sold per annum.

The quality of goods carried in the shops is outstanding. However, the cost of living is extremely high, being about three times higher than that of South Africa.

Reunion is administered as an integral part of France and as such, is a member of the European Common Market. The entire direction of government emanates from France. There are no restrictions placed on trade relationships with South Africa other than the normal restrictions placed on all countries, which like South Africa, are not members of the Common Market. It is unlikely that the political situation will change to any considerable degree in the foreseeable future, unless France should decide to relinquish her control of the island. Although there is nothing definite in this regard at present, the possibility does exist that France may decide to withdraw. Should this happen before the island has been able to achieve a degree of economic independence and development, the consequences could be serious.

As I have already said, Reunion is entirely dependent upon sugar. There is virtually no agricultural diversification and little local manufacture. This is the disturbing thing about Reunion - it is entirely dependent upon France while at the same time has a relatively high standard of living. Unlike Mauritius, which is attempting to take active steps in the creation of a Free Trade Zone and the granting of considerable investment incentives, Reunion does not appear to have the same sense of urgency to obtain self-sufficiency. Notwithstanding this, however, a large scale pelagic fishing industry is being established on the island in consortium with the Japanese.

MAURITIUS.

The first view the air traveller gets of Mauritius is of an emerald green island set in the deep blue of the vast Indian Ocean. Here to the casual visitor, the holiday maker and the pleasure seeker, is a tropical paradise of rolling lands, of swaying sugar cane, of white tropical beaches and coral reefs, of some good hotels and an idyllic holiday. But the less casual visitor who moves aside the curtain of beauty and idyll is soon greeted by the stark spectre of man's life and death struggle against himself. Mauritius is chronically overpopulated and the people are consequently underemployed and no income means no food, no homes and no life.

The island is only 720 sq. miles in extent and has a population of nearly 800 000, thus giving it a population density of 1 100 persons per sq. mile overall, making Mauritius one of the most densely populated countries in the world.

When Mauritius became a British Crown Colony in December 1810 after the grand sea battle between the British and French navies in the bay at Mahebourg in which both sides lost over 30 ships, the island had

about 75 000 inhabitants: 7 000 whites of French origin, 60 000 slaves of African and Madagascan origin and 7 500 ("freedmen") of diverse origins - Arabs, Persians, Malays and Indians from the province of Madras . The British numbered less than 1 000 except for the intermittent stay of British troops. The abolition of slavery proclaimed on the 1st April, 1835 created a labour problem on the sugar cane fields as many of the ex-slaves refused to return to work there.

Faced with this situation which threatened to ruin their plantations, the planters decided to import Indian Labour. The principle of immigration was adopted in 1837 and maintained until 1904. During this period 458 636 men and women from various parts of India and belonging to many different faiths were brought to the island on five year contracts. Of this number 136 975 returned to India and the remainder were authorised to become residents. Today there are 550 000 Indo-Mauritians.

In 1929 the first Chinese, numbering 400, were brought to the island, but most returned after a few months as the nature of the work did not suit them. A few who had become established in commerce remained and today the Chinese population numbers nearly 25 000.

The white population numbers approximately 8 000, the majority of whom are descended from the early sugar planters and all of whom are French speaking, although almost without exception their English is faultless. The Franco-Mauritians are characterised occupationally by their ownership and management of most of the sugar estates on the island and the larger business houses in Port Louis.

The remainder of the population is comprised of Creoles, who are the most heterogenous community on the island and number about 225 000. The Creole language which is French patois, is the lingua franca of the island.

Of the three islands, Mauritius is generally the one that is best known to us in South Africa. The main reasons for this are:

Both countries were once tied through the intimate bonds of the British Commonwealth, both countries are in the Sterling Area and as a result, reciprocal most-favoured nation treatment obtains in the import tariffs and import regulations of both countries; both countries have English as an official language; aircraft flying between South Africa, Australia and the Far East stop at Mauritius en route and today the island is becoming an increasingly important playground for South African tourists.

The entire economy of Mauritius is based on single crop - sugar. Over 50% of the surface area of the island is under cultivation and over 90% of this is under sugar cane. Sugar production in 1969 amounted to 675 000 tons. This single crop accounts for 93% of the island's exports and it follows that any change in crop production (or in the world price of sugar) has a marked effect on the island's balance of trade and the economy as a whole. More than 75% of the island's export trade is with the United Kingdom, since the latter country imports Mauritian sugar at a guaranteed price in terms of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.

The standard of living on the island is generally low due to the acute overpopulation problem and high rate of unemployment. Competition for jobs has resulted in a phenomenally low wages which seem incredible to industrialists from inflation conscious countries. Skilled artisans earn between 90c and R1,50 per day. apprentices R3,00 - R12,00 per month;

foremen R40,00 - 60,00 per month; clerks R20,00 - R50,00 per month.

The capital of Mauritius is Port Louis, which is also the island's only harbour and is the main commercial centre. About 20 miles inland on the central plateau is Curepipe - 1850 feet above sea level - which is primarily a residential area for those people who can afford to commute to Port Louis and so escape the capital's sticky humidity during the sultry summer months.

I would like to consider, very briefly, Mauritius as a new member of the community of nations. What are the island's prospects? Where is it going? What does Mauritius mean to and for us here in South Africa?

The political development of Mauritius has tended to follow the diversity of the population: the Labour Party which is the majority party is a predominantly Hindu Party and is led by the present Prime Minister, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam. This party led the drive for Independence. The Social Democratic Party, which is a predominantly Creole and a minority group party, opposed the Labour Party and the move for Independence for fear of being suppressed by the Hindu majority. This led to armed conflict in 1968 which was only put down after the arrival of British troops from Singapore. An uneasy truce was declared and a coalition government was formed which has gained in strength after the granting of Independence of 1968, although this received a blow late last year with the resignations of two prominent Cabinet Ministers from the Social Democratic Party - Guy Marchand (Economics and Development) and Gaetan Duval (Foreign Affairs). However, they subsequently rejoined the party and the government. There has been a further development with possible ominous overtones and that is the Mauritian Militant Movement which is led by a young French radical Paul Berenger. This third party recently won a by-election for the National Assembly in a predominantly Hindu area. The party is Marxist orientated and claims to have a base of support in the island's trade union movement. However, unless my assessment of Sir Seewoosagur is wrong, he will tolerate the Party and Mr. Berenger only as long as they remain on the periphery of the mainstream of Mauritian politics.

The government is faced with one burning question - how to employ its rapidly increasing and young population (55% of the people are under 20 years old, 25% are between 20 and 40 and barely 5% are aged people). Employment has to be rapidly created by the attraction of foreign investment to the island. Thus in the very threat to its continued existence, lies the key to the island's prosperity - abundant cheap, but good labour.

In order to attract foreign industrial investment, Mauritius offers enormous incentives to investors, which South African are equally invited to share. On the 3rd November last year, a Free Trade Zone was opened at Port Louis, in terms of which investors are offered inter alia:

Exemption of import duties on capital goods, raw materials, components and semi-finished goods;

Corporate income tax holiday for a minimum of 10 years and a maximum of 20 years, depending on the merits of each case;

Loans at preferential rates;

The provision of reinforced factory buildings;

All foreign capital invested in Mauritius may be repatriated together with dividends after deduction of local taxation.

Of course for South African industrialists, there is the added incentive of using Mauritius as a back door to markets in boycott countries. Here is a new Hong Kong in the making, and entrepôt port in which we can participate and reap rich rewards. Moreover, it is of vital concern to South Africans that the island can overcome its unemployment and development problems. Only communism which breeds in festering social sores will benefit if it does not. Already the island hovers on a delicate tight rope between East and West while its present leanings are undoubtedly towards the West. There can be no question of this steadfastly remaining so if adequate support is not forthcoming that will enable the island to vitalise its economy, and thus prevent internal chaos that must inevitably lead from prolonged poverty and unemployment.

Furthermore, the Russians must surely realise the price for stimulating the Mauritian economy would be a mere pittance in comparison with its strategic value in the machinations of international politics.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in conclusion, South Africans cannot afford, either from a political or an economic point of view, to sit on the side lines and watch the golden opportunities the East Coast islands offer us to slip past. We must make a definite economic contribution to the development of these Islands. It will be to our inestimable economic and political advantage in the short, medium and long term if we do so.

Mr. A.G. Mountain delivered the above address to a meeting of the Cape Town branch of the Institute on 15th September, 1971

THOUGHTS ON SOUTH WEST AFRICA

by

COLIN EGLIN

I believe that it is in the interests of South Africa, of Southern Africa and not least of the people of South West Africa that the impasse over the future status of this territory be resolved. What is more I believe that it can be resolved provided - and this might prove to be a very big proviso - the South African Government on the one hand and the Governments of other countries on the other are prepared to consider as paramount, not their own interests in or purposes with South West Africa but the interests of the inhabitants of the territory.

After all that is what the mandate of 1919 was all about. Its whole purpose was to ensure the well-being and development of the people of South West Africa. In terms of Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles -

"To these colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the Sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant".

And more specifically in relation to South West Africa Article 2 of the Mandate states -

"The Mandatory (South Africa) shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory, subject to the present Mandate".

The well-being of the people of the territory of South West Africa not of South Africa or Ethiopia or Liberia or Russia or Britain or the United States of America. The interests of the people of South West Africa was the purpose of the mandate.

And yet how many times have we not seen the South West Africa issue raised, not in order to promote the interests of the inhabitants but as part of a more general strategy against the apartheid policy of the South African Government. And equally it appears that the prime concern of the South African Government is often not with the interests of the people of South West Africa but with those of the Republic of South Africa.

And so we must return to the basic issue, the well-being of the people of South West Africa.

In October 1966 the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Resolution No. 2145 "to terminate the Mandate for South West Africa and cancel South Africa's right to administer the territory". In June of last year the International Court of Justice on a 13 - 2 vote of its members gave an advisory opinion supporting the United Nation's claim that it had validly terminated the Mandate. The South African Government has rejected both the United Nation decision and the Advisory opinion of the World Court. This is where the matter stands on the legal side and I do not believe that anything practical will be achieved by pursuing the arguments in this field any further.

But what is of importance, especially if one accepts the paramountcy of the interests of the inhabitants is the fact that the South African Government is the de facto administrator of the territory and will continue to fulfill this role for some time into the future. However unpalatable this might be for certain other countries it is a fact which cannot be ignored.

And on the shoulders of the administering power - whether it be de facto or de jure or both - rests the obligation to give full effect to the purpose of the mandate whether this exists as a legal injunction or as a legacy of responsibility.

From the text of the Mandate and the Covenant of the League of Nations (Article 22, Part 1 of the Treaty of Versailles) it is clear that the primary purpose of the mandate was "to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory".

On another issue, often averred to be a purpose - the development of the inhabitants so that they can stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world at some stage in the future - the Mandate is not explicit. The International Court of Justice has said that the right of self determination in due course was implied in the Mandate. The South African Government, supported by many legal authorities has held that there was no such implication.

I believe that the time has come for South Africa to determine its course of action, not in terms of an implied injunction in the old mandate - if indeed such an injunction exists - but against the background of the concept of self-determination which has developed in the world in the past 25 years and which has become a pivotal concept in the stated policy of the Nationalist Party Government in South Africa. I believe that the Covenant and the Mandate taken together with the weight which is attached to the concept of self-determination as a national right must lead South Africa to give to the people of South West Africa the right to decide on their own status and form of government at some time in the future.

Indeed Mr. Vorster's government went some way towards conceding this right in offering to the World Court in January of 1971 that the matter of the future status of South West Africa be referred to a plebiscite of the people of the territory. Just to complete the record on this point he was supported in this offer by the United Party -

"This is a positive constructive suggestion to find a solution to the problem. It has been made before. I hope it finds more favourable consideration on this

occasion than in the past". (de Villiers Graaf).

- and the Progressive Party -

"The offer was a bold attempt by the Government to seize the initiative in the impasse. The offer was an important recognition by South Africa of the quasi-international status of South West Africa". (Colin Eglin).

However, Mr. Vorster has since, in January of this year, withdrawn the offer.

So much for the background. Let me turn to the present and the future. I urge the Government as the administering power to take three steps to discharge its responsibilities towards the people of South West Africa.

Firstly, race discrimination in the sense of the denial of equal opportunity of individual advancement to citizens on the grounds of race can never be compatible with the injunction "to promote the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants".

That racially discriminatory practices still persist in South West Africa is not in dispute.

In the last two months, with the strike of Ovambo workers in South West Africa, many South Africans became aware for the first time of the extent of these discriminatory practices in the field of labour and employment. For the Ovambos who form the majority of the inhabitants of South West Africa there has been no right to take up employment outside of the area which the Government has designated their homeland, no right of individual job selection, no right of collective bargaining, no right to have wife and child live with him in the town where he is employed. And added to these lack of rights was a minimum cash wage of R8.25 per month as compared with a minimum cash wage of R109 per month for the white schoolboys who were employed temporarily by the South African Railways to do the work formerly done by the striking Ovambos.

The Government must start immediately with the elimination of discriminatory practices. The system goes far but the Government could commence by ensuring equal access to education - primary, secondary, and higher, equal access to training and employment opportunities, equal pay for equal work and promotion on merit within Government departments, equal opportunity to enjoy a family life near one's place of employment - this means the end of the wasteful disruptive migrant labour system. These are the first and urgent steps that should be taken.

Secondly, the Government must make it clear that it does envisage the people of South West Africa deciding on their status at some time in the future. The Government itself, before the International Court of Justice in January, 1971, offered a plebiscite as a means of making this decision. It has since withdrawn the offer. By doing so it has cast doubt on its own integrity. For if the offer was sincere and

meaningful and put forward in the interests of the people of South West Africa, surely having been made the offer must stand unless the people of South West Africa themselves decide that they do not want to express themselves by way of a plebiscite.

I believe that the Government should commit itself to a genuine test of the opinion of the people of South West Africa on the question of the future state of the territory, and in order to remove any uncertainty it should set a date, say within the next five years, by which this exercise in self-determination will be held.

Mr. Vorster has repeatedly declared his Government's intention of granting "independence" to areas of South Africa should the inhabitants at some stage in the future wish this. Surely the Government, especially when it takes into account the background of the mandate, the very limited extent of integration with South Africa in the field of labour, the size and the relatively separate location of the territory, its relatively buoyant economy and its comparatively brief and qualified constitutional association with South Africa, will not give less opportunity for self-determination to South West Africa than it says it will give to the "Bantu Homelands" of South Africa !

Thirdly, I believe that it is important that the peoples of South West Africa consult with each other and that the Government of South Africa consults with them collectively during the period preceding the test of self-determination.

For this purpose I propose that a South West African Council representative of all the groups and communities in the territory be set up without delay.

This Council need not at this stage replace the various legislative and executive bodies which exist at present in the territory. But, the Council could act in an advisory and consultative capacity in relation to the South African Government and could also enable the people of the territory to discuss matters relating to the plebiscite, to the questions to be put, and to the form of government which could emerge.

These three steps which I have outlined could go a long way to resolve the present impasse over the future of South West Africa. They would enable South Africa to discharge with honour the obligations which it undertook in such good faith when the Mandate on South West Africa was conferred on it 53 years ago.

I hope that if put into effect they will prove to be significant steps towards a greater federation of self-governing states here in the South of the African continent.

The above article is part of an address given by Mr. Colin Eglin, leader of the Progressive Party of South Africa, to the Cape Town Branch of the Institute on the 1st February, 1972. Mr. Eglin also gave his views on the subject of "dialogue" in

Africa and it is hoped to include that part of his address in the next issue of the Newsletter. During the second half of 1972, The Witwatersrand Branch of the Institute organised two meetings on the subject of South West Africa : The first on "South West Africa : The International Court's Opinion and the Future", was addressed by Professor Marinus Wiechers, Professor C.J.R. Dugard and Advocate E.M. Grosskopf S.C. The second on "South West Africa, the United Nations and the Future", was addressed by Mr. J. du P. Basson M.P., Mr. R.F. Botha M.P., Dr. Denis Worrall and Mr. John Barratt. The Institute is preparing a publication based on the addresses given at the above two meetings.

WEST GERMANY AND THE NEW EUROPE

by

DR. DENIS WORRALL

On the 12th August, 1970, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression treaty. The treaty itself is relatively simple. There is a preamble followed by five articles, and apart from mention of the purely non-aggression clause, two provisions are worth reproducing here. Part of Article 1 states that:

"They affirm their endeavour to further the normalization of the situation in Europe and the development of peaceful relations among all European States, and in so doing proceed from the actual situation existing in this region."

And Article 3 states that:

"In accordance with the foregoing purposes and principles, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics share the realization that peace can only be maintained in Europe if nobody disturbs the present frontiers

- they undertake to respect without restriction the territorial integrity of all States in Europe within their present frontiers;
- they declare that they have no territorial claims against anybody nor will assert such claims in the future;
- they regard today and shall in future regard the frontiers of all states in Europe as inviolable such as they are on the date of signature of the present treaty, including the Oder-Neise line which forms the Western frontier of the People's Republic of Poland and the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic."

Following this, on the 7th December, 1970, in Warsaw, Chancellor Willy Brandt and his Polish counterpart signed a similar non-aggression treaty, the main provisions of which are in line with the Moscow document. The provisions relating to boundaries and the expansion of inter-state ties read as follows:-

1. The Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Poland state in mutual agreement that the existing boundary line, the course of which is laid down in Chapter IX of the Decisions of the Potsdam Conference of 2 August, 1945 as running from the Baltic sea immediately West to Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder river to the confluence of the Western Neisse river, and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, shall constitute the Western State frontier of the People's Republic of Poland.

2. They reaffirm the inviolability of the existing frontiers now and in the future and undertake to respect each other's territorial integrity without restriction.

3. They declare that they have no territorial claims whatsoever against each other and that they will not assert such claims in the future;

and Article 3 reads:

1. The Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Poland shall take further steps towards full normalisation and a comprehensive development of their mutual relations of which the present treaty shall form the solid foundation.

2. They agree that a broadening of their co-operation in the sphere of economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other relations is in their mutual interest.

The general reaction of these developments was favourable. Chancellor Brandt's statesmanship was generally hailed by Western news media, although within the United States some reservation was expressed. Thus Mr. George Ball in an article in The New York Times of the 8th January, 1971, urged "..... Americans to reserve final judgement on the new treaties:....What most concerns me", the former Under Secretary of State wrote, "is that the West Germans derive little from the treaties but a sense of good feeling, while the Soviets substantially gain".

Two questions arise: What are the circumstances and factors which led up to these treaties? And what is their significance for West Germany, for Western Europe, and for East-West relations?

I

From its inception in 1949, West Germany explicitly declared itself dependent on the former Western allies for the achievement of its national goals and its security. West Germany's foreign policy goals from the very beginning were (1) reunification, (2) European integration, and (3) European security. There is no question of the primacy of the first of these. The Basic Law or constitution of the Federal Republic was formulated with reunification in mind, and crucial to West Germany's relations with other states was the so-called Hallstein doctrine. However, the Germans recognised that reunification could only be pursued within the framework of a broad Western policy towards the Communist bloc. West Germany also saw its security to lie within the Western alliance, and happily accepted its obligations in this regard when it became a full member of Nato in 1954. This was never an easy policy to follow, because whereas for Bonn reunification was primary, to its allies it was a side-issue. There is also the fact that Moscow's position on the question of reunification contrasted sharply with that of Bonn. The West German argument was: There can be no lessening of tension between East and West in the European theatre without reunification: whereas the Soviet Union's view throughout the fifties was that reunification could only seriously be discussed after a general security treaty had been signed, agreement reached on disarmament, and Nato and the Warsaw pact scrapped.

It is to Adenauer's credit, therefore, that the Americans and their allies supported the West German's position throughout the fifties.

The West's position is clearly reflected in the following remarks of President Eisenhower at the Geneva summit meeting of 1955. He said

"Germany is still divided. That division is a grievous wrong to a people which is entitled, like any other, to pursue together a common destiny. While that division continues, it creates a basic source of instability in Europe. Our talk of peace has little meaning if at the same time we perpetuate conditions endangering the peace. In the interests of enduring peace, our solution should take account of the legitimate security interests of all concerned. That is why we insist that a United Germany is entitled to its choice, to exercise its inherent right of self-defence. By the same token, we are ready to take account of the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union."

The first indications of a change in the United States' attitude becomes evident under President Kennedy. In the wake of the West Berlin crisis of 1961 (when the wall was erected) and the subsequent Cuban missile confrontation with the Soviet Union, Kennedy consciously sought an improvement in United States-Soviet relations; and the change in attitude towards German reunification is reflected in the following remarks which President Kennedy made to the Finnish President Kekonnen in October, 1961. Of Soviet policy on Berlin, the American President said:

".....It is designed to neutralize West Germany as a first step in the neutralization of Western Europe. That is what makes the present situation so dangerous. West Germany is the key as to whether Western Europe will be free.....It is not that we wish to stand on the letter of the law or that we underestimate the dangers of war. But if we don't meet our commitments in Berlin, it will mean the destruction of NATO and a dangerous situation for the whole World. All Europe is at stake in West Berlin."

Continuing, President Kennedy said:

"We do not want to spread that state of melancholy (occasioned in West Germany by the erection of the Wall) by legitimizing the East German regime and stimulating a nationalist revival in West Germany.....Germany has been divided for sixteen years and will continue to stay divided. The Soviet Union is running an unnecessary risk in trying to change this from an accepted fact into a legal state. Let the Soviet Union keep Germany divided on its present basis and not try to persuade us to associate ourselves legally with the division and thus weaken our ties to West Germany and their ties to Western Europe."

If this latter excerpt is examined it will be seen that half of President Kennedy's remarks seem to justify a rigid adherence to past policies: the need to negotiate is rejected, and the maintenance of West German confidence is obviously a matter of high priority. But the other half of the passage quoted above shows that Kennedy felt compelled to admit that the division in

Germany would continue, barring a radical shift in Soviet policy. To Kennedy, as the first excerpt indicates, the main issue was no longer German reunification, but Berlin.

There is no indication that the West Germans sensed this subtle but important change in American policy. As late as October 1965, with the re-election of Ludwig Erhard as Chancellor and the formation of a CDU/CSU, FDP coalition, West German foreign policy was still cast in the Adenauer mould. Its important commitments were to (1) German reunification and the maintenance of the Hallstein doctrine, and (2) European political integration. So at this time the West Germans were still convinced of continued Western interest in reunification.

II

The year 1966 constitutes a watershed in West German foreign policy and in Atlantic alliance politics. In that year France, under de Gaulle's impact revised many of the attitudes towards international relations which had developed in the fifties and was busily engaged in formulating a new foreign policy based on different premises. This much emerges from a statement on foreign policy delivered by Premier Pompidou before the French National Assembly in April, 1966. Explaining France's withdrawal earlier in the year from Nato, the French Premier said:

"This issue for us is to draw the lesson of the evolution of the international situation since the 1950's.

"Following the last war, Western Europe no longer existed, either militarily or even economically. Faced with the threat brought to bear on it by Stalinist Russia, its only guarantee, its single hope lay in the American atomic power.

"NATO - that is, first and foremost the integration of commands under the authority of an American general, simultaneously commander in chief of the allied forces and commander in chief of the American troops, responsible in this capacity, and in particular for the use of the atomic force, to the President of the United States alone - NATO placed Europe under American protection. I am not criticising, I am only noting a de facto situation.

"This situation has, since then, changed from top to bottom. Russia's possession of an enormous nuclear arsenal has changed the ratio of forces between her and the United States.

"The economic rebirth of the European countries, France's conquest of the atomic weapon, have equally changed the relations within the atlantic alliance. Soviet Russia's evolution since the Cuban crisis, the concerns created for her by China's growth, the confrontation in Asia, more obvious each day, between American and Chinese policies, have also changed the situation. The threat on Western Europe has diminished. Asia has taken the place of Europe as a closed arena where the mighty confront one another.

"Within NATO itself, we have seen the replacement, gradual and without our agreement, of the initial strategy that was based on deterrence and, consequently, on the immediate use

of atomic reprisals, by a strategy called 'flexible' which, under the pretext of lessening the risk of total war, actually consists in enabling the United States to limit the field of the initial operations by sparing the territory of the main potential aggressor.

"Such a formula cannot satisfy us because, for us French, it piles up dangers."

As far as the United States is concerned, with the Vietnam war now a major domestic issue, the Americans wanted a detente with the Russians and were reluctant to pursue any objectives in the foreign policy field which would hinder this. That this meant that the Americans were not prepared to push reunification was made quite clear to Erhard when he visited Washington in September 1966. In fact the advice of both the Americans and the French was that the West Germans should themselves take up the issue of reunification with the Soviet Union. Thus Pompidou, in a reference to French-German relations in the address mentioned earlier, observed:

"But...and we have often said this quite frankly to the German leaders...that there is no solution to the great problem, to the essential problem of Germany, and I mean reunification, except by affirming a resolutely peaceful policy and by improving relations with Russia."

They could reinforce this advice by pointing to the objectives of Soviet policy in Europe at this time which seemed to invite an approach from West Germany. As stated by Gromyko in discussions with Rusk, the Russians were eager to gain (1) agreement on the holding of a European security conference, (2) a non-proliferation treaty which would put an end to the actual or suspected nuclear ambitions of the Federal Republic, and (3) some form of recognition of the Soviet zone as a second German state.

The message to Bonn in 1966, therefore, was that it would have to take the initiative on the question of reunification.

That this message was received is evident from foreign policy commentary in German newspapers during the latter half of 1966. For the first time there was talk of revising the Hallstein doctrine, and suggestions were made that Poland might be willing to exchange ambassadors on condition the Oder-Neise line was recognised. Thus in an editorial in October 1966, the Frankfurter Rundschau asserted that "...a normalization of relations between the Federal Republic and Poland was conceivable. Bonn will then have the key to a successful Eastern policy. Or does Bonn prefer to wait until the government in East Berlin is in a position to claim negotiations with the Federal Republic as its own preserve?" And an article in Die Welt of 12 October, 1966, was quite explicit in spelling out the new circumstances in which West Germany found itself. Dealing with the implications for West German foreign policy of the United States' wish for improved relations with the Soviet Union, the article declared:

"The resumption of Russo-American relations calls to mind one hard fact of international politics: neither France, a single European state, nor Great Britain in its sea of troubles are seriously considered by Moscow as partners in negotiations. America is.

"The Federal government has been able since 1949, and even more since 1955, to base its policy on the consent of the Allies. This consent no longer exists in the same form. The identity of interest has slackened. In places they virtually conflict. The dovetailing of German with defence policy, a concept which, so far as it is recognisable, still conditions the Federal government's thinking, is on the verge of dismemberment by the Allies.

"The policy of German reunification has long become of minor importance to them. Ties with the Soviet Union are what matter to the United States, wrote influential liberal Senator Church recently in 'Foreign Affairs', and he is not alone.

"The resumption of the Russo-American dialogue merely points up the change which has come about in the policy of the Western alliance and in East-West relations. Government and politicians in the Federal Republic should stop distorting their own and the people's view of the facts. Only then can they be turned to full advantage."

The practical implementation of an initiative in the East in a so-called Ostpolitik occurred after the general election of late 1966 and the establishment of the grand coalition under Kiesinger, with Brandt as foreign minister. Bonn's foreign policy thrust in two clear directions. The Atlanticist tradition of Adenauer and Erhard was retained, except that West Germany looked towards France rather than to the United States for a lead: within five days of the formation of the new government Brandt was in Paris, and Kiesinger followed him barely five weeks later. The new government's foreign policy also revealed a determination to seek a detente in the East. But for this to succeed, Kiesinger pointed out in an important policy statement of 21 December, 1966, (1) the Hallstein doctrine would have to be reviewed, (2) the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) could not be ignored, and (3) the problems which the Oder-Neise line created for Poland would have to be recognised.

A concrete step in the implementation of the Ostpolitik was taken with the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Rumania early in 1967.

The significance of the year 1966 as far as West German foreign policy is concerned, is that, very much with the encouragement of her Western allies, the Federal Republic substituted a general improvement of relations towards the East for reunification as the major goal of its foreign policy; and the only event to upset the steady realisation of this objective was the Soviet Union's invasion of Prague in August 1968. The Russian action rocked West Germany back on its heels. The main plank in Russian propaganda at this time was that the West Germans had interfered in Czechoslovakia, and the spectre of German militarism was also the main justification for the Russian intervention and for the subsequent so-called Brezhnev doctrine.

From this traumatic experience the West Germans drew an important conclusion. Normalization of relations with the Soviet Union had to precede diplomatic overtures to the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe. And this indeed was the course which the new SPD/FDP coalition of September 1969, followed. The Bonn-Moscow treaty of August 1970, is a consequence.

III

In assessing the significance of the Ostpolitik one needs to bear in mind that its successes to date are of a very slight nature. Thus the treaties with Moscow and Warsaw have been signed but not ratified. The explanation generally offered is that ratification depended on some form of settlement being reached on the Berlin question. (This, in any event, was the view put forward by Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, until very recently Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in an article in Aussen Politik Vol. 21, No. 4.) However, a Four-Power agreement on Berlin has now been reached but no moves have been made to place the treaties before the West German parliament, and there are no signs that the CDU/CSU opposition to the treaties has relented. (According to a statement issued shortly after the signing of the Bonn-Moscow treaty, Christian Democratic opposition to it rests mainly on the interpretation that "(a) The Treaty does not contain a clear statement by the Soviet Union to refrain from the use of force with regard to the Federal Republic of Germany, but merely confirms Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.....; and (b) The rise of the German people to self-determination is jeopardized. The Treaty no longer permits any removal of the border between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic...."). With a majority of no more than 16 in a Bundestag of over 500 members, there seems to be little likelihood that the treaties will be ratified before the next parliamentary elections.

Moreover, the two treaties have been entered into at a considerable cost in foreign policy options. This is the brunt of Ambassador George Ball's criticism in the article referred to earlier. The point is that German reunification as a foreign policy goal and claims to territory east of the Oder Neisse rivers are now foreclosed to the Federal Republic, and the Hallstein doctrine has now to be discarded. Chancellor Brandt's reply is that all the treaties do in this regard is realistically recognise conditions which have existed for more than twenty-five years.

More favourable to the Ostpolitik is the fact that that country has now come of age in international relations. No longer can it be said of West Germany that it is an economic giant but a political dwarf, and the result must be an altogether healthier society. This, of course, is less directly attributable to the Moscow and Warsaw treaties than it is to the spirit of self-reliance and independence of the Ostpolitik itself.

If the treaties have removed the reunification question as an issue in West German's foreign relations, this matter continues to figure in Bonn politics - albeit in a somewhat blunted form. This emerges quite clearly from Chancellor Brandt's attempts to regularise relations with the German Democratic Republic, which despite the treaty with Poland, are very important if the Ostpolitik is to succeed with other socialist countries.

The first top-level meeting between the West German Chancellor and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR took place at Erfurt on 19 March, 1970. In an address to the SPD a few days later Brandt spoke of the meeting in these terms

"The Erfurt meeting was only a beginning. The Government is trying through direct talks to sound out whether an improvement in relations between the two states in Germany is possible. There is a direct connection between this

meeting and efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union, Poland and the other states in the Warsaw Pact. The talks in Erfurt, Moscow and Warsaw are initial steps on a long road. Concrete results may only become visible after a longer period of time. Much that divides and a great deal of mistrust must be dismantled.

"For the first time in the existence of the two states in Germany, their heads of government met together. Here, the real, existing different views clashed head on. Anything else was not expected. The exchange of arguments in personal talks will, however, contribute to a better assessment and judgement of the other's positions. This itself lends value and significance to the Erfurt meeting. I am convinced - and my talks with Herr Stoph have confirmed this view - that we should not stop trying to make progress along this laborious road. The next stage, namely an agreement to meet a second time, has been reached.

"It would have been illusionary to have expected more from a first meeting."

Referring to the East German position and his own response, Brandt declared:

"Herr Stoph's prime demand was the Federal Republic's recognition of the GDR in international law. I pointed out that this concept did not apply to what was involved in the establishment of relations on an equal footing between the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR. We are looking for neighbourly co-operation. In the interests of the people in both German states and in the interests of peace in Europe, we are looking for co-operation leading to co-existence, in a form that is legally fully effective. At the same time, it is our job to preserve the unity of the nation. I tried to make clear that both states must avoid anything that would block once and for all the possibility of the German people, at some distant time, being able to decide on the political nature of its co-existence within the framework of a European peace arrangement and in free self-determination."

At the second meeting with Herr Stoph on 21 May, 1970, at Kassel, Chancellor Brandt, in answer to a somewhat provocative speech by the East German leader, said (and this lengthy quotation seems justified):

"The relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic are determined, as we see, by the situation of Germany and the Germans as a consequence of the Second World War and the subsequent development in the two States in Germany.

"On this basis, both States in Germany should agree to a contractual regularization of their mutual relations. To the extent that it has been, or will be, impossible contractually to initiate special rulings covering specific ranges of activity in the two States in Germany, the universally recognised principles of international law, in particular the principles of

sovereign equality, equality of status, territorial integrity and non-discrimination, are applied. In this connection, it is a matter of course that when we speak of, for example, sovereign equality, equality of status and so on we do not contemplate any conflict with the principles laid down in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.

.....
"I continue to disagree with what you have said about the conception of nation. I do not think that at this moment we can convince each other. I must, therefore, once more give a brief outline of our ideas.

"We regard the conception of nation primarily, but not solely, as embracing the past. Nation, in our view, embraces more than common language and culture, and still more than political and social systems. Its foundation is the feeling of people of belonging to one another. And in this sense there is, in our opinion, a unity of the nation. Neither by you nor by us can the unity of the nation be destroyed.

"Even if you describe the integration of the two States in, on the one hand, NATO and, on the other, the Warsaw Pact as a deep divide, this could affect, at the most, the sphere of the State, but not, as we understand it, the continuance of the nation.

"On the other hand, there is no one among us who disputes the fact that life in general in the two parts of the nation differs greatly in many spheres through the political and social development. In spite of this, the Germans are still bound together not only by the common language, the common history, a still-existing, persisting feeling of belonging to one another, but also by the common destiny of cleavage brought about by the Second World War and its consequences. As against this, we are bound together, as I hope - and I hope in increasing measure in the time stretching before us - by the awareness of our responsibility and of our special obligation to safeguard and maintain peace and to protect nations from the violation of their right to self-determination."

Whatever Brandt means by "...both States in Germany should agree to a contractual regularization of their mutual relations", quite clearly he intends this to be understood in the Federal Republic itself as implying a status for the German Democratic Republic which amounts to less than independent statehood.

In contrast, there is no uncertainty whatever about the German Democratic Republic's position or regarding what it had wished to derive from the exchanges at Erfurt and Kassel. In December 1969, the GDR submitted to the Federal Republic a draft treaty "On the Establishment of Relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on a Basis of Equality". Article 1 of this document states:

"The parties concluding the Treaty agree on the establishment of normal relations, on terms of equality and free from any discrimination, between the German Democratic Republic and

the Federal Republic of Germany on the basis of the universally recognized principles and norms of international law. In particular, their interrelationship is based on the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and the inviolability of the national frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage."

At Erfurt and Kassel, Herr Stoph repeatedly returned to this draft treaty and in particular to Article 1. In his report to the Volkskammer (People's Chamber) two days after the Erfurt meeting, he said:

"Our position during the Erfurt talks, esteemed representatives of the People's Chamber, was constructive from start to finish. Time and again we emphasized that we ask nothing from the Federal Republic in regard to ourselves that we are not ready to grant to the Federal Republic. But the West German side replied to our one realistic standpoint, that of also holding to the generally recognized principles of international law in the relations between the GDR and the FRG, with the all-too-transparent formula of supposed 'special intra-German relations'.

"As early as in my statement of the start of the consultations, I left no doubt that such constructions could only serve the purpose of championing, in an altered form, the old assertion of the right of sole representation; and of continuing with other methods the discrimination against the GDR.

"That is entirely unacceptable to us, and no subject of negotiation. Quite simply I told Mr. Brandt: We do not presume to treat the Federal Republic in that way, and we expect that such attempts in relations to us will likewise be abandoned once and for all.

"What sense is this formulation about the supposed 'special intra-German relations' supposed to have, then? Mr. Brandt spoke of the 'special, specific circumstances in Germany'. Our answer to that is: There is no state of Germany, so there can be no special, specific circumstances in the relations between our states. Despite all protestations to the contrary, this is in fact the attempt to place the sovereign German Democratic Republic under the tutelage of the West German Federal Republic. It is the claim to be able at any time to interfere in the GDR's domestic affairs. It means excluding international law in relations with the GDR. Under the roof of this peculiar 'special intra-German' formulation, all agreements about, for example, renunciation of force, non-discrimination, respect for borders and territorial integrity would be robbed of their substance under international law. Thus they would become, in effect, meaningless. Aggressive actions against our state - undertaken by whatever political constellation in Bonn - could be passed off as 'intra-German affairs'.

"That obviously will not work."

And further on in his report, he declared:

"The situation is certainly clear: There are the GDR and the FRG - two sovereign, mutually independent states. Between them there can be - as between all other states as well - normal, equal-status relations only on the basis of international law. In this sense at Erfurt we consistently championed the principle of mutual non-discrimination. Our draft treaty too speaks, in this context, a clear language. Thus the treaty is acceptable to anyone of good will.

As I mentioned earlier, the regularisation of relations between the two Germanies is an important factor in the over-all success of the Ostpolitik. But it remains to be seen how the two points of view just outlined can be reconciled. The East Germans are implacable, and even though Brandt personally might be willing to meet them and extend recognition to the GDR, he seems to be very aware of the continued relevance of the reunification issue in West German politics.

The Moscow and Warsaw treaties, and the Ostpolitik as a facet of West German foreign policy, are obviously also significant within the wider frame of reference of East-West relations, and, more specifically, the nature of Western European participation in world affairs.

The theme of West German foreign policy in regard to the settlement of problems arising out of World War II has been increasing self-reliance and independence of its partners in the West. The point has been stressed that this has occurred with the active encouragement of Western countries. But Ostpolitik may be said also to reflect changes within the Atlantic Alliance and changes in the Soviet Union's relations to the countries of Western Europe.

Since the mid-sixties and the dramatic escalation of American involvement in Vietnam, the United States has attached less and less importance to its relations with Western Europe, and has increasingly downplayed its role in European politics. This is a trend which has not caused Western Europeans any loss of sleep. As a matter of fact, if anything they themselves have contributed to the cooling off of America's interest in European politics. De Gaulle's postures and policies spring to mind here, as does the resentful apprehension (most notably articulated by Servan-Schreiber in his Le Déf. Américain) of the role of American businesses in Western Europe. There is also the fact that in the eyes of many Europeans American society has lost a great deal of its previous glamour: with its urban and race problems, its rising crime rates, and its problem of drug abuse, etc., it has become to a growing number of Western Europeans a disturbing example of what could be the shape of things to come.

If the psychological distance between the United States and Western Europe has increased since the late sixties, the gap between the Soviet Union and Western Europe has narrowed over the same period. In some measure this is due to what might be called "Cold War fatigue". To the younger generations the traumatic episodes of the Cold War are now simply pages in history books, and the sharp contrast between the social and political systems of Western and Eastern Europe, which conditioned the attitudes

and reactions of the older generation, no longer exists. (Among social scientists in Western European and especially German Universities, Marxist concepts and methods of analysis probably dominate.)

This particular psychological rapprochement has not been a one-way process. It has been facilitated by the realisation within the Soviet Union of its very real technological and economic backwardness vis-a-vis the countries of Western Europe and the United States; and the growing conflict between expenditure on armaments and the space programme on the other hand, and the need to satisfy consumer demands on the other, causes political vibrations even in the Soviet Union. The SALT talks are part of the Soviet leadership's response to the situation. But clearly the most effective way of catching up lies through closer association with the countries of Western Europe.

At this point the Brandt-Scheel coalition was formed - a coalition of two parties sharing a commitment to the Ostpolitik. This does not mean that Brandt would be willing, with a little encouragement, to move out of the Western orbit. The so-called Rapallo theory (named after the treaty of friendship signed between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1922) which asserts this, postulates that increasing involvement of Bonn in Eastern Europe is inevitable. But the Federal Republic's commitment to West European integration is there for all to see. That country has consistently championed the United Kingdom's entry to the European Economic Community and has been the most outspoken advocate for European currency reform.

Dealing with this question of whether the Federal Republic might not move away from Western Europe, Walter Scheel in an article in Aussenpolitik (Vol.22,2/71) wrote:

"Developments have shown that this concern is unjustified. Neither has anyone cherished such a political intention, nor would it make any sense, given the present political configuration. It is only because of our ties to Western Europe and their continually being forged that an active policy towards Eastern Europe is made at all possible. The Soviet Union will have to note this. I have conducted talks lasting over many hours with Mr. Gromyko ... I did not leave him with any manner of doubt that continuing West European integration is a reality".

The West German Foreign Minister went on to stress also Bonn's defence alliance with and its relations to the United States.

"In this, and in this alone, is our security grounded. Only proceeding from this basis can the Federal Republic pursue a foreign policy. On its own it can neither establish the stability it needs for itself nor can it contribute anything to a relaxing of tensions if it proceeds from a non-aligned status ... The Soviet Union is also aware of this fact. We have made it clear beyond doubt, just as with continuing to pursue the integration of Western Europe, our membership in the defence alliance and its continued development is and remains the underlying basis of our treaties with it and with the other nations of Eastern Europe".

If any country is to open the gates to the East from a strong base in Western Europe it clearly is the Federal Republic. There is the fact of its geographic location and it does have the resources. But Bonn also has an overwhelming desire to expiate the sins of World War II. Many of Brandt's countrymen feel that he has already gone too far in this direction; and time alone will tell whether the steps taken so far have wisely served West Germany's long-term national interest.

Dr. Denis Worrall, of the Department of International Relations of the University of the Witwatersrand, is Academic Adviser to the Institute. The above article is based on the text of a lecture by Dr. Worrall to the Witwatersrand Branch of the Institute on 10 March, 1971.

VERSLAG VAN DIE NASIONALE VOORSITTER/REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CHAIRMAN

MNR/MR. LEIF EGELAND

Tweejarige Vergadering van die Nasionale Uitvoerende Raad
Biennial Meeting of the National Executive Council

————— Kaapstad/Cape Town
21 Feb., 1972.

The last biennial meeting of the Institute's National Executive Council was held in June, 1970, during the Conference at Jan Smuts House in Johannesburg on the international implications of the "population explosion". We are now on the eve of the next important conference at Jan Smuts House, which will be concerned with "Accelerated Development in Southern Africa". Between these two conferences the Institute organised last year a symposium on "Natural Resources in Southern Africa: Scientific and Policy Aspects".

It can fairly be said, therefore, that the Institute's aim to make its headquarters at Jan Smuts House a recognised centre for conferences on important international topics, is well on its way to being realised. We hope that the Institute will be able to build on the success of its initial ventures in this field, and that it will be possible to hold a major conference, with participants from other countries, every second year, and smaller conferences or symposia in the intervening years. The support which has been received from universities and other organisations within the Republic fully justifies our plans, but the question of the financial resources for these projects in the future, as well as for the Institute's regular activities, remains a matter of concern.

Die Konferensie van 1970 is deur die Instituut op eie houtjie georganiseer, met die bystand van sowat sestig Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappye, waaronder 'n aantal van die Instituut se Korporasie-lede, sonder wie se finansiële steun die Konferensie nie moontlik sou gewees het nie. Te oordeel na die reaksie van deelnemers, sowel uit die buiteland as uit Suid-Afrika, was daardie onderneming ongetwyfeld 'n groot sukses. Die feit dat die firma Macmillan in Londen bereid is om die verslag oor die Konferensie te publiseer, is 'n verdere aanduiding van die wêreldwye belang van die onderwerp en die hoë standaard van die referate.

Die eerskomende Konferensie insake ontwikkeling in Suider-Afrika, wat van 22 tot 25 Maart 1972 sal plaasvind, word gereël deur die Instituut in samewerking met die Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit en die Foundation for Foreign Affairs Inc. van Chicago in die Verenigde State. Die Instituut is besonder bly om te kan saamwerk met hierdie twee liggameenersyds, 'n vooruitstrewende Suid-Afrikaanse Universiteit, en andersyds 'n gevestigde Amerikaanse liggaam met doelstellings wat ooreenkom met die van one eie Instituut. Hierdie samewerking het ons in staat gestel om 'n Konferensie te beplan met 'n ietwat wyer omvang as die vorige. Daar sal meer deelnemers uit die buiteland wees, veral uit die Verenigde State,

en by hierdie geleentheid was ons ook in staat om die medewerking te kry van persone uit die aangrensende lande in Afrika, asook uit die ontwikkelende tuislande binne die Republiek. Die onderwerp van die Konferensie het by uitstek betrekking op die behoeftes van die lande van Afrika, met inbegrip van Suid-Afrika, en ons wil vertrou dat daar 'n openhartige uitwisseling van kennis en ondervinding sal wees, tot voordeel van alle deelnemers, en dat dit tot gevolg sal hê 'n konstruktiewe bydrae tot die ontwikkeling van die lande en gebiede van Suider-Afrika.

Die feit dat hierdie Konferensie in Suid-Afrika gehou word, en dat dit die geesdriftige steun geniet van baie van ons deskundiges op die gebied van ekonomiese, sosiale en politieke ontwikkeling, sowel as persone met uiteenlopende politieke oortuigings, is na my mening 'n goeie aanduiding dat Suid-Afrika nie slegs bereid is nie, maar ook in staat is om 'n konstruktiewe rol te speel in die ontwikkeling van ons vasteland, en in die besonder die gebied wat ons noem Suider-Afrika. Ek meen dit toon ook die gewilligheid van Suid-Afrikaners om verder te kyk as slegs hul eie groepe of belange, en om 'n dialoog op hoë vlak aan te knoop dwarsoor die grense van groep of staat.

I have referred in the first place to these conferences which the Institute has held or has been planning during the past two years, because they provide a dramatic illustration of the Institute's role as an independent non-partisan forum for the exchange of views, as well as for study and research, on international questions, especially as regards South Africa's international relations and foreign policy. There is no other body in South Africa attempting to play this role in the international relations field, and to play it effectively it is essential that the Institute strictly maintain its independence and its non-partisan position - as is in fact required by its Constitution which states, inter alia, that the Institute "shall not express by resolution or in any other manner its opinion upon any aspect of any question or problem" within its scope. This has been a basic principle of the Institute since its foundation in 1934. It is not peculiar to our Institute, but is common to the other Institutes founded first in Britain and the United States after the first World War and subsequently in many other countries throughout the world. This principle enables Institutes such as ours to maintain channels of communication with various organisations and persons, inside and outside the country, with different outlooks and approaches; to encourage the expression of differing - even opposing - viewpoints at its meetings; and to encourage objective study and research, while at the same time not becoming involved itself in passing political disputes, whether of an international or domestic nature.

Baie van die deelnemers aan die konferensies en ander werksaamhede van die Instituut is verbonde aan universiteite, sowel in Suid-Afrika as in die buiteland. Hierdie kontakte en gesprekke berus allereers op 'n gemeenskaplike akademiese belangstelling in die studie en navorsing op die gebied van internasionale verhoudinge. Maar die gebruik van die woord "akademies" beteken geensins dat die verband met die werklikheid verloor word nie, want die werk van die ware akademikus sal altyd in voeling bly met die wêreld en met die bepaalde gemeenskap waarin hy hom bevind. Internasionale verhoudings as akademiese studievak moet noodgedwonge verband hou met praktiese vraagstukke in die wêreld. 'n Akademiese studie van hierdie vraagstukke is dus van belang vir almal wat daarby betrokke is - sowel regerings as burgers. In hierdie sfeer, soos in alle ander, kan

die akademici 'n rol speel buite die perke van hul universiteite, deur die openbare mening op te voed en selfs deur regerings regstreeks by te staan met advies en te help met beleidsbeplanning. Hierdie rol moet hulle op konstruktiewe en verantwoordelike wyse probeer vervul; maar daarteenoor rus daar op die regerings ook 'n verpligting om gebruik te maak van die waardevolle bronne wat tot hul beskikking staan in universiteite en ander navorsings-organisasies.

Die Instituut het 'n taak om hierdie wisselwerking aan te moedig en om 'n brug te bou tussen die akademici en diegene in ander sferes wat betrokke is by internasionale aangeleenthede. In hierdie verband geniet die Instituut die noue samewerking van die Universiteit van die Witwatersrand se Departement van Internasionale Verhoudings wat in Huis Jan Smuts gesetel is. Die lede van daardie Departement is onlangs formeel aangewys as adviseurs van die Instituut. In samewerking met die Departement lê die Instituut hom doelbewus toe op die uitbouing van verhoudings met ander sentra van internasionale studie, sowel hier te lande as in die buiteland. Die Instituut probeer ook om sy lede uit alle vertakkinge van die samelewing te werf -- die universiteite, die sakelewe, die professies, die Staatsdiens, die politiek, ens. Hoewel daar nog veel meer gedoen kan word om die Instituut in staat te stel om hierdie taak binne die Suid-Afrikaanse raamwerk doeltreffend te vervul, is daar reeds die afgelope paar jaar groot vordering gemaak, en word die Instituut al hoe meer erken as 'n sentrum vir kontak en meningswisseling. Op hierdie wyse hoop hy om in die toekoms 'n verantwoordelike en doeltreffende bydrae te lewer tot die gesonde ontwikkeling van Suid-Afrika se internasionale verhoudings.

The Institute is being increasingly looked to by foreign embassies and visitors to South Africa for insight into questions to do with South Africa's foreign relations. During the past few years the number of small private discussion meetings arranged at Jan Smuts House for important visitors to South Africa has been rising considerably.

In its function of providing information, the Institute's relations with the Press are also of importance, and the Institute is not only pleased to welcome Editors and others from their profession as members, but it also tries whenever possible to include interested representatives of the news media in small private meetings for background purposes.

I have referred to similar Institutes in other parts of the world. The Institute is attempting to maintain and develop its contacts and exchanges with such Institutes in the Americas, Europe and Asia. Unfortunately in Africa there are few Institutes of a similar nature, and at present there are none in any of our neighbouring countries. I can, however foresee the time when such Institutes will be established, and in fact we are already in touch with one or two individuals and groups interested in establishing Institutes in their own countries. If and when this development takes place, our Institute will be able to encourage increased contacts with our neighbouring states on a non-official level for the mutual benefit of all those with a serious interest in international relations and foreign policy in our region of Africa.

Apart from the conferences to which I have referred, the regular activities of the Institute have continued to develop in a healthy way during the past two years. There are now six Branches throughout the country,

which organise their activities independently and which hold regular meetings addressed by distinguished visitors and South African experts. The establishment of a Branch in Stellenbosch last year was especially welcome, and illustrates the healthy growth of our Institute in South Africa. Some of the Branches have particular problems which prevent them from being as active as others, and which need to be examined by the Council. The largest Branch by far is the Witwatersrand Branch, which has the advantage of being able to use the facilities of Jan Smuts House for its meetings, and there is no doubt that it has had a full and stimulating programme during the past two years. The Cape Town Branch has also held regular monthly meetings, and the standard of speakers who have addressed the Branch in recent years has been very impressive. The smaller Branches, while not able to meet as frequently as these two, have nevertheless provided their members with meetings of importance and interest.

In 1970 the Institute published the papers presented at a symposium held in 1969 on "United States Foreign Policy in a Regional Context", and also a special book by the late Professor T.J. Haarhoff entitled "Smuts the Humanist", to mark the centenary of the birth of General Smuts. The report on the population conference, entitled "International Aspects of Over-population" and edited by our Director, Mr. John Barratt, and the Smuts Professor of International Relations, Dr. Michael Louw, is about to be published. In addition the Institute has during the past two years continued to publish its quarterly Newsletter, which has been well received both in South Africa and abroad, and it also issued nineteen occasional papers, containing special articles, the texts of lectures or information and reference material.

Needless to say, the healthy development of the Institute's work has brought with it increasing costs. Financial considerations are in fact imposing a serious limit on the development of the Institute's work; much more could be done, if the funds were available. For instance, the Institute's staff is kept at a bare minimum, and neither manpower nor financial resources are available for an adequate programme of research and publications.

The Institute's regular income is derived from the subscriptions of its Corporate Members, whose generous support over the years has made it possible for the Institute to be maintained. Support is also given by the Smuts Memorial Trust. But the level of income is now insufficient to meet the real needs of a growing Institute, and special attention will have to be given to this matter by the Council in consultation with our Corporate Members. On the solution of this question, in fact, depends the continued development of the Institute's work, as I have briefly described it.

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